[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-95]
THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND IMPLICATIONS
OF THE PEACE PROCESS ON
U.S. INVOLVEMENT
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 20, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
42-876 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Emma Morrison, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 4
WITNESSES
Biddle, Dr. Stephen, Professor of International and Public
Affairs, Columbia University; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on
Foreign Relations.............................................. 8
Crocker, Hon. Ryan, Career Ambassador, Retired, U.S. Foreign
Service, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 5
Jones, Dr. Seth G., Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational
Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........ 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Biddle, Dr. Stephen.......................................... 62
Crocker, Hon. Ryan........................................... 51
Jones, Dr. Seth G............................................ 76
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Smith.................................................... 93
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 97
.
THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESS
ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Friday, November 20, 2020.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I call the committee to order.
We--our full committee hearing today is on the U.S.
military mission in Afghanistan and the implications of the
peace process on U.S. involvement.
We are doing this hearing both with some members present
and some members remote. We also have two of our witnesses that
will be remote. So we are--this is the first time we have been
back for a full committee meeting of the House Armed Services
Committee since the COVID [coronavirus] outbreak. So I urge all
of those of you participating and watching to be patient as we
make sure we work out the bugs and get everybody the chance to
say what they need to say, and run the committee in an orderly
fashion. Before we start, along those lines, I am going to read
the basic rules and outlines of how we are doing this
particular hearing.
I welcome the members who are joining today's markup
remotely. Those members are reminded that they must be visible
on screen within the software platform for the purposes of
identity verification when joining the proceeding, establishing
and maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
voting.
Members participating remotely must continue to use the
software platform's video function while attending the
proceedings unless they experience connectivity issues or other
technical problems that render the member unable to fully
participate on camera. If a member who is participating
remotely experiences technical difficulties, please contact the
committee staff for assistance and they will help you get
reconnected.
When recognized, video of remotely attending members'
participation will be broadcast in the room and via the
television/internet feeds. Members participating remotely are
asked to mute their microphone when they are not speaking.
Members participating remotely will be recognized normally for
asking questions, but if they want to speak at another time,
they must seek recognition verbally. In all cases, members are
reminded to unmute their microphone prior to speaking.
Members should be aware that there is a slight lag of a few
seconds between the time you start speaking and the camera shot
switching to you.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
the software platform video function on for the entirety of the
time they attend the proceeding. Those members may leave and
rejoin the proceeding. If members depart for a short period for
reasons other than joining a different proceeding, they should
leave the video function on. If members will be absent for a
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding,
they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin
it if they return.
Members are also advised that I have designated a committee
staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members'
microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may
disrupt the proceeding. Members may use the software platform
chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or
logistical support issues only.
Finally, remotely participating members should see a 5-
minute countdown clock on the software platform's display. But
if necessary, I will remind members when their time is up.
Yes, I was joking with staff before we got started here
this morning that doing these hearings now is a little like
trying to launch the space shuttle. It is not quite that bad,
but there is a lot more technical stuff involved than usual.
But the purpose of this hearing is both incredibly
important and very timely, and we are lucky to have three
outstanding witnesses with us today. The Honorable Ryan
Crocker, who will be appearing remotely, career ambassador,
retired, U.S. Foreign Service, nonresident senior fellow at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and among other
things, a former ambassador to Afghanistan. Dr. Stephen Biddle,
professor--also participating remotely--professor of
international and public affairs at Columbia University and an
adjunct senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations. And
here in person we have Dr. Seth Jones, who is the Harold Brown
Chair, director of Transnational Threats Project, and senior
advisor for the International Security Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
As mentioned, this is an incredibly important and very
timely topic. It is just about 19 years ago that we went into
Afghanistan, and at the time, we had a very clear mission.
Having just been attacked on 9/11 by Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaida out of Afghanistan, we went in there to make sure it
never happened again, to stop the threat and to contain it. And
I think that continues to be the top mission. We face a threat
from transnational terrorist groups. We can debate how large
that threat is, where exactly it comes from, and how best to
contain it, but it is not debatable that that threat is there.
It's also worth noting that for all the problems and
troubles and difficulties that we had, that mission has been
successful in one sense. We have not had a transnational
terrorist attack on the U.S. And when we think about all the
men and women who serve in the military, those who lost their
lives, those who were injured, those who have suffered because
of this, also all of the State Department personnel and all of
the aid workers who have been there, and all of our allies and
partners. Keep in mind, this is not just the United States of
America. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and a number
of other countries have participated in this mission.
And in that one key point, it has been successful and it
should not be taken for granted. But the question is, where do
we go from here? Because while that has been successful, there
has also been a great cost. As was just mentioned, in terms of
lives lost, people injured, and the sheer cost to the Nation,
and money as well.
So where do we go from here and how do we move forward? I
think it is important that we continue to maintain the mission
to stop transnational terrorist threats. But some of the other
costs associated with this is the fact that it is disruptive to
have foreign troops in a country. And as we look to contain the
terrorist threat and stop the spread of the toxic ideology that
fuels it, the presence of U.S. troops in foreign countries is
one of those things that we cannot deny fuels it.
And you can think of your--if you were in your own town,
wherever you live in America, and a foreign troop came rolling
through town telling you what you had to do, it would not make
you feel good about that foreign country. We would be in a
better place if we did not have to have our troops in foreign
countries. And I don't think we should ever forget that.
The other aspect of this mission that has made it difficult
is, in addition to preventing transnational terrorist threats,
that mission has morphed a little bit into trying to bring
peace and stability to Afghanistan. Now, there is a clear
reason for that in connection to the basic principle of
stopping transnational terrorist threats. We have learned that
ungoverned spaces, failed governments make it easier for these
terrorist groups to show up and take root.
And, certainly, South Asia is a place where there are a lot
of ideological extremists who could take advantage of that. So
one can argue, and many have, that if Afghanistan falls apart,
we will be right back where we were on 9/11. I don't think that
is necessarily as quick a guarantee as some argue.
I also believe that what we have learned in 19 years, is we
are not going to impose peace on Afghanistan. We are not--you
know, whether, however we are going to bring a coalition
together and try to build institutions and reduce corruption
and build confidence, outside forces are not going to bring
peace to Afghanistan. One way or the other, the people of
Afghanistan are going to have to make that choice.
And when we look at Afghanistan, I think we need to be very
humble about imagining that there is something that we can do
to make that different. We can help, certainly. We cannot
ultimately solve the problem, and we have to balance that
against all of the costs that I just laid out.
And it seems to me at this point that the commonsense thing
to do is to have the absolute minimum presence that we require
to meet our goal of stopping that transnational terrorist
threat. I happen to believe that we need to draw down there,
because of the cost, because of the impact, and because of the
fact that it has become clear that we are not going to be able
to impose peace upon Afghanistan.
There are a lot of different ways to contain troublesome
regions that could potentially pose transnational terrorist
threats. Regrettably, we have an enormous amount of experience
with doing just that. Whether you are talking about Libya or
Yemen or Somalia or, you know, several different countries in
West Africa, the disruptions that are present there, the
instability and the presence of violent extremist groups, in
some cases with transnational ambitions, has shown us that we
have to work very hard with local partners in a variety of
different ways to contain that threat. It doesn't require
thousands of U.S. troops.
And my hope today is that our witnesses can give us some
guidance as we go forward how best to contain the threat that
comes out of Afghanistan and South Asia, more broadly, while
minimizing the risk, cost, and expense, and also crucially
minimizing that disruptive effect that the presence of U.S.
troops on foreign soil has, that the propaganda that it hands
to our enemies to argue about what the U.S. is doing that
requires this ideological extremism. How do we balance all of
that?
And, again, this is timely because, you know, the President
has just made his announcement that he is drawing down to 2,500
troops in Afghanistan. It is absolutely crucial that we work
with our partners on whatever our plans are. But I think this
is a crucial moment as we decide what our future is in
Afghanistan.
Nobody wants to be there forever. Now, you know, people
have said, well, we can't have forever wars. And I personally
never liked that phrase, because a war that lasts one day that
was done for the wrong reasons and wasn't necessary is
completely and totally wrong. On the other hand, if you are
going to war, if you are fighting because you need to protect a
core interest, then it lasts as long as it lasts.
I never imagined myself one to quote Lindsey Graham, but
when he said, you may be tired of fighting ISIS [Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria], but ISIS is not tired of fighting you, I
think that is an important thing to think about as we try to
figure out how we contain these threats while minimizing the
risk and the cost and the impact of how we do that.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. With that, I
will turn it over to Ranking Member Thornberry for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I have to say it is good to be back in our Armed
Services Committee home. And because this may well be the last
hearing of this session of Congress, I want to take a moment
and just express appreciation to you and to the staff for the
way you have dealt with incredibly challenging circumstances
under COVID, and yet we have pressed ahead with hearings, we
pressed ahead with having our bill passed overwhelmingly on the
floor of the House, in conference now with the Senate. So our
business has continued in spite of the challenges. And that is
in no small measure a tribute to you and the staff dealing with
all the technical challenges that we face, and I appreciate it.
I agree with you that this is an incredibly important
topic. Rightfully, our national secur--our military and
national security apparatus is more focused on great power
competition, but the terrorist threat has not gone away. And so
it is one of the challenges of our time that we have to worry
about this wide range of threats.
The other thing I just want to emphasize, which you
mentioned, and I think we maybe don't say it enough, is that
when it comes to national security, it is really hard to prove
what did not happen. And in the case of Americans who have
fought, and some died, to prevent a repeat or worse of 9/11, I
think it is very important for those who participated and
family members who lost loved ones to know that it has been--
the last 19 years has seen far greater success than I ever
expected on September 11, 2001.
The idea that we would be this far removed--there have been
terrorist attacks against our homeland, but nothing on the
scale of 9/11. And we know from our classified briefings that
they were planned, attempted, and some far worse even than that
day.
So appropriate appreciation, as you say, to the military,
but also intelligence community, law enforcement, who have
helped prevent that is probably something we need to say and
recognize more often.
I think it is very important to have this hearing today. I
should say, by the way, that a hearing on Afghanistan has been
on our agenda for months, but it turns out that this is a very
timely hearing today. The goal all of us have is for the
Afghans to be able to handle their security issues on their own
so that no transnational threat emerges from that territory.
But I do not believe that they are there yet.
I have tremendous respect for each of our witnesses today
and look forward to hearing from them, what they see is the
state of the conflict today, what effect our unilateral
withdrawal in the midst of negotiations may have, and any
advice they have for the incoming Biden administration on how
to deal with the Afghan and broader situation in South Asia. So
I look forward to hearing from them and appreciate their
participation today.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Our first witness will be the Honorable Ryan Crocker who is
participating remotely. Ambassador Crocker, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN CROCKER, CAREER AMBASSADOR, RETIRED,
U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thornberry. Are you able to hear me?
The Chairman. Yes. We've got you loud and clear. Go ahead.
Ambassador Crocker. Excellent.
I would note that I come to you this morning from the great
State of Washington. It is about zero dark 30 out here, but I
am honored to be here.
The Chairman. I approve of that, and I wish I was there as
well.
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking
member have summarized, I think, very, very well the central
question that we as a nation are dealing with. Why are we in
Afghanistan after 19 years? It is pretty simple, pretty basic,
and pretty crucial: to ensure that nothing again ever comes out
of Afghanistan to strike us in our homeland. After two decades,
it is again very important to remind ourselves of that and to
remind ourselves of who we face out there.
After 9/11, the Taliban was given a choice. It could give
up the al-Qaida terrorists, who are enjoying a safe haven in
Afghanistan, and we would not take military action, or they
could stand back and suffer the consequences. They chose the
latter, Mr. Chairman, and have been in exile now for almost two
decades. Unfortunately, we are at a moment when the Taliban
sees the end of its exile and an opportunity to return to
control.
Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of opening our Embassy in
Afghanistan in the beginning of January 2002. What I saw there
was a scene of utter devastation, a shattered city, a destroyed
country. And as bad as the physical damage was, I was
immediately aware of the profound damage two decades of
conflict had done to the Afghan people, especially during the
period of Taliban rule to women and girls in Afghanistan. I
thought it important to move swiftly to try to repair the
damage to the human capital as well as the physical. So we
opened girls' schools right away.
Still in January of 2002, I had the privilege of hosting
the then-chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Joe Biden. I took him to visit a girls' school. We sat
in on a first grade class that had girls ranging from age 6 to
age 12. The 12-year-olds, of course, came of school age when
the Taliban took over the country.
So I saw a unique opportunity here. As this committee knows
so well, we often find a tension between our core national
values and our national security agenda. In Afghanistan, the
two came together: our values and our interests. It dictated
that we be present, that we ensure that the Taliban did not
return with its al-Qaida allies. And the best way to do that,
we felt, was developing that human capital.
So when I arrived in Afghanistan in 2002, there were about
900,000 students, all of them boys, in Afghan schools. I
returned as ambassador a decade later. And when I ended that
ambassadorial post, there were 8 million students, and around
35 percent of them were girls.
Over the long run, Mr. Chairman, it is the Afghan people,
as you rightly note, who have to make peace. Certainly an
educated population, and with girls and women playing the role
they deserve in this momentous decision is the best way to
secure--to ensure our own long-term security. It will take
strategic patience and it will take continued U.S. engagement.
The peace process, so-called, it was launched now almost 2
years ago, represented a very bad U.S. concession. We agreed to
a longstanding Taliban demand that we talk to them but not with
the Afghan Government in the room; they considered it a puppet
regime. So we gave in. And it underscored, I think, that this,
again, so-called peace process, that is not what this is about.
These are surrender talks. We are waving the white flag,
basically saying to the Taliban, you win, we lose, let's dress
this up as best we can. An eerie reminder of the Paris peace
talks on Vietnam. But I wouldn't push that parallel too hard
and too far.
