    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                            GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                          INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 3, 2020

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-136

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    42-439 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    		 ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California	             LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota		     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas    		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

    	     Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                 Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
                          International Organizations

                         KAREN BASS, California, Chair

    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota                 Ranking Member
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       RON WRIGHT, Texas
                                         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Badwaza, Mr. Yoseph, Senior Advisor, Africa Freedom House........     9
    Lemma, Ms. Tsedale, Editor-in-Chief, Founder, Addis Standard
      Magazine.......................................................    20
    Ploch Blanchard, Ms. Lauren, Specialist in African Affairs,
      Congressional Research Services................................    29
    Stigant, Ms. Susan, Director of Africa Program, United States
      Institute of Peace.............................................    43

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    68
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    69
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    70

                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LETTER

    Letter submitted for the record from Mary Mazanec................    71

                       THE UNFOLDING CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA

                           Thursday, December 3, 2020

                              House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
                Global Human Rights, and International
                                         Organizations,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                         Washington, DC

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in
    via Webex, Hon. Karen Bass [chairwoman of the subcommittee]
    presiding.
        Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human
    Rights, and Internal Organizations will come to order. Without
    objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the
    subcommittee at any point, and all members will have 5 days to
    submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the
    record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. To
    insert something into the record, please have your staff email
    the previously mentioned address or contact full committee
    staff.
        As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
    on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
    please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
    Consistent with House Resolution 965 and the accompanying
    regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as
    appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate
    background noise.
        I see that we have a quorum, and I will now recognize
    myself for opening remarks.
        Pursuant to notice, we are holding a hearing on the
    unfolding conflict in Ethiopia. Today we are hearing testimony
    on the conflict in Ethiopia, and would like to hear
    recommendations on what the United States and the international
    community can do to help stabilize the region and decrease the
    tensions between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray
    People's Liberation Front.
        There are several intra-ethnic conflicts regarding politics
    and social standing in Ethiopia covering decades. This
    highlights the country's long dispute over group and individual
    rights and whether centralized government is the way to true
    democracy for citizens of Ethiopia.
        During my many visits to Ethiopia, I have expressed to
    leaders that the government must have representation for all
    ethnic groups, and most importantly, always protect its
    citizens. The current State of Ethiopia, not only has a ripple
    effect on its citizens, but neighboring countries such as
    Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea are negatively affected.
        Ethiopia's instability and ethnic strife are producing
    security repercussions in Somalia. African Union forces depend
    heavily on Ethiopian troops to help combat violent extremism in
    the region.
        Somalia has upcoming elections that may be tense, and the
    Trump administration is planning to withdraw U.S. Special
    Operation Forces from the country soon, which will strengthen
    Al Shabaab and weaken anti-forces.
        Recent reporting noted that Tigray forces fired missiles
    toward the capital of Eritrea after Ethiopian troops pushed
    them from their regional capital. These actions certainly have
    political ramifications, but one of my major concerns is that
    far too often during conflict innocent civilians are the ones
    who are killed, injured, or displaced and have to flee across
    borders.
        Another regional concern for Sudan, after 30-plus years of
    authoritarian rule, Sudan, which borders Tigray, is trying to
    peacefully transition to a democracy and strengthen its economy
    in the
        [inaudible] Tigray People's Liberation Front to have a
    continued peaceful dialog with the help of African Union
    mediation to resolve this issue once and for all.
        Citizens on all sides of this conflict should have a right
    to be heard and peacefully protest, and there should be the
    freedom to disseminate what is going on in the country by
    journalists.
        I appreciate and I am looking forward to hearing from
    Tsedale Lemma, who can give a firsthand report on what is
    happening in the country.
        The Ethiopian diaspora is also critical in resolving this
    conflict. My office meets with and hears the concerns of this
    multiethnic community. We have taken meetings with groups
    representing the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan, and other
    communities. We have heard from activists, journalists,
    political actors, and regular citizens who are concerned about
    their loved ones in the country. I hear you, my office hears
    you, and Congress hears you.
        That said, I want you to know that the purpose of this
    hearing is to explore the deteriorating social and political
    situation in the country, the recent conflict, while attempting
    to find ways for the United States to be helpful and hear
    policy recommendations for how to resolve this conflict.
        The purpose is not to provide a space for any one ethnic
    group to lay out their grievances. We understand various
    ethnic, religious, regional, and political communities have
    been affected, and we want to acknowledge that. That is the
    reason why we are holding this hearing. Each witness here will
    contribute to our understanding of the situation.
        But you must know also that this is not the only source of
    our information. You know that the members present at this
    hearing today care about their constituents who are among the
    Ethiopian diaspora, recognizing the long-standing bilateral
    relations with Ethiopia and consider the country an important
    regional partner, but we must maintain a diplomatic posture and
    ensure that this hearing does not contribute to tensions back
    in Ethiopia. You will notice that we will raise your concerns
    and ask questions that you have raised in meetings or via email
    or written correspondence.
        I hope that you trust that we will continue to be champions
    for human rights in Ethiopia. I recently led the bipartisan
    resolution 1183, supporting respect for human rights and
    encouraging continued democratic progress in Ethiopia and
    condemning the targeted violence and destruction of property
    directed against ethnic and religious minorities, the excessive
    use of force by Ethiopian forces against peaceful protesters,
    the arrest of journalists and peaceful protesters who exercise
    their constitutional rights, and hate speech and disinformation
    that fuel ethnic and political violence by groups raised in
    Ethiopia and in the diaspora. I heard from constituents that
    the language did not go far enough. We hear you, and we will
    consider this feedback as we revise and prepare the legislation
    for the new Congress.
        I would like to thank our witnesses for participating in
    this important hearing. We all look forward to hearing your
    insight into the current situation in the country and
    recommendations for possible ways forward.
        When we decide to have a hearing, it is with great
    consideration, and mainly the push to have this hearing came
    from the diaspora. Sometimes it is difficult for us, though, to
    make a decision to have a hearing because then when we do,
    people want us to represent one side or the other, and that is
    not the role for us to play here in Congress. So hopefully you
    will find this hearing productive, and you will understand that
    we are committed to the U.S. playing a productive role in
    assisting Ethiopia find its way to peace and unity. And this
    hearing is just--and the resolution--is just one step forward.
    It will not be the last.
        Thank you very much, and I now call on the ranking member
    for his comments.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very, very much, Karen, Chairwoman
    Bass, for convening this very, very important hearing. And as
    you said, we are listening, and I think it is important that we
    do it. It is totally bipartisan, and I want to thank you for
    that. It has been a real joy to work with you as ranking
    member, and at one point you were my ranking member. So I
    think, you know, it just shows it is all about the issues and
    the concerns. And obviously what has happened in Tigray region
    is very, very serious. The loss of life has been horrific, and
    so I think it is very important that we have this hearing
    today. So thank you very much.
        Indeed, it is my belief that Ethiopia is one of the most
    strategically significant countries in the middle of Africa;
    Nigeria, in my opinion, being the other one; and there are
    others that are very important as well. But what happens there
    is amplified throughout the region.
        While I am hopeful that the Ethiopian Government, since
    they have captured the regional Tigray capital of Mekelle,
