    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDURING
                              BONDS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND
                                 NONPROLIFERATION

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               December 10, 2020

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-140

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                                docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    42-495 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023

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                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    		ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California	             LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota		     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas    		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

    	    Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                 Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

             Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation

                        AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
    GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
    ANDY LEVIN. Michigan
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia

                                         SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
                                         ANN WAGNER, Missouri
                                         BRIAN MAST, Florida
                                         JOHN CURTIS, Utah

                        Nikole Burroughs, Staff Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Glaser, Ms. Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the
      China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and
      International Studies..........................................     7
    Rigger, Dr. Shelley, Brown Professor of Political Science,
      Davidson College...............................................    18
    Kan, Ms. Shirley, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Retired
      Specialist at yhe Congressional Research Service...............    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    51
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    52
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    53

                       STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    54

     TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES: ENDURING BONDS IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY

                          Thursday, December 10, 2020

                              House of Representatives,
                Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
                                       Nonproliferation
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC,

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m.,
    via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.
        Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
    Nonproliferation will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
    5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
    for the record, subject to the length limitation of the rules.
    To insert something into the record, please have your staff
    email the previously mentioned address or contact full
    committee staff.
        Please keep your video function on at all times, even when
    you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible
    for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute
    yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with H.Res. 965
    and the accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members
    and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under
    recognition to eliminate background noise.
        I see we have a quorum and will now recognize myself for
    opening remarks. Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing
    to discuss the current state of U.S.-Taiwanese relations and
    the way forward.
        I want to take a moment before I go into my opening
    statement. This is the last hearing of the Subcommittee for
    Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, and I want to thank
    the committee members for their active participation. If we
    think back, our first hearing, back on February 6, was the
    first hearing Congress had on what at that time was called a
    novel coronavirus. It did not have a name. Obviously, today we
    know it as COVID-19.
        And this has been a great subcommittee, very active, and I
    believe that we were the most active subcommittee in terms of
    briefings, hearings, roundtables during this virtual phase of
    Congress over the last 9 months. So I really want to thank the
    subcommittee members, the participants just for their active
    engagement in what is going to be obviously a very vibrant
    subcommittee as we go into the 117th Congress.
        I also want to just take a moment to recognize my good
    friend and my classmate, the ranking member, Congressman Ted
    Yoho. He is retiring from Congress. And, Ted, it has been
    wonderful just working with you, getting to know you. The
    various pieces of legislation that we have been able to put
    together from the authorization of CEPI and just watching you
    over these last few years when we have been in Congress on the
    Foreign Affairs Committee traveling with you. I think you and I
    traveled with Chairman Royce to Taiwan. So that certainly is
    timely with regards to this hearing.
        And then finally, you have been a champion on Taiwan. And,
    I am glad that we are able to close out this Congress with a
    hearing on the relations between the United States and Taiwan
    but also what is happening with regards to Taiwan and the
    People's Republic of China.
        With that, let me go ahead and just jump into my opening
    statement. I will keep it short because I also know votes may
    get called at 7:30, and people will be going in and out to get
    their votes--or virtually going in and out.
        So, with regards to the U.S.-Taiwan relations, I understand
    our relations can be complicated. But what is not complicated
    is the closeness of the people-to-people relationship between
    the United States and Taiwan. What is not complicated are the
    shared values that we have with Taiwan and the deep, enduring
    ties that we have with Taiwan.
        And the nature of Taiwan is not complicated. It is a
    resilient democracy, a thriving economy, a vibrant society. And
    that is confirmed in their response to COVID-19, which has been
    dramatic. Despite their proximity to Mainland China, Taiwan
    mobilized quickly. They had learned lessons from previous
    outbreaks, like SARS in 2003, and to date they have only seen
    about 700 cases and suffered just 7 deaths. That is quite
    remarkable, and that is a testimony to the people of Taiwan.
        When we think about the relationship between Taiwan, the
    PRC, and the U.S., we cannot ignore that Taiwan's most relevant
    relationship is that with the People's Republic of China. And
    it is our policy and longstanding U.S. policy for the
    resolution of disputes between Taiwan and the PRC to be arrived
    at peacefully with ascent of the people of Taiwan, as Taiwan is
    a democracy.
        This resolution process should take place between Taiwan
    and the PRC only. We should not entangle this dispute with
    other issues we may have with the PRC. That said, recent
    military actions by the PRC do not enhance the relationships
    and actively undermine global opinions of the PRC.
        The aims of this hearing will examine the current state of
    U.S.-Taiwan relations and its future. This is a critical time
    for the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and
    it is time where we have to show the closeness of that
    relationship.
        The Trump Administration and Congress has done much to
    advance closer ties in recent years, but we need to make sure
    we are advancing both our interests and those of Taiwan and the
    Taiwanese people. This is particularly important as we address
    the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of climate change
    and other issues that we will have to work together as a global
    community.
        So as we explore, I will look forward to hearing from the
    witnesses, but what actions should the incoming Administration
    take with regards to Taiwan, and how can we advance and address
    these challenges like pandemics and climate change together?
        I am an optimist. I believe Taiwan's future is bright. Its
    strength lies in its people, its strong society, and its
    values. I am hopeful for a future for Taiwan that continues to
    be prosperous, peaceful, and secure, that welcomes Taiwan into
    the global community.
        And, with that, I will conclude by how I began: Taiwan and
    the United States remain closer than ever.
        Let me go ahead and, I now yield 5 minutes to my good
    friend from Florida, our ranking member, Representative Yoho,
    for any opening comments he may have.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Chairman Bera, for holding this
    hearing today, the last one I will be participating in as a
    Congressman, as I do retire. And it has been an honor to work
    with you this year as ranking member. Your leadership has been
    great, as you talked about, the COVID hearings that we have
    had; in fact, you had two of those, and they were very timely,
    and I know we had to push back against State Department, and we
    did, and it was great. And I am confident that the work of this
    subcommittee will continue to remain in good hands going into
    the next Congress.
        Over the past decade, changing circumstances in the Indo-
    Pacific have greatly influenced our forming relationships with
    Taiwan as a regional partner. Just as we have witnessed
    external threats from China as it pairs military intimidation
    with economic and diplomatic isolation, we have also seen
    Taiwan rise to the challenge by increasing its commitments to
    defense, providing the world with vital global health
    contributions during this pandemic, and making strides to
    deepen this economic cooperation with trade partners. In
    addition, they have very effective foreign development programs
    helping developing countries grow their economies.
        It is time for the U.S. to create a new strategy in regards
    to our relationship with Taiwan. We need experts with firsthand
    experience to deal with Taiwan's renewed importance. They are
    an island nation of 23-plus million people, our tenth largest
    trading partner, a vibrant and functional democracy, and they
    deserve the respect, not just from us but from all Western
    democracies that believe in liberties and freedom.
        This past year, I introduced Taiwan Fellowship Act, along
    with Chairman Bera, which establishes a 2-year fellowship
    exchange program for Federal employees to live and work in
    Taiwan. At the end of their stay, fellows return to the Federal
    Government--their service in the Federal Government better
    positioned to advance U.S. values and interests in the Indo-
    Pacific region with a special emphasis on strengthening our
    strategy partnership with Taiwan.
        This partnership legislation is essential to shoring up our
    long-term approach to Taiwan and the region at large. However,
    we must also act quickly and decisively to meet the immediate
    challenges before us. This includes addressing the looming
    threat of military invasion by the PLA, their forces across the
    Taiwan Strait, and the increasing likelihood of military
    conflict in the area.
        Neither of our countries want bloodshed, but because
    miscalculations, miscommunications invite conflict, we must
    embrace a new strategic clarity where we clearly articulate the
    U.S. position on Taiwan. And this should not be America alone.
    This should be all Western democracies standing up to stand up
    for Western--or any country that has a Western democracy and
    enforce the red lines over the island and order shared capacity
    for deterrence.
        For these reasons, I introduced the Taiwan Invasion
    Prevention Act over the summer, which would authorize a
    President to defend Taiwan with U.S. Armed Forces in the event
    of an attack by the PLA. We are stressing that all negotiations
    need to be done peacefully.
        Additionally, this bill instructs agency officials at the
    highest level to improve our defense coordination with Taiwan
    and invite our regional allies into shared cooperation and
    defensive exercise. We do not invite conflict again, but we
    must show that we are prepared for it.
        One neglected front we can improve is U.S.-Taiwan ties
    outside of defenses through trade. Members of Congress have
    overwhelmingly supported the negotiation of the FTA with our
    tenth largest trading partner, Taiwan, for years.
        Recently, at great political cost to her party, President
    Tsai Ing-wen lifted restrictions on beef and pork imports, the
    last major hurdle in trade friction between our two countries
    as a sign of good faith and spurring free trade talks. Yet, so
    far, this Administration has done very little to pursue an FTA.
    Instead, USTR is preoccupied with preserving a phase 1 trade
    deal with China that Beijing has failed in every measure to
    live up to.
        A U.S.-Taiwan FTA between two enthusiastic trade partners
    would bring incredible benefits to both of our economies.
    United States should move to immediately start TIFA talks with
    Taiwan in order to eventually secure a bilateral trade
    agreement. Failing to initiate talks with Taiwan damages trade
    relations, not only with our country but also with Taiwan's
    other trade partners who awaiting on the United States to make
    the first move initiating their free FTA talks with Taiwan.
    Neglecting one of our strongest trade partners as they face
    economic strangulation is not just misguided; it is incredibly
    dangerous.
        And I want to end again by thanking Chairman Bera and all
    the members on the committee that I have had the honor to serve
    for holding this hearing. Everyone else has worked with me over
    the years to get to this point. Serving as chairman and ranking
    member of this subcommittee has been an honor of my lifetime,
    and I am incredibly grateful to my colleagues for their working
    together to produce some truly incredible legislation. And I
    know this subcommittee will continue to be guided by great
    leadership and look forward to seeing the work that it will
    accomplish in the future, and I thank you.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Yoho.
        I also just want to take a quick moment before I introduce
    the witnesses to applaud your staff, Colin Timmerman, Bryan
    Burack, and Allison Turk for the great work that they have
    done.
        And then also my subcommittee staff, Nikole Burroughs, Ryan
    Uyehara, and Shervin Taheran for the work they have done.
        So, we are only as good as the staff that we have.
        Mr. Yoho. I tell you what, we have been blessed with great
    staff.
        Mr. Bera. We have. Well, great. Let me now introduce our
    witnesses. Our witnesses for today's hearing are Ms. Bonnie
    Glaser, Dr. Shelley Rigger, and Ms. Shirley Kan. I would like
    to thank all our witnesses for being here today.
        Ms. Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and director
    of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies and a friend of this committee. Dr.
    Shelley Rigger is the Brown professor of political science at
    Davidson College. And, finally, Ms. Shirley Kan is a specialist
    in Asian security affairs and worked at the congressional
    Research Service from 1990 to 2015.
        I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes, and
    without objection, your prepared written statements will be
    made part of the record. I will first call on Ms. Glaser for
    her testimony.
        Ms. Glaser.

