[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDURING 
                          BONDS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND 
                             NONPROLIFERATION

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           December 10, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-140

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
		     
		ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California	             LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota		     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas    		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas


	    Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
             Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

         Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation

                    AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

DINA TITUS, Nevada                   TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia

                                     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
                                     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
                                     BRIAN MAST, Florida
                                     JOHN CURTIS, Utah

                    Nikole Burroughs, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Glaser, Ms. Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the 
  China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and 
  International Studies..........................................     7
Rigger, Dr. Shelley, Brown Professor of Political Science, 
  Davidson College...............................................    18
Kan, Ms. Shirley, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Retired 
  Specialist at yhe Congressional Research Service...............    26

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    51
Hearing Minutes..................................................    52
Hearing Attendance...............................................    53

                   STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    54

 
 TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDURING BONDS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY

                      Thursday, December 10, 2020

                          House of Representatives,
            Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
                                   Nonproliferation
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC,

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
Nonproliferation will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have 
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions 
for the record, subject to the length limitation of the rules. 
To insert something into the record, please have your staff 
email the previously mentioned address or contact full 
committee staff.
    Please keep your video function on at all times, even when 
you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible 
for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute 
yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with H.Res. 965 
and the accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members 
and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under 
recognition to eliminate background noise.
    I see we have a quorum and will now recognize myself for 
opening remarks. Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing 
to discuss the current state of U.S.-Taiwanese relations and 
the way forward.
    I want to take a moment before I go into my opening 
statement. This is the last hearing of the Subcommittee for 
Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, and I want to thank 
the committee members for their active participation. If we 
think back, our first hearing, back on February 6, was the 
first hearing Congress had on what at that time was called a 
novel coronavirus. It did not have a name. Obviously, today we 
know it as COVID-19.
    And this has been a great subcommittee, very active, and I 
believe that we were the most active subcommittee in terms of 
briefings, hearings, roundtables during this virtual phase of 
Congress over the last 9 months. So I really want to thank the 
subcommittee members, the participants just for their active 
engagement in what is going to be obviously a very vibrant 
subcommittee as we go into the 117th Congress.
    I also want to just take a moment to recognize my good 
friend and my classmate, the ranking member, Congressman Ted 
Yoho. He is retiring from Congress. And, Ted, it has been 
wonderful just working with you, getting to know you. The 
various pieces of legislation that we have been able to put 
together from the authorization of CEPI and just watching you 
over these last few years when we have been in Congress on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee traveling with you. I think you and I 
traveled with Chairman Royce to Taiwan. So that certainly is 
timely with regards to this hearing.
    And then finally, you have been a champion on Taiwan. And, 
I am glad that we are able to close out this Congress with a 
hearing on the relations between the United States and Taiwan 
but also what is happening with regards to Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China.
    With that, let me go ahead and just jump into my opening 
statement. I will keep it short because I also know votes may 
get called at 7:30, and people will be going in and out to get 
their votes--or virtually going in and out.
    So, with regards to the U.S.-Taiwan relations, I understand 
our relations can be complicated. But what is not complicated 
is the closeness of the people-to-people relationship between 
the United States and Taiwan. What is not complicated are the 
shared values that we have with Taiwan and the deep, enduring 
ties that we have with Taiwan.
    And the nature of Taiwan is not complicated. It is a 
resilient democracy, a thriving economy, a vibrant society. And 
that is confirmed in their response to COVID-19, which has been 
dramatic. Despite their proximity to Mainland China, Taiwan 
mobilized quickly. They had learned lessons from previous 
outbreaks, like SARS in 2003, and to date they have only seen 
about 700 cases and suffered just 7 deaths. That is quite 
remarkable, and that is a testimony to the people of Taiwan.
    When we think about the relationship between Taiwan, the 
PRC, and the U.S., we cannot ignore that Taiwan's most relevant 
relationship is that with the People's Republic of China. And 
it is our policy and longstanding U.S. policy for the 
resolution of disputes between Taiwan and the PRC to be arrived 
at peacefully with ascent of the people of Taiwan, as Taiwan is 
a democracy.
    This resolution process should take place between Taiwan 
and the PRC only. We should not entangle this dispute with 
other issues we may have with the PRC. That said, recent 
military actions by the PRC do not enhance the relationships 
and actively undermine global opinions of the PRC.
    The aims of this hearing will examine the current state of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations and its future. This is a critical time 
for the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and 
it is time where we have to show the closeness of that 
relationship.
    The Trump Administration and Congress has done much to 
advance closer ties in recent years, but we need to make sure 
we are advancing both our interests and those of Taiwan and the 
Taiwanese people. This is particularly important as we address 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of climate change 
and other issues that we will have to work together as a global 
community.
    So as we explore, I will look forward to hearing from the 
witnesses, but what actions should the incoming Administration 
take with regards to Taiwan, and how can we advance and address 
these challenges like pandemics and climate change together?
    I am an optimist. I believe Taiwan's future is bright. Its 
strength lies in its people, its strong society, and its 
values. I am hopeful for a future for Taiwan that continues to 
be prosperous, peaceful, and secure, that welcomes Taiwan into 
the global community.
    And, with that, I will conclude by how I began: Taiwan and 
the United States remain closer than ever.
    Let me go ahead and, I now yield 5 minutes to my good 
friend from Florida, our ranking member, Representative Yoho, 
for any opening comments he may have.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Chairman Bera, for holding this 
hearing today, the last one I will be participating in as a 
Congressman, as I do retire. And it has been an honor to work 
with you this year as ranking member. Your leadership has been 
great, as you talked about, the COVID hearings that we have 
had; in fact, you had two of those, and they were very timely, 
and I know we had to push back against State Department, and we 
did, and it was great. And I am confident that the work of this 
subcommittee will continue to remain in good hands going into 
the next Congress.
    Over the past decade, changing circumstances in the Indo-
Pacific have greatly influenced our forming relationships with 
Taiwan as a regional partner. Just as we have witnessed 
external threats from China as it pairs military intimidation 
with economic and diplomatic isolation, we have also seen 
Taiwan rise to the challenge by increasing its commitments to 
defense, providing the world with vital global health 
contributions during this pandemic, and making strides to 
deepen this economic cooperation with trade partners. In 
addition, they have very effective foreign development programs 
helping developing countries grow their economies.
    It is time for the U.S. to create a new strategy in regards 
to our relationship with Taiwan. We need experts with firsthand 
experience to deal with Taiwan's renewed importance. They are 
an island nation of 23-plus million people, our tenth largest 
trading partner, a vibrant and functional democracy, and they 
deserve the respect, not just from us but from all Western 
democracies that believe in liberties and freedom.
    This past year, I introduced Taiwan Fellowship Act, along 
with Chairman Bera, which establishes a 2-year fellowship 
exchange program for Federal employees to live and work in 
Taiwan. At the end of their stay, fellows return to the Federal 
Government--their service in the Federal Government better 
positioned to advance U.S. values and interests in the Indo-
Pacific region with a special emphasis on strengthening our 
strategy partnership with Taiwan.
    This partnership legislation is essential to shoring up our 
long-term approach to Taiwan and the region at large. However, 
we must also act quickly and decisively to meet the immediate 
challenges before us. This includes addressing the looming 
threat of military invasion by the PLA, their forces across the 
Taiwan Strait, and the increasing likelihood of military 
conflict in the area.
    Neither of our countries want bloodshed, but because 
miscalculations, miscommunications invite conflict, we must 
embrace a new strategic clarity where we clearly articulate the 
U.S. position on Taiwan. And this should not be America alone. 
This should be all Western democracies standing up to stand up 
for Western--or any country that has a Western democracy and 
enforce the red lines over the island and order shared capacity 
for deterrence.
    For these reasons, I introduced the Taiwan Invasion 
Prevention Act over the summer, which would authorize a 
President to defend Taiwan with U.S. Armed Forces in the event 
of an attack by the PLA. We are stressing that all negotiations 
need to be done peacefully.
    Additionally, this bill instructs agency officials at the 
highest level to improve our defense coordination with Taiwan 
and invite our regional allies into shared cooperation and 
defensive exercise. We do not invite conflict again, but we 
must show that we are prepared for it.
    One neglected front we can improve is U.S.-Taiwan ties 
outside of defenses through trade. Members of Congress have 
overwhelmingly supported the negotiation of the FTA with our 
tenth largest trading partner, Taiwan, for years.
    Recently, at great political cost to her party, President 
Tsai Ing-wen lifted restrictions on beef and pork imports, the 
last major hurdle in trade friction between our two countries 
as a sign of good faith and spurring free trade talks. Yet, so 
far, this Administration has done very little to pursue an FTA. 
Instead, USTR is preoccupied with preserving a phase 1 trade 
deal with China that Beijing has failed in every measure to 
live up to.
    A U.S.-Taiwan FTA between two enthusiastic trade partners 
would bring incredible benefits to both of our economies. 
United States should move to immediately start TIFA talks with 
Taiwan in order to eventually secure a bilateral trade 
agreement. Failing to initiate talks with Taiwan damages trade 
relations, not only with our country but also with Taiwan's 
other trade partners who awaiting on the United States to make 
the first move initiating their free FTA talks with Taiwan. 
Neglecting one of our strongest trade partners as they face 
economic strangulation is not just misguided; it is incredibly 
dangerous.
    And I want to end again by thanking Chairman Bera and all 
the members on the committee that I have had the honor to serve 
for holding this hearing. Everyone else has worked with me over 
the years to get to this point. Serving as chairman and ranking 
member of this subcommittee has been an honor of my lifetime, 
and I am incredibly grateful to my colleagues for their working 
together to produce some truly incredible legislation. And I 
know this subcommittee will continue to be guided by great 
leadership and look forward to seeing the work that it will 
accomplish in the future, and I thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Yoho.
    I also just want to take a quick moment before I introduce 
the witnesses to applaud your staff, Colin Timmerman, Bryan 
Burack, and Allison Turk for the great work that they have 
done.
    And then also my subcommittee staff, Nikole Burroughs, Ryan 
Uyehara, and Shervin Taheran for the work they have done.
    So, we are only as good as the staff that we have.
    Mr. Yoho. I tell you what, we have been blessed with great 
staff.
    Mr. Bera. We have. Well, great. Let me now introduce our 
witnesses. Our witnesses for today's hearing are Ms. Bonnie 
Glaser, Dr. Shelley Rigger, and Ms. Shirley Kan. I would like 
to thank all our witnesses for being here today.
    Ms. Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and director 
of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies and a friend of this committee. Dr. 
Shelley Rigger is the Brown professor of political science at 
Davidson College. And, finally, Ms. Shirley Kan is a specialist 
in Asian security affairs and worked at the congressional 
Research Service from 1990 to 2015.
    I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes, and 
without objection, your prepared written statements will be 
made part of the record. I will first call on Ms. Glaser for 
her testimony.
    Ms. Glaser.

