[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG 
                      POLICY COMMISSION: CHARTING A 
                      NEW PATH FORWARD

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 3, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-137

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
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                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
42-434PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                       
                       COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota	             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas                            

                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

                                WITNESS

O'Neil, Dr. Shannon, Chair, Western Hemisphere Drug Policy 
  Commission, Council on Foreign Relations.......................     7

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    51
Hearing Minutes..................................................    52
Hearing Attendance...............................................    53

                   STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    54

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record Representative 
  Castro.........................................................    56

            ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Information submitted for the record.............................    62

 
  THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG POLICY COMMISSION: CHARTING A NEW PATH 
                                FORWARD

                       Thursday, December 3, 2020

                           House of Representatives
                       Committee on Foreign Affairs
                                                     Washington, DC

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in 
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman Engel. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come 
to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point. And all members will have 
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions 
for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
    To insert something into the record, please have your staff 
email the previously circulated address or contact full 
committee staff.
    As a reminder to members and others physically present in 
this room, per guidance of the Office of Attending Physician 
masks must be worn at all times during today's proceedings, 
except when a member or witness is speaking. Please also 
sanitize your seating area. The chair views these measures as a 
safety issue and, therefore, an important matter of order and 
decorum to this proceedings.
    For members participating remotely, please keep your video 
function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by 
the chair.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. 
And please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
    Consistent with Resolution 965 and the accompanying 
regulation, staff will only mute members and witnesses, as 
appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate 
background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum. And I now recognize myself for 
opening remarks.
    We convene today to examine the findings of the Western 
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission which was sent to Congress in 
the Commission's final report this week. It is a personal 
pleasure and honor that we hold this meeting as we wrap up the 
work of the 116th Congress. One of my proudest moments as a 
member of this body was when President Obama signed my 
bipartisan legislation to create an independent commission to 
evaluate U.S. counter-narcotics policies in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
    As we grapple with this challenge here in Congress, the 
country continues to struggle with the devastation that drug 
overdoses have brought to our communities. As the Commission 
points out in its report, more than half a million Americans 
have died from overdoses over the past decade, with an 
unprecedented 71,000 deaths in 2019. It is really unbelievable 
when you see how many people have died.
    It is a tragedy. It is hard to think of many issues more in 
need of Congress's urgent attention. We need to increase 
investment in drug treatment. We need to pursue robust criminal 
justice reform. And we need to focus on improving drug supply 
reduction policies in the Americas.
    And that is why we are here today. The idea behind my 
legislation was simple. In recent decades the United States has 
spent billions of dollars fighting the drug trade in the 
Americas, but the successes have been few and far between.
    Put simply, the drug war declared by Richard Nixon in June 
1972, nearly 50 years ago, has failed. As the number of lives 
lost climbs, it is clear that we have too much at stake not to 
improve U.S. drug policy and ensure that our policies are 
focused on maximizing impact and minimizing harm.
    And the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission and its 
bipartisan commissioners have given us a roadmap. The report 
offers a fresh approach to drug control policy. They tell us 
plainly that we are too focused on crop eradication; that U.S. 
drug certification process is ineffective; and that the State 
Department should have a leading role in developing U.S. 
counternarcotics policies abroad. It is really quite good.
    As we collectively rethink U.S. drug policy in the 
Americas, I also hope that we will take a closer look at how to 
improve accountability for U.S. law enforcement agencies 
operating in the region, including DEA-vetted units whose 
actions have, at times, led to tragic civilian deaths.
    The Department of Justice's Inspector General is currently 
preparing a report for me looking at this very issue, which I 
hope will complement the Drug Commission's work.
    And to help put an end to corrosive violence in Mexico, we 
must do much more, much more to crack down on the illegal 
trafficking of firearms at our southern border. To that end, I 
join Senator Durbin in requesting a report from the Government 
Accountability Office that should highlight key areas for us to 
strengthen our response to illegal firearms trafficking to 
Mexico.
    On a personal note, today's work is somewhat of a bookend 
for my years of work on Latin America, including as chairman 
and ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee. I 
care deeply about Latin America, and believe that we must all 
work collaboratively to end the scourge of crime, violence, and 
drug trafficking that has affected far too many of the region's 
citizens.
    While I will not be in Congress next year, I look forward 
to working with the Biden/Harris Administration and my 
colleagues on this committee to make sure that the good work of 
the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission is implemented.
    I thank our witnesses and look forward to your testimony, 
pending which I yield to my friend, our Ranking Member Mr. 
McCaul of Texas for any opening remarks he might have.
    Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 
you personally for your hard work and dedication on this issue 
over the years, and particularly when you chaired the Western 
Hemisphere Subcommittee. So, we thank you for that.
    Now, the Western Hemisphere continues to face serious 
threats from drug trafficking cartels carried out by these 
transnational criminal organizations. These organizations 
destabilize governments, contribute to corruption, use violence 
against local populations, and traffic drugs, including 
fentanyl, into America.
    The United States and our partners in the region have been 
working to stem the flow for decades. And while we have made 
progress on the ground, new threats are emerging as criminal 
organizations change the way they do business. And we have to 
stay ahead of them.
    As a Texan, a former Federal prosecutor, current co-chair 
of the U.S.-Mexico Interparliamentary Group, and former 
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I have for years 
closely tracked U.S. cooperation with Mexico to combat drug 
cartels. Sadly, violence in Mexico has increased as the cartels 
expand their activities into opium and fentanyl. These deadly 
drugs come across our border and poison millions, including our 
children.
    In 2019, there were nearly 71,000 overdose deaths in the 
United States. Over 70 percent of those involved opioids, 
including fentanyl. And I was proud to see the House pass the 
bipartisan FENTANYL Results Act last month, which I introduced 
with Congressman Trone. This bills ensures that we leverage the 
tools of the State Department to combat the opioid epidemic.
    Through this drug trafficking, although it has a large 
Western Hemisphere nexus, I am also extremely concerned about 
the Chinese Communist Party's role in allowing precursor 
chemicals for the production of fentanyl to be exported from 
their shores. As chairman of the House China Task Force I have 
spoken out about the need to counter the CCP's malign influence 
globally. We must take action to hold them accountable for 
their activities in the Western Hemisphere related to the drug 
trade and beyond.
    In addition, I am very disturbed about the reports the 
Mexican drug cartels are the top buyers of drugs coming from 
Colombia. Despite various challenges, I am encouraged by the 
progress that we have made underplaying Colombia and applaud 
the Duque Administration in their commitment to working with 
the United States.
    However, the illegitimate Maduro regime and its connections 
to drug trafficking are also a longstanding concern. I applaud 
the Trump Administration for its efforts to hold the regime 
accountable through criminal charges and a tough sanctions 
regime.
    There are some bright spots in this struggle. Of note, I am 
encouraged by the various regional initiatives, including the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Central American 
Regional Security Initiative. Last year I traveled with 
Chairman Engel to El Salvador and we saw firsthand that our 
assistance there is having positive results.
    And that is why we introduced together the U.S.-Northern 
Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act to make sure we remain 
committed to supporting our partners in the region.
    Creating effective policies to combat drug trafficking in 
our own hemisphere should remain a priority. The Western 
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, created by Chairman Engel to 
analyze our policies in the region and make recommendations to 
Congress on the best way forward, is the way to do this. And I 
applaud you for your work on this, Mr. Chairman, truly 
visionary and vital work.
    And I also want to thank the members of the Commission for 
their work and this report. I look forward to hearing more 
about the report in today's discussion.
    Thank you with that, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you. I thank my friend, the ranking 
member. We have worked together very closely on this committee, 
and I am very pleased of the work, the hard work all the 
members of the committee have done.
    I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished witnesses 
whose work on the Commission has really been superb. It seems 
like it was just yesterday that I was swearing you all in as 
commissioners.
    Shannon O'Neil is the Chair of the Western Hemisphere Drug 
Policy Commission. Dr. O'Neil is also the Vice President, 
Deputy Director of Studies, and Nelson and David Rockefeller 
Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on 
Foreign Relations.
    Cliff Sobel is the Vice Chair of the Western Hemisphere 
Drug Policy Commission. Ambassador Sobel served as the United 
States Ambassador to the Netherlands in 2001 until 2005, and 
Ambassador to Brazil in 2006 until 2009, where I first met him. 
He is a personal friend of mine and does wonderful work.
    Mary Speck is the Executive Director of the Western 
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. Dr. Speck previously served 
as the senior associate focused on Mexico at the International 
Crisis Group.
    I look forward to Dr. O'Neil's testimony, which will be 
followed by questions from members of the committee.
    Dr. O'Neil, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. SHANNON O'NEIL, CHAIR, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DRUG 
        POLICY COMMISSION, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    Dr. O'Neil. Great. Thank you, Chairman Engel, and thank 
you, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished members of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee. It truly is an honor to 
testify before you about the findings of the Western Hemisphere 
Drug Policy Commission.
    Now, as the Chairman said, Congress created the Commission 
to evaluate U.S. counternarcotic policies in the Americas and 
to provide practical recommendations. And we endeavored in this 
report to do just that.
    In our work we found many new successes and promising 
paths. And this includes U.S. assistance programs in Colombia 
that provide legal livelihoods in coca-growing regions. It 
includes U.S. support and capacity building in Mexico organized 
around criminal justice reform. And it involves police reforms, 
anti-corruption efforts, and violence prevention programs that 
have helped, albeit unevenly, the troubled nations of Central 
America's Northern Triangle: El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras.
    U.S. assistance has also furthered progress in the fight 
against money laundering by organized crime. It has helped 
strengthen regulations, and it has helped strengthen the 
capacity of local financial intelligence agencies. 
Nevertheless, drugs have kept flowing, and Americans and Latin 
Americans have kept dying. Something is not working.
    And, moreover, as we have heard already, the nature of drug 
markets are changing. New synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are 
growing in prominence and lethality. And the legal ground rules 
are changing in the United States and throughout the region.
    [Audio interference] to take on this shift_
    [audio interference] approach to drug policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. To start, this means reorganizing the way the U.S. 
Government designs and implements international drug policy. We 
recommend that the State Department take the lead. It should be 
empowered to develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter 
transnational criminal organizations and to reduce the foreign 
supply of illicit drugs.
    To give heft to this leading role, we recommend that the 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs be put in charge of this 
effort, and that it should work with all the relevant agencies, 
including USAID, Federal law enforcement, the U.S. Treasury, 
the Department of Defense to pursue this strategy. And we also 
recommend that Political Affairs should directly oversee the 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
or INL.
    The political undersecretary should then direct U.S. 
embassies to construct foreign assistant compacts with their 
partner governments. And these compacts should be based on the 
model that was pioneered by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. At the country level, these agreements should 
define shared goals for combating organized crime, 
strengthening justice institutions, and protecting citizen 
security and human rights. And the nature of these compacts 
should be made as public as possible and they should specify 
the roles both of the U.S. and the host government.
    Like the Millennial Challenge Corporation, they should use 
evaluations and metrics to measure success, and they should 
have the flexibility to adjust and prioritize the most 
effective programs.
    Now, to do all this the U.S. Government needs better 
metrics and stronger evaluations of what does and does not 
work. Counting how many police officers have received training 
or how many hectares of coca have been eradicated does not 
necessarily tell us whether we are reducing the harm of illegal 
drugs for Americans.
    We recommend that the White House Office on National Drug 
Control Policy, the ONDCP, play this vital role. It should be 
tasked with developing better measures of policy success. It 
should support the State Department strategy and work with 
other agencies to create a new set of benchmarks, of metrics, 
and of data. It should also help coordinate between these 
international drug policies and domestic ones.
