THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG POLICY COMMISSION: CHARTING A NEW PATH FORWARD

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THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG POLICY COMMISSION: CHARTING A NEW PATH FORWARD

Thursday, December 3, 2020

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ENGEL. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order.

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point. And all members will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

To insert something into the record, please have your staff email the previously circulated address or contact full committee staff.

As a reminder to members and others physically present in this room, per guidance of the Office of Attending Physician masks must be worn at all times during today’s proceedings, except when a member or witness is speaking. Please also sanitize your seating area. The chair views these measures as a safety issue and, therefore, an important matter of order and decorum to this proceedings.

For members participating remotely, please keep your video function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.

Consistent with Resolution 965 and the accompanying regulation, staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.

I see that we have a quorum. And I now recognize myself for opening remarks.

We convene today to examine the findings of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission which was sent to Congress in the Commission’s final report this week. It is a personal pleasure and honor that we hold this meeting as we wrap up the work of the 116th Congress. One of my proudest moments as a member of this body was when President Obama signed my bipartisan legislation to create an independent commission to evaluate U.S. counter-narcotics policies in Latin America and the Caribbean.

As we grapple with this challenge here in Congress, the country continues to struggle with the devastation that drug overdoses have brought to our communities. As the Commission points out in
its report, more than half a million Americans have died from overdoses over the past decade, with an unprecedented 71,000 deaths in 2019. It is really unbelievable when you see how many people have died.

It is a tragedy. It is hard to think of many issues more in need of Congress's urgent attention. We need to increase investment in drug treatment. We need to pursue robust criminal justice reform. And we need to focus on improving drug supply reduction policies in the Americas.

And that is why we are here today. The idea behind my legislation was simple. In recent decades the United States has spent billions of dollars fighting the drug trade in the Americas, but the successes have been few and far between.

Put simply, the drug war declared by Richard Nixon in June 1972, nearly 50 years ago, has failed. As the number of lives lost climbs, it is clear that we have too much at stake not to improve U.S. drug policy and ensure that our policies are focused on maximizing impact and minimizing harm.

And the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission and its bipartisan commissioners have given us a roadmap. The report offers a fresh approach to drug control policy. They tell us plainly that we are too focused on crop eradication; that U.S. drug certification process is ineffective; and that the State Department should have a leading role in developing U.S. counternarcotics policies abroad. It is really quite good.

As we collectively rethink U.S. drug policy in the Americas, I also hope that we will take a closer look at how to improve accountability for U.S. law enforcement agencies operating in the region, including DEA-vetted units whose actions have, at times, led to tragic civilian deaths.

The Department of Justice's Inspector General is currently preparing a report for me looking at this very issue, which I hope will complement the Drug Commission's work.

And to help put an end to corrosive violence in Mexico, we must do much more, much more to crack down on the illegal trafficking of firearms at our southern border. To that end, I join Senator Durbin in requesting a report from the Government Accountability Office that should highlight key areas for us to strengthen our response to illegal firearms trafficking to Mexico.

On a personal note, today's work is somewhat of a bookend for my years of work on Latin America, including as chairman and ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. I care deeply about Latin America, and believe that we must all work collaboratively to end the scourge of crime, violence, and drug trafficking that has affected far too many of the region's citizens.

While I will not be in Congress next year, I look forward to working with the Biden/Harris Administration and my colleagues on this committee to make sure that the good work of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission is implemented.

I thank our witnesses and look forward to your testimony, pending which I yield to my friend, our Ranking Member Mr. McCaul of Texas for any opening remarks he might have.

Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you personally for your hard work and dedication on this issue over
the years, and particularly when you chaired the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. So, we thank you for that.

Now, the Western Hemisphere continues to face serious threats from drug trafficking cartels carried out by these transnational criminal organizations. These organizations destabilize governments, contribute to corruption, use violence against local populations, and traffic drugs, including fentanyl, into America.

The United States and our partners in the region have been working to stem the flow for decades. And while we have made progress on the ground, new threats are emerging as criminal organizations change the way they do business. And we have to stay ahead of them.

As a Texan, a former Federal prosecutor, current co-chair of the U.S.-Mexico Interparliamentary Group, and former chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I have for years closely tracked U.S. cooperation with Mexico to combat drug cartels. Sadly, violence in Mexico has increased as the cartels expand their activities into opium and fentanyl. These deadly drugs come across our border and poison millions, including our children.

In 2019, there were nearly 71,000 overdose deaths in the United States. Over 70 percent of those involved opioids, including fentanyl. And I was proud to see the House pass the bipartisan FENTANYL Results Act last month, which I introduced with Congressman Trone. This bill ensures that we leverage the tools of the State Department to combat the opioid epidemic.

Through this drug trafficking, although it has a large Western Hemisphere nexus, I am also extremely concerned about the Chinese Communist Party’s role in allowing precursor chemicals for the production of fentanyl to be exported from their shores. As chairman of the House China Task Force I have spoken out about the need to counter the CCP’s malign influence globally. We must take action to hold them accountable for their activities in the Western Hemisphere related to the drug trade and beyond.

In addition, I am very disturbed about the reports the Mexican drug cartels are the top buyers of drugs coming from Colombia. Despite various challenges, I am encouraged by the progress that we have made underplaying Colombia and applaud the Duque Administration in their commitment to working with the United States.

However, the illegitimate Maduro regime and its connections to drug trafficking are also a longstanding concern. I applaud the Trump Administration for its efforts to hold the regime accountable through criminal charges and a tough sanctions regime.

There are some bright spots in this struggle. Of note, I am encouraged by the various regional initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Central American Regional Security Initiative. Last year I traveled with Chairman Engel to El Salvador and we saw firsthand that our assistance there is having positive results.

And that is why we introduced together the U.S.-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act to make sure we remain committed to supporting our partners in the region.

Creating effective policies to combat drug trafficking in our own hemisphere should remain a priority. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, created by Chairman Engel to analyze
our policies in the region and make recommendations to Congress on the best way forward, is the way to do this. And I applaud you for your work on this, Mr. Chairman, truly visionary and vital work.

And I also want to thank the members of the Commission for their work and this report. I look forward to hearing more about the report in today's discussion.

Thank you with that, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. I thank my friend, the ranking member. We have worked together very closely on this committee, and I am very pleased of the work, the hard work all the members of the committee have done.

I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished witnesses whose work on the Commission has really been superb. It seems like it was just yesterday that I was swearing you all in as commissioners.

Shannon O'Neil is the Chair of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. Dr. O'Neil is also the Vice President, Deputy Director of Studies, and Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Cliff Sobel is the Vice Chair of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. Ambassador Sobel served as the United States Ambassador to the Netherlands in 2001 until 2005, and Ambassador to Brazil in 2006 until 2009, where I first met him. He is a personal friend of mine and does wonderful work.

Mary Speck is the Executive Director of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. Dr. Speck previously served as the senior associate focused on Mexico at the International Crisis Group.

I look forward to Dr. O'Neil's testimony, which will be followed by questions from members of the committee.

Dr. O'Neil, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. SHANNON O'NEIL, CHAIR, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG POLICY COMMISSION, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Dr. O'NEIL. Great. Thank you, Chairman Engel, and thank you, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It truly is an honor to testify before you about the findings of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission.

Now, as the Chairman said, Congress created the Commission to evaluate U.S. counternarcotic policies in the Americas and to provide practical recommendations. And we endeavored in this report to do just that.

In our work we found many new successes and promising paths. And this includes U.S. assistance programs in Colombia that provide legal livelihoods in coca-growing regions. It includes U.S. support and capacity building in Mexico organized around criminal justice reform. And it involves police reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and violence prevention programs that have helped, albeit unevenly, the troubled nations of Central America's Northern Triangle: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

U.S. assistance has also furthered progress in the fight against money laundering by organized crime. It has helped strengthen
regulations, and it has helped strengthen the capacity of local financial intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, drugs have kept flowing, and Americans and Latin Americans have kept dying. Something is not working.

And, moreover, as we have heard already, the nature of drug markets are changing. New synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are growing in prominence and lethality. And the legal ground rules are changing in the United States and throughout the region. [Audio interference] to take on this shift—

[Audio interference] approach to drug policy in the Western Hemisphere. To start, this means reorganizing the way the U.S. Government designs and implements international drug policy. We recommend that the State Department take the lead. It should be empowered to develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter transnational criminal organizations and to reduce the foreign supply of illicit drugs.

To give heft to this leading role, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs be put in charge of this effort, and that it should work with all the relevant agencies, including USAID, Federal law enforcement, the U.S. Treasury, the Department of Defense to pursue this strategy. And we also recommend that Political Affairs should directly oversee the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL.

The political undersecretary should then direct U.S. embassies to construct foreign assistant compacts with their partner governments. And these compacts should be based on the model that was pioneered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. At the country level, these agreements should define shared goals for combating organized crime, strengthening justice institutions, and protecting citizen security and human rights. And the nature of these compacts should be made as public as possible and they should specify the roles both of the U.S. and the host government.

Like the Millennial Challenge Corporation, they should use evaluations and metrics to measure success, and they should have the flexibility to adjust and prioritize the most effective programs.

Now, to do all this the U.S. Government needs better metrics and stronger evaluations of what does and does not work. Counting how many police officers have received training or how many hectares of coca have been eradicated does not necessarily tell us whether we are reducing the harm of illegal drugs for Americans.

We recommend that the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy, the ONDCP, play this vital role. It should be tasked with developing better measures of policy success. It should support the State Department strategy and work with other agencies to create a new set of benchmarks, of metrics, and of data. It should also help coordinate between these international drug policies and domestic ones.

Within this broader strategy we believe the U.S. Government should end the drug certification and designation process. The current process offends our partners and does little to deter drug trafficking in unfriendly nations. It should be replaced with a more nuanced and global report that reviews country efforts to counter trafficking and other transnational crimes. And the U.S. should
hold itself to the same standard and include a self-evaluation in this report.

Finally, the Commission recognizes the threat of illicit financial flows and money laundering. It recommends increasing the capacity of and the funding for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, both for its own investigations and for its assistance to foreign partners.

We recommend, too, that regulators should work with the private sector to improve the efficiency and the quality of their financial reporting.

I want to thank you for the honor to serve on this congressional commission. It has truly been a wonderful experience. And I want to thank you today for this opportunity to testify as to its findings and its recommendations.

And with that, we look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Neil follows:]
The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward

Testimony by Shannon K. O'Neil, PhD
Chair, Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission
Council on Foreign Relations

House Foreign Affairs Committee
December 3, 2020

Congress created the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission (WHDPC) to address a dilemma that has long plagued US policymakers: why, despite aggressive enforcement, have illicit drugs remained plentiful and increasingly potent while drug trafficking organizations have grown stronger and more violent?

The failure to control drug abuse and drug trafficking has exacted an enormous human toll. In the United States, more than 500,000 people have died from overdoses during the past decade, soaring to an unprecedented 71,000 deaths in 2019. Latin American countries not only face growing drug usage but also epidemics of criminal violence that are taking many more lives.²

The illicit drug industry has evolved far more rapidly than our efforts to contain it. Traditional dichotomies no longer apply. Developed nations both manufacture and abuse synthetic opioids; developing countries both produce and consume dangerously addictive plant-based substances. Throughout our hemisphere, the poor suffer most: those who are socially and economically marginalized are more likely to develop drug use disorders and more likely to be victimized by criminal gangs.

Organized crime – powered largely but not exclusively by illegal drug trafficking – also threatens the region’s still fragile democracies. The most extreme example is Venezuela, a democracy that has devolved into dictatorship, defying financial sanctions with the help not only of other unfriendly states, such as Cuba, Russia, and Iran, but also of transnational criminal organizations, including illegal drug and gold smugglers.

An increasingly complex threat requires a more agile, adaptive long-term strategy. We need smarter international policies within an interagency effort led by the State Department. This over-all effort should focus on accomplishing a fundamental foreign policy goal: reducing the supply of dangerous drugs by helping partner governments in

Latin America counter vicious transnational criminal organizations.

This interagency effort must also address the challenge of money laundering. US policymakers need to develop data-driven tools to detect and block the flow of illicit funds using new techniques, such as cryptocurrencies and complex cross-border financial transactions.

The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy should ensure that these policies are cost effective, providing the executive branch with research-based analysis and performance evaluations that measure both the positive and negative impacts of law enforcement and foreign assistance.

No diplomatic challenge in the Western Hemisphere looms larger than Venezuela's descent into political and economic turmoil. A thorough evaluation of US and regional efforts to resolve the Venezuelan crisis was beyond the scope of the Commission's report. The WHDPC recognizes, however, that the United States and its partners cannot control the flow of illicit drugs from South America without halting the political and economic meltdown in Venezuela and encouraging an orderly transition to stable, accountable, democratic rule.

US counternarcotics policies

The Commission's evaluation of US policy in the region shows promising results: our assistance programs in Colombia are providing licit livelihoods in coca-growing regions; our capacity building in Mexico has strengthened criminal justice reforms; and our police reform, anti-corruption, and violence prevention efforts have helped the troubled nations of Central America's Northern Triangle – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – make progress – albeit unevenly – toward more effective governance.

The United States and its partners have also strengthened anti-money laundering regulations, collecting data that can potentially be used to uncover the financial networks that perpetuate organized crime, corruption, and terrorism.

The shortcomings of US counternarcotics policies are obvious, however. Drug production remains at historically high levels in Latin America as do drug overdoses (most of which involve powerful synthetic drugs) in the United States.5

US-supported counternarcotics policies can also cause considerable harm, complicating rather than curbing drug trafficking and drug-related crimes. Coca eradication has moved illicit crops to marginal regions, threatening vulnerable communities. Kingpin targeting has fractured drug cartels, heightening inter- and intra-gang violence. Anti-money

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laundering efforts have spurred black and grey market innovations as traffickers and their financial enablers move from bulk cash smuggling into elaborate trade-based schemes and digital transactions.

**Supply and demand**

Two truisms about counternarcotics policy bear repeating: we cannot control the supply of dangerous drugs without also reducing demand and we cannot curb demand without also limiting supply. We may never end illegal drug trafficking, just as we cannot eliminate substance abuse. But we can better manage these deadly problems with a comprehensive strategy designed to address underlying causes and conditions, carefully measure progress, and eliminate or mitigate adverse consequences.

US policy to reduce drug demand has evolved in recent years. Since 2010, Congress has increased spending on treatment and prevention significantly, appropriating nearly double the amount spent during the previous decade. Though funding remains inadequate, policymakers understand the need for science-based approaches that treat substance abuse as a disease, not simply a crime or moral failing.

Supply-side policies have changed little, however. The 2020 National Drug Control Strategy still focuses on reducing potential drug production in Latin America and increasing drug removals in the transit zones, despite little evidence that these outputs will impact the desired outcome, i.e. increasing the price and purity of drugs available in the United States.\(^4\)

Amid the economic havoc wreaked by COVID-19, it is more important than ever for the US government to spend its counternarcotics budget effectively. The pandemic has exacerbated conditions that are fuelling our ongoing opioid crisis, such as lack of adequate treatment, economic distress, and social isolation. It is also likely to further weaken security and justice institutions in the Latin American countries that produce drugs or lie along drug transit routes.