 STATEMENT OF BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR ADVISER FOR ASIA, DIRECTOR 
OF CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
                            STUDIES

    Ms. Glaser. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you so much 
for the opportunity to testify before you today on the topic of 
U.S.-Taiwan relations.
    Taiwan's security and prosperity are critically important 
to the United States. It is in U.S. interest to help create an 
environment in which Taiwan can continue to protect its 
freedoms and further consolidate its democracy so it can set an 
example to China and the entire world about the resilience of 
democratic values in the face of Chinese intimidation.
    Taiwan's importance to U.S. economic prosperity and 
competitiveness is significant and growing. Taiwan is now the 
ninth largest trading partner of the United States, and 
strengthening innovation to ensure that our country remains a 
leader in the strategic technologies of the 21st century will 
be aided by deepening supply chain and R&D integration with 
Taiwan.
    I completely agree with Ranking Member Yoho, a U.S.-Taiwan 
free trade agreement would promote security and economic growth 
for the United States, Taiwan, and the Indo-Pacific as a whole. 
Taiwan's geographic position makes it central to the 
competition for power and influence in the Indo-Pacific. It 
sits in the middle of the first island chain, stretches from 
Japan to the Philippines.
    Taiwan is part of a strategically important barrier to 
Chinese power projection. Chinese occupation of Taiwan would 
enable the PLA to operate more freely in the Pacific and put 
Japan's security in jeopardy. The United States must shore up 
deterrence by making credible the U.S. military's ability to 
intervene if Taiwan comes under attack.
    Over the past 4 years, the Trump Administration has 
implemented policies toward Taiwan that have generally 
strengthened bilateral relations. Arms sales, support for 
Taiwan's participation in international organizations, 
democracy promotion, religious freedom programs, high-level 
visits, and of course public statements of support for Taiwan's 
achievements, such as combating the spread of COVID-19, all of 
these steps have bolstered U.S.-Taiwan ties and increased the 
confidence of Taiwan's government and public in the United 
States. The Taiwan Travel Act, the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
Act, the TAIPEI Act demonstrated that Taiwan has steadfast 
support from the U.S. Congress.
    In some cases, however, Trump Administration policies 
toward Taipei have imposed costs on Taiwan. Some actions 
appeared intended primarily to irritate Beijing. Decisions with 
potentially significant consequences for Taiwan's security were 
sometimes taken without consulting the Tsai Ing-wen 
Administration.
    And since Taiwan is invariably the target of Chinese 
retaliatory actions, it is essential to coordinate closely with 
Taipei prior to any shift in U.S. approach to cross-strait 
issues. Symbolic actions are absolutely sometimes needed to 
provide reassurance to Taiwan's government and public, but the 
central focus of U.S. policy should be on substantive actions 
that meaningfully enhance Taiwan's security and prosperity. 
Making public aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in 
sensitive areas, I think, should be done only careful, cost-
benefit calculation.
    The incoming Biden Administration will inherit a robust 
U.S.-Taiwan relationship with potential for further growth in 
the coming years. The U.S. and Taiwan share a similar vision of 
secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific that is buttressed by the 
rules-based international order. Both are concerned about 
China's growing use of political, economic, and military 
coercion, the expansion of its military capabilities, 
disinformation, political interference, and illicit practices 
to procure advanced technology.
    Under President Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, Taiwan can be 
counted on to be a reliable and effective partner, and the U.S. 
must consistently treat Taiwan as a valued partner not a weapon 
to be used in its competition with China. A guiding principle 
of U.S. policy toward Taiwan should be do no harm.
    Rising concern about China's strategic ambitions creates 
opportunities to build a coalition of like-minded countries to 
support Taiwan's participation in international organizations. 
To secure the backing of U.S. allies in this endeavor, 
Washington must pursue predictable policies that contribute to 
cross-strait and regional stability.
    CSIS recently issued a report titled ``Toward a Stronger 
U.S.-Taiwan Partnership,'' and the report is a product of a 
bipartisan task force, which I co-chaired, and it examines the 
state of U.S.-Taiwan relations and provides actionable policy 
recommendations in the areas of defense and economics and 
diplomacy for the coming 4 years and beyond. Some of those key 
recommendations are included in my written testimony, which I 
hope you will take a look at.
    And thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today for this very important hearing.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Glaser.
    Now let me go ahead and call on Dr. Rigger for her 
testimony.