In Vietnam, neither the Viet Cong nor the North Vietnamese
had attacked the homeland or ever considered such a step. Al-
Qaida did attack the homeland from Afghanistan, hosted by the
Taliban. They have not become kinder and gentler in the
intervening years. It is, I am afraid to say, folly to think
that a full U.S. troop withdrawal is somehow going to make us
safer or uphold our core values.
We have, as you point out, NATO in the mix. I think that is
very important. We have heard from the Secretary General of
NATO expressing his concern over the President's decision this
week to cut in half the already small number of troops we have
in Afghanistan.
So, again, I commend you for holding this hearing. I do
believe there is a way forward in Afghanistan that will
minimize our cost and our human losses, which has to be an
imperative. I will be part of a working group put together by
the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Atlantic Council to do
just that. But we have to show the strategic patience we need
to face down a determined enemy.
I would like to take just a moment on another special group
of individuals that have sacrificed a great deal for us, and
those are our interpreters and other Afghan individuals who
have helped our mission in that country.
Mr. Chairman, you recently received a letter from Senators
Shaheen and Wicker, asking that the necessary steps be taken to
grant 4,000 additional visas for these brave individuals and
their immediate families. There is a backlog of almost 18,000
cases. And, hey, these are individuals that are at enormously
serious risk. No One Left Behind, a group dedicated to bringing
our interpreters and others here to safety, calculates that
about 300 individuals, interpreters and their family members,
have been killed while waiting for the visas we promised them
and have delivered slowly and in disappointingly small numbers.
So I would urge this committee as it moves ahead to--to do
the right thing, the thing we promised, bring these brave
people here, bring them home. Their new home. We will never
regret having done so. If we fail in this endeavor, we will
have traduced, I think, our own core values. The nature of war
has changed. There is no more total war. We can be grateful.
Conflicts of the future are going to require interpreters, and
the world is watching to see how we handle this case.
So, again, I commend this committee for its support for the
Special Immigrant Visa program. I urge that you take the
necessary steps to see that these people are able to leave
danger behind and come here to us. They earned it. They paid
for it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker can be found
in the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Next, we have Dr. Stephen Biddle who is also coming to us
remotely. Dr. Biddle, you are recognized for your opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Biddle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity to
speak with you today about Afghanistan and the important
choices it faces there. I would also like to say that it is an
honor to be part of such an august panel, with two colleagues
that I have long respected and admired in Ryan Crocker and Seth
Jones.
Normally, I would have used my opening remarks to summarize
the key points from my written submission, but that submission
was written prior to Tuesday's announcement of the 50 percent
reduction in U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan.
In light of this new development, I thought I would take
the liberty to use my opening comments chiefly to respond to
the Tuesday announcement and to offer some thoughts on where
U.S. policy should go from here in light of it; though, of
course, I would be happy to respond to questions about my
submission or any other aspect of the issue as the members may
wish.
In my view, the drawdown policy announced Tuesday was a
mistake. I suspect like all of us here, I would like to see
U.S. troops come home. But the question is when and how. And it
seems to me that a progressive incremental withdrawal, in my
view, is the worst of three possible options before us: total
withdrawal, no withdrawal without a negotiated settlement to
end the war, and the announced policy of partial unilateral
drawdowns.
As I argued in my submission, I believe our interests are
best served by no further withdrawals without a settlement to
end the war. In my view, we should maintain our current troop
level chiefly for its political value as bargaining leverage in
the ongoing talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban
but that we should be prepared to withdraw those troops
entirely in exchange for negotiated concessions from the
Taliban precisely in order to increase our ability to get such
concessions from the negotiations.
This view is premised on my hope that a settlement,
although difficult, is achievable if we husband our remaining
leverage carefully. Inasmuch as our troop presence is a major
element of that leverage, in my own view, thus we should not
give this leverage away unrequited. That said, a reasonable
case can be made that the prognosis for a successful
negotiation is now so poor that this is fruitless. I disagree,
but this is a reasonable position. If so, however, the logical
implication would be total withdrawal.
Our current posture is vastly less expensive than it was
during the 2009 to 2011 surge, but it involves sacrifice all
the same. And as I argue in my written submission, our Afghan
allies cannot maintain the current military stalemate
indefinitely. Even if we maintain today's small U.S. presence
indefinitely, the battlefield situation on the ground in
Afghanistan is a slowly decaying military stalemate that the
Afghan Government will eventually lose unless today's
battlefield trends reverse and----
[Audio malfunction.]
The Chairman. Dr. Biddle, you went silent on us. I
apologize for that.
Dr. Biddle. Sorry.
The Chairman. You are back. It is not your fault.
Dr. Biddle. Some argue that I am better when silent. I
suspect the committee's purposes are better served by----
The Chairman. You are back. So go ahead.
Dr. Biddle. Very well.
The point I was making when I assume I went silent was that
in a slowly decaying military stalemate, if nothing changes, we
will eventually lose the war. This decay will eventually
produce the collapse of the allied position in the country. And
what that implies, then, if you accept that assessment, is that
in the long run, the plausible alternatives are either eventual
defeat or some kind of negotiated settlement before that
happens.
If a settlement really is impossible, then defeat is the
likely outcome, and we would then be better served to lose
cheaply via immediate total withdrawal than to lose more
expensively via a series of slower partial withdrawals that
simply prolong the process of failure and increase its cost.
Instead, what the administration announced on Tuesday is the
slower, more expensive version of failure.
Whatever one thinks of the prognosis for a successful
negotiation, it goes down every time we announce such partial
withdrawals. We have two chief remaining sources of leverage in
these talks: the promise of post-settlement aid and the foreign
troop presence. The Taliban want us out. This has been among
their most consistent and oft-expressed aims.
In a negotiation where we are radically leverage-poor,
troop withdrawal is thus a crucial bargaining chip. In fact,
this political role as a bargaining chip for negotiation is
now, in my view, the most important contribution U.S. forces
make to the war. Of course, this is not their only role. The
U.S. air strikes, in particular, are also important for
enabling our Afghan allies to maintain today's stalemate, but
our forces' political function as bargaining leverage in the
negotiation is, in my view, the most important contribution
they make.
When we gradually draw down that troop presence, we thus
reduce the leverage available from a now smaller troop
presence, diminishing our ability to negotiate relatively
favorable terms in the talks. And perhaps most importantly,
partial incremental drawdowns encourage the Taliban to freeze
the talks. Why should they offer concessions when the U.S.
keeps giving away what they want for free, step by step,
gradually over time?
And every time we reduce U.S. support for the Afghan
Security Forces, we create some chance that those security
forces might break under the strain of reduced support, which
gives the Taliban a further incentive to wait and see whether
their opposition on the battlefield might just melt away this
time.
And even if the Afghan Security Forces don't break
altogether, they will surely be weaker with less U.S. support,
enabling a faster expansion in Taliban territorial and
population control and moving the possible bargaining space in
the talks further in the Taliban's direction, reducing the
scale of concessions we could reasonably expect. All of this
tends to stall real bargaining while the Taliban await further,
potentially favorable developments created by our policy of
progressive incremental withdrawal.
Again, reasonable people can differ on the prognosis for
these talks. I still believe there is a potential bargaining
space for a negotiated settlement that would be much better for
us and for our Afghan allies who have sacrificed so much than
would be outright defeat. But I believe we just reduced that
bargaining space via our withdrawal announcement. And if we--
but if we suspend further drawdowns and retain the remaining
troops in theater pending a successful settlement, then perhaps
we can still get out of this with something better than simple
failure. But if one disagrees on this, the logical policy would
be total withdrawal, not difference-splitting partial drawdowns
that just make defeat slower and more expensive.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jones, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. SETH G. JONES, HAROLD BROWN CHAIR; DIRECTOR,
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT; AND SENIOR ADVISER,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee, both in
person and virtually, for the opportunity to testify before the
House Armed Services Committee on an important--actually, a
critically important subject, the U.S. military mission in
Afghanistan and implications of the peace process.
I am going to break my introductory remarks into four
sections. First, U.S. objectives, not just in Afghanistan, but
more broadly, and how they have evolved. Second is the state of
the peace settlement and discussions right now. Third is the
war and the Taliban itself. And, fourth, I will summarize with
some brief conclusions.
But let me just begin by noting, as others have noted,
including Dr. Biddle, that U.S. policy options at this point
two decades in are not optimal. They are suboptimal. We do not
have a range of good options. And I think it is worth noting
that.
My concern, though, is absent a peace deal, the further
withdrawal of U.S. forces will likely continue to shift the
balance of power on the ground, in the military campaign, in
favor of the Taliban, other militant groups including al-Qaida,
and the Taliban's outside supporters which include Pakistan,
Iran, Russia, and other countries, and outside actors. The
drawdown will have an impact on the U.S. ability to train,
advise, and assist Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
in the middle of the war against the Taliban, a group which we
should all remember is an extremist organization committed to
establishing an Islamic emirate in the country, and something
that I think we have got to grapple with, is that what we want
in the end, is that what we want to leave behind in
Afghanistan?
So let me begin with my first section on U.S. interests. I
think there is no question, as we have heard both from Chairman
Smith and Ranking Member Thornberry, the U.S. is in a different
position than it was in in 2001. There are other important
objectives overseas, including competition with a rising China
and aggressive Russia. There are also implications of COVID,
including economic ones.
The U.S. does, in my view, have some interests in
Afghanistan and South Asia, a region that I would remind
everyone has three of the U.S. major competitors. It has got
the Chinese on the border, it has got the Iranians on the
border, and it has the Russians very close by. And as we have,
I think, seen with news reports this year, they have--they
continue to have a relationship with the Taliban, including a
lethal relationship.
Al-Qaida continues to be active in Afghanistan. The numbers
are relatively small. But I would urge anybody that has not
seen it, there are a series of U.N. assessments, United Nations
assessments, including one this summer, which continued to note
that the Taliban retains close links with senior and lower
level al-Qaida leaders, particularly ones associated with al-
Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, al-Qaida's local affiliate.
As the report concluded: Relations between the Taliban--I am
quoting here--Relations between the Taliban, especially the
Haqqani Network and al-Qaida, remain close, based on
friendship, a history of shared struggle, ideological sympathy,
and intermarriage.
We also have--we have seen attacks and continue to see
activity from the Islamic State's local affiliate, the Islamic
State Khorasan Province.
I also think there are broader, strategic interests that
the U.S. has to be aware of, including regional balance of
power competition between the Indians and Pakistan, both of
which are nuclear-armed. And I do think we have to be mindful
of a potentially worsening humanitarian crisis if we were to
leave. Afghanistan has the second largest refugee population in
the world at the moment, at 2.5 million. A withdrawal at this
point would likely significantly worsen that prospect.
Let me just move very briefly to the peace talks. We have
already heard other witnesses remark along these lines. On
February 29, 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban, not the Taliban
and the Afghan Government, the U.S. and the Taliban signed
agreement intended to be a first step. Negotiations began on
September 15 of this year. But the peace process has stalled.
In fact, I would argue it has never really begun meaningfully.
So what we have right now is Taliban advances. Data right
now suggests that Taliban attacks are at the highest levels,
some of the highest levels of the war. This year, in 2020, they
continue to fight.
So let me just briefly conclude by noting that--and this
really goes back to the announcement this week. The U.S.
decision to go down to 2,500 troops did not occur because of
successful peace talks. In fact, it occurred in spite of them.
The U.S. did not coordinate--and I think this was a mistake--
meaningfully with NATO forces operating in the country. They
were alerted just before the announcement. And I think it is
worth noting that they stood with us on 9/11, committed to
Article 5 of NATO, and then sent forces after that. So we do
have other countries that have shed their blood in Afghanistan,
sent advisors, diplomats, and intelligence officers.
And then also, I think, a withdrawal has an impact on our
intelligence collection and other capabilities in Afghanistan,
particularly from CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and the
National Security Agency, as we withdraw forces. We will be
increasingly blind to what is happening in the country.
So moving forward, I think the U.S. goal should be to
continue to build political consensus in Afghanistan, to
support peace talks, and at least to prevent the overthrow of
the Afghan Government by the Taliban.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones can be found in the
Appendix on page 76.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
A couple of housekeeping items. We are going to have votes
here shortly. Now, one of the advantages of the COVID voting
thing is it is spread over an extended period of time. It is my
intention, with the ranking member's consensus, that we
continue the hearing and stagger when we go so that we can have
members here asking questions. I will need someone to sit in
for me when I go. We are going to keep going on that.
Second, as we get into the Q&A [question and answer], as we
discovered with remote people, it is really helpful if you
direct your questions towards one specific witness. You are
going to have a devil of a time getting through a 5-minute
window there for bouncing all over the place remotely.
And towards that end, let me start with you, Dr. Jones. You
know, the general theme here seems to be, you know, we can't
get out because of all the bad things that would happen, which
raises the question of why is there so much pressure for us to
want to get out. Now, I think it is really important to
understand that.
Number one, there was a strong feeling amongst a lot of
people, I included, that no matter the scenario, we are not
going to defeat the Taliban and we are not--there is not going
to be a successful peace process. The level best that we can
hope for by maintaining our presence is it doesn't get much
worse. Okay. The idea that we are going to defeat the Taliban,
peace is going to come, and we are going to have a stable
government there, most people think is insane. I would say off
the top of my head, you know, I can't predict the future, but
if you tell me I got to bet a hundred dollars one way or the
other, I am betting rather confidently that the chaos is going
to continue. And we are in the middle of that chaos.
Now, we are not as in the middle of it as we were before.
But lives are still being lost, money is still being spent, and
people are still--you know, our troops and others are still
being forced to be sent over there. I think the American people
are saying, for what? Okay. And if the answer is because, gosh,
if we just hang in for another year or two, if we just send
another 5,000 troops, we will get to a peace deal. I don't
think anybody believes that, okay, not in any serious way. So
we are not going to get there. That peace is not going to be
achieved.
So what happens if we pull out? Well, I mean, a slightly
different flavor of chaos in the minds of most people. So we
have protected lives and saved money and just traded one type
of chaos for another, and that is a win.
Now, the real threat is what we have talked about. Okay.