     STATEMENT OF BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR ADVISER FOR ASIA, DIRECTOR
    OF CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Ms. Glaser. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you so much
    for the opportunity to testify before you today on the topic of
    U.S.-Taiwan relations.
        Taiwan's security and prosperity are critically important
    to the United States. It is in U.S. interest to help create an
    environment in which Taiwan can continue to protect its
    freedoms and further consolidate its democracy so it can set an
    example to China and the entire world about the resilience of
    democratic values in the face of Chinese intimidation.
        Taiwan's importance to U.S. economic prosperity and
    competitiveness is significant and growing. Taiwan is now the
    ninth largest trading partner of the United States, and
    strengthening innovation to ensure that our country remains a
    leader in the strategic technologies of the 21st century will
    be aided by deepening supply chain and R&D integration with
    Taiwan.
        I completely agree with Ranking Member Yoho, a U.S.-Taiwan
    free trade agreement would promote security and economic growth
    for the United States, Taiwan, and the Indo-Pacific as a whole.
    Taiwan's geographic position makes it central to the
    competition for power and influence in the Indo-Pacific. It
    sits in the middle of the first island chain, stretches from
    Japan to the Philippines.
        Taiwan is part of a strategically important barrier to
    Chinese power projection. Chinese occupation of Taiwan would
    enable the PLA to operate more freely in the Pacific and put
    Japan's security in jeopardy. The United States must shore up
    deterrence by making credible the U.S. military's ability to
    intervene if Taiwan comes under attack.
        Over the past 4 years, the Trump Administration has
    implemented policies toward Taiwan that have generally
    strengthened bilateral relations. Arms sales, support for
    Taiwan's participation in international organizations,
    democracy promotion, religious freedom programs, high-level
    visits, and of course public statements of support for Taiwan's
    achievements, such as combating the spread of COVID-19, all of
    these steps have bolstered U.S.-Taiwan ties and increased the
    confidence of Taiwan's government and public in the United
    States. The Taiwan Travel Act, the Asia Reassurance Initiative
    Act, the TAIPEI Act demonstrated that Taiwan has steadfast
    support from the U.S. Congress.
        In some cases, however, Trump Administration policies
    toward Taipei have imposed costs on Taiwan. Some actions
    appeared intended primarily to irritate Beijing. Decisions with
    potentially significant consequences for Taiwan's security were
    sometimes taken without consulting the Tsai Ing-wen
    Administration.
        And since Taiwan is invariably the target of Chinese
    retaliatory actions, it is essential to coordinate closely with
    Taipei prior to any shift in U.S. approach to cross-strait
    issues. Symbolic actions are absolutely sometimes needed to
    provide reassurance to Taiwan's government and public, but the
    central focus of U.S. policy should be on substantive actions
    that meaningfully enhance Taiwan's security and prosperity.
    Making public aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in
    sensitive areas, I think, should be done only careful, cost-
    benefit calculation.
        The incoming Biden Administration will inherit a robust
    U.S.-Taiwan relationship with potential for further growth in
    the coming years. The U.S. and Taiwan share a similar vision of
    secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific that is buttressed by the
    rules-based international order. Both are concerned about
    China's growing use of political, economic, and military
    coercion, the expansion of its military capabilities,
    disinformation, political interference, and illicit practices
    to procure advanced technology.
        Under President Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, Taiwan can be
    counted on to be a reliable and effective partner, and the U.S.
    must consistently treat Taiwan as a valued partner not a weapon
    to be used in its competition with China. A guiding principle
    of U.S. policy toward Taiwan should be do no harm.
        Rising concern about China's strategic ambitions creates
    opportunities to build a coalition of like-minded countries to
    support Taiwan's participation in international organizations.
    To secure the backing of U.S. allies in this endeavor,
    Washington must pursue predictable policies that contribute to
    cross-strait and regional stability.
        CSIS recently issued a report titled ``Toward a Stronger
    U.S.-Taiwan Partnership,'' and the report is a product of a
    bipartisan task force, which I co-chaired, and it examines the
    state of U.S.-Taiwan relations and provides actionable policy
    recommendations in the areas of defense and economics and
    diplomacy for the coming 4 years and beyond. Some of those key
    recommendations are included in my written testimony, which I
    hope you will take a look at.
        And thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today for this very important hearing.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Glaser.
        Now let me go ahead and call on Dr. Rigger for her
    testimony.

