[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
                     AMTRAK'S RESPONSE TO COVID	19

=======================================================================

                                (116-63)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
                        AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 9, 2020

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
             
             
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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                             
                             
                          ______                       


              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
43-104 PDF              WASHINGTON : 2021                             
                             



             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska                      District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ROB WOODALL, Georgia                 JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York                 HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California             JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania          DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan              ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               MARK DeSAULNIER, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama              STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, 
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            Vice Chair
  Puerto Rico                        ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ROSS SPANO, Florida                  TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              GREG STANTON, Arizona
CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia       DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida
GREG PENCE, Indiana                  LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
MIKE GARCIA, California              COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
                                     SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
                                     ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
                                     JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
                                     ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
                                     CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
                                     ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
                                     HARLEY ROUDA, California
                                     CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania

     Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

 DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois, Chair
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           MARK DeSAULNIER, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California             STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania          TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
ROSS SPANO, Florida                  ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota                District of Columbia
GREG PENCE, Indiana                  EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)    ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
                                     COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas, Vice Chair
                                     ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
                                     CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
                                     PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
                                     Officio)


                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Illinois, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, 
  Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials:

    Opening statement............................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative in Congress from 
  the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials:

    Opening statement............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure:

    Opening statement............................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, prepared statement.............................    71

                               WITNESSES

William Flynn, President and Chief Executive Officer, National 
  Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak):

    Oral statement...............................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Arthur Maratea, National President, Transportation Communications 
  Union:

    Oral statement...............................................    15
    Prepared statement...........................................    17
Amy Griffin, Local 1460 President, Transport Workers Union of 
  America:

    Oral statement...............................................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive Officer, Rail 
  Passengers Association:

    Oral statement...............................................    29
    Prepared statement...........................................    30

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford:

    Statement of Ross Capon, Consultant..........................    72
    Letter of September 3, 2020, from Randal O'Toole, Senior 
      Fellow, Cato Institute.....................................    78

                                APPENDIX

Questions to William Flynn, President and Chief Executive 
  Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), 
  from:

    Hon. Eric A. ''Rick'' Crawford...............................    81
    Hon. Lloyd Smucker...........................................   102
    Hon. Scott Perry.............................................   104
    Hon. Garret Graves...........................................   106
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Arthur Maratea, National 
  President, Transportation Communications Union.................   127
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Jim Mathews, President and 
  Chief Executive Officer, Rail Passengers Association...........   129

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                           September 9, 2020

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
and Hazardous Materials
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
Hazardous Materials
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Amtrak's Response to 
COVID-19''
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
Materials will meet on Wednesday, September 9, 2020, at 11:00 
a.m. in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Cisco Webex 
to hold a hearing titled ``Amtrak's Response to COVID-19.'' The 
hearing will examine the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
Amtrak and Amtrak's response, including workforce cuts and 
reductions in train service. The Subcommittee will hear 
testimony from Amtrak, the Transportation Communications Union, 
the Transport Workers Union of America, and the Rail Passengers 
Association.

                         SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

    As of September 2, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has killed 
more than 170,000 Americans and disrupted every facet of 
life.\1\ The pandemic's impacts are apparent in many sectors, 
including all modes of transportation. Amtrak's current 
ridership rates are a fraction of its 2019 levels and have 
dipped as low as five percent of regular operating levels.\2\ 
To help mitigate the effects of the pandemic, Amtrak received 
$1.02 billion in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act.\3\ In May 2020, Amtrak requested an 
additional $1.475 billion, and also announced plans to reduce 
costs by cutting 20 percent of its workforce and significantly 
reducing long-distance service. More recently, Amtrak has 
estimated that $4.8 billion will be necessary to maintain 
service and avoid furloughs. With no certainty on fiscal year 
(FY) 2021 funding, Amtrak has started the process of cutting 
2,050 jobs effective October 1, 2020, a 14 percent cut in its 
workforce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CDC, Daily Update of Totals by Week and State (last accessed 
September 2, 2020), available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/
covid19/index.htm.
    \2\ USA Today, Amtrak to cancel Acela Express trains in Northeast 
as coronavirus reduces demand (March 22, 2020), available at https://
www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2020/03/22/amtrak-cancels-acela-trains-
northeast-coronavirus-reduces-demand/2895882001/.
    \3\ P.L. 116-136.
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AMTRAK STATUS AND NETWORK

    Amtrak is tasked with operating a national rail passenger 
transportation system that ties together existing and emergent 
regional rail passenger service and other intermodal passenger 
services.\4\ This system includes the Northeast Corridor (NEC), 
long-distance routes, and short-distance routes operated by 
Amtrak.\5\ To provide national passenger rail service, Amtrak 
runs more than 300 trains per day, services more than 500 
stations located in 46 states and Washington, D.C., and 
operates a network that stretches more than 21,000 miles across 
the country.\6\ Of all Amtrak passenger trips in 2019, 
approximately 38 percent were taken on the NEC; 48 percent on 
state-supported routes; and 14 percent on long-distance routes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 49 U.S.C. Sec.  24701.
    \5\ 49 U.S.C. Sec.  24102.
    \6\ Amtrak, FY 2019 Year End Ridership, available at http://
media.amtrak.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FY19-Year-End-
Ridership.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

COVID-19 RESPONSE AND CARES FUNDING

    In light of the global pandemic, Amtrak continues to face 
historic ridership lows for all routes, with overall demand at 
a fraction of regular ridership.\7\ In March 2020, Amtrak's 
overall ridership dropped by 95 percent.\8\ As of July 2020, 
overall revenue was down 82 percent compared to 2019, with the 
NEC revenue down by 93 percent, state-supported route revenue 
down by 83 percent, and long-distance routes down by 61 
percent.\9\ Ticket sales have been limited to 50 percent train 
capacity to allow for safer social distancing.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ USA Today, supra, note 2.
    \8\ Id.
    \9\ Trains Magazine, Amtrak Leadership Defends Value of Triweekly 
Service as Short-Term Move, (August 17, 2020) available at https://
trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/08/17-amtrak-leadership-continues-
movement-toward-triweekly-operation.
    \10\ Amtrak, Amtrak Sets a New Standard of Travel, available at 
https://www.amtrak.com/planning-booking/policies/
coronavirus.html?intcmp=wsp_tab_link_coronavirus_tab1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Earlier this year in March 2020, Amtrak received $1.02 
billion in supplemental FY 2020 funding in the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, including a 
requirement that Amtrak provide any worker furloughed as a 
result of efforts to prepare or respond to COVID-19 the 
opportunity to be recalled to their job as service levels were 
restored.\11\ Amtrak cut NEC route frequency at that time, 
reducing Northeast Regional service levels by 60 percent and 
cancelling Acela service completely.\12\ Northeast Regional and 
Acela services returned in June 2020 on modified schedules.\13\ 
The CARES Act emergency Amtrak funding included $239 million to 
supplement the states-supported routes, with language limiting 
the states' financial responsibility to 80 percent of the 
amount paid in 2019.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ P.L. 116-136.
    \12\ USA Today, supra, note 2.
    \13\ Boston Globe, Amtrak Resumes Modified High Speed Acela Service 
in Northeast Corridor; Implements Safety Measures, (June 1, 2020), 
available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/01/metro/amtrak-
resumes-modified-high-speed-acela-service-northeast-corridor-
implements-safety-measures/.
    \14\ P.L. 116-136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In May 2020, Amtrak requested an additional $1.475 billion 
in supplemental funding for FY 2021 to help respond to fallen 
demand. Amtrak's FY 2021 funding request incorporated planned 
workforce reductions of 20 percent and lower frequency long-
distance and NEC service, which it claimed would achieve a $500 
million reduction in operating expenses.\15\ The Health and 
Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act did 
not include any Amtrak funding.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Amtrak, Supplemental Funding Letter to Congress, (May 25, 
2020), available at https://media.amtrak.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/Amtrak-Supplemental-FY21-Funding-Letter-to-Congress-Final-Signed-
5.25.20.pdf.
    \16\ H.R. 6800, 116th Congress (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House FY 2021 Transportation, Housing, and Urban 
Development (THUD) Appropriations bill, which passed the House 
at the end of July 2020, would provide a total of $10.05 
billion for Amtrak and its state partners. This includes $2.05 
billion in regular budget authority for Amtrak's National 
Network, an increase of $50 million above the FY 2020 enacted 
level.\17\ The THUD bill also includes an additional $8 billion 
in economic recovery funds for Amtrak, including $5 billion for 
the NEC and $3 billion for the National Network. Attached to 
this recovery money is a requirement that the funding be used 
to prevent employee furloughs and that no funds may be used to 
reduce the frequency of rail service on any long-distance or 
state-supported route below frequencies for such route in FY 
2019.\18\ The Senate has not yet acted on any FY 2021 
appropriations package.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ H.R. 7617, 116th Congress (2020).
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 24, 2020, Amtrak updated its FY 2021 supplemental 
funding request. This request seeks $4.8 billion in FY 2021 
funding for Amtrak operations. The new number reflects Amtrak's 
updated ridership projections--now estimated at 34 percent of 
2019 levels, rather than 50 percent as Amtrak had previously 
forecast. The new request includes additional money for state-
supported Amtrak service and Railroad Rehabilitation and 
Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan assistance, as well as an 
estimate of funds needed to avoid furloughs or long-distance 
service cuts. Finally, the request seeks $496 million to cover 
``revenue risk'' in case Amtrak's ticket sales and other 
revenues fall short of projections.

SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR PASSENGERS AND EMPLOYEES

    Given the highly contagious nature of the coronavirus, the 
safety of Amtrak's workers and passengers has been a major 
concern.\19\ Amtrak currently requires customers and employees 
to wear masks.\20\ The railroad made changes to station arrival 
procedures and gate procedures, increased cleaning frequency, 
and put up physical distancing signs in high traffic areas in 
some stations.\21\ Amtrak has also added enhanced filtration 
systems to passenger cars.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Business Insider, Is it safe to travel by train during a 
pandemic? (July 31, 2020), available at https://
www.businessinsider.com/is-train-travel-safe-coronavirus.
    \20\ Amtrak, Amtrak Sets a New Standard of Travel, available at 
https://www.amtrak.com/coronavirus.
    \21\ Id.
    \22\ See id., (describing new booking policies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PROPOSED CUTS TO LONG-DISTANCE SERVICE AND WORKFORCE

    In May 2020, Amtrak announced plans to significantly reduce 
both its workforce and long-distance service due to the 
financial effects of the coronavirus.\23\ In a memo to 
employees, Amtrak outlined plans to cut 20 percent of the 
Amtrak workforce (approximately 4,000 jobs) by October 1, 
2020.\24\ Amtrak offered a buyout to some employees, with 510 
acceptances. On September 1, 2020, Amtrak announced 2,050 job 
cuts, including 1,995 bargaining unit employee furloughs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Wash. Post, Amtrak to Cut up to 20 Percent of Workforce as 
Coronavirus Takes Toll. (May 27, 2020), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2020/05/27/amtrak-cut-up-20-
percent-workforce-coronavirus-takes-toll/.
    \24\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amtrak is also set to temporarily reduce service to three 
days per week, until at least Summer 2021, on 12 of its 15 
long-distance routes.\25\ These changes are scheduled to begin 
on October 1, 2020, except for Silver Star and Silver Meteor 
service reductions, which began in July 2020.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ The Auto Train, which runs from Virginia to Florida, will 
maintain daily service. The Cardinal line, running from New York City 
to Chicago, and the Sunset Limited line, running from New Orleans to 
Los Angeles, regularly run three days a week.
    \26\ USA Today, Amtrak to reduce New York-Florida trains starting 
July 6, with more cuts coming Oct. 1 (June 29, 2020), available at 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2020/06/29/amtrak-reduce-new-
york-florida-trains-starting-july-6/3254400001/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Though ridership and revenue remain lower due to the 
pandemic, ticket revenues from long-distance trains increased 
71 percent, from $6.8 million to $11.6 million, from April to 
May 2020.\27\ At the same time, NEC ticket revenues increased 
from $1.5 million to $2.4 million and state-supported route 
revenues increased from $2.3 million to $3.5 million; almost 
half of the long-distance service revenue.\28\ The long-
distance routes targeted for service reductions currently make 
up more than 60 percent of Amtrak's current total revenue.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Trains Magazine, Amtrak Plans Triweekly Service for Almost All 
Long-Distance Trains as of Oct. 1, (June 15, 2020), available at 
https://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/06/15-amtrak-plans-
triweekly-service-for-almost-all-long-distance-trains-as-of-oct-1
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Trains Magazine, supra, note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amtrak previously attempted long-distance service 
reductions to achieve cost savings in 1995. On the advice of an 
outside consultant, Amtrak decreased 11 long-distance routes to 
a tri-weekly timetable to cut costs. After these service cuts 
had either become permanent or removed in favor of regular 
schedules, Congress evaluated the financial impact. Pursuant to 
the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that 
discussed the long-term effects of long-distance route 
reductions.\30\ Noting that Amtrak closed four routes, 
shortened six, and reduced service frequency on 11 routes, the 
GAO found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Govt. Accountability Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: 
Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes (May 1998), GAO/RCED-98-151, 
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225657.pdf.

        Amtrak achieved $54 million in cost savings in fiscal year 
        1995; however, it subsequently restored much of this service 
        because the ridership and financial performance of routes with 
        less than daily service were worse than anticipated . . . 
        [D]uring fiscal year 1996, Amtrak's overall ridership dropped 
        by 1.1 million passengers, or 5%, and anticipated reductions in 
        operating costs were not realized on routes with reduced 
        frequency of service.

    Amtrak told GAO that cost savings from less-frequent 
service were not realized because riders were not willing or 
able to adjust their plans to less-than-daily service, and 
less-frequent service caused inefficient usage of equipment and 
otherwise failed to cut costs.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ GAO, supra, note 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Former Amtrak executives publicly discussed the 1995 long-
distance service reductions, and concluded that they were 
ineffective.\32\ At a September 2000 Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation oversight hearing, former 
Amtrak President George Warrington testified, ``I will tell 
you, though, that generally, in retrospect, all of those 
eliminations back in 1995 and 1996 ended up costing the company 
more in lost revenue than we were able to take out in the way 
of expenses, given the fixed-cost nature of the operation.'' 
\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Trains Magazine, Former Amtrak President Revisits Previous 
Move to Triweekly Service, (Aug. 3, 2020), available at https://
trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2020/08/03-former-amtrak-president-
revisits-previous-move-to-triweekly-service.
    \33\ George Warrington testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Oversight Hearing 
on Amtrak, (Sept. 26, 2000), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg85968/html/CHRG-106shrg85968.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SERVICE CHANGES ON STATE-SUPPORTED ROUTES

    Amtrak has been coordinating with States to develop service 
and reduction plans for state-supported routes operated under 
Section 209 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement 
Act (PRIIA). For FY 2020 service, this process has been eased 
considerably by the CARES Act provisions that supplement state-
supported route funding and limit the States' funding share to 
80 percent of FY 2019 levels.\34\ The State-Amtrak Intercity 
Passenger Rail Committee (SAIPRC), a multi-agency body whose 
members include 20 agencies in 17 States, Amtrak, and the 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), has held discussions 
about 2021 planning.\35\ Amtrak included an additional $260 
million for state-supported routes in its May 2020 supplemental 
funding letter, accompanied by testimonials from transportation 
leaders in North Carolina and Wisconsin.\36\ Without a funding 
stopgap like the CARES Act provision to supplement state-
supported routes and replace lost revenues, States will need to 
make hard choices about the service levels they can sustain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ P.L. 116-136.
    \35\ State-Amtrak Intercity Passenger Rail Comm., https://
www.saiprc.com/.
    \36\ Amtrak, supra, note 15, at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

RETURNING TO NORMAL OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES AHEAD

    Amtrak, along with its workers and State partners, faces 
many challenges in the months and years ahead. Amtrak estimates 
that ridership for FY 2021 will be down 34 percent from 2019 
levels. This ridership drop results in less revenue--which is 
necessary to fund operations, pay workers, support State rail 
service, and maintain a state-of-good repair. As travel 
restrictions are lifted, Amtrak must work to convince riders 
that trains are a safe travel option in comparison to other 
travel options.
    If Amtrak does in fact institute the long-distance service 
cuts that are currently planned, there will be additional 
barriers to getting back on track. Amtrak plans to restore 
long-distance service based on a series of metrics that it says 
measure public health, future demand, and current performance. 
Amtrak contemplates restoring service between May 26 and June 
30, 2021, at the earliest.\37\ For routes that are not restored 
by June 2021, Amtrak will reevaluate the route's viability in 
the FY 2022 planning cycle.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Amtrak, Restoring Long Distance Service, available at https://
www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-long-distance-restoration-
plan.pdf.
    \38\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All metrics must be met before restoration of service on a 
given route. Amtrak's service restoration metrics are:
    1. LAdvance Bookings: Amtrak will compare passenger ticket 
bookings made by February 2021 for travel in June 2021 to 
passenger ticket bookings made by February 2020 for travel in 
June 2020. To restore service, 2021 levels must be at least 90 
percent of 2020 seating capacity.\39\ The metric, intended to 
forecast summer ridership, accounts for travel booked four 
months in advance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2. LRidership Levels: Amtrak's second metric requires 
Amtrak to reach ridership levels equal to or exceeding 90 
percent of the projections found in Amtrak's COVID-19-adjusted 
first quarter Fiscal Year 2021 operating plan.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3. LPandemic Recovery: Amtrak's third service resumption 
metric reflects the rate of COVID-19 infections. To resume 
service, COVID-19-related hospitalization rates in the regions 
through which a given long-distance train operates must show 
stable or declining trends by February 15, 2021.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Id.

    If Amtrak cuts long distance service, it will likely face 
an uphill battle to restore that service to previous levels. 
This could have a significant impact on travel options for many 
rural areas that depend on Amtrak long-distance service.

                               APPENDICES

Appendix A: Amtrak ``Restoring Long Distance Service'' memo.
Appendix B: ``Amtrak System Map''.

                               APPENDIX A

                    Restoring Long Distance Service

    Amtrak is committed to operating a national rail network 
that serves customers across the United States. In response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, we have already made temporary 
reductions in service frequency to our Northeast Corridor (NEC) 
and State Supported services. We are now extending similar 
temporary reductions to most of our Long Distance routes, 
effective October 1.
    To be clear, our temporary reductions and subsequent plan 
to restore this service are dependent on sufficient federal 
assistance (at least $3.5 billion in FY21 assuming a 50% 
systemwide ridership level, but additional assistance could be 
required if ridership does not reach this level), but in order 
to best protect our passengers' and employees' health, and to 
make the best possible use of limited taxpayer investment, we 
will consider the following metrics to decide when to restore 
each affected Long Distance service:
    1. LPublic Health--Is the COVID-19 pandemic under control?
       LAmtrak will assess COVID-19-related 
hospitalization rates in the regions through which a given Long 
Distance route operates. If those rates are stable or declining 
as of February 15, 2021, this condition will be met.
    2. LFuture Demand--Are customers booking trips near the 
same rate as in 2020?
       LAmtrak will compare advance bookings for June 
2021 (as of February 15, 2021) to advance bookings for June 
2020 (as of February 15, 2020). If the percentage of available 
seat- and room-miles booked in 2021 is at least 90% of the 2020 
percentage, this condition will be met. (Note that calculations 
of availability for 2021 will reflect any caps on ticket sales 
to promote social distancing, as well as any other relevant 
measures adopted to minimize COVID-related risks.)
    3. LCurrent Performance--Is ridership close to our 
projections in our operating plan?
       LAmtrak will compare systemwide ridership levels 
for the fall (Q1 of FY 2021) with our FY 2021 operating plan, 
which already accounts for reduced ridership due to COVID. If 
the number of passengers is at least 90% of the projected 
figure, this condition will be met.

    If all three conditions are met for a given Long Distance 
route, then in February 2021, we will begin working to restore 
service along that route. Depending on the particular route, 
that restoration could be complete as early as late May, and no 
later than June 30, 2021. If any route is not yet ready to be 
restored when we conduct our review, we will apply an updated 
version of the criteria described above as part of the FY 2022 
planning cycle (or sooner, in the event of dramatic improvement 
in demand prior to that point).
    Before the pandemic, 4.6 million of our 32 million annual 
passengers traveled on Amtrak's Long Distance routes. COVID-19 
has changed a lot, at times causing our total ridership to drop 
by more than 95% from FY 2019 levels--but Amtrak is still 
America's Railroad, and we are still committed to serving our 
customers and connecting communities across the nation.

                   APPENDIX B: AMTRAK SYSTEM MAP \42\


    \42\ The numbers on this map correspond to the routes as follows: 
1. Cascades; 2. Coast Starlight; 3. Capitol Corridor, San Joaquin; 4. 
Pacific Surfliner; 5. Empire Builder; 6. California Zephyr; 7. 
Southwest Chief; 8. Sunset Limited; 9. Blue Water, Carl Sandburg, 
Hiawatha, Hoosier State (discontinued as of July 2019), Illini, 
Illinois Zephyr, Lincoln, Pere Marquette, Saluki, Wolverine; 10. 
Missouri River Runner; 11. Heartland Flyer; 12. Texas Eagle; 13. City 
of New Orleans; 14. Lake Shore Limited; 15. Capitol Limited; 16. 
Cardinal; 17. Crescent; 18. Maple Leaf; 19. Adirondack, Empire, Ethan 
Allen; 20. Keystone, Pennsylvanian; 21. Vermonter, Valley Flyer 
(initiated August 2019); 22. Downeaster; 23. Northeast Corridor; 24. 
Carolinian, Piedmont, Virginia; 25. Auto Train, Palmetto; 26. Silver 
Meteor, Silver Star. Where State-Supported and Long-Distance routes 
overlap, the State-Supported route is shown.
    AMTRAK, General and Legislative Annual Report & Fiscal Year 2020 
Grant Request, available at https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/
projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/reports/Amtrak-
General-Legislative-Annual-Report-FY2020-Grant-Request.pdf, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               WITNESSES

     LMr. William Flynn, President, Amtrak
     LMr. Arthur Maratea, National President, 
Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM)
     LMs. Amy Griffin, President, Local 1460, Transport 
Workers Union of America (TWU)
     LMr. Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Rail Passengers Association


                     AMTRAK'S RESPONSE TO COVID-19

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020

                  House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
                                         Materials,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:07 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Webex, Hon. 
Daniel Lipinski (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Lipinski. The subcommittee will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    This is a hybrid hearing. I want to remind Members of key 
regulations from the House Committee on Rules to ensure this 
hearing goes smoothly.
    Members must be visible on screen for the purposes of 
identification when joining this hearing.
    Members must also continue to use the video function on 
today's software platform, Cisco Webex, for the remainder of 
the time they are attending this hearing, unless experiencing 
connectivity issues or other technical problems.
    If a Member is experiencing any connectivity issues or 
other technical problems, please inform committee staff as soon 
as possible, so you can receive assistance. A chat function is 
available for Members on the Cisco Webex platform for this 
purpose. Members can also call the committee's main phone line 
at (202) 225-4472 for technical assistance by phone.
    Members may not participate remotely in any other 
proceeding that may be occurring simultaneously.
    It is the responsibility of each Member seeking recognition 
to unmute their microphone prior to speaking.
    To avoid any inadvertent background noise, I request that 
every Member keep their microphone muted when not seeking 
recognition to speak.
    Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I will 
request that the Member please mute their microphone.
    Finally, despite this being a hybrid hearing, I want to 
emphasize that all the standard rules of decorum apply.
    As the chair of today's hearings, I will make a good faith 
effort to provide every Member experiencing connectivity issues 
an opportunity to participate fully in the proceedings.
    Members will have a standard 5 minutes to ask questions.
    To insert a document into the record, please have your 
staff email it to the committee clerk, Mike Twinchek.
    This hearing also is being livestreamed for the public to 
view.
    And with that, I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes 
for an opening statement.
    Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today's 
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee 
hearing on Amtrak's response to COVID-19. As you can see, we 
are doing a hybrid hearing today, with most Members and our 
witnesses remote to safely conduct this hearing.
    I want to wish everyone participating or watching this 
hearing my best during these tough times, and I hope everyone's 
family and loved ones are safe.
    Before we get started, this is my first opportunity to 
publicly congratulate William Flynn, who became Amtrak's CEO 
less than 5 months ago. There could not be a much tougher time 
to begin this service.
    [Microphone unmuted.]
    Mr. Lipinski. I think we got that corrected, the mute 
there.
    So I wish Mr. Flynn well.
    COVID has wreaked havoc on the health and economic welfare 
of Americans, just as it has done across the globe. 
Economically, the travel industry has been especially hard hit. 
I understand Amtrak faces serious financial issues and other 
strains on its operations. We will hear specifically about this 
directly from Mr. Flynn.
    I have always been a strong advocate for Amtrak, because it 
provides an important public service: national passenger rail 
service. It is critical that all of us, especially everyone at 
Amtrak, always keep in mind that it is, first and foremost, a 
national public service, though this does not mean that it 
should not be run well.
    In addition, as everyone watching knows, I have been a 
staunch advocate for the men and women who work at Amtrak. It 
is essential that they all are treated fairly, especially in 
the midst of an unprecedented pandemic that has caused economic 
hardships for millions of Americans and their families.
    That brings me to the issue of furloughs recently announced 
by Amtrak. Congress recognized the financial difficulty Amtrak 
is experiencing because of a steep drop in ridership, and 
provided over $1 billion in CARES Act funding for Amtrak, with 
the understanding that part of the funds would be used to 
prevent furloughs. So Amtrak's announcement that they will 
furlough over 2,000 employees on October 1st is extremely 
disappointing.
    I understand that, technically, we are about to begin a new 
fiscal year. But one of the biggest frustrations I and other 
Members have is that Amtrak has had months to come to Congress 
and request additional funding to help keep workers on payroll. 
The principal reason Amtrak didn't get any money in the Heroes 
Act passed by the House was that Amtrak didn't submit a 
supplemental request until 10 days after passage. To make 
matters worse, Amtrak is just now submitting their amended 
fiscal year 2021 supplemental request to Congress, less than 1 
month before the current fiscal year expires, and Amtrak plans 
to implement these furloughs.
    But frustrations aside, I believe that Congress needs to 
act quickly to prevent furloughs and avoid long-distance 
service cuts.
    First, the furloughs won't actually save the Federal 
Government that much money, because the workers furloughed will 
be eligible for railroad unemployment insurance, which is 
funded through taxes paid by workers and their employers--in 
this case, Amtrak.
    Second, we tried cutting long-distance service to 3 days a 
week under President Clinton in 1994. Congress, on a bipartisan 
basis, led by Mississippi Republican Senator Trent Lott, 
eventually rejected those cuts, and restored long-distance 
service to 7 days a week because cutting long-distance service 
economically hurts rural communities, undermines Amtrak's role 
as a national passenger rail system, and actually doesn't save 
that much money. Congress' view on this has not changed in the 
past 25 years.
    Finally, we should reject these cuts because most of us on 
this committee believe that whenever this pandemic is over, 
Amtrak should go back to running the service it had before this 
pandemic. We cannot just flip the switch, so to speak, if 
Amtrak is going to lose valuable workers, know-how, and riders 
because of these cuts.
    Ultimately, the furloughs and long-distance service cuts 
are misguided, and weaken our national passenger rail service. 
It is important we hear from Amtrak CEO William Flynn today, 
and his long-term vision for Amtrak, and why Amtrak is making 
these cuts.
    Finally, I feel it necessary to remind Amtrak that, while I 
strongly support our Nation's passenger railroad, Amtrak must 
heed and not ignore Congress' desire that it work well with 
others, including commuter railroads like Metra in northeastern 
Illinois, as well as States and local municipalities. Too often 
it feels like Amtrak is happy to take money from Congress and 
then ignore Congress' directives. That is not helpful, 
especially when Amtrak needs much more from Congress right now.
    With that, I recognize Ranking Member Crawford for his 
opening statement.
    [Mr. Lipinski's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in 
  Congress from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
             Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today's Railroads, 
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee's hearing on Amtrak's 
response to COVID-19. As you can see, we are doing a hybrid hearing 
today with most members and our witnesses remote to safely conduct this 
hearing. I want to wish everyone participating or watching this hearing 
my best during these tough times. I hope everyone's family and loved 
ones are safe. Before we get started, this is my first opportunity to 
publicly congratulate William Flynn who became Amtrak's CEO less than 
five months ago. There could not be a much tougher time to begin this 
service; I wish you well.
    COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the health and economic welfare of 
Americans, just as it has done across the globe. Economically, the 
travel industry has been especially hard hit. I understand Amtrak faces 
serious financial issues and other strains on its operations, and we'll 
hear specifically about this directly from Mr. Flynn. I've always been 
a strong advocate for Amtrak because it provides an important public 
service--national passenger rail service. It is critical that all of 
us, especially everyone at Amtrak, always keep in mind that it is 
first-and-foremost a national public service. Though this does not mean 
that it should not be run well. In addition, as everyone watching 
knows, I have been a staunch advocate for the men and women who work at 
Amtrak. It is essential that they are all treated fairly, especially in 
the midst of an unprecedented pandemic that has caused economic 
hardship for millions of Americans and their families.
    That brings me to the issue of the furloughs recently announced by 
Amtrak. Congress recognized the financial difficulty Amtrak is 
experiencing because of a steep drop in ridership and provided over $1 
billion in CARES Act funding for Amtrak with the understanding that 
part of the funds would be used to prevent furloughs. So Amtrak's 
announcement that they will furlough over 2,000 employees on October 
1st is extremely disappointing. I understand that, technically, we are 
about to begin a new fiscal year. But one of the biggest frustrations I 
and other members have is that Amtrak has had months to come to 
Congress and request additional funding to help keep workers on the 
payroll. The principal reason Amtrak didn't get any money in the HEROES 
Act passed by the House was that Amtrak didn't submit a supplemental 
request until 10 days after passage. To make matters worse, Amtrak is 
just now submitting their amended FY21 supplemental request to Congress 
less than one month before the current fiscal year expires and Amtrak 
plans to implement these furloughs.
    My frustrations aside, I believe that Congress needs to act quickly 
to prevent furloughs and avoid long distance service cuts. First, the 
furloughs won't actually save the federal government that much money 
because the workers furloughed will be eligible for Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance, which is funded through taxes paid by workers 
and their employers--in this case Amtrak. Second, we tried cutting long 
distance service to three days a week under President Clinton in 1994. 
Congress on a bipartisan basis led by Mississippi Republican Senator 
Trent Lott eventually rejected those cuts and restored long distance 
service to seven days a week because cutting long distance service 
economically hurts rural communities, undermines Amtrak's role as a 
national passenger rail system, and actually doesn't save that much 
money. Congress' view on this has not changed in the past 25 years. 
Finally, we should reject these cuts because most of us on this 
Committee believe that whenever this pandemic is over, Amtrak should go 
back to running the service it had before this pandemic. We cannot just 
flip the switch so to speak if Amtrak is going to lose valuable 
workers, know-how, and riders because of these cuts. Ultimately, the 
furloughs and long distance service cuts are misguided and weaken our 
national passenger rail system.
    It's important we hear from Amtrak CEO William Flynn today on his 
long-term vision for Amtrak and why Amtrak is making these cuts.
    Finally, I feel it necessary to remind Amtrak that while I strongly 
support our nation's passenger railroad, Amtrak must heed, and not 
ignore, Congress' desire that it work well with others, including 
commuter railroads like Metra in northeastern Illinois, as well as 
States and local municipalities. Too often it feels like Amtrak is 
happy to take money from Congress and then ignore Congress' directives. 
That is not helpful, especially when Amtrak needs much more from 
Congress.
    With that, I recognize Ranking Member Crawford for an opening 
statement.

    Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing. I also want to thank our witnesses for 
being here today.
    Our hearing today is to review Amtrak's response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
    In March, Congress gave Amtrak over $1 billion in 
additional funding to offset pandemic losses and avoid 
furloughs. Since that time, however, Amtrak has significantly 
cut its routes and announced that it is laying off 20 percent 
of its workforce--that is almost 4,000 people--by October 1st, 
2020.
    Amtrak has also more than doubled its fiscal year 2021 
funding request from just over $2 billion to almost $5 billion. 
I am troubled that Amtrak is receiving and requesting record 
amounts of funding, while cutting services of thousands and 
thousands of jobs.
    Amtrak also recently requested a waiver of its Buy America 
requirements to purchase equipment from foreign countries. When 
I asked for more specifics in a July letter, Amtrak could not 
provide even the most basic information, including the costs 
and origins of the equipment. Amtrak should not be spending its 
taxpayer-provided bailout money on foreign goods, while cutting 
American jobs and services.
    I welcome new Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn. I look forward to 
hearing about how he is responding to the COVID-19 crisis, but 
also his thoughts on other important issues, including his 
plans for meeting Amtrak's congressionally mandated requirement 
of making a profit.
    Thank you again to all our witnesses for being here today, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
    [Mr. Crawford's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative 
      in Congress from the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, 
     Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    Thank you, Chairman Lipinski, for holding this hearing. I also want 
to thank our witnesses for being here today.
    Our hearing is to review Amtrak's response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. In March, Congress gave Amtrak over $1 billion in additional 
funding to offset pandemic losses and avoid furloughs. Since that time, 
Amtrak has significantly cut its routes and announced that it is laying 
off 20 percent of its workforce, or almost 4,000 people, by October 1, 
2020.
    Amtrak has also more than doubled its fiscal year 2021 funding 
request from just over $2 billion, to almost $5 billion. I am troubled 
that Amtrak is receiving and requesting record amounts of funding while 
cutting services and thousands of jobs.
    Amtrak also recently requested a waiver of its Buy America 
requirement to purchase equipment from a foreign country. When I asked 
for more specifics in a July letter, Amtrak could not provide even the 
most basic information, including the costs and origins of the 
equipment. Amtrak should not be spending its taxpayer-provided bailout 
money on foreign goods while cutting American jobs and services.
    I welcome new Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn. I look forward to hearing 
about how he is responding to the COVID-19 crisis, but also his 
thoughts on other important issues including his plans for meeting 
Amtrak's Congressionally mandated requirement of making a profit.

    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Crawford. The Chair will now 
recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Graves, 
for an opening statement.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Sorry about that, Mr. Chairman, 
sorry about that. I was muted.
    Mr. Lipinski. OK. Go ahead.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. I want to thank you for holding 
this hearing, and I do want to thank all the witnesses for 
attending.
    Obviously, today's hearing is a great opportunity to review 
how Amtrak has handled the COVID-19 pandemic. Now, prior to the 
crisis, Amtrak was coming off its best year ever. In 2020, 
Amtrak was expecting to make a profit for the first time in 
almost 50 years. But after the pandemic, Amtrak obviously 
reported that its ridership dropped by 95 percent, and its 
revenues were down 82 percent, compared to the 2019 levels.
    Today is also Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn's first appearance, as 
you pointed out, before the committee since taking over in 
April, and I welcome Mr. Flynn. He comes to Amtrak after 
several years working in various roles in the private-sector 
transportation industry. His experience includes high-level 
positions in, obviously, the aviation industry with Atlas, and 
maritime industries, and also working for a Class I freight 
railroad.
    And I know many of the members on the committee on both 
sides have worked with Bill as he has served in various roles. 
And I have always found Bill to be both effective and 
forthright in many of his past positions, and I expect that is 
going to be the same case for Amtrak and his leadership at 
Amtrak.
    I look forward to hearing from Mr. Flynn on his update when 
it comes to Amtrak's COVID-19 response, and I am also 
interested in hearing about his future plans for Amtrak, 
including recovering from the pandemic, and restoring 
ridership, and meeting the congressional mandate of turning a 
profit.
    So with that, again, thanks to all the witnesses, and I 
look forward to the discussion. I would yield back.
    [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    I want to thank Chairman Lipinski for holding this hearing, and I 
want to thank our witnesses for attending.
    Today's hearing is a good opportunity to review how Amtrak has 
handled the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to this crisis, Amtrak was coming 
off its best year ever. In 2020, Amtrak was expecting to make a profit 
for the first time in its almost 50-year history. After the pandemic 
hit, Amtrak reported that its ridership dropped by 95 percent and its 
revenues were down by 82 percent compared to 2019 levels.
    Today is also Amtrak CEO Bill Flynn's first appearance before the 
Committee since taking over in April. I welcome Mr. Flynn. He comes to 
Amtrak after several years working in various roles in the private 
sector transportation industry. His experience includes high level 
positions in the aviation and maritime industries, and also working for 
a Class I freight railroad.
    I know many of the Members of this Committee on both sides have 
worked with Mr. Flynn as he's served in these various roles. I have 
always found Mr. Flynn to be both effective and forthright in many of 
his past positions. I expect that will be the same for his leadership 
of Amtrak.
    I look forward to hearing Mr. Flynn's update on Amtrak's COVID-19 
response. I am also interested in hearing about his future plans for 
Amtrak, including recovering from the pandemic, restoring ridership, 
and meeting the Congressional mandate of turning a profit.

    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Graves. I now would like to 
welcome the witnesses on our panel: Mr. William Flynn, 
President and CEO of Amtrak; Mr. Arthur Maratea, national 
president, Transportation Communications Union; Amy Griffin, 
president of Local 1460, Transport Workers Union of America; 
and Mr. Jim Mathews, president and chief executive officer of 
the Rail Passengers Association.
    Thank you for participating today, and I look forward to 
your testimony.
    Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be 
included in the record.
    Since your written testimony has been made part of the 
record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral 
testimony to 5 minutes.
    And with that, Mr. Flynn, you may proceed for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM FLYNN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
  OFFICER, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK); 
      ARTHUR MARATEA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION 
   COMMUNICATIONS UNION; AMY GRIFFIN, LOCAL 1460 PRESIDENT, 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA; AND JIM MATHEWS, PRESIDENT 
    AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, RAIL PASSENGERS ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Flynn. Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member 
Graves, and Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the 
subcommittee. Thank you for the kind welcome and the 
opportunity here to address the committee.
    As you know, I am Bill Flynn, Amtrak's recently appointed 
President and CEO, and I am here to discuss our company's 
response to COVID-19.
    But I have to start my remarks by thanking our dedicated 
employees who have more than risen to the pandemic challenge. 
Our highest priority is always going to be the safety of our 
customers and the safety of our employees, and I am truly proud 
of our team's efforts.
    Amtrak has been an early leader throughout the crisis, 
instituting social distancing requirements, employee pay 
protection, mask requirements, and now COVID-19 testing for all 
of our employees on an as-requested basis. We are also 
partnering with a leading university to study airflow and 
ventilation in our railcars, and working with others to 
strengthen our disinfecting protocols.
    I want to thank you for the INVEST in America Act. And, if 
enacted, we finally have the funding we require to modernize 
our system, add more trains and new routes across our Nation, 
and receive the priority treatment from our host railroads that 
your constituents deserve. Simply put, it is the game changer 
we have always hoped for.
    Amtrak did deliver record performance in fiscal year 2019, 
and fiscal year 2020 was set to be another record year. But as 
the pandemic's effect took hold in March, our ridership 
plummeted by 97 percent. In February, we carried more than 
80,000 daily passengers. But in April, there were less than 
4,000 passengers, with corresponding impacts on our revenues. 
Thanks to the CARES Act, we have managed to survive these 
difficult times for fiscal year 2020. But unfortunately, our 
ridership and revenue are still down more than 80 percent.
    We recently updated our forecast for fiscal year 2021, and 
we now anticipate needing up to $4.9 billion in funding to 
operate and invest in our network, support our partners, and 
address various congressional concerns, such as avoiding 
employee furloughs and maintaining daily long-distance service. 
But given the current uncertainty of COVID-19 supplemental 
funding or fiscal year 2021 appropriations levels, we must be 
prudent and prepare for the situation at hand, while hoping for 
the best.
    Therefore, as explained this summer, we are implementing 
our plans to adjust our service and workforce levels beginning 
in October. As difficult as these actions are, if we do not 
take such cost-saving measures and fail to receive supplemental 
funding, we anticipate burning nearly $250 million each month. 
At this rate of loss, we would be forced to take drastic 
measures with long-lasting impacts on the company, on our 
employees, and on our network.
    As you know, we have already reduced service on both the 
Northeast Corridor and State-supported routes, and we now plan 
to extend temporary frequency adjustments to most of our long-
distance trains. But let me be clear: these adjustments are 
temporary. There is no secret plan or hidden agenda, as critics 
may suggest. Many of your districts have long-distance service, 
and I have heard your concerns loud and clear. And please know 
that I am 100 percent committed to our long-distance network 
and to its future. By way of example, we continue to make 
investments that demonstrate this commitment today, and I can 
point to our purchase of 75 diesel locomotives for this service 
line.
    Until our ridership recovers, we must make difficult 
workforce adjustments, as we cannot continue to indefinitely 
fund a workforce too large for the number of passengers we are 
serving. Many States have told us that they will be unable to 
partner with Amtrak unless we reduce our costs to better align 
with ridership.
    Having grown up in a rail labor family, I know how hard 
furloughs can be, and we are working hard to minimize impacts 
to our employees. Earlier this year we implemented several 
cost-saving measures. But given the continued lack of riders 
and uncertain funding, we plan to reduce our workforce by 
approximately 2,050 agreement and management positions.
    Going forward, we will do everything in our power to return 
furloughed employees to work as soon as possible, and we are 
going beyond our contractual requirements to provide extended 
and no-cost healthcare coverage during this period.
    Intercity passenger rail remains one of the safest, most 
efficient, and most sustainable forms of transportation. Once 
the pandemic passes, Amtrak stands ready to grow and serve more 
of America in large cities and in rural communities, thereby 
providing thousands of good, living-wage jobs for skilled 
employees in the process.
    Please know that I am committed to working through this 
crisis with you and with other stakeholders to manage these 
near-term challenges, while safeguarding Amtrak's future.
    Thank you for your time and support, and I look forward to 
your questions.
    [Mr. Flynn's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of William Flynn, President and Chief Executive 
       Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)
                              Introduction
    Good morning, Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and 
Members of this Subcommittee. Thank you for calling this hearing today 
to discuss Amtrak and COVID-19. My name is William Flynn, and this is 
my first opportunity to testify as Amtrak's president and chief 
executive officer, a position I assumed in April of this year.
    Let me begin by thanking this Subcommittee for drafting and 
advancing the Rail Title of the INVEST in America Act. This critical 
piece of legislation proposes historic levels of federal investment 
that will help Amtrak rehabilitate or replace its aged assets, such as 
100-year-old bridges, tunnels and 40-year-old trains, and expand our 
services. The bill also includes important policy reforms, such as 
passenger train preference enforcement to ensure on-time performance on 
our host freight railroads, an expedited process for host railroad 
access, and substantial grant funding that will help Amtrak evolve, 
expand, and modernize our network so that we can connect more Americans 
to the places they want to go. If enacted, the INVEST Act will be a 
game changer for Amtrak and intercity passenger rail. It is what 
Americans deserve, and I applaud your bold leadership and thank you for 
your confidence in Amtrak.
    Let me also take this opportunity to thank the thousands of Amtrak 
employees who have risen to the challenges associated with COVID-19 and 
have remained focused on Amtrak's mission to provide safe, reliable 
transportation to our customers and your constituents. Ticket agents, 
conductors, train attendants, red caps, cleaners, and dozens of other 
specialties are doing their part to keep America moving, and I am very 
proud of to be a part of the team.
    I come from a railroad family. My father and uncle were locomotive 
engineers, and my brother was an Amtrak conductor and local union 
chair. My first transportation job during summer break from college was 
working on a maintenance-of-way gang that was installing welded rail on 
the Northeast Corridor (NEC) in New England. In 43 years in the 
transportation industry, I have had the opportunity to serve in a 
multitude of roles in ocean shipping, airline, and railroad companies. 
These connections deepen the honor I feel to lead Amtrak, and I will do 
all I can to further Amtrak's important mission to serve the country.
    As Amtrak finished FY 2019 and even through the first five months 
of FY 2020, the company was in a stronger position than at any time in 
its soon to be fifty-year history. Ridership, revenue, and financial 
performance were at record levels. Amtrak was on track to generate 
passenger revenues exceeding operating expenses in FY 2020 for the 
first time ever. The company was preparing to take delivery of next 
generation Acela trainsets for its high-speed NEC service, and had a 
bold vision of expanding train service in new and existing corridors 
across the country.
    Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic then hit this nation. Amtrak, 
like all transportation providers, was hit especially hard. In a matter 
of weeks, Amtrak's ridership plummeted by 97% and we undertook 
immediate actions to protect the health and safety of our customers and 
employees and reduce capacity.
    Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the CARES Act, which provided 
important emergency funding to Amtrak and our state partners in order 
to minimize the negative financial impacts of COVID-19 during FY 2020. 
Unfortunately, recovery has been slow, and our ridership and revenue 
are still down over 80% compared to a year ago. It has become clear 
that the pandemic's impacts will extend through, and almost certainly 
beyond, FY 2021 as well, and Amtrak, along with our state partners, are 
now working to plan for the year ahead.
    What I would like to do today is discuss with you Amtrak's response 
to COVID-19 thus far, including how we ensure our customers and 
employees are safe and healthy, as well as the steps we have taken to 
manage the loss of revenue. I would also like to focus on two issues 
that I know are important to this subcommittee: how we must adjust our 
workforce and our train service given the pandemic's impacts on our 
ridership. Finally, it is important to understand what happens after we 
get through this pandemic and the vision for Amtrak and intercity 
passenger rail for the future.
                     Amtrak's Response to COVID-19
    To provide more detail about how Amtrak has responded to COVID-19, 
let me offer a quick summary of the steps we have taken since the 
crisis began to unfold in late winter of this year.
    Our number one job is to provide a safe work and travel environment 
for our employees and our riders. In January, as concern about the 
virus spreading in the U.S. started to emerge, we began reminding 
employees about the need to be vigilant about hand washing and 
sanitizing. As it became clearer that we were about to face a serious 
public health crisis we developed a safety plan, and over the past 
several months we have worked to inform and execute our plan with the 
best available information.
    We have taken many actions to minimize health and safety risks to 
our customers and employees. They include:
      Requiring masks for passengers and employees on our 
trains and in our facilities.
      Limiting reservations on trains (other than in private 
sleeping room accommodations) to allow social distancing.
      Adopting and continuously refining new and enhanced 
cleaning procedures on our trains and in our stations.
      Instructing all employees whose jobs can be performed 
remotely to work from home.
      Distributing supplies of Personal Protective Equipment to 
employees across the country.
      Providing every employee infected by or exposed to COVID-
19 with up to two weeks of pay protection to safeguard their households 
and ensure that ill employees stay home. (Similarly, absenteeism due to 
COVID-19 symptoms has not been subject to the application of our 
attendance policy.)
      Enhancing our web site and mobile application with 
features like improved boarding guides and train capacity indicators 
that help our customers to make safe traveling decisions.
      Installing protective plastic barriers in our cafe cars 
and in our stations to support physical distancing, and hand sanitizer 
dispensers on all our trains.
      Contracting with Quest Diagnostics to make voluntary 
COVID-19 testing available to all employees. While our employees 
primarily rely upon testing available at no cost to them through the 
CARES Act, this service will provide additional confidence that we are 
taking the necessary steps to mitigate the risk of infection among our 
workforce.
      Creating a research partnership with a leading university 
to study airflow, ventilation, and air filtration systems in passenger 
railcars to determine if additional measures would further reduce the 
possibility of airborne spread of infectious particles on our 
equipment.
      Working with RB, the makers of Lysol, to strengthen our 
comprehensive disinfection protocols for trains, stations, and lounges. 
The partnership will launch in NEC stations and on the Pacific 
Surfliner route, before expanding across our network.
      Partnering with the George Washington University Milken 
Institute School of Public Health to secure ongoing technical expertise 
and guidance to enhance Amtrak's comprehensive coronavirus pandemic 
response.