 STATEMENT OF DR. SHELLEY RIGGER, BROWN PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL 
                   SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE

    Dr. Rigger. Thank you very much to the chairman and to the 
ranking member and to the members of the committee, and also to 
my good friend Bonnie Glaser for saying most of the things that 
needed to be said.
    One thing that Bonnie did not say is that as no less an 
authority than Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen herself has 
pointed out, U.S.-Taiwan relations are, and quoting President 
Tsai, at their best in decades. It is popular to attribute that 
progress to the U.S., but the truth is, without a willing 
partner in Taiwan, improvements in U.S.-Taiwan relations would 
be much more limited.
    My written testimony provides a detailed explanation of how 
Taiwan's position has evolved over the past dozen years. But to 
summarize, President Tsai's predecessor, President Ma Ying-
jeou, valued the U.S. but he prioritized constructive ties with 
the People's Republic of China. Ma believed that the best way 
to ensure Taiwan's security was to minimize friction with the 
PRC while protecting Taiwan's autonomy and democracy.
    Ma was able to make significant breakthroughs in relations 
with the PRC, and his Administration also saw positive progress 
in relations with the U.S., including creating the Global 
Cooperation and Training Forum, or GCTF, in 2015, which has 
become a powerful framework for Taiwan to assist other 
countries and to expand its unofficial diplomacy.
    Taiwan's electorate affirmed President Ma's approach to 
Taiwan's external relations when it reelected him in 2012, but 
in 2016, Taiwanese voted for a new strategy, one that placed a 
lower priority on engagement with the mainland.
    President Tsai has never sought confrontation with the PRC. 
Nonetheless, the PRC refuses to work with her, and the result 
has been a rebalancing of Taiwan's policy to prioritize 
relations with the U.S. That opened the door on the Taiwan side 
for the developments we have seen in the years since.
    How can we sustain the momentum that has been created under 
the Tsai Administration and the Trump Administration, which is 
largely concurrent with Tsai's Presidency. Taiwan shows that 
the ideas Americans treasure are not ours alone, that Chinese 
heritage is not a barrier to democracy, and that market 
economics in a free society can nurture widespread prosperity 
and progress.
    I agree with Bonnie that Americans must not treat Taiwan as 
an instrument of U.S. policy or a weapon to be deployed to 
frustrate the PRC's rise. Treating Taiwan as an end in itself 
not as a tool for others to use is one of the strengths of the 
legislation Congress has passed in recent years, and it is also 
what differentiates our policy toward Taiwan from the PRC's.
    We also need to remember that the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend is not how U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations work. Taiwanese do 
not want to be absorbed into the PRC, but they do not want a 
hostile relationship with Beijing either, nor do they want to 
be pulled into conflicts between Washington and Beijing.
    Taiwan is most prosperous and secure when U.S.-Taiwan 
relations are stable. When Washington and Beijing manage their 
disagreements, the space for Taiwan expands, and when they are 
at loggerheads, Taiwan gets squeezed.
    My testimony also includes several concrete steps the U.S. 
can take: engaging Taiwan in meaningful economic discussions, 
as has already been mentioned twice; advocating for and 
normalizing Taiwan's role in international organizations. 
Exiting the World Health Organization surrendered one of 
Washington's most fruitful avenues in this regard, but this 
should not be the end of the road for Taiwan's international 
participation, especially given its extraordinary performance 
in taming the COVID epidemic.
    I think we also need to avoid rhetorical solutions that 
sound good but might have unintended consequences. We also need 
to work with Taiwan to create opportunities for Taiwanese and 
American officials to understand one another's interests, and 
on this front, I would reiterate the support for the Taiwan 
Fellowship Act, which is currently pending before this body 
with your sponsorship.
    Finally, I think it is extremely important that we ensure 
that Taiwan remains, as it has always been, a bipartisan 
priority in the United States. It does not serve Taiwan to 
become a pet project of either U.S. political party.
    Finally, the most powerful thing the United States could do 
right now to support and strengthen Taiwan and other young 
democracies is to affirm our own commitment to democracy by 
respecting the will of the American people and upholding the 
integrity of our own institutions.
    Again, thank you very much, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rigger follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Dr. Rigger, for your testimony.
    I will now call on Ms. Kan for her testimony.

STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY KAN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN SECURITY AFFAIRS, 
    RETIRED SPECIALIST AT THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