     STATEMENT OF DR. SHELLEY RIGGER, BROWN PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
                       SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE

        Dr. Rigger. Thank you very much to the chairman and to the
    ranking member and to the members of the committee, and also to
    my good friend Bonnie Glaser for saying most of the things that
    needed to be said.
        One thing that Bonnie did not say is that as no less an
    authority than Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen herself has
    pointed out, U.S.-Taiwan relations are, and quoting President
    Tsai, at their best in decades. It is popular to attribute that
    progress to the U.S., but the truth is, without a willing
    partner in Taiwan, improvements in U.S.-Taiwan relations would
    be much more limited.
        My written testimony provides a detailed explanation of how
    Taiwan's position has evolved over the past dozen years. But to
    summarize, President Tsai's predecessor, President Ma Ying-
    jeou, valued the U.S. but he prioritized constructive ties with
    the People's Republic of China. Ma believed that the best way
    to ensure Taiwan's security was to minimize friction with the
    PRC while protecting Taiwan's autonomy and democracy.
        Ma was able to make significant breakthroughs in relations
    with the PRC, and his Administration also saw positive progress
    in relations with the U.S., including creating the Global
    Cooperation and Training Forum, or GCTF, in 2015, which has
    become a powerful framework for Taiwan to assist other
    countries and to expand its unofficial diplomacy.
        Taiwan's electorate affirmed President Ma's approach to
    Taiwan's external relations when it reelected him in 2012, but
    in 2016, Taiwanese voted for a new strategy, one that placed a
    lower priority on engagement with the mainland.
        President Tsai has never sought confrontation with the PRC.
    Nonetheless, the PRC refuses to work with her, and the result
    has been a rebalancing of Taiwan's policy to prioritize
    relations with the U.S. That opened the door on the Taiwan side
    for the developments we have seen in the years since.
        How can we sustain the momentum that has been created under
    the Tsai Administration and the Trump Administration, which is
    largely concurrent with Tsai's Presidency. Taiwan shows that
    the ideas Americans treasure are not ours alone, that Chinese
    heritage is not a barrier to democracy, and that market
    economics in a free society can nurture widespread prosperity
    and progress.
        I agree with Bonnie that Americans must not treat Taiwan as
    an instrument of U.S. policy or a weapon to be deployed to
    frustrate the PRC's rise. Treating Taiwan as an end in itself
    not as a tool for others to use is one of the strengths of the
    legislation Congress has passed in recent years, and it is also
    what differentiates our policy toward Taiwan from the PRC's.
        We also need to remember that the enemy of my enemy is my
    friend is not how U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations work. Taiwanese do
    not want to be absorbed into the PRC, but they do not want a
    hostile relationship with Beijing either, nor do they want to
    be pulled into conflicts between Washington and Beijing.
        Taiwan is most prosperous and secure when U.S.-Taiwan
    relations are stable. When Washington and Beijing manage their
    disagreements, the space for Taiwan expands, and when they are
    at loggerheads, Taiwan gets squeezed.
        My testimony also includes several concrete steps the U.S.
    can take: engaging Taiwan in meaningful economic discussions,
    as has already been mentioned twice; advocating for and
    normalizing Taiwan's role in international organizations.
    Exiting the World Health Organization surrendered one of
    Washington's most fruitful avenues in this regard, but this
    should not be the end of the road for Taiwan's international
    participation, especially given its extraordinary performance
    in taming the COVID epidemic.
        I think we also need to avoid rhetorical solutions that
    sound good but might have unintended consequences. We also need
    to work with Taiwan to create opportunities for Taiwanese and
    American officials to understand one another's interests, and
    on this front, I would reiterate the support for the Taiwan
    Fellowship Act, which is currently pending before this body
    with your sponsorship.
        Finally, I think it is extremely important that we ensure
    that Taiwan remains, as it has always been, a bipartisan
    priority in the United States. It does not serve Taiwan to
    become a pet project of either U.S. political party.
        Finally, the most powerful thing the United States could do
    right now to support and strengthen Taiwan and other young
    democracies is to affirm our own commitment to democracy by
    respecting the will of the American people and upholding the
    integrity of our own institutions.
        Again, thank you very much, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Rigger follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Dr. Rigger, for your testimony.
        I will now call on Ms. Kan for her testimony.

    STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY KAN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN SECURITY AFFAIRS,
        RETIRED SPECIALIST AT THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Ms. Kan. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Yoho, all Members of
    Congress, I appreciate the invitation to testify at this
    hearing appropriately on Human Rights Day. Congress was
    brilliant in passing the TRA without the benefit of hindsight.
    Now congressional oversight of the TRA is even more critical
    for three reasons: First, U.S. policy must counteract the CPC's
    growing challenges to peace and freedom.
        First, the U.S. and Taiwan can ensure that the PLA's
    strategy of incremental intimidation will fail. Second,
    Congress could sustain stronger ties given the uncertainty
    about Biden's policy. The U.S. has strengthened this
    partnership to safeguard our geostrategic interests. As one
    indicator, this Administration has now notified Congress of
    arms sales worth $18.3 billion so far. Nonetheless, the dollar
    amount is not the most important factor.
        Congress had to deal with whether Presidents Bush and Obama
    adhered to the TRA. From his first year in office, Obama did
    not propose arms sales in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016.
    This Administration repaired a broken arms sales process to get
    regular notifications to Congress. In short, there are no more
    packages to delay multiple pending arms sales.
        Also, this Administration allows more flag and general
    officers to visit Taiwan, and Assistant Secretary of State Dave
    Stilwell was the first U.S. official to reiterate the six
    assurances. Now the question is whether Biden will reverse the
    progress and return to minimized contacts under Obama. There
    should not be a major rollback because this Administration had
    to repair the relationship and respond to China. The NSC, DoD,
    and State Department have been clear and strong but not
    reckless and radical.
        Third, Congress could fill in the gaps in explaining our
    strategic objective. A relationship is not the objective. I
    think that we seek a strong and democratic Taiwan so that it
    deters the PLA, remains a force for freedom in the global
    balance of power, and has a future with a peaceful resolution
    without the U.S. military entering into a conflict.
        Congress has options to tackle divergences or weaknesses to
    help sustain our strategic interests. Also, I emphasize that
    the TRA embodies mutual obligations not U.S.-only ones. One,
    Congress could call for a reset of our military engagement to
    reduce the divergence over Taiwan's overall defense concept for
    a credible, cost-effective deterrent. Taiwan's top military
    leaders ought to fund and implement the ODC for asymmetric
    advantage and engage with U.S. military leaders, including flag
    and general officers.
        Two, we have trade-related gaps. Although Taiwan is our
    five largest trading partner, Congress could urge the USTR to
    resume right away the TIFA talks, which have been suspended
    since 2016. Congress could call for a bilateral trade agreement
    before Biden sets his overall policy on trade. Our partnership
    with Taiwan is unique, so let's apply that logic to a BTA
    before others.
        I am now optimistic about a BTA because of a key
    development. For so many years, we have worked on this dispute,
    but now President Tsai recently announced that Taiwan will
    remove trade barriers to our beef and pork. Taiwan is doing the
    right thing for reciprocity and reliability as a partner.
        So, in closing, Congress could preserve the progress and
    fill in the gaps in our partnership. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Kan follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Kan, for your testimony.
        I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each, and
    pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes
    of questioning our witnesses. Because of the virtual format of
    this hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority,
    alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your
    turn, please let our staff know, and we will circle back to
    you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone
    and address the chair verbally.
        I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes. The
    ranking member mentioned strategic ambiguity in his opening
    statement and each of the witnesses alluded to it. The United
    States has long held this position of strategic ambiguity
    toward China, meaning not committing one way or another to how
    the United States would respond to PRC aggression against
    Taiwan.
        My sense is the rationale is that without this clarity, the
    PRC military planners would be unsure in their planning and may
    be reluctant to conduct certain actions against Taiwan for fear
    of provoking a U.S. response. Some concerns with this policy
    and some, including many of us in Congress, would argue that we
    should change our position on this as we see a more assertive
    China.
        Dr. Rigger, I sense that you are opposed to the--to
    strategic clarity.
        Ms. Glaser, in your testimony, you alluded to that the U.S.
    may want to reevaluate it.
        Maybe we will start with Ms. Glaser. Should we change and
    clarify our policy? What are the benefits? What are the risks?
    And how does Taiwan feel about this? And what might the PRC do
    in response to more strategic clarity?
        I will start with Ms. Glaser. Then we will go to Dr.
    Rigger. Then we will go to Ms. Kan.
        Ms. Glaser. So thank you, Congressman Bera, for the
    question. I have published on this topic a short article in
    Foreign Affairs, which was actually in response to the article
    that was written initially by CFR President Richard Haass, who
    advocated strategic clarity.
        I am not in support of this policy because I think that it
    will have negative consequences for Taiwan's security rather
    than strengthen deterrence. If we make a rhetorical statement
    that we will, under all conditions, all circumstances come to
    Taiwan's defense but yet we are constrained in our ability to
    do so, we actually might provoke a response from the PRC to
    take advantage of what they might see as a window of
    opportunity while the United States is challenged by the anti-
    access area denial capabilities that China has been developing
    and while Taiwan is still continuing to bolster its stability--
    its ability to defend itself.
        I believe that China is--its most pressing objective it has
    achieved, that is to prevent de jure independence being
    declared by Taiwan. Certainly under Tsai Ing-wen's
    Administration, that is not going to happen. Xi Jinping has
    said, of course, reunification is a goal. Every Chinese leader
    has said that. I do not believe that it is a pressing priority.
        So what we need to do is, rather than change our rhetorical
    stance, we need to shore up our ability to defend Taiwan and
    make that credible. Once we do that, if China's attack on
    Taiwan seems like it is more urgent and if it appears imminent
    then, yes, there is a range of things that we can do to signal
    China, not only publicly but also privately, that there would
    be very severe consequences if, in fact, they were to use force
    against Taiwan.
        So, if we think about strategic clarity and strategic
    ambiguity as the two extreme ends of the spectrum, there are
    many things we can do in between. And if a threat appears
    urgent, we can move toward that direction of clarity. But I
    think changing our rhetoric without actually bolstering our
    capabilities is potentially risky.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you for that.
        Dr. Rigger, do you want to add?
        Dr. Rigger. Yes. I agree with much if not all of what
    Bonnie just said, but I want to add one other dimension, again,
    looking from the Taiwanese perspective. One of the great
    challenges for Taiwan and for Taiwan's leaders, including
    President Tsai, is persuading her own population that Taiwan
    faces a significant military threat and that they need to
    devote resources, including their own time and lives to the
    island's own defense.
        There is plenty of survey research to suggest that a lot of
    Taiwanese folks believe that the U.S. will take care of them,
    and that one of the reasons people offer why they do not need
    to join the military or they do not need to encourage young
    people to join the military is that the--that Taiwan has a
    military commitment from the U.S.
        Recent Taiwanese leaders, especially President Tsai, have
    made great efforts to refute that position and to encourage
    Taiwanese to recognize the essential role that they will play
    in their own defense in the event of a military crisis.
    Offering Taiwan an unconditional guarantee of U.S. lives and
    treasure will undermine that work or will make it even more
    difficult to overcome the resistance to a self-funded and self-
    insured military capable of defending Taiwan at least long
    enough for the U.S. to intervene. So that is another reason why
    I think this kind of policy change would be ill advised.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Dr. Rigger.
        And I notice I am out of time.
        Ms. Kan, if you want to take 30 seconds to quickly add your
    thoughts.
        Ms. Kan. Yes. Okay. Very quickly. I also call for
    consistency but for a different reason. As a champion of
    Congress, I believe in Congress maintaining its prerogatives.
    The TRA has no absolute guarantee on defense. The reason is
    because of legislative intent of the TRA. The legislative
    intent was to subject any future decision on an act of war to
    actions by the Congress, not only the President. So the
    Congress needs to maintain its prerogatives so that we can be
    as clear or flexible as we need for our U.S. interests. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Ms. Kan.
        Let me now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Yoho, for 5
    minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Yoho. Chairman Bera, again, you have picked--we have
    got three great witnesses here, and they have done an excellent
    job.
        Ms. Glaser, I agree with you that all engagement with
    Taiwan should be okay with Taiwan before we move. I think that
    is a very smart thing.
        Dr. Rigger, you are talking about how we can strengthen our
    relationship with Taiwan without going back to old doctrine or
    challenging the strategic ambiguity. And I want to say
    something before I ask you guys to answer.
        And, Ms. Kan, surely, you--I thought you and I were pretty
    much in alignment with everything we talked about.
        I do not want to look at the now so much as, how did we get
    to this point? If we go back to 1979 when Jimmy Carter got rid
    of the diplomatic relationships with Taiwan that led in to the
    strategic ambiguity that has caused us to do the Taiwan
    Relations Act, all these other things, the increased tension
    that we are getting when we sell military equipment to Taiwan
    from China, and if you go back to Robert Gates' book, the
    admiral of China vehemently opposed any more sales to Taiwan.
    And our representative says, ``Well, why? We have we have been
    doing this for years.'' This is what he said. He goes, ``You
    have. We were weak then; we are strong now.''