    We have prominently communicated information about our response to 
COVID-19 and the changes we have made to address it to our passengers 
through Amtrak.com, social media and station signage. We have also 
communicated openly and frequently with our employees through employee 
advisories and companywide town halls. During the townhalls, we have 
briefed employees on new developments and answered their questions, the 
responses to which are made available to all employees on our intranet. 
In addition, our labor relations team has met at least weekly with 
representatives of our unions.
                      COVID-19's Financial Impact
    We, along with our state partners, have seen stunning revenue 
losses as a result of the precipitous decline in ticket sales due to 
COVID-19. As of early March, Amtrak was on track to generate FY 2020 
passenger revenues greater than operating costs for the first time in 
our history. Over the next few weeks, ridership on our trains plummeted 
by 97%, and since then only a small portion of our passengers have 
resumed traveling. Our latest projections are that in FY 2020, Amtrak's 
revenue loss from ticket sales will be $1.266 billion, which would be 
only 55% of what it was in FY 2019.
    To try to align with the current depressed demand for service, 
manage our financial losses, and continue to make investments in 
capital projects for future riders, we made several cost-cutting 
decisions:
      We have reduced service frequency and train capacity on 
the NEC, and on our state supported routes in partnership with our 20 
state partners.
      We deferred and/or restructured $600 million in capital 
projects.
      We dramatically reduced overtime.
      We offered voluntary unpaid time off to our employees.
      Several of our unions agreed to defer previously 
negotiated wage increases, for which we are grateful.
      The reduced number of trains meant that while our 
agreement employees have not been furloughed, their earnings have been 
impacted by a reduction in hours worked.
      The 401k match for our non-agreement employees was 
suspended, and their pay was reduced 7-22% based on a tiered system for 
the remainder of FY 2020. I have not drawn a salary during this 
difficult time.

    A combination of these cost controls and the FY 2020 CARES Act 
funding allowed us to avoid involuntary layoffs and furloughs during 
this fiscal year.
                      Adjustments to Train Service
    In the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic's onset, we 
reduced service frequency on both the NEC and state-supported routes by 
approximately 70%. On the NEC, Acela service was suspended entirely, 
along with all but a few Northeast Regional trains; and in consultation 
with our state partners we reduced service on 10 of our 28 state-
supported routes and suspended all service on 14 others. Some service 
has since been restored, including a limited number of Acela trains 
that resumed operation on June 1. A complete list of the service 
reductions and the restorations made to date is appended to my 
testimony.
    We have joined with our state partners in urging Congress to 
provide additional funding to help offset the lost revenue that our 
state partners are experiencing during the pandemic. We are gratified 
that Congress included additional funding for FY 2020 in the CARES Act, 
and that the House appropriations bill includes such funding for FY 
2021. We will continue to work closely with Congress to find the best 
way to help our state partners out during these difficult times. We 
recently updated our forecast and now anticipate needing up to $4.9 
billion in funding to operate and invest in our network, support our 
partners, and address various congressional concerns like avoiding 
employee furloughs and maintaining daily long distance service.
    In addition to changes in service frequency, we have also adjusted 
the number and types of cars operated on individual trains, as well as 
on-board food service, ticketing policies, and other aspects of our 
customer service. We made these changes to facilitate social 
distancing, match capacity to reduced demand, avoid unnecessary 
expenditures, and accommodate COVID-19 driven changes in customer 
preferences and state partner service change requests on state-
supported routes.
    We are in the process of finalizing our FY 2021 Operating Plan. 
Unlike years past, that Plan will undoubtedly require frequent 
adjustments to reflect both the presently unpredictable progress in the 
battle against COVID-19 and the equally unpredictable impact COVID-19 
will have on Americans' willingness to travel during the year ahead. We 
will constantly evaluate external developments, and changes in Amtrak 
ridership, ticket revenue, and customer preferences, as we refine that 
Plan, adjust service levels to match demand, and provide state partners 
with the changes in services they request. I should note that the 
Operating Plan includes as one of its assumptions the availability of a 
vaccine. Should a vaccine not become available, or be extensively 
delayed, this will have significant negative consequences for our 
projections.
                   Long Distance Frequency Reductions
    Throughout FY 2020, Amtrak has continued to operate its long 
distance trains on their normal, pre-pandemic service frequency, 
despite huge ridership drops and service reductions--or outright 
service suspensions--on every other North American intercity passenger 
service. Airlines, intercity bus companies and the Alaska Railroad have 
all made major reductions in service, as Amtrak has done on the NEC and 
our state-supported routes. VIA Rail Canada, our Canadian counterpart, 
has suspended all service on its long distance routes until at least 
November 1.
    In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, we hoped that passenger 
demand would increase appreciably on long distance routes during what 
is normally their peak Summer season. Because of the resurgence in 
COVID-19 infections and the continuing reluctance of travelers to take 
any trips, particularly long trips on public transportation, that did 
not happen. In June and July, ridership and revenues on long distance 
routes (excluding the Auto Train) were down by nearly two-thirds 
compared to the same months in 2019--even though we had not made the 
huge reductions in service implemented on nearly all of our other 
routes.
    The two thirds reduction in revenues has had a major impact on long 
distance financial performance. While long distance trains had 
significant operating losses prior to COVID-19 ($475 million in FY 
2019), in normal times they cover most of the out-of-pocket costs such 
as fuel, commissary supplies, host railroad payments, and wages and 
benefits for on-board employees that are incurred by each train that 
operates over a route. Therefore, operating service three times a week 
rather than daily ordinarily would not produce significant and 
immediate cash savings.
    However, these are not ordinary times. Since ridership and revenues 
on long distance trains (other than the Auto Train) have fallen 
precipitously, we are incurring huge, additional operating losses for 
each train we operate--for the benefit of just a third of the normal 
number of passengers. Given that, we felt that it would be 
irresponsible to continue spending a much larger share of our limited 
funding to provide the same frequency of service for a much smaller 
number of remaining passengers, particularly as we entered the Fall/
Winter season when monthly long distance ridership normally declines up 
to 40% from the Summer peak.
    Beginning in October, we will temporarily reduce service on most 
long-distance routes from daily to three times per week. The exceptions 
are the Auto Train, which will continue to operate daily; the Silver 
Meteor, which began operating four days a week in July to provide daily 
service between New York City and Miami in combination with the Silver 
Star, which was reduced to tri-weekly operation and operates a similar 
route between New York City and Miami; and the Cardinal and Sunset 
Limited, which already operate three times a week.
    Like the more significant service reductions we have made on our 
NEC and state supported routes, these long distance frequency 
adjustments will be temporary. As ridership returns, we intend to 
restore service frequency to previous levels. We remain committed to 
our long distance system.
    If Amtrak receives less than $4.9 billion and there is no 
congressional directive related to long distance service, we will 
evaluate three metrics to decide in February of next year whether to 
restore daily service on each affected long distance route.
    1)  Public Health: Is the COVID-19 pandemic under control? Are 
COVID-19-related hospitalization rates in the regions through which a 
given long distance route operates stable or declining?
    2)  Future Demand: Are customers booking trips near the same rate 
as in 2020? Is the percentage of available seat- and room-miles booked 
for 2021 (as of February 15, 2021) at least 90% of the percentage for 
June 2020 (as of February 15, 2020), taking into account any caps on 
ticket sales to promote social distancing or other relevant measures 
adopted to minimize COVID-19-related risks?
    3)  Current Performance: Is ridership close to our projections in 
our operating plan? Was systemwide ridership in the First Quarter of FY 
2021 (October-December 2020) at least 90% of the projected figure in 
our FY 2021 operating plan, which already accounts for reduced 
ridership due to COVID-19?

    If all three conditions are met for a given long distance route, we 
will restore daily service along that route between late May and June 
2021. If any route is not yet ready to be restored when we conduct our 
review, we will apply an updated version of the criteria described 
above as part of our FY 2022 planning cycle (or sooner, in the event of 
a dramatic improvement in demand prior to that point).
    One thing I want to make absolutely clear: these long distance 
frequency reductions are temporary. We are committed to continuing to 
operate our current long distance network and to improving the service 
we provide to our long distance passengers. However, we need two things 
from Congress to enable us to provide a viable long distance service 
when the COVID-19 pandemic is at last behind us. The first is increased 
funding for essential long distance capital investments, particularly 
equipment. Most of the passenger cars we operate on our long distance 
trains are already, or will soon be, more than 40 years old. These cars 
have reached the end of their useful lives and must be replaced if we 
are to maintain current long distance services.
    The second thing we need from Congress is the ability to enforce 
our statutory right to preference over freight trains. The greatest 
threat to the future of our long distance network is not COVID-19 but 
rather poor on-time performance that diminishes the value of these 
services to our customers. The leading cause of delays to our long 
distance trains is the failure of some of our host railroads to comply 
with this longstanding legal obligation to provide Amtrak trains with 
preference over their tracks. During FY 2019, our trains incurred over 
one million minutes of delays due to freight train interference on host 
railroads. While freight train interference also affects some state 
supported routes, our long distance passengers--who have the same right 
to arrive at their destinations on time as passengers on the Amtrak-
dispatched NEC--bear the brunt of these railroads' inability or refusal 
to obey the law. We are very grateful that this Committee included a 
provision in the INVEST in America Act that gives us the ability to 
enforce our preference rights.
    Our commitment to the future of our long distance network is 
reflected in the many investments we are currently pursuing, despite 
funding limitations that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated, to 
modernize our long distance service and enhance its safety.
      Capital projects to improve accessibility for customers 
with disabilities and the experience of all customers when they use our 
stations are under construction at eight stations served only by long 
distance trains; projects at 16 more long distance-only stations are 
out for bid or in final design.
      We are taking delivery of the last of the 130 Viewliner 
II cars that have replaced the long distance cars that were the oldest 
equipment in our fleet; we are refreshing the interiors of our other 
long distance passenger cars with new seat cushions, upholstery, and 
carpet.
      We have ordered 75 new Amtrak Long Distance Charger 4,200 
horsepower (ALC-42) diesel locomotives that will begin the replacement 
of our long distance locomotive fleet; and we are planning for the 
acquisition of the next generation of long distance passenger 
equipment.
      We continue to invest in track upgrades across multiple 
long distance routes, including major upgrades on the Southwest Chief 
route and improvements to Chicago-area tracks used by the Cardinal, and 
are working to install positive train control (PTC) technology or make 
other safety enhancing investments on portions of eight long distance 
routes.
                        Adjustments to Workforce
    From the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, what has been most 
important to us other than ensuring the safety of our passengers and 
employees is preserving the jobs of our workforce. Avoiding involuntary 
reductions in force was not only the right thing to do, it was also 
necessary to safeguard the skills, talent, and experience of our 
employees, our most valuable asset. The aid extended to Amtrak by the 
CARES Act allowed us to make it through FY 2020 with no involuntary 
furloughs or layoffs.
    With the CARES Act funding running out, and the increasing 
recognition by everyone in the travel industry that it will be years 
before travel demand returns to normal, we recognize that we cannot ask 
Congress and the taxpayers to continue to pay all of the employees for 
whom we will not have any work in the foreseeable future. Likewise, as 
the state partners who provide funding for our State-Supported services 
struggle with unprecedented fiscal challenges brought about by COVID-
19, many of them have made it clear to us that they will not be able to 
continue to pay for those services unless we reduce our costs to 
reflect the significant reductions in the number of trains operating, 
and the much greater losses in ticket revenues. Other companies in the 
travel industry--an industry severely decimated by COVID-19--are facing 
the same dilemma. Most major airlines have announced plans to reduce 
their workforces by 20% or more when the CARES Act prohibition on 
airline employee furloughs ends on September 30.
    While we see no alternative to workforce reductions, we have taken 
every possible step to minimize the number of people whose jobs will be 
impacted. As I mentioned earlier, we offered voluntary unpaid leave to 
our employees and implemented other cost-saving measures that enabled 
us to stretch out our CARES Act funding. When it became apparent that 
we would have to become a smaller company, we implemented a voluntary 
separation incentive program in which 521 agreement-covered and 
management employees elected to participate. As we undertake painful 
but necessary reductions of 100 management employees and 1,950 
furloughs among our agreement forces, we will continue to communicate 
with our employees, their union representatives, and Congress regarding 
adjustments to our workforce. Going forward, we will do everything in 
our power to bring employees who must be furloughed back to our 
workforce as soon as possible.
    Looking at both the temporary changes to our long distance service 
and our recent workforce reductions, I must emphasize that Amtrak 
really had no choice but to take these actions, given the uncertainty 
in our federal funding. Without these vital cost saving measures, we 
will burn through nearly $250 million each month, ultimately forcing us 
to take drastic measures that would have wide-ranging impacts on the 
company, our employees, and our ability to serve our customers. If this 
continued long enough, we would eventually face insolvency.
                          Capital Commitments
    The biggest challenge Amtrak has faced since we began operation in 
1971 is the lack of dedicated and reliable capital funding. One of the 
most significant accomplishments Amtrak has made in recent years is 
that our increased revenues and more efficient operations have enabled 
us to set aside money from our annual appropriations, which in years 
past were used primarily to subsidize operations, so that we can fund 
critically important capital projects. In addition to the long distance 
investments I already mentioned, the most urgent investment needs 
include replacement of the 45-year old Amfleet I fleet that provides 
most of our NEC and much of our state supported service and major 
capital projects such as Portal North Bridge, New York Penn Moynihan 
Train Hall, and desperately needed improvements at Chicago Union 
Station.
    Some have suggested that Amtrak should not alter its services or 
workforce to reflect the greatly reduced ridership and financial 
changes wrought by COVID-19, but should instead take money out of these 
capital commitments and use it to fund regular operations for the 
duration of this crisis. I cannot emphasize too strongly that 
cannibalizing these capital funds is the wrong approach. Using scarce 
capital funding to operate nearly empty trains would not be productive, 
nor would it be a prudent use of the American taxpayer's investment in 
Amtrak. Rather, it would preclude us from undertaking projects that 
will increase safety, enhance reliability, and improve convenience in 
ways that will benefit tens of millions of our customers in FY 2021 and 
the years ahead. It is also critical that Congress understands that 
slashing capital spending would not prevent workforce reductions since 
much of this capital spending goes for the wages and benefits of the 
Amtrak employees who work on capital projects. Maintaining and 
improving infrastructure supports a large, dedicated, skilled 
workforce, representing approximately 2,000 full time equivalent 
employees. To be clear, cutting capital spending would also result in 
workforce reductions.
    It is also misleading to call our capital needs discretionary. Some 
of our capital dollars are restricted by law from being used for other 
purposes, such as the federal dollars Congress has directed us to set 
aside for ADA compliance, upgrades to the Southwest Chief route, and 
important safety technology for certain corridor routes. The Northeast 
Corridor Commission estimates that the NEC has a more-than-$40 billion 
state-of-good-repair backlog. When we delay the replacement of century-
old infrastructure, the Amtrak employees who would perform the work on 
those projects bear the immediate cost. But the Amtrak and commuter 
train passengers who use the NEC every day also pay the cost, as they 
endure the unreliability that comes with depending on infrastructure 
never meant for today's demands. We cannot allow the COVID-19 crisis to 
cost us projects that are essential to restoring and maintaining normal 
operations and will dramatically improve the safety, reliability, and 
quality of our services for many decades to come.
                            Amtrak's Future
    2020 has been a hard year for the country and for Amtrak. We will 
be grappling with the effects of the pandemic for years to come. 
However, it is important to remind ourselves of deeper trends that 
still bode well for Amtrak's future, despite the setbacks we are 
currently facing. COVID-19 has not changed the fact that intercity 
passenger rail is the most efficient and the most environmentally 
responsible way to serve the transportation need of the megaregions 
throughout the country whose rapid population growth will continue. It 
has not changed the need to address highway congestion by steps other 
than adding more lanes. In fact, highway congestion is already 
returning as travelers resume driving between cities and avoid air and 
transit travel due to social distancing concerns. Nor has COVID-19 
reduced the requests Amtrak receives from communities and elected 
officials across the country for service in corridors and regions we do 
not serve today. Finally, the extraordinary increase in unemployment 
that COVID-19 has spawned has reinforced the need for many additional 
good, living wage jobs for skilled employees of the kind that Amtrak, 
and the companies from which we buy equipment, goods, and services, 
provide.
    We want to be ready to provide the passenger rail service America 
needs as the country returns to normal: along the Northeast Corridor 
where the much-anticipated replacement of the Acela fleet will begin 
next year; on our state-supported routes and new intercity corridors, 
where we see our greatest opportunities to meaningfully address the 
carbon crisis and enhance mobility as our population continues to grow; 
and in the small towns throughout rural America where our long distance 
trains help connect our riders to their family and friends. In the 
meantime, I am committed to working through this crisis with you, our 
employees, our state partners, our customers and other stakeholders to 
best manage the near-term challenges while protecting the future we all 
want for intercity passenger service in the next 50 years.
    Thank you for your time and your support of Amtrak. I look forward 
to your questions.
 COVID-19 Service Reductions on Northeast Corridor and State-Supported 
                                 Routes
    Note that daily totals for some routes may be averages.
      Acela: Suspended entirely March 23-June 1. Currently 
operating 4 daily round trips.
      Northeast Regional: Most service initially suspended 
Currently operating 10 round trips Washington-New York City and 8 round 
trips New York City-Boston on weekdays, and reduced service on 
weekends.
      Adirondack: Suspended Albany-Montreal since March 17.
      Blue Water: Unchanged
      Capitol Corridor: Operating 8 daily round trips, down 
from 12, with reduced weekend service.
      Carolinian: Suspended entirely April through June. Now 
operating with reduced capacity.
      Cascades: Operating 1 round trip Seattle-Portland-Eugene, 
down from 4; no service Vancouver, BC-Seattle.
      Downeaster: Initially suspended entirely; now operating 4 
round trips, down from 5.
      Empire Service: Operating 9 weekday round trips, down 
from 12, with reduced service on weekends.
      Empire West/Maple Leaf: Initially reduced to 1 daily 
round trip, now 2, down from 3. Service suspended between Niagara 
Falls, New York and Toronto, Canada.
      Ethan Allen: Suspended north of Albany since March 17.
      Heartland Flyer: Unchanged.
      Hiawatha: Initially suspended; now operating 4 weekday 
round trips, down from 7.
      Illini/Saluki: Operating 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
      Illinois Zephyr/Carl Sandburg: 1 daily round trip, down 
from 2.
      Keystone: Suspended March 18 to June 1. Full service 
recently restored Harrisburg-Philadelphia; Philadelphia-New York City 
suspended except for 1 weekday round trip.
      Lincoln Service: Operating 2 daily round trips, down from 
4.
      Missouri River Runner: 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
      New Haven-Springfield/Valley Flyer: Operating 5 daily New 
Haven-Springfield round trips, down from 8; 1 round trip north of 
Springfield, down from 2.
      Pacific Surfliner: 6 daily round trips between Los 
Angeles and San Diego, down from 13; 4 of normal 5 round trips north of 
Los Angeles.
      Pennsylvanian: Suspended March 19; resumed June 1.
      Pere Marquette: Suspended March 21; resumed June 29.
      Piedmont: Operating 1 daily round, down from 3.
      San Joaquins: Operating 4 daily round trips between 
Bakersfield-Oakland, down from 5. Bakersfield-Sacramento service 
suspended.
      Vermonter: Suspended north of New Haven since March 26.
      Wolverine: 1 daily round trip, down from 3.
      Washington-Roanoke: Unchanged.
      Washington-Newport News: Full service recently restored.
      Washington-Norfolk: 1 daily round trip, down from 2.
      Washington-Richmond: 1 daily round trip suspended.

    Mr. Lipinski. And thank you, Mr. Flynn. We will now move on 
to Mr. Maratea. Mr. Maratea, I hope that I pronounced that 
correctly this time.
    Mr. Maratea. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, you did. Perfect, 
right on the mark.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you, Ranking 
Member Crawford, Chairman DeFazio, for allowing me to speak 
today on the impact of COVID-19 on Amtrak's workforce.
    My name is Artie Maratea, national president of the 
Transportation Communications Union.
    TCU is the largest labor unit on Amtrak, representing 
approximately 1,600 workers in the clerical, fireman, 
supervisory, and other crafts. I am here on behalf of Amtrak 
workers to urge Congress and President Trump to act now to 
preserve our Nation's railroad, protect Amtrak workers from 
getting furloughed, and reauthorize the extension and expansion 
of RUI benefits, so that thousands of railroaders continue to 
put food on the table.
    Today the immediate future of Amtrak's workforce is largely 
uncertain. With the additional funds from the CARES Act drying 
up, and overall ridership severely reduced compared to last 
year, Amtrak now stands at the edge of a fiscal cliff. Absent 
action from Congress, October 1st will mark the beginning of 
severe workforce and service reductions, nationwide.
    This House of Representatives passed their fiscal year 2021 
THUD bill, which included $10 billion in operating, capital, 
and emergency response grants for Amtrak, and a requirement to 
maintain the workforce and route frequencies. On behalf of 
Amtrak workers, I call on the Senate to pass the House bill and 
for President Trump to sign it today.
    The COVID crisis has been a nightmare for all of us, but 
particularly for the transportation sector. That is why TCU has 
been outspoken about the size of aid Amtrak would need early 
on. Last week Amtrak finally increased their fiscal year 2021 
supplemental request to $2.9 billion, which includes 
maintaining the workforce and long-distance frequencies. 
Unfortunately, they also began issuing furlough notices to all 
of their crafts in the event Congress doesn't provide adequate 
funding.
    And just to be clear, if Amtrak receives no supplemental 
funding on October 1st, the damage will be catastrophic. 
According to Amtrak, service cuts would be severe, and 
furloughs would amount to approximately 60 percent of the 
workforce. These are the same frontline transportation workers 
that have been coming in to work day after day during the 
pandemic at great risk to themselves and their families. Many 
have contracted the virus. Some have died.
    You can understand my frustration and why Amtrak workers 
are so scared for their future. While many Americans have had 
the luxury of working from home, these Amtrak workers have been 
putting their lives on the line to keep our fragile economy 
moving. Our people have sacrificed, and now they are faced with 
losing their jobs come October 1st. These people need action, 
and they need it now.
    Unfortunately, Amtrak workers are indeed furloughed. The 
CARES Act, the expansion of railroad unemployment insurance, 
has already expired. But these thousands of railroaders will be 
immediately thrown into a system that is already under immense 
pressure.
    President Trump's memo addressing unemployment insurance 
attempts to provide a $300 expanded benefit for regular, State-
based unemployment insurance. Unfortunately, President Trump's 
memo does nothing for railroaders, as it fails to include them 
in the expanded benefit. It doesn't even mention railroad 
unemployment insurance.
    And to make matters worse, unlike every other unemployment 
insurance program in the country, railroad unemployment is 
unique, since it is the only one subject to budget 
sequestration. This means that not only will furloughed 
railroaders not receive the expanded benefits, but the regular 
RUI checks will be reduced by 6 percent. This is unfair, and 
Congress should fix this today.
    Fortunately, this House of Representatives has once again 
already paved the way. The Heroes Act included both an 
extension and expansion of RUI, as well as removing it from 
sequestration. On both RUI and Amtrak funding, we urge the 
Senate to follow the House's lead, and act now to prevent the 
kind of economic collapse that would occur if our 
transportation modes and workers are left to wither on the 
vine.
    I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Maratea's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
       Prepared Statement of Arthur Maratea, National President, 
                  Transportation Communications Union
    I want to thank Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and 
Chairman DeFazio for inviting me to speak today on the impact of COVID-
19 on the Amtrak workforce.
    My name is Artie Maratea, National President of the Transportation 
Communications Union (TCU).
    TCU is the largest labor union on Amtrak, representing clerical 
crafts, ticket clerks, station agents, onboard service staff, customer 
service representatives, supervisors, coach cleaners, car repairmen, 
and others.
    I'm here on behalf of these thousands of Amtrak workers to urge 
Congress and President Trump to act now to preserve our nation's 
railroad, protect good jobs at Amtrak, and reauthorize the extension 
and expansion of RUI benefits so that thousands of railroaders--Amtrak 
or otherwise--can continue to put food on the table.
                            Amtrak's Outlook
    Today, the immediate future of Amtrak's workforce is largely 
uncertain. With the additional funds from the CARES Act drying up, and 
overall ridership continuing to be severely reduced compared to last 
year, Amtrak now stands on the edge of a fiscal cliff. Absent action 
from Congress, October 1st will mark the beginning of severe workforce 
and service reductions nationwide.
    Amtrak's heavily-criticized May 25th Supplemental Grant Request 
initially outlined their intention to furlough up to 3,700 employees 
and reduce most long-distance trains from daily to three times per 
week. TCU and others disagreed with Amtrak issuing a self-defeating 
proposal that volunteered the elimination of employees--our members. 
Others, such as the Rail Passengers Association (RPA), were similarly 
outraged by Amtrak's proposed reduction of long-distance train 
frequencies. Indeed, these actions align with former Amtrak CEO Richard 
Anderson's long-sought goal of gutting the National Network. To this 
point, Amtrak's proposal for returning long-distance service, once cut, 
leaves too many unanswered questions, and fails to guarantee its return 
to pre-COVID levels.
    Many in the Senate also expressed their frustrations with Amtrak's 
proposals, including Republican Senators Daines (MT), Cramer (ND), 
Hoeven (ND) and Braun (IN), as well as Democratic Senators Tester (MT), 
Bennet (CO), Heinrich (NM) and Udall (NM). We thank these Senators for 
standing up for Amtrak workers and service.



    Our own analysis of Amtrak's May 25th request shows that the 
proposed savings don't add up, while shifting much of the financial 
burden to taxpayers.\1\ Regardless, Amtrak's proposal relied on getting 
$1.5 billion in supplemental funding--a figure critics believed would 
be grossly insufficient, even in the earlier days of the pandemic, and 
which has proven true with Amtrak's most recent updated request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Transportation Communications Union: ``Amtrak cuts save less 
than you think'' 8/3/20 [Attachment A]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If Congress fails to act, and Amtrak receives no supplemental 
funding on October 1st, the damage to the railroad would be 
catastrophic: according to Amtrak, furloughs would amount to over 
10,000 employees (approx. 60% of the workforce) and service cuts would 
be severe across all business lines.
    There is indeed wide bipartisan agreement that Amtrak should 
continue to exist as our National Passenger Railroad. The question 
before us today: when will Amtrak and Congress take action to ensure 
its survival? Today? Or after it's too late.
    On July 28th, TCU, TWU and other rail labor unions issued our 
request for $4.5 billion in supplemental funding for Amtrak [$6.5 
billion total FY21 funding].\2\ RPA supports bold funding as well. This 
House of Representatives included $10 billion in operating, capital, 
and emergency response grants in their THUD appropriations bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Transportation Trades Dept., AFL-CIO letter to Congressional 
Leadership on Amtrak funding, 7/28/20 [Attachment B]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What is Amtrak doing? It took Amtrak until this past week to 
finally increase their FY21 supplemental request to $2.9 billion [$4.9 
billion total].
    Don't get me wrong: we're glad Amtrak came to their senses, but 
what took them so long? Airlines and Transit agencies have had their 
grant request figures out for months. It feels like Amtrak had to be 
shamed into asking for adequate help. And just as the airlines' payroll 
support program seeks to protect airline workers from furlough, any 
funding provided to Amtrak by Congress must guarantee protections for 
the workforce and daily long-distance service.
    Again, we're glad Amtrak's request is finally moving towards their 
true needs to maintain the workforce and long-distance routes. Sadly, 
it comes a mere three weeks before the new fiscal year.
    You can therefore understand my frustration, and why thousands of 
Amtrak workers are so scared about the next few months. While many 
Americans have had the luxury of working from home, these Amtrak 
workers--as well as their counterparts in other transportation modes--
have been putting their lives on the line to keep our fragile economy 
moving, at great risk to themselves and their families.
    To date, Amtrak has done a reasonably acceptable job protecting our 
members and riders from COVID-19 transmission, including mandating 
masks for both employees and riders. However, there have been some 
concerns. For example, some Onboard Service crews have complained 
they're given inadequate supplies of PPE and cleaning agents to last 
the duration of their roundtrip shift deployment. These workers--and 
many others in the transportation sector--need assurances and support 
as the pandemic continues.
    TCU is very supportive of legislative efforts to establish strong 
federal mandates on issues like the provision of PPE and cleaning 
protocols, including language in the HEROES Act, an amendment that was 
included in H.R. 2 offered by Rep. Chuy Garcia, as well as S. 3884, the 
Essential Transportation Employee Safety Act of 2020.
    As September 1st, 3,843 Amtrak workers have had to quarantine and 
miss work, 462 have contracted the virus, and, sadly, some have died. 
These people have sacrificed, risking exposure to themselves and their 
families, and now they're faced with losing their jobs come October 
1st.
    The House of Representatives has been proactive in trying to put 
some certainty in their lives by averting this nightmare scenario.
    Amtrak workers were thrilled to see the FY2021 funding numbers in 
the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (THUD) appropriations 
bill, which included $10 billion for Amtrak's operating and capital 
budgets, as well as to respond to the pandemic. The bill also requires 
Amtrak to retain its workforce and train frequencies, provisions that 
must be included in any supplementary funding agreement.
    This is the kind of bold action that Amtrak workers need--and they 
needed it yesterday.
    TCU strongly urges the Senate to follow the House's lead, and act 
now to ensure that Amtrak workers can stay on and continue to move 
Americans across the country.
                    Railroad Unemployment Insurance
    Without immediate action from Congress, Amtrak will be sending 
thousands onto the Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) rolls. 
Unfortunately, RUI is dire straits as well. The expansion and extension 
of RUI that was included in the CARES Act expired on July 31st, and the 
additional funds provided to the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) for 
administering these increased benefits are nearly gone.
    On August 8th, President Trump issued a Memorandum attempting to 
unilaterally address the lapsing of the Unemployment Insurance 
expansion. His memo attempts to provide a $300 expanded benefit for 
regular State-based Unemployment Insurance. Unfortunately, President 
Trump's memo does nothing for railroaders as it fails to include them 
in the extended benefit.
    And, while I'm on the topic, the Senate Republican Leadership's 
July 27th draft coronavirus relief package failed to include RUI as 
well.
    The current maximum benefit under Railroad Unemployment Insurance 
(RUI) is $80 per day, or $400 per week. Unfortunately, in 1985, the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act mistakenly included 
RUI on a list of programs subject to sequestration, railroaders must 
now take an artificial 6% hit to their RUI checks.
    This is a slap in the face to railroaders who deserve every bit of 
their earned benefit. Congress should fix this unfairness today.
    Please note that no other Unemployment Insurance program is subject 
to sequestration, only railroaders. I can think of no better time to 
remedy this unfairness than today, when so many railroaders are being 
furloughed, and families of the unemployed need every dollar they're 
owed.
    That's why the Rail Labor Division (RLD) joined the Association of 
American Railroads (AAR) and the American Short Line and Regional 
Railroad Association (ASLRRA) wrote a joint letter urging Congress to 
remove RUI from the list of programs subject to sequestration.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ RLD-AAR-ASSLRA May 4th, 2020 letter to Congressional leadership 
calling for RUI to be removed from sequestration [Attachment C]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House has at least heard our calls for help as they addressed 
issues surrounding railroad unemployment in the HEROES Act, which 
expanded and extended RUI until January 31st, 2021, while also removing 
RUI from the list of sequestration programs.
    Again, we urge the Senate to pass this legislation today.
    Amtrak workers, our transit workers, and millions of Americans need 
Congress to act NOW to prevent the kind of economic catastrophe that 
would occur if our transportation modes are left to wither on the vine. 
We ask Congress to provide urgent funding to Amtrak in order to 
preserve our nation's passenger railroad, keep people employed, and 
provide vital transportation access to all the places that Amtrak 
serves.
    Thank you for allowing me to testify.
                              attachment a
                                         Corrected: August 3, 2020.
  Analysis: Amtrak's proposed workforce cuts save less than you think
Introduction
    On May 25th, 2020, Amtrak issued its FY2021 Supplemental grant 
request in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting impact 
on the company's financial position. The railroad argued that the 
severe downturn in ridership--down 95% at its worst--would require 
significant federal assistance to stay afloat. Their request asks for 
$1.475 billion in funding to supplement Amtrak's regular $2.04 billion 
grant request, for a combined $3.515 billion for FY2021.
    Amtrak leadership also conveyed their plan to cut operating 
expenses in order to reduce the size of tax-payer assistance, and 
``reduce enormous losses and protect funding for our critical capital 
needs'' (Amtrak FY21 Supplemental, Pg. 4). Amtrak proposes the round 
figure of $500 million, broken out as $150 million in savings from 
reduced capacity and frequencies of routes (i.e. the reduction of long-
distance train service from daily to 3x a week), and $350 million in 
savings from workforce reductions.
    This memo will focus on the costs associated with furloughing 3,190 
employees for one year (3,700 proposed furloughs minus the 510 
employees that took VSIP), to include direct costs to Amtrak as well as 
costs to taxpayers resulting from the furloughs. For additional 
reading, please review the Rail Passengers Association's (RPA) analysis 
on the public costs of reducing long-distance train services.
    On its face, Amtrak's proposal to reduce its workforce by up to 20% 
(3,700 people) seems like a prudent move by any company in dire 
financial straits. However, due to the nature of the service, the 
unique costs of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) system, 
ancillary costs associated with health insurance and healthcare 
utilization, and the costs of training new hires upon resumption of 
service, the savings to taxpayers are nowhere close to what Amtrak 
advertises in their FY2021 Supplemental grant request.
Summary
    Amtrak initiated a Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP) 
which culminated in the planned exit of 510 employees: 226 management, 
and 284 agreement (aka ``union'') personnel. Amtrak set separation 
payments at $20,000 per management employee and $10,000 per agreement 
employee, for a total cost to Amtrak at $7,360,000.
    Subtracting 510 employees from the stated 3,700 announced furloughs 
leaves 3,190 employees to be furloughed beginning on October 1st, 2020, 
per Amtrak's proposal. The following is our estimation of the flawed 
and misleading savings Amtrak is reporting as part of the plan outlined 
in their FY2021 Supplemental Grant request, and how the amount the 
proposed savings is not close to what is being proposed, only saving 
Amtrak and taxpayers approximately $40,826,168 after factoring in all 
costs attributable to the furloughs.
    Please note that this paper does not address the potential 
destruction of Amtrak as we know it, by reducing long-distance routes 
from daily to 3x week, and the loss of economic activity that would 
befall small communities across America as a result.
Analysis
The following analysis should be read along with the accompanying cost 
spreadsheet. Please cite the spreadsheet for detail regarding 
calculations, estimates and assumptions.
    Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Amtrak is part of the 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) system, which is a benefit 
administered through the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), and serves as 
the unemployment insurance system for railroad workers in place of 
State-based UI. Under the RUI system, normal benefits last for 26 
weeks, with an additional 13 weeks for tenured railroaders (those with 
over 10 years of railroad service). The CARES Act added an additional 
13 weeks onto RUI resulting in 52 weeks total (26+13+13=52 weeks).
    Based on the 52-week benefit term period (and the assumption of 
tenured 10-year railroaders), and the normal $400/week benefit, regular 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance will cost taxpayers $66,352,000. And 
while this would not be borne out on Amtrak's balance sheet, they are 
still considered tax dollars via the federal government.
    Using the same figures in the preceding paragraph but using the 
$600/week benefit, per CARES Act, the expanded benefits would cost 
taxpayers an additional $74,646,000 if continued for all 52 weeks.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Congress is currently debating amending the UI expansion and 
extension that was part of the CARES Act, but due to time constraints 
and impending legislation we chose to calculate as if the expansion is 
to be continued for the foreseeable future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    RUI Employer Tax Increases--Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) 
contributions are paid by railroad employers, not employees. There is a 
separate variable surcharge tax applied to all railroad employers, but 
for the purposes of this analysis we will only discuss the ``Experience 
Rate'' placed on an employer because it is reactive to the employer's 
usage of the RUI system.
    To explain the Experience Rate: if Company X uses RUI frequently 
(i.e. furloughs people often), Company X pays more in the subsequent 
years (the experience rate is based on a 5-year average so as not to 
sticker-shock employers with a tax increase). The rate is formulated 
based on payouts from RUI versus Company X's remaining compensation 
base.
    [Again, there's also a Surcharge placed on all employers depending 
on whether the RUI account's funds are running low (the threshold is 
indexed annually), but we won't include those calculations here since 
it would be difficult to ascribe what percentage of the Surcharge Tax 
increase would be attributable to Amtrak's furloughs.]
    Since individual employer overall tax rates are not disclosed, we 
have to estimate based on prior instances of mass furloughs to a 
Carrier, and the resulting experience rate increases over the several 
years that followed. We estimate the individual experience rate to 
Amtrak would be increased to at least 4.93% in the first year it is 
counted (2022), with the rate gradually decreasing over the next few 
years. [Remember: the experience rate is a 5-year average of the 
company's utilization of the RUI system, so a single mass furlough will 
impact the company's taxes for several years.]
    In addition, the Experience Rate tax is only applied to approx. the 
first $20,000 of an employee's annual earnings, or $1,666 per month. 
It's currently $1,655 in 2020, but we index to $1,666/mo or $20k/year 
for 2022 calculation and reuse that figure for simplicity (even though 
the figure would actually be higher in subsequent years 2023-26). 
Therefore, based on the remaining workforce of 14,900 and at an annual 
taxable base of $20k per employee, the total annual taxable 
compensation for Amtrak would be $298 million.
    Using $298 million as the compensation base subject to taxes, and 
the estimated increased tax rates projected over 5-years, we can 
project a total Experience Rate tax increase on Amtrak of $43,270,494--
all due to the one-time furlough of 3,190 employees.
    Lost Health & Welfare Contributions--Currently, Amtrak employees 
contribute $228/month towards their health insurance. Amtrak has agreed 
to carry furloughed employees on their health insurance for a year 
after Oct. 1st. While this is indeed a nice benefit--and was called out 
by union officials and agreed to by Amtrak--the end result is still an 
added cost to Amtrak as a result of furloughs, and therefore is 
expected to cost Amtrak $8,727,840 for FY2021 in lost contributions 
from furloughed employees.
    Increased Healthcare Utilization by Furloughed Employees--Amtrak is 
self-insured and as such must make payments of the costs, on a monthly 
basis, for their workers utilization of healthcare services. Rail Labor 
estimates increases their utilization by at least 8%. This is 
conceptually supported by an National Institute of Health (NIH) study 
that found that employees who retain their Health Insurance after 
furloughs are announced.\2\ It is therefore estimated the additional 
usage of the healthcare system by furloughed workers will cost Amtrak 
$8,160,000 in premium increases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Hamad, R., Modrek, S., & Cullen, M. R. (2016). The Effects of 
Job Insecurity on Health Care Utilization: Findings from a Panel of 
U.S. Workers. Health services research, 51(3), 1052-1073. https://
doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12393
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amtrak's Training costs due to Furloughs--Amtrak will incur 
training costs to replace approximately 80% of the furloughed workforce 
when service and ridership returns to prepandemic levels. This 
percentage is from past experience on Amtrak.
    According to an Amtrak OIG analysis, Amtrak spent between $40-$45 
Million on training in 2009. This is the last year that this 
information has been available. According to the report, more than half 
of the training dollars were spent on new employees. After calculating 
the per employee cost and adjusting for inflation, the 2020 cost of 
training is $12,401 per new employee. Applying the percentage of 
employees who did not return to Amtrak after furlough (80%), 2,552 
employees will need to be trained at a cost of $30,889,408.
Conclusion
    The COVID-19 crisis is taking a toll on all transportation modes, 
and Amtrak is no different. While ridership revenues are down across 
all of Amtrak's business lines (NEC, Long-Distance, State-Supported), 
that does not mean that people aren't continuing to ride, or that 
ridership won't return once the pandemic abates. Indeed, Amtrak's Long-
Distance trains have lost less ridership than other business lines, 
indicating a resilient and dedicated ridership that is choosing Amtrak 
for intercity travel, both for its quality experience and the ability 
to be more socially distant.
    This memo has shown, from a purely cost-standpoint, why Congress 
should think twice before adopting Amtrak's FY2021 Supplemental request 
proposal. As we've shown, the net savings for Amtrak and taxpayers 
associated with furloughing 3,190 employees is relatively minimal 
compared to the drastic service reductions. In addition, the skilled 
workforce that Amtrak relies on to operate and deliver a top-quality 
experience would be decimated by these cuts, and retraining employees 
after the pandemic abates would not only cost Amtrak millions, but 
would inevitably delay and complicate Amtrak's ability to restart in a 
timely manner.
    The Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM) is the largest 
union on Amtrak, representing approx. 6800 employees in various 
clerical, onboard service, supervisory, and maintenance crafts. On 
behalf of our members, we strongly encourage Congress to fully fund 
Amtrak in a manner that keeps our people employed and running trains at 
robust frequencies.
_______________________________________________________________________

Transportation Communications Union (TCU/IAM)
Legislative Department

Bill DeCarlo,
Nat. Vice President & Nat. Legislative Director.

Dave Arouca,
Asst. National Legislative Director.

        Amtrak saving & costs associated w/furloughing employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Amtrak's Proposed Savings (via FY21 Supplemental)
                          Assumed base figures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY19 total employees (per Amtrak FY19 year-end                   18,600
 corporate profile):.................................
FY21 total expected employees (FY19 minus proposed               14,900
 workforce reductions)...............................
Proposed employee furloughs (3,700 minus 510 VSIP)...             3,190
Average Amtrak salary:...............................           $87,847
  Amtrak's proposed total salary cost savings:.......      $280,231,930
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     TCU's calculated costs associated w/furloughing 3,190 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost H&W Contributions...............................        $8,727,840
RUI--Regular.........................................       $66,352,000
RUI--Expansion (+$600)...............................       $74,646,000
Est. increased RUIA Experience Rate taxes on Amtrak..       $43,270,494
VSIP costs...........................................        $7,360,000
Estimated increased Healthcare costs (from increased         $8,160,000
 utilization)........................................
Est. cost to retrain employees (based on rehiring           $30,889,408
 same number of ``proposed furloughs''):.............
                                                      ------------------
  Total Amtrak/taxpayer costs for fuloughing:........      $239,405,742
    ACTUAL net savings from furloughing 3,190               $40,826,188
     employees:......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Lost Health & Welfare (H&W) Contributions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             3,190
Monthly employee HC contribution:....................              $228
Monthly total employee HC contribution:..............          $727,320
  Annual total employee HC contributions.............        $8,727,840
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) Costs--Regular
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             3,190
Weekly RUI (per employee):...........................              $400
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................        $1,276,000
  Total RUI expansion costs (52 weeks available):....       $66,352,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Expansion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             3,190
Weekly RUI expansion (per employee):.................              $600
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................        $1,914,000
  Total RUI expansion costs (39 weeks available):....       $74,646,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
                     RUI Employer Tax Increases \**\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak compensation base subject to RUI Experience         $298,000,000
 Rate taxes (only applies to first $20k in comp. per
 employee):..........................................
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate........................             4.97%
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........       $14,803,746
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate........................             4.93%
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........       $14,700,042
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate........................             2.64%
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $7,881,504
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate........................             1.71%
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $5,081,496
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate........................             0.27%
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........          $803,706
                                                      ------------------
  Est. Experience Rate total cost as a direct result        $43,270,494
   of furloughs:.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
226 management x $20k buyout.........................        $4,520,000
284 agreement x $10k buyout..........................        $2,840,000
                                                      ------------------
  Total VSIP cost:...................................        $7,360,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Increased Healthcare Costs (not including vision/dental)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furloughed Employees.................................             3,190
Amtrak healthcare costs, per employee, per month                 $2,500
 (avg)...............................................
Amtrak's monthly healthcare costs for furloughed             $7,975,000
 employees...........................................
Amtrak's annual healthcare costs for furloughed             $95,700,000
 employees...........................................
Est. percentage increase in healthcare costs due to                  8%
 increased utilization: \***\........................
  2021 premium increase in usage est.................        $8,160,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Amtrak's cost to train new hires (post-pandemic)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report: ``Amtrak spends between $40-45 million on           $42,500,000
 training each year'':...............................
Report: ``More than half spent on new employees''           $22,100,000
 (Extrapolation: multiply by 52%)...................
Report: ``Amtrak hired 1097 new employees over first              1,097
 6 months of 2009''..................................
Extrapolate annual new hires by multiplying x2)......              2194
2009 training costs per new hire (divide new hire               $10,073
 training costs / Est. 2009 total new hires) =.......
Adj. for inflation, expressed in 2020 $$.............           $12,104
New hires to retrain after pandemic: 80% of those                2,960
 furloughed don't return.............................
  Cost to train new hires after pandemic:............       $30,889,408
Source: Amtrak OIG report on Training and Employee Development (2009)
 https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/
 Training%20Eval%20Report%20Final.pdf...................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\**\ NOTE: RUIA taxes on employers expand and contract based on
  utilization of the RUI system. Part of the tax calculation is based on
  a railroad employers individual ``experience rating''--a calculation
  of how much they utilize RUI. This rate varies from the minimum of
  0.65% to a maximum 12% based on the employer's experience rating. The
  tax is also based on a 5 year average of the company's utilization of
  RUI, and is a measure of their usage versus their remaining
  compensation base. Furthermore, the application of the tax is capped
  at $20k per employee, lowering the taxable base. Our calculations are
  based on a 5-year impact to Amtrak's experience rate tax, derived from
  acquired knowledge of another large railroad that recently experienced
  similar furlough trends.
\***\ NOTE: Rail labor estimates that, on average, employees that retain
  their health insurance after being furloughed increase their
  utilization by 8% during their remaining covered period. This is based
  on previous experiences with groups of furloughed members. This is
  also backed up by a National Institute of Health (NIH) study that
  looked at the healthcare utilization of workers at plants where
  furloughs had been announced during the Great Recession (https://
  www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874827/): ``In particular, it
  suggests an increase in overall utilization concerning for
  ``hoarding'' of health care or worsening health, but a relative
  decrease in outpatient care and increase in emergency care among those
  at high-layoff plants. The latter results confirm findings from the
  previous literature that suggest foregone preventive care among
  employed individuals during economic downturns with potentially
  negative long-term health consequences. This study suggests that the
  health and social impacts of increased job insecurity experienced by
  workers during the recent recession may still emerge even as the
  economy improves.''

