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NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

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NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 11, 2020.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. We will call the meeting to order, a full committee hearing this morning on the national security challenges and U.S. military activity in North and South America, part of our ongoing series for this year to get ready for the FY21 [fiscal year 2021] budget cycle, basing this off of the budget that the President submitted for FY21.

Our witnesses this morning are the Honorable Kenneth Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; Admiral Craig C. Faller, who is the commander of the U.S. Southern Command; and General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, who is the commander of the U.S. Northern Command. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning.

We have discussed a number of the issues surrounding the overall defense budget, and I think that is the thing we are most interested in, is how your piece fits into that. We have got the blank slate review, which is an attempt to sort of look at everything within DOD [Department of Defense] and build out a strategy based on what is to come, based primarily on the premise that we are still kind of stuck in the past a little bit in terms of where we are spending our money, where our priorities are, and we need to shift those priorities.

Now, as always, when you are shifting priorities, it is very easy to focus on what the new priorities should be. The harder part is figuring out what you are going to do less of, to balance that out. And we want to see how that strategy builds together. I understand that the blank slate review for your two commands I think is not yet done at any rate. So, we are curious what you see in that, what you would say, "Here is what we need to do more; here is what we need to do less." How can we balance that out?

Obviously, on the NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] side, homeland security is the number one priority. So, we are also particularly curious how you work with the Department of Homeland

Security, what your responsibilities are, what their responsibilities are, how those things balance out.

And there is considerable concern on the committee about the reprogramming request that most impacts these two commands, that took \$3.8 billion out of existing procurement to put it into further building the wall on the southern border. We are very concerned about how those priorities were set and the impact that it might have on the programs that were cut going forward.

And it is worth noting, also, that there is still to come \$3.6 billion which is supposed to be taken out of MILCON [military construction]. That is in addition to the \$3.6 billion that was taken last year. The impact that that is going to have is profound. So, we

are concerned about that.

We would also be interested in various troop deployments to the southern border. We know that, typically, these are requests from DHS [Department of Homeland Security] that are supposed to be reimbursed. They have not been being reimbursed. Where do you see those requests going and do you see you getting paid back for that? How do we balance the money on all of those issues?

And also, when it comes to homeland security, we are concerned about election interference, not just from Russia, but from a variety of different countries. As we head towards 2020, that is going to be a major concern. What are you doing to prepare for that?

And then, most importantly, overarching all of this is the coronavirus outbreak that is going to have a huge impact on every community. If you watched the press conference yesterday, I think the smartest thing said is, if it hasn't impacted you yet, it will. Being from the State of Washington, it started there first, but it is by no means done. We have seen it spread quickly to New York, yesterday a major problem in Massachusetts. If you understand the epidemiology of this at all, it is going to put an enormous amount of pressure on our country.

Now, primarily, that is not the responsibility of DOD, but, certainly, from a NORTHCOM perspective, we want to know what you could potentially do to contribute to meeting that threat. And from a SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] perspective, eventually, in all likelihood, it will be a factor in Latin America as well, and how it impacts that.

So, there are many challenges. I have them laid out in a more detailed way in my opening statement, which I will submit for the record.

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me join in welcoming all of our witnesses here today.

Like the other combatant commands, these two have a lot on their plate, and it is absolutely part of our responsibility to understand their budgetary needs and capabilities to meet their responsibilities. I am struck by the fact, though, that with these two commands, as with others, extraneous events also get a vote. And so, in SOUTHCOM you have got to watch and deal with what happens in Venezuela. With NORTHCOM, as you mentioned, what is the military support for coronavirus, not only now, but how may that develop in the future? That is part of, I think, the specific challenging part of putting together a military budget. It is the other side, whatever the other side is, gets a vote.

And I appreciate the challenges that both of these commanders have with a whole variety of issues and will look forward to their

answers to our questions.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rapuano, assuming you are going first, go ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND GLOBAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary RAPUANO. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the national security challenges faced by the United States and the Department of Defense actions to meet these challenges.

I am honored to be here in the company of General O'Shaughnessy, the commander of NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and U.S. Northern Command, and Admiral Fall-

er, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command.

I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a diverse range of issues, including homeland defense, cyber, space, countering weapons of mass destruction, mission assurance, and defense support to civil authorities.

I would like to emphasize three key points today.

The first is that the U.S. homeland is not a sanctuary. Rather, the homeland is a target in a complex global security environment.

Two, China and Russia are using malign influence against the United States and our neighbors to undermine regional security.

And lastly, we have taken action to ensure our Nation and part-

ners will prevail in this security environment.

China and Russia are seeking capabilities to win below the threshold of armed conflict, to erode our national security and prosperity. They are attempting to undermine democratic governance, the rule of law, market-driven economies, and compliance with international rules and norms. Our competitors' capabilities, strategies, and actions underscore that we must anticipate multidimensional attacks on land, in the air, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace, targeted not just against our military forces, but against our critical infrastructure and our population; indeed, our way of life at home and abroad.

Should conflict arise, China and Russia hope to prevent the U.S. from intervening in the defense of our allies and partners. China's arsenal includes anti-satellite capabilities and advanced missile systems. China has also successfully tested hypersonic glide vehicles and claimed or created and militarized islands in the South

China Sea in its efforts to coerce the U.S. and our allies and partners. Although Russia poses a different challenge, it, too, is developing anti-satellite capabilities, advanced missile hypersonic glide

vehicles, and advanced cyber capabilities.

Rogue regimes, such as North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela, continue to pose threats to the United States and our allies and partners. Iran is investing significant resources on ballistic missile and space launch capabilities which could lead to the development of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] systems. With support from Russia, Cuba, and China, the Maduro regime fails to provide Venezuelans with sufficient food and medicine. In response, most governments in the region have recognized Interim President Juan Guaidó as the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

Despite our successes, terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and other malicious, non-state actors threaten us with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. We are countering threats to our Nation and our regional partners. Our actions will deny adversary benefits from aggression; impose costs on adversaries, should they commit acts of aggression against the United States and our strategic interests.

These efforts in our sustained regional engagement undermine our competitors' attempts to increase their influence near U.S. bor-

The U.S. is strengthening its homeland missile defenses. DOD is developing a new interceptor to meet future threats. We are developing a new generation of advanced ground- and space-based sensors to better detect, track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads. These capabilities will enhance our ability to deny our adversaries benefits from missile attack.

Space systems underpin virtually every U.S. weapons system. China and Russia both seek to deny the U.S. and our allies and partners the advantages of space. The U.S. is responding to this threat by transforming our space enterprise and working closely with our allies and partners.

The President's budget request provides \$18 billion for space programs, including \$111 million to support the establishment of the new military service. The budget also funds the new space combatant command, the U.S. Space Command, and the Space Development Agency, which will accelerate and develop the fielding of military space systems.

New Presidential policy on cyberspace operations, as well as statutory authority, have enabled the proactive approach to competition in cyberspace. For example, Cyber Command engages in "hunt forward" operations, defensive cyber teams operating globally at

the invitation of our allies and partners.

Working closely with our partners, and informed by the wholeof-nation approach, similar to those framed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission report issued today, we are maturing our concept of layered cyber deterrence.

The Department is focused on preventing WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation globally and ensuring U.S. military forces are prepared to respond to WMD incidents and operate in

contaminated environments.

We are working with our Federal partners and with other public and private sector partners to expand sharing of threat information that affects defense critical infrastructure and the defense industrial base.

DOD is better prepared to assist civil authorities than at any other time in our Nation's history. In 2019, DOD responded to 113 requests for assistance. So far in 2020, DOD has responded to 20 requests for assistance.

While the Department's number one priority is defense of the homeland, we are also enhancing the security of our allies and partners in the Western Hemisphere through several primary lines of effort.

Working with partners to limit malign influence. The authoritarian model offered by China and Russia uses economic, diplomatic, and security means to gain undue influence over the sovereign decisions of others. We are working with our allies and partners to counter this threat.

Collaboration with our partners. We are advancing defense relationships with our self-funding partners while continuing support for our traditional training and equip programs, focusing on strategic-level cooperation.

Sustaining defense cooperation through institution-building. Our defense institution-building is an increasingly important aspect of our efforts. We seek to share experiences and help and implement processes that magnify the effectiveness and sustainability of all other aspects of our cooperation.

The Department of Defense takes a global view of the challenges facing the Nation. We continue to improve our ability to defend the U.S. homeland in all domains and develop capabilities to defend the Nation's interests globally.

I appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring the Department is prepared to compete, deter, and win in every contested domain—air, land, space, and cyberspace.

I especially thank the men and women of the Department of Defense and their families for all that they do every day to keep our Nation safe and secure.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rapuano can be found in the Appendix on page 56.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General O'Shaughnessy.

STATEMENT OF GEN TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee, I am truly honored to be here today as the commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

I am also pleased to testify alongside my cousin, Admiral Craig Faller, and Mr. Rapuano, both of whom I have great admiration for.

Chairman Smith, with your concurrence, I would like to submit my written statement for the record.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are charged with executing the National Defense Strategy's number one objective: defend the homeland. Our adversaries have watched, learned, and invested to offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses. They have demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate their capability, capacity, and intent to hold our homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold.

The changing security environment makes it clear that the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall and the oceans are no longer protective moats. They are now avenues of approach to the homeland, which

highlights the increase in adversary presence in the Arctic.

To meet this challenge, we need to invest in a capable, persistent defense that can deter adversaries, protect critical infrastructure, enable power projection forward, and prevent homeland vulnerabilities from being exploited. To deter, detect, and defeat the threats arrayed against the homeland today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are transforming our commands and our way of thinking. We cannot defend the Nation against 21st century threats with 20th century technology. We must be able to outpace our adversaries using a layered defense infused with the latest technology.

To do so, and to secure our competitive advantage, we will continue to partner with our Nation's defense and commercial industry to transform rapidly evolving scientific information into leading-edge, digital-age technology. And the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense, or what we call SHIELD, is the architecture we need to defend our homeland against these

advancing threats.

As such, our layered defense needs to establish awareness in all domains, from below the oceans to the highest levels of space, including the unseen cyber domain, which are all at risk. We need a layered sensing grid with sensors in all domains which can detect and track threats from their point of origin long before approaching our sovereign territory. In other words, it requires the ability to identify and eliminate the archers before the arrows are released. We need an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and control, capable of fusing a myriad of sensors across the globe into accurate, decision-quality threat information, and at the speed of relevance for effective command and control. The Department of Defense, with the United States Air Force in the lead, is using the 2021 budget to further this capability of joint all-domain command and control.

And lastly, we need the ability to deploy defeat mechanisms capable of neutralizing advanced weapon systems in order to defend our great homeland. We have put great effort into these areas, such as ballistic missile defense, and the need also exists to aggressively defeat additional threats, to include the ever-growing cyber threat and the cruise missile threat.

And consistent with these concepts, we are changing how we are engaging with industry. We have shared our toughest challenges with our industry partners and have received an overwhelming response from not only traditional defense contractors, but also small and large commercial companies, to leverage the military application of advancements we have seen in the commercial industry.

We are harnessing emerging, existing, and rapidly evolving technology to plug into our SHIELD, our architecture for homeland defense. However, more needs to be done to keep pace with the advancing threats to our homeland. We need to ensure we have complete awareness of what is happening in and around our sovereign territory.

We are mindful of the gravity of our mission and the trust you have placed in us. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy, and capturing our sense of urgency, we at USNORTHCOM and NORAD have declared 2020 as a year of homeland defense and are moving forward with the implementation of our SHIELD.

You and the committee should have great faith in the men and women at USNORTHCOM and NORAD because, together, we have the watch. Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

STATEMENT OF ADM CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Admiral FALLER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

I am honored to be here with Secretary Rapuano and my friend, shipmate, and cousin, General O'Shaughnessy. We work very closely together to defend the homeland and ensure there are no seams between our regions, because we certainly know the bad guys don't pay attention to seams. Last year, General O'Shaughnessy and I traveled to Mexico City and Guatemala City to make that very point to our friends and neighbors.

I am joined by Ambassador Jean Manes, former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, and my civilian deputy, who brings with her a wealth of knowledge about our region and a deep understanding of China in our hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is our shared home. It's our neighborhood. We are connected to the nations here in every domain—sea, air, land, space, cyber—and most importantly, with our values. Over the last year, I have seen firsthand the opportunities and the challenges that impact the security of our hemisphere, and we also understand the urgency with which we must react to those challenges.

I have come to describe the challenges of a vicious circle of threats that deliberately erode the stability and security in the region and our homeland, vicious circles framed by systemic issues that face young democracies, like weak institutions, corruption, that are exploited by transnational criminal organizations, a \$90-billion-a-year industry in this hemisphere.

These institutions are often better funded than the security organizations they face. And external state actors that don't share our values—China, Russia, and Iran—and violent extremist organizations exploit this. They are trying to advance their own ends at the expense of U.S. and partner nation security.

In fact, the "aha" moment for me this past year has been the extent to which China is aggressively pursuing their interests right

here in our neighborhood. Why would China invest in critical infrastructure, like deepwater ports and large swaths of coastline, within a 2-hour flight from Miami? Why would China want to lock up total interest in a space station in this hemisphere? They certainly recognize the importance of this part of the world, and so must we.

This vicious circle I described can be seen most acutely in the tragedy that is Venezuela. Human suffering in this once thriving democracy has driven nearly 5 million people to flee to neighboring countries, like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and more. These countries are absorbing the migrants and the strain that is placed on their health care, education, and security services. Colombia alone has spent over \$2.5 billion in the last 2 years to support migrants.

And while Russia, Cuba, and China prop up the illegitimate Maduro dictatorship, the democracies of the world are looking for a way to get the Venezuelan people what they deserve, a free and

prosperous Venezuela.

The best way to attack this vicious circle is as a team, the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM team, our interagency team, our whole-of-nation team, and with our partners. In this neighborhood, a little goes a long way, and our partners are willing to contribute, especially with U.S. encouragement, investment, and presence.

In recognition of the complex threats challenging our neighborhood, there will be an increase in U.S. military presence in the hemisphere later this year. This will include an enhanced presence of ships, aircraft, and security forces to reassure our partners, improve U.S. and partner readiness and interoperability, and counter a range of threats, to include illicit narcoterrorism.

Last year, our partners played a critical role in 50 percent of our drug interdictions, up from 40 percent the year before. Getting our partners in the game by training and equipping them through security cooperation programs is exactly the right approach. These threats affect all of us here in our neighborhood, and we must tack-

le them together.

Likewise, International Military Education and Training, IMET, is a small investment that yields long-term returns. It builds lasting trusted relationships. As I speak, half our region's chiefs of defense are graduates of IMET. Along with exercises—exercises are our North Star—IMET exercises and security cooperation are the last programs we should consider cutting.

last programs we should consider cutting.

Deployments like the United States Naval Ship *Comfort* show the best outstretched hand of America. The mission this year treated nearly 68,000 patients, extending our enduring promise as a

trusted partner to the neighborhood.

Thanks to the support of this committee, we also deployed a Multi-Mission Support Vessel, acronym MMSV, a contracted innovative ship that is supporting counterdrug detection and supporting our partners as a platform for their extended reach. The MMSV is using intelligence produced by Joint Interagency Task Force South, JIATF South. JIATF South, located in Key West, our southernmost base in the continental United States, is of strategic and significant value for defending a wide range of threats to our national security, and we are working to take steps to improve the resiliency and the quality of life there in one of the highest-cost re-

gions in the Nation. At our headquarters in Miami, we are also working to address the cost of living and housing concerns that cre-

ate hardships for our families.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thornberry, thank you for the opportunity today. The SOUTHCOM team appreciates the support of Congress and the trust you place in us. I look forward to the questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Faller can be found in the

Appendix on page 104.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I just have two questions. Admiral Faller, can you give us an update on Venezuela? You know, how are China and Russia potentially involved? What are our interests there? And how is it impacting the region?

Admiral FALLER. The Maduro regime continues to cling to power and brutalize the population. The Human Rights Report this year listed a significant number of human rights abuses by the Maduro

regime.

Maduro stays in power because of the thousands of Cubans that protect and guard him and, basically, own the intelligence service in Venezuela; Russia, in the numbers of hundreds right in there alongside, working to upgrade air defense systems; Russian special forces working to train Maduro forces. And China to a lesser extent, but China is involved, particularly in some of the cyber areas, working to their interest. Unfortunately, this has allowed Maduro to cling to power and continue to brutalize the population.

The narcotraffickers have taken advantage of this, as well as the ELN [National Liberation Army] and FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] dissident terrorists, and that instability, along with the migrants, has spawned instability out in the regions. It is a credit to partners like Colombia that they have handled it so

well.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is not going to change anytime soon? Maduro is pretty solidly in power at this point, would be your estimation?

Admiral FALLER. Maduro is isolated and continues to be isolated. The international unity is there. We are continuing to work with Special Representative Elliott Abrams and the State Department for the pressure campaign. Unfortunately, this transition can't happen soon enough for the brutalized population.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General O'Shaughnessy, could you tell us what your missile defense needs are here for your command, where it is at, what your needs are in the short term?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity to highlight some of the work that we are doing and some of

the work that we need support in doing.

First, on the ballistic missile front, we have had some success now on Next Generation Interceptor [NGI]. Obviously, we would rather not be where we are relative to the RKV, Redesigned Kill Vehicle, but now that we are, we made a decision to stop that program, start NGI. I am happy to report, just yesterday, we had the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that successfully met to talk about how do we actually bring this capability to bear sooner. One of the things we have to make sure that we understand is the

threat continues to advance. And so, while we may have delays in

our program, the threat doesn't stop.

And so, as a result of the great work we have done with MDA [Missile Defense Agency], to include the work with R&E [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the ability to actually figure out what is the capability that we most need, and how can we bring it to bear at the speed of relevance, and I think we have had some success there. Part of that is because we're working with industry to understand what are the long poles in the tent, what are the most challenging things that are driving a longtime acquisition program, and what are the things we can do for the trade space, where time is now a factor of risk, so that we can bring that into the discussion. I am happy to report we have made progress on that front and we are going to be able to bring this capability to bear sooner. I look forward to the RFP [request for proposal] ultimately being released and ultimately getting this capability.

In the meantime, Chairman, it is also important we continue to pursue other means, to include an under-layer, critically important as we have our GBIs [Ground-Based Interceptors], which is a very capable system right now. We bring an under-layer such as bringing in SM-3 IIAs, which we are going to do a test in May to ensure that it can defeat an ICBM threat. That brings tremendous capability and opportunity and potential to what we can bring to the homeland. Also looking at THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and how can we use THAAD for the protection of the

homeland in ways that we haven't yet done.

The combination of all those together with the work we are doing on our sensors, our radars, to bring the discrimination capability forward, is going to allow us to maintain that advantage over our adversaries. So I can come to this committee and continue to tell you that we can defend against the ballistic missile threats from a rogue nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral, yesterday we had CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] before us. And one of the points I think everybody agreed on is great power competition occurs all over the world, including Africa, the Middle East. You pointed out China is very active in the Southern Hemisphere, but you also made the point that cutting IMET and those sorts of training, exercises, providing military equipment, doesn't seem to make much sense. That is my interpretation. Can you give us just a scale of how much money you spend in your AOR [area of responsibility] on things like exercises and joint training, and that sort of thing? And then, what happens from last year to this year?

Admiral Faller. The programs you mentioned, IMET, the education program, the exercise program, security cooperation, are our pivotal programs. They are key. They are high-return investment

options.

As we look at those programs, the IMET accounts have been solid, with good support to increase IMET. And so, we have asked for an increase. We may see a modest increase. Eleven million is what we spent last year. That is making a difference.

The exercise program and the security cooperation, they have received cuts in the defense-wide review across the Department. The Joint Exercise Program received a 10 percent reduction, and the security cooperation, our main Department of Defense-funded program, which is called 333, received approximately a 20 percent reduction that is being distributed amongst the combatant commands. For me, the impact over this coming year will be at or around a 20 percent reduction in our 333 money. And that reduction will mean we will have to make some choices and have to defund some programs. Those programs that we will defund are likely ones that have made an impact that have increased our partners' ability to do things like counternarcotics.

Mr. Thornberry. You mentioned IMET as \$11 million. What is a ballpark for putting all of those programs together in your AOR,

ballpark?

Admiral Faller. A ballpark for our needs in those three programs is probably around \$130 million per year, if you total it.

Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I think it is helpful for us just to have

a perspective on that.

General, some coronavirus folks are being housed at military bases. My understanding is some folks coming off this latest cruise ship, about 500 may go to Texas, 500 to Georgia, or something like that. Explain to us how you, or the Department, balances effect on military readiness and the health and safety of our military folks versus the need to have some isolation for people who are coming off cruise ships or maybe in other circumstances. How do you know when it hurts our military more than it should? How do you balance that, is what I am trying to get to.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Šir, thank you for allowing me to highlight this. Let me, first, acknowledge that we are, in fact, housing some U.S. citizens as a result of the passenger ship challenge that we are faced with. To me, this needs to be a whole-of-nation response. And so, the Department of Defense is contributing to that

whole-of-nation response to take care of our citizens.

Specifically, the guidance we were given from the Secretary of Defense was the first priority is to ensure the safety of our military personnel and their families. The second priority we were given was to ensure that we maintain our readiness, our ability to perform our core mission set, because, of course, that can't be degraded. And then, with that in mind, we look at what can we add

to the whole-of-nation response.

And the particulars that you mentioned here, we do have folks right now at Travis, at Miramar, at Lackland, and at Dobbins. That is actually billeting rooms that we provided. HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] has been providing the actual, what we call wraparound, services to that. In other words, we are not providing the medical capability. We are not providing some of those contract services. They are actually being provided by HHS. What that allows us to do is we can provide them the rooms. We can maintain our ability to take care of our own families and our own military members and do the mission that we need to do. And I think it is a good balance of where we are right now. We can contribute, but no degradation to our ability to perform our mission, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rapuano and General O'Shaughnessy, I gave you a headsup on this question, but I wanted to get it for the record. We had a call last night with our Governor in the State regarding the COVID-19 response in our State and the continuing need for help. But the question he had, and that I wanted to pass on and get some direction on this, would be the ability or necessity of NORTH-COM duty to support response if we need a surge capacity for mobile hospital units. We are not making that request now, but in the event that we need to make that request, where does NORTHCOM fit into that role?

Secretary Rapuano. So, the Department of Defense is working the whole-of-government process. managed by the President's White House Task Force that is led by the Vice President, working very closely with CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], HHS, DHS, and the other agencies involved. CDC and HHS, they are the lead for the domestic response. They are also the lead for the medical response. There is very significant capacity that is available to them, working with the State and locals as well. DHS and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] also have some levels of capability.

The Department of Defense, for the force that we have, has relatively limited medical capacity, particularly with regard to the importance of force health protection for the force and their dependents and our other beneficiaries, but also the potential of contingency operations requiring additional medical capabilities on top of that.

So, we are very cognizant of that balance. When you look at the low-density, high-value elements, such as ICU [intensive care unit] beds and ventilators, the Department of Defense dose not have a large number of those. That is not typically military medicine type of capabilities. So, there is not a surplus of capability there. Again, we are working very closely with CDC and HHS in terms of where we can best support and how we can limit the impact on defense readiness and capabilities.

Mr. Larsen. All right. That is fair enough. We will probably follow up with you later on. Again, we are trying to do our best to prepare, and we are in contact with the CDC and HHS as well. But our emergency operations center is active at Camp Murray in our State as well. So, our local National Guard folks are helping out.

Secretary Rapuano, I have a question. I am also chair of the Aviation Subcommittee. It has been a priority for me that the Department, any department or agency with counter-UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] authority works hand-in-glove with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] in implementing its authority before deployment of counter-UAS technology at any location. So, since we gave the DOD some authorities the last couple of years on counter-UAS, what specific factors do you take into account before deploying counter-UAS equipment at any given location, given the use of civilian airspace in order to implement and operate counter-UAS?

Secretary RAPUANO. Absolutely. I will give you an overview, and then hand it over to General O'Shaughnessy.

Mr. Larsen. You have got a minute and 41 seconds.

Secretary RAPUANO. Okay. We work very closely with FAA. We do have authorities for counter-UAS domestically. Those authorities are limited in terms of we have to take into account undue risk to civil aviation, other activities that are not threatening to DOD facilities. So, that is a process that is ongoing.

And again, I will just in the limited time turn to General

O'Shaughnessy to provide some additional steps. Mr. LARSEN. Great. Thanks.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, we have a very robust relationship with the FAA. Steve Dickson and I have met on multiple occasions to talk about these very issues, and our staffs work on an almost daily basis with this, as well as with the Department of Homeland Security, who plays an equally critical role within this.

I would highlight, though, we do have different perspectives. In some ways, the FAA is concerned about that compliant operator, right, and the safety of flight of that compliant operator, where we are more worried about the non-compliant operators and how do we separate the non-compliant and potential threat from those that are doing things in accordance with the FAA rules.

And so, as we continue to work our way forward, this is a threat that we really have to find the right balance between safety for those to be able to operate and commercial businesses, and whatnot, that want to expand the use of UASes, while still at the same time maintaining our ability to defend our critical installations as well as the national critical infrastructure.

I think that partnership is right. I think the authorities are right. I think we, from an investment standpoint, need to also look at those things that will allow both. And some of the systems we employ overseas aren't quite as useful here at home, when we have to have the continual operation of airfields, to include the commercial ones, while being able to defend. So, we need to invest continued within the commercial industry.

Mr. Larsen. Great. I will have some followup questions later, but thank you. I am going to yield back. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, you both in your opening statements and in your written statements reference China and Russia and their activities in South America. Mr. Secretary, you even talked of maligned influence. What tools do you see that you have in the DOD portfolio, or what other things do we need to be doing, to increase our influence in the area? Do we still have a competitive advantage? Are there areas where we are not competing that we should? What are you seeing and what advice would you give

Admiral Faller. Thank you for that important question. We still have the competitive advantage, but that advantage is eroding. Our competitive advantage remains in our education system. Our partners want to educate with us. China has seen that. A recent example, they offer 5-to-1. So, if we are offering one slot to Carlisle, they have come in behind us to offer five to their version of Carlisle. Some of our partners are taking them up on it. It seems to be a nice vacation. But we are quality. So, we will take our quality any day.

