[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                   THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                        GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                      INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 3, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-136

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
		      
		 ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California	             LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota		     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas    		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas


	     Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
             Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

    Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 
                      International Organizations

                     KAREN BASS, California, Chair

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, 
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota                 Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       RON WRIGHT, Texas
                                     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Badwaza, Mr. Yoseph, Senior Advisor, Africa Freedom House........     9
Lemma, Ms. Tsedale, Editor-in-Chief, Founder, Addis Standard 
  Magazine.......................................................    20
Ploch Blanchard, Ms. Lauren, Specialist in African Affairs, 
  Congressional Research Services................................    29
Stigant, Ms. Susan, Director of Africa Program, United States 
  Institute of Peace.............................................    43

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    68
Hearing Minutes..................................................    69
Hearing Attendance...............................................    70

                 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LETTER

Letter submitted for the record from Mary Mazanec................    71

 
                   THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA

                       Thursday, December 3, 2020

                          House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
            Global Human Rights, and International 
                                     Organizations,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                     Washington, DC

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in 
via Webex, Hon. Karen Bass [chairwoman of the subcommittee] 
presiding.
    Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human 
Rights, and Internal Organizations will come to order. Without 
objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the 
subcommittee at any point, and all members will have 5 days to 
submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the 
record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. To 
insert something into the record, please have your staff email 
the previously mentioned address or contact full committee 
staff.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. 
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and 
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with House Resolution 965 and the accompanying 
regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as 
appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate 
background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum, and I will now recognize 
myself for opening remarks.
    Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on the 
unfolding conflict in Ethiopia. Today we are hearing testimony 
on the conflict in Ethiopia, and would like to hear 
recommendations on what the United States and the international 
community can do to help stabilize the region and decrease the 
tensions between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray 
People's Liberation Front.
    There are several intra-ethnic conflicts regarding politics 
and social standing in Ethiopia covering decades. This 
highlights the country's long dispute over group and individual 
rights and whether centralized government is the way to true 
democracy for citizens of Ethiopia.
    During my many visits to Ethiopia, I have expressed to 
leaders that the government must have representation for all 
ethnic groups, and most importantly, always protect its 
citizens. The current State of Ethiopia, not only has a ripple 
effect on its citizens, but neighboring countries such as 
Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea are negatively affected.
    Ethiopia's instability and ethnic strife are producing 
security repercussions in Somalia. African Union forces depend 
heavily on Ethiopian troops to help combat violent extremism in 
the region.
    Somalia has upcoming elections that may be tense, and the 
Trump administration is planning to withdraw U.S. Special 
Operation Forces from the country soon, which will strengthen 
Al Shabaab and weaken anti-forces.
    Recent reporting noted that Tigray forces fired missiles 
toward the capital of Eritrea after Ethiopian troops pushed 
them from their regional capital. These actions certainly have 
political ramifications, but one of my major concerns is that 
far too often during conflict innocent civilians are the ones 
who are killed, injured, or displaced and have to flee across 
borders.
    Another regional concern for Sudan, after 30-plus years of 
authoritarian rule, Sudan, which borders Tigray, is trying to 
peacefully transition to a democracy and strengthen its economy 
in the
    [inaudible] Tigray People's Liberation Front to have a 
continued peaceful dialog with the help of African Union 
mediation to resolve this issue once and for all.
    Citizens on all sides of this conflict should have a right 
to be heard and peacefully protest, and there should be the 
freedom to disseminate what is going on in the country by 
journalists.
    I appreciate and I am looking forward to hearing from 
Tsedale Lemma, who can give a firsthand report on what is 
happening in the country.
    The Ethiopian diaspora is also critical in resolving this 
conflict. My office meets with and hears the concerns of this 
multiethnic community. We have taken meetings with groups 
representing the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan, and other 
communities. We have heard from activists, journalists, 
political actors, and regular citizens who are concerned about 
their loved ones in the country. I hear you, my office hears 
you, and Congress hears you.
    That said, I want you to know that the purpose of this 
hearing is to explore the deteriorating social and political 
situation in the country, the recent conflict, while attempting 
to find ways for the United States to be helpful and hear 
policy recommendations for how to resolve this conflict.
    The purpose is not to provide a space for any one ethnic 
group to lay out their grievances. We understand various 
ethnic, religious, regional, and political communities have 
been affected, and we want to acknowledge that. That is the 
reason why we are holding this hearing. Each witness here will 
contribute to our understanding of the situation.
    But you must know also that this is not the only source of 
our information. You know that the members present at this 
hearing today care about their constituents who are among the 
Ethiopian diaspora, recognizing the long-standing bilateral 
relations with Ethiopia and consider the country an important 
regional partner, but we must maintain a diplomatic posture and 
ensure that this hearing does not contribute to tensions back 
in Ethiopia. You will notice that we will raise your concerns 
and ask questions that you have raised in meetings or via email 
or written correspondence.
    I hope that you trust that we will continue to be champions 
for human rights in Ethiopia. I recently led the bipartisan 
resolution 1183, supporting respect for human rights and 
encouraging continued democratic progress in Ethiopia and 
condemning the targeted violence and destruction of property 
directed against ethnic and religious minorities, the excessive 
use of force by Ethiopian forces against peaceful protesters, 
the arrest of journalists and peaceful protesters who exercise 
their constitutional rights, and hate speech and disinformation 
that fuel ethnic and political violence by groups raised in 
Ethiopia and in the diaspora. I heard from constituents that 
the language did not go far enough. We hear you, and we will 
consider this feedback as we revise and prepare the legislation 
for the new Congress.
    I would like to thank our witnesses for participating in 
this important hearing. We all look forward to hearing your 
insight into the current situation in the country and 
recommendations for possible ways forward.
    When we decide to have a hearing, it is with great 
consideration, and mainly the push to have this hearing came 
from the diaspora. Sometimes it is difficult for us, though, to 
make a decision to have a hearing because then when we do, 
people want us to represent one side or the other, and that is 
not the role for us to play here in Congress. So hopefully you 
will find this hearing productive, and you will understand that 
we are committed to the U.S. playing a productive role in 
assisting Ethiopia find its way to peace and unity. And this 
hearing is just--and the resolution--is just one step forward. 
It will not be the last.
    Thank you very much, and I now call on the ranking member 
for his comments.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very, very much, Karen, Chairwoman 
Bass, for convening this very, very important hearing. And as 
you said, we are listening, and I think it is important that we 
do it. It is totally bipartisan, and I want to thank you for 
that. It has been a real joy to work with you as ranking 
member, and at one point you were my ranking member. So I 
think, you know, it just shows it is all about the issues and 
the concerns. And obviously what has happened in Tigray region 
is very, very serious. The loss of life has been horrific, and 
so I think it is very important that we have this hearing 
today. So thank you very much.
    Indeed, it is my belief that Ethiopia is one of the most 
strategically significant countries in the middle of Africa; 
Nigeria, in my opinion, being the other one; and there are 
others that are very important as well. But what happens there 
is amplified throughout the region.
    While I am hopeful that the Ethiopian Government, since 
