[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
           DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                        GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                      INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 30, 2020
                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-108
                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        

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Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov


                              ___________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
41-970PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022   



                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	     JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
                                                                          
                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director

               Brandon Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

    Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 
                      International Organizations

                     KAREN BASS, California, Chair

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, 
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota                 Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       RON WRIGHT, Texas
                                     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Fomunyoh, Dr. Christopher, Senior Associate for Africa, National 
  Democratic Institute for International Affairs.................     8
Bekoe, Dr. Dorina, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense 
  Analyses.......................................................    20
Temin, Mr. Jon, Director, Africa Program, Freedom House..........    29
Meservey, Mr. Joshua, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the 
  Middle East, The Heritage Foundation...........................    39

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    59
Hearing Minutes..................................................    60
Hearing Attendance...............................................    61

                           OPENING STATEMENT

Opening statement submitted for the record from Chair Bass.......    62

             ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Smith.....    68
Statement submitted for the record from Adotei Akwei of Amensty 
  International..................................................    75
Unanimous Consent for Representative Sherman.....................    85




                     Wednesday, September 30, 2020

                          House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
             Global Human Rights, and International
                                     Organizations,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                     Washington, DC

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass 
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global 
Human Rights, and International Organizations will come to 
order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any point, and all members will 
have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and 
questions for the record subject to the length limitation in 
the rules.
    To insert something into the record, please have your staff 
email the previously mentioned address or contact full 
committee staff. I see that we have a quorum and I will now 
recognize the ranking member for his opening statement.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Bass, 
for convening today's very important hearing on a very 
disturbing topic, the backsliding we have seen to sub-Saharan 
Africa when it comes to democracy and governance.
    And I thank you for the courtesy of letting me go first. I 
am also the ranking member on the China Commission and we have 
a hearing at 10 o'clock on Tibet and I have opening comments 
there I need to make, so I am going to go and come back. So I 
do thank you for that courtesy. It is very kind of you.
    Madam Chair, according to the metrics put out by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit earlier this year, democracy in 
sub-Saharan Africa has been on the retreat, declining between 
2018 and 2019, when its Democracy Index recorded its lowest 
total since 2010. With postponements of elections in 2020 
attributed to COVID-19 and subsequent lockdowns serving 
sometimes as a pretext for stifling dissent, I fear that 2020 
may see an even greater decrease in democracy on the continent.
    Today's hearing is also timely as elections are approaching 
next month in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast, both countries 
which appear to be on a downward trajectory in terms of 
governance in respect for civil and political rights. And I 
want to note that Chairwoman Bass has introduced legislation 
with respect to Tanzania and I am very proud to be a co-sponsor 
of it and I thank her for that leadership.
    We also see the role of outside actors facilitating a 
downward race to the bottom. In particular, China, which seeks 
to export its bad governance model throughout Africa, but also 
the Gulf States, Turkey, and even African countries such as 
Rwanda, which has had a sustained disruptive impact on its 
neighbors for many years, particularly in the DRC.
    I suspect we will hear about the U.S., what the U.S. is 
doing to promote democracy and good governance throughout 
Africa, and we have as one of our witnesses, our distinguished 
witnesses, Dr. Chris Fomunyoh. Thank you for your work at NDI. 
And along with its sister organization, the IRI, they have 
dedicated much of their work to promotion of democracy in sub-
Saharan Africa. I also hope that we will take a closer look at 
our missteps as well. For example, it is quite obvious to 
outside observers in the DRC that the declared winner of the 
latest Presidential election held in late 2018, Felix 
Tshisekedi, received less votes than Martin Fayulu. Because of 
a corrupt bargain between the outgoing strawman Joseph Kabila, 
Tshisekedi, the Constitutional Court packed by Kabila, declared 
him to be the winner.
    What happened next was troubling, as our State Department 
issued a statement that said, and I quote, ``The United States 
welcomes the Congolese Constitutional Court certification of 
Felix Tshisekedi as the next President of the DRC,'' which was 
apparently driven by a handful of diplomats including our 
Ambassador.
    I believe this sent a terrible message, with ramifications 
not only within the DRC but beyond as well. For example, 
elections in Nigeria were first postponed by sitting President 
Buhari and marred by irregularities in advance of the election 
day, including arson attacks on the Independent National 
Electoral Commission offices in opposition strongholds and 
Buhari's removal of Supreme Court Justice Walter Onnoghen.
    Nonetheless, there has also been progress too and we should 
note that. Namibia is developing toward a stable democracy. 
During the last elections in Namibia, we saw an incumbent 
president win reelection with a reduced vote and a robust 
opposition winning enough votes to deny the ruling party SWAPO 
its supermajority in the legislature. Botswana is another 
example of a country which is developing good democratic 
habits. While there is room for improvement in both countries, 
the overall trajectory is positive.
    We also welcome with guarded optimism developments in Sudan 
following the ouster of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir. Yet 
at the same time, we need to temper our appraisal given the 
continued role of people such as Hemetti and Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan, the real powers behind the throne. Both have been 
implicated in past atrocities in Darfur and both must 
ultimately be held to account for that.
    Before Sudan is delisted as a State sponsor of terrorism, I 
also believe there must be justice for all victims of its past 
bad acts including the victims of 9/11, many of whom live in my 
own State of New Jersey and in my district.
    Ethiopia has made fitful progress since Prime Minister Abiy 
assumed power. There was initial euphoria as he released 
political prisoners in the free media. When Chairwoman Bass and 
I met with him in August 2018 in Addis, he was riding a wave of 
optimism. Since then, however, ethnic and religious tensions 
have roiled Ethiopia with targeted attacks against ethnic and 
religious minorities in certain States. Elections have been 
postponed on account of COVID crisis and the government 
response to violence has been mixed. Arrest of political 
opponents, some of whom have themselves fomented violence, is 
worrisome.
    My personal view is that the Prime Minister is trying to 
advance a pan-Ethiopian vision which transcends ethnicity and 
religion, but he is also facing very strong headwinds. Respect 
for democracy also demands that opposition figures behave 
responsibly as well, in addition to the government which wields 
these levers of power.
    Finally, I want to note that in my position as past 
chairman and now current ranking member, I have met many 
African leaders as has our distinguished chairwoman, including 
some with whom I took to task for offenses against democracy, 
including Bashir when I met with him in 2005 in Khartoum, and 
former President Meles. But there are others who have stood out 
in a very positive way, including former President Benin whom I 
met at the General Assembly 1 year ago and with whom we had a 
very, very good exchange.
    Unfortunately, his successor, President Patrice Talon, has 
not preserved the gift that he was given. He has cracked down 
on free speech, imposed restriction on political organizing, 
shot demonstrators, and even detained for nearly 2 months his 
predecessor who subsequently had to flee the country. I grieve 
for Benin and its people and as I do, as we all do, for many in 
Africa who have not realized the dream of democracy to which 
they are entitled. I thank the chairwoman and yield back.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Representative Smith.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times even when you are not recognized by the chair. 