    coupled with the announcement just made, that the government
    will allow United Nations humanitarian assistance to flow into
    the region under their control, that hopefully that signals an
    end to armed conflict. But there is a concern, and I know you
    share it, Chairwoman Bass, that the fall of the capital does
    not necessarily mark the end of the armed conflict. It could be
    part of a stage, and we are very worried, all of us, about a
    protracted civil war characterized by guerrilla attackers, all
    the more reason why there must be a robust response by
    everyone.
        This concern is based in part on the history of the Tigray
    People's Liberation Front, or the TPLF, and the geography of
    the Tigray region in Ethiopia. The TPLF, as we all know, came
    to rule all of Ethiopia following a successful guerrilla
    campaign against the Derg, a case of Marxist-inspired movement,
    overthrowing a Marxist government in the early 1990's. As
    guerrillas, the TPLF used the highland terrain of Ethiopia,
    including Tigray, to their advantage.
        During the years of TPLF rule, the subcommittee was at the
    forefront of raising concern about human rights abuses.
    Following a critical hearing that I chaired in the spring of
    2005, I traveled to Ethiopia, met with Prime Minister Meles
    that August, as well as with human rights leaders. I raised
    concerns directly with him in about a 2-hour meeting,
    especially the egregiously flawed election--national election--
    and the killing of dissidents that was occurring in the streets
    and the mass arrests.
        In the next year, I introduced the Ethiopia Freedom,
    Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act. And following the
    passing of Prime Minister Meles, domination by the TPLF
    continued, and this subcommittee again held another critical
    hearing: Ethiopia after Meles, and the future of democracy and
    human rights. And there was a resolution which I introduced,
    along with you, Chairwoman Bass, H. Res. 128, Supporting
    respect for human rights and encouraging inclusive governance
    in Ethiopia. It passed the House on April 10, 2018, and it laid
    out milestones for transition from rule by the TPLF.
        Following Prime Minister Abiy's ascension, you and I met
    with him in Addis in August 2018, and we were encouraged by his
    words, by his actions, including the release of thousands of
    political prisoners.
        The removal of the TPLF, as we all know, as the dominant
    power in Ethiopia, has brought a reform-minded Prime Minister
    Abiy to leadership in 2008, but it also unleashed protracted
    jockeying between other ethnic groups, most notably, the two
    largest, the Oromo and the Amhara, as well as intra-ethnic
    conflict.
        Indeed, the prime minister's position among his own Oromo
    group is not completely solidified, and his pan-Ethiopian
    vision is challenged by Oromo separatists, just as the--or such
    as the Oromo Liberation Front and now jailed firebrand Jawar
    Mohammed.
        These ethnic tensions are further exacerbated by a
    constitutional order bequeathed by the TPLF commonly called
    ``ethnic federalism,'' which has led to the pitting of one
    group against another and fueled regional separatism and a
    desire to cleanse regions of other ethnicities.
        While it may not be considered polite to discuss issues
    such as ethnicity and religion, one cannot understand the
    current crisis in Ethiopia without reference to the ethnic
    tensions which are often overlaid with religious ones. We in
    the Congress must be careful, however--and I think you pointed
    it out in your opening statement, Chairwoman Bass--not to
    inadvertently stir up further ethnicity-based division by
    taking the side of one group over another, but rather, urge a
    path of reconciliation and negotiation, which will likely lead
    to no one being fully satisfied but will help reduce tensions.
        Many individuals and groups can point to grievances, we
    know that--and they are well-founded grievances, whether
    historical or ongoing--and they are real. The war in Tigray
    threatens to exacerbate an already severe humanitarian problem.
    We have seen crisis upon crisis beset Ethiopia in this year
    alone. Not only did COVID-19 impact Ethiopia, as it did so many
    other countries including our own, but on top of that, there
    was a major locust plague which has created major food
    insecurity throughout Ethiopia, the Horn, East Africa, and
    beyond, and now armed conflict.
        There needs to be a time for justice and accountability for
    the atrocities committed by all sides. No matter what the
    exigent circumstances, civil liberties--which Prime Minister
    Abiy Abiy to his credit helped restore in 2018--cannot be
    curtailed indefinitely. But first we need to stop the bloodshed
    and address the humanitarian crisis, and the anti-ethnic
    violence and hateful rhetoric must end.
        As Secretary Mike Pompeo related in his call with Prime
    Minister Abiy on November 30, there should be a complete end to
    the fighting and a constructive dialog to resolve the crisis.
    He also stressed the need to protect civilians from further
    harm, including those fleeing the conflict, crossing the border
    into Sudan, and respect for the human rights of all ethnic
    groups, including Tigrayans.
        Fortunately, it looks like an agreement has been reached
    between the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations to
    allow for unimpeded humanitarian access to areas of Tigray
    under government control. I hope that at a minimum the basic
    needs of those who have been displaced due to fighting, which
    some estimate to be a million people, can now be addressed
    while political issues remain to be resolved.
        Ethiopia, as we all know, is a great country--a great
    country--a proud nation whose roots date back thousands of
    years, to the Old Testament. It retained its independence where
    others did not. It is the seed of the African Union and a world
    leader. Its soldiers help keep peace in other countries in
    conflict, and its cultural and artistic influence is
    widespread. It is, therefore, absolutely imperative that
    Ethiopia not succumb to internal division and ethnic hatred.
    Ethiopia is far too important, not just for the Ethiopian
    people, but for the entire Horn and Africa as a whole. It must
    overcome this year of crisis and crises and return to being an
    example, an inspiring example, to be followed.
        Again, I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
        Ms. Bass. And let me just thank you once again because you
    have always been, for so many decades, such an incredible
    champion for human rights. And I remember our visit to
    Ethiopia, and I just hope that we see peace, that the bombing
    stops, and that also full communication is opened up. I was
    encouraged that I know that humanitarian relief can go in, but
    obviously so much more needs to be done.
        Before I introduce our witnesses, let me just mention that
    Members of Congress, whether on this panel today or not,
    represent many different Ethiopian communities, many different
    Ethiopian ethnic groups. And I suspect that some of the members
    that are here today might, when it gets to their questions,
    reflect the questions from that perspective. That is one of the
    ways that we will try to handle the incredible amount of text
    messages, emails, phone calls that we have received from
    various sectors of the Ethiopian diaspora.
        And as Congress Member Smith said, it is really important
    that we try to maintain a neutral position. As much as various
    diaspora groups would like for us to take one side or another,
    it is just not appropriate for us to do that as a Member of
    Congress.
        So now I want to introduce our witnesses, and I will
    recognize each witness for 5 minutes. And without objection,
    your prepared statements will be made as part of the record. I
    will first call on witness No. 1 for their testimony, but
    before, let me read the bio of all of the witnesses.
        Our first witness, Mr. Yoseph Badwaza, is a senior regional
    adviser at Freedom House, managing Ethiopia programs. Prior to
    joining Freedom House, he was Secretary General of Ethiopian
    Human Rights Council, Ethiopia's foremost human rights
    organization most known for monitoring and reporting on human
    rights violations. After systemic and persistent attacks in
    response to the Human Rights Council, Mr. Badwaza fled the
    country. Once relocated to the United States, he continues to
    be a leading voice for human rights protection and good
    governance in Ethiopia through advocacy, policy, and research.
    In 2010, he won the Human Rights Award for extraordinary
    activism.
        Our second witness is Ms. Lauren Blanchard, is a specialist
    in African affairs with the congressional Research Service,
    where she provides nonpartisan analysis on African political,
    military, and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy toward the
    region to Congress Members. Ms. Blanchard's portfolio has
    focused on East Africa, Chad, and Nigeria, and on security
    issues and military engagement on the continent. Previously,
    Ms. Blanchard managed democracy and governance programs in East
    and Southern Africa.
        Ms. Tsedale Lemma began journalism in 2000 and worked until
    2005 with three local newspapers, including as a senior
    reporter at the now defunct but prominent Addis Tribune. From
    2005 to 2010, she served at the Ethiopian Embassy in Israel,
    focusing on communication, regional, political affairs, and
    media. In 2011, Ms. Lemma established the Addis Standard
    monthly magazine, and over the last 10 years, has made it one
    of the most influential magazines in the history of independent
    media in Ethiopia.
        Our final witness, Ms. Susan Stigant, is the director of
    Africa Programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace, that last month
    established an Africa Center to deepen, elevate, and expand the
    Institute's commitment to stem violent conflict in Sub-Saharan
    Africa. Ms. Stigant oversees the Institute's programming on
    strategic regional engagement in the Greater Horn of Africa,
    with the African Union, as well as constitutional reform and
    national dialog processes. She is also a co-convener of the
    senior study group on peace in the Red Sea arena, convened by
    the U.S. Institute of Peace.
        I would now like to call on our witnesses for their
    testimony. And remember, each witness will have 5 minutes, and
    we will let you know when the 5 minutes are up. I will tap
    lightly on my gavel at the 30-second mark, and then we will ask
    you to conclude. Thank you very much.
        I would like to call on Mr. Badwaza.