    Ms. Kan. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, all Members of 
Congress, I appreciate the invitation to testify at this 
hearing appropriately on Human Rights Day. Congress was 
brilliant in passing the TRA without the benefit of hindsight. 
Now congressional oversight of the TRA is even more critical 
for three reasons: First, U.S. policy must counteract the CPC's 
growing challenges to peace and freedom.
    First, the U.S. and Taiwan can ensure that the PLA's 
strategy of incremental intimidation will fail. Second, 
Congress could sustain stronger ties given the uncertainty 
about Biden's policy. The U.S. has strengthened this 
partnership to safeguard our geostrategic interests. As one 
indicator, this Administration has now notified Congress of 
arms sales worth $18.3 billion so far. Nonetheless, the dollar 
amount is not the most important factor.
    Congress had to deal with whether Presidents Bush and Obama 
adhered to the TRA. From his first year in office, Obama did 
not propose arms sales in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016. 
This Administration repaired a broken arms sales process to get 
regular notifications to Congress. In short, there are no more 
packages to delay multiple pending arms sales.
    Also, this Administration allows more flag and general 
officers to visit Taiwan, and Assistant Secretary of State Dave 
Stilwell was the first U.S. official to reiterate the six 
assurances. Now the question is whether Biden will reverse the 
progress and return to minimized contacts under Obama. There 
should not be a major rollback because this Administration had 
to repair the relationship and respond to China. The NSC, DoD, 
and State Department have been clear and strong but not 
reckless and radical.
    Third, Congress could fill in the gaps in explaining our 
strategic objective. A relationship is not the objective. I 
think that we seek a strong and democratic Taiwan so that it 
deters the PLA, remains a force for freedom in the global 
balance of power, and has a future with a peaceful resolution 
without the U.S. military entering into a conflict.
    Congress has options to tackle divergences or weaknesses to 
help sustain our strategic interests. Also, I emphasize that 
the TRA embodies mutual obligations not U.S.-only ones. One, 
Congress could call for a reset of our military engagement to 
reduce the divergence over Taiwan's overall defense concept for 
a credible, cost-effective deterrent. Taiwan's top military 
leaders ought to fund and implement the ODC for asymmetric 
advantage and engage with U.S. military leaders, including flag 
and general officers.
    Two, we have trade-related gaps. Although Taiwan is our 
five largest trading partner, Congress could urge the USTR to 
resume right away the TIFA talks, which have been suspended 
since 2016. Congress could call for a bilateral trade agreement 
before Biden sets his overall policy on trade. Our partnership 
with Taiwan is unique, so let's apply that logic to a BTA 
before others.
    I am now optimistic about a BTA because of a key 
development. For so many years, we have worked on this dispute, 
but now President Tsai recently announced that Taiwan will 
remove trade barriers to our beef and pork. Taiwan is doing the 
right thing for reciprocity and reliability as a partner.
    So, in closing, Congress could preserve the progress and 
fill in the gaps in our partnership. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Kan follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Kan, for your testimony.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each, and 
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of questioning our witnesses. Because of the virtual format of 
this hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority, 
alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your 
turn, please let our staff know, and we will circle back to 
you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone 
and address the chair verbally.
    I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes. The 
ranking member mentioned strategic ambiguity in his opening 
statement and each of the witnesses alluded to it. The United 
States has long held this position of strategic ambiguity 
toward China, meaning not committing one way or another to how 
the United States would respond to PRC aggression against 
Taiwan.
    My sense is the rationale is that without this clarity, the 
PRC military planners would be unsure in their planning and may 
be reluctant to conduct certain actions against Taiwan for fear 
of provoking a U.S. response. Some concerns with this policy 
and some, including many of us in Congress, would argue that we 
should change our position on this as we see a more assertive 
China.
    Dr. Rigger, I sense that you are opposed to the--to 
strategic clarity.
    Ms. Glaser, in your testimony, you alluded to that the U.S. 
may want to reevaluate it.
    Maybe we will start with Ms. Glaser. Should we change and 
clarify our policy? What are the benefits? What are the risks? 
And how does Taiwan feel about this? And what might the PRC do 
in response to more strategic clarity?
    I will start with Ms. Glaser. Then we will go to Dr. 
Rigger. Then we will go to Ms. Kan.
    Ms. Glaser. So thank you, Congressman Bera, for the 
question. I have published on this topic a short article in 
Foreign Affairs, which was actually in response to the article 
that was written initially by CFR President Richard Haass, who 
advocated strategic clarity.
    I am not in support of this policy because I think that it 
will have negative consequences for Taiwan's security rather 
than strengthen deterrence. If we make a rhetorical statement 
that we will, under all conditions, all circumstances come to 
Taiwan's defense but yet we are constrained in our ability to 
do so, we actually might provoke a response from the PRC to 
take advantage of what they might see as a window of 
opportunity while the United States is challenged by the anti-
access area denial capabilities that China has been developing 
and while Taiwan is still continuing to bolster its stability--
its ability to defend itself.
    I believe that China is--its most pressing objective it has 
achieved, that is to prevent de jure independence being 
declared by Taiwan. Certainly under Tsai Ing-wen's 
Administration, that is not going to happen. Xi Jinping has 
said, of course, reunification is a goal. Every Chinese leader 
has said that. I do not believe that it is a pressing priority.
    So what we need to do is, rather than change our rhetorical 
stance, we need to shore up our ability to defend Taiwan and 
make that credible. Once we do that, if China's attack on 
Taiwan seems like it is more urgent and if it appears imminent 
then, yes, there is a range of things that we can do to signal 
China, not only publicly but also privately, that there would 
be very severe consequences if, in fact, they were to use force 
against Taiwan.
    So, if we think about strategic clarity and strategic 
ambiguity as the two extreme ends of the spectrum, there are 
many things we can do in between. And if a threat appears 
urgent, we can move toward that direction of clarity. But I 
think changing our rhetoric without actually bolstering our 
capabilities is potentially risky.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you for that.
    Dr. Rigger, do you want to add?
    Dr. Rigger. Yes. I agree with much if not all of what 
Bonnie just said, but I want to add one other dimension, again, 
looking from the Taiwanese perspective. One of the great 
challenges for Taiwan and for Taiwan's leaders, including 
President Tsai, is persuading her own population that Taiwan 
faces a significant military threat and that they need to 
devote resources, including their own time and lives to the 
island's own defense.
    There is plenty of survey research to suggest that a lot of 
Taiwanese folks believe that the U.S. will take care of them, 
and that one of the reasons people offer why they do not need 
to join the military or they do not need to encourage young 
people to join the military is that the--that Taiwan has a 
military commitment from the U.S.
    Recent Taiwanese leaders, especially President Tsai, have 
made great efforts to refute that position and to encourage 
Taiwanese to recognize the essential role that they will play 
in their own defense in the event of a military crisis. 
Offering Taiwan an unconditional guarantee of U.S. lives and 
treasure will undermine that work or will make it even more 
difficult to overcome the resistance to a self-funded and self-
insured military capable of defending Taiwan at least long 
enough for the U.S. to intervene. So that is another reason why 
I think this kind of policy change would be ill advised.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Dr. Rigger.
    And I notice I am out of time.
    Ms. Kan, if you want to take 30 seconds to quickly add your 
thoughts.
    Ms. Kan. Yes. Okay. Very quickly. I also call for 
consistency but for a different reason. As a champion of 
Congress, I believe in Congress maintaining its prerogatives. 
The TRA has no absolute guarantee on defense. The reason is 
because of legislative intent of the TRA. The legislative 
intent was to subject any future decision on an act of war to 
actions by the Congress, not only the President. So the 
Congress needs to maintain its prerogatives so that we can be 
as clear or flexible as we need for our U.S. interests. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Ms. Kan.
    Let me now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Yoho, for 5 
minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Yoho. Chairman Bera, again, you have picked--we have 
got three great witnesses here, and they have done an excellent 
job.
    Ms. Glaser, I agree with you that all engagement with 
Taiwan should be okay with Taiwan before we move. I think that 
is a very smart thing.
    Dr. Rigger, you are talking about how we can strengthen our 
relationship with Taiwan without going back to old doctrine or 
challenging the strategic ambiguity. And I want to say 
something before I ask you guys to answer.
    And, Ms. Kan, surely, you--I thought you and I were pretty 
much in alignment with everything we talked about.
    I do not want to look at the now so much as, how did we get 
to this point? If we go back to 1979 when Jimmy Carter got rid 
of the diplomatic relationships with Taiwan that led in to the 
strategic ambiguity that has caused us to do the Taiwan 
Relations Act, all these other things, the increased tension 
that we are getting when we sell military equipment to Taiwan 
from China, and if you go back to Robert Gates' book, the 
admiral of China vehemently opposed any more sales to Taiwan. 
And our representative says, ``Well, why? We have we have been 
doing this for years.'' This is what he said. He goes, ``You 
have. We were weak then; we are strong now.''
    All we have to do is kind of look at what Xi Jinping said 
in the 19th Communist Party Congress where ultimately his goal 
was world domination. We have seen him ignore the world norms 