Our partners want to exercise with us. Our partners want to do exchanges with us. And our partners want to be able to afford our gear. Our equipment is the best, built in America. Unfortunately, some of our partners have financial issues. China has figured that out. They have come in and started gifting large sums of gear,

trucks, boats to partners.

In a recent conversation with a chief of defense in a small Caribbean nation, he gets around to it and he says, "Yes, they only gave me 20 million last year." And I looked at my cheat sheet, and it was about \$1 million across all our assistance in a mil-to-mil. We don't need to outspend China. We just need to have enough and be present to continue that leverage and that access, presence, and in-

fluence that we can bring as reliable, trusted partners.

Secretary RAPUANO. So, I would just amplify Admiral Faller's points. We have unique differentiators as the United States in our alliance system. We, unlike the Chinese or the Russians, have a very robust system of allies and partners. We don't have to spend them dollar for dollar, but we do need to be resourcing these relationships and developing them in a manner that makes clear where the benefits are and over the long term what is in the best interest of these nations.

And it is very difficult sometimes when you look at the immediate laydown of what resources the Chinese are offering with maybe long-term payout in some areas. But it is increasingly, if you just review the inputs that are coming out from around the world, it is increasingly understood by nations that this is a predatory policy, particularly the Chinese approach, in terms of the loss leader upfront and, then, the dependence on systems for which they do not have the same control.

So, again, this is just how we can most thoughtfully apply not the same amount of resources, but increased resources to address

this important challenge.

Mr. Turner. General, you and I had the opportunity to talk yesterday of the huge investment that we are going to be undertaking. As we look to the national defense authorization this year, we have areas of space that we have to invest in, sensors, missile defense. Even our nuclear deterrent is one that is going to require significant investment.

You and I talked about your successors. If we don't make these investments, tell us what your concerns would be for your successors 10 years from now if we falter and don't modernize and invest

in our systems.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you for that opportunity to highlight these very important issues relative to our ability to defend our homeland. I will start with our ballistic missile defense. We have a good program in place. We have a good plan in place. I think if we are able to execute that program as we have it designed with the under-layer, I think we will continue to maintain that competitive advantage, both capacity and capability, to defend our Nation against a rogue nation, whether that be a future devel-

opment of capability in Iran or the current North Korean threat that we face.

I think we often, though, have to think about the peer competitors that we have, Russia and China. As we look at their actions and their activities, and what they are investing in, we want to make sure we are able to stay ahead of them relative to our ability to defend our homeland. And it is not so much that we expect, for example, the Russians to be—that you will wake up in the morning and find that they are invading the United States of America. That is not what we are saying.

But there could be a regional crisis, for example, in Europe, that, then, based on the nature of the capability that they have, could very quickly expand to a global fight. And so, as we see that, we could very well find ourselves where they are trying to hold us at risk, whether it be with cruise missiles, whether it be with cyber, whether it be the myriad of capability that they have and they

have been investing in.

And so, I think we have to look at this with clear eyes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I should have said this upfront. When we get to the end, I try to stop it. So, if you can just wrap up quickly, General O'Shaughnessy?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, sir.

We need to invest to maintain that competitive advantage in order to maintain our ability to defend ourselves against all threats and all demands.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rapuano, General O'Shaughnessy, and Admiral Faller, thank you all for being here and your service to the country.

Obviously, you all face unique challenges across the diplomatic, information, military, and obviously economic domains. And the Arctic, among one of them, has rapidly become a battleground and a great power competition that we talked about here today. Climate change is obviously already exacerbating the challenges, as we see increasing hostilities and more navigable waterways. My question is, General O'Shaughnessy, do you agree that climate change is an aggregating factor in your theater?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, what we are seeing is diminished ice, increased usability of some of the waterways. We see increased activity. We see some of the impacts of the result of that; for example, some erosion. And those are all things that we have to take

into account.

From my particular point of view, what I am most concerned with is, as we do see our potential adversaries increasing their capability and capacity to take advantage of some of these more navigable waters, we also need to be able to operate in that environment. And so, I have a renewed invigoration to make sure that we are able to operate in that Arctic environment.

Mr. Langevin. So, my question is, how is NORTHCOM factoring the implications for changing climate dynamics in its military plan-

ning?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. So, specifically, what we are doing is maintaining our ability to operate, looking at all facets of it, wheth-

er it is our infrastructure, and make sure that we don't have impacts to our infrastructure as a result of any changes that we see. But, also, again, because we see more activity there, because of the environmental impacts that we are seeing, we also have to make sure we have the ability to operate there, that we have invested in things like communication, domain awareness, and infrastructure that will withstand those changes.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral Faller, anything that you have to add? Mr. Rapuano?

Admiral FALLER. The ability to rapidly respond to events, whether it is a weather event or an environmental event, a terrorist attack, transnational criminal organizations, is important. So, we continue to watch that closely and ensure that our exercise programs, our security cooperation programs, emphasize the partners' capacity to do that. Because, as we see in some of these massive hurricanes, no one nation has the ability to do it alone.

Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Rapuano, I want to, first of all, thank you, on another topic, for all the work that you have done in the Solarium Commission over the past year. I was very proud to be a part of that commission as well, chaired by Senator King and Representative Gallagher, and I am very proud of the final product that is being re-

leased today.

One of the major recommendations that we make in the report is strengthening CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] at Homeland Security to ensure that it has the authorities and resources that it needs to perform its civil defense mission. So, Secretary Rapuano, do you agree with the Solarium Commission that we need to strengthen CISA? And can you explain why the Department of Defense needs a strong partner at the Department of Homeland Security to protect the Nation in cyberspace?

And the last one, another key recommendation is the importance of exercising. Secretary Rapuano—and, General O'Shaughnessy, feel free to chime in, of course—can you detail how the Department leads or participates in national-level exercises to better prepare us to act in situations where DOD assets are called on to support civil

authorities?

Secretary RAPUANO. First, thank you very much for the question,

Congressman Langevin.

The Solarium Commission was a very fruitful and productive exercise, from our perspective, in the very frank, deliberate, in-depth discussions associated with the evolving, growing cyber threat. And I think one of the most critical outcomes from it was just strong coalescence, stronger, empathic understanding of the whole-of-government, whole-of-nation context which we must rely on to be able to respond to growing cyber threats.

Mr. Langevin. Could you comment on CISA, in particular?

Secretary RAPUANO. I'm sorry?

Mr. Langevin. And comment on CISA.

Secretary RAPUANO. Specifically to CISA, CISA is the lead for DHS, which is the lead Federal agency for responding and providing support to industry critical infrastructure. CISA, of course, needs to be resourced to perform that role. And we understand, with the growing threat, there will be growing needs in terms of

the resources required to effectively perform that mission. And we are very supportive of CISA being provided the appropriate resources to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here and for your service to our country.

General O'Shaughnessy, in the President's budget the Hawaii and Pacific radars were canceled. My first question is, why? My second question is, what kind of gaps does this create in coverage? And my third question is, what are you going to do if the SBX [Seabased X-band Radar] does not see when a threat arises?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, just for clarification, though, we view that as being postponed versus canceled. It is still a priority for us. There were some concerns relative to the executability of the funding, as our SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] has commented about. I will say, from my perspective, it is, with the SBX, we have the ability today to defend all of our defended area, to include Hawaii. What we would like to see, though, is this continue to be looked at to see how it fits into the overall system and our ability to execute that mission, to your point, with the SBX being, obviously, an at-sea platform and the risk inherently involved in that.

With respect to our vantage point, clearly, we see PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] has put it in as one of their unfunded priorities, and we certainly applaud that. They also have regional considerations besides the broader GBI execution from the regional missile defense.

Mr. Rogers. For example?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. For example, as they look at the capability they have with the other radars, the TPY-2s, what they have at Guam, threats that they have in the shorter range threat, not necessarily ICBMs, that this would contribute to as well, beyond the NORTHCOM role in that specific mission set.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

General, in your testimony you say, quote, "In order to reclaim our strategic advantage in the high north, it's critical that we improve our ability to take and track surface vessels and the aircraft in our Arctic approaches and establish more reliable secure communications for our Joint Force warfighters operating in the higher latitudes." Closed quote.

What specific capabilities would you like to see us develop to counter the increasing threats from China and Russia? And is there something, in particular, they are working on together that concerns you?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. There is, sir. First, let me start, we have to start with domain awareness. We have to understand what is operating in the approaches to our sovereign airspace and territory as well as within the confines of our sovereign territory.

We saw just yesterday—you may have seen in the news—we had a Russian bomber 60 miles off the coast of Alaska, operating in one of our ICEX [Ice Exercise] exercises we have where our submarines actually pop up out of the ice. The camp established that they were loitering about 2,500 feet above that. And mind you, they were loitering with an F-22 and F-18 on their wing when they did that.

So, we have to maintain the ability to be able to react appropriately, not just for a strategic messaging-type event here, but potentially in the future to actually defeat any threats. It starts with domain awareness, and then you need the ability to command and control. In the command and control, you have to be able to communicate. We have severe limitations to communicate in the Arctic. Above about 65 degrees [latitude], it becomes limited. Above about 70, it becomes severely limited, except for our more exquisite capa-

I think one of the things we can leverage is the commercial technology that is out there. We see the proliferation of LEO [low Earth orbit], whether it be a company such as OneWeb or Starlink. We see amazing technology that is going to bring literally broadband connectivity, the same that you would have in your home right now, you could actually establish within the Arctic very quickly, in a matter of literally a year or so. To me, that would actually fastforward our ability to operate within that very difficult, challenging battlespace, having the ability to communicate. And so, we have as our number one unfunded priority list Arctic communications to leverage the commercial work and the proliferation of LEO that I think would be a game changer, not only for the military, but also for the civilian communities.

Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much.

Admiral, in your testimony you talk about South America's strategic location for space activity and how China is pursuing that. Can you give us some examples of what you mean by that?

Admiral Faller. The one space station that China has virtual control over is what allowed China to land on the dark side of the moon.

Mr. Rogers. Is that the one in Argentina?

Admiral FALLER. Yes, sir. And that is an example. And so, China sees this, as does Russia, and they are working to get their inroads into that area. Fortunately, we are pushing with countries, good partners like Brazil, to increase our access and our cooperation in space. And I think there are some real opportunities there with some of the agreements we have signed with Brazil over the last year, including this past Sunday we signed a research development agreement with Brazil, that was put together quite rapidly for types of agreements, that will allow a broad range of technology and defense cooperation that could be included into space.

Mr. Rogers. Yes. It is a very important point I hope the committee takes note of, that China and Russia are both making great efforts to get toeholds in South and Central America, and we can't

just ignore that.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Norcross.

Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.

General, Admiral, Secretary, thank you for being here.

I want to talk a little bit more about the Arctic. I happened to be up at ICEX this weekend and we all waved to the Russians as they flew over. I just thought they were there to see me, but apparently not.

We often talk about the threat from Russia. Can you also talk about the recent activities from China and what they are doing,

and how or why we should be concerned?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, sir. Thank you again for allowing me to highlight one of my most pressing concerns. It is really the Arctic and our ability to operate there and what we see our adver-

saries doing.

Specifically to the China question, we see activity, for example, the *Xue Long*, which is one of their scientific vessels, that is probably the preliminary work they are doing to bring up military capability and capacity to operate in the Arctic. We see that China declared themselves as a near-Arctic state. We see the economic investment that they are doing and that we have seen in other areas of the world where that course of economics has a very nefarious intent behind it.

Mr. NORCROSS. But where specifically? If you could just point out

the other nations that are investing in it?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, obviously, Russia. We see amazing activity on the Russian side, both in their installations that they are rapidly improving as well as just their ability to operate in that environment with a very robust presence in exercises and training. And I think, from our vantage point, we also need to ensure we have the ability to operate in that what is—frankly, it is battlespace—we need to be able to operate in that environment.

I would use the analogy that we can deploy a force anywhere in the world. We have been very good at that, in the United States of America projecting power. You cannot deploy to the Arctic if you have not trained there, if you don't have the right kit, you don't have the right equipment, because it is such a harsh environment. And so, we have been working closely with the services to increase the activity.

We see things like the training ranges, the ranges in Alaska like the JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex] range, continuing to invest in those, so we have a playing field to go practice and scrimmage. We do see that as a principal avenue of approach that we need to be able to defend.

Mr. NORCROSS. So, the Bering Strait is one of the primary areas up there. We see that Russia is adding some more missile assets to their side. What concern and how are we countering those?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. As you mentioned, the deployment of the missiles to that very critical navigation point that is a choke-point for entry into the Arctic waters is absolutely critical. We need to have the ability to maintain our presence there, even in a contested environment. Those missiles can strike Alaska and our critical infrastructure within Alaska with very little indications of warning. Therefore, we have to have that persistent defense, that persistent domain awareness, the persistent command and control, and persistent ability to defend, not be able to just deploy it up there in a time of need because we will not necessarily be able to get inside the actions of our adversaries. So, we need to invest more in the Arctic.

Mr. NORCROSS. Just to shift gears a little bit, I'm going to talk about the defense of the homeland. With our layered defense, you had talked earlier about what we have done to increase the capabilities. Hypersonics, how we are defending against the hyper-

sonics, particularly if it was a submarine launch?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. So, a couple of points I would make on hypersonics. First, we find that the hypersonics, for example, what actually Russia has claimed and we see in place already with the Vanguard missile, the hypersonic glide vehicle that has nuclear capability. Our biggest point on the nuclear capability is that we need to be able to give advanced warning. Because it flies in a much different trajectory, it does not, like a ballistic missile where you can get a radar on it and you know exactly where it is going, the hypersonic glide vehicle is unlike that. It has the energy to go to multiple areas within the United States, as an example. And so, maintaining custody of that requires a different set of sensors to be able to do that. So, we have to invest in our domain awareness, those sensors that can do the hypersonic. That is for the glide vehicle.

For cruise missiles that we see, it shrinks the time. It shrinks the time you have to react. And so, there is an investment that we need to continue to make to stay ahead of this threat that we can operate at the speed of relevance relative to the threat that we see of these advancing cruise missiles.

Mr. NORCROSS. In 26 seconds, talk about the time difference, what you can in this environment. How much does that cut down

on the President's ability to make a decision?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. It cuts down a lot. Both it is the speed of it and it is the energy that it has. It can go to multiple places, and that doesn't give you the ability to project that in a timely manner for our senior leadership with our current capability. We need to invest.

Mr. NORCROSS. I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hartzler.

Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here.

I didn't realize you guys were cousins. Your grandparents must have been so proud of you all. That is pretty amazing, pretty amaz-

ing

General O'Shaughnessy, I wanted to start off talking about the F-15C fleet. At last year's posture hearing, you testified on the importance of modernizing the fleet for the homeland defense and the deteriorating status of the F-15C fleet. And the urgency to replace these aircraft was the primary driver for the establishment of the F-15EX program. But this year's budget request reduced the number of F-15EX aircraft the Air Force planned to acquire from 18 to 12. So, from a homeland defense perspective, is it still urgent to replace the F-15C fleet and what are the vulnerabilities that we face if we don't quickly provide these units with capable and safe aircraft?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Ma'am, thank you for letting me highlight that. First, as you mentioned, the F-15C has been an incredibly important asset for us within the NORAD construct. The F-

15EX, not only does it modernize it—and obviously, an aging air-craft has maintenance reliability problems—but it just brings capability really applicable to us in the homeland defense business. Specifically, it can carry significantly more missiles. And so, that one aircraft can actually have much more of an effect relative, for example, to cruise missiles that you are trying to defend against.

Second, it has increased radar capabilities. So, with that capability, it allows you to see further out and be able to react to those

lower radar cross-section threats.

And the third, I will use the example of what you just saw a couple of days ago with the Russians flying over Alaska. It is the long lengths that we have to fly; 750 miles from Elmendorf, as an example, before we were able to intercept that bomber. The F-15EX brings you that extended range which allows us to get to the archer, not just the arrows. In other words, we can get to the bombers before they actually launch those cruise missiles. So, it really gives us flexibility. It gives us an incredible increase in capability. So, I would just continue to advocate for the advancement of that F-15C and transitioning over to the F-15EX one as fast as possible.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. So, what vulnerabilities do you have with seeing a reduction in the number of EXs that we are going to purchase?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, it is just a question of what gets—obviously, there will be a delay in purchasing, which results in a delay in fielding. And so now, we will maintain the current fleet of F-15Cs for longer as we continue to have—

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is that possible? I mean, they are in really bad shape, aren't they? I mean, could you give us an update on the sta-

tus of those?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. They are, but we have just an amazing group of maintainers that work incredibly hard. I mean, these aircraft, much like the F-16s, are just older aircraft, but our maintainers are phenomenal, keep them in operational status. But we are putting a stress on the system. And so, I would just continue to advocate for replacement as soon as possible.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

Admiral Faller, SOUTHCOM's unfunded priorities list requests funding for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. So, what are your current ISR capabilities, requirements, and shortfalls? And how will your mission be impacted if you are not provided with adequate ISR capabilities?

Admiral FALLER. Well, the impact of the transnational criminal organizations and the drugs and illicit things that they bring here to the United States, it is a national security priority and it is a

travesty. And we clearly need to do more.

One of our gaps is in intelligence, and ISR gives us some of our best intelligence in our maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and some shorter range aircraft. So, we have gaps in all that. Congress has been very good with an ISR transfer fund that has helped us fill those gaps, but, still, we are trying to cover-down on an area the size of the United States with a handful of assets.

We also have gaps in ships, which we call those force packages a helicopter, a ship, and its ability to search an area as well. And

that is another significant gap.

And I would also illuminate the impact security cooperation funds have in this regime. For a modest investment, for example, in El Salvador special forces, we are able to extend the security envelope hundreds of miles out into the ocean.

Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. It is a huge task.

How concerned are you with the military's dependence on China to receive our pharmaceutical products from them? As you know, America does not make aspirin anymore. America does not make penicillin. Ninety percent of the drugs that we take here in our country, pharmaceutical products, come from China, and 80 percent of those components are China-based. And we see now they make all the syringes. They make our protective air masks, face masks, and all of these things—the vaccines, antibiotics, and pharmaceuticals—that our military has come from China. With China being an existential threat, how concerned are you that they are our main source of medicine?

The CHAIRMAN. And I apologize, but that is going to have to be taken for the record at this point because the gentlelady is out of time.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 125.]

The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you to all you three for being here.

The political crisis in Venezuela has devastated the Venezuelan people and has led to an increase in illicit activities, such as drug trafficking. In addition, Venezuelan refugees have fled the country and sought temporary residence in neighboring countries, especially Colombia. Secretary Rapuano, what is your assessment on how the Venezuelan crisis has impacted Colombia, Colombia's security and stability, and how has the crisis affected regional stability in general?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, I certainly can say generally that there has been a significant impact in the region, in a number of countries. So, I think that this is an ongoing challenge. It is a reason why it remains a priority for the President and the administration, and we are continuing to increase the pressure, so we can look for the appropriate changes in terms of the behaviors of the Venezuelan government.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

Admiral Faller, an important aspect to strengthening regional security in SOUTHCOM is capacity-building through sustained engagement. Can you provide the committee an update on ongoing capacity-building efforts and also state what the biggest operational barriers are for expanding these partnerships?

al barriers are for expanding these partnerships?

Admiral FALLER. The security cooperation programs that we invest in are long-term, high-payoff investments for the security right here at home and our partners. So, we are helping them build stronger institutions, so they can buffer their democracies from the shocks of transnational criminal organizations and, frankly, to gain their positional advantage from the predatory practices of wannabe

great powers like China and Russia. So, it has a high impact, and it is not a large dollar amount.

So, we will invest in programs, for example, to help a country set up an intelligence service from education to doctrine to a system, so they can secure their own information. And then, that allows them to share it with us. This is an area that we have focused on and prioritized on.

Mr. Carbajal. What are the barriers to being more effective and

doing more of that?

Admiral FALLER. One of the barriers is stable funding. So, what we have found is, when we don't have a budget that passes on time, we try to do a year's worth of security cooperation activities in 9 months or 8 months. And then, at the end of the year, we often get scrutinized for our lack of good, solid execution as we rush to get the money obligated. So, multiyear money would be one. Consistent funding levels would be another, and authorities associated with those consistent funding levels.

Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.

General O'Shaughnessy, I know this has been touched on a bit, but I wanted to be a little bit more poignant and specific with you. This week the committee has discussed quite extensively great powers competition across the areas of responsibility. With that, China and Russia continue to invest heavily in the Arctic, as the Arctic increasingly is viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition. In DOD's report to Congress on its Defense Arctic Strategy, it states, "Russia and China are challenging the rules-based order in the Arctic." Can you elaborate on that? Does the U.S. have sufficient strategy to counter Russian and Chinese efforts in the Arctic—with the underscoring of "sufficient"?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I think part of that answer is going to be highlighting the great work done to craft and deploy the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy, a significant change from the 2013 version thereof, with a real focus of a secure and stable region in which the U.S. national security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended—so, it recognizes that we must be in the Arctic to defend our homeland—and that nations work cooperatively to address the shared challenges.

And so, to your point there, while we do see some cooperation, we are seeing more and more of this great power competition that has arrived in the Arctic. I will use an example of what the Russians are doing with respect to the Northern Sea Route, where they are claiming that you need to use a Russian icebreaker; you need to use a Russian pilot on your vessel. That is not in accordance with the rules-based international order. And so, I think we need to be able to have a presence, have the ability to operate there, if we are going to be able to show by example exactly our ability to operate in these common navigable waters.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Do you feel we have sufficiency?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. So, what I would say is we need to invest in the Arctic. I have seen an increase in that activity, and we need to invest in order to operate there significantly.

Mr. CARBAJAL. So, we are not where we want to be as of right now?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. The trajectory is in the right direction in order to be done.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you so much.

Mr. Chair, I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us.

General O'Shaughnessy, I want to start with you. Recently, I have experienced and seen increased Russian activity off the east coast, and that is of deep concern. I understand the Navy has stood up the 2nd Fleet as a counter to that increased Russian aggression, but I am concerned that we are not adequately resourced to really address this the way we need to. You see the acquisition of sonobuoys being on the unfunded requirements list for the Navy. You see P–8 Poseidon production, our anti-submarine warfare aircraft, that production being truncated. You also see now a delay in the MQ–4 Triton program. All of those things cause concern to me. The Navy only has five long-range SURTASS [Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System] vessels, which are critical in being able to deter and detect activity in the North Atlantic.

We also see, too, that we are on the opposite track on our submarine fleet, our attack submarines. We are going to go from a high of 52 today to a low of 41 by 2028 in the *Virginia*-class submarine fleet. All of those things appear to me to be going in the opposite direction, as we see increased Russian activity and aggression on the east coast.

Give me your perspective on the full scope of that Russian aggression. And are we properly resourced and positioned to be able to counter what we see, at least in the past 2 years, as pretty significant and continued presence of the Russian fleet in the east coast off the United States?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you, sir, for highlighting this. This is something that I think over time we have been able to have the luxury of not having threats to the homeland that are literally right off of our doorstep. That environment is rapidly changing and has changed. We are correspondingly investing in our ability to do that, but, as of yet, we have not yet achieved the capability and capacity that we need to maintain that competitive advantage.

To your specific points—and you highlighted exactly the list that I would go down ultimately—but I think the ability to have that domain awareness—when I say "domain awareness," it is not just radars that can see the air domain. It is from the undersea, the surface vessels, and all the way up. And so, that investment not only in the SURTASS capability, but also in the IUSS [Integrated Undersea Surveillance System], the ability to have the sensors under the water that can detect those in a persistent manner, are critically important.

I think continuing to invest in the sonobuoys, as you mentioned. We employed a lot of them this last little bit, without getting into operational details. And I actually got to go down and talk to the crews specifically that were doing some of those mission sets. And the good news is they did not feel that they needed to be limited in their ability to operate as a result of the current status. But we

have to be mindful of that going into the future, invest in that capability, that attributable capability that we need to have at our disposal at any time.

The broader point I would make to what you are saying is these threats that used to be global in other areas, they are now here on our doorsteps, and we must be prepared to defend against them.

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you think that the current budget request is

a reasonable response to this increased Russian aggression?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Sir, we work really hard with the United States Navy on this. And I would highlight the fact that they have put significant investment into the homeland defense architecture and the ability to be able to defend ourselves here at home. We need to continue that resourcing, though. It can't be 1 year or 2 years and be done. This is a continuing investment that we need to make.

Things besides the resources that you think about in the budget, but, as you mentioned, 2nd Fleet. Even just having our ships operate out there in that environment, it used to be just training. Now

it is actually operational-level commitment.

Mr. WITTMAN. In addition to that, we also see, I think, continued threats to our transoceanic cables. Those are continual efforts that I think our adversaries look to exploit. And as we went through last year's back-and-forth in the Congress, we did put together a cable ship security program that says that we should have some ships available if, perchance, there is an activity against those transoceanic cables. My question would be, what else should we be doing going forward? Is that threat a constant threat? Is it an increasing threat? What are the necessary resources to make sure that we are addressing that threat?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I would quickly just say that, yes, that is a consistent threat, and that is the way we have to look at it. We can't look at it as something we would just apply during a crisis. This is something, with so much of our communications going through those undersea cables, we must do it in a persistent way.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Horn.

Ms. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

Following on some of the conversations that we have had, I want to talk about, Admiral Faller, the National Guard and the role that they play, especially in your AOR. I know that they played a critical role over this long period of the past 20 years of conflict or so. But I know that one of our Guard units in Oklahoma is particularly active along the Panama Canal. And I would like for you to speak about the role that the National Guard plays, and units like the 137th play, in your area of responsibility around the Panama Canal for a moment, please.

Admiral FALLER. The State Partnership Program with our National Guard is one of our main efforts to build partner capacity and readiness of our Guard units. It has the advantage of having the habitual relationship over time, over many years, that builds

trust. And our investments in that program are good investments

for the security here at home and our partners.

The Oklahoma Guard currently is deployed to Colombia with two MC-12s. These are deployed in partnership with Special Operations Command. We are supporting our Colombian partners who are in a tough fight with ISR, and that ISR has directly, from those two units—and I went down and visited them, and it is a real economy effort. There are about 40 of the guardsmen there. They are motivated. And that has directly resulted in the Colombians being able to action ELN, FARC dissident terrorists, and to get after narcotraffic, significantly making a huge impact, those MC-12s and the Oklahoma Guard.