        All we have to do is kind of look at what Xi Jinping said
    in the 19th Communist Party Congress where ultimately his goal
    was world domination. We have seen him ignore the world norms
    in the South China Sea, lie saying they were not going to
    militarize those islands--I do not want to call them islands.
    That gives credibility to them--those land masses that they
    dredged up and destroyed coral reefs, they have militarized
    them.
        And then you saw the disregard for the British-Sino
    agreement on peaceful handing off of Hong Kong. After 22 and a
    half years, Xi Jinping says that is null and avoid; it does not
    matter. I think the writing is on the wall, and I do not want
    to do this in a lone approach that the U.S. says, ``All right,
    we are going to normalize diplomatic relations.'' I would like
    to do that, but I realize that puts us against China and puts
    Taiwan in the middle.
        And this is what I want to ask you. What do you think if we
    have this discussion, since we were part of forming the United
    Nations, as a world body of negotiating to prevent future
    conflicts to have a resolution brought up? You know, I think we
    are all in agreement, Taiwan has never been part of the PRC. In
    fact, China was run by the government of Taiwan before the
    Communists took over and beat them in the civil war. They have
    never been part of the Communist Party, nor do they desire to.
        I want to hear from you, what do you think if we started a
    movement to get Western democracy saying, ``You know what, we
    stand with Taiwan; China needs to have peaceful negotiations''?
    Ms. Glaser, do you want to start with that? And I realize it is
    a bold move.
        Ms. Glaser. Right. I will be brief so that others can chime
    in. But I actually completely agree with you that the way to
    bolster Taiwan's security is through multilateral mechanisms
    and cooperation with our allies and like-minded countries. One
    of the things I have suggested is that the G7 include a
    statement that Taiwan be returned to observer status in the
    World Health Assembly.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Ms. Glaser. So the D-10, the group of democracies, is
    another potential grouping coalition. This is the one way that
    we can influence, I think, Chinese behavior, regardless of what
    Xi Jinping's ambitions are. I believe that we still can
    influence the way that they seek to approve these--to achieve
    these goals and the timeline for them.
        I do not believe that China has actually set a concrete,
    hard deadline for unification with Taiwan, for example. So we
    have tremendous ability, I think, to begin to shape China's
    decisionmaking regarding Taiwan and other issues, and the way
    forward, the way to do that is by working with like-minded
    countries with other democracies.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Dr. Rigger.
        Dr. Rigger. Agreed. Multilateralism is the way to go
    because Taiwan ultimately will not thrive if it has only one
    friend in the world.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Dr. Rigger. And Taiwan has many friends. One thing that I
    would just point out is that the GCPF, a framework that was
    created by the U.S. and Taiwan together, has already begun to
    have really positive results in terms of creating relationships
    for Taiwan, nonofficial but very valuable substantive
    relationships with Taiwan beyond the U.S. and even beyond its
    immediate region. So, again, continuing to invigorate and
    invest in the GCPF is another thing we can do.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        And, Chair, I will defer to you if you want Ms. Kan to
    respond.
        Mr. Bera. Sure, we can give Ms. Kan a chance to respond.
        Ms. Kan. So the U.S. leadership to broaden foreign support
    for Taiwan is really important for one reason: we have to
    disarm the People's Republic of China's political warfare. That
    permeates all the other challenges that we face, whether it is
    defense, deterrence, international organizations, Taiwan's
    economic resilience to withstand any coercion.
        And one of the best ways that we can disarm that political
    warfare is to hit back at this disinformation that China pushes
    at the United Nations and other places regarding how Taiwan is
    supposedly a status, has a status as a part of the PRC. And the
    best way to do this, I think, is to rebut China's
    disinformation by stating very clearly, setting the record that
    U.N. Resolution 2758 did not establish Taiwan as a part of
    China. It did not even mention Taiwan.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you.
        And let me remind the members that, in order for me to call
    on them they have to be on the video pursuant to House rules.
        So let me go to my good friend from California, Congressman
    Brad Sherman, for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        A number of our witnesses have talked about how critical
    Taiwan is to the defense of Japan. Several of our witnesses
    have talked about increasing our military capacity in a
    substantial way to defend Taiwan, and we have enormous military
    budget. We have forces deployed around the world. Presumably
    our forces in Europe need to be in Europe. Presumably our
    forces in Africa and the Middle East need to be there. So it is
    not a matter of redeploying forces from elsewhere.
        So the question is, what is the price tag for a very
    substantial increase in our capacity to defend Taiwan? Is there
    any chance that taxpayers in Japan or Taiwan would be footing a
    major part of that bill? I will ask any witness who wants to
    respond. Do we have a response?
        Ms. Glaser. I will be happy to respond, Congressman
    Sherman. I think that Taiwan has increased the amount that it
    is spending on defense, but it is still not even at the 3
    percent of the GDP that both parties, the DPP and KMT, in
    Taiwan have Stated is an objective. But it is increasing under
    President Tsai Ing-wen.
        One of the challenges in Taiwan is the overall revenue that
    they take in from taxpayers. It is actually quite low, and so
    even 3 percent of GDP is not very significant. So, going
    forward, what I believe Taiwan needs to do is to expand the
    amount of revenue they are taking in from their taxpayers, and
    maybe that could create some potential for them to contribute
    more, which I hope that they will do.
        Japan contributes, of course, in many ways with a great
    deal of resources to supporting U.S. presence in the region.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        [Inaudible.] But obviously, we want Taiwan to spend 3
    percent on its defense. Obviously, Japan is a valued ally. But
    we are talking about tens or hundreds of billions of dollars
    that our witnesses are proposing be spent to increase American
    military capacities to defend Taiwan, and we have heard that--I
    have heard that described rhetorically, but I do not see a
    price tag.
        And I wonder how much of that, given the fact that you have
    said Taiwan is struggling just to pay for its own military
        [inaudible] And Japan is doing what you think is a lot, it
    seems like all that burden will fall on the American taxpayer,
    how much is it? I would like each witness who proposed
    massive--substantially--I will not say ``massive''--a
    significant increase in our military capacity to give some sort
    of price tag.
        Again, I think I will regard that as a rhetorical question
    and just go on to say that I applaud our witnesses and my
    colleagues for underlining the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan
    relationship, and I have supported every effort to sell weapons
    to Taiwan and to bring Taiwan into international organizations.
        It is a democracy that would differ slightly from
    phraseology of some. I would not say a Western democracy
    because I do not think democracy is Western. I think democracy
    reflects universal human values. So I want to applaud
    especially our chair and our ranking member for the work they
    have taken to help bring Taiwan into the community of nations,
    and point out that a number of pieces of legislation that I
    worked with them on would provide for Taiwanese officials to
    visit the Washington, DC, area.
        We talk about building a better relationship with the
    Taiwanese government. One way to do that is to actually talk to
    them face-to-face, especially in the months to come when we
    hope face-to-face discussions with possible.
        With that, I will yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Congressman Sherman.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Hey, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you
    calling the hearing, Dr. Bera.
        Before I begin, I do wish to pay tribute to the outgoing
    ranking member of this committee, Mr. Yoho. And Ted has
    rendered a great service to our country.
        I think I speak on behalf of many of us on this committee
    who say thank you very much for everything you have done and
    the sacrifices you have made to do it, Ted. We are going to
    miss you.
        With that, I think we must begin to realize the provision
    within the TAIPEI Act that calls for Taiwanese membership in
    select international organizations in which Statehood is not a
    requirement and at least observer status in other appropriate
    global institutions.
        I believe that this commitment can do more to demonstrate
    our commitment to this goal and expand upon it. And it starts
    by elevating the position of director of the American Institute
    in Taiwan to an ambassador-level rank requiring the
    confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
        To this end, I am grateful to have joined my friend Mr.
    Chabot in advocating for this needed change. Alongside this
    effort, this committee I think should consider legislation
    designating the American Institute of Taiwan as the U.S.
    Embassy to Taiwan and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural
    Representative Office as the Taiwanese Embassy to the United
    States.
        In light of this move, Representative Hsiao should be
    referred to as Ambassador in all official capacities and
    exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. These
    diplomatic measures demonstrate just a small fraction of our
    unwavering commitment to Taiwan that we will not be cowed by
    the Chinese Communist Party, and we will not allow the Beijing
    government to dictate our foreign policy as a sovereign nation.
        These measures show--would show the world the greatest
    nation on the planet, our Nation, values the relationship we
    share with Taiwan and encourages other countries and global
    organizations to do the same. Over the past few years, the U.S.
    has made an exerted effort to increase Taiwanese partnership
    participation in international institutions, but more needs to
    be done going forward.
        On one point, there can be no compromise: Taiwan must be
    afforded the full right to participate in the United Nations
    and all her constituent institutions, including the World
    Health Assembly. The President's Ambassador to the United
    Nations, Ambassador Kelly Craft, has already made this point,
    saying that the U.N. without Taiwan's full participation is
    actually cheating the world.
        And we can only speculate what would have happened had the
    World Health Organization listened to the exhortations of the