in the South China Sea, lie saying they were not going to 
militarize those islands--I do not want to call them islands. 
That gives credibility to them--those land masses that they 
dredged up and destroyed coral reefs, they have militarized 
them.
    And then you saw the disregard for the British-Sino 
agreement on peaceful handing off of Hong Kong. After 22 and a 
half years, Xi Jinping says that is null and avoid; it does not 
matter. I think the writing is on the wall, and I do not want 
to do this in a lone approach that the U.S. says, ``All right, 
we are going to normalize diplomatic relations.'' I would like 
to do that, but I realize that puts us against China and puts 
Taiwan in the middle.
    And this is what I want to ask you. What do you think if we 
have this discussion, since we were part of forming the United 
Nations, as a world body of negotiating to prevent future 
conflicts to have a resolution brought up? You know, I think we 
are all in agreement, Taiwan has never been part of the PRC. In 
fact, China was run by the government of Taiwan before the 
Communists took over and beat them in the civil war. They have 
never been part of the Communist Party, nor do they desire to.
    I want to hear from you, what do you think if we started a 
movement to get Western democracy saying, ``You know what, we 
stand with Taiwan; China needs to have peaceful negotiations''? 
Ms. Glaser, do you want to start with that? And I realize it is 
a bold move.
    Ms. Glaser. Right. I will be brief so that others can chime 
in. But I actually completely agree with you that the way to 
bolster Taiwan's security is through multilateral mechanisms 
and cooperation with our allies and like-minded countries. One 
of the things I have suggested is that the G7 include a 
statement that Taiwan be returned to observer status in the 
World Health Assembly.
    Mr. Yoho. Right.
    Ms. Glaser. So the D-10, the group of democracies, is 
another potential grouping coalition. This is the one way that 
we can influence, I think, Chinese behavior, regardless of what 
Xi Jinping's ambitions are. I believe that we still can 
influence the way that they seek to approve these--to achieve 
these goals and the timeline for them.
    I do not believe that China has actually set a concrete, 
hard deadline for unification with Taiwan, for example. So we 
have tremendous ability, I think, to begin to shape China's 
decisionmaking regarding Taiwan and other issues, and the way 
forward, the way to do that is by working with like-minded 
countries with other democracies.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
    Dr. Rigger.
    Dr. Rigger. Agreed. Multilateralism is the way to go 
because Taiwan ultimately will not thrive if it has only one 
friend in the world.
    Mr. Yoho. Right.
    Dr. Rigger. And Taiwan has many friends. One thing that I 
would just point out is that the GCPF, a framework that was 
created by the U.S. and Taiwan together, has already begun to 
have really positive results in terms of creating relationships 
for Taiwan, nonofficial but very valuable substantive 
relationships with Taiwan beyond the U.S. and even beyond its 
immediate region. So, again, continuing to invigorate and 
invest in the GCPF is another thing we can do.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
    And, Chair, I will defer to you if you want Ms. Kan to 
respond.
    Mr. Bera. Sure, we can give Ms. Kan a chance to respond.
    Ms. Kan. So the U.S. leadership to broaden foreign support 
for Taiwan is really important for one reason: we have to 
disarm the People's Republic of China's political warfare. That 
permeates all the other challenges that we face, whether it is 
defense, deterrence, international organizations, Taiwan's 
economic resilience to withstand any coercion.
    And one of the best ways that we can disarm that political 
warfare is to hit back at this disinformation that China pushes 
at the United Nations and other places regarding how Taiwan is 
supposedly a status, has a status as a part of the PRC. And the 
best way to do this, I think, is to rebut China's 
disinformation by stating very clearly, setting the record that 
U.N. Resolution 2758 did not establish Taiwan as a part of 
China. It did not even mention Taiwan.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Yoho. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    And let me remind the members that, in order for me to call 
on them they have to be on the video pursuant to House rules.
    So let me go to my good friend from California, Congressman 
Brad Sherman, for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    A number of our witnesses have talked about how critical 
Taiwan is to the defense of Japan. Several of our witnesses 
have talked about increasing our military capacity in a 
substantial way to defend Taiwan, and we have enormous military 
budget. We have forces deployed around the world. Presumably 
our forces in Europe need to be in Europe. Presumably our 
forces in Africa and the Middle East need to be there. So it is 
not a matter of redeploying forces from elsewhere.
    So the question is, what is the price tag for a very 
substantial increase in our capacity to defend Taiwan? Is there 
any chance that taxpayers in Japan or Taiwan would be footing a 
major part of that bill? I will ask any witness who wants to 
respond. Do we have a response?
    Ms. Glaser. I will be happy to respond, Congressman 
Sherman. I think that Taiwan has increased the amount that it 
is spending on defense, but it is still not even at the 3 
percent of the GDP that both parties, the DPP and KMT, in 
Taiwan have Stated is an objective. But it is increasing under 
President Tsai Ing-wen.
    One of the challenges in Taiwan is the overall revenue that 
they take in from taxpayers. It is actually quite low, and so 
even 3 percent of GDP is not very significant. So, going 
forward, what I believe Taiwan needs to do is to expand the 
amount of revenue they are taking in from their taxpayers, and 
maybe that could create some potential for them to contribute 
more, which I hope that they will do.
    Japan contributes, of course, in many ways with a great 
deal of resources to supporting U.S. presence in the region.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    [Inaudible.] But obviously, we want Taiwan to spend 3 
percent on its defense. Obviously, Japan is a valued ally. But 
we are talking about tens or hundreds of billions of dollars 
that our witnesses are proposing be spent to increase American 
military capacities to defend Taiwan, and we have heard that--I 
have heard that described rhetorically, but I do not see a 
price tag.
    And I wonder how much of that, given the fact that you have 
said Taiwan is struggling just to pay for its own military
    [inaudible] And Japan is doing what you think is a lot, it 
seems like all that burden will fall on the American taxpayer, 
how much is it? I would like each witness who proposed 
massive--substantially--I will not say ``massive''--a 
significant increase in our military capacity to give some sort 
of price tag.
    Again, I think I will regard that as a rhetorical question 
and just go on to say that I applaud our witnesses and my 
colleagues for underlining the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship, and I have supported every effort to sell weapons 
to Taiwan and to bring Taiwan into international organizations.
    It is a democracy that would differ slightly from 
phraseology of some. I would not say a Western democracy 
because I do not think democracy is Western. I think democracy 
reflects universal human values. So I want to applaud 
especially our chair and our ranking member for the work they 
have taken to help bring Taiwan into the community of nations, 
and point out that a number of pieces of legislation that I 
worked with them on would provide for Taiwanese officials to 
visit the Washington, DC, area.
    We talk about building a better relationship with the 
Taiwanese government. One way to do that is to actually talk to 
them face-to-face, especially in the months to come when we 
hope face-to-face discussions with possible.
    With that, I will yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Congressman Sherman.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 
Perry.
    Mr. Perry. Hey, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you 
calling the hearing, Dr. Bera.
    Before I begin, I do wish to pay tribute to the outgoing 
ranking member of this committee, Mr. Yoho. And Ted has 
rendered a great service to our country.
    I think I speak on behalf of many of us on this committee 
who say thank you very much for everything you have done and 
the sacrifices you have made to do it, Ted. We are going to 
miss you.
    With that, I think we must begin to realize the provision 
within the TAIPEI Act that calls for Taiwanese membership in 
select international organizations in which Statehood is not a 
requirement and at least observer status in other appropriate 
global institutions.
    I believe that this commitment can do more to demonstrate 
our commitment to this goal and expand upon it. And it starts 
by elevating the position of director of the American Institute 
in Taiwan to an ambassador-level rank requiring the 
confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
    To this end, I am grateful to have joined my friend Mr. 
Chabot in advocating for this needed change. Alongside this 
effort, this committee I think should consider legislation 
designating the American Institute of Taiwan as the U.S. 
Embassy to Taiwan and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office as the Taiwanese Embassy to the United 
States.
    In light of this move, Representative Hsiao should be 
referred to as Ambassador in all official capacities and 
exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. These 
diplomatic measures demonstrate just a small fraction of our 
unwavering commitment to Taiwan that we will not be cowed by 
the Chinese Communist Party, and we will not allow the Beijing 
government to dictate our foreign policy as a sovereign nation.
    These measures show--would show the world the greatest 
nation on the planet, our Nation, values the relationship we 
share with Taiwan and encourages other countries and global 
organizations to do the same. Over the past few years, the U.S. 
has made an exerted effort to increase Taiwanese partnership 
participation in international institutions, but more needs to 
be done going forward.
    On one point, there can be no compromise: Taiwan must be 
afforded the full right to participate in the United Nations 
and all her constituent institutions, including the World 
Health Assembly. The President's Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Ambassador Kelly Craft, has already made this point, 
saying that the U.N. without Taiwan's full participation is 
actually cheating the world.
    And we can only speculate what would have happened had the 
World Health Organization listened to the exhortations of the 
Taiwanese medical professionals in late December of last year 
when they provided evidence to the World Health Organization 