Ms. HORN. Speaking of ISR and following up on some of Congresswoman Hartzler's questions earlier, with the proposed change in the MC-12 and the needs for ISR and drug interdiction and the work in South America, in this transition do you see the ability to

continue the ISR that you need?

Admiral Faller. Having the ability to assist our partners develop their own ISR capabilities, it means we have got to be engaged, present, provide our leadership. And these types of deployments are extremely helpful to do that. I would recommend continuing these high-payoff, low-cost efforts, such as the MC-12s that are with the Guard unit. As I understand it, those are slated to be taken out of service with upcoming budgets. I think they are making the case right now as to why it makes a difference, both for the drugs that are taken off the streets in Oklahoma and the rest of our States and to take that money out of the hands of narcoterrorists in our partners' countries.

Ms. HORN. So, you see that as a valuable mission?

Admiral FALLER. That is an extremely valuable asset to have the ISR in theater with our partners.

Ms. HORN. Thank you.

And, Admiral Faller, one more area that I want to discuss with you, and that following on about the funding for narcoterrorism and the impact. The [section] 333 funding authority is designed, of course, to support programs that provide training and equipment to foreign countries to build capacity of partner nations. I know we have touched on this in several ways. But what challenges do you

see with the 333 funding process?

Admiral Faller. It is clear there is never enough money to do all the things the Department wants to do, and we have got to make tough choices. The Secretary of Defense has been clear about that. And we are all in to work the National Defense Strategy Line of Effort 3, which means we have got to account for every dollar of money we spend and hour of our time. So, as we look forward, the security cooperation funds have got to be applied in a manner that directly impacts the future challenges. And so, having a balance of these funds to look at the global fight is really important. The overall funds are about \$1.1 billion. So, it is a significant amount of money. Applying that globally is really important. As we leverage for the future, these long-term payoffs and getting that right is so important to us, and our partners depend on it. It is paying dividends here at home.

Ms. HORN. Thank you very much, Admiral Faller.

I am almost out of time. So, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Faller, I think you have been very kind with your comments. I think the fact of the matter is DOD gives you what is left over of ISR after they fulfill the other requests throughout the various operating regions.

And I want to just ask all of you this very quickly. Just yes or no, should defending the homeland include defending American citizens from narcoterrorists and transnational criminal organizations? Yes or no? It is not a trick question. All right. Yes?

Admiral Faller. Absolutely, Congressman.

Mr. Scott. Okay.

Admiral Faller. It is a threat to our homeland.

Mr. Scott. Absolutely.

Admiral FALLER. And the National Security Strategy recognized it as such.

Mr. Scott. Absolutely. So, SOUTHCOM's total operating budget for fiscal year 2020 is \$1.2 billion, is that correct?

Admiral Faller. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Scott. So, to put that in perspective, we spent 14 times that in Afghanistan.

Admiral FALLER. I am sure it is a higher number. I don't know the exact—

Mr. Scott. We spent 14 times that in Afghanistan. We have had 32 deaths in the United States from the coronavirus this year, not to diminish that, but this Congress, virtually all of us walked out on the floor the other day and appropriated over \$8 billion for the coronavirus, which has killed 32 so far in the United States, again not diminishing that. But we lost 150 Americans yesterday to drug overdoses. We will lose over 5,000 a month to drug overdoses that are the end result of Congress, and quite honestly, the administration's, not prioritizing defending the homeland from narcoterrorists and transnational criminal organizations.

So, your total operating budget is \$1.2 billion. Seventy-five million of your budget is for theater security cooperation. General, that is the cost of, it is less than one F-35. That is less than the cost of one F-35.

In your written testimony—and this is what concerns me the most—you stated that you were unable to act on 91 percent—91 percent—of the shipments, despite having actual intelligence and authority that a shipment of narcotics was coming into the United States. How much additional money would be needed to lower this figure to 10 percent?

Admiral FALLER. Yes, we have taken a hard look at that, and as I have said in my opening statement, as a result of illuminating those gaps, we have received support from the Department of Defense, and, clearly, from the President's direction, to increase our presence, to address the range of threats. That is an area the size of the United States. So, the number of assets required to do that is significant. We are talking in the dozens of ships and force packages, which is why it is so important, sir, to get the partners in the game, getting the partners enabled. They are at 50 percent of

the interdictions right now. With our continued leadership—and sometimes it is just time and some resources—and our whole-of-nation here, working with State [Department] INL [Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs], and our DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], we want to get those partners

into 60 percent this year.

Mr. Scott. So, my concern, as a whole, more Americans are dying from the actions of the transnational criminal organizations and the violent extremist organizations in the Western Hemisphere than any other identifiable source. That number of 90 percent, the 90 percent range, has not changed. As much money as we have given to the DOD and the increased funding over the last 10 years, which has predominantly been the end result of this committee, we are still allowing 90 percent of the actionable items to come through. And so, all of the additional money we have given has been transferred to other priorities and not to the priority that is resulting in more deaths than any other area.

And I am almost out of time, but I do hope that other members will go to SOUTHCOM and look at the small things that could be done for a very small price that would actually take significant amounts of drugs off the streets of America. And as the chairman said, if it hasn't impacted you yet—and he was speaking of the coronavirus—it will, and I agree with him on that. But I promise you this, if you haven't been to a funeral of somebody who died in your neighborhood from a drug overdose, you are the lucky one. And I will bet you that you will get to go over the next couple of

years.

Thank you for your work.

The CHAIRMAN. And certainly I think that the gentleman is correct on the statistics. I would point out, we need to work on the supply, but at the end of the day, it is a demand problem. What drives the money, what drives this—and you know in SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM what they do to get drugs into this country boggles the mind. I mean, they make submarines. I believe a fake shark was once used to do this. We just heard about the tunnels that are going under the wall that would make Hamas proud in terms of what they have built there. And they put ladders over the top.

And why? Because of the money. There is a lot of money to be made by selling drugs to Americans who demand them. So, we need to really—if that demand went away, there wouldn't be a problem. And I really feel in this country we do not focus enough on why is the demand there and what can we do to reduce it. If the market dried up, you guys' job would be a lot, lot easier. So,

we need to work on both.

With that, I will yield to Mr. Golden.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you.

General O'Shaughnessy, I wanted to ask kind of a followup to a lot of questions you got from people earlier about your operations in the Arctic with Russia and China building their presence out there. Recently, I was reading a little bit of a conference where Jim Webster from NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] and the American Society of Naval Engineers was talking about some of the struggles with hulls and the ability to break through ice and

navigate up there. Obviously, we need more Coast Guard ice-breakers and such. But he did make note that the destroyer, the DDG-51's hull performs fairly well relative to a lot of other plat-

forms that you might have up in that region.

So, just a more specific question about the DDG, as you are considering deterrence, and the role and requirement for freedom of the seas that you have up in that region, as I mentioned. Are you thinking about, what kind of consideration are you giving to leveraging the capabilities coming online in FY23 with the Flight III DDG [Arleigh Burke-class destroyer], particularly where it is going to have the anti-air ballistic missile defense capabilities added to it? Is that something that you are looking to use up in that region?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, first let me start with the polar security cutter. Obviously, not within the Department of Defense, but our partners within the Coast Guard need this capability. They need it soonest and they need it robustly. And so, without that icebreaking capability, the other surface vessels will not be able to

operate.

That said, our DDGs have proven to be amazing platforms all over the globe. They will continue to do so in those regions, especially as we see diminishing ice, but they are not icebreakers. And so, therefore, they need the appropriate operating environment.

I applaud the Navy's efforts over the last several years of really increasing their ventures into the high north, the Arctic, to actually get the crews out there, and they haven't been for some period of time, to experience it, learn those lessons, and make sure we have the ability to operate in that environment. And so, I applaud CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and I applaud all of the operators for going up there, where it would be the Harry S. Truman and others that we have seen.

And I am excited to see, as we look into the future, they are continuing that level of effort, as are some of the other services, to be able to operate in the Arctic. Because if you are not actually doing it, you will not be prepared to operate in that environment.

Mr. GOLDEN. I appreciate that.

Just throwing it out there, one of the things that I was reading in this particular writeup is lessons learned. It was something about just old-school tactics. I don't know that I quite understand this as a Marine that didn't spend much time on a Navy ship. But they were talking about bringing baseball caps to combat ice growing on ships. Admiral Faller, I don't know, maybe that is something you have heard. But I thought it was an unusual lesson learned from training up there. So, it is important to do that.

Thank you.

Ms. HORN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Golden.

Mr. Byrne, you are recognized. Mr. Byrne. Thank you.

Admiral Faller, good to see you.

For some time, you and I have discussed, and we have discussed on this committee, the need to have a naval presence in your AOR. You finally got the USS Detroit. Tell us what impact has come from

Admiral Faller. I will just associate myself with the remarks of General O'Shaughnessy on the importance of ships, Coast Guard

assets, U.S. Navy ships. At the end of the day, we have got to have platforms to do the work. And they both enable us to do detection and monitoring, to find and then use law enforcement assets, Coast Guard law enforcement detachments to do the interdiction, but they also allow us to train with our partners and to perform a variety of missions.

In the case of *Detroit*, the first deployment of a littoral combat ship to the region, it performed above all standards of good operational readiness. We took that ship off the coast of Venezuela. We did a freedom of navigation operation. That ship performed superbly. The ship was involved in counternarcotics operations and it was welcome. And so, we will see that ship back.

And so, that presence sends a big statement about U.S. commitment. It sends a big statement to our friends—it reassures themand then, to our adversaries. And those are capable platforms.

Mr. Byrne. Would you like to have more?

Admiral FALLER. We have a demand signal that is unmet through the global force distribution. And I think our Navy would like to have more and we would like to have some of that presence in SOUTHCOM. Our 4th Fleet, which is the counterpart to the 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, they focus on building partner capacity, working with our partners in exercises. You have got to have ships to do that. You have got to have assets to do that.

And I think the littoral combat ship, you and I have been to sea

on one.

Mr. Byrne. Yes.

Admiral Faller. They provide the right kind of platform for this region to meet our partners' needs. And the ship, it had some problems in the past. It is working those bugs out. And we have been happy with the deployment of the *Detroit*.

Mr. Byrne. Good.

Last year, we authorized and appropriated money to convert an expeditionary fast transport to a medical transport. Does this type

of capability help with your missions in SOUTHCOM?

Admiral FALLER. It does. We have one deployed with us now. We have asked for more. We think we could use it as a platform for a range of missions—counternarcotics mission, to put Marines on. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has been very clear he wants to get the Marine Corps back to sea. This platform can hold in the neighborhood of hundreds of Marines and it can be flexible to move around and allow those Marines to engage partner marines. The United States Marine Corps, like our Navy, are the gold standard. Partners want to train with them and learn from them. And then, that plays back when our partners need to fight alongside us, as some of them have had to do in past wars. And so, we welcome that ship as a flexible platform.

It turns out they are in demand by all the combatant commanders, and we are making the case for why a couple more, working in tandem with perhaps a littoral combat ship, as a floating logistics base, in addition to working with Marines-you know, the fast speed, shallow draft, there is a tremendous amount of flexibility in those platforms. And we have asked for those, as well as we have asked for the acceleration of the expeditionary staging bases, which are built out in San Diego, as a way to move Marines around the theater, make a statement of U.S. presence and commitment, and importantly, get our partners engaged in the training. Important platforms.

Mr. GOLDEN. Let me shift gears for a minute. What effect has the reduction in foreign assistance to the Northern Triangle had on

your ability to work with partners and allies in the region?

Admiral FALLER. The funding has been restored, and it is critical in the mil-to-mil range. IMET training, for example, is what we would apply to a country like Honduras. I use those as examples. So, while that funding was suspended—and I agree that the pressure actually worked that we placed. Those nations have stepped up to do more on the migration. So, the pressure was good. The pause in funding, to me, in a way demonstrated the commitment of our partners. Honduras transferred money around, and they value our education so much that they paid for it.

But something, clearly, didn't get done as a result of that. So, the consistent funding in those realms is important to build their capacity. Again, there has to be a return on investment shown. We have seen that. So, there was an impact, but I think we are through that now and we are moving ahead. And those nations have stepped up to demonstrate why they are responsibly using the funds that our taxpayers are providing. We have got to have a

show of return on investment.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you. I yield back.

Ms. HORN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Byrne.

Ms. Torres Small, you are recognized.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I thank you all for being here and for your service to our country. General O'Shaughnessy, in the context of a heightened period such as we are in today, with the eve of the 2020 elections and aftermath of the Soleimani strike, can you speak to how NORTH-COM liaises with DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], U.S. Cyber Command, and the National Security Agency, to monitor for domestically targeted threats from overseas adversaries such as China and Russia?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, thank you, ma'am, for allowing me to highlight some of the great work that is being done, and

there is collaboration here. And that is the exciting part.

Literally, from the day that CISA stood up, literally the very day they stood up, we had liaisons embedded within their and they had liaisons embedded within our command and control organization at NORTHCOM. And so, literally, as it was birthed, we were able to be part and connected with CISA.

Almost every event that we do, we end up there with CISA because you can't separate homeland defense and homeland security to that point. In fact, I meet more with the Secretary of Homeland Security, I think, than even the Department of Defense because we have such a tight relationship there.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. And what is NORTHCOM's specific role in

that partnership?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Right. One of the things that we found is that it is a team effort, right? And you mentioned the right players that are part of that. One of the things NORTHCOM has found

is we can apply the same model that we have been using for hurricanes and applying Federal capability to some of the State and local issues. We find that we can actually apply that using that model and taking the expertise, for example, in Cyber Command and applying it through NORTHCOM in a defense support to civil authorities model.

So, I will use the elections as an example in both 2018 and now even in the Super Tuesday we just had. We actually brought all of the TAGs [The Adjutants General] in to our headquarters and we had Paul Nakasone from Cyber Command there and Joel Langill there. We provided them information at the highest classification level of what the threats were that were out there. We then gave them some capability and capacity that they could bring back to their States, because it is just not fair for a State, like the local State like Colorado is where I live, to be competing with a Russia, as an example. And so, that-

Ms. TORRES SMALL. And I promise I am not cutting you off because you are from Colorado, but I do want to switch to get to another point quickly. Admiral Faller, I am going to switch to you just briefly. I really appreciated my colleague's discussion with you about the Northern Triangle, and I just want to follow up slightly.

I noticed in your statement—and I appreciate your concernabout South America's increasing absorption into China's Belt and Road Initiative, and these tactics of predatory economics provide the pathway for China to hold significant leverage over the region's affairs. I know that you talked about the funding being restored, but during the time that it was frozen, do you believe that it helped

malign actors like Russia and China grow in the region?

Admiral FALLER. It certainly provides an additional window for them to come in and work their tactics and techniques. What we hear from partners is that they want to partner with the U.S. They want to align with us. And I don't actually get into the choosing thing, but we do talk about democracies and values and consistent long-term relationships and respect for human rights and rule of law, and those sorts of things that align themselves. And we, then, expand it beyond the predatory loans to IT [information technology] that not only has a front door but a back door right into Beijing, to illegal fishing and illegal mining, and construction of questionable construction, and all these sorts of things.

And the clear choice is to partner with the U.S., but in order to do that, we have got to be present. And I think we are at the level, we are back to the level now with the countries, the Northern Triangle—Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador—that allows us to continue to commit and have them pay back on our security.

Ms. Torres Small. And just very briefly, could you mention any specific programs that the State Department and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] have that work especially well to enhance regional security and protect our interests in

the Northern Triangle?

Admiral FALLER. I have mentioned it several times today, the IMET program. International education is key. The Foreign Military Finance, FMF, program is a State Department program. It is multiyear and gains that security cooperation. That is important. The State Department has a GPOI, Global Peace Operations [Initiative] program. That, for example, allows the El Salvadorans to deploy to Mali.

Ms. Torres Small. Okay. I have got one more question. So,

thank you, and we will follow up on those. I apologize.

General O'Shaughnessy, one more question for you. As migration flow at our southern border has decreased, have the number of Ac-

tive Duty troops decreased commensurately?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Ma'am, they have been consistent throughout this year, this both calendar and fiscal year, to what the request for assistance had come from the Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. So, you have not decreased the troops? They have not returned to their missions?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. They have not. They have been steady-state.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Okay. Thank you.

I yield the remainder of my time.

Ms. HORN. Thank you, Ms. Torres Small.

Mr. Kelly, you are recognized.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Admiral Faller, recently, I have been hearing rumors that there is a potential for up to a 20 percent reduction in security cooperation funding within DOD. If true, I am extremely concerned about the disproportionate impacts these cuts will have in your AOR and, also, in AFRICOM, some of those places where we do a lot more with less. I am extremely concerned that I think a large part of that is planned to be taken out of the State Partnership Program, which gives tremendous benefits all across the world and is a low cost. So, we cut something that is really effective. Can you talk about the strategic risk that a cut to security cooperation, and specifically the State Partnership Program, would have on SOUTH-COM?

Admiral Faller. The defense-wide review did cut 20 percent from the Department's, what we call our 333, security cooperation program. And those cuts have been distributed across the combatant commands. The FY21 percentage of that cut for SOUTHCOM is right at about 20 percent. SOUTHCOM has been decreased in that fund 32 percent in the last 3 years, and we have had to make some hard choices on prioritization. And prioritization is important. So, there is no argument there in terms of prioritization. But our Guard's teams, and your State's Guard team partnership

with Bolivia, they are key and they fall in. Often, those Guard teams, the partnership teams are the force providers that go along with the security cooperation fund. So, with just the people without the funds, it really doesn't provide a whole package for some of the

engagements.

We are looking at how do we restart our relationship for Bolivia, for example. And that will be challenging for us to find the funds to leverage that relationship. I will argue that that is great power competition and a long-term investment, as we provide a modest amount of investment in a country like Bolivia or Ecuador or Peru that gives us leverage and allows us to train, allows us to be interoperable with our partner, allows them to get after threats that affect us and them. So, the drug threat is a perfect example. It pays

long-term dividends and gives the United States of America positional advantage against future great power moves from China and Russia. Somebody is going to fill the void.

One of our chiefs of defense said, "When you need a life ring, you are going to take it from anybody." I said, "Yes, but careful what

the rope around that life line does to you."

Mr. Kelly. And you are right, we also have a State partnership with Uzbekistan, which has yielded tremendous benefits in CENT-COM's AOR, based on a State partnership and a personal relationship that I have that was established long ago through my Guard State Partnership job.

Talking about Bolivia, I am hopeful that we can re-engage. And I know that our Adjutant General is re-engaging, and I think there are some opportunities there to get in on the ground floor and es-

tablish relationships that help us carry that forward.

So, I hope that we will continue to strengthen the State partnerships in Bolivia and other areas and, also, the IMET. We have got to use that. And I know that you do. But places like Bolivia, where we haven't in the past had people in IMET, the sooner we get engaged, the sooner we are influencing and making friends with the leaders of 20 or 30 years from now, which is very important.

I was just recently in Iraq. The CHOD [chief of defense] was actually a guy I served with over there. And we recognized each

other, and that goes a long way.

So, if you would just briefly, what can we do to strengthen the

State Partnership Program in the Western Hemisphere?

Admiral FALLER. I think the things General O'Shaughnessy mentioned where he brings the State partners together, we do the same thing. We bring them together. We talk about what our shared objectives are, how do we reach those shared objectives with the partner, how do we make the best—and for us, a State partnership is our principal force that we send to these nations. And so, how do we ensure that we are doing that most efficiently?

Predictability is important because we have got to be able to tell our partner nations and our State partners a year out that you can depend on this month, this time. We want to be unpredictable to our enemies, but predictable to our partners in the Guard and to our nation, partner nation. So, stable, on-time budgets, the consistent funding level are very, very important as we go forward.

Mr. Kelly. And just finally, I want to compliment both of you guys and all our other COCOM [combatant command] commanders. You guys are really engaged with the State Partnership Program and give good guidance, so that we make sure that our Guard units from 54 different States and territories are engaged with the right priority, which are DOD's priorities. So, I just thank you for what you all do every day with our State Partnership Program.

With that, I yield back.

Ms. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Kelly. Ms. Escobar, you are recognized.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you to our panelists. Thank you for being here today, and thank you most especially for your service.

General O'Shaughnessy, it was wonderful to visit with you yesterday, and I really appreciated our conversation and the time that you took, and your commitment to ongoing communication, especially with regard to Fort Bliss and El Paso. My questions really are going to center around some of the conversations that we had yesterday.

I know NORTHCOM oversees critical missions that help provide for our security. And you and I talked about how important those missions are. That is why one of the things I am always concerned about is the opportunity cost of tapping military resources. When we apply military resources to legal asylum seekers, we take our eyes off of genuine national security threats. With regard to the latest crisis response force being deployed to the border, including to my community, El Paso, can you indicate what missions they would otherwise be engaged in and how are those losses made up?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, ma'am. First, I would highlight that this force that we are talking about, approximately 160, of which 80 went to California and 80 went to Texas, that force is actually assigned to us for this particular mission set. This is actually an opportunity to highlight the great work we do with the Department of Homeland Security, realizing, to your point, that this force is really for a different purpose, and they allowed us to keep that force at home at Fort Polk in order to maximize the readiness for that force. They were able to train together. They were able to stay at home with their families until they were actually needed for, in this case, what they were seeing as an increased demand signal as a result of the Ninth Circuit Court decision. And so, in some ways, that was a positive because, since October, they have been on this mission set, but they haven't had to deploy to actually go do the mission on the border. Our commitment to DHS was that, if they asked for it, though, we would make it available to them. So, we did in the timelines that they were so inclined to do so.

But this is a military police force. This also includes helicopters and a general purpose force. So, we have tried to walk that balance of maintaining the readiness while still contributing to our lead Federal agency for securing the border, Department of Homeland

Security.

Ms. ESCOBAR. I do want to point out that what has been unusual and new, and particularly alarming to my community, is the sight of military personnel with guns at our ports of entry—ports of entry that are utilized every single day by tens of thousands of people in a community that is binational, bicultural, truly international, a community really that sees itself as one region. And we see our ports of entry as symbols of unity and symbols of friendship and familial ties as well and economic ties. While this may be part of the umbrella of work, having seen this just happen recently has been jarring to many members of my community. How long do you expect the crisis response force to be engaged at our ports of entry in this way?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Ma'am, I would say, first, I want to send kudos to our teammates in this, our Department of Homeland Security brethren and our Customs and Border Protection [CBP]. They do a phenomenal effort every day across not only the ports,

but across the border at large.

Specifically to this particular deployment, it will last as long as Customs and Border Protection feel that they need to have this capability there. So, I can't give you a specific answer. It is not a task. It is actually on call, if you will, for the remaining of the fiscal year. I don't believe it will be deployed for that long. I suspect over time, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, they will relieve us of that particular mission set.

I would also note that they are not the primary responders. They are there as a backup for our lead Federal agency in doing this

mission.

Ms. ESCOBAR. I understand that. It still is really jarring to have families who have been used to seeing our ports of entry in a very positive light suddenly see military enforcement on these ports.

What are the specific duties? Do you know what the specific duties are for the folks that are actually on the ports of entry? And I am running out of time. So, if you wouldn't mind just being brief.

Thank you.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Very quickly—and this might actually help—first, we transport the DHS members, the CBP members to the right place. Second, we provide the engineering capability to move obstacles, if they need to move obstacles very quickly. And only third, and in a tertiary role, do we have our military police that could be employed.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you so much, General.

I just want to reiterate for the public that the Congress has funded the Department of Homeland Security, two supplementals, hundreds of millions of dollars. And I believe they are well-equipped to do the job.

Thank you so much. I really appreciate all of you. I yield back.

Ms. HORN. Thank you, Ms. Escobar. Mr. Gallagher, you are recognized.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

Secretary Rapuano, I want to thank you for your consistent engagement with the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Thank you for mentioning the work of the report in your testimony and the concept of layered cyber deterrence. We are, as you mentioned, releasing our findings today.

For those who are interested or perhaps are having trouble sleeping, this is the final report. You can get a copy from all of us. For the literal tens of people watching on C-SPAN right now, this is

the report right here.

But we do hope that we can spark a debate, and your work was essential to the final product. So, I want to thank you for that.

Because so much of our final strategic recommendation involves building upon the progress that has been made within DOD around "defend forward," could you briefly sort of describe the genesis of defend forward and the steps you have taken to implement that, as part of DOD's overall cyber and National Defense Strategy

Secretary RAPUANO. Certainly. Thank you, Congressman Galla-

gher.

Defend forward is really about preempting, deterring, defeating malevolent cyber activity targeting the United States. In order to do that, you have to be forward; you have to be understanding how adversaries are operating, what tools they are using, what techniques they are applying. So, that is really the driving emphasis of our strategy in terms of where we were several years ago and

where we are today.

Mr. Gallagher. And then, a lot of what we talked about in the course of the Commission's work was, in some sense, the difference between deterrence in cyber and strategic nuclear deterrence in the Cold War is that there is little margin for error and for failure in the latter, but we start from a position of sort of constant failure, particularly below the threshold for military force in cyber. And therefore, we need to build in a certain level of resilience in the face of failure.

With that in mind, and when we talk about homeland defense, let's say there is a significant cyberattack. Would it make sense to have some sort of continuity to the economy plan in place with accompanying legal authorities to be more resilient and be able to re-

cover quickly in the case of such a massive cyberattack?

Secretary RAPUANO. Sir, I think what you are getting at is identifying the most critical infrastructure functions that may be vulnerable to cyber, identifying them as such, and applying specific measures of effectiveness and applications of security that should be applied to those systems, and thinking through what rapid reconstitution would be required if there were successful attacks against these most critical elements of the Nation's economy and other vital functions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thinking through the unthinkable and being ready prior to a crisis to potentially mitigate the effects of it?

Secretary RAPUANO. Correct.

Mr. Gallagher. And then, finally, I would just say one of the recommendations that may not get as much attention is this idea that we have talked about at the subcommittee level of having the cyber mission force do a force structure assessment. Those of us who deal with the Navy argue about the Navy's force structure assessment, or lack thereof sometimes. Similarly, the cyber mission force was designed based on outdated requirements from 2013. And so, we are sort of asking you and General Nakasone and others to do some analysis and tell us, given everything that has changed in the interim and the threat landscape in cyber, what is the appropriate force structure for cyber? Is that something that makes sense to you?