    Taiwanese medical professionals in late December of last year
    when they provided evidence to the World Health Organization
    and to the PRC that this new virus could be spread by human-to-
    human transmission.
        It is absolutely farcical that so many across the globe
    believe that the world ought to listen to China, that it is
    perfectly acceptable for the CCP to sit on the U.N. Human
    Rights Council and to participate in the World Health Assembly
    as a respected State actor, but Taiwan somehow should be kept
    silent.
        I can think of really no clear example, quite honestly, of
    just moral cowardice. I do look forward to working with all my
    colleagues to make our partnership with Taiwan even stronger,
    and I am glad to turn to at least one question here.
        Ms. Kan, how have recent events in Hong Kong affected
    Taiwan's public views of China's proposed one country, two
    system arrangement for Taiwan and the views of China more
    broadly? I mean, I cannot imagine that they are not in a state
    of believing that China really--that the Communist Party
    actually believes that and would respect that agreement.
        Ms. Kan. Yes. So I think that the whole proposition of one
    China, two systems was a nonstarter in Taiwan to begin with. It
    was never applicable to Taiwan. Taiwan was already a sovereign
    country with a formal name of Republic of China for a long
    time.
        However, at the same time, what the PRC has done to Hong
    Kong has been to basically tear up that international agreement
    regarding one country, two systems, and so that continues to
    show that China's promises just cannot be something that we can
    accept. It is something that China breaks its own rules
        [inaudible] And that in itself has shown the people in
    Taiwan that they cannot continue to trust any kind of
        [inaudible] To be reciprocated from China.
        Mr. Perry. Well, thank you very much.
        And, Chairman, I will yield the balance of the time, but
    you can count me in on more strident measures against the
    Communist Party of China and more benevolent and friendly
    measures toward our friends in Taiwan. And I yield.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Mr. Perry.
        Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms.
    Houlahan.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Chairman.
        I really appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses
    today. My questions have to do with my community. I am--my
    district is home to the mushroom capital of the world, and
    Mainland China has approached the industry more than a few
    times with an interest of doing partnerships in the mushroom
    industry in Mainland China.
        I am wondering what the prospects are for expanding U.S.
    exports to Taiwan in agriculture, like the mushroom industry,
    in industrial goods and services, and what sort of
    opportunities and challenges exist in each of these areas with
    respect to Taiwan?
        Dr. Rigger. I would be happy to lead off, if that is all
    right.
        Ms. Houlahan. That would be great. Thank you.
        Dr. Rigger. It is very interesting that you mention
    mushrooms because mushrooms actually play a significant role in
    Taiwan's economic history. Back in the immediate post-war era,
    one of the ways that Taiwan accelerated its economic
    development was through a really exceptional agricultural
    reform, and mushrooms were a major crop and a major cash crop
    for Taiwanese farmers that helped them break out of subsistence
    agriculture and become farmers who were exporting and all kinds
    of--especially to Japan and others in the region.
        So Taiwan--but today Taiwan is very much an importer of
    U.S. agricultural goods, and I honestly do not know whether
    they import mushrooms or not. But Taiwan is certainly a very
    significant customer for American agriculture because Taiwan is
    a very small and extremely crowded island. And while it has a
    vibrant agricultural sector, it is by no means adequate to
    serve the needs of Taiwan's people. So there is always more
    opportunity for agricultural exports to Taiwan, and Taiwanese
    people do love their mushrooms.
        However, one of the reasons that we are all advocating, I
    think, a more extensive and formalized bilateral trade
    agreement of some kind with Taiwan is precisely because there
    are some protectionist aspects to the Taiwanese economy. In
    agriculture, we saw the biggest barrier fall this summer, which
    was the barrier to U.S. meat imports, but Taiwan also has
    protectionist features in other aspects of its economy,
    including manufacturing and a lot of other things.
        I think that one of the real virtues of a bilateral trade
    negotiation process would be to create some external pressure
    on the Taiwan Government to help Taiwan's Government do what
        [inaudible] Already know needs to be done, which is to
    liberalize imports and to make Taiwan's market for friendly to
    imported goods.
        So, Taiwan definitely stands to benefit from trade
    negotiations, but the U.S. also stands to benefit, and Taiwan
    as well because liberalizing Taiwan's economy would be a good
    step for them too. So thank you for the question.
        Ms. Houlahan. Yes. If I could followup on that which is, of
    course, kind of trade relationships are a part of the
    conversation, but also there is part of the conversation which
    is having the Taiwanese invest more heavily in U.S. businesses
    and in areas where they perhaps--mushrooms is an example where
    they, perhaps, do not have the land mass to be able to work.
        What kind of policies can we ask for or look for to be able
    to have that happen because to be honest, quite frankly, the
    pull is from mainland China right now. The economic pull in
    that way and the economic investment paths in that way are
    coming from the mainland.
        Ms. Riggers. Well, most of my conversations about
    investment are with people in Taiwan, encouraging them to be
    more creative and innovative in their investment patterns.
        Taiwanese companies and individuals have accumulated a
    massive amount of wealth in the last 30 years or so as a result
    of their investments in mainland China. And they have not been
    super quick to turn that around into new business creation in
    Taiwan or elsewhere.
        So, again, I think this is something that American
    officials can usefully talk to the Taiwanese government about
    is, how can you get some of this cash out of the real estate
    market, for example, and into new business creation, foreign
    direct investment, as well as new investments in your own
    economy. It is definitely something that they need to work on.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I really appreciate your input.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Congresswoman Houlahan.
        I know we have had a few members drop off to go vote and we
    will recognize folks as they come back. But, I will recognize
    myself for a second round of questioning, and I know the
    ranking member also has a second question that he would like to
    ask. Any of the members who also do have second questions, we
    will come back to them.
        I guess for all the witnesses, one question that I would
    have, and certainly something that I think about with the
    incoming Biden Administration. They will take a much more
    multilateral approach to both entering into kind of the
    approaches they think about China and so forth.
        In just about every country we interact in the region, we
    do so understanding that country's relationship with China as
    well.
        I guess for the witnesses, as we are thinking about U.S.
    Taiwan relations in a multilateral way, what advice would you
    give both Congress, but also the incoming Administration, in
    trying to build that multilateral support for Taiwan because,
    again, I think that is the better approach as we are in this
    strategic competition with China, and maybe we will start with
    Ms. Glaser.
        Ms. Glaser. Thank you for the question, Congressman Bera.
    You know, I think the first thing that needs to be pointed out
    is, of course, there is recognition around the world for
    Taiwan's extraordinary performance in controlling the spread of
    COVID-19.
        And this has already laid the groundwork for greater
    support for restoring Taiwan's observers in the World Health
    Assembly and enabling Taiwan to send its experts to the
    technical meetings of the World Health Organization which China
    has blocked in many, many cases.
        So if the United States is pursuing a policy that is
    consistent, that looks like it is, in fact, part of a larger
    strategy, if the United States is not seen as being too
    provocative toward China, and I do want to underscore that, if
    the Chinese think that the United States has totally abandoned
    its One China policy and is moving in a direction of ultimately
    recognizing the Republic of China, then we may be in a
    dangerous place.
        This is not what we want to create as an environment for
    other countries to join us in an effort to help Taiwan. So we
    have to be responsible and push forward those policies that
    other countries will get on board with so that we can expand
    Taiwan's participation in the international community.
        If we want Japan to be a good partner with us in
    conducting, for example, exercise that will signal that Japan
    might be on our side if there is a Chinese attack on Taiwan,
    that it might actually be actively engaged in a way to help
    defend Taiwan, then clearly, we have to be pursuing a policy
    that is seen by Japan as responsible.
        So there is, right now, broken support for Taiwan, I think,
    in many countries around the world, many of our allies. We
    should be doing the right things and setting an example. And if
    we negotiate, again, a free trade agreement with Taiwan, then
    maybe other countries will go forward and do the same.
        There is also the potential for a double taxation agreement
    that Taiwan is interested in and I think we would benefit from,
    so we have to be pursuing the right policies for others to get
    on board.
        Mr. Bera. So just to make sure, one area that does seem
    right to create some multilateral support for Taiwan obviously
    is in the COVID-19 space and their response and bringing them
    into some of the organizations that are developing alliances,
    that are developing around responding to COVID-19 and the virus
    and, making sure they have an active role in that.
        Maybe I will go to Dr. Riggers. Ms. Glaser touched on a
    free trade agreement and commerce, and I think both you and Ms.
    Kan have also touched on that as another potential tool to
    create multilateral support for Taiwan without necessarily
    diverting from the One China policy, in less threatening ways
    to help Taiwan increase its relationship.
        Dr. Riggers, what do you think about trade as a tool of
    also, creating and helping Taiwan participate?
        Ms. Riggers. Yes. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was
    controversial for many reasons, but one of the things that was
    built into it was the idea that as a trade agreement in the
    Asia-Pacific or the Pacific rim Nations, it had the potential--
    one that was not dominated by China.
        The TPP had the potential to be a venue in which Taiwan
    could participate, right. Taiwan entered the WTO back in 2000