and to the PRC that this new virus could be spread by human-to-
human transmission.
    It is absolutely farcical that so many across the globe 
believe that the world ought to listen to China, that it is 
perfectly acceptable for the CCP to sit on the U.N. Human 
Rights Council and to participate in the World Health Assembly 
as a respected State actor, but Taiwan somehow should be kept 
silent.
    I can think of really no clear example, quite honestly, of 
just moral cowardice. I do look forward to working with all my 
colleagues to make our partnership with Taiwan even stronger, 
and I am glad to turn to at least one question here.
    Ms. Kan, how have recent events in Hong Kong affected 
Taiwan's public views of China's proposed one country, two 
system arrangement for Taiwan and the views of China more 
broadly? I mean, I cannot imagine that they are not in a state 
of believing that China really--that the Communist Party 
actually believes that and would respect that agreement.
    Ms. Kan. Yes. So I think that the whole proposition of one 
China, two systems was a nonstarter in Taiwan to begin with. It 
was never applicable to Taiwan. Taiwan was already a sovereign 
country with a formal name of Republic of China for a long 
time.
    However, at the same time, what the PRC has done to Hong 
Kong has been to basically tear up that international agreement 
regarding one country, two systems, and so that continues to 
show that China's promises just cannot be something that we can 
accept. It is something that China breaks its own rules
    [inaudible] And that in itself has shown the people in 
Taiwan that they cannot continue to trust any kind of
    [inaudible] To be reciprocated from China.
    Mr. Perry. Well, thank you very much.
    And, Chairman, I will yield the balance of the time, but 
you can count me in on more strident measures against the 
Communist Party of China and more benevolent and friendly 
measures toward our friends in Taiwan. And I yield.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Mr. Perry.
    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. 
Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Chairman.
    I really appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses 
today. My questions have to do with my community. I am--my 
district is home to the mushroom capital of the world, and 
Mainland China has approached the industry more than a few 
times with an interest of doing partnerships in the mushroom 
industry in Mainland China.
    I am wondering what the prospects are for expanding U.S. 
exports to Taiwan in agriculture, like the mushroom industry, 
in industrial goods and services, and what sort of 
opportunities and challenges exist in each of these areas with 
respect to Taiwan?
    Dr. Rigger. I would be happy to lead off, if that is all 
right.
    Ms. Houlahan. That would be great. Thank you.
    Dr. Rigger. It is very interesting that you mention 
mushrooms because mushrooms actually play a significant role in 
Taiwan's economic history. Back in the immediate post-war era, 
one of the ways that Taiwan accelerated its economic 
development was through a really exceptional agricultural 
reform, and mushrooms were a major crop and a major cash crop 
for Taiwanese farmers that helped them break out of subsistence 
agriculture and become farmers who were exporting and all kinds 
of--especially to Japan and others in the region.
    So Taiwan--but today Taiwan is very much an importer of 
U.S. agricultural goods, and I honestly do not know whether 
they import mushrooms or not. But Taiwan is certainly a very 
significant customer for American agriculture because Taiwan is 
a very small and extremely crowded island. And while it has a 
vibrant agricultural sector, it is by no means adequate to 
serve the needs of Taiwan's people. So there is always more 
opportunity for agricultural exports to Taiwan, and Taiwanese 
people do love their mushrooms.
    However, one of the reasons that we are all advocating, I 
think, a more extensive and formalized bilateral trade 
agreement of some kind with Taiwan is precisely because there 
are some protectionist aspects to the Taiwanese economy. In 
agriculture, we saw the biggest barrier fall this summer, which 
was the barrier to U.S. meat imports, but Taiwan also has 
protectionist features in other aspects of its economy, 
including manufacturing and a lot of other things.
    I think that one of the real virtues of a bilateral trade 
negotiation process would be to create some external pressure 
on the Taiwan Government to help Taiwan's Government do what
    [inaudible] Already know needs to be done, which is to 
liberalize imports and to make Taiwan's market for friendly to 
imported goods.
    So, Taiwan definitely stands to benefit from trade 
negotiations, but the U.S. also stands to benefit, and Taiwan 
as well because liberalizing Taiwan's economy would be a good 
step for them too. So thank you for the question.
    Ms. Houlahan. Yes. If I could followup on that which is, of 
course, kind of trade relationships are a part of the 
conversation, but also there is part of the conversation which 
is having the Taiwanese invest more heavily in U.S. businesses 
and in areas where they perhaps--mushrooms is an example where 
they, perhaps, do not have the land mass to be able to work.
    What kind of policies can we ask for or look for to be able 
to have that happen because to be honest, quite frankly, the 
pull is from mainland China right now. The economic pull in 
that way and the economic investment paths in that way are 
coming from the mainland.
    Ms. Riggers. Well, most of my conversations about 
investment are with people in Taiwan, encouraging them to be 
more creative and innovative in their investment patterns.
    Taiwanese companies and individuals have accumulated a 
massive amount of wealth in the last 30 years or so as a result 
of their investments in mainland China. And they have not been 
super quick to turn that around into new business creation in 
Taiwan or elsewhere.
    So, again, I think this is something that American 
officials can usefully talk to the Taiwanese government about 
is, how can you get some of this cash out of the real estate 
market, for example, and into new business creation, foreign 
direct investment, as well as new investments in your own 
economy. It is definitely something that they need to work on.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I really appreciate your input.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Congresswoman Houlahan.
    I know we have had a few members drop off to go vote and we 
will recognize folks as they come back. But, I will recognize 
myself for a second round of questioning, and I know the 
ranking member also has a second question that he would like to 
ask. Any of the members who also do have second questions, we 
will come back to them.
    I guess for all the witnesses, one question that I would 
have, and certainly something that I think about with the 
incoming Biden Administration. They will take a much more 
multilateral approach to both entering into kind of the 
approaches they think about China and so forth.
    In just about every country we interact in the region, we 
do so understanding that country's relationship with China as 
well.
    I guess for the witnesses, as we are thinking about U.S. 
Taiwan relations in a multilateral way, what advice would you 
give both Congress, but also the incoming Administration, in 
trying to build that multilateral support for Taiwan because, 
again, I think that is the better approach as we are in this 
strategic competition with China, and maybe we will start with 
Ms. Glaser.
    Ms. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman Bera. 
You know, I think the first thing that needs to be pointed out 
is, of course, there is recognition around the world for 
Taiwan's extraordinary performance in controlling the spread of 
COVID-19.
    And this has already laid the groundwork for greater 
support for restoring Taiwan's observers in the World Health 
Assembly and enabling Taiwan to send its experts to the 
technical meetings of the World Health Organization which China 
has blocked in many, many cases.
    So if the United States is pursuing a policy that is 
consistent, that looks like it is, in fact, part of a larger 
strategy, if the United States is not seen as being too 
provocative toward China, and I do want to underscore that, if 
the Chinese think that the United States has totally abandoned 
its One China policy and is moving in a direction of ultimately 
recognizing the Republic of China, then we may be in a 
dangerous place.
    This is not what we want to create as an environment for 
other countries to join us in an effort to help Taiwan. So we 
have to be responsible and push forward those policies that 
other countries will get on board with so that we can expand 
Taiwan's participation in the international community.
    If we want Japan to be a good partner with us in 
conducting, for example, exercise that will signal that Japan 
might be on our side if there is a Chinese attack on Taiwan, 
that it might actually be actively engaged in a way to help 
defend Taiwan, then clearly, we have to be pursuing a policy 
that is seen by Japan as responsible.
    So there is, right now, broken support for Taiwan, I think, 
in many countries around the world, many of our allies. We 
should be doing the right things and setting an example. And if 
we negotiate, again, a free trade agreement with Taiwan, then 
maybe other countries will go forward and do the same.
    There is also the potential for a double taxation agreement 
that Taiwan is interested in and I think we would benefit from, 
so we have to be pursuing the right policies for others to get 
on board.
    Mr. Bera. So just to make sure, one area that does seem 
right to create some multilateral support for Taiwan obviously 
is in the COVID-19 space and their response and bringing them 
into some of the organizations that are developing alliances, 
that are developing around responding to COVID-19 and the virus 
and, making sure they have an active role in that.
    Maybe I will go to Dr. Riggers. Ms. Glaser touched on a 
free trade agreement and commerce, and I think both you and Ms. 
Kan have also touched on that as another potential tool to 
create multilateral support for Taiwan without necessarily 
diverting from the One China policy, in less threatening ways 
to help Taiwan increase its relationship.
    Dr. Riggers, what do you think about trade as a tool of 
also, creating and helping Taiwan participate?
    Ms. Riggers. Yes. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was 
controversial for many reasons, but one of the things that was 
built into it was the idea that as a trade agreement in the 
Asia-Pacific or the Pacific rim Nations, it had the potential--
one that was not dominated by China.
    The TPP had the potential to be a venue in which Taiwan 
could participate, right. Taiwan entered the WTO back in 2000 
with China. They simultaneously were able to enter. Since then, 
it has been really difficult for Taiwan. China has blocked 