Secretary RAPUANO. So, Secretary Esper has already tasked that to be done, an assessment for cyber operating forces, looking back at what drove the original numbers, where we are today, the very significant, dramatic changes in terms of the threat environment, as well as in the capabilities and authorities of the Department of Defense and other agencies as well. And what is that? How well do we understand what types of capabilities/expertise need to be represented in that force? So, that is being done as we speak.

Mr. Gallagher. Well, fantastic. And again, thank you for your engagement with the commission. Thank you for your leadership. And again, in a shameless plug to the Commission's work, it is

And again, in a shameless plug to the Commission's work, it is also available—shocker—online at solarium.gov for those who would like to read the final work of the Commission. We hope this will, if nothing else, spark a debate about the status quo in cyber.

And I think all of your testimonies have shown how important this new domain of geopolitical competition that is cyber is.

So, thank you, gentlemen, for all of your service. Appreciate it.

And I yield back.

Ms. HÖRN. Mr. Gallagher, would you like to submit those for the record?

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is a great idea. Can I submit these for the record?

Ms. HORN. I ask unanimous consent to include into the record all members' statements and extraneous material, including the Cyberspace Solarium Commission reports. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]

Ms. HORN. Ms. Luria, you are recognized.

Mrs. Luria. Thank you.

And I would like to follow up on my colleague Mr. Byrne's comments about the LCS [littoral combat ship] deployment to SOUTH-COM. Over the course of these hearings last year, I specifically asked each geographic combatant commander about the presence that they have received in their region versus what they have requested through the GFM [Global Force Management] process. It is good to hear that we have increased exponentially from zero to one this year, but I wanted to focus back on the importance of that deployment to the SOUTHCOM region. And you mentioned FON ops, the freedom of navigation ops, partnership missions, counternarcotics operations.

Just for the moment, I would like to focus on the capability of the LCS as a platform, as a suitable platform for those types of missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR. As a caveat, the reason I mention that is because in other hearings with the Navy there has been discussion of decommissioning the first four ships of the class as early as 12 years in their life. So, can you comment on how effective that platform is for missions in areas such as SOUTHCOM?

Admiral Faller. It is a very effective platform. It is versatile. It has a large flight deck. The variants that we have deployed, we have sent with Unmanned Fire Scout capability as well as manned helicopter. That really exponentially improves the ability to search out the ISR over time. The mission capability, the large internal reconfigurable spaces are important for the full range of mission sets.

We have been up to Mayport, Florida, and visited some. I have taken my Marine Forces South commander with me. Lots of potential there for Marines to go afloat with flexible maneuverability. So, we could partner as a naval force with our partners and in exercises, as well as the mission sets that you mentioned.

Mrs. LURIA. So, would you include in the utility of that platform also the first four ships of the class? We are looking at decommissioning ships well beyond the end of their service life. Yet, it sounds like the baseline capabilities of these ships would be useful within SOUTHCOM for the missions that you are accomplishing.

Admiral FALLER. Broadly, ma'am, I would say numbers do matter. There is a value to capacity and the capability it brings. I know the Navy is challenged with the budget numbers and readiness,

and I know there has been some challenges with these lead ships of the class on readiness. I don't think I am in a position from the readiness tradeoff and cost to comment on the utility of those first four, but I would say that, broadly, we don't have enough plat-

Mrs. Luria. Right. So, I was going to say presence is important, and presence in the SOUTHCOM AOR, you have reiterated numerous times how important that is to our allies and to the other actors within the region. And so, I have frequently discussed the OFRP, or the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and how that is not generating as much presence as I believe the Navy's capability has. So, if I am taking it, you would prefer to see more presence generated than purely surge capability from the vessels that the Navy currently has, not even talking about upcoming shipbuilding?

Admiral FALLER. You stated well, and better than I. Zero is equal to zero in any math equation or it is infinity, unsolvable. So, we have to be present in some levels to compete. And so, that persistent presence is important, in addition to the presence that we might provide from an exercise. And so, it does take numbers of ships to do that. I think that the OFRP readiness model is capable of generating the right readiness for that presence. Not all the ships have to be, in my view, to go to South America and Latin America, the Caribbean, ready for every warfare mission. They have to be safe to steam. They have to be able to protect themselves, and they also have to be able to partner and do the counternarcotics mission set. And so, I think we can look at this globally and put the right presence at the right time, and ships are one of our critical gaps.

Mrs. Luria. And you also mentioned earlier the MMSV, the Multi-Mission Support Vessel. Can you talk a little bit more about that construct and what other types of somewhat out-of-the-boxtype combinations of vessels, whether they be contract, MSC [Military Sealift Command]-operated, Navy, or Coast Guard, that could provide further capabilities that are really specific to your region, and that essentially done at a lower cost than our high-end ships such as DDGs or cruisers?

Admiral FALLER. Thanks to filling unfunded priority, this innovative Multi-Mission Vessel is making a huge difference, and we have put it in as an unfunded for next year at \$18 million for the request. I think it is a game changer.

Mrs. Luria. So, you are basically saying \$18 million is making a big difference?

Admiral Faller. But that is \$18 million funding for the entire

year for the ship, for the Multi-Mission Vessel.

I would also just be remiss if I didn't talk about how much more the Coast Guard is doing. They sign up for four force packages a year, and they are currently supplying eight. And so, the Coast Guard is punching well above its weight in this AOR.

Mrs. LURIA. It is great to see the Coast Guard providing that ca-

I know we don't have a lot of time left, but I would like to think further about the MSC platforms and, specifically, how we could leverage those types of platforms for exactly the mission that you are talking about. So, I would like to have an opportunity to continue that conversation later.

Admiral FALLER. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.

Ms. HORN. Thank you, Ms. Luria. Mr. Waltz, you are recognized.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Thank you all for everything that you do. And, Admiral, thank

you for your time this week.

So, I just want to again shift back to some of the great power competition that we are seeing in our own backyard. I am not very sanguine about it at all. I think we need, as this committee and as leaders, need to be ringing the alarm bells to the American people, who I don't know fully appreciate the level of what is going on

just to our south, and frankly, across the United States.

So, while I fully support the National Defense Strategy, I am not so sure about the apportionment that we are seeing in this budget, as you heard a number of members mention. I mean, this committee will literally authorize hundreds of billions of dollars buying more stuff, a lot of stuff, a lot of it focused on the Taiwan scenario, and I fully support that. But, as we have all mentioned, security assistance is great power competition. Partnering with our partners is great power competition. The State Partnership Program— Florida's partner is Venezuela—is great power competition. So, while we are kind of shoulder-to-shoulder or force-to-force wargaming out in the Indo-Pacific, we have the termites eating up our foundation right in our backyard, and I find that incredibly concerning.

So, the first question for you, Admiral, can you tell us more about China and Russia, boots on the ground in Venezuela? It is mentioned in your testimony, "advisors." Are those uniformed Russian military that are on the ground in Venezuela advising the

Maduro regime?

Admiral Faller. We have Cubans in the thousands, Russians in the hundreds, the Chinese in lesser amounts. These Russians range from contractors working on air defense systems, working on helicopters, working on Su-30s [fighter aircraft], to the highest end special forces that are present, training-

Mr. Waltz. Spetsnaz?

Admiral Faller. Yes, sir, that is right. More broadly, I would like to expand the Russian presence in the AOR. We saw a record number of Russian ship deployments this year. The cable survey, cable-cutting ships, currently on station doing their work here; a Russian high-end frigate that has cruise missile, nuclear-capable cruise missile that came around, and with several other ships came into NORTHCOM's AOR. Late last year, we had Russian bombers fly into Venezuela. So, Russians have also invested in a training center in Nicaragua.

Mr. WALTZ. Would you say that the Monroe Doctrine is at risk? Admiral Faller. Oh, I think the Russians see the value of their access, presence, and influence here in the hemisphere, as well as the Chinese. You mentioned the Chinese. We have been asking ourselves the question-and Ambassador Manes fought the hard fight as ambassador in El Salvador—why would the Russians—or the Chinese, excuse me—try to lock up 75 percent of the coast of El Salvador in a 99-year lease? Now they were thwarted, but they are still at it. Why is China trying to buy a deepwater port in Jamaica? And why has China built a road across Jamaica, which they have a 50-year lease to collect all the tolls on that road? It is not

a very good deal.

Mr. Waltz. I think, in addition, I was just down in Panama with Representative Rogers and Representative Scalise. I think the American people need to understand the Chinese own the Panama Canal now. They own the ports on both sides, and they are putting the ports they don't own out of business. And we have had frigates that cannot stop and get the repairs they need because the Chinese-backed ownership has said no. Do you find that concerning? Obviously, a part of our CON plans, our contingency plans, is to be able to shift our fleets from east to west, or vice versa. And if the Chinese own the Panama Canal, built by Americans, does that concern you as a military commander?

Admiral Faller. Our most significant exercise every year is the defense of the Panama Canal exercise. And as you noted——

Mr. WALTZ. Sorry, I am just very short on time. Should we be

back in Panama, American boots on the ground?

Admiral Faller. I think it is something we should approach carefully with the government of Panama. The new government is very aligned with U.S. interests and is looking to reverse some of the Chinese influence, and we should approach carefully what the best access is there. It is a strategic location and we need to stay engaged there.

Mr. Waltz. General, just in my time remaining, my understanding, in the Bahamas, the Chinese are very aggressively moving into the Bahamas 50 miles off the coast of the United States and buying fishing rights, when we have one of our most sophisticated underwater testing facilities there that tests all of our submarines, our unmanned vehicles. What are we doing in terms of the Chinese influence in the Bahamas?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. As I am short of time, I will just broadly say that we are concerned about the Chinese influence there, both from a commercial investment and resorts that, then, equates influence. AUTEC [Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center] is the particular place you are referring to. We have sensitive operations there that we want to keep sensitive and then be able to do what we do there without intrusion from the Chinese. So, yes, we are concerned, and I think sometimes we forget that it is 50 miles off our coast.

Mrs. Luria [presiding]. General, your time has expired.

Mr. WALTZ. Can I take the rest for the record?

Mrs. Luria. I request that you take this conversation for the record.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 125.]

Mrs. Luria. And, Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I almost want to yield you another 5 minutes. You are onto something very important, Mr. Waltz.

Every answer to your question was "We're concerned." That is totally unsatisfactory. Yes, we are concerned, too, but what are you doing about it?

Admiral FALLER. With the Chinese, our best efforts are to stay engaged through education, exercise, and security cooperation. One

of our main nuclear forces—

Mr. GARAMENDI. We have already heard that the security cooperation money is being taken out of the appropriations and out

of the budget. We had that discussion earlier.

The point here is, yes, we are concerned, but at the same time we are not providing the resources that that concern can actually result in action. And there is much, much more. Nobody here has yet asked about the infamous border wall ripoff, \$11 billion—\$1.4 billion or \$2 billion taken from the National Guard across the United States, all of them, for their equipment.

Mr. Rapuano, is that creating a national security problem within the borders of the United States when the National Guard doesn't

have its equipment?

Secretary RAPUANO. The decision—

Mr. GARAMENDI. The answer is yes. Okay? Is it yes or no?

Secretary RAPUANO. The decision was it was a prioritization process made by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. GARAMENDI. To do what? To build a border wall.

Secretary RAPUANO. To meet direction from the President to address a homeland security challenge that the Department was not—

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, it was the President's decision. What is your view?

Secretary RAPUANO. My view is that DHS is supporting the enforcement of laws on the border, legislated by Congress, and is overwhelmed in terms of its capacity by the numbers crossing illegally.

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is a lot of—that is just not factual. You know that is not factual. So, don't give us that. All right?

Secretary RAPUANO. That is factual.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Then, deliver to me the facts, not alternate facts. Deliver to us the facts. Okay? When will you have those facts in my office?

Secretary RAPUANO. We can provide you all the information upon which we based our response to DHS's request for assistance.

Mr. GARAMENDI. When will you have it in my office?

Secretary RAPUANO. We will provide you copies-Mr. GARAMENDI. When?

Secretary RAPUANO. When?

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes. Tomorrow?

Secretary RAPUANO. No, not tomorrow, but—

Mr. GARAMENDI. But when?

Secretary RAPUANO. Next week.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Don't dance with me. When will you deliver those facts?

Secretary Rapuano. Next week I think we can do that.

Mr. GARAMENDI. When?

Secretary RAPUANO. By Wednesday of next week.

Mr. Garamendi. Very good. I will expect it.

Secretary RAPUANO. You will have it.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Eleven billion dollars taken out of the Department of Defense activities all across this world, including within the United States—Puerto Rico, Guam, New York, New Mexico, critical national projects that were determined by the Department of Defense and this committee, and the Senate, military construction projects. So, when are those going to be built, because we knew they were important?

Secretary RAPUANO. They will be funded in the years ahead. They were deemed to be not as critical in terms of funding now.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. I would like to see the analysis of that criticality. Will you deliver that to my office next Wednesday also, why the border wall, of which, under construction projects, \$3.8 billion was taken out of those military construction projects across the world? Less than \$900 million has been obligated of that money; \$2.9 billion has been sitting unspent for the last year. Are you aware of that? It is a fact. That is \$2.9 billion of critical military construction projects that have not been built, but that money is sitting unspent, unobligated, somewhere in the Department of Defense, or the Treasury, or OMB [Office of Management and Budget], or somewhere. Can you explain why it is more important that that money be unspent, sitting unspent, rather than those construction projects, including the European Defense Initiative programs not going forward, that were deemed to be critical in pushing back against Russia's aggression? Can you explain that to me?

Secretary RAPUANO. I will pass your request to the comptroller. Mr. GARAMENDI. No, this is a policy question and you are the pol-

icy——

Secretary RAPUANO. I am sorry, Congressman, I don't have the status of all those, the funding elements in terms of your understanding that they are frozen.

Mr. GARAMENDI. It is a fact that \$2.9 billion is sitting unspent

and unobligated.

Apparently, I am out of time, but I am not out of questions.

You have been participating in a monumental—Mrs. Luria. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I appreciate all three of you being here. It is great to see General O'Shaughnessy again, who I served with off and on in my Air Force career. So, great to see you here.

My first question is to Admiral Faller. I appreciate hearing the information you have been sharing on Russia's and China's investment. So, I won't go down that path, but that was where I wanted to go as well.

But could you tell us a little bit the status of Chile right now? I know a few months back there was a lot of violence and demonstrations there, and they are a good ally. So, I was concerned.

Thank you.

Admiral Faller. They are a good ally, as you mentioned, and they are an exporter of security. As we speak, a Chilean frigate is deploying with the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike group to the Asia-Pacific. And this is a demonstration of the Chileans' commitment to global security, not just hemispheric security. And it is a

demonstration of the Chileans' high-end capability. There is a lot to learn from working with them.

Last year, we partnered with Chile and hosted the UNITAS Pacific in Chile, the Nation's, in fact, the world's longest-serving maritime exercise. And Chileans led that exercise and they led it capa-

We are working to do additional partnership with the Chileans in cyber and in the land domain. And so, we continue to have a strong relation. Earlier this year, unfortunately, they lost a C-130. We surged some assets to try to help them do the search and rescue, but it was in the horrible conditions of the Antarctic.

Closely looking at the instability, we are very pleased to work with our partners that have remained professional.

Mr. Bacon. Is it starting to calm down? Admiral Faller. Well, I think we haven't taken our eye off that ball, but we are in constant dialog and sharing intelligence with them and helping them.

Mr. Bacon. There was recently a report, too, of some violence in Colombia, where the rebels used to operate. Are we still in a good position there in Colombia? Are they doing all right with the peace agreement that they have?

Admiral FALLER. Sir, I would fight along with the Colombians any day of the week. They are fighters. They are professional. They have tough security challenges that they have overcome. Plan Colombia was a success.

Mr. Bacon. Right.

Admiral FALLER. It was a long-term investment. They invested \$10 for every dollar that other nations invested. They have got a lot of challenges. They have got terrorists and narcotraffickers.

Mr. Bacon. So, the recent reports, were they just one-off, or was that just—hopefully, not a reoccurrence?

Admiral FALLER. Well, again, we are watching that closely.

Mr. Bacon. Okay.

Admiral FALLER. They have close to 2 million migrants in their country. They are dealing with FARC dissidents. They are dealing with narcotraffic, narcoterrorism, and a significant challenge there. They are working all these challenges and they are continuing to export security. Last year, they trained 1,500 special force units in Central America to help them get after their fight, while still working their security challenges at home. So, it is a top priority for us, working with Colombia.

Mr. BACON. Right. I flew with the Colombian air force about a half dozen times, extraordinarily professional. I was impressed.

General O'Shaughnessy, you talked a little bit about our ability to detect ICBMs, and we have some capacity to interdict them. And you also mentioned it is much harder with the cruise missiles and the hypersonic weapons, and that we need new capabilities there. How does your budget request, how does it get towards this problem? What things are we trying to invest in to detect these new

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, first, if you will indulge me for one second, I will reminisce back to our time and service together. And thank you for your great work in the United States Air Force and, then, continuing to serve in Congress and, then, on this committee

to continue to influence national security.

Specific to your question, this is a very difficult challenge we are faced with going forward. One of the ways that we are really trying to get after it is, working with industry, instead of just going after a particular widget and saying, "We need a widget to do this," to do this one mission set, we are actually going with industry and saying, "Here is our challenge." We need domain awareness. We need to understand what is happening from undersea to space. We need the ability to command and control that, and then, we need those defeat mechanisms in a holistic system. And by really talking to industry and collaborating with industry, we see what is in the realm of the possible. And so, we have actually had some success there.

And then, we are taking that into the budget process, because of instead of asking, like traditionally, what we do within the DOD is asking for a particular system, we are actually looking for a system of systems. And so, how do we bring that into the acquisition process?

We have had some success this year of really focusing on homeland defense, and that is why this year, 2020, is a year of homeland defense, because we now have that traction. Now it is time to turn that into actual results, so we can defend our Nation.

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Mrs. Luria. Mr. Crow.

Mr. CROW. Thank you, Chairwoman.

Thank you to all the witnesses and for your continued service to

the country and your testimony today.

I understand that the FY20 counterdrug funding has been put on hold. It may be cut up to \$90 million to pay for U.S. Army Corps operating cost to execute border wall construction for FY19 projects. Admiral, are any of your counterdrug or drug interdiction projects impacted by this hold?

Admiral FALLER. There was a delay in flowing counternarcotics funding. That money is now flowing. So, to date, we have had no impact to what was programmed for the FY20 level for our coun-

ternarcotics funding.

Mr. Crow. How long was that delay?

Admiral FALLER. It was several months into the year before that money started to flow. The uncertainty really impacted our ability to do the kind of long-term management that we needed to, but we worked through it and now the money is flowing.

Mr. CROW. Do you anticipate any cuts for your FY20 planned

projects?

Admiral FALLER. There have been discussions about cuts. You mentioned a figure. To date, we haven't received any cuts, and our accounts, we have got a good spend plan based on the current amount for the rest of the year.

Mr. Crow. If there are any reductions in FY21, how will that im-

pact your region?

Admiral FALLER. This money, about one-third of all our funds for SOUTHCOM are counternarcotics money. They are critical for the security of the United States of America. They are saving lives. So, reductions in funds are going to be something that we are not

going to do, and that is going to result in some narcotrafficker that is not taken off the battlefield.

Mr. CROW. And for all the witnesses, are any of you anticipating, or have you been ordered to create plans, or in the process of planning for, additional deployments to the southern border?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Not beyond the current support that is

being provided.

Mr. Crow. So, as of today, there is no planning for additional troop level increases to the southern border?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Not as of today, no.

Mr. Crow. Okay.

Admiral FALLER. No plans, sir.

Mr. Crow. Shifting gears just briefly, on the issue of Arctic control and the increased pressures in the Arctic, there are plans to increase the number of our icebreakers. There have been appropriations for both the planning and the start of the construction for those icebreakers. So, General O'Shaughnessy, starting with you, are the current plans sufficient, in your view, over the next 5 years to field the icebreakers that are necessary to counter both Russian and Chinese influence in the Arctic region?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Well, first, I would applaud the effort of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy that has supported that procurement of the icebreakers. I have actually been on the *Polar Star*, our icebreaker that is 44 or so years old. We need these ice-

breakers and we need the polar security cutters now.

I would also say that, as the deployment happens, normally six of them, at least three heavy, initial deployment is likely to Antarctica. And so, we have to look not just at the first one that will be operational, but when is the second and third one going to be operational, which we will need in the Arctic as well. So, from my perspective, I am very pleased that we are making progress on this. We had significant funds this year, over \$500 million applied to it, but we need to continue that program and, if anything, we ought to be looking to accelerate it.

Mr. CROW. So, the six, as we understand it, will that be sufficient

in the long term? Because I know Russia has upwards of 20.

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. Clearly, it is a start. As we work closely with the Coast Guard, and especially with the three heavy as

ly with the Coast Guard, and especially with the three heavy as a minimum, potentially up to six heavy, depending on how they end up doing the procurement, it will give us a start. But we see diminishing sea ice. More navigation actually increases the need for those icebreakers in order to take advantage of the Arctic.

Mr. CROW. Yes. And, Admiral, could you just very briefly classify for me, as we talk about the pivot to great power competition, a lot of people view that solely as an Indo-Pacific pivot, but could you just paint the picture for us as to the Chinese investments in Central and South America, and how you believe that fits in with their overall strategy?

Admiral FALLER. Yes, it is clearly a global view for that great power competition. It is playing right out here in our neighborhood—the significant increase in foreign direct investment, in loans. China is the number one creditor. The Chinese trade, I think by the end of this year we will see the Chinese as the number one

trading partner with the whole hemisphere.

And as I have emphasized, our presence with small units, like Joint Task Force Bravo, which is 685 soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, that is our main maneuver force, along with our State partners. That is key to anchoring our positional advantage in this hemisphere.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Thank you. Madam Chair, Í yield back. Mrs. Luria. Thank you.

And I think that concludes our questions from members of the

committee.


Mr. Thornberry and I would both like to thank you very much for your participation today and for answering these valuable questions that will provide insights into the process as we move forward for the NDAA. And thank you again.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

March 11, 2020



Statement of Chairman Adam Smith House Armed Services Committee Hearing on: "National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America"

March 11, 2020

Good Morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses for today's hearing: Kenneth Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Admiral Craig Faller, U.S. Southern Command, and General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command. Thank you all for your continued commitment to addressing critical national security challenges in your respective regions. Your views are an important part of the committee's work to draft the annual National Defense Authorization Act.

Like yesterday and our previous posture hearings, I'd like to continue to focus on the Department's strategy and how the budget makes tradeoffs to achieve that strategy. How do the Administration's policies and investments in the Western Hemisphere adhere to the objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)? The NDS prioritizes great power competition and, in doing so, highlights the importance of partners and allies. Nowhere are our partners closer to home than in the Western Hemisphere, our backyard. So, how is the Department striking appropriate balance with regard to posture in these regions and how are resources allocated in the budget?

The United States has built and maintained strong relationships with Western Hemisphere countries. Our geographical proximity brings many shared benefits and values but also shared challenges, including drug trafficking, the humanitarian situation in Central America and Venezuela, and our preparation and readiness to support natural disasters. Latin America is a source of significant migration to the U.S. in recent years and is also the largest source of illegal drugs entering the country. By law, the Department is the lead agency responsible for the detection and monitoring of drugs transiting into the U.S. and our counterdrug cooperation with countries in the region and support to U.S. law enforcement have helped interdict countless volumes of illegal drugs before they reach the U.S. but there is still more work to be done.

Like with Africa, I am concerned that the Department's current zero-base review of combatant commands, while important, should consider the second and third order effects of posture and resources changes. For example, the fiscal year (FY) 2021 budget request cuts funds for joint exercises, which are key to preparing for crises in Latin America and could have significant effects later during a disaster response. Cuts in investments to the FY2021 budget request for security cooperation could also impact the flow of drugs into the U.S. and reduce our presence in the region at a time when China is seeking to make strategic investments. China, in particular, has made it clear that they want to exert

influence and continue to advance their political and economic agendas throughout the region. El Salvador, for example, is one location where China has sought to invest through the Belt and Road Initiative. Our presence in the region can be a deterrent to malign influence and an opportunity to continue to share our values, this is especially important where democracies are at risk, corruption remains, and partners seek reassurance that they have our support. Consistent policies and steady engagement with our allies and partners in the region are essential and are also one of the best ways to ensure a stable Western Hemisphere. Our partnership with Colombia, one of our strongest partners, is an example of how building partnership capacity can have positive effects in the region.

Latin America is also a clear example of the importance of complementary investments by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. foreign assistance has helped to reduce violence, create economic opportunities, and help communities combat corruption and develop more effective governments with whom we can partner. Our assistance has targeted some of the drivers of migration from the Northern Triangle and Latin America. Significant cuts to foreign assistance challenge relationships and send the wrong message.

Slightly closer to home, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is charged with defending the homeland, a complex mission that includes defending the United States from maritime, aerospace, missile, cyber, and countless other potential threats. Within that mission, NORTHCOM is responsible for defense from cruise and long-range ballistic missiles and the committee has been focused on delivering a reliable, tested, and cost-effective system to carry out this critical mission. NORTHCOM is also the Department lead for synchronizing Defense Support of Civilian authorities a mission we often think of when it comes to supporting responses to natural disasters but in fact encompasses much more.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the Department's recent reprogramming of \$3.8 billion in funds from congressional defense procurement priorities - critical ships, vehicles, and aircraft - and the National Guard to fund the President's border wall. It is hard to understand why \$3.8 billion was taken from this fiscal year's budget when over \$6 billion dollars taken from the Department's 2019 budget has not been disbursed. The President has claimed credit for 'rebuilding' the military, but just last week the Chief of the National Guard testified before Congress, that the Guard requires \$300 million to replenish spending on deployments to the southern border. If the Guard is unable to recover this funding, they may be forced to cancel drill weekends for the last three months of the year. This does not build readiness, the number one priority of the NDS, this does the exact opposite, it crushes readiness. Cancelling drill weekends for the last three months of the year may also place financial burdens on members of the National Guard, who may factor drill pay into their monthly budget. So, not only is the Department being used to fund the president's campaign promise of a wall, but un funded and extended deployments to the southern border could hamper the readiness of our citizen soldiers with the canceling of training weekends, which

could cause an undue financial burden on them due to loss of military pay. Fiscal year (FY) 2020 counterdrug funds that support the efforts of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, among other impacted combatant commands, are also on hold to support operating expenses for the wall's construction and will potentially mean tens of millions of dollars less than budgeted will go toward the Department's global counterdrug efforts, including programs that directly support interdiction of drugs into the U.S. I'd like to know from our witnesses today when funds will be released and if previously planned counterdrug programs will be impacted by the wall.