      STATEMENT OF YOSEPH BADWAZA, SENIOR ADVISOR, AFRICA FREEDOM
                                 HOUSE

        Mr. Badwaza. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members
    of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you
    today. I ask that my full testimony be admitted into the
    record.
        The devastating developments of the past 4 weeks, have
    brought immeasurable human suffering and the destruction of
    livelihoods and appear to have returned Ethiopia to yet another
    protracted civil war, nearly 30 years after it emerged from its
    last. These tragic events have also dealt a deadly blow to what
    would have been one of the most consequential democratic
    transitions on the African continent, with significant
    repercussions for enduring peace and stability in Africa.
        Hostility between the leaders of the Tigray People's
    Liberation Front, which ruled Tigray region for nearly three
    decades, and the Federal Government in Addis Ababa had simmered
    for 2-1/2 years prior to the dramatic escalation of tensions on
    the night of November 3. This animosity contributed to
    deepening rifts among communities and has caused profound
    damage to the prospect of an inclusive and democratic pan-
    Ethopia project that could have been an inspiration to millions
    of across Africa.
        With a communication blackout in the region since the start
    of the fighting in November, and the entrenched practice by
    both parties of using public communication tools to disseminate
    highly politicized propaganda messages, efforts to
    independently assess the situation have been difficult.
        A series of missed opportunities in the last 2-1/2 years
    led to the tragic derailment of a promising democratic
    experiment. A half-hearted effort at implementing reforms by a
    ruling party establishment reluctant to shed its deeply
    authoritarian roots stands in the way of a genuine, inclusive
    political process. This is consistent with the core feature of
    the old EPRDF establishment, which has repeatedly failed to see
    a middle ground on anything throughout its tenure. The latest
    descending of political differences into an armed confrontation
    is a consequence of this winner-take-all delusions held by
    parts of the old EPRDF establishment, which have plagued
    Ethiopia's democratic progress for decades.
        I now offer a few recommendations on how to get out of this
    political deadlock and return Ethiopia to a democratic
    transition.
        While Ethiopia's political problems have complex,
    historical, and cultural roots, many of them can be addressed
    by adopting a political culture that prioritizes dialog as a
    means of managing different views. To support this endeavor and
    efforts to bring Ethiopia back to the democratic transition,
    the United States should take several steps.
        One, the United States should urge Ethiopian Government and
    all political actors to engage in broad-based and comprehensive
    national dialog to address the core national issues and reach a
    political settlement ahead of the 2021 national elections.
    Significant resources have been spent on mainly State-led
    dialog initiatives. None of them have succeeded, as they
    followed the same ineffective model of organizing large
    gatherings without clearly defined set of objectives and
    agreed-upon rules of engagement.
        For dialog initiatives to be effective and get political
    process back to track, they should incorporate several steps.
    One, dialog should be preceded by an audit of political actors,
    conducted by independent groups, including civil society. And
    the dialog should be inclusive and reject the idea of what many
    call an elite pact, but should also be preceded by an audit of
    the political groups.
        There are 170 political parties in Ethiopia, but very few
    have active membership. The audit would serve the purpose of
    determining which ones have--which ones represent legitimate
    views and have interest of communities at heart.
        No. 2, dialog should be guided by rules agreed upon by all
    parties. Among others, the rules should identify independent
    facilitators and sanctions for noncompliance.
        All parties must renounce the use of violence as a
    political tool and agree to refrain from inciting supporters to
    engage in illegal activity.
        To foster the legitimacy and confidence in the dialog
    process, individuals in prison because of their political views
    should--and journalists and dissidents should be immediately
    released.
        Independent civil society, community, and thought leaders
    should be represented at all levels of the dialog.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Badwaza follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you. Thank you very
    much.
        I would like to now move on to our next witness. Tsedale
    Lemma, the journalist, if she would please speak.
        And witnesses know that when it comes to the Q&A period,
    you will have further opportunity to speak.
        Ms. Tsedale.

      STATEMENT OF TSEDALE LEMMA, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, FOUNDER, ADDIS
                           STANDARD MAGAZINE

        Ms. Lemma. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member
    Smith, and honorary members of the House subcommittee. I am
    honored to be here to testify about the tragicpolitical
    trajectory my beloved country Ethiopia is confronted with
    today. The timing for this hearing could not have come at the
    right moment, provided that the topic to be covered not only
    deals with the conflict itself, but its complex root cause and
    recommendations on how to address the crisis in order to help
    prevent the security situation further deteriorating in
    Ethiopia and the wider region on the Horn of Africa.
        The source of the last 30 days' military conflict in Tigray
    is fundamentally political, and as such, inseparable from the
    cascade of other political crisis that rocked Ethiopia for the
    last 2-1/2 years and which have contributed to their astounding
    number of ethnic, religious, and political violence that
    continued threatening the country, weakening the State, and
    causing devastating suffering to Ethiopians across the country.
        The conflict in Tigray, although alarming in the
    immeasurable amount of the suffering it has caused to
    civilians, especially Tigrayans, it should, therefore, be not
    viewed in separate, an one-off event. In my view, the conflict
    is a cumulative result of three major political failures.
        The first one is the ill-timed and unceremonious collapse
    of the then ruling party, the EPRDF, over which TPLF had a
    monopoly.
        The second is the ill-managed opening up of the political
    space in Ethiopia, which lacked a comprehensive and inclusive
    political dialog and political settlement aimed at charting out
    an agreed-upon transition and roadmap.
        And the third is the advent of COVID-19 pandemic, which
    induced the postponement of the much anticipated elections in
    Ethiopia and how the government handled the postponement of the
    election. Instead of dealing with it with other political
    parties and reaching a settlement--agreed-upon settlement, the
    government has indefinitely postponed the election and caused
    an agitation of the political space, which has resulted in
    irreversible crisis that the country continued experiencing.
        So these political failures were further compounded by
    political assassinations, the last one of which, the
    assassination of Hachalu Hundessa, being the most
    consequential, that has stirred the political landscape from
    that which failed to find the negotiated settlement to that
    which saw the government as a jailer and its formidable
    opponents as the jailed.
        In light of this, I believe three things need to happen and
    need to happen fast. The first one is Ethiopia needs a U.N.-
    mandated team to investigate the war on Tigray, the
    assassinations of senior officials and artist Hachalu Hundessa,
    as well as the killings of countless civilians and the
    displacement of millions since Prime Minister Abiy came to
    office. He has blamed the TPLF for it, which would further
    create more altercation in the ongoing war.
        There are repeated recommendations, including one made by
    Yoseph now, for independent and transparent investigations from
    all corners around the world. But I do believe only a U.N.-
    mandated team should be empowered and enabled to commence such
    task. As a result of a deeply polarized society, no other
    institution from Ethiopia's Human Rights Commission to Amnesty
    International, to Human Rights Watch, earns the trust of
    Ethiopia's polarized society to conduct such important tasks
    the same way as a U.N.-mandated and a politically insulated
    investigation team should.
        In a global human rights update delivered at the 45th
    session of the Human Rights Council on the 14th of September
    2020, Michelle Bachelet, the U.N. Human Rights--High
    Commissioner for Human Rights, said her office was ready to
    support a thorough, independent, impartial, and transparent
    investigation of the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa and
    subsequent violence that really altered the political landscape
    in Ethiopia. This offer has not been taken up yet, and I do
    believe it is time we take Ms. Bachelet's offer and acted on
    it.
        What is at stake in post-Tigray's conflict is not the same
    way what is at stake in post-Hachalu Hundessa's assassination
    in Ethiopia, nor can the U.S. afford losing Ethiopia, one of
    its staunch allies and a force of stability in the Horn and
    beyond, and wishes to get away with it like it did with
    Somalia.
        Ethiopia's political crisis, which is haunting the
    government of Prime Minister Abiy, needs to find its root
    causes. A U.N.-mandated investigation team is the only place to
    start looking for in order to hold to account those who have
    wrecked havoc for the last 2-1/2 years and continue to find the
    closure.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Ms. Lemma. Ethiopia must also commence an all-inclusive
    political dialog as soon as possible----
        Ms. Bass. Excuse me.
        Ms. Lemma [continuing]. And that should be preceded by the
    release of all political prisoners.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Lemma follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Bass. Excuse me. We are finished now. Excuse me. Let me
    move on to the next witness, please.
        Ms. Blanchard? Is Ms. Blanchard with us?
        Ms. Blanchard. Can you see me?
        Ms. Bass. No, but keep talking. I think the camera will
    appear.
        Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Sorry. I seem to be having a video
    problem. Can you hear me, though?
        Ms. Bass. We can hear you fine. You just go right ahead.

      STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN
                AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES

        Ms. Blanchard. Okay. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    inviting CRS to testify today.
        While the Government of Ethiopia announced an end to its
    military operations last Saturday, the situation in Tigray
    remains serious, with fighting ongoing and a potential for this
    to become a protracted insurgency.
        For context, Tigray has a population roughly equivalent to
    that of Maryland, around 6 million people. The Federal
    Government is now moving to install a provisional, regional
    administration in areas under its control, but it remains to be
    seen how they will be received. In my testimony today, I would
    like to highlight a few key points on the situation for
    congressional consideration and respectfully request that my
    written testimony be submitted for the record.
        First, the communications blackout and access restrictions
    to Tigray have made it very difficult to confirm information on
    the conflict and humanitarian situation there. This allows
    misinformation to flourish amidst contested and very polarizing
    narratives.
        Second, the conflict was not unforeseen. Tensions between
    Abiy's government and the TPLF had been simmering for months
    with saber-rattling from both sides. Opportunities to avert
    this conflict were missed, both by domestic and international
    actors.
        Third, the conflict is ongoing, and there are reports of
    atrocities by militia associated with both sides.
        Fourth, Tigray is not the only conflict zone in Ethiopia,
    and a protracted conflict there could undermine the
    government's ability to respond to unrest and threats to
    civilians in other parts of the country.
        And finally, the conflict has implications for U.S.
    interests, not only in Ethiopia but the broader region.
        First, on the information blackout, with phone and internet
    connections to Tigray down and journalists prevented from
    accessing most of the region, it is very difficult to know what
    is happening there. The extent of internal displacement and
    humanitarian need are still unclear. The press suggests that
    thousands have been killed, but there are no reliable estimates
    on the scale of the casualties.
        Prime Minister Abiy says no civilians were killed in the
    government's operations, but some refugees are telling a
    different story. Human rights experts note that it is very
    difficult to verify responsibility for reported atrocities.
    Both sides have sought to shape the narrative on the conflict,
    and there has been a serious rise of hate speech on social
    media platforms.
        Journalists, meanwhile, are facing threats and
    intimidation. Ethiopian journalists are in a particularly
    difficult position, but foreign correspondents are also under
    pressure. Federal authorities have issued fact-check statements
    to disseminate positions and contradict what they characterize
    as misrepresentations in the international media. And 2 weeks
    ago, the senior analyst on Ethiopia from the International
    Crisis Group was expelled from the country ostensibly over a
    work permit issue.
        Second, despite the Federal Government declaring victory,
    reports suggest that the fighting continues in parts of Tigray.
    U.N. officials and aid agencies have stressed serious concerns
    about the current humanitarian situation inside the region and
    the need for urgent access, particularly to the Eritrean
    refugee camps inside Tigray where over 96,000 Eritrean refugees
    are located.
        An agreement reached this week between the U.N. and the
    Federal Government is an important development, but it isn't
    yet clear how civilians in areas beyond Federal control will be
    reached. Civilians have been caught in the middle of this
    conflict.
        Refugees who have fled to Sudan have reported the shelling
    of towns and attacks on civilians by ethnically based militia.
    Some refugees have arrived with wounds from knives and
    machetes. The reports of ethnically targeted attacks underscore
    simmering ethnic grievances in the country that have fueled
    concerns for Ethiopia's stability in recent years.
        U.N. officials have described ethnic violence in the
    country as having reached an alarming level over the past 2
    years. They have noted that the stigmatization of certain
    ethnic groups, including the Tigrayans, Amhara, Somali, and
    Oromo peoples, among others, have significantly contributed to
    ethnic intolerance in the country. Human Rights Watch has noted
    the proliferation of official and unofficial armed groups
    operating with limited oversight and competing narratives of
    historic injustices among the country's ethnic communities.
        Communal disputes over border lands have played out across
    Ethiopia. Some of the violence in Tigray reflects these
    tensions over territorial disputes. The town of Mai Kadra,
    where one of the worst known incidents of mass killings
    occurred since the beginning of the conflict in Tigray, is one
    of those contested areas. It has been administered as part of
    Tigray since the EPRDF came to power, but many Amhara consider
    it to be their traditional land.
        The hostilities in Ethiopia threaten a range of U.S.
    interests in the country and the broader region. The level of
    humanitarian need in Ethiopia was already extremely high before
    the conflict began, with almost 12 million people facing food
    insecurity in a region that has been struggling with
    overlapping natural disasters and the impacts of COVID-19.
        The conflict poses risks not only for Ethiopia's democratic
    transition but also potentially neighboring Sudan. The reported
    role of Eritrea in the conflict further complicates the
    situation.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you. We will come back to you
    during the questions. Thank you very much.
        Our final witness is Susan Stigant.

    STATEMENT OF SUSAN STIGANT, DIRECTOR OF AFRICA PROGRAM, UNITED
                       STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