**Multi-faceted strategy**

The Commission understands there are no quick fixes. The United States needs a long-term strategy linked to its strategic objective: “drastically reducing the number of Americans losing their lives to drug addiction.”\(^\ast\)

The federal government should apply the same scientific rigor to foreign supply-reduction efforts: designing and implementing a cost-effective, interagency strategy with carefully targeted policies to curb the flow of dangerous drugs into the United States while

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\(^\ast\) 2020 NDICR, p. 4.
addressing institutional weaknesses in drug producing and transit countries that allow transnational criminal organizations to flourish.

Drug trafficking and drug abuse are complex problems that require a multi-faceted, long-term strategy that addresses not only demand and supply reduction, but also the broader problems created by transnational organized crime, such as violence and corruption. To deal with these issues effectively, a comprehensive strategy should be:

- **Balanced.** US efforts should address the supply and the demand for illicit drugs, both at home and abroad.
- **Shared.** Transnational crime requires transnational solutions, with the US and its partners jointly responsible for stopping trafficking, reducing corruption, and addressing illicit drug consumption.
- **Flexible.** US agencies should have the authorities and the resources to respond quickly to changing patterns of drug use and drug trafficking, collaborating with our partners on country-led reforms to address country-specific challenges.
- **Sustainable.** US initiatives should be cost-effective with relevant long-term goals, including measurable benchmarks to assess progress.
- **Holistic.** US policymakers should address drug trafficking as a subset of the many illicit activities carried out by transnational criminal organizations that threaten citizen security, foster corruption, and undermine US interests throughout the hemisphere.
- **Humane.** US policies should above all promote public health, public security, and human rights throughout the hemisphere. This means that policymakers need to assess the harms of supply reduction policies when evaluating results.

**The State Department**

The State Department should be responsible for developing and coordinating interagency policy to counter transnational organized crime. As the lead agency, the State Department should prepare a whole-of-government strategy with three fundamental goals: 1) reducing and interdicting the flow of drugs into the United States; 2) helping partner governments in the hemisphere build effective, legitimate criminal justice systems; and, 3) curbing the global demand for illicit drugs by leading an international effort to prevent and treat substance use disorders with evidence-based public health policies.

Congress should provide flexible, multi-year funding streams for counternarcotics and counter-transnational organized crime efforts, which can be re-allocated in response to periodic evaluations conducted by field-based staff and independent experts.

The State Department also needs the authority to disburse emergency funds. Drug trafficking is dynamic: in response to enforcement, traffickers can quickly move
production, adjust trafficking routes, develop new smuggling vehicles or methods, and create new, more dangerous, products. The US government needs to become equally agile in its response.

To implement this strategy, the Secretary of State should:

- **Make the Undersecretary for Political Affairs responsible for coordinating a whole-of-government effort to counter transnational organized crime.** The Undersecretary for Political Affairs should oversee the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) while working with all relevant departments and agencies, including USAID, federal law enforcement agencies, the US Treasury, and the Department of Defense to develop and implement coherent regional strategies to reduce illicit drug trafficking, disrupt criminal networks, and discourage money laundering.

  Moving INL into Political Affairs (P), which manages overall regional and bilateral issues, would increase organizational efficiency and ensure that these efforts receive the high-level attention they deserve, both within the federal government and partner governments.

The Undersecretary for Political Affairs should:

- **Develop a five-year international drug control strategy** with defined annual goals in coordination with partner governments. This should include regional and/or bilateral strategies for strengthening police and justice institutions and promoting citizen security with clearly defined goals and benchmarks based on both qualitative and quantitative evaluations.

- **Work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to prepare an interagency drug control/law enforcement budget for interdiction and foreign assistance programs.**

- **Work with Congress on long-term, flexible funding authorities.** The State Department also needs long-term funding and the authority to disburse emergency funds. State should work with OMB and Congress to create a drawdown counternarcotics account (similar to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund), which would permit INL to provide targeted assistance so that partner governments can prevent or contain emerging threats.6

- **Replace the drug certification and designation process** with more effective tools to assess country efforts to counter transnational crime and sanction those who fail to act. The current certification process offends our partners and does little to deter corrupt practices in unfriendly nations. Instead INL should produce a global report reviewing country efforts to counter trafficking and other

transnational crimes, including US policies. This report should also assess whether
US sanctions, such as the Kingpin Act, effectively target the most dangerous
criminal organizations, especially those responsible for trafficking or producing
fentanyl and other highly toxic substances.

- **Negotiate compact-based assistance programs** based on the model
  pioneered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The Undersecretary should
  empower US ambassadors to work with partner governments on agreements that
  identify shared goals for combating organized crime, strengthening criminal
  justice institutions, and protecting citizen security and human rights. The
  agreements should specify the roles and responsibilities of both the US and host
governments, as well as civil society stakeholders.

  This country-led process should bring the US government and other donors
  together with political leaders and security officials to identify an appropriate, cost-
effective reform agenda. The resulting agreements should be made as public as
  possible and include robust, transparent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms,
  based on quantitative and qualitative indicators collected by both program
  implementers and independent experts. These agreements should also include
  commitments by host governments to implement vigorous anti-corruption
  mechanisms and ensure transparency.

  Congress should provide State with multiyear funding authorities for these
  compacts, giving it the flexibility to tailor bilateral assistance to each country’s
  commitments, needs, and capacities. It should also provide State with emergency
  funds to help partner governments deal with emerging threats, particularly from
  new psychoactive substances, such as fentanyl.

- **Prioritize global efforts to treat and prevent drug abuse.** The US
  government should work with partners to establish a global fund to fight substance
  use disorders. This is especially urgent amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which is
  amplifying risk factors associated with drug abuse while limiting access to
treatment. Supply and demand reduction measures are mutually reinforcing; the
United States cannot limit the international supply of illicit drugs without
simultaneously reducing international demand.

  USAID’s Bureau for Global Health should lead this effort, working within the
framework of the successful Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
The stigma attached to drug abuse often prevents addicts from seeking treatment,
just as stigma used to prevent HIV/AIDS sufferers from receiving treatment. A
global effort could help eliminate these barriers while promoting cost-effective
medication-assisted treatments.
The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)

Congress established the ONDCP in 1988 to develop an interagency counternarcotics strategy and oversee drug-control budgets. The law specified that the ONDCP’s strategy should include “comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals for reducing drug abuse” along with “short-term, measurable” objectives. It is the White House office that bridges foreign and domestic counternarcotics policies, including both supply- and demand-control efforts.

The ONDCP has rarely lived up to expectations, however. Its ability to coordinate and implement a national drug control strategy hinges on its authority to depoliticize agency budgets, a power it has exercised only once. Compared to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the ultimate enforcer of presidential priorities, the ONDCP’s influence over White House domestic and foreign policies has been minimal.

The Commission recommends that the ONDCP function instead as the president’s chief advisor on counternarcotics, providing objective, reliable information about which policies are most effective. It should also serve as the president’s forum for managing both supply-reduction and demand-reduction policies, ensuring that options are fully analyzed before reaching the White House. It should evaluate ongoing efforts and monitor trends to anticipate drug risks before they become full-blown epidemics.

The ONDCP needs to develop more effective measures of supply-control policies, most of which still focus on plant-based drugs. While demand-side efforts have benefited from public health research, there is a dearth of research on supply-side measures. For example, the 2020 National Drug Control Strategy (NDSC) focuses on reducing drug availability as reflected by purity-adjusted prices, although the impact of supply interventions (such as eradication and interdiction) on these prices, which have fallen or remained stable over the past decade, remains unclear.

Moreover, the ONDCP’s long-standing goal of reducing purity-adjusted prices does not address the problem of heroin or cocaine adulterated with fentanyl and other psychoactive substances. A more appropriate goal may be to reduce drug toxicity by focusing law enforcement on disrupting fentanyl supply chains.

The ONDCP should also consider the harm caused by law enforcement efforts both abroad and at home. Performance measures should include indicators that measure both the costs and benefits of law enforcement strategies, such as whether crop eradication, drug interdiction, and kingpin targeting outweigh the social, economic, and political costs to our partners.

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2 The ONDCP has publicly acknowledged an agency budget only once: in 1997, Barry McCaffrey instructed the Defense Department to resubmit a larger anti-drug budget to the OMB. President Clinton increased the military counternarcotics budget, though not as much as the ONDCP had requested. See "The General and the "War" on Drugs" by Barry McCaffrey and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, *Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University, 1998.
4 Pardo and Roeder, p. 3.
To make the ONDCP more effective, the President should:

- **Require the ONDCP to develop new supply control performance measures.** The ONDCP should support the State Department by convening an interagency task force to develop new long-, medium-, and short-term metrics. The supply-control indicators in the 2020 NDCS — potential production of plant-based drugs (coca and heroin), cocaine removals in the transit zone, and drug seizures at the U.S. border and points of entry — focus principally on plant-based drugs. The ONDCP needs to work with implementing agencies to develop and test new performance measures linked to its primary objective: saving lives. This means measuring not just the price and purity of illicit drugs, but also their toxicity.

- **Incorporate cost-benefit analysis into drug control strategy.** The ONDCP should work with implementing agencies and partner governments to evaluate the second and third-order effects associated with both drug trafficking and law enforcement efforts at each point in the drug supply chain. A cost-benefit analysis should weigh the ecological and social harm caused by both coca cultivation and crop eradication in Colombia; evaluate the impact of interdiction on drug flows, and explore the relationship between kingpin targeting and criminal violence in Mexico.

- **Direct the ONDCP to work with the interagency to collect timely data on emerging drug trends.** The ONDCP cannot develop proactive, evidence-based metrics without real-time data, especially on highly toxic synthetics. The ONDCP should take the lead in assessing technologies, such as wastewater testing, to monitor the spread of synthetic drugs to new markets. It should work with both law enforcement and public health authorities to find more effective ways to share intelligence and toxicity data from postmortems or hospital emergency departments. It should also assess whether U.S. law enforcement and foreign partners are effectively targeting fentanyl trafficking networks.

- **Provide the ONDCP with discretionary funding for research to counter regional illicit drug networks.** Congress should give the ONDCP additional resources for research grants to study the impact of law enforcement efforts both at home and abroad. These grants could be used to apply innovative law enforcement practices to counternarcotics policy. For example, focused deterrence, which has been used successfully in the United States to prevent gang violence, could also be

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15 See Bryce Fardo, “Considering the Heroin Drug Supply Indicators,” April 2020, white paper prepared for the WHDPC.
16 On focused deterrence see the Rand Corporation’s “Focused Deterrence Strategy (FDS),” On how this strategy could be used to deter fentanyl trafficking, see Bryce Fardo and Peter Reuter, Enforcement Strategies for fentanyl and other synthetic opioids (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2020).
applied in cooperation with Mexican state and local law enforcement to deter fentanyl production.

**Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing**

Money laundering requires at least as much ingenuity and innovation as smuggling itself, using methods that range from simple bulk cash smuggling to complex foreign trade-based transactions to digital mechanisms such as cryptocurrencies. And it requires legions of enablers or gatekeepers to the legal economy. Just as cartels employ mules to carry drugs, engineers to build tunnels, and hitmen to eliminate rivals or informants, they also hire accountants, lawyers, real estate brokers, auditors, and other financial agents to move and hide their profits.

Criminal organizations, rebel groups, and terrorists thrive in similar contexts: countries where the state is fragile and easily corrupted, where there are vast ungoverned spaces, or whose citizens suffer from high rates of poverty and inequality, exacerbated by racial or ethnic tensions.

Where trafficking and armed political groups coincide, the combination is especially dangerous. The Tri-Border Area (where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet) has long been a smuggling hub, which provides money laundering opportunities for a variety of criminal groups, including drug traffickers and international terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. In Colombia, dissident elements of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN) not only smuggle cocaine but also engage in illegal gold mining. Venezuela provides a haven for these groups, while its leaders profit from drug and gold smuggling.

**High costs, low results**

Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CTF) laws have grown increasingly robust. They also entail considerable costs to business. A 2016 study estimates that compliance costs US companies anywhere from $4.8 billion to $8 billion per year. There is an incentive to overreport: failure to file suspicious activity reports can result in both substantial financial penalties and damage to the bank’s reputation.

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Given the enormous amount of dirty money circulating in the global economy and the variety of businesses and institutions involved in laundering it, enforcement is remarkably lax. Successful money laundering prosecutions, which can be extremely complex and time-consuming, remain relatively rare. The value of illicit proceeds seized or frozen is minuscule in comparison to the magnitude of money laundering within the international financial system.

The federal government spends very little to analyze and operationalize financial intelligence. In FY 2020, the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network – FinCEN – had a budget of about $126 million and a staff of 500. Congress should provide the US Treasury Department with additional resources to:

- **Strengthen FinCEN:** The US government has increased AML/CTF regulations, collecting enormous amounts of data, but the system is under-resourced and overwhelmed. FinCEN’s small staff lacks the capacity to analyze existing intelligence or to anticipate new and emerging threats. Providing FinCEN with the leadership and resources needed to gather, protect, and analyze financial intelligence should be a priority.

- **Use research to improve regulations and facilitate investigations.** Establish a database of money-laundering cases that can be shared among law enforcement agencies, describing prices and methods along with the predicate crimes involved. This would allow regulators and investigators to make better use of existing data, especially the information generated by suspicious activity reports.

- **Promote innovation in both the public and private sector:** Regulators should work with financial institutions to make anti-money laundering reports more effective and efficient by encouraging innovative practices and sharing best practices. The US government should also encourage the private sector to improve the quality of reporting by focusing on priority risks and by providing up-to-date information about newly identified threats and vulnerabilities.

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* illicit financial flows include the proceeds of all illegal activities, including drugs, arms and human trafficking as well as bribery, tax evasion and other forms of corruption. They also include funds used to commit crimes, such as terrorist attacks.
* See Reuter and Truman, Chasing Dirty Money, p. 8.
Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much. We appreciate the testimony.

I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. Pursuant to the rules, all time yielded is for the purpose of questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid virtual format of this hearing, I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will come back to you.

If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. And as we start questioning I will start by recognizing myself.

Dr. O’Neil, I appreciate the Commission’s recommendation that the State Department develop compact-based counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs with countries in the region based on the model used by the Millennial Challenge Corporation. This certainly makes sense to me. And I believe it is essential that the State Department and our embassy teams be placed at the center of U.S. counternarcotics efforts.

But, I think we also need to take stock of the current political leadership in the hemisphere, and ask whether we have sufficient confidence in some of our neighbors to merit the development of counternarcotics compacts.

My question is this: with a country like Honduras where the president has been named as a co-conspirator in a drug trafficking case in New York in which his brother was convicted, how can we have adequate trust that the government will negotiate a counternarcotics accord in good faith?

Are compacts even possible in situations like these?

Dr. O’Neil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. And that is an incredibly important one for all of these policies that we are talking about.

I think the compact approach actually makes it easier to deal with the variations in leadership that we find throughout the hemisphere because we are not asking for a one-size-fit-all type of relationship. We can have a different policy in places like Colombia where we have a longstanding relationship, much more trust build-up, and experience between us, compared to a place like Honduras, where there are real questions about the motives and positions of some of our counterparts.

I would say in a case like that you would develop a compact. It would be important to look for other participants and actors that we have potentially more faith in their motives and their interest in implementing the policies and reaching the goals that the United States too shares. So, that could include society groups and members, that could include international, other international bodies. In the past we had bodies such as the CICIG in Guatemala or an equivalent in Honduras. It could include members of the private sector.

The benefit of a compact that is run out of or guided by the embassy is it can take into account that variation in the capacity and direction of local government, and put in play the kind of policy that will forward U.S. goals but that could look very different than it would in other nations. And it can bring to the table other people besides just government officials, if that makes the most sense.
Let me open it up if either of my colleagues, Ambassador Sobel or Mary would like to, Mary Speck, would like to comment as well.