Well, what if we have another al-Qaida-like situation? But I
think the other conclusion is, as awful as the Taliban is, and
there is a lot of awful governments all over the world doing a
lot of awful things, do we really think that at this point, if
the Taliban came back into power--they are fighting ISIS too,
by the way. Those two do not get along. So they are not going
to be snug and secure in a peaceful situation. Do we really
think that we will face anything anywhere approaching the type
of transnational terrorist threat that we mistakenly didn't see
back before 9/11? I mean, that is the bottom line. Because I
don't think so. I don't think that same type of threat is going
to be there and, therefore, it doesn't justify the cost.
And then the final point is, I get our partners, but I
totally, you know--and I was all over the Trump administration
for what happened in Syria, as a lot of people on this
committee were. They did not consult. They pulled the rug out
from under our allies in the blink of an eye. That is not what
happened this time. The discussion to go down to 2,500 has been
going on for months. Okay. And at some point, we had a
disagreement with our allies and the President decided, sorry,
this is what we are going to do. So I get the ally point, but
if they are in a different place from us, that is something we
have to manage.
But, again, the question is, you know, can someone tell me
that we are hanging out and less chaos is going to result,
number one? And number two, can you really argue that we face
the--let's say everything falls apart and the Taliban take
over, do we really face a significant transnational threat at
that point?
Dr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
questions. You have actually hit, I think, on what are the most
important questions that the U.S. and the American population
need to think through.
My response is severalfold. One is, when I look at--since
World War II, there have been roughly 200 insurgencies across
the globe. In about 37 percent of those cases, the government
won on the battlefield; about 35 percent of the cases, the
insurgent side won; and at about 27 percent--these are my
numbers--there was a peace settlement or some kind of draw.
So just to be clear, that means about two-thirds of the
cases we have had either a government win or a peace
settlement. And I think, as I look at the odds, that is the
kind of--those are the odds that I would look for in
Afghanistan. I don't know whether a peace----
The Chairman. Sorry to interrupt on that point. But that is
like the guy who drowned by, you know, walking across the river
with an average depth of 3 feet. Okay, that is great. Okay. But
this is Afghanistan. And this is what is going on right now.
And you don't sort of get the average. And I think you can look
at Afghanistan and see where we are going to fall on that
ledger. I mean, the average, that is nice that out of 132
things, but this is a very specific case with very specific
facts that ought to inform that opinion as well. Don't you
think?
Dr. Jones. Yes, absolutely. I have spent much of the last
20 years in Afghanistan. I would just say that if I am a
betting person right now, those are the odds that I would be
looking for in the foreseeable future.
I would note a few other things. One is that the U.S. has
been successful with its force presence there in severely
weakening al-Qaida, including killing Osama bin Laden and a
number of senior leaders. And actually most importantly, I
think, is some of the recent killing of al-Qaida leaders have
actually been Afghan forces that have been supported by U.S.
forces. And I think what we are seeing is some successes,
particularly among Afghan special operations forces; they still
need U.S. help, but we are making progress.
What has me concerned, Mr. Chairman, though, is that in
2011, the U.S. pulled out of Iraq, and the situation
deteriorated significantly. Now, the upside in Iraq is that we
had an ally where we could push forces back in. In Afghanistan,
were we to leave, we would have an enemy in Kabul, the Taliban.
The ability to come back in a meaningful way, I think, would be
much more significant.
And I think what worries me, and this gets to your final
question, is the number of militant groups operating in some
capacity in Afghanistan today, not just al-Qaida, but a range
of the Kashmiri groups, including ones that perpetrated attacks
in Mumbai that involved Americans like David Headley, still
persist.
So what I can't say is tomorrow things are going to get as
bad as they were, say, on 9/11, but I think the trajectory is
where I would be concerned about.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
One more question, and I will just have to take this for
the record because I want other people to get in here.
But, Dr. Biddle, you had made the point about, you know,
basically all or nothing. And I do think that if we go the
nothing route, you still have to draw down. And I think you
would agree with that. You can't just pull them out tomorrow.
You've got to do it over, you know, a certain amount of time
and be safe.
But the other point that I would like if you could give me
a written--sir, you used to be on that screen, and now I am
just looking at myself, so it really doesn't do me any good.
But the question is, I have heard the argument that the
2,500 troops, and I have heard this from senior Pentagon
leaders right now, is a sufficient counterterrorism force.
That, in fact, that 2,500 number does--it performs exactly the
mission that Dr. Jones just alluded to, which is to be able to,
you know, keep the more--the terrorist groups at bay.
So if you could just give me a written response on why you
don't think 2,500 makes sense from a CT [counterterrorism]
standpoint, that would be helpful.
With that, I will turn it over to Mr. Thornberry for his
questions.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 93.]
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask each of you to address this
question. And we will go Ambassador Crocker and then Dr. Biddle
and then Dr. Jones.
The question is, if you had 1 minute to speak with the
President-elect on what he should do in Afghanistan, what would
you tell him? So what----
Again, Ambassador Crocker, we will start with you. One
minute to speak with the President-elect on what he should do
in Afghanistan, what would your message to him be?
Ambassador Crocker. Joe, for strategic reasons, stay the
course. As my colleagues, Dr. Biddle and Dr. Jones, have
pointed out, the worst thing we can do is what we are doing in
a [inaudible]. So I would tell the Vice President that hold
where we are prior to President Trump's announcement and then
reassess. The most important thing to reassess would be the
[inaudible]. We could not go over it with them any further
without some meaningful concessions from the Taliban. And we
would need to show the strategic patience to see that through,
remembering that [inaudible] security as a Nation and our
values as a Nation.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. We had some connection issues there
that made it hard for me to understand everything you were
saying. It may be we will either work on the connection or you
could help provide that to the committee in writing when we are
done, because it was hard to--we didn't get all the words.
We will try, Dr. Biddle, can you address that?
Dr. Biddle. Yeah. My advice would be that the plausible
long-term outcomes at this point are either outright defeat or
a negotiated compromise settlement. Our strategy should be to
get serious about a compromise negotiated settlement, and we
should understand our troop level in Afghanistan in that light.
That means we should maximize its potential leverage as a
bargaining chip, which means don't partially withdraw without
some sort of compensating concession from the Taliban. If you
think the negotiations are hopeless, which is a defensible
position, the sensible strategy in that scenario is cut our
losses and get out altogether.
Mr. Thornberry. Sorry, if I could follow up. So would you
go back up to 4,500 because you believe that there is a chance
of negotiations?
Dr. Biddle. That would be my preference. Whether that is
politically sustainable is an area beyond my expertise, of
course. But I think the chance of a compromise settlement is
not zero. I think the cost of our remaining presence at this
point by comparison with what we were paying in 2009 to 2011
certainly is extremely small. Our interests in Afghanistan,
though limited, are nonzero. Given the costs of continuing to
pursue a settlement, which I think are fairly modest, I think
it is in the U.S. interest to do our best, to try and get out
of this with a deal we can live with rather than simply
failure.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Jones.
Dr. Jones. I think to follow on what my two colleagues
noted, I would say three things. One is I wouldn't go down any
further. I think I would ask, among other issues, I would ask
the commanding general, U.S. general in Afghanistan and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their advice on what
the 4,500 or the 2,500 gives us. Do we need more than just a
counterterrorism force? Do we need to continue to provide
training, advice, and assistance. And I think that is going to
be an analytical judgment from our senior military leadership
is where to go.
The second is I think we do need to show commitment to the
Afghan Government. Some of this will be financial. Some of this
is just a political commitment that we will remain an ally
against an extreme Islamic emirate.
And third, I think we have got to be able to tell the
Taliban that our one major--or one of our major bargaining
chips, our forces, they are not going to come down without a
peace settlement. So I think we have got to ramp up pressure
along those lines. Those would be my three issues.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Good. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. Thank you.
I am going to continue, Susan Davis, with the questions,
and then we will try and grab our colleagues as they come in
the room.
You know, this is always difficult for me because I have
spent the last 15 years traveling to Afghanistan, visiting our
troops, our female troops particularly, and our deployed moms.
And over the course of that time, we witnessed the progress of
women who had started businesses, had served in parliament. And
certainly as Ambassador Crocker said, you know, we shared with
them that we had their back. It doesn't feel like we have their
back anymore.
And I wanted to just get a sense, Dr. Crocker--Ambassador
Crocker, I probably know your response, but from Dr. Jones and
Mr. Biddle, just where that value analysis falls in this and
whether--what's the role of Congress in that? Can that be
helpful or no longer helpful?
My other concern is really about, you know, talking about
the challenges of integrating the Taliban into society. I mean,
is there any hope for that? Is there any reason anybody should
trust that that is possible? And given that, where do we go? Is
there any kind of a plan B that actually incorporates that
concern?
We haven't really spoken much about ISIS. And I think we
know that former Taliban fighters are going to be looking for
another group to pick up arms with. And despite the fact that
they don't have any great feeling for one another,
nevertheless, it can be attractive.
So I wonder--first, let me go to Dr. Biddle, if I may, and
then to--or, Dr. Jones, why don't you start.
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much. All of these were important
issues. Let me start with the women issue. I have an article
out in West Point, the U.S. Military Academy's journal, it
comes out today, the CTC [Combating Terrorism Center] Sentinel.
And among other things, it notes--it looks at the Taliban
today, who they are. And I think one of the things it notes is
that the Taliban's continuing persecution of women is deeply
troubling. Women have been victims--women that have been
victims of domestic violence by the Taliban have little
recourse--or living in Taliban-controlled areas have little
recourse to justice in Taliban courts. The Taliban continues to
discourage women from working, denies women access to modern
healthcare, prohibits women from participating in politics to
look at Taliban's makeup during the negotiations, and supports
punishments against women, such as stoning and public lashing.
So I think Congress has a very important role to keep this as a
front burner issue.
Now, you know, Afghanistan does have some conservative
elements of society, so there is a broader debate. And I don't
think we want to entirely put our--our values on Afghanistan.
But I think what we have seen is there has been major progress
on this in the past 20 years. A Taliban takeover, in my view,
will eliminate that virtually immediately.
I do think, you know, we have had some examples of the
integration of senior Taliban leaders into the government or at
least on the government side. Rice Pograni, Mullah Zaeef, Mudua
Akill, they have generally behaved when they have integrated
back to the government. So I think we have some cases where we
can trust them.
And I would just finally highlight your concerns about the
Islamic State. It has shrunk in size as it has been targeted,
but I think a growing civil war in the country does provide an
opportunity for them to regenerate.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Dr. Biddle, would you want to comment? And I would love to
hear from Ambassador Crocker quickly too.
Dr. Biddle. Ma'am, certainly. We have many important values
at stake in Afghanistan. The rights of women are an important
value. The rights of ethnic minorities are an important value.
The rights and the future of an entire generation of young
Afghans who put their trust in us and have tried hard to build
a new country and have brought about actually significant
change in Afghanistan since the Taliban were in control in
2000.
The trouble is, if we want to realize these values, we are
going to have to make an investment commensurate with the
threat to those values. If we want to defend the rights of
Afghan women, and we are concerned that the Taliban won't
respect those, it is going to require a military investment on
our part sufficient to prevent the Taliban from taking control
of the country.
The dilemma we face, of course, is that we have interests
that we care about, but many Americans worry that those
interests aren't commensurate with the scale of military effort
from the United States that would be required to secure that.
So we are stuck in this unfortunate situation where we have to
look at a potential compromise to values we care about and
should care about to at least some degree, given the limits and
the scale of the military investment we are willing to make.
And given that, it seems to me, the only way to square that
circle at the moment is through the negotiating process.
Now, with respect to the Taliban and whether we can trust
them and what their behavior is likely to be, obviously, the
Taliban are not an ideal negotiating partner. One rarely
encounters those in war termination.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Dr. Biddle. It is my responsibility
to keep this going. So as much as I would love to have you
continue to speak, Mr. Conaway, you are next.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I think both Dr. Jones and Dr. Biddle helped answer part of
the question. The only question really is, the Taliban of the
nineties, are they distinctly different than the Taliban of
today? And what I heard Dr. Jones say is not really, that what
we saw happen in Afghanistan to women, thought leaders,
teachers, all forms of folks who disagreed with the Taliban,
they were eliminated, killed, and persecuted. I am not sure
that wouldn't happen today.
And I think the question for Americans is making these
decisions with eyes wide open. In America today, we tend to
defend the rights of smaller and smaller groups of individuals
against the rights of larger groups, and to great lengths. And
so the question is are we willing to do that, you know, in
Afghanistan? Is it the right thing for us to do? Those kinds of
issues. So this is a real conflict within ourselves as to what
we do next in that country.
But I do think that we bear responsibility for having led
the reforms that are there, the expectations, particularly on
folks who have grown up post-Taliban era, they don't really--
well, they may know the history. They didn't live under the
Taliban rule in the mid-nineties, late nineties, and so their
expectations are different.
Are those expectations--and either Dr. Jones or Ambassador
Crocker--are those expectations strong enough to lead that
nation out of the wreck that a Taliban takeover, again, in my
view, would happen? Can they lead themselves out? Are they
strong enough to take those risks to move forward?
Dr. Jones.
Dr. Jones. Well, I would certainly say, without U.S. and
broader international assistance, they are not. And I think
this is a--it is an unfair fight in that sense, because the
Taliban are continuing to have sanctuary in neighboring
Pakistan, support from Iran and Russia.
But I think with support, both some military, even small
levels of military, and financial support, some financial
support--the Europeans have actually provided a fair amount of
assistance to a range of these programs--I do think the Afghan
Government and the population is able to do what you are
outlining.
It will take time, but I think we see in public opinion
polls conducted by The Asia Foundation that the population
supports that kind of a vision and does not generally support
the Taliban's extremist vision.
I would say in response to your first comment, I do think
that the Taliban has modified its views on a few issues. They
appear to be allowing some girls to go to school now. They are
a lot more technologically savvy. They were not in the 1990s.