    Within this broader strategy we believe the U.S. Government 
should end the drug certification and designation process. The 
current process offends our partners and does little to deter 
drug trafficking in unfriendly nations. It should be replaced 
with a more nuanced and global report that reviews country 
efforts to counter trafficking and other transnational crimes. 
And the U.S. should hold itself to the same standard and 
include a self-evaluation in this report.
    Finally, the Commission recognizes the threat of illicit 
financial flows and money laundering. It recommends increasing 
the capacity of and the funding for the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, both for its own investigations 
and for its assistance to foreign partners.
    We recommend, too, that regulators should work with the 
private sector to improve the efficiency and the quality of 
their financial reporting.
    I want to thank you for the honor to serve on this 
congressional commission. It has truly been a wonderful 
experience. And I want to thank you today for this opportunity 
to testify as to its findings and its recommendations.
    And with that, we look forward to answering your questions. 
Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. O'Neil follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Engel. Thank you very much. We appreciate the 
testimony.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. Pursuant 
to the rules, all time yielded is for the purpose of 
questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid virtual format 
of this hearing, I will recognize members by committee 
seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If 
you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will come 
back to you.
    If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone 
and address the chair verbally. And as we start questioning I 
will start by recognizing myself.
    Dr. O'Neil, I appreciate the Commission's recommendation 
that the State Department develop compact-based 
counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs with 
countries in the region based on the model used by the 
Millennial Challenge Corporation. This certainly makes sense to 
me. And I believe it is essential that the State Department and 
our embassy teams be placed at the center of U.S. 
counternarcotics efforts.
    But, I think we also need to take stock of the current 
political leadership in the hemisphere, and ask whether we have 
sufficient confidence in some of our neighbors to merit the 
development of counternarcotics compacts.
    My question is this: with a country like Honduras where the 
president has been named as a co-conspirator in a drug 
trafficking case in New York in which his brother was 
convicted, how can we have adequate trust that the government 
will negotiate a counternarcotics accord in good faith?
    Are compacts even possible in situations like these?
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. And 
that is an incredibly important one for all of these policies 
that we are talking about.
    I think the compact approach actually makes it easier to 
deal with the variations in leadership that we find throughout 
the hemisphere because we are not asking for a one-size-fit-all 
type of relationship. We can have a different policy in places 
like Colombia where we have a longstanding relationship, much 
more trust buildup, and experience between us, compared to a 
place like Honduras, where there are real questions about the 
motives and positions of some of our counterparts.
    I would say in a case like that you would develop a 
compact. It would be important to look for other participants 
and actors that we have potentially more faith in their motives 
and their interest in implementing the policies and reaching 
the goals that the United States too shares. So, that could 
include society groups and members, that could include 
international, other international bodies. In the past we had 
bodies such as the CICIG in Guatemala or an equivalent in 
Honduras. It could include members of the private sector.
    The benefit of a compact that is run out of or guided by 
the embassy is it can take into account that variation in the 
capacity and direction of local government, and put in play the 
kind of policy that will forward U.S. goals but that could look 
very different than it would in other nations. And it can bring 
to the table other people besides just government officials, if 
that makes the most sense.
    Let me open it up if either of my colleagues, Ambassador 
Sobel or Mary would like to, Mary Speck, would like to comment 
as well.
    Mr. Sobel. Let me, add one point to actually mention in the 
remarks. And that is there needs to be more accountability, as 
the chairman and you have indicated. And the governance of 
these compacts, which is similar to the structures of the MCC, 
will make us be more able to evaluate these programs. There is 
no question the ONDCP needs to be very focused on being able to 
evaluate these programs and being able to change them to the 
extent that they need to be changed.
    Mary.
    Dr. Speck. I would just quickly add that one of the 
advantages of a compact because it is as publicly available as 
possible both sides make certain commitments and can be held to 
them by the U.S. Government and also by their own public.
    So, certainly anti-corruption would be a major issue that 
we would want Central American Governments to be held to.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Sobel. One other thing to add, if I might, Mr. 
Chairman, and that is when I was an ambassador in Brazil and we 
worked with the Federal authorities on many of these kinds of 
issues, we found a lot of receptivity on the local level, or 
the provinces, the States, local law enforcement. So, while 
there may be issues dealing with certain aspects of government, 
even the Federal Government, that does not preclude the ability 
to work with local government agencies.
    Chairman Engel. Well, thank you. Let me ask another 
question to both Ambassador Sobel and Dr. Speck.
    I was very pleased to see the Drug Commission's 
recommendation that Congress eliminate the present practice 
with which the White House decertifies countries not 
cooperating in combating the drug trade. We note that this 
process offends our neighbors--that is a quote from you--
offends our partners, and does little to deter corrupt 
practices in unfriendly nations. So, I would say, frankly, the 
end of this certification process is long overdue.
    Can any of you, either of you, both of you, explain to the 
committee why the current drug certification process has been a 
failure? How is it perceived in Latin America and the 
Caribbean? And what should the existing drug certification 
process be replaced with?
    Dr. Speck.
    Mr. Sobel. If I might talk first, Mary. And defer to you 
and, of course, our Chairman Shannon.
    I had the experience of working with this program when I 
was Ambassador to the Netherlands. And if you look at the small 
footnote, somewhere in this 117-page report you will see that 
one of the positive outcomes was dealing with the ecstasy issue 
in the early 2000's in the Netherlands.
    As someone in the middle of it, I was almost made persona 
non grata. We would have gotten what we needed with local 
authorities on ecstasy with or without this, but it became a 
major issue with the minister of justice that created 
unnecessary tension in the relationship. And it really did not, 
in my opinion as an ambassador to one country, resolve 
anything, but it did make my job much more difficult.
    Chairman Engel. Yes, if anyone would like to, to add, you 
know, again, the reasons why you think the current drug 
certification process has been a failure and how it has been 
perceived in Latin America and the Caribbean, and what should 
the existing drug certification process be replaced with? 
Anyone wants to expand on what they think?
    Yes.
    Dr. Speck. I would just point out that the countries we 
have decertified, for example Venezuela and Bolivia recently, 
are already pariah States, unfriendly States. So, it really did 
not affect their activities. The Bolivians already expelled the 
DEA and wore its decertification as a kind of badge of honor.
    So, it has generally been used against States that are 
already unfriendly. For example, we decertified Guatemala but 
made a waiver for humanitarian reasons. There has been great 
reluctance to decertify countries where we have relations with 
their law enforcement because we are afraid of being frozen 
out.
    So, it really has not been an effective means. We have only 
decertified countries that are already not cooperating with us. 
And as Shannon pointed out, we would still have a report on all 
of these countries, and we include the U.S., a little bit of 
self-criticism. And that would be a more nuanced way to 
encourage them to improve their policies.
    Chairman Engel. Well, thank you, Dr. Speck.
    I now turn to Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I remember Congressman 
Cuellar and I introduced an amendment to an appropriations bill 
that passed on the floor. It later became the Merida 
Initiative.
    I would like to get, if I could, from our witnesses just a 
report card on the successes and really the status of where we 
are with the Merida Initiative, in addition the Central 
American Regional Security Initiative, and Northern Triangle. 
Maybe if all three can comment on what is your report card on 
the effectiveness? And what do we need to do more to combat 
this problem that has not gone away? In fact, some could argue 
it has gotten worse.
    I am not sure about Obrador's strategy in Mexico. I think 
the cartels are back on the rise in many respects. And it may 
just be a laissez faire policy where he does not--he just lets 
them play in the sandbox and then they get along. But we are 
certainly seeing, you know, armored tanks and pretty 
threatening actors south of our border that threaten the United 
States.
    And so maybe if I could go to each of you to get sort of an 
update and a report card.
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you for that question. And I think we 
will each take, take a part of that.
    Let me start with the relationship with Mexico and the 
Merida Initiative. Obviously it has been in place for over a 
decade, and it has evolved with U.S. policy and support for 
Mexico as well as the levels of cooperation and role that each 
government has played.
    I would say over this time period that there have been real 
successes of the Merida Initiative. We have seen the U.S. help 
play a quite vital role in the transition of Mexico's justice 
system. They have over the decade moved from one that was one 
based on written testimoneys to one that is more based on an 
accusatorial system of oral trials and due process and the 
like.
    And we do have studies and evaluations that show that the 
new system, when it has come into place, is one that provides 
justice in a more timely way, pre-detentions and the like have 
already fallen. It provides people with a fairer justice 
system. The judges in the courts have the ability to cross-
evidence presented and the like, so it is fair in terms of due 
process for the defendants that are there.
    There is greater satisfaction with the court system and the 
process of justice than there was with the past system among 
the general public. So, I think that is one of the successes of 
the Merida Initiative.
    We have also seen significant in several places in Mexico, 
for U.S. pilot programs for community policing, for other means 
of policing, particularly at the local and the State level that 
have also shown some significant promise.
    But as you say, and rightly point out, the levels of 
violence in Mexico have not fallen. The trafficking of drugs 
has not ended. It has morphed, as you mentioned, to include 
fentanyl and others coming in, from the precursors coming in 
from China and other places. And so, the challenges are still 
there.
    Part of the challenge is when there is a change in 
government in Mexico that there are changing priorities within 
their own law enforcement system. And there has been, 
particularly under the Lopez Obrador Administration, a full 
revamping of the law enforcement agencies within that nation. 
So, we have seen the end of the Federal police that was a 
partner of the U.S. Government in much of the Merida Initiative 
and replacing it with the National Guard.
    We have seen the sidelining of the navy, they are called 
the marines, that was often the most trusted partner by the 
U.S. with the rising power of the army.
    So there has been some reluctance to engage on many 
different areas that past Mexican governments have engaged with 
the United States.
    Mr. McCaul. I think the Navy has been very trustworthy. I 
do not know how you would rate the National Guard experiment. 
Although I was supportive, I would not want to leave the navy 
out because they have done such a great job.
    CSIN is a very, I think, reliable intelligence partner. 
Certainly in my Department of Justice days we saw that.
    Last question, because my time is expiring. All these 
fentanyls coming in from China it is, for them it is a great 
foreign policy, they make a lot of money off this and they kill 
Americans. They poison our children. It is coming into this 
hemisphere, primarily into Colombia and Mexico. How can we, how 
can we possibly stop this?
    This is becoming the No. 1 death threat in the United 
States.
    Dr. O'Neil. I think as you mentioned in your earlier 
opening comments, this is something between the United States 
and China. There should be a stronger effort to stop the 
precursors from leaving China itself. But this is an awkward 
issue, particularly for the U.S. and Mexico.
    We have seen under the Lopez Obrador Administration the 
Army take over management of the ports. And it does look like 
most of the flow for those precursors come in through the 
ports. So it, again, is an issue for law enforcement 
cooperation between the two countries.
    And as we look toward a new Merida Initiative, because I 
think we need a revamp of it, and the Mexicans are calling for 
that as well, this should be one of the main issues on the 
table for discussion.
    Mr. McCaul. That is a very good take-away, yes, a new 
Merida Initiative that includes this.
    I apologize but my time has expired. I yield back.
    Mr. Sobel. Mr. Chairman, because that question I thought 
was probably the key question of how successful have we been to 
date, if there is an extra minute for me to reply to that I 
would appreciate it.
    Chairman Engel. Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Sobel.
    Mr. Sobel. I was going to say that the structure that we 
are proposing allows for an incredible amount of flexibility to 
reorientate programs to use current metrics, better 
communications with our allies. And fentanyl clearly should be 
an equal priority, maybe even more so, than the plant drugs 
coming in: heroin, cocaine. And that is why using ONDCP on a 
current basis, realtime, to evaluate the programs, to amend our 
expenditures, which as the Congressman pointed out have been 
very sizable, is critically important so that we are less 
reactive and more proactive.
    I would also just make mention that, clearly, the 
counterinsurgency success in Colombia is self-evident. We still 
have to redefine how we make the counternarcotics program more 
successful.