        Ms. Stigant. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member
    Smith, and members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your
    leadership on this issue. I am the director of the Africa
    Programs at U.S. Institute of Peace, although the views
    expressed here are my own.
        Political transitions rarely move forward with consistent,
    one-directional progress. It is normal that there will be
    resistance to reforms. It is normal that there will be
    fundamental debates about the nature and shape of the State,
    and it is expected that the legacy of a system that was based
    on exclusion and repression over decades requires sustained
    generational efforts to forge a justice and genuine inclusion.
        Amidst the escalating tensions that other witnesses have
    discussed and failed efforts of dialog, it is deeply concerning
    but unsurprising that Ethiopia's Federal Government and the
    Tigrayan People's Liberation Front would view the exercise of
    force as logical, effective, and even necessary in the short
    term. However, all of our best thinking and practice and
    knowledge underlines that violence does not work. This
    knowledge has forged consensus about the imperative of
    prevention in U.S. policies and assistance, and this approach
    needs to be at the center of U.S. policy and partnerships with
    Ethiopia. The reverberations resulting from the violence have
    exacted intolerable costs--humanitarian, human, economic, food
    security, and Ethiopia's own regional leadership. And these
    have provoked core questions about the trajectory of the
    transition and should provoke a fundamental reassessment of
    U.S. policy.
        In this spirit, I would like to focus my testimony on four
    recommendations for the U.S. administration and the continued
    leadership from this committee to end and prevent further
    cycles of violence.
        First, the U.S. administration and Congress need to
    continue to send consistent private and public messages about
    the imperative to deescalate violence, also to actively
    discourage outside military engagement and pursue a political
    solution. The U.S. can and needs to underscore the long-term
    costs the conflict will have on Ethiopia's economy and
    international image. The U.S. can signal and galvanize broader
    coordinated support with global partners for the African
    Union's leadership to silence and to keep silent the guns.
        Second, the U.S. administration and Congress can actively
    request and provide funding for an independent investigation.
    Allegations of incidents that could amount to war crimes have
    been reported by all parties. Investigation and documentation
    are needed to deter further violations, mitigate the risks of
    escalating rhetoric, and provide a path toward justice and
    accountability.
        Preliminary reporting by Amnesty International and the
    Ethiopian Human Rights Commission needs to be bolstered by
    investigations in other areas where fighting has occurred and
    with those who have fled the country. Amidst the deep
    polarization, the competing narratives and potentially complex
    jurisdictional issues, the U.N. High Commission for Human
    Rights and other U.N. mechanisms are needed to bolster the
    existing efforts.
        Third, the U.S. Government can safeguard space for
    inclusive conversations about the transition. In public and
    private messaging, the U.S. needs to strengthen its messages in
    support for freedom of expression, space for independent
    journalism, and they need to expand conversations to those who
    have diverging views. Existing assistance programs in support
    of the transition and democratic development can be activated
    to support conversations about what inclusion means and ways
    that confidence can be built toward dialog. Structures and
    mechanisms for inclusive conversations are needed to safeguard
    the broader democratic transition and to prevent backsliding.
    Conducting credible elections will eventually depend on
    fostering security, trust, and reconciliation. Ethiopians will
    need to feel confident that engaging in political debate and
    campaigning is possible. And eventually agreeing on changes to
    the Federal structure will require sensitive discussions and
    negotiations. Setting a precedent that such changes will be
    done through dialog, and not imposed, will be critical.
        Finally, the U.S. can and needs to engage Ethiopia in the
    context of a new political and diplomatic strategy for the Red
    Sea arena that puts inclusive, legitimate governance at the
    center. A recent bipartisan senior study group convened by USIP
    determined that in recent years, the geopolitical and
    geoeconomic dynamics of the Horn are increasingly tied to the
    Middle East, and yet the U.S. policy has not kept pace with
    these changes.
        To overcome the bureaucratic seams, there is a need to
    designate a special envoy with responsibility, or the deputy
    secretary to bridge between the Horn of Africa and the Middle
    East. There is a need to realign U.S. assistance to promote
    inclusive legitimate governance and economic growth, possibly
    by designating the Horn of Africa as a priority region under
    the Global Fragility Act.
        And there is a need for sustained, active congressional
    engagement to strengthen the coordination between congressional
    bodies on a transregional and interdisciplinary basis and to
    encourage bipartisan congressional champions to provide
    particular support to the transitions in the Horn.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stigant follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        Let me take this opportunity to thank all of our witnesses
    for taking time to be with us today and also as we navigate
    this COVID virtual environment. We are used to having hearings
    in person, and so this is a bit challenging.
        I now want to go to questions. I will recognize each member
    for 5 minutes. I will start with myself, then go to ranking
    member, and we will go back and forth, Democrat, Republican.
        I would like to ask one, our witness that just finished
    testifying. You were talking about the relationship of the Horn
    and the Middle East, and I wanted to know if you could expand
    on that a little more, referencing specific countries and what
    aspects of the relationship were you referring to?
        After that, I would like to ask Mr. Badwaza if he would
    talk about what are some of the minimum preconditions that have
    to be met for a genuine national dialog that could lead to an
    effective political settlement. I would also like to ask Mr.
    Badwaza if he would comment about the U.S. response so far,
    which has been to suspend aid. And oftentimes, that--well, not
    oftentimes, but with this administration suspending aid might
    be a tactic that is used, but I am just not sure whether that
    helps move the country toward peace.
        So would you please begin? Ms. Stigant?
        Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question. I think if we
    look at the recent transition that took place in Sudan, it has
    to point to a way where it is critical to involve Gulf
    countries. If we look back to the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace
    agreement and the role that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
    Arabia played in helping to convene and move forward that peace
    agreement, I think it points to the ways that the Gulf
    countries have a vested and strong interest going forward.
        There have been some reports and rumors that there might be
    some level of involvement of the UAE, given its close
    relationship with Eritrea. I think that, along with the
    investigations that have been raised, probably needs some
    further understanding and information and documentation.
        I think there is also an opportunity, not just in terms of
    potentially dangerous actions, but the ability of key partners
    to Ethiopia, including the Emiratis, to deliver similar
    messages to what the United States is delivering, that violence
    is not a sustainable path forward, that the stability and the
    integrity of the country is critical, and to use some of their
    diplomatic and financial and technical partnerships to drive in
    the same direction forward.
        So I think this is--there is an increasing thought that
    ensuring that we think about the interconnectedness of the
    economic, political, and security aspects is important.
        The other piece that I mention is that there have been
    efforts, and one of the priorities for the Federal Government
    of Ethiopia has been to forge a stronger relationship with
    Eritrea and Somalia. And if we look at the Red Sea coastline
    and the strategic positioning of the coastline, this will
    impact on the overall power dynamics and where the country goes
    going forward.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Badwaza.
        Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, for those questions. I
    think as I was reading earlier, in terms of for an effective
    dialog to take place and to move sort of the needle from the
    political stalemate that Ethiopia has found itself in, frankly,
    descended into an armed conflict, there should be a reset of
    how we understand the entire concept of dialog in a political
    context in Ethiopia.
        Oftentimes, it is taken to mean having large gatherings
    with everyone that has a claim to be a political organization
    without even necessarily having their status updated or their
    membership testifying to them. So I think we should be able to
    clear that with a prior audit, so that we can identify which
    ones are the legitimate representatives of communities and have
    something to contribute to the political process.
        I think it should also be based on rules agreed to by all
    parties, and there should be consequences for those who are not
    complying with these agreed-upon rules. And it should not be
    facilitated by one of the parties, one of the contending
    parties. There should be an agreed-upon independent facilitator
    of this dialog----
        Ms. Bass. Excuse me. Let me ask you, when you say
    ``independent,'' independent in what way? Outside of the
    country, international, or how can it be internal?
        Mr. Badwaza. Not necessarily. There have been a number of
    institutions in Ethiopia that have reasonably wide respect and
    acceptance among the population. This could be from religious
    groups, interreligious groups. This could be from thought
    leaders in the academia where a reasonable agreement by all
    parties could be reached. Or if that is necessary and for, I
    think, mainly professional reasons and providing technical
    support, there should also be a room for international
    facilitators.
        So it should be--it is a perception from the beginning,
    parties going into with this path, that this is going to be
    dominated by a certain group of actors that dooms a lot of
    these efforts at dialog so far. So there should be confidence
    on the facilitators, there should be confidence that there is
    consequences, and there should be rules that guide that.
        And I think dialog in a type of environment that is the way
    the political space is gradually shrinking is not going to give
    us the results that we aspire. There should be some gesture of
    releasing all people that are in prison because of the
    political views that they were--they have espoused. This
    include journalists, political leaders, and other dissidents.
        So there should be a broader approach and a systematic
    approach to what we have done, dialog in Ethiopia so far for it