                              attachment b
                                                     July 28, 2020.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Kevin McCarthy,
Minority Leader,
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
Majority Leader,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Chuck Schumer,
Minority Leader,
United States Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Speaker Pelosi, Leader McConnell, Leader McCarthy, and Leader 
Schumer:
    As Congress continues to negotiate the terms of its next COVID-19 
relief package, we call on you to include emergency supplemental 
funding to preserve Amtrak, the critical services it provides, and the 
livelihoods of its employees. Similar to other modes of passenger 
transportation, Amtrak has seen ridership fall as much as 95% on 
certain routes over the course of the pandemic. In response, Congress 
wisely provided critical financial assistance to the carrier through 
the CARES Act.
    Unfortunately, the ongoing impacts of the pandemic have denied 
Amtrak the revenue it requires to operate a national intercity 
passenger rail service and continued financial assistance is necessary. 
Without additional support, the viability of Amtrak is unequivocally at 
risk. To this end, we request that Congress include $4.5 billion in 
supplementary funding in its next COVID relief package. These funds 
will allow Amtrak to remain operational, to keep its dedicated 
workforce connected to wages and benefits like healthcare, and prevent 
the need for disastrous service cuts on the National Network.
    The result of not providing this level of funding will be dire. The 
most recent request presented by Amtrak is deeply insufficient, and by 
its own admission its plan will send thousands of employees, up to 20% 
if its workforce, to the unemployment lines beginning on October 1. 
Further, this plan would reduce the frequency of many of Amtrak's long 
distance routes from daily to three times a week. These routes serve 
small towns and rural communities who depend on the daily service 
Amtrak provides and will not operate on full schedules without 
financial support and the workforce required to operate them.
    Further, while we strongly support continued assistance for Amtrak, 
it is critical that these funds are used to benefit Amtrak's employees 
and the travelling public. We therefore urge that any supplementary 
funding provided to Amtrak be made contingent on prohibitions against 
using the funds to furlough employees or reduce service and route 
frequencies.
    On behalf of Amtrak's workforce, we call on you to take decisive 
action to protect Amtrak workers, and the integrity of the service they 
provide, to overcome the current crisis and safeguard the future of 
intercity passenger rail service, and we thank you for your 
consideration.
        Sincerely,
                                           Larry I. Willis,
              President, Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO.
                              attachment c
                                                       May 4, 2020.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Chuck Schumer,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kevin McCarthy,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Majority Leader McConnell, Speaker Pelosi, Minority Leader 
Schumer, and Minority Leader McCarthy:
    On behalf of the Rail Labor Division of the Transportation Trades 
Department, AFL-CIO, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association, the Association of American Railroads, and the Teamsters 
Rail Conference, we thank the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. 
Senate for passage of the CARES Act. We are especially appreciative of 
your efforts to ensure that railroad workers, through Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) enhancements, were provided similar 
protections and benefits as other hardworking Americans during this 
pandemic.
    As Congress considers additional legislative packages to address 
the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, we urge you to continue providing parity 
in unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers. 
Additionally, continued investment in the Railroad Retirement Board 
(RRB) is critical to ensure RUIA benefits and protections can be 
delivered in an expeditious manner during this extraordinary time. 
Specifically, we respectfully request:
      An additional $11.5 million in administrative funds to 
support the Agency as it continues in this expanded telework posture to 
aid in the move toward paperless processing, self-service portals, and 
other critical IT enhancements; and
      The removal of RUIA from the effects of sequester, which 
causes an artificial reduction in unemployment benefits, below 
statutorily provided amounts. This would not result in an adverse 
impact on the federal budget. State-administered UI programs are not 
subject to this reduction.

    Your continued support for the men and women who are on the 
frontlines moving America's essential goods is greatly appreciated. 
Thank you for your consideration of these important requests.

  Rail Labor Division of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-
                                                               CIO.
             American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association.
                                 Association of American Railroads.
                                         Teamsters Rail Conference.

    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Maratea. Next we will have Ms. 
Griffin.
    Ms. Griffin, you may proceed.
    Ms. Griffin. Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, 
and members of the committee. On behalf of the members of the 
Transport Workers Union of America, thank you for holding this 
important hearing to discuss the damaging impacts COVID-19 has 
had on Amtrak frontline workers, as well as the railroad's 
response.
    The TWU represents over 150,000 members at railroads, 
airlines, transit systems, and other industries. TWU members, 
like other critical frontline workers across the country, have 
suffered greatly from this virus and the economic fallout. More 
than 90 percent of TWU members, including all of our members at 
Amtrak, are frontline transportation workers who have been 
deemed essential during this pandemic.
    Nearly 10 percent of TWU members have tested positive, or 
have been quarantined from the virus. However, these numbers do 
not account for the additional emotional and mental toll the 
virus has taken on me and my colleagues.
    Despite these serious challenges, TWU members have 
continued to provide essential services across the country. I 
greatly appreciate the opportunity to share both my own 
experience and the experience of Amtrak workers during the 
COVID-19 crisis. This is an issue with which our union is, 
unfortunately, all too familiar. As a lead service attendant 
for Amtrak's onboard service for 32 years, president of 
Transport Workers Union Local 1460, and most importantly, as an 
American, I feel it is my duty to serve under these dire 
circumstances. Amtrak workers have persevered through this 
crisis by relying on each other more than the railroad.
    At the beginning of the crisis, when Amtrak claimed it 
could not find masks or sanitizer for our members, the TWU 
secured proper PPE and distributed it to the frontline 
workforce. Today, while access to protective equipment and 
supplies is no longer an issue, we have been forced to trade 
best practices between ourselves as the company's pandemic 
policies put the frontline workforce at much more risk of 
exposure.
    This past July, while working my regular position as lead 
service attendant on the DC to Boston Amtrak Acela route, I was 
notified by my supervisor that I had been in contact and 
exposed to an employee who tested positive for COVID-19. 
Despite the significantly increased chance of spreading the 
virus, the railroad still expected me to work the rest of my 
scheduled days without seeking testing.
    Fearing the possibility of infecting passengers and 
coworkers on my train, I elevated my concerns, and was 
ultimately told that I would work the trip back from Boston to 
DC, potentially exposing hundreds of passengers needlessly. And 
then I would be taken out of service at the end of the route. 
On the next day I was not removed from service. After again 
elevating the situation through my union, I was finally taken 
offline and told to quarantine for 14 days. However, the 
railroad abruptly ended the quarantine early, and I was never 
tested for COVID-19 before I returned to work.
    My experience is typical of the approach Amtrak has taken 
towards their workforce and the potential spread of COVID-19. 
There is currently a lack of coach cleaners, as a result of the 
coronavirus. Amtrak has chosen to leave these positions vacant, 
making it harder for the cleaners to sanitize the cars 
properly.
    The frontline workforce is working hard every day to 
overcome these unnecessary handicaps, and keeping the traveling 
public safe. This is why it is extremely disheartening that 
Amtrak plans to furlough 20 percent of us beginning in October. 
Per Amtrak management, as many as 10,000 workers at the 
railroad could be impacted by these reductions. Every one of 
these workers is key to responding to the current pandemic and 
to our economic recovery. These are devastating numbers that 
require immediate action from Congress.
    Amtrak's management's recent decisions make it clear that 
these cuts are not necessary in any case. For example, 
management has committed to restarting the 401(k) match for 
themselves beginning in October, just as the first set of 
frontline workers will be sent into unemployment. In November 
pandemic pay cuts for management expire and they will return to 
full pay. Meanwhile, onboard service workers remain at 
significantly reduced hours for the foreseeable future.
    We urge Amtrak to reverse course and prioritize the rank-
and-file frontline workers who interact directly with our 
riders, rather than themselves. All this will be much easier if 
Congress can come together to provide at least $4.5 billion in 
additional support for the railroad. This money would not just 
keep thousands employed, but preserve safe and healthy rail 
travel for the communities we serve.
    Thank you for allowing me to speak today, and I look 
forward to any questions you may have.
    [Ms. Griffin's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Amy Griffin, Local 1460 President, Transport 
                        Workers Union of America
    Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the 
committee, on behalf of the members of the Transport Workers Union of 
America, AFL-CIO, I wanted to thank you for holding this important 
hearing to discuss the damaging impacts COVID-19 has had on Amtrak 
frontline workers, and Amtrak's response.
    The Transport Workers Union represents over 151,000 members across 
the rail, aviation, transit, universities, utilities and services 
sectors. TWU members, like other critical frontline workers across the 
country, have suffered from the threats this virus has posed to our 
daily lives. More than 95% of TWU members are frontline transportation 
workers who have been deemed ``essential workers'' during this 
pandemic.
    Nearly 10% of TWU members have tested positive or been quarantined 
from the virus. However, these numbers don't account for the additional 
emotional and mental toll the virus has taken on my union colleagues as 
they live in fear of potentially bringing this virus home to their 
families, losing co-workers and friends, and potentially serving as a 
vector for the virus to members of our family, community, or workplace. 
Despite these threats, TWU members have continued to provide essential 
services across the country. At airports, train stations, bus depots, 
and as custodians, fighting in the frontline so our first responders 
are able to make it to work in hospitals, clinics, police and fire 
stations.
    I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share both my own 
experience and the experiences of Amtrak workers during the COVID-19 
crisis. This is an issue with which our union is, unfortunately, all 
too familiar. My colleagues and I at Amtrak have witnessed firsthand 
the disastrous effects this pandemic has caused on our personal lives 
and to the economy.
    Amtrak's 20,000 employees include the TWU members who work onboard 
providing food and beverage service to passengers, as well as carmen 
and cleaners who work to maintain, repair, and service Amtrak cars in 
the rail yards. As a Lead Service Attendant for Amtrak's On-Board 
Service for 32 years, President of Transport Workers Union Local 1460, 
and most importantly as an American, it is my duty to serve even under 
these dire circumstances.
    Under Amtrak's on-board service, TWU members who provide much of 
Amtrak's food and beverage services have kept working their routes, 
allowing safe, comfortable train travel to continue, even if on a more 
limited basis. These workers also have had to fight for adequate 
protections in the face of a pandemic. At the beginning of the crisis, 
when Amtrak claimed it could not find masks or sanitizer for our 
members, the union secured proper PPE and distributed it to the 
frontline workforce. We have actively engaged and fought with the 
railroad to ensure that enhanced cleaning and infection prevention 
protocols such as temperature checks mandatory mask policies for 
passengers are in place on all routes. While access to PPE supplies is 
not an issue anymore, Amtrak's COVID-19 policy is potentially putting 
employees at risk.
    This past July, while working my regular position as Lead Service 
Attendant on the Amtrak Acela, en route to Boston from Washington, DC, 
I was notified by my supervisor, Jamal Philips, that on July 24 I had 
been in contact and exposed to an employee who had tested positive for 
COVID-19 and that Amtrak's medical department would be in contact with 
me.
    Fearing of possibly infecting passengers and coworkers on my train, 
I contacted our TWU Railroad Division Director John Feltz to make him 
aware of what was happening. Mr. Feltz contacted On Board Service 
General Superintendent Anella Popo, and strongly suggested that I 
should be removed from my position at the New York Penn Station and be 
replaced by another employee. Ms. Popo contacted the medical department 
and they advised her that they would be in contact with my direct 
supervisor Jamal Philips. Supervisor Philips then contacted me and 
stated that the medical department said that I could continue to Boston 
if I were not showing symptoms, and that they would remove me from 
service the next day.
    On the next day, I was not removed from service. I again contacted 
Mr. Feltz and in a 3-way conservation with Ms. Popo, Mr. Feltz, and 
myself, she responded that it must have been a mistake and she would 
have the situation corrected, which to her credit she did. I was 
removed from service and told to quarantine for 14 days. After 10 days 
of quarantine, however, I was contacted by Amtrak's medical department 
and told that since I was ``not showing'' symptoms of COVID-19 I could 
return to service the next day.
    I was never tested for COVID-19 before I returned to work. And just 
do you know, there is also a lack of coach cleaners as many of them 
have been out on sick leave from the coronavirus, and Amtrak does not 
fill these vacancies. This has made it hard for Amtrak's coach cleaners 
to sanitize the cars properly.
    Keeping coach cars, maintenance facilities, and employee break 
rooms sanitized is time-consuming and labor-intensive. It is work that 
is done by people committed to making sure Amtrak is safe--not just for 
our coworkers, but more importantly for the traveling public.
    This is why it is extremely disheartening to learn that Amtrak 
plans to furlough 20% of its workforce, including 700 on-board services 
workers represented by TWU, beginning in October. I'll be honest, this 
is like a slap in the face. These are my brothers and sisters who have 
put their lives on the line during this pandemic. We have continued to 
go to work when our government has asked everyone else to stay home. 
The increased exposure and risk we have faced because of this is not on 
our job description. In return for the brave effort my colleagues have 
made over the past six months, the railroad is threatening the 
livelihoods of 2,000 essential workers. This is not acceptable.
    But it's not just TWU workers that are being affected by the 
proposed cuts. Per Amtrak management, as many as 10,000 workers at the 
railroad could be impacted by workforce reductions. These are 
devastating numbers that require immediate aid from Congress.
    It also requires Amtrak to re-think some of the decisions that will 
be made in the coming months as we face these drastic cuts. For 
example, management has committed to reinstituting the 401(k) match for 
managers in beginning in October, just as the first set of frontline 
workers will be sent onto unemployment.
    Likewise, in November, all of management's pay cuts expire and 
their full pay will be reinstituted, while onboard service people who 
had their hours reduced from 180 per month to 150 will remain that way 
for the foreseeable future. We urge Amtrak to prioritize the rank & 
file, frontline workers who interact directly with our riders, the 
people who are facing job loss, rather than themselves.
    Amtrak is an essential service in this country--it ensures that 
communities across the country have access to all of our economy. But 
the railroad is powered by frontline workers, like me, who service 
customers, clean cars, fix engines, and drive locomotives.
    We are urging Congress to provide at least $4.5 billion in support 
for the railroad not just to help keep our jobs but preserve this 
industry and sustain the communities we serve.
    That is not possible without the frontline workers who are the 
railroad. It is our hope that we can all work together to ensure the 
survival of Amtrak, and more importantly, protect these workers who 
have already sacrificed so much, and continue to do so every day.
    Thank you for allowing me to speak today and I look forward to any 
questions you may have.

    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Ms. Griffin.
    Mr. Mathews, you may now proceed.
    Mr. Mathews. Thank you, sir. Good morning. And thank you, 
Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and all of the 
members of this subcommittee, for your leadership on passenger 
rail.
    I am Jim Mathews. I am president and CEO of the Rail 
Passengers Association. We are the oldest and largest group 
speaking for more than 40 million Americans who rely on trains 
of all kinds: long distance, short corridor, and commuters. We 
know Amtrak faces tough choices from the pandemic, but our 
members have watched with growing alarm since May as plans take 
shape to degrade essential service by cutting 12 out of 15 
long-distance routes to only 3 times a week.
    This morning I would like to highlight one of the most 
crucial findings from our new modeling of this plan's effects. 
Dropping daily service in 30 States would inflict staggering 
economic damage in America's heartland, but produce only 
minuscule savings. We were glad to see the bold vision this 
committee laid out in the Moving Forward Act, and we were also 
glad to see House appropriators respond to your vision by 
including $10 billion in Amtrak grants for fiscal year 2021. 
These remain the right answers for the long term.
    But we are also glad to hear that Amtrak is working with 
you on a no-harm supplemental request to at least maintain 
nationwide daily service and prevent massive layoffs. We 
support this request wholeheartedly. Failure to act on some 
kind of bare bones supplemental would deal a catastrophic blow 
to not only long-distance routes, but also State-supported and 
commuter trains, as well: truly essential daily service and the 
foundation for future growth.
    But even a bare bones supplemental would mean great 
hardship for millions of Americans and hundreds of smaller and 
rural communities. Over 62 million people live in so-called 
flyover country. One-quarter are veterans. Another quarter are 
seniors over 65. Intercity rail has always played an outsized 
role in these towns. It is even more true today, during the 
pandemic. Passengers with health problems can more easily and 
safely make socially distanced trips on Amtrak.
    The numbers tell this story. Since the pandemic began in 
March through the end of July, NEC ridership was down nearly 90 
percent, but long-distance routes were off only 68 percent. 
Today, during COVID, long-distance makes up 45 percent of 
Amtrak's revenues, compared with 21 percent a year ago, and has 
contributed the largest single share of Amtrak revenues in 
every month since March. That could all change on October 1st, 
if Congress can't act.
    If I could have our slides, please.
    We have always said that passenger rail is an economic 
engine in America's heartland. In 2018 we codeveloped a rail 
service benefits model with the University of Southern 
Mississippi's Trent Lott Center, and we used it to look at 
Amtrak's three-times-a-week plan.
    Next slide, please.
    And we found that the 12 routes in Amtrak's cross hairs 
contribute some $4.8 billion to the communities served every 
single year.
    Next slide, please.
    I can also report today that cutting daily service could 
drop at least a $2.3 billion bomb on flyover country, while 
possibly only saving Amtrak $213 million. Overall, the damage 
could top $3 billion if Amtrak's planned 9 months of degraded 
service stretches another quarter to a full year.
    I am finished with the slides, thank you.
    Some Amtrak communities will be hit especially hard. That 
is because several big airlines now say they will drop service 
when the CARES Act expires. In fact, of 67 cities facing air 
cutbacks, nearly half, 31 of them, would also lose trains, from 
Sacramento and San Antonio to Charleston and Tampa. These 
routes touch nearly every corner of our country.
    On the Empire Builder in eight States, from Illinois to 
Washington, those towns face a nearly $400 million blow. The 
north-south City of New Orleans, between Illinois and 
Louisiana, today produces nearly $134 million in economic 
benefits; 3x service could wipe out as much as $88 million of 
that.
    Simply put, the drastically reduced utility of a nationwide 
network operating only 3 days a week on mismatched schedules, 
making connections difficult or impossible, will gut these 
services. And snatching as much as $3.1 billion from our 
hardworking heartland during a historic recession for the sake 
of only $213 million in savings to Amtrak seems, to us, to be 
bad public policy.
    And it also ignores history. Amtrak tried this in 1994. It 
didn't work then, and it is not going to work now. Passengers 
travel for the same reasons today as they did then, and they 
will skip the ride for the very same reasons.
    In closing, we think [inaudible] a better way: cut some 
costs, while preserving daily service by simply running shorter 
trains. Fewer locomotives mean less fuel burn, fewer coaches 
mean less maintenance. But continued service means continued 
opportunities to earn badly needed revenue, the largest single 
pandemic revenue contributor since March. When gas tax revenues 
flatlined, Congress didn't let the Federal Highway 
Administration close highways 4 days out of 7. Congress 
shouldn't stand by and allow our national railroad to impose 3x 
service on hundreds of hardworking towns across America's 
heartland, towns which, in many cases, can afford it the least.
    Strong investment in Amtrak could position our country for 
recovery. But at the very least, preserving daily service will 
stave off disaster in flyover country.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Mathews' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Jim Mathews, President and Chief Executive 
                  Officer, Rail Passengers Association
                              Introduction
    Good morning, and thank you Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member 
Crawford, and all of the members of this Committee for holding this 
hearing to focus attention on our nation's intercity rail network at 
this critical juncture. I firmly believe what the Congress decides to 
do about rail and transit between now and September 30 will have 
important and lasting impact for hundreds of Amtrak-served communities 
and millions of Americans.
    My name is Jim Mathews, and I am President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Rail Passengers Association, the oldest and largest 
national organization giving a voice to more than 40 million rail 
passengers in the U.S. Our mission is to improve and expand 
conventional intercity and regional passenger train services, support 
higher speed rail initiatives, increase connectivity among all forms of 
transportation and ensure safety for our country's trains and 
passengers. I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before you 
today on behalf of our 28,000 members from all across the U.S. I am 
also conscious of the duty I have to share their growing sense of alarm 
over the diminishment of an essential service upon which their 
communities rely.
    Today, I will talk about the challenges this once-in-a-generation 
pandemic poses for America's rail passengers, and the consequences 
governmental inaction poses to the cities, towns, and rural communities 
connected by our intercity rail network. I understand well that Amtrak 
faces real and difficult choices, and that without financial aid there 
are far greater risks to the network than thrice weekly (3x) service 
for long-distance routes--we could lose entire corridors, permanently.
    Our Association was thrilled by the level of investment in 
passenger trains laid out by this committee in the Moving Forward Act. 
This bold, forward-thinking infrastructure bill would not only get our 
rail system through the current pandemic, it would put millions of 
Americans back to work building a truly world class transportation 
network.
    We were also glad to see House appropriators respond to the vision 
outlined in H.R. 2 by including $10 billion in grants for Amtrak in the 
FY 2021 transportation budget passed out of the House in July.
    We wholeheartedly endorse this level of investment as the right 
course for America's passengers and the U.S. economy, and we continue 
to believe that this is the best way forward for our passenger-rail 
system.
    We understand, however, that Amtrak can maintain existing service 
levels at significantly lower levels of investment. We're heartened to 
hear that Amtrak is working with Congress to establish a no-harm 
supplemental budget request. Our Association continues to believe that 
maintaining daily service across the National Network and preventing 
massive furloughs and layoffs of Amtrak workers should be the floor, 
not the ceiling. As Amtrak Chief Operating Officer Stephen Gardner 
noted in a March 22nd article in the Washington Post, ``Eventually this 
will pass, but none of the bridges or [train] cars or any of the things 
we have that are old and need to be replaced will get younger as a 
result of this crisis.'' We wholeheartedly agree and continue to 
support the bold vision of this Committee and of your appropriations 
colleagues to make the investments we need so that rail service can 
help restore the U.S. economy.
    When I testified before this committee less than a year ago, I was 
able to speak about the unique moment of strength passenger rail in the 
U.S. found itself in, enjoying record ridership and record levels of 
federal funding. Now, however, COVID-19 has devastated the travel 
sector. Americans are foregoing travel of all types in an attempt to 
keep themselves, their families, and their fellow citizens safe. The 
result has been that, during ``the COVID Period'' (i.e., March-July 
2020), Amtrak revenues are down 83 percent compared with the same 
period in 2019. This unprecedented decline in demand for passenger 
transportation has forced U.S. rail and transit operators to navigate 
extraordinary difficulties to keep these systems afloat.
    Our Association understands all of these factors. And we recognize 
the difficult decisions and tradeoffs Amtrak's leadership has had to 
make and will continue to make. Theirs is not an easy task.
    However, even with these exogenous shocks to demand, the fact 
remains: Amtrak is an essential service for tens of millions of 
Americans and hundreds of communities. We were quite pleased with 
Amtrak President & CEO William Flynn's May 25th statement to Congress 
that the railroad understands ``how important Amtrak service is to the 
nation and, particularly, small communities across the nation where we 
play a unique role in connecting these communities to the rest of 
America.'' However, reducing service on the 12 of the 15 long-distance 
routes--a vital transportation link to the 40 percent of the nation's 
small and rural communities that it serves--to only three days per week 
speaks much louder than words. Whatever the reasons, reducing 
frequencies across the National Network will drop a $2 billion-dollar 
bomb on ``Flyover Country.''
                     Defining an Essential Service
    It's worth taking time to be explicit about what we mean when we 
say Amtrak is an ``essential service'' to the communities it connects. 
For many, it's easier to understand why a service like the Northeast 
Corridor (NEC) is necessary; without the 2,200 daily trains and 260 
million annual trips the NEC carries, the regions this corridor links 
would grind to a halt. How can a single daily train to a small town 
also be accurately described as ``essential'' to the people it serves?
    To understand, you have to look at the dearth of transportation 
options faced by rural and small-town Americans. Over 62 million people 
live in so-called ``Flyover Country,'' a quarter of whom are veterans, 
another quarter are senior citizens over the age 65. Intercity rail 
plays an outsized role in these communities, with almost one-fifth of 
Amtrak's passengers traveling to or from a rural station with no access 
to air service.
    Think of what this implies for just a single use-case. Long-
distance trains, frequently used by senior citizens and passengers with 
mobility impairments, provide access to healthcare facilities that 
would otherwise be too expensive or difficult to reach. In an August 
letter to the U.S. Senate advocating for daily service, the Station 
Host Association of California, an independent volunteer organization 
operated in cooperation with Amtrak, shared its frontline experiences 
helping passengers navigate our rail system:

        ``Particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, long distance 
        trains provide accessible bedrooms ensuring privacy and 
        cleanliness for any passengers who may need to travel within or 
        out of state, and for whom the more public setting of an 
        airplane creates a health risk. The private rooms on the 
        overnight trains provide an additional level of safety to 
        travel during a pandemic while minimizing exposure to the 
        virus. However, if the tri-weekly service intervals do not 
        match the passengers' needs, then the entire benefit is moot.''

    So while travel demand is down broadly, coronavirus has actually 
made these passenger rail services more necessary for certain segments 
of the population.
    These are just a few of the many reasons Amtrak's long-distance 
routes have proved to be the most resilient business line in the face 
of the pandemic. Amtrak's own ridership numbers back this up. Since the 
crisis began through the end of July, NEC revenues are down 90 percent 
from the same period last year, compared with a 64 percent decline for 
the National Network. Ridership has also flatlined across the NEC, down 
88 percent. By contrast, ridership on the long-distance routes is down 
only 68 percent during the COVID Period.


                                Fig 1.1



                                Fig 1.2

    Perhaps one of the more significant statistics is that during the 
COVID Period, Amtrak's National Network of long-distance intercity 
passenger routes has contributed 45 percent of Amtrak's revenues, 
compared with 21 percent a year ago. Moreover, the so-called ``money-
losing long-distance routes'' have contributed the largest single share 
of revenues in every month since March.
    Make no mistake: these trains are essential to the communities they 
serve. Congress didn't let the Federal Highway Administration close 
highways four days out of seven when gas tax revenues flatlined, and it 
shouldn't stand by and allow Amtrak to introduce 3x service to hundreds 
of communities across the U.S.
          Airlines Eliminating Service to Amtrak-Served Cities
    These cuts will fall especially hard on a subset of Amtrak 
communities that will see a simultaneous reduction in rail service and 
air service on October 1st. Several major airlines announced last month 
that they will drop service to dozens of cities upon the expiration of 
the CARES Act. Rail Passengers looked at service reduction 
announcements released by 11 air carriers and found that of 67 cities 
seeing air services cut, 31 would also see cuts to passenger rail 
service (see: Appendix B).
    Airlines have been walking away from mid-sized markets for decades, 
and it is clear that this trend will only accelerate in the wake of 
COVID-19 as passengers shy away from a mode of travel they fear is 
unsafe. An August survey of consumer sentiment conducted by Boston 
Consulting Group found that 60 percent of U.S. consumers worry about 
being infected from flying, and 70 percent of respondents expect travel 
spending will not return to normal for more than a year. This will 
further erode the business model for midsized airports, leaving more 
and more Americans disconnected from job opportunities, educational 
institutions, and critical health services.
    Rail Passengers firmly believes that running daily trains could put 
Amtrak in a position to expand its market share in this environment. 
Amtrak offers a unique product: a socially distant way to move around 
the country. Our government should be increasing access to rail 
service, not diminishing it.
           Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Daily Service
    I've said it to this committee before, and I'll say it to anyone 
who'll listen--it's not a question of if trains make money, it's about 
who trains make money for. Rail corridors generate value by acting as 
economic engines in the communities they serve--through jobs, retail, 
mobility, tourism and real-estate development. The ``profit'' goes not 
to Amtrak, but to the communities served, often to the tune of billions 
of dollars.
    We decided it's not enough to say it, we've got to put our money 
where our mouth is. That's why I invested our association's resources 
in 2018 to co-develop a rigorous economic model with the University of 
Southern Mississippi's Trent Lott Center. We've used that model to 
quantify the economic return on passenger rail corridors in a way that 
hasn't been done previously.
    This time, we've modeled a preliminary, high-level analysis of the 
economic consequences of Amtrak's decision to cut its daily intercity 
passenger services back to only three runs per week. Unfortunately, 
even the most conservative assessment is dire: to save $213 million, 
Amtrak's nine months of daily service cuts could drop at least a $2.3 
billion bomb on Flyover Country, a figure that could rise above $3 
billion if the cuts remain in place for the full year.
    This is tied directly to passenger-rail's role as an economic 
engine in the communities it serves. The existence of Amtrak buoys the 
economies of hundreds of towns and cities all across America. Degrading 
that service means withdrawing those benefits from millions of 
Americans, even those who don't necessarily ride the trains themselves, 
because in many cases lives and livelihoods depend on the routes' 
operation.
    We examined six National Network services--the City of New Orleans, 
the Empire Builder, the combined Silver services, the Southwest Chief, 
the Texas Eagle and the Crescent. Together, these six intercity 
passenger rail routes serve 30 states plus the District of Columbia, 
and Rail Passengers estimates that they produce $2.4 billion every year 
in economic benefit. In fact, Amtrak's existing group of daily long-
distance trains (excluding the Auto Train) collectively produce some 
$4.7 billion in economic benefits which are widely distributed 
throughout America's heartland.
    These benefits take many forms, which our model attempts to 
capture. Whether traveling for vacation, personal reasons or business, 
visitors spend money at their destinations, paying for hotels or other 
lodging, patronizing restaurants, shopping or buying local items. By 
doing this they support the hotel workers, the restaurant waiters and 
cooks, retail and entertainment outlets, and they generate sales tax 
revenues for the communities they visit. The local workers also 
contribute to the local tax base, further spreading the economic 
benefit. Meanwhile, because those visitors have left their cars behind, 
they're not imposing wear and tear on highways and roads, and they're 
avoiding the risk and cost of injuries or even death from car crashes.
    Cutting service reduces these benefits. Rail Passengers' model 
estimates that Amtrak's plans would slash the $2.7 billion produced by 
the six services we examined down to just a little more than $800 
million--a more than $1 billion hit on just those routes alone during 
the proposed nine-month period of reduced service, or $1.5 billion on 
an annualized basis. Systemwide on an annualized basis, America's 
Amtrak-served communities could absorb a $3.1 billion body-blow. This 
after already reeling from the effects of a deep economic recession.


                                Fig. 1.3

    Some of the poorer states will be among those hit hardest. In the 
case of the Silver services, Amtrak decided to degrade service months 
ahead of the October 1st plan outlined for the rest of the system, 
leaving some of the South's poorest communities to absorb an even 
harsher punishment than the rest of the country. Combining the Silver 
Star and Silver Meteor into a single route and then cutting back daily 
service means many Star-served stations have already seen a 50 percent 
reduction in service--communities like Southern Pines and Hamlet, N.C., 
or Camden, Columbia and Denmark in South Carolina. Those stations 
account for 13 percent of the Star's ridership. The Census Bureau 
reports that more than two-thirds of Southern Pines' population is non-
white, and some 14 percent of the town's residents are estimated to 
live below the poverty line. So, too, Denmark, SC, is majority non-
white, and 15 percent of residents are below the poverty line.
    But make no mistake. The damage is not confined to a handful of 
towns or just one region of the country. Amtrak's National Network 
touches nearly every corner of our country, and the economic pain will 
be felt in 30 states and the District of Columbia. Communities in eight 
states served by the popular Empire Builder route from Illinois to 
Washington State (with a portion of the train split to Oregon) will 
absorb a $391 million annualized economic loss. The seven states 
traversed by the Texas Eagle will lose $318 million, and states from 
New York to Florida and in-between will feel the hit twice, from losses 
of service on the Crescent ($153 million) and the Silver services ($251 
million).


                                Fig. 1.4

    (Rail Passengers would like to acknowledge our volunteer members 
and our partners at Transportation 4 America, who participated in the 
preliminary research we needed for this rapid-response study and helped 
to gather and collate the state-level tourism data we needed for our 
modeling exercise.)
                         A Better Route Forward
    Even if we are to analyze 3x service proposal narrowly, we still 
can't support it as an operating plan based on its merits. The U.S. has 
been down this path before, and it didn't work.
    In the mid-1990s, Mercer Consulting advised Amtrak leaders to 
eliminate several long-distance routes, shorten others, and take 11 
routes down from daily to three and four times per week. In Fiscal Year 
1995, the first year of diminished operations, Amtrak's network saw a 
decrease of 13 percent in total route miles and saved $54 million. 
However, the General Accounting Office (the government watchdog now 
known as the Government Accountability Office) reported to Congress 
that the very next year Amtrak lost 1.1 million riders--a 5 percent 
drop in ridership--and never saw the savings they had projected for the 
11 routes with less-than-daily service. A functioning passenger 
transportation service requires reliable and frequent connections. And 
there is nothing to suggest that the buying and traveling habits of 
today's riders are much different from those in 1994.
    One of our members, former BNSF Railroad train dispatcher Mark 
Meyers, performed an analysis of 3x on the present-day network. He 
found that three-times weekly service--a 57 percent cut in overall 
service--only cuts the number of on-board crew starts by 38 percent and 
engineer-crew starts by 36 percent, while producing large compensable 
layovers for some of the affected crews. Equipment use is only cut 40 
percent. Staffing at stations would be cut only minimally because even 
3x weekly trains arrive over the course of more than five days, which 
would require a second station staff position to continue to be filled.
    The problem will be exacerbated by missed connections. The 
devilishly tricky math of ensuring that one set of trains that only 
runs three days a week can connect reasonably to another set of trains 
also running three days a week guarantees that many thousands of 
journeys simply won't be taken. This is because a passenger planning on 
a connection would have to work backwards from her planned arrival date 
while taking into account not only that her original train is running 
only three out of seven days, but that so, too, is her connecting 
train. And in many instances, those trains will not mesh.
    Some $39 million of connecting revenue flows through Amtrak's 
Chicago Union Station alone, and the 3x schedule disrupts all of these 
connection patterns.
    The California Zephyr and the Texas Eagle are particularly hurt. 
For example, travelers taking the Eagle to Chicago hoping to connect 
for a further eastbound trip on the Capitol Limited or the Lake Shore 
Limited can only make a same-day connection on Mondays and Saturdays. 
Going westbound it's even worse--with the exception of a single 
connection from the Cardinal on Tuesdays, not a single Amtrak long-
distance train will offer a same-day connection in Chicago to the 
westbound Eagle. All passengers will have to assume a hotel stay in 
Chicago, perhaps even a multi-day stay. That will be enough to lead 
most passengers to forego the trip. Eagle connections from other routes 
accounted for nearly 12 percent of connecting travel through Chicago in 
Fiscal 2019, and this plan would largely eliminate those connections. 
On Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays and Sundays, westbound 
passengers hoping to connect to the California Zephyr would be out of 
luck. The Cardinal will only have a same-day Zephyr connection on one 
day each week, Saturdays, and passengers from the Capitol, Lake Shore 
and City of New Orleans will only get a same-day connection on 
Saturdays and Mondays.
    If this seems complicated in written testimony, think of how 
complicated it will be for the average passenger trying to work out the 
best departure day to take a journey connecting to another train. The 
utility of a schedule like this to the traveling public quickly 
approaches zero for all but the most leisurely of trips. And as we 
know, despite a popular narrative, pure leisure trips are not the 
majority of trips on Amtrak.
    The drastically reduced utility of a nationwide network of trains 
operating only three days a week on schedules that make connections 
difficult or impossible helps to explain why ridership will plummet 
even more than many observers would expect, driving catastrophic 
economic losses to the communities served.
    We've already seen the negative effect this has on ridership. While 
the long-distance average was down 62 percent in July over the same 
period last year, Silver Star bookings--already subject to 3x service, 
losing four days of intra-Florida service--were off 72 percent in that 
same period. In light of Amtrak's metrics for returning service, this 
is a statistically significant reduction.
    Amtrak has acknowledged this fact in the construction of its 3x 
schedule, with railroad management explaining that the decision to run 
the Star/Meteor on successive days ``was made to allow for more 
efficient use of operating crews while assuring availability of crew 
resources for all journey segments . . . While from a marketing 
standpoint alternating days may have had some utility for some 
customers, our overall demand patterns by day of week do not differ 
materially and do not justify the operational risk.''
    We understand that Amtrak leadership sincerely believes that this 
is the only choice available to the railroad. But the facts we've just 
outlined demonstrate that this choice is bad public policy for the 
country. Amtrak will throw away a little more than half the daily 
frequencies but will lose two-thirds of the ridership and save only 38 
percent of the crew costs, squeezing out at most $213 million of 
savings while hurting the taxpayers in 30 states to the tune of as much 
as $3 billion.
    Rail Passengers instead proposes an alternative: continue to run 
daily long-distance trains with shorter equipment consists for the 
duration of the pandemic. This has been the compromise in place since 
the crisis began in March, and it has served Amtrak well so far. As 
we've noted above, operating every day with shorter consists the 12 
daily intercity passenger trains Amtrak plans to cut back have 
contributed the largest single share of Amtrak's revenues in every 
month this year since the pandemic began. Slashing daily frequencies to 
three times per week would only ensure that the long-distance trains 
would sink to levels similar to those being seen in Amtrak's other 
business lines. By contrast, running shorter consists but maintaining 
daily frequencies would preserve connections and jobs and allow 
Amtrak's National Network ridership to return to previous levels 
organically, all while still lowering some operating costs.
                               Conclusion
    Amtrak is a taxpayer-supported public service. Its object is not 
profit, but to serve the Nation. It cannot fulfill its mandate by 
cutting service for half the country during one of the most severe 
economic crises our nation has experienced and during a pandemic that 
has made air travel a perilous gamble for millions of Americans. Our 
association, our 28,000 members and the millions of American passengers 
call upon Congress to provide Amtrak with the necessary financial 
relief to operate a full network in this pandemic, and to include 
safeguards for all Amtrak-served communities and Amtrak workers facing 
cutbacks and furloughs.
   appendix a--economic analysis of long-distance route service cuts


          appendix b--announced airline service cuts to cities
    Cities highlighted in yellow are projected to see cuts to both air 
service and Amtrak service (long-distance and/or State-supported 
trains) on October 1st following the expiration of CARES Act service 
protections.



  Source: One Mile At a Time, https://onemileatatime.com/us-airlines-
                 will-stop-flying-to-dozens-of-cities/