    The recent plantings of cocaine in Colombia have set a new 
all-time high, 112,000 hectares. That being said, we have 
already eradicated 100,000 hectares. So, clearly, we need to 
double down. I am not suggesting another $10 billion, but we 
need to be very, very specific and more targeted in our funding 
going forward.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Ambassador. We 
appreciate your testimony.
    Mr. Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses 
for being here today and for your testimony.
    I have a question for Dr. O'Neil.
    The report finds that the State Department should be 
empowered and recommends that it lead an interagency effort to 
counter transnational criminal organizations and reduce the 
foreign supply of illicit drugs. Yet, State has had its 
authority undermined and its people disenfranchised over the 
past several years.
    Why does the Commission believe the State Department is the 
right agency to lead this effort? And what key capabilities 
does State need to restore and strengthen the efforts?
    Dr. O'Neil. Yes. Thank you very much for that question. It 
is an important one.
    As we looked at this issue we felt that State was really 
the only agency that could lead this. It has people on the 
ground. It has the embassies on the ground. And it has the 
reach within Washington in order to balance both the in-country 
issues and understanding and the like, as well as what is 
happening in Washington.
    We felt there, too, that within State that this issue in 
particular needed a raising of the profile as well as the heft 
behind those that would be guiding it and convening the 
meetings and the discussions and task forces within the various 
agencies. And, hence, our recommendation for Political Affairs 
to be the part of the State Department that would take this on, 
consolidating the various workings within the State Department 
within that area.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you.
    Dr. O'Neil. Your question about--yes, thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Oh, please. Well, I have one more followup, but 
go ahead. Go ahead, please finish.
    Dr. O'Neil. I would say this is an area where there is a 
lot to build and rebuild. You need people, you need staff, so 
filling the spots is very important within the State Department 
to take this on and work with those across various agencies. 
You need people with knowledge and expertise and deep 
understanding of these issues. There are many within the State 
Department or the larger State Department community that can be 
called on to do so.
    We hope that a new Administration coming in will take a 
look at these recommendations and report and work to rebuild 
the State Department, particularly with these issues in mind.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Sure. And the report suggests that the Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs should be charged with 
coordinating this effort. In the past there have been serious 
concerns about making the use and trade of illicit drugs a 
political issue rather than a global public health issue.
    How is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs suited to 
handle this responsibility?
    Dr. O'Neil. Sir, I will let Ambassador Sobel chime in as 
well because he may--he has talked about that.
    But I would say over all it is a key part of the State 
Department. It has reached across the whole department as well 
as the government broadly. Having someone with that ability, 
that capacity, and that profile to bring together all the 
different interagency elements is what we saw as crucial.
    Mr. Sobel. I would add to that that the Congressman has 
rightly focused on what was one of our biggest debates within 
the Commission, and that is, where should we place it? And 
there is no one right answer here, that is clear. But we 
unanimously agreed that P is better situated to do it, as 
opposed to Global Affairs, which is where you are indicating we 
should give it consideration.
    We actually interviewed some people at State, got some of 
their input on it.
    Keep in mind there is also the issue of so many 
organizations, and agencies, and bureaus have touched this very 
important critical aspect of our foreign policy. But in-country 
it is the Ambassador that is the front line.
    And we thought in the end that it is so critical to 
individualize it, to work with governments, that it should fit 
under P.
    There are issues of working with OMB. OMB has many, many 
competing interests for budgets. Without putting someone as a 
titular convener for the interagency process, I do not think we 
could ever get a whole-of-government effort.
    And I think the one take-away from this report is we are 
focused on maybe not the only, but in our view the best whole-
of-government approach to dealing with this horrible problem 
that affects our Nation.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Ambassador.
    And thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Castro.
    Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 
this hearing today. I think it is very important.
    The opioid crisis has hit my congressional district back in 
Cincinnati particularly hard, as it has many other communities 
all across the country. And I will address this to any of the 
witnesses that would like to take it.
    Which of your report's recommendations do you consider most 
essential to combating the opioid crisis in the United States? 
And what can we do to make progress in reducing the flow of 
these illicit substances through major transit countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean?
    Dr. O'Neil. I will get started and then I will turn to some 
of my colleague here.
    Our mandate was to look at the international drug policy. 
We did discuss in our first meetings what that entailed, and 
decided that since there is lots of other great work happening 
in the United States, and other commissions frankly, that are 
looking at the domestic side of it that that was not within our 
purview. So, we did not broach many of the important questions, 
obviously, and concerns that you raised there.
    In terms of what are the most effective policies we found 
some very micro-level ones, and that is part of the compact 
approach, different things work in different places. So, 
violence prevention, strengthening the rule of law, and police 
training works in some places and not in other places.
    In Colombia we found promise in holistic policies that 
provide alternative livelihoods for coca growers and the like. 
So I think that what works best in stopping the flow of drugs 
is not always a big, overarching issue of eradication or these 
efforts, or interdiction, it is actually more locally based 
changes and policies, and investments that change the 
calculation of the people that supply those drugs.
    What we did find is that there is not a one-size-fits-all 
approach, though there are overarching things. And this greater 
idea of reducing harm, protecting civilian security, of 
strengthening the rule of law allows Latin American governments 
to take on transnational criminal organizations within their 
own societies.
    A big part of their revenues are illegal drugs. But they 
also do other things in these countries. And so, seeing there's 
a larger organized crime challenge is something that I think is 
helpful both for our ultimate end to lessen the harm of illegal 
drugs within the United States, as well as the bigger 
challenges that many of these Latin American countries face, 
given those that are trafficking drugs in the region.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me go ahead and ask one more 
question, because I will run out of time if I do not.
    And Ranking Member Mr. McCaul did mention Merida already, 
but I would like to followup on that. Because back in 2008, 
obviously Mexico and the U.S. launched the Merida Initiative to 
increase security cooperation to disrupt organized crime, 
strengthen the judicial sector and rule of law, and strengthen 
border security. And the U.S. at this point has spent $3 
billion on that initiative.
    What policies should we pursue to make the use of those tax 
dollars as effective as possible? And, again, I would open it 
up to any of the three witnesses.
    Mr. Sobel. Shannon, if I might, I am going to use this as a 
segue to touch upon another key elements of our commission 
report. And it does not answer the Congressman's question 
directly because it is a universal answer, but it does focus on 
both domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
    I would like to point out that our report indicates that we 
probably interdict 5 to 10 percent of the drug flows coming 
into the United States. Yet, remarkably, with $400 to $600 
billion of illegal retail drug trade a year--and our stats go 
back to 2017, so clearly it is more--the amount of money 
laundering seizures is well under 1 percent.
    So, when you look at an Achilles heel here, FinCEN, which 
has a budget of $127 million, 300 people, is looking at money 
laundering to the tune of $600 billion with very poor success. 
Not that they are not well staffed, well motivated, but they 
are definitely underfunded.
    And if we are able to get to money laundering as a key 
element to reduce the flow of drugs, then we have made a big 
success. And some of those areas we can do so much more in, 
whether the drugs are plant-based or fentanyl. So, it's a 
universal way of addressing this awful scourge.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
    My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I be heard?
    Chairman Engel. Yes.
    Mr. Connolly. Great. Thank you so much, and thanks for 
having this hearing.
    Let me ask two questions of our panelists. One is, you 
know, how, how do we honestly deal with corruption? I mean, Mr. 
Chabot just pointed out we have spent $3 billion on the Merida 
Initiative in Mexico, and yet we just recently detained the 
highest ranking military officer of Mexico because of 
corruption charges related to drug trafficking.
    And at what point do we acknowledge that corruption, drug 
corruption especially, is so powerful and pervasive that our 
efforts are not only impeded but, arguably, ineffective? And 
how do we deal with that forthrightly in a drug interdiction 
and drug prevention program?
    And then, second, how do we adjust our own overseas drug 
policies and programs in light of the fact that in the United 
States we have a decriminalization and legalization movement 
that is very powerful with respect to some previously 
prohibited drugs like marijuana? And there are referendums in 
States that go further than that, but certainly marijuana. And, 
in fact, we just saw the United Nations this week reclassify 
marijuana as a less dangerous drug than heretofore.
    How do those movements, especially here in the United 
States, affect our overseas policies and exhortations to 
foreign governments for cooperation when, in fact, our own 
State governments are going in a very different direction?
    Dr. O'Neil. Great. Thank you for that question. I will take 
that first one and what do we do about corruption.
    One thing that makes a difference and that we see a 
difference in our country which, obviously, has a significant 
flow of drugs since we are the retail market for much of these 
flows north, is justice systems that work. And one of the 
challenges of many of these Latin American countries is 
widespread impunity and the lack of a rule of law.
    So, I do think professionalizing these systems and 
strengthening them is really a key element.
    One thing in the past that has worked when a domestic 
system does not have the strength on its own is having 
international investigatory bodies come in, either backed by 
the U.N. in the case of Guatemala, or the OAS in the case of 
Honduras. I do think that those kinds of organizations they 
could be country based, as they have been in the past, or we 
could think about ones that are regionally based, that are not 
just dependent on a local government like k shows promise in 
helping local justice systems take on corruption. I would 
recommend that.
    Mary, I do not know if you would like to comment on 
decriminalization, or Cliff. Otherwise, I would be happy to.
    Mr. Sobel. And you mentioned that we also looked at this 
when our commission was formed, and clearly we are not here to 
talk about domestic policy, but we do recognize in the report 
that 35 of our States have, in varying degrees, legalized 
marijuana. If that allows authorities to focus on the more 
insidious drugs, that would be fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, 
perhaps that is a positive. But that is out of our domain to 
opine on that.
    I will go back to one other point, though, and that is we 
cannot turn our back to our neighbors. Violence and corruption, 
if not curbed, will threaten to overwhelm these, these States. 
And we need to just be very, very precise on where our money is 
doing the most good.
    And that is why I keep coming back to this. Giving the 
mandate to ONDCP to really put together metrics, long-term and 
short-term, on where we are getting the best effect from our 
significant investment is so critically important.
    Mr. Connolly. Cliff, if I can just followup. I understand 
your, you know, wanting an escape hatch here by saying that is 
not, you know, domestic policy is not our purview. But my 
question was not for you to comment on our domestic policy, it 
was how does it impinge on your formulating policy for the 
Western Hemisphere?
    I mean, what is that challenge or lack of challenge in 
dealing with your counterparts in other governments in the 
Western Hemisphere who point to these changes in our State 
policies, you know, maybe positively or negatively? I mean, 
what, how does that affect you?
    Mr. Sobel. It is interesting. I would rather not talk from 
a Commission standpoint. Mary can do that and Shannon perhaps a 
little bit better. Because, we were obviously somewhat 
restricted with COVID from travel and dealing with local 
authorities.
    We did get one trip in to Colombia. That was very good. 
Mary went down to, I think, El Salvador and Central America.
    But it is interesting, I found personally that the war on 
drugs was something that we were able to develop cooperation 
on. And while we did not decide not to look at marijuana 
because we should be looking at heroin, there was a joint 
effort.
    I am not so sure our legalization is a major issue that 
creates problems. But that is a personal point of view. Mary 
was in the region. Shannon's Council on Foreign Relations deals 
with this much more frequently. Let me defer to them because it 
is an important question.
    Dr. O'Neil. You know, one thing I would add there is Latin 
American nations, particularly over the last several years, are 
struggling themselves with being consumer nations. They started 
off being more producers and transit countries, and they now 
have serious consumption problems themselves and what that does 
to societies.
    On the one side, I have spoken with policymakers in the 
region who say, you know, you are decriminalizing something 
that you are asking us to fight in a criminal way. And that, 
this hypocrisy, frankly, of that is illegal till it crosses the 
border, and then all of a sudden it is legal, is a challenge. 
But they also see it because they are struggling with the same 
idea.