    to be effective.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, thank you.
        Let me now turn to Ranking Member Smith for his questions.
    After all of the members have asked questions for 5 minutes, we
    will do another round if members would like that.
        Mr. Smith. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Blanchard, in your testimony, you point out that the
    TPLF denies initiating the conflict on November 4, accusing
    Abiy of starting the war to consolidate his personal power.
    Could you--and I have a number of questions, and I want to stay
    within the time limit. Is there any doubt that the TPLF was
    involved with going after munitions and going after the
    military in Tigray, No. 1?
        Second, you also point out, you know, as maybe a precursor
    of some of this, that the Federal Government's decision in
    October to reshuffle the leadership of the military's Northern
    Command exacerbated the tensions. You might want to speak to
    that in connection with that first question.
        In terms of dialog--and you have all made very good, good,
    passionate pleas for meaningful dialog and hopefully under some
    auspices, maybe the U.N. Is the best. But there are three
    envoys, including Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who have been deployed
    to try to find a way of getting all parties to speak. Would the
    African Union be, you know, the right institution to initiate
    this? What are those three envoys doing, you know, in order to
    encourage national dialog and to deconflict this problem?
        The safety of humanitarian workers, we know that reports
    were there were about four people who were killed in refugee
    settings. They were helping Eritreans, but they were killed. We
    do not know the details. I have looked for them online and
    elsewhere, do not know it, maybe you know it. But what about
    the safety of humanitarian workers? You know, we know in so
    many conflict areas they get targeted, and unfortunately they
    often get killed, and that is a very, very serious protection
    that needs to be in place.
        With regards to the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009,
    both Karen Bass and I noted that in H. Res. 128, as being, you
    know, an instrument that was so expansive, particularly as it
    relates to groups like Jerwaz (ph), and we know now that there
    is a new antiterrorism law of 2009. It seems to have some wide
    open language about punishing those who incite terrorism. I am
    not sure what the definition is, but, again, laws need to be
    well defined or else they could be easily breached and bad
    things can happen. I have got a lot of other questions, but
    that would be my time, please try to answer those.
        Ms. Blanchard. Thank you, Mr. Smith. You have asked me a
    complicated question. The government's narrative--the Federal
    Government's narrative is that the TPLF attacked facility's
    Northern Command and killed soldiers and seized weapons. The
    TPLF debates that narrative, and it is very difficult to, you
    know, ascertain who is right and wrong on this. What we do know
    is that there was a lot of saber-rattling, and there were
    tensions that built up to this.
        And I want to go back to the postponement of elections and
    the decision by the Tigray Government to go ahead and have
    their own elections. And basically what that resulted in was
    both sides declaring the other illegitimate, the government in
    Tigray saying that the government in Addis, the Federal
    Government, did not have the constitutional mandate to extend
    its own term and needed to have elections before its term
    expired in October. And then by the same token, the Federal
    Government declaring that the elections that Tigray went ahead
    and held for regional positions were illegitimate.
        And so after that, when the Federal Government tried to
    change out some of the leadership of the Northern Command,
    which by most accounts is sort of one of the most heavily armed
    commands in the country, as a legacy of the long border war and
    standoff with Eritrea, TPLF sort of considered that to be a
    threat.
        There were reports by the TPLF before the conflict started
    on November 4 of troop movements toward the border with Tigray.
    And so by some accounts, the TPLF felt that it was going to be
    attacked and moved to respond in self-defense. So the narrative
    has competed, and CRS certainly isn't in a position to verify
    which is the correct story.
        You know, the unfortunate aftermath is that you have a
    split within the military and the security forces in Tigray and
    elsewhere. There are reports that there has been some isolated
    fighting among forces, Ethiopian military forces, including in
    Somalia, that--one of the things I was going to mention, I ran
    out of time--Ethiopia's reported to have pulled back at least
    3,000, if not more, of their forces from Somalia where they are
    fighting Al Shabaab and supporting regional stabilization
    operations. And there are reports of tensions within the
    forces. So that is, you know, I think something else of U.S.
    concern.
        On the issue of the envoys, President Ramaphosa of South
    Africa, who is the current chairman, appointed these three
    former leaders to serve as envoys. The Federal Government in
    Addis has resisted the idea of mediation, of a negotiation with
    the TPLF. But those envoys did visit and held meetings in Addis
    Ababa. I do not think they were able to meet with the TPLF, and
    I do not know what the status of their engagement is. And there
    are a lot of, I think
        [inaudible] Out there on how to move forward on a
    discussion that deescalates the conflict from here.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        Let me move now to Susan Wild.
        Ms. Wild. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Thank
    you for conducting this hearing.
        My first question is to Mr. Badwaza. Last year, on November
    28, the Ethiopian Prime Minister declared victory over the
    Tigray People's Liberation Front and the end of the military
    operation in the Tigray region. Since then, however, reports of
    ongoing violence and unrest have continued. What, in your
    estimation, is the actual current state of the conflict with
    the People's Liberation Front? That is my first question, and
    then I have two subquestions to that.
        Mr. Badwaza.
        Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for the question. As you mentioned,
    once the Federal Government declared the cessation of military
    operations on Saturday, there have been rocket launches to
    Eritrea. So that is, I think, an indication of the fact that
    there is still a TPLF force with a capability to engage some
    sort of military engagement.
        On top of that, there have been daily reports from outlets
    that are affiliated with the TPLF talking about downing fighter
    jets and taking prisoners of war that belong to the Eritrean
    Army. So if the TPLF leadership explained that there is
    reasonable assessment, then there is reason to believe that at
    least some of their forces are fighting in some form or
    another.
        So again I would reiterate that it is still difficult to
    come up with any independent confirmation of what is going on
    in the region, but I am of the opinion that fighting has--I am
    of the opinion that the fighting has not yet completely
    stopped.
        Ms. Wild. Do you have any thoughts on intermediate steps
    that could or should be taken by the United States to avert
    even greater loss of human life, a major humanitarian crisis
    and a major refugee crisis in the region?
        Mr. Badwaza. I think that there are opportunities and some
    gestures by the Federal Government that are being taken, one of
    them being the agreement that they reached where they are going
    to supply humanitarian assistance.
        And I think that should be complemented by reiterating the
    call for--since the government has already declared that armed
    hostilities have stopped, the next step should be the start of
    how to engage in peacemaking. So I think these are
    opportunities for the United States to call for the
    continuation of dialog and engagement, particularly giving a
    chance to the initiative by the African Union, which the
    current chair, President Ramaphosa, has started.
        Ms. Wild. And do you have any thoughts on a longer-range--
    or what the United States should do on a longer-range basis to
    encourage a political resolution to this conflict?
        Mr. Badwaza. I think one of it starts with getting the
    messaging right. I think there should be a consistent,
    coherent, balanced, and principled messaging from the United
    States concerning all actors in Ethiopia.
        So, for example, the perception that Ethiopians have toward
    the United States' stand with regard to the Nile--the Great
    Renaissance Dam negotiations has to be rectified, in terms of
    enhancing the U.S.'s standing among the Ethiopian populations,
    without any efforts that the U.S. Government would be a part
    of, could be accepted by the Ethiopian population and have the
    desired effect.
        So apart from getting a consistent messaging all across the
    branches of the U.S. Government, there needs to be a very
    thoughtful and deliberate approach to reaching the communities
    from both sides but the Ethiopian population in general
    directly. Because that is one of the challenges we are looking
    at, in terms of all parties taking a piece of that messaging
    and trying to use to further their stance.
        So there should be a way of reaching the messaging to the
    Ethiopian population as well as Ethiopia's other development
    partners, including the African Union.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Let me now move to Representative Phillips.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And greetings to today's witnesses.
        And a special welcome to my friends among the Ethiopian
    diaspora in my home State of Minnesota, who are surely watching
    today's hearing with both great interest and equally grave
    concerns.
        And I want to reiterate the sentiments of Chairwoman Bass,
    of Chairman Engel, and Ranking Member McCaul, in that Ethiopia
    is a key ally of the United States of America, and we must
    continue our important work of preserving the democratic gains,
    the spurring of economic growth, and advancing peace and
    security for all.
        With that said, I remain extremely concerned, gravely
    concerned, by the fighting in Tigray and the risk of
    internationalization of the conflict and the humanitarian
    impacts of the conflict as well.
        I want to focus on human rights for my first question.
        U.N. officials are saying that ethnic violence has reached,
    quote, ``an alarming level over the past 2 years'' and note
    that the stigmatization of certain ethnic groups, including the
    Tigray, Amhara, Somali, and Oromo, among others, has
    significantly contributed to ethnic intolerance throughout the
    country. Recently, Amnesty International as well as other NGO's
    have reported a major uptick in ethnic and religious violence
    during the conflict, of which we are all aware.
        So my first question is a very fundamental one. What should
    and can Ethiopia be doing to better protect civilians from
    ethnic and religious-based violence?
        Perhaps we can start with you, Mr. Badwaza.
        Ms. Bass. Actually, before you respond, Representative
    Phillips, I think your screen is blocked, or we are not sure
    what is happening with your screen.
        Go ahead, Mr. Badwaza.
        Mr. Phillips. Is that on now?