Finally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has already sent the Department a FY 2021 request for assistance at the southern border. When will we see the end of having nearly five thousand active duty and National Guard solders at our southern border? I am interested to hear what our troops continue to do on the border and how the Administration is working to turn this mission back over the DHS and CBP. NORTHCOM's resources should be utilized to defend the United States, provide proactive support in the event of a natural disaster, and continue to build and maintain strong relationships with our partners and allies to the north, south, and parts of the Caribbean.

Last, but incredibly importantly, General O'Shaughnessy and his team serve as the Department's Coordinating Authority and synchronizer for all the Department's novel coronavirus (COVID-19) activities in the U.S. in support of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). To date, NORTHCOM has supported response efforts by providing up to 1,000 temporary billets on military installations for U.S. citizens evacuated from China, the Diamond Princess, and the Grand Princess cruise ships. As the country continues to deal with this outbreak, I am particularly interested in learning what support NORTHCOM may be able to provide should HHS request additional support. In past responses, the Department has played an important support role and we're seeing outbreaks across the country. My home state has seen some of the earliest cases of COVID-19 in the community and, sadly, many lethal cases. The health of our servicemembers around the world is also essential and, globally, NORTHCOM also serves as the Department's synchronizer for the Department's pandemic influenza and infectious disease planning. In this capacity, USNORTHCOM coordinates with other combatant commands to assess the impact of COVID-19 in their theaters to determine and mitigate potential impacts to the U.S. and its territories. The focus of USNORTHCOM efforts is to protect the operational effectiveness of military forces and to preserve the Department's ability to maintain mission assurance and meet strategic objectives. I'd like to know exactly what this entails and how NORTHCOM is resourced to perform that mission.

I thank the witnesses for being here today to speak to these regional challenges. I look forward to hearing their testimony.

Statement by The Honorable Kenneth Rapuano Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security Office of the Secretary of Defense

Before the 116th Congress Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives March 11, 2020

Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the national security challenges faced by the United States and Department of Defense (DoD) actions to meet these challenges. I am honored to be here in the company of General O'Shaughnessy, the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Admiral Faller, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command.

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, I am the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a diverse range of matters, including Homeland Defense, Cyber, Space, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mission Assurance, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

I would like to emphasize two key points for you today: (1) the U.S. homeland is not a sanctuary, rather, the homeland is a target in a complex global security environment in which every domain is contested; and (2) we have taken action, guided by key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by partnerships, to ensure that our Nation will prevail in this security environment.

Strategic Environment

As I testified last year, today's security environment is increasingly complex, characterized by challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term strategic economic, information, diplomatic, and military competition. Every military domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. Action in these domains will spike when we approach active conflict, but attacks against our homeland — our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure — are occurring now. Adversaries are seeking to understand our dependencies on commercially owned infrastructure, and they seek to hold that infrastructure at risk to threaten the United States and to challenge DoD's ability to operate in and from the homeland.

Our adversaries seem to believe that they can conduct malign activities against the United States below the threshold of armed conflict in order to achieve their objectives without firing a shot. However, such tactics are misguided, dangerous, escalatory, and destabilizing. Regardless, we are prepared and we are improving.

China and Russia

China and Russia continue to challenge the United States' power, influence, and interests by attempting to erode our national security and prosperity. China and Russia have studied our military capabilities and seek capabilities to counter them and reduce our advantages. The erosion of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to be a central DoD challenge. China's arsenal includes its first aircraft carrier; anti-satellite capabilities; short, medium, and long-range missiles; and anti-ship ballistic missiles. China continues development of an increasingly sophisticated integrated air and missile defense system; successfully tested hypersonic glide vehicles; modernized and expanded its nuclear capabilities; claimed, or created, and militarized islands in the South China Sea in its efforts to coerce the United States and its allies and partners; and continued efforts to penetrate systems and networks for data mining and other purposes. Our competitors' actions underscore that we must anticipate multi-dimensional attacks - on land, in the air, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace - targeted not just against our military forces, but on critical infrastructure at home. Our adversaries are mapping, targeting, and infiltrating U.S. and allied and partner critical infrastructure, notably power, transportation, water, and communication networks, most of which DoD neither owns nor operates, with the intention of laying the groundwork for future disruptive attacks.

The November 5, 2019, "Joint Statement on Ensuring Security of the 2020 Elections," released by the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Acting Director of National Intelligence, and other Federal leaders, highlights the threats Russia, China, and Iran pose to our elections.

Additionally, the Arctic poses new challenges to the defense for the United States and Canada. Russia has steadily expanded its military presence in the region and, by fielding advanced long-range cruise missiles, left us no choice but to improve our homeland defense

capability and capacity. China has displayed an interest in expanding its influence and taken incremental steps to increase its military presence in the region. Defense of the U.S. homeland increasingly depends on our ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats both in and passing through the Arctic. DoD must ensure the security of U.S. Arctic interests, including open sea lanes of communications, while promoting cooperation with our competitors.

North Korea and Iran

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran continue to pose threats to the United States and our allies and partners. Iran has grown increasingly brazen, as demonstrated by its ballistic missile attacks on Iraqi military bases hosting U.S. personnel in January 2020. Although currently unable to strike our homeland with strategic weapons, Iran is investing significant resources on ballistic missile and space-launch capabilities, which could provide the know how to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of ranging the contiguous United States. Iran is also responsible for proliferating ballistic missile capabilities with other malign actors. North Korea and Iran are developing cyber capabilities to target our defense capabilities, civilian critical infrastructure, and economy, and Iran particularly continues to execute a robust counterintelligence campaign against the United States. Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks in our homeland through its terrorist proxies and its growing cyber capabilities.

Violent Extremist Organizations

Despite our successes, terrorists still actively seek to harm the United States and its citizens, its allies, and its partners. Terrorists also continue to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The continued emergence of dangerous naturally occurring, pathogens coupled with advances in bioengineering increase the potential for, expand the variety of, and ease access to biological agents, and challenge our ability to defend against them. Additionally, terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and other malicious non-state actors threaten us with increasingly sophisticated capabilities, including tools of mass disruption, such as cyber capabilities.

Support of Civil Authorities

In support of the National Security Strategy, DoD is prepared to support civil authorities: in response to natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and pandemic

diseases) and in response to man-made threats (e.g., terrorism and terrorist use of WMD); to assist civil authorities in securing special events such as the State of the Union Address and the presidential conventions; to help protect our nation's elections against malign foreign influence; to support civil authorities' efforts to secure our borders, and to respond to other national security threats.

We Continue to Take Action

Guided by the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2019 National Military Strategy, we continue to take action to counter threats to our Nation. DoD is improving its defensive capabilities. Our actions will: deny adversary benefits from aggression; impose costs on adversaries should they commit acts of aggression against the United States and our strategic interests; and, better protect our surge capabilities when projecting power.

Air and Missile Defense

The United States is strengthening its homeland missile defenses and is pursuing more advanced capabilities to stay ahead of rogue state threats. Today the U.S. is defended by the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system – 44 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) supported by a globally integrated network of sensors and a command and control system. To improve the current GMD system, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 budget request includes funds for increasing the current GBI fleet's reliability through hardware and software improvements, deploying a new radar, and improving advanced sensor capabilities. DoD is also developing a new interceptor to meet future threats, the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which will incorporate the advanced technology needed to defeat rogue state missile threats. The FY 2021 budget contains \$638M for NGI development and risk reduction and we anticipate it will begin to be fielded in 2028, and, over time, bringing the total number of GBIs to 64. We are developing a new generation of advanced ground and space based sensors to better detect, track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads, including the completion of ground based radar in Alaska (\$132M in FY 2021) and the development of new space-based sensors to track more sophisticated missile threats (\$100M in FY 2021). Lastly, to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system, DoD is funding options for layered homeland missile

defense capabilities to complement the existing GMD system and enhance protection of the homeland, including a Spring 2020 flight test of the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-class target as well as evaluating the development of a new THAAD interceptor to support homeland defense. DoD is requesting \$274M for these layered homeland defense efforts which, when fully developed, could be available mid-decade.

With the expansion of additional sensors and aerospace control Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar equipped alert fighters, our defensive capability and the capacity of our missile defense sensors will continue to improve. This is a part of a phased effort to enhance our ability to warn and defend against threats from the air and cue our air and missile defense systems against them. In Fiscal Year 2021, DoD has proposed to use \$67.3M to address development of point missile defense capabilities, indications and warning (I&W) capabilities, and site surveys of long-range I&W capabilities in Alaska, Oregon, and Maine. The Department is conducting a binational Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) with the full partnership of the Canadian Science and Technology community, sharing data and analysis from the Canadian All Domain Situational Awareness effort in order to fill capability gaps and inform executive decisions on appropriate binational investments in surveillance modernization.

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems

In the face of the proliferation and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), we appreciate the vital support of Congress for the Department's ability to protect is installations, activities, and personnel in the U.S. homeland. Small UAS are being used in ways that test the seams in our physical defenses, legal authorities, and jurisdictional boundaries. The Department continues to develop and deploy counter-UAS capabilities in close partnership with the Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and Justice. We continue to work with our partners to ensure safety and navigability in the national airspace system. To these ends, we are once again asking Congress to close critical gaps in our authority to protect DoD facilities and assets from UAS.

The Arctic

The Department is also improving its defensive posture in the approaches to North America, especially the Arctic. There is a joint U.S. and Canadian effort to identify technology options that could modernize the North Warning System – the radar network that that provides threat warning and surveillance for the northern approaches to North America. Additionally, DoD is building the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) to improve ballistic defense discrimination.

Space

Space systems underpin virtually every weapon system in our arsenal. But many systems were designed for an era when there were few threats in space. This is not the case today. China and Russia both seek to be able to deny the United States and our allies and partners the advantages of space. The United States is responding to this threat by transforming our space enterprise, fielding resilient architectures, developing space warfighting expertise, and working closely with our allies and partners in combined operations. I want to acknowledge and recognize the bipartisan leadership role that this committee played over several years to establish the U.S. Space Force as a sixth branch of the Armed Forces and make this historic step possible. The President's Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request provides \$18 billion for space programs, including \$111 million to support the establishment of the headquarters and field centers for this new Military Service. In addition to the U.S. Space Force, the President's Budget also provides funding for the new space combatant command – U.S. Space Command – and the Space Development Agency, which will accelerate the development and fielding of military space capabilities necessary to ensure U.S. and allied and partner technological and military advantages.

Cyberspace

We have taken great strides forward in advancing the objectives of the President's National Cyber Strategy and DoD's Defense Cyber Strategy, and in addressing critical gaps identified in the congressionally directed Cyber Posture Review. New Presidential policy on cyberspace operations, as well as statutory authority, have enabled a proactive approach to competition in cyberspace. For example, U.S. Cyber Command engages in "hunt forward" operations – defensive cyber team operating globally, at the invitation of allies and partners, to

search for adversary malicious cyber activities. DoD's Cyber National Mission Force leverages its operations to expose malicious signatures publicly to the cybersecurity community, allowing organizations and individuals around the world to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and, as a result, degrade the efficacy of adversary tools and campaigns. We are also postured to complement and support lead Federal agencies efforts, such as efforts undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, efforts to protect U.S. election systems. Working closely with our interagency partners and informed by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, we are maturing our concept of layered cyber deterrence which combines traditional deterrence mechanisms and extends them beyond the Federal Government to develop a "whole of society" approach. It also incorporates the concept of defending forward to address the range of foreign malicious cyber activity that the United States has thus far been unable to deter.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

To counter the spread of WMD, the Department is focused on preventing proliferation globally, working with domestic and international partners, and ensuring U.S. military forces are prepared to respond to WMD incidents and operate in WMD environments. In the Western Hemisphere, DoD engages with domestic and international partners through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort to stop trafficking of WMD and their delivery systems and looks for opportunities to help our partners develop their own WMD response capabilities. As the WMD threat has evolved and increased, so too has the need to measure our success, ensure our activities yield a return on investment, and look for process efficiencies, international partnerships, and new technologies that can improve homeland defense capabilities. In 2018, DoD established the Countering WMD Unity of Effort Council to: share information; improve cooperation; identify challenges and generate solutions; and inform actions consistent with the NDS and the Department's Strategy for Countering WMD. These efforts strengthen DoD's ability to detect and respond to WMD threats.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

We are working with our Federal partners and with other the public and private sector partners to expand sharing of threat information that affects Defense Critical Infrastructure and

the Defense Industrial Base. The Department's Mission Assurance Strategy identifies and prioritizes our most critical assets, evaluates their vulnerabilities and most likely threats, and employs risk mitigation measures to enhance their resilience. We are now actively expanding that process by working with industry to ensure the resilience of privately owned infrastructure, systems, and networks on which DoD depends. We are also looking at ways that we can manage risk to strategic missions earlier in the acquisition lifecycle. We are investing heavily in critical infrastructure risk management initiatives, such as expanding the scope of cyber vulnerability assessments and performing integrated cyber dependency analysis across our global strategic mission set. We are pursuing resiliency in our systems as well as in our decision-making process to blunt attacks in the U.S. homeland during conflict, or perhaps even before full conflict, we will respond in decisive terms to prevent further attacks.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

DoD is better prepared to assist civil authorities than at any other time in our Nation's history. We maintain this level of preparedness through continual integrated planning, training, exercises, and real-world experience. In 2019, DoD responded to 113 requests for assistance. So far in 2020, DoD has responded to 20 requests for assistance, including from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to assist with: the safety and security of special events; supporting FEMA responses to natural disasters, including severe storms and an earthquake in Puerto Rico; continued assistance to DHS and CBP to secure the U.S. southern border; and assistance to HHS to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak.

The Western Hemisphere

The Western Hemisphere is a relatively peaceful and stable region but continues to face significant challenges. Growing Chinese and Russian malign influence threatens regional prosperity and security. Repressive regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua undermine democratic principles and create destabilizing conditions throughout the region. Weak governance, corruption, poverty, crime, violence, and the effects of natural disasters risk regional stability and thus threaten U.S. national interests. These challenges suppress the full potential of

our increasingly capable military and security partners to contribute to our shared defense and security goals while exacerbating domestic challenges associated with migration and illicit trafficking.

One of the objectives of our National Defense Strategy, which is derived directly from the National Security Strategy, is to maintain a favorable regional balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. Our national prosperity and security depend on well-developed, cooperative relationships with our neighbors in the region that help prevent instability and mitigate the influence of strategic competitors.

The Inter-American System

The Western Hemisphere has developed a track record in recent history of resolving conflicts through diplomacy and institutions, rather than through force. Partner nations' militaries throughout the region consistently demonstrate high levels of professionalism, adherence to civilian control, de-politicization, and respect for human rights, but we continue to take seriously all credible allegations of abuse, especially with concern to security forces' conduct during peaceful civilian protests in the region. The Organization of American States, through the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, and other entities, such as the Lima Group and most recently, select members of the Rio Treaty, demonstrate the region's shared values and multilateral cooperation in support of democracy and the rule of law. The Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) provide venues to advance multilateral defense and security cooperation. Canada is an important ally in the region and globally.

Collaborative defense and security relationships in the region are vital to advancing U.S. security interests. With sustained engagements, we can undermine our competitors' attempts to increase their influence near U.S. borders and help our partners manage more effectively the domestic security challenges that often undermine U.S. interests at home. By promoting U.S. and partner bilateral and multilateral cooperation and burden-sharing, including by building partner capacity, our partners in the hemisphere can increasingly contribute to our mutual objectives in the region and globally, thereby reducing reliance on U.S. resources and personnel.

Challenges

Despite the enormous potential of our region, we face some very real dangers. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and Kremlin do not share our same interest in a region that upholds democratic governance, the rule of law, market-driven economies, and compliance with international rules and norms. Instead, their activities aim to prop up the failing, repressive regimes of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua to encourage autocratic governance in the region and export their preference for government surveillance measures, enabling those regimes to tightly control their respective populations. The PRC also erodes our partners' sovereignty by applying coercive pressure on their political, diplomatic, economic, and security decisions through predatory practices designed to create security and economic dependencies.

Terrorist organizations, such as the ELN and FARC dissidents, find safe harbor under the Maduro regime in Venezuela, fomenting further insecurity along the Venezuela/Colombia border and stoking conditions for increased hostilities with the Colombian Government. Another ongoing challenge present in the region is illicit trafficking, which corrupts societies in many countries and exacerbates violence. Also, irregular migrant flows due to the crisis in Venezuela add significant burdens on partner nations in the region. Finally, natural disasters threaten to devastate the region, requiring a coordinated multilateral response to thwart human suffering and lessen the long-term effects on regional growth and prosperity.

Venezuela is a prime example of how an oppressive regime results in regional challenges. The corrupt Maduro regime – with support from Russia, Cuba, and China – fails to provide Venezuelans with food and medicine, which has made a once proud resulting in tragic and unnecessary starvation and death, and has made a once proud and prosperous country destitute. In response to this crisis, the region unified in support of the Venezuelan people, as most governments of the region recognize Interim President Juan Guaidó as the legitimate leader of the country. Neighboring countries provide generous refuge to Venezuelans fleeing their country, but this has put significant strain on those countries. The U.S. Government, along with our partners, is using diplomatic, information, and economic means to pressure Maduro to step down, and the United States is also responding to Interim President Guaidó's call for

humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people. In 2019, for the second year in a row, the Department of Defense deployed the U.S. Naval Hospital Ship COMFORT to the region in 2019 to provide humanitarian medical assistance to partner nations that received influxes of refugees from Venezuela. The United States remains committed to the people of Venezuela to restore their democracy and liberty.

Although Venezuela is the most striking challenge to security in the region today, there are other challenges we must face. Over the last year, there has been civil unrest in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Peru in response to internal challenges, including economic inequality, the implementation of austerity measures, constitutional crises, and the manipulation of elections. In some cases, unrest has put security forces in difficult positions. We are monitoring these developments closely and reinforcing to our partners the importance of armed forces demonstrating restraint, staying out of politics, and meeting the highest standards of respect for human rights.

The Western Hemisphere is among the most prosperous economic regions in the world, and our vision is that it remains a collaborative, prosperous, and secure region. It is a region where nations prefer to work with the United States, and together we advance mutual interests both regionally and globally. The Department of Defense has several primary objectives for the region:

1. Work with Partners to Limit Malign Influence: The Western Hemisphere is a region of Great Power competition. China and Russia continue their efforts to deepen influence in the Western Hemisphere through predatory economic practices and offers of security cooperation, and by propping up repressive regimes. The authoritarian model offered by the PRC and Kremlin uses economic, diplomatic, and security means to gain undue influence over the sovereign decisions of others. Left unchecked, China and Russia's aggressive marketing of information technology, including 5G infrastructure, and cyber cooperation create dependencies and vulnerabilities that could limit DoD's ability to deepen cooperation with our partners and risk the security of the region's citizens and governments' communications.

As China expands access to markets, natural resources, and port infrastructure in the region, it uses predatory economic policies to exert leverage, gain access to key infrastructure, and create extractive relationships. Russia is focused on increasing its role as a provider of military training and arms sales while demonstrating military presence near the United States. Russia has increased support to the Maduro regime at the expense of the Venezuelan people and its neighbors, sending weapons, materiel, and disinformation support; propping up its oil industry; and pillaging Venezuela's gold reserves by encouraging illegal mining that has devastated Venezuela's ecosystem.

2. Collaborate with our Partners: Our ability to work together with our partners is paramount. At the Department of Defense, we work to deepen our relationships with our NATO and NORAD ally Canada to defend the homeland and strengthen global security. We also work with other regional partner nations that address shared regional and global security challenges. We will focus on advancing defense relationships with our self-funding partners, while continuing support for our traditional train and equip programs, focusing on a strategic level of cooperation. We strive for interoperability among our forces and seek to improve our abilities to share vital intelligence, increase our defense science and technology and trade cooperation, build increased capacity in cyber, and increase the complexity and frequency of our bilateral and multilateral exercises. We are stronger when we act together with our partners, and our emphasis in this area ensures that the threats and challenges we face together can be resolved together.

We work with Canada and Mexico, including through the North American Defense Ministerial, to strengthen the defense of North America and support Mexico's increasing leadership role in the region and willingness to cooperate with DoD on mutual defense objectives. DoD relies on strengthening our partnerships with regional security exporters, several of which are self-funding. In 2019, Brazil was designated the region's second Major Non-NATO Ally, and Chile provides regional humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) leadership. Colombia became the region's first NATO Global Partner in 2018, Mexico provides institutional capacity-building to Central American and Caribbean partners,

Jamaica sends its Disaster Assistance Response Teams to regional partners, and Uruguay is the region's number one UN peacekeeping troop contributor.

3. HA/DR Cooperation and Collaboration: Most of the region is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters including earthquakes and hurricanes, the outbreak of infectious diseases, and a variety of destabilizing effects that follow those events, which compound economic hardship and cause increases in large-scale migration. DoD prioritizes expanding the HA/DR capacity of our regional partners and seeks to address these challenges to reduce human suffering and insecurity, reduce pressures on migration, and reduce requirements for U.S. forces to respond to disasters in the region. DoD will also promote military and security force interoperability through regional HA/DR operations and strengthen the U.S. role as the partner of choice in the region.

At the 2018 Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA), the Secretary of Defense and his counterparts agreed that promoting regional HA/DR cooperation should be a permanent agenda topic for the conference and called on the IADB to play a central role in facilitating the collaboration. Chile is utilizing its leadership of the 2020 CDMA to develop a HA/DR response coordination mechanism for the Western Hemisphere.

Weak health systems in partner nations make countries like Venezuela and Haiti especially vulnerable to potential pandemics, such as the coronavirus. The 2019 deployment of the USNS COMFORT exemplified DoD's strong multilateral cooperation and commitment to the hemisphere, providing much needed medical assistance to nations affected by the influx of Venezuelan refugees and other partners whose health systems cannot address all their populations' needs. During its five-month deployment, the USNS COMFORT made mission stops to 12 nations, positively affecting the lives of more than 67,000 patients, providing world class medical care, and relieving the strain on local health systems.

4. Sustain Defense Cooperation through Institution Building: A pillar of the U.S. National Defense Strategy is institutional reform. DoD emphasizes defense institution building as an increasingly important aspect of our efforts in the hemisphere. Strong institutions and anticorruption efforts are intended to promote good civil-military relationships and effective resource management, reduce corruption, promote human rights, and sustain warfighting capabilities over time. In conducting defense institution building initiatives with our partners, we seek to share experiences and help them implement processes that magnify the effectiveness and sustainability of all other aspects of our cooperation. We have defense institution-building efforts underway at both the strategic and operational levels, and we seek to expand those efforts to a broader number of countries, given increasing demand. The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is one of the lead DoD entities implementing institution-building efforts and has sponsored numerous regional and bilateral strategic policy-level discussions on this topic.

5. Support U.S. Government Efforts to Disrupt Illicit Trafficking: The Department of Defense helps to support interagency efforts to counter illicit trafficking, which not only affects the United States, but affects the safety, security, and prosperity of the citizens of the region. Drug cartels and criminal organizations create fear, promote corruption, increase political instability, and negatively affect legitimate economies. We in the Department of Defense help to counter trafficking by supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies and providing monitoring and detection capabilities. The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force at U.S. Southern Command leads a multi-national effort for interdiction operations. Our defense capacity-building programs with partner countries contribute to this success. Beyond simply conducting maritime interdiction activities, we also improve the security of citizens in partner countries. We work closely with our colleagues from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice to promote cooperation among the militaries and law enforcement agencies of our partners. We also continue our strong emphasis on human rights training as fundamental to the basic security of citizens and the effectiveness of military and police actions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to note that the Department of Defense takes a global view of the challenges facing the United States. Driven by and focused on key strategies, supported by analyses, and strengthened by experience and partnerships, we continue to improve our ability to defend the U.S. homeland in all domains, counter the WMD threat, and develop capabilities to defend the Nation's interests globally. DoD's strategy regarding effective defense engagement with the Western Hemisphere region is founded on strong relationships based on cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Our partners watch carefully for signs of changes in U.S. attention to the hemisphere, and China, Russia, and other malign actors actively promote a narrative of U.S. decline and disengagement. Through sustained bilateral and multilateral engagement, DoD can counter that narrative, demonstrating value as the region's partner of choice, countering Chinese and Russian inroads into the region, and helping develop partner militaries that are increasingly willing and able to contribute to shared objectives.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee. I appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring that the Department is prepared to compete, deter, and win in every contested domain – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. I especially thank the men and women of the Department of Defense – military and civilian, Active, Guard, and Reserve – and their families for all that they do every day to keep our nation safe and secure.

Kenneth P. Rapuano Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

Mr. Kenneth P. Rapuano is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. Previously Mr. Rapuano was a Senior Vice President at the ANSER Corporation, and the Director of the Studies and Analysis Group which provided multi-disciplinary studies and operational analysis for a broad array of government clients in the national security, homeland security areas. Up until November of 2016, Mr. Rapuano Directed the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI), a Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation (FFRDC) operated by ANSER, a mission oriented not-for-profit organization.

Prior to joining ANSER Mr. Rapuano was the Director of Advanced Systems at the MITRE Corporation. He was responsible for guiding crosscutting strategic national and homeland security mission initiatives, with particular focus on counterterrorism, intelligence, aviation security, crisis management/decision support, national preparedness, and CWMD.

Previously, Mr. Rapuano served at the White House as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2004-2006. He was responsible for managing the development and implementation of homeland security policies among departments and agencies, chaired the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, and co-chaired the White House Counterterrorism Security Group. He left the White House in 2006 to volunteer for deployment as a Marine Corps officer to Afghanistan with a Joint Special Operations Task Force, establishing and directing a targeting fusion center tracking high-value terrorists and insurgents. He also served in Iraq in 2003, commanding the Joint Interrogations and Debriefing Center of the Iraq Survey Group established to conduct the mission of surveying and exploiting possible weapons of mass destruction activities across Iraq.