Mr. SOBEL. Let me, add one point to actually mention in the remarks. And that is there needs to be more accountability, as the chairman and you have indicated. And the governance of these compacts, which is similar to the structures of the MCC, will make us be more able to evaluate these programs. There is no question the ONDCP needs to be very focused on being able to evaluate these programs and being able to change them to the extent that they need to be changed.

Mary.

Dr. SPECK. I would just quickly add that one of the advantages of a compact because it is as publicly available as possible both sides make certain commitments and can be held to by the U.S. Government and also by their own public.

So, certainly anti-corruption would be a major issue that we would want Central American Governments to be held to.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. SOBEL. One other thing to add, if I might, Mr. Chairman, and that is when I was an ambassador in Brazil and we worked with the Federal authorities on many of these kinds of issues, we found a lot of receptivity on the local level, or the provinces, the States, local law enforcement. So, while there may be issues dealing with certain aspects of government, even the Federal Government, that does not preclude the ability to work with local government agencies.

Chairman ENGEL. Well, thank you. Let me ask another question to both Ambassador Sobel and Dr. Speck.

I was very pleased to see the Drug Commission's recommendation that Congress eliminate the present practice with which the White House decertifies countries not cooperating in combating the drug trade. We note that this process offends our neighbors—that is a quote from you—offends our partners, and does little to deter corrupt practices in unfriendly nations. So, I would say, frankly, the end of this certification process is long overdue.

Can any of you, either of you, both of you, explain to the committee why the current drug certification process has been a failure? How is it perceived in Latin America and the Caribbean? And what should the existing drug certification process be replaced with?

Dr. Speck.

Mr. SOBEL. If I might talk first, Mary. And defer to you and, of course, our Chairman Shannon.

I had the experience of working with this program when I was Ambassador to the Netherlands. And if you look at the small footnote, somewhere in this 117-page report you will see that one of the positive outcomes was dealing with the ecstasy issue in the early 2000’s in the Netherlands.

As someone in the middle of it, I was almost made persona non grata. We would have gotten what we needed with local authorities on ecstasy with or without this, but it became a major issue with the minister of justice that created unnecessary tension in the relationship. And it really did not, in my opinion as an ambassador to
one country, resolve anything, but it did make my job much more
difficult.

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, if anyone would like to, to add, you know,
again, the reasons why you think the current drug certification
process has been a failure and how it has been perceived in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and what should the existing drug cer-
tification process be replaced with? Anyone wants to expand on
what they think?

Yes.

Dr. SPECK. I would just point out that the countries we have de-
certified, for example Venezuela and Bolivia recently, are already
pariah States, unfriendly States. So, it really did not affect their
activities. The Bolivians already expelled the DEA and wore its de-
certification as a kind of badge of honor.

So, it has generally been used against States that are already
unfriendly. For example, we decertified Guatemala but made a
waiver for humanitarian reasons. There has been great reluctance
to decertify countries where we have relations with their law en-
forcement because we are afraid of being frozen out.

So, it really has not been an effective means. We have only decer-
tified countries that are already not cooperating with us. And as
Shannon pointed out, we would still have a report on all of these
countries, and we include the U.S., a little bit of self-criticism. And
that would be a more nuanced way to encourage them to improve
their policies.

Chairman ENGEL. Well, thank you, Dr. Speck.

I now turn to Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I remember Congress-
man Cuellar and I introduced an amendment to an appropriations
bill that passed on the floor. It later became the Merida Initiative.

I would like to get, if I could, from our witnesses just a report
card on the successes and really the status of where we are with
the Merida Initiative, in addition the Central American Regional
Security Initiative, and Northern Triangle. Maybe if all three can
comment on what is your report card on the effectiveness? And
what do we need to do more to combat this problem that has not
gone away? In fact, some could argue it has gotten worse.

I am not sure about Obrador’s strategy in Mexico. I think the
cartels are back on the rise in many respects. And it may just be
a laissez faire policy where he does not—he just lets them play in
the sandbox and then they get along. But we are certainly seeing,
you know, armored tanks and pretty threatening actors south of
our border that threaten the United States.

And so maybe if I could go to each of you to get sort of an update
and a report card.

Dr. O’NEIL. Thank you for that question. And I think we will
each take, take a part of that.

Let me start with the relationship with Mexico and the Merida
Initiative. Obviously it has been in place for over a decade, and it
has evolved with U.S. policy and support for Mexico as well as the
levels of cooperation and role that each government has played.

I would say over this time period that there have been real suc-
cesses of the Merida Initiative. We have seen the U.S. help play a
quite vital role in the transition of Mexico’s justice system. They
have over the decade moved from one that was one based on written testimoneys to one that is more based on an accusatorial system of oral trials and due process and the like.

And we do have studies and evaluations that show that the new system, when it has come into place, is one that provides justice in a more timely way, pre-detentions and the like have already fallen. It provides people with a fairer justice system. The judges in the courts have the ability to cross-evidence presented and the like, so it is fair in terms of due process for the defendants that are there.

There is greater satisfaction with the court system and the process of justice than there was with the past system among the general public. So, I think that is one of the successes of the Merida Initiative.

We have also seen significant in several places in Mexico, for U.S. pilot programs for community policing, for other means of policing, particularly at the local and the State level that have also shown some significant promise.

But as you say, and rightly point out, the levels of violence in Mexico have not fallen. The trafficking of drugs has not ended. It has morphed, as you mentioned, to include fentanyl and others coming in, from the precursors coming in from China and other places. And so, the challenges are still there.

Part of the challenge is when there is a change in government in Mexico that there are changing priorities within their own law enforcement system. And there has been, particularly under the Lopez Obrador Administration, a full revamping of the law enforcement agencies within that nation. So, we have seen the end of the Federal police that was a partner of the U.S. Government in much of the Merida Initiative and replacing it with the National Guard.

We have seen the sidelining of the navy, they are called the marines, that was often the most trusted partner by the U.S. with the rising power of the army.

So there has been some reluctance to engage on many different areas that past Mexican governments have engaged with the United States.

Mr. McCaul. I think the Navy has been very trustworthy. I do not know how you would rate the National Guard experiment. Although I was supportive, I would not want to leave the navy out because they have done such a great job.

CSIN is a very, I think, reliable intelligence partner. Certainly in my Department of Justice days we saw that.

Last question, because my time is expiring. All these fentanyls coming in from China it is, for them it is a great foreign policy, they make a lot of money off this and they kill Americans. They poison our children. It is coming into this hemisphere, primarily into Colombia and Mexico. How can we, how can we possibly stop this?

This is becoming the No. 1 death threat in the United States.

Dr. O’Neill. I think as you mentioned in your earlier opening comments, this is something between the United States and China. There should be a stronger effort to stop the precursors from leaving China itself. But this is an awkward issue, particularly for the U.S. and Mexico.
We have seen under the Lopez Obrador Administration the Army take over management of the ports. And it does look like most of the flow for those precursors come in through the ports. So it, again, is an issue for law enforcement cooperation between the two countries.

And as we look toward a new Merida Initiative, because I think we need a revamp of it, and the Mexicans are calling for that as well, this should be one of the main issues on the table for discussion.

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a very good take-away, yes, a new Merida Initiative that includes this.

I apologize but my time has expired. I yield back.

Mr. SOBEL. Mr. Chairman, because that question I thought was probably the key question of how successful have we been to date, if there is an extra minute for me to reply to that I would appreciate it.

Chairman ENGEL. Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Sobel.

Mr. SOBEL. I was going to say that the structure that we are proposing allows for an incredible amount of flexibility to reorientate programs to use current metrics, better communications with our allies. And fentanyl clearly should be an equal priority, maybe even more so, than the plant drugs coming in: heroin, cocaine. And that is why using ONDCP on a current basis, realtime, to evaluate the programs, to amend our expenditures, which as the Congressman pointed out have been very sizable, is critically important so that we are less reactive and more proactive.

I would also just make mention that, clearly, the counterinsurgency success in Colombia is self-evident. We still have to redefine how we make the counternarcotics program more successful.

The recent plantings of cocaine in Colombia have set a new all-time high, 112,000 hectares. That being said, we have already eradicated 100,000 hectares. So, clearly, we need to double down. I am not suggesting another $10 billion, but we need to be very, very specific and more targeted in our funding going forward.

Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Ambassador. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. CASTRO.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for your testimony.

I have a question for Dr. O’Neil.

The report finds that the State Department should be empowered and recommends that it lead an interagency effort to counter transnational criminal organizations and reduce the foreign supply of illicit drugs. Yet, State has had its authority undermined and its people disenfranchised over the past several years.

Why does the Commission believe the State Department is the right agency to lead this effort? And what key capabilities does State need to restore and strengthen the efforts?

Dr. O’NEIL. Yes. Thank you very much for that question. It is an important one.

As we looked at this issue we felt that State was really the only agency that could lead this. It has people on the ground. It has the embassies on the ground. And it has the reach within Washington
in order to balance both the in-country issues and understanding and the like, as well as what is happening in Washington.

We felt there, too, that within State that this issue in particular needed a raising of the profile as well as the heft behind those that would be guiding it and convening the meetings and the discussions and task forces within the various agencies. And, hence, our recommendation for Political Affairs to be the part of the State Department that would take this on, consolidating the various workings within the State Department within that area.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you.

Dr. O’NEIL. Your question about—yes, thank you.

Mr. CASTRO. Oh, please. Well, I have one more followup, but go ahead. Go ahead, please finish.

Dr. O’NEIL. I would say this is an area where there is a lot to build and rebuild. You need people, you need staff, so filling the spots is very important within the State Department to take this on and work with those across various agencies. You need people with knowledge and expertise and deep understanding of these issues. There are many within the State Department or the larger State Department community that can be called on to do so.

We hope that a new Administration coming in will take a look at these recommendations and report and work to rebuild the State Department, particularly with these issues in mind.

Thank you.

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. And the report suggests that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs should be charged with coordinating this effort. In the past there have been serious concerns about making the use and trade of illicit drugs a political issue rather than a global public health issue.

How is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs suited to handle this responsibility?

Dr. O’NEIL. Sir, I will let Ambassador Sobel chime in as well because he may—he has talked about that.

But I would say over all it is a key part of the State Department. It has reached across the whole department as well as the government broadly. Having someone with that ability, that capacity, and that profile to bring together all the different interagency elements is what we saw as crucial.

Mr. SOBEL. I would add to that that the Congressman has rightly focused on what was one of our biggest debates within the Commission, and that is, where should we place it? And there is no one right answer here, that is clear. But we unanimously agreed that P is better situated to do it, as opposed to Global Affairs, which is where you are indicating we should give it consideration.

We actually interviewed some people at State, got some of their input on it.

Keep in mind there is also the issue of so many organizations, and agencies, and bureaus have touched this very important critical aspect of our foreign policy. But in-country it is the Ambassador that is the front line.

And we thought in the end that it is so critical to individualize it, to work with governments, that it should fit under P.

There are issues of working with OMB. OMB has many, many competing interests for budgets. Without putting someone as a tit-
ular convener for the interagency process, I do not think we could ever get a whole-of-government effort.

And I think the one take-away from this report is we are focused on maybe not the only, but in our view the best whole-of-government approach to dealing with this horrible problem that affects our Nation.

Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ambassador.

And thank you, Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Castro.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing today. I think it is very important.

The opioid crisis has hit my congressional district back in Cincinnati particularly hard, as it has many other communities all across the country. And I will address this to any of the witnesses that would like to take it.

Which of your report’s recommendations do you consider most essential to combating the opioid crisis in the United States? And what can we do to make progress in reducing the flow of these illicit substances through major transit countries in Latin America and the Caribbean?

Dr. O’Neil. I will get started and then I will turn to some of my colleague here.

Our mandate was to look at the international drug policy. We did discuss in our first meetings what that entailed, and decided that since there is lots of other great work happening in the United States, and other commissions frankly, that are looking at the domestic side of it that that was not within our purview. So, we did not broach many of the important questions, obviously, and concerns that you raised there.

In terms of what are the most effective policies we found some very micro-level ones, and that is part of the compact approach, different things work in different places. So, violence prevention, strengthening the rule of law, and police training works in some places and not in other places.

In Colombia we found promise in holistic policies that provide alternative livelihoods for coca growers and the like. So I think that what works best in stopping the flow of drugs is not always a big, overarching issue of eradication or these efforts, or interdiction, it is actually more locally based changes and policies, and investments that change the calculation of the people that supply those drugs.

What we did find is that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach, though there are overarching things. And this greater idea of reducing harm, protecting civilian security, of strengthening the rule of law allows Latin American governments to take on transnational criminal organizations within their own societies.

A big part of their revenues are illegal drugs. But they also do other things in these countries. And so, seeing there’s a larger organized crime challenge is something that I think is helpful both for our ultimate end to lessen the harm of illegal drugs within the United States, as well as the bigger challenges that many of these Latin American countries face, given those that are trafficking drugs in the region.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me go ahead and ask one more question, because I will run out of time if I do not.

And Ranking Member Mr. McCaul did mention Merida already, but I would like to followup on that. Because back in 2008, obviously Mexico and the U.S. launched the Merida Initiative to increase security cooperation to disrupt organized crime, strengthen the judicial sector and rule of law, and strengthen border security. And the U.S. at this point has spent $3 billion on that initiative.

What policies should we pursue to make the use of those tax dollars as effective as possible? And, again, I would open it up to any of the three witnesses.

Mr. SOBEL. Shannon, if I might, I am going to use this as a segue to touch upon another key elements of our commission report. And it does not answer the Congressman's question directly because it is a universal answer, but it does focus on both domestic and foreign policy initiatives.

I would like to point out that our report indicates that we probably interdict 5 to 10 percent of the drug flows coming into the United States. Yet, remarkably, with $400 to $600 billion of illegal retail drug trade a year—and our stats go back to 2017, so clearly it is more—the amount of money laundering seizures is well under 1 percent.

So, when you look at an Achilles heel here, FinCEN, which has a budget of $127 million, 300 people, is looking at money laundering to the tune of $600 billion with very poor success. Not that they are not well staffed, well motivated, but they are definitely underfunded.

And if we are able to get to money laundering as a key element to reduce the flow of drugs, then we have made a big success. And some of those areas we can do so much more in, whether the drugs are plant-based or fentanyl. So, it's a universal way of addressing this awful scourge.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CONNOLLY.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I be heard?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Great. Thank you so much, and thanks for having this hearing.

Let me ask two questions of our panelists. One is, you know, how do we honestly deal with corruption? I mean, Mr. Chabot just pointed out we have spent $3 billion on the Merida Initiative in Mexico, and yet we just recently detained the highest ranking military officer of Mexico because of corruption charges related to drug trafficking.

And at what point do we acknowledge that corruption, drug corruption especially, is so powerful and pervasive that our efforts are not only impeded but, arguably, ineffective? And how do we deal with that forthrightly in a drug interdiction and drug prevention program?

And then, second, how do we adjust our own overseas drug policies and programs in light of the fact that in the United States we have a decriminalization and legalization movement that is very
powerful with respect to some previously prohibited drugs like marijuana? And there are referendums in States that go further than that, but certainly marijuana. And, in fact, we just saw the United Nations this week reclassify marijuana as a less dangerous drug than heretofore.

How do those movements, especially here in the United States, affect our overseas policies and exhortations to foreign governments for cooperation when, in fact, our own State governments are going in a very different direction?