But in terms of ideology, same kind of organization, same kind
of Islamic emirate that they are trying to establish.
Mr. Conaway. Professor Crocker, your thoughts?
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, I hope you can at least hear me
now.
I would associate myself with the remarks of my two
colleagues. I do not see this as mission impossible and,
indeed, the experience we have had with force levels one-tenth
of what they were when I was Ambassador to Afghanistan indicate
that that is the case.
So this is--you know, we are not facing defeat on the
battlefield, so it is ironic that we seem to be trying to
defeat ourselves. It is true that all wars must end and return
to the political process; it is true in this one, but not on
the terms that this administration has set for these talks.
These are surrender negotiations.
I would hope the President-elect, when he becomes
President, will simply freeze them, not cancel them out, but as
my colleagues again have suggested, to tell the Taliban that,
until you live up to your side of the deal, we are not going
anywhere, and then be prepared to back that up.
Mr. Conaway. Dr. Biddle, is it fair to say that the Taliban
is getting significant outside help and that an Afghan
Government with no outside help, that would be an unfair fight?
Dr. Biddle. Yes, absolutely. The Taliban have been getting
substantial support from the Pakistanis and from others and
from illicit economic activity like the drug trade in
Afghanistan for a very long time.
I think there is very good reason to believe that if
outside assistance to the Afghan Government ceased, the
Afghanistan National Security Forces would break up, the
Taliban would then quickly march into Kabul, and we would get a
chance to find out what chaos presents in Afghanistan. That is
not a social science experiment I would personally like to run.
I think it is important to note that the great majority of
the money required to keep the Afghan National Security Forces
in the field comes from outside. Their operating budget
annually is more than twice the entire domestic revenue of the
Afghan Government. If that outside support to the Afghan
Security Forces were to stop, their ability to sustain a
stalemate, much less do better, I think would go away quite
quickly.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, gentlemen.
Yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin, you are next.
Mr. Langevin. Thanks, Madam Chair. Can you hear me okay?
Mrs. Davis. Yes, we can hear you.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
So let me start with Dr. Jones. First, I want to thank all
of our panelists for testifying today.
But, Dr. Jones, I would like to go back to the chairman's
question. If I understood it right, he seemed to say that if we
stay there could be chaos, if we withdraw there could be chaos,
so it is just one kind of chaos for another, and that we were
caught off guard, not anticipating the plotting or planning
that was going on before 9/11, and that do we really think that
that kind of thing could go on again without us knowing.
So if I understood that question the right way, my question
is, if we are not there and we do withdraw precipitously, how
would we know with adequate fidelity whether al-Qaida or any
other terrorist organization is plotting or planning against
us? And without a presence there, how could we respond
effectively and know exactly where to hit?
I know that we would certainly engage still in intelligence
gathering with our partner agencies. But would we even know
enough how and where to adequately be able to respond should
there be a known threat to America or our allies?
Dr. Jones. Thank you. Very, very good questions.
On the chairman's--on the discussion with the chairman, my
response was essentially that while--I wouldn't characterize
necessarily the situation as chaos now. I mean, there is a war.
But I think were the U.S. to withdraw, it would significantly
worsen.
I mean, it is worth pointing out that the Taliban controls
not a single major city right now, and compare that, say, 2014,
2015, 2016, to Iraq and Syria where the Islamic State
controlled Raqqa and Fallujah and Ramadi and Mosul. The Taliban
controls zero, zero cities right now.
So I think it is worth noting that that would change, I
think. My assessment is that would change with a U.S.
withdrawal.
How would we know, you ask. It would become a lot more
difficult. Obviously, as you noted, the U.S. would have some
intelligence collection capabilities. But it would be much more
difficult to understand what al-Qaida was doing, what the
Taliban, what other militant groups were doing in Afghanistan
without a military--CIA, NSA [National Security Agency]--
meaningful presence in the country.
Mr. Langevin. And I would agree with that. That would be my
interpretation as well.
Ambassador Crocker, the U.S.-Taliban agreement commits the
Taliban to preventing any groups, including al-Qaida, from
using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States
and its allies. So what would the verification mechanism be to
ensure the Taliban are compliant? And would a troop reduction
impact our ability to ensure the Taliban are compliant?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you for that excellent question.
The Taliban has no intention--and in their view no need--to
make good on any of their commitments. They will say what we
want to hear, but they know that we are going home as these
negotiations are currently structured. And, again, the
President's latest decision to cut by half our small remaining
force tells the Taliban all they need to know about our staying
power and our willingness to continue our support and our
presence in Afghanistan.
So unless or until this whole so-called peace process
effort is restructured to show that we are serious about this,
that if they do not live up to their basic commitments we are
not going away--if there is a single phrase that I would
commend to this committee on what we need, we need strategic
patience.
The Taliban and al-Qaida have that strategic patience. They
believe they can outlast us, and we are proving them right. We
have got to stay and we have got to show that we do have the
will to stay a course until we see circumstances in Afghanistan
that warrant further withdrawal.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you very much to all of our
panelists.
I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Been a great morning.
So I am not an expert on this issue like the three of you
are, but I am an expert on what the people in my district
think. We all are. That is how we got here. And I don't think
what the people in my district think is much off of what the
people in America in general think on this issue.
The people of my district are tired of nation building in
Afghanistan. They think 19 years, thousands of lives, American
lives lost, all these injuries, all these hundreds of thousands
of service men and women lives disrupted, obviously billions
and billions and billions of dollars, you know, enough.
So I think they are not for nation building anymore. We
have done great things. Ambassador Crocker has made a great
point about all that. But my folks think we have done enough.
And I think they probably would support a continuing
counterterrorism effort, okay, they don't want al-Qaida to get
back in control there.
So when you talk about the drawdown, the question in my
mind is, what is the right number? Can we have a successful
counterterrorism effort with 2,500 versus 5,000 troops there?
And, Dr. Jones, I will start with you and ask you that
question.
Dr. Jones. That is really the $64,000 question. And let me
say----
Mr. Byrne. It is a lot more than that.
Dr. Jones. That is probably true. The $64 billion question
maybe.
Mr. Byrne. Yeah.
Dr. Jones. I am tired of nation building. We are well
beyond that. And I don't think anybody, as you note, is talking
about anything close to the 100,000 forces we had in
Afghanistan in 2009.
What I would say is the question I think that we need to
ask our military leadership is, is 2,500 enough to prevent a
Taliban overthrow of the government? For me it is not just a
counterterrorism issue. It is also a prevention of the
overthrow of the government.
And so what does 2,500 give us versus something closer to
4,500 or 5,000? That is a question for General Miller. That is
a question for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And I think
that is where I would come back to.
I think, again, I would say it is more than just killing or
capturing al-Qaida leaders. It is also, do we want to prevent
the overthrow of the government, and how can we continue to
sustain and support the Afghan Government to do the fighting
and dying?
Mr. Byrne. Well, I think I know the answer to this, but let
me ask it because I think it is a fundamental question.
Is it a given, if the Taliban take back over again, that
they will allow the country to be a harbor for al-Qaida? How
much they hate ISIS, I think they still like al-Qaida. Will
they allow al-Qaida to be harbored again?
Dr. Jones. I would answer that in two ways. One is the U.N.
assessments in 2020 have been unambiguous on this, that they
continue to have strategic, operational, and tactical-level--
the Taliban has strategic, operational, and tactical-level
relations with al-Qaida, al-Qaida senior and al-Qaida in the
Indian Subcontinent. And I think we have also seen local
Taliban commanders have been willing to give sanctuary to al-
Qaida leaders in areas that they control.
So I think the answer there is, yes, we will see--continue
to see Taliban/al-Qaida relations in the future.
Mr. Byrne. On that last question, Dr. Biddle, what is your
opinion?
Dr. Biddle. Yeah, I would agree with my colleague, Dr.
Jones. It is a mistake to separate counterterrorism and the
survival of the Afghan Government. If the Afghan Government
falls and the Taliban take over or there is simply a chaotic
civil war, the terrorism threat from Afghanistan will go
substantially up and the ability of a handful of American
troops operating from a handful of bases that will look like,
you know, a sieged fort disaster in the middle of a catastrophe
will be very, very limited.
Worse still, the security of Afghanistan's neighbors will
be importantly implicated, and especially the security of a
nuclear-armed Pakistan. In the event that chaos in Afghanistan
flows across the border in the aftermath of a government
collapse, we then have the potential for militant groups in
Pakistan, if that government falls, getting their hands on
actual usable nuclear weapons.
So I think the tendency to say what we really want is
counterterrorism, let's forget all of this counterinsurgency to
protect the government, is a false dichotomy in very important
ways.
Mr. Byrne. Very quickly, Ambassador Crocker, on that last
question?
Ambassador Crocker. I share the view, Congressman. We have
seen this movie before. We were heavily engaged with the
Pakistanis and Afghan fighters throughout the decade of the
1980s to expel the Soviets. We succeeded, and then we walked
out.
What did we get? The Afghanistan civil war, the rise of the
Taliban, and the road to 9/11.
It would be folly to think it is somehow going to be
magically different this time if we walk out. As my colleagues
have said, there is no doubt about the link between al-Qaida
and the Taliban. Again, the Taliban gave up the country for al-
Qaida.
The Chairman. I apologize, Ambassador, but the gentleman's
time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the witnesses, thank you very much.
To my colleagues for their questions, you have provided
some really good questions and good insight into the situation.
Hopefully I can do the same.
I am looking at the--all of you have argued for the
presence of American troops somewhat higher than 2,500 for the
purposes of securing a negotiated settlement between the
Taliban and the Afghan Government. Could you please describe
what that settlement would look like? What exactly do we want
to see? How will the Taliban and the Afghan Government merge
into some sort of a reconciliation?
Let's start with Mr. Jones, and then we will go Crocker and
end with Biddle.
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much for the question.
I mean, I think it is important to ask very specifically
what a settlement might look like. And, obviously, it is at
this point, with negotiations just starting in September, it is
difficult to predict where they might go.
But I think what we have seen in those Taliban that have
defected and come to the Afghan Government side is a
willingness to participate in the political process.
I think what we probably have to see is some compromise on
both sides on issues, including power-sharing arrangements,
ministry, key ministries, including security services.
I think one would ideally want to see the Taliban allowed,
as they have been in some other wars--think of El Salvador or
even Colombia, where there was a peace deal--demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration of fighters, some cases
potentially into the government security services. I think
there also has to be some discussion on the Afghan
Constitution, the role of Islam in the Constitution.
So I think the issue is can we get to a place where the
Afghan Government and the Taliban can compromise on a range of
these types of issues and get support from their
constituencies, which will be hard, and I think there is room
for bargaining.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to interrupt you. I have just a
few moments. So a short answer would be necessary here.
Let's go on.
Mr. Biddle.
Dr. Biddle. Yeah, I think the nature of the bargaining
space here is that the Taliban would have to give up several
things. They would have to break with al-Qaida. They would have
to renounce violence. They would have to disarm. And they would
have to accept some variation of today's Afghan Constitution.
That is a lot, but it is plausible.
We would have to give up a lot. We would have to legalize
the Taliban as a political actor in Afghanistan. We would have
to agree to withdraw all foreign troops, including our
counterterrorism presence, unless the Afghan Government asked
us to stay to train their troops to defend their own borders.
And we would have to provide the Taliban with some sort of set-
aside of guaranteed offices in the Afghan Government,
guaranteed seats in the Afghan Parliament.
They know they are unpopular. If all we are doing is
offering to let them run for election in ways they know they
would lose, they won't agree to a deal.
Where turkey will be talked is over what kind of set-aside.
How big? What will the power sharing look like? What version of
the Afghan Constitution will we get? But I think that is what
the general bargaining space within which a deal would be cast
looks like.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker. Ambassador, your thoughts on this? What
is a negotiated settlement?
Apparently Ambassador Crocker is not available.
The Chairman. I think we lost him for one reason or
another. We will work on that.
Go ahead, John.
Mr. Garamendi. The next question really is one that we need
to consider. It has been said a couple of times. And that is
the neighborhood is also involved. We haven't talked much about
the neighborhood. Could you do so in, I don't know, 15-second
spots here, starting with Mr. Biddle?
Dr. Biddle. Fifteen seconds on the neighborhood?
The most important neighbor is Pakistan. They are a
nuclear-armed country that is fighting a civil war at the
moment. That civil war could go badly for them. If it does--and
the prospects of that would go up a lot if the government in
Kabul collapsed--then you could have a failed state with
nuclear weapons running around and lots of militants that don't
like us any more than they like them.
Mr. Garamendi. I should not have asked for 15 seconds.
Dr. Biddle. I could go on longer if you wish. That is up to
you.
Mr. Garamendi. Let's go Jones.
Dr. Jones. Agree with Dr. Biddle. Pakistan is the primary
supporter of the Taliban. It is where its leadership structure
is located. Taliban also does receive some assistance from Iran
and Russia, among others.
The Chairman. Thank you. Your time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi. So in my final 5 seconds here, I just would
simply say that we need----
The Chairman. John.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. We need to consider the
neighborhood in all of this.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate the questions of my colleague about the
status of the women in Afghanistan. I had the privilege of
traveling with Representative Davis--we are going to miss you--
but on one of those trips and met with many of the women who
are now in Parliament and heard some of the stories of what
life was like when Taliban was in charge. And so I am very
concerned about that. But since there have already been some
questions asked about that, I wanted to move on.
Start with Mr. Biddle, talking about the status of the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. We have invested
in them for years. And I would like you and the other witnesses
to kind of summarize in your mind the progress that has been
made in their abilities. And do you envision a future where the
Afghanistan security forces are self-sustaining? And what level
of support or time commitment should the United States provide
to ensure Afghanistan has adequate defense forces?
And along with that goes, along with our assistance, should
the United States and international community continue to
provide military and economic assistance, specifically economic
assistance to Afghanistan, into the future?
So, I know there are several questions there. But, Mr.
Biddle, if you could start, that would be great.