                appendix c--image from amtrak timetable



    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Mathews.
    We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will 
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will begin by recognizing 
myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Flynn, Ms. Griffin mentioned this in her testimony, and 
I was made aware that, at an Amtrak townhall on July 29th that 
you attended, your team said that the 401(k) match will return 
for management employees on October 1st, and the pay cut for 
certain management employees that they took will be restored in 
early November. Can you confirm that this information is 
accurate?
    And if it is, do you think it is appropriate to restore the 
401(k) matches and the pay for management employees when you 
are furloughing over 2,000 employees and cutting vital train 
service?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. So, 
yes, it is accurate that during that townhall meeting we 
discussed restoring the 401(k) match.
    At the beginning of the pandemic we took the initiative to 
reduce expenses, and I referred to that in my remarks. And so 
we did cut the 401(k) match for all management employees.
    The 401(k) program was put in place some years earlier, 
when we eliminated the defined benefit pension plan, and in 
exchange for eliminating what was viewed to be a very 
attractive pension plan with a much lower cost 401(k) match, we 
cut those expenses at the beginning of the pandemic. We thought 
that it was an appropriate action to take because, while it 
would have impact to total compensation for our employees, it 
wasn't immediate take-home pay.
    But we have heard loud and clear from our employees that 
taking that match away had significant impact to them. And I 
will point out, of course, there were no cuts to any agreement 
benefits at that time. So, considering the equities of the 
situation, it made sense to us to restore the 401(k) match at 
the beginning of October.
    On a voluntary basis, we--well, for me, on a voluntary 
basis, I elected to take no compensation when I joined the 
company at the beginning of April 15th, in view of the economic 
crisis that our company was suffering.
    We took substantial cuts across our management ranks. And 
when I compare those cuts to reductions that other management 
teams and other transportation industries have taken, I believe 
those cuts were larger and deeper, in terms of how far down the 
management ranks they went.
    Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Flynn, I do appreciate that. I appreciate 
taking no compensation. The question is, should this be 
restored to management while we are furloughing frontline 
workers?
    Mr. Flynn. My view is we are restoring a basic level of 
pay, considering all the equities, to ensure that we also 
retain now a smaller group of management people, as a result of 
furloughs and VSIP, so that we can properly run the railroad.
    Mr. Lipinski. Well, I think that that is not going to be 
looked on well, just for the equity. But let's move on.
    If Congress gives you the $4.8 billion by October 1st, as 
you indicated, will you commit on the record to rescinding the 
furloughs and rescinding the cuts to longer distance service?
    Mr. Flynn. I will commit that we will do as directed by 
Congress. And if that $4.9 billion instructs us to rescind the 
furloughs and rescind the service cuts, we will do that.
    Mr. Lipinski. If Congress does not provide any additional 
supplemental funding in the COVID relief bill or appropriations 
package, what other cuts can we expect to workers in service?
    Mr. Flynn. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, is that providing the 
$2 billion and nothing else, or providing nothing?
    Mr. Lipinski. Let's say if $2 billion was provided.
    Mr. Flynn. We would be in a very, very difficult position, 
as a company, Mr. Chairman.
    As I mentioned in my testimony, our cash burn is about $250 
million a month right now. And so we would have to make very 
dramatic reductions across the company in order to stave off 
bankruptcy, I would argue, in the long term, certainly very, 
very significant challenges to run this company or operate this 
company on behalf of our customers and with our employees in 
the near term. So substantial reductions in all services, and 
perhaps elimination of some LD services, if that is the cash 
burn we are having and no supplemental funding.
    Mr. Lipinski. Well, it would be good to see what those 
would be, just as we are looking at the providing of funding. 
As I said, I support providing the funding, but we want to know 
what additional cuts may be.
    And I am running out of time here. So for the purpose of 
the record, are you willing to work with me to amicably resolve 
some local issues that I have, including Chicago Union Station 
contract disputes between Amtrak and Metra, and the request of 
Lemont, Illinois, for a new Amtrak stop on the Lincoln Service?
    So I just want to get you on the record. Will you work with 
me to help to resolve these local issues?
    Mr. Flynn. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. And, as I 
mentioned, I did meet with the Metra CEO, and we talked about 
some very useful measures we can take. And we will continue to 
work to resolve our differences.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    My time has expired. I will now recognize Mr. Crawford for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Flynn, in your written testimony you stated that the 
leading cause of delays to our long-distance trains is the 
failure of some of our host railroads to comply with this 
longstanding legal obligation to provide Amtrak trains with 
preference over their tracks. Can you clarify that remark? 
Because the data sets I have examined show that FTI accounts 
for only a small percentage of overall Amtrak delays, at least 
on the lines I have examined.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member Crawford.
    I think we stand by our remarks we publish every month and 
our statistics, which are available online, the number of 
minutes of delay that we experience on each of our host 
railroads, and have done that for quite a long period of time. 
We regularly and routinely find passenger trains are not given 
preference over freight railroads. And that is what our 
statistics and our experience reflect.
    And that is why, in part, we were encouraged in the INVEST 
in America Act, that there is language there that would provide 
us a private right of action to be able to enforce our 
statutory rights.
    Mr. Crawford. I have been closely following the metrics and 
standards rulemaking out of the FRA. Understanding the need for 
preserving Amtrak ridership, and providing Amtrak riders with a 
safe and positive experience, it would make sense to me for 
Amtrak to revisit current schedules to account for actual 
runtime. Can you explain how you are working with freight 
railroads on lengthening some of your schedules, in light of 
the new FRA metric?
    Mr. Flynn. Well, we are working with the FRA to have the 
new standards and metric rule finally issued. That hasn't been 
issued yet.
    We are in regular routine correspondence and communications 
with the FRA about the schedules that we have in place, and how 
those schedules could be adjusted. We have a team of people 
here who are simply dedicated to the working relationship with 
our Class I railroads, and they speak with the Class I 
railroads regularly, in some cases at least once a week on the 
different scheduling issues we may have.
    Mr. Crawford. Can you commit that Amtrak is willing to 
lengthen schedules, where it is appropriate?
    Mr. Flynn. I am not sure I can answer that question. I am 
not sure what ``where it is appropriate'' means. We have a 
schedule requirement of 80 percent on-time arrival within 30 
minutes. I don't know what your ``appropriate'' means, from the 
railroad point of view. We would need to really dig into the 
details. And we would need a final rule on standards and 
metrics for me to be able to do that.
    Mr. Crawford. OK. All right. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Crawford.
    The Chair will now recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot has been made of 
the use of enhanced cleaning procedures, advanced air 
filtration systems, limited reservations, a lot of cleaning. 
What has been the feedback from rail passengers on the process?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you for that question, Congressman Sires. 
The feedback has actually been very positive, both in terms of 
our customer satisfaction surveys, and focus groups that we 
have with our customers. We have regular focus groups, 
virtually, with our most frequent passengers.
    And I can say also, anecdotally. I ride our trains between 
New York and DC quite regularly. I get to speak with our 
onboard service staff and with customers. And we have received 
very positive feedback on all----
    Mr. Sires. So you will be meeting with the Rail Passengers 
Association members?
    Mr. Flynn. I am certainly available always to meet with 
anyone that is representing our customers. And, as I mentioned 
in my remarks and in my filed testimony, we continue to 
investigate what more we can do to enhance that environment.
    Mr. Sires. So they are--they certainly are aware of your 
efforts.
    Mr. Flynn. I believe they are. And we continually 
communicate all the steps that we are taking, all the different 
actions that we have not only taken in terms of cleaning, and 
the cleaning protocols, but we have enhanced our communications 
with our customers to give them more information about service, 
about the trains.
    For example, if you were to book a train today, you could 
understand what that level of booking is. And you may find that 
you want to book another train with just fewer passengers on 
it. Those are the kinds of enhancements that we provide, and we 
communicate them.
    Mr. Sires. So the question I have also about the furloughs 
is, have you have broken it down by State? For example, New 
Jersey, how many people will lose their jobs if this were to go 
through?
    Mr. Flynn. So we talk about 1,950 furloughs that we are 
going to announce. They are going to occur in October, and they 
are by craft. And they would depend on--it could well be that a 
person works in New York but resides in New Jersey, so that is 
further work that we need to do. But we can certainly provide 
that.
    Mr. Sires. Because I represent the northern part of the 
State, which is very heavily congested. And a lot of people 
work at Amtrak. So I am just wondering what the impact is going 
to be in that area for people being furloughed.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, I want to get back to you with the accurate 
information, but I do understand that the number of employees 
who will be furloughed who identify themselves as New Jersey 
residents is a relatively small number. And I mean something 
less than 25.
    Mr. Sires. For New Jersey?
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Sires. So I assume that these--all right.
    Mr. Flynn. But what we will----
    Mr. Sires. Is that the reason, because of the Northeast 
Corridor?
    Mr. Flynn. Pardon me, sir?
    Mr. Sires. Is that the reason--the reason, is it because it 
is the Northeast Corridor, and it is very active in that area?
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, sir. But we will be happy to provide the 
committee staff with the numbers by State, so all the Members 
can have that information.
    Mr. Sires. OK, I appreciate that. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Graves for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate it, and my question is for Mr. Flynn.
    I am very optimistic, given your background in the private 
sector, that you are going to be able to meet that mandate for 
profitability and be successful.
    And I know it is, obviously, not an ideal situation to take 
over an unprofitable business in the middle of a pandemic. That 
makes it that much harder.
    But can you just give the committee your perspective or 
your ideas on how you are going to be able to achieve that 
mandate, and hopefully turn Amtrak around and make it 
profitable?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Ranking Member Graves. That is a 
great question.
    What we fundamentally believe, of course, is that we are in 
a pandemic. Earlier in the year we might have thought that the 
shape of the recovery would look perhaps like a V, or look like 
a U, but that is not the case.
    What we believe, of course, is that the service we provide 
is essential, that there is real demand for our service. And as 
we come out of that pandemic, there will be a combination of 
regaining our prior customers, as well as attracting new 
customers to our services. And we are engaged in some of that 
now.
    At the end of fiscal year 2019, we had, as a company, 
dramatically reduced losses on an adjusted operating income 
basis, and were well on track to have its first positive year 
in 2020. What that tells me is that our customers value the 
service that we provided, and the results were such that the 
amount of earnings we were generating in 2019 and into 2020 
meant that the supplemental grants that we would get from 
Congress, we could use for capital investment and 
infrastructure that is desperately needed here.
    I believe that future is still out there for Amtrak. I 
think it is a few years away, because we still don't know what 
the shape of the recovery is. But our vision is growth and 
expansion. There is a true demand for an intercity passenger 
rail service in the corridor, from our States, and in our long-
distance network, and in particular many metropolitan corridors 
that exist on that network.
    So I was excited to have the opportunity to lead Amtrak 
when I accepted the position at the beginning of the year. I 
had a belief there of what the future could be, and I still 
hold that belief. It is just further out in the future now than 
I might have thought of in early March.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, I appreciate it. And 
again, thanks for your testimony.
    And I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mr. 
Payne for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 
speak this day, and to welcome all the witnesses.
    The CARES Act included an important section that provided 
payroll grants to airlines and their contractors, so that 
airline employees would be kept on payroll and avoid furloughs. 
The term of that requirement is set to expire at the end of 
this month. Do you think that any extension of the CARES Act 
payroll grant provision should be extended to Amtrak employees, 
as well?
    And that is to all the witnesses.
    Mr. Flynn?
    Mr. Flynn. OK, thank you, sir. I wasn't sure if you wanted 
me to respond first.
    So we did receive just over $1 billion in the CARES Act. We 
have not furloughed any of our employees at this point in time. 
The furloughs that we have announced take effect in October.
    In our supplemental grant discussions and submissions we 
have identified the amount of supplemental funding that would 
be required for us to avoid furloughs and [inaudible] retain 
the full service.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Anyone else?
    Mr. Maratea. Yes, Mr. Congressman. We would definitely 
support extending the CARES Act. In my testimony before, the 
CARES Act funding protections for [inaudible] and long-distance 
frequencies [inaudible] of Amtrak. So we would absolutely be 
supportive.
    Mr. Mathews. Mr. Payne, I would like to add to that from 
the point of view of the rail passengers.
    Our passengers really do rely on those frontline employees, 
particularly when you start looking at the number of disabled 
folks, elderly folks, people who need that extra hand. We 
really would very much hate to see anything happen to some of 
those frontline folks.
    Our friends at TCU and TWU--and not only on the trains, but 
even in the call centers. For example, you know, now, if you 
are looking at the strange connection pattern that we are going 
to see of three times weekly service, and the drastic 
[inaudible] of connections in Chicago, planning a trip is going 
to become an incredibly complicated exercise. And having expert 
[inaudible] employees on the other side of that phone line to 
make that connection clear to a passenger is also going to be 
very important.
    So whether you are looking at folks on the trains, or 
dealing with customers in remote ways, we would be very 
supportive for those folks to have that aid.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you.
    And Mr. Flynn, I understand that COVID-19 has upended the 
transportation industry across the country, and cost Amtrak 
billions in lost revenue. We know that Amtrak plans to furlough 
2,000 employees, approximately 10 percent of the workforce, at 
the end of September. Now, I am sure these furloughs are your 
attempt to mitigate these revenue losses. We are here because 
Amtrak has requested $4.9 billion in additional funding from 
Congress to deal with the revenue shortfall.
    Amtrak is a public entity, and the profits should not be 
the priority. Passenger safety and service quality must be 
priorities. What would happen if Congress fails to provide the 
funding you are requesting?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Payne.
    Well, first, I fully agree with you that safety is our 
number-one priority, and safety informs everything that we do, 
regardless of the level of funding. The level of funding 
affects the level of operations, but never the level of safety.
    If we are not able to achieve supplemental funding, as I 
replied to Congressman Lipinski and his question, we would have 
to make substantial other service reductions across the 
company, and that also means we would have to adjust the 
workforce [inaudible] that we have.
    In addition, we also have to reduce our level of capital 
expenses [inaudible] capital expenditure, of course, whether 
that [inaudible] structure, and some of the other longer term 
capital projects, such as our bridges and tunnels [inaudible] 
and our capital program [inaudible] Amtrak [inaudible] 
reduction in service, a reduction in employment, a reduction in 
[inaudible] very difficult choices that we have to make.
    Mr. Payne. OK, well, thank you. And my time is up.
    And I would yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
    I just want to remind everyone to make sure you mute when 
you are not speaking. And hopefully Mr. Flynn also--the 
connection seemed to be going bad. Hopefully it will get back 
to the way it was.
    The Chair will now recognize Mr. Perry for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will address my 
questions to Mr. Flynn, as well.
    And in your written testimony it states that Amtrak was on 
track to generate passenger revenues exceeding operating 
expenses in fiscal year 2020 for the first time ever, prior to 
the COVID-19 outbreak. In other words, Amtrak was going to turn 
a profit before COVID-19 devastated ridership. And if true, 
that would be welcome news to the taxpayers.
    And I don't think I need to remind you that the American 
taxpayers provided Amtrak with over $100 billion in subsidies 
over the nearly 50-year history. And I heard you talk to the 
ranking member about the same claim, if I can use that term.
    I am just wondering, can you explain, then, why Amtrak 
counts State-funded operation subsidizes as passenger revenue, 
but does not count Federal subsidies in the same manner? 
Because it seems to me that--I am not familiar with this 
accounting standard whereby you leave certain things out and 
put certain things in. So if you can explain that one, and also 
explain why Amtrak does not include depreciation costs in total 
expenses for its unaudited monthly performance report, but 
includes these costs in total expenses for Amtrak's audited 
financial reports.
    These practices appear to be done in order, in my opinion, 
to hide the amount of losses Amtrak runs every year. But I 
certainly want to give you the benefit of the doubt. And how do 
these accounting practices improve the ability of Amtrak, 
Congress, or the American people, for that matter, to evaluate 
Amtrak's financial viability?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Perry. Can you hear me 
OK?
    Mr. Perry. I do have you loud and clear at the moment.
    Mr. Flynn. OK, good. Well, thank you very much.
    So your question really gets to the financial reporting of 
the company, and are we reporting on a GAAP basis, or are we 
reporting on adjusted operating income basis.
    The numbers that I referred to in my answer to several of 
the other Members so far were indeed talking in terms of 
adjusted operating income, which, in the private sector, it 
would often be called EBITDA. And you also mentioned that this 
does not include depreciation, and that is exactly right. So, 
the largest difference between adjusted operating income and 
GAAP is the exclusion, or--of EBITDA, for discussion purposes.
    Many companies across varied industries often talk in terms 
of EBITDA or some form of adjusted operating income to provide 
investors--if we are talking about a publicly traded company--
with as accurate a view of the core operating results of the 
company.
    But GAAP, of course, is the bottom line, and we report on 
that. The biggest number is depreciation, which largely 
addresses the catchup in investing that the company is doing in 
fleet and other infrastructure. That hasn't been done for many, 
many years. But we report both, and both are available on the 
Amtrak website.
    Mr. Perry. Well, I am just going to--because I want to move 
on to a couple of other questions. I remain unconvinced about 
the difference between State and Federal subsidies and how they 
are reported. I don't see the difference. And I don't think 
many of my bosses, my constituents, do, either.
    Amtrak's latest supplemental funding request includes $4.9 
billion in anticipated expenses for fiscal year 2021 to operate 
and invest in the network. According to Amtrak's own figures, 
though, total expenses for fiscal year 2019 were $4.198 
billion. Can you explain why? Why is this such a vast 
difference? I mean, that is a lot of money. What is the 
difference there, $4.198 billion to $4.9 billion?
    Mr. Flynn. All right. So I want to just come back to your 
State question for just a second, please.
    The State revenues are reported in other revenue, and it is 
what the State pays us to actually perform service. So we 
operate quite a few State-supported trains. And, for example, 
in Pennsylvania, the Harrisburg to Philadelphia line, the 
Keystone Service, is a State-supported train. They sell the 
capacity, the tickets. They put a price on those tickets and 
pay us the operating cost of running the train, maintaining 
track infrastructure.
    And based on Ernst and Young, who is our outside auditor, 
Ernst and Young provided us the accounting guidance that said 
that is where you should properly account for the revenues, or 
the moneys you receive from the State, because we are providing 
a physical service. We would be happy to meet with your office 
or provide more detail----
    Mr. Perry. OK.
    Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Out of time.
    But without being difficult, could you please repeat the 
question? I was thinking----
    Mr. Perry. Yes, I----
    Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Of the answer of your prior 
question when you were asking that question, so I apologize.
    Mr. Perry. I am out of time, but I would like to know the 
difference between the $4.9 billion request and the $4.198 
billion expense for 2019. Why is there such a delta there? That 
is a lot of money, and I am trying to figure out what the 
difference is there.
    Mr. Flynn. Well, I think the expense there is a total 
expense on a GAAP basis. And so there are hundreds of millions 
of dollars of depreciation in that number.
    The $4.9 billion request as we go forward on fiscal year 
2021, first of all, addresses the revenue shortfalls that we 
are experiencing as a result of the drop in ridership. It 
includes moneys, if Congress so directs, that we do not 
furlough employees. And so it would be covered in that. It 
includes operating expenses for the long-distance network, if 
we are directed to operate a 7-day service. It also includes 
moneys for the States and commuter railroads, based on what 
they have told us they need and what revenues, frankly, they do 
not have, but still want us to continue to operate a higher 
level of service.
    We would be very happy to meet with your office or your 
staff and provide greater detail, since we are out of time on 
that question, sir.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mrs. 
Fletcher for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you to all of our witnesses for being here today. This is an 
important hearing, and I am glad to have the witnesses here to 
testify about the COVID-19 pandemic's impacts that are evident 
across so many sectors.
    From the energy industry here in my district, to 
transportation systems across the country, sectors are under 
strain from the disruption and the danger that the pandemic 
presents. And Amtrak, as we have discussed and heard about, 
already has plans to furlough 700 onboard service workers 
beginning in October, because of the uncertainty in funding 
they face. And that is something that, unfortunately, we are 
seeing across the country, and is of particular concern here, I 
know, for this committee.
    So, while Congress did provide in the CARES Act, I am 
concerned that the billion dollars that was provided has fallen 
short when Amtrak's overall revenue was down 82 percent in 
July, compared to 2019, and where the ridership of these long-
distance routes is 61 percent, as we have discussed a little 
bit already this morning.
    So this--it was an important lifeline, but we still don't 
know--and I think Amtrak still has yet to provide a detailed 
accounting of--how it spent those funds from the CARES Act. So 
I am concerned, but also would like to know how and when we 
will know how the CARES Act funding has been spent.
    So, Mr. Flynn, could you first address when a detailed 
accounting of CARES Act funding can be completed and made 
available to Congress and to the public?
    Mr. Flynn. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Fletcher. We 
are closely tracking every dollar that we spend under the CARES 
Act, and the Amtrak OIG recently issued a--I won't say a full 
report, but an interim update on Amtrak's expenditure and 
recording of the tracking of those expenditures just several 
weeks ago.
    In addition, we provided the FRA and the committee staff 
with a detailed accounting of how we have expended so far the 
CARES moneys that we have been provided, and would be happy to 
provide that to your office so you could have those details, 
because we are reporting that now on an ongoing basis, ma'am.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK, thank you. Yes, that would be useful, I 
think, for all of us to have that, and to address this question 
of the funding.
    Also in your testimony, Mr. Flynn, you mentioned the 
metrics Amtrak claims to use to decide when to bring back daily 
long-distance service on each route. And the three factors are 
public health, measured by COVID-19 hospitalization rates; 
future demand, measured by whether customers are booking trips 
near the same rate as 2019; and then the current performance, 
or how close ridership is to operating planned projections.
    I believe that cutting long-distance service to the 3 days 
per week may unavoidably slash demand because the service 
becomes less convenient for passengers. And certainly we heard 
some concerns from our colleagues in the Northeast Corridor. We 
know in other parts of the country, where there is less 
frequent service, that there is an impact on demand.
    So given that predicament, how will Amtrak guarantee the 
long-term prospects of the daily long-distance routes?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you. Our view is we will continually 
evaluate our long-distance services with a view to restoring 
our long-distance services. That is our commitment. And you 
talked about the three areas we want to take a look at.
    So first of all, we want to look at just the state of the 
pandemic. Has it subsided, or are we in a situation where we 
have a phase 2, or a second wave of the pandemic? And that is 
just practical and common sense.
    The other thing in that public health that we are going to 
be looking at is whether there is, indeed, an effective vaccine 
or vaccines that have been developed and are also effectively 
being distributed and made available to the public, because we 
believe that is absolutely the inflection point as to when the 
public is going to feel safer about traveling again.
    In terms of level of ridership, it is comparing the level 
of ridership against a low level of capacity that already 
exists. So we are not going to compare the level of ridership 
or future demand in 2021 against 2019, because they are simply 
not comparable. The level of utilization or load factor that we 
will be looking at would be load factor against very, you know, 
already reduced capacity or frequency. So it would account for 
perhaps a lower level of ridership as a result of a lower level 
of frequency.
    And then the third area, Congresswoman, that we are going 
to look at is just our state of the company, and what level of 
funding have we received.
    So I think they are three pretty commonsense metrics to 
look at. It is something we are going to look at on a continual 
basis.
    And our goal here is to grow our company, not shrink our 
company. And so, as we come through the pandemic, and we see 
demand improve, we clearly want to be growing the company. And 
that would include, certainly, our long-distance network.
    And one other point I will make. We are certainly going to 
need the help and the cooperation of our host railroads in 
order to not only restore service, but grow service. Thank you.
    Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you so much. I have used up all my 
time, so I want to thank you for your answers, and thank all of 
our witnesses for being here.
    And I will yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Rodney 
Davis. Rodney, we hope that you are doing well.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. And 
great to be with you. Sorry I couldn't get on the call earlier. 
I had something else already previously scheduled.
    Mr. Flynn, welcome. Great to see you again. I look forward 
to continuing to work with you in this new capacity of yours.
    I don't know if you are aware of this or not, but one of my 
constituents, one of my local mayors, has been nominated to 
serve on your board of directors, Mayor Chris Koos of Normal, 
Illinois. I certainly hope the Senate can confirm him and the 
rest of the slate so they can get to work. He knows the issues 
with Amtrak in central Illinois inside and out. I am very proud 
to have him serving with you, and I look forward to you and he 
working together.
    I know that this is a tough time, as my colleagues have 
mentioned, as you mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Flynn, 
financially for Amtrak, passengership, ridership. Obviously, 
those numbers have gone down. But now I think it is the time to 
address some of the institutional issues that exist with on-
time service for Amtrak, while the passengership and the 
ridership is not at levels where it is impacting them.
    We have an issue with the Saluki and the Illini in central 
Illinois with on-time service. And there has always been a 
conflict between the local railroad, who owns those tracks, and 
Amtrak service. And it seems like a constant game of back and 
forth.
    Now, I would like to get your commitment to work with the 
railroad, especially on those two lines, to try to address the 
short shunt issue that has been driving some of these on-time 
service issues when the passengership is higher. And what are 
you guys doing now, with ridership down, to address some of 
those concerns, Mr. Flynn?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Davis. It is good to see 
you again.
    Well, you raise an excellent point. So, with lower levels 
of train operations, indeed, our level of on-time performance, 
frankly, has improved. And some of those lower levels of 
operations are, indeed, Class I host railroads, which suggests 
to me that real improvement is available and achievable, and 
why we were excited to see it in the legislation, the right of 
private action.
    We are, specifically in Illinois, in discussion with the 
Canadian National Railway on levels of service and on 
operations, certainly for the Illini and the Saluki, but also 
for other operations that we have in and out of Chicago. And 
our belief is, while the COVID-19 certainly has created 
challenges for the long-distance services--frankly, all of our 
other services--the number-one issue we have in long-distance 
service is cooperation with the Class I railroads to deliver a 
much higher level of on-time performance.
    I personally have spoken with the CEO of Canadian National 
Railway, but our teams are working with them on a regular 
basis. I believe it is solvable, but it has to be solved, and 
it hasn't been.
    Mr. Davis. Well, I appreciate that. And I agree with you, 
Mr. Flynn. I hosted a community roundtable with representatives 
of Amtrak and of the CN in Champaign, Illinois, and Urbana, 
Illinois, a few months before COVID hit. And I was assured by 
the CN and also by Amtrak that we were this close to the 
technological advancement that would make sure we were ready to 
address the on-time performance of those two lines in 
particular, which have abysmal on-time performance measures.
    Now, I certainly hope, as we move forward, that you could 
reiterate to the CN--and I will do the same--that we certainly 
hope that this technology could be tested now, just to see if 
it addresses some of the short shunt issues on those two lines. 
Because if we are not testing it now, and if there is not the 
cooperation now, I am afraid we are going to go back to the 
same old, same old once we get there.
    So if I can be helpful in urging the CN to work with you on 
testing this technology, please let me know. Or if you have any 
other ideas, I would like to give you the rest of my time to 
make those ideas known.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. So we certainly understand the 
testing that needs to be accomplished with the short shunting 
situation that you describe. However, the folks and the 
technology that is going to test that are from the U.K.
    Indeed, I am not going to blame everything on COVID, but 
this is one situation where I do believe that COVID-19 has had 
an impact to get this testing done. It is certainly something 
that we want to do, and our job certainly is to improve the 
level of service everywhere, and certainly on these routes.
    Mr. Davis. Well, great. I just got off another call with 
Members of Parliament from the U.K., so maybe we can get the 
technology installed and provide the technical assistance via 
Webex or Zoom. I am sure Chairman Lipinski can help us do that.
    Anyway, I yield back my time. Dan, I took it all.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Davis. Thanks.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. We will now move on to Mr. 
Malinowski.
    You are now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 
Flynn.
    I can only begin to imagine what it is like to take this 
leadership position at Amtrak at a moment of such crisis, when 
ridership is down 95 percent. And I want to tell you how much 
we appreciate how much responsibility you are bearing on your 
shoulders right now, and your willingness to serve in this job, 
and to take our tough questions. We are all trying to pull 
together and keep this extraordinary railroad strong to help it 
survive this crisis.
    I do want to come back--speaking of tough questions--
though, to the topic that Chairman Lipinski raised with you 
about the 401(k) contributions and the furloughs. I listened to 
your answer. I completely understand where you are coming from, 
and I completely understand why an Amtrak employee would want 
to see those contributions resume.
    But I am, I think, somewhat more concerned about those 
employees who may no longer be employees, if they are 
furloughed or lose their jobs. I have constituents in that 
category. I just heard from one this morning, in fact.
    And I wonder, for example, if you believe that you have to 
move in this direction, why restore the full 7 percent? Why not 
2 or 3 percent?
    Why did Amtrak decide to move forward the date of 
restoration from January to October? Because originally, you 
told the employees it would be January, and now you are telling 
them October.
    Is this all or nothing here, given the fact that so many 
people may lose their jobs?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you for the question, Congressman 
Malinowski. It was a decision--the restoration decision was 
really a--I would call it balancing the equities that were 
involved. The vast majority of our employees that we are 
talking about are frontline managers and supervisors who often 
are making less than the agreement employees that they 
supervise, and their benefits are not as rich as the benefits 
can be for our organized employees.
    We were hearing loud and clear from our employee base just 
how concerned they were about the lack of the match. I had 
explained earlier, I think to Chairman Lipinski, that the 7-
percent contribution is substantially less than what the 
contribution would be under a defined benefit plan that prior 
existed here.
    So it was a management judgment call, sir. And I thought, 
along with the senior leadership team here, that it seemed to 
be the right thing to do at the time, in part considering 
retention of employees. It is tough to furlough anyone. It is 
tough to lay anyone off. I come from a railroad family myself. 
I was 6, 7 years old, 2 years in a row my father was 
furloughed. He was a locomotive engineer on the New Haven 
Railroad. And I don't remember all the details, but I remember 
the anxiety our family felt when that happened, and--as a 
little 6- or 7-year-old--I don't remember a lot, but I do 
remember that period of time. And so it was a very difficult 
decision, personally.
    Mr. Malinowski. I am sorry, we don't have that much time, 
but could you convey to us, whether you know it now or after 
the hearing, how much this is going to cost, so that we can 
help evaluate this balance? Because you have to balance laying 
people off and paying people these benefits, which they richly 
deserve, I agree with you. But either way, there is a cost, and 
it would help us understand the balancing decision better if we 
knew exactly how much this is going to cost.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, off the top of my head, I don't have the 
number. But I would be very happy----
    Mr. Malinowski. What about bonuses? Because I also 
understand Amtrak does have bonus programs for its management 
employees, bonuses that are tied to performance. Have those----
    Mr. Flynn. Our bonuses are wiped out----
    Mr. Malinowski. OK.
    Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Bonuses this year. And our long-
term incentive bonuses, or the long-term incentive plan, is 
wiped out for the next 3 years.
    Mr. Malinowski. OK. Very quickly, on a happier note, the 
Portal Bridge, the first stage of the----
    Mr. Flynn. Yes.
    Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. Gateway project, we got the 
first grant announcement from the FTA. Can you give us an 
update on moving towards the construction phase of that 
incredibly important project?
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, it is incredibly important, as you say, and 
so we are working very closely with New Jersey Transit to 
ensure that the FTA, the Federal Transit Administration, has 
everything they need so that they can enter into the full 
funding grant agreement that is required.
    And we are also very pleased to see the DOT commit more 
than $765 million to the project. And we are hoping for the 
possible start of construction in early 2021, but certainly a 
very important project for us and for all of our customers.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. The Chair will now 
recognize Mr. Babin for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate it. 
I wanted to ask some questions of Mr. Flynn, as well.
    I appreciate all of our witnesses being here, but Mr. 
Flynn, according to the Cato Institute, Amtrak currently 
receives a Federal subsidy of roughly 30 cents per passenger 
mile. And compare that to the aviation industry, which receives 
a subsidy of roughly 1 cent per mile. Do you believe this is an 
appropriate balance, here, subsidy per passenger mile, for 
Amtrak?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. I am not specifically aware of 
the numbers, but certainly I can address the question.
    Due to being an essential service, we are receiving the 
subsidies, as you point out. We are generating an operating 
income adjusted basis. In fiscal year 2019 and before, and well 
into 2020, we were generating a surplus on our Northeast 
Corridor, essentially a break-even level of operation in our 
State-supported network--perhaps a few pennies here and there. 
But the operational subsidy fundamentally underpins our long-
distance services.
    And so the vast majority, if not all of that subsidy, if we 
were to do it on a service line basis, would be in the long-
distance service.
    Dr. Babin. OK. Well, it just seems to be quite a 
discrepancy between, you know, 30 times greater than what we 
are seeing for the aviation industry.
    My second question would be when Amtrak received over $1 
billion as part of the CARES Act here in Congress, we were 
expecting that this was going to help avoid layoffs and 
furloughs. However, Amtrak then announced that it would 
potentially be cutting roughly 3,700 jobs by October the 1st, 
2020, while increasing its fiscal year 2021 funding request by 
almost $1.5 billion. How do you reconcile cutting those jobs, 
while asking a dramatic increase in the amount of $1.5 billion?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. The slightly above $1 billion 
that we were fortunate to receive in the CARES Act really 
addressed our level of operations in fiscal year 2020. In early 
March, when we were first trying to gauge the impact of what 
the level of ridership would be post--or in the pandemic, we 
anticipated about a 50-percent level of ridership in fiscal 
year 2021, as compared to fiscal year 2019, which--I will call 
it our last full normal year.
    That simply hasn't happened. Our level of ridership is 
going to be about 34 percent of fiscal year 2019. The 
supplemental request that we made in May, as you point out, was 
just about $1.5 billion. It presupposed that we would have some 
level of furloughs, as well as a reduction in the long-distance 
service, and about $500 million of cost reductions that, as a 
management team, we would achieve, in part through furloughs, 
and in part through other operating expenses being reduced.
    Dr. Babin. OK, and then I have got about 1 minute left or 
so.
    What is your plan for Amtrak to increase ridership, restore 
services, and work towards making a profit in the next few 
years?
    I know that is a big question, but if you can answer, hit 
some of the high points about your plans.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. Well, our plan is, indeed, 
ultimately to grow our company. We are going to have a very 
challenging 2021. I don't know about 2022 at this point, but it 
will be difficult, I imagine. We won't see ridership levels 
start to return until we have a vaccine that is widely 
distributed and the public assumes that conditions have 
changed.
    We can restore services on our long-distance network. We 
can restore services in the NEC. We can increase the level of 
State-supported routes. And frankly, many of the States were 
looking for increased levels of service before COVID pandemic. 
I believe that there is a great demand, latent demand and real 
demand, for our services after COVID. And I think that we can 
grow on new corridors, as well as regain customers that we have 
and, importantly, attract new customers to our business. That 
is a very high-level, very quick answer, but there is a lot of 
thought and detail behind that, sir.
    Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. My time has expired, so I 
appreciate that very much. We wish you the very best.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Babin. And Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mrs. 
Napolitano for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Griffin and Mr. Maratea, are you concerned that COVID 
will be used as an excuse to furlough employees permanently, 
even when ridership levels return?
    Ms. Griffin. Thank you for the question, and yes, I am.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Maratea?
    Mr. Maratea. Yes, Congresswoman. Yes, I do believe that 
they would use COVID-19 as an excuse to furlough people. Quite 
frankly, in the written brief that we just saw, they are 
looking for work pool concessions that were a shock to us. We 
never heard of anything during our months of talking with 
Amtrak.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Then----
    Mr. Maratea. [Inaudible] as an excuse.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Flynn, do you share your budget report 
with labor?
    Mr. Flynn. Can you hear me, Congresswoman?
    Mrs. Napolitano. Yes.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, we do. We keep labor informed of, really, 
everything that we are doing----
    Mrs. Napolitano. No, your budget reports, your budget 
reports. Actually, your expenses, what you are spending on--
CARES Act for COVID.
    Mr. Flynn. Oh, so yes. All of our financial reports are 
publicly available on our website.
    Mrs. Napolitano. No, no, I mean directly to them, not the 
public.
    Mr. Flynn. Well, I am not specifically aware that we 
formally send them a report every month, but we have indeed 
shared our results with labor, and we speak with them, many 
labor leaders, on a regular basis.
    Mrs. Napolitano. All right. Ms. Griffin and Mr. Maratea, do 
you have any comment?
    Ms. Griffin, Mr. Maratea?
    Mr. Maratea. Ms. Congresswoman, we have never received any 
financial updates. They might be on the website, but we never 
received them.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Ms. Griffin?
    Ms. Griffin. I have never received any.
    Mrs. Napolitano. It would behoove the agency to share with 
them, so they know where the money is spent. If you are doing 
the 401(k) only to certain people, what justifies your being 
able to do that?
    Then the next question I have--I am from California, and 
three of the five busiest State-supported routes are in 
California. Has the ridership on these routes not on the 
Northeast Corridor diminished to the same proportion as 
ridership on the Northeast Corridor?
    What is being done to assist State-supported routes and our 
workers on these routes being furloughed differently than 
workers on other areas of Amtrak operations?
    Mr. Flynn. So State-supported routes in California, the 
three JPAs, are very important operations for Amtrak and 
important for the State----
    Mrs. Napolitano. I know that.
    Mr. Flynn [continuing].Congresswoman. We are operating a 
level of train service based on what the three JPAs instruct us 
to operate. So they make the decision of how many trains we 
should operate during COVID and post-COVID. So we respond to 
them. They make the, I would say, the business decision on how 
many trains to operate.
    And our State partners are certainly working with us, but 
also insisting that we keep our costs low. And in part, that 
gets to what level of employment base will we have to support 
the services. It is something that we hear about from the three 
JPAs regularly as part of our ongoing discussion with them as 
we are planning for 2021 levels of service, ma'am.
    Mrs. Napolitano. All right. Well, I would suggest that you 
communicate with all your employees, your labor organizations, 
and have some transparency so they can see why you have to do 
what you do.
    And I support Amtrak. No doubt they do a great job, and I 
support the employees. But I would wish that the organization, 
with you being new onboard, that you might consider connecting 
with them to allow them to see why you are doing the things you 
are doing, and not have to come up before us, and explain it to 
Congress.
    I think that the waiver of Buy American, we want to keep 
things in America. We want to do more manufacturing in America. 
So I suppose that there might be some need for it, but let's 
look at how important that is to your organization.
    And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Smucker for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Smucker. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I appreciate you holding 
this hearing. I would like to address some comments to Mr. 
Flynn, as well. I have some questions, as well.
    But first, I recognize that I know you have taken 
leadership of this organization during a particularly 
challenging time. The coronavirus has certainly taken a 
tremendous toll on families, businesses, and workers all across 
my district and across the country. And I know that----
    Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Smucker?
    Mr. Smucker. Yes?
    Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Smucker, if you will hold for a second 
there, can you turn your camera on? It doesn't appear to be on.
    Mr. Smucker. Sorry. I must have hit that when I muted 
myself. Sorry about that.
    Mr. Lipinski. All right.
    Mr. Smucker. That wasn't on.
    So, as I was saying, as individuals have shifted their work 
habits and travel, I know that there has been a tremendous toll 
on Amtrak. And so it has got to be a tough time to take on the 
leadership of an organization like this, and I want to 
congratulate you, and understand that it's a difficult time.
    Rail is important to our transportation infrastructure, and 
I support rail passenger service, as well. It is important in 
my community, particularly Amtrak. The Keystone line runs right 
through the district that I represent. Lancaster Station is one 
of the busiest stations in Pennsylvania, right behind 30th 
Street Station, and so it is important.
    You have talked a little bit about the virus impact on 
Amtrak, but I specifically want to sort of understand what has 
happened on the Keystone line, and then have some specific 
questions.
    You said ridership was down 97 percent, I believe, overall. 
What have you seen on the Keystone line?
    Mr. Flynn. So 97 percent was the immediate impact, Mr. 
Congressman, in March, April, and May. Our ridership has 
recovered about 20 percent. So we are down 80 percent. On a----
    Mr. Smucker. And did that track similarly on the Keystone 
line?
    Mr. Flynn. The Keystone line was actually the first of the 
State-supported lines to shut down. Early in the pandemic, at 
the direction of SEPTA, the Keystone line was shut down for a 
period of time, and I think, in part, because of the COVID 
outbreak, or incidents of COVID within several of the SEPTA 
operations itself.
    We are happy that the Keystone line has been reinstated, 
and we are operating the Keystone line for SEPTA today, as we 
speak. I don't, off the top of my head, know the specific level 
of ridership, but that is certainly something we can get back 
to you with.
    Mr. Smucker. How is the----
    [Microphone unmuted.]
    Mr. Smucker. I am sorry?
    Mr. Flynn. It would be similar, although several of the 
commuter services or State-supported lines that operate more 
like a commuter service have had a bit higher level of 
ridership as people are returning to work, more than people are 
taking leisure travel. I just don't have the number, off the 
top of my head.
    Mr. Smucker. Yes. Do you know how the revenue compares year 
to date, compared to last year at this time?
    Mr. Flynn. I don't have that, off the top of my head, 
Congressman Smucker. I will have to get back----
    Mr. Smucker. If you can get that information, that would be 
great for me to know that.
    You mentioned it is a State-supported line. How does 
Amtrak's capital investment in the Keystone line compare to the 
investment from the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Flynn. Another area I would have to get back to you on.
    Mr. Smucker. Sure.
    Mr. Flynn. I don't recall that number, off the top----
    Mr. Smucker. I would be glad to get that from you later.
    Do you know what percentage of the Amtrak stations along 
the Keystone line are ADA compliant?
    Mr. Flynn. I do not. I do know that we are making 
substantial investments in ADA compliance, and certainly the 
Keystone line is part of that. We have a requirement----
    Mr. Smucker. And I am sorry, I am almost running out of 
time. Do you know what percentage of those upgrade projects 
were paid for by Amtrak, as compared to by the State, by the 
Commonwealth?
    Mr. Flynn. Most of it is paid by Pennsylvania, sir, in my 
understanding.
    Mr. Smucker. Do all of the Amtrak revenues outside of 
ticket sales, including fees generated from other rail line 
utilizers and additional revenue, get reinvested back into the 
Keystone line?
    Mr. Flynn. Keystone revenues into Keystone line? The 
Keystone line is part of the entire Northeast Corridor, and so 
there is a very comprehensive set of rules and legislation 
under 212----
    Mr. Smucker. I am going to stop you, I am sorry. I am at 
the end of my time here. You might be able to guess what I am 
getting at.
    During the committee's markup earlier this year, I offered 
an amendment that would transfer the Keystone line to the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Next week, when the House returns 
to session, I plan to offer that amendment as a bill. I just 
would like to ask you, don't you think that, at this time, that 
Amtrak is losing money on the Keystone line, particularly with 
the challenges now? Don't you think that transferring the line 
to the Commonwealth would put Amtrak in better financial 
standing?
    Mr. Flynn. I don't, sir. I think making a short-term 
decision over the long-term level of operations, I don't think 
it would be a good decision.
    Mr. Smucker. As I said, I know rail service is important. 
And I think at this time, with these challenges, I think it is 
important we consider outside-of-the-box innovations to better 
serve the American people.
    But I thank you for your answers, and I look forward to 
some of those answers coming forward. Thank you.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Cohen for 5 
minutes.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Lipinski. Do we have Mr. Cohen?
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Lipinski. OK, the Chair will now recognize, then, Mr. 
Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Lipinski 
and Ranking Member Crawford, for convening this timely hearing.
    Like my colleagues, I am deeply concerned about the changes 
that we are hearing about at Amtrak. Concerned, but not 
surprised, given the magnitude of this pandemic. I do not envy 
the tough decisions that you are having to make at this time. 
But no one could have predicted the financial onslaught the 
transportation sector would suffer when the pandemic first 
struck.
    Since March we have quickly seen ridership drop 
precipitously, and the financial disaster that COVID has been 
for so many sectors. It has been especially clear in Chicago, 
where almost 1,300 Amtrak workers live and work every day.
    The vast majority of frontline workers at Amtrak--train 
operators, engineers, and the like--are union members. They 
make decent, livable wages, thanks to their good-paying union 
jobs. For Amtrak employees getting the pink slip, the decision 
is crippling. Frankly, my constituents are feeling the pain. 
Not only have they kept our economy moving, but they have done 
so at the risk of their own health and that of their families, 
as well. Still, we are letting them down, and you are letting 
them go.
    In our preliminary conversations with representatives from 
Amtrak in Chicago, I was informed that nearly 200 employees in 
the Chicagoland area will be either furloughed or severed 
entirely. Mr. Flynn, can you confirm the number of furloughed 
versus fired employees we can expect from this proposed action 
at Amtrak, both nationally and in Chicago or Illinois?
    Mr. Flynn. So thank you very much for your question, 
Congressman Garcia. Furloughed would apply to any union-
represented employee. So they are not severed from the company. 
They have rights of return to service on a seniority basis, and 
those seniority recall rights, or the recall rights, are 
indefinite. The only time a union employee would be severed 
would be if the union employee did not accept a return to 
service when so advised. And so they retain those rights.
    A management employee, however, does not have a right of 
recall. And so management employees are severed when 
furloughed. I think we are severing about 100 people. Again, a 
very difficult decision to do. Management employees--100 
total--management employees have the right to reapply, or apply 
to be rehired, one year or more after their severance.
    I don't have, off the top of my head, specific Chicago 
numbers, but would be happy to provide that.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. If you would. And then, will these 
families receive any severance or extended benefits? What about 
healthcare?
    Mr. Flynn. Well, that is a very important question. Thank 
you, sir.
    So we have gone beyond our contract requirements with our 
union-represented employees, and they will have full healthcare 
coverage at no cost to the employee or his or her family 
through September 30th of 2021. For a management employee, we 
have reduced COBRA for them for a period of months after they 
are severed from the company.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And can you briefly--changing 
gears--shed light on the type of service changes we can expect 
in Chicago?
    I understand several interstate routes like trips to 
Detroit and through Wisconsin will be heavily impacted. And 
brief me, please.
    Mr. Flynn. Our long-distance routes that come through 
Chicago will go to a 3-day-a-week service, those that are not 
already there will go to a 3-day-a-week service from a 7-day, 
although a couple are already at 3-day-a-week.
    And then the State-supported routes will be dependent on 
what the States tell us they want us to operate. We don't 
control that.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. I wanted to ask you more indepth 
about the thousands of people in Indiana, Wisconsin, and the 
collar counties of Chicago that rely on State-supported Amtrak 
trains to get to work or family. But I will skip that, because 
my time is running out.
    If the THUD Act were enacted instead of languishing in the 
Senate under Mitch McConnell's desk, how would that additional 
funding be utilized beyond the $4.9 billion you have requested?
    Mr. Flynn. So if we were to get the $10 billion of funding 
that THUD has spoken to, about $4.9 billion would be used for 
the--as we have already described, in the incremental 
supplemental expense. And then the other $5 billion would be 
used both across our company, some in the Northeast Corridor, 
but the majority, or greater than half, in our national 
network. And we would use it to invest in fleet, our bridges 
and tunnels, as well as in workforce training and working with 
our labor unions to develop internships and job training 
opportunities.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Great. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you for your indulgence.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Garcia. The Chair will now 
recognize Mr. Fitzpatrick for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding, for 
holding the hearing today. Thanks to all the panel for being 
here with us today. My question is for President Maratea.
    I was wondering if you could walk us through and explain to 
the committee what TCU has done to assist Amtrak with reducing 
its overall costs of doing business.
    Mr. Maratea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. 
First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your ongoing 
support for the Amtrak workforce, and for leading a bipartisan 
letter, along with Congressman Moulton, supporting emergency 
relief funding for Amtrak, and protections for our workers. You 
have also shown time and again that you support and care about 
Amtrak workers, even standing with us at our rally in freezing 
cold February in Philadelphia.
    To answer your question, what have TCU members been doing? 
Most recently our onboard workers have received a 10-percent 
pay cut. By putting them on the actual list, their guaranteed 
money has been reduced. And that is continuing. Many employees 
took voluntary leave without pay to help Amtrak. They lost a 
week's pay per month. And we have also said to Amtrak, ``What 
could we do to work together to try to make other side 
agreements,'' which, unfortunately, we have not had any 
movement on.
    To go back a little further, I negotiated the last round of 
the contract bargaining. I was the lead spokesman for our 
coalition. Meeting with Amtrak, they wanted major needs from 
us. One was relief on their healthcare. Not short-term--long-
term relief on their healthcare plan.
    We buckled down, rolled up our sleeves, and we attacked it. 
By making a whole new healthcare plan for the first 5 years of 
an employee's employment before they can go into the higher 
level plan, which, according to our numbers, generated $4 
million over those 5 years of savings. Rolling it out for the 
future, 10 years, would generate $17 million, and over 25 
years, $72 million, which Amtrak needed for stability in their 
healthcare.
    We also increased our membership cost share that, during 
term, would have generated $20 million in money back to Amtrak 
for our employees. Plus, on wages, they needed relief early on, 
and we gave them that relief by adding a 6-month zero in the 
front of the contract, and basically taking a 1.25 for 18 
months of the first 2 years of that contract. Industry 
standard, everybody was getting a 2.5. Again, we took 1.25 and 
backloaded that deal to help Amtrak, both for the future, and 
future employment for our members.
    We have a long history of bargaining with Amtrak, sitting 
down, and rolling up our sleeves and making things work. We 
have added part-time agreements in our call centers and our 
ticket windows, anything we could do to keep our people moving. 
And this is just a small step in the right direction that we 
had to take time and time again to make things work.
    And that is why it is a little disheartening to see our 
frontline people, who, when you talk about heroes, these guys 
are the heroes. These brothers and sisters are your frontline 
people: ticket clerks, ushers who are cleaning the station, 
doing spot cleaning so everybody stays safe, and now risking 
their lives and families, have to go out and take a--lose their 
job.
    And to further respond to the congressman's question, I 
just want to add--and I am sorry, Congressman--the managers, if 
they hold rights to the union, they come back. They don't hit 
the street. And most managers hold rights. They paid us dues. 
They come back, they bump. So that has to be taken into 
consideration. The TCU has always stepped up, and we have many 
times. We will.
    I hope that answers your question, Congressman.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Yes, thank you, Mr. Maratea.
    And to Chairman Lipinski and all my colleagues on the 
committee, I just think it is important that we remember and 
recognize these frontline workers. We hear that term used a 
lot. These people actually should be included in that 
definition. As you just heard Mr. Maratea walk through, they 
have significant skin in the game, and have made tremendous 
sacrifices. And when we talk about Amtrak, we got to start the 
conversation with the men and women who are on the front lines.
    So, sir, thank you for your service.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Ms. 
Norton for 5 minutes.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Lipinski. Ms. Norton, are you there?
    Ms. Norton. I am sorry, can----
    Mr. Lipinski. OK, go ahead, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Norton. OK, I am sorry. I must have been muted.
    I particularly appreciate this hearing. Amtrak is on the 
Northeast Corridor, and Washington Union Station is its second 
busiest station, nationwide. Of course, I represent the 
District. It is a question first for Mr. Flynn.
    Mr. Flynn, I know the continuing or competing pressures you 
have. You have got a decrease in ridership, a drop in revenue. 
You have got new safety protocols. And yet, I know capital 
improvements are continuing, for example, the Portal North 
Bridge, among others. I would like you to answer how you are 
able to continue capital improvements in the middle of this 
economic and health crisis that Amtrak faces.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Ms. Norton. The capital improvements 
that we continue to pursue are improvements that have been 
pursued for a long time, as you know, and we believe are 
essential improvements for the company and for our riders.
    Ms. Norton. Where does the revenue come from for these 
improvements?
    Mr. Flynn. The revenue for the improvements comes from 
Congress. It is moneys that are allocated to us, working 
jointly with the Department of Transportation and the Federal 
Railway Administration and FTA, where appropriate.
    So Portal North, for example, is, I believe----
    Ms. Norton. So have there been any cuts in the revenue you 
have gotten from Congress for these improvements?
    Mr. Flynn. No, there haven't been any cuts. The capital 
funding is fairly specific as to what it is intended to do, and 
these are investments in 100-year-old infrastructure.
    I am not sure if you can hear me. I am getting a----
    Ms. Norton. I can hear you. Yes, I can hear you. And I 
understand the importance of these capital improvements, I am 
simply trying to reconcile the funds you are not receiving, for 
example, from Congress in the Heroes Act, funds you need so 
badly, and your ability to continue to fund capital 
improvements in and across the country, it looks like. But I 
take it that those funds were already appropriated.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Norton. For the capital improvements.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am. Those funds were appropriated. And 
certainly additional consideration for capital expenditures in 
CARES, as well.
    Ms. Norton. For--in CARES, all right.
    I am intrigued, upon learning of your partnership, I will 
call it, with RB, which is the maker of Lysol. Ms. Griffin of 
the Transport Workers Union earlier testified about lack of 
coach cleaners. I am wondering about this new partnership to 
strengthen disinfectant protocols for trains and stations, and 
I am interested in it because you are trying this out first in 
Washington Union Station and on our Pacific Surfliner, but in 
Washington Union Station, which is one of the busiest in the 
Northeast Corridor.
    So could you give us some greater detail on these enhanced 
protocols that you will be using on Amtrak in this new 
partnership with the maker of Lysol?
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, ma'am. So Lysol, the RB product Lysol, is 
one of very few products that the Food and Drug Administration 
has determined to be effective against COVID-19, and effective 
against other coronaviruses of different types.
    And what we are doing is we are constantly researching, 
seeking to understand what more can we do to mitigate and/or, 
essentially, eliminate the potential for our customers and our 
employees to contract COVID while in a station or on a train.
    And so, in working out this agreement with Lysol, they are 
providing us with what the FDA has determined to be a very 
efficacious product. They are also working with us and 
providing advice to us on how we can enhance the cleaning 
protocols that we employ on the trains. In fact, before they 
would sign this agreement with us, they did a very 
comprehensive review of what we are doing, because while we are 
cobranding with Lysol, they are cobranding with us, and they 
weren't going to cobrand with an entity that they didn't feel 
had the right level of protocols and actions in place.
    And so we are testing it first in the stations, as you 
pointed out, now. We believe those products could also be 
useful on the train. But that is a next step that we are doing 
with the company RB for their products.
    Ms. Norton. That is reassuring. Thank you very much, and I 
see my time has expired.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Ms. Norton. The Chair will now 
recognize Mr. Balderson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Chairman Lipinski. It is great to 
have Mr. Flynn here today.
    Mr. Flynn, thank you for being here, and I want to thank 
Amtrak for their service through these trying times. But I 
appreciate you being here.
    Mr. Flynn, I would like to follow up on a point my 
colleague, Congressman Perry, made earlier regarding 
depreciation. On November 8, 2019, Amtrak announced its lowest 
ever adjusted operating loss of $29.8 million for fiscal year 
2019. In that same statement, Amtrak went on to project a 
profit for 2020, which would be a first in Amtrak's near 50-
year history. If depreciation was included in this financial 
reporting, what would Amtrak's net loss have been in 2019, and 
what would the projection have been for fiscal year 2020?
    Mr. Flynn. If we were to add back the depreciation, it 
would be about, say, $750 to $800 million. So at an adjusted 
operating income basis, I believe that fiscal year 2019 was a -
$29 million, or near break-even on that level. You would have 
to add back to $750 million or so of depreciation, and there 
may be some other expenses in there, but that would get you to 
about an $800 million loss on a GAAP basis. And it is a similar 
level, sir, of depreciation going into fiscal year 2020. I 
don't know the exact number, but it would increase somewhat, 
but not of an order of magnitude.
    Mr. Balderson. OK, good to know, thank you.
    The next question would be, assuming a level playing field, 
including workforce protections and safety standards, would you 
oppose opening certain national network routes for a 
competitive bid, if that meant driving down cost and improving 
service?
    Mr. Flynn. Well, I have--certainly not a question I have 
considered, and I appreciate your asking that, Congressman.
    But as a first impression to me, no, I don't believe we 
would operate or open up our long-distance routes for 
competitive bids at this point in time. We have a hard enough 
time just getting on the network with our host railroads to 
operate the services that we provide. More operators create 
more complexity, among other things. And I would imagine it 
could be highly disruptive to us, and I would imagine it could 
be highly disruptive to the Class I railroads.
    And I think that would also--such a situation there, I 
think, would certainly jeopardize employment opportunities for 
our current employees, were that----
    Mr. Balderson. OK, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I can't see the clock. How is my time?
    Mr. Lipinski. You have 2 minutes.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Flynn, my last question, then, I understand you worked 
for a Class I railroad, and I know you are familiar with the 
importance of freight railroads to our economy. How do you plan 
to work with all classes of freight railroads to strengthen a 
relationship between those railroads and Amtrak to eliminate 
conflicts and improve on-time performance?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, sir. I did have the opportunity to 
work for CSX for several years a while ago. And so I do believe 
I have a Class I freight railroad perspective. And I believe we 
can certainly coexist, but I think we can do more than coexist. 
I believe we can both prosper. Freight railroads make an 
important contribution to our economy, broadly, and so does 
Amtrak.
    And so I think, if we could have standards and metrics in 
place, clarify the ground rules there, obtain the right of 
private action, I believe we can sit down with the Class I 
railroad and absolutely work to an operating profile that 
allows for high-quality, on-time operations for both our 
passenger operation and our host railroad's freight operation.
    Mr. Balderson. Mr. Flynn, thank you very much for taking 
the time to be here, and please pass along our thanks to Amtrak 
employees for their frontline workers, and being out there, and 
God bless them, and stay safe and healthy.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back my remaining time.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. The Chair will now recognize Mr. 
Lowenthal for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all--
and to the ranking member, and thank you to all the panelists 
on this very interesting issue on--talking about Amtrak and the 
future of Amtrak. I would like to really focus in on Amtrak's 
response to COVID-19, specifically. My first questions are to 
Ms. Griffin.
    Ms. Griffin, in your written testimony you provide a 
concerning account of your experience in July, when you were in 
contact with a COVID-19-positive colleague. You took steps to 
notify your supervisors, to initiate protocols that would 
remove you from further service to avoid further spreading the 
virus. However, you were not immediately removed from service, 
and were only removed after further intervention from 
supervisors.
    Most concerning to me is that you were told by Amtrak to 
return to service after only 10 days, and were never tested for 
COVID before returning to work. While you did not display any 
symptoms, we know that asymptomatic individuals spread the 
virus just as much. In fact, a study that has just recently 
been published in last month's Journal of the American Medical 
Association's Internal Medicine found that asymptomatic and 
presymptomatic individuals carried as much of the virus as 
those who were exhibiting symptoms.
    Since your experience in July, do you know if Amtrak has 
instituted a different process to remove possibly infected 
individuals from work, and to ensure that they are COVID-free 
before returning to work?
    Ms. Griffin. Thank you for your question. And as far as I 
know, no, it is the same procedures as I went through. 
Actually, I have been quarantined twice through Amtrak with 
possible exposure. And this has been the same protocol.
    Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
    Mr. Flynn, what went wrong in Ms. Griffin's case?
    Mr. Flynn. Well, I paid very close attention to Ms. 
Griffin's testimony as she was describing the conditions and 
circumstances to the committee. And I am going to ensure that 
we look into those details very closely.
    We require that our employees quarantine after we confirm 
exposures, real exposures to another employee. And if they are 
on the road, we ask them to isolate on the return trip. And 
also, we require a 14-day period of time.
    I can't comment, again, specifically on Ms. Griffin's 
circumstances. I believe she might have just said that the 
first time that she quarantined it was for 14 days.
    Ms. Griffin. Ten days.
    Mr. Flynn. Well, again, I want to look into the details of 
that. I don't know if 10 days was an elapsed total of 14 days 
since the exposure. I don't know, and it wouldn't be 
appropriate for me to presuppose any of that. But as I said to 
you, and I confirmed to Ms. Griffin, who is on the panel here 
with me, I will certainly look into those details.
    Mr. Lowenthal. So, and I----
    Mr. Flynn. But we do require our employees to quarantine. 
We do pay-protect our employees when they are on quarantine. So 
far, we have had, for example, 3,921 employees that we have 
pay-protected, and not only because they were potentially 
exposed or exposed, but if they believe that they had some 
exposure, or if they had some of the symptoms of COVID. We have 
had 1,845 employees test for COVID, 482 tested positive, of 
which only 7 are current. And we are now providing testing on 
demand, which is over and above CDC guidelines, to any employee 
that requests it, sir.
    Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. Thank you for describing the 
processes that Amtrak has in place to ensure that potentially 
infected employees are not on duty, or in trains, or in the 
stations.
    My next question is, does Amtrak have any processes in 
place to contact trace COVID-infected passengers? What happens 
if a passenger tests positive a day or two after their train 
trip? Do employees who worked on that train, do they find out 
about that? So, if you could, describe that process, also.
    Mr. Flynn. Yes, we do have contact tracing in place, our 
workers and, where we can, with our passengers. And what I mean 
by where we can is that we don't always know where a passenger 
sits on a train. We did actually have an early COVID case 
passenger as early as March on a train from Chicago to St. 
Louis. We were able to contact virtually everyone on the 
train--there weren't a lot of riders on that train--not just 
everyone in the car, but certainly all of our employees. And so 
we are also working with the public health departments to 
continue to do so.
    Mr. Lowenthal. Well, thank you. Thank you, Ms. Griffin, and 
thank you, Mr. Flynn, for that testimony. I am very concerned 
about the processes that are in place, and whether examples of 
Ms. Griffin, where things did not work out as well as she would 
have liked, that they have improved.
    And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Lipinski. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Carson for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chair. Am I on? OK. Yes. So my 
question----
    Mr. Lipinski. We can hear you, but your camera is not on. 
We can't see you.
    OK, there you go.
    Mr. Carson. I had to logon online. It is Webex. So my 
question is for Mr. Flynn regarding Beech Grove.
    I have been very concerned about the furloughs you are 
considering. I am especially concerned about the possible 
impact on maintenance facilities. Can you tell me if you plan 
to cut positions at Beech Grove?
    I would also appreciate, in writing, any plans you have to 
change the workforce levels at the Beech Grove facility.
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Carson. We are not 
furloughing any employees at Beech Grove. In fact, a number of 
our Beech Grove employees did take the VSIP, the voluntary 
separation, and retire. So, in fact, we are actually hiring 
some employees in Beech Grove to backfill the positions.
    As you know, Beech Grove requires some substantial capital 
investments over the next several years. But as we develop 
future plans about Beech Grove, or plans that would impact 
Beech Grove, we would be very happy to advise your office of 
what those plans would be.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you. That would be a big help. Thank you 
very much.
    But Mr. Mathews, I appreciate listening to your testimony 
about the damage being done to the passenger rail service in 
the Midwest by reducing the daily service on long-distance 
routes. Indianapolis was previously served, and benefitted from 
this.
    To Mr. Mathews, can you elaborate on what happens to 
Midwestern cities when daily services are cut? Do you think 
Congress should mandate daily services?
    And if anyone else wants to jump in about a congressionally 
mandated daily service, chime in.
    Mr. Mathews. So, well, yes, sir. Our position is that, yes, 
these services should be, at a minimum, daily. And the reason 
for that is because of the multiplier effect that these 
services have in the communities.
    We have heard a lot this morning, an assertion that Amtrak 
is required by Congress to make a profit. It is not. It is 
required to minimize subsidies. And when we have the 
conversation about profit, that ignores the benefits that the 
communities receive, and we talked about that, and the Midwest 
is a perfect example of that.
    When we looked at the effect of the long-distance routes, 
12 of the 15 long-distance routes that would be affected by 
these cuts, those routes together contribute about $4.7, $4.8 
billion to the economy. That is the profit. The profit is going 
to those communities that are served. And whether you are 
looking at places like St. Louis or Indianapolis or anywhere in 
the Midwest, these services provide an outsized benefit in 
terms of tourism, in terms of visitor spending, in terms of 
taking vehicles off the road. All of those impacts are 
measurable, quantifiable.
    Amtrak itself used to talk about $7.4 billion of value to 
the economy that was created. We think that number is actually 
a lowball. We think it is actually a little higher than that.
    When you cut the daily service down to three times a week, 
you don't just cut 4 days' worth of ridership. The ridership 
declines more than that because of the diminished utility, and 
because of the diminished connections.
    Chicago is an enormous connection point, as you know, and 
that is going to be a particularly difficult situation for the 
Midwest, because a lot of those connections, because they are 
difficult to make, those trips simply won't take place. Thirty-
nine million dollars of revenue, of connecting revenue, flows 
through Chicago alone. And a lot of these trips are going to 
originate in Chicago and flow through the Midwest, and those 
trips will not take place because the network does not have the 
utility required to make those trips worthwhile.
    So those are people that will not be getting off in those 
smaller towns, will not be spending their money in those towns, 
will not be eating in the restaurants, and will not be 
supporting the local economy. And that is a big blow. It is 
already a big blow, and it is only going to get worse.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you. Thank you both.
    Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Carson. The Chair will now 
recognize Mr. Lynch for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lynch. Yes, Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
    Mr. Lipinski. We can hear you and we can see you.
    Mr. Lynch. All right, well, that is good. Two for two.
    First of all, I want to thank you, Chairman Lipinski, for 
keeping your focus on this. This is a very important issue. And 
I appreciate the witnesses trying to help.
    Mr. Flynn, going back to the CARES Act, we pushed through 
$1 billion, hoping that that would help recapitalize Amtrak so 
that you could avoid furloughs. Then we put through $10 billion 
in addition to that, on the transportation appropriations bill. 
And then, under H.R. 2, we actually, I thought, were very 
generous to Amtrak by supporting $30 billion for Amtrak over 
the next 5 years. And to be honest with you, I thought we were 
very generous.
    And just so you know, during the debate of H.R. 2, I had an 
amendment. The amendment would have prohibited any furloughs, 
layoffs, or reductions in force during the term of this 
pandemic. And yet, the feeling between Amtrak and members of 
the committee and staff was that, with this generous funding of 
Amtrak, that this would be unnecessary, and that I should 
withdraw my amendment. And so in good faith--in good faith--I 
did. I withdrew that amendment that would have prohibited what 
you are doing right now. So I am not happy about that.
    I just want to tell you that there are consequences to your 
decision.
    In good faith, I supported all that funding for Amtrak. And 
as a matter of fact, while my district is at one end of the 
Northeast Corridor that provides a profit for Amtrak, I am 
entirely comfortable, and I fully support Amtrak using the 
profit that they would make in the Northeast Corridor to help 
our Midwestern and Southern and Western States, some of those 
red States, those rural areas that would be without service. So 
I support that. I don't think that we should cut out those 
lines of service, those long-haul lines that don't necessarily 
benefit my district, but I think benefit the country.
    I hope you take very seriously the credibility that you 
will lose by engaging in these furloughs, and the reputational 
damage that comes to Amtrak management because of this 
decision. These 2,000 line workers are very important to us. 
They are the heart and soul of Amtrak. And I appreciate that 
the management personnel are important, as well.
    We are going through a rough patch right now. And I think 
this decision, you are not keeping faith with our line workers 
for Amtrak, you are not keeping faith with the people who drive 
those trains and maintain those trains every single day. I 
really have some deep misgivings about my own decision to pull 
that amendment.
    So, I am asking you to rethink that. We are all in this 
together. I don't think that your decision to furlough these 
2,000 employees is going to save the day, quite honestly, 
because cutting them out is going to reduce service. Cutting 
them out is going to continue to spiral that bottom-line 
deficit. And you are going to lose the faith of Members of 
Congress like me, who were behind you and supportive of you, 
because of this decision.
    So do you have any other alternatives, other than what you 
are suggesting right now with this furlough decision?
    Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Congressman Lynch. These are really 
very difficult decisions, and ones that we all feel very 
personally.
    As you pointed out, if H.R. 2 were to become law, it would 
be game-changing for Amtrak on many, many levels, including the 
ability to retain everyone employed, and to retain the long-
distance service.
    Should the economic recovery, as proposed under THUD 
legislation, that would be some multiple of game changing. I am 
not sure what the right adjective is for that.
    But we don't have that funding certainty yet. And that is 
why, in the $4.9 billion supplemental that we presented to the 
committee, and had discussions with staff and with Members, it 
is about retaining employees who would otherwise be furloughed, 
or may be furloughed and then recalled, and the long-distance 
service.
    As I mentioned in a response to another member of the 
committee, we had quite a bit of input from a wide array of 
stakeholders, including the Senate, and including in the 
administration that said, ``You need to, in your request, look 
at those areas where, given the very, very low levels of 
ridership you are experiencing, you need to engage and you need 
to take some self-help in reducing cost,'' and those are the 
equities we are simply trying to balance.
    And I heard everything you said, which is why, in my 
remarks here today, I was pointing out levels of funding, given 
a 34-percent level of ridership in 2021 as compared to 2019, 
that we would require.
    Mr. Lynch. Well, you know, I think we have got to hang 
together, and I just do not see the support that I think we owe 
to our line workers. I just don't see it in this, these 2,000 
furloughs. So I would encourage you to revisit that decision.
    The other piece of the question I had was the vendor 
bidding on contracts that may result in jobs being exported 
overseas, lost in the United States and then exported overseas. 
Do you have anything to say about that?
    Mr. Flynn. We did receive a waiver to purchase some very 
specific track-laying equipment from overseas, and we did that 
after the FRA and the committee satisfied themselves it was 
absolutely necessary and not available.
    If you are referring to a recent RFP for IT work, that has 
certainly very strongly been brought to my attention--I was 
unaware--by both----
    Mr. Lynch. OK.
    Mr. Flynn [continuing]. Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member 
Graves, or by Chairman DeFazio, specifically. And we have 
adjusted that RFP and taken out the ability of the responder, 
or the successful responder, to outsource that IT programming 
work.
    Mr. Lynch. OK.
    Mr. Flynn. We had some other RFPs, and we also made those 
changes, as well.
    Mr. Lynch. All right. Under the circumstances, you could 
see how you would be under severe criticism for doing that. But 
I appreciate that you have revisited that, and I am glad you 
are listening to Chairman DeFazio, and happy that at least the 
IT portion of that has been retained.
    Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back, and I want to thank 
the witnesses for their help with the committee at this 
hearing. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.
    Are there any Members who have not had a chance to ask any 
questions?
    All right, hearing none, I want to thank the witnesses for 
your testimony.
    I think Mr. Lynch's comments there at the end were a very 
good way to conclude. We need to be supportive of the workers 
at Amtrak. I am sorry that Mr. Maratea and Ms. Griffin didn't 
have more of an opportunity here to field questions, but I 
think everyone understands that Mr. Flynn is really in the 
driver's seat here for what is happening.
    But Amtrak needs the support and the help from Congress. I 
was very happy to hear at the end, I was not aware--I sent that 
letter, along with Chairman DeFazio, about the outsourcing of 
the IT jobs. So I am very glad to hear that that has been 
changed, that the option has been changed. That is good news to 
hear from you, Mr. Flynn.
    But we are going to have to continue to talk about the need 
to make sure that Amtrak workers are taken care of, and also 
that Amtrak passengers receive the service that they deserve, 
and when the pandemic is over, that we can return to all of the 
service. Which is very questionable, if we have cuts to service 
in the meantime.
    But I want to thank all the witnesses again for your 
testimony.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as the witnesses have provided 
answers to questions that may be submitted to them in writing.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record 
of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    And with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
     Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chairman Lipinski and Ranking Member Crawford, for 
calling today's hearing to discuss Amtrak's response to COVID-19.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has wrought devastating public health and 
economic impacts--185,000 Americans dead to date and tens of millions 
of job losses. And the numbers just keep going up.
    Sadly, the Trump administration and Senate Republicans have turned 
a blind eye to the pressing needs of average Americans by stonewalling 
House-passed measures and downplaying the clear need for another relief 
bill. Their tactics have needlessly cost our country more lives and 
jobs. The bottom line is that the challenges facing us in this pandemic 
are far from over. Similarly, the challenges Amtrak faces from COVID-19 
are far from over.
    Like every other transportation mode, Amtrak has been hammered by 
the COVID-19 pandemic. At one point in March, ridership across Amtrak's 
network was down 95 percent. Even now, ridership and ticket revenues 
are significantly down across the network . . . and Amtrak is 
estimating that it will take several years for ridership to fully 
recover. For example, ridership on the Cascades route through my home 
state of Oregon is down significantly--from 85,700 riders in July 2019 
to 6,400 in July 2020. Right now, Amtrak estimates that, in 2021, 
they'll have 34 percent of the systemwide riders that they had in 2019. 
That means roughly 34 percent of the ticket revenues used to operate 
its trains, reduce its state-of-good repair backlog, improve service, 
and pay workers.
    In July, the House passed a comprehensive infrastructure bill, H.R. 
2, the Moving Forward Act, that provided Amtrak $29 billion in funding 
over five years and would invest in infrastructure to jumpstart a post-
COVID economic recovery. Also in July, the House passed a FY 2021 
appropriations bill with $10.05 billion for Amtrak, including $8 
billion of recovery aid for Amtrak and its state partners to help keep 
the trains running and workers employed.
    And from the Senate, we've heard . . . crickets. No leadership, no 
accountability. Abandoning its responsibility to legislate, the Senate 
went on recess while the COVID-19 pandemic continued and millions 
without work saw cuts to their unemployment benefits take effect.
    As a result, on October 1st Amtrak will cut 2,050 people from its 
workforce. These include workers who provide onboard services; assist 
passengers as Red Caps and ticket and station agents; work as 
conductors and engineers operating trains; as well some management 
staff. Thanks to strong Federal labor protections, these are good jobs 
that pay wages that sustain American middle-class families. To show the 
real-world impacts of these cuts, we will now hear a voicemail my 
office received from an Amtrak conductor who just learned that he will 
be furloughed.
    [Committee staff will play audio recording of Amtrak conductor 
discussing his fear and concern and asking for Congressional support.]
    To make things harder for Amtrak employees, these job losses come 
at a time of high unemployment. Though the unemployment rate recently 
rebounded to 8.4 percent from historic highs of 14.7 percent in April, 
the rate was at 3.5 percent in February. And 29 million Americans are 
still drawing some form of jobless benefits. It won't be easy for laid-
off Amtrak workers to find new jobs with wages that allow them to pay 
their mortgages and support their families.
    In addition to cutting jobs, Amtrak plans to drastically reduce 
service. Amtrak has already cut Northeast Corridor service frequencies 
and worked with states to trim state-supported route frequency. Now on 
the chopping block is long-distance service. This service, which 
connects rural and urban areas around the country, has fared better 
than the rest of the service lines, with long-distance ridership down 
62 percent from the previous year, versus a reduction of about 80 
percent for the Northeast Corridor and state-supported routes.
    Still, Amtrak plans to cut almost all of its daily long-distance 
routes to just three times per week. The impacts of this change will 
trickle down, limiting travel choices for rural Americans, hurting 
cross-service connections, damaging rider loyalty, and taking money 
away from the towns and cities along the routes that benefit from 
Amtrak service.
    While Amtrak has announced metrics it will use to resume daily 
service on long-distance routes, I have concerns about slashing service 
on the routes where demand has fallen less dramatically. I also worry 
about creating a chicken-or-the-egg situation where reduced frequencies 
cause lower rider demand, making the metrics impossible to achieve. 
This could lead to service cuts that linger for years and dramatically 
hurt Amtrak's long-distance network.
    The truth is that daily service is vastly more convenient than 
three days a week, and Amtrak will have an uphill battle to rebuild 
demand if it's offering less attractive service options. As the travel 
economy recovers, Amtrak should be capitalizing on the advantages of 
long-distance travel by train, including Amtrak's trains' effective 
ventilation and air filtration and the options for better social 
distancing than other transportation modes. Amtrak also has added 
enhanced safety and cleaning measures, instituted contact-less 
notification measures to improve the safety of traveling, and has, for 
months, required passengers and Amtrak workers to wear face coverings 
onboard trains.
    I'm curious to hear from the witnesses today on Amtrak's COVID-19 
response and recovery, and the ways that job and service cuts hurt 
workers and threaten the future of Amtrak's rail network. Thank you.