In 2003, Mr. Rapuano was appointed Deputy Under Secretary for Counter Terrorism at the Department of Energy, responsible for nuclear counter terrorism, homeland security, emergency response, and all related special access programs for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Previous to that, he was the National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Energy. Mr. Rapuano has also served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy. He served 21 years on active duty and in the reserves as a Marine Corps infantry officer and intelligence officer.

Mr. Rapuano has also served as a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University's Center for the Study of WMD, as a member of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Role of DoD in Homeland Defense, the Pacific Northwest National Lab's National Security Advisory Committee, the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Advisory Group, the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Advisory Committee, and the DHS Science and Technology Advisory Committee.

Mr. Rapuano received a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Middlebury College, a master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, and has attended the Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Officer Course at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence School.

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

AND

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND



BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 11 MARCH 2020

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Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the Committee: I am honored to appear before you today and to serve as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Our commands are driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the homeland. In the years following the Cold War, our nation enjoyed the benefits of military dominance as well as geographic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the reach of most conventional threats. Our power projection capabilities and technological overmatch allowed us to fight forward, focusing our energy on the conduct of operations overseas.

However, our key adversaries watched and learned, invested in capabilities to offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses, and have demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate they currently have the capability, capacity, and intent to hold our homeland at significant risk below the threshold of nuclear war. Eroding military advantage is undermining our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter aggression against the homeland. This is emboldening competitors and adversaries to challenge us at home, holding at risk our people, our critical infrastructure, and our ability to project power forward.

The threats facing our nations are real and significant. The Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of approach for advanced conventional weapons and the platforms that carry them. Our adversaries' capability to directly attack the homeland has leapt forward, and they are engaged in overt, concerted efforts to weaken our national technological, economic, and strategic advantage. To address this reality, our two distinct but complementary commands are taking significant, vigorous steps to ensure

our homeland defense enterprise is ready to deter, detect, and defeat threats now and well into the future.

Today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand more united than ever and are laser-focused on our vital mission to defend the homeland. Just as our adversaries have signaled their intent to hold the United States at risk, we are making it equally obvious that an attack against our country is destined to fail and will result in an unacceptable cost to our adversaries. Even so, we must be clear-eyed about the challenges ahead of us and steadfast in our resolve to defend our nation against committed and well-resourced adversaries.

Threats to the Homeland

The strategic threat to the homeland has entered a new era. Key adversaries Russia and China have deployed and continue to advance a range of capabilities to hold the homeland at risk with nuclear, conventional, and cyberspace weapons, believing it to be an effective means of offsetting Western military advantages and limiting our options in a crisis. These adversaries are also increasingly willing to challenge the United States in the international arena and take actions below the level of armed conflict to erode our global influence. While our adversaries seek to avoid a direct military conflict with the United States, their growing assertiveness increases the risk of miscalculation and gives rise to a threat environment more complex and dynamic than we have seen since the end of the Cold War.

Our adversaries have spent the last 30 years observing our global military operations and forming strategies to negate our conventional military advantages, especially the foundational benefits afforded by our strategic deterrent. A key element of our adversaries' strategy is to develop and demonstrate increasing capabilities to hold the homeland at risk below the nuclear threshold and in multiple domains, believing a credible threat to our homeland will undermine

our diplomats' ability to negotiate from a position of strength and degrade our ability to project military force from our homeland into other theaters.

Russia

Over the last decade, Russia has sought to influence the security environment by developing and deploying conventionally armed cruise missiles capable of reaching targets in the homeland. Russia has spent considerable money and effort to develop a new generation of highly precise cruise missiles that Russian leaders believe will be a credible means of threatening unacceptable damage on our homeland during a conflict. Having demonstrated the utility of these weapons during combat operations in Syria, the Russian military is now working to modernize their air- and sea-based launch platforms.

The Russian air force modernized five BEAR H heavy bombers in 2019, according to the country's Defense Minister, upgrading the aircraft's communications and navigation systems and enabling them to launch the new AS-23 cruise missile. The minister claimed that Russia's heavy bomber force conducted 48 air patrols in 2019 "to ensure a military presence in strategically important areas." Several of these flights approached the homeland and were intercepted by NORAD fighters. The Russian air force demonstrated new levels of cooperation with international partners, including the first-ever deployment of BLACKJACK heavy bombers to South Africa in October and an unprecedented combined air patrol with Chinese medium bombers over the Sea of Japan in July. The Russian air force has announced that its goals for 2020 include the modernization of an additional six BEAR-H bombers and a return to Cold Warera readiness levels for its heavy bomber fleet.

The Russian navy also expanded its operations of cruise-missile capable platforms in 2019, both on and below the ocean surface. In October, foreign press reported that multiple

Russian submarines conducted an exercise in the North Atlantic intended to practice penetrating the West's anti-submarine barrier between Greenland and the United Kingdom. Also in October, President Putin oversaw the Grom-2019 strategic command-staff exercise, which featured live launches of advanced cruise missiles by Russia's heavy bombers and its most capable naval platforms like the Severodvinsk multi-role submarine and the Admiral Gorshkov guided missile frigate. Earlier in the year, the Gorshkov deployed to the Caribbean Sea and made a port call in Havana, well within land-attack cruise missile range of the southeastern United States. President Putin announced in December that Russia plans to double its number of cruise missile-capable vessels by 2023.

Meanwhile, 2019 also saw continued expansion of Russia's military infrastructure in the Arctic. Throughout the year, Russia lengthened existing runways and built new ones at multiple airfields in the high north. In September, Russia deployed a Bastion coastal defense cruise missile unit to the Chukotka Peninsula, opposite the Bering Sea from Alaska, for a first-ever training launch from that region. The missile successfully struck a sea-based target more than 200 kilometers away, according to the Russian Defense Ministry. When deployed to the Russian northeast, this system has the capability not only to control access to the Arctic through the Bering Strait, but also to strike land targets in parts of Alaska with little to no warning.

Finally, Russia continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, which it views as the ultimate means to guarantee its sovereignty and survival. Russia made significant progress in 2019 on several of the "invincible" weapons that President Putin unveiled to the world during a landmark March 2018 speech depicting Russia's response to U.S. missile defense developments. In April, Russia launched the experimental Belgorod submarine, which is intended to serve as the launch platform for the Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo. Despite a deadly accident in

August, Russia also continued development work on the extremely long-range Burevestnik nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile. In December, a Russian general announced that the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile had been placed on "experimental combat duty" in the Russian Arctic. Also in December, Russia announced that its first regiment of Avangard-equipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had assumed alert duty, marking the world's first operational ICBM armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle payload designed to challenge our missile warning systems.

China

China's rapid military modernization and efforts to extend its military's global reach demonstrate a growing willingness to challenge the United States. Of particular concern to USNORTHCOM and NORAD, China is developing many of the same technologies that the Russians have deployed and may seek to hold portions of the homeland at risk with long-range, conventionally armed precision-strike weapons. In a future crisis, China could use these weapons—along with its world-class offensive cyber capabilities—to attack our logistics nodes in an attempt to frustrate our force flows across the Pacific.

In the meantime, China is also investing heavily to improve the survivability and penetrability of its nuclear forces in an effort to guarantee its ability to retaliate following a strategic first strike. Among the novel weapon systems China is testing is an intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle—similar to the Russian Avangard—which is designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.

Like the Russians, China also continues to invest heavily in the Arctic, determined to exploit the region's economic and strategic potential as a self-proclaimed "near Arctic" nation. In the last few years, Chinese survey vessels have conducted several deployments to the Bering and

Chukchi Seas, providing familiarity and experience that could eventually translate to Chinese naval operations in the region.

Finally, in the past year we have observed signs of a nascent but growing strategic cooperation between China and Russia—including the combined bomber patrol last July and Chinese participation in multiple Russian exercises.

North Korea

Kim Jong Un has demonstrated the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed ICBMs. In 2017, North Korea successfully tested an apparent thermonuclear weapon as well as two ICBM designs capable of ranging most or all of North America—feats only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council had previously achieved.

Following North Korea's last ICBM test in November 2017, Kim declared that the country had completed the research and development phase of its strategic weapons program and would now begin serial production and deployment of these new systems. In the last year, North Korea has tested several new short-range missile systems, demonstrating advancing technologies that could eventually be incorporated into its strategic systems.

During the December 2019 plenary meeting of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party

Central Committee, Kim stated it was time for North Korea to take offensive measures to ensure
the sovereignty and security of the country and claimed that he would soon unveil a new
strategic weapon. While Kim did not specify what this new weapon would be, recent engine
testing suggests North Korea may be prepared to flight test an even more capable ICBM design
that could enhance Kim's ability to threaten our homeland during a crisis or conflict.

Iran

The Iranian regime has grown increasingly brazen in its strategic competition with the United States, as demonstrated by the ballistic missile attacks on Iraqi military bases hosting U.S. personnel in Iraq in January 2020. While Iran is not currently able to strike our homeland with strategic weapons, it has expended significant resources on ballistic missile and space-launch capabilities and could develop an ICBM capable of ranging the contiguous United States quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks in our homeland via its terrorist proxies and its growing cyber capabilities.

Violent Extremist Organizations

Terrorists remain committed to attacking the United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent extremists to act in their stead. Foreign terrorist groups—hardened by military experience in the Middle East—continue to adapt their tactics to identify and exploit seams in our security. Commercial aviation persists as a preferred target due to the high casualties and disproportionate economic impact that such attacks can engender.

Capable Defense—Credible Deterrence

The international security environment and the threats arrayed against our homeland have evolved extraordinarily quickly over a short period of time, and there is every reason to believe this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Our adversaries have invested heavily in advanced weapons and highly capable delivery platforms, and they have shown indications of their intent to target our homeland if necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. In order to defend against these 21st century threats, our homeland defense enterprise must reflect the fact that the threats to the homeland have expanded beyond the violent extremist threat that led to USNORTHCOM's establishment. Both USNORTHCOM and NORAD have refocused our

efforts on deterring and defeating the complex nation-state threats and adversarial strategies that have eroded our military advantage, and our defense priorities should continue to evolve to stay ahead of current and emerging threats identified in the National Defense Strategy.

Our adversaries have the ability to threaten our homeland in multiple domains and from numerous avenues of approach. Whether an attack originates in cyberspace or from the physical approaches to the homeland, we cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we cannot defeat that which we cannot detect. In order to effectively defend the homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD) consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for domain awareness, an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and new defeat mechanisms for advanced threats, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and small unmanned aerial systems.

These three elements are vital to deterring and defeating advanced threats to the homeland, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a sense of profound urgency to bring these capabilities into the fight.

Our need to improve our domain awareness begins with developing and integrating advanced sensors capable of detecting and tracking threats no matter where they originate. In order to defend the homeland in all domains, we need a sensing grid with undersea, maritime, land, air, near-space, space, and cyber layers that reach from the seafloor to outer space. These sensors must be able to detect, track, and discriminate advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and small unmanned aerial systems at the full ranges from which they are employed. The sensors must also detect and track the platforms—aircraft, ships, and submarines—that carry those weapons. A robust and resilient space layer is increasingly critical to provide the earliest possible detection and fidelity of data required.

Stovepiped transmission of data from non-compatible sensors presents a significant impediment to our ability to defend against advanced threats. To overcome this issue, we need a robust architecture for JADC2 to effectively gather data from a myriad of sensors across all domains and share it seamlessly. The architecture must facilitate rapid data fusion, processing, and analytics to feed decision makers at all levels with accurate, decision-quality information at the speed of relevance. Data from any sensor should feed any defeat mechanism, and rapid data fusion and analysis should provide faster, more precise solutions to all shooters. This architecture will facilitate high-tempo decision cycles for agile, resilient, redundant, and joint command and control. By leveraging a cloud architecture, big data analytics, edge computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, this network should sense a threat from one node and engage it precisely and expeditiously from another across vast distances and across all domains.

Finally, we require new defeat mechanisms for cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and small unmanned aerial systems. As adversary threat systems, employment doctrine, and operational competencies become more numerous, multi-modal, and complex, our current defeat mechanisms will become increasingly challenged. Additionally, the cost ratio of adversary threat missiles to our missile defeat mechanisms is not in our favor. We must flip the cost ratio back in our favor with deep magazine, rapid fire, and low-cost defeat mechanisms.

Homeland Defense in the Digital Age: Leveraging American Ingenuity

Given the number and complexity of threat systems arrayed against the homeland today, we cannot afford the prohibitive costs or extensive time required to develop high-end, custom built, stove-piped systems provided through current acquisition practices. Instead, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have fundamentally changed how our commands engage with defense and commercial industry, and we are proactively seeking out and collaborating with

private-sector partners who offer innovative and viable solutions to our most immediate challenges.

Specifically, our commands are collaborating with large and small companies from the commercial tech sector in order to leverage emerging technologies and digital-age approaches with potential homeland defense applications. Under this iterative approach, our commands and our commercial partners have developed a common understanding of our shared challenges and opportunities over time. In turn, we are allowing our nation's innovators to apply their expertise and propose advanced, innovative solutions using new but proven technology that can be rapidly incorporated into the homeland defense ecosystem in order to improve our domain awareness, JADC2 architecture, and defeat mechanisms.

We are also adapting and evolving how we work with traditional U.S. defense industry. Rather than prescribing specific materiel solutions to the challenges facing our commands, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are engaged in ongoing two-way dialogue with defense industry innovators to share our perspective on the changing strategic environment, emerging threats to the homeland, and operational requirements. We are working with our industry partners to ensure they understand our specific challenges and needs. In turn, our partners are identifying ways to bring new and existing systems into the homeland defense architecture and provide tailored solutions to our unique challenges.

This approach has already shown game-changing potential. Over the last several months, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have collaborated with defense industry, commercial tech partners, and the military Services on successful field demonstrations of emerging sensor, information fusion, and satellite communications technologies. I am excited and encouraged by

the results of these demonstrations, and we will continue to lead these experiments and to solicit innovative proposals from established defense industry and emerging tech partners.

As we defend the homeland against complex threats in all domains, our commands absolutely understand that the status quo is not acceptable and that we must act now to build a capable defense that provides a credible deterrent. In an age of rapidly advancing technology, rising strategic competition, and extraordinary innovation, we simply cannot afford to rely on antiquated technology and outdated approaches. To reverse our eroding military advantage, we are bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new technologies to bear against our adversaries in order to defend our nation and our way of life.

Thanks to the ingenuity and innovation of American defense industry, our nation has fielded the most advanced and capable military in the world. The technical challenges we currently face are significant, but the extraordinary advancements in global commercial logistics and communications over the last decade are clear evidence those challenges are not insurmountable. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will remain engaged with our defense and commercial industry partners to address our most pressing challenges in ways that are proven, adaptable, and affordable.

Cruise Missile Defense

In concert in the National Defense Strategy, homeland defense is the number one priority and focus of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Advanced cruise missiles now carried by Russian aircraft and submarines present a growing challenge to our current sensor networks and have the range and accuracy to strike military and civilian targets throughout the United States and Canada. As a result, our two commands are actively working to improve our ability to detect, track, and defeat potential cruise missile attacks against the homeland.

At my direction, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted substantial manpower to this critical effort. With the cruise missile threat at the forefront of our minds, our commands are working closely with industry partners to develop a layered sensing grid, build an adaptive architecture for JADC2, and field advanced defeat mechanisms.

Investments in improving our CMD capabilities are necessary to defend our vital facilities and infrastructure, preserve our national ability to project power abroad, and help to safeguard our citizens and vital institutions. We do not need a force field over the entire nation, but we also cannot present a soft target. We need a sufficiently capable steady-state defense to present a credible deterrent.

And, because the same cruise missiles that hold targets in the United States at risk also threaten our bases, personnel, and allies overseas, improving our defenses at home will have far-reaching impacts both in the homeland and for our forces, allies, and partners abroad. Aligning our defense investments with the stated priorities of the National Defense Strategy will profoundly improve our ability to defend our citizens and our way of life while strengthening each of the elements of our national power.

This is not the first time that a peer competitor has elected to hold our homeland at risk. Early in NORAD's history, when nuclear-armed Soviet bombers first presented an existential threat to the United States and Canada, our nations faced down that daunting challenge by establishing the Distant Early Warning line of radars and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) command and control system in less than three years. That stunning achievement demonstrated the power of shared resolve and innovation by our great nations and had an immediate deterrent effect. We hear echoes of that era in today's strategic environment,

and while the challenges before us are significant, history makes clear that innovation and resolve will allow us to bolster our strategic advantage.

While I am concerned by the limitations of some of our older sensors, recent advancements show great promise toward improving our ability to detect, track, and defeat advanced cruise missiles. In one key example, USNORTHCOM and NORAD partnered with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and industry in December 2019 at Eglin AFB, Florida, on a demonstration that successfully showcased elements of JADC2 and the Advanced Battle Management System for cruise missile defense of the U.S. homeland.

Thanks to the outstanding support and collaboration by each of the Services, we were able to bring air, sea, and land domain forces together to demonstrate technology with significant potential for meeting our most urgent homeland defense requirements. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to build on the momentum established with our Service partners so that we are capable of deterring, detecting, and defeating any potential threat to the homeland.

Specifically, the demonstration combined capabilities from across the Joint Force to detect, track, identify, and simulate the intercept of ground and air-launched subsonic cruise missiles. While still in the early stages of development, these efforts also demonstrated an "every sensor, fused data, best shooter capability" that incorporates machine learning and artificial intelligence to gather and act upon sensor data far more quickly and accurately than ever before.

By demonstrating the potential for these low-cost, multi-domain systems to defend critical targets, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are actively establishing and pushing hard on efforts with innovative industry partners in ways that break down slow-moving stovepipes between warfighters, acquisition agencies, and industry. Together with our partners, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to ensure that we have the means to fulfill our

essential homeland defense priorities and outpace the threats to our homeland by actively pursuing the National Defense Strategy objective to establish a national security innovation base that supports DOD operations and sustains security and solvency.

Our commands have taken an aggressive leadership role in identifying and evaluating potential solutions to the significant technical challenges associated with our cruise missile defense mission. Over the summer of 2019, USNORTHCOM and NORAD sponsored a test of over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) capabilities to evaluate their potential application to detect cruise missiles launched against the United States and Canada from the far north. This important test, conducted in close collaboration with the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory and Defence Research and Development Canada, allowed USNORTHCOM and NORAD to evaluate the ways in which OTHR can help to provide persistent surveillance of our northern approaches.

The OTHR test, using test arrays in Ottawa, Ontario and at Camp Grafton, North Dakota demonstrated outstanding collaboration between our U.S. Air Force, Canadian military, and industry partners in a shared effort to mitigate the cruise missile threat to the United States and Canada. That same spirit of common commitment was on display in October 2019 during a USNORTHCOM-sponsored homeland defense demonstration at Ft. Carson, Colorado. This event successfully demonstrated the potential for a mesh network and artificial intelligence to detect, identify, and track a cruise missile threat in realistic field conditions.

The Arctic

The Arctic affords our adversaries a direct avenue of approach to the homeland and is representative of the changing strategic environment in our area of responsibility. More consistently navigable waters, mounting demand for natural resources, and Russia's military buildup in the region make the Arctic an immediate challenge for USNORTHCOM, NORAD,

our northern allies, and our neighboring geographic combatant commands, U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The Arctic is the new frontline of our homeland defense. Russia has steadily expanded its military presence in the region and, by fielding advanced, long-range cruise missiles—to include land attack missiles capable of striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory—Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland defense capability and capacity. In the meantime, China has taken a number of incremental steps toward expanding its own Arctic presence. In turn, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are strengthening the four pillars of our defenses in the high north: domain awareness, communications, infrastructure improvement, and sustainable presence in our own Arctic territory.

I want to take this opportunity to thank the Congressional defense committees for your constant support as USNORTHCOM and NORAD have met our homeland defense challenges in the Arctic head-on. There are no easy solutions to the challenges presented by the extreme climate, terrain, and distances inherent in Arctic operations. However, due in no small measure to your continued attention and advocacy for our commands' requirements, we have seen significant attention, expertise, and resources brought to bear on the homeland defense mission in the Arctic from throughout the Department of Defense.

Over the last year, our commands have worked alongside the military Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our warfighting requirements are met, with particular emphasis on improving joint domain awareness and communications. In order to reclaim our strategic advantage in the high north, it is critical that we improve our ability to detect and track surface vessels and aircraft in our Arctic approaches and establish more reliable secure communications for our joint force warfighters operating in the higher latitudes. This

focus is now apparent in the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy, which reflects my command priorities and makes it clear that DOD must defend the homeland against threats emanating from our northern approaches.

As stated in the National Defense Strategy, a core Department of Defense objective is to ensure that common domains remain open and free. In pursuit of that objective,

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are very proud of our work with allies and partners to improve our shared presence and interoperability in the region and update our information sharing agreements with our Arctic allies and partners. Of note in the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD leaders also conducted engagements with the Danish Joint Arctic Command in Greenland and joined the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense in direct staff talks. These collaborative efforts help to reaffirm our commitment to our international partners while enhancing USNORTHCOM and NORAD's defense capability.

We are leveraging the on-the-ground experience and expertise of our warfighters in USNORTHCOM's Alaska Command along with leaders, planners, and combatants from USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM as we prepare for ARCTIC EDGE 20—the nation's premier Arctic exercise. ARCTIC EDGE 20 will take full advantage of the unsurpassed capabilities of the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and allow us to test our capability to fight, communicate, and win in the harsh terrain and climate of the high north. I am personally placing significant emphasis on this important exercise, as the lessons we learn from ARCTIC EDGE 20 will play an important role in validating the requirements that will allow us to deter, detect, and defeat potential adversaries along the front line of our nation's defenses.

Ballistic Missile Defense

USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission remains a no-fail mission. North Korea continues to openly threaten the United States with nuclear-capable ICBMs, and it is essential that our ballistic missile defense system continues to provide a reliable and lethal defense against a potential missile attack by North Korea or Iran, should Iran decide to develop ICBM technology.

Fielding modernized radars capable of discriminating between a lethal warhead and the debris, non-lethal components, and potential countermeasures associated with an inbound ICBM remains my top BMD priority. Improved discrimination capability will provide a higher probability of intercept and, therefore will deliver greater confidence in the successful defeat of an inbound nuclear armed re-entry vehicle. Improved persistent discrimination capability is even more necessary given the cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV).

While I understand the issues that led to the August 2019 decision by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to cancel the RKV, and I ultimately concurred with that course of action, I want to make it clear that I am deeply concerned with the resulting delay in adding to our ground-based interceptor capability and capacity. As we progress toward a next-generation interceptor (NGI) capability, USNORTHCOM remains responsible for defending the homeland from missile attacks. It is therefore necessary to swiftly develop and field a lower-tier missile defense capability as a complement to NGI to intercept current and emerging missile threats. Given the nature of the ballistic missile threat, I am a strong advocate for bringing a layered capability on board for the warfighter well before NGI is fielded.

From a warfighter perspective, a reliable and lethal follow-on system must be fielded as soon as practicable as our adversaries continue to pursue advanced missile technologies to

threaten our homeland. I retain confidence in the current ground-based interceptor fleet and the ballistic missile defense system as a whole; however, to remain ahead of emerging threats, the timely fielding of improved discriminating sensor technology and an NGI is crucial. As our adversaries rapidly advance their capability and capacity to threaten the United States, USNORTHCOM is working side-by-side with MDA to ensure that USNORTHCOM's warfighter requirements are met, and I remain in close contact with VADM Hill to ensure our priorities remain aligned.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to accurately detect, discriminate, and track individual inbound ICBM warheads in the event of a ballistic missile attack from North Korea or potentially Iran is critical to the successful intercept of those weapons. With current and emerging threats in mind, improved terrestrial sensors are a necessary and cost-effective step in the evolution of our missile defense system. However, the urgency of taking steps now to develop and field a future space-based sensing layer as soon as technology allows cannot be overstated.

As cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats evolve at an extraordinarily rapid pace, space-based sensors will become a necessity in the near future, and as we have seen with other adversary threat technologies, we cannot wait until a new weapon system is in the field before starting work on new technology to mitigate that threat.

Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems

Events involving unmanned aerial systems in the Middle East, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom provide clear examples of how new technologies can be developed, proliferated, and exploited by nefarious actors much faster than our institutions can react. We must be prepared to defend our nation against potential threats from Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), but the

complexity and diversity of these recent attacks underscore the challenges of our homeland defense mission. This is a difficult problem set, one that will not be solved with simple, silver bullet solutions or in isolation. While USNORTHCOM and NORAD play a key role in interagency counter-UAS (C-UAS) efforts, actions to mitigate the threat have proven to be complex. Therefore, extensive collaboration and cooperation at all levels and across a wide range of agencies is critical to our shared success.

Only a few years after commercial drone technology became readily available in the commercial marketplace, small UAS (sUAS) are being employed in ways that test the seams in our physical defenses, legal authorities, and jurisdictional boundaries. The capabilities and authorities inherent to NORAD's aerospace warning mission enable us to provide our partners with increased airspace awareness, and we are striving to establish a common operating picture with our partners. By establishing real-time warning and information sharing between interagency partners, we will significantly increase our shared ability to limit a potential attacker from exploiting sUAS technology in an attack against the homeland.

Together with partners from inside and outside the Department of Defense, to include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Transportation, and numerous other agencies in the United States and Canada, USNORTHCOM and NORAD is championing a whole-ofgovernment approach to overcoming the potential threats presented by the nefarious use of UAS. Over the last year in particular, we have made significant progress toward leveraging existing DOD and DHS mitigation investments made possible by the enhanced authorities granted by Congress.

The expanded use of sUAS in the national airspace is inevitable and has clear benefits that exist alongside ways in which this emerging technology can be exploited to cause harm. With those parallel facts in mind, we, along with all of our interagency partners, are fundamentally committed to improving our collective capability to defend our citizens and infrastructure from being targeted by sUAS, without compromising safety, civil liberties, or legitimate commercial enterprise.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Nested under our homeland defense responsibilities, USNORTHCOM provides for the safety and support of our citizens through our defense support of the civil authorities mission. Acting in support of lead federal agencies following disasters, such as during the response to Hurricane Dorian in the eastern United States, allows USNORTHCOM to demonstrate our resilience and test our response to unplanned domestic contingencies. These include natural disaster relief efforts or following a manmade disaster such as an attack by a peer adversary or a terrorist organization. When circumstances overcome the abilities of federal, state, or local public safety officials to respond effectively—and when we are asked to help—USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide trained, ready, and capable active duty forces when and wherever they are needed to protect the life, health, and safety of our citizens and neighbors.