Dr. O’NEIL. Great. Thank you for that question. I will take that first one and what do we do about corruption.

One thing that makes a difference and that we see a difference in our country which, obviously, has a significant flow of drugs since we are the retail market for much of these flows north, is justice systems that work. And one of the challenges of many of these Latin American countries is widespread impunity and the lack of a rule of law.

So, I do think professionalizing these systems and strengthening them is really a key element.

One thing in the past that has worked when a domestic system does not have the strength on its own is having international investigatory bodies come in, either backed by the U.N. in the case of Guatemala, or the OAS in the case of Honduras. I do think that those kinds of organizations they could be country based, as they have been in the past, or we could think about ones that are regionally based, that are not just dependent on a local government like k shows promise in helping local justice systems take on corruption. I would recommend that.

Mary, I do not know if you would like to comment on decriminalization, or Cliff. Otherwise, I would be happy to.

Mr. SOBEL. And you mentioned that we also looked at this when our commission was formed, and clearly we are not here to talk about domestic policy, but we do recognize in the report that 35 of our States have, in varying degrees, legalized marijuana. If that allows authorities to focus on the more insidious drugs, that would be fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, perhaps that is a positive. But that is out of our domain to opine on that.

I will go back to one other point, though, and that is we cannot turn our back to our neighbors. Violence and corruption, if not curbed, will threaten to overwhelm these, these States. And we need to just be very, very precise on where our money is doing the most good.

And that is why I keep coming back to this. Giving the mandate to ONDCP to really put together metrics, long-term and short-term, on where we are getting the best effect from our significant investment is so critically important.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Cliff, if I can just followup. I understand your, you know, wanting an escape hatch here by saying that is not, you know, domestic policy is not our purview. But my question was not for you to comment on our domestic policy, it was how does it impinge on your formulating policy for the Western Hemisphere?

I mean, what is that challenge or lack of challenge in dealing with your counterparts in other governments in the Western Hemisphere who point to these changes in our State policies, you know,
maybe positively or negatively? I mean, what, how does that affect you?

Mr. SOBEL. It is interesting. I would rather not talk from a Commission standpoint. Mary can do that and Shannon perhaps a little bit better. Because, we were obviously somewhat restricted with COVID from travel and dealing with local authorities.

We did get one trip in to Colombia. That was very good. Mary went down to, I think, El Salvador and Central America.

But it is interesting, I found personally that the war on drugs was something that we were able to develop cooperation on. And while we did not decide not to look at marijuana because we should be looking at heroin, there was a joint effort.

I am not so sure our legalization is a major issue that creates problems. But that is a personal point of view. Mary was in the region. Shannon's Council on Foreign Relations deals with this much more frequently. Let me defer to them because it is an important question.

Dr. O'NEIL. You know, one thing I would add there is Latin American nations, particularly over the last several years, are struggling themselves with being consumer nations. They started off being more producers and transit countries, and they now have serious consumption problems themselves and what that does to societies.

On the one side, I have spoken with policymakers in the region who say, you know, you are decriminalizing something that you are asking us to fight in a criminal way. And that, this hypocrisy, frankly, of that is illegal till it crosses the border, and then all of a sudden it is legal, is a challenge. But they also see it because they are struggling with the same idea.

You are seeing, increasingly, Latin American nations decriminalize themselves, or at least having those debates. So, Mexico is now right in the middle of that. Their Senate has passed a bill that would decriminalize marijuana. So, I think you are going to start seeing similar debates as we are having here in the United States happening in the region.

And while, yes, it creates tensions in the short term, perhaps it can create some understanding and empathy for each other as we go forward because it is a similar challenge that we are facing in that sense.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. WILSON.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, indeed, it is good to see Chairman Connolly looking so good.

As we begin today, Chairman Engel, I want to thank you for your distinguished service. It has just been extraordinary. I will always cherish being on the delegation with Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania to Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea. And we saw firsthand, sadly, the people oppressed of that police State in North Korea.

And then I have seen your success worldwide. When I was in Kosovo, to find out that you are a folk hero to the people of Kosovo to the point where in the city of Peja, one of the major cities of Kosovo, they have named Congressman Engel Boulevard. And so,
it is really real, Mr. Chairman, you are a success, and we are all grateful to be with you and wish you well for the future.

Additionally, I want to thank the panel today. My wife and I have been the co-chairs of the Partners of the Americas program, and so, we have had extraordinary opportunities working with young people of our hemisphere, particularly from Colombia, where we have hosted them as students. And then two of my sons were exchange students to Colombia.

And so, Ambassador, with that in mind how can the U.S.-Colombia security partnership be more effective in combating coca production and cocaine trafficking at each level of process?

How should Colombia and the U.S. evaluate and modernize eradication, demand reduction, and interdiction strategies?

Mr. SOBEL. I am not sure Shannon was an ambassador, so I think you are asking me that question. So, I will be the first to answer it. But I think all three of us should. And I will be very quick.

Mr. WILSON. That would be good.

Mr. SOBEL. There are many parts of a matrix. Eradication, obviously, has had issues, but eradication by itself without planting what you are eradicating with new crops forces the farmer to go back to illicit crops for his livelihood.

The destruction of labs is something that we could focus on significantly more. Our report points out building more tertiary roads that allow for better police and law enforcement I think would be important. Land titling is a new tool that is being utilized.

Just recently the DFC, the Development Financial Corporation, went into the region and plans to use our dollars to help build infrastructure that will take people away from crime and have alternate livelihoods. Whether agriculture, manufacturing, whatever. So, it is again a whole-of-government effort. And that is why we really like the idea we came up with that State and P could lead that effort.

Mary, I do not know if you want to answer that since you were down there with the members of the Commission as well.

Mr. WILSON. That would be excellent.

We have had massive eradication in Colombia for many years. And I think it is fair to point out that even before aerial fumigation, was suspended in 2015, coca was reviving. Coca growers can adapt to, and have adapted to forced eradication, whether aerial or manual, by moving into national parks. Even by even simple techniques such as spraying molasses on their plants. And there is also rapid re-planting if eradication is the only tool.

So, for sustainable reduction of coca production I think people in Colombia may disagree about the role eradication should play, but the people we have spoken with all agreed that you have to offer alternatives. You have to go into the community, you have to establish State presence, you have to, you have to provide the roads, as Cliff mentioned, land titling so that there will be financial inclusion. You have to apply these essential ingredients for legal crops.

And we met with some beneficiaries. They would much rather not be producing coca. They do not like the risk. They do not like being subject to the guerillas. They want the opportunity to produce legal crops.

Mr. WILSON. And Dr. O’Neil?
Dr. O’Neil. I would concur with all that they have said. The Washington level is a more whole-of-government approach. We find that that is the best way forward in all of these countries.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your efforts.

And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will always be appreciated.

Chairman Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson. I appreciate you as well. Thank you.

Ms. Wild.

Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Susan Wild here.

I would like to direct my first question to Dr. O’Neil. And thank you very much to both of you for this very important testimony that you have given today.

My question is this: the Leahy laws prohibit the United States from providing funding for foreign security forces’ force unit credibly implicated in a gross violation of human rights. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, human rights violations committed by security forces, including torture, enforced disappearance, and abuses against migrant have continued under the Administration of President Obrador, who took office in December 2018. Impunity remains the norm.

I noticed that the report does not include any references to Leahy law reporting in Mexico. In your estimation, does the U.S. Government currently have sufficient safeguards in place to guard against systemic human rights violations by Mexican security forces?

Dr. O’Neil. Thank you, Representative Wild. It is an important question.

One thing we have seen under the Lopez Obrador Administration is, frankly, a deterioration in the relationship and the working back and forth between U.S. law enforcement and Merida Initiative programs and the current government. They are less interested, frankly, then we have seen in past governments.

One of the challenges, too, in Mexico is that we have seen this fundamental reordering of the security forces. So, we have seen the disappearance of some and the rise of totally new forces that have yet to, let’s say, find their footing or find their coherence and order.

I think all of those are important considerations. As we go forward and we create a new Merida Initiative, which both sides seem to be calling for, particularly the Mexicans are calling for, the human rights elements of that, the anti-corruption elements of that I think are going to be vital to be part of any compact that the U.S. Government would form with the Mexican Government.

Ms. Wild. And do you think that by undermining trust in Mexican authorities these human rights violations not only hurt the Mexican people but also undermine the objective of effectively combating narcotrafficking?

Dr. O’Neil. Mexicans have very complicated relationships with their security forces. And you see variations in support for them. If you look at polls of municipal police and State police, they are much less trusted than, say, the army has been trusted. You see variations in trust in the military forces, the army, depending on time, depending on geography, and depending on actual contact with the army in various places.
So, yes, when the general population does not trust law enforce-
ment it undermines, as we know in any community it undermines the ability to bring a rule of law that is fair and neutral. This obviously is a worrisome issue.

Ms. Wild. Do you have any specific ideas of what a U.S. Admin-
istration could do to emphasize to our Mexican counterparts that we believe in a holistic approach, combating the effects of narco-
trafficking in ways that advance rather than undermine human rights?

Dr. O’Neil. Well, what our report lays out is in many ways that we need to have a more holistic approach ourselves. So, the idea of strengthening the P Bureau and the State Department to con-
vene the interagency to deal with this issue is a start. If we do not have a holistic approach, then it is hard to ask others to have a holistic approach too then.

What we have seen in the past with the Merida Initiative is a more holistic approach. There was high level economic dialogue, there has been high level security dialogue that has existed in the past with the Mexican Government, though not in the most recent years. Reviving some of those elements where there are lots of peo-
ple at the table who are interacting with their Mexican counter-
parts would be a helpful step forward.

Ms. Wild. And I would like to ask Ambassador Sobel a quick question, because I know I am running short on time. But, Ambas-
sador, recognizing the history of the United States’ interference in the sovereignty of many Latin American countries, what do you think the most important initial step was that a U.S. Administra-
tion could take to make it clear that it is intent on building counter-
narcotics relationships built on mutual respect and partnership?

Mr. Sobel. I really like that question. Thank you for asking it. I think we can listen more. I think that one of the high points of my term as Ambassador in Brazil is when a group within the State Department called S/P, which does the work of policy planning for the future, came down. And the government in Brazil kept asking me, Well, what are they going to ask us for, because nobody comes without asking?

And the whole trip was to listen to what was important to Brazil, how do we work together, and not to be directing.

So, I believe an early listening round without a hundred new policies, an interagency process chaired byP in the State Depart-
ment— Let me go back to one other thing. USAID, as great of an organization as it is, and we cannot exist without them internation-
ally, working with P will give it even more clout. And one of our recommendations is for USAID to develop a global health fund similar to the successful Global Fund to deal with the issues of drug treatment, and the ability to deal with patients in local com-
munities.

So, I think we are killing you with the words “holistic” and “whole-of-government,” but they reinforce each other.

Let me also just go to Merida. Our report also lists the fact that the American Correctional Association, the ACA, has recently con-
tinued to accredit prisons in Mexico. And today there are over a hundred that are accredited, that comply with our rules of safety, security, and health standards. So, that is an improvement. It is
not whole-of-country, but we are working together wherever we can.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Ambassador. I wish we had more time to talk. I would love to continue this.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Wild.

Mr. PERRY.

Mr. PERRY. I want to thank the Chairman for calling this timely hearing, and the valued work and input of this Commission. And I want to say that it has been a privilege and a pleasure to serve with you, Mr. Chairman. We have not always agreed, but you have always been respectful and honorable, and I sure appreciate that. And I hope everybody knows that bears saying.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Perry.

Mr. PERRY. We remain in the midst of an opioid crisis in our country. And the crisis is being exacerbated by the production and trafficking of fentanyl. We know that in 2019 fentanyl and other synthetic opioids claimed the lives of 36,500 Americans. That is in 1 year. One year, 36,500 Americans.

In 2016, a report by the DEA noted that Mexican drug traffickers are importing fentanyl and fentanyl precursors from China, which is not a surprise. I think everybody expects to hear that.

A 2020 DEA report highlights China as the main source of fentanyl traffic into the United States, again not a surprise.

Regina LaBelle, Chief of Staff in the Office of National Drug Control Policy during the Obama Administration, expressly doubted the CCP's genuine oversight of the production and export of illegal drugs in a Time interview just last year.

So, my question is for Ambassador Sobel. I am going to quote to you a small section from the Commission report regarding the measures we take to confront drug traffickers. And I quote:

"The concept of a 'Majors List' seems increasingly anachronistic. Policymakers design the process to deal with plant-based drugs mainly grown and processed in Latin America and then transported directly to the United States. Such distinctions make less sense with the rise of synthetic drugs which can be manufactured almost anywhere and shipped through the postal system. And they are."

One of—the first questions is, is why has China not been placed on the "Majors List"?

And then the second question would be, would you characterize the CCP's role in the production and export of synthetic drugs as an evolution of the challenge drug trafficking possesses? And what can we do to marginalize China's role in exporting synthetic drugs like fentanyl overseas?

I mean, it seems like the minimum thing we would do is add them to the "Majors List." But I await your response.

Mr. SOBEL. Well, clearly we do not make policies. So, it is going to be difficult for me to answer that directly. However, let me put that in context.

While we have definitely indicated that we do not see the value of keeping the drug certification and designation process in place, that does not mean that we are not strongly indicating that INL should produce a global report reviewing countries' efforts, and
clearly pointing out those countries that underperform or, worse, work against our citizens. And that would be an appropriate place.

But, ultimately, all these reports have a political process to them. As Mary pointed out, the number of designations and sanctions have been so limited—I think it is Bolivia, probably Venezuela—that it takes a political decision to do that. And my belief is that, in this whole-of-government effort here, those kind of issues should be, and I am sure will be, addressed in the future because they are critical to getting it right.

You know, it is interesting, I do not want to get political here, but it is amazing how a country can say one thing and do something else. And we have seen it repeatedly with some countries and, hopefully, we will hold them accountable over time. So, thank you for asking that question.

Shannon?

Dr. O’NEIL. I would just reaffirm Cliff’s comments there. And I think the fact that China, for all the reasons you say, is not on the list, the “Majors List,” shows the weakness of that mechanism and sort of its ineffectiveness and the reason why we should have a different kind of report.

Thank you.

Mr. PERRY. So, so just to clarify, you both agree that the report should be something very different because it does not accurately reflect the current circumstances, the ever changing circumstances? And even so, even if there were a different report or some other mechanism, I would tend to think you would agree that China needs to be included in whatever our efforts are in that regard?

Mr. SOBEL. I am going to answer that quickly. Every nation should be held accountable, especially as it affects the welfare of our citizens.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Perry. I appreciate those kind words.

Ms. HOULAHAN.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I very much appreciate you all who are testifying today. And I will, I think, start my first question with Dr. O’Neil.

I have been trying through my couple of years on the Foreign Affairs Committee to focus on women, women and security particularly. And this report that we are talking about today notes that the international drug treaties, of course, have not been updated for more than three decades and they need to be modernized.

And according to a 2014 report from the Organization of American States nowhere in existing conventions and international agreements are there mandates for commitment States to understanding the global crisis of controlled substances through the gender lens.

So, I am wondering if you could talk a little bit, any of you all but I guess starting with Dr. O’Neil, about how we would recommend that a government seek to understand and address the role of gender, the role of women in the illicit drug trade. And how can we use women in the gender-focused lens, or issues, or initiatives to help reduce the supply of dangerous drugs to the United States?
Dr. O’NEIL. Great. Thank you. That is an incredibly important question.