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves and 
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with H.R. 965 and the accompanying regulations, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate, 
when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background 
noise.
    Thank you for attending today's hearing on Democratic 
Backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa which we believe is timely as 
other parts of the world, including here, suffer similar 
challenges. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses today 
who will provide deeper insight into the dynamics contributing 
to the erosion of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
impact this seemingly global trend will have on democratic 
governance, economic growth, and improved access to health and 
education resources.
    We are here today because several countries across the 
African continent are retreating from core democratic 
principles which we refer to as democratic backsliding. 
Democratic backsliding includes, but is not limited to, the 
degradation of free and fair elections, infringement on freedom 
of speech, impairment of political opposition to challenge the 
government or hold it accountable, the weakening of the rule of 
law such as limiting the autonomy of the judiciary, and the 
manufacturing or overemphasizing of a national security threat 
that allows the government to malign critics.
    These actions singularly or collectively lead to State-
organized debilitation or elimination of political institutions 
that can look like actions taken to uphold our strength and 
democracy. Flawed elections remain an issue in most of Africa 
with leaders manipulating laws, freedoms, and elections to 
retain power. Most concerning is the situation in Tanzania, 
which I recently addressed in House Resolution 1120, where 
current leadership is repressing the opposition and basic 
freedoms of expression and assembly in a blatant attempt to 
retain power.
    We see similar patterns in Cote d'Ivoire as the executive 
branch legalizes the deviation and democratic institutions to 
codify nondemocratic actions. We have similar concerns about 
Guinea and are going to be very watchful of upcoming elections 
there, and in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Gabon, Ghana, Niger, and Somalia. The actions of these 
governments to suppress freedom of expression, including social 
media, to exclude opposition participation in the electoral 
process and to use police and military resources against 
protestors, undermine democracy and jeopardize the rights and 
very lives of their citizens.
    There are many sub-Saharan countries of concerns and I look 
forward to hearing which countries we should monitor closely 
and the witnesses' recommendations for how we can support them. 
What concerns me most is that democratic backsliding is not 
limited to Africa and we seem to be in a place of retreat from 
democracy that I only hope is an anomaly.
    In Europe, we see the egregious behavior of Belarusian 
President Alexander Lukashenko who claimed success in a 
disputed August 9th election and sought support from extra-
national resources such as Russia to justify his claim to 
power. Thousands of Belarusians openly protested against the 
election results for more than 50 days, suffering multiple 
incidents of police brutality. This democratic backsliding 
comes approximately 1 year after the U.S. and Belarus agreed to 
exchange Ambassadors after a 15-year pause as a result of 
significant democratic progress of the Belarusian Government.
    Other European countries experiencing democratic 
backsliding include Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Serbia, and Turkey, to which we must continue to lend our 
support and protect the dignity and rights of their citizens. 
In Asia and Latin America, we have to be extremely vigilant to 
help strengthen democracy in some of the largest and most 
populous countries in the world such as Brazil, India, the 
Philippines, and Thailand.
    In Brazil, President Bolsonaro is challenging the autonomy 
of the judiciary and Congress to investigate the excessive 
presence of the military in civil public services. President 
Duterte of the Philippines is accused of lawfare or weaponizing 
the law to deter or defeat freedoms, personalities, and 
establishments that promote human rights, press freedoms, and 
rule of law, while also cracking down on individual freedoms.
    These countries have experienced erosion in democratic 
institutions and human rights exemplified by the imposition of 
tighter State control over multiple political institutions that 
result in more authoritarian forms of government and increased 
human suffering. I have only mentioned a few, but there are 
other nations suffering from democratic backsliding, or 
democratic failure. In these countries, human suffering and 
poverty correlate directly to authoritarianism and corruption.
    Now, finally, in our own country, the United States is 
witnessing an erosion of democracy as various institutions are 
misused to solidify power. The threat of a non-peaceful 
transition of power and other electoral irregularities such as 
delegitimizing the use of mail-in ballots during a global 
pandemic, the use of rhetoric to instill fear and disunity 
among the citizenry, threatening to send people to the polls to 
intimidate voters while also expediting the appointment of a 
new supreme court justice to support the incumbent in case of a 
contested election, these are only a few examples of democratic 
backsliding in the United States.
    And as the global champion for democracy, the U.S. cannot 
allow these actions to continue or prevail. It is of paramount 
importance that the United States set the highest example and 
use our democratic institutions such as the Constitution, 
freedom of expression, assembly and association, and fair and 
free elections to preserve and advance democratic leadership 
around the world. The world is watching us and we can, if we 
are not careful, conveniently become an excuse for others' 
backsliding.
    Although backsliding is not new, we notice a particular 
pattern of change also caused by COVID-19 global pandemic that 
has led to subtle, incremental, democratic erosion as some 
sitting leaders use safety measures to prevent the spread of 
the virus to debilitate freedom of expression and infringe upon 
human rights. Tanzania offers a stark example of this behavior 
by denying the existence of COVID-19 in the country and 
suppression of information related to the pandemic that places 
citizens' health at risk and violates citizens' freedom of 
speech and right of access to information.
    We also have been guilty of mishandling the COVID-19 
pandemic through misinformation, politicizing public health 
guidance, and the failure to develop a national strategy and 
participate in international efforts to eradicate the disease. 
Most alarming is the President's attempt to discredit the 
election process by threatening not to accept defeat and 
alleging election fraud should he lose, and by challenging the 
legality of mail-in ballots which are extremely important 
during a global pandemic that requires sheltering in place.
    The impacts of global democratic backsliding are severe and 
threaten the very foundation of human advancement as we have 
seen its extreme forms in Mali, Hungary, the Philippines, and 
Venezuela. Clearly, our work is cut out for us, but we can be 
hopeful in the fact that democracy is an enduring institution 
that has survived for centuries.
    According to the International Report on the Global State 
of Democracy, addressing the ills and reviving the promise 
democracy is a resilient form of government and remains in 
strong demand around the world. Eighty-one of the ninety-seven 
democracies have enjoyed uninterrupted democratic status since 
their democratic transitions. The report further notes 
democratic nations enjoy a higher level of gender equality and 
human development and lower levels of corruption, ideals for 
which we must unceasingly strive to be enjoyed by all peoples 
of the world.
    I look forward to hearing the views, perspectives, and 
recommendations of the panel of witnesses we have here today. 
Without objection--Mr. Sherman is coming? Okay.
    All right--let me move to introduce our witnesses.
    Our first witness is Dr. Chris Fomunyoh, is the senior 
associate for Africa and regional director at the National 
Democratic Institute. He has led international election 
observation missions and supervised democracy support programs 
in various African countries. He is an adjunct faculty at the 
Africa Center for Strategic Studies and a former adjunct 
professor of African politics and government at Georgetown 
University.
    Our second witness is Dr. Dorina Bekoe, is a research staff 
member with the Africa program at the Institute for Defense 
Analyses. Previously, she was an associate professor of 
conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution at the Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies. She is the editor of Voting in 
Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her areas of 
expertise include Africa's political development, conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding, peace agreements, electoral 
violence, and institutional reform.
    Dr. Jon Temin is the director of the Africa program at the 
Freedom House. From 2014 to 2017, he was a member of the U.S. 
Department of State Policy Planning Staff, providing strategic 
guidance and long-term thinking to the Secretary of State. He 
also served as director of the U.S. Institute of Peace Africa 
Program, leading the Institute's effort to help end conflicts 
and prevent new violence.
    Our final witness, who will be online, is Joshua Meservey, 
is the senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at 
the Heritage Foundation. He studies African geopolitics and 
counterterrorism. He is a returned Peace Corps volunteer who 
served in Zambia before joining a refugee settlement 
organization based out of Nairobi, Kenya.
    I would like to welcome Dr. Fomunyoh.

  STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE FOR 
AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

    Dr. Fomunyoh. Chairman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and 
distinguished members of this subcommittee, on behalf of the 
National Democratic Institute, I appreciate the opportunity to 
discuss democratic backsliding in sub-Saharan Africa and issues 
of institutional fragility, freedoms, and human rights. NDI has 
over three decades of technical assistance to, and support for, 
democratic institutions and processes in Africa, and currently 
runs active programs in 20 countries.
    On a personal note, I have served with the Institute for 
over 25 years and remember NDI's first initiative in Africa, a 
conference on multipartism held in Dakar, Senegal in 1985. A 
few years ago, after that Senegal conference on multipartism, 
the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the 
anti-apartheid hero Nelson Mandela regained his freedom in 
South Africa.
    And that began a cascade of events in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's that jump-started a wave of democratization across 
the entire continent. By Freedom House's ratings, Africa then 
went from two-thirds of the countries classified as ``not 
free,'' and only two countries, Botswana and Mauritius, 
``free'' in 1989, to two-thirds of all African countries 
classified as either free or partly free by 2009.
    Unfortunately, regrettably, by 2019, democratic trends 
reversed, and there are now fewer democracies in Africa than 
was the case 20 years ago. Notably, West Africa, previously 
commended as a trailblazer region, has seen serious backsliding 
as Mali experienced a military coup and major controversies 
have arisen about candidacies of incumbent presidents in Guinea 
Conakry and Cote d'Ivoire.
    The Central Africa region remains stuck, with the highest 
concentration of autocratic regimes with the three longest-
serving presidents in the world in that sub-region, notably, 
Equatorial Guinea, 41 years; Cameroon, 38 years; and Congo-
Brazzaville, 38 years. In Southern and East Africa, continued 
persecution of political opposition and civil society activists 
in Zimbabwe, and similar worrying signs or patterns in Tanzania 
since 2016, seriously diminish citizen participation in 
politics and governance, and also stymie prospects for much 
needed reforms.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has not helped, as it has slowed or 
impeded election preparations and generated fears that in some 
countries with national elections scheduled to take place 
before the end of the year, incumbents would use emergency 
powers to limit freedoms of expression and assembly and further 
shrink political space.
    In my written testimony, I go into much more detail about 
the domestic or internal ingredients of backsliding as well as 
the external vectors that contribute to backsliding. I also 
list in more detail the link, the linkage that I see between 
constitutionalism or the lack of respect for constitutional 
term limits, and authoritarianism, by taking a more detailed 
look at the specific case of Cameroon, where an incumbent 
president forced through a constitutional amendment in 2018, so 
that even now at age 87 and after 38 years in office he could 
continue to run for president for the rest of his life.
    This fight--sorry, Madam Chair. Building a firewall against 
democratic backsliding in Africa requires a combined effort 
amongst Africans and democracy advocates, practitioners, and 
champions worldwide. Below, I have a few recommendations that 
could contribute to that collective endeavor.
    The U.S. should revamp its Africa policy with a view to 
consolidating investments made over the past three decades in 
building democratic institutions and especially targeting that 
assistance toward the generation that is 35 years or younger 
that I term the ``democratization wave generation,'' which 
constitutes 75 percent of Africa's population.
    The international community at large should amplify public 
diplomacy on measures that strengthen democracy and provide 
avenues within the United Nations system, including the United 
Nations Security Council, to discuss issues that pertain to 
gross human rights violations and atrocities on the African 
continent that shock the world and humanity's conscience.
    Africans themselves should also intensify building 
synergistic national and regional networks of democracy 
advocates and champions to foster peer-to-peer review, support, 
and encouragement.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Fomunyoh follows:]

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    Ms. Bass. Thank you. You will have a little more time 
during the Q&A.
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Bass. Sure.
    Dr. Bekoe.