                                 
 Statement of Ross Capon, Consultant, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
                       Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford
    I am an independent consultant and president emeritus of the Rail 
Passengers Association (RPA, formerly National Association of Railroad 
Passengers) which I led as executive director and then president and 
CEO from 1976 to 2014. I do not represent RPA but I am in frequent 
touch with my successor, Jim Mathews, and generally support his 
testimony. From 1971-75, I worked for the Massachusetts Secretary of 
Transportation & Construction and was responsible for one of Amtrak's 
earliest state-supported trains.
    Massive reductions in long-distance service are ill-advised and may 
well be irreversible. The ``restoration metrics'' Amtrak has presented 
are a trap; Amtrak's statement that ``the service reductions are 
temporary'' is not credible, nor is the notion that Amtrak can drop so 
much service and restore it by June 30, 2021, while meaningfully 
reducing taxpayer costs.
    The long-distance trains are more resistant to COVID-19 than are 
Amtrak's short-distance trains. Starting in April, long-distance train 
revenues have exceeded revenues of NEC and State-supported trains 
combined. Also, Amtrak's plan worsens the nation's economic inequality, 
since long-distance coach travelers are Amtrak's lowest income market 
segment.
    Intercity travel now is dominated by three factors--concern about 
health, ability to telecommute and availability of alternatives.
    Amtrak deserves praise for good work in creating the healthiest 
possible environment for staff and passengers, and in promoting that 
fact. For some travelers, this likely has tipped the balance from air 
to rail. It is ironic that Amtrak now plans to remove so much of this 
service.
    Telecommuting has challenged commuter rail and Amtrak's short 
corridors. Many former riders, if they can work from home, see no (or 
much less) need to travel.
    A key reason long-distance travel has returned more strongly than 
shorter rail trips is that many longer trips were not work-related 
before the pandemic, and for many people the alternatives are less 
attractive or--for the car-less--non-existent. Indeed, the 
transcontinental trains serve regions where Greyhound has over the last 
decade done its heaviest route reductions. Coach demand for short 
round-trips is likely to increase and would be hit hard by planned 
service reductions.
    Amtrak paints long-distance service reductions as leveling the 
playing field with its short corridors where the number of trains per 
day has been reduced. This is wrongheaded.
    First, ridership on the short-distance trains has declined more 
sharply than has the number of short-distance departures.
    Second, ``less-than-daily'' weakens the network far beyond the 
impact of ``three trips versus seven.'' There is an existential 
difference between providing daily service vs. telling people they must 
wait two to five days for the next train, or that their trip newly 
requires one or more overnights at an intermediate point. (Tables on 
pages 6-8 \\ show days and times of arrivals and departures at 
Portland, Sacramento, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Chicago, and 
Washington.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \\ Editor's Note: The page numbers listed for the tables 
refer to Mr. Capon's original statement and not as the statement 
appears in this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, anyone wishing to travel from the East to Arkansas or 
Texas is out of luck because the Texas Eagle departs Chicago on the 
days after the three East Coast trains arrive there. This is good for 
private car owners since Amtrak no longer offers same-day switches in 
Chicago for an extra fee, but it is not good for the general public. As 
well, Wednesday's California Zephyr departure from Chicago will have no 
connections from the East or South.
    Amtrak often quotes systemwide figures and polls which hide the 
stronger performance of long-distance routes.
      Mr. Flynn's May 25 letter to Congress: ``We know from 
recent polls that approximately half of those surveyed expressed 
reluctance to ride a train in the next six months.''
      Stephen Gardner's August 4 letter to me: ``Amtrak has 
never faced a situation of losing 95% of its riders and revenues in the 
space of two weeks . . . Although there were early signs of a small 
recovery in the Long Distance sector, the pandemic in the United States 
shows no signs of slowing.'' This invites the incorrect assumption that 
ridership on routes serving COVID-challenged states significantly 
weakened.

    In attempting to convince political leaders and the public that the 
service reductions will be temporary and will yield significant 
financial savings, Amtrak asks us to ignore the huge costs of making 
and reversing these changes. Here are just the sales and marketing 
``front end'' costs:

      The immediate ``negative marketing'' effect of the May 25 
announcement, which led some people to think service reductions were 
immediate.
      Sales are open out 11 months and were not closed until 
mid-August, after which the reservation bureau had to contact any 
passenger whose itinerary completely or partly involved canceled 
trains, attempt to rebook, or issue refunds.

    Then there are the ongoing costs:
      Long talk times for reservation agents attempting to 
match days desired with days on offer. Some connecting passengers would 
find their trip impossible or requiring costly overnight layovers.
      Skyrocketing hotel and meal costs of missed connections, 
anxiety for passengers, and ``brand risk'' for Amtrak. Today, if a late 
train misconnects, the passenger is accommodated for one night. Under 
the October plan, the layover would be two or three nights (four or 
five in some Florida-train cases). Misconnects result from big delays 
due to freight train incidents or weather, and Amtrak mechanical 
problems--not from the handful of minutes associated with adding or 
removing private cars.
      Amtrak continues health insurance for workers for a year 
after they are furloughed.
      Will surplus rolling stock be maintained or cannibalized? 
Will the cost of restoring it become part of an unacceptably high level 
of ``adequate funding'' [Flynn's May 25 letter] Amtrak will request to 
restart service?

    Finally, the restart costs:
      Significant marketing expenses, almost like a new 
service, will be incurred to convince travelers that daily service has 
returned. How far in advance will service restoration be announced? The 
further in advance, the better the load factors once service begins, 
but also the more publicity is wasted because it will reach people who 
see the promotion but want to travel before service resumes.
      Rehiring and requalifying/retraining skilled personnel--
if they are available.

    Amtrak (in the above-referenced August 4 letter) quoted $945 
subsidy per long-distance passenger for April and May. Outside Zoom, 
home delivery companies and the like, few economic activities in those 
months were sustainable. Ridership has grown significantly since the 
spring and should continue to grow if the service is not dramatically 
reduced. Also, how much of that $945 is allocated fixed costs that will 
not disappear when service is reduced--certainly not before June 30, 
2021?
Tri-Weekly History:
    Amtrak began the Coast Starlight and the California Zephyr's 
Denver-west segment in 1971 as tri-weekly trains. In 1973, they were 
converted to daily as summer experiments which proved so successful 
they became permanent.
    Amtrak President George Warrington testified to the Senate Commerce 
Committee on September 26, 2000, that less-than-daily service on select 
routes in 1995-96 ``ended up costing [Amtrak] more in lost revenue than 
we were able to take out in the way of expenses, given the fixed cost 
nature of the operation'' p. 99 (computer p. 103).
Short Distance, Long Distance:
    The September 1 New York Times Amtrak report ends with Stephen 
Gardner saying long-distance rail is ``a small part of our business. We 
need to be where the people are.'' Right now, as noted on page one, 
Amtrak long-distance is where the money is, reflecting the devastating 
impact of COVID-19 on shorter runs. There is some concern about long-
distance ridership suppression, including cases where sales have been 
blocked even though seats were available (after taking into account 
Amtrak's COVID-related restrictions on sales). Cases brought to my 
attention include California Zephyr eastbound trips that originated 
August 10 and 24 and September 5.
    Gardner's quote recalls the June 26, 2019, Senate Commerce 
testimony of then Amtrak President and CEO Richard Anderson: ``We 
should be looking at breaking up some of those long-distance trains and 
figuring out how we serve the American consumer to provide high-quality 
service in short-haul markets where they're using that service today.'' 
This implies new short-distance corridors where neither state DOT or 
host railroad circumstances are supportive. For segments like 
Charlotte-Atlanta or Jackson-New Orleans to thrive, speeds and 
frequencies would need to be increased, at huge costs. Prospects for 
such investments are limited and include the Colorado Front Range and 
New Orleans-Mobile which face challenges; neither are segments of 
existing long-distance routes.
    Certainly, there is a strong case for Amtrak's short-haul markets. 
That is reflected in at least thirty years of organic growth in those 
markets; now 14 states fund such service. California's June 5, 1990, 
election was pivotal. California voters approved Propositions 116, 108 
and 111, forcing Caltrans to move towards genuinely balanced 
transportation. Props 116 and 108 produced almost $3 billion for rail; 
Prop 111 generated major additional funding for transportation, 
including transit.
    Today, as noted, short corridors are more vulnerable to 
telecommuting--and to the negative impacts of Amtrak's long-distance 
reductions. Amtrak's May 25 request said ``the elimination of any of 
the state services would result in increased costs to the remaining 
services, as common network costs are reallocated, further increasing 
the financial pressure on the states that wish to continue their rail 
service.'' Similarly, reduction of long-distance service would harm 
state services on the cost side and also eliminate revenue from 
connecting passengers. The latter effect would be particularly harsh 
for the Oklahoma City-Fort Worth Heartland Flyer, about 30% of whose 
passengers connect to/from the Texas Eagle.
Private cars and charter trains:
    This statement is pro bono except for this paragraph. My major 
client is American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO). 
The Association appreciates Section 9219 of HR 2--and indeed most of 
the bill's passenger rail provisions. AAPRCO believes that the more 
positive approach to private cars and charter trains envisioned in that 
provision would yield valuable revenue for Amtrak--revenue that is more 
important now than ever. In particular, the elimination of key access 
points such as Tucson, Arizona; Jacksonville, Florida; Whitefish, 
Montana, and Huntington, West Virginia, seem counterproductive, as does 
the restriction of charter trains to Amtrak's existing network.
Suspension of Amtrak Package Express:
    Here again, Amtrak is turning away revenues. ``Effective October 1, 
2020, Express shipping service on Amtrak's regularly scheduled 
passenger trains will be suspended until further notice. The last date 
for accepting these shipments will be September 15, 2020, which will 
ensure all shipments will reach their final destinations before October 
1st . . . In addition, human remains will not be accepted.'' https://
www.amtrak.com/express-shipping
    Perhaps this was yet another casualty of ``universal tri-weekly'' 
service. It also appears that management neglected the business and was 
overcharging for it. When something is carried on a train that is 
operating anyway, rates charged should cover direct costs plus a 
reasonable profit margin. In contrast, the Amtrak Inspector General 
said ``Management stated that [Amtrak] will use the results of its 
costing analysis to confirm that the pricing for each private railcar 
activity exceeds both the direct and fully allocated costs of 
performing that activity'' [Report OIG-A-2019-003, February 6, 2019, 
page 14]. This is pricing to drive away business and also appears to 
have been applied to Express shipping. By contrast, Robert Menzies, 
owner and board chair of the freight shortline Aberdeen, Carolina & 
Western Railway, says, ``We carry sand even though it might not cover 
full cost like chemicals and plastics, but sand does cover variable 
cost and contribute to our fixed costs.''
    Amtrak has a fleet of new baggage cars ideal for handling express.
    RAILnet-21 https://www.railnet-21.com/ is a legislative proposal 
leveraging private funds against a federal loan, fully secured by a 
third-party, investment-grade repayment guarantee, to bring Amtrak-
owned infrastructure to a state-of-good-repair. This proposal 
recognizes that Amtrak-owned infrastructure, primarily the Northeast 
Corridor, constitutes a huge financial drain that threatens Amtrak's 
entire network. Under RAILnet-21, Amtrak-owned infrastructure would be 
leased to an infrastructure management organization (IMO) selected by 
the Surface Transportation Board. The IMO would be a railroad subject 
to FRA, STB, and DOT IG oversight, and required to comply with the 
Railway Labor Act, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Act, etc. The IMO would be required to hire all 
current Amtrak infrastructure employees; assume their collective 
bargaining agreements where-is, as-is; honor their seniority; and 
recognize their labor representation. The IMO--in order to make the 
substantial infrastructure investments required to achieve its business 
goals and satisfy its statutory mandates--would hire additional 
unionized personnel in the field and in its offices, both from which 
Amtrak has been laying off employees. Amtrak would remain the nation's 
rail passenger carrier, and the IMO would be statutorily proscribed 
from offering any form of revenue train service on the NEC or 
elsewhere.
    Not surprisingly, Amtrak leadership is skeptical, having written: 
``We don't believe that the RAILnet concept offers value to the company 
or to the NEC at this time and we believe that most, if not all, of the 
central tenets underlying the proposal have deep flaws or are 
practically unworkable'' [Stephen Gardner, August 4 letter]. However, 
given the unfortunate direction Amtrak is now taking, and Amtrak's 
funding requirement (per the Northeast Corridor Commission) of at least 
$45 billion to achieve state-of-good-repair, Congress should (a) get 
Amtrak to explain the ``central tenets underlying [RAILnet's] deep 
flaws'' and why RAILnet is ``practically unworkable,'' and (b) grill 
Robert Serlin and his colleagues on RAILnet-21. Both conversations 
should include discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on NEC passenger 
revenues.
    Thank you for the Committee's hard work on intercity rail passenger 
issues, and for considering my views.
                                appendix
   Arrival & Departure Days at Key Connection Points Under Amtrak's 
              Forthcoming ``Tri-Weekly Everywhere'' Scheme
    The number in parentheses after the time is the Monday of the 
October 2020 week when reduced service begins on that route. (This will 
be a challenge for some October travelers using two or more routes with 
different tri-weekly implementation dates.)

                                             Connections at Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                  At Chicago                   To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Cap Ltd...........................  Wash/Martinsburg/PGH/    8:45 (5)
                                        CLE/TOL/South Bend      MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 City of N.O.......................  NOL/Jackson/Mem/Carb     9:15 (5)
                                                                MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 Lake Shore Ltd....................  BOS/NYP/Alb/Buff/CLE/    9:50 (12)
                                        TOL/South Bend          MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
51 Cardinal..........................  NYP/WAS/WSS/CIN/INDY     10:00
                                                                MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Texas Eagle.......................                           13:45 (12)               StL/Little Rock/Texas/
                                                                TuFSu                    Tucson/Maricopa/[LAX]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 Texas Eagle.......................  [LAX]/Maricopa/Tucson/   13:52 (12)
                                        Texas/                  MWSa
                                       Little Rock/StL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Cal Zep............................                           14:00 (5)                Omaha/Denver/SLC/Reno/
                                                                MWSa                      Sac/Bay Area
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Emp Bldr...........................                           14:15 (19)               StPaul/Fargo/Havre/
                                                                MThSa                     Whitefish/
                                                                                         Spokane/Portland/
                                                                                          Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 SW Chief...........................                           14:50 (12)               KC/Garden City/La Junta/
                                                                MThSa                     Flagstaff/
                                                                                         SanBernardino/LAX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 SW Chief...........................  KC/Garden City/La Junta/ 14:50 (12)
                                        Flagstaff/              MThSa
                                       SanBernardino/LAX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Cal Zep............................  BayArea/Sac/Reno/SLC/    14:50 (5)
                                        Denver/Omaha            MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Emp Bldr...........................  Seattle/Portland/        15:55 (19)
                                        Spokane/                MThSa
                                       Whitefish/Havre/Fargo/
                                        StPaul
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 Cardinal..........................                           17:45                    INDY/CIN/WV/WSS/WAS/NYP
                                                                TuThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Cap Ltd...........................                           18:40 (5)                South Bend/TOL/CLE/PGH/
                                                                MThSa                    Martinsburg/Wash
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 City of N.O.......................                           20:05 (5)                NOL/Jackson/Mem/Carb
                                                                MThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Lake Shore Ltd....................                           21:30 (12)               South Bend/TOL/CLE/Buff/
                                                                MThSa                     Alb/NYP/BOS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           Connections at Portland, OR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                 At Portland                   To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Builder............................  Chicago/WI/MN/ND/        10:10 (19)
                                        Whitefish/              MWSa
                                       Spokane
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Starlight.........................                           14:25 (12)               Sacramento/Oakland/LAX
                                                                MWSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Starlight.........................  LAX/Oakland/Sacramento   15:32 (12)
                                                                TuThSa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 Builder...........................                           16:45 (19)               Spokane/Whitefish/ND/MN/
                                                                TuThSa                    WI/
                                                                                         Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           Connections at New Orleans
 (currently single-overnight for every Sunset and City of New Orleans trip; the Sunset has been tri-weekly since
                                            before Amtrak's creation)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                At New Orleans                 To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Crescent..........................                           7:00 (5)                 Meridian/Birmingham/ATL/
                                                                SuTuTh                    Charlotte/
                                                                                         Charlottesville/WAS/NYP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Sunset.............................                           9:00                     Houston/San Antonio/NM/
                                                                MWSa                      Tucson/
                                                                                         Maricopa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 City of...........................                           13:45 (5)                Jackson/Memphis/Carb./
New Orleans                                                     SuWFr                     Champaign/
                                                                                         Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 City of...........................  Chicago/Champaign/Carb./ 15:47 (5)
New Orleans                             Memphis/                SuTuF
                                       Jackson
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Crescent..........................  NYP/WAS/Charlottesville/ 19:32 (5)
                                        Charlotte/              MWSa
                                       ATL/Birmingham/Meridian
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Sunset.............................  LAX/Maricopa/Tucson/NM/  21:40
                                        San Antonio/            TuFrSu
                                       Houston
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crescent to Sunset--Monday & Saturday arrivals require 2 nights in New Orleans; Wednesday arrival 3 nights
Sunset to Crescent--all trips require 2 nights
City of New Orleans to Sunset--all trips 1 night
Sunset to City of New Orleans--Sunday arrival requires three nights; Tuesday one, and Friday two. (Arriving
  Sunday connects to the same 58 [Wednesday] as arriving Tuesday.)


                                            Connections at Sacramento
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                At Sacramento                  To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Coast Starlight...................  Seattle/Portland/Eugene/ 6:35 (12)
                                        Klamath Falls           SuTuTh
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 California Zephyr..................                           11:09 (5)                Reno/SLC/Glenwood
                                                                TuThSa                    Springs/
                                                                                         Denver/Omaha/Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 California Zephyr..................  Chicago/Omaha/Denver/    14:13 (5)
                                       Glenwood Springs/SLC/    SuWF
                                        Reno
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Coast Starlight...................                           23:59 (12)               Klamath Falls/Eugene/
                                                                MWF                       Portland/Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                           Connections at Los Angeles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                At Los Angeles                 To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Sunset.............................  NOL/Houston/San Antonio/ 5:35
                                        El Paso                 MWF
                                       NM/Tucson/Maricopa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Chief..............................  Chicago/IA/KS/CO/        8:15 (12)
                                        Albuquerque             MWSa
                                       Flagstaff/San
                                        Bernardino
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Starlight.........................                           10:10 (12)               Bay Area/Sacramento/
                                                                MWF                       Portland/Seattle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Chief..............................                           18:00 (12)               San Bernardino/
                                                                TuThSa                    Flagstaff/Albuquerque
                                                                                         CO/KS/IA/Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Starlight.........................  Seattle/Portland/        21:00 (12)
                                        Sacramento              SuTuTh
                                       Bay Area
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Sunset.............................                           22:00                    Maricopa/Tucson/NM/El
                                                                SuWF                      Paso
                                                                                         San Antonio/Houston/NOL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Starlight arrivals:
Sunday--3 nights to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Tuesday--1 night to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Thursday--1 night to Sunset; 2 nights to Chief
Starlight departures:
Monday and Wednesday same-day connections from Chief; effectively no connection on Friday.
All three Sunset arrivals have same-day connections.


                                          Connections at Washington, DC
                              (Silver Service reductions took effect July 6, 2020)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Train                            From                    At DC                      To
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
98 Silver Meteor.....................  Miami/Orlando/           7:07
                                        Jacksonville            MTuWTh
                                       Savannah/Charleston/
                                        Richmond
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Crescent..........................  NOL/Meridian/Birmingham  9:53 (5)
                                       Atlanta/Charlotte/       MWF
                                        Charlottesville
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
51 Cardinal..........................                           11:00                    Charlottesville/
                                                                SuWF                      CharlestonWV
                                                                                         Cincinnati/IND/CHI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Capitol Ltd.......................  Chicago/South Bend/      13:05 (5)
                                        Toledo                  SuTuF
                                       Cleveland/Pittsburgh
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
92 Silver Star.......................  Miami/Tampa/Orlando/JAX  14:38
                                       Savannah/Columbia/       SuMSa
                                        Raleigh/RVR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
91 Silver Star.......................                           15:05                    RVR/Raleigh/Columbia/
                                                                SuFSa                     SAV
                                                                                         JAX/Orlando/Tampa/Miami
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Capitol Ltd.......................                           16:05 (5)                Pittsburgh/Cleveland
                                                                SuWF                     Toledo/South Bend/
                                                                                          Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 Cardinal..........................  [CHI]/Indianapolis/      18:19
                                        Cincinnati              SuWFr
                                       CharlestonWV/
                                        Charlottesville
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Crescent..........................                           18:30 (5)                Charlottesville/
                                                                SuTuFr                    Charlotte/Atlanta
                                                                                         Birmingham/Meridian/NOL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
97 Silver Meteor.....................                           19:25                    San Bernardino/
                                                                MTuWTh                    Flagstaff
                                                                                         Albuquerque/CO/KS/IA/
                                                                                          Chicago
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Same-day connections from eastbound Cardinal to southbound Meteor not sold.


                                 
 Letter of September 3, 2020, from Randal O'Toole, Senior Fellow, Cato 
 Institute, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford
                                                 September 3, 2020.
Hon. Daniel Lipinski,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. Rick Crawford,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and members of the 
subcommittee:
    My name is Randal O'Toole and I am a senior fellow with the Cato 
Institute and author of Romance of the Rails: Why the Passenger Trains 
We Love Are Not the Transportation We Need, as well as of several 
policy papers about Amtrak. Thank you for allowing me to submit 
comments for the September 9, 2020 hearing on Amtrak.
    I love passenger trains and ride them whenever I get the 
opportunity, but I don't think other people should have to subsidize my 
hobby. Objectively, the COVID-19 pandemic has proven that Amtrak is an 
insignificant and obsolete part of our transportation system and does 
not deserve the attention and federal funds given to it by Congress. 
Even before the pandemic, Amtrak's contribution to transportation was 
less than a rounding error.
    According to table 1-40 of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics' 
National Transportation Statistics, Amtrak carried the average American 
less than 20 miles in 2018. For comparison, Americans bicycled an 
average of 26 miles per year and walked an average of more than 100 
miles per year. Motor coaches carried more than ten times as many 
passenger miles as Amtrak; domestic airliners more than 110 times; and 
automobiles more than 750 times as many passenger miles as Amtrak. 
Nationally, Amtrak carried just one-tenth of one percent of passenger 
travel.
    Amtrak brags that it carries more people than the airlines in the 
Northeast Corridor. But it admits that it carries just 6 percent of 
intercity travel in the corridor, with the airlines carrying 5 percent 
and the rest going by bus or automobile. While no one keeps an exact 
record, based on bus schedules and average bus loads, I estimate that 
intercity buses alone carry about 25 percent more passenger miles in 
the corridor than Amtrak.
    Amtrak's insignificance has been underscored by the current 
pandemic. In a crisis such as the pandemic, the relative worth of 
various modes of transportation can be assessed by how much they are 
affected by the crisis and how quickly they rebound.
    By these criteria, Amtrak did not perform well. According to 
Amtrak's Monthly Performance Reports, compared with the same months in 
2019, Amtrak lost more than 95 percent of its riders in April, 92 
percent in May, 85 percent in June, and 81 percent in July. In 
contrast, according to the Federal Highway Administration's Traffic 
Volume Trends, the year-over-year decline in driving was 40 percent in 
April, 26 percent in May, and 13 percent in June. July data are not yet 
available but traffic monitor INRIX estimates that July 2020 driving 
was slightly more than in July 2019.
    People drove because they needed to both cope with the pandemic and 
take care of their daily needs. They did not ride Amtrak because 
intercity passenger trains did not serve those needs.
    Further evidence of Amtrak's failure to meet people's 
transportation needs can be seen in the decline of its fare revenues. 
For October 2019 through February 2020, Amtrak fares averaged 38 cents 
per passenger mile. With the pandemic, this quickly declined, with 
fares falling to 26 cents per passenger mile in April and 22 cents in 
June.
    Amtrak's irrelevance would be unimportant if it were a profit-
making company. There are many fields in which small companies can 
profit and thrive despite having only a tiny share of their markets. 
But Amtrak is far from profitable, nor will it ever be profitable.
    This contradicts Amtrak's claims that its operations lost only 
$29.8 million in 2019 and that it was on its way to making an operating 
profit in 2020 if the coronavirus hadn't intervened. Amtrak was able to 
make these claims only by cooking its books in two different ways.
    First, Amtrak counted $235 million in operating subsidies provided 
by 18 states as ``passenger revenues.'' State subsidies to passenger 
trains are no more passenger revenues than federal subsidies, yet 
Amtrak counts only the state subsidies as passenger revenues, not the 
federal subsidies.
    Second, Amtrak ignored the second largest line item in its budget: 
depreciation, which was $870 million in 2019. Depreciation is included 
as an operating cost in Amtrak's audited consolidated financial 
statement for 2019, but Amtrak left it off when it claimed in press 
releases and other public statements that it lost only $29.8 million. 
If Amtrak were truly a private company, such omissions would be 
considered securities fraud.
    Deleting the state subsidies from passenger revenues and adding 
depreciation to operating costs increases Amtrak's actual operating 
loss to $1.13 billion, which is 38 times as much as Amtrak claimed. 
Clearly, with such a large operating loss, Amtrak is never going to be 
profitable. Amtrak claims that its trains in the Northeast Corridor are 
profitable, and it is only the long-distance trains that lose a lot of 
money. It makes this claim without allocating depreciation to 
individual routes. Amtrak admits that it has developed an accounting 
system that makes such allocations, but it has never published the 
results.
    Recognizing that most of the infrastructure owned by Amtrak is in 
the Northeast Corridor, I made a rough calculation of the profits or 
losses per passenger mile for Amtrak's three groups of trains: the 
Northeast Corridor, state-supported day trains, and overnight long-
distance trains. I found that they all lost about the same amount of 
money per passenger mile. This will disappoint those who think we might 
be able to privatize the Northeast Corridor.
    Depreciation is more than just an accounting fiction that was 
imposed on railroads years ago by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
It represents the amount of money a railroad needs to spend or set 
aside to deal with wear-and-tear on its physical plant. Being able to 
set aside that money is a signal to investors that the railroad is well 
managed.
    Railroads that can't cover depreciation with their operating 
revenues end up deferring necessary maintenance and capital 
replacement. Amtrak is in this situation today. Railroad passenger cars 
are fully amortized and should be replaced after about 25 years. Yet, 
according to table 1-33 of National Transportation Statistics, the 
average age of Amtrak passenger cars in 2015 was 31 years. Amtrak 
hasn't replaced many cars since then, so the average age today must be 
close to 36 years.
    The Northeast Corridor, most of which is owned by Amtrak, suffers 
from a huge state-of-good-repair backlog. According to the Northeast 
Corridor Master Plan Working Group, the corridor has $52 billion of 
capital replacement needs. Not all of that is attributable to Amtrak, 
but most of it is needed if Amtrak is to continue to operate. Amtrak's 
failure to allocate depreciation to individual routes deceptively 
ignores this problem.
    Federal subsidies, state capital grants, and state operating 
subsidies to Amtrak in 2019 totaled to nearly $2.5 billion. This works 
out to 38 cents per passenger mile, the federal share of which is 30 
cents. Since ticket revenues averaged just 35 cents per passenger mile, 
subsidies cover more than half the cost keeping Amtrak running. In 
contrast, subsidies to flying averaged about a penny per passenger mile 
in 2017 and subsidies to driving averaged less than a penny per 
passenger mile in 2018, the latest years for which data are available.
    Instead of debating about which Amtrak routes should receive daily 
service, which should be three days a week, and which should not be 
served by passenger trains at all, Congress should simply give Amtrak 
an incentive to operate and let it decide where it is most effective. 
That means promising Amtrak a fixed subsidy per passenger mile. Whether 
that subsidy should be a penny, as it is for the airlines and highway, 
or the 30 cents that Amtrak receives today is a matter for debate, but 
as much as I personally love passenger trains I don't see that the 
benefits Amtrak produces justify greater subsidies than other modes of 
travel.
    Responding intelligently to the pandemic means recognizing that 
some modes of travel are more resilient than others in the face of 
unexpected events (black swans). Those unexpected events can include 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters such as hurricanes or wildfires, 
financial crises, or epidemics.
    One mode of travel has proven itself to be most resilient in the 
face of all of these unexpected events: motor vehicles and highways. 
Rather than penalizing automobiles, as some advocate, in favor of modes 
that are less resilient, Congress should recognize the advantages of 
motor vehicles in a wide range of conditions and end its favoritism 
towards other modes. Congress does not need to favor motor vehicles as 
they are the mode of choice for 80 percent of our travel even without 
such favoritism. Instead, Congress should either ending federal 
subsidies to all modes of travel or reduce those subsidies to be at 
parity with one another.
    Thank you for your consideration.
        Yours truly,
                                            Randal O'Toole,
                                     Senior Fellow, Cato Institute.



                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


    Questions from Hon. Eric A. ''Rick'' Crawford to William Flynn, 
  President and Chief Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger 
                          Corporation (Amtrak)

A. Schedules & On Time Performance (OTP)
    Question 1. Is it correct that no segment of a schedule should be 
shorter than the minimum achievable run time for the segment?
    Answer. Schedules are designed with the following components:
      Pure Running Time: The least amount of time that a 
passenger train will take to operate between two points over the 
train's optimal route, operating at maximum authorized speeds with the 
most favorable possible signal aspects on that route.
      Recovery Time: Time added to the schedule to help a train 
``recover'' to the published schedule in the event that it encounters 
delays.
      Miscellaneous Adjustment: Additional recovery time in the 
schedule, typically for a specific reason, such as a planned meet with 
another passenger train.
      Dwell Time: Time scheduled at station stops for passenger 
detraining and boarding and any required servicing of the train or crew 
changes.

    The minimum possible scheduled time for a given segment between two 
stations will be equivalent to the Pure Running Time of the segment, 
however, many segments also include additional Recovery Time and 
Miscellaneous Adjustment minutes to absorb delays experienced by the 
train.

    Question 2. Please provide a table showing the minimum run time for 
each Amtrak train. Please include within the table the last time the 
minimum run time was validated against the present schedule in 
coordination with the host for each Amtrak train.
    Answer. Please see the attached exhibit that provides the Pure 
Running Time and total scheduled time by train. All train schedules in 
operation have been agreed upon with each host railroad over which the 
train operates. The Pure Running Time of a segment is periodically 
updated at either the host railroad's or Amtrak's request.

    Question 3. If operations remain unchanged, but your schedules are 
lengthened, could that improve Amtrak's On Time Performance (OTP)?
    Answer. Lengthening the schedule inevitably changes the operation; 
when a schedule is modified, the host railroad is required to dispatch 
the Amtrak train differently in order to meet the new schedule. 
Lengthening the schedule allows for additional time to delay the train 
and inconveniences our passengers who would otherwise be able to travel 
to their destination in less time. And of course, lengthening the 
schedule costs Amtrak and its passengers more time, money and 
inconvenience.
    The premise of this question fails to recognize the historical 
reality: when Amtrak has lengthened schedules in the past, on-time 
performance has become worse. For example, after the on-time 
performance of the Sunset Limited plummeted due to increased freight 
train interference in the early 2000s, Amtrak lengthened the train's 
schedule by approximately three hours eastbound and more than two hours 
westbound in the hope that this would improve OTP. Unfortunately, 
performance deteriorated further: OTP fell to just 4% in 2004 and 
ridership dropped due to chronic delays and the longer schedules, which 
required that key markets such as Mobile and the Mississippi Gulf be 
served in the middle of the night. See also the response to Question 
C1, which describes the similar deterioration in the on-time 
performance of VIA Rail Canada's Canadian after major schedule 
lengthening. Schedule lengthening is not an antidote to poor OTP.