And as I know you are well aware, there is lots of evidence that when women are included in peace agreements or negotiations for peace agreements that those agreements tend to come to resolution faster and last longer on the other side. So it is important to think about both who is negotiating things and who is working on these issues.

We also know that one of the effects within Latin America of the drug trade is the devastation of local communities. And we have seen, though it is more anecdotal evidence than hard, rigorous analysis that there are women who are brought into it as well in lots of different roles, from the farming aspect all the way through to the transit to and into the United States, and to the final users, as we know as well.

As we think about developing policies, I think there are a few things here. Some policies should be gender neutral or gender blind. So, as we think about strengthening court systems, as we think about addressing citizen security, some of that should benefit whole communities, all individuals, and so it should not be—you would hope that it would not be gendered.

But I do think it is important for U.S. policies, whether they are run by USAID other agencies because there are several there, to think about the types of harm and then the types of avenues that women and girls play within this.

One area that we have seen an uptick that is quite unfortunate in recent years is as it becomes harder to move drugs into the United States, due to various policies, that these cartels are diversifying. They are really transnational criminal organizations, they are not just drug cartels. And one of the businesses that has, unfortunately, been picking up in Latin America is the trafficking of women and girls.

Especially with the challenges that we see of forced migration of Central America and out of Venezuela, that trafficking of women and girls is—they are an increasingly vulnerable population out there because they are out of their homes and out of their own countries. I would recommend as we develop these compacts, as we develop these larger security policy and assistance programs, that we really think about the human trafficking aspect which is parallel to if not exactly part of drug trafficking, but they are often the same organizations that are committing both of these crimes.

So, thank you.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Sobel, would you be interested in remarking on that as well before I move, if I have time, to my next question?

Mr. SOBEL. I will be very quick because I just want to focus on the fact that there is not one variety here. If you are a drug trafficker that does not mean you do not do other types of trafficking.

And obviously one of these hubs is the tri-border area, and there is definitely a crossover that we are cognizant of and we need to be very focused on as we develop local policies and compacts to deal with these issues.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Excellent.
It looks as though I only have about 40 seconds left. And maybe I will try and throw in my question and then maybe ask for your guys to help me with it for the record.

You, Mr. Sobel, talked a little bit about whole-of-government. And it sounds as throughout the course of this that is a theme through here. What I am wondering about is in a scenario that where is the State Department in this particular situation, what is the new role, if any, of the Department of Defense? Will they continue their effort but will the State Department be in the driver’s seat?

I only have 9 seconds left of my time, so I am not sure if you can reply to that.

Mr. SOBEL. I will ask the Chairman to let me go overtime.

Chairman ENGEL. I will be very generous.

Mr. SOBEL. Okay. I cannot wait for somebody to say to the Department of Defense that they will be governed by the State Department. I will leave that to higher authorities.

But, it is an interagency process, but it needs a head. It needs a convener. And we believe working with—and the report says it and Shannon said it—working with Homeland Security, Defense, all the bureaus, coordinated and convened under P so that when we go to OMB it is not only one voice, because there will never be one voice, but at least there is some consistency. So, it is meant to be a convening authority.

We all know government too well. You are not going to have one person dealing with this critical issue. Even within the State Department, USAID, and INL there needs to be, I think, a better demarcation of where USAID’s policies are engaged and where INL policies are engaged.

But, you know, Rome was not built in a day, and we will make this better in our future government that are coming on January 20th.

Shannon, want to add something?

Dr. O’NEIL. Yes, I concur with what you just put forward. Thank you.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much to you both. And I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. YOHO.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I reiterate the words of all my colleagues on your leadership here. Thank you and best of luck to you and Pat in the future.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador Sobel, you stated that you are not in the role of making policy, and I understand that. But I know you all know this, the three witnesses today, and as all witnesses in the past are the ones that give us the fodder that do go into the drafting the legislation that does get passed, that does become law. And so, your testimonies are invaluable because so much information comes out of this.

President Nixon had the war on drugs started in 1971. Over that time period to current we spent over $2 trillion on the war on drugs. And I have in front of me a chart on coca production in South America. And in 2011—you can read the numbers, you know
them—they were less than half of what they are today. Colombia is dismal in that they had 83,000 hectares growing in 2011. Coca today, it is over 212,000 acres.

So, the war on drugs is not really working. I think we have done a shell game. We have displaced it. And I think so many times our programs, as good as they are, they focus on the symptoms, you know. It would be like a cancer: we are treating symptoms instead of going after that. Our focuses are on the symptoms instead of going after it.

The symptoms are increased production, increased use, the violence, the corruption, lack of good governance. And if we look at the cause of these things, it is greed, it is money, and it is the power that the narcotraffickers have. And that we really need to go after that.

If we look at what China is doing with fentanyl, and it does come through Mexico, mainly through the ports, but it is also shipped in, and China supplies the pill-making machines for that, for the methamphetamine, one has to understand the reasoning behind Mexico—or China in the opium wars, and that is for retaliation of the opium wars from the 1800's that led to their century of shame. They are wanting to destroy this country, and they are going to do it any way they can. And one of them is to weaken us and destroy us through the fentanyls.

When you see how many people have died, as Mr. Perry brought up, and other members have talked about the deaths in America, that is just a tip of the iceberg. It is all the people that are the addicts today that will be the deaths tomorrow that we have to combat. And so, we have to look at a different approach from the $2 trillion that we have spent on this war on drugs that is not working.

And, Dr. Speck, you talked about the metrics of MCC. And I agree with that. I think that is an awesome program, and that the metrics of decertification do not work. In your opinion, or anybody else that wants to answer this, what other metrics can we put in place that will have the teeth in it that curbs that activity?

Mr. SOBEL. Maybe the chairman will let us have about 30 minutes on that——

Mr. YOHO. Yes.

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. Excellent set of questions. But let me hit one or two small points.

Mr. YOHO. I am going to come, I am going to come back to you, Ambassador. I asked Dr. Speck first.

Mr. SOBEL. Mary. Okay. Okay.

Mr. YOHO. And I want to come back to you because I have a specific question for you.

Mr. SOBEL. OK, Mary.

Dr. SPECK. Well, on metrics I think you mentioned quite rightly, and we tried to emphasize this in the report and agreed you really have to look at the financial flows and we need better tools: more effective investigations, quicker prosecutions. It takes an awfully long time to prosecute a money laundering case. And we need to do that more effectively.

Mr. YOHO. That is the kind of stuff I would love to hear. What are we—I mean, if you are there, you are seeing what is not work-
ing, if you could let this committee know in a report, just say, this is what you have to do.

Dr. Speck. Well, I think financial flows, getting at the proceeds and the profits is not working.

Mr. Yoho. I agree.

Dr. Speck. Unfortunately, what is also not working is interdiction and the eradication. As you said, these are symptoms. So, and even though it is a long process, we cannot pretend that there is a one-size-fits-all solution or silver bullet. You have to go into the regions that produce coca and give alternatives, real alternatives. That is going to take a while but that is the only way.

Mr. Yoho. Okay. Let me pivot to Ambassador Sobel because that is one I wanted to ask him. Because he hit on the head on this about economics.

What economic developments can we do with the infrastructures that are lacking today via DFC, USAID, MCC that we can go into a region, say the Northern Triangle, maybe do a regional compact to put in the infrastructure that will bring in direct investment, foreign direct investment, the business community partnering up with us, now that we can do that with the DFC, to make that significant investment in that region so that they create an indigenous economy outside of the drug trade to starve the drug trade because people will not need it, the people that are working the fields?

Mr. Sobel. Well, that is another great question.

Our government is getting much better at using all of our tools, including DFC, which now has significant new funding to do programming. EXIM Bank is back in business again. There are many tools in our government that can be better coordinated to go into regions and look at dealing with a more holistic government approach, almost an interagency approach.

But I want to go back to what Mary said because I think it gets to the core of your question, which is a really important question which Shannon and I both mentioned earlier. And that is we do interdict 5, 10 percent. But on money laundering it is probably closer to 0.2 percent.

Mr. Yoho. Wow.

Mr. Sobel. And it is remarkable. And it is not that reports are not being generated. It is estimated that the private sector spends $4 to $8 billion on compliance issues.

And let me give you a stat which is, to me, amazing. There were 163,000 activity reports on money laundering in 2000. Today it is 2.3 million.

Mr. Yoho. Wow.

Mr. Sobel. And yet, you have an agency—and I do not want to be critical here—but you have an agency, FinCEN, which is critical to this process that has a budget of $127 million. So, I am not suggesting what Congress should spend, but I am saying this is a critical area and that if you take away some of the flow of money you will hurt these organizations.

Mr. Yoho. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Engel. Thank you.

Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to thank the witnesses for the work that they have done on the Commissioner’s report. I really appreciate the fact that you have taken a holistic approach and moved away from just the crop eradication focus.

I want to mention that instead of just looking at economic alternatives and ways to go after drug trafficking, that we also look at how promoting democratic institutions can make a difference: good governance, more democracy, how that ties into tackling the drug trafficking issue.

So, I would ask the witnesses if from their perspective do they agree or how critical do they see concurrent democracy promotion programs and strengthening of new democracies around the world that we should be doing? How do they see that fitting in with the goals of stopping some of this drug trafficking?

And could they talk about any specific investments that we have made in democratic government that tie to the drug trafficking issue?

Dr. O’Neil. Thank you very much for that question. And that is an important one. I will kick off and let my colleagues join in as they choose.

Governance and democratic governance definitely matter. I think if we have learned anything over these last several decades of these types of policies is that it cannot just be interdiction and eradication, it has to be helping these countries create systems that can take on transnational criminal organizations themselves. You cannot do that if you do not have functioning court systems, functioning police systems, or other security law enforcement that work, and that can go after the bad guys and protect the good guys. And that is, I think, a fundamental challenge.

If these nations have justice systems, law enforcement systems, and legislatures and executive branches that work and that represent the people and not these illegal organizations, it matters how you in the end reduce the harm that is happening there and also the harm that is happening here.

So, how do we go about doing that? I think we have some examples of anticorruption bodies that have been put in place at various moments that have really helped strengthen rule of law. We have had exchanges of lawyers in terms of training on how to work within court systems. We have had programs that have helped these countries transform the legal structures to make them fairer, and more open, and transparent, and less susceptible to undue nefarious influences and the like.

And those are the kinds of programs that I do think are really important as part of this more holistic approach to drug policy as we go forward.

Ms. Titus. Thank you. Anybody else?

Mr. Sobel. Mary, why do not you answer that. I would like to talk about some of the things that USAID is doing. And I think it is critical as weak governments will get weaker post-pandemic. And these issues are even more important today.

But Mary was down in the region, particularly the CARSI, the Northern Triangle. And I think she has a lot of firsthand references of where we have had success.
Dr. Speck. Well, Shannon mentioned some of them, the international commissions, these hybrid commissions have been quite effective in going after corruption. But I might add that even in the absence of those commissions, and in the case of governments like Honduras, where we do not have credible counterparts, strengthening civil society is absolutely crucial.

These are the watchdogs. These are the groups that need to monitor campaign financing and other forms of corruption. And certainly in Central America there is a lot of penetration, or at least there is a perception that there is a great deal of penetration, particularly in local areas, of criminal groups, including drug traffickers, influencing elections and controlling mayoralties, and things like that.

Civil society is an area that we definitely have to strengthen, particularly in weak states like those in Central America.

Ms. Titus. And you mentioned that we are going to—we are seeing backsliding in democratic governments around the world. And that has become more a problem during this pandemic. So, I am glad to hear you agreeing with me we need to do things politically as well as economically to have a real holistic approach. And it really does make a difference. Sometimes what USAID does with so few resources makes such a big different.

So, thank you very much.

Chairman Engel. Thank you, Ms. Titus.

Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to you and the ranking member for calling this hearing. And I want to thank you both for your leadership in our hemisphere as well as in fighting this drug crisis.

This report from the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission could not come at a better time. During times of crisis we often see an uptick in the misuse and abuse of different substances. And while this pandemic is no exception, what we are seeing is an explosion in abuse of synthetic drugs and other opioids.

As we all know, many of these drugs are manufactured, cultivated, or transported from our southern neighbors into the United States where the market for these drugs is thriving. While conditions on the ground throughout Latin America are getting worse, the Commission does highlight a handful of success stories in countering the drug trade, from programs in Colombia, to transition of coca-growing farms into profitable and legal crops producers, to anticorruption programs in the Northern Triangle, we are making some progress. But, sadly, as a result of this pandemic many of the gains made in the region have been eroded by stress in the economies in the hemisphere. And I think now it is especially time to do more.

So, let me ask my first question to Ambassador Sobel.

How difficult would it be to implement a Millennial Challenge Corporation kind of style program to combat narco-trafficking?

And what would be the benefits and some of the challenges that our embassies would face in that?

Mr. Sobel. Well, we actually liked your idea a lot. And we actually mentioned it prominently in our report.
Taking a lot of the accountability with measurable outcomes to be able to not continue programs that are not working or that need to be adjusted, so accountability, which I think is a cornerstone of MCC, where a country takes responsibility, you have mutually agreed upon outcomes. And to the extent that you reach those outcomes you get additional funding. And if you do not, there are consequences.

I think that that is definitely part, a key part of our program on accountability, not just to spend money but make money effective.

Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Let me also ask you what role does Nicolas Maduro and his regime play in the illicit drug trade in Venezuela? And how has that changed since he came into power?

Mr. Sobel. Shannon, if you do not mind, I would love to be the first one to respond to that because you hit, again, on a huge issue that without resolving that you cannot resolve the issues that we are talking about today.

You basically have a State that has become a criminal State that is creating an opportunity for a huge flow of additional drugs. In fact, the stat that I have here is that it has more than quadrupled since 2011, the outflow of drugs into the Caribbean our neighbors, as well as into Venezuela. But until we are able to deal with Venezuela and make it a democratic nation again, accountable and not a pariah State, we will continue to have huge problems.

Shannon, you want to answer that I am sure.

Dr. O’Neil. I would just add that this is indeed the case. And we have seen from now well over a decade ago when Hugo Chavez kicked out the DEA and other U.S. law enforcement that dealt with these issues, there has been a huge growth in the flights that go across Venezuela. Venezuela is a safe harbor for many of those that traffic in these drugs, as well as traffic in other things as well.

The challenge of the lack of law in these sorts of areas, and these sorts of issues in Venezuela is a huge cost but also a challenge for places like Colombia that are trying to deal with these efforts, as well as dealing with almost 2 million Venezuelans who have fled their country and come into Colombia, and hundreds of thousands in other nations.

So, the drug issue and the challenges, we have the pandemic and the declines in economics, is compounded by the challenges of Venezuela both as an unlawful space where these people can be harbored or can use to traffic their drugs, but also in the refugees that have left Venezuela and are taxing or putting strains on the systems in these other countries. So, it is a huge issue.

Mr. Kinzinger. Yes, thank you.

Sadly, I think we missed a really big opportunity or I guess almost burden in Venezuela, and we have ignored our own hemisphere for a long time. And I think we have been almost too nervous to be involved.

But let me just, since I am running out of time, I will also say we need to continue to look at roles of, you know, the dual currencies like bitcoin and stuff in this whole process.

So, Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for calling this hearing. I thank the witnesses. And I will yield back.

Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger.