Dr. Biddle. Time permitting.
I am on the pessimistic end of the spectrum of opinion on
the prognosis for the Afghan National Security Forces. I think
what we see with a lot of forces of this kind in the developing
world, not just in Afghanistan, is in weakly institutionalized
political settings, where you don't have a judiciary, you don't
have courts, you don't have police that can resolve conflicts
between armed elites, the government is required to maintain an
internal balance of power in which it cannot allow its own
military to get too strong, because it threatens other warlords
and armed actors within the elite, broadly defined. And that is
a bigger threat to the government usually than an insurgency
is.
What that means is you end up with corruption and cronyism
as tools to control the threat that the national military poses
to armed elites within the regime, broadly defined, and that is
a profound, systematic, deeply rooted limiter on the combat
potential of the Afghan Security Forces, and forces in similar
countries elsewhere, in their ability to actually defeat an
insurgency.
I think they are strong enough to maintain a slowly
decaying stalemate. There are almost 300,000 of them in the
country after all at the moment. I don't think they are a
plausible capability for defeating the insurgency, regardless
of plausible levels of U.S. support.
Now, in terms of U.S. aid moving forward, I think the
primary role for U.S. aid moving forward, once we get a
settlement--before a settlement--is to keep the Afghan forces
in the field and maintaining a stalemate. Without our support,
they can't do that.
After a settlement, aid will be required as a way of
enforcing the terms of the settlement. The presence or absence
of outside aid is the critical tool to get a power-shared
government, in which the Taliban will play a role, to behave
itself and observe the terms of the agreement.
Therefore, some kind of international aid is going to be
necessary in the long term, nothing like the current scale. But
a complete shutdown of U.S. aid, even if we get a settlement,
will lead to a collapse of the settlement because we will lose
our leverage to enforce its terms.
Mrs. Hartzler. Let me follow up real quickly before we go
to Dr. Jones.
You mentioned the courts. So when I was there in 2011, we
visited with our Department of Justice and officials from the
State Department. We were there actually helping them set up
their court system, and it was progressing.
What would you say is the status of the courts? You
indicated that you think there is no ability of the courts to
maintain justice. Could you expand on that, please?
Dr. Biddle. I think the courts are better than they were,
but they have the fundamental limit of their inability to
enforce adjudication of disputes on armed members of the elite.
We have seen over and over again that the kind of grand mal
corruption that is used to maintain this internal balance of
power within the Afghan elite, broadly defined, is largely
beyond the ability of the courts and the judicial system to
solve.
When Afghan power brokers are accused of corruption and
evidence is presented, the judiciary system as a general rule
has been unable to enforce its will on them.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Dr. Biddle. And I don't think that is surprising.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Thirty seconds, Dr. Jones. Can you expound on any of these
topics?
Dr. Jones. Yes. Actually just briefly, starting with women,
I think we have also seen the Taliban in areas they control
today, not just in the 1990s, oppressive of women. So their
track record today is not very good.
I think the area where we have seen the most success on
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces has been the
commandos, roughly the 20,000 commandos, and I think the
important lesson here is that has been sustained U.S. training
from special operations forces. Those are the best. They are
the best trained, they are the most consistently trained, and
that is where I think we have had the most success.
Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
Yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes. And
I believe we do have Mr. Crocker back. So if you wish to ask
questions of Mr. Crocker, you can do that as well.
Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
This is directed to the Ambassador.
The 15th of January is the date by which the report has the
withdrawal of the troops. What strategic advantage, if any, did
we achieve, or what are we getting in response for the
drawdown, in your opinion?
Ambassador Crocker. We are getting nothing in response to
that drawdown. That has been the problem with these talks from
the beginning. By sitting down with the Taliban without the
Afghan Government in the room, they knew from the start that
this is a negotiation on the terms of our surrender. And
everything that has happened since I think has validated that
view in the eyes of the Taliban.
So they will continue to press their offensive, and we will
continue to withdraw. That is not a staged, reasoned step. It
is, frankly, cutting our force in half in 2 months. That is a
rout.
Mr. Norcross. So that brings me to the next question, for
Dr. Biddle.
One of the four pillars, obviously, in my opinion, is the
[inaudible] harboring terrorists. We have seen so many times
throughout our history the plausible deniability: ``I had no
idea they were there.''
In your opinion, how does one enforce or obtain true
information that is verifiable whether they are harboring
terrorists? And that is a relative question.
Dr. Biddle. Yeah, there are two pieces to that. There is
the intelligence problem of figuring out whether they are
behaving themselves, whether they are complying with the terms
of whatever agreement we eventually reach. And then there is
the issue of leverage, if we decide that they are not
complying, to force them back into compliance.
On the intelligence side of this, it is partly a function
of the intelligence mechanisms of the U.S. Government. But it
is also a part, in part, a function of the intelligence
mechanisms of Afghans who oppose the Taliban within a power-
sharing regime.
If we get some sort of settlement, it won't involve a
Taliban takeover. If what we end up with is a surrender
instrument for us, then, of course, we will offer no aid to
support that kind of a deal. If we are talking about a deal
that is in our interest and that we are willing to support that
will involve power sharing in which we retain allies within the
Afghan Government who would have an incentive to report to us
violations of the agreement by the Taliban, that, coupled with
our own intelligence, is necessary for us to know whether the
agreement is being violated.
If it is violated, our leverage to bring them back into
compliance is aid. That is one of the reasons why I think
continued aid is essential if any agreement we reach is going
to be stable.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
So, Dr. Jones, let's bring this back to the end. Does
Taliban control automatically equal a terrorist, an existential
threat of some sort to the United States--existential goes too
far--but a threat to the United States, either they directly or
through them allowing other groups to come back in? Does that
automatically mean they are going to look at the United States
for some sort of an additional attack?
Dr. Jones. Well, I think it is important to differentiate
types of terrorist organizations. The Taliban has been
committed to conducting attacks against the Islamic State
Khorasan Province, in Afghan provinces such as Kunar and
Nangarhar. So I think we could expect the Taliban to fight
those kinds of organizations. But those are a minority.
I think, based on the relationship today between the
Taliban and al-Qaida at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels, I think we could expect over time that the
U.S. national security interests are threatened based on
international and regional terrorist groups operating in
Afghanistan, including al-Qaida.
Mr. Norcross. So assuming that, maybe not immediately, that
we are going to be back in the same situation, what does that
new Afghanistan look like in terms of troops?
Obviously, after the Second World War, we are not looking
at Germany, but certainly we have been prepared for Russia and
the Soviet Union. Are we potentially looking at a long-term
presence in order to keep in check those who would do us harm?
Dr. Jones.
Dr. Jones. My answer to that is, until there is a peace
agreement or something else that weakens the Taliban, yes, I
think my judgment would be a continuing U.S. military presence,
a small presence that is able to fight against these and weaken
these organizations.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Jones, I represent Fort Drum, which is home of the 10th
Mountain Division, which you know is the most deployed division
in the U.S. Army since 9/11 to Afghanistan. Currently the
division headquarters and members of the 1st Brigade Combat
Team are operating in Afghanistan with the 2nd Brigade Combat
Team on schedule to deploy to the region throughout this fall.
I want to wish our 10th Mountain soldiers a very happy
Thanksgiving. I know this is not the first Thanksgiving for
many of them who are away from their friends and family at
home.
Given your experience advising military commanders, how can
we balance the reduction of forces in Afghanistan with the
necessary force protection measures to ensure that our
remaining troops that are in-country are protected and able to
safely conduct their daily operations and missions? I want to
ensure that we are keeping force protection to the absolute
highest level.
Dr. Jones. Force protection is obviously essential, as are
logistics, and there are other components of that. So I think
the question, when we talk about numbers, is, as you are
implying, I think, it is not just the number of
counterterrorism forces that are striking targets or arresting
or even training Afghan terrorists--or training Afghan
commandos to target terrorist organizations like al-Qaida--but
it is also the force protection of bases that is necessary.
That may be military police and others to secure bases. On
any of the bases that I have ever served on, we have also hired
local Afghans to provide basic protection and in some cases
contractors as well. So that does need to be added to the mix
of the force posture we are talking about.
Ms. Stefanik. And then in your written statement you
mentioned a troop drawdown's impact on our ability to conduct
the train, advise, and assist mission and conduct CT missions
and operations and collect intelligence.
What overall does this mean for the resurgence and
strengthening of terror groups in Afghanistan, particularly in
reference to potential difficulties we may have when it comes
to conducting CT? Does this put us in a similar situation that
we faced in Iraq in 2011 to 2014 in which we will be back in
Afghanistan down the road to combat stronger, more organized
terrorist groups that threaten us?
Dr. Jones. Well, I don't think it entirely puts us back to
2011 where we pulled all forces out, but we are now taking a
risk by going down to 2,500.
What it means, I think, is that that force posture may be
enough to conduct strikes against terrorists, but we are going
to have to move a range of our train, advise, and assist
trainers from the kandak level, from the Afghan Air Force, up
to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior level.
So what we lose is the ability to train Afghans at the
operational and tactical level, actually where the fight is
happening. So that means it is a risk to the state of the war.
And I think that is where we are at right now and that is where
we are going to accept some risk.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I defer to my colleague, Representative Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Gallego, for yielding your time to
me.
Everyone here today has spoken about the need to address
the threat, and I think there is universal agreement that there
is indeed a threat in Afghanistan. But the fact of the matter
is we face a lot of threats, we have a lot of adversaries, and
we do so with limited resources.
So because we have to take a holistic view and make
decisions about those limited resources, there are ultimately
tradeoffs and opportunity costs to that.
I went to war after 9/11 three times, twice in Afghanistan,
and fought the Taliban, because I do take seriously our charge
to keep our country safe and our responsibility to respond to
those threats.
But I also know that we face domestic terror threats that
we haven't adequately addressed, that over a thousand Americans
a day are dying of COVID-19 because we are not adequately
addressing that, over 50,000 Americans a year are dying by
opioids because we are not adequately addressing that, and over
20 veterans a day are dying because we are not addressing that
threat and that need as well.
But this isn't a philosophical discussion about the value
that we place on different threats. It is a practical one. And
what I believe is that we do have to draw down for the reasons
that many of my colleagues have articulated before, but there
is a right way to do it and there is a wrong way to do it.
From my perspective, the administration's process has been
largely a black box. It has changed and we don't have
sufficient information and we can't have a discussion as a body
here and as an American public about the process and the
relative risks.
So from your perspective, very briefly, starting with Dr.
Jones, since you are here, going to Ambassador Crocker, and
then to Mr. Biddle, do you believe that America would benefit
from a more transparent process like the one that we outlined
in the National Defense Authorization Act, a provision that
would require broader engagement with Congress and our partners
so we better understand those threats and the proper way to
draw down?
Dr. Jones. Yes, very briefly, I think it is always better
to have a transparent process where we have any administration
outline what its objectives are in places like Afghanistan and
what is the force posture necessary to meet those objectives,
as well as the diplomatic presence, intelligence presence, and
others, yes.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you.
We are a great democracy, and the greatness of our
democracy depends on the transparency of an administration. The
American people will sacrifice a lot and deal with a lot of
hardship if they understand why they are being asked to make
these sacrifices.
So I would hope that there will be an effort in the coming
months for the new administration to articulate precisely that.
What are the stakes in Afghanistan? Why are we there?
I think those are questions that we can answer and have
answered in this committee, but the case needs to be made and
made repeatedly.
Mr. Crow. And very briefly, Mr. Biddle, because I do have
one more question, but love your thoughts on that first
question.
Dr. Biddle. Transparency is key. A democracy waging a war
is engaging in policies that take lives in the name of the
state and spend billions of dollars of public treasury. We owe
it to the public to debate this publicly, to build a consensus
behind whatever policy we adopt. And I commend the committee
for its role in furthering the debate with today's hearings.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
My last question is, America is strong just not because of
our power and our military, but because we have friends. We
have friend and allies. That has an outsized impact not just on
Afghanistan but in every way that we engage.
And I am extremely concerned that there hasn't been
consultation with our NATO partners. Thirty-eight partners and
allies have committed to the U.S.-led NATO mission, and they,
by my estimation, have not been given adequate information
about what we are trying to do.
In fact, as you mentioned, Dr. Jones, Article 5 has only
been invoked after 9/11, and there was always an estimation
that we would go in together and come out together.
So very briefly, each of you, 15 seconds on the impact on
the NATO alliance of not adequately consulting with them.
Dr. Jones. Well, I think it makes it hard--not consulting
with allies makes it harder for them to make a case to their
own populations to keep a presence in Afghanistan that we need
because it provides additional value to us.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker.
Ambassador Crocker. Clearly we have got to do a better job
of communicating with our strategic partners in NATO. We have
seen the statement of the Secretary General of NATO this past
week after the President's announcement, expressing his
distress over where we are going and how we are doing it.
So, yes, NATO has stood up for us in Afghanistan. They are
with us there now. They need to hear from us that we will stay
the course.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. Mr. Biddle, very briefly?
Dr. Biddle. Our alliance system is one of the great grand
strategic advantages of the United States relative to our
primary competitors in China and Russia, neither of whom enjoys
the alliance system that the United States enjoys. Respect for
our allies enables us to take advantage of the things that this
alliance system brings to the table. We should further that
critical grand strategic advantage by taking our allies
seriously and consulting them to the greatest degree possible.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
Thank you again to Mr. Gallego for yielding me his time.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Gaetz is next for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And not only am I a minority member of this committee, I
hold a minority view on the war in Afghanistan on the
committee. I am against it.
Based on even the words of our own witnesses today, the
corruption in Afghanistan is unsolvable, the war is unwinnable,
and the strategy is indecipherable. It is not a criticism of
the current administration. These are conditions that have been
present for the last 19 years as we have traded the same
villages back and forth with the Taliban.
I listened intently as Dr. Biddle said we are leaving and
we are getting nothing. What we are getting is out.
To me the biggest loser in Afghanistan is the nation that
stays the longest.