    You are seeing, increasingly, Latin American nations 
decriminalize themselves, or at least having those debates. So, 
Mexico is now right in the middle of that. Their Senate has 
passed a bill that would decriminalize marijuana. So, I think 
you are going to start seeing similar debates as we are having 
here in the United States happening in the region.
    And while, yes, it creates tensions in the short term, 
perhaps it can create some understanding and empathy for each 
other as we go forward because it is a similar challenge that 
we are facing in that sense.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, indeed, it is 
good to see Chairman Connolly looking so good.
    As we begin today, Chairman Engel, I want to thank you for 
your distinguished service. It has just been extraordinary. I 
will always cherish being on the delegation with Congressman 
Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania to Pyongyang, Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, North Korea. And we saw firsthand, sadly, 
the people oppressed of that police State in North Korea.
    And then I have seen your success worldwide. When I was in 
Kosovo, to find out that you are a folk hero to the people of 
Kosovo to the point where in the city of Peja, one of the major 
cities of Kosovo, they have named Congressman Engel Boulevard. 
And so, it is really real, Mr. Chairman, you are a success, and 
we are all grateful to be with you and wish you well for the 
future.
    Additionally, I want to thank the panel today. My wife and 
I have been the co-chairs of the Partners of the Americas 
program, and so, we have had extraordinary opportunities 
working with young people of our hemisphere, particularly from 
Colombia, where we have hosted them as students. And then two 
of my sons were exchange students to Colombia.
    And so, Ambassador, with that in mind how can the U.S.-
Colombia security partnership be more effective in combating 
coca production and cocaine trafficking at each level of 
process?
    How should Colombia and the U.S. evaluate and modernize 
eradication, demand reduction, and interdiction strategies?
    Mr. Sobel. I am not sure Shannon was an ambassador, so I 
think you are asking me that question. So, I will be the first 
to answer it. But I think all three of us should. And I will be 
very quick.
    Mr. Wilson. That would be good.
    Mr. Sobel. There are many parts of a matrix. Eradication, 
obviously, has had issues, but eradication by itself without 
planting what you are eradicating with new crops forces the 
farmer to go back to illicit crops for his livelihood.
    The destruction of labs is something that we could focus on 
significantly more. Our report points out building more 
tertiary roads that allow for better police and law enforcement 
I think would be important. Land titling is a new tool that is 
being utilized.
    Just recently the DFC, the Development Financial 
Corporation, went into the region and plans to use our dollars 
to help build infrastructure that will take people away from 
crime and have alternate livelihoods. Whether agriculture, 
manufacturing, whatever. So, it is again a whole-of-government 
effort. And that is why we really like the idea we came up with 
that State and P could lead that effort.
    Mary, I do not know if you want to answer that since you 
were down there with the members of the Commission as well.
    Mr. Wilson. That would be excellent.
    We have had massive eradication in Colombia for many years. 
And I think it is fair to point out that even before aerial 
fumigation, was suspended in 2015, coca was reviving. Coca 
growers can adapt to, and have adapted to forced eradication, 
whether aerial or manual, by moving into national parks. Even 
by even simple techniques such as spraying molasses on their 
plants. And there is also rapid re-planting if eradication is 
the only tool.
    So, for sustainable reduction of coca production I think 
people in Colombia may disagree about the role eradication 
should play, but the people we have spoken with all agreed that 
you have to offer alternatives. You have to go into the 
community, you have to establish State presence, you have to, 
you have to provide the roads, as Cliff mentioned, land titling 
so that there will be financial inclusion. You have to apply 
these essential ingredients for legal crops.
    And we met with some beneficiaries. They would much rather 
not be producing coca. They do not like the risk. They do not 
like being subject to the guerillas. They want the opportunity 
to produce legal crops.
    Mr. Wilson. And Dr. O'Neil?
    Dr. O'Neil. I would concur with all that they have said. 
The Washington level is a more whole-of-government approach. We 
find that that is the best way forward in all of these 
countries.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your efforts.
    And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You will always be 
appreciated.
    Chairman Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson. I appreciate 
you as well. Thank you.
    Ms. Wild.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Susan Wild here.
    I would like to direct my first question to Dr. O'Neil. And 
thank you very much to both of you for this very important 
testimony that you have given today.
    My question is this: the Leahy laws prohibit the United 
States from providing funding for foreign security forces' 
force unit credibly implicated in a gross violation of human 
rights. According to a recent Human Watch Rights report, human 
rights violations committed by security forces, including 
torture, enforced disappearance, and abuses against migrant 
have continued under the Administration of President Obrador, 
who took office in December 2018. Impunity remains the norm.
    I noticed that the report does not include any references 
to Leahy law reporting in Mexico. In your estimation, does the 
U.S. Government currently have sufficient safeguards in place 
to guard against systemic human rights violations by Mexican 
security forces?
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you, Representative Wild. It is an 
important question.
    One thing we have seen under the Lopez Obrador 
Administration is, frankly, a deterioration in the relationship 
and the working back and forth between U.S. law enforcement and 
Merida Initiative programs and the current government. They are 
less interested, frankly, then we have seen in past 
governments.
    One of the challenges, too, in Mexico is that we have seen 
this fundamental reordering of the security forces. So, we have 
seen the disappearance of some and the rise of totally new 
forces that have yet to, let's say, find their footing or find 
their coherence and order.
    I think all of those are important considerations. As we go 
forward and we create a new Merida Initiative, which both sides 
seem to be calling for, particularly the Mexicans are calling 
for, the human rights elements of that, the anti-corruption 
elements of that I think are going to be vital to be part of 
any compact that the U.S. Government would form with the 
Mexican Government.
    Ms. Wild. And do you think that by undermining trust in 
Mexican authorities these human rights violations not only hurt 
the Mexican people but also undermine the objective of 
effectively combating narcotrafficking?
    Dr. O'Neil. Mexicans have very complicated relationships 
with their security forces. And you see variations in support 
for them. If you look at polls of municipal police and State 
police, they are much less trusted than, say, the army has been 
trusted. You see variations in trust in the military forces, 
the army, depending on time, depending on geography, and 
depending on actual contact with the army in various places.
    So, yes, when the general population does not trust law 
enforcement it undermines, as we know in any community it 
undermines the ability to bring a rule of law that is fair and 
neutral. This obviously is a worrisome issue.
    Ms. Wild. Do you have any specific ideas of what a U.S. 
Administration could do to emphasize to our Mexican 
counterparts that we believe in a holistic approach, combating 
the effects of narcotrafficking in ways that advance rather 
than undermine human rights?
    Dr. O'Neil. Well, what our report lays out is in many ways 
that we need to have a more holistic approach ourselves. So, 
the idea of strengthening the P Bureau and the State Department 
to convene the interagency to deal with this issue is a start. 
If we do not have a holistic approach, then it is hard to ask 
others to have a holistic approach too then.
    What we have seen in the past with the Merida Initiative is 
a more holistic approach. There was high level economic 
dialogue, there has been high level security dialogue that has 
existed in the past with the Mexican Government, though not in 
the most recent years. Reviving some of those elements where 
there are lots of people at the table who are interacting with 
their Mexican counterparts would be a helpful step forward.
    Ms. Wild. And I would like to ask Ambassador Sobel a quick 
question, because I know I am running short on time. But, 
Ambassador, recognizing the history of the United States' 
interference in the sovereignty of many Latin American 
countries, what do you think the most important initial step 
was that a U.S. Administration could take to make it clear that 
it is intent on building counternarcotics relationships built 
on mutual respect and partnership?
    Mr. Sobel. I really like that question. Thank you for 
asking it.
    I think we can listen more. I think that one of the high 
points of my term as Ambassador in Brazil is when a group 
within the State Department called S/P, which does the work of 
policy planning for the future, came down. And the government 
in Brazil kept asking me, Well, what are they going to ask us 
for, because nobody comes without asking?
    And the whole trip was to listen to what was important to 
Brazil, how do we work together, and not to be directing.
    So, I believe an early listening round without a hundred 
new policies, an interagency process chaired byP in the State 
Department-- Let me go back to one other thing. USAID, as great 
of an organization as it is, and we cannot exist without them 
internationally, working with P will give it even more clout. 
And one of our recommendations is for USAID to develop a global 
health fund similar to the successful Global Fund to deal with 
the issues of drug treatment, and the ability to deal with 
patients in local communities.
    So, I think we are killing you with the words ``holistic'' 
and ``whole-of-government,'' but they reinforce each other.
    Let me also just go to Merida. Our report also lists the 
fact that the American Correctional Association, the ACA, has 
recently continued to accredit prisons in Mexico. And today 
there are over a hundred that are accredited, that comply with 
our rules of safety, security, and health standards. So, that 
is an improvement. It is not whole-of-country, but we are 
working together wherever we can.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, Ambassador. I wish we had more time to 
talk. I would love to continue this.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Ms. Wild.
    Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. I want to thank the Chairman for calling this 
timely hearing, and the valued work and input of this 
Commission. And I want to say that it has been a privilege and 
a pleasure to serve with you, Mr. Chairman. We have not always 
agreed, but you have always been respectful and honorable, and 
I sure appreciate that. And I hope everybody knows that bears 
saying.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. We remain in the midst of an opioid crisis in 
our country. And the crisis is being exacerbated by the 
production and trafficking of fentanyl. We know that in 2019 
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids claimed the lives of 
36,500 Americans. That is in 1 year. One year, 36,500 
Americans.
    In 2016, a report by the DEA noted that Mexican drug 
traffickers are importing fentanyl and fentanyl precursors from 
China, which is not a surprise. I think everybody expects to 
hear that.
    A 2020 DEA report highlights China as the main source of 
fentanyl traffic into the United States, again not a surprise.
    Regina LaBelle, Chief of Staff in the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy during the Obama Administration, expressly 
doubted the CCP's genuine oversight of the production and 
export of illegal drugs in a Time interview just last year.
    So, my question is for Ambassador Sobel. I am going to 
quote to you a small section from the Commission report 
regarding the measures we take to confront drug traffickers. 
And I quote:
    ``The concept of a 'Majors List' seems increasingly 
anachronistic. Policymakers design the process to deal with 
plant-based drugs mainly grown and processed in Latin America 
and then transported directly to the United States. Such 
distinctions make less sense with the rise of synthetic drugs 
which can be manufactured almost anywhere and shipped through 
the postal system. And they are.''
    One of--the first questions is, is why has China not been 
placed on the ``Majors List''?
    And then the second question would be, would you 
characterize the CCP's role in the production and export of 
synthetic drugs as an evolution of the challenge drug 
trafficking possesses? And what can we do to marginalize 
China's role in exporting synthetic drugs like fentanyl 
overseas?
    I mean, it seems like the minimum thing we would do is add 
them to the ``Majors List.'' But I await your response.
    Mr. Sobel. Well, clearly we do not make policies. So, it is 
going to be difficult for me to answer that directly. However, 
let me put that in context.
    While we have definitely indicated that we do not see the 
value of keeping the drug certification and designation process 
in place, that does not mean that we are not strongly 
indicating that INL should produce a global report reviewing 
countries' efforts, and clearly pointing out those countries 
that underperform or, worse, work against our citizens. And 
that would be an appropriate place.
    But, ultimately, all these reports have a political process 
to them. As Mary pointed out, the number of designations and 
sanctions have been so limited--I think it is Bolivia, probably 
Venezuela--that it takes a political decision to do that. And 
my belief is that, in this whole-of-government effort here, 
those kind of issues should be, and I am sure will be, 
addressed in the future because they are critical to getting it 
right.
    You know, it is interesting, I do not want to get political 
here, but it is amazing how a country can say one thing and do 
something else. And we have seen it repeatedly with some 
countries and, hopefully, we will hold them accountable over 
time. So, thank you for asking that question.
    Shannon?
    Dr. O'Neil. I would just reaffirm Cliff's comments there. 