they have captured the regional Tigray capital of Mekelle, 
coupled with the announcement just made, that the government 
will allow United Nations humanitarian assistance to flow into 
the region under their control, that hopefully that signals an 
end to armed conflict. But there is a concern, and I know you 
share it, Chairwoman Bass, that the fall of the capital does 
not necessarily mark the end of the armed conflict. It could be 
part of a stage, and we are very worried, all of us, about a 
protracted civil war characterized by guerrilla attackers, all 
the more reason why there must be a robust response by 
everyone.
    This concern is based in part on the history of the Tigray 
People's Liberation Front, or the TPLF, and the geography of 
the Tigray region in Ethiopia. The TPLF, as we all know, came 
to rule all of Ethiopia following a successful guerrilla 
campaign against the Derg, a case of Marxist-inspired movement, 
overthrowing a Marxist government in the early 1990's. As 
guerrillas, the TPLF used the highland terrain of Ethiopia, 
including Tigray, to their advantage.
    During the years of TPLF rule, the subcommittee was at the 
forefront of raising concern about human rights abuses. 
Following a critical hearing that I chaired in the spring of 
2005, I traveled to Ethiopia, met with Prime Minister Meles 
that August, as well as with human rights leaders. I raised 
concerns directly with him in about a 2-hour meeting, 
especially the egregiously flawed election--national election--
and the killing of dissidents that was occurring in the streets 
and the mass arrests.
    In the next year, I introduced the Ethiopia Freedom, 
Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act. And following the 
passing of Prime Minister Meles, domination by the TPLF 
continued, and this subcommittee again held another critical 
hearing: Ethiopia after Meles, and the future of democracy and 
human rights. And there was a resolution which I introduced, 
along with you, Chairwoman Bass, H. Res. 128, Supporting 
respect for human rights and encouraging inclusive governance 
in Ethiopia. It passed the House on April 10, 2018, and it laid 
out milestones for transition from rule by the TPLF.
    Following Prime Minister Abiy's ascension, you and I met 
with him in Addis in August 2018, and we were encouraged by his 
words, by his actions, including the release of thousands of 
political prisoners.
    The removal of the TPLF, as we all know, as the dominant 
power in Ethiopia, has brought a reform-minded Prime Minister 
Abiy to leadership in 2008, but it also unleashed protracted 
jockeying between other ethnic groups, most notably, the two 
largest, the Oromo and the Amhara, as well as intra-ethnic 
conflict.
    Indeed, the prime minister's position among his own Oromo 
group is not completely solidified, and his pan-Ethiopian 
vision is challenged by Oromo separatists, just as the--or such 
as the Oromo Liberation Front and now jailed firebrand Jawar 
Mohammed.
    These ethnic tensions are further exacerbated by a 
constitutional order bequeathed by the TPLF commonly called 
``ethnic federalism,'' which has led to the pitting of one 
group against another and fueled regional separatism and a 
desire to cleanse regions of other ethnicities.
    While it may not be considered polite to discuss issues 
such as ethnicity and religion, one cannot understand the 
current crisis in Ethiopia without reference to the ethnic 
tensions which are often overlaid with religious ones. We in 
the Congress must be careful, however--and I think you pointed 
it out in your opening statement, Chairwoman Bass--not to 
inadvertently stir up further ethnicity-based division by 
taking the side of one group over another, but rather, urge a 
path of reconciliation and negotiation, which will likely lead 
to no one being fully satisfied but will help reduce tensions.
    Many individuals and groups can point to grievances, we 
know that--and they are well-founded grievances, whether 
historical or ongoing--and they are real. The war in Tigray 
threatens to exacerbate an already severe humanitarian problem. 
We have seen crisis upon crisis beset Ethiopia in this year 
alone. Not only did COVID-19 impact Ethiopia, as it did so many 
other countries including our own, but on top of that, there 
was a major locust plague which has created major food 
insecurity throughout Ethiopia, the Horn, East Africa, and 
beyond, and now armed conflict.
    There needs to be a time for justice and accountability for 
the atrocities committed by all sides. No matter what the 
exigent circumstances, civil liberties--which Prime Minister 
Abiy Abiy to his credit helped restore in 2018--cannot be 
curtailed indefinitely. But first we need to stop the bloodshed 
and address the humanitarian crisis, and the anti-ethnic 
violence and hateful rhetoric must end.
    As Secretary Mike Pompeo related in his call with Prime 
Minister Abiy on November 30, there should be a complete end to 
the fighting and a constructive dialog to resolve the crisis. 
He also stressed the need to protect civilians from further 
harm, including those fleeing the conflict, crossing the border 
into Sudan, and respect for the human rights of all ethnic 
groups, including Tigrayans.
    Fortunately, it looks like an agreement has been reached 
between the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations to 
allow for unimpeded humanitarian access to areas of Tigray 
under government control. I hope that at a minimum the basic 
needs of those who have been displaced due to fighting, which 
some estimate to be a million people, can now be addressed 
while political issues remain to be resolved.
    Ethiopia, as we all know, is a great country--a great 
country--a proud nation whose roots date back thousands of 
years, to the Old Testament. It retained its independence where 
others did not. It is the seed of the African Union and a world 
leader. Its soldiers help keep peace in other countries in 
conflict, and its cultural and artistic influence is 
widespread. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that 
Ethiopia not succumb to internal division and ethnic hatred. 
Ethiopia is far too important, not just for the Ethiopian 
people, but for the entire Horn and Africa as a whole. It must 
overcome this year of crisis and crises and return to being an 
example, an inspiring example, to be followed.
    Again, I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
    Ms. Bass. And let me just thank you once again because you 
have always been, for so many decades, such an incredible 
champion for human rights. And I remember our visit to 
Ethiopia, and I just hope that we see peace, that the bombing 
stops, and that also full communication is opened up. I was 
encouraged that I know that humanitarian relief can go in, but 
obviously so much more needs to be done.
    Before I introduce our witnesses, let me just mention that 
Members of Congress, whether on this panel today or not, 
represent many different Ethiopian communities, many different 
Ethiopian ethnic groups. And I suspect that some of the members 
that are here today might, when it gets to their questions, 
reflect the questions from that perspective. That is one of the 
ways that we will try to handle the incredible amount of text 
messages, emails, phone calls that we have received from 
various sectors of the Ethiopian diaspora.
    And as Congress Member Smith said, it is really important 
that we try to maintain a neutral position. As much as various 
diaspora groups would like for us to take one side or another, 
it is just not appropriate for us to do that as a Member of 
Congress.
    So now I want to introduce our witnesses, and I will 
recognize each witness for 5 minutes. And without objection, 
your prepared statements will be made as part of the record. I 
will first call on witness No. 1 for their testimony, but 
before, let me read the bio of all of the witnesses.
    Our first witness, Mr. Yoseph Badwaza, is a senior regional 
adviser at Freedom House, managing Ethiopia programs. Prior to 
joining Freedom House, he was Secretary General of Ethiopian 
Human Rights Council, Ethiopia's foremost human rights 
organization most known for monitoring and reporting on human 
rights violations. After systemic and persistent attacks in 
response to the Human Rights Council, Mr. Badwaza fled the 
country. Once relocated to the United States, he continues to 
be a leading voice for human rights protection and good 
governance in Ethiopia through advocacy, policy, and research. 
In 2010, he won the Human Rights Award for extraordinary 
activism.
    Our second witness is Ms. Lauren Blanchard, is a specialist 
in African affairs with the congressional Research Service, 
where she provides nonpartisan analysis on African political, 
military, and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy toward the 
region to Congress Members. Ms. Blanchard's portfolio has 
focused on East Africa, Chad, and Nigeria, and on security 
issues and military engagement on the continent. Previously, 
Ms. Blanchard managed democracy and governance programs in East 
and Southern Africa.
    Ms. Tsedale Lemma began journalism in 2000 and worked until 
2005 with three local newspapers, including as a senior 
reporter at the now defunct but prominent Addis Tribune. From 
2005 to 2010, she served at the Ethiopian Embassy in Israel, 
focusing on communication, regional, political affairs, and 
media. In 2011, Ms. Lemma established the Addis Standard 
monthly magazine, and over the last 10 years, has made it one 
of the most influential magazines in the history of independent 
media in Ethiopia.
    Our final witness, Ms. Susan Stigant, is the director of 
Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, that last month 
established an Africa Center to deepen, elevate, and expand the 
Institute's commitment to stem violent conflict in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Ms. Stigant oversees the Institute's programming on 
strategic regional engagement in the Greater Horn of Africa, 
with the African Union, as well as constitutional reform and 
national dialog processes. She is also a co-convener of the 
senior study group on peace in the Red Sea arena, convened by 
the U.S. Institute of Peace.
    I would now like to call on our witnesses for their 
testimony. And remember, each witness will have 5 minutes, and 
we will let you know when the 5 minutes are up. I will tap 
lightly on my gavel at the 30-second mark, and then we will ask 
you to conclude. Thank you very much.
    I would like to call on Mr. Badwaza.