STATEMENT OF DR. DORINA BEKOE, RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER, INSTITUTE 
                      FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

    Dr. Bekoe. Good morning, Chair Bass and Ranking Member 
Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 
for the invitation to testify on democratic backsliding in sub-
Saharan Africa. I am a research staff member at the Institute 
for Defense Analyses, as you said----
    Ms. Bass. You might want to pull the mic closer. It is hard 
to understand you.
    Dr. Bekoe. My remarks do not represent IDA or any of its 
government sponsors. My remarks and views are my own, and my 
testimony will focus on elections and political transition. So 
today, all countries in Africa except Eritrea hold elections. 
Africa's experience has been mixed. While there have been 
notable strides and important innovations, worrisome trends 
undermine Africa's governance and security.
    Many hoped that elections would result in regular, 
peaceful, predictable changes in government such as reducing 
the number of coups, and they have, but coups still occur even 
in the context of the predictability of a democratic 
government. Mali's 2012 coup took place even though there was a 
regularly scheduled election just 1 month away. And the coup in 
August of this year took place despite the fact that in 2018 
there was a Presidential election and last year there were 
legislative elections.
    Many hoped that elections would also end authoritarianism 
by offering opportunities for changes in government. And while 
21 countries on the continent have respected their 
constitutionally mandated two-term limits, 14 countries have 
modified or eliminated the term limit, and 8 countries have 
never adopted them. In Africa today, there are ten leaders that 
have served for 20 years or more and my colleague Chris 
Fomunyoh highlighted a number of them.
    An important aspect is understanding how African citizens 
themselves rate the quality of their countries' elections and 
here we turn to Afrobarometer, which is an independent pan-
African research institution, and their surveys indicate that 
40 percent of Africa's citizens rated their countries as having 
organized completely free and fair elections, so less than 
half. And this average has held steady for over two decades, or 
for the last two decades.
    Citizens also communicate by turning out to vote, and 
research that I have done with Stephanie Burchard showed that 
reduced voter turnout is one of the many side effects of pre-
election violence. And we saw that in Kenya. Low voter turnout 
also reflects low political engagement and we can look to Mali 
on this as well. Sustained low voter turnout between 30 and 40 
percent has often been cited as an indication of public 
disengagement, disdain for corruption, and mistrust of the 
country's democratic institutions, which some analysts feel 
also facilitated the acceptance of a coup.
    Electoral violence is an important indicator of democratic 
backsliding and some highlights from research tell us that 
approximately 65 percent of Africa's elections have experienced 
violence. Most of that violence has been in the form of verbal 
harassment, discouraging political aspirants, vandalizing 
election materials, impeding the media. We also know that 95 
percent of electoral violence is before the election.
    Post-election violence, while it is less frequent, is 
actually much deadlier, and Africa's worst incidents of 
electoral violence have occurred afterwards. There are some 
encouraging signs that I would like to point out, however. One, 
Kenyan civil society has pioneered electronic platforms where 
citizens can record incidents of fraud and harassment and that 
has been replicated many places on the continent.
    There are election situation rooms where information is 
conveyed to a central location and steps are taken to mitigate 
tension. Parallel vote tabulation is also widely practiced as a 
check on official results, and other countries like Ghana have 
developed national peace infrastructure to play an active role 
in creating a peaceful environment. Judiciaries are also 
playing an important role in leveling the playing field, but 
they must be credible and independent.
    I would like to just close with three recommendations. One 
is to focus on the pre-election environment by identifying 
hotspots of violence and developing mechanisms to reduce 
tension. Two is to strengthen electoral dispute adjudication, 
supporting viable and trusted avenues for addressing electoral 
grievances whether through the courts, negotiations, or other 
mechanisms. And then, finally, to provide support to 
independent civil society organizations to enhance their 
capacity to prevent electoral violence and enhance the quality 
and credibility of elections.
    So I will close with that. Thank you very much for the 
opportunity to address the committee.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Bekoe follows:]

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    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Mr. Temin.

 STATEMENT OF MR. JON TEMIN, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, FREEDOM 
                             HOUSE