Hurricane Dorian's impact on The Bahamas was nothing short of devastating, and USNORTHCOM was proud to support the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and our Bahamian partners by providing defense coordinating officials, strategic airlift, and rotary wing airlift in the early days following the storm. Working in support of USAID, the Command and our Service partners were able to expedite the deployment of military and non-governmental organization relief personnel and equipment to Abaco.

Although this was the first time that USNORTHCOM has directly supported a USAID-led relief effort, we and our interagency partners were able to build on lessons learned from previous disaster relief and recovery efforts. Those hard-earned lessons, in turn, ensured that the correct mix of assets and personnel were ready to deploy as soon as they were requested by The Bahamian government.

Homeland defense and homeland security are inseparable, and USNORTHCOM also recognizes the significance of our work and relationships with our DHS partners.

USNORTHCOM's role in synchronizing DOD's support to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on the southwest border has helped to increase the level of coordination and cooperation at all levels of our organizations. That mission has bolstered USNORTHCOM's relationship with our partners throughout the DHS enterprise, and the shared lessons learned have led us to adopt new tactics, techniques, and procedures that have improved communications and interoperability up and down our chains of command. These improvements will continue to pay dividends for future USNORTHCOM and DHS collaborative efforts. For example, in 2020, USNORTHCOM will join DHS in a national exercise that will assess our collective response to a cyber event, and we will continue to prioritize our work with DHS to defend our citizens, infrastructure and vital institutions.

Over the last year, USNORTHCOM has continued to provide military-unique capabilities to federal law enforcement, including operations and intelligence along the southwest border and supporting federal prosecutors' case development with counter-threat finance analysts. With 69,000 overdose deaths in 2018, illegal drugs are just one of many revenue streams for the cartels that present a significant threat to the health and safety of our citizens. USNORTHCOM supports these efforts to stem the flow of illicit narcotics and other illicit commodities into our

country. We are also working with non-DOD partners across the U.S. interagency community and in Mexico to develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter transnational organized crime.

Supporting Cyber Defense in the Homeland

In addition to the physical risks posed by natural disasters and potential kinetic strikes, our nation faces ongoing significant threats in the cyber domain. Our adversaries—including state and non-state actors—continue to actively target military networks, civilian critical infrastructure, and our democratic processes through network-based intrusions. USNORTHCOM places a high priority on our active and vital role in supporting DHS, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and other government partners in the defense of U.S. critical infrastructure.

In January 2019, USNORTHCOM welcomed the command's first liaison officer from the newly established DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) into our headquarters as it stood up on day one. Meanwhile, USNORTHCOM assigned two of our cybersecurity experts to serve as liaison officers in the CISA Integrated Operations Coordination Center (IOCC) and in the CISA headquarters in Washington, D.C. The establishment of these liaisons immediately led to a significant improvement in interagency communications and information sharing, as our collective experts have been able to identify and remedy communications stovepipes and bureaucratic obstacles to timely exchanges of intelligence and other key information.

As part of the whole-of-government effort to ensure that our elections are free from foreign interference, USNORTHCOM is working closely with DHS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USCYBERCOM, and the National Guard Bureau to support DHS if needed to

defend critical elections cyber infrastructure. On request, USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide the expertise of these network specialists to DHS as the lead federal agency.

Cyber attacks and attempts by our adversaries to penetrate our nation's sensitive networks continue at an extraordinary pace. If successful, these intrusions could result in significant harm to our national security. The collective efforts by USNORTHCOM and our partners to improve the security and resiliency of our critical networks and infrastructure is moving forward rapidly in order to remain well ahead of our adversaries efforts. Due in large part to the lines of communication that have been opened by our collaborative efforts with CISA, USNORTHCOM now participates in daily secure synchronization events with the CISA IOCC. This ensures that we and our DHS partners are sharing the very latest intelligence, indicators, and threat assessments regarding past and potential attacks on U.S. military and civilian critical infrastructure.

In December 2019, USNORTHCOM hosted a cyber forum that brought together USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and DHS leaders, CDRUSCYBERCOM GEN Paul Nakasone, The Adjutants General from 51 states and territories, alongside partners from numerous other federal agencies and the intelligence community in order to ensure that our respective commands, departments, and agencies are aligned and ready to defend our networks, critical infrastructure, and our democratic processes. These complex technical efforts are made possible by detailed planning, year-round coordination, and close personal interaction with our interagency partners at every level. While USNORTHCOM is not in the lead for these missions, we are proud to support our federal partners and to help coordinate DOD efforts to the fullest extent possible.

Theater Security Cooperation

Defending the homeland and advancing our strategic objectives requires strong relationships with our military partners throughout our area of responsibility, and USNORTHCOM continues to enjoy close collaboration and mutually beneficial ties with our partners in Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. In this era of great power competition, each of our international partners faces significant and complex challenges that can only be mitigated through open and frequent communications and a shared commitment to identifying common security objectives and implementing measures that strengthen individual national defenses while contributing to enhanced regional security.

The strong relationships we share with each of our international partners provide a range of benefits for the entire region, enhancing domain awareness along our northern and southern approaches, and impeding the ability of transnational criminal organizations to transport illicit drugs and smuggle migrants into the United States. The training, equipment, and other defensive capabilities provided through USNORTHCOM's theater security cooperation initiatives have direct, tangible benefits for our partners and for the safety and security of the United States by providing effects-based capabilities to reduce illicit trafficking from Mexico and The Bahamas. In one key effort, USNORTHCOM was proud to support our Mexican partners' fight against the drug cartels by delivering a radar to Hermosillo, Mexico that immediately improved the government of Mexico's ability to monitor air trafficking routes, forcing the cartels to change their tactics and procedures.

In September 2019, I was joined by CDRUSSOUTHCOM, Admiral Craig Faller, as we met with the secretaries of Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) and Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) in Mexico City to emphasize our shared commitment to regional security

cooperation. Following that productive engagement, ADM Faller and I traveled together into USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility to tour the northern border of Guatemala. That boots-on-the-ground experience provided a valuable firsthand understanding of the security challenges and opportunities that exist along the rugged international border and in the seams between USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM operational boundaries. The visit highlighted the importance of frequent, open communication between USNORTHCOM and our partners—to include our sister combatant commands—in order to ensure that we are operating from the same set of expectations in pursuit of common strategic objectives.

Partnerships

Our homeland defense mission relies on strong, ongoing collaboration between our commands and a long list of DOD, DHS, and federal interagency partners. With that fact firmly in mind, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are constantly working to increase integration with our partners, from the initial phases of the planning process to the execution of missions that invariably cross over geographic and jurisdictional boundaries—and frequently across warfighting domains.

Our adversaries have demonstrated their ability to exploit our institutional boundaries. These threats are deliberately designed to take advantage of the existing seams across combatant commands, federal agencies, and their associated legal authorities. We recognize that we cannot wait until a contingency plan is finalized to fill in those seams; it is essential that we collaborate across the national security enterprise to develop playbooks that prevent those seams from forming from the outset.

For example, NORAD's maritime and aerospace warning missions require tightly knit collaboration with U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command,

the intelligence community, the U.S. Coast Guard, and a host of others to ensure we have constant, global situational awareness of potential threats, from ballistic missile launches to out-of-area deployments by Russian and Chinese aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are then able to make notifications, deploy forces, and implement contingency plans as necessary.

Given the realities of today's security environment, we no longer view issues as purely regional. Global integration is at the forefront of our planning efforts, and alongside our fellow combatant commanders, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have worked diligently to reduce the seams, stovepipes, and outdated mindsets that previously hampered communication and coordination between DOD partners. In 2019, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, our sister combatant commands, and DOD senior leaders participated in a globally integrated exercise that placed a strong focus on threats to the homeland and illustrated how the successful execution of the homeland defense mission underpins our combat missions abroad. I am optimistic that the valuable lessons learned from this event will inform our planning, budgeting, and future plans and exercises for years to come.

Conclusion

As we enter a new decade, USNORTHCOM and NORAD remain laser focused on defending the homeland. Working side by side with our DOD, federal, industry, and international partners, our commands are committed to protecting our nations, our citizens, and our way of life from threats in all domains. The challenges facing us are daunting, but our adversaries and allies alike should never doubt our resolve.

While the weapons that threaten our homeland today are stealthier and more precise than those we faced during the Cold War, the hard-earned lessons of the past continue to echo today.

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The spirit of innovation and shared commitment to a common cause that brought our nation safely through previous conflicts will serve us well again during this period of strategic competition and uncertainty. Guided by our history of shared commitment and sacrifice, honored by the trust our citizens have placed in us, and profoundly committed to our sacred responsibility, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are ready to deter and defeat any threat.

It is my profound honor to lead the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and on their behalf, I want to thank the Committee for your steadfast support of our essential mission.

We Have the Watch.

General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy

General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy is Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. USNORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

General O'Shaughnessy is a 1986 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has commanded at the squadron, group, wing, NAF and MAJCOM levels, including the 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the 35th Fighter Wing as Misawa Air Base, Japan, and the 613th Air and Space Operations Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. General O'Shaughnessy has served as the U.S. Pacific Command Director of Operations responsible for joint operations in a region encompassing more than half the globe and 36 nations. General O'Shaughnessy's joint experience also extends to his time as the Joint Staff J5 Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia where he shaped regional planning and policy in the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia regions, supporting the commanders of U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command. Prior to his current assignment, General O'Shaughnessy was Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Osan AB, South Korea and Commander, Pacific Air Forces and Air Component Commander for U.S. Pacific Command, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

General O'Shaughnessy is a command pilot with more than 3,000 hours in the F-16 Fighting Falcon, including 168 combat hours.

EDUCATION

1986 Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science, aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.

1992 Fighter Weapons Instructor Course, U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. 1993 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1996 Master's degree in aeronautical science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Fla. 1998 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

2003 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 2003 Information Studies Concentration Program, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

2005 NATO Senior Officer Policy Course, NATO Defense College, Oberammergau, Germany 2007 Department of Defense Senior Managers Course in National Security, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

2007 Air Force Enterprise Leadership Course, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2009 Combined Air and Space Operations Senior Staff Course, Hurlburt Field, Fla.

2011 Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 2012 Joint Flag Officer Warfighter Course

2013 Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course, Newport, R.I. 2015 National Defense University PINNACLE Course, Suffolk, Va.

ASSIGNMENTS

June 1986 - September 1987, student, undergraduate pilot training, Sheppard AFB, Texas September 1987 - August 1988, student, T-38 lead-in fighter training and F-16 training, Holloman AFB, N.M., and Luke AFB, Ariz.

August 1988 - December 1991, F-16 aircraft commander and instructor pilot, Shaw AFB, S.C. January 1992 - June 1992, student, F-16 Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. July 1992 - July 1993, weapons officer and flight commander, 35th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan AB, South Korea

July 1993 - July 1997, assistant operations officer and air-to-ground flight commander, F-16 Division, U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.

July 1997 - June 1998, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

June 1998 - June 1999, Chief, Air Superiority Weapons Branch, Global Power Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

June 1999 - June 2000, Chief, Fighter Programs, Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

June 2000 - April 2001, operations officer, 555th Fighter Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy

April 2001 - July 2002, Commander, 510th Fighter Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy

August 2002 - June 2003, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

June 2003 - August 2004, Chief, Joint Plans and Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium

August 2004 - July 2005, senior special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander,

U.S. European Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium

July 2005 - December 2006, Commander, 57th Adversary Tactics Group, Nellis AFB, Nev.

January 2007 - August 2008, Commander, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa AB, Japan

September 2008 - August 2009, Commander, 613th Air and Space Operations Center, Hickam AFB, Hawaii

August 2009 - July 2010, Vice Commander, 13th Air Force, Hickam AFB, Hawaii

July 2010 - April 2012, Commander, 57th Wing, Nellis AFB, Nev.

April 2012 - August 2013, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

August 2013 - October 2014 - Director for Operations, Headquarters, United States Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

December 2014 – July 2016, Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Osan AB, South Korea

July 2016 – May 2018, Commander, Pacific Air Forces; Air Component Commander for U.S. Pacific Command; and Executive Director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii

May 2018 – present, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

June 2003 - August 2004, Chief, Joint Plans and Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium, as a colonel

August 2004 - July 2005, senior special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander,

U.S. European Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium, as a colonel April 2012 - August 2013, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va. as a brigadier and major general.

August 2013 - October 2014, Director for Operations, Headquarters, United States Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, as a major general

December 2014 – July 2016, Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, 7th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Osan AB, South Korea, as a lieutenant general.

May 2018 - present, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Colorado Springs, Colo, as a general.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: command pilot Flight hours: more than 3,000

Aircraft flown: F-16, AT/T-38 and T-37

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with oak leaf cluster
Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal with two oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Combat Readiness Medal
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Kosovo Campaign Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Korea Defense Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986
First Lieutenant May 28, 1988
Captain May 28, 1990
Major Sept. 1, 1997
Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 2000
Colonel Aug. 1, 2004
Brigadier General Nov. 2, 2009
Major General Aug. 2, 2013
Lieutenant General Dec. 19, 2014
General July 12, 2016

(Current as of May 2018)

POSTURE STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 116^{TR} CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 11, 2020



Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs, we are focused on sustaining our advantages in the Western Hemisphere—the most important of which are strong partnerships founded on shared democratic values. Recent trends illustrate that the Western Hemisphere – our shared neighborhood – is critical space in the global competition—and global challenges—posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our partnerships in the Western Hemisphere strong and vibrant will allow us to achieve the NDS objective of maintaining a favorable regional balance of power that reduces security threats to the homeland.

Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, the region is home to ~25% of all U.S. exports and key global infrastructure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes, and deep water ports that provide access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to our homeland in every domain—land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values—which makes any threat or encroachment in this region particularly concerning. Latin America's strategic importance lies in its unique potential as both a vulnerability and an opportunity for our own security, prosperity, and efforts to address global challenges.¹

Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese government absorbed three more Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative, bringing the regional total to 19 – more than half of all countries in the region. Beijing now has 29 government exchange programs with Latin America and the Caribbean, and continues to expand offers of professional military education, equipment donations, and funding for infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our neighborhood, establishing a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying (for the first time) its most advanced nuclear-capable

¹ R. Evan Ellis (2016). "Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean."

warship; and sending a research ship capable of mapping and cutting undersea cables, as well as two other naval research vessels to operate near our homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage, oppression in Venezuela is ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily arrested for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019. Between January 2018 and May 2019, regime-aligned security forces killed more than 7,000 people, and many of these killings may constitute extrajudicial killings.

These malign state actors are part of a vicious circle of threats that deliberately erode stability and security in the region. This vicious circle is framed by systemic issues of young democracies, often with weak governance and porous legal frameworks, exacerbated by a propensity towards patronage and corruption that is deliberately exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external state actors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to advance their own ends at the expense of U.S. and partner nation security. This vicious circle continues to negatively impact our homeland, most acutely in the form of illegal immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in other, more harmful ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government corruption, support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean is at its lowest levels in 15 years, ² providing further openings for malign state actors to increase their influence. A number of countries are experiencing democratic backsliding, with others sliding towards outright authoritarianism.

Positive Trends. These threats are real, and they demand a sense of urgency. But so do the opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru demonstrate that, while democracy may be troubled, citizens are exercising democratic rights to uphold their constitutions.

²2018/2019 AmericasBaromter report, funded by USAID. Available at: https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-slump-across-americas-according-to-new-survey/

Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador now recognize the Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban officials, some even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador are doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular migration towards our border; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago regularly deploy to regional disaster response efforts, to include supporting the Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian; and Colombia, Brazil, and Chile continue to grow their contributions to global security.

Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of USSOUTHCOM are moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and sustain our security advantages in the Western Hemisphere. While doing so, we remain committed to making good use of every taxpayer dollar Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we undertook a detailed review of all aspects of our organization to gain efficiencies and support the Department's reform efforts. I look forward to discussing how we are freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our top priorities: strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering threats, and building the readiness of our team.

Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and partnerships—which is exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where strengthening partnerships is the best way to counter threats, enhance our collective readiness and capability to meet global challenges, and maintain the regional balance of power in favor of the United States. We also support the interagency, including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, reinforcing the importance of leveraging all tools of national security.

We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other competitors by playing to our strengths of shared values, professionalism, and equipment built to last, and by investing in education, intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, joint operations, and security cooperation. More

than anything else, <u>persistent presence matters in this fight</u>. Like athletes, we have to be present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win.

Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors. As the Department of Defense has prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has aggressively turned its attention to the Western Hemisphere, exporting corrupt business practices and disregard for international law and standards to countries already struggling with government corruption and weak governance. The competitive space is truly global and all-domain as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the PRC and Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15 worldwide) still recognize Taiwan—a fact that has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, which is engaging in persistent (and successful) dollar diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19 Latin American and Caribbean nations now participating in the One Belt One Road Initiative and pledges of at least \$150 billion in loans, the PRC is now the region's largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of predatory financing and "no strings attached" largesse it has wielded in other parts of the world. On the defense side, this includes "gifts" of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to copy our successful military education program.

Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host Chinese infrastructure projects. Most concerning, certain investments have strategic value for future military uses. Chinese investment in numerous deep water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the Panama Canal could enable the Chinese military to threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the movement of U.S. forces. Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the sovereign rights of coastal states to conduct illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Latin American countries, while Chinese mining and infrastructure projects have created lasting environmental damage. Beijing sees immense value in South America's strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing

additional access to regional space infrastructure. With telecommunication projects in 16 countries, Huawei and ZTE provide the backbone of commercial and government communication systems, providing a backdoor for the Chinese government to monitor or intercept official information we share with our partners. Beijing is also gaining real-time, street-level situational awareness by selling surveillance technology through its "Smart Cities" initiative—the same technology the Chinese Communist Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens.³

Russia continues to play the role of "spoiler," seeking to sow disunity and discredit the United States within our own hemisphere. As it does across the world, Russia meddles in regional affairs by spreading false information on its media platforms and engaging in malicious cyber activity. Russia's ability to disseminate disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En Español's social media platforms received more views in 2019 than any other Spanish-language news source. While Moscow denies having a military presence in the region, Russian "advisors" continue to prop up the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua provide Russia with footholds close to our homeland, giving Putin strategic options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia's access to the Western Hemisphere, allowing Russia to collect intelligence in close proximity to the United States.

Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the Americas in the past, maintains facilitation networks and raises funds through its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah supporters cache weapons and raise funds, often via charitable donations, remittances, and sometimes through illicit means, such as drug trafficking and money laundering. Having a footprint in the region also allows Iran to collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible retaliatory attacks

³ Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses and China's National Intelligence Law, citizens living in democracies in the Western Hemisphere could have their entire digital identity under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.

against U.S. and/or Western interests.

After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for authoritarianism, an exporter of malign ideology, and an underlying driver of instability in the region. Cuban intelligence personnel support and counsel non-democratic leaders, including directly propping up the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba, Russia, and the PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to undercut U.S. initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays the thousands of Cuban medical personnel it sends as humanitarian, such aid routinely includes intelligence collection, propagation of Cuba's failed ideology, and advancing a distinctly anti-U.S. agenda.

The final malign actors—Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela—pose one of the most direct threats to peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. Emboldened by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Cuban protection and patronage, Maduro has allowed Venezuela to become a safe haven for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and drug traffickers while the Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020 hold, the number of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian exodus. To date, nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant strain on Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and other host countries in the region. Colombia bears the brunt of this crisis and has generously stepped up to support the over 1.6 million refugees while at the same time having 7.8 million internally displaced persons of their own, the largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan crisis will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require significant support to help Venezuelans address the decades of mismanagement, widespread insecurity, and corruption of defense and other institutions in order to realize the natural richness of their resources.

What We're Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the field to compete. And when we are on the field, our impacts are positive and long-lasting. In the absence of an enduring U.S. military presence, recurring rotations of small teams of Special Operations Forces, Soldiers, Sailors,

Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and National Guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and exchange critical expertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership Program (SPP) is uniquely positioned based on its dual military experience to provide a persistent and sustained presence to our partner nations by means of senior leader visits, exchanges, and cooperative training and exercises in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) and Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) build collective response and security capability and readiness in Army and Marine Corps Reserve Forces and partner militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru integrated into the SPMAGTF last year, building interoperability for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three partners also formed part of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT's multinational team. The 2019 COMFORT mission delivered significant returns, providing world-class medical care to nearly 68,000 patients in 12 countries, reducing suffering caused by the man-made crisis in Venezuela, and enhancing medical readiness in the U.S. Navy, our partners, and allies. JTF-B facilitates strategic access to Central America, builds enduring relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to create regional stability and security. JTF-B provided medical care to over 20,000 partner nation patients, rapid response capability for a wide range of contingencies, and assigned forces to participate in exercises.

As directed by the NDS, we're deepening relations with "regional countries that export military capabilities to priority regional and global security challenges." Recently designated a Major Non-NATO ally and the newest partner in the State Partnership Program (SPP), we work closely with Brazil on a range of priority missions. Chile exports its security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and Central America, and is actively partnering with us and U.S. Army South to develop a concept for a combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise later this year. Colombia—NATO's only global partner

in the region—seeks to share its humanitarian demining and counter IED expertise with NATO allies while also serving in South Korea as part of the United Nations Command, a legacy that stems from its participation in the Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong supporter of U.S. efforts to hold global malign actors accountable, de-flagging numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation of U.S. and international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its weight having supported coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan and applying training and equipment received via the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their current deployments to the UN Mission in Mali.

In the face of the PRC's and Russia's global assault on international norms, engagement on shared values is more important than ever before. As I told this Committee last year, education, training, and security cooperation efforts like the SPP and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program and the Department of State's International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of time and money, these programs are helping us reinforce mutual understanding, shared values and culture, and doctrine. Along with IMET; our Human Rights Initiative; noncommissioned officer development; and Women, Peace, and Security programs enhance the professionalism of the region's militaries and security forces. In particular, USSOUTHCOM's decades-long commitment to promoting respect for human rights has become a cornerstone of our strong partnerships with like-minded militaries. These efforts are among the most effective ways we can expand competitive space and outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage our partners to hold the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of peace, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information about Beijing's predatory

economic practices, the security risks associated with Chinese technology, and activities by Russia, Iran, and their authoritarian allies that undermine regional sovereignty and security. In addition to expanding our information sharing efforts throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with partners in the region to enhance our understanding of the security threats posed by the Venezuelan crisis, which in turn assists with multinational efforts to plan for longer term recovery and stability once free and fair democratic elections are held.

We also support the NDS' focus on developing operational concepts to enhance Joint Force lethality while building interoperability with allied and partner forces. We leverage our science and technology portfolio in high-end multinational exercises like UNITAS and PANAMAX, providing opportunities for the Services to test new warfighting capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment. Through our Caribbean-focused TRADEWINDS exercise, we are now laying the groundwork for a combined task force that can counter a range of threats and enable sea control and denial operations. We conduct cyber training and capacity building with partners like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil in an effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish shared cyber situational awareness in the region. We continue to work closely with other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure globally integrated plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and opportunities in this hemisphere.

Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs. As the NDS recognizes, "non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities." TCOs engage in a wide array of illegal activities that generate approximately two trillion dollars in illicit proceeds annually, including drug and weapons trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We see these impacts directly in our homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans since 1999, 4 costing

A https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html. From 1999 to 2017, more than 700,000 people have died from a drug overdose.

our nation billions in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity costs – in addition to the suffering caused by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption and violence, TCOs also challenge and erode the governance of partners that we rely on to advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse decades of successful U.S. policies and security investments.

Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment facilitating opportunities for malign actors to expand influence, and VEOs leverage to move people and weapons through our hemisphere. This latter vulnerability is particularly troublesome; there is an interconnected system of pathways that spans our neighborhood, running through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our homeland, and anything can move on them—for the right price. This ongoing threat was illustrated in 2019 by several successful U.S. law enforcement operations against human smuggling networks, which continue to enable the movement of individuals with terrorist links, many of whom attempt to enter the U.S. homeland illegally.

What We're Doing. We're strengthening partnerships with countries that contribute military capabilities to regional security and beyond, with a focus on enabling combined operations and building interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to the U.S. homeland, reduce the effectiveness of priority TCOs, and prevent VEOs from leveraging regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.

Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared responsibility, and one in which they are sacrificing blood and treasure to meet their commitment to halve cocaine production by 2023. Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to conduct maritime counterdrug operations while working closely with Panama and Costa Rica to seize drugs headed to the U.S. In 2019, Colombia also manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of almost 600 police and military killed or wounded, largely due to IEDs emplaced to protect the coca fields. Inside of Colombia, their security forces also disrupted and destroyed over 300 cocaine-producing labs, preventing over 400 metric tons of

cocaine from ever leaving the country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America's security challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six Central American countries through the U.S. Colombia Action Plan program since the program's inception in FY13. We continue to enable Colombian operations against priority narco-terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents, yielding significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.

In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our capacity-building efforts on improving border security, drug interdiction rates, and institutional effectiveness. Jamaica has now integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into Joint Interagency Task Force South counterdrug operations, enhancing our operational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training by Naval Special Warfare teams, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales Navales (FEN) is now entirely self-sufficient and responsible for more than 80% of Guatemala's drug seizures. Like Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador are applying U.S.-provided training and equipment to regularly interdict drug shipments more than 100 miles from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across America from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are leveraging our Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian Assistance Program to better address factors driving violence and migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a force multiplier across the hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the strategic level and reinforce accountability and transparency in defense institutions.

In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on modest investment. Last year, the international and interagency "team of teams" at JIATF-South helped keep 280 metric tons of cocaine off U.S. streets. JIATF-South-led interdictions at sea account for almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times larger than the United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF-South continue to be among

the best investments in the U.S. government.