  STATEMENT OF YOSEPH BADWAZA, SENIOR ADVISOR, AFRICA FREEDOM 
                             HOUSE

    Mr. Badwaza. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members 
of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you 
today. I ask that my full testimony be admitted into the 
record.
    The devastating developments of the past 4 weeks, have 
brought immeasurable human suffering and the destruction of 
livelihoods and appear to have returned Ethiopia to yet another 
protracted civil war, nearly 30 years after it emerged from its 
last. These tragic events have also dealt a deadly blow to what 
would have been one of the most consequential democratic 
transitions on the African continent, with significant 
repercussions for enduring peace and stability in Africa.
    Hostility between the leaders of the Tigray People's 
Liberation Front, which ruled Tigray region for nearly three 
decades, and the Federal Government in Addis Ababa had simmered 
for 2-1/2 years prior to the dramatic escalation of tensions on 
the night of November 3. This animosity contributed to 
deepening rifts among communities and has caused profound 
damage to the prospect of an inclusive and democratic pan-
Ethopia project that could have been an inspiration to millions 
of across Africa.
    With a communication blackout in the region since the start 
of the fighting in November, and the entrenched practice by 
both parties of using public communication tools to disseminate 
highly politicized propaganda messages, efforts to 
independently assess the situation have been difficult.
    A series of missed opportunities in the last 2-1/2 years 
led to the tragic derailment of a promising democratic 
experiment. A half-hearted effort at implementing reforms by a 
ruling party establishment reluctant to shed its deeply 
authoritarian roots stands in the way of a genuine, inclusive 
political process. This is consistent with the core feature of 
the old EPRDF establishment, which has repeatedly failed to see 
a middle ground on anything throughout its tenure. The latest 
descending of political differences into an armed confrontation 
is a consequence of this winner-take-all delusions held by 
parts of the old EPRDF establishment, which have plagued 
Ethiopia's democratic progress for decades.
    I now offer a few recommendations on how to get out of this 
political deadlock and return Ethiopia to a democratic 
transition.
    While Ethiopia's political problems have complex, 
historical, and cultural roots, many of them can be addressed 
by adopting a political culture that prioritizes dialog as a 
means of managing different views. To support this endeavor and 
efforts to bring Ethiopia back to the democratic transition, 
the United States should take several steps.
    One, the United States should urge Ethiopian Government and 
all political actors to engage in broad-based and comprehensive 
national dialog to address the core national issues and reach a 
political settlement ahead of the 2021 national elections. 
Significant resources have been spent on mainly State-led 
dialog initiatives. None of them have succeeded, as they 
followed the same ineffective model of organizing large 
gatherings without clearly defined set of objectives and 
agreed-upon rules of engagement.
    For dialog initiatives to be effective and get political 
process back to track, they should incorporate several steps. 
One, dialog should be preceded by an audit of political actors, 
conducted by independent groups, including civil society. And 
the dialog should be inclusive and reject the idea of what many 
call an elite pact, but should also be preceded by an audit of 
the political groups.
    There are 170 political parties in Ethiopia, but very few 
have active membership. The audit would serve the purpose of 
determining which ones have--which ones represent legitimate 
views and have interest of communities at heart.
    No. 2, dialog should be guided by rules agreed upon by all 
parties. Among others, the rules should identify independent 
facilitators and sanctions for noncompliance.
    All parties must renounce the use of violence as a 
political tool and agree to refrain from inciting supporters to 
engage in illegal activity.
    To foster the legitimacy and confidence in the dialog 
process, individuals in prison because of their political views 
should--and journalists and dissidents should be immediately 
released.
    Independent civil society, community, and thought leaders 
should be represented at all levels of the dialog.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Badwaza follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you. Thank you very 
much.
    I would like to now move on to our next witness. Tsedale 
Lemma, the journalist, if she would please speak.
    And witnesses know that when it comes to the Q&A period, 
you will have further opportunity to speak.
    Ms. Tsedale.

  STATEMENT OF TSEDALE LEMMA, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, FOUNDER, ADDIS 
                       STANDARD MAGAZINE

    Ms. Lemma. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member 
Smith, and honorary members of the House subcommittee. I am 
honored to be here to testify about the tragicpolitical 
trajectory my beloved country Ethiopia is confronted with 
today. The timing for this hearing could not have come at the 
right moment, provided that the topic to be covered not only 
deals with the conflict itself, but its complex root cause and 
recommendations on how to address the crisis in order to help 
prevent the security situation further deteriorating in 
Ethiopia and the wider region on the Horn of Africa.
    The source of the last 30 days' military conflict in Tigray 
is fundamentally political, and as such, inseparable from the 
cascade of other political crisis that rocked Ethiopia for the 
last 2-1/2 years and which have contributed to their astounding 
number of ethnic, religious, and political violence that 
continued threatening the country, weakening the State, and 
causing devastating suffering to Ethiopians across the country.
    The conflict in Tigray, although alarming in the 
immeasurable amount of the suffering it has caused to 
civilians, especially Tigrayans, it should, therefore, be not 
viewed in separate, an one-off event. In my view, the conflict 
is a cumulative result of three major political failures.
    The first one is the ill-timed and unceremonious collapse 
of the then ruling party, the EPRDF, over which TPLF had a 
monopoly.
    The second is the ill-managed opening up of the political 
space in Ethiopia, which lacked a comprehensive and inclusive 
political dialog and political settlement aimed at charting out 
an agreed-upon transition and roadmap.
    And the third is the advent of COVID-19 pandemic, which 
induced the postponement of the much anticipated elections in 
Ethiopia and how the government handled the postponement of the 
election. Instead of dealing with it with other political 
parties and reaching a settlement--agreed-upon settlement, the 
government has indefinitely postponed the election and caused 
an agitation of the political space, which has resulted in 
irreversible crisis that the country continued experiencing.
    So these political failures were further compounded by 
political assassinations, the last one of which, the 
assassination of Hachalu Hundessa, being the most 
consequential, that has stirred the political landscape from 
that which failed to find the negotiated settlement to that 
which saw the government as a jailer and its formidable 
opponents as the jailed.
    In light of this, I believe three things need to happen and 
need to happen fast. The first one is Ethiopia needs a U.N.-
mandated team to investigate the war on Tigray, the 
assassinations of senior officials and artist Hachalu Hundessa, 
as well as the killings of countless civilians and the 
displacement of millions since Prime Minister Abiy came to 
office. He has blamed the TPLF for it, which would further 
create more altercation in the ongoing war.
    There are repeated recommendations, including one made by 
Yoseph now, for independent and transparent investigations from 
all corners around the world. But I do believe only a U.N.-
mandated team should be empowered and enabled to commence such 
task. As a result of a deeply polarized society, no other 
institution from Ethiopia's Human Rights Commission to Amnesty 
International, to Human Rights Watch, earns the trust of 
Ethiopia's polarized society to conduct such important tasks 
the same way as a U.N.-mandated and a politically insulated 
investigation team should.
    In a global human rights update delivered at the 45th 
session of the Human Rights Council on the 14th of September 
2020, Michelle Bachelet, the U.N. Human Rights--High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, said her office was ready to 
support a thorough, independent, impartial, and transparent 
investigation of the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa and 
subsequent violence that really altered the political landscape 
in Ethiopia. This offer has not been taken up yet, and I do 
believe it is time we take Ms. Bachelet's offer and acted on 
it.
    What is at stake in post-Tigray's conflict is not the same 
way what is at stake in post-Hachalu Hundessa's assassination 
in Ethiopia, nor can the U.S. afford losing Ethiopia, one of 
its staunch allies and a force of stability in the Horn and 
beyond, and wishes to get away with it like it did with 
Somalia.
    Ethiopia's political crisis, which is haunting the 
government of Prime Minister Abiy, needs to find its root 
causes. A U.N.-mandated investigation team is the only place to 
start looking for in order to hold to account those who have 
wrecked havoc for the last 2-1/2 years and continue to find the 
closure.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Ms. Lemma. Ethiopia must also commence an all-inclusive 
political dialog as soon as possible----
    Ms. Bass. Excuse me.
    Ms. Lemma [continuing]. And that should be preceded by the 
release of all political prisoners.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lemma follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. Bass. Excuse me. We are finished now. Excuse me. Let me 
move on to the next witness, please.
    Ms. Blanchard? Is Ms. Blanchard with us?
    Ms. Blanchard. Can you see me?
    Ms. Bass. No, but keep talking. I think the camera will 
appear.
    Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Sorry. I seem to be having a video 
problem. Can you hear me, though?
    Ms. Bass. We can hear you fine. You just go right ahead.

  STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN 
            AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES

    Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting CRS to testify today.
    While the Government of Ethiopia announced an end to its 
military operations last Saturday, the situation in Tigray 
remains serious, with fighting ongoing and a potential for this 
to become a protracted insurgency.
    For context, Tigray has a population roughly equivalent to 
that of Maryland, around 6 million people. The Federal 
Government is now moving to install a provisional, regional 
administration in areas under its control, but it remains to be 
seen how they will be received. In my testimony today, I would 
like to highlight a few key points on the situation for 
congressional consideration and respectfully request that my 
written testimony be submitted for the record.
    First, the communications blackout and access restrictions 
to Tigray have made it very difficult to confirm information on 
the conflict and humanitarian situation there. This allows 
misinformation to flourish amidst contested and very polarizing 
narratives.
    Second, the conflict was not unforeseen. Tensions between 
Abiy's government and the TPLF had been simmering for months 
with saber-rattling from both sides. Opportunities to avert 
this conflict were missed, both by domestic and international 
actors.
    Third, the conflict is ongoing, and there are reports of 
atrocities by militia associated with both sides.
    Fourth, Tigray is not the only conflict zone in Ethiopia, 
and a protracted conflict there could undermine the 
government's ability to respond to unrest and threats to 
civilians in other parts of the country.
    And finally, the conflict has implications for U.S. 
interests, not only in Ethiopia but the broader region.
    First, on the information blackout, with phone and internet 
connections to Tigray down and journalists prevented from 
accessing most of the region, it is very difficult to know what 
is happening there. The extent of internal displacement and 
humanitarian need are still unclear. The press suggests that 
thousands have been killed, but there are no reliable estimates 
on the scale of the casualties.
    Prime Minister Abiy says no civilians were killed in the 
government's operations, but some refugees are telling a 
different story. Human rights experts note that it is very 
difficult to verify responsibility for reported atrocities. 
Both sides have sought to shape the narrative on the conflict, 
and there has been a serious rise of hate speech on social 
media platforms.
    Journalists, meanwhile, are facing threats and 
intimidation. Ethiopian journalists are in a particularly 
difficult position, but foreign correspondents are also under 
pressure. Federal authorities have issued fact-check statements 
to disseminate positions and contradict what they characterize 
as misrepresentations in the international media. And 2 weeks 
ago, the senior analyst on Ethiopia from the International 
Crisis Group was expelled from the country ostensibly over a 
work permit issue.
    Second, despite the Federal Government declaring victory, 
reports suggest that the fighting continues in parts of Tigray. 
U.N. officials and aid agencies have stressed serious concerns 
about the current humanitarian situation inside the region and 
the need for urgent access, particularly to the Eritrean 
refugee camps inside Tigray where over 96,000 Eritrean refugees 
are located.
    An agreement reached this week between the U.N. and the 
Federal Government is an important development, but it isn't 
yet clear how civilians in areas beyond Federal control will be 
reached. Civilians have been caught in the middle of this 
conflict.
    Refugees who have fled to Sudan have reported the shelling 
of towns and attacks on civilians by ethnically based militia. 
Some refugees have arrived with wounds from knives and 
machetes. The reports of ethnically targeted attacks underscore 
simmering ethnic grievances in the country that have fueled 
concerns for Ethiopia's stability in recent years.
    U.N. officials have described ethnic violence in the 
country as having reached an alarming level over the past 2 
years. They have noted that the stigmatization of certain 
ethnic groups, including the Tigrayans, Amhara, Somali, and 
Oromo peoples, among others, have significantly contributed to 
ethnic intolerance in the country. Human Rights Watch has noted 
the proliferation of official and unofficial armed groups 
operating with limited oversight and competing narratives of 
historic injustices among the country's ethnic communities.
    Communal disputes over border lands have played out across 
Ethiopia. Some of the violence in Tigray reflects these 
tensions over territorial disputes. The town of Mai Kadra, 
where one of the worst known incidents of mass killings 
occurred since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray, is one 
of those contested areas. It has been administered as part of 
Tigray since the EPRDF came to power, but many Amhara consider 
it to be their traditional land.
    The hostilities in Ethiopia threaten a range of U.S. 
interests in the country and the broader region. The level of 
humanitarian need in Ethiopia was already extremely high before 
the conflict began, with almost 12 million people facing food 
insecurity in a region that has been struggling with 
overlapping natural disasters and the impacts of COVID-19.
    The conflict poses risks not only for Ethiopia's democratic 
transition but also potentially neighboring Sudan. The reported 
role of Eritrea in the conflict further complicates the 
situation.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you. We will come back to you 
during the questions. Thank you very much.
    Our final witness is Susan Stigant.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN STIGANT, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA PROGRAM, UNITED 
                   STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