    Question 4. Amtrak seems to emphasize faster service as more 
important than strong OTP. How does Amtrak assess the trade-off between 
modestly longer schedules and higher OTP?
    Answer. Amtrak's statutory mission requires schedules that are both 
trip-time competitive with other modes of travel and operated with a 
high degree of reliability. Amtrak has made significant changes to 
schedules when justified, but often host railroad claims that schedules 
should be lengthened are not supported by data or experience.
    While some host railroads assert there is a trade-off between 
longer schedules and on-time performance, that is a false choice. 
Current schedules already include plenty of ``pad'' to absorb delays 
and lengthening schedules provides more opportunity to delay 
passengers. Further, what some host railroads deems to be a ``modest'' 
schedule change has historically included the addition of as many as 
several hours to the schedule--drastic and unnecessary schedule changes 
when OTP could be improved by simply enforcing the law that ensures 
Amtrak trains receive preference on freight railroads.
    Amtrak is required by statute to offer ``efficient and effective 
intercity passenger rail mobility consisting of high-quality service 
that is trip-time competitive with other intercity travel options.'' 
Statute also requires that Amtrak ``operate Amtrak trains, to the 
maximum extent feasible, to all station stops within 15 minutes of the 
time established in public timetables'' and ``implement schedules based 
on a systemwide average speed of at least 60 miles an hour that can be 
achieved with a degree of reliability and passenger comfort.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See 49 U.S. Code Sec.  24101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For many of Amtrak's trains, schedules already reflect an average 
speed that is far below 60 miles per hour and offer limited trip-time 
competitiveness. Communities and passengers across the country deserve 
intercity passenger rail service that meets the standards set forth 
under law and schedules must be designed accordingly.

    Question 5. A significant problem with measuring Amtrak customer 
OTP is that it involves using Amtrak schedules that are badly outdated 
and inaccurate. Will you commit to ensuring that these schedules are 
accurate and updated, including lengthening as necessary, especially 
when used to enforce OTP?
    Answer. All schedules in operation have been agreed upon with every 
host railroad and state partner associated with each train. Amtrak and 
host railroads discuss schedules frequently--every week, in the case of 
several host railroads--and schedule modifications are regularly 
implemented, including changes for host railroad maintenance 
activities. Schedule accuracy is also tested regularly using 
statistical analysis and ride study programs. It would not be correct 
to say that Amtrak schedules are outdated and inaccurate.
    The customer OTP metric accurately reflects the customer 
experience, in that it provides the percentage of customers that arrive 
at their detraining station on time, which also allows for a grace 
period of 15 minutes, in addition to the recovery time ``pad'' included 
in the schedule. Amtrak has used the customer OTP metric as our 
internal measure of reliability since October 2018 and has engaged host 
railroads since then to seek to adjust schedules as needed to ensure 
the schedules are aligned with the metric. In addition, Amtrak is not 
opposed to lengthening schedules, provided Amtrak trains are receiving 
the preference over freight transportation required by law. We are not 
willing to inconvenience our customers solely to allow freight 
railroads to put freight ahead of people.

    Question 6. Do you agree that if a State sponsor prefers to trade 
off a shorter or longer schedule for greater OTP for its state-
supported route, and it is willing to bear any additional associated 
costs and the host is agreeable, you should honor the State sponsor's 
wishes? If you do not agree, please explain why. If you do agree, 
please provide an example where this has occurred.
    Answer. All schedules for state supported trains are approved by 
the respective state partners and designed to meet their transportation 
needs. If the state partner would prefer a longer schedule and is aware 
of all the cost implications, and the host railroad is providing Amtrak 
trains with preference over freight transportation, Amtrak would be 
agreeable to implementing such a change. There are many examples of 
state supported schedules being modified, including lengthening the 
schedule, to accommodate host railroad maintenance of way projects, 
such as several Michigan Service trains this summer. However, the more 
frequent scenario that we encounter is a host railroad refusing to 
agree to implement schedules that state partners propose or support.

    Question 7. The data for measuring Amtrak train performance is 
collected by Amtrak. To ensure proper monitoring of train performance 
and improved OTP, will you commit to sharing with your hosts real-time 
station-specific ridership data, historic station-specific ridership 
data, and Amtrak's projections of future station-specific ridership 
data?
    Answer. There is no ``real-time'' station-specific ridership data 
available. Amtrak passengers can book reservations and purchase tickets 
up to and even after they board an Amtrak train.
    Amtrak already provides host railroads with the following:
      Direct access to the Amtrak network and its on-time 
performance and delay database, which includes:
        Real-time and historical delay entries for every train 
in the Amtrak network.
        Real-time and historical station arrival and departure 
times for each train.
        Real-time and historical train status reports for any 
train.
        Reports that provide real-time accounting of updates 
and source information for delay entry data and station times.
         Reports that provide historical arrival and departure 
information for any station by train and by route.
      Some host railroads have opted to receive a data feed 
throughout the day (nearly real-time) that provides all delays, train 
status information, Amtrak crew information, and other data directly to 
host railroad systems of their choosing.
      Daily customer on-time performance report that includes 
the customer on-time performance for each train traveling over the host 
railroad for the prior day, month to date, quarter to date, and fiscal 
year to date.
      Quarterly ridership report that shows the number of 
detraining passengers by station for each train for each of the 
preceding four quarters.
      Daily ridership data by train and station, subject to 
execution of a nondisclosure agreement to prevent disclosure of this 
commercially sensitive data.
B. Preference and Coding of Delays (FTI/HRD)
    Question 1. The freight railroads claim to give Amtrak's trains the 
highest traffic priority on their lines. What more do you think freight 
railroads should do in order to meet their obligation to provide 
preference to Amtrak's trains? Are railroads required to hold freight 
traffic even if it is not necessary for the Amtrak train to arrive on 
time in accordance with its schedule?
    Answer. Freight train interference caused 1 million minutes of 
delay to Amtrak trains in FY 2019, which demonstrates that on many host 
railroads Amtrak trains are not receiving the preference over freight 
transportation required by law, despite any claims by host railroads to 
the contrary. On any given day, Amtrak trains are directed into sidings 
to allow freight trains to pass. While a freight railroad may claim 
this represents their ``highest priority'' this is not acceptable for 
Amtrak passengers trying to get to a business meeting or to visit a 
relative. Recovery time is included in all schedules to absorb delays 
encountered by a train. However, if there is sufficient time in the 
current schedule for a freight train to delay an Amtrak train and still 
arrive on time, that schedule would be a strong candidate for 
shortening the schedule to offer passengers and communities a more 
trip-time competitive and effective transportation service.

    Question 2. Is it correct that when the Surface Transportation 
Board (STB) proposed a policy regarding preference it did not agree 
that preference is absolute (i.e., always requiring that Amtrak trains 
go first, even where no explicit exception to preference applies) (See 
Ex parte 728 (December 28, 2015))?
    Answer. This is incorrect insofar as it fails to account for the 
fact that the STB later withdrew the proposed Policy Statement.
    On December 28, 2015 the STB issued a ``proposed Policy Statement'' 
(Proposal) in Docket No. EP 728 regarding STB investigations of poor 
on-time performance, which it characterized as ``a potential starting 
point for parties to consider when developing evidence'' for OTP 
investigations, and stressed that the Board was ``not making any 
binding determinations.'' The STB sought public comment on the 
Proposal, so that interested parties ``may suggest other 
interpretations'' of Amtrak's preference rights as it pertained to OTP 
investigations. The Proposal was a severe departure from the clear 
language of the statute, as well as positions of the DOJ and other 
agencies regarding the meaning and effect of Amtrak's right to 
preference.
    Indeed, on July 28, 2016, the STB withdrew the proposed Policy 
Statement, stating that its approach to preference issues would be 
``developed and refined in the context of specific'' STB OTP 
investigations. Any statements in the Proposal regarding how the Board 
would interpret Amtrak's statutory right to preference are therefore 
null and of no effect. The Board has not issued any decision or 
guidance interpreting the scope of Amtrak's statutory right of 
preference since then.

    Question 3. Do you know how many minutes the freight railroads 
delayed their own trains due to Amtrak? If the railroads are delaying 
their own trains much more than they are delaying Amtrak, does that 
suggest that they are providing Amtrak with preference?
    Answer. While Amtrak has repeatedly sought basic information from 
freight host railroads regarding the operating plans and performance 
data for their freight trains, analogous to information that Amtrak 
provides host railroads for its own trains, nearly all requests are 
denied even when there is a non-disclosure agreement in place intended 
specifically to cover this type of information.
    If any host railroad believes that providing preference to Amtrak 
materially lessens the quality of freight transportation provided to 
shippers, the law allows the host railroad to apply to the Surface 
Transportation Board for relief from the obligation to provide 
preference. Not one host railroad has ever sought such relief.

    Question 4. Your written testimony stated that it does not make 
economic sense for Amtrak to expend capital funding to operate ``nearly 
empty trains'' (See Written Testimony at pg. 9). Does that same 
principle prove that freight railroads should not be required to park 
and hold their trains in the name of absolute preference to allow 
Amtrak's ``nearly empty trains'' to proceed without delay?
    Answer. The referenced testimony stated that ``[u]sing scarce 
capital funding to operate nearly empty trains would not be 
productive.'' (Emphasis added.) As the testimony indicated, Amtrak does 
not intend to do that. Instead, we have adjusted service frequency on 
all our services to reflect greatly reduced passenger demand due to 
COVID-19. The trains we are operating on our host railroads continue to 
carry a significant number of passengers--and those passengers are no 
less important. Every passenger has a right to arrive at their 
destination on time.

    Question 5. On page 7 of your written testimony you state that long 
distance passengers bear the brunt of host ``railroads' inability or 
refusal to obey the law'' regarding Amtrak preference. Please elaborate 
on what is meant by ``inability.'' Further, please explain how you can 
claim a ``preference'' requirement has been violated in a situation 
where a host is unable to obey it.
    Answer. Amtrak trains sometimes do not receive preference over 
freight trains due to the poor training or overwork of dispatchers, 
rather than a deliberate decision or practice of giving freight trains 
preference over Amtrak trains. Fatigue or insufficient training are not 
excuses for violating the laws and regulations governing railroad 
operations--or, for that matter, for violating traffic laws. Some 
railroads have claimed inability to provide preference but have offered 
no evidence of that. If a railroad was truly unable to give Amtrak 
trains preference over freight trains without materially lessening the 
quality of freight transportation it provides to shippers, the statute 
(49 USC 24308(c)) allows the railroad to ask the Surface Transportation 
Board (STB) to establish preference rights of freight and Amtrak trains 
on reasonable terms. No railroad has ever made such a claim to the STB.

    Question 6. Does Amtrak have evidence that host railroads are not 
following the law that requires them to give preference to Amtrak? If 
so, please provide this evidence and documents to the Subcommittee. 
Over the last 30 years, have any of Amtrak's host railroads been found 
by a court or agency to have violated its preference obligation?
    Answer. Freight train interference is the largest cause of delay to 
Amtrak trains traveling on host railroads. The high level of freight 
train interference on some host railroads demonstrates that they are 
prioritizing freight trains over Amtrak trains, a violation of Amtrak's 
legal right to preference.
    While other organizations can defend themselves when their rights 
are being violated, only the United States Attorney General can enforce 
Amtrak's right to preference, which is why Amtrak supports preference 
enforcement legislation currently under consideration in Congress.
    The Department of Justice found in 1979 that the Southern Pacific 
was not providing Amtrak preference, despite the Southern Pacific's 
claims to the contrary, and brought an enforcement action that resulted 
in a consent decree. We believe a similar conclusion would be reached 
if there were a court or agency proceeding today to determine whether 
some host railroads are giving preference to Amtrak trains.

    Question 7. Your written testimony states that ``the leading cause 
of delays to [y]our long distance network is the failure of some of 
[y]our host railroads to comply with th[e] longstanding legal 
obligation to provide Amtrak trains with preference over their 
tracks.'' (Written Testimony at pg. 7). However, data reviewed shows 
that Freight Train Interference (FTI) is not the greatest cause of 
Amtrak train delay.
    Answer. The evidence clearly supports the statement that the 
leading cause of delays to our long distance network is the failure of 
some of our host railroads to comply with their longstanding legal 
obligation to provide Amtrak trains with preference over their tracks, 
as shown in the table below.

                         CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Percentage
          Responsible Party                 Delay Code           Delay Description     Delay Minutes   of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad.......................  FTI...................  Freight Train                  657,910         27%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DSR...................  Slow Orders...........         341,760         14%
Host Railroad.......................  PTI...................  Passenger Train                212,517          9%
                                                               Interference.
Amtrak..............................  SYS...................  Crew and System.......         193,852          8%
Host Railroad.......................  DCS...................  Signals...............         166,203          7%
Amtrak..............................  HLD...................  Hold for Passengers or         121,448          5%
                                                               Baggage.
Amtrak..............................  SVS...................  Servicing.............         100,991          4%
Host Railroad.......................  RTE...................  Routing...............          99,330          4%
Third Party.........................  WTR...................  Weather...............          79,484          3%
Amtrak..............................  ENG...................  Engine................          74,037          3%
Amtrak..............................  OTH...................  Other.................          60,055          2%
Amtrak..............................  ADA...................  Hold for Passenger              58,630          2%
                                                               Mobility.
Host Railroad.......................  CTI...................  Commuter Train                  51,662          2%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DMW...................  Maintenance of Way....          46,105          2%
Amtrak..............................  CON...................  Connection Hold.......          34,373          1%
Third Party.........................  TRS...................  Trespasser............          34,236          1%
Third Party.........................  POL...................  Police Hold...........          33,401          1%
Amtrak..............................  ITI...................  Late Inbound Train....          26,966          1%
Amtrak..............................  CAR...................  Car Mechanical Issue..          17,950          1%
Host Railroad.......................  DTR...................  Detour................          14,174          1%
Third Party.........................  DBS...................  Debris................          10,811          0%
Amtrak..............................  INJ...................  Injury................           9,535          0%
Third Party.........................  MBO...................  Movable Bridge Opening           5,500          0%
Third Party.........................  CUI...................  Customs...............             375          0%
Amtrak..............................  CCR...................  Cab Car Mechanical                 274          0%
                                                               Issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


        Question 7a) First, the ``Reports & Documents'' page on 
        Amtrak's website (last accessed Sept. 23, 2020) shows delays 
        attributed to host railroads, but no reports comparing that to 
        all sources of delay, or even showing all delays attributed to 
        Amtrak or third parties.
    Answer. Amtrak delays, including the top two delay categories, are 
reported for every train and route in the Federal Railroad 
Administration's Quarterly Report on the Performance and Service 
Quality of Intercity Passenger Train Operations, published every 
quarter since September 2010, as Congress directed, and publicly 
accessible on the Federal Railroad Administration website [https://
railroads.dot.gov/passenger-rail/amtrak/rail-service-metrics-and-
performance-reports].
    The ``Host Railroad Report'' posted to the Amtrak website [https://
www.amtrak.com/reports-documents], as the name suggests, is designed to 
provide performance information related to host railroads. The report 
also provides the total Amtrak and Third-Party delays for trains 
operating over the six major host railroads, as shown in the excerpt 
below.



                Question 7a.i.). Please direct the Subcommittee to 
                public reports that have that information you relied 
                upon. If Amtrak publishes data for ``host responsible'' 
                delays but fails to publish equivalent data for Amtrak 
                responsible delays, that creates a false and misleading 
                picture that hides Amtrak's responsibility for causing 
                delays and unfairly suggests that hosts are responsible 
                for Amtrak's own poor performance. Accordingly, if 
                Amtrak is not publishing equivalent data on delays 
                attributable to Amtrak, will you commit to publishing 
                complete delay information in the future?
    Answer. Amtrak delays, including the top two delay categories, are 
reported for every train and route in the Federal Railroad 
Administration's Quarterly Report on the Performance and Service 
Quality of Intercity Passenger Train Operations, published every 
quarter since September 2010, as Congress directed, and publicly 
accessible on the Federal Railroad Administration website [https://
railroads.dot.gov/passenger-rail/amtrak/rail-service-metrics-and-
performance-reports].
    The ``Host Railroad Report'' posted to the Amtrak website [https://
www.amtrak.com/reports-documents], as the name suggests, is designed to 
provide performance information related to host railroads. The report 
also provides the total Amtrak and Third-Party delays for trains 
operating over the six major host railroads.

                Question 7a.ii.). There are concerns about the accuracy 
                of what Amtrak codes as ``Host Responsible Delays.'' 
                For example, Amtrak includes Passenger Train 
                Interference (PTI) within Host Responsible Delays, 
                which includes delays caused by interference with 
                Amtrak's own trains, even if delays due to such 
                conflicts are unavoidable by the host. Is that correct? 
                If so, would Amtrak also be responsible for some of 
                these host delays, as PTI is a greater source of delay 
                for State-sponsored services than FTI?
    Answer. Host railroads make all dispatching decisions regarding 
which trains are allowed to go first and which trains must wait on 
their rail lines. When two Amtrak trains are operating on a host 
railroad and must meet or pass each other, the host railroad is in 
complete control of each train's movement, which means they control the 
amount of any delay experienced by the Amtrak trains. Amtrak schedules 
contain recovery time so Amtrak trains operating on-time can meet one 
another without impact to on-time performance. When an Amtrak train is 
delayed by a freight railroad causing a train to operate off-schedule, 
it frequently results in additional delay to both Amtrak trains.
    The duration of a passenger train interference delay can vary 
substantially from one host to another depending on the efficiency of 
the host railroad's operation, dispatching effectiveness, and the 
amount and quality of rail infrastructure that a host has chosen to 
provide. Schedules agreed upon with each host railroad are designed to 
specifically account for any scheduled meets between Amtrak trains.
    The largest cause of delay to state supported trains is freight 
train interference, not passenger train interference, as shown in the 
table below.

                        CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for State Supported Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Percentage
          Responsible Party                 Delay Code           Delay Description     Delay Minutes   of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad.......................  FTI...................  Freight Train                  339,410         15%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  PTI...................  Passenger Train                311,491         14%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DSR...................  Slow Orders...........         290,221         13%
Host Railroad.......................  DCS...................  Signals...............         189,393          9%
Host Railroad.......................  CTI...................  Commuter Train                 174,986          8%
                                                               Interference.
Amtrak..............................  SYS...................  Crew and System.......         154,472          7%
Host Railroad.......................  RTE...................  Routing...............         112,646          5%
Amtrak..............................  HLD...................  Hold for Passengers or          88,202          4%
                                                               Baggage.
Amtrak..............................  OTH...................  Other.................          81,424          4%
Amtrak..............................  ADA...................  Hold for Passenger              71,236          3%
                                                               Mobility.
Host Railroad.......................  DMW...................  Maintenance of Way....          64,561          3%
Amtrak..............................  ENG...................  Engine................          61,401          3%
Third Party.........................  WTR...................  Weather...............          44,626          2%
Amtrak..............................  ITI...................  Late Inbound Train....          42,576          2%
Third Party.........................  POL...................  Police Hold...........          41,732          2%
Third Party.........................  TRS...................  Trespasser............          37,737          2%
Amtrak..............................  SVS...................  Servicing.............          31,214          1%
Amtrak..............................  CAR...................  Car Mechanical Issue..          15,725          1%
Third Party.........................  MBO...................  Movable Bridge Opening          13,791          1%
Amtrak..............................  CCR...................  Cab Car Mechanical               9,141          0%
                                                               Issue.
Amtrak..............................  CON...................  Connection Hold.......           7,925          0%
Third Party.........................  CUI...................  Customs...............           7,662          0%
Third Party.........................  DBS...................  Debris................           7,396          0%
Host Railroad.......................  DTR...................  Detour................           7,227          0%
Amtrak..............................  INJ...................  Injury................           2,910          0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


        7b) Data fails to support your claim that host carrier freight 
        train interference is the greatest source of Amtrak delays to 
        long distance trains. Please review and confirm in writing for 
        the subcommittee the following facts, which are based on 
        Amtrak's calendar year 2019 data:
                Question 7b.i.). The delays your conductors attribute 
                to Amtrak-caused delays accounted for 30% of the total 
                delays to long distance trains, whereas delays 
                attributed to FTI accounted for only 26% of total 
                delays;
    Answer. This statistic highlights the severe impact that freight 
train interference has on Amtrak trains: a single delay category, 
freight train interference, is responsible for nearly as many delay 
minutes as all 11 categories of Amtrak delays combined. The delay data 
for CY 2019 are provided below.

  CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Responsible Party for Long Distance Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Percentage
              Responsible Party                Delay Minutes   of Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad...............................       1,589,661         63%
Amtrak......................................         698,111         30%
Third Party.................................         163,807          7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------



                         CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Percentage
          Responsible Party                 Delay Code           Delay Description     Delay Minutes   of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad.......................  FTI...................  Freight Train                  657,910         27%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DSR...................  Slow Orders...........         341,760         14%
Host Railroad.......................  PTI...................  Passenger Train                212,517          9%
                                                               Interference.
Amtrak..............................  SYS...................  Crew and System.......         193,852          8%
Host Railroad.......................  DCS...................  Signals...............         166,203          7%
Amtrak..............................  HLD...................  Hold for Passengers or         121,448          5%
                                                               Baggage.
Amtrak..............................  SVS...................  Servicing.............         100,991          4%
Host Railroad.......................  RTE...................  Routing...............          99,330          4%
Third Party.........................  WTR...................  Weather...............          79,484          3%
Amtrak..............................  ENG...................  Engine................          74,037          3%
Amtrak..............................  OTH...................  Other.................          60,055          2%
Amtrak..............................  ADA...................  Hold for Passenger              58,630          2%
                                                               Mobility.
Host Railroad.......................  CTI...................  Commuter Train                  51,662          2%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DMW...................  Maintenance of Way....          46,105          2%
Amtrak..............................  CON...................  Connection Hold.......          34,373          1%
Third Party.........................  TRS...................  Trespasser............          34,236          1%
Third Party.........................  POL...................  Police Hold...........          33,401          1%
Amtrak..............................  ITI...................  Late Inbound Train....          26,966          1%
Amtrak..............................  CAR...................  Car Mechanical Issue..          17,950          1%
Host Railroad.......................  DTR...................  Detour................          14,174          1%
Third Party.........................  DBS...................  Debris................          10,811          0%
Amtrak..............................  INJ...................  Injury................           9,535          0%
Third Party.........................  MBO...................  Movable Bridge Opening           5,500          0%
Third Party.........................  CUI...................  Customs...............             375          0%
Amtrak..............................  CCR...................  Cab Car Mechanical                 274          0%
                                                               Issue.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                Question 7b.ii.). Delays attributable to Amtrak 
                exceeded FTI delays by over 110,000 minutes; and
    Answer. This question compares a group of 11 delays to a single 
delay category. Host railroads caused more than 1.6 million minutes of 
delay to long distance trains, equivalent to 3 years of delay, and 
freight train interference delays alone accounted for 657,910 minutes 
of delay.

                Question 7b.iii.). Nine of the 15 long distance 
                services had more minutes of Amtrak delay than FTI 
                delay, and FTI delay was not the major cause of total 
                delay for any Amtrak long distance service.
    Answer. This statement is incorrect. Freight train interference 
delays were the largest cause of delay for 14 of the 15 long distance 
services, and slow orders were the largest cause of delay for one long 
distance service, as shown in the table below.

                            CY 2019 Leading Cause of Delay for Long Distance Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Service                    Largest Cause of Delay         Responsible Party       Delay Minutes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Auto Train..............................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          30,953
California Zephyr.......................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          63,154
Capitol Limited.........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          61,050
Cardinal................................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............           9,056
City of New Orleans.....................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          27,732
Coast Starlight.........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          37,068
Crescent................................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          59,694
Empire Builder..........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          82,087
Lake Shore Limited......................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          49,129
Palmetto................................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          13,367
Silver Meteor...........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          21,929
Silver Star.............................  Slow Orders...............  Host Railroad.............          22,855
Southwest Chief.........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          49,947
Sunset Limited..........................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          63,390
Texas Eagle.............................  Freight Train Interference  Host Railroad.............          70,086
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question 8. Is it correct that the difference between Amtrak caused 
delays and FTI is even greater for state-supported routes? Please 
review and confirm in writing for the subcommittee the following facts, 
which are based on Amtrak's calendar year 2019 data for state-supported 
routes:
        Question 8a) FTI delay accounted for just 15% of total delays, 
        and FTI delays were less in number than delays caused by meets 
        with Amtrak's own passenger trains (i.e., PTI);
    Answer. Freight train interference delays were the largest cause of 
delay to state supported trains in CY 2019, amounting to nearly 340,000 
minutes, equivalent to 236 days of delay caused by freight trains 
alone, as shown in the table below.

                        CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Delay Type for State Supported Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Percentage
          Responsible Party                 Delay Code           Delay Description     Delay Minutes   of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad.......................  FTI...................  Freight Train                  339,410         15%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  PTI...................  Passenger Train                311,491         14%
                                                               Interference.
Host Railroad.......................  DSR...................  Slow Orders...........         290,221         13%
Host Railroad.......................  DCS...................  Signals...............         189,393          9%
Host Railroad.......................  CTI...................  Commuter Train                 174,986          8%
                                                               Interference.
Amtrak..............................  SYS...................  Crew and System.......         154,472          7%
Host Railroad.......................  RTE...................  Routing...............         112,646          5%
Amtrak..............................  HLD...................  Hold for Passengers or          88,202          4%
                                                               Baggage.
Amtrak..............................  OTH...................  Other.................          81,424          4%
Amtrak..............................  ADA...................  Hold for Passenger              71,236          3%
                                                               Mobility.
Host Railroad.......................  DMW...................  Maintenance of Way....          64,561          3%
Amtrak..............................  ENG...................  Engine................          61,401          3%
Third Party.........................  WTR...................  Weather...............          44,626          2%
Amtrak..............................  ITI...................  Late Inbound Train....          42,576          2%
Third Party.........................  POL...................  Police Hold...........          41,732          2%
Third Party.........................  TRS...................  Trespasser............          37,737          2%
Amtrak..............................  SVS...................  Servicing.............          31,214          1%
Amtrak..............................  CAR...................  Car Mechanical Issue..          15,725          1%
Third Party.........................  MBO...................  Movable Bridge Opening          13,791          1%
Amtrak..............................  CCR...................  Cab Car Mechanical               9,141          0%
                                                               Issue.
Amtrak..............................  CON...................  Connection Hold.......           7,925          0%
Third Party.........................  CUI...................  Customs...............           7,662          0%
Third Party.........................  DBS...................  Debris................           7,396          0%
Host Railroad.......................  DTR...................  Detour................           7,227          0%
Amtrak..............................  INJ...................  Injury................           2,910          0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


        Question 8b). Amtrak delays accounted for 28% of total delays; 
        and
    Answer. Host railroads were responsible for 67% of delays and 
Amtrak was responsible for 26% of delays, as shown in the table below.


 CY 2019 Delay Minutes by Responsible Party for State Supported Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Percentage
              Responsible Party                Delay Minutes   of Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host Railroad...............................       1,489,935         67%
Amtrak......................................         566,226         26%
Third Party.................................         152,944          7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------


        Question 8c). Delays attributed to Amtrak exceeded FTI delays 
        by more than 275,000 minutes.
    Answer. This statement compares a category of 11 delays to a single 
delay type. The correct comparison is between Amtrak and host railroad 
delays: host railroad delays to state supported trains exceeded Amtrak 
delays by more than 900,000 minutes. Freight train interference was the 
largest type of delay to state supported trains, amounting to nearly 
340,000 minutes of delay in 2019.

    Question 9. How can Amtrak prove that there is a level of 
preference violations when Amtrak does not record a category of delays 
due to alleged preference violations? Does Amtrak categorize delays as 
FTI only when Amtrak views the delay as due to a preference violation? 
Should the FTI delay category be broader than that? Is your delay 
category of Host Responsible Delays not also broader than FTI? Please 
delineate and explain each item or criteria utilized in the delay 
category and Amtrak's justification for its usage.
    Answer. Freight train interference delays are delays to Amtrak 
trains caused by freight trains. These delays represent clear evidence 
of violations of Amtrak's rights to preference as required by law.
    There are eight types of host-responsible delays--information 
publicly available in the monthly Host Railroad Report posted to the 
Amtrak website \2\--as summarized in the table below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents

                    Types of Host-Responsible Delays
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Host-Responsible Delay                     Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commuter Train Interference...............  Delays from meeting or
                                             following commuter rail
                                             trains.
Detour....................................  Delays from detours.
Freight Train Interference................  Delays from freight trains.
Maintenance of Way........................  Delays from host railroad
                                             maintenance of way
                                             activities.
Passenger Train Interference..............  Delays from meeting or
                                             following other intercity
                                             passenger rail trains.
Routing...................................  Dispatching delays.
Slow Order................................  Delays from slow orders,
                                             except for heat or cold
                                             orders which are coded as
                                             third-party weather delays.
Signals...................................  Signal-related delays.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    For each delay, the following details are reported to the extent 
known, based on direct observations, train bulletins, radio traffic, 
and information relayed by the engineer, dispatcher, maintenance of way 
staff, signal maintainers, other train crews, and others:
      Location names or mileposts.
      Train symbol or number and/or locomotive number (with 
railroad initials) for other trains causing delay.
      Mileposts or other locations, speeds, and track number 
for slow-order delays.
      Names and aspects for signal delays.
      Engine or car number (with initials for non-Amtrak 
equipment) for mechanical delays.
      Locations for diversion delays, and track numbers routed 
from/to.
      Additional comments and information regarding the 
circumstances of the delay.

    Question 10. We are troubled by the appearance that Amtrak's delay 
data includes supposed delays to its trains even when the delay is 
planned for as part of its schedule, or when a train makes up lost 
time, or even when the delayed train is not actually late. Does your 
delay data include these items? If Amtrak categorizes trains as delayed 
without regard to their actual schedule and whether they are on time, 
will you clarify these different delays in the data that present to the 
public?
    Answer. Delays in a given segment of a route are recorded against 
the Pure Running Time for that segment, as a ``delay'' represents an 
impediment to the movement of the train. Amtrak's detailed approach to 
delay recordation provides actionable information, allowing both Amtrak 
and the host railroads to take corrective action to reduce delays, 
improving the on-time performance of Amtrak trains. Customer OTP, on 
the other hand, reflects the performance of the train based on the 
public schedule and provides a clear picture of the customer 
experience.
C. Proposed Private Right of Action
    Question 1. You stated that Amtrak needs the ability to enforce its 
right of preference over freight trains, but there are non-Amtrak 
passenger rail services throughout the country that run on time without 
any right of preference. Why do you think that Amtrak needs the ability 
to enforce its right of preference over freight when other non-Amtrak 
passenger rail services run on time without such a preference?
    Answer. Preference of passenger trains over freight trains is 
essential to providing on-time passenger rail service. The question 
provides no evidence to the contrary.
    The experience of VIA Rail Canada, Canada's intercity passenger 
rail operator, demonstrates the dire consequences to passenger rail in 
the absence of a right to preference over freight transportation. As 
noted in a 2016 Special Examination Report of VIA Rail by Canada's 
auditor general, ``in Canada, passenger trains do not have the right of 
way. Therefore, VIA's trains are frequently required to yield to 
freight traffic, which sometimes results in significant delays.'' \3\ 
These delays due to lack of preference have decimated the performance 
of VIA's principal long distance train, the Toronto-Vancouver Canadian. 
In 2009, VIA added an extra night to the Canadian's schedule with the 
expectation that this would improve its poor on-time performance. 
Instead, on-time performance plummeted to just 8% in 2018 and some 
trains operated as much as 43 hours late, ``impeding VIA Rail from 
effectively providing a viable travel service'' according to VIA's 
2019-2023 Corporate Plan.\4\ In that year, VIA added an additional 12 
hours to the Canadian's schedule, but on-time performance continued to 
deteriorate according to VIA's Second Quarter 2019 Report.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.viarail.ca/sites/all/files/media/pdfs/About_VIA/
VIA%20SPECIAL
%20EXAMINATION%20REPORT%20FINAL.pdf
    \4\ https://www.viarail.ca/sites/all/files/media/pdfs/About_VIA/
our-company/corporate-plan/
Corporate_Plan2019.pdf, pg. 9.
    \5\ https://media.viarail.ca/sites/default/files/publications/
VIA_Q2_2019_EN_1.pdf, p. 37
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amtrak's own experience also validates the vital need for real 
preference enforcement. Around the time of the enactment of the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, which included 
the metrics and standards provisions regarding on-time performance, the 
average on-time performance of long distance trains increased 45 points 
to 75%. However, after the Association of American Railroads initiated 
litigation regarding the metrics and standards provision, the average 
on-time performance of long distance trains fell 22 percentage points 
within a year. The data confirms that freight host railroads limit the 
freight train interference delays to Amtrak passengers when there are 
real consequences for violating Amtrak's right to preference.

    Question 2. Regarding enforcement of preference, does the Passenger 
Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 allow Amtrak to enforce its 
rights regarding underperforming services at the STB? Is that right 
insufficient to keep Amtrak trains on time because the STB does not 
share Amtrak's view regarding the requirements of preference?
    Answer. The reason that Section 24308(f) of the Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) is not a sufficient tool for 
enforcing the federal law giving Amtrak trains a right of preference 
are the actions of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and 
certain freight railroads to block the applicability of that statute at 
every possible turn. Moreover, whatever views the current members of 
the STB may have regarding the requirements of preference has nothing 
to do with why the existing provisions of the PRIIA are insufficient to 
keep Amtrak trains on time.
    Section 24308(f) of PRIIA allows Amtrak to begin a proceeding to 
have the STB investigate poor OTP, but only if OTP falls below certain 
triggers. The statute contains two triggers, and the AAR and certain of 
the freight railroads banded together shortly after PRIIA was passed to 
bring litigation to invalidate both of those triggers.
    The first trigger for an action under Section 24308(f) is that the 
host railroad fail to meet certain metrics and standards developed by 
FRA and Amtrak pursuant to PRIIA Section 207. FRA and Amtrak did 
develop those metrics and standards, after notice and comment, but AAR 
and certain freights sued the Department of Transportation, claiming 
that Section 207 and the metrics and standards developed under them 
were unconstitutional. The case went up to the Supreme Court and back 
down to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where--after ten years of 
litigation--it was finally held that the statute was generally 
constitutional but that the metrics and standards would need to be 
developed again. FRA and Amtrak have begun that process, but it is not 
certain that AAR and the freights will not attempt to invalidate them 
again in order to keep Amtrak from enforcing its rights to preference 
at the STB.
    The second trigger for an STB action under Section 24308(f) is that 
an Amtrak train fall below a certain percentage OTP. At the AAR's 
request, the STB, through notice and comment rulemaking, determined how 
OTP would be measured for purposes of that provision. The AAR and 
certain freight railroads promptly challenged the STB's rule in the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the rule was invalidated.
    The result of the litigation brought by the AAR and freight 
railroads is that the two existing cases Amtrak had brought under PRIIA 
were dismissed by the STB. Any STB proceeding Amtrak brought after 
issuance of new metrics and standards could once again be nullified by 
future judicial challenges.

    Question 3. Is it the case that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is 
empowered to enforce the freight railroad's preference obligation? How 
many preference enforcement actions has Amtrak asked the DOJ to bring 
over the past 30 years? How many actions has the DOJ refused to bring? 
Please provide the details of any cases or refusals to bring cases.
    Answer. Under 49 USC Sec.  24103(a)(1), only the Attorney General 
of the United States (DOJ) may bring a civil action when a freight 
railroad refuses, fails, or neglects to discharge its duties and 
responsibilities under certain provisions of the law, including 
Amtrak's right to preference under 49 USC Sec.  24308(c). However, the 
Attorney General is only empowered to seek equitable relief, rather 
than monetary relief such as damages caused by the unlawful behavior.
    In the 47 years since the preference law was enacted, the DOJ has 
only commenced one case to enforce Amtrak's preference rights. That was 
in 1979, in a case against what was then the Southern Pacific (since 
merged into Union Pacific). In that case, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia entered a Consent Order under which Southern 
Pacific was ordered to ``accord to the operations of the Sunset Limited 
between New Orleans and Houston a preference over freight trains in the 
use of Southern Pacific's rail lines in accordance with'' the 
preference law, as well as other requirements to support that order.
    Since then, Amtrak has attempted to convince the DOJ to enforce 
federal preference law when appropriate, but without success. Because 
DOJ does not represent Amtrak but only other federal agencies, it has 
no obligation to enforce Amtrak's preference rights or to prioritize 
preference enforcement over enforcement of other federal laws. Amtrak 
does not have a record of every conversation or meeting with 
representatives of the DOJ or the DOT over the past 30 years regarding 
preference and so cannot answer with certainty your question about 
every instance where Amtrak asked the DOT or DOJ to enforce Amtrak's 
preference rights.

    Question 4. Without evidence that violations of preference are a 
significant problem for Amtrak, is it worth the potential lost time, 
expense, and harm to relationships that would be caused by Amtrak 
threatening or litigating preference claims against the very hosts it 
needs to work with to provide quality service? Should the right of 
preference be limited to instances where FTI represents the majority of 
all delays to a service? Should it at least at least be limited to 
instances where FTI exceeds all other sources of delay that cannot be 
reasonably controlled by the host?
    Answer. Freight train interference--violations of Amtrak's right to 
preference--caused 1 million minutes of delay to Amtrak trains in FY 
2019. That is equivalent to nearly two years of delays to passengers. 
It is the leading reason why the on-time performance of long distance 
services was only 42% last year, with a third of long distance routes 
less than 30% on time. This disregard of the law is a fundamental 
challenge to Amtrak's ability to provide reliable service and meet our 
mission set forth by Congress in statute.
    Amtrak has repeatedly sought to work with host railroads to jointly 
reduce delays, which has led to important successes and reliable 
service for some routes. However, long-term and consistently reliable 
performance cannot be achieved systemwide without the real possibility 
of preference enforcement.
    Amtrak would prefer not to litigate preference claims, but history 
has proven that the only times when Amtrak is provided with reliable 
service across the system is when a real threat of preference 
enforcement has existed. Around the time of the enactment of the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), which 
included the metrics and standards provisions regarding on-time 
performance, the average on-time performance of long distance trains 
increased 45 percentage points to 75%. After the Association of 
American Railroads initiated litigation regarding the metrics and 
standards provision of PRIIA, the average on-time performance of long 
distance trains fell 22 percentage points within a year.
    Amtrak's right to preference protects our customers, our mission, 
and is an essential element in providing reliable service. Passengers 
will experience more reliable service when more host railroads comply 
with the law.
    Federal law provides that the right of preference is not limited to 
the instances that the question suggests it should be limited to, and 
for good reason. It should be noted that the law provides an 
opportunity for host railroads to demonstrate that providing preference 
would materially lessen the quality of freight transportation provided 
to shippers and seek relief from the law, but no freight railroad has 
every sought such relief. It is therefore appropriate to assume that 
relief has never been required. Excusing repeated host railroad 
violations of preference that did not exceed some arbitrary threshold 
would be no different than allowing drivers who repeatedly run red 
lights to avoid paying fines until they receive a large number of 
tickets.

    Question 5. You verbally suggested that increased OTP during this 
period of reduced train operations supports the need for a private 
right of action for Amtrak to enforce preference. But data shows that 
most of the improvement in OTP during this period has been the result 
of reductions in Amtrak delays rather than freight delays. For long 
distance trains, for example, during April 1, 2020, through August 30, 
2020, a period of reduced freight and passenger operations, the average 
FTI delay per train decreased by 14 minutes from 2019, whereas the 
average delay per train caused by Amtrak decreased by 34 minutes. Does 
this suggest that Amtrak could achieve its OTP goals by reducing its 
own delays or adding time to the schedule to account for delays it 
cannot eliminate and delays the Host cannot control?
    Answer. No. In fact, the question lays bare the unfortunate 
reality: while Amtrak continues to make great strides in reducing its 
own delays, many freight host railroads continue to prioritize freight 
over passengers, failing to comply with their legal obligations to 
provide Amtrak trains with preference. Freight train interference 
delays are entirely within the control of host railroads and represent 
the largest cause of delay to Amtrak trains. In the period referenced 
by the question (April 1, 2020 to August 30, 2020), there were 35% more 
freight train interference delays to long distance trains than all 
Amtrak delays combined. Moreover, freight train interference is just 
one type of host railroad delay. Considering all host railroad-
responsible delays to Amtrak trains, there were 234% more delay minutes 
caused by host railroads than all delays caused by Amtrak.
    The greatest single opportunity for improving the on-time 
performance of Amtrak trains is to reduce freight train interference 
delays. In CY 2019, there were nearly 11,000 hours of delay to Amtrak 
long distance train passengers from freight train interference alone, 
equivalent to more than one year of passengers waiting for freight to 
operate first. The fact that some freight host railroads have elected 
not to reduce delays merely proves there is much more for host 
railroads to do to comply with the law. America's rail passengers 
deserve nothing less.
D. Private Sector Contracting
    Question 1. One idea for helping Amtrak become more efficient and 
profitable is contracting out services to the private sector. How can 
Amtrak partner with the private sector on passenger rail operations and 
services on a broader scale?
    Answer. Amtrak already contracts out many services that other 
entities can better provide at a lower cost. Examples including 
commissary operations for on-board food services and servicing of 
Amtrak equipment at remote terminals. We also have many contractual 
arrangements and partnerships with private sector entities in areas 
such as station development and provision of bus services that connect 
with our trains. We are open to other opportunities for contracting and 
partnering with private entities that will improve financial 
performance and service quality and are not inconsistent with legal 
requirements or collective bargaining agreements.
    It is important to keep in mind, however, that contracting out 
services does not necessarily reduce costs, and can lead to 
degradation, loss of control over, or impairment of services. When 
Amtrak began operation in 1971, it contracted with private railroads to 
perform virtually all aspects of its operations and services, which 
resulted in high costs and poor service quality. Recognizing this, 
Congress amended the Rail Passenger Service Act in 1973 to direct 
Amtrak to ``operate and control directly, to the extent practicable, 
all aspects of the rail passenger transportation it provides'' (49 
U.S.C. 24305(a)(2)). Amtrak's assumption of direct operation and 
control of most aspects of its services significantly reduced costs and 
improved service quality. More recent experience of Amtrak and other 
passenger railroads with privatization of services, discussed in detail 
in a white paper entitled ``Should Amtrak Services and Infrastructure 
be `Privatized'?'' on Amtrak's Stakeholder FAQs website 
(``Privatization White Paper''),\6\ demonstrates that privatization is 
not a magic panacea that would make Amtrak profitable, but rather can 
increase costs, diminish operational performance and customer service, 
and jeopardize safety and continued operation of services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-privatization.pdf

    Question 2. You testified that certain National Network routes for 
competitive bid would create more complexity. Please explain what you 
meant and include any evidence that supports this claim.
    Answer. Competitive bidding for National Network routes--which the 
Federal Railroad Administration and a Midwestern state unsuccessfully 
attempted in recent years, as discussed in the Privatization White 
Paper \7\--would create additional complexity, and increase 
administrative and oversight costs, because Amtrak would no longer 
control aspects of the services it provides to passengers that were 
privatized; terms under which Amtrak would continue to provide other 
aspects of those services would have to be negotiated or determined 
through adjudicatory proceedings; and the provision of services by both 
Amtrak and other entities would create inefficiencies, customer 
confusion, and disputes over responsibility for ensuring safe 
operations and addressing service deficiencies that do not exist when 
all aspects of a service are provided or controlled by a single 
operator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Ibid.

    Question 3. Please answer each the following questions in detail:
        Question 3a) Do you agree that opening routes up for 
        competitive bid could drive down costs? If not, please explain 
        why, including evidence supporting this denial.
    Answer. As discussed in detail in the Privatization White Paper,\8\ 
the costs to taxpayers in Great Britain increased greatly after rail 
services were privatized; in September, British rail regulators 
announced that the government would reassume control over rail services 
and end franchising of routes to private operators. The Midwestern 
state that partially privatized an Amtrak state supported route 
terminated that arrangement after just 17 months when the private 
operator sought large increases in the state's payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Ibid.

        Question 3b) Do you agree that opening routes up for 
        competitive bid could improve service? If not, please explain 
        why, including evidence supporting this denial.
    Answer. Privatization of Great Britain's rail services resulted in 
degradation of service quality, including severe overcrowding and poor 
on-time performance. (See Jones, Owen, ``Why Britain's Trains Don't Run 
on Time: Capitalism,'' New York Times, April 4, 2017.) \9\ As discussed 
in the Privatization White Paper,\10\ during the first year of partial 
privatization of a Midwestern Amtrak state-supported route, mechanical 
delays, which were attributable to problems with the contractor's 
equipment, increased 35%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/opinion/why-britains-trains-
dont-run-on-time-
capitalism.html
    \10\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/documents/
corporate/position-papers/white-paper-amtrak-privatization.pdf

        Question 3c) Do you agree that opening routes up for 
        competitive bid would likely create jobs in communities along 
        Amtrak routes? If not, please explain why, including evidence 
        supporting this denial.
    Answer. No. The creation of jobs in on-line communities due to the 
operation of passenger rail service is heavily dependent on increasing 
the number of passengers carried, since this translates into more 
commercial activity and more spending by visitors on hotels, 
restaurants, entertainment, etc. As indicated in the Privatization 
White Paper, ridership declined by more than 10% following partial 
privatization of a Midwestern Amtrak service.
    Unsuccessful privatization efforts have led to discontinuance of 
passenger rail services, which eliminates both railroad jobs and other 
jobs in on-line communities that are dependent upon passenger rail 
service. A Canadian intercity passenger rail service was suspended in 
2015 when the newly-selected private operator was unable to fulfill its 
contractual obligations, and subsequent efforts to find a suitable 
private operator were unsuccessful. The service has never resumed. See 
Kelly, Lindsay, ``Rail supporters reboot search for third-party 
operator,'' Northern Ontario Business, March 4, 2016.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ https://www.northernontariobusiness.com/regional-news/sault-
ste-marie/rail-supporters-
reboot-search-for-third-party-operator-371850
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Buy America Waiver
    Question 1. On August 13, 2020, you responded to Ranking Member 
Crawford's letter regarding the Buy America waiver Amtrak sought to 
purchase foreign equipment. None of Amtrak's responses directly 
answered the questions posed by Ranking Member Crawford. Accordingly, 
please respond directly to each of the following questions without 
restating the responses Amtrak provided in the August 13, 2020, letter.
        Question 1a) Please list all items/equipment for which the Buy 
        America waiver was sought.
    Answer. Between March 2018 and May 2019, Amtrak issued three 
requests for proposal (RFP):
      One railbound tunnel crane
      One track laying machine
      Eight two-man rail car movers with heavy cranes, 
railgear, and rail car couplers (and related equipment)

    In the case of the tunnel crane and the track-laying machine, the 
request was sent to multiple potential offerors; in the case of the 
rail car movers, the request was sent to a single bidder based on a 
previous RFP. In two of three cases, the request was also posted 
publicly on Amtrak's website.

        Question 1b) Please list the cost of all items purchased or 
        sought to be purchased with the Buy America waiver.
    Answer. This procurement process continues to be ongoing. As Amtrak 
negotiates the contracts, some elements of the contract have remained 
at play. Pricing, as is common to any business negotiation, is a 
critical part of a contract negotiation. We are happy to report that 
over the past several weeks, Amtrak and vendors have finalized two of 
the three negotiations and contracts have been issued:
      Railbound Tunnel Crane--$12,979,205.00
      Two-man Rail Car Movers--$7,464,000.00

    The third and final contract for the Track Laying Machine remains 
under negotiation, but we are happy to follow up with your staff with 
that information once that contract has been issued. We expect to 
complete that TLM negotiation in the coming months. In the meantime, my 
team can be available to discuss this with you or your staff if you 
have any additional questions.