    Mr. Temin. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members of 
the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you today. I 
ask that my full written testimony be admitted into the record.
    I will start by highlighting several trends we at Freedom 
House observed in sub-Saharan Africa in the most recent version 
of our Freedom of the World Report. First, we are seeing lots 
of volatility in the State of freedoms and democracy. Of the 12 
largest score declines globally in our recent report, seven are 
in sub-Saharan Africa. But of the eight largest improvements, 
six are in the region.
    Second, West Africa, previously considered the democratic 
leader among Africa's sub-regions, is of particular concern. Of 
those seven large score declines, five are from countries in 
West Africa. Third, freedom and democratic governance is 
enjoyed by far too few Africans. Only 9 percent of people in 
sub-Saharan Africa live in countries that Freedom House 
categorizes as free.
    Citizens bear the brunt of democratic backsliding. They are 
attacked when they peacefully protest in opposition to the 
government as in Guinea and Cameroon. They are unable to use 
the internet when the government restricts access as in 
Ethiopia and Chad. Civil society groups face excessive 
limitations on their activity as in Tanzania and Burundi, and 
journalists are threatened and detained as in Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe.
    Governments are developing new methods to limit citizen 
activity such as requiring bloggers to meet stringent 
registration requirements, as in Uganda, and using COVID-19 as 
a pretext for closing political and civic space, to which I 
will add that Freedom House strongly endorses H.R. 6986, the 
Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, which is currently 
under consideration.
    In the interest of time, I will focus the rest of my 
remarks on recommendations. My first recommendation concerns 
American messaging. While that messaging is often strongly 
supportive of democracy, it is inconsistent. This is inevitable 
as competing American interests will always lead to modulated 
messaging based on the context. But we need to strive for 
greater consistency across countries and regions in how we 
speak about democracy. To cite one example, the United States 
and much of the rest of the world has rightly criticized the 
undemocratic change of power in Mali, a textbook example of a 
coup.
    But when leaders in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire and in Rwanda, 
Chad, Uganda, and elsewhere before them sought to change the 
rules of the game to extend their time in office, amounting to 
an undemocratic extension of their tenure, the American voice 
has been muted. This contradiction does not go unnoticed among 
Africans and contributes to a sense that the United States 
places security interests above democratic concerns and pulls 
punches when issues involve our perceived allies.
    Second, in building on my first recommendation, the United 
States should consider changes to term and age limits that 
allow incumbent leaders to extend their time in office as 
essentially a coup against the constitution and respond 
accordingly. These moves by leaders who have already served two 
terms are an usurpation of power that deny the country and its 
citizens the many benefits of leadership rotation. Most 
important, they are broadly unpopular with citizens.
    Polling by Afrobarometer consistently demonstrates that 
approximately three-quarters of Africans favor two-term limits 
for their leaders. Legislation requires that when a military 
overthrows a duly elected government, many forms of assistance 
to that country are suspended. As a matter of policy, the 
United States should adopt a similar approach when a leader 
changes the rules to benefit himself or herself.
    That move should trigger an automatic, across-the-board 
review of all assistance to the country, and elements of that 
assistance that benefit the executive and upper echelons of 
government should be suspended. Congress should consider 
institutionalizing this policy through legislation. That way, 
leaders will know that if they choose to change the rules to 
benefit themselves, they will automatically face consequences. 
This policy should apply globally, not just to Africa.
    Third, countries where citizens are bravely seeking to move 
past decades of authoritarianism deserve rapid and substantial 
support from the United States. Opportunities to buttress 
successful citizen-led movements for democracy are rare. In 
Sudan, the long overdue process of removing the country from 
the list of State sponsors of terrorism may soon conclude, but 
that is not enough. The United States needs to support the 
civilian component of Sudan's transitional government every 
step of the long road toward democracy and do all that it can 
to revive Sudan's economy.
    In Ethiopia, there are deeply concerning signs that the 
government is reaching for tools of repression that many hoped 
were relegated to history. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains on a 
tentative path to democratic elections that can be 
transformative. In this context, the decision by the United 
States to withhold development assistance from Ethiopia in a 
quixotic and counterproductive effort to influence Ethiopia's 
negotiating position concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam is bad policy that should be reversed. Now is not the time 
to curtail support to Ethiopia's more than one hundred million 
citizens and inhibit their efforts to democratize. Similar to 
Sudan and Ethiopia, nascent democratic transitions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Gambia, and Angola also 
call for strong U.S. support.
    Permit me to conclude with a broader observation. The 
ability of the United States to advance democracy around the 
world, including Africa, is directly tied to the strength of 
our democracy at home. The United States remains broadly 
popular in the eyes of Africans, but many of them are closely 
watching the strength of our institutions and how we manage our 
differences through peaceful, democratic processes.
    Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you 
may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Temin follows:]

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                        FREEDOM HOUSE JOHN TEMIN

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    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Our final witness is Mr. Joshua 
Meservey and he is online.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA 
          AND THE MIDDLE EAST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you on this important topic. The 
views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be 
construed as representing the official position of the Heritage 
Foundation.
    I have been asked to focus my remarks on the role that 
foreign powers may play in the democratic backsliding happening 
in parts of Africa. The Chinese government is the staunchest 
antidemocratic actor in Africa. The antipathy to democratic 
values is inherent to the Chinese Communist Party's or CCP's 
ideology which believes in the utter primacy of the Party over 
all facets of life.
    China's communist leadership believes that only complete 
fidelity to its ideology can help it achieve its goals. 
Democracy, with its devolution of power to citizens, is a 
horrifying concept to the CCP. It is an existential threat, in 
fact. It is unsurprising that the CCP crushes liberty at home 
and battles it overseas. This manifests with varying levels of 
intensity and obviousness across the African continent. And 
while I believe that the Chinese government is deliberately 
trying to undermine African democracy, some of its other 
actions can have that same effect even if it is not by design.
    Some of the ways the Chinese government threatens democracy 
are as follows: First, it openly denigrates democracy, claiming 
that it is a Trojan horse of the West to enable meddling in 
African affairs. Beijing blames multiparty democracy for 
bringing chaos and poverty to Africa and spreads the idea that 
economic rights trump fundamental individual rights that form 
the core of any successful democracy.
    Second, since President Xi Jinping's ascension, Beijing 
increasingly offers its own model of development, which is some 
economic freedom with repressive governance, as a solution for 
African nations. Third, Beijing's supposed no-strings-attached 
aid policy allows regimes to use that aid to fuel patronage 
networks that help them stay in power. Fourth, China supplies 
the technology, training, and expertise for repression in some 
African countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.
    Fifth, Beijing provides scholarships and sponsors trips to 
China for tens of thousands of African students, scholars, 
politicians, and media professionals who will likely be exposed 
to heavy doses of Marxism and Maoism. Whether any Africans are 
persuaded by the ideology during their stays in China needs 
further study, but it is an obvious risk. And sixth and 
finally, Chinese economic practices such as the use of bribes 
to win contracts and general favor or opaque lending and 
tendering arrangements fuel corruption and are an obvious 
challenge to accountable governance.
    Now China is not the only influential country in Africa 
that models illiberal governance. Turkey, which has grown 
increasingly authoritarian under President Erdogan, has been 
very active diplomatically, militarily, and economically on the 
continent, while State monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, and Qatar, all of which we can assume have little love for 
democracy, are spreading some of their fabulous wealth to parts 
of Africa as well. These countries and others allegedly spread 
cash around during Somalia's last electoral process to 
influence that result, subverting an American goal of having 
genuine democracy take root in that country.
    Finally, Russia with its mercenaries, arms sales, and 
economic agreements, is becoming increasingly important on the 
continent. This should concern the U.S. for a number of 
reasons, including because we care about democracy. The Gulf 
States and Turkey do not attack democracy with the same 
commitment that Beijing does; however, there is still the moral 
example these countries set, and their willingness to tamper in 
Somalia's electoral process suggest they are willing to do the 
same elsewhere. There are a number of steps the U.S. can take 
to try to strengthen democracy in Africa, but I will offer four 
brief recommendations.
    Confidently advocate for American values with the African 
public and its leaders. Most people yearn for representative 
government, rule of law, and individual freedom, and the U.S. 
should unapologetically cheerlead for those values. Two, 
strengthen civil society in Africa which is critical to the 
development and maintenance of a responsive and honest 
government.
    Three, prioritize the fight against African government 
which corrodes all efforts to broaden and deepen democratic 
governance. And, finally, deepen cooperation on the continent 
with pro-democracy allied countries. Thank you again for this 
opportunity to testify and I look forward to any questions you 
may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]