And I think the fact that China, for all the reasons you say, 
is not on the list, the ``Majors List,'' shows the weakness of 
that mechanism and sort of its ineffectiveness and the reason 
why we should have a different kind of report.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Perry. So, so just to clarify, you both agree that the 
report should be something very different because it does not 
accurately reflect the current circumstances, the ever changing 
circumstances? And even so, even if there were a different 
report or some other mechanism, I would tend to think you would 
agree that China needs to be included in whatever our efforts 
are in that regard?
    Mr. Sobel. I am going to answer that quickly. Every nation 
should be held accountable, especially as it affects the 
welfare of our citizens.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Perry. I appreciate those 
kind words.
    Ms. Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I very much 
appreciate you all who are testifying today. And I will, I 
think, start my first question with Dr. O'Neil.
    I have been trying through my couple of years on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee to focus on women, women and security 
particularly. And this report that we are talking about today 
notes that the international drug treaties, of course, have not 
been updated for more than three decades and they need to be 
modernized.
    And according to a 2014 report from the Organization of 
American States nowhere in existing conventions and 
international agreements are there mandates for commitment 
States to understanding the global crisis of controlled 
substances through the gender lens.
    So, I am wondering if you could talk a little bit, any of 
you all but I guess starting with Dr. O'Neil, about how we 
would recommend that a government seek to understand and 
address the role of gender, the role of women in the illicit 
drug trade. And how can we use women in the gender-focused 
lens, or issues, or initiatives to help reduce the supply of 
dangerous drugs to the United States?
    Dr. O'Neil. Great. Thank you. That is an incredibly 
important question.
    And as I know you are well aware, there is lots of evidence 
that when women are included in peace agreements or 
negotiations for peace agreements that those agreements tend to 
come to resolution faster and last longer on the other side. 
Soit is important to think about both who is negotiating things 
and who is working on these issues.
    We also know that one of the effects within Latin America 
of the drug trade is the devastation of local communities. And 
we have seen, though it is more anecdotal evidence than hard, 
rigorous analysis that there are women who are brought into it 
as well in lots of different roles, from the farming aspect all 
the way through to the transit to and into the United States, 
and to the final users, as we know as well.
    As we think about developing policies, I think there are a 
few things here. Some policies should be gender neutral or 
gender blind. So, as we think about strengthening court 
systems, as we think about addressing citizen security, some of 
that should benefit whole communities, all individuals, and so 
it should not be--you would hope that it would not be gendered.
    But I do think it is important for U.S. policies, whether 
they are run by USAID other agencies because there are several 
there, to think about the types of harm and then the types of 
avenues that women and girls play within this.
    One area that we have seen an uptick that is quite 
unfortunate in recent years is as it becomes harder to move 
drugs into the United States, due to various policies, that 
these cartels are diversifying. They are really transnational 
criminal organizations, they are not just drug cartels. And one 
of the businesses that has, unfortunately, been picking up in 
Latin America is the trafficking of women and girls.
    Especially with the challenges that we see of forced 
migration of Central America and out of Venezuela, that 
trafficking of women and girls is--they are an increasingly 
vulnerable population out there because they are out of their 
homes and out of their own countries. I would recommend as we 
develop these compacts, as we develop these larger security 
policy and assistance programs, that we really think about the 
human trafficking aspect which is parallel to if not exactly 
part of drug trafficking, but they are often the same 
organizations that are committing both of these crimes.
    So, thank you.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    Mr. Sobel, would you be interested in remarking on that as 
well before I move, if I have time, to my next question?
    Mr. Sobel. I will be very quick because I just want to 
focus on the fact that there is not one variety here. If you 
are a drug trafficker that does not mean you do not do other 
types of trafficking.
    And obviously one of these hubs is the tri-border area, and 
there is definitely a crossover that we are cognizant of and we 
need to be very focused on as we develop local policies and 
compacts to deal with these issues.
    Ms. Houlahan. Excellent.
    It looks as though I only have about 40 seconds left. And 
maybe I will try and throw in my question and then maybe ask 
for your guys to help me with it for the record.
    You, Mr. Sobel, talked a little bit about whole-of-
government. And it sounds as throughout the course of this that 
is a theme through here. What I am wondering about is in a 
scenario that where is the State Department in this particular 
situation, what is the new role, if any, of the Department of 
Defense? Will they continue their effort but will the State 
Department be in the driver's seat?
    I only have 9 seconds left of my time, so I am not sure if 
you can reply to that.
    Mr. Sobel. I will ask the Chairman to let me go overtime.
    Chairman Engel. I will be very generous.
    Mr. Sobel. Okay. I cannot wait for somebody to say to the 
Department of Defense that they will be governed by the State 
Department. I will leave that to higher authorities.
    But, it is an interagency process, but it needs a head. It 
needs a convener. And we believe working with--and the report 
says it and Shannon said it--working with Homeland Security, 
Defense, all the bureaus, coordinated and convened under P so 
that when we go to OMB it is not only one voice, because there 
will never be one voice, but at least there is some 
consistency. So, it is meant to be a convening authority.
    We all know government too well. You are not going to have 
one person dealing with this critical issue. Even within the 
State Department, USAID, and INL there needs to be, I think, a 
better demarcation of where USAID's policies are engaged and 
where INL policies are engaged.
    But, you know, Rome was not built in a day, and we will 
make this better in our future government that are coming on 
January 20th.
    Shannon, want to add something?
    Dr. O'Neil. Yes, I concur with what you just put forward. 
Thank you.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 
to you both. And I yield back.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Yoho.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I reiterate the 
words of all my colleagues on your leadership here. Thank you 
and best of luck to you and Pat in the future.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Yoho. Ambassador Sobel, you stated that you are not in 
the role of making policy, and I understand that. But I know 
you all know this, the three witnesses today, and as all 
witnesses in the past are the ones that give us the fodder that 
do go into the drafting the legislation that does get passed, 
that does become law. And so, your testimoneys are invaluable 
because so much information comes out of this.
    President Nixon had the war on drugs started in 1971. Over 
that time period to current we spent over $2 trillion on the 
war on drugs. And I have in front of me a chart on coca 
production in South America. And in 2011--you can read the 
numbers, you know them--they were less than half of what they 
are today. Colombia is dismal in that they had 83,000 hectares 
growing in 2011. Coca today, it is over 212,000 acres.
    So, the war on drugs is not really working. I think we have 
done a shell game. We have displaced it. And I think so many 
times our programs, as good as they are, they focus on the 
symptoms, you know. It would be like a cancer: we are treating 
symptoms instead of going after that. Our focuses are on the 
symptoms instead of going after it.
    The symptoms are increased production, increased use, the 
violence, the corruption, lack of good governance. And if we 
look at the cause of these things, it is greed, it is money, 
and it is the power that the narcotraffickers have. And that we 
really need to go after that.
    If we look at what China is doing with fentanyl, and it 
does come through Mexico, mainly through the ports, but it is 
also shipped in, and China supplies the pill-making machines 
for that, for the methamphetamines, one has to understand the 
reasoning behind Mex--or China in the opium wars, and that is 
for retaliation of the opium wars from the 1800's that led to 
their century of shame. They are wanting to destroy this 
country, and they are going to do it any way they can. And one 
of them is to weaken us and destroy us through the fentanyls.
    When you see how many people have died, as Mr. Perry 
brought up, and other members have talked about the deaths in 
America, that is just a tip of the iceberg. It is all the 
people that are the addicts today that will be the deaths 
tomorrow that we have to combat. And so, we have to look at a 
different approach from the $2 trillion that we have spent on 
this war on drugs that is not working.
    And, Dr. Speck, you talked about the metrics of MCC. And I 
agree with that. I think that is an awesome program, and that 
the metrics of decertification do not work. In your opinion, or 
anybody else that wants to answer this, what other metrics can 
we put in place that will have the teeth in it that curbs that 
activity?
    Mr. Sobel. Maybe the chairman will let us have about 30 
minutes on that----
    Mr. Yoho. Yes.
    Mr. Yoho [continuing]. Excellent set of questions. But let 
me hit one or two small points.
    Mr. Yoho. I am going to come, I am going to come back to 
you, Ambassador. I asked Dr. Speck first.
    Mr. Sobel. Mary. Okay. Okay.
    Mr. Yoho. And I want to come back to you because I have a 
specific question for you.
    Mr. Sobel. OK. Mary.
    Dr. Speck. Well, on metrics I think you mentioned quite 
rightly, and we tried to emphasize this in the report and 
agreed you really have to look at the financial flows and we 
need better tools: more effective investigations, quicker 
prosecutions. It takes an awfully long time to prosecute a 
money laundering case. And we need to do that more effectively.
    Mr. Yoho. That is the kind of stuff I would love to hear. 
What are we--I mean, if you are there, you are seeing what is 
not working, if you could let this committee know in a report, 
just say, this is what you have to do.
    Dr. Speck. Well, I think financial flows, getting at the 
proceeds and the profits is not working.
    Mr. Yoho. I agree.
    Dr. Speck. Unfortunately, what is also not working is 
interdiction and the eradication. As you said, these are 
symptoms. So, and even though it is a long process, we cannot 
pretend that there is a one-size-fits-all solution or silver 
bullet. You have to go into the regions that produce coca and 
give alternatives, real alternatives. That is going to take a 
while but that is the only way.
    Mr. Yoho. Okay. Let me pivot to Ambassador Sobel because 
that is one I wanted to ask him. Because he hit on the head on 
this about economics.
    What economic developments can we do with the 
infrastructures that are lacking today via DFC, USAID, MCC that 
we can go into a region, say the Northern Triangle, maybe do a 
regional compact to put in the infrastructure that will bring 
in direct investment, foreign direct investment, the business 
community partnering up with us, now that we can do that with 
the DFC, to make that significant investment in that region so 
that they create an indigenous economy outside of the drug 
trade to starve the drug trade because people will not need it, 
the people that are working the fields?
    Mr. Sobel. Well, that is another great question.
    Our government is getting much better at using all of our 
tools, including DFC, which now has significant new funding to 
do programming. EXIM Bank is back in business again. There are 
many tools in our government that can be better coordinated to 
go into regions and look at dealing with a more holistic 
government approach, almost an interagency approach.
    But I want to go back to what Mary said because I think it 
gets to the core of your question, which is a really important 
question which Shannon and I both mentioned earlier. And that 
is we do interdict 5, 10 percent. But on money laundering it is 
probably closer to 0.2 percent.
    Mr. Yoho. Wow.
    Mr. Sobel. And it is remarkable. And it is not that reports 
are not being generated. It is estimated that the private 
sector spends $4 to $8 billion on compliance issues.
    And let me give you a stat which is, to me, amazing. There 
were 163,000 activity reports on money laundering in 2000. 
Today it is 2.3 million.
    Mr. Yoho. Wow.
    Mr. Sobel. And yet, you have an agency--and I do not want 
to be critical here--but you have an agency, FinCEN, which is 
critical to this process that has a budget of $127 million. So, 
I am not suggesting what Congress should spend, but I am saying 
this is a critical area and that if you take away some of the 
flow of money you will hurt these organizations.
    Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Ms. Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 
thank the witnesses for the work that they have done on the 
Commissioner's report. I really appreciate the fact that you 
have taken a holistic approach and moved away from just the 
crop eradication focus.
    I want to mention that instead of just looking at economic 
alternatives and ways to go after drug trafficking, that we 
also look at how promoting democratic institutions can make a 
difference: good governance, more democracy, how that ties into 
tackling the drug trafficking issue.
    So, I would ask the witnesses if from their perspective do 
they agree or how critical do they see concurrent democracy 
promotion programs and strengthening of new democracies around 
the world that we should be doing? How do they see that fitting 
in with the goals of stopping some of this drug trafficking?
    And could they talk about any specifics investments that we 
have made in democratic government that tie to the drug 
trafficking issue?