Now, as I read some of the prepared testimony of our
witnesses, particularly Dr. Biddle, here is how the argument
seems to go. Twenty-five hundred troops really has no military
value. There is no technical capability with 2,500 troops that
we have that is going to fundamentally win this war. We have
had 100,000 troops there and we couldn't win it and now we
think with 2,500 that is what is going to, like, preserve these
alliances and ensure our allies that we are really there with
sufficient grit.
But the purpose of these 2,500 troops is politics, that it
is a political feature of the war in Afghanistan that if we
leave 2,500 troops there we will get more leverage, and that if
we engage in accelerated drawdowns, well, the Afghans, the
Taliban in particular, will see that this is sort of a war of
attrition that the United States is going to lose. And so they
are just going to stick there and maintain a level of violence
that allows them to potentially recapture their political
power.
But the obvious question is, if we know that the 2,500
troops we are leaving there don't have military value and are
there as a political statement, probably the enemy knows that,
too. Probably they understand the very dynamics that our
witnesses have laid out through their testimony today that this
only ends one way: with us leaving, with the Taliban getting
more power, and with conditions in Afghanistan in pretty rough
shape going forward, as they have been for the last two
decades, as they were for a substantial period of time before
that.
I am grateful that in the Trump administration we have
highlighted our near-peer adversaries as the requisite focus
for our work. I am glad that we don't believe we have to chase
every potential terrorist into every potential cave in
``Whereveristan'' so we can thump our chests and say that we
are being tough with a global counterterrorism mission.
It is my sincere hope that we not only reduce our troop
levels to 2,500, but that we reduce them to zero, that we leave
Afghanistan. This has been the longest war in our Nation's
history. Our country is weary of it, even if the Armed Services
Committee is not.
And I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Moulton, you are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, having served four tours in Iraq, there is no one
who wants to bring the troops home more. But if there is one
lesson we have learned after the last 20 years, it is harder to
get out of these wars than to get in. And we leaving willy-
nilly, without any plan, without any leverage, is clearly the
wrong thing to do according to every witness, Republican and
Democrat, before this committee.
I want to end the war in Afghanistan, too, but I want to
end it responsibly. And more importantly, I want to bring the
troops home for good. I do not want to repeat the mistake we
made in Iraq where we withdrew so quickly, without sufficient
plans, that we had to turn around and go back in.
And although I think all of our witnesses also agree that
we are not going to, quote, unquote, win the war in
Afghanistan--frankly, that is not on the table and hasn't been
for a long time now--there are very devastating ways that we
could lose--most of all, of course, a repeat of 9/11.
Ambassador Crocker, I would like to ask you a question
about another way that we could lose, which is that there are
two Americans that we suspect are being held hostage in
Afghanistan, in Pakistan, by groups with close ties to the
Taliban: Paul Overby, an author from Massachusetts, and Mark
Frerichs, a Navy veteran and defense contractor.
As this administration proceeds with plans to withdraw
troops early and without any concessions from the Taliban,
there is no indication that Mr. Overby or Mr. Frerichs' release
and safe return are being considered in diplomatic negotiations
or required as a precondition for an accelerated drawdown.
In your experience and opinion, what are important factors
to consider in securing the release of these two Americans? And
if we withdraw troops earlier than anticipated, what other
potential leverage do we have to ensure that Mr. Overby and Mr.
Frerichs are returned safely to their families?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Congressman.
As with these sad cases, we, I think, see another
illustration of what we are giving up by giving up our
leverage, and we are certainly doing that by unilateral troop
withdrawals that require nothing of the Taliban. They have no
incentive to cooperate at any scale or on any level. And that
would impact both from the top strategic level of support for
the government and its survivability in Afghanistan and it goes
down to this level as well.
It is pretty hard to get something if you have given up
your leverage. There is no incentive for the Taliban, who we
presume are holding these two Americans, to take any steps to
release them.
So, again, if you are programmed for defeat, which we seem
to be, you have no leverage and no expectation that we will
gain anything, including a release of these two Americans.
Mr. Moulton. Well, certainly a principle that I understood
in the Marine Corps is we don't leave Americans behind. And I
hope that the purported ``art of the deal,'' who should know a
little bit about negotiation, is thinking about these two
Americans, as well as our troops, as we figure out the best way
forward.
Mr. Ambassador, I would like to ask you about the
importance of the Special Immigrant Visa program that you
stressed in your opening statement. I was proud to support an
extension of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program in the
House version of the fiscal year 2021 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]. We recognized the critical importance of
the program for U.S. Government operations in Afghanistan and
also for future operations where young troops, like I was, are
going to have to convince allies overseas to trust us enough to
put their lives on the line to support us.
So can you just tell us why the program is so critical in
your eyes and the effect that the success of the program in
Afghanistan will have on future national security operations
overseas?
Ambassador Crocker. I think that is exactly right,
Congressman. As I noted, there is a backlog of some 18,000
cases in Afghanistan. The sad reality is probably today more
interpreters and their family members are getting killed in
Afghanistan because of their service to us than are getting
Special Immigrant Visas to make good on our pledge to them that
we would take care of them.
And you are quite right, this has implications far beyond
the borders of Afghanistan. The world is watching. The nature
of war has changed. The wars of the future are going to look a
little like this in the sense that we have got to have people
from the community, from the nation, working with us, otherwise
we are blind out there. And you know what that is like from
your extraordinary service in Iraq.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Mr. Keating, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Sorry. I couldn't hear that, Madam Chairman.
Madam Chairman, who did you call on?
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Keating. Are you ready? You have 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Yes, I am. I couldn't hear my name.
Mrs. Davis. Oh, sorry.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Very briefly, there is not a broad consensus
today on exactly what we should do in terms of our troops in
Afghanistan and their deployment. But there is a broad
consensus on the fact that the way the administration is
proposing this drawdown is precipitous and it is disagreed
with, I think, by virtually everyone that has spoken today.
It is pretty clear that one of the reasons is it undercuts
our--the so-called peace plan, you know, where there is a
political date that was put on this, Inauguration Day, for the
drawdown.
It also is one more example, a large one, of our inability
to coordinate and respect our allies who have troops on the
ground.
This falls on the heels of dealing with the pullout after
discussions with President Erdogan in Syria so quickly, without
notice, adequate notice certainly, hours, I heard in
questioning, to our allies about that decision; pullouts from
Germany of the troops there, another political decision on the
heels of the G7 pullout by the Chancellor of Germany; and also
the political switching of funds from things like the European
Defense Initiative--Deterrence Initiative.
So these abound, let alone our inability to consult with
them on--our allies on INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces]
Treaty or the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]
decisions.
I mean, this is a critical problem. I was in discussions
just in the last few days with our allies, private discussions,
and their concern for the way that this has been decided, their
lack of consultation, is profound.
But I want to just quickly go on a couple of other issues
that we haven't dealt with directly, I don't think.
The danger of this pullout and the timing, the contracted
nature of it, with troop safety, this isn't the longer term
issue of force protection, but actually moving our troops
safely out in such a tight timeframe.
Also, the protection of our military assets, billions of
dollars of assets that could fall into terrorist hands as a
result of this artificial timeframe.
And also, the third thing, justification because of our
situation with Pakistan, a very complicated issue. But how
exactly can troop deployment there help us with Pakistan as
opposed to our increasing inability to deal with them directly?
So those are the issues, the troop safety short term, asset
protection short term, and exactly how this is going to benefit
our position strategically with problems in Pakistan.
I will throw it open probably first to Dr. Jones.
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much for the questions.
On the danger of pullout and the safety issue, you do raise
very important questions. I think the Taliban has shown over
the last couple of months since the February deal that it is
not--it has significantly decreased, in fact it has generally
stopped targeting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It is targeting
Afghan forces, but not U.S.
So I would not expect the Taliban to take advantage of this
opportunity. But as we have already noted during this committee
hearing, we have other groups, including the Islamic State
Khorasan Province, that continue to conduct attacks.
So I think there are issues related to the safe withdrawal
in spite or in the face of groups like the Islamic State that
may conduct attacks.
I do think there also has to be very serious questions
about what are we doing with American assets, infrastructure in
the country. The U.S. has poured large amounts of money. What
is going to happen? Who is going to get it, including who is
going to be in the bases, if the U.S. is also downsizing.
On Pakistan, just very briefly, I think Pakistan almost
certainly believes this is a win for it. Its ally, the Taliban,
is likely to advance with a continuing U.S. drawdown. So I see
this as largely viewed positively by Islamabad.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I have got 30 seconds left. I will yield back so my
colleagues can ask questions. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Carbajal, you have got 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ambassador Crocker, we have been in Afghanistan for almost
two decades. While I am concerned with the administration's
recent unilateral announcement to draw down U.S. troops to
2,500 in January, we cannot be in an open-ended war.
How can the U.S. better assist diplomatically and
militarily in addressing the main barriers that are inhibiting
an intra-Afghan agreement? And I know you briefly have touched
on this. But if you could elaborate, I would greatly appreciate
it.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Congressman. Your question
was broken up with my technical problems, but I think I have
the gist of it.
Again, it is an issue of strategic patience, of a long-term
view. The Taliban certainly have it. They have spent all those
years in exile rather than give up their al-Qaida colleagues.
They know they can--they believe they can outwait us, and the
course of these so-called peace talks would, I think, vindicate
that.
I know about being tired, Congressman. I spent 7 out of the
first 11 years after 9/11 in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. I
was ambassador to all three. So I get that, too, I get it, that
the American people are tired.
But getting tired and giving up need to be two different
things, and I just pray that it is not too late to reverse the
disastrous course we are on right now. That is simply running
up the white flag and we will pay for it down the line, not
just in Afghanistan.
Mr. Carbajal. Ambassador, if you could just touch on what
concrete steps we could do to create that intra-agreement.
Ambassador Crocker. Well, first, we need to make it clear
that we are not neutral in this matter, that the Afghan
Government has our solid backing, that we are not going to
abandon an ally to the Taliban. That would be the first and
critical, I think, concrete thing we can do.
And then from that making it clear that anything we do
further is going to be strictly all based on conditions. We
will maintain our presence as long as the government wants and
as long as we need to, to defend our own national security
interests. We need, in short, to demonstrate some strategic
patience and we need to do it now.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Ambassador.
Dr. Jones, as is well known, part of the U.S.-Taliban deal
negotiated by the Trump administration was the Taliban's
commitment to prevent al-Qaida and other terrorist groups from
using Afghan soil to threaten the U.S. or its allies, including
by preventing recruiting, training, and fundraising. There is a
grave concern and apprehension that the Taliban are not and
will not uphold that commitment.
Looking forward, how do we measure the extent to which the
Taliban fulfills this part of the agreement?
Dr. Jones. It is a very good question, Congressman. I think
the answer, in part, hinges on our intelligence collection and
analysis capabilities. To what degree do we continue to see
meetings, that is from human intelligence and signals
intelligence, meetings between the Taliban and al-Qaida? To
what degree do we see al-Qaida continue to operate in areas
where there are Taliban commanders? And to what degree do we
see al-Qaida and other camps operating in Afghanistan or along
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?
There are obviously a range of ways, including through
geospatial intelligence, that we can monitor that. It does
become harder the more we drop in forces, though. It makes it
more difficult for NSA and CIA to put their important units in
collection sites, because they use the military for those. So
the more we withdraw, the harder it becomes to see that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I have limited time. Dr. Biddle, in your testimony you
discuss how the Afghan National Defense and the Security Forces
need to be professionalized to root out corruption. What can
the United States do and our allies to support these efforts?
Dr. Biddle. There is a limited amount that we can do
actually, because the corruption and cronyism we see is so
deeply rooted in fundamental political features of the Afghan
governing system.
What we can do, however, is to reach a low ceiling. And I
think the key to that is conditionality in the aid that we
provide. We need to tell the Afghans what we expect in exchange
for our support that can move their incentives, albeit
gradually, in the direction of professionalization. We should
do that, but we should also be realistic about how much we can
accomplish on that score.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I am out of time.
I yield back.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Kim, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Kim. Thank you.
Dr. Jones, I am going to start with you. Thank you for
taking some time to be able to come here.
And I was reading through an October interview that you
conducted with now Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller
just I guess in October, and he mentioned three lessons learned
in the CT fight. One is that we have to maintain pressure on
the terrorist organizations so that they cannot create
sanctuaries. Number two, that you don't let states fail. And
then three, bad policies do not get better with age.
And I wanted to just kind of think through. With these
three counterterrorism lessons in mind, I wanted to get your
reflections upon now the decision that he is taking part in
with regards to Afghanistan, what your thoughts are on each of
those three levels and whether or not those conditions have
been met in Afghanistan.
Dr. Jones. Well, let me begin with the importance of
maintaining pressure. I think the 2,500 does allow us to
continue to pressure al-Qaida and some terrorist groups,
including the Islamic State, in Afghanistan. So I do think a
complete withdrawal would have eliminated our ability to
maintain pressure against terrorist organizations. Having some
special operations forces and some aircraft does allow us to
keep pressure.
But I do think going down to the levels that we are does
cause us to risk the broader counterinsurgency campaign. So I
think we are taking risk. I am not sure I would have
recommended that, to go down to 2,500. But I do think we still
can maintain some pressure with the size force we have.
I don't think we want to let Afghanistan fail. And, again,
part of the issue is not just the military footprint; part of
it is also the aid that we need to provide. And one of the
things that I recommended, Mr. Kim, in my testimony, in my
written testimony, was also to make it very clear to the Afghan
Government that we are going to provide sustained assistance to
that government, like we do in other countries, and that we
would be a supporting partner in the next several years.
So I think the issue is not to focus just on military
forces but, what are we doing in terms of State Department and
U.S. Agency for International Development assistance? What are
we doing on the intelligence aid side? That stuff has not been
clear. So I would actually like to hear more clarity on what
non-military types of assistance are happening.