    with China. They simultaneously were able to enter. Since then,
    it has been really difficult for Taiwan. China has blocked
    Taiwan again and again and again from participation.
        So the TPP, the idea was that here was one that was led by
    the United States and other like-minded countries and would not
    be subject as easily to China's restrictions on Taiwan.
        So, there were plenty of reasons to dislike the TPP. In the
    last Presidential election, both major candidates opposed it,
    but I think that was an example of the kind of thing that needs
    to be done because getting Taiwan into organizations where
    China has veto power will be well-nigh, in my opinion,
    impossible. But creating new ones with--outside of China's
    sphere of power is a more plausible route to take.
        Mr. Bera. Ms. Kan, would you like to add?
        Ms. Kan. Yes. First of all, I want to talk about something
    that is overall important for the role of Congress, and that is
    explaining to the American people from the heartland all the
    way to the coasts and beyond why Taiwan matters, and that is
    something that is not often obvious.
        Connecting to the previous question about Japan, I think
    the first thing we can explain is that Taiwan's geostrategic
    position places it as the interlocking piece to fortify our
    U.S. allies to the north of Taiwan and to the south in the
    South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the East China Sea,
    all the way to the western Pacific.
        And speaking of the western Pacific, that is where we can
    have a more multilateral approach to the presence of Taiwan.
    And I am talking about linking the presence of Taiwan to our
    freely associated States. They are Marshall Islands,
    Micronesia, and Palau. They have special relationships with the
    United States.
        Taiwan has four countries in the Pacific that recognize
    Taiwan as the Republic of China with diplomatic ties. We have a
    synergy there in the western Pacific to maintain our interests,
    and that is where congressional role comes in. The Compacts of
    Free Association are up for renewal, and that is where Congress
    can put its attention to whether or not to renew the COFA.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Bera. I know that the ranking member is off voting, but
    he does want to ask a second question.
        Ms. Houlahan, do you have a second round of questions? I
    certainly, with this panel of experts, have multiple questions
    that I would like to ask.
        Ms. Houlahan. I do have, Chairman, Mr. Chairman, one more
    question.
        Could you or the witnesses tell us what we think or how we
    attribute the success of Taiwan in combating COVID? What is the
    secret sauce? Is there anything that we could be doing here in
    this Nation, lessons learned from them that we could be
    applying here in the United States?
        Ms. Riggers. Maybe I will start that one off too because I
    was in Taiwan when COVID started. I was actually in China when
    COVID really started. I was in China when Wuhan, the city of
    Wuhan, was locked down. And I was on a Fulbright last year,
    spent most of my time in Taiwan. I was supposed to send some
    time in China, but as soon as that happened, I started looking
    for a way out.
        And so I ended up going back to Taiwan and spending the
    time between late January and the beginning of April in Taiwan,
    and what I saw made perfect sense.
        First of all, at the first sign that there was a problem,
    Taiwan's leaders did not wait for confirmation from China or
    from the WHO. Taiwan's leaders immediately mobilized the plans
    that they had created after the SARS crisis in 2002 and put
    them into action. So they were very much operating on their own
    timetable and on their own judgment of what was going on in
    China.
        So the first thing they did was to restrict entry from
    China and to impose quarantine requirements on people entering
    from China. I got in on January 29. By January 31, there was a
    2-week quarantine requirement on everyone coming from the PRC.
        The second thing they did was to encourage people to wear
    masks. People throughout Asia, including Taiwan, normally wear
    masks when they are sick. It is considered a good hygiene
    practice, so it was not hard to get people to wear masks. And,
    in fact, the immediate reaction was a little bit of panic
    buying in the mask market.
        So the Taiwanese government took over the production and
    distribution of masks to ensure that everyone would have what
    they needed and that there would be no price gouging.
        The next thing they did was to implement widespread
    testing. Anybody who was concerned that they might have been
    exposed to COVID or had symptoms consistent with COVID could
    get tested, and thousands and thousands of people did get
    tested.
        There have been almost no cases, fewer than--about 50 cases
    of domestic transmission of COVID in Taiwan. All the other
    cases are imported, mostly Taiwanese people returning from
    overseas into a quarantine which then contained them while they
    were still infectious.
        But even though there was almost no domestic spread, there
    was still widespread testing, and everyone was encouraged to be
    tested. And though the testing sites were set up so that people
    did not have to interact with one another, everybody stayed
    outside, and they were called in for their test and then
    immediately released. And from February, Taiwan had rapid
    testing capabilities. So within 72 hours, you knew your testing
    status.
        The other--the one other thing that I thought was really
    interesting was, of course, contract--contact tracing. So all
    of those cases that were domestic transmission were traced back
    to the point of origin. I think there are fewer than five cases
    that they cannot explain how the person actually contracted
    COVID.
        And they made the quarantine requirements bearable for
    people by, for example, paying people to be in quarantine. So
    if you were coming back from the U.S.--a lot of young Taiwanese
    were returning from the U.S. when their colleges closed down.
    They flooded back to Taiwan, and they were supposed to stay in
    quarantine.
        And most of them just went to their parents' house, homes,
    and stayed there. But people who were coming from high-risk
    places like mainland China went into an official quarantine
    near the airport, a kind of hotel where you just stayed for 2
    weeks, but they were paid to stay there.
        They got about $100 a day to stay in this hotel so that
    they were not--they did not feel the pressure. I have got to
    get out and work because they were not losing income by
    complying with the quarantine. So in all of these ways, they
    have kept a handle on it.
        Most recently, there have been a lot of cases now coming in
    from southeast Asia, and this is putting pressure on the system
    because Taiwan relies on southeast Asian helpers for a lot of
    elder care and also child care.
        And there is a bit of tension between families that, need
    their helpers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and the public
    health authorities who are saying we cannot let folks in
    because the COVID infection rate is just too high in those
    places.
        But, there is not a secret sauce. It is all the stuff we
    know, that for whatever reason in this country, we did not do
    but they did at, 95 to 100 percent.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Let me recognize the ranking member, Mr. Yoho,
    for a second question.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this has been a very
    engaging conversation. And I think for the points that were
    just brought up about Taiwan, we have the
        [Inaudible] Place, it should be in the omnibus, that
    reinstates China--Taiwan into the World Health Assembly. And I
    think this is something, without going full bore and----
        I heard your testimoneys, Dr. Rigger, about, having U.N.
    veto authority to Taiwan. I know that is going to cause a
    problem. But I think if we do a lot of small steps, recognizing
    Taiwan in the World Health Assembly, and having countries
    around the world put pressure on that just for what you brought
    up, their great work that they have done to prevent COVID in a
    large way in their country.
        I think if we do enough of these things around the world
    and other countries backing us, it is going support that.
        If you look at Israel, Israel is out there by itself. We
    are their strongest ally, but now we are seeing other countries
    come to the table, with the Abraham Accords. This is my vision
    for what I would like to accomplish, what I would like for the
    U.S. Government to accomplish, that kind of leadership where
    you get other countries to come in.
        And if you guys can suggest any other things that we could
    do, I would love to hear it, and I will end my questioning.
        Ms. Kan. I can start. Yes. I can start to respond to that
    question about Taiwan at the United Nations and the
    international organizations.
        First of all, we have to hit back at the disinformation
    that somehow the so-called One China principle at the U.N. as
    defined by China will prevent Taiwan from participating in the
    United Nations' specialized organizations and other
    international organizations. And this is the insidious,
    distorted narrative that is bolstered by China's information
    without any rebuttals.
        And U.S. leadership is needed, specifically from our
    Ambassador at the United Nations, to set the international
    record straight that the General Assembly Resolution 2758,
    2758, did not settle the status of Taiwan.
        It restored the right of China, specifically, the PRC, to
    be in the United Nations and expel the so-called
    representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. But nowhere, nowhere in
    that resolution did the United Nations or the international
    community determine the status of Taiwan.
        In fact, Taiwan was not even mentioned in this resolution,
    so how can this resolution be used to keep Taiwan out of
    international organizations? And when this Administration led a
    very, very high profile campaign to get Taiwan into
    participation at the World Health Organization, led by
    Secretary of State Mike Pompeo----
        It lacked a missing piece, and that was the failure to
    mention that 2758 cannot be used to keep Taiwan out of
    international organizations. Thank you.
        Ms. Glaser. I would just add very briefly that it is
    notable that in the recent meeting of COVAX, under WHO, China
    did not step in to block Taiwan's participation, and so that
    shows that Beijing recognizes that the global community is
    supporting Taiwan at this moment.
        And so if we can sustain that momentum and use this support
    from our like-minded countries and democracies and just
    continue to include Taiwan in the WHO.
        I personally am pleased that the President-Elect has said
    that the United States will not withdraw from the World Health
    Organization. There are issues with the WHO, and China's
    influence, its undue influence in the operations of that
    organization which I hope can be fixed going forward, but we
    have to be a member in order to influence the WHO going
    forward.
        So I think that is one example of Taiwan
        [Inaudible] COVAX is a good one.
        Mr. Bera. Mr. Yoho? So it looks like we lost Ted's audio,