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you very much for that question. And that 
is an important one. I will kick off and let my colleagues join 
in as they choose.
    Governance and democratic governance definitely matter. I 
think if we have learned anything over these last several 
decades of these types of policies is that it cannot just be 
interdiction and eradication, it has to be helping these 
countries create systems that can take on transnational 
criminal organizations themselves. You cannot do that if you do 
not have functioning court systems, functioning police systems, 
or other security law enforcement that work, and that can go 
after the bad guys and protect the good guys. And that is, I 
think, a fundamental challenge.
    If these nations have justice systems, law enforcement 
systems, and legislatures and executive branches that work and 
that represent the people and not these illegal organizations, 
it matters how you in the end reduce the harm that is happening 
there and also the harm that is happening here.
    So, how do we go about doing that? I think we have some 
examples of anticorruption bodies that have been put in place 
at various moments that have really helped strengthen rule of 
law. We have had exchanges of lawyers in terms of training on 
how to work within court systems. We have had programs that 
have helped these countries transform the legal structures to 
make them fairer, and more open, and transparent, and less 
susceptible to undue nefarious influences and the like.
    And those are the kinds of programs that I do think are 
really important as part of this more holistic approach to drug 
policy as we go forward.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. Anybody else?
    Mr. Sobel. Mary, why do not you answer that. I would like 
to talk about some of the things that USAID is doing. And I 
think it is critical as weak governments will get weaker post-
pandemic. And these issues are even more important today.
    But Mary was down in the region, particularly the CARSI, 
the Northern Triangle. And I think she has a lot of firsthand 
references of where we have had success.
    Dr. Speck. Well, Shannon mentioned some of them, the 
international commissions, these hybrid commissions have been 
quite effective in going after corruption. But I might add that 
even in the absence of those commissions, and in the case of 
governments like Honduras, where we do not have credible 
counterparts, strengthening civil society is absolutely 
crucial.
    These are the watchdogs. These are the groups that need to 
monitor campaign financing and other forms of corruption. And 
certainly in Central America there is a lot of penetration, or 
at least there is a perception that there is a great deal of 
penetration, particularly in local areas, of criminal groups, 
including drug traffickers, influencing elections and 
controlling mayoralties, and things like that.
    Civil society is an area that we definitely have to 
strengthen, particularly in weak states like those in Central 
America.
    Ms. Titus. And you mentioned that we are going to--we are 
seeing backsliding in democratic governments around the world. 
And that has become more a problem during this pandemic. So, I 
am glad to hear you agreeing with me we need to do things 
politically as well as economically to have a real holistic 
approach. And it really does make a difference. Sometimes what 
USAID does with so few resources makes such a big different.
    So, thank you very much.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
    Mr. Kinzinger.
    Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to you 
and the ranking member for calling this hearing. And I want to 
thank you both for your leadership in our hemisphere as well as 
in fighting this drug crisis.
    This report from the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy 
Commission could not come at a better time. During times of 
crisis we often see an uptick in the misuse and abuse of 
different substances. And while this pandemic is no exception, 
what we are seeing is an explosion in abuse of synthetic drugs 
and other opioids.
    As we all know, many of these drugs are manufactured, 
cultivated, or transported from our southern neighbors into the 
United States where the market for these drugs is thriving. 
While conditions on the ground throughout Latin America are 
getting worse, the Commission does highlight a handful of 
success stories in countering the drug trade, from programs in 
Colombia, to transition of coca-growing farms into profitable 
and legal crops producers, to anticorruption programs in the 
Northern Triangle, we are making some progress. But, sadly, as 
a result of this pandemic many of the gains made in the region 
have been eroded by stress in the economies in the hemisphere. 
And I think now it is especially time to do more.
    So, let me ask my first question to Ambassador Sobel.
    How difficult would it be to implement a Millennial 
Challenge Corporation kind of style program to combat 
narcotrafficking?
    And what would be the benefits and some of the challenges 
that our embassies would face in that?
    Mr. Sobel. Well, we actually liked your idea a lot. And we 
actually mentioned it prominently in our report.
    Taking a lot of the accountability with measurable outcomes 
to be able to not continue programs that are not working or 
that need to be adjusted, so accountability, which I think is a 
cornerstone of MCC, where a country takes responsibility, you 
have mutually agreed upon outcomes. And to the extent that you 
reach those outcomes you get additional funding. And if you do 
not, there are consequences.
    I think that that is definitely part, a key part of our 
program on accountability, not just to spend money but make 
money effective.
    Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Let me also ask you what role 
does Nicolas Maduro and his regime play in the illicit drug 
trade in Venezuela? And how has that changed since he came into 
power?
    Mr. Sobel. Shannon, if you do not mind, I would love to be 
the first one to respond to that because you hit, again, on a 
huge issue that without resolving that you cannot resolve the 
issues that we are talking about today.
    You basically have a State that has become a criminal State 
that is creating an opportunity for a huge flow of additional 
drugs. In fact, the stat that I have here is that it has more 
than quadrupled since 2011, the outflow of drugs into the 
Caribbean our neighbors, as well as into Venezuela. But until 
we are able to deal with Venezuela and make it a democratic 
nation again, accountable and not a pariah State, we will 
continue to have huge problems.
    Shannon, you want to answer that I am sure.
    Dr. O'Neil. I would just add that this is indeed the case. 
And we have seen from now well over a decade ago when Hugo 
Chavez kicked out the DEA and other U.S. law enforcement that 
dealt with these issues, there has been a huge growth in the 
flights that go across Venezuela. Venezuela is a safe harbor 
for many of those that traffic in these drugs, as well as 
traffic in other things as well.
    The challenge of the lack of law in these sorts of areas, 
and these sorts of issues in Venezuela is a huge cost but also 
a challenge for places like Colombia that are trying to deal 
with these efforts, as well as dealing with almost 2 million 
Venezuelans who have fled their country and come into Colombia, 
and hundreds of thousands in other nations.
    So, the drug issue and the challenges, we have the pandemic 
and the declines in economics, is compounded by the challenges 
of Venezuela both as an unlawful space where these people can 
be harbored or can use to traffic their drugs, but also in the 
refugees that have left Venezuela and are taxing or putting 
strains on the systems in these other countries. So, it is a 
huge issue.
    Mr. Kinzinger. Yes, thank you.
    Sadly, I think we missed a really big opportunity or I 
guess almost burden in Venezuela, and we have ignored our own 
hemisphere for a long time. And I think we have been almost too 
nervous to be involved.
    But let me just, since I am running out of time, I will 
also say we need to continue to look at roles of, you know, the 
dual currencies like bitcoin and stuff in this whole process.
    So, Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for calling this 
hearing. I thank the witnesses. And I will yield back.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger.
    Ms. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing the 
hearing and for championing the important review of U.S. 
counterdrug policies that our witnesses have just completed. I 
appreciate also your many accomplishments as chair of this 
committee, your commitments to bipartisanship, and your 
tireless efforts in support of U.S. foreign policy.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mrs. Wagner. I would also like to thank our witnesses for 
their work to improve U.S. efforts to end the illicit drug 
trade and mitigate its impact on our hemisphere.
    I have had the opportunity to travel to the Northern 
Triangle and Peru, and have seen the immense suffering the drug 
trade has caused in the United States and its partner nations. 
I am committed to examining and improving U.S. counterdrug 
policies.
    We were just talking about it a little bit, so I would like 
to delve a little deeper here. Maduros' despotic and 
illegitimate regime in Venezuela is hampering efforts to 
control the drug trade. And, Ambassador Sobel, you touched on 
it some. But to go in a little more depth here, how does 
illicit drug trafficking in and through Venezuela support 
transnational criminal organizations in neighboring countries 
and throughout the region?
    And more specifically, what can the U.S. and international 
partners do to disrupt these destabilizing operations?
    Mr. Sobel. Well, let me start by saying that we have been 
close a number of times, but there are a number of foreign 
actors_we know who they are_that continually prop up this 
illegitimate regime, which makes it difficult. Homicides in the 
Caribbean have risen so dramatically recently, which we believe 
are a direct result of the transnational gangs that are 
transmitting drugs from places like Venezuela into the 
Caribbean to get to our country.
    So, I think that at this point we need to work with our 
allies, which is critically important. We need to continue to 
stay focused on putting democracy back into that country.
    If we had an answer from the Commission, we would be more 
than happy to give it to you. But I think we also are dealing 
with it. We all know how important it is.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, as a followup, and I am just going to 
call it out. Ambassador Sobel, how does Cuban, Russian, and 
Iranian support for the Maduro regime undermine efforts to hold 
Venezuela accountable for its narcotrafficking impunities? I 
believe those are the actors we are talking about?
    Mr. Sobel. Right. Well, and there are probably a few others 
there that have been buying Venezuelan oil over time, like 
China. That plays a role as well.
    Mrs. Wagner. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Sobel. You know, we have talked, and again we are not 
making policy, but sanctions can be an effective tool by 
government. We have seen them work. Sometimes they take a long 
time to work. Our government over time has demonstrated how we 
can deal with this issue which is a cancer in not only that 
country, but affects all of the countries around, including our 
own.
    Mrs. Wagner. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy 
Commission's report recommends that the U.S. empower our 
diplomats to negotiate bilateral foreign assistance compacts 
based on shared goals for combating crime, strengthening 
justice systems, and protecting human rights.
    Dr. O'Neil, how would a compact-based approach save money 
and improve outcomes?
    Dr. O'Neil. Well, we envision the benefit of a compact 
approach is that it can be very specific, so it can respond to 
the actual situation on the ground. So, what a Colombia needs 
is very different than what a Mexico or an El Salvador would 
need. The actors in place will be different. So, in that sense, 
it saves money by adjusting policy to a particular context.
    The other thing is that we envision some flexibility. And 
the idea especially of asking ONDCP to really think about 
important metrics and data so we actually know which programs 
are working. Are these the programs to prioritize and engage? 
Perhaps other ones are ones to put away and shift gears.
    I think the nature of a compact approach is quite useful in 
getting the most bang for the direct taxpayers' buck.
    Mrs. Wagner. I agree.
    I know I am out of time here. I just want to say that the 
compact system also forms a basis for my bipartisan H.R. 2836, 
the Central American Women and Children Protection Act, which I 
have championed with Representative Norma Torres. And H.R. 2836 
will kickstart, I think, the negotiation of bilateral compacts 
with Northern Triangle governments to strengthen the justice 
systems of those countries and create safer communities for 
women and children.
    So, I am very interested in you taking a look at this, Dr. 
O'Neil and figuring out how compacts can protect women and 
children from violence and impunity, support, and supporting 
our counterdrug programs, so.
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you. I will do that.
    Mr. Sobel. Can I say one other thing, Shannon?
    The Congress will make these decisions, obviously, in the 
future, but multi-year funding is also critically important to 
these programs because as you build basic support to be able to 
continue progress, and not lose it, and take years to build it 
back, is critically important. And I would just stress that 
long-term funding, or flexible funding as needs arise, is 
important.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, I thank you all very much. I am over 
time. I appreciate the Chair's indulgence. Thank you.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wagner.
    Ms. Omar.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman. And really appreciate the 
conversation today.
    Dr. Speck, is there any relationship between 
decriminalization of drugs and a corresponding decrease in 
violence?
    Dr. Speck. We now have 35 states in the United States that 
have decriminalized marijuana. But marijuana had, for a while, 
not been an important source of income for drug traffickers. 
Probably not as important as cocaine, or heroin. And now, of 
course, fentanyl is emerging. It could potentially, as 
Ambassador Sobel pointed out, allow law enforcement to focus on 
the most dangerous drugs.
    But it is unlikely to have much of an impact, in my view, 
on the intra-cartel violence that you see exploding in Mexico. 
Decriminalization is unlikely to remove a significant source of 
income because these organizations are so diverse.