Taiwan again and again and again from participation.
    So the TPP, the idea was that here was one that was led by 
the United States and other like-minded countries and would not 
be subject as easily to China's restrictions on Taiwan.
    So, there were plenty of reasons to dislike the TPP. In the 
last Presidential election, both major candidates opposed it, 
but I think that was an example of the kind of thing that needs 
to be done because getting Taiwan into organizations where 
China has veto power will be well-nigh, in my opinion, 
impossible. But creating new ones with--outside of China's 
sphere of power is a more plausible route to take.
    Mr. Bera. Ms. Kan, would you like to add?
    Ms. Kan. Yes. First of all, I want to talk about something 
that is overall important for the role of Congress, and that is 
explaining to the American people from the heartland all the 
way to the coasts and beyond why Taiwan matters, and that is 
something that is not often obvious.
    Connecting to the previous question about Japan, I think 
the first thing we can explain is that Taiwan's geostrategic 
position places it as the interlocking piece to fortify our 
U.S. allies to the north of Taiwan and to the south in the 
South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the East China Sea, 
all the way to the western Pacific.
    And speaking of the western Pacific, that is where we can 
have a more multilateral approach to the presence of Taiwan. 
And I am talking about linking the presence of Taiwan to our 
freely associated States. They are Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, and Palau. They have special relationships with the 
United States.
    Taiwan has four countries in the Pacific that recognize 
Taiwan as the Republic of China with diplomatic ties. We have a 
synergy there in the western Pacific to maintain our interests, 
and that is where congressional role comes in. The Compacts of 
Free Association are up for renewal, and that is where Congress 
can put its attention to whether or not to renew the COFA. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. I know that the ranking member is off voting, but 
he does want to ask a second question.
    Ms. Houlahan, do you have a second round of questions? I 
certainly, with this panel of experts, have multiple questions 
that I would like to ask.
    Ms. Houlahan. I do have, Chairman, Mr. Chairman, one more 
question.
    Could you or the witnesses tell us what we think or how we 
attribute the success of Taiwan in combating COVID? What is the 
secret sauce? Is there anything that we could be doing here in 
this Nation, lessons learned from them that we could be 
applying here in the United States?
    Ms. Riggers. Maybe I will start that one off too because I 
was in Taiwan when COVID started. I was actually in China when 
COVID really started. I was in China when Wuhan, the city of 
Wuhan, was locked down. And I was on a Fulbright last year, 
spent most of my time in Taiwan. I was supposed to send some 
time in China, but as soon as that happened, I started looking 
for a way out.
    And so I ended up going back to Taiwan and spending the 
time between late January and the beginning of April in Taiwan, 
and what I saw made perfect sense.
    First of all, at the first sign that there was a problem, 
Taiwan's leaders did not wait for confirmation from China or 
from the WHO. Taiwan's leaders immediately mobilized the plans 
that they had created after the SARS crisis in 2002 and put 
them into action. So they were very much operating on their own 
timetable and on their own judgment of what was going on in 
China.
    So the first thing they did was to restrict entry from 
China and to impose quarantine requirements on people entering 
from China. I got in on January 29. By January 31, there was a 
2-week quarantine requirement on everyone coming from the PRC.
    The second thing they did was to encourage people to wear 
masks. People throughout Asia, including Taiwan, normally wear 
masks when they are sick. It is considered a good hygiene 
practice, so it was not hard to get people to wear masks. And, 
in fact, the immediate reaction was a little bit of panic 
buying in the mask market.
    So the Taiwanese government took over the production and 
distribution of masks to ensure that everyone would have what 
they needed and that there would be no price gouging.
    The next thing they did was to implement widespread 
testing. Anybody who was concerned that they might have been 
exposed to COVID or had symptoms consistent with COVID could 
get tested, and thousands and thousands of people did get 
tested.
    There have been almost no cases, fewer than--about 50 cases 
of domestic transmission of COVID in Taiwan. All the other 
cases are imported, mostly Taiwanese people returning from 
overseas into a quarantine which then contained them while they 
were still infectious.
    But even though there was almost no domestic spread, there 
was still widespread testing, and everyone was encouraged to be 
tested. And though the testing sites were set up so that people 
did not have to interact with one another, everybody stayed 
outside, and they were called in for their test and then 
immediately released. And from February, Taiwan had rapid 
testing capabilities. So within 72 hours, you knew your testing 
status.
    The other--the one other thing that I thought was really 
interesting was, of course, contract--contact tracing. So all 
of those cases that were domestic transmission were traced back 
to the point of origin. I think there are fewer than five cases 
that they cannot explain how the person actually contracted 
COVID.
    And they made the quarantine requirements bearable for 
people by, for example, paying people to be in quarantine. So 
if you were coming back from the U.S.--a lot of young Taiwanese 
were returning from the U.S. when their colleges closed down. 
They flooded back to Taiwan, and they were supposed to stay in 
quarantine.
    And most of them just went to their parents' house, homes, 
and stayed there. But people who were coming from high-risk 
places like mainland China went into an official quarantine 
near the airport, a kind of hotel where you just stayed for 2 
weeks, but they were paid to stay there.
    They got about $100 a day to stay in this hotel so that 
they were not--they did not feel the pressure. I have got to 
get out and work because they were not losing income by 
complying with the quarantine. So in all of these ways, they 
have kept a handle on it.
    Most recently, there have been a lot of cases now coming in 
from southeast Asia, and this is putting pressure on the system 
because Taiwan relies on southeast Asian helpers for a lot of 
elder care and also child care.
    And there is a bit of tension between families that, need 
their helpers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and the public 
health authorities who are saying we cannot let folks in 
because the COVID infection rate is just too high in those 
places.
    But, there is not a secret sauce. It is all the stuff we 
know, that for whatever reason in this country, we did not do 
but they did at, 95 to 100 percent.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Let me recognize the ranking member, Mr. Yoho, 
for a second question.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this has been a very 
engaging conversation. And I think for the points that were 
just brought up about Taiwan, we have the
    [Inaudible] Place, it should be in the omnibus, that 
reinstates China--Taiwan into the World Health Assembly. And I 
think this is something, without going full bore and----
    I heard your testimoneys, Dr. Rigger, about, having U.N. 
veto authority to Taiwan. I know that is going to cause a 
problem. But I think if we do a lot of small steps, recognizing 
Taiwan in the World Health Assembly, and having countries 
around the world put pressure on that just for what you brought 
up, their great work that they have done to prevent COVID in a 
large way in their country.
    I think if we do enough of these things around the world 
and other countries backing us, it is going support that.
    If you look at Israel, Israel is out there by itself. We 
are their strongest ally, but now we are seeing other countries 
come to the table, with the Abraham Accords. This is my vision 
for what I would like to accomplish, what I would like for the 
U.S. Government to accomplish, that kind of leadership where 
you get other countries to come in.
    And if you guys can suggest any other things that we could 
do, I would love to hear it, and I will end my questioning.
    Ms. Kan. I can start. Yes. I can start to respond to that 
question about Taiwan at the United Nations and the 
international organizations.
    First of all, we have to hit back at the disinformation 
that somehow the so-called One China principle at the U.N. as 
defined by China will prevent Taiwan from participating in the 
United Nations' specialized organizations and other 
international organizations. And this is the insidious, 
distorted narrative that is bolstered by China's information 
without any rebuttals.
    And U.S. leadership is needed, specifically from our 
Ambassador at the United Nations, to set the international 
record straight that the General Assembly Resolution 2758, 
2758, did not settle the status of Taiwan.
    It restored the right of China, specifically, the PRC, to 
be in the United Nations and expel the so-called 
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. But nowhere, nowhere in 
that resolution did the United Nations or the international 
community determine the status of Taiwan.
    In fact, Taiwan was not even mentioned in this resolution, 
so how can this resolution be used to keep Taiwan out of 
international organizations? And when this Administration led a 
very, very high profile campaign to get Taiwan into 
participation at the World Health Organization, led by 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo----
    It lacked a missing piece, and that was the failure to 
mention that 2758 cannot be used to keep Taiwan out of 
international organizations. Thank you.
    Ms. Glaser. I would just add very briefly that it is 
notable that in the recent meeting of COVAX, under WHO, China 
did not step in to block Taiwan's participation, and so that 
shows that Beijing recognizes that the global community is 
supporting Taiwan at this moment.
    And so if we can sustain that momentum and use this support 
from our like-minded countries and democracies and just 
continue to include Taiwan in the WHO.
    I personally am pleased that the President-Elect has said 
that the United States will not withdraw from the World Health 
Organization. There are issues with the WHO, and China's 
influence, its undue influence in the operations of that 
organization which I hope can be fixed going forward, but we 
have to be a member in order to influence the WHO going 
forward.
    So I think that is one example of Taiwan
    [Inaudible] COVAX is a good one.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Yoho? So it looks like we lost Ted's audio, 