        Question 1c) Please list the country or countries where the 
        equipment was sought from or purchased.
    Answer. Equipment was purchased or will be purchased as follows:
      Railbound Tunnel Crane--Switzerland
      Two-man Rail Car Movers--Canada
      Track Laying Machine--Germany

        Question 1d) Please state whether the equipment was, or will 
        be, purchased using funding provided through the Coronavirus 
        Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. If so, how much 
        of the CARES Act money is or will be spent on the equipment?
    Answer. Amtrak closely tracks how CARES Act funds are used, 
consistent with the terms of the legislation and our agreements with 
the FRA. No CARES-provided funding has been or will be used to acquire 
the equipment that was part of this procurement. At all stages, the 
waiver process has been independent of the pandemic, and of Congress's 
financial response to the pandemic.
    This is a snapshot of the waiver request timeline and process:
      Amtrak first sought an Amtrak Buy American waiver weeks 
before the first confirmed COVID-19 case, months before the first U.S. 
case.
      This process began approximately six months before 
enactment of the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136).
      The FRA's public notice of Amtrak's request preceded the 
execution of CARES Act grant agreements.

    I want to reiterate my earlier message that this waiver request, a 
process that began over two years ago now, is a step Amtrak rarely 
takes and that we worked hard to avoid. On average, Amtrak spends just 
under $2 billion a year on products and services. Since 1992, when the 
FRA began posting waiver requests, Amtrak has requested six waivers 
under the FRA statute (49 USC Sec. 22905(a), formerly 49 USC Sec.  
24405(a)) and the Amtrak statute, 49 USC Sec.  24305(f). Of the six 
requested waivers, only five have been required. (One of the waivers, 
for the Amtrak High Speed Rail Prototype Trainsets, ultimately was not 
utilized.)
    Amtrak's request for a waiver of its domestic buying preference 
requirements is not the product of an elective choice; rather, it is 
the result of market realities and Amtrak's need for equipment that 
meets certain technical specifications the company is unable to change. 
Amtrak sought to acquire the relevant equipment from manufacturers that 
can meet Amtrak Buy American requirements without a waiver but was 
unable to do so; the FRA has granted Amtrak's request based on narrow 
criteria that Congress spelt out in statute.
F. Amtrak Accounting
    Question 1. According to the Cato Institute (see Cato statement 
submitted for the record), Amtrak currently receives a federal subsidy 
of roughly thirty cents per passenger-mile, whereas the aviation 
industry receives a subsidy of roughly one cent per mile. What specific 
amount do you think is an appropriate subsidy per passenger-mile for 
Amtrak?
    Answer. Since the referenced testimony does not indicate how the 
subsidy per passenger mile figures were calculated (e.g., whether 
indirect federal, and all aviation trust fund, spending on the aviation 
industry was included), we are unable to assess the accuracy of the 
comparison. We believe that the level of federal funding Amtrak 
receives should not be based upon an arbitrary per passenger-mile 
figure, but rather on the benefits the country receives from investing 
in Amtrak.
    The approximately $2 billion Congress has invested annually in 
Amtrak in recent years, is a tiny fraction of what the federal 
government spends on competing transportation modes. For example, in 
2017, according to data compiled by the Congressional Budget Office, 
federal spending on highways exceeded Amtrak's federal grant by a 
factor of more than thirty to one.\12\ The funding Congress has 
provided to Amtrak has produced a very high return on investment. 
Significant, sustained investments in intercity passenger rail service, 
comparable to those in other countries, would result in much higher 
ridership, more efficient operations, and economies of scale that would 
significantly reduce expenditures per passenger-mile, as has occurred 
on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54539

    Question 2. Does Amtrak use benefit-cost analysis when determining 
long-distance service?
    Answer. Amtrak's decisions about long distance service levels 
reflect many factors, but are always informed by the mission, goals, 
and other directives Congress has spelt out for Amtrak in statute, 
including the requirements that we operate a ``national rail passenger 
transportation system'' (49 USC Sec.  24701), defined in a way that 
explicitly includes long distance routes (49 USC Sec.  24102), and that 
we use our best business judgment to minimize governmental subsidies 
(49 USC Sec.  24101). Our business judgment is of course informed by 
cost-benefit analyses, and such analyses have prompted or supported 
major decisions about long distance service; the pre-pandemic 
transition to flexible dining on many eastern (single-night) routes and 
the post-pandemic reduction of service levels are two recent examples.

    Question 3. Do you acknowledge Amtrak's Congressionally-mandated 
mission of making a profit as contained in the Rail Passenger Service 
Act of 1970? Please answer each of the following questions in detail.
    Answer. Amtrak has never had a Congressionally-mandated mission of 
making a profit. The referenced provision in the Rail Passenger Service 
Act of 1970, which stated that Amtrak was to be a ``for-profit 
company'' was amended in 1979 to provide that Amtrak was to be 
``operated and managed as a for-profit company.'' (49 U.S.C. 
24301(a)(2), emphasis added). The legislative history of the 1979 
amendment indicates that it reflected the fact that Amtrak could not be 
profitable.
    The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has found that there was 
``little evidence . . . in the legislative history'' of the 1970 Act to 
support the ``assert[ion] that Amtrak was intended by Congress to be a 
profit-making enterprise.'' CRS noted that whatever expectations there 
were that Amtrak might eventually become profitable were premised on 
the assumptions that the federal government would provide the 
significant funding required to develop faster service in high-density 
corridors and that Amtrak would not be required to continue to operate 
a national network of unprofitable routes. CRS found that neither pre-
condition had been met. (See CRS, ``Amtrak Profitability: An Analysis 
of Congressional Expectations at Amtrak's Creation'' (June 26, 2002).) 
\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL31473

        Question 3a) COVID-19 considerations aside, do you agree that 
        trying to make a profit should be a goal for Amtrak?
    Answer. We believe that operating an efficient service in a 
business-like manner that makes optimal use of available public funding 
should be Amtrak's goal. Like Amtrak's long distance routes, virtually 
all of the airline and intercity bus routes that serve rural regions of 
the United States receive significant federal subsidies, without which 
these services would disappear. Every dollar we save is a dollar we can 
reinvest into the railroad to ensure we can better serve our customers 
and your constituents.

        Question 3b) COVID-19 considerations aside, do you believe that 
        Amtrak should operate in a fiscally responsible way that seeks 
        to minimize wasting taxpayer money?
    Answer. We agree that Amtrak should operate in a fiscally 
responsible way. We disagree with the implication that providing 
funding for intercity passenger rail service is a waste of taxpayer 
money.

        Question 3c) Do you believe providing good service and making a 
        profit are in conflict?
    Answer. While providing good service is not in conflict with 
operating in a financially efficient manner, an expectation that a 
national network of intercity passenger rail service could be 
profitable is unrealistic. As indicated in the CRS report,\14\ Amtrak 
was created because the private railroads that then provided intercity 
passenger rail service were all losing huge amounts of money operating 
passenger rail service that became inherently unprofitable after post-
World War II public investments in competing transportation modes. No 
country in the world has a profitable passenger rail system that does 
not require public funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Ibid.

        Question 3d) Looking beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, please 
        explain in detail your plan to ensure that Amtrak makes a 
        profit and meets its Congressional mandate. If you do not 
        believe Amtrak should make a profit, please explain.
    Answer. As discussed above, Amtrak does not have a congressional 
mandate to make a profit.

    Question 4. What are the losses, per train or per passenger-mile, 
when taking into account the depreciation of equipment?
    Answer. Amtrak uses the group method of depreciation (group method) 
in which a single composite depreciation rate is applied to the gross 
investment in a particular class of property or equipment, despite 
differences in the service life or salvage value of individual property 
units within the same class. While we know how much depreciation has 
been recorded for a particular group, we do not calculate equipment 
depreciation per train, which would vary from day to day depending upon 
the number and type of equipment units assigned.

    Question 5. The previous Amtrak CEO developed accounting figures to 
factor in depreciation of equipment to each individual route but did 
not publish this information. Will you agree to publish this 
information and provide it to this Committee? If not, please state your 
reasoning.
    Answer. Depreciation is not a cash expense and not a good measure 
of the day-to-day operating expenses of a route or the cost of 
replacing railroad assets. For that reason, our adjusted operating loss 
(similar to EBITDA) is a much better measure of route profitability. 
Many public companies, across varied industries, often talk in terms of 
EBITDA, or some form of adjusted operating income to provide investors 
with an accurate view of the core operating results of the company. You 
can see the adjusted operating loss for a route in our publicly 
available ``Monthly Performance Report'' on the Amtrak.com website 
under ``Reports.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. COVID-19 and CARES Act
    Question 1. As a result of the coronavirus, many states are facing 
budget deficits and financial difficulties. What is Amtrak's plan for 
working with the states in 2021, specifically regarding the state-
supported routes?
    Answer. We appreciate the tremendous financial strain that the 
coronavirus has created for our state partners. Our overarching goal as 
we navigate the coronavirus is to preserve all of our state supported 
services, so that as we emerge from this pandemic we can continue to 
provide mobility and connectivity to the states in support of economic 
recovery. To do this, we believe the foundation must be continued 
emergency federal funding to Amtrak and our state partners to replace 
the lost ticket revenue resulting from reduced travel associated with 
the coronavirus. In addition to this emergency funding, we are working 
to make our operating agreements with states as flexible as possible so 
that we can all respond as nimbly as possible to our quickly changing 
environments.

    Question 2. Amtrak's Office of Inspector General recently found 
that Amtrak is utilizing a ``legacy process'' to calculate state 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) Section 
209 payments and that management will not have an ``alternative'' 
billing and methodology system implemented before the end of this 
fiscal year. How can states trust that Amtrak will implement 
alternative billing and cost methodologies before their next service 
agreements are signed?
    Answer. Under PRIIA Section 209 and the FAST Act, the cost sharing 
methodology is governed by the State-Amtrak Intercity Passenger Rail 
Committee (SAIPRC), of which Amtrak is a member along with states 
funding state supported services and the Federal Railroad 
Administration. Changes to the cost sharing methodology must be 
approved by all parties. Amtrak has repeatedly expressed its openness 
to considering alternative approaches to the process we have today. We 
look forward to collaborating with our SAIPRC partners to investigate 
these alternatives but based on the way the statute was designed Amtrak 
cannot unilaterally change the existing processes.

    Question 3. Amtrak's state-supported routes have identified clear 
reductions in service because of the COVID-19 pandemic but have not 
seen corresponding decreases in their cost of service. On state routes, 
what costs does Amtrak consider to be fixed and what costs does Amtrak 
consider to be variable?
    Answer. From October 2019 to February 2020, the period in FY 2020 
prior to COVID-19, Amtrak ran 1.2M state supported train-miles per 
month, which resulted in Section 209 operating costs of $62.1M per 
month. From March through August 2020, based on guidance from state 
partners, Amtrak ran only 552K state supported train-miles per month, 
resulting in Section 209 operating costs of $44.5M per month. To 
clarify, these costs during COVID-19 are lower than they were prior to 
COVID-19 based on the reductions in service.
    A railroad is an entity where many costs are fixed. Certain costs 
can be fixed or variable based on the time period. Please see the 
following table, which we shared with our state partners during one of 
our weekly (now bi-weekly) conference calls where we address COVID-19 
related issues:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        %
                Cost                  Labor      More Variable            More Fixed                Note
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Host RR............................      na  Access fees,           NRPC officer.........  Minor costs from some
                                              incentives.                                   hosts even if no
                                                                                            Amtrak service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel & Power.......................      na  Fuel.................  Negligible...........  Note that fuel
                                                                                            management
                                                                                            activities charged
                                                                                            in T&E Additive
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T&E Crew Labor.....................     95%  Labor................  Extra board, some       Variability
                                                                     costs at smaller       can be short-run and
                                                                     crewbases.             long-run
                                                                                            Long lead
                                                                                            times for crew
                                                                                            qualification,
                                                                                            training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car & Loco Maint. & Turnaround.....     55%  Labor, materials.....  Facilities, shop        Variability
                                                                     tools and equipment.   can be short-run and
                                                                                            long-run
                                                                                            Long lead
                                                                                            times for
                                                                                            qualification,
                                                                                            training for certain
                                                                                            crafts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-Board Passenger Technology......      na  Cellular access fees   Fixed support costs
                                              driven by installed
                                              base.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OBS Crew...........................     95%  Labor, provisions....  Negligible...........   Variability
                                                                                            can be short-run and
                                                                                            long-run
                                                                                            Lower lead
                                                                                            times for
                                                                                            qualification,
                                                                                            training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commissary Provisions..............      na  Cafe provisions......  E.g., paper towels...  Includes some
                                                                                            consumables used
                                                                                            outside of food
                                                                                            service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route Advertising..................      na  Media placement......  na...................  Determined by
                                                                                            individual states
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reservations & Call Centers........     40%  Labor................  Technology...........  BPO call center
                                                                                            provider offers
                                                                                            greater variability
                                                                                            of labor costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stations--Route....................     70%  Labor................  Facilities...........  Variability can be
                                                                                            short-run and long-
                                                                                            run
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stations--Shared...................     70%  Labor................  Facilities...........  Variability can be
                                                                                            short-run and long-
                                                                                            run
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Station Technology.................      na  Access fees driven by  Fixed support costs..  See above
                                              installed base.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commissions and Res. System Access.     <1%  Commissions..........  na...................  Costs driven by
                                                                                            revenue purchased
                                                                                            through specific
                                                                                            channels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customer Concession................     <1%  Credits, refunds.....  na...................  Costs driven by
                                                                                            passenger counts;
                                                                                            category has
                                                                                            decreased
                                                                                            substantially due to
                                                                                            accounting changes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Motor Coach.............     Low  Yes..................  na...................  Determined by
                                                                                            individual states
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional/Local Police..............     97%  Labor................  Support costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Tower Operations...........     97%  Labor................  Technology...........  These costs have been
                                                                                            decreasing over
                                                                                            years as remaining
                                                                                            manual towers are
                                                                                            automated /
                                                                                            centralized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terminal Yard Operations...........     95%  Labor................  Extra board, some       Variability
                                                                     crew base costs.       can be short-run and
                                                                                            long-run
                                                                                            Long lead
                                                                                            times for crew
                                                                                            qualification,
                                                                                            training
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insurance..........................      na  Some insurance costs   Some costs determined  Some costs
                                              vary by activity       by insurance market.   controllable by
                                              levels.                                       Amtrak, some costs
                                                                                            determined by larger
                                                                                            insurance market
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question 4. The Amtrak Office of Inspector General recently found 
that Amtrak was not providing states with clear data on how service 
changes due to coronavirus would affect state costs. This data is 
especially important as states face budget shortfalls due to 
coronavirus. Please explain how Amtrak is working to fix this problem. 
Secondly, will Amtrak agree to provide states with this data? If not, 
please state why. If so, please share a copy with the Subcommittee and 
notify the Subcommittee when this sharing occurs.
    Answer. The question above about fixed and variable costs shows the 
blend of fixed and variable costs at a railroad. When service changes, 
variable costs change but most of the time fixed costs do not. 
Different state supported routes have different mixes of fixed and 
variable costs, based in part on their geography; their infrastructure; 
service decisions that have been made by states; and more. Together, 
these factors make it challenging to forecast how service changes will 
change costs. To address this issue, Amtrak has introduced a simplified 
forecasting approach for FY 2021 that will make it possible to provide 
states with estimated costs of service changes much more quickly. 
Please find attached an example of the kinds of forecasts we have 
provided states for different service levels on various state supported 
routes.
H. Amtrak Police
    Question 1. Do the workforce layoffs and furloughs announced by 
Amtrak include members of the Amtrak police department? If so, how many 
employees of the Amtrak police department are affected and how does 
this decision impact passenger safety?
    Answer. No members of the Amtrak Police Department were furloughed, 
and one member was laid off. That employee was a senior continuity of 
operations manager and was in a support position tasked with 
establishing corporate-level business continuity programs.

    Question 2. Earlier this year, the Amtrak Office of the Inspector 
General reported issues with Amtrak's ability to define the role, 
priorities, and size of the Amtrak police department. Please explain 
how Amtrak is addressing these issues.
    Answer. Issued on July 1, 2020, Amtrak OIG report OIG-A-2020-012 
\16\ offered four primary findings and three recommendations. To 
address them, Amtrak has committed to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/OIG-A-2020-
012%20APD.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1.  Facilitate discussions between the Executive Leadership Team 
and the Board of Directors to reach a consensus on what APD should be 
doing. The results of those discussions will inform the mission and 
objectives of the department, which will incorporate them into its 
strategic plan. In addition, the Executive Safety and Security Council 
will ensure that APD appropriately executes its strategic plan and 
ensures that it is incorporated into the company's integrated Safety 
and Security Policy. As part of this effort, APD has engaged a 
consultant to assist in the preparation of a strategic plan, due winter 
2021. APD has engaged with the ELT for their input and feedback, which 
will inform the strategic planning process, scheduled for December 7, 
2021. APD has always been clear on its public safety mission of 
protecting life, property, and infrastructure.
    2.  Review staffing models from partner agencies and best practice 
guidelines from police research organizations to develop a data-driven, 
risk-based process to recommend an optimal size for APD. The department 
expects to have a proposal to senior leadership during the first 
quarter of FY 2021. Additionally, APD leadership will use the results 
of a recently commissioned audit of the contract security services the 
company uses to develop proposals on alternative staffing options. APD 
intends to maximize agreements the company has in place and reallocate 
resources accordingly, to more effectively supplement APD sworn 
officers. APD leadership will forward the audit results and its related 
recommendations to the Executive Leadership Team for consideration and 
action. Also, APD is in the process of evaluating its current goals and 
metrics as part of the APD Security Management System annual review 
process. At the September 2020 Board meeting, APD presented its FY 2021 
goals and metrics to the ELT and the Board, who approved them then. The 
target completion date for these tasks is March 31, 2021.
    3.  Remediate identified weaknesses with the Computer Aided 
Dispatch system and optimize several of the current IT platforms to 
improve workload data. Management stated that APD will use the improved 
workload data to inform decisions it makes about the size and 
allocation of its staff. In addition, IT is working with APD to 
determine the best reports and metrics it needs to inform its decisions 
about staff composition and allocation, and train APD staff on the use 
of any resulting dashboards and reporting tools it generates. The 
target completion date for this effort is July 1, 2021.
I. Miscellaneous
    Question 1. Who should decide Amtrak's National Network routes: 
Congress, Amtrak, or someone else? Please elaborate on your rationale 
this decision.
    Answer. Amtrak's 1997 reauthorization gave Amtrak responsibility 
for determining its route network, and directed Amtrak to ``operate a 
national rail passenger transportation system which ties together 
existing and emergent regional rail passenger service and other 
intermodal passenger service'' (49 U.S.C. 24701). Section 209 of the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 made states 
responsible for funding most of the costs not covered by revenues of 
routes of less than 750 miles in length (other than the Boston-to-
Washington Northeast Corridor), which means that the continued 
operation of such routes, and the initiation of new less than 750-mile 
routes, is determined by states (subject to operational constraints and 
the availability of necessary funding and equipment).
    Amtrak believes that it is appropriate that Amtrak, which is 
required by the Rail Passenger Service Act to operate and be managed as 
a for-profit business and to make the best use of available resources, 
determine Amtrak's long distance route network. We also believe that 
states should continue to be responsible for determining whether to 
initiate or continue operation of state supported routes they primarily 
fund, but that expansion of Amtrak service to corridors and regions 
that are underserved or not served by existing Amtrak services will 
require the federal government and Amtrak to play a greater role in 
initiating or expanding under-750-mile corridor services and providing 
the funding necessary to accomplish this. Finally, we recognize that it 
is ultimately up to Congress, which funds the operating losses and 
capital costs of Amtrak's long distance network and the state supported 
route costs that Amtrak pays, to set the policy for what passenger rail 
service Amtrak will provide.

    Question 2. Amtrak currently requires any claims against it to be 
arbitrated. Do you think that arbitration is a fair, reasonable, and 
highly efficient means of alternative dispute resolution? Will you 
agree to continue this policy? If not, please state why in detail.
    Answer. Amtrak's arbitration program is consistent with other major 
Amtrak initiatives to improve the overall customer experience, and 
Amtrak adopted it for two simple reasons: to expedite resolution of 
claims and to reduce unnecessary litigation costs.
    First, Amtrak's arbitration program provides a much quicker 
resolution of claims and much faster compensation to injured parties 
than court litigation, while retaining most important aspects and 
protections of the civil litigation system: convenient venues 
throughout the country; legal representation; an independent 
decisionmaker; authorization for appropriate discovery; and the ability 
of a prevailing claimant to be awarded damages and all other relief 
available under applicable law. The major difference is that 
arbitration provides a resolution in less time--generally well within a 
year of filing--by avoiding unnecessary discovery and other time-
consuming proceedings, and the often years-long wait for a trial date 
on overcrowded court dockets. This is especially advantageous now, with 
the significant backlogs facing U.S. courts due to closures associated 
with the COVID-19 pandemic. There is no comparable backlog in the 
arbitration system, and arbitrations can be held remotely if necessary 
or desired by the parties.
    Second, in its oversight of Amtrak, Congress has directed Amtrak to 
``use its best business judgment in acting to minimize United States 
Government subsidies.'' Arbitration achieves that aim by streamlining 
the scope, and thus the expense, of the traditional civil litigation 
proceeding. The only beneficiaries of protracted and extraordinarily 
expensive court litigation are the lawyers, whose fee agreements can 
consume up to 40 percent of a successful claimant's award.
    Amtrak's arbitration program has been carefully crafted to meet the 
standards for such programs set forth in Supreme Court and other 
judicial rulings, proving false the vague assertions that our program 
violates passengers' constitutional rights. Indeed, the program goes 
far beyond those standards in order to provide a fair, flexible, and 
easy-to-utilize process for our passengers. Amtrak has a fundamental 
commitment to Congress to be a careful steward of taxpayer funds. 
Amtrak spends roughly $2-3 million annually--some $11 million over the 
last five years--for outside counsel to represent the Company with 
respect to passenger claims. We believe arbitrating disputed passenger 
claims under our policy will reduce those costs significantly; that is 
money that can then be spent in safety programs and other passenger 
service and care programs.
    For these reasons, Amtrak plans to continue with this policy for 
the foreseeable future.

    Question 3. Section 11207 of the FAST Act requires Amtrak to 
eliminate operating loss from food and beverage services. Despite this 
fact, there has been Congressional support for Amtrak serving expensive 
gourmet meals.
        Question 3a) In light of COVID-19 and other financial 
        difficulties, do you believe Amtrak should be offering meals 
        such as filet mignon and French toast to passengers?
    Answer. Section 11207 of the FAST Act's prohibition on using 
federal funds to cover operating losses associated with food and 
beverage service (previously codified at 49 U.S.C. Sec.  24321(d)) was 
repealed by P.L. 116-159 on September 30.
    Amtrak offers traditional dining with sit-down meal service on six 
long distance routes with trip times over 30 hours, and to sleeping car 
passengers on the Auto Train between Virginia and Florida. Sample menus 
may be found online.\17\ While Amtrak does not serve filet mignon, 
French toast, a popular offering in diners and fast food restaurants, 
is one of the breakfast choices.
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    \17\ https://www.amtrak.com/onboard/meals-dining/dining-car.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Due to COVID-19, only the Auto Train currently offers traditional 
dining. On other long distance routes we are temporarily offering 
sleeping car passengers the flexible dining service we have introduced 
in recent years for sleeping car passengers on most shorter (one-night) 
long distance routes. Flexible dining, which offers pre-plated meals 
picked up from an attendant or delivered to rooms, is described on our 
web site, where one can also find sample menus.\18\
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    \18\ https://www.amtrak.com/onboard/meals-dining/flexible-
dining.html

        Question 3b) Will you follow the law and ensure that Amtrak's 
        meal options are fiscally prudent, eliminate financial losses, 
        and do not result in an unnecessary waste of taxpayer money?
    Answer. Notwithstanding the repeal of 49 U.S.C. Sec.  24321(d), 
improving financial performance of food service remains one of Amtrak's 
goals. We will continue to make smart business decisions that seek to 
provide a positive customer experience while at the same time 
minimizing costs. As on airlines, most of which provide (complimentary) 
meal service to all passengers on trips of much shorter duration than 
trips on Amtrak's long distance trains, offering food service that is 
both cost-efficient and meets customers' expectations and dietary 
requirements is essential to optimizing financial performance.

    Question 4. Do you support or oppose the use of private cars on 
Amtrak trains and charter trains operated by Amtrak?
    Answer. Amtrak supports the use of private cars on Amtrak trains 
and charter trains operated by Amtrak. In 2018, Amtrak revised its 
policies related to both these activities to ensure we conducted them 
with the highest standards of safety, to minimize operational impacts, 
and to ensure the associated fees fully covered all the related costs. 
You can find all our private car information, as well as a link to our 
detailed private car policy, on our web site.\19\ For charter trains, 
the relevant information is also on the Amtrak site.\20\
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    \19\ https://www.amtrak.com/privately-owned-rail-cars
    \20\ https://www.amtrak.com/charter-your-private-train

    Question 5. Last year, some of Amtrak's creditors filed suit 
alleging inappropriate handling of Amtrak's Alstom-Bombardier HHP-8 
locomotives.
        a) Is it true that Amtrak has retired all those locomotives 
        after only 10 years of revenue service?
        b) What is Amtrak doing with the retired HHP-8 locomotives 
        today?
        c) Is this situation indicative of Amtrak's typical fleet 
        maintenance practices?
    Answer. As this matter is subject to on-going litigation, we cannot 
comment at this time under guidance from our counsel.

    Question 6. If funding and financing were put in place tomorrow, 
what would the timeline be for the Gateway Program? When would the new 
Hudson River tunnel open? When would rehabilitation of the existing 
tunnel be completed?
    Answer. We and our partners continue to do everything in our power 
to advance Gateway, and we are optimistic that significant progress 
will be made in the coming year. Portal North Bridge will begin 
construction in 2021. Early work on Hudson Yards Concrete Casing 
Section 3 began in September. And additional Gateway projects, such as 
Sawtooth, Dock Bridge, and Penn Station Expansion, are advancing into 
the design phase and NEPA review. The Hudson Tunnel Project is a 10-
year program: approximately seven and a half years for construction of 
the new tunnel, then a year and a half per tube for rehabilitation of 
the existing century-old tunnel. The broader Gateway Program, including 
expansion of Penn Station New York, the Sawtooth Bridges Replacement, 
and Portal South Bridge, among others, could be delivered by 2035 if 
all funding and financing were in place, and assuming that all 
necessary approvals and permits were granted expeditiously.

    Question 7. Can you discuss the reasons for variations in load 
factor for Northeast Corridor, State-Supported, and Long-Distance 
routes?
    Answer. Load factors on a given route or service line are driven by 
the capacity (seat-miles) offered on the trains, the level of total 
demand (passengers) on the trains, the distance those passengers choose 
to travel (passenger-miles), and the distribution of the various 
destinations along the length of the route served. Load factors in any 
period can vary based on decisions regarding capacity offered and by 
customer behavior, which in turn can be influenced by the economic 
environment, competition, product pricing, and a host of other external 
factors. Variations in load factors across the service lines in FY 2020 
reflect the myriad differences across these variables in a fluid 
environment under great stress given the role of the pandemic in daily 
life. While a commercial airliner traveling from one city to another 
city could achieve a 100% load factor, a train that serves multiple 
destinations along a route is much less likely to do so. Conversely, 
that same airliner can only sell each seat once for a given trip, 
whereas an Amtrak train often sells a given seat multiple times. (For 
example, someone may travel from Washington to Baltimore and detrain, 
at which point a second person may ride from Philadelphia to New York 
in that seat, and then a third could ride from New York to Providence.) 
For a long distance train, it is also worth noting that sleepers tend 
to support a higher load factor than do coaches, such that the total 
load factor for a long distance train is an average between the full or 
nearly full sleepers and the coaches, which have more turnover and are 
relatively less full.

Questions from Hon. Lloyd Smucker to William Flynn, President and Chief 
  Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

    Question 1. What is the Keystone Line's current ridership as of 9/
24/20 and do you believe projected passenger demand warrants full 
service?
    Answer. Actual Keystone ridership in the first eleven months of FY 
2020 was 761,987, with a forecast September ridership of 19,586, for a 
projected total FY 2020 ridership of 781,573. (Please note that service 
was entirely suspended for more than two months earlier in the year as 
a result of the ongoing pandemic; service between Philadelphia and New 
York City remains reduced.)
    As one of Amtrak's state supported services, the Keystone is 
supported by funding from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; 
accordingly, service levels reflect the Commonwealth's wishes. Amtrak 
is committed to continuing to work with all its state partners to 
provide the level of service they wish to see.

    Question 2. How does Amtrak's CY2020 revenue from the Keystone line 
compare to this time last year?
    Answer. In January and February Keystone revenue in CY 2020 was up 
year-over-year, in keeping with the performance of many other routes. 
Because of the pandemic, revenue in subsequent months has lagged FY 
2019 levels.
    Actual Keystone ticket revenue in the first eight months of CY 2020 
was roughly $10.2 million, with a forecast September ticket revenue of 
roughly $564,000. Keystone ticket revenue in the first eight months of 
CY 2019 was roughly $31.4 million, and September 2019 ticket revenue 
was roughly $4.0 million. The CY 2020 figures reflect the suspension of 
Keystone service for more than two months, as well as reductions in 
service.

    Question 3. How does Amtrak's capital investment over the past 5 
years in the Keystone line compare to the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's investment in the line over the same timeframe?
    Answer. Capital expenditures for Fiscal Years 2016 through 2020 by 
Amtrak, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and SEPTA on Keystone Line 
infrastructure and Keystone Line stations served by Amtrak were 
approximately:

 Amtrak................................            $99.7 million
 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania..........            $66.1 million
 SEPTA.................................            $43.0 million
                                                ------------------------
   Total...............................           $208.8 million
 


    The figures for Pennsylvania and SEPTA reflect the amounts they 
provided to Amtrak (including any unpaid billings) or reported; Fiscal 
Year 2020 expenditures are pre-audit. The SEPTA figures reflect 
investments on the portion of the Keystone Line between Philadelphia 
and Thorndale predominantly used by SEPTA trains and passengers; they 
include funding provided to SEPTA by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and the Federal Transit Administration.

    Question 4. As of 9/24/2020 what percentage of Amtrak stations 
along the Keystone line are ADA compliant?
    Answer. Amtrak is solely responsible for ADA compliance at two of 
the 11 stations on the Harrisburg Line (Parkesburg and Middletown) and 
shares ADA responsibility with other entities at six stations (Paoli, 
Coatesville, Lancaster, Mount Joy, Elizabethtown, and Harrisburg). Of 
those eight stations:
      two are fully compliant (Paoli and Mount Joy);
      four are not fully compliant, but platforms and trains 
can be accessed by passengers using wheelchairs (Lancaster, 
Elizabethtown, Middletown, and Harrisburg); and
      two are not compliant (Coatesville and Parkesburg).

    SEPTA is responsible for ADA compliance at three stations used 
predominantly by SEPTA trains and passengers. Of these stations, Exton 
is compliant and construction of investments at Ardmore and design of 
investments at Downingtown to bring these stations into compliance are 
underway.
    Of the six stations that are not fully ADA-compliant for which 
Amtrak has or shares ADA responsibility:
      the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation is 
progressing projects to replace the Middletown and Coatesville stations 
with new, fully ADA-compliant stations; and
      design or construction of improvements to bring three 
other stations (Parkesburg, Lancaster, and Harrisburg) into full 
compliance is underway.

    Amtrak expects that all components of Amtrak-served stations on the 
Keystone Line for which we have ADA responsibility will be fully ADA 
compliant by 2026. In recent years, Amtrak's expenditures on ADA 
compliance have exceeded the amounts that Congress has directed us to 
spend. We remain committed to working with Congress, and with the 
commuter railroads, states, municipalities, and other entities that 
have or share ADA compliance responsibility at the majority of our 
stations, to achieve full compliance at all stations.

        Question 4a) What percentage of those completed upgrade 
        projects were paid for by Amtrak compared to the Commonwealth 
        of Pennsylvania or other entities?
    Answer. The following are the approximate expenditures since 2009 
for completed ADA compliance projects at the 11 Keystone Line stations:

 Amtrak................................            $23.6 million
 SEPTA.................................            $57.0 million
 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania..........            $59.0 million
                                                ------------------------
   Total...............................           $139.6 million
 


    The figures for Pennsylvania and SEPTA reflect the amounts they 
provided to Amtrak (including any unpaid billings) or reported; Fiscal 
Year 2020 expenditures are pre-audit. The SEPTA figures reflect 
expenditures at the Paoli and Exton stations predominantly used by 
SEPTA trains and passengers; they include funding provided to SEPTA by 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Federal Transit 
Administration. The Amtrak figures do not include the $11 million 
Amtrak has spent on completed ADA compliance projects at William H. 
Gray III 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, which is served by 
Keystone Service trains but is not located on the Keystone Line.

    Question 5. Do all Amtrak revenues generated on the Keystone Line 
aside of ticket sales, including fees generated from other rail line 
utilizers get reinvested back into Keystone line?
    Answer. Sec. 209 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement 
Act defines ``Keystone Line'' as the segment between Philadelphia and 
Harrisburg; the Keystone segment between Philadelphia and New York is 
treated as part of the NEC, and revenues generated along that segment 
of track are credited accordingly.
    The revenues generated from travel between Philadelphia and 
Harrisburg are credited against the operating costs that Pennsylvania 
is responsible for under the Sec. 209 formula. Those revenues are not 
specifically segregated and used for investments, but they are used to 
offset the state's obligation, for operating purposes.
    SEPTA access charges are assessed and allocated based on the PRIIA 
Sec. 212 formula; revenue based on real estate that Amtrak owns (i.e., 
from retail leasing in William H. Gray III 30th Street Station) is 
handled separately, along with an allocation of costs that support that 
revenue.

 Questions from Hon. Scott Perry to William Flynn, President and Chief 
  Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

    Question 1. In response to my question about the questionable 
accounting practices at Amtrak, you stated:

        ``So, the largest difference between adjusted operating income 
        and GAAP is the exclusion of EBITDA for discussion purposes.

        Many companies, across varied industries, often talk in terms 
        of EBITDA, or some form of adjusted operating income to provide 
        investors, if we're talking about a publicly traded company, to 
        provide investors with as accurate a view of the core operating 
        results of the company. But GAAP, of course, is the bottom line 
        and we report on that.

        The biggest number is depreciation which largely addresses the 
        catch up in investing that the company is doing in fleet and 
        other infrastructure. That hasn't been done for many, many 
        years.''

    According to the Congressional Research Service, Amtrak changed its 
definition of ``total expenses'' to exclude depreciation and other 
items in 2017--not ``many, many years'' ago.\1\
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    \1\ See ``Table I. Amtrak Revenues, Expenses, and Federal Support, 
FY2015-FY2019, Notes.'' Page 5. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45942.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Can you please provide me with Amtrak's justification for why they 
chose to make such a definition change in 2017?
    Answer. In Amtrak's audited consolidated financial statements,\21\ 
the definition has not changed: ``depreciation and amortization'' is 
included within ``total expenses'' for FY 2014 through FY 2019 (i.e., 
all years for which the statements are posted), as it will be in the FY 
2020 statement.
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    \21\ https://www.amtrak.com/reports-documents
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    The CRS figures for Amtrak's ``total expenses'' in the linked 
report agree with Amtrak's own reported total expenses for FY 2015 and 
FY 2016; note that their figures in FY 2017 through FY 2019 are 
actually lower, not higher, than Amtrak's reported totals. It is 
possible that the cited note is referring to a change Amtrak made in 
its monthly performance reports. During FY 2018, we began reporting 
adjusted operating results in those documents, specifically, to be more 
consistent with how management views financial data and in an effort to 
make sure various reports were consistent.

    Question 2. Along those same lines, in response to my question 
about the difference between FY19 operating expenses and the FY21 
request:

        ``Well, I think the expense there is the total expense on a 
        GAAP basis. And so, there's hundreds of millions of dollars of 
        depreciation in that number.''

    As the Congressional Research Service clearly indicates, the FY19 
total operating expenses cited do not include depreciation.
    According to your opening statement,

        ``Therefore, as explained this summer, we are implementing our 
        plans to adjust our service and workforce levels, beginning in 
        October. As difficult as these actions are, if we do not take 
        such cost saving measures and fail to receive supplemental 
        funding, we anticipate burning nearly $250 million, each month. 
        At this rate of loss, we would be forced to take drastic 
        measures with long lasting impacts on the company, on our 
        employees, and on our network.''

    Assuming you reach the anticipated burn rate for each of the 12 
months for FY21, the annual burn rate would be $3 billion without 
adjusting service or workforce levels. This seems to contradict your 
answer that the $4.9 billion is necessary if

        ``Congress so directs that we do not furlough employees'' and 
        ``operating expenses for the long-distance network, if we're 
        directed to operate a seven-day service.''

    Can you please explain why the request exceeds the annual burn rate 
by $1.9 billion and why it exceeds the ``total expenses'' reported by 
Amtrak from FY19 by more than $700 million?
    Answer. The $250 million ``burn rate'' figure to which I referred 
assumes that Amtrak does receive its requested level of base funding 
($2.040 billion) but does not receive its requested level of 
supplemental funding (an additional $2.817 billion). The requested 
level of supplemental funding works out to roughly $235 million per 
month--somewhat less than the burn rate we discussed.
    Amtrak's $4.857 billion combined FY 2021 request (base + 
supplemental) for Amtrak and its state partners exceeds Amtrak's FY 
2019 total expenses ($4.397 billion, as reported in our publicly 
available audited consolidated financial statements) \22\ primarily 
because it includes roughly $500 million to replace payments that our 
cash-strapped Sec. 209 and Sec. 212 partners would otherwise need to 
make for the state supported service we provide, and for use of the 
NEC. Note that $500 million exceeds the difference between these two 
figures.
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    \22\ https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/
public/
documents/corporate/financial/Amtrak-Audited-Consolidated-Financial-
Statements-FY2019.pdf

    Question 3. I understand that some of the $4.9 billion comes due to 
lost passenger revenue and state subsidies.
    Does Amtrak expect passenger revenue and state subsidies to 
increase during FY21 as the economy reopens or are they projected to 
remain flat and what impact will that have on future viability/need for 
additional federal funds moving forward?
    Answer. We expect a gradual increase in ridership and passenger 
revenue as the fiscal year progresses, with ticket revenues remaining 
near current, COVID-affected levels through February, followed by 
gradual upticks beginning in March; we estimate that we could achieve 
close to 50% of pre-COVID levels by the end of FY 2021. Under such a 
scenario, total state subsidies would double their normal levels, from 
roughly $235 million to roughly $470 million (absent CARES-style 
assistance). However, these expectations entail a great deal of 
uncertainty, and reflect assumptions about conditions over which Amtrak 
has no control (e.g., progress towards development and widespread 
distribution of a vaccine for COVID-19).

    Question 4. Further, the request for $4.9 billion seems to exceed 
Amtrak's transportation footprint--Amtrak carries less one tenth of one 
percent of National passenger travel. It also raises significant 
fairness questions about providing additional subsidies exceeding 
Amtrak's total expenses from FY19 when Congress has yet to provide any 
assistance to direct, private competitors of Amtrak. The Motor Coach 
Industry carries more than ten times as many passenger miles as Amtrak 
does and they have been devastated by the COVID-19 pandemic, yet they 
are expected to subsidize their competitors while they suffer.
    How can the $4.9 billion request be justified in light of Amtrak's 
small footprint and the lack of funding for its direct competitors?
    Answer. The level of emergency financial aid Congress provides to 
Amtrak does not, and did not, constrain Congress from providing 
emergency funding to other modes of transportation. The $50 billion in 
federal funding Congress provided to the airline industry, which 
competes with Amtrak, in the CARES Act dwarfs the approximately $1 
billion that Amtrak received. While the CARES Act did not provide 
direct funding to the motor coach industry (the vast majority of whose 
ridership is attributable to charter and commuter passengers for whom 
Amtrak does not compete), it provided over $2 billion for the Federal 
Transit Administration's Section 5311 program that can be used for 
rural intercity bus service, and most motorcoach companies are small 
businesses eligible for Payroll Protection Program funding. 
Nonetheless, because Amtrak has partnerships and contractual 
relationships with hundreds of motor coach companies throughout the 
country that provide connecting Thruway bus service for Amtrak 
passengers to communities we do not directly serve and substitute 
service during Amtrak disruptions, we share the concern about the 
impact of COVID-19 on the motor coach industry.
    Of Amtrak's $4.857 billion FY 2021 funding request, $2.040 billion 
is simply our base annual funding request--effectively a continuation 
of pre-pandemic funding levels. We are requesting an additional $2.817 
billion for Amtrak and its state partners in response to unprecedented 
effects of the ongoing pandemic, which has caused a massive and 
sustained reduction in ticket revenue that will likely continue for 
many months. (Included in this amount is the $546 million that would be 
required if Congress determines that Amtrak should not furlough any 
employees and should continue to operate pre-COVID-19 service frequency 
on all long distance routes.) Without this additional funding, Amtrak 
will need to defer numerous capital projects and procurements critical 
to our future; we are advised by our state partners that many of them 
may be forced to cancel corridor train service, which could prove very 
difficult to restore; and perhaps 2,400 corresponding additional jobs 
(linked to the aforementioned capital projects and state supported 
service) could be at risk.

    Question 5. Finally, you offered to meet with me and my office to 
go through these issues in further depth.
    Can you please have your staff arrange such a briefing with my 
Legislative Director?
    Answer. We are always available to meet with you and your staff; 
our Government Affairs team will work to schedule a meeting.

Questions from Hon. Garret Graves to William Flynn, President and Chief 
  Executive Officer, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

    Question 1. Amtrak often treats the long distance routes like they 
are isolated, land-based cruise ship routes. But thousands of riders 
make connections between long-distance trains and other service, 
including state-supported routes, commuter lines, Northeast Corridor 
services, Amtrak's connecting bus services and a host of other 
transportation options.
    On the Gulf Coast, our New Orleans to Mobile route will connect 
with three of Amtrak's long-distance services in New Orleans, and this 
connectivity played a significant role in applications for CRISI and 
REG grants from the FRA. In awarding grants to the project, the FRA 
recognized that the ability to connect with multiple long-distance 
services at New Orleans made the project more viable.
    Amtrak's decision to cut back nearly all long-distance services 
jeopardizes the viability of services like those which are being 
actively rebuilt in the Gulf States. Decreases in long-distance routes 
will threaten the future of the Mobile-New Orleans route and future 
phases of the project, leaving local stakeholders feeling like there 
isn't a future for passenger rail in our region.
    How can Amtrak better coordinate with the FRA to ensure that 
federal dollars toward infrastructure improvement projects with non-
Amtrak passenger rail components are not wasted?
    Answer. Amtrak already works in close coordination with FRA to 
ensure that federal funding for rail infrastructure investments--both 
for existing or planned Amtrak services such as restoration of New 
Orleans-Mobile service, and for projects that have non-Amtrak 
components but will benefit Amtrak--is spent on projects that will make 
the best use of federal dollars. As a member of the Gulf Coast Working 
Group chaired by FRA, Amtrak has worked with FRA, the Southern Rail 
Commission (SRC) and other stakeholders for nearly five years to 
identify the optimal infrastructure investments to facilitate 
restoration and reliable operation of Amtrak service between New 
Orleans and Mobile. We have also worked with SRC and other Gulf Coast 
stakeholders on successful applications to FRA for federal funding, for 
which Amtrak has agreed to contribute funding to the required non-
federal match. In addition to working with FRA on projects that 
directly benefit Amtrak services, we regularly advise FRA of 
applications for federal rail funding grants by states, commuter and 
freight railroads that we support because we believe they would provide 
an indirect benefit to passenger rail.
    We are very cognizant of the importance of facilitating 
connectivity between planned state supported routes like New Orleans-
Mobile and our long distance network. The many benefits that will be 
realized from the investments that the federal government, and Amtrak, 
states and local governments, have made or committed to make to restore 
New Orleans-Mobile service will not in any way be affected by the 
temporary reductions in service frequency Amtrak is making on two of 
the three long distance routes with which that service will connect in 
New Orleans. As I stated in my testimony, Amtrak plans to restore daily 
service on all the routes on which service frequency is being reduced 
due to dramatic reductions in passenger demand attributable to COVID-19 
once ridership demand returns. We hope that progress in addressing 
COVID-19, and resulting increases in ridership, will result in 
restoration service by June of 2021, in accord with the criteria for 
service restoration I described in my testimony.
    The reality is that the delay in reintroducing New Orleans-Mobile 
service, and the greatest threat to the service going forward, has not 
been due to Amtrak, but rather action or lack thereof by the service's 
host railroads. In early 2016, Amtrak operated a very well received 
demonstration train along the proposed route. The enthusiasm of the 
crowds of people across the region who turned out to show support for 
the service reflected Amtrak's own enthusiasm for the new service and 
was representative of our commitment to the endeavor. However, the 
return of service to the Gulf Coast has been delayed by a lack of 
cooperation from the freight host railroads. CSX initially demanded $2 
billion in capital investment to restore service consisting of just two 
daily Amtrak trains. In contrast, the Congressionally directed Gulf 
Coast Working Group concluded in a report issued July 2017 that $117.67 
million in capital investment would be needed.\23\ We are currently 
progressing another study with the host railroads and continue to 
advocate for a fair and expeditious process to return Amtrak service to 
the Gulf Coast region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/
17156/2017-07-17_Gulf%20Coast%20
Working%20Group%20Report%20to%20Congress%20%28Main%20Section%29-
%20Final.pdf

    Question 2. Last week, Long-Distance trains provided 30 percent all 
bookings, and 55 percent of all revenue to Amtrak. More revenue than 
State-Supported and Northeast Corridor services combined. In addition, 
Long-Distance services have gained riders and revenue every month since 
April.
    How can Amtrak justify the decision to cut a service that is 
outperforming its other service sectors and has shown consistent 
improvement?
    Answer. Roughly seven months since the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, ridership and revenues on long distance routes (other than 
the Auto Train) are still two-thirds below FY 2019 levels and showing 
no indications of significant improvement as we enter the fall/winter 
period when monthly long distance ridership normally decreases by up to 
40%. As a result, every long distance train we operate is incurring 
large, increasing and unsustainable cash losses, while carrying few 
passengers.
    While reductions in long distance ridership and revenues since the 
onset of COVID-19 have not been have as large as the reductions on our 
state supported and Northeast Corridor services, a major reason for 
this is that we have continued to operate pre-COVID service frequency 
on most long distance routes while significantly reducing, and in some 
cases suspending, service frequency on virtually all other routes.

    Question 3. As the Rail Passenger Association pointed out in their 
testimony, losses to local economies from Long-Distance service cuts at 
over $2.3 billion nationally, including $179 million on the trains 
serving Louisiana alone. Today, do you understand the economic impact 
of focusing service cuts on less urban parts of the country?
    Answer. During the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
virtually all the service reductions Amtrak made were on Northeast 
Corridor and state supported routes that predominantly serve more 
urbanized regions. While service frequency on both the Northeast 
Corridor and our state supported route network was reduced by over 50%, 
and some state supported routes were suspended entirely at the request 
of state partners, the only reduction in long distance service 
frequency was the consolidation of our two daily New York-Miami trains 
into a daily service in early July.
    While we have endeavored to maintain service frequency on long 
distance routes, we must operate within our financial means and use our 
taxpayer-provided resources as efficiently as possible. As of this 
writing, we have not received any additional funding for Fiscal Year 
2021 to make up for the massive decreases in revenues we are 
experiencing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. If Congress provides 
sufficient additional funding, it would be possible to avoid or reverse 
long distance service reductions.
    Amtrak understands that long distance trains deliver significant 
economic benefits to the communities and states that they serve. 
However, most of the economic benefits attributable to Amtrak's 
services, such as the passengers' expenditures on hotels, restaurant 
meals and entertainment and recreation at the destinations to which 
they travel, are driven by the number of passengers traveling. When 
ridership declines by two-thirds, as is the case on our long distance 
routes, there is a proportionate decrease in these expenditures, even 
if passengers engage in normal activities at their destination.
                               Appendix A

                     as referenced in question A.2

Pure Running Time and Total Scheduled Time by Train
All times provided in hours:minutes:seconds format. Days of operation 
reflect pre-pandemic operations.