        Ms. Bass. No. But you can--do not worry about it if you
    cannot get it on.
        Mr. Phillips. Okay.
        Ms. Bass. Okay.
        Mr. Badwaza. Thank you for those questions.
        I think the escalation of the ethnic violence,
    intercommunal violence, in Ethiopia can be attributed in part
    to how wrongly the transition that started in 2018 has been
    managed so far.
        One of the outcomes of this transition and the
    liberalization of the political space over the past 2-1/2 years
    in Ethiopia is the emboldenment of these local and regional
    actors and some with ethno-nationalist sentiments to use even
    government resources to organize and train ethnic-based
    militias and special forces and using those to settle political
    and territorial scores.
        There have not been any constitutional foundations to some
    of these armed groups that every State in Ethiopia now seems to
    have, the militias. And then those, even by the government's
    own admission, are being actively used to fuel and carry out
    some of these very violent intercommunal clashes.
        So I think, for a resolution to be found in that regard and
    to return the political transition back to track, there should
    be, I think, a serious measure that the Federal Government
    should be taking, either to regulate these armed militia and
    special forces that every region seems to have and also put a
    political and legal framework that regulates political
    organization in Ethiopia--that is, in terms of regulating using
    ethnic and religious affiliation as a political organizing
    form.
        So, with these measures and getting the legal and political
    framework and the regulatory framework right, I think there
    could be some relief, at least when it comes to the various
    atrocities that the country has witnessed over the past 2-1/2
    years.
        Mr. Phillips. Okay. Thank you, sir.
        I am so sorry about my video. I apologize for that.
        I would like to ask--if I can continue questioning, Madam
    Chair, I would like to ask a question about the elections, of
    course.
        As you all know, Ethiopia's election board announced in
    March 2020 that national and regional elections scheduled for
    August would be postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
        The Tigray regional government, led by the TPLF, of course,
    went ahead with its regional council elections in September
    despite the Federal Government warning that the vote, of
    course, would be illegal. The only exacerbated tensions between
    the Abiy government and the TPLF, of course, has since led to
    the conflict.
        Ms. Stigant, if you could please answer, what can the U.S.
    do to support the coronavirus precautions while also ensuring
    that Ethiopia is able to safely hold free and fair elections
    next year?
        Ms. Stigant. Thank you for your question.
        You know, part of the reason that the national election
    board postponed the elections was that, in March, they made a
    determination that they wouldn't have been able to put in place
    the necessary technical pieces in the roadmap. And so I think
    an important foundation point is to have a clear calendar that
    is regularly updated.
        My understanding is that there are ongoing and existing
    programming to support this aspect of Ethiopia's democratic
    transition. I think it is important to protect those programs
    despite some of the restrictions and holds that were put on
    assistance in relation to the policies in the talks on the dam
    and the GERD.
        But elections aren't just technical exercises, as you well
    know; they are fundamentally political exercises. And they are
    moments where, rather than a country most likely coming
    together, they can be deeply polarizing. And so I think as
    important as the technical preparations are ensuring, going
    back to your first question, that there is a space in the
    country for civic actors, for people who have different plural
    voices to be speaking freely their minds, that there is space
    for journalists to be covering, that there is space for
    political debate about fundamental questions about where the
    country heads. And the U.S. can support that through its
    programming; it can support it through its ongoing messaging.
        And I think it is very important that there isn't a rush
    toward elections, that really finding an environment that is
    ripe is critical to avoid the potential to catalyze additional
    violence leading into that political milestone.
        Mr. Phillips. All right. Thank you.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Bass. And thank you, Representative Phillips. I
    certainly remember the visit to your district and the very
    brief meeting we had with diaspora in your area, and I am sure
    your questions reflect their concerns as well.
        I did want to continue, though, with Ms. Stigant for
    another minute, especially talking about elections and wanting
    to know what you think the U.S. might be able to do in terms of
    supporting Ethiopia getting to the point where they can have
    the national elections.
        Ms. Stigant. Thank you for that question.
        I think if we look to the experiences in other countries
    coming out of transition, creating space for the inter-
    political dialog that needs to take place is a priority. And so
    my understanding is that there are existing programs through
    democracy assistance that are working to support political
    parties, that are working to support civic groups. I think that
    is going to need additional attention.
        We often approach elections and peace-building as separated
    cones. And I think there is a particular need, coming out of
    this violence and what we see as the closing space, to
    interconnect these together more effectively. There will be, I
    think, a tendency for political leaders to mobilize their base.
    And finding ways to ensure that that remains nonviolent, if
    people are coming to the streets, will be absolutely critical
    going into the electoral period.
        Ms. Bass. And it is an area where we have had a lot of cuts
    in terms of democracy and governance. Those two categories have
    had significant budget cuts.
        And so, I think, looking at a new administration coming in,
    I wanted to ask Mr. Badwaza and also Ms. Blanchard, what advice
    do you have for the new administration? And then can you
    specifically comment on the impact that cutting foreign
    assistance has already had?
        So I would ask both Mr. Badwaza and Ms. Blanchard to
    respond to that, and then I will go to Mr. Smith for any
    concluding questions that he has.
        Mr. Badwaza.
        Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Chair Bass, again.
        I think, again, there is a lot of support by way of
    humanitarian assistance that goes to Ethiopia from the United
    States. And, over the years, the core principle that used to
    guide the relationship has been this cooperation over
    counterterrorism efforts in the region. That has, in the years
    past, I think, clouded some of the real human rights and
    political concerns that the Ethiopian population was having.
        And the messaging, again, from the United States was not
    really to the satisfaction of a large majority of the Ethiopian
    population. As it has been mentioned earlier, there have been
    resolutions that needed to come out of the U.S. House of
    Representatives to highlight those concerns and to, sort of,
    chart a direction to a more democratic political process in
    Ethiopia.
        So I would say the incoming new administration should be
    proactive in engaging voices outside of the government. I
    understand government-to-government relations should continue,
    but, in terms of getting a wider perspective of the
    developments and the core national issues on Ethiopia, I think
    there should be a focus on institution-building.
        For example, there have been really encouraging work that
    is being done, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission over the
    past few months, in terms of investigating the human rights
    abuses all over the country and also trying to hold officials
    to account to their deeds.
        So I think the United States should focus on encouraging
    institutions like this one and building independent media,
    which could force the culture of inclusive dialog and
    independent analysis of events, instead of the one we are
    seeing, based mainly on hateful practices, hate speech, and
    dangerous speech that is being particularly, in many cases,
    produced by members of the diaspora and being imported to the
    conversation in the domestic political sphere.
        I think there are measures that need to be taken in terms
    of trying to tame the impact of these harmful interventions
    from actors both inside and outside of Ethiopia. And the U.S.
    Government can support independent groups, independent
    institutions, including the media, to try and counter those
    harmful narratives and force the culture of inclusive political
    dialog.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Ms. Blanchard, if you could quickly respond, because I have
    actually run out of time.
        Ms. Blanchard. Sure. Absolutely.
        You asked about the U.S. assistance and how it has changed.
    And, of course, democracy and governance funding and
    programming in Ethiopia prior to the transition when Abiy came
    into office was limited, in large part because of the
    restricted political space in the country. It has since
    expanded, particularly with the aim of supporting democratic
    elections.
        But that assistance has been impacted by the suspension
    related to the GERD negotiations. As you know, in August, the
    administration suspended roughly $260 million in assistance to
    Ethiopia. Of that total $260 million, at least $30 million has
    been redirected elsewhere. It was expiring. And of what
    remains, by my tally, over $20 million in governance and
    democracy and human-rights-related funding is affected.
        Now, how much of an effect is a little bit difficult to
    tell, because a lot of that programming was also somewhat
    slowed by the COVID pandemic and partners' ability to program
    in the midst of that. And, of course, the election delay also
    had some impact. But I think there are concerns that the
    suspension of assistance may have an impact on U.S. and
    partners' ability to respond to the conflict.
        With the prospect of elections coming up, there is so much
    work to do, if they are to be held--voter registration
    exercises and otherwise.
        And, of course, you know, these outstanding questions about
    whether or not the conflict continues, that will impact the
    ability to hold elections in Tigray but potentially in other
    parts of the country. This was part of what had delayed the
    election processes, including a planned census, was the large
    amount of displacement from conflict in the years preceding.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith, would you like to close us out with a round of 5
    minutes?
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        A couple of questions on the antiterrorism law of 2019.
    Does it comport with human rights norms? Did it truly replace
    the proclamation of 2009, which we were very, very critical of?
        The safety of humanitarian personnel, we did not have time
    to get an answer to that. Do you feel there will be enough
    assurances there?
        Mr. Badwaza, you had talked in your testimony about an
    audit of political actors, and I am not sure what you meant. Is
    that for accountability, or is that to include them in a