    Ms. Stigant. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member 
Smith, and members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your 
leadership on this issue. I am the director of the Africa 
Programs at U.S. Institute of Peace, although the views 
expressed here are my own.
    Political transitions rarely move forward with consistent, 
one-directional progress. It is normal that there will be 
resistance to reforms. It is normal that there will be 
fundamental debates about the nature and shape of the State, 
and it is expected that the legacy of a system that was based 
on exclusion and repression over decades requires sustained 
generational efforts to forge a justice and genuine inclusion.
    Amidst the escalating tensions that other witnesses have 
discussed and failed efforts of dialog, it is deeply concerning 
but unsurprising that Ethiopia's Federal Government and the 
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front would view the exercise of 
force as logical, effective, and even necessary in the short 
term. However, all of our best thinking and practice and 
knowledge underlines that violence does not work. This 
knowledge has forged consensus about the imperative of 
prevention in U.S. policies and assistance, and this approach 
needs to be at the center of U.S. policy and partnerships with 
Ethiopia. The reverberations resulting from the violence have 
exacted intolerable costs--humanitarian, human, economic, food 
security, and Ethiopia's own regional leadership. And these 
have provoked core questions about the trajectory of the 
transition and should provoke a fundamental reassessment of 
U.S. policy.
    In this spirit, I would like to focus my testimony on four 
recommendations for the U.S. administration and the continued 
leadership from this committee to end and prevent further 
cycles of violence.
    First, the U.S. administration and Congress need to 
continue to send consistent private and public messages about 
the imperative to deescalate violence, also to actively 
discourage outside military engagement and pursue a political 
solution. The U.S. can and needs to underscore the long-term 
costs the conflict will have on Ethiopia's economy and 
international image. The U.S. can signal and galvanize broader 
coordinated support with global partners for the African 
Union's leadership to silence and to keep silent the guns.
    Second, the U.S. administration and Congress can actively 
request and provide funding for an independent investigation. 
Allegations of incidents that could amount to war crimes have 
been reported by all parties. Investigation and documentation 
are needed to deter further violations, mitigate the risks of 
escalating rhetoric, and provide a path toward justice and 
accountability.
    Preliminary reporting by Amnesty International and the 
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission needs to be bolstered by 
investigations in other areas where fighting has occurred and 
with those who have fled the country. Amidst the deep 
polarization, the competing narratives and potentially complex 
jurisdictional issues, the U.N. High Commission for Human 
Rights and other U.N. mechanisms are needed to bolster the 
existing efforts.
    Third, the U.S. Government can safeguard space for 
inclusive conversations about the transition. In public and 
private messaging, the U.S. needs to strengthen its messages in 
support for freedom of expression, space for independent 
journalism, and they need to expand conversations to those who 
have diverging views. Existing assistance programs in support 
of the transition and democratic development can be activated 
to support conversations about what inclusion means and ways 
that confidence can be built toward dialog. Structures and 
mechanisms for inclusive conversations are needed to safeguard 
the broader democratic transition and to prevent backsliding. 
Conducting credible elections will eventually depend on 
fostering security, trust, and reconciliation. Ethiopians will 
need to feel confident that engaging in political debate and 
campaigning is possible. And eventually agreeing on changes to 
the Federal structure will require sensitive discussions and 
negotiations. Setting a precedent that such changes will be 
done through dialog, and not imposed, will be critical.
    Finally, the U.S. can and needs to engage Ethiopia in the 
context of a new political and diplomatic strategy for the Red 
Sea arena that puts inclusive, legitimate governance at the 
center. A recent bipartisan senior study group convened by USIP 
determined that in recent years, the geopolitical and 
geoeconomic dynamics of the Horn are increasingly tied to the 
Middle East, and yet the U.S. policy has not kept pace with 
these changes.
    To overcome the bureaucratic seams, there is a need to 
designate a special envoy with responsibility, or the deputy 
secretary to bridge between the Horn of Africa and the Middle 
East. There is a need to realign U.S. assistance to promote 
inclusive legitimate governance and economic growth, possibly 
by designating the Horn of Africa as a priority region under 
the Global Fragility Act.
    And there is a need for sustained, active congressional 
engagement to strengthen the coordination between congressional 
bodies on a transregional and interdisciplinary basis and to 
encourage bipartisan congressional champions to provide 
particular support to the transitions in the Horn.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stigant follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
    Let me take this opportunity to thank all of our witnesses 
for taking time to be with us today and also as we navigate 
this COVID virtual environment. We are used to having hearings 
in person, and so this is a bit challenging.
    I now want to go to questions. I will recognize each member 
for 5 minutes. I will start with myself, then go to ranking 
member, and we will go back and forth, Democrat, Republican.
    I would like to ask one, our witness that just finished 
testifying. You were talking about the relationship of the Horn 
and the Middle East, and I wanted to know if you could expand 
on that a little more, referencing specific countries and what 
aspects of the relationship were you referring to?
    After that, I would like to ask Mr. Badwaza if he would 
talk about what are some of the minimum preconditions that have 
to be met for a genuine national dialog that could lead to an 
effective political settlement. I would also like to ask Mr. 
Badwaza if he would comment about the U.S. response so far, 
which has been to suspend aid. And oftentimes, that--well, not 
oftentimes, but with this administration suspending aid might 
be a tactic that is used, but I am just not sure whether that 
helps move the country toward peace.
    So would you please begin? Ms. Stigant?
    Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question. I think if we 
look at the recent transition that took place in Sudan, it has 
to point to a way where it is critical to involve Gulf 
countries. If we look back to the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace 
agreement and the role that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia played in helping to convene and move forward that peace 
agreement, I think it points to the ways that the Gulf 
countries have a vested and strong interest going forward.
    There have been some reports and rumors that there might be 
some level of involvement of the UAE, given its close 
relationship with Eritrea. I think that, along with the 
investigations that have been raised, probably needs some 
further understanding and information and documentation.
    I think there is also an opportunity, not just in terms of 
potentially dangerous actions, but the ability of key partners 
to Ethiopia, including the Emiratis, to deliver similar 
messages to what the United States is delivering, that violence 
is not a sustainable path forward, that the stability and the 
integrity of the country is critical, and to use some of their 
diplomatic and financial and technical partnerships to drive in 
the same direction forward.
    So I think this is--there is an increasing thought that 
ensuring that we think about the interconnectedness of the 
economic, political, and security aspects is important.
    The other piece that I mention is that there have been 
efforts, and one of the priorities for the Federal Government 
of Ethiopia has been to forge a stronger relationship with 
Eritrea and Somalia. And if we look at the Red Sea coastline 
and the strategic positioning of the coastline, this will 
impact on the overall power dynamics and where the country goes 
going forward.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Badwaza.
    Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, for those questions. I 
think as I was reading earlier, in terms of for an effective 
dialog to take place and to move sort of the needle from the 
political stalemate that Ethiopia has found itself in, frankly, 
descended into an armed conflict, there should be a reset of 
how we understand the entire concept of dialog in a political 
context in Ethiopia.
    Oftentimes, it is taken to mean having large gatherings 
with everyone that has a claim to be a political organization 
without even necessarily having their status updated or their 
membership testifying to them. So I think we should be able to 
clear that with a prior audit, so that we can identify which 
ones are the legitimate representatives of communities and have 
something to contribute to the political process.
    I think it should also be based on rules agreed to by all 
parties, and there should be consequences for those who are not 
complying with these agreed-upon rules. And it should not be 
facilitated by one of the parties, one of the contending 
parties. There should be an agreed-upon independent facilitator 
of this dialog----
    Ms. Bass. Excuse me. Let me ask you, when you say 
``independent,'' independent in what way? Outside of the 
country, international, or how can it be internal?
    Mr. Badwaza. Not necessarily. There have been a number of 
institutions in Ethiopia that have reasonably wide respect and 
acceptance among the population. This could be from religious 
groups, interreligious groups. This could be from thought 
leaders in the academia where a reasonable agreement by all 
parties could be reached. Or if that is necessary and for, I 
think, mainly professional reasons and providing technical 
support, there should also be a room for international 
facilitators.
    So it should be--it is a perception from the beginning, 
parties going into with this path, that this is going to be 
dominated by a certain group of actors that dooms a lot of 
these efforts at dialog so far. So there should be confidence 
on the facilitators, there should be confidence that there is 
consequences, and there should be rules that guide that.
    And I think dialog in a type of environment that is the way 
the political space is gradually shrinking is not going to give 
us the results that we aspire. There should be some gesture of 
releasing all people that are in prison because of the 
political views that they were--they have espoused. This 
include journalists, political leaders, and other dissidents.
    So there should be a broader approach and a systematic 