Mr. Kim. Well, absolutely, and as would I. And as a former
State Department official that worked in Afghanistan about 10
years ago--and then, also, I visited Afghanistan with a number
of my colleagues in a bipartisan group a year ago--these are
the exact same questions that were heard, which is: What is
that comprehensive strategy? What is the actual way in which we
work in this way in a civ-mil fashion here.
And I wanted to turn to Ambassador Crocker.
Ambassador, you were the Ambassador in Afghanistan when I
was there in 2011, and I always appreciated your leadership out
there.
And I wanted to focus in on what you said about NATO. You
were talking about how NATO is coming up with a different
approach. They have different opinions there. I wanted to ask
you if you could give us a little bit more detail into any
reflections you have, any communication you have with NATO
partners or other countries about how they are seeing the
situation. And why is it that they seem to have a longer
horizon and approach to this?
And, also, just conclude: What is your assessment of the
state of the NATO alliance and thoughts there in terms of how
we need to repair?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
NATO made it clear during the time I was there--and I do
remember your visit. Thank you for making that effort. It is so
important to come out and see things on the ground for
yourself, as you did.
Our NATO allies, as you know, stood up for us on Article 5.
I have been pleasantly surprised of their willingness to make
the long-term commitment they have in Afghanistan. They are
ready to stay as long as we are staying.
But we would delude ourselves utterly to think they are
going to stay if we are going. And I think that is the hinge
point we are at right now after the President's drawdown
decision that did not involve consultations with NATO.
I believe very strongly that the NATO alliance is critical
for global security as well as America's security. We have all
had frustrations with NATO, both in terms of financial
commitments and capabilities. Here is one arena where they are
ready to make a stand----
Mr. Kim. Ambassador, unfortunately, my time has expired
here, so I am going to have to yield back to the chairman, but
thank you for your assessments here.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Horn is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Horn. I will yield back my time. I have just walked in.
Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay. At this point, I don't think we have
anyone else seeking time.
I have one last question for Ambassador Crocker, and I
think it is sort of the crux of the problem. And, certainly, we
understand the risks, and they have been very well explained,
of what can happen in Afghanistan. And, you know, those risks
go up, to some extent, if we aren't present, trying to contain
them.
But when you talked about--and this is, you know, a very
long-held belief by many people, that, after the Soviets were
driven out of Afghanistan, our decision to not stay engaged and
the impact of that--you know a lot more about Afghanistan than
I do. I have been there eight or nine times but not for any
length and certainly not in the depth that you have.
But if you were to take me, you know, back to that moment,
and then, you know, knowing what we know now, I just don't
think us staying would have solved the problem. And I think
that is what a lot of people are, you know, wrestling with,
is----
[Audio interruption.]
The Chairman. I am sorry. Ambassador Crocker, are you
hearing me okay?
Staff. He is having issues. We will work on that.
The Chairman. Yeah. I will take that as a ``no.''
So I guess we have Dr. Jones and Dr. Biddle here, if you
could answer this question.
My point is--and we have heard it described. And I forget,
I think it was Dr. Jones who was making the points about, you
have got all the warlords, and if the government gets too
powerful, the warlords get upset and you have to appease them.
You certainly have got the drug trade. You have got extremists.
Everyone in Afghanistan owns 10 guns. And after the Soviets
came in, it really blew up the existing government. You had the
funding of the madrasas that came out of Saudi Arabia into
Pakistan, which radicalized a large portion of the population.
Can we honestly say that there was something we could have
done in 1989 that would have changed that? I think that is what
concerns a lot of people, is, here we are saying, ``Oh, there
is a huge problem here, and if we show up, we will solve it.''
That just doesn't seem to play out. There are certain things
that U.S. military in foreign countries just can't come in and
solve.
And the idea that, you know, ``Gosh, if we leave,
everything is going to go to hell''--it is an enormous cost,
certainly, you know, in lives, in the risk of lives, in the
disruption of lives of American service members and others who
serve there. But it is also a global cost, in terms of our
credibility and other--while we are doing that, what else can't
we be doing? All right.
And, again, you know, we have got U.S. troops killing
Afghans, all right? There is going to be a certain amount of
resentment amongst the Afghan people for that.
So, I guess, how can you answer the question of, are we as
Americans and the military really able to solve these
incredibly complex problems that exist in Afghanistan? Because
I think most people's impression is, that is the folly, is
thinking that, somehow, oh, if we were just there in greater
numbers and if we were just there a little bit smarter, we
could achieve some sort of peace deal.
So I don't know what the connectivity stuff is that is
going on here, so, Dr. Jones, you are sitting in front of me. I
am going to let you take a stab at that.
Dr. Jones. Very good questions. And I do think it is
important to look at the history of the country, including the
1980s. I would say, the U.S. position today is very different
than what it was in the 1980s, where we were actually in
Pakistan--we were not in Afghanistan--where we were providing
assistance to the Mujahedeen. So I don't----
The Chairman. But what I am really talking about--actually,
sir, I garbled that because I got confused in terms of what was
going on with the connectivity there. I am talking about when
it was done. And that is, you know, Charlie Wilson's war. That
was the great lament of it. Gosh, you know, we pulled out and
everything went to hell; you know, if only we had gone in, it
would have been fixed. And that is what I don't believe, to be
honest with you.
Dr. Jones. Well, I would take the one lesson that we did
not do that we could have done, is kept a close intelligence
and probably a special operations presence embedded with
Northern Alliance forces which were still surviving at the end
of the 1990s. And we could have--and I think the 9/11
Commission report highlights this--we could have conducted
attacks against bin Laden at that point.
We did not pull the trigger. The Clinton administration had
bin Laden within its sights. So I think we could--having a
presence there would have allowed us to conduct some action. I
think----
The Chairman. Just on that one quick point, though, there
are risks in doing what you just described. Okay? Because that
is the risk of inaction. Okay?
We have taken actions before. You know, we bombed that, you
know, pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which, you know, blew up
in our face. You know, we did launch a bunch of cruise missiles
in to try to take out bin Laden.
So I think there is a tendency to say ``inaction, bad;
action, good'' or ``action, bad''--I mean, it is more of a
balance depending on the circumstances, and there are risks
either way.
Dr. Jones. Yes, I think there are risks either way. And I
think that is where we are at today. Do we take the risk of
leaving and seeing what happens afterwards? Or can we accept
some small military presence, some aid, and keep the Afghan
Government and the Taliban talking and prevent the overthrow,
at least for the next couple years, and see where this goes?
And that is what my advice is to consider.
The Chairman. Understood.
And, you know, just to conclude, I mean, I believe that
there is still a transnational terrorist threat. And when we
talk about the shift to great power competition, ``we need to
get out of this stuff'' and everything, I know the challenges
that are presented by Russia and China, but I think it is
important that we all keep in mind that there is still only one
group of people that gets up every morning hoping to kill as
many Americans and Westerners as they possibly can. And the
only thing that is stopping them is the ability to do it; it is
not a lack of will. And that is al-Qaida and ISIS and various
affiliated groups all over the world.
We will have to do something, in my view, to contain that
threat. And I think those who wish it away and say, ``Gosh, if
we just weren't fighting them, they would just stop hating
us,'' that is not going to work. Something needs to be done to
contain that threat.
And I think what the American people are trying to figure
out is, how can we do that in a way that is less costly and
places fewer troops at risk? And I think that is what we have
to work towards.
This is horribly unfair, but, believe it or not, Mac, we
are wrapping up. And----
Mr. Thornberry. Well, Mr. Chairman, I did have one----
The Chairman. I say that because Mr. Thornberry just walked
back into the room, by the way.
Mr. Thornberry, you have the floor. Go ahead.
Mr. Thornberry. I just had a brief question based on some
earlier conversation.
Ms. Stefanik was asking you, Dr. Jones, about force
protection. And I know that Dr. Biddle had talked about two
sources of leverage. One is the presence of our troops; the
other is our financial commitment.
The concern has been expressed to me that, if we
unilaterally make significant cuts to our financial commitment,
it could endanger our forces who are there in some way, because
that leverage, that incentive would be reduced. Do you have an
opinion about that?
Dr. Jones. Yeah. I think the answer to that depends, Mr.
Thornberry, on what types of assistance were cut. But I
certainly think training to local forces, particularly if it
starts to trigger some animosity--we have seen attacks against
U.S. forces from Afghans as the situation deteriorates--that
would be a concern.
But I also think, are we cutting key resources that protect
our forces on the bases where we operate? And I think that
needs to be looked at very closely.
Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. Well, whatever the number--25, 45--it
is not many folks. And we depend upon the Afghans to protect
our folks, by and large. And it just seems to me to be a key
consideration.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just say, I really
appreciate all three witnesses and their testimony and their
bearing with us today. I think it has been very helpful.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We did have a couple more members who came back in since we
concluded this. So we will go with Ms. Speier first and then
Ms. Torres Small. And then we will adjourn.
Ms. Speier, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you especially
for this hearing. It has been very insightful.
To all of the witnesses, extraordinary testimony.
To Ambassador Crocker, what a lifetime of contributions you
have made to our country.
I am not sure if it was you, Ambassador, or someone else,
but someone said, ``We are going to pay for it if we leave
abruptly.'' And I would like for someone, whoever said that, to
define, what does ``paying for it'' mean?
The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Yes?
The Chairman. I am sorry.
Ambassador Crocker, are you still with us?
It sounds like we have lost our connection to Ambassador
Crocker.
Ms. Speier. Okay.
So maybe to Dr. Biddle and Dr. Jones. An abrupt
withdrawal--I mean, we have seen what has happened, certainly,
in Iraq. I worry about the reinstatement of Sharia law and the
impacts on women and children. And I worry that we have to
calibrate what a presence, and a presence that will be
relevant, is.
Is 2,500 enough, or do we need 4,000? Can we reinstate the
other 2,000 after the Biden administration comes into
operation, if that is where he is inclined to go? If you could
just kind of, in your own words, kind of answer those two or
three questions.
And let's start with you, Dr. Biddle.
Dr. Biddle. I would personally like to see the withdrawal
order remanded, and I would like our current troop level to
remain at least through the beginning of the Biden
administration, in part for the political issue of bargaining
leverage and the talks, but in part because our Afghan allies
do continue to depend especially on the air strikes that the
U.S. presence provides.
If we were to totally withdraw--which I think is a
defensible view if you think the talks are hopeless. But if we
were to totally withdraw, I think it is very likely that the
Afghan National Security Forces would break.
They are taking heavy casualties in combat already. There
are serious strains on the organization. If we were to leave,
that would signal them that the future is very negative, and
the combat motivation of the remaining troops would be affected
in a very dangerous way by a perception that this is now a
hopeless enterprise and that, sooner or later, they are looking
at failure and defeat in the absence of U.S. support.
I think the signal that would send to the Afghan Security
Forces is likely to cause them to be unable to sustain the
stalemate that we now see.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Dr. Jones.
Dr. Jones. Yes. I did not make the--or I did not use the
words ``pay for it,'' but what I would say is that, at the
moment, we have something close to a military stalemate in
Afghanistan and a rough balance of power, the Afghan Government
on the one side, with some support from the U.S. and other NATO
countries, and on the other, we have the Taliban with some
support from Pakistan, from Iran, from Russia, and from some
other outside donors. You break that balance by a complete
withdrawal, so you shift the balance in favor of the Taliban.
And I think, as all of us have noted during this hearing,
that the Taliban continues to have relations with al-Qaida. I
think it becomes only a matter of time before the Taliban
starts to overrun major cities in Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, and
other provinces. And I think then the concern is that we start
to see----
[Audio interruption.]
The Chairman. I apologize for that.
Ms. Speier, you still have time. Go ahead.
Ms. Speier. Was that Dr. Jones speaking or Ambassador
Crocker?
The Chairman. That was Dr. Jones speaking.
Ms. Speier. Okay. And I guess Ambassador Crocker cannot
connect.
All right. I guess my final question, if I still have time,
Mr. Chairman, is: Is there anything that hasn't been asked this
morning that any of you would like to inform us about that we
should be looking at that maybe has not been discussed?
The Chairman. I am getting a head shake.
Dr. Biddle. Well, I----
The Chairman. And it is going to have to be quick. I
apologize. Almost out of time. Go ahead.
Dr. Biddle. I will just take the opportunity then.
What I would suggest is, this whole exercise tells us that
it is very important to think of the termination of a war when
you begin a war. If we engage in any of these kinds of
interventions in the future, we need from the beginning to
assume not that the war just ends when you conquer the capital
but that there is going to be some subsequent process that we
need to think through in advance.
If we had understood that in 2001 to 2002 and negotiated
the Taliban when we had the opportunity and the advantage,
rather than assuming that we had won the war because the
capital had fallen, I don't think we would now be in this
situation.
The easiest way to prevent the kind of dilemmas we face now
is to solve them at the beginning. When we get involved and we
understand what our war aims are and when we accept the idea
that negotiation is a way to realize our war aims at the
beginning, it is a better solution than waging a 20-year war
and then finding yourself with no good options in the end.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Torres Small----
Ms. Speier. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [continuing]. Is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
I wanted follow up on Congressman Kim's question regarding
the impact that this scaled withdraw would impact on our
allies.
So could you just--Dr. Jones, I would love to hear your
sense about how our allies--what position our allies would be
put in, both NATO and non-NATO, given this reduction in forces.
Dr. Jones. Well, I think there were two challenges.
One is--and I think we saw it with the reaction of the NATO
Secretary General. They were not given sufficient advance
warning, so that what it didn't include was a broader U.S.,
NATO, and other forces--what are their objectives, combined
objectives? What are the force postures, collectively, that
they need? And how does this affect all of that? So I did not
see a lot of strategic planning with our allies.
The second issue is: Remember, there is pressure, and there
should be pressure, in all of our allies' capitals and among
their populations with people that are asking, why do we
still--why do the Germans still have forces? The Italians, the
British, and others, why do they still have forces in
Afghanistan?