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    Ms. Bass. Thank you. We will now move to questions and each 
member will have 5 minutes. I now recognize myself.
    I wanted to begin by letting Dr. Fomunyoh--you were getting 
ready to offer recommendations, and if you would like to 
continue. And then I also want to ask, after he is finished 
with his recommendations, from our other panelists, if you 
could provide some examples of which nations do you feel on the 
continent are the strongest at maintaining their democracies 
and have not participated in backsliding.
    Doctor?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Chairman. And my 
prepared remarks have got more elaborate recommendations. But 
the three most important recommendations I thought the 
committee should consider would be, first, address to U.S. 
policymakers the need for them to revamp U.S.-Africa policy and 
collaborate such engagement intensely on what I term ``the 
democratization wave generation,'' which is this generation of 
Africans 35 years or younger who constitute 75 percent of the 
1.4 billion people who live on the African continent.
    Second, that the international community at large should 
open up global platforms within the United Nations system, 
including within the United Nations Security Council, and take 
actions for substantive discussions on Africa and actions that 
can help put an end to the gross atrocities and human rights 
violations that we see on the continent in undemocratic regimes 
that shock the conscience of humanity.
    And that third, I have recommendations for Africans 
themselves, that Africans themselves need to build synergies of 
national and regional networks or actors to consolidate best 
practices and enhance peer-to-peer learning and support and 
also invest intensely, or heavily, in empowering women and 
youth as leaders to safeguard and promote greater and better 
democratic performance.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Bass. Dr. Bekoe.
    Dr. Bekoe. Thank you. In terms of which nations are the 
strongest, I would point to five that come to mind right away. 
One is Ghana. They are getting ready to hold their eighth 
election since 1992 and they have had three changes between the 
political parties and so you have a lot of predictability 
there. Senegal, in fact, in 2016, the Senegalese citizens 
approved a referendum to reduce the number of years within the 
terms from five to seven. Mauritius, Botswana, and South 
Africa--those leap to mind right away in terms of strong 
institutions.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Mr. Temin.
    Mr. Temin. Thank you. And I would agree with Dr. Bekoe's 
assessment, although I would caveat on Senegal. We are 
concerned in our observations at Freedom House on their 
trajectory. Two prominent opposition politicians were not 
allowed to compete in the last election and that was very 
concerning, and in fact, Senegal has gone from our category of 
free to our category of partly free.
    But Dr. Bekoe is correct. I would add, many of the island 
nations do quite well--Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Sao 
Tome, and Principe. Let me also mention one really good story 
from this last year, which is Malawi, which had a deeply flawed 
election process but there was a lot of resistance from civil 
society, and the supreme court there played a very strong, 
consistent role respecting rule of law that led to a rerun of 
the election where the opposition was victorious. That is a 
real bright spot and Malawi could join these other countries in 
doing quite well.
    Ms. Bass. Mr. Meservey.
    Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with what my colleagues say. I 
am not sure if Namibia was mentioned in their remarks, but I 
would certainly add that country. And I echo Jon's comments 
about Malawi. That was really, frankly, inspiring and 
surprising, the outcome of that. So hopefully they can 
consolidate those victories.
    And then on the concerning side is Benin. Part of what 
makes what is happening there so sad is that Benin was actually 
a previous success story. It was the first country that--where 
an incumbent was defeated at the polls, so I will add that on 
the worrisome side.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. Does anybody have an opinion about 
ECOWAS, what ECOWAS's intervention in Mali, which is a little 
problematic considering ECOWAS is not consistent.
    Dr. Bekoe, are you----
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Madam Chair, ECOWAS has had a highly rated 
reputation in terms of respecting its protocols because ECOWAS 
has got on the books the protocol on governance, good 
governance and democracy that was adopted in 2001. And in a 
number of countries, ECOWAS has come through in terms of 
representing the interests of people and their commitment to 
democratic governance.
    Unfortunately, in recent weeks--sorry, in recent months, it 
has been challenged by the military intervention in Mali and 
has tried to muddle through a compromise solution in finding a 
retired military officer who is now considered a civilian and 
accepting that that civilian could govern Mali while the 
country goes through a transition of 18 months.
    So our hope is that Mali will be able to get back on the 
democratic track with ECOWAS's support, but of course there are 
concerns with regards to ECOWAS's standards in turns of 
constitutional, respectful constitutional term limits.
    Ms. Bass. It played a great role in the Gambia, but now we 
will see what happens with Mali.
    You, actually, are just in time, Mr. Ranking Member, if you 
would like to ask questions.
    Mr. Smith. Can I defer to Mr. Burchett?
    Ms. Bass. Sure. Sure, sure.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. Mr. Burchett.
    Mr. Burchett. Chairlady, if the ranking member would like 
to go, I will yield to his wisdom and age.
    Ms. Bass. He just yielded to you.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay, great. We are very diplomatic on this 
committee. I really dig that, Chairlady. Thank you so much. And 
thank you all for being here. It is not in my notes, but 
sometimes I get popped from some people back home on the 
internet and they say, ``Burchett, what does any of this have 
to do with the second congressional district?''
    Well, dadgummit, it has a whole lot to do with it. Freedom. 
Freedom is something we should all cherish and for good folks 
in Africa that are trying to get it, and it ticks me off when 
people try to take it from you all, and I appreciate every one 
of you all being here and your testimoneys. And you all got 
that one for free. It was not in my notes.
    But I heard that some of the officers who took part in the 
Mali coup d'etat had recently returned from Russia. 
Additionally, I heard reports that some of the coup supporters 
were spotted waving Russian flags after President--how do you 
say his name, Chairlady, is it Keita? Is that how you say--
President Keita was deposed. What, if any, was the role of 