Ms. Wagner.
Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing the hearing and for championing the important review of U.S. counterdrug policies that our witnesses have just completed. I appreciate also your many accomplishments as chair of this committee, your commitments to bipartisanship, and your tireless efforts in support of U.S. foreign policy.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mrs. WAGNER. I would also like to thank our witnesses for their work to improve U.S. efforts to end the illicit drug trade and mitigate its impact on our hemisphere.

I have had the opportunity to travel to the Northern Triangle and Peru, and have seen the immense suffering the drug trade has caused in the United States and its partner nations. I am committed to examining and improving U.S. counterdrug policies.

We were just talking about it a little bit, so I would like to delve a little deeper here. Maduro’s despotic and illegitimate regime in Venezuela is hampering efforts to control the drug trade. And, Ambassador Sobel, you touched on it some. But to go in a little more depth here, how does illicit drug trafficking in and through Venezuela support transnational criminal organizations in neighboring countries and throughout the region?

And more specifically, what can the U.S. and international partners do to disrupt these destabilizing operations?

Mr. SOBEL. Well, let me start by saying that we have been close a number of times, but there are a number of foreign actors—we know who they are—that continually prop up this illegitimate regime, which makes it difficult. Homicides in the Caribbean have risen so dramatically recently, which we believe are a direct result of the transnational gangs that are transmitting drugs from places like Venezuela into the Caribbean to get to our country.

So, I think that at this point we need to work with our allies, which is critically important. We need to continue to stay focused on putting democracy back into that country.

If we had an answer from the Commission, we would be more than happy to give it to you. But I think we also are dealing with it. We all know how important it is.

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, as a followup, and I am just going to call it out. Ambassador Sobel, how does Cuban, Russian, and Iranian support for the Maduro regime undermine efforts to hold Venezuela accountable for its narcotrafficking impunities? I believe those are the actors we are talking about?

Mr. SOBEL. Right. Well, and there are probably a few others there that have been buying Venezuelan oil over time, like China. That plays a role as well.

Mrs. WAGNER. Uh-huh.

Mr. SOBEL. You know, we have talked, and again we are not making policy, but sanctions can be an effective tool by government. We have seen them work. Sometimes they take a long time to work. Our government over time has demonstrated how we can deal with this issue which is a cancer in not only that country, but affects all of the countries around, including our own.

Mrs. WAGNER. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission’s report recommends that the U.S. empower our diplomats to negotiate bilateral foreign assistance compacts based on shared
goals for combating crime, strengthening justice systems, and protecting human rights.

Dr. O'Neil, how would a compact-based approach save money and improve outcomes?

Dr. O'Neil. Well, we envision the benefit of a compact approach is that it can be very specific, so it can respond to the actual situation on the ground. So, what a Colombia needs is very different than what a Mexico or an El Salvador would need. The actors in place will be different. So, in that sense, it saves money by adjusting policy to a particular context.

The other thing is that we envision some flexibility. And the idea especially of asking ONDCP to really think about important metrics and data so we actually know which programs are working. Are these the programs to prioritize and engage? Perhaps other ones are ones to put away and shift gears.

I think the nature of a compact approach is quite useful in getting the most bang for the direct taxpayers' buck.

Mrs. Wagner. I agree.

I know I am out of time here. I just want to say that the compact system also forms a basis for my bipartisan H.R. 2836, the Central American Women and Children Protection Act, which I have championed with Representative Norma Torres. And H.R. 2836 will kickstart, I think, the negotiation of bilateral compacts with Northern Triangle governments to strengthen the justice systems of those countries and create safer communities for women and children.

So, I am very interested in you taking a look at this, Dr. O'Neil and figuring out how compacts can protect women and children from violence and impunity, support, and supporting our counterdrug programs, so.

Dr. O'Neil. Thank you. I will do that.

Mr. Sobel. Can I say one other thing, Shannon?

The Congress will make these decisions, obviously, in the future, but multi-year funding is also critically important to these programs because as you build basic support to be able to continue progress, and not lose it, and take years to build it back, is critically important. And I would just stress that long-term funding, or flexible funding as needs arise, is important.

Mrs. Wagner. Well, I thank you all very much. I am over time. I appreciate the Chair's indulgence. Thank you.

Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wagner.

Ms. Omar.

Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. And really appreciate the conversation today.

Dr. Speck, is there any relationship between decriminalization of drugs and a corresponding decrease in violence?

Dr. Speck. We now have 35 states in the United States that have decriminalized marijuana. But marijuana had, for a while, not been an important source of income for drug traffickers. Probably not as important as cocaine, or heroin. And now, of course, fentanyl is emerging. It could potentially, as Ambassador Sobel pointed out, allow law enforcement to focus on the most dangerous drugs.
But it is unlikely to have much of an impact, in my view, on the intra-cartel violence that you see exploding in Mexico. Decriminalization is unlikely to remove a significant source of income because these organizations are so diverse.

Ms. Omar. Yes. So, is it fair to say that this is less of a drug trafficking problem and more of an organized crime problem?

Dr. Speck. Yes. I would, I would definitely agree with that.

Looking at the groups in Mexico, they are highly diverse. A major source of income right now is fuel theft. To think of these as simply drug trafficking organizations is overly simplistic, particularly today. They have evolved into multifaceted mafias.

Ms. Omar. I appreciate that.

I also think it is really important for us today to address the extraordinary double standards that exist when we talk about Latin America and drug trafficking. In September President Trump only identified two countries that have failed demonstrably in adhering to their drug control obligations: Venezuela and Bolivia.

What struck me about this is that Juan Orlando Hernandez, a supposed U.S. ally and a partner in counternarcotics, was named as co-conspirator in two different cases in New York. His own brother was convicted on narcotrafficking charges.

Is this not a demonstrated failure? This is not just a Trump problem or a Republican problem, it is a criticism I have had of presidents from both parties. How can we genuinely—and this is question to all of you—work to end this scourge of organized crime and violence in the Americas if we turn a blind eye to our own allies when they are involved?

Mr. Sobel. Shannon, let me take a first stab at this on one element. It will not answer your entire question, but it is an interesting example.

We talked about the designation process and the “Majors List,” as they say, as something that we should do away with because, first, it has not been an effective tool. It has been used, as you pointed out, very sparingly as far as the sanctions go.

However, the INL report that we are recommending in its place will be able to be much more utilized for the issues that you are pointing out, so that it will allow government to make decisions, not black and white, because in some cases they are gray. Is the whole country at fault or is it a power within the government or, in this case, a government official’s relative.

So, I think we are giving more capability to our government to bring up these issues, identify them so they are not swept under the rug so to say, and let government make those decisions individually as opposed to just saying sanctions or no sanctions.

I do not know if that helps, but.

Ms. Omar. It does.

Does anyone else want to add anything? I have one more question.

Dr. O’Neil. I will say very just quickly, you know, I think this broader approach in a compact is when you have potentially unreliable partners in places, it allows you to bring in other actors. It allows you to bring in civil society actors. It allows you to bring in the private sector. It allows you to bring in perhaps local govern-
ment, or State government in a federated system, that might be more reliable.

And so, I think that is the benefit of this more context-based approach, precisely when you have variation in the Federal-level partnerships.

Ms. Omar. I appreciate that. And I think in many of these aspects credibility is important, and it is important that we try to keep it intact.

And one of the other aspects of the so-called war on drugs that I think needs to be on the table in relationship it has to repression and severe human rights violations. I think too often our understanding, and our understandable desire to fight narcotraffickers and cartels has led us to give military weapons and training to police forces with partners of corruption and human rights abusers.

In Honduras, in Colombia, and elsewhere this has led pretty clearly to torture, massive displacement, arbitrary detention, and State-sponsored murder. And it has failed disproportionately against Black and indigenous people in Latin America.

How should we and our partners protect human rights as we are fighting organized crime. And is that even possible with a militarized approach?

And any of you can take this one.

Dr. O’Neil. I am happy to start. You know, when we look at this approach, and we are calling for a holistic approach and an all-of-government approach precisely because it should not be just a military approach. And one of the big focal points of these different compacts in our approach to the region should be strengthening the rule of law. And if you have court systems that work, that work both for narcotraffickers but also works for human rights abusers.

I think that is important for citizen security in Latin America, but it is also important for the flow of illicit drugs that come to the United States. In that sense, these kinds of policies I do think benefit both sides and get at what our ultimate goal is, which is to reduce the harm of Americans that happened here.

So, thank you.

Mr. Sobel. Clearly, I just want to add, a lot of our policies in every one of these compacts that exist today, whether it be a Merida, or CARSI, or any of them, the focus is on justice training, law enforcement professionalization. They focus not only on interdiction, but on being able to help civil society deal with these issues. And while it is not always 100 percent effective, it has to stay a critical part of our program in the region.

Chairman Engel. Thank you. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Burchett.

Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo the sentiments of a lot of the committee members. You will be really missed. And I appreciate your friendship, brother.

Chairman Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Burchett. I guess I will issue my disgust over this issue. It seems like talk is cheap, and we are doing a lot of it. And I do not see a lot getting done. You know, we have a war on drugs, and
that does not work. And then we say we are going to go invest money in these countries, and then that does not seem to work. And it just seems we are back at square one always.

I have friends that have lost loved ones to drug addiction and abuse. Fentanyl seems to be the hot ticket right now. At some point I would hope that we would just tell these countries they do not have a bill of rights, they do not have a constitution, they maybe say they do, but the reality is they can stop it and they will not. China can stop it, and they will not. These Central American banana republics, whatever you want to call them, Maduro, all those cats, they can stop it if they want to, but they will not.

And at some time we are going to have to address that and just quit playing ball with him. I would hope that would happen soon.

But, I'm wondering how are we working with Mexico to stop the flow of fentanyl from China?

And how can future foreign assistance better target and stop the flow of the drug?

And what policies or strategies should the U.S. adopt to punish fentanyl producers?

And, again, I think at some point folks like China, Mexico, some of these folks, they know these producers, they know where they are, they ought to execute them. They are murderers, they are killing our people, and it just never seems to end. So, I will throw that out to the committee.

And you can tell I am not, I am not looking for a job with the United Nations.

Dr. O'NEIL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURCHETT. And it is cold in here, and that is why I am wearing this jacket. I am not sure why the chairman kept it cold. They usually keep it cold when it is going to be a boring topic to keep all us old folks awake. But today it is not a boring topic and it is freezing in here.

Chairman ENGEL. If you know the person who can turn it off I would be very much obliged.

Mr. BURCHETT. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Turn it on, I should say.

Mr. BURCHETT. Well, I will requisition the proper forms and in 12 years we will have a committee meeting and we will probably get it heated back up by then. And it will be good right in the middle of the summer.

But go right ahead. I am sorry.

Dr. O'NEIL. No, no, thank you. I will say a few words.

I think there are two ways to go after the fentanyl issue. And one, as you rightly say, these precursors come from China. So, this is a China problem as well as a Mexico problem. And so there it is working with China, discussing it with China, and setting it up so that these precursors do not leave China. And that is a big challenge.

There have been discussions there. But I think those could be prioritized and focused on, amid the other obvious tensions that we have with China today.

With Mexico, once they enter Mexico, of course, this is a new drug and one that laces in with all other sorts of drugs that Mexico transits up to and traffics into the United States. So, as these
transnational criminal organizations diversify. I think we need to work with them and work with Mexico, but also work with ourselves, too, and strengthen some of the things that we have talked about in this report to take on all kinds of criminality.

One of the big issues that would matter for fentanyl as well as everything else is strengthening our ability to go after these financial flows. If you cannot transfer the money to the people making it in China, then you will not be able to buy that fentanyl that comes from that direction. And as Cliff has laid out in detail, the lack of funding and support for FinCEN and others that are able to track this money. I think that is a big part of it.

And then the other part is intelligence and finding partners in Mexico that we can share the intelligence when we see these fentanyl flows coming in. Because we know they are coming from China as well as a couple other places, but mostly China, and how do you track them and how do you stop them as they come into the port system, which is now increasingly controlled by Mexico's military. So, working with—which is just a recent development—so working with those partners to try to stop these flows as they come into the Mexican space.

Mr. BURCHETT. I thought you said stop them.

Mr. SOBEL. I just might add——

Mr. BURCHETT. Go ahead.

Mr. SOBEL [continuing]. To the conversation. We have also prioritized fentanyl very much in our report. I have not counted how many times we have referenced it, but we definitely agree with you 100 percent, and the whole committee, that we need to give it even more priority. Whereas up till now many of our programs have focused on plant-based narcotics.

And there is no question when you look at the deaths in our country, which in 2019, before COVID, spiked to 71,000, as was pointed out by one of the Congresswomen earlier. For the whole decade it was 500,000. And we can only imagine, although I would not want to, what it will be like this year. It will be awful once again.

So, this has got to be a priority of our compacts. It has got to be a priority of the State Department leadership. And we have to hold countries accountable.

Mr. BURCHETT. How do you suggest we hold them accountable?

Mr. SOBEL. Well, it is not my place to do that. So it is something that——

Mr. BURCHETT. Well, I guess you are saying it is——

Mr. SOBEL. On a personal basis, not from the Commission, I would say we have been very effective over a long period of time on sanctions. We should be prepared to use sanctions on fentanyl. That's a personal opinion.

Mr. BURCHETT. I agree with you 100 percent. We cut them off. We starve them. We cut their banks off.

And I think we should put our bankers on notice, our international bankers in those cartels, that we are going to have to hit them in their pocketbooks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have run over my time. Thank you for your hospitality, sir.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.
Mr. Sobel. I am going to ask once again just to add something because the Congressman allowed me to think about a comment made by a congressperson earlier. And that is the digital assets, transferences becoming even more of an emerging threat.

In 2020, this is a concern of the National Drug Strategy, which clearly says that digital asset transfers are now an emerging threat. DEA in 2019 found that both Colombia and Mexico drug cartels were beginning to use virtual currencies to facilitate payments.

So, anti-money laundering cannot be as we have looked at it in the past. It definitely needs to take in the ability to use digital assets for transfers as well.

Sorry.

Chairman Engel. No. Thank you. That is very important.

Mr. Levin.

Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you there in our beloved committee room where you belong.

I wanted to focus on Mexico and specifically on corruption in Mexico. So, Dr. O'Neil, I am going to direct my questions to you.

A couple weeks ago reporter Ioan Grillo wrote this in The New York Times about Mexico's war on drugs. And I am quoting.

"Many here wonder if justice merely extends to the powerful in this war." He pointed out that Mexico's former Public Security Secretary faces drug trafficking charges in New York, and Mexico's former Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos was indicted in New York on drug trafficking charges, but his charges were dropped when Attorney General Barr intervened following Mexico's threat to kick U.S. drug Federal agents out of the country, meaning out of Mexico.

So, how might this incident, the decision to drop charges against Cienfuegos and release him to Mexico affect the future of U.S. efforts to address corruption in Mexico?

Dr. O'Neil. Thank you for that question. And I will speak on my own personal behalf.

I think obviously the U.S. Department of Justice and law enforcement have been very active and have made strides against some of these corrupt figures. The process is going forward but it looks like there is significant evidence that they were involved in corruption there.

And that has been a partnership we have seen with Mexico, we have seen with Brazil, and other places, too, fighting corruption with Lava Jato and other points of corruption.

I do think the return of Cienfuegos, of the defense minister, to Mexico to potentially face some sort of justice there, nor and it is at least a perception that U.S. justice can be bullied into bringing someone back. I think it is a challenge to the way U.S. justice succeeds in the hemisphere and in Mexico.

I also think it is going to be a real challenge in our work with Mexico in that Mexicans seem like they do not want to try those of high-ranking levels that perhaps have behaved badly during their government position. I think it will add a level of tension and uncertainty in terms of that back and forth.