    Ms. Omar. Yes. So, is it fair to say that this is less of a 
drug trafficking problem and more of an organized crime 
problem?
    Dr. Speck. Yes. I would, I would definitely agree with 
that.
    Looking at the groups in Mexico, they are highly diverse. A 
major source of income right now is fuel theft. To think of 
these as simply drug trafficking organizations is overly 
simplistic, particularly today. They have evolved into 
multifaceted mafias.
    Ms. Omar. I appreciate that.
    I also think it is really important for us today to address 
the extraordinary double standards that exist when we talk 
about Latin America and drug trafficking. In September 
President Trump only identified two countries that have failed 
demonstrably in adhering to their drug control obligations: 
Venezuela and Bolivia.
    What struck me about this is that Juan Orlando Hernandez, a 
supposed U.S. ally and a partner in counternarcotics, was named 
as co-conspirator in two different cases in New York. His own 
brother was convicted on narcotrafficking charges.
    Is this not a demonstrated failure? This is not just a 
Trump problem or a Republican problem, it is a criticism I have 
had of presidents from both parties. How can we genuinely--and 
this is question to all of you--work to end this scourge of 
organized crime and violence in the Americas if we turn a blind 
eye to our own allies when they are involved?
    Mr. Sobel. Shannon, let me take a first stab at this on one 
element. It will not answer your entire question, but it is an 
interesting example.
    We talked about the designation process and the ``Majors 
List,'' as they say, as something that we should do away with 
because, first, it has not been an effective tool. It has been 
used, as you pointed out, very sparingly as far as the 
sanctions go.
    However, the INL report that we are recommending in its 
place will be able to be much more utilized for the issues that 
you are pointing out, so that it will allow government to make 
decisions, not black and white, because in some cases they are 
gray. Is the whole country at fault or is it a power within the 
government or, in this case, a government official's relative.
    So, I think we are giving more capability to our government 
to bring up these issues, identify them so they are not swept 
under the rug so to say, and let government make those 
decisions individually as opposed to just saying sanctions or 
no sanctions.
    I do not know if that helps, but.
    Ms. Omar. It does.
    Does anyone else want to add anything? I have one more 
question.
    Dr. O'Neil. I will say very just quickly, you know, I think 
this broader approach in a compact is when you have potentially 
unreliable partners in places, it allows you to bring in other 
actors. It allows you to bring in civil society actors. It 
allows you to bring in the private sector. It allows you to 
bring in perhaps local government, or State government in a 
federated system, that might be more reliable.
    And so, I think that is the benefit of this more context-
based approach, precisely when you have variation in the 
Federal-level partnerships.
    Ms. Omar. I appreciate that. And I think in many of these 
aspects credibility is important, and it is important that we 
try to keep it intact.
    And one of the other aspects of the so-called war on drugs 
that I think needs to be on the table in relationship it has to 
repression and severe human rights violations. I think too 
often our understanding, and our understandable desire to fight 
narcotraffickers and cartels has led us to give military 
weapons and training to police forces with partners of 
corruption and human rights abusers.
    In Honduras, in Colombia, and elsewhere this has led pretty 
clearly to torture, massive displacement, arbitrary detention, 
and State-sponsored murder. And it has failed 
disproportionately against Black and indigenous people in Latin 
America.
    How should we and our partners protect human rights as we 
are fighting organized crime. And is that even possible with a 
militarized approach?
    And any of you can take this one.
    Dr. O'Neil. I am happy to start. You know, when we look at 
this approach, and we are calling for a holistic approach and 
an all-of-government approach precisely because it should not 
be just a militaristic approach. And one of the big focal 
points of these different compacts in our approach to the 
region should be strengthening the rule of law. And if you have 
court systems that work, that work both for narcotraffickers 
but also works for human rights abusers.
    I think that is important for citizen security in Latin 
America, but it is also important for the flow of illicit drugs 
that come to the United States. In that sense, these kinds of 
policies I do think benefit both sides and get at what our 
ultimate goal is, which is to reduce the harm of Americans that 
happened here.
    So, thank you.
    Mr. Sobel. Clearly, I just want to add, a lot of our 
policies in every one of these compacts that exist today, 
whether it be a Merida, or CARSI, or any of them, the focus is 
on justice training, law enforcement professionalization. They 
focus not only on interdiction, but on being able to help civil 
society deal with these issues. And while it is not always 100 
percent effective, it has to stay a critical part of our 
program in the region.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has 
expired.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Burchett.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo the 
sentiments of a lot of the committee members. You will be 
really missed. And I appreciate your friendship, brother.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Burchett. I guess I will issue my disgust over this 
issue. It seems like talk is cheap, and we are doing a lot of 
it. And I do not see a lot getting done. You know, we have a 
war on drugs, and that does not work. And then we say we are 
going to go invest money in these countries, and then that does 
not seem to work. And it just seems we are back at square one 
always.
    I have friends that have lost loved ones to drug addiction 
and abuse. Fentanyl seems to be the hot ticket right now. At 
some point I would hope that we would just tell these countries 
they do not have a bill of rights, they do not have a 
constitution, they maybe say they do, but the reality is they 
can stop it and they will not. China can stop it, and they will 
not. These Central American banana republics, whatever you want 
to call them, Maduro, all those cats, they can stop it if they 
want to, but they will not.
    And at some time we are going to have to address that and 
just quit playing ball with him. I would hope that would happen 
soon.
    But, I'm wondering how are we working with Mexico to stop 
the flow of fentanyl from China?
    And how can future foreign assistance better target and 
stop the flow of the drug?
    And what policies or strategies should the U.S. adopt to 
punish fentanyl producers?
    And, again, I think at some point folks like China, Mexico, 
some of these folks, they know these producers, they know where 
they are, they ought to execute them. They are murderers, they 
are killing our people, and it just never seems to end. So, I 
will throw that out to the committee.
    And you can tell I am not, I am not looking for a job with 
the United Nations.
    Dr. O'Neil. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Burchett. And it is cold in here, and that is why I am 
wearing this jacket. I am not sure why the chairman kept it 
cold. They usually keep it cold when it is going to be a boring 
topic to keep all us old folks awake. But today it is not a 
boring topic and it is freezing in here.
    Chairman Engel. If you know the person who can turn it off 
I would be very much obliged.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Engel. Turn it on, I should say.
    Mr. Burchett. Well, I will requisition the proper forms and 
in 12 years we will have a committee meeting and we will 
probably get it heated back up by then. And it will be good 
right in the middle of the summer.
    But go right ahead. I am sorry.
    Dr. O'Neil. No, no, thank you. I will say a few words.
    I think there are two ways to go after the fentanyl issue. 
And one, as you rightly say, these precursors come from China. 
So, this is a China problem as well as a Mexico problem. And so 
there it is working with China, discussing it with China, and 
setting it up so that these precursors do not leave China. And 
that is a big challenge.
    There have been discussions there. But I think those could 
be prioritized and focused on, amid the other obvious tensions 
that we have with China today.
    With Mexico, once they enter Mexico, of course, this is a 
new drug and one that laces in with all other sorts of drugs 
that Mexico transits up to and traffics into the United States. 
So, as these transnational criminal organizations diversify I 
think we need to work with them and work with Mexico, but also 
work with ourselves, too, and strengthen some of the things 
that we have talked about in this report to take on all kinds 
of criminality.
    One of the big issues that would matter for fentanyl as 
well as everything else is strengthening our ability to go 
after these financial flows. If you cannot transfer the money 
to the people making it in China, then you will not be able to 
buy that fentanyl that comes from that direction. And as Cliff 
has laid out in detail, the lack of funding and support for 
FinCEN and others that are able to track this money. I think 
that is a big part of it.
    And then the other part is intelligence and finding 
partners in Mexico that we can share the intelligence when we 
see these fentanyl flows coming in. Because we know they are 
coming from China as well as a couple other places, but mostly 
China, and how do you track them and how do you stop them as 
they come into the port system, which is now increasingly 
controlled by Mexico's military. So, working with--which is 
just a recent development--so working with those partners to 
try to stop these flows as they come into the Mexican space.
    Mr. Burchett. I thought you said stop them.
    Mr. Sobel. I just might add----
    Mr. Burchett. Go ahead.
    Mr. Sobel [continuing]. To the conversation. We have also 
prioritized fentanyl very much in our report. I have not 
counted how many times we have referenced it, but we definitely 
agree with you 100 percent, and the whole committee, that we 
need to give it even more priority. Whereas up till now many of 
our programs have focused on plant-based narcotics.
    And there is no question when you look at the deaths in our 
country, which in 2019, before COVID, spiked to 71,000, as was 
pointed out by one of the Congresswomen earlier. For the whole 
decade it was 500,000. And we can only imagine, although I 
would not want to, what it will be like this year. It will be 
awful once again.
    So, this has got to be a priority of our compacts. It has 
got to be a priority of the State Department leadership. And we 
have to hold countries accountable.
    Mr. Burchett. How do you suggest we hold them accountable?
    Mr. Sobel. Well, it is not my place to do that. So it is 
something that----
    Mr. Burchett. Well, I guess you are saying it is----
    Mr. Sobel. On a personal basis, not from the Commission, I 
would say we have been very effective over a long period of 
time on sanctions. We should be prepared to use sanctions on 
fentanyl. That's a personal opinion.
    Mr. Burchett. I agree with you 100 percent. We cut them 
off. We starve them. We cut their banks off.
    And I think we should put our bankers on notice, our 
international bankers in those cartels, that we are going to 
have to hit them in their pocketbooks.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have run over my time. Thank you 
for your hospitality, sir.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Sobel. I am going to ask once again just to add 
something because the Congressman allowed me to think about a 
comment made by a congressperson earlier. And that is the 
digital assets, transferences becoming even more of an emerging 
threat.
    In 2020, this is a concern of the National Drug Strategy, 
which clearly says that digital asset transfers are now an 
emerging threat. DEA in 2019 found that both Colombia and 
Mexico drug cartels were beginning to use virtual currencies to 
facilitate payments.
    So, anti-money laundering cannot be as we have looked at it 
in the past. It definitely needs to take in the ability to use 
digital assets for transfers as well.
    Sorry.
    Chairman Engel. No. Thank you. That is very important.
    Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It is good to 
see you there in our beloved committee room where you belong.
    I wanted to focus on Mexico and specifically on corruption 
in Mexico. So, Dr. O'Neil, I am going to direct my questions to 
you.
    A couple weeks ago reporter Ioan Grillo wrote this in The 
New York Times about Mexico's war on drugs. And I am quoting.
    ``Many here wonder if justice merely extends to the 
powerful in this war.`` He pointed out that Mexico's former 
Public Security Secretary faces drug trafficking charges in New 
York, and Mexico's former Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos 
was indicted in New York on drug trafficking charges, but his 
charges were dropped when Attorney General Barr intervened 
following Mexico's threat to kick U.S. drug Federal agents out 
of the country, meaning out of Mexico.
    So, how might this incident, the decision to drop charges 
against Cienfuegos and release him to Mexico affect the future 
of U.S. efforts to address corruption in Mexico?
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you for that question. And I will speak 
on my own personal behalf.
    I think obviously the U.S. Department of Justice and law 
enforcement have been very active and have made strides against 
some of these corrupt figures. The process is going forward but 
it looks like there is significant evidence that they were 
involved in corruption there.
    And that has been a partnership we have seen with Mexico, 
we have seen with Brazil, and other places, too, fighting 
corruption with Lava Jato and other points of corruption.
    I do think the return of Cienfuegos, of the defense 
minister, to Mexico to potentially face some sort of justice 
there, nor and it is at least a perception that U.S. justice 
can be bullied into bringing someone back. I think it is a 
challenge to the way U.S. justice succeeds in the hemisphere 
and in Mexico.