Russia in this military coup?
    Any of you all want to take that is fine with me.
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Congressman, you are right. We have seen 
those reports and we saw images in Bamako of demonstrations 
after the coup of people waving the Russian flag. And also the 
fact that the Russian ambassador in Bamako, the first 
Ambassador, foreign Ambassador to meet with the junta. However, 
we have not been able to trace any direct linkages in terms of 
Russia's role, but that is certainly something that needs to be 
watched very closely.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir. I suspect if they are carrying AK-
47s and waving Russian flags that is pretty evident of what the 
heck is going on. Thank you.
    How is the resulting political turmoil in Mali affecting 
the security situation in the Sahel?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Unfortunately, Mali has turned out to be the 
weak link as countries in the Sahel ranging from Niger 
Republic, Burkina Faso, and countries that are part of the G5, 
Sahel, which is a combination of Chad, Mauritania, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, and Niger Republic, fight to curb the expansion of 
violent extremists in the Sahel. As we all know, northern Mali 
has been in turmoil since 2012, and so to have the government 
in Bamako be undermined further aggravates what is already 
predicting risk for the country that could be further realized 
by violent extremism.
    It is important that the Government of Mali regain its feet 
and regain its commitment to democratic government, and 
professional military that can help working with the partners, 
for example, the French with the Operation Barkhane, and other 
United Nations peacekeeping forces to curb this spread. Because 
if Mali falls, if any one of the countries in the Sahel falls, 
then the coastal countries along the West African coast are 
going to be immediately hit and that would mean--that would be 
very catastrophic for the rest of the continent.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay, thank you so much.
    Mr. Meservey, you published a report recently where you 
documented that Chinese companies have built around 190 African 
government buildings including over 20 houses of African heads 
of State. Combine that with the reports that Huawei technology 
is used during construction, and we are looking at the Chinese 
having ample opportunities for spying and intelligence 
gathering operations.
    What more should we be doing to highlight the Chinese 
Communist Party's attempt to undermine democratic governance 
and support for authoritarian regimes?
    Mr. Meservey. Yes, it is a challenge. I think that one of 
the best things we can do, and it is a longer-term solution but 
I also think it is the most effective chance we have here, is 
to buttress civil society organizations in Africa. A number of 
them have actually been effective in shining light on some 
Chinese activity going on, so they have been able to expose 
deals that were not to the benefit of the country. They were 
able to stop projects that were going to be environmentally 
disastrous.
    So they have had a surprising amount of success and I think 
the U.S. should double down on its support of those sorts of 
organizations. That includes journalists. The Chinese 
Government has made a very concerted effort to co-opt African 
journalists all across the continent, so I think the U.S. needs 
to launch sort of a counter-movement, if you will, where we, 
you know, support independent, ferocious journalism on the 
continent.
    So I, really, I always come back to civil society. I think 
that is a critical part of what we need to be doing on the 
continent.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay.
    Chairlady, thank you. I have gone over my time. Thank you 
for your courtesy. I have to go to the Small Business 
Committee. I apologize. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Bass. No problem. Thank you for being here.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. Let me go to Representative Phillips.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, and greetings and 
gratitude to all of our witnesses today in this important 
hearing.
    Strengthening democratic institutions----
    Ms. Bass. Can you get closer to your laptop?
    There you go.
    Mr. Phillips. Okay. Is that a little better?
    Ms. Bass. Yes.
    Mr. Phillips. Okay. Thank you, everybody.
    Strengthening democratic institutions and exposing 
democratic backsliding is terribly important work and a 
distinct priority of mine in Congress. The United States is not 
perfect. We all see what is happening in our very own country 
right now. But what is important is that we are constantly 
working to improve, to strengthen, and to encourage free and 
fair elections all around the world including in our own 
country, and to use our voices powerfully, but also peacefully.
    I would like to start to talk about--my question will be, 
first, about Ethiopia. While Prime Minister Abiy advanced a 
vision of national unity early in his term by releasing 
political prisoners and unbanning certain political parties and 
promising free and fair elections, it has become very clear 
that there is a lot more work to be done relative to his reform 
agenda. So I have heard a lot of concerns from my constituents 
in Minnesota regarding restrictions on civil liberties, 
violence perpetrated against civilians by State and non-State 
actors, arrests of human rights activists in the smaller region 
of Ethiopia, and detention of political opposition leaders.
    So my first question is for you, Mr. Temin. What can Abiy's 
government do to mitigate ethnic incitement in religious 
conflict and hate speech without restricting civil liberties, 
and going forward, how can the government more effectively 
respond to ethnic and religious tensions in the country?
    Mr. Temin. Thank you for the question and for raising some 
very concerning issues in Ethiopia. There are no easy answers 
to these questions. One of the most important steps is that the 
Abiy government really seek to consult with the political 
opposition and politicians across the spectrum, and they have 
not been very good at doing that so far.
    The decision they made to postpone elections was probably 
the right one given COVID and logistical challenges, but they 
did that in a vacuum without consultation and that has led to a 
lot of the grievance that we are seeing now. Elections are now 
supposed to happen in 2021, so the government needs to start 
now a real process of consultation with the entire political 
spectrum to talk about the road between here and those 
elections and how those elections can be as free, fair, and 
transparent as possible. Those elections really can be 
transformative, but the government simply has to stop reaching 
for these tools of past repression that we really thought were 
relegated to history. And they need to be called out on that, 