So I think the recognition here is, if we want those
countries to continue to train and to continue to engage in
combat operations, we have to treat them as allies, plan with
them as allies. And that is the only way, I think, we are able
to keep it. Because I think they actually--they provide
advantages. They have forces on the ground. They can train
Afghan forces. And I think that, at the end of the day, this
shows that it is not just us.
Ms. Torres Small. Earlier in discussions, we talked about
the potential impact that the removal of troops or the drawdown
of troops would have on negotiations for peace. And I wanted to
link those two discussions together--the need for us to
strategically plan with our allies and the potential domino
effect that our reduction of troops could have on other
presence, our allies' presence, on the ground and how that
might impact negotiations, especially given changing
relationships, perhaps heightened tensions, with our allies.
Dr. Jones. Is that directed at me?
Ms. Torres Small. Yes. Sorry.
Dr. Jones. Okay. I think it is a very good question.
I think when you look at this from the Taliban's
perspective, they agreed to start negotiations in September.
Those negotiations have gone nowhere. They have dragged their
feet. And now they have--they perceive they have been rewarded
for dragging their feet by further U.S. drawdown that was not
connected in any way to progress on the peace settlement.
So I think the issue here is, if we want an actual peace
agreement, then no one can be rewarded for this.
Ms. Torres Small. Just specifically on the point of a
relationship with NATO and non-NATO allies, is there anything
more you would say in terms of that impact on potential
collaboration and strategy, as you mentioned, for the peace
negotiations?
Dr. Jones. Well, I think the addition of international
forces is also an important bargaining chip in the
negotiations. It is not just U.S. forces leaving, as we have
talked about; it is also other international forces leaving.
That is an important note here.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
And I don't know if we still have Ambassador Crocker, but
if he wanted to weigh in on this, I would appreciate it.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you. I think I am reconnected.
The Chairman. You are.
Ambassador Crocker. Ultimately, this is not about force
levels. It is about American resolve. And that resolve has
been, very sadly, wanting, going all the way back to the
inception of these talks that excluded the Afghan Government.
That is the decision we need to make as a country.
All of us, in different ways, all three of us, have said we
are in a very dangerous situation right now and that further
unlinked troop withdrawal is going to make it worse. Our great
strength as a nation has been based on many things. One of them
are our alliances. NATO is crucial.
We have an opportunity here. We need seize it. But, first,
we need to stop [inaudible] literally. And, second, we have to
have a conversation among ourselves and with our allies. This
is not a lost cause if we demonstrate that resolve.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
I yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We do have one more member who has returned, and then that
is it, no matter who comes back.
Ms. Houlahan, you will have the last 5 minutes of the
hearing. You are up.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
And I hope that you all can hear me.
My question is for Dr. Biddle.
The United States has committed to a conditions-based
drawdown, as we have just heard from several people asking
questions. And your written testimony says that the
expectations on the part of the Afghanis for U.S. engagement
were central to the ability to negotiate an acceptable
settlement.
I was just wondering, in your view, what would moving away
from our publicly touted conditions-based approach, especially
on the eve of a transition of government here in the United
States, signal to the Afghan people? And what does it mean for
our ability to credibly facilitate inter-Afghan negotiations in
the future?
Dr. Biddle. I think, during the Trump administration, the
view of many Afghans was that we were simply headed out
regardless of what happened; the conditions-based language
wasn't to be taken seriously and wasn't to be trusted.
And that, in turn, made it very, very difficult for the
Afghan Government to persuade members of its own political
coalition that they should accept compromises in order to get a
deal, because it looked like the half-life of the entire Afghan
Government was going to be very, very limited. And, hence,
asking power brokers within the Afghan elite at large to make
near-term sacrifices for a long-term better Afghanistan, when
total U.S. cut-and-run looked like it was going to create a
long term in Afghanistan measured in minutes, months, years at
most, didn't look like a good bargain. That, in turn, made it
very, very difficult for them to organize any kind of
consistent bargaining position vis-a-vis the Taliban.
Now, an incoming Biden administration is going to have an
opportunity to make its own decisions about how seriously it
takes these talks, to what degree they are prepared to use the
leverage we have remaining to bring about successful talks.
Among the many difficulties in these talks is that there
are so many parties. I mean, we tend to think of it as the
Taliban and the U.S. It is actually the Taliban and the Afghan
Government, but the Afghan Government is not a unified actor.
And in terms of the Afghan Government's ability to get a
consistent position among all of the different actors
internally to its side of these talks, some degree of
understood consistency and U.S. support for the Afghan
Government is critical for enabling the Afghan leadership to
persuade elements of its own political coalition that it makes
sense for them to be in this for the long haul.
If we signal to them that we are not in it for the long
haul, the stability of their own government goes way down, the
ability of that unstable government to command enough loyalty
and cooperation from its own power brokers to make concessions
in compromise talks goes way down.
These are issues that the Biden administration now has an
opportunity to recast. I hope they will take that opportunity.
Ms. Houlahan. My next question is somewhat related to that.
Assuming that the Biden administration gets that opportunity,
what kind of conditions, if any, do you think need to be met
before the U.S. would consider reducing or withdrawing troops
further, assuming that it were a Biden administration or even
what remains of this administration?
Dr. Biddle. I would like to see further withdrawals
conditioned on an end to the war. I mean, if that is our
strategy for getting out of this with an acceptable outcome,
the way we use our resources needs to be tied to that outcome.
If an end to the war is what we want--and that is what we
should want--then we should be prepared to leave the small
number of troops that are there now--I mean, this isn't the
almost 100,000-soldier presence of 2011 anymore. This is a
rather small footprint to begin with. I think we should be
prepared to say we are going to leave it there until we get
what we want, which is an end to the war through a negotiated
settlement.
Ms. Houlahan. And that actually is--you must be kind of
reading my mind. My next question is, what kind of troops
should remain, and what kind of troops would you recommend that
we remain in terms of personnel? And I have about a minute
left, sir.
Dr. Biddle. I would recommend leaving every single American
soldier who is there now there until the war ends.
Now, in terms of the configuration of what is there, I
suspect it is pretty close to optimized now, because I have
confidence in General Miller and his ability to design his
force structure to be optimal with respect to the cap that he
is given.
In terms of the military capabilities that go along with
the political role of driving us towards a settlement, the
critical military capability at the moment is air strikes. Our
ability to do air strikes effectively rests, in turn, on how
many bases we can maintain in the country and how much
cooperation we can get with Afghan corps headquarters to enable
us to know where Afghan forces are, what they are doing, what
they are seeing, and, thus, how we can support them with our
air power.
The way I would evaluate in military terms that the size
and configuration of a posture which, in my view, is primarily
valued for political purposes would be, centrally, how does it
affect our ability to deliver air power to keep our Afghan
allies militarily effective in the field, to the extent that we
can do it? That is the criterion I would use in evaluating the
makeup of that posture.
Ms. Houlahan. Perfect. I very much appreciate your time.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And I want to join the ranking member in thanking our
witnesses for this discussion. Appreciate you being here.
Appreciate you sharing your knowledge with us.
And, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 20, 2020
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 20, 2020
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 20, 2020
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Dr. Biddle. This letter is in response to the question you posed in
the Committee's November 20 hearing on Afghanistan, where you asked
whether a U.S. force of 2,500 would be a sufficient counterterrorism
(CT) force in that country.
[In] the short term, a force of this size could provide useful CT
capability. It would facilitate drone or piloted airstrikes by
providing bases near their targets. It could enable a small special
operations presence to carry out raids. It could provide modest in-
country intelligence capability to assist in targeting such raids and
air strikes, and to hasten exploitation of material captured in special
operations raids.
But a very small presence in a hostile warzone can be an
inefficient way to provide such capabilities. Bases must be protected,
maintained, and resupplied. Some of this overhead can safely be
assigned to local nationals, but not all. There are irreducible minima
to sustain secure bases in a war zone, especially inland bases far from
supply sources. Very small troop counts thus tend to increase the ratio
of support and infrastructure costs (and personnel) to those of the
combat forces and intelligence functions that provide the actual
capability we seek.
Perhaps more important, the long-term sustainability of such a
posture is far from clear. Its viability depends on the Afghan
government's ability to keep the Taliban and Islamic State at bay. But
a U.S. drawdown to a 2,500-person CT force would undermine the
negotiations that are our only realistic way to preserve the Afghan
government. As I argued in my testimony, the U.S. troop presence
constitutes much of our remaining, limited, leverage in the settlement
talks. Unrequited unilateral drawdowns attenuate that leverage, and
worsen the prospects for settlement. Without a settlement, the Afghan
government will eventually lose the war. And if that happens, U.S. CT
capability in Afghanistan will become radically less viable regardless
of how we try to configure a tiny rump posture. A government collapse
would create a far more hazardous security environment than today's, in
which it would be much more difficult for a 2,500-person U.S.
contingent to protect and resupply itself once isolated far inland
amidst a chaotic multi-sided civil war in which few actors will find
much reason to support an unpopular U.S. rump presence dedicated to
killing terrorists who threaten only Americans. (I see chaotic civil
warfare as likelier than a simple Taliban restoration if the Kabul
government collapses, but a Taliban restoration would be even worse for
U.S. CT prospects: a restored Taliban government would oppose such a
presence with the resources of a state military.) I have long believed
that it is thus a false dichotomy to separate counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The counterinsurgency mission of
sustaining the government in Kabul is necessary to enable the
counterterrorism capability it accompanies. A posture limited to CT
risks a government collapse that would undermine the viability of the
CT mission.
This is why I see the most important contribution of U.S. forces
today as their political role in facilitating negotiations to end the
war, rather than in their military contribution to counterterrorism.
Failure in the settlement talks risks greater damage to U.S.
counterterrorism capability than the withdrawal or retention of a small
U.S. CT presence. For this reason, we should be willing to offer a
total withdrawal of all U.S. forces--including U.S. CT forces--if this
is part of a settlement that ends the war. But we should be willing to
keep as much of today's presence as possible, in excess of just the
2,500 figure, for as long as there is a reasonable chance that this
could help reach a settlement and end the fighting. [See page 14.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 20, 2020
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Ambassador Crocker, in light of the Taliban's recent
comments which have demonstrated little to no shift from their previous
draconian and violent position on women, what should the United States
do to ensure that women's rights are not traded away at the negotiating
table? What has the United States done to ensure that women and members
of civil society are present and able to participate in the
negotiations, for example as monitors and observers? If no steps have
been taken, why not?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you for this very important question.
There are several women and civil society representatives on the
Afghan government delegation to the Taliban talks. That is important,
but the critical issue is the structure and progression of the talks
themselves. By agreeing to meet with the Taliban without the Afghan
government present, a long standing Taliban demand, the U.S.
effectively delegitimized the Afghan government and signaled that the
U.S. was finished in Afghanistan. Subsequent developments have only
reinforced that analysis. The U.S. has withdrawn forces without
requiring the Taliban to live up to its commitments. The latest
decision by President Trump to reduce our dangerously small force by
2500 before he leaves office is tantamount to a declaration of
surrender.
In my view, Trump is putting American national security and core
American values at risk. The Taliban seeks to retake power in
Afghanistan by force. If they are successful, they will bring al-Qaida
with them. They chose military defeat and exile rather than give up al-
Qaida in 2001. There is no reason to think they would abandon them now.
This is the combination that brought us 9/11, and they have not become
kinder and gentler over the last two decades. Similarly, there is no
reason to expect that once the Taliban return, they will take a
different approach toward Afghan females. In our absence, they will
pursue the same pernicious policies they did prior to 9/11. That would
be a betrayal of our most fundamental values. When I reopened our
Embassy in Kabul after the defeat of the Taliban, Senator Biden was our
first Congressional visitor. We went to see a girls school we had just
opened. In a first grade class we saw girls ranging in age from six to
twelve. The older girls had been deprived of education under the
Taliban. Our message to girls and women was that as you step forward,
we have your back. I hope President-elect Biden remembers that.
Ms. Speier. Dr. Jones, can the extraordinary gains that Afghan
women and girls have made since 2001 be preserved? Should we be
trusting the Taliban with women's rights, human rights, and minorities
rights? What assurances can we seek from the Taliban that it will
recognize women's and human rights in the constitution and according to
international law?
Dr. Jones. Representative Speier, thanks for your important
questions. As you are aware, the Taliban's ideology is deeply rooted in
the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. While the Taliban's
ideology has been evolving since the movement's establishment in the
1990s, Taliban leaders today generally support the establishment of an
extreme government by Islamic law (sharia) and the creation of an
``Islamic Emirate'' in Afghanistan. The Taliban elevate the role of
Islamic scholars (ulema) that issue legal rulings (fatwas) on all
aspects of daily life. The ulema play a particularly important role in
monitoring society's conformity with their view of Islam and in
conservatively interpreting religious doctrine. Taliban officials claim
they have moderated their views on some issues, such as women's rights.
Taliban deputy leader Sirajuddin Haqqani wrote in February 2020 that
the Taliban would ``build an Islamic system in which all Afghans have
equal rights, where the rights of women that are granted by Islam--from
the right to education to the right to work--are protected.'' But the
Taliban has a well-documented record of repression, intolerance, and
human rights abuses against women, foreigners, ethnic minorities, and
journalists. The Taliban's persecution of women is particularly
concerning. Women that are victims of domestic violence have little
recourse to justice in Taliban courts, and the Taliban discourages
women from working, denies women access to modern health care,
prohibits women from participating in politics, and supports such
punishments against women as stoning and public lashing.
In short, the United States should not trust the Taliban with
women's rights, human rights, and minority rights. Nor should the
United States trust a Taliban government to sincerely abide by any
promises to recognize women's and human rights. This reality leads to
two conclusions. First, the United States and its partners (including
in Europe) need to use diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic,
and other instruments to prevent a Taliban overthrow of the government.
A Taliban overthrow would undermine U.S. interests in a range of areas,
from international terrorism to women's rights. Second, any peace deal
between the Afghan government and the Taliban should recognize women's
and human rights in any revised Afghan constitution, according to
international law. This includes universal suffrage and the right to
run for office.
[all]