One thing we talk about in the report that I think is a place to begin with this in U.S.-Mexico cooperation is that, yes, we can
work with the Federal Government but we can also work with State governments. We can also work at other levels where we may have more credible counterparts. And I think that is something as we look at a compact and we look at working with Mexico on security issues, which we need to do, can we find other actors within the system, or outside of the government system that can push forward shared goals.

Mr. Levin. Well, yes, I was going to ask you about that and what you say in your report. I mean, it is hard to understand how we can collaborate with Mexico in going after drug kingpins knowing we might have another Cienfuegos-like situation.

And your report recommends that the U.S. support efforts to combat corruption within Mexican police forces, public prosecutors' offices, the courts, right. But I am just trying to understand, how do we combat corruption at the highest levels of government given what we are seeing here? I mean, if there is corruption at the very top it is hard to see tackling corruption lower down, I guess.

Mr. Sobel. I am going to help Shannon on that because I lived through it.

When I was confirmed as the Ambassador to Brazil I was asked at my Senate hearing what am I going to do about corruption in Brazil. And this is even before I got confirmed. And I learned first-hand as an ambassador, and Shannon hit the nail on the head, there are many pockets of—more than pockets—there are many places that are looking forward to cooperating with the United States to get our training, to get our expertise, definitely funding.

But we have an incredible program with almost every State in Brazil that I think allowed us and our law enforcement agencies to be very effective, despite not always working with the Federal Government on local issues.

So, the compact allows that flexibility for the Ambassador to focus on those areas where there are reliable partners. And there will be many institutions. We just cannot turn our back because it puts our citizens even more at risk. I know that's recommended.

Mr. Levin. Well, that is helpful. But I want to try to get in one more question here. So, let me shift a little bit.

Because you are aware, of course, that corruption in Mexico isn't limited to anti-drug efforts. And I wanted to talk about the labor situation for a moment.

Last year Mexico passed labor law reforms to give workers an opportunity to remove corrupt protection unions, which are actually creatures of employers, and replace them with independent unions and to vote on collective bargaining contracts so workers can finally win higher wages and raise their standards of living.

But I am not optimistic about those laws being enforced based on the reality on the ground. Just this summer Mexican labor lawyer Susana Prieto Terrazas spent nearly a month in a dangerous Mexican jail during the pandemic for the crime of helping workers organize an independent democratic union, precisely what the reforms are supposed to allow. And it is just super important that these reforms take hold, not only for Mexican workers but for U.S. workers because they could level the playing field and stop middle class jobs from being outsourced.
So, the problem is that I do not see it happening, and I think it could be helpful in dealing with the cartels as well.

This weekend The New York Times reported that Mexican drug cartels are using social media to disseminate propaganda to, as they put it, mask the bloodbath and use the promise of infinite wealth to attract expendable, quote unquote, “expendable” young recruits.

So, you can see where I am getting at here. If you cannot get a decent job and make a decent wage, you are more susceptible to this.

And I wanted to ask, you know, and again I will direct this to Dr. O’Neil, do you think it is fair to say that deplorable working conditions that the Mexican people face, the inability to win fair wages, could be a factor in enhancing the appeal of the sort of lifestyle that the drug cartels are portraying in their propaganda?

Dr. O’Neil. Well, I will say two things. One, the lack of opportunity in Mexico is something that propels people into this other life. And over half of Mexican workers work in the informal economy, so they are not even registered. And so that is a huge challenge.

Mr. Levin. Right.

Dr. O’Neil. The other thing I would say, though, that we should focus on as well, or remember, is that the new USMCA trade agreement, the new NAFTA, has labor mechanisms within it to monitor and to enforce change. And in Mexican law, treaties supersede national law.

So, I do think the United States as we go forward in our bilateral relationship, those mechanisms within the USMCA could be useful for the concerns, some of the concerns that you rightly bring up.

Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Levin. Right. But those are exactly the mechanisms I am worried about. I have not seen them work in any way.

Chairman Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Levin. Thank you.

Chairman Engel. Mr. Green.

Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaul, for this hearing. And thank our witnesses for being here today.

And, Chairman, I am relatively new to the committee but your reputation for bipartisanship [audio interference] service.

I know the focus may be on the Western Hemisphere today. But I want to dig in as others have into these huge problems with China, particularly, as our witnesses report, fentanyl is killing people left and right in my home state of Tennessee, and we are livid about it. China is pushing this stuff, the Mexican cartels are pushing it into my State. My constituents are dying while China does nothing.

Are we to believe that the Chinese Communist Party can track down or crack down on Chinese churches using CCTV and track innocent Muslims in Xinjiang, place them in concentration camps, find Falun Gong practitioners that they harvest organs from, but somehow they cannot—they have no idea of where the fentanyl is
coming from or being developed in their country. It is absolutely preposterous to think that they cannot.

I understand the problems Mexico while China is a totalitarian regime with total control. And they claim they are trying to address this but just cannot seem to do very much.

After their pattern of deceit and outright lies to cover up the coronavirus outbreak can we really believe that they have no control over this? Fentanyl far exceeds the deaths caused by other opiates

Their charts show us, charts show us virtually a broken line with no end in sight where the sky is the limit. And yet, the destruction brought about by this incredible formidable drug, it is bad enough that China allowed the coronavirus to spread uncontrollably, lied to the world, silenced whistleblowers, and now around 1.5 million are dead from the virus.

But their handling of fentanyl is also atrocious. This fentanyl is lab created for profit in China, with a layover in Mexico where it is smuggled into the United States. The CCP is purposely and deliberately turning a blind eye. One thousand three hundred and seven in my home State alone died of opiate overdoses in 2018. And of that, 827 were from fentanyl and other synthetics. This is all from Communist China, the largest violator of human rights. And they are domestically exporting these atrocities abroad.

The CCP has silenced free speech at American basketball games and Hollywood movies, and they are forever silencing so many Tennesseans and Americans who will not see another day because of fentanyl and their incompetence on handling the COVID outbreak.

Now to my question. And really open to the panel, any of the witnesses can chime in.

Can you guys share with us if you believe the Chinese Government knows about fentanyl production?

Dr. O'NEIL. Thank you for that question. And like you, it is hard for me to believe that they have so much knowledge about so many things and surveillance, and this is something that somehow goes under the radar.

And, you know, the U.S.-China relationship has many touchpoints and many tensions, but this is, obviously, an increasing one, and a very personal one, as you rightly point out for citizens across the United States.

Mr. SOBEL. I think it is remarkable that this program or this problem not only still exists but is escalating. When I was Ambassador to the Netherlands in the early 2000's, the precursors, the shipments to the ports of Rotterdam were known, were documented. So, your point is well taken. This is not a new problem and it needs to be dealt with.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Green.

Mr. TRONE.

Mr. TRONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. O'Neil, now, your mandate was primarily of plant-based drugs, but your reporting knowledge is the troubling emerging threats of synthetic drugs like fentanyl, which is now involved in two-thirds of our opioid deaths.

I wrote with Leader McCaul, who has been fantastic in this issue to work with on this issue to work with, the FENTANYL Result
Act which passed the House on suspension a few weeks ago to address this. We know that fentanyl precursors and the pre-precursors are being shipped from China, Mexico—China, India, to Mexico where they are increasing their scientific knowledge on how to combine these chemicals to manufacture fentanyl.

So, how do these labs and factories fit into the existing drug trafficking infrastructure in Mexico?

Dr. O’NEIL. You know, I am going to let Mary, my colleague, begin with that one because she has looked carefully into which cartels are involved in this.

Mr. TRONE. Perfect.

Dr. SPECK. Well, I think we know that the major cartels are involved to some degree with fentanyl. The main rivals right now that you hear most about are Sinaloa, but also the New Generation Jalisco Cartel.

But I have to emphasize that these cartels are opportunistic, very adaptive. And from what I understand, fentanyl is very easy to manufacture. It comes through the ports, as do other precursors. Areas such as Michoacan and others along the Pacific coast have long been involved in drug production. This is clearly something that the U.S. and Mexico have to come to terms with and identify new ways to combat.

Detecting fentanyl is like trying to find a packet of sugar crossing the border. It is so tiny and so potent that we need to develop new technologies to identify it effectively.

Mr. TRONE. So, what would a smart U.S.-Mexican partnership to stop this manufacturing that they are doing, moving to Mexico now from China, look like in Mexico?

Dr. SPECK. Well, we suggest focused deterrence on the cartels that are trafficking in fentanyland on the cartels that are most violent. Focus on dismantling, not just beheading the top, but really after the mid-level operatives, and coming up with new strategies to try to look at the cartel as a whole rather than just going after the kingpin. Obviously law enforcement needs to determine the correct strategy.

But we do mention that the idea of focused deterrence is something that the two governments should explore, specifically in the case of the trafficking in fentanyl.

Mr. TRONE. Does our government have the right tools, the right technology for detection and surveillance to combat the synthetic drug trade in Mexico?

Dr. SPECK. My understanding is that we do not really, and that there are scanners that are better but some of them have not been deployed. But we probably need additional technology because fentanyl is so small, so easily hidden, and so potent.

And we also need new methods of detection of fentanyl and new measures. For example, we look at price and purity. That is not a measure that identifies fentanyl. We should be looking at the toxicity of the drugs coming into the United States and the cartels that are trafficking the most toxic drugs.

Mr. TRONE. But how do we track or can we track from the ports these precursors and the pre-precursors so we—because they are hitting the Mexican labs, the cartel labs, you know, doing the manufacturing, it seems like, you know, China is clearly sending these
precursors now, and the Mexicans are doing all the manufacturing. They are trying to integrate vertically. So, how can we track this with the Mexican Government?

What sites, or do you know of any tools or ideas that we can help track it?

Dr. O'NEIL. Let me just spin with one idea. And probably it is tracking the drug itself, which as Mary points out is difficult with the technology that we have or that we have rolled out.

The other is to track the money. And so that is money that is going from the United States to China where a lot of the precursors come from, through Mexico and back. So, there is a triangulation of money that is moving around. And that is a place where I do believe FinCEN or others with expanded resources would be able to make a dent.

Mr. TRONE. Yes. Okay, well good. I yield back then. Thank you very much.

Chairman ENGEL. Okay. This really is the conclusion of the hearing. But before we conclude I want to thank the witnesses for their excellent testimony. And I want to thank all our members who participated in today's hearing.

As you can see, there were many, many people on both sides of the aisle who stayed and asked intelligent questions. And this is a very successful hearing.

And I learned a lot. And I am very grateful to our witnesses for the work they do, but also their testimony. And all the members who participated in today's hearing, thank you very much.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

December 3, 2020

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building. Pursuant to H. Res. 965, Members who wish to participate remotely may do so via Cisco WebEx. The hearing is available by live webcast on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/.

DATE: Thursday, December 3, 2020
TIME: 10:00 a.m., EDT
LOCATION: 2172 Rayburn House Office Building
SUBJECT: The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward

WITNESS:

Shannon O’Neil, Ph.D.
Chair
Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission
Council on Foreign Relations

The Honorable Cliff Sobel
Vice Chair
Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission
(Former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil and The Netherlands)

Mary Speck, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission

By Direction of the Chairman

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day: Thursday  Date: 12/03/2020  Room: 2172 RHOB

Starting Time: 10:07 a.m.  Ending Time: 12:21 p.m.

Recesses: 0 (to ___) (to ___) (to ___) (to ___) (to ___) (to ___)

Presiding Member(s)
Chairman Eliot L. Engel

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]  Electronically Recorded [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]  Stenographic Record [ ]
Televised [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:
"The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward"

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓]  No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)
SFR - Engel, Connolly
QFR - Castro

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _________
or
TIME ADJOUNCED 12:21 p.m.

Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
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STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement for the Record from Representative Connolly
The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward
December 3, 2020

This week, the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission released its report reviewing U.S. foreign policy in the Americas to reduce the flow of illicit drugs and the damage associated with drug trafficking. The Commission evaluated a range of U.S. counternarcotics programs in the region and developed recommendations to improve them. This report is a serious contribution to tackle an intractable problem that the COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated. The incoming Administration should consider adopting many of the report’s recommendations to mitigate the scourge of drug abuse that has claimed more than 500,000 American lives over the past decade.

The Commission recommends empowering the State Department to develop and coordinate interagency policy to counter transnational organized crime. This would involve moving the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) under the Undersecretary for Political Affairs to ensure that these efforts receive the high-level attention needed to combat illicit drug trafficking. If such bureaucratic changes are pursued, it will be important for the next Administration to clearly define the responsibilities of the many other agencies involved in counternarcotics, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Defense, and particularly the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The report also recommends replacing the drug certification and designation process because it “offends our partners and does little to deter corrupt practices in unfriendly nations.” I look forward to working with my colleagues and the Administration on these and other recommendations to improve the way we address this crisis.

This report reiterates a truism: drug metrics is critical to measuring the effectiveness of supply-control programs – tracking the right metrics and benchmarks. The Trump Administration has worked hard to expand the number of measures of supply-control programs, but new metrics are needed to protect public health research, the costs of drug treatment, and the appropriate outcome of supply-control programs evolved in response to parity-adjusted prices as a problem of heroin or cocaine laced with fentanyl and other dangerous additives.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an already complex and unwieldy problem. Economic stress, social isolation, and the disruption of treatment and recovery programs have aggravated illegal drug use. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States reached a record high 74,000 overdose deaths from April 2019 to March 2020, up from 68,000 during the previous year. In Latin America, drug cartels have taken advantage of lockdowns to solidify territorial control and fill the void left by weak government institutions.

While the Commission’s scope was limited to a focus on U.S. counternarcotics programs in Latin America, we would be remiss not to mention the importance of reducing demand for illicit drugs in the
United States. While funding for substance abuse prevention and treatment has increased significantly since 2010, it remains inadequate to address the needs of so many Americans affected by this disease. I look forward to working with the incoming Administration to improve both the supply and demand sides of the illicit drug flow problem, and the Commission’s report provides a thoughtful foundation for that effort.
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Questions for the Record from Representative Castro
The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward
December 3, 2020

State Department Role

Question:

“The report finds that the State Department should be empowered and recommends that it leads an interagency effort to counter transnational criminal organizations and reduce the foreign supply of illicit drugs. Yet State has had its authority undermined and its people disenfranchised over the past several years. Why does the Commission believe the State Department is the right agency to lead this effort, and what key capabilities does State need to restore and strengthen?”

Answer:

Dr. O’Neil: As our report stresses, we need a more agile, adaptive counternarcotics strategy that is better coordinated at the top and more flexible on the ground. The State Department is the only federal agency with the presence both in Washington and abroad to lead this effort. The Commission recommends that Congress provide the State Department with flexible, multi-year funding streams to counter transnational organized crime, which can be re-allocated in response to periodic evaluations and changing needs on the ground.

The Commission also recognizes that the State Department needs strengthening, which is why we recommend enhancing foreign service training and knowledge sharing. Congress should work with the new administration to ensure that US overseas personnel, starting with the ambassador, have the authorities and expertise needed to oversee programs designed to control drug flows, improve citizen security, strengthen rule of law, and promote alternative development.

Question:

“Furthermore, the report suggests that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs should be charged with coordinating this effort. In the past, there have been serious concerns about making the use and trade of illicit drugs a political issue, rather than a global public health issue. How is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs suited to handle this responsibility?”