                                                                          Acela
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2100..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:52:00    02:28:36
2103..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    222.10    02:55:00    02:28:54
2104..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:49:00    02:28:36
2107..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    222.10    02:53:00    02:27:36
2109..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:53:00    02:25:36
2110..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:50:00    02:28:36
2117..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:52:00    02:24:12
2119..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:55:00    02:26:00
2121..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:51:00    02:26:00
2122..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:50:00    02:28:30
2124..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:49:00    02:28:30
2126..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:52:00    02:30:12
2128..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:50:00    02:28:30
2150..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    06:41:00    05:32:42
2151..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.56    06:46:00    05:40:42
2153..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:49:00    05:35:48
2154..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    06:45:00    05:34:48
2155..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.46    06:40:00    05:34:12
2155..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:40:00    05:34:36
2158..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    06:56:00    05:34:42
2159..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:46:00    05:35:48
2160..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:56:00    05:37:48
2163..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:51:00    05:35:48
2164..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.06    06:46:00    05:37:18
2165..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:48:00    05:35:48
2166..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    456.96    06:40:00    05:36:36
2167..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:51:00    05:35:48
2167..................................  Thu......................  Boston--South Sta........  New York................    231.66    03:45:00    03:09:48
2168..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:50:00    05:37:42
2168..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.26    03:49:00    03:09:12
2170..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:45:00    05:39:06
2171..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:46:00    05:35:48
2172..................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:48:00    05:39:54
2173..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:53:00    05:35:12
2173..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  New York................    231.66    03:45:00    03:09:48
2175..................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:39:00    05:34:24
2190..................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.46    03:48:00    03:07:42
2203..................................  Sat......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:58:00    02:27:30
2205..................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:59:00    02:26:54
2208..................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:51:00    02:30:36
2213..................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:59:00    02:27:30
2215..................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    02:54:00    02:27:30
2218..................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:00:00    02:30:36
2222..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:55:00    02:30:36
2224..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:55:00    02:30:36
2228..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    02:55:00    02:30:36
2248..................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    07:07:00    05:37:24
2249..................................  Sat......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:58:00    05:37:18
2250..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    07:03:00    05:38:00
2251..................................  Sat......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:53:00    05:37:18
2252..................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    07:17:00    05:39:48
2253..................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.56    06:54:00    05:40:18
2254..................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:53:00    05:39:48
2255..................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:59:00    05:37:18
2256..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:55:00    05:39:48
2257..................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:59:00    05:37:18
2258..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:51:00    05:39:48
2259..................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:54:00    05:37:18
2260..................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    06:51:00    05:39:48
2261..................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:54:00    05:37:18
2275..................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    06:50:00    05:36:06
2290..................................  Sat......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.46    03:48:00    03:06:12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Adirondack
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
68....................................  Daily....................  Montreal, QC.............  New York................    368.20    10:30:00    07:58:54
69....................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Montreal, QC............    368.81    10:55:00    07:50:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Auto Train
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52....................................  Daily....................  Sanford, FL..............  Lorton, Va..............    877.00    16:59:00    14:58:00
53....................................  Daily....................  Lorton, Va...............  Sanford, FL.............    877.00    16:58:00    14:47:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Blue Water
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
364...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Port Huron, MI..........    318.50    06:31:00    05:21:00
365...................................  Daily....................  Port Huron, MI...........  Chicago, IL.............    317.70    06:25:00    05:11:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                    California Zephyr
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Emeryville, CA..........   2525.62    52:10:00    43:40:00
6.....................................  Daily....................  Emeryville, CA...........  Chicago, IL.............   2520.32    51:40:00    43:34:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                    Capitol Corridor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
520...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:58:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
521...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
522...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:58:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
523...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
524...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
525...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
527...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:06:00    02:38:00
528...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:09:00    02:34:00
529...................................  M-F......................  Auburn, CA...............  Oakland, CA (Jack London    126.10    02:59:00    02:34:00
                                                                                               Square).
530...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:58:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
531...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland Coliseum, CA....     94.60    02:03:00    01:47:00
532...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
534...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:58:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
535...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland Coliseum, CA....     94.60    02:03:00    01:47:00
536...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Auburn, CA..............    126.10    02:57:00    02:26:00
                                                                    Square).
537...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
538...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:09:00    02:34:00
540...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:58:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
541...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    134.90    03:04:00    02:38:00
542...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
543...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:46:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
544...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    02:59:00    02:34:00
545...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.50    01:57:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
546...................................  M-F......................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
547...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:13:00    02:38:00
548...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    02:06:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
549...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:56:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
550...................................  M-F......................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.50    01:59:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
551...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.50    01:57:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
553...................................  M-F......................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.50    01:57:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
720...................................  SaSu.....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:56:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
723...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:02:00    02:38:00
724...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
727...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
728...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
729...................................  SaSu.....................  Auburn, CA...............  San Jose, CA............    171.50    04:05:00    03:33:00
732...................................  SaSu.....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    02:03:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
733...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:56:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
734...................................  SaSu.....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:56:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
736...................................  SaSu.....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:56:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
737...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
738...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:04:00    02:34:00
741...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:03:00    02:38:00
742...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Auburn, CA..............    171.60    04:01:00    03:22:00
743...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  San Jose, CA............    135.00    03:08:00    02:38:00
744...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:03:00    02:34:00
745...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:56:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
746...................................  SaSu.....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Sacramento, CA..........     89.60    01:56:00    01:38:00
                                                                    Square).
747...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:46:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
748...................................  SaSu.....................  San Jose, CA.............  Sacramento, CA..........    135.00    03:03:00    02:34:00
749...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:56:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
751...................................  SaSu.....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Oakland, CA (Jack London     89.60    01:56:00    01:39:00
                                                                                               Square).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Capitol Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29....................................  Daily....................  Washington Union Station.  Chicago, IL.............    813.50    17:40:00    14:41:00
30....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Washington Union Station    814.30    17:25:00    14:31:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Cardinal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50....................................  TuThSa...................  Chicago, IL..............  New York................   1152.70    23:59:00    22:40:18
51....................................  WeFrSu...................  New York.................  Chicago, IL.............   1152.70    24:00:00    22:37:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Carolinian
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
79....................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Charlotte, NC...........    718.10    13:30:00    10:25:24
79....................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Charlotte, NC...........    718.10    13:38:00    10:25:24
80....................................  MoTuWeSa.................  Charlotte, NC............  New York................    717.70    13:50:00    10:28:12
80....................................  ThFrSu...................  Charlotte, NC............  New York................    717.70    13:50:00    10:28:12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Cascades
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
500...................................  M-F......................  Eugene-Springfield, OR...  Seattle, WA.............    307.80    06:20:00    05:17:00
501...................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Portland, OR............    186.40    03:30:00    03:00:00
502...................................  SaSu.....................  Portland, OR.............  Seattle, WA.............    186.40    03:30:00    03:06:00
504...................................  M-F......................  Portland, OR.............  Seattle, WA.............    186.40    03:30:00    03:06:00
505...................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Eugene-Springfield, OR..    307.80    06:20:00    05:11:00
506...................................  SaSu.....................  Eugene-Springfield, OR...  Seattle, WA.............    307.80    06:30:00    05:17:00
507...................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Portland, OR............    186.40    03:30:00    03:00:00
508...................................  Daily....................  Eugene-Springfield, OR...  Seattle, WA.............    307.80    06:20:00    05:17:00
511...................................  M-F......................  Portland, OR.............  Eugene-Springfield, OR..    121.40    02:35:00    02:11:00
513...................................  SaSu.....................  Portland, OR.............  Eugene-Springfield, OR..    121.40    02:35:00    02:11:00
516...................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Vancouver, BC...........    156.00    04:00:00    03:29:00
517...................................  Daily....................  Vancouver, BC............  Portland, OR............    342.40    08:10:00    06:43:00
518...................................  Daily....................  Portland, OR.............  Vancouver, BC...........    342.40    08:00:00    06:35:00
519...................................  Daily....................  Vancouver, BC............  Seattle, WA.............    156.00    04:10:00    03:43:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                   City of New Orleans
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58....................................  Daily....................  New Orleans, LA..........  Chicago, IL.............    936.05    19:30:00    15:50:00
59....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  New Orleans, LA.........    936.05    19:27:00    15:40:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Coast Starlight
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11....................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Los Angeles, CA.........   1379.40    35:15:00    27:22:00
14....................................  Daily....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  Seattle, WA.............   1379.40    33:46:00    27:18:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Crescent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19....................................  Daily....................  New York.................  New Orleans, LA.........   1393.40    26:14:00    24:45:30
20....................................  Daily....................  New Orleans, LA..........  New York................   1393.30    26:46:00    24:43:18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Downeaster
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
680...................................  M-F......................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
681...................................  M-F......................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:00:00
682...................................  M-F......................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
683...................................  M-F......................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:00:00
684...................................  M-F......................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:04:30
685...................................  M-F......................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:15:00    03:00:00
686...................................  M-F......................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
687...................................  M-F......................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:25:00    03:02:00
688...................................  M-F......................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
689...................................  M-F......................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:10:00    03:00:00
690...................................  SaSu.....................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:15:00    03:03:30
691...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:00:00
692...................................  SaSu.....................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    144.16    03:20:00    03:05:00
693...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:00:00
694...................................  SaSu.....................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
695...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:00:00
696...................................  SaSu.....................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    145.06    03:20:00    03:03:30
697...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:20:00    03:01:00
698...................................  SaSu.....................  Brunswick, ME............  Boston (North Station)..    144.16    03:20:00    03:05:00
699...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston (North Station)...  Brunswick, ME...........    143.56    03:10:00    03:00:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Empire Builder
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27....................................  Daily....................  Spokane, WA..............  Portland, OR............    345.90    07:35:00    06:30:00
28....................................  Daily....................  Portland, OR.............  Spokane, WA.............    345.90    07:28:00    06:39:00
7.....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Seattle, WA.............   2135.01    46:10:00    38:00:00
8.....................................  Daily....................  Seattle, WA..............  Chicago, IL.............   2135.21    45:15:00    37:50:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Empire Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
230...................................  M-F......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    130.70    02:20:00    02:10:00
232...................................  M-F......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:23:00    02:11:00
233...................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:11:00
234...................................  M-F......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:25:00    02:11:00
235...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:11:00
236...................................  M-F......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:25:00    02:16:00
237...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:24:00    02:09:00
238...................................  Daily....................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:35:00    02:16:00
239...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:40:00    02:10:00
241...................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:11:00
242...................................  M-F......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:33:00    02:16:00
243...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    134.10    03:47:00    02:22:30
244...................................  Daily....................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:35:00    02:12:00
245...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:10:00
250...................................  Fri-Sun..................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.00    02:30:00    02:15:00
252...................................  FrSa.....................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.00    02:30:00    02:15:00
253...................................  Fri-Sun..................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:10:00
254...................................  Sun......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.00    02:35:00    02:11:00
255...................................  Fri......................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:10:00
256...................................  Sun......................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.00    02:35:00    02:15:00
259...................................  Fri-Sun..................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:10:00
260...................................  Fri-Sun..................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.00    02:30:00    02:15:00
261...................................  Fri-Sun..................  New York.................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    130.80    02:29:00    02:09:00
280...................................  Daily....................  Albany/Rensselaer, NY....  New York................    131.20    02:40:00    02:12:00
281...................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Niagara Falls, NY.......    448.50    08:50:00    07:18:00
283...................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Niagara Falls, NY.......    448.50    08:50:00    07:18:00
284...................................  Daily....................  Niagara Falls, NY........  New York................    446.90    08:58:00    07:22:00
288...................................  Sun......................  Niagara Falls, NY........  New York................    446.90    08:46:00    07:18:00
290...................................  M-F......................  Rutland, Vt..............  New York................    233.27    05:30:00    04:28:54
291...................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Rutland, Vt.............    232.88    05:31:00    04:29:00
292...................................  FrSa.....................  Rutland, Vt..............  New York................    233.07    05:30:00    04:27:54
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Heartland Flyer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
821...................................  Daily....................  Oklahoma City, OK........  Fort Worth, TX..........    205.10    04:02:00    03:28:00
822...................................  Daily....................  Fort Worth, TX...........  Oklahoma City, OK.......    205.10    04:02:00    03:28:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Hiawatha
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
329...................................  M-F......................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
330...................................  Mo-Sa....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:42:00    01:24:00
331...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
332...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
333...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
334...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
335...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
336...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
337...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
338...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
339...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:37:00    01:22:00
340...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
341...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
342...................................  Daily....................  Milwaukee, WI............  Chicago, IL.............     85.50    01:29:00    01:18:00
343...................................  Fri......................  Chicago, IL..............  Milwaukee, WI...........     85.50    01:29:00    01:19:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                      Illini/Saluki
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
390...................................  Daily....................  Carbondale, IL...........  Chicago, IL.............    313.75    05:30:00    04:42:00
391...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Carbondale, IL..........    313.75    05:30:00    04:38:00
392...................................  Daily....................  Carbondale, IL...........  Chicago, IL.............    313.75    05:30:00    04:42:00
393...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Carbondale, IL..........    313.75    05:30:00    04:38:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Keystone
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:31:00    02:38:42
601...................................  M-F......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:50:00    01:32:00
605...................................  M-F......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:55:00    01:32:00
607...................................  M-F......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:45:00    01:25:48
609...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:45:00    02:41:48
610...................................  Sat......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  Phila. 30th St..........    102.45    01:45:00    01:31:24
611...................................  Sat......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:50:00    01:32:00
612...................................  Sun......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  Phila. 30th St..........    102.45    01:50:00    01:31:24
615...................................  Sun......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:47:00    01:30:48
618...................................  Mo-Th....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  Phila. 30th St..........    102.55    01:40:00    01:30:18
619...................................  M-F......................  Phila. 30th St...........  Harrisburg, PA..........    104.25    01:51:00    01:32:00
620...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  Phila. 30th St..........    102.55    01:41:00    01:29:48
622...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  Phila. 30th St..........    102.55    01:41:00    01:29:48
637...................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Phila. 30th St..........     90.60    01:21:00    01:08:00
639...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Phila. 30th St..........     90.60    01:24:00    01:09:30
640...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:30:00    02:43:36
641...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:28:00    02:43:18
642...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:31:00    02:37:42
643...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:19:00    02:39:36
644...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:10:00    02:33:06
645...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:29:00    02:39:36
646...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:16:00    02:38:42
647...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:18:00    02:36:00
648...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:10:00    02:33:06
649...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:55:00    02:45:42
650...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:21:00    02:36:54
651...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:26:00    02:41:00
652...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:49:00    02:48:54
653...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:24:00    02:41:30
654...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:42:00    02:39:12
655...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:29:00    02:45:00
656...................................  M-F......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:28:00    02:39:42
658...................................  Fri......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.15    03:20:00    02:38:36
660...................................  SaSu.....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:29:00    02:43:12
661...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:19:00    02:41:00
662...................................  Sat......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:29:00    02:39:42
663...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:35:00    02:43:00
664...................................  SaSu.....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:19:00    02:37:42
665...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:29:00    02:40:48
666...................................  SaSu.....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:37:00    02:39:42
667...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:31:00    02:41:00
669...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:27:00    02:40:48
670...................................  SaSu.....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:27:00    02:39:42
671...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Harrisburg, PA..........    194.85    03:36:00    02:41:00
672...................................  SaSu.....................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:29:00    02:39:42
674...................................  Sun......................  Harrisburg, PA...........  New York................    193.05    03:29:00    02:39:42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                   Lake Shore Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
448...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Boston--South Sta.......    206.60    21:30:00    20:14:00
449...................................  Daily....................  Boston--South Sta........  Albany/Rensselaer, NY...    198.20    05:10:00    04:18:00
48....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  New York................    983.00    19:57:00    15:20:30
49....................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Chicago, IL.............    980.20    19:10:00    15:00:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Lincoln Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
300...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Chicago, IL.............    281.30    05:25:00    04:47:00
301...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  St. Louis, MO...........    281.30    05:20:00    04:34:00
302...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Chicago, IL.............    281.30    05:40:00    04:47:00
303...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  St. Louis, MO...........    281.30    05:35:00    04:46:00
304...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Chicago, IL.............    281.30    05:40:00    04:47:00
305...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  St. Louis, MO...........    281.30    05:30:00    04:46:00
306...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Chicago, IL.............    281.30    05:40:00    04:47:00
307...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  St. Louis, MO...........    281.30    05:30:00    04:46:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Maple Leaf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63....................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Toronto, ON.............    530.50    12:25:00    09:15:00
64....................................  Daily....................  Toronto, ON..............  New York................    529.10    13:35:00    09:14:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                  Missouri River Runner
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
311...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Kansas City, MO.........    279.10    05:40:00    05:00:00
313...................................  Daily....................  St. Louis, MO............  Kansas City, MO.........    279.10    05:40:00    05:00:00
314...................................  Daily....................  Kansas City, MO..........  St. Louis, MO...........    279.10    05:40:00    04:59:00
316...................................  Daily....................  Kansas City, MO..........  St. Louis, MO...........    279.10    05:40:00    04:59:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                   Northeast Regional
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
111...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:37:00    02:55:30
121...................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:24:00    02:45:30
122...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:16:00    02:53:24
123...................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:30:00    02:49:30
124...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:29:00    02:53:12
125...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Newport News............    413.30    08:44:00    06:08:30
126...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:20:00    02:50:42
127...................................  WeThFr...................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:24:00    02:40:36
129...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:26:00    02:48:36
130...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:30:00    02:53:12
131...................................  Sat......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:36:00    02:51:00
132...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    08:42:00    06:31:48
133...................................  Fri......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:21:00    02:41:06
134...................................  ThFr:....................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:23:00    02:47:24
135...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:57:00    06:18:24
136...................................  Fri......................  Washington Union Station.  Springfield MA..........    365.96    07:08:00    05:31:12
137...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    08:12:00    06:15:24
138...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:31:00    02:58:42
139...................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:50:00    06:15:36
140...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Springfield MA..........    365.96    07:29:00    05:27:42
141...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  Washington Union Station    365.86    07:13:00    05:26:00
141...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  Washington Union Station    365.86    07:23:00    05:26:00
141...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  Washington Union Station    365.86    07:18:00    05:26:00
143...................................  Sun......................  Springfield MA...........  Washington Union Station    365.86    07:21:00    05:29:00
145...................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Roanoke, VA.............    452.40    08:52:00    07:14:30
146...................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  Springfield MA..........    365.96    06:57:00    05:26:42
147...................................  Sat......................  Springfield MA...........  Roanoke, VA.............    593.16    12:58:00    09:57:30
148...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Springfield MA..........    365.16    07:25:00    05:31:12
149...................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    08:27:00    06:17:36
150...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    08:00:00    06:19:18
150...................................  Sat......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.46    04:14:00    03:29:36
151...................................  MoTu.....................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:26:00    02:46:30
152...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:37:00    02:52:12
153...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:27:00    02:48:30
154...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:26:00    02:53:12
155...................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:29:00    02:46:30
156...................................  SaSu.....................  Roanoke, VA..............  New York................    452.40    09:06:00    07:27:12
157...................................  Sun......................  Springfield MA...........  Norfolk, VA.............    586.63    12:38:00    09:10:00
158...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:35:00    02:58:12
159...................................  Sat......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:31:00    02:48:30
160...................................  Sun......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.46    04:17:00    03:26:12
160...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    07:53:00    06:17:30
161...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:53:00    06:17:54
162...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    08:02:00    06:22:00
163...................................  Sat......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:58:00    06:17:36
164...................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    08:07:00    06:32:18
164...................................  SaSu.....................  Richmond, VA.............  Boston--South Sta.......    566.96    10:47:00    08:21:18
165...................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    08:23:00    06:18:06
166...................................  Sun......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    07:52:00    06:22:00
167...................................  Sat......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    08:12:00    06:16:36
168...................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    08:01:00    06:23:48
169...................................  Sun......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:52:00    06:14:00
170...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    07:54:00    06:16:06
171...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Roanoke, VA.............    684.16    13:40:00    10:55:24
172...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    08:03:00    06:27:24
172...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    07:53:00    06:20:24
173...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:55:00    06:15:30
174...................................  M-F......................  Newport News.............  Boston--South Sta.......    645.86    13:10:00    09:43:24
175...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:56:00    06:14:36
176...................................  M-F......................  Roanoke, VA..............  Boston--South Sta.......    684.76    13:52:00    10:59:24
177...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    08:06:00    06:24:00
178...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    08:18:00    06:23:48
179...................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  New York................    231.66    04:09:00    03:26:54
180...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:14:00    02:49:24
181...................................  SuTuWeFr.................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:27:00    02:49:30
182...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:20:00    02:50:42
183...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:24:00    02:43:00
184...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:25:00    02:52:12
185...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:22:00    02:45:30
186...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:27:00    02:52:42
187...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:21:00    02:43:00
189...................................  [Sun.....................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:29:00    02:47:30
190...................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.56    07:54:00    06:16:24
190...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Boston--South Sta.......    232.46    04:13:00    03:26:12
192...................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:25:00    02:53:12
193...................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Washington Union Station    225.10    03:17:00    02:45:12
194...................................  Sat......................  Newport News.............  Boston--South Sta.......    645.76    12:48:00    09:40:24
195...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.56    07:52:00    06:15:42
195...................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Richmond, VA............    566.16    10:29:00    08:08:42
196...................................  Mo-Th....................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:25:00    02:54:42
198...................................  WeFr.....................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:26:00    02:50:42
82....................................  Sat......................  Richmond, VA.............  Boston--South Sta.......    566.96    10:51:00    08:15:54
82....................................  Sat......................  Washington Union Station.  New York................    225.10    03:26:00    02:53:42
84....................................  M-F......................  Norfolk, VA..............  New York................    445.77    08:18:00    06:38:42
84....................................  M-F......................  Norfolk, VA..............  New York................    445.77    08:15:00    06:35:12
85....................................  M-F......................  New York.................  Richmond, VA............    334.70    06:10:00    04:37:06
86....................................  M-F......................  Richmond, VA.............  Boston--South Sta.......    567.06    10:38:00    08:14:24
86....................................  Wed......................  Washington Union Station.  Boston--South Sta.......    457.36    07:58:00    06:17:24
87....................................  SaSu.....................  New York.................  Norfolk, VA.............    445.77    08:31:00    06:37:00
88....................................  SaSu.....................  Norfolk, VA..............  Boston--South Sta.......    678.03    13:25:00    10:05:54
93....................................  Mo-Th....................  Boston--South Sta........  Norfolk, VA.............    677.63    13:01:00    09:59:30
93....................................  [Fri.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Washington Union Station    456.76    07:48:00    06:15:30
94....................................  M-F......................  Norfolk, VA..............  Boston--South Sta.......    678.03    13:10:00    10:03:06
95....................................  M-F......................  Boston--South Sta........  Norfolk, VA.............    677.23    12:54:00    10:01:00
96....................................  Sun......................  Newport News.............  Boston--South Sta.......    645.76    13:37:00    09:40:24
99....................................  SaSu.....................  Boston--South Sta........  Newport News............    644.56    12:26:00    09:44:06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                    Pacific Surfliner
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1564..................................  SaSu.....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.60    02:56:00    02:20:00
1584..................................  SaSu.....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.40    02:59:00    02:20:00
1767..................................  SaSu.....................  San Diego, CA............  Goleta, CA..............    241.30    06:25:00    04:36:00
564...................................  M-F......................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.60    02:59:00    02:20:00
579...................................  Daily....................  San Diego, CA............  Los Angeles, CA.........    128.60    03:01:00    02:22:00
580...................................  Daily....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.60    02:52:00    02:20:00
584...................................  M-F......................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.40    02:54:00    02:20:00
593...................................  Daily....................  San Diego, CA............  Los Angeles, CA.........    128.60    02:59:00    02:22:00
763...................................  Daily....................  San Diego, CA............  Goleta, CA..............    241.30    06:01:00    04:36:00
767...................................  M-F......................  San Diego, CA G..........  oleta, CA...............    241.30    06:11:00    04:36:00
768...................................  Daily....................  Goleta, CA...............  San Diego, CA...........    241.30    06:15:00    04:42:00
774...................................  Daily....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  San Diego, CA...........    128.60    02:55:00    02:20:00
777...................................  Daily....................  San Diego, CA............  Goleta, CA..............    241.30    05:51:00    04:36:00
785...................................  Daily....................  San Diego, CA............  Los Angeles, CA.........    128.60    02:59:00    02:24:00
796...................................  Daily....................  Goleta, CA...............  San Diego, CA...........    241.30    06:27:00    04:35:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                      Pennsylvanian
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42....................................  Daily....................  Pittsburgh, PA...........  New York................    430.65    09:20:00    07:23:54
43....................................  Daily....................  New York.................  Pittsburgh, PA..........    432.35    09:08:00    07:17:18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                 Palmetto/Silver Service
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
89....................................  MoThSa...................  New York.................  Savannah, GA............    835.50    15:01:00    12:01:54
90....................................  WeFrSu...................  Savannah, GA.............  New York................    836.80    15:36:00    12:14:36
91....................................  Fri-Sun..................  New York.................  Miami, FL...............   1521.50    30:55:00    25:08:30
92....................................  ThFrSa...................  Miami, FL................  New York................   1520.00    31:00:00    25:02:48
97....................................  Mo-Th....................  New York.................  Miami, FL...............   1391.20    27:21:00    21:36:42
98....................................  SuMoTuWe.................  Miami, FL................  New York................   1391.20    26:50:00    21:26:30
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Pere Marquette
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
370...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Grand Rapids, MI........    176.83    04:04:00    03:45:00
371...................................  Daily....................  Grand Rapids, MI.........  Chicago, IL.............    176.03    04:08:00    03:45:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Piedmont
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
73....................................  Daily....................  Raleigh, NC..............  Charlotte, NC...........    183.10    03:10:00    02:48:00
74....................................  Daily....................  Charlotte, NC............  Raleigh, NC.............    182.70    03:11:00    02:49:00
75....................................  Daily....................  Raleigh, NC..............  Charlotte, NC...........    183.10    03:10:00    02:48:00
76....................................  Daily....................  Charlotte, NC............  Raleigh, NC.............    182.70    03:11:00    02:49:00
77....................................  Daily....................  Raleigh, NC..............  Charlotte, NC...........    183.10    03:10:00    02:48:00
78....................................  Daily....................  Charlotte, NC............  Raleigh, NC.............    182.70    03:11:00    02:49:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       San Joaquin
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
701...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Sacramento, CA..........    280.60    05:37:00    04:26:00
702...................................  Daily....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Bakersfield, CA.........    280.60    05:31:00    04:25:00
703...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Sacramento, CA..........    280.60    05:23:00    04:26:00
704...................................  Daily....................  Sacramento, CA...........  Bakersfield, CA.........    280.60    05:31:00    04:25:00
710...................................  Daily....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Bakersfield, CA.........    313.50    06:21:00    05:00:00
                                                                    Square).
711...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Oakland, CA (Jack London    313.50    06:15:00    05:01:00
                                                                                               Square).
712...................................  Daily....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Bakersfield, CA.........    313.40    06:21:00    05:00:00
                                                                    Square).
713...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Oakland, CA (Jack London    313.50    06:15:00    05:01:00
                                                                                               Square).
714...................................  Daily....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Bakersfield, CA.........    313.40    06:21:00    05:00:00
                                                                    Square).
715...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Oakland, CA (Jack London    313.50    06:15:00    05:01:00
                                                                                               Square).
716...................................  Daily....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Bakersfield, CA.........    313.50    06:21:00    05:00:00
                                                                    Square).
717...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Oakland, CA (Jack London    313.50    06:18:00    05:01:00
                                                                                               Square).
718...................................  Daily....................  Oakland, CA (Jack London   Bakersfield, CA.........    313.50    06:21:00    05:00:00
                                                                    Square).
719...................................  Daily....................  Bakersfield, CA..........  Oakland, CA (Jack London    313.50    06:17:00    05:01:00
                                                                                               Square).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Southwest Chief
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Los Angeles, CA.........   2321.50    43:10:00    36:32:00
4.....................................  Daily....................  Los Angeles, CA..........  Chicago, IL.............   2321.50    42:50:00    36:34:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                  Springfield Shuttles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
400...................................  SaSu.....................  Springfield MA...........  Greenfield..............     38.31    01:08:00    00:59:00
409...................................  Sun......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:22:00    01:14:36
417...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:23:00    01:14:36
450...................................  Sat......................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:23:00    01:16:06
460...................................  Sun......................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:23:00    01:16:06
461...................................  SaSu.....................  Greenfield...............  New Haven CT............    103.61    02:41:00    02:06:36
463...................................  Sat......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:22:00    01:14:36
464...................................  SaSu.....................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:24:00    01:16:06
465...................................  Sun......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:23:00    01:14:36
467...................................  Sat......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:22:00    01:14:36
470...................................  M-F......................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:23:00    01:16:06
471...................................  M-F......................  Greenfield...............  New Haven CT............    103.61    02:43:00    02:06:36
473...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:23:00    01:14:36
474...................................  M-F......................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:25:00    01:16:06
475...................................  M-F......................  Springfield MA...........  New Haven CT............     65.30    01:23:00    01:14:36
476...................................  M-F......................  New Haven CT.............  Springfield MA..........     65.10    01:23:00    01:16:06
478...................................  M-F......................  New Haven CT.............  Greenfield..............    103.41    02:43:00    02:14:36
488...................................  SaSu.....................  New Haven CT.............  Greenfield..............    103.41    02:53:00    02:15:06
494...................................  M-F......................  New Haven CT.............  Greenfield..............    103.41    02:48:00    02:14:36
495...................................  M-F......................  Greenfield...............  New Haven CT............    103.61    02:42:00    02:06:36
499...................................  SaSu.....................  Greenfield...............  Springfield MA..........     38.31    01:08:00    00:52:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                     Sunset Limited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.....................................  SuTuFr...................  New Orleans, LA..........  Los Angeles, CA.........   2004.40    46:35:00    34:59:00
2.....................................  WeFrSu...................  Los Angeles, CA..........  New Orleans, LA.........   2004.40    45:40:00    34:59:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                       Texas Eagle
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21....................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  San Antonio, TX.........   1307.30    32:10:00    24:22:00
22....................................  Daily....................  San Antonio, TX..........  Chicago, IL.............   1307.10    30:52:00    24:30:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Vermonter
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
54....................................  SaSu.....................  Washington Union Station.  St. Albans, VT..........    621.87    13:20:00    10:07:48
55....................................  M-F......................  St. Albans, VT...........  Washington Union Station    621.57    12:47:00    10:01:48
56....................................  M-F......................  Washington Union Station.  St. Albans, VT..........    621.07    12:40:00    10:00:18
57....................................  SaSu.....................  St. Albans, VT...........  Washington Union Station    621.57    13:13:00    10:08:06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                                                        Wolverine
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                 Pure
                                                                                                                          Total   Total Time    Running
                Train #                     Days of Operation                Origin                  Destination          Miles   (hh:mm:ss)     Time
                                                                                                                                              (hh:mm:ss)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
350...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Pontiac, MI.............    310.30    06:19:00    05:11:00
351...................................  Daily....................  Pontiac, MI..............  Chicago, IL.............    312.10    05:42:00    04:58:00
352...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Pontiac, MI.............    312.90    06:14:00    05:07:00
353...................................  Daily....................  Pontiac, MI..............  Chicago, IL.............    312.10    06:05:00    05:03:00
354...................................  Daily....................  Chicago, IL..............  Pontiac, MI.............    312.90    06:05:00    05:07:00
355...................................  Daily....................  Pontiac, MI..............  Chicago, IL.............    312.10    06:05:00    05:05:00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Appendix B

                     as referenced in question G.4
                     






    Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Arthur Maratea, National 
             President, Transportation Communications Union

    Question 1. Your testimony included an analysis that examined the 
financial result of Amtrak furloughing 3,190 employees for one year. 
However, Amtrak President Bill Flynn testified to the fact that Amtrak 
would instead be furloughing 2,000 employees. In light of this new 
information, please submit an amended version of your ``Amtrak savings 
and costs associated with furloughing employees'' spreadsheet that 
reflects the financial result of the updated employee furlough number.
    Answer. Thank you for your question regarding our analysis of the 
total cost of furloughs to Amtrak and taxpayers. Per your request, we 
have updated our analysis to calculate based on Amtrak's September 2nd, 
2020 announcement that it intends to furlough at least 2,000 employees 
on October 1st, 2020. Please see the updated savings and costs 
spreadsheet attached.

NOTE: The following is in response to Chairman Peter DeFazio's Question 
for the Record (QFR) for the September 9th, 2020 hearing ``Amtrak's 
Response to COVID-19'', before the House Railroads Subcommittee. This 
updated cost/savings analysis recalculates based on Amtrak's proposed 
furlough of 2,000 employees on Oct. 1st, 2020.

     Amtrak saving & costs associated w/furloughing 2,000 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Amtrak's Proposed Savings (via FY21 Supplemental)
                          Assumed base figures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY19 total employees (per Amtrak FY19 year-end                   18,600
 corporate profile):.................................
FY21 total expected employees (FY19 minus proposed               16,600
 workforce reductions)...............................
Proposed employee furloughs (Amtrak announced 2000                2,000
 furloughs on 9/2/2020)..............................
Average Amtrak salary:...............................           $87,847
  Amtrak's proposed total salary cost savings:.......      $175,694,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     TCU's calculated costs associated w/furloughing 2,000 employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lost H&W Contributions...............................        $5,472,000
RUI--Regular.........................................       $41,600,000
RUI--Expansion (+$600)...............................       $46,800,000
Est. increased RUIA Experience Rate taxes on Amtrak..       $28,785,906
VSIP costs...........................................        $7,360,000
Estimated increased Healthcare costs (from increased         $4,800,000
 utilization)........................................
Est. cost to retrain employees (based on rehiring           $19,366,400
 same number of ``proposed furloughs''):.............
                                                      ------------------
  Total Amtrak/taxpayer costs for fuloughing:........      $154,184,306
    ACTUAL net savings from furloughing 2,000               $21,509,694
     employees:......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Lost Health & Welfare (H&W) Contributions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             2,000
Monthly employee HC contribution:....................              $228
Monthly total employee HC contribution:..............          $456,000
  Annual total employee HC contributions.............        $5,472,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI) Costs--Regular
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             2,000
Weekly RUI (per employee):...........................              $400
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................          $800,000
  Total RUI expansion costs (52 weeks available):....       $41,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
            Railroad Unemployment Insurance (RUI)--Expansion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed employee furloughs..........................             2,000
Weekly RUI expansion (per employee):.................              $600
Weekly RUI Costs (total):............................        $1,200,000
  Total RUI expansion costs (39 weeks available):....       $46,800,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     RUI Employer Tax Increases \**\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak compensation base subject to RUI Experience         $298,000,000
 Rate taxes (only applies to first $20k in comp. per
 employee):..........................................
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate........................             3.28%
Est. 2022 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $9,774,400
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate........................             3.25%
Est. 2023 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $9,685,000
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate........................             1.74%
Est. 2024 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $5,185,200
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate........................             1.12%
Est. 2025 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........        $3,337,600
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate........................             0.27%
Est. 2026 RUI Experience Rate annual cost:...........          $803,706
                                                      ------------------
  Est. Experience Rate total cost as a direct result        $28,785,906
   of furloughs:.....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
226 management x $20k buyout.........................        $4,520,000
284 agreement x $10k buyout..........................        $2,840,000
                                                      ------------------
  Total VSIP cost:...................................        $7,360,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Increased Healthcare Costs (not including vision/dental)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furloughed Employees.................................             2,000
Amtrak healthcare costs, per employee, per month                 $2,500
 (avg)...............................................
Amtrak's monthly healthcare costs for furloughed             $5,000,000
 employees...........................................
Amtrak's annual healthcare costs for furloughed             $60,000,000
 employees...........................................
Est. percentage increase in healthcare costs due to                  8%
 increased utilization: \***\........................
  2021 premium increase in usage est.................        $4,800,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Amtrak's cost to train new hires (post-pandemic)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report: ``Amtrak spends between $40-45 million on           $42,500,000
 training each year'':...............................
Report: ``More than half spent on new employees''           $22,100,000
 (Extrapolation: multiply by 52%)...................
Report: ``Amtrak hired 1097 new employees over first              1,097
 6 months of 2009''..................................
Extrapolate annual new hires by multiplying x2)......              2194
2009 training costs per new hire (divide new hire               $10,073
 training costs / Est. 2009 total new hires) =.......
Adj. for inflation, expressed in 2020 $$.............           $12,104
New hires to retrain after pandemic: 80% of those                1,600
 furloughed don't return.............................
  Cost to train new hires after pandemic:............       $19,366,400
Source: Amtrak OIG report on Training and Employee Development (2009)
 https://amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/
 Training%20Eval%20Report%20Final.pdf...................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\**\ NOTE: RUIA taxes on employers expand and contract based on
  utilization of the RUI system. Part of the tax calculation is based on
  a railroad employers individual ``experience rating''--a calculation
  of how much they utilize RUI. This rate varies from the minimum of
  0.65% to a maximum 12% based on the employer's experience rating. The
  tax is also based on a 5 year average of the company's utilization of
  RUI, and is a measure of their usage versus their remaining
  compensation base. Furthermore, the application of the tax is capped
  at $20k per employee, lowering the taxable base. Our calculations are
  based on a 5-year impact to Amtrak's experience rate tax, derived from
  acquired knowledge of another large railroad that recently experienced
  similar furlough trends.
\***\ NOTE: Rail labor estimates that, on average, employees that retain
  their health insurance after being furloughed increase their
  utilization by 8% during their remaining covered period. This is based
  on previous experiences with groups of furloughed members. This is
  also backed up by a National Institute of Health (NIH) study that
  looked at the healthcare utilization of workers at plants where
  furloughs had been announced during the Great Recession (https://
  www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4874827/): ``In particular, it
  suggests an increase in overall utilization concerning for
  ``hoarding'' of health care or worsening health, but a relative
  decrease in outpatient care and increase in emergency care among those
  at high-layoff plants. The latter results confirm findings from the
  previous literature that suggest foregone preventive care among
  employed individuals during economic downturns with potentially
  negative long-term health consequences. This study suggests that the
  health and social impacts of increased job insecurity experienced by
  workers during the recent recession may still emerge even as the
  economy improves.''

Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Jim Mathews, President and Chief 
             Executive Officer, Rail Passengers Association

    Question 1. Your testimony included an analysis that examined the 
financial result of Amtrak reducing service on its long-distance routes 
to three times per week. Please submit any economic impact analyses 
that you have for individual states.
    Answer. As you know, the analysis we prepared for our September 9th 
testimony focused on six of Amtrak's existing 12 daily long-distance 
National Network routes. In response to your question, we performed 
additional analysis on the effects of three-times weekly service on 30 
served states. Please note, our state-level analyses on these issues 
address only the long-distance routes through a given state. We did not 
calculate the inevitable effects from cutbacks on state-supported 
business lines in those same states, nor did we account for connections 
between state-supported services and long-distance routes. As a result, 
we believe these numbers are more than conservative.
    Overall, Rail Passengers' analysis found that we can expect the 
long-distance service cuts to eliminate about 4.7 million annual 
riders, and that would drive a total annualized loss of at least $2.3 
billion to the economies of those states--a figure that is well beyond 
either any savings Amtrak might be able to claim from the service 
reductions, or the typical annual appropriation used to support the 
operation of these routes.
    This figure encompasses Direct effects, which includes factors such 
as visitor spending, avoided travel costs versus other modes, effects 
from reduced pollution and the effects of reduced vehicle-miles 
traveled per passenger on road maintenance and road fatalities and 
incidents.
    Our model also includes Indirect factors, such as the effects on 
sales tax collections, real-estate, and additional local employment.
    Our model is based on passenger-rail's quantifiable, observable 
role as an economic engine in the communities it serves. Most benefit-
cost models look only at factors such as number of riders, fares 
collected, direct operating expense and related areas. But the 
existence of Amtrak buoys the economies of hundreds of towns and cities 
all across America--in fact, we estimate that the long-distance 
National Network alone produces nearly $5 billion each year in economic 
benefits, plus another $2 billion in Amtrak spending nationwide. 
Degrading that service means withdrawing those benefits from millions 
of Americans, even those who don't necessarily ride the trains 
themselves, because in many cases lives and livelihoods depend on the 
routes' operation.
    Whether traveling for vacation, personal reasons or business, 
visitors spend money at their destinations, paying for hotels or other 
lodging, patronizing restaurants, shopping or buying local items. By 
doing this they support the hotel workers, the restaurant waiters and 
cooks, retail and entertainment outlets, and they generate sales tax 
revenues for the communities they visit.
    Those local workers in turn also contribute to the local tax base, 
further spreading the economic benefit. Meanwhile, because those 
visitors have left their cars behind, they're not imposing wear and 
tear on highways and roads, and they're avoiding the risk and cost of 
injuries or even death from car crashes.
    Cutting service drives down ridership and by doing so reduces these 
benefits.
    We have produced three tables which detail the results of this 
analysis for each of the 30 states considered. The first table is a 
summary ranking the economic losses by state. The second table ranks 
the states by ridership losses. The third table supplies the state-by-
state detail.
    Table 1_States Ranked By Economic Losses    Table 2_States Ranked 
By Ridership Losses

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.............  California.........  $519,800,803.......  1.............  Illinois..........  849,266
2.............  Illinois...........  $403,676,817.......  2.............  Florida...........  594,948
3.............  Florida............  $278,443,713.......  3.............  California........  541,797
4.............  Texas..............  $256,434,548.......  4.............  Virginia..........  326,367
5.............  Virginia...........  $142,177,506.......  5.............  Washington........  237,719
6.............  Washington.........  $106,826,168.......  6.............  Texas.............  196,283
7.............  North Carolina.....  $77,992,755........  7.............  Oregon............  181,963
8.............  Colorado...........  $72,644,114........  8.............  Colorado..........  177,588
9.............  South Carolina.....  $55,059,008........  9.............  Pennsylvania......  172,244
10............  Pennsylvania.......  $48,914,041........  10............  North Carolina....  160,275
11............  Oregon.............  $43,431,309........  11............  Missouri..........  120,454
12............  Montana............  $38,158,312........  12............  South Carolina....  117,683
13............  Georgia............  $34,306,923........  13............  Louisiana.........  115,995
14............  Missouri...........  $31,029,227........  14............  Georgia...........  93,132
15............  Wisconsin..........  $28,510,460........  15............  Minnesota.........  86,725
16............  Louisiana..........  $27,768,541........  16............  Mississippi.......  80,859
17............  Mississippi........  $24,193,548........  17............  Montana...........  79,746
18............  Minnesota..........  $22,801,058........  18............  Maryland..........  78,775
19............  New Mexico.........  $22,682,457........  19............  New Mexico........  76,746
20............  North Dakota.......  $18,774,381........  20............  North Dakota......  66,437
21............  Indiana............  $17,674,277........  21............  Arizona...........  65,451
22............  Arizona............  $16,450,744........  22............  Wisconsin.........  62,698
23............  Maryland...........  $15,557,269........  23............  Indiana...........  58,030
24............  Nebraska...........  $8,817,043.........  24............  Tennessee.........  42,616
25............  Kansas.............  $8,158,626.........  25............  Iowa..............  33,842
26............  Iowa...............  $7,115,380.........  26............  Alabama...........  33,642
27............  Alabama............  $5,974,693.........  27............  Nebraska..........  32,646
28............  Tennessee..........  $3,845,363.........  28............  Kansas............  30,546
29............  Delaware...........  $1,661,800.........  29............  Delaware..........  27,818
30............  Idaho..............  $383,258...........  30............  Idaho.............  4,420
                                    ---------------------                                    -------------------
                                     $2,339,264,141.....                                      4,746,712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                       Table 3--Detailed Analysis Results By State
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Estimated Economic Losses By State                                        Estimated Ridership Declines (annualized)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Indirect        Total State       FY2019      RPA-Modeled 3x    Annualized
                                                        Direct Losses  Effects\\      Impact         Ridership       Ridership    Ridership Loss
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama..............................................      $2,418,904        $3,555,789       $5,974,693          51,195          17,553          33,642
Arizona..............................................      $6,660,220        $9,790,524       $9,790,524          99,600          34,149          65,451
California...........................................    $210,445,669      $309,355,134     $519,800,803         824,473         282,676         541,797
Colorado.............................................     $29,410,573       $43,233,542      $72,644,114         270,242          92,654         177,588
Delaware.............................................        $672,794          $989,007       $1,661,800          42,332          14,514          27,818
Florida..............................................    $112,730,248      $165,713,465     $278,443,713         905,356         310,408         594,948
Georgia..............................................     $13,889,443       $20,417,481      $34,306,923         141,722          48,590          93,132
Idaho................................................        $155,165          $228,093         $383,258           6,726           2,306           4,420
Illinois.............................................    $163,431,910      $240,244,907     $403,676,817       1,292,361         443,095         849,266
Iowa.................................................      $2,880,721        $4,234,659       $7,115,380          51,499          17,657          33,842
Indiana..............................................      $7,155,578       $10,518,699      $17,674,277          88,307          30,277          58,030
Kansas...............................................      $3,303,087        $4,855,539       $8,158,626          46,483          15,937          30,546
Louisiana............................................     $11,242,324       $16,526,217      $27,768,541         176,514          60,519         115,995
Maryland.............................................      $6,298,489        $9,258,779      $15,557,269         119,875          41,100          78,775
Minnesota............................................      $9,231,198       $13,569,861      $22,801,058         131,973          45,248          86,725
Mississippi..........................................      $9,794,959       $14,398,590      $24,193,548         123,046          42,187          80,859
Missouri.............................................     $12,562,440       $18,466,787      $31,029,227         183,300          62,846         120,454
Montana..............................................     $15,448,709       $22,709,603      $38,158,312         121,352          41,606          79,746
Nebraska.............................................      $3,569,653        $5,247,390       $8,817,043          49,679          17,033          32,646
New Mexico...........................................      $9,183,181       $13,499,276      $22,682,457         116,788          40,042          76,746
North Carolina.......................................     $31,576,014       $46,416,741      $77,992,755         243,896          83,621         160,275
North Dakota.........................................     $7O,600,964       $11,173,417      $18,774,381         101,100          34,663          66,437
Oregon...............................................     $17,583,526       $25,847,783      $43,431,309         276,900          94,937         181,963
Pennsylvania.........................................     $19,803,256       $29,110,786      $48,914,041         262,110          89,866         172,244
South Carolina.......................................     $22,291,096       $32,767,911      $55,059,008         179,083          61,400         117,683
Tennessee............................................      $1,556,827        $2,288,536       $3,845,363          64,851          22,235          42,616
Texas................................................    $103,819,655      $152,614,893     $256,434,548         298,692         102,409         196,283
Washington...........................................     $43,249,461       $63,576,708     $106,826,168         361,747         124,028         237,719
Wisconsin............................................     $11,542,696       $16,967,763      $28,510,460          95,410          32,712          62,698
Virginia.............................................     $57,561,743       $84,615,762     $142,177,506         496,646         170,279         326,367
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: Rail Passengers Association modeling estimate
\\ Indirect effects include community-level effects such as sales taxes, real-estate, local employment and other similar factors