so----
    Ted, are you back on?
    Mr. Yoho. Can you hear me?
    Mr. Bera. We can, yes. Go ahead.
    Mr. Yoho. I apologize. Did you get any of that?
    Mr. Bera. No. We did not get the last question.
    Mr. Yoho. Well, I think that that is the direction we 
should go. And if we can get China to honor the one country, 
two systems, and leave Taiwan alone, I think the world will be 
a better place. Taiwan will definitely be better off.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks for that, Congressman Yoho.
    I am going to recognize myself just for a quick followup 
question. You know, something that Dr. Riggers touched on 
earlier was the Taiwanese people participation in their own 
military.
    Dr. Riggers, I am assuming that they do not have a formal 
draft or mandatory service in that case, and that is a 
volunteer army and volunteer----
    Ms. Riggers. Actually, Taiwan has mandatory military 
service for men. And in recent years, they have been 
transitioning to an all-volunteer military. They felt that the 
system of conscription was not actually providing 
professionalism and--nor at affordable cost needed and for a 
sort of contemporary, 21st century military force.
    But they are having a great deal of difficulty meeting 
recruitment targets, so they have been extending--shrinking the 
length of time that men have to serve but extending the 
compulsory military service beyond when they thought, I think, 
they were going to be able to switch to all volunteer.
    Mr. Bera. And if I just played off of that, in 
understanding some of the domestic pressures that we see here 
in the United States, I think they are reflected in the Trump 
Administration policy for the United States not defending the 
entire world. And we see that in our conversations with our 
great--our allies in the Republic of Korea. We certainly see 
that in, the push for NATO Nations to pay their fair share.
    I have a sense that, while very much I think that the Biden 
Administration and most Members of Congress want to see U.S. 
global leadership around the world and, the world is a safer 
place with the United States engaged, I also think where our 
domestic population is, and potentially where, Congress is 
starting to shift. We also want to see those nations, doing 
their fair share of devoting resources to their own defense, 
their own population stepping up to be prepared to defend their 
own nations as well with the United States in partnership.
    Do you have some suggestions for how we approach that with 
Congress? One is, certainly getting them, I think, and maybe 
this is for Ms. Glaser as well, really encouraging Taiwan to 
invest their own resources in their own defense.
    Ms. Riggers. Well, I think Bonnie would have a lot to say 
about that. I would just point out that, President Tsai is 
definitely working on this issue and that U.S.-Taiwanese 
military cooperation is at a high point, at a high level today. 
And that unlike previous Administrations in Taiwan, the Tsai 
Administration is really open to this kind of cooperation and 
collaboration, seeking ways to make Taiwan's own military 
capacity more sufficient.
    And some of that has to do with the overall defense concept 
that Shirley Kan mentioned earlier which has to do with the 
sort of the strategic nature of Taiwan's defense preparations, 
but some of it too has to do with kind of changing the attitude 
that Taiwanese people have toward military service.
    So, for example, we have seen President Tsai in a helmet 
and camouflage more than any president of Taiwan since Chiang 
Kai-Shek. She is out there interacting with the troops, 
visiting installations, showing her public that this is 
important, and it is something she values. And I think that is 
really--that is the first step is recognizing that they have a 
real military threat and recognizing that smart, capable, 
ambitious people can look at military service as a worthwhile 
career and life choice.
    But Bonnie probably has better answers than that.
    Mr. Bera. Ms. Glaser.
    Ms. Glaser. Adding to your remarks, Shelley, which I agree 
with, what Taiwan does not have is a whole of society effort 
supporting their defense. And given the threat that it faces, 
this is truly remarkable. We look at countries like South Korea 
that is under a great threat from North Korea or Israel being 
another good example and having a whole of society effort that 
signals their determination to defend their country. And this 
is something that Taiwan really needs to cultivate.
    An important part of that is rebuilding their reserves, and 
this is something that, again, President Tsai Ing-wen has 
indicated her support for and I know the Department of Defense 
is continuing to push for.
    But the military in Taiwan actually does not really--has 
not provided great buy in for rebuilding their reserves. If the 
PLA actually lands on the beach, takes over ports and 
airfields, then the reserves have to be the next line of 
defense, and they have to be willing and able to work with the 
military and also potentially with the public.
    So, I mean, I would like to see ways in which we can help 
them, maybe through our National Guard, to explain to them how 
we do things, but the United States may not be the best model 
for Taiwan. They should be looking at countries like Israel, 
maybe Singapore, as examples of how to build an all of society 
effort.
    So this is something that is cultural, as Shelley just 
indicated. There is not a lot of support for the military. 
There is not a good civil-military relationship in Taiwan. So 
these are things that, really, they are not going to change 
overnight, but they really need to be made priorities in 
Taiwan.
    Mr. Bera. Right. Ms. Kan, do you want to say anything?
    Ms. Kan. Hi. Yes. I wrote into my testimony that this is 
one of the areas we need to have a discussion with Taiwan in 
order to reduce divergence.
    The Congress has been emphasizing to Taiwan since 2016 in 
legislation and other actions to reform its reserves. And now 
Taiwan's Ministry of Defense just said it is not even going to 
start to reform its reserves until 2022.
    And back to the discussion about the defense budget. Under 
current exchange rates, Taiwan's defense budget is about $12.5 
billion U.S. dollars. But more importantly, it is only about 
1.8 percent of GDP. Now, I understand full well that Taiwan 
also has what is called a special budget to buy large systems 
such as the F-16 fighters and such as submarines. But when we 
look at the one indicator of the defense budget, and when we 
compare it to other countries like South Korea that also faces 
an existential threat, it is a bipartisan consensus in this 
government, both with Democrats and with Republicans, that 
Taiwan's defense budget is insufficient, and specifically 
insufficient in terms of reallocation within the budget in 
order to fund this overall defense concept.
    Concerning the volunteer force, it is a misnomer, I 
believe, to call it an all-volunteer force. There is just no 
way that Taiwan can have an all-volunteer force. It is trying 
to shift to have less conscription and more volunteers.
    But this was a strategic blunder by the previous Ma Ying-
jeou Administration to do away with this full--full force with 
conscription just like South Korea, for example. There was a 
misunderstanding under the previous Administration that somehow 
this was safe money.
    As we know in our own superior military force, personnel 
costs in the military are quite high within our defense budget. 
In order to fund a professional military like ours that is 
superior, we need to have greater funding of personnel, 
especially. President Tsai may understand this. She may do 
more, but she really needs to put more of her own efforts as 
the commander in chief in order to guide Taiwan's military and 
not delegate so much.
    Why? I have written the reason is because we have certain 
differences in our military culture. And it takes leadership, 
it takes the commander in chief in order to play the role to 
bridge our different military cultures in order to reduce the 
divergences. We need a reset in our military-to-military 
relationships. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    And I want to thank all of the witnesses for their 
excellent testimony. Certainly, as we go into the 117th 
Congress, this is a topic that we will revisit and certainly 
look forward to continuing to work with the witnesses.
    Given that this is the ranking member, Mr. Yoho's, final 
hearing, I do not know, Ted, if you are still on, if you would 
like to make any final closing comments and thoughts and 
reflections.
    Mr. Yoho. Yes, I do. I mean, can you hear me?
    Mr. Bera. We can, yes.
    Mr. Yoho. No. I really appreciate the three witnesses. You 
guys did a fantastic job. And, Ami, our friendship and your 
leadership--I have been impressed with your leadership and, 
value our friendship very much, and it has been an honor to 
have this last meeting.
    I just want to--I have to plug the TIPA bill that we 
introduced, the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act. We have got 
Members already wanting to pick it up next Congress. It 
addresses a lot of the things that you talked about: military 
readiness, increasing the amount of time that they spend in the 
military, working together with our military and other like-
minded countries' military. It puts the emphasis on putting 
more money into their military for buying the right kind of 
defensive equipment and not wasting it on tanks and stuff like 
that.
    And it also encourages other countries in the Indo-Pacific 
to do the same thing. It promotes a free trade agreement and 
high level State visits between our government and the 
government of Taiwan and the invite of President Tsai over here 
and other high diplomats.
    This is something, I think--if we get this on, and we have 
other countries around the world to do similar things, I think 
we can have a peaceful resolution of the relationships between 
Taiwan and China and the rest of the world.
    With that, Mr. Speaker, I am off. We will see you later, 
and this is my last meeting. Goodbye.
    Mr. Bera. Well, great. And thanks, Ted, for promoting me to 
Speaker of the House.
    Anyways, it has been great serving with you. We will stay 
in touch and certainly want you to stay active in, these issues 
that we have worked on and, look forward to the next chapter of 
your service to our country.
    With that, I want to thank the witnesses for participating 
in this very important virtual hearing, and the hearing is now 
adjourned.
    Ms. Kan. Thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing.
    Ms. Glaser. Thank you again, Congressman Bera, for your 
service and for holding the hearing and inviting me to 
testifying today.
    Ms. Riggers. That goes for me too on all three fronts.
    Mr. Bera. Absolutely. Thank you, and everyone be safe. Be 
well.
    Ms. Kan. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Bye-bye.
    [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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