In FY20, thanks to congressional support, we are filling detection and monitoring (D&M) capability gaps through innovative solutions like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). Having only recently deployed, the MMSV already has supported the disruption of over 3000 kilograms of cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping a low profile vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a capacity-building platform in the Dominican Republic, a key transit point for cocaine trafficking into major U.S. cities like Washington D.C., Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying commercially-available technology like unmanned aircraft systems to increase the MMSV's ability to conduct D&M and provide information to partner nations who are conducting the interceptions. In addition to the MMSV, we now have one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the region that will provide needed naval capabilities and technological advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deployments – these will be game changers.

On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM, and support the work of our interagency partners to stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism who are attempting to exploit the region's weak border security to move into the U.S. homeland. We deepened counter threat finance collaboration with the Treasury Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based member of al-Qa'ida last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging the DOD Rewards Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for minimal investment; in 2019, we paid \$1.2 million for 72 rewards (information) that led to the neutralization of 97 terrorists, the seizure of 80 weapons caches, and the destruction of 22 drug labs.

In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago continues to pay dividends for international efforts targeting extremist networks supporting ISIS and other dangerous groups. Our

biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and stop known or suspected terrorists last year, while we deepened collaboration with Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious activities by supporters of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.

Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) support the global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the battlefield. As we take proactive steps to address infrastructure issues associated with continued detention operations, the JTF-GTMO team remains the epitome of professionalism, conducting safe, legal, and humane detention operations that protect our homeland and U.S. troops serving in harm's way.

Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our homeland's defense, we are focused on building an effective, efficient, and resilient team.

For decades, USSOUTHCOM's modest budget and small footprint have encouraged us to embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches. Over the last five years, we absorbed 25% cuts to our personnel, a 10% reduction to our Exercise program, and a steady decline in available assets and forces needed to support our mission. We've tried to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to minimize operational impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies, improve performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.

With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the Department's current reform efforts.

Our revised campaign plan drove a review of all FY20 operations, activities, and investments. We eliminated over 200 lower priority events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic partners.

We've also revised our joint exercise program to make it more effective and more relevant. In 2019, we sharpened our emphasis on building readiness of U.S. forces and supporting Joint Force experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exercises to more directly support the global competition with the PRC and Russia. Other areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF-

GTMO manning, contracts, and theater posture.

At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved support to military and civilian families, and enhanced our training and professional development programs to build a more ready, results-oriented organization. We continue to work closely with the Department of the Army and local South Florida community to address housing and high living costs impacting our men and women. At JTF-GTMO, we undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine long-term requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. We are also taking steps to improve quality of life and resiliency of JIATF-South's headquarters building at Naval Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in the continental United States, NAS Key West has significant strategic value in defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I look forward to working with the Congress on our housing issues in the year ahead to ensure our men and women get the support they need.

Congressional Support. I'd like to repeat last year's invitation to members of this Committee to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that we value this region and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood safe. Your presence, attention, and engagement, along with that of other key leaders, matters. I also want to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel. Confidence in stable, predictable budgets will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable security partners.

Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our competitive edge: persistent presence and engagement. We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that have streamlined security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security partner of choice. Your continued support to these security cooperation programs and capabilities like IMET and the Perry Center allow us to build trust and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow

contributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly, support for analytic initiatives focused on open source/publicly available information helps mitigate reduced intelligence resources and provides a steady stream of useful information (especially about malign state actors) that we can share with partners.

As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the counterdrug mission, we still only enabled the successful interdiction of about nine percent of known drug movement. That is a small increase over previous years, but still significantly below where we need to be. We appreciate your continued support to creative solutions like the MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the security of the Western Hemisphere. Each additional force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable ship, embarked helicopter, and law enforcement detachment) enables the disruption of 35 more metric tons of cocaine. Grey hulls, in particular, still serve as a powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our competitors, and a reassuring one to our friends. They can also yield multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while participating in our UNITAS exercise last year, the USS MICHAEL MURPHY supported the interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine, simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of intelligence, demonstrating rules-based maritime behavior, and providing coalition training opportunities for the U.S. Navy.

Conclusion. I'd like to close as I began: with a note of caution, and one of hope.

Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends on the security of our borders and the stability of our hemisphere – both of which are under assault. Likewise, our ability to

⁵ USCG National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and/or the Navy's LITTORAL Combat Ship could fill this requirement, providing us with a game-changing edge, providing unique capabilities to engage drug traffickers where they are most vulnerable.

advance diplomatic and economic goals depends on the strength of both our partnerships and our shared values. We've seen what happens when we ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In the past decade, we've seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs, increased presence of malign actors, and negative trends in democracy.

We're now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security threats we face now and in the near future, and the significant opportunities that await only with our initiative and engagement in the hemisphere. There is no other region we depend upon more for our prosperity and security, and with which we are more closely tied through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for our shared values. As I hope I've conveyed, the right, focused attention and modest investments go a long way in this part of the world, paying significant security dividends to both our global efforts and to our homeland's defense. When we don't engage in our neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our homeland security pays the price. When we do engage, we reduce threats to the homeland and limit opportunities for adversaries to operate in close proximity to us. And there is no better return on investment than that.

Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the USSOUTHCOM team and their families. I look forward to your questions.


Admiral Craig Faller

Admiral Craig Faller is a native of Fryburg, Pennsylvania and 1983 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering. He is also a 1990 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Master's in National Security Affairs (Strategic Planning).

At sea, Admiral Faller served as Reactor Electrical Division Officer, Electrical Officer and Reactor Training Assistant aboard USS South Carolina (CGN 37); Operations Officer aboard USS Peterson (DD 969); Station Officer aboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65), and Executive Officer of USS John Hancock (DD 981). As Commanding Officer of USS Stethem (DDG 63), he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and participated in maritime interception operations in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq. During his tour as Commanding Officer of USS Shiloh (CG 67), he assisted victims of the devastating tsunami off Indonesia. Finally, as Commander, John C. Stennis Strike Group / Carrier Strike Group 3, he deployed to the Middle East supporting Operations New Dawn (Iraq) and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).

Ashore, Admiral Faller served as a D1G Prototype Staff Officer at the Nuclear Power Training unit in Ballston Spa, NY; Action Officer in Navy Strategy and Concepts Branch (N513); Legislative Fellow on the staff of Senator Edward M. Kennedy; Program Manager, Surface Nuclear Officer Programs and Placement; Executive Assistant to the Commander U.S. Pacific Command; Executive Assistant to Commander U.S. Central Command; Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations; Commander, Navy Recruiting Command; Director of Operations (J3) U.S. Central Command; Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs; and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Faller has earned various personal, unit, service and campaign awards.




RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Admiral Faller. We are tracking the concern though, so far, we have not seen a direct impact to mission readiness within SOUTHCOM. We appreciate the work being done by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to remedy our reliance on Chinese manufacturers. For any further discussion on the supply chain, I would refer you to OSD. [See page 22.1]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

General O'Shaughnessy. Although China has expanded its military engagement in The Bahamas, the United States remains The Bahamas' defense partner of choice. One reason is that USNORTHCOM provides the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) with approximately \$6M in training and assistance annually. By contrast, the Chinese have made occasional security assistance contributions to the RBDF at significantly smaller amounts than the United States. Furthermore, our partnership also extends beyond traditional military-to-military cooperation, as demonstrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian in 2019, when USNORTHCOM was proud to lead the Department of Defense portion of the relief effort in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in The Bahamas. Bahamian senior leaders prefer U.S. cooperation and investment, and USNORTHCOM uses all available authorities to support our RBDF partners. And finally, the RBDF is a willing partner and has made significant investments to modernize its capabilities. We are collaborating on a bi-national security cooperation framework to improve the RBDF's ability to detect, identify, track and interdict illicit trafficking in both its territory and the approaches to the United States. The Bahamas also hosts the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC), which is a sophisticated U.S. Navy facility that tests and certifies the undersea warfare capabilities of submarines, vessels, and aircraft. Given The Bahamas' proximity to the U.S. mainland (50 miles offshore), Bahamian leadership in regional security matters, and their hosting of AUTEC, the USNORTHCOM relationship with the RBDF is crucial to the cooperative defense of the United States. [See page 42.]



QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. The military has done a commendable job of training our counterparts in the SOUTHCOM region. One of the best examples is the Colombian military. The Colombian forces are now some of the best in the world and travel the globe training other militaries. Admiral Faller, to what do you attribute the success of the Colombian military and how can we replicate that with other partners in the region?

Admiral Faller. The Colombian military is SOUTHCOM's most willing and capable strategic partner in the region due largely to decades of security investment by both the U.S. and Colombia. Colombia receives the majority of regional U.S. Title 10 and Title 22 funding. More importantly, the Government of Colombia also invests heavily, spending 3.4% of its GDP on defense resulting in a multiplier effect on U.S.-capacity building efforts. The Colombian military's exceptionalism comes from recognition in the end of the last century that it was facing an enemy that could only be defeated by a military committed to professionalism and embracing human rights. Recognizing that survival required modernization, Colombia partnered with the U.S. in Plan Colombia, a multiyear, whole-of-government strategy to defeat the narco-terrorist insurgency that threatened to destroy the country. Colombia has spent nearly \$38 million in national funds over the last twenty years in addition to significant U.S. investment to send its officers and noncommissioned officers to U.S. International Professional Military Education (I–PME) courses and training, fundamental to the success of modernization. Additionally, Colombia has expanded its participation and leadership in global and regional multinational exercises such as Rim of the Pacific naval exercise (RIMPAC), PANAMAX, and UNITAS. Attesting to the wide acceptance and recognition of their exceptional competence and interoperability, Colombian officers serve in numerous key leadership positions in U.S. military organizations. To replicate Colombian success, we must seek opportunities to work with willing nations when they look for a security partner, while understanding their unique challenges and capabilities. To do so effectively, we must apply sustained levels of resources, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Sec 333 funding—and have the strategic patience to build these long-term capabilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. Larsen. Using counter-UAS equipment can pose both safety and operational issues for authorized airspace users in the vicinity, due in large part to the immaturity or lack of readiness of counter-UAS technologies in civilian airspace. Can you comment on this issue and the challenges presented? How does DOD ensure its impacts on authorized civilian airspace users and air navigation equipment are minimal?

Secretary Rapuano. The Department of Defense (DOD) manages risk of collateral C–UAS effects through activities at the national and local levels. Nationally, DOD has partnered closely with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop jointly processes and procedures to identify and mitigate the potential collateral effects of DOD C–UAS actions on national airspace system users. These processes and procedures include pre-employment testing of C–UAS technologies for collateral impacts, coordination with the FAA prior to emplacement of C–UAS systems within the United States, and a rapid notification system by which DOD C–UAS operators inform local Air Traffic Controllers of the use of C–UAS technologies. At the local level, or installation level, risks associated with C–UAS employment are further mitigated through FAA-administered airspace management measures and DOD installation-level risk management activities, including training, posting "No Drone" signage, and partnerships with local law enforcement agencies and UAS user groups.

Mr. Larsen. Several other Federal departments or agencies would like authority similar to DOD to counter UAS in the United States. What lessons learned can you provide Congress for when it considers future counter-UAS proposals?

Secretary RAPUANO. The Department has proceeded cautiously and deliberately in seeking and implementing its C-UAS authorities, in close partnership with the FAA, and other key Federal departments and agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration. DOD has similarly proceeded with careful regard for the impact of these technologies on legitimate users of both the national airspace system and the electro-magnetic spectrum. Balancing the emergent threat to DOD facilities and assets against the potential collateral effects of C-UAS technologies, DOD has used a risk-based approach and open communication and coordination with the FAA and other key stakeholders, to strike the appropriate balance between facility and asset security and aviation safety. Recent experience has demonstrated that the security environment can rapidly change in unexpected ways. Authorizing the Secretary of the Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, to designate facilities and assets as "covered assets" temporarily on the basis of emergent indicators that they are at high risk for unlawful unmanned aircraft activity, would provide DOD the flexibility to respond to unanticipated events in a safe and effective manner.

Mr. LARSEN. Can you please discuss the training for DOD personnel currently operating counter-UAS systems in the United States?

Secretary Rapuano. Training is essential to DOD's safe operation of C-UAS technologies and DOD's efforts to preserve the safety of the national airspace system. In implementing 10 U.S.C. 130i, the Military Services and other DOD Components each require installation-level training in the use of C-UAS technologies. Installation commanders are required to verify that the required training program is in place when they request approval to operate C-UAS equipment. The required training programs and specific requests to operate C-UAS equipment are reviewed within DOD and by the FAA. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has contributed by providing hands-on training to units during site visits and have made webbased distance learning available.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. General O'Shaughnessy, you mention the cancellation of RKV and the effects that has had on your command from the perspective of the warfighter. Do you agree with the assessment that, while we can be confident in our current GMD posture to counter a North Korean threat for the next 5 to 6 years, at the rate the DPRK is developing their ICBM capabilities we must begin assuming increased risk around 2025 and beyond?

There are many internal discussions taking place between Congress, industry, and the Department on how we can shore up our homeland missile defenses prior to the NGI coming online. In your testimony, you called yourself "a strong advocate for bringing a layered capability on board for the warfighter well before NGI is field-

ed."

What do you mean by that: are you talking about an SM-3IIA/THAAD-ER underlayer, an interim GBI gap-filler that leverages designs and concepts that could be delivered by industry earlier than NGI, or "all of the above"?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I am confident in our ability to defend against a North Korean ICBM threat today, but their capabilities continue to advance. USNORTH-COM is working with the Missile Defense Agency and other organizations to develop the Strategic Homeload Integrated Fessystem for Leveled Defense (SHIELD) the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense (SHIELD) to provide defense against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonics as soon as possible. This layered homeland defense will consist of multiple systems that complement, not replace, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and its current inventory of ground-based interceptors. This layered system is critical to maintaining our ability to adequately defend the United States even after the fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor. As we develop the SHIELD capability to provide defense against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonics, we will look at using Aegis Afloat and the current THAAD capability in some capacity if required to deploy an immediate capability. This solution is not ideal as it provides limited coverage and takes high-demand capabilities from other regional combatant commanders. In the longer term, a purpose-built system like Aegis Ashore may be part of a permanent solution that will not only provide an interim gap-filler, but also provide a valuable capability into the future.

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Faller, in your testimony, you mention that Iran is able to leverage its Hezbollah proxy forces to reach into the Americas and has done so

in the past.

Can you please describe for us the nature of Iranian activities in your AOR and the Iranian regime's relationship with the Maduro regime?

Can you also describe for us the kinds of capabilities the Iranians are able to

bring to bear leveraging these forces and relationships?

Admiral FALLER. In Latin America, Iran primarily seeks to develop diplomatic and economic partnerships to alleviate the pressure caused by U.S. sanctions. Over the last year, Tehran's relationship with the Maduro regime remained nominal, with Iran focused on sustaining access to Venezuela's natural resources and gaining a return on previous investments. In April, we identified a noted increase in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-associated Mahan Air scheduling non-commercial flights into Venezuela's Paraguana Peninsula. These flights likely brought needed Iranian-supported oil infrastructure and repair equipment to Venezuela's largest petroleum refinery complex in exchange for gold, circumventing existing sanctions on Iran and the Maduro regime. In late May, Iran shipped gasoline to Venezuela, in contravention to U.S. sanctions, Such actions are indicative of the evolving relationship between Venezuela and Iran. Iran's partner, Hizballah, maintains access to a large Lebanese diaspora and sympathetic, Iran shipped expatriate community in Latin America that it seeks to exploit by garnering economic and political support for its social services and welfare programs in Lebanon. Hizballah's relationship with the Maduro regime remains largely symbolic. While we have observed Iran and Hizballah's historic targeting in Panama and the Andean region, we have no current or credible information indicating the Iran Threat Network has the intent to attack U.S. forces deployed forward or our partners in the SOUTHCOM grees of responsi U.S. forces deployed forward or our partners in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Mrs. Hartzler. The national supply of antibiotics, vaccines and many other drugs depends on Chinese manufacturers—Chinese pharmaceutical producers provide 97 percent of the U.S. antibiotic market. How would U.S. national security be impacted if China decided to withhold antibiotics from the U.S. market during conflict?

Secretary RAPUANO. U.S. national security would be negatively impacted if a conflict with China emerged. As with many other areas, the antibiotic market would be adversely impacted. However, as we have seen with the challenges posed by COVID-19, the United States has the human and physical capital to overcome or at least minimize many of the challenges a conflict with China would present.

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General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security and the

Department of Health and Human Services as the lead federal agencies for assessing the potential impacts of the scenario described above.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. Scott. How can an active littoral constabulary presence by the U.S. Coast Guard in partnership with cooperative nations limit the freedom of movement en-

joyed by transnational and transregional threat networks?

Admiral Faller. Pushing out our borders over 1,500 nautical miles offshore is critical to confronting drug cartels and enhancing our national security. Attacking the cartels' profit sources in the maritime transit zones, where they are most vulnerable, is part of a holistic approach to mitigate their influence enabled by cocaine smuggling. At-sea interdictions of pure cocaine are the most effective way to limit cartels from trafficking their entire spectrum of illicit products. Due to the US Coast Guard's law enforcement authorities, an active and persistent presence of US Coast Guard force packages -which include a cutter/vessel, helicopter, and boarding team-is central to US efforts combating maritime smuggling by transnational criminal or-ganizations. Drugs and other contraband detected by DOD cannot legally be inter-dicted without US Coast Guard or partner nation participation. Partner nations have increasingly contributed to interdictions, currently participating in over 50% of interdictions—up from 40% last year. The training and interoperability of partner nation forces is creating a significant force multiplier for this effort. There are more well-trained response capabilities and personnel to bring to the effort, ones deeply familiar with their territorial waters and the littorals used by criminal organizations. These organizations exploit any lack of presence to move contraband. The littorals are vital to their efforts as their contraband must be brought ashore for

further distribution. A persistent US Navy and Coast Guard presence, coupled with increasing partner nation participation and maritime coverage, would directly and significantly hinder these networks' ability to move and/or land contraband unchal-

Mr. Scott. What would a day in the life of SOUTHCOM be without the United

States Coast Guard?

Admiral FALLER. The Coast Guard provides more than 4,000 hours of support by maritime patrol aircraft and 2,000 major cutter days to SOUTHCOM each year. The counter drug mission is an overwhelmingly maritime one due to traffickers harnessing the economic efficiency of large drug shipments by sea. The Coast Guard's specialized capabilities, unique authorities, and strong international relationships enable the U.S. to build partner-nation capacity and model rules-based values and behaviors, strengthening regional stability and enhance economic prosperity. As a member of the armed services, law enforcement, and intelligence communities, the Coast Guard is uniquely suited to operate with, and provide capability and capacity development programs to Central and South American nations. Coast Guard expertise specifically delivered through Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Field Teams supports security cooperation programs and engagement activities in the region to reduce the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Without these interactions, our efforts to build our partners' capabilities to serve as force multipliers to protect the region and our homeland would diminish. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant Command with a Coast Guard officer serving as the Director of Operations. This is as compelling a detail as any showing that the Coast Guard is central to SOUTHCOM mission success.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VELA

Mr. Vela. How many troops are currently operating at the U.S. Southern Border and what activities are they doing? What activity are you seeing at the border from 1) China, 2) Russia, 3) North Korea, 4) Iran, 5) ISIS and 6) al-Qaida? General O'SHAUGHNESSY. As of 16 June 2020, there were 2,612 Title 10 forces and

2,451 Title 32 forces supporting the southwest border mission. The Department of Defense is assisting U.S. Customs and Border Protection in four key areas: Detection and Monitoring (operation of 157 mobile surveillance cameras), Operational Support (such as maintenance transport operations, heavy equipment operations, and crisis response force), Infrastructure Support (such as fence repair), and Aviaand trisis response force, infrastructure Support (such as light and medium rotary wing, fixed wing, and unmanned aircraft system support). Additionally, there are 599 Title 10 forces who are operating 60 mobile surveillance camera positions in support of COVID-19 response along the southwest border. USNORTHCOM is in constant communication with national intelligence and law enforcement agencies to ensure our requirements for intelligence are met and that any adversary activity comes to our attention immediately. The predominant activity I see from China in Mexico is economic investment, which includes an industrial park near the border in northeast Mexico, but I have seen no indications of Chinese malicious activity along our borders. Likewise, beyond legacy Russian foreign military sales activity, I am aware of no Russian, North Korean or Iranian activity of concern along our borders, to include any reporting that adversary foreign intelligence entities focus their activities at our borders, although they may have plans in place for border crossings during a crisis or conflict. Finally, I have seen no evidence that ISIS or al-Qa'ida maintains a presence in Mexico or Canada, or that these organizations are directing operatives to transit through Mexico or Canada and across our borders to infiltrate or attack the homeland. I am well supported through constant communication with national intelligence and law enforcement agencies to ensure I am made aware of any such activity. Regarding this latter issue, the COVID-19 crisis has put a damper on migration—stricter border controls and less pull factors—probably lessening the potential for adversary exploitation. Nonetheless, I am watchful for any signs of a return to large-scale migration and the attendant vulnerabilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM

Dr. Abraham. Admiral Faller, recently you told the Senate Armed Services Committee that only about 20% of your ISR needs are being met in SOUTHCOM. What are somethings we on the committee can do to help you meet those needs?

Following up on that, it is my understanding that you also employ some non-tra-ditional ISR methods in SOUTHCOM, would you be able to speak to what some of

these methods or platforms are, and would you be open to looking at more non-traditional ways to provide SOUTHCOM with ISR?

Admiral FALLER. Congress has been very supportive of SOUTHCOM by providing resources that allow us to mitigate our ISR gaps with non-traditional, innovative, and efficient solutions. A key mitigation to SOUTHCOM's shortfall for overland ISR is our use of contracted airborne ISR platforms (multi-INT B200's and FALCON-I FOPEN), which as stated in our FY21 Unfunded Requirements List, has an \$8-9M shortfall every fiscal year. Additional funding for the acquisition and operation of these critical platforms would greatly assist in minimizing large gaps in intelligence collection time, space, and capability. These assets allow SOUTHCOM to focus intelligence collection efforts in multiple locations around the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility in support of US Federal Law Enforcement Agencies and partner nation efforts. These assets have already assisted us in finding over 20 drug processing labs during the first 30 days of our Enhanced Counter-Narcotics Operation. Also an FY21 unfunded requirement, the Technical Network Analysis Cell (TNAC) continues to reap benefits during the Enhanced Counter-Narcotics Operation. In conjunction with our European partners, we seized ~8 MT of cocaine in the month of April from TNAC-provided information. Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF—S), in partnership with US Federal Law Enforcement entities, has proven that this capability can identify illegal shipping container movements and illuminate the associated threat networks. Providing additional funding to the TNAC will reap a significant return on investment and prevent substantial amounts 9M shortfall every fiscal year. Additional funding for the acquisition and operation TNAC will reap a significant return on investment and prevent substantial amounts of illicit narcotics from entering directly into the homeland. If funding is made available for these and our other non-traditional FY21 Unfunded Requirements List items—the Commercial Data Integration Cells, HUMINT through the Cyber Domain, and UAS support to the MMSV—we can expect to see a return on investment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

Mr. Waltz. I am pleased to see the administration increasing oil sanctions against the regime in Venezuela, including targeting third-country companies dealing in Venezuelan oil. News reports suggest those companies would rather divest from Venezuela than challenge U.S. sanctions.

However, this strategy targets the regime's licit activity only. As the economic pressure mounts, we can surely expect Maduro to increasingly rely on illicit activity such as drug trafficking and dirty deals involving gold to generate hard currency. Are you seeing an uptick in Venezuelan involvement in this kind of transnational organized crime? What do you see as SOUTHCOM's role in countering this illicit

Admiral Faller. Due to heavy economic sanctions on Venezuela, U.S. Southern Command continues to identify and counter the illicit activity conducted by the Maduro Regime. There has been a year-on-year increase of transnational organized crime activity emanating from Venezuela. Apure and Zulia states remain hotbeds for illicit flights departing Venezuela with cocaine bound for Central America, Mexico, and eventually the U.S. In 2019, the number of suspected illicit flights departing Venezuela increased significantly, which was the highest number of suspected illicit flights since 2009. The Orinoco River, which acts as a border with Colombia and runs through Venezuela, is a key corridor for drug trafficking. Additionally, Venezuela's northern coastline serves as a key departure zone, with traffickers conducting at sea drug transfers in Venezuela's territorial waters. All of this is possible because the Maduro regime's armed forces cooperate with drug traffickers and terrorist organizations such as the ELN and FARC dissidents. U.S. Southern Command supports Partner Nations, Law Enforcement, and Interagency partners' efforts to counter illegal activity conducted by Venezuela. Recent indictments by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and sanctions by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are examples of actions to counter the illicit activity in Venezuela. Specifically, U.S. Southern Command provides analytic support to Law Enforcement investigations and to OFAC in support of sanctions on businesses and individuals involved in drug trafficking and money laundering activity to disrupt or deny financial benefit to the Maduro Regime.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN

Mr Golden. The 2nd Fleet was reestablished in 2018 to better establish a U.S. presence in the Atlantic and Arctic, and it is encouraging to see that the 2nd Fleet was declared Fully Operational Capable in December 2019. Given the challenging maritime environment of the Arctic, what unique capabilities must the 2nd fleet

possess to be effective in this Area of Operations, to include ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, strategic land strike, anti-aircraft, and anti-ship? Additionally, how do the capabilities of the Flight III DDG-51 contribute to 2nd Fleet operations and overall U.S. presence in the Arctic?

General O'SHAUGHNESSY. I am encouraged that 2nd Fleet is fully operational and that there is increased focus on fleet operations in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Increased presence in the Arctic is a key element of USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission. Recent U.S. Navy deployments to the North Atlantic and Arctic demonstrated we must address and mitigate operational challenges posed by nomeiand defense mission. Recent U.S. Navy deployments to the North Atlantic and Arctic demonstrated we must address and mitigate operational challenges posed by the harsh Arctic operating environment and lack of infrastructure in the northern reaches of the North Atlantic. Periodic fleet deployments to the Arctic build and maintain proficiency across the full spectrum of maritime missions and play a vital role in both deterrence and homeland defense. I am confident the Flight III DDG–51 will play an important role in supporting USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission; however, for information regarding the ship's specific capabilities, I defer to the U.S. Navy.

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