approach to what we have done, dialog in Ethiopia so far for it 
to be effective.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you.
    Let me now turn to Ranking Member Smith for his questions. 
After all of the members have asked questions for 5 minutes, we 
will do another round if members would like that.
    Mr. Smith. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Blanchard, in your testimony, you point out that the 
TPLF denies initiating the conflict on November 4, accusing 
Abiy of starting the war to consolidate his personal power. 
Could you--and I have a number of questions, and I want to stay 
within the time limit. Is there any doubt that the TPLF was 
involved with going after munitions and going after the 
military in Tigray, No. 1?
    Second, you also point out, you know, as maybe a precursor 
of some of this, that the Federal Government's decision in 
October to reshuffle the leadership of the military's Northern 
Command exacerbated the tensions. You might want to speak to 
that in connection with that first question.
    In terms of dialog--and you have all made very good, good, 
passionate pleas for meaningful dialog and hopefully under some 
auspices, maybe the U.N. Is the best. But there are three 
envoys, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who have been deployed 
to try to find a way of getting all parties to speak. Would the 
African Union be, you know, the right institution to initiate 
this? What are those three envoys doing, you know, in order to 
encourage national dialog and to deconflict this problem?
    The safety of humanitarian workers, we know that reports 
were there were about four people who were killed in refugee 
settings. They were helping Eritreans, but they were killed. We 
do not know the details. I have looked for them online and 
elsewhere, do not know it, maybe you know it. But what about 
the safety of humanitarian workers? You know, we know in so 
many conflict areas they get targeted, and unfortunately they 
often get killed, and that is a very, very serious protection 
that needs to be in place.
    With regards to the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009, 
both Karen Bass and I noted that in H. Res. 128, as being, you 
know, an instrument that was so expansive, particularly as it 
relates to groups like Jerwaz (ph), and we know now that there 
is a new antiterrorism law of 2009. It seems to have some wide 
open language about punishing those who incite terrorism. I am 
not sure what the definition is, but, again, laws need to be 
well defined or else they could be easily breached and bad 
things can happen. I have got a lot of other questions, but 
that would be my time, please try to answer those.
    Ms. Blanchard. Thank you, Mr. Smith. You have asked me a 
complicated question. The government's narrative--the Federal 
Government's narrative is that the TPLF attacked facility's 
Northern Command and killed soldiers and seized weapons. The 
TPLF debates that narrative, and it is very difficult to, you 
know, ascertain who is right and wrong on this. What we do know 
is that there was a lot of saber-rattling, and there were 
tensions that built up to this.
    And I want to go back to the postponement of elections and 
the decision by the Tigray Government to go ahead and have 
their own elections. And basically what that resulted in was 
both sides declaring the other illegitimate, the government in 
Tigray saying that the government in Addis, the Federal 
Government, did not have the constitutional mandate to extend 
its own term and needed to have elections before its term 
expired in October. And then by the same token, the Federal 
Government declaring that the elections that Tigray went ahead 
and held for regional positions were illegitimate.
    And so after that, when the Federal Government tried to 
change out some of the leadership of the Northern Command, 
which by most accounts is sort of one of the most heavily armed 
commands in the country, as a legacy of the long border war and 
standoff with Eritrea, TPLF sort of considered that to be a 
threat.
    There were reports by the TPLF before the conflict started 
on November 4 of troop movements toward the border with Tigray. 
And so by some accounts, the TPLF felt that it was going to be 
attacked and moved to respond in self-defense. So the narrative 
has competed, and CRS certainly isn't in a position to verify 
which is the correct story.
    You know, the unfortunate aftermath is that you have a 
split within the military and the security forces in Tigray and 
elsewhere. There are reports that there has been some isolated 
fighting among forces, Ethiopian military forces, including in 
Somalia, that--one of the things I was going to mention, I ran 
out of time--Ethiopia's reported to have pulled back at least 
3,000, if not more, of their forces from Somalia where they are 
fighting Al Shabaab and supporting regional stabilization 
operations. And there are reports of tensions within the 
forces. So that is, you know, I think something else of U.S. 
concern.
    On the issue of the envoys, President Ramaphosa of South 
Africa, who is the current chairman, appointed these three 
former leaders to serve as envoys. The Federal Government in 
Addis has resisted the idea of mediation, of a negotiation with 
the TPLF. But those envoys did visit and held meetings in Addis 
Ababa. I do not think they were able to meet with the TPLF, and 
I do not know what the status of their engagement is. And there 
are a lot of, I think
    [inaudible] Out there on how to move forward on a 
discussion that deescalates the conflict from here.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
    Let me move now to Susan Wild.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Thank 
you for conducting this hearing.
    My first question is to Mr. Badwaza. Last year, on November 
28, the Ethiopian Prime Minister declared victory over the 
Tigray People's Liberation Front and the end of the military 
operation in the Tigray region. Since then, however, reports of 
ongoing violence and unrest have continued. What, in your 
estimation, is the actual current state of the conflict with 
the People's Liberation Front? That is my first question, and 
then I have two subquestions to that.
    Mr. Badwaza.
    Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for the question. As you mentioned, 
once the Federal Government declared the cessation of military 
operations on Saturday, there have been rocket launches to 
Eritrea. So that is, I think, an indication of the fact that 
there is still a TPLF force with a capability to engage some 
sort of military engagement.
    On top of that, there have been daily reports from outlets 
that are affiliated with the TPLF talking about downing fighter 
jets and taking prisoners of war that belong to the Eritrean 
Army. So if the TPLF leadership explained that there is 
reasonable assessment, then there is reason to believe that at 
least some of their forces are fighting in some form or 
another.
    So again I would reiterate that it is still difficult to 
come up with any independent confirmation of what is going on 
in the region, but I am of the opinion that fighting has--I am 
of the opinion that the fighting has not yet completely 
stopped.
    Ms. Wild. Do you have any thoughts on intermediate steps 
that could or should be taken by the United States to avert 
even greater loss of human life, a major humanitarian crisis 
and a major refugee crisis in the region?
    Mr. Badwaza. I think that there are opportunities and some 
gestures by the Federal Government that are being taken, one of 
them being the agreement that they reached where they are going 
to supply humanitarian assistance.
    And I think that should be complemented by reiterating the 
call for--since the government has already declared that armed 
hostilities have stopped, the next step should be the start of 
how to engage in peacemaking. So I think these are 
opportunities for the United States to call for the 
continuation of dialog and engagement, particularly giving a 
chance to the initiative by the African Union, which the 
current chair, President Ramaphosa, has started.
    Ms. Wild. And do you have any thoughts on a longer-range--
or what the United States should do on a longer-range basis to 
encourage a political resolution to this conflict?
    Mr. Badwaza. I think one of it starts with getting the 
messaging right. I think there should be a consistent, 
coherent, balanced, and principled messaging from the United 
States concerning all actors in Ethiopia.
    So, for example, the perception that Ethiopians have toward 
the United States' stand with regard to the Nile--the Great 
Renaissance Dam negotiations has to be rectified, in terms of 
enhancing the U.S.'s standing among the Ethiopian populations, 
without any efforts that the U.S. Government would be a part 
of, could be accepted by the Ethiopian population and have the 
desired effect.
    So apart from getting a consistent messaging all across the 
branches of the U.S. Government, there needs to be a very 
thoughtful and deliberate approach to reaching the communities 
from both sides but the Ethiopian population in general 
directly. Because that is one of the challenges we are looking 
at, in terms of all parties taking a piece of that messaging 
and trying to use to further their stance.
    So there should be a way of reaching the messaging to the 
Ethiopian population as well as Ethiopia's other development 
partners, including the African Union.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Let me now move to Representative Phillips.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And greetings to today's witnesses.
    And a special welcome to my friends among the Ethiopian 
diaspora in my home State of Minnesota, who are surely watching 
today's hearing with both great interest and equally grave 
concerns.
    And I want to reiterate the sentiments of Chairwoman Bass, 
of Chairman Engel, and Ranking Member McCaul, in that Ethiopia 
is a key ally of the United States of America, and we must 
continue our important work of preserving the democratic gains, 
the spurring of economic growth, and advancing peace and 
security for all.
    With that said, I remain extremely concerned, gravely 
concerned, by the fighting in Tigray and the risk of 
internationalization of the conflict and the humanitarian 
impacts of the conflict as well.
    I want to focus on human rights for my first question.
    U.N. officials are saying that ethnic violence has reached, 
quote, ``an alarming level over the past 2 years'' and note 
that the stigmatization of certain ethnic groups, including the 
Tigray, Amhara, Somali, and Oromo, among others, has 
significantly contributed to ethnic intolerance throughout the 
country. Recently, Amnesty International as well as other NGO's 
have reported a major uptick in ethnic and religious violence 
during the conflict, of which we are all aware.
    So my first question is a very fundamental one. What should 
and can Ethiopia be doing to better protect civilians from 
ethnic and religious-based violence?
    Perhaps we can start with you, Mr. Badwaza.
    Ms. Bass. Actually, before you respond, Representative 
Phillips, I think your screen is blocked, or we are not sure 
what is happening with your screen.
    Go ahead, Mr. Badwaza.