    I also think it is going to be a real challenge in our work 
with Mexico in that Mexicans seem like they do not want to try 
those of high-ranking levels that perhaps have behaved badly 
during their government position. I think it will add a level 
of tension and uncertainty in terms of that back and forth.
    One thing we talk about in the report that I think is a 
place to begin with this in U.S.-Mexico cooperation is that, 
yes, we can work with the Federal Government but we can also 
work with State governments. We can also work at other levels 
where we may have more credible counterparts. And I think that 
is something as we look at a compact and we look at working 
with Mexico on security issues, which we need to do, can we 
find other actors within the system, or outside of the 
government system that can push forward shared goals.
    Mr. Levin. Well, yes, I was going to ask you about that and 
what you say in your report. I mean, it is hard to understand 
how we can collaborate with Mexico in going after drug kingpins 
knowing we might have another Cienfuegos-like situation.
    And your report recommends that the U.S. support efforts to 
combat corruption within Mexican police forces, public 
prosecutors' offices, the courts, right. But I am just trying 
to understand, how do we combat corruption at the highest 
levels of government given what we are seeing here? I mean, if 
there is corruption at the very top it is hard to see tackling 
corruption lower down, I guess.
    Mr. Sobel. I am going to help Shannon on that because I 
lived through it.
    When I was confirmed as the Ambassador to Brazil I was 
asked at my Senate hearing what am I going to do about 
corruption in Brazil. And this is even before I got confirmed. 
And I learned firsthand as an ambassador, and Shannon hit the 
nail on the head, there are many pockets of--more than 
pockets--there are many places that are looking forward to 
cooperating with the United States to get our training, to get 
our expertise, definitely funding.
    But we have an incredible program with almost every State 
in Brazil that I think allowed us and our law enforcement 
agencies to be very effective, despite not always working with 
the Federal Government on local issues.
    So, the compact allows that flexibility for the Ambassador 
to focus on those areas whee there are reliable partners. And 
there will be many institutions. We just cannot turn our back 
because it puts our citizens even more at risk. I know that's 
recommended.
    Mr. Levin. Well, that is helpful. But I want to try to get 
in one more question here. So, let me shift a little bit.
    Because you are aware, of course, that corruption in Mexico 
isn't limited to anti-drug efforts. And I wanted to talk about 
the labor situation for a moment.
    Last year Mexico passed labor law reforms to give workers 
an opportunity to remove corrupt protection unions, which are 
actually creatures of employers, and replace them with 
independent unions and to vote on collective bargaining 
contracts so workers can finally win higher wages and raise 
their standards of living.
    But I am not optimistic about those laws being enforced 
based on the reality on the ground. Just this summer Mexican 
labor lawyer Susana Prieto Terrazas spent nearly a month in a 
dangerous Mexican jail during the pandemic for the crime of 
helping workers organize an independent democratic union, 
precisely what the reforms are supposed to allow. And it is 
just super important that these reforms take hold, not only for 
Mexican workers but for U.S. workers because they could level 
the playing field and stop middle class jobs from being 
outsourced.
    So, the problem is that I do not see it happening, and I 
think it could be helpful in dealing with the cartels as well.
    This weekend The New York Times reported that Mexican drug 
cartels are using social media to disseminate propaganda to, as 
they put it, mask the bloodbath and use the promise of infinite 
wealth to attract expendable, quote unquote, ``expendable'' 
young recruits.
    So, you can see where I am getting at here. If you cannot 
get a decent job and make a decent wage, you are more 
susceptible to this.
    And I wanted to ask, you know, and again I will direct this 
to Dr. O'Neil, do you think it is fair to say that deplorable 
working conditions that the Mexican people face, the inability 
to win fair wages, could be a factor in enhancing the appeal of 
the sort of lifestyle that the drug cartels are portraying in 
their propaganda?
    Dr. O'Neil. Well, I will say two things. One, the lack of 
opportunity in Mexico is something that propels people into 
this other life. And over half of Mexican workers work in the 
informal economy, so they are not even registered. And so that 
is a huge challenge.
    Mr. Levin. Right.
    Dr. O'Neil. The other thing I would say, though, that we 
should focus on as well, or remember, is that the new USMCA 
trade agreement, the new NAFTA, has labor mechanisms within it 
to monitor and to enforce change. And in Mexican law, treaties 
supersede national law.
    So, I do think the United States as we go forward in our 
bilateral relationship, those mechanisms within the USMCA could 
be useful for the concerns, some of the concerns that you 
rightly bring up.
    Chairman Engel. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Levin. Right. But those are exactly the mechanisms I am 
worried about. I have not seen them work in any way.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you.
    Chairman Engel. Mr. Green.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
McCaul, for this hearing. And thank our witnesses for being 
here today.
    And, Chairman, I am relatively new to the committee but 
your reputation for bipartisanship
    [audio interference] service.
    I know the focus may be on the Western Hemisphere today. 
But I want to dig in as others have into these huge problems 
with China, particularly, as our witnesses report, fentanyl is 
killing people left and right in my home state of Tennessee, 
and we are livid about it. China is pushing this stuff, the 
Mexican cartels are pushing it into my State. My constituents 
are dying while China does nothing.
    Are we to believe that the Chinese Communist Party can 
track down or crack down on Chinese churches using CCTV and 
track innocent Muslims in Xinjiang, place them in concentration 
camps, find Falun Gong practitioners that they harvest organs 
from, but somehow they cannot--they have no idea of where the 
fentanyl is coming from or being developed in their country. It 
is absolutely preposterous to think that they cannot.
    I understand the problems Mexico while China is a 
totalitarian regime with total control. And they claim they are 
trying to address this but just cannot seem to do very much.
    After their pattern of deceit and outright lies to cover up 
the coronavirus outbreak can we really believe that they have 
no control over this? Fentanyl far exceeds the deaths caused by 
other opiates
    Their charts show us, charts show us virtually a broken 
line with no end in sight where the sky is the limit. And yet, 
the destruction brought about by this incredible formidable 
drug, it is bad enough that China allowed the coronavirus to 
spread uncontrollably, lied to the world, silenced 
whistleblowers, and now around 1.5 million are dead from the 
virus.
    But their handling of fentanyl is also atrocious. This 
fentanyl is lab created for profit in China, with a layover in 
Mexico where it is smuggled into the United States. The CCP is 
purposely and deliberately turning a blind eye. One thousand 
three hundred and seven in my home State alone died of opiate 
overdoses in 2018. And of that, 827 were from fentanyl and 
other synthetics. This is all from Communist China, the largest 
violator of human rights. And they are domestically exporting 
these atrocities abroad.
    The CCP has silenced free speech at American basketball 
games and Hollywood movies, and they are forever silencing so 
many Tennesseans and Americans who will not see another day 
because of fentanyl and their incompetence on handling the 
COVID outbreak.
    Now to my question. And really open to the panel, any of 
the witnesses can chime in.
    Can you guys share with us if you believe the Chinese 
Government knows about fentanyl production?
    Dr. O'Neil. Thank you for that question. And like you, it 
is hard for me to believe that they have so much knowledge 
about so many things and surveillance, and this is something 
that somehow goes under the radar.
    And, you know, the U.S.-China relationship has many 
touchpoints and many tensions, but this is, obviously, an 
increasing one, and a very personal one, as you rightly point 
out for citizens across the United States.
    Mr. Sobel. I think it is remarkable that this program or 
this problem not only still exists but is escalating. When I 
was Ambassador to the Netherlands in the early 2000's, the 
precursors, the shipments to the ports of Rotterdam were known, 
were documented. So, your point is well taken. This is not a 
new problem and it needs to be dealt with.
    Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Green.
    Mr. Trone.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. O'Neil, now, your mandate was primarily of plant-based 
drugs, but your reporting knowledge is the troubling emerging 
threats of synthetic drugs like fentanyl, which is now involved 
in two-thirds of our opioid deaths.
    I wrote with Leader McCaul, who has been fantastic in this 
issue to work with on this issue to work with, the FENTANYL 
Result Act which passed the House on suspension a few weeks ago 
to address this. We know that fentanyl precursors and the pre-
precursors are being shipped from China, Mexi--China, India, to 
Mexico where they are increasing their scientific knowledge on 
how to combine these chemicals to manufacture fentanyl.
    So, how do these labs and factories fit into the existing 
drug trafficking infrastructure in Mexico?
    Dr. O'Neil. You know, I am going to let Mary, my colleague, 
begin with that one because she has looked carefully into which 
cartels are involved in this.
    Mr. Trone. Perfect.
    Dr. Speck. Well, I think we know that the major cartels are 
involved to some degree with fentanyl. The main rivals right 
now that you hear most about are Sinaloa, but also the New 
Generation Jalisco Cartel.
    But I have to emphasize that these cartels are 
opportunistic, very adaptive. And from what I understand, 
fentanyl is very easy to manufacture. It comes through the 
ports, as do other precursors. Areas such as Michoacan and 
others along the Pacific coast have long been involved in drug 
production. This is clearly something that the U.S. and Mexico 
have to come to terms with and identify new ways to combat.
    Detecting fentanyl is like trying to find a packet of sugar 
crossing the border. It is so tiny and so potent that we need 
to develop new technologies to identify it effectively.
    Mr. Trone. So, what would a smart U.S.-Mexican partnership 
to stop this manufacturing that they are doing, moving to 
Mexico now from China, look like in Mexico?
    Dr. Speck. Well, we suggest focused deterrence on the 
cartels that are trafficking in fentanyland on the cartels that 
are most violent. Focus on dismantling, not just beheading the 
top, but really after the mid-level operatives, and coming up 
with new strategies to try to look at the cartel as a whole 
rather than just going after the kingpin. Obviously law 
enforcement needs to determine the correct strategy.
    But we do mention that the idea of focused deterrence is 
something that the two governments should explore, specifically 
in the case of the trafficking in fentanyl.
    Mr. Trone. Does our government have the right tools, the 
right technology for detection and surveillance to combat the 
synthetic drug trade in Mexico?
    Dr. Speck. My understanding is that we do not really, and 
that there are scanners that are better but some of them have 
not been deployed. But we probably need additional technology 
because fentanyl is so small, so easily hidden, and so potent.
    And we also need new methods of detection of fentanyl and 
new measures. For example, we look at price and purity. That is 
not a measure that identifies fentanyl. We should be looking at 
the toxicity of the drugs coming into the United States and the 
cartels that are trafficking the most toxic drugs.
    Mr. Trone. But how do we track or can we track from the 
ports these precursors and the pre-precursors so we--because 
they are hitting the Mexican labs, the cartel labs, you know, 
doing the manufacturing, it seems like, you know, China is 
clearly sending these precursors now, and the Mexicans are 
doing all the manufacturing. They are trying to integrate 
vertically. So, how can we track this with the Mexican 
Government?
    What sites, or do you know of any tools or ideas that we 
can help track it?
    Dr. O'Neil. Let me just spin with one idea. And probably it 
is tracking the drug itself, which as Mary points out is 
difficult with the technology that we have or that we have 
rolled out.
    The other is to track the money. And so that is money that 
is going from the United States to China where a lot of the 
precursors come from, through Mexico and back. So, there is a 
triangulation of money that is moving around. And that is a 
place where I do believe FinCEN or others with expanded 
resources would be able to make a dent.
    Mr. Trone. Yes. Okay, well good. I yield back then. Thank 
you very much.
    Chairman Engel. Okay. This really is the conclusion of the 
hearing. But before we conclude I want to thank the witnesses 
for their excellent testimony. And I want to thank all our 
members who participated in today's hearing.
    As you can see, there were many, many people on both sides 
of the aisle who stayed and asked intelligent questions. And 
this is a very successful hearing.
    And I learned a lot. And I am very grateful to our 
witnesses for the work they do, but also their testimony. And 
all the members who participated in today's hearing, thank you 
very much.
    The Committee on Foreign Affairs is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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