    so----
        Ted, are you back on?
        Mr. Yoho. Can you hear me?
        Mr. Bera. We can, yes. Go ahead.
        Mr. Yoho. I apologize. Did you get any of that?
        Mr. Bera. No. We did not get the last question.
        Mr. Yoho. Well, I think that that is the direction we
    should go. And if we can get China to honor the one country,
    two systems, and leave Taiwan alone, I think the world will be
    a better place. Taiwan will definitely be better off.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks for that, Congressman Yoho.
        I am going to recognize myself just for a quick followup
    question. You know, something that Dr. Riggers touched on
    earlier was the Taiwanese people participation in their own
    military.
        Dr. Riggers, I am assuming that they do not have a formal
    draft or mandatory service in that case, and that is a
    volunteer army and volunteer----
        Ms. Riggers. Actually, Taiwan has mandatory military
    service for men. And in recent years, they have been
    transitioning to an all-volunteer military. They felt that the
    system of conscription was not actually providing
    professionalism and--nor at affordable cost needed and for a
    sort of contemporary, 21st century military force.
        But they are having a great deal of difficulty meeting
    recruitment targets, so they have been extending--shrinking the
    length of time that men have to serve but extending the
    compulsory military service beyond when they thought, I think,
    they were going to be able to switch to all volunteer.
        Mr. Bera. And if I just played off of that, in
    understanding some of the domestic pressures that we see here
    in the United States, I think they are reflected in the Trump
    Administration policy for the United States not defending the
    entire world. And we see that in our conversations with our
    great--our allies in the Republic of Korea. We certainly see
    that in, the push for NATO Nations to pay their fair share.
        I have a sense that, while very much I think that the Biden
    Administration and most Members of Congress want to see U.S.
    global leadership around the world and, the world is a safer
    place with the United States engaged, I also think where our
    domestic population is, and potentially where, Congress is
    starting to shift. We also want to see those nations, doing
    their fair share of devoting resources to their own defense,
    their own population stepping up to be prepared to defend their
    own nations as well with the United States in partnership.
        Do you have some suggestions for how we approach that with
    Congress? One is, certainly getting them, I think, and maybe
    this is for Ms. Glaser as well, really encouraging Taiwan to
    invest their own resources in their own defense.
        Ms. Riggers. Well, I think Bonnie would have a lot to say
    about that. I would just point out that, President Tsai is
    definitely working on this issue and that U.S.-Taiwanese
    military cooperation is at a high point, at a high level today.
    And that unlike previous Administrations in Taiwan, the Tsai
    Administration is really open to this kind of cooperation and
    collaboration, seeking ways to make Taiwan's own military
    capacity more sufficient.
        And some of that has to do with the overall defense concept
    that Shirley Kan mentioned earlier which has to do with the
    sort of the strategic nature of Taiwan's defense preparations,
    but some of it too has to do with kind of changing the attitude
    that Taiwanese people have toward military service.
        So, for example, we have seen President Tsai in a helmet
    and camouflage more than any president of Taiwan since Chiang
    Kai-Shek. She is out there interacting with the troops,
    visiting installations, showing her public that this is
    important, and it is something she values. And I think that is
    really--that is the first step is recognizing that they have a
    real military threat and recognizing that smart, capable,
    ambitious people can look at military service as a worthwhile
    career and life choice.
        But Bonnie probably has better answers than that.
        Mr. Bera. Ms. Glaser.
        Ms. Glaser. Adding to your remarks, Shelley, which I agree
    with, what Taiwan does not have is a whole of society effort
    supporting their defense. And given the threat that it faces,
    this is truly remarkable. We look at countries like South Korea
    that is under a great threat from North Korea or Israel being
    another good example and having a whole of society effort that
    signals their determination to defend their country. And this
    is something that Taiwan really needs to cultivate.
        An important part of that is rebuilding their reserves, and
    this is something that, again, President Tsai Ing-wen has
    indicated her support for and I know the Department of Defense
    is continuing to push for.
        But the military in Taiwan actually does not really--has
    not provided great buy in for rebuilding their reserves. If the
    PLA actually lands on the beach, takes over ports and
    airfields, then the reserves have to be the next line of
    defense, and they have to be willing and able to work with the
    military and also potentially with the public.
        So, I mean, I would like to see ways in which we can help
    them, maybe through our National Guard, to explain to them how
    we do things, but the United States may not be the best model
    for Taiwan. They should be looking at countries like Israel,
    maybe Singapore, as examples of how to build an all of society
    effort.
        So this is something that is cultural, as Shelley just
    indicated. There is not a lot of support for the military.
    There is not a good civil-military relationship in Taiwan. So
    these are things that, really, they are not going to change
    overnight, but they really need to be made priorities in
    Taiwan.
        Mr. Bera. Right. Ms. Kan, do you want to say anything?
        Ms. Kan. Hi. Yes. I wrote into my testimony that this is
    one of the areas we need to have a discussion with Taiwan in
    order to reduce divergence.
        The Congress has been emphasizing to Taiwan since 2016 in
    legislation and other actions to reform its reserves. And now
    Taiwan's Ministry of Defense just said it is not even going to
    start to reform its reserves until 2022.
        And back to the discussion about the defense budget. Under
    current exchange rates, Taiwan's defense budget is about $12.5
    billion U.S. dollars. But more importantly, it is only about
    1.8 percent of GDP. Now, I understand full well that Taiwan
    also has what is called a special budget to buy large systems
    such as the F-16 fighters and such as submarines. But when we
    look at the one indicator of the defense budget, and when we
    compare it to other countries like South Korea that also faces
    an existential threat, it is a bipartisan consensus in this
    government, both with Democrats and with Republicans, that
    Taiwan's defense budget is insufficient, and specifically
    insufficient in terms of reallocation within the budget in
    order to fund this overall defense concept.
        Concerning the volunteer force, it is a misnomer, I
    believe, to call it an all-volunteer force. There is just no
    way that Taiwan can have an all-volunteer force. It is trying
    to shift to have less conscription and more volunteers.
        But this was a strategic blunder by the previous Ma Ying-
    jeou Administration to do away with this full--full force with
    conscription just like South Korea, for example. There was a
    misunderstanding under the previous Administration that somehow
    this was safe money.
        As we know in our own superior military force, personnel
    costs in the military are quite high within our defense budget.
    In order to fund a professional military like ours that is
    superior, we need to have greater funding of personnel,
    especially. President Tsai may understand this. She may do
    more, but she really needs to put more of her own efforts as
    the commander in chief in order to guide Taiwan's military and
    not delegate so much.
        Why? I have written the reason is because we have certain
    differences in our military culture. And it takes leadership,
    it takes the commander in chief in order to play the role to
    bridge our different military cultures in order to reduce the
    divergences. We need a reset in our military-to-military
    relationships. Thank you.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
        And I want to thank all of the witnesses for their
    excellent testimony. Certainly, as we go into the 117th
    Congress, this is a topic that we will revisit and certainly
    look forward to continuing to work with the witnesses.
        Given that this is the ranking member, Mr. Yoho's, final
    hearing, I do not know, Ted, if you are still on, if you would
    like to make any final closing comments and thoughts and
    reflections.
        Mr. Yoho. Yes, I do. I mean, can you hear me?
        Mr. Bera. We can, yes.
        Mr. Yoho. No. I really appreciate the three witnesses. You
    guys did a fantastic job. And, Ami, our friendship and your
    leadership--I have been impressed with your leadership and,
    value our friendship very much, and it has been an honor to
    have this last meeting.
        I just want to--I have to plug the TIPA bill that we
    introduced, the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act. We have got
    Members already wanting to pick it up next Congress. It
    addresses a lot of the things that you talked about: military
    readiness, increasing the amount of time that they spend in the
    military, working together with our military and other like-
    minded countries' military. It puts the emphasis on putting
    more money into their military for buying the right kind of
    defensive equipment and not wasting it on tanks and stuff like
    that.
        And it also encourages other countries in the Indo-Pacific
    to do the same thing. It promotes a free trade agreement and
    high level State visits between our government and the
    government of Taiwan and the invite of President Tsai over here
    and other high diplomats.
        This is something, I think--if we get this on, and we have
    other countries around the world to do similar things, I think
    we can have a peaceful resolution of the relationships between
    Taiwan and China and the rest of the world.
        With that, Mr. Speaker, I am off. We will see you later,
    and this is my last meeting. Goodbye.
        Mr. Bera. Well, great. And thanks, Ted, for promoting me to
    Speaker of the House.
        Anyways, it has been great serving with you. We will stay
    in touch and certainly want you to stay active in, these issues
    that we have worked on and, look forward to the next chapter of
    your service to our country.
        With that, I want to thank the witnesses for participating
    in this very important virtual hearing, and the hearing is now
    adjourned.
        Ms. Kan. Thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing.
        Ms. Glaser. Thank you again, Congressman Bera, for your
    service and for holding the hearing and inviting me to
    testifying today.
        Ms. Riggers. That goes for me too on all three fronts.
        Mr. Bera. Absolutely. Thank you, and everyone be safe. Be
    well.
        Ms. Kan. Thank you.
        Mr. Bera. Bye-bye.
        [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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