    Mr. Phillips. Is that on now?
    Ms. Bass. No. But you can--do not worry about it if you 
cannot get it on.
    Mr. Phillips. Okay.
    Ms. Bass. Okay.
    Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for those questions.
    I think the escalation of the ethnic violence, 
intercommunal violence, in Ethiopia can be attributed in part 
to how wrongly the transition that started in 2018 has been 
managed so far.
    One of the outcomes of this transition and the 
liberalization of the political space over the past 2-1/2 years 
in Ethiopia is the emboldenment of these local and regional 
actors and some with ethno-nationalist sentiments to use even 
government resources to organize and train ethnic-based 
militias and special forces and using those to settle political 
and territorial scores.
    There have not been any constitutional foundations to some 
of these armed groups that every State in Ethiopia now seems to 
have, the militias. And then those, even by the government's 
own admission, are being actively used to fuel and carry out 
some of these very violent intercommunal clashes.
    So I think, for a resolution to be found in that regard and 
to return the political transition back to track, there should 
be, I think, a serious measure that the Federal Government 
should be taking, either to regulate these armed militia and 
special forces that every region seems to have and also put a 
political and legal framework that regulates political 
organization in Ethiopia--that is, in terms of regulating using 
ethnic and religious affiliation as a political organizing 
form.
    So, with these measures and getting the legal and political 
framework and the regulatory framework right, I think there 
could be some relief, at least when it comes to the various 
atrocities that the country has witnessed over the past 2-1/2 
years.
    Mr. Phillips. Okay. Thank you, sir.
    I am so sorry about my video. I apologize for that.
    I would like to ask--if I can continue questioning, Madam 
Chair, I would like to ask a question about the elections, of 
course.
    As you all know, Ethiopia's election board announced in 
March 2020 that national and regional elections scheduled for 
August would be postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    The Tigray regional government, led by the TPLF, of course, 
went ahead with its regional council elections in September 
despite the Federal Government warning that the vote, of 
course, would be illegal. The only exacerbated tensions between 
the Abiy government and the TPLF, of course, has since led to 
the conflict.
    Ms. Stigant, if you could please answer, what can the U.S. 
do to support the coronavirus precautions while also ensuring 
that Ethiopia is able to safely hold free and fair elections 
next year?
    Ms. Stigant. Thank you for your question.
    You know, part of the reason that the national election 
board postponed the elections was that, in March, they made a 
determination that they wouldn't have been able to put in place 
the necessary technical pieces in the roadmap. And so I think 
an important foundation point is to have a clear calendar that 
is regularly updated.
    My understanding is that there are ongoing and existing 
programming to support this aspect of Ethiopia's democratic 
transition. I think it is important to protect those programs 
despite some of the restrictions and holds that were put on 
assistance in relation to the policies in the talks on the dam 
and the GERD.
    But elections aren't just technical exercises, as you well 
know; they are fundamentally political exercises. And they are 
moments where, rather than a country most likely coming 
together, they can be deeply polarizing. And so I think as 
important as the technical preparations are ensuring, going 
back to your first question, that there is a space in the 
country for civic actors, for people who have different plural 
voices to be speaking freely their minds, that there is space 
for journalists to be covering, that there is space for 
political debate about fundamental questions about where the 
country heads. And the U.S. can support that through its 
programming; it can support it through its ongoing messaging.
    And I think it is very important that there isn't a rush 
toward elections, that really finding an environment that is 
ripe is critical to avoid the potential to catalyze additional 
violence leading into that political milestone.
    Mr. Phillips. All right. Thank you.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. And thank you, Representative Phillips. I 
certainly remember the visit to your district and the very 
brief meeting we had with diaspora in your area, and I am sure 
your questions reflect their concerns as well.
    I did want to continue, though, with Ms. Stigant for 
another minute, especially talking about elections and wanting 
to know what you think the U.S. might be able to do in terms of 
supporting Ethiopia getting to the point where they can have 
the national elections.
    Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question.
    I think if we look to the experiences in other countries 
coming out of transition, creating space for the inter-
political dialog that needs to take place is a priority. And so 
my understanding is that there are existing programs through 
democracy assistance that are working to support political 
parties, that are working to support civic groups. I think that 
is going to need additional attention.
    We often approach elections and peace-building as separated 
cones. And I think there is a particular need, coming out of 
this violence and what we see as the closing space, to 
interconnect these together more effectively. There will be, I 
think, a tendency for political leaders to mobilize their base. 
And finding ways to ensure that that remains nonviolent, if 
people are coming to the streets, will be absolutely critical 
going into the electoral period.
    Ms. Bass. And it is an area where we have had a lot of cuts 
in terms of democracy and governance. Those two categories have 
had significant budget cuts.
    And so, I think, looking at a new administration coming in, 
I wanted to ask Mr. Badwaza and also Ms. Blanchard, what advice 
do you have for the new administration? And then can you 
specifically comment on the impact that cutting foreign 
assistance has already had?
    So I would ask both Mr. Badwaza and Ms. Blanchard to 
respond to that, and then I will go to Mr. Smith for any 
concluding questions that he has.
    Mr. Badwaza.
    Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, again.
    I think, again, there is a lot of support by way of 
humanitarian assistance that goes to Ethiopia from the United 
States. And, over the years, the core principle that used to 
guide the relationship has been this cooperation over 
counterterrorism efforts in the region. That has, in the years 
past, I think, clouded some of the real human rights and 
political concerns that the Ethiopian population was having.
    And the messaging, again, from the United States was not 
really to the satisfaction of a large majority of the Ethiopian 
population. As it has been mentioned earlier, there have been 
resolutions that needed to come out of the U.S. House of 
Representatives to highlight those concerns and to, sort of, 
chart a direction to a more democratic political process in 
Ethiopia.
    So I would say the incoming new administration should be 
proactive in engaging voices outside of the government. I 
understand government-to-government relations should continue, 
but, in terms of getting a wider perspective of the 
developments and the core national issues on Ethiopia, I think 
there should be a focus on institution-building.
    For example, there have been really encouraging work that 
is being done, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission over the 
past few months, in terms of investigating the human rights 
abuses all over the country and also trying to hold officials 
to account to their deeds.
    So I think the United States should focus on encouraging 
institutions like this one and building independent media, 
which could force the culture of inclusive dialog and 
independent analysis of events, instead of the one we are 
seeing, based mainly on hateful practices, hate speech, and 
dangerous speech that is being particularly, in many cases, 
produced by members of the diaspora and being imported to the 
conversation in the domestic political sphere.
    I think there are measures that need to be taken in terms 
of trying to tame the impact of these harmful interventions 
from actors both inside and outside of Ethiopia. And the U.S. 
Government can support independent groups, independent 
institutions, including the media, to try and counter those 
harmful narratives and force the culture of inclusive political 
dialog.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Ms. Blanchard, if you could quickly respond, because I have 
actually run out of time.
    Ms. Blanchard. Sure. Absolutely.
    You asked about the U.S. assistance and how it has changed. 
And, of course, democracy and governance funding and 
programming in Ethiopia prior to the transition when Abiy came 
into office was limited, in large part because of the 
restricted political space in the country. It has since 
expanded, particularly with the aim of supporting democratic 
elections.
    But that assistance has been impacted by the suspension 
related to the GERD negotiations. As you know, in August, the 
administration suspended roughly $260 million in assistance to 
Ethiopia. Of that total $260 million, at least $30 million has 
been redirected elsewhere. It was expiring. And of what 
remains, by my tally, over $20 million in governance and 
democracy and human-rights-related funding is affected.
    Now, how much of an effect is a little bit difficult to 
tell, because a lot of that programming was also somewhat 
slowed by the COVID pandemic and partners' ability to program 
in the midst of that. And, of course, the election delay also 
had some impact. But I think there are concerns that the 
suspension of assistance may have an impact on U.S. and 
partners' ability to respond to the conflict.
    With the prospect of elections coming up, there is so much 
work to do, if they are to be held--voter registration 
exercises and otherwise.
    And, of course, you know, these outstanding questions about 
whether or not the conflict continues, that will impact the 
ability to hold elections in Tigray but potentially in other 
parts of the country. This was part of what had delayed the 
election processes, including a planned census, was the large 
amount of displacement from conflict in the years preceding.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Mr. Smith, would you like to close us out with a round of 5 
minutes?
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    A couple of questions on the antiterrorism law of 2019. 
Does it comport with human rights norms? Did it truly replace 
the proclamation of 2009, which we were very, very critical of?
    The safety of humanitarian personnel, we did not have time 
to get an answer to that. Do you feel there will be enough 
assurances there?
    Mr. Badwaza, you had talked in your testimony about an 
audit of political actors, and I am not sure what you meant. Is 
that for accountability, or is that to include them in a 