    dialog? Maybe you could just amplify or give some clarity as to
    what that audit would look like.
        And, Ms. Tsedale Lemma, in your November 11 op-ed in The
    New York Times, you claimed that much of the blame for the
    Tigray conflict lies with Prime Minister Abiy. One of the
    pieces of evidence that you cite is that the Prime Minister
    dismantled the old political order and marginalized the TPLF
    through the creation of the Prosperity Party last year, which
    the TPLF did not want to join.
        However, you did point out in the op-ed that, following
    massive protests by the Oromo and Amhara communities, which
    together make up nearly two-thirds of the population, you know,
    you point out that these protests were against the TPLF's
    dominance of the government, the TPLF coalition and their
    authoritarian rule.
        So I am just--you know, when you have a true majority,
    shouldn't there be some restructuring of the old political
    order which had dominated Ethiopia for so long?
        And, again, the massive human rights abuses over the years
    being committed by previous governments--and Don Payne, who was
    my ranking, and I was his ranking when he was chair--we went
    back and forth, like Karen and I have gone back and forth over
    the years--he, too, was very critical, you know, in terms of
    the massive human rights abuses. So maybe you could speak to
    that.
        And the role of faith-based. Are the faith-based leaders,
    whether they be the Islamic community or from the Christian
    community, are they playing a positive role?
        Ms. Blanchard.
        Ms. Blanchard. Sorry. I did not know if you had directed
    that at me.
        Let me start with your last question. The faith-based
    community in Ethiopia has been trying to engage to stop the
    fighting. The Inter-Religious Council has called for an
    immediate end to the fighting and called for dialog and echoed
    some of the sentiments that have been expressed by the AU
    leadership and others in the international community.
        To your other questions, you know, I would defer to Yoseph
    and Tsedale on their thoughts on the revisions to the
    restrictive legislation. But, as you note, there was a major
    political opening in 2018 and 2019, and that cannot be
    discounted. You know, thousands of political prisoners
    released; opposition leaders and groups that had been in exile
    and accused of treason able to come back into the country; sort
    of a flourishing of press freedom.
        But, by the same token, I think in the last year and a half
    or so there has been some sign of a tightening space. And that,
    I think, reflects some of the government's struggles in trying
    to figure out how to manage this simmering ethnic conflict,
    communal conflicts that are happening around the country.
        The unrest that broke out in July, in which, you know,
    hundreds of people were killed, I think the government
    struggled with how to deal with that. But the 3-week shutdown
    of the internet meant that, you know, I think, ability for
    other voices to stem the violence and stem the disinformation
    that was spreading was very limited. And that was very
    difficult. And we are seeing the same with the situation in
    Tigray now.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Badwaza and Tsedale, if you could respond.
        Mr. Badwaza. Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. I will take
    the antiterrorism proclamation question.
        I think, overall, it is a major departure from the 2009
    really draconian law. I say this for a couple of reasons.
        One, the level of effort that the drafting committee made
    to include different perspectives, including civil society,
    media professionals, and regional actors, was, I think, one of
    the very encouraging features that distinguishes the new
    antiterrorism proclamation from the 2009 one.
        And in terms of content, second. I think the changes it
    made to the acts that were considered a terrorist deedd and
    also the evidentiary provisions that it introduced by rejecting
    some of the very controversial aspects of the older law, I
    would say this is a much better piece of legislation as
    compared to the 2009 one.
        The audit I mentioned of political groups is related to, I
    think, making the dialog interventions effective. What I am
    saying is that there are hundreds of political parties that
    have registration certificates from the National Electoral
    Board of Ethiopia, and I think an actual audit would reveal
    that, once the registration criteria have been met by many of
    these political groupings, it is very questionable whether a
    lot of them have a functioning constituency that they
    represent.
        Yet many of these groups get to a gathering that is named a
    dialog, and you see a venue full of people that are talking
    about different priorities of their own, sometimes individuals,
    sometimes a small group, mixed with political groups that have
    a genuine political agenda, economic plans, and socio-cultural
    policies to actually transform the lives of people for the
    better.
        So my suggestion is to try and sift which ones are really
    working for the good of the population and which ones are just
    representing their own interests or they want to be staying in
    the political scene without necessarily having a viable policy
    framework to offer to the Ethiopian people. So that is what I
    meant by an audit should be conducted.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Badwaza.
        Ms. Lemma.
        Mr. Smith. Yes.
        Ms. Lemma. Thank you.
        Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. You have asked a very
    legitimate question. And we all know what led to Prime Minister
    Abiy Ahmed's ascent to office, is that there was a very,
    almost--after the 2015 election, the first thing that happened
    was a rejection of the result of that election, in which the
    EPRDF won more than 99 percent of the seats.
        So there was that very legitimate rejection. It has lost
    its legitimacy. It has grown into a collection of some, you
    know, crony members of the elite, the top elite. So they deeper
    and deeper detest it, EPRDF. And, as such, there was a
    legitimate need to dismantle it.
        It is not the question of dismantling it. It is the
    question of how it was dismantled that created no avenue for
    these parties to come and have a dialog to sort their
    differences. Because the EPRDF was the last, so to say,
    umbilical cord that kept these parties together. For all their
    differences, it somehow provided them the space to come and
    talk if they could manage to settle their differences there.
    With that dismantlement, the question became not only not
    having the space to discuss but also a question of power.
    Because when you dismantle it, you pushed away the people who
    held it together and who monopolized it.
        This is one point. The second one is, for 27 years, the
    country did not have any other political order except for the
    EPRDF. So, when you dismantle that, you are unleashing a
    political force without having an alternative that could absorb
    the shock that would come as a result of dismantling. So, as I
    say, it was like hitting it with a blunt force. You know, it
    needed an unraveling that was carefully--that should have been
    carefully done.
        And that is why I am holding the Prime Minister responsible
    for dismantling it unceremoniously and for creating that power
    vacuum in which disgruntled members of the EPRDF could come
    back and, you know, demand a seat in the table. Because then it
    is not only the lack of the avenue for discussion but also the
    power question, and that is what is leading the multiple crises
    in the country.
        It also led to have no political viable force in the
    Southern Nations and Nationalities when the regional State was
    undergoing through an increasing number of questions for self-
    administration. The dismantlement of the SEPDM in the Southern
    Nations has led to the vacuum of a mediating force between
    these rising questions for self-administration and the central
    government.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Ms. Lemma. So these self-administration questions have led
    to multiple violences that we have seen in the last 2-1/2
    years.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Representative Phillips, you are recognized.
        Mr. Phillips. We will try this again. Thank you. Sorry for
    my AV problems. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lemma, I would like to continue with you relative to
    the free press.
        The Ethiopian Federal Government, of course, has cut phone
    service and internet communications with the Tigray region and
    restricted journalists' access, making it awfully difficult for
    the outside world to verify any information that we are
    hearing.
        Of course, we are all seeing continued reports of detention
    of political opponents. And it is deeply troublesome.
        So, please, very specifically, you know, what can the
    United States do to ensure access of the press and due process
    in Ethiopia during these trying times?
        Ms. Bass. And, Ms. Lemma, I am going to ask--because we
    actually are over time for the hearing. So, if you could
    respond quickly, and then we will wrap up the hearing.
        Ms. Lemma. Thank you very much.
        It is not too late for the government to allow independent
    journalists to travel to the area. However, to find out what
    exactly happened in the last 1 month, it would be even too
    overwhelming for even powerful media, independent media, to
    establish. And without establishing what exactly happened in
    the last 1 month, it would be very difficult to solve the
    problem.
        Going forward, it remains very crucial that communication
    is restored and that Tigrayans that are living outside of the
    region have the right to find out what exactly happened to
    their family, not only for journalists--access to journalists,
    but they have the right to find out whether their families are
    dead or alive.
        So the restoration of communication as soon as possible is
    immediate. And the United States can do that by having a
    conversation with the Federal Government, opening up all
    communication, allowing journalists to travel to the area,
    those who can travel to the area to travel to the area, and
    continue filing the reports from the ground and talking to
    other people. This remains very crucial, and it cannot wait a
    day.
        Mr. Phillips. I couldn't agree more. And I am grateful to
    you. And thank you for your time today.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Bass. Absolutely.
        Well, let me thank the ranking member, Mr. Smith, and the
    other members who attended and especially all of our witnesses.
    Thank you so much. We know this is such a crucial time in
    Ethiopia and in the entire region in East Africa.
        And, in about 50 or so days, we will have a new
    administration coming in--which I think it is going to take
    some time for the new administration to get settled and
    functional and for all of the top officials to be confirmed.
    But I think that we need to look forward to see, what can the
    U.S. do, what kind of assistance can we provide.
        Clearly, we need to make sure that the accounts for
    governance and democracy are well-funded and so that we can
    participate in whatever way possible in helping to bring peace
    to Ethiopia.
        Thank you very much.
        And I call the meeting adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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