frankly.
    The U.S. and the rest of the world should not be in the 
business of celebrating Prime Minister Abiy--that probably 
happened a little bit too much, a little bit too quickly even 
given some of the remarkable early steps--but we need to be in 
the business of strengthening Ethiopian institutions and 
Ethiopian civil society and those who are investigating and 
highlighting the abuses that are going on.
    The ethnic violence is substantial and it is hard to 
contain. I will note that there are voices that are fanning 
this ethnic animosity across the spectrum, many of them 
Ethiopian in Ethiopia. Some of them are outside of Ethiopia 
too, and we do need to keep an eye on those voices including in 
the diaspora who do sometimes fan the flames of ethnic tension.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, sir.
    And, you know, we also have elections coming up in Cote 
d'Ivoire, October 31st, I believe. Of course, it is clear that 
the country is at risk as well for large-scale violence against 
civilians. According to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
early warning signs of mass atrocity are already visible and 
certainly warrant attention. I just introduced House Resolution 
1150 which highlights this important issue and urges the 
government of Cote d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all 
citizens to respect the democratic principles, refrain from 
violence, and hold free and fair and transparent elections this 
October.
    Dr. Bekoe, regarding Cote d'Ivoire, what can the United 
States and our embassy in particular do to support transparent 
and peaceful elections in October and, for that matter, in 
Ethiopia and Somalia? What can be done to create conditions for 
those same free and fair elections next year in 2021?
    Dr. Bekoe.
    Dr. Bekoe. Yes. Thank you for that question. Yes, the 
upcoming elections in Cote d'Ivoire are quite worrisome because 
the violence has already started. We have seen that with 
opposition forces or opposition supporters being attacked. The 
important way to support civil society is to support efforts 
that help civil society track what the State is doing, how to 
substantiate results to make sure that there is inclusion in 
voter registration.
    Those are things that kind of fuel the violence, although 
the underlying reason for the violence is the fact that the 
incumbent is seeking to run for his third term. And so that is 
the real issue that is fueling a lot of this violence.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Dr. Bekoe. And adhering to term limits is one way that that 
will stop.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I did just 
leave a hearing on China. As I mentioned before, I am ranking 
member of the China Commission. And the discussion was on the 
70 years of Tibetan oppression by the Chinese Government made 
much worse more recently by Xi Jinping, as he has done to the 
Muslims in Xinjiang, the Uyghurs.
    I am concerned and I have been concerned, and as the 
chairwoman knows, I have chaired a number of hearings when I 
was chairman of this subcommittee on China's malign influence 
on Africa, its ability to buy votes particularly at the United 
Nations, its ability to build a soccer stadium or do something 
else in order to gain benefits that are very tangible. There is 
no foreign corrupt practices act, so when it comes to trade, 
bribes help facilitate the deal.
    But the biggest concern, I think, most of us are having, I 
have as well, is China's bad governance model. And I am 
wondering if you might speak, any of you who would like, about 
this. You know, in 2019, the African leaders pledged to use the 
Belt and Road to build a Sino-Africa Community of Common 
Destiny. A China-Africa Institute was established to develop 
new models in mutual learning and to facilitate policies, 
synergy, and alignment in bringing this about.
    Kenya's Vision 2030, Rwanda's Vision 2050, Uganda's Vision 
2040, and South Africa's National Development Plan of 2030 are 
examples of this strategic African blueprint that incorporate 
elements of the Chinese government's model and envision ongoing 
Chinese inputs as key catalysts, and I am wondering if you 
would speak to this.
    We know that in Zimbabwe the Chinese were providing Mugabe 
with all kinds of help. There is very high profile--Bashir 
found and Khartoum had found that China was a very willing 
assistor and enabler of their terrible deeds for all those 
years. But now we have, I think, this all-out effort to 
sanction the kind of governance that China does to its own 
people each and every day and that is cruel repression of the 
Han Chinese, the Tibetans, the people of faith, the Falun Gong, 
and the Muslim Uyghurs and others.
    So could you speak to that? I mean how do we undo this 
malign influence that I think is in ascendency throughout the 
world, not just in Africa, as China--I mean look at the impact 
they are having at the U.N. Human Rights Council. They are 
barely held to account for anything that they do including this 
ongoing genocide against the Muslims in Xinjiang.
    So your thoughts on that because, you know, there are 
always people in governments who want to do the right thing and 
that is certainly, you know, with exclamation points what we 
know so many people in Africa want to do. But then you get 
these affiliations with people who say oppression works, secret 
police works, jailing dissidents works--and that is the Chinese 
model. So if you could speak to that I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Temin. Thank you for the question. Let me just make a 
brief point which is that in democracies Chinese misbehavior is 
more likely to be scrutinized, and that is all the more reason 
for the entire topic of the conversation today which is 
American investment in democracy promotion and advancing 
democracy in Africa.
    In democracies, civil society organizations are more likely 
to dig into what China is doing. In democracies, the government 
is probably more willing to dig into that as well. And to 
reiterate an important point that Josh made earlier, building 
that capacity to better scrutinize Chinese activity is really 
important and that is both within civilian society across 
Africa and within African governments as well, to fully 
understand the deals that they are signing up for, the long-
term consequences of those deals.
    Josh also made a really important point which I will 
reiterate on investigative journalism. You know, I think there 
is no better bang for the buck than investments in 
investigative journalism and supporting those brave journalists 
across the continent to really dig into Chinese activity.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
    Representative Omar.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman. Can you hear me?
    Ms. Bass. I can.
    Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman, for this important 
committee hearing and grateful to our witnesses. I want to 
start with Dr. Fomunyoh. In your