dialog? Maybe you could just amplify or give some clarity as to 
what that audit would look like.
    And, Ms. Tsedale Lemma, in your November 11 op-ed in The 
New York Times, you claimed that much of the blame for the 
Tigray conflict lies with Prime Minister Abiy. One of the 
pieces of evidence that you cite is that the Prime Minister 
dismantled the old political order and marginalized the TPLF 
through the creation of the Prosperity Party last year, which 
the TPLF did not want to join.
    However, you did point out in the op-ed that, following 
massive protests by the Oromo and Amhara communities, which 
together make up nearly two-thirds of the population, you know, 
you point out that these protests were against the TPLF's 
dominance of the government, the TPLF coalition and their 
authoritarian rule.
    So I am just--you know, when you have a true majority, 
shouldn't there be some restructuring of the old political 
order which had dominated Ethiopia for so long?
    And, again, the massive human rights abuses over the years 
being committed by previous governments--and Don Payne, who was 
my ranking, and I was his ranking when he was chair--we went 
back and forth, like Karen and I have gone back and forth over 
the years--he, too, was very critical, you know, in terms of 
the massive human rights abuses. So maybe you could speak to 
that.
    And the role of faith-based. Are the faith-based leaders, 
whether they be the Islamic community or from the Christian 
community, are they playing a positive role?
    Ms. Blanchard.
    Ms. Blanchard. Sorry. I did not know if you had directed 
that at me.
    Let me start with your last question. The faith-based 
community in Ethiopia has been trying to engage to stop the 
fighting. The Inter-Religious Council has called for an 
immediate end to the fighting and called for dialog and echoed 
some of the sentiments that have been expressed by the AU 
leadership and others in the international community.
    To your other questions, you know, I would defer to Yoseph 
and Tsedale on their thoughts on the revisions to the 
restrictive legislation. But, as you note, there was a major 
political opening in 2018 and 2019, and that cannot be 
discounted. You know, thousands of political prisoners 
released; opposition leaders and groups that had been in exile 
and accused of treason able to come back into the country; sort 
of a flourishing of press freedom.
    But, by the same token, I think in the last year and a half 
or so there has been some sign of a tightening space. And that, 
I think, reflects some of the government's struggles in trying 
to figure out how to manage this simmering ethnic conflict, 
communal conflicts that are happening around the country.
    The unrest that broke out in July, in which, you know, 
hundreds of people were killed, I think the government 
struggled with how to deal with that. But the 3-week shutdown 
of the internet meant that, you know, I think, ability for 
other voices to stem the violence and stem the disinformation 
that was spreading was very limited. And that was very 
difficult. And we are seeing the same with the situation in 
Tigray now.
    Mr. Smith. Mr. Badwaza and Tsedale, if you could respond.
    Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. I will take 
the antiterrorism proclamation question.
    I think, overall, it is a major departure from the 2009 
really draconian law. I say this for a couple of reasons.
    One, the level of effort that the drafting committee made 
to include different perspectives, including civil society, 
media professionals, and regional actors, was, I think, one of 
the very encouraging features that distinguishes the new 
antiterrorism proclamation from the 2009 one.
    And in terms of content, second. I think the changes it 
made to the acts that were considered a terrorist deedd and 
also the evidentiary provisions that it introduced by rejecting 
some of the very controversial aspects of the older law, I 
would say this is a much better piece of legislation as 
compared to the 2009 one.
    The audit I mentioned of political groups is related to, I 
think, making the dialog interventions effective. What I am 
saying is that there are hundreds of political parties that 
have registration certificates from the National Electoral 
Board of Ethiopia, and I think an actual audit would reveal 
that, once the registration criteria have been met by many of 
these political groupings, it is very questionable whether a 
lot of them have a functioning constituency that they 
represent.
    Yet many of these groups get to a gathering that is named a 
dialog, and you see a venue full of people that are talking 
about different priorities of their own, sometimes individuals, 
sometimes a small group, mixed with political groups that have 
a genuine political agenda, economic plans, and socio-cultural 
policies to actually transform the lives of people for the 
better.
    So my suggestion is to try and sift which ones are really 
working for the good of the population and which ones are just 
representing their own interests or they want to be staying in 
the political scene without necessarily having a viable policy 
framework to offer to the Ethiopian people. So that is what I 
meant by an audit should be conducted.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Badwaza.
    Ms. Lemma.
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    Ms. Lemma. Thank you.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. You have asked a very 
legitimate question. And we all know what led to Prime Minister 
Abiy Ahmed's ascent to office, is that there was a very, 
almost--after the 2015 election, the first thing that happened 
was a rejection of the result of that election, in which the 
EPRDF won more than 99 percent of the seats.
    So there was that very legitimate rejection. It has lost 
its legitimacy. It has grown into a collection of some, you 
know, crony members of the elite, the top elite. So they deeper 
and deeper detest it, EPRDF. And, as such, there was a 
legitimate need to dismantle it.
    It is not the question of dismantling it. It is the 
question of how it was dismantled that created no avenue for 
these parties to come and have a dialog to sort their 
differences. Because the EPRDF was the last, so to say, 
umbilical cord that kept these parties together. For all their 
differences, it somehow provided them the space to come and 
talk if they could manage to settle their differences there. 
With that dismantlement, the question became not only not 
having the space to discuss but also a question of power. 
Because when you dismantle it, you pushed away the people who 
held it together and who monopolized it.
    This is one point. The second one is, for 27 years, the 
country did not have any other political order except for the 
EPRDF. So, when you dismantle that, you are unleashing a 
political force without having an alternative that could absorb 
the shock that would come as a result of dismantling. So, as I 
say, it was like hitting it with a blunt force. You know, it 
needed an unraveling that was carefully--that should have been 
carefully done.
    And that is why I am holding the Prime Minister responsible 
for dismantling it unceremoniously and for creating that power 
vacuum in which disgruntled members of the EPRDF could come 
back and, you know, demand a seat in the table. Because then it 
is not only the lack of the avenue for discussion but also the 
power question, and that is what is leading the multiple crises 
in the country.
    It also led to have no political viable force in the 
Southern Nations and Nationalities when the regional State was 
undergoing through an increasing number of questions for self-
administration. The dismantlement of the SEPDM in the Southern 
Nations has led to the vacuum of a mediating force between 
these rising questions for self-administration and the central 
government.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Ms. Lemma. So these self-administration questions have led 
to multiple violences that we have seen in the last 2-1/2 
years.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Representative Phillips, you are recognized.
    Mr. Phillips. We will try this again. Thank you. Sorry for 
my AV problems. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Lemma, I would like to continue with you relative to 
the free press.
    The Ethiopian Federal Government, of course, has cut phone 
service and internet communications with the Tigray region and 
restricted journalists' access, making it awfully difficult for 
the outside world to verify any information that we are 
hearing.
    Of course, we are all seeing continued reports of detention 
of political opponents. And it is deeply troublesome.
    So, please, very specifically, you know, what can the 
United States do to ensure access of the press and due process 
in Ethiopia during these trying times?
    Ms. Bass. And, Ms. Lemma, I am going to ask--because we 
actually are over time for the hearing. So, if you could 
respond quickly, and then we will wrap up the hearing.
    Ms. Lemma. Thank you very much.
    It is not too late for the government to allow independent 
journalists to travel to the area. However, to find out what 
exactly happened in the last 1 month, it would be even too 
overwhelming for even powerful media, independent media, to 
establish. And without establishing what exactly happened in 
the last 1 month, it would be very difficult to solve the 
problem.
    Going forward, it remains very crucial that communication 
is restored and that Tigrayans that are living outside of the 
region have the right to find out what exactly happened to 
their family, not only for journalists--access to journalists, 
but they have the right to find out whether their families are 
dead or alive.
    So the restoration of communication as soon as possible is 
immediate. And the United States can do that by having a 
conversation with the Federal Government, opening up all 
communication, allowing journalists to travel to the area, 
those who can travel to the area to travel to the area, and 
continue filing the reports from the ground and talking to 
other people. This remains very crucial, and it cannot wait a 
day.
    Mr. Phillips. I couldn't agree more. And I am grateful to 
you. And thank you for your time today.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Bass. Absolutely.
    Well, let me thank the ranking member, Mr. Smith, and the 
other members who attended and especially all of our witnesses. 
Thank you so much. We know this is such a crucial time in 
Ethiopia and in the entire region in East Africa.
    And, in about 50 or so days, we will have a new 
administration coming in--which I think it is going to take 
some time for the new administration to get settled and 
functional and for all of the top officials to be confirmed. 
But I think that we need to look forward to see, what can the 
U.S. do, what kind of assistance can we provide.
    Clearly, we need to make sure that the accounts for 
governance and democracy are well-funded and so that we can 
participate in whatever way possible in helping to bring peace 
to Ethiopia.
    Thank you very much.
    And I call the meeting adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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