Answer:

Dr. O’Neil: Institutional reform – including anti-corruption efforts – is a long-term effort that requires high-level political commitment in Latin America. We believe the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, which manages overall regional and bilateral issues, has the clout to ensure that these efforts receive the attention they deserve both in Washington and at our embassies in Latin America.
Our report stresses the importance of addressing the problem of illicit drugs as both a public security and a public health issue. That means helping our partners in Latin America combat transnational organized crime by strengthening their criminal justice institutions while also investing in programs designed to prevent and treat drug abuse and addiction, both at home and abroad.

**Question:**

“And while you focus on some internal structural changes to facilitate State Department leadership among agencies, leadership and authority with our foreign partners in the Western Hemisphere is equally critical – what steps should be taken to restore broken trust with them?”

**Answer:**

**Dr. O’Neil:** The State Department can rebuild trust in at least three important ways:

First, it should empower US ambassadors to negotiate compact-based assistance programs with partner governments. This country-led process would bring US and foreign officials together to identify shared goals for combatting organized crime, strengthening criminal justice institutions, and protecting citizen security and human rights.

Second, the US should eliminate the drug certification and designation process, which humiliates our partners and does little to deter corrupt practices in unfriendly nations. Instead, the State Department should produce a global report that not only reviews the efforts of foreign governments, but also assesses US policies to control the supply of and demand for illicit drugs.

Finally, the State Department should strengthen multilateral tools designed to curb drug trafficking and illicit financial flows, such as the Organization of American States’ Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism and the Financial Action Task Force. Both of these peer-review mechanisms include country evaluations that can be used to identify shortcomings, while offering incentives – such as technical assistance – to encourage positive change.
The Mérida Initiative

**Question:**

“It has been 13 years since the United States and Mexico launched the Merida Initiative to fight impunity of drug and criminal organizations that threaten the health and public safety of our citizens, and the stability of the region. However, violence in Mexico remains rampant and, most concerning, drug overdoses in our own country continue and are unacceptable.

a. In which ways do you envision the State Department leading efforts to reassess the future of the initiative with its Mexican counterparts?

b. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in May 2020 urging the U.S. agencies working with Mexico to evaluate the initiative’s effectiveness based on outcomes rather than outputs. For example, assessing the impact of training rather than the number of police trained. Do you agree with this suggestion and how do you think it could improve the initiative’s effectiveness?”

**Answer:**

Ambassador Sobel did not submit a response in time for printing.

**Comprehensive and Alternative Drug Policy Approaches**

**Question:**

“In recent years, multiple countries in the Western Hemisphere including Canada and Uruguay have decided to legalize and regulate their domestic cannabis markets. Similarly, the Mexican Senate recently voted favorably to legalize recreational cannabis and is waiting for a final vote on its lower house in the Mexican Congress this month. **What are the implications of a possible cannabis legalization in Mexico for the future of how the U.S. and Mexico address the illicit drug market in the region?”**

**Answer:**

Dr. Speck: The possible legalization of cannabis in Mexico is unlikely to have a major impact on the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle drugs into the United States. Cannabis legalization in many US states and in Canada has already reduced demand for illegal marijuana smuggled over the border, though this has not reduced the power and wealth of organized crime.

These criminal organizations are both poly-drug and poly-crime mafias, which engage in smuggling and other rackets, such as fuel theft, migrant smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping. They have also grown more violent, fueling homicides as they struggle for control of criminal territory.
Of most concern to the United States – given its toxicity – is Mexican involvement in the fentanyl trade. Mexican cartels mix fentanyl with heroin and press it into fake oxycodone pills for sale in the United States. Most of the fentanyl trafficked by Mexican cartels comes from China, though the DEA has also detected \(^1\) a shift to India, possibly due to tougher Chinese regulations.

While cannabis legalization is unlikely to weaken Mexico’s drug cartels, it may free resources so that law enforcement on both sides of the border can concentrate resources on the groups engaged in fentanyl smuggling and other dangerous rackets. The US and Mexico also need to focus on illicit financial flows between the US, Mexico, and Asian suppliers of fentanyl and chemical precursors.

**Question:**

“According to the International Drug Policy Consortium, one of the greatest public health issues facing Latin America and the Caribbean regarding drug use is the lack of access to quality, evidence-based treatment. Treatment centers are often community-based without proper oversight, regulation, funding, and results. High-quality centers are often only available to high-income people. We face similar obstacles here in the U.S. to provide affordable and accessible treatments for low-income communities seeking help with their drug addictions. How can we work with civil society groups in Latin America and the Caribbean to support at-risk populations and provide affordable access to treatment? How can we strengthen our support and collaboration with USAID as we combat this issue?”

**Answer:**

**Dr. O’Neil:** The Commission recommends that the United States work with international partners to establish a global fund to fight substance use disorders by promoting cost-effective, medication-assisted treatments. USAID’s Bureau for Global Health should direct this effort, within the framework of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Civil society should play an important role, providing both treatment and oversight. This is especially important in regions such as the Northern Triangle of Central America, where endemic corruption undermines effective regulation. Civil society organizations should also work with public health authorities to remove the stigma that often prevents users from getting treatment for addiction.

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\(^1\) https://admin.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/DEA_GOV_DIR-008-20%20Fentanyl%20Issue%2004%2020%20United%20States_0.pdf
Climate Change and Climate Refugees

Question:

“Climate change has had an exponentially profound impact on the world and has disproportionately impacted vulnerable populations in the Western Hemisphere. Drought has ravaged many regions in Central America, and we have also seen the tragic consequences of the recent flooding with the back to back hurricanes of Eta and Iota. Climate change will only continue to destabilize fragile societies leading to more crisis with climate refugees. Did the Commission take into account the sustained impact of climate change in its strategic assessment and if so how? Correspondingly, was similar consideration given for the impact of COVID-19 and the pronounced challenges on the ground?

- Given these circumstances, should humanitarian assistance be more intrinsically integrated into a renewed strategic approach?”

Answer:

Dr. O’Neil: As we state in our report, the economic havoc wreaked by COVID-19 makes it more urgent than ever for the US government to integrate law enforcement and public health assistance into a more strategic, cost-effective approach. We also recognize that the countries of Latin America face multiple humanitarian crises, from drought and hurricanes in Central America to the influx of Venezuelan refugees in Colombia.

We believe that instructing US embassies to negotiate compact-based foreign assistance packages in each country is the best way to address these humanitarian challenges. This country-led approach would allow the US to tailor assistance to the most urgent needs of our partners in the region. We also believe that these negotiations should include civil society organizations, which in some instances may be better able to assist vulnerable communities.
The Coronavirus Pandemic

Question:
“The Pandemic has changed the world, but also the ways of drug trafficking business. Criminal activity is breaking out into the black market for supplies, and gangs are filling the government void by providing goods and services that communities are in desperate need of. These criminal elements are also providing financial services that leave vulnerable people in debilitating debt and reliance. How does this report address these developments and what are the key takeaways?”

Answer:
Dr. Speck: Governments throughout the hemisphere are struggling to curb organized crime as they cope with the pandemic and its devastating economic fall-out. This makes it more important than ever for the US to provide effective, targeted foreign assistance designed to help governments in the region fill the institutional vacuums that allow criminal groups to flourish.

As the WHDPC report points out, criminal groups have exploited the pandemic to solidify territorial control and build social capital, filling the void left by weak government institutions. Mexican drug gangs have distributed boxes of food emblazoned with cartel logos. The MS-13 in El Salvador has enforced lockdowns in gang-dominated areas. Armed groups in Colombia have imposed curfews and travel restrictions to reinforce their control of coca-growing areas.

These developments highlight the need for flexible assistance programs designed to address local needs and unforeseen threats. The WHDPC recommends that US embassies in the region negotiate country and/or regional assistance agreements or compacts that take the local context into account. The WHDPC also recommends providing the State Department with emergency funds to deal quickly with unforeseen threats, such as rising criminal activity during the pandemic.

Finally, the US government needs to prioritize anti-money laundering. We need to invest more in financial intelligence to deprive criminal groups of the funds they use to finance unlawful rackets and corrupt government officials.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

December 2, 2020

The Honorable Eliot Engel  The Honorable Michael McCaul
Chairman  Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs  Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives  U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515  Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the Committee:

I wish to express my appreciation to the chairman and members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the opportunity to submit this statement. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission is addressing an important, but frequently under-examined, issue in our relations with our hemispheric neighbors. For decades, the United States has pursued a vigorous campaign to stamp out the trafficking in illegal drugs, as well as the use of such substances by American consumers. The campaign escalated dramatically when President Richard M. Nixon declared a "war" on drugs in 1971, and it has remained a high priority for U.S. policymakers since then.

That war has both demand-side and supply-side components. The latter seeks not only to interdict shipments of illegal drugs, but to eradicate drug crops, principally marijuana, cocaine, and opium poppies, in drug-source countries. The impact of the U.S.-led policy has been especially pronounced on Mexico, Central America, and the Andean countries of South America. Unfortunately, the strategy has not only failed to achieve the desired results, it has fostered increased corruption, social strains, and disorder in those societies. Worse, it has helped enrich and empower the most violence-prone criminal drug cartels. The Commission wisely seeks alternatives to the current, failed policy.

Washington’s focus on the Andean region peaked during the 1980s, 1990s, and the initial years of the twenty-first century. It subsequently has shifted north to Central America and, especially, to Mexico. The Andean phase exacerbated social tensions in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Aerial spraying programs to eradicate coca and other drug-source crops were especially unpopular in Colombia during the years they were in effect because of both health concerns and adverse economic effects. It was during this period that the Colombian drug cartels rose to unprecedented prominence and influence. Astonishingly, Colombia's defense minister, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, stated just this week that he wants to resume the aerial spraying programs that were suspended in 2015, despite that dismal track record. Indications are that the U.S. government would enthusiastically endorse such a resumption.

The negative impact of drug eradication campaigns in Peru and Bolivia is somewhat less severe than in Colombia, but it has been bad enough. Among other consequences, it helped create extensive political support for radical left-wing political figures such as...
Bolivia’s former president, Evo Morales. Beleaguered coca farmers long have been the core of his political base. More recently, income from drug trafficking has helped fund and empower Venezuela’s authoritarian regime.

Such examples hardly exhaust the list of adverse unintended consequences in the hemisphere from Washington’s war on drugs. Even apparent triumphs usually turn out to be hollow. U.S. officials celebrated the decline of the Colombian drug cartels, but control of the illicit trade merely shifted northward to Mexico, facilitating the rise of equally violent cartels in that country. It was an example of the “push-down, pop-up” phenomenon. Drug war “victories” in one arena simply lead to the emergence of new, dominant players in another locale where the pressure is not as great. The United States and its hemispheric allies continue to play this grotesque game of “whack-a-mole” with predictably unsatisfying results.

The outcome has been especially tragic in Mexico. In 2006, George W. Bush’s administration pressed Mexico’s newly elected president, Felipe Calderon, to wage a more vigorous campaign against the cartels. Calderon then made the military the lead agency and launched a vigorous armed offensive. The result was outright warfare between the military and drug-trafficking organizations and a surge in fatalities that—except for a modest interlude from 2012 to 2016—continues to spiral upward.

A key reason for the temporary flattening of the curve was the ability of the Sinaloa cartel under the leadership of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman to gain control of an estimated 50 percent of Mexico’s illicit drug trade. The resulting weakness of his competitors reduced the number and severity of turf fights. When Mexican authorities captured Guzman (for the third time) in January 2016 and extradited him to the United States, leaders in both countries were ecstatic. But the achievement triggered another set of highly unpleasant, unintended consequences. The decline and eventual fracture of the Sinaloa cartel created power vacuums and led to turf fights of unprecedented severity.

Mexico’s nearly 35,000 murders (most of which were related to the drug trade) in 2019 set a new record—breaking the previous record in 2018. The first six months of 2020 saw an additional increase, despite lockdowns and other restrictions on movement imposed in response to the COVID pandemic. Mexico’s homicide rate in 2005, the year before Calderon ordered the military to launch its offensive against the cartels, was 10 per 100,000 inhabitants; in 2019, the figure stood at 29 per 100,000.

In October 2019, armed enforcers of the Sinaloa cartel battled units of Mexico’s National Guard on the streets of Culiacan, a city of eight hundred thousand people, for more than eight hours to free two sons of El Chapo Guzman from jail. In a stunning development, they defeated the Guard troops and compelled the national government to release the suspects. That incident is just one indication of how powerful the cartels have become. Major swaths of territory in Mexico are under their effective control, and government security personnel venture into such zones only at their great peril.
The consequences of the war on drugs in Central America are at least as bad. As pressure on the cartels from Mexico's government mounted after 2006, traffickers relocated many of their processing and distribution operations to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. It was yet another manifestation of the "push-down, pop-up" effect. As a result, those already fragile and turbulent societies have experienced a massive spike in both corruption and violence. Major portions of all three countries are now under the de facto control of one or more cartel armies. Among other actions, those organizations forcibly recruit teenagers and young adults into their ranks. Many of the people in the large refugee flows coming from Central America through Mexico in recent years are not fleeing generic poverty in their home countries, as bad as that poverty might be; instead they are attempting to escape the depredations of the drug cartels. Once again, Washington's hemispheric war on drugs has produced horrific unintended consequences.

The existing hemispheric drug policy defies the basic laws of economics. The cartels are powerful because there is a sizable consumer market for drugs in the United States and other countries. The prohibition policy to which Washington and its allies stubbornly cling drives up prices (usually by several hundred percent), thereby enriching and empowering the organizations that control such a lucrative commerce. Much of the violence, especially in Mexico, is the result of "turf fights" to control valuable trafficking routes to the United States.

Officials in some countries are now balking at Washington's continuing demand for uncompromising anti-drug crusades. Several years ago, Uruguay embraced a policy of widespread decriminalization, and Mexico's current government openly discusses the option of full decriminalization or even legalization of drug consumption. In doing so, reformers likely look to the model that Portugal adopted nearly two decades ago. Portuguese authorities shifted from viewing drug use as a matter for the national security and criminal justice systems and instead addressed it as a public health issue. Instead of jailing drug users, officials made drug-treatment programs more widely available. Contrary to the prediction of soaring drug use and crime under such a system, the reforms have led to less crime and even to less drug consumption.

The new Biden administration should respect the wishes of such advocates of reform among our hemispheric neighbors. Moving away from the failed policy of drug prohibition would be a more effective strategy to defund the cartels and curb their power. Even the limited decriminalization or legalization of marijuana in some portions of the United States has drastically reduced the revenue flow from that source to the trafficking organizations. Not surprisingly, most American consumers prefer to get their marijuana from legal enterprises rather than unsavory gangs, if they have that choice. Applying the same principle to harder drugs would strike an even bigger blow to cartel revenues.

Such an approach requires policymakers to accept a frustrating, unappealing reality. As much as we might wish otherwise, millions of Americans (and other populations) will continue to use mind-altering substances, whether they are legal or illegal. Government edicts and actions cannot suppress the trade in such substances when a high level of consumer demand is present. Where a robust demand exists, suppliers inevitably will arise
to fulfill that demand and reap the profits. Government policies will determine only whether honest businesses or violent criminal gangs control the supply. The hemispheric war on drugs, as did America’s ill-fated experiment with alcohol prohibition, has guaranteed that it will be the latter option. Washington’s strategy has created enormous grief both in the United States and in other countries throughout the hemisphere. It is long past time to adopt a totally different approach.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ted Galen Carpenter, PhD
Senior Fellow, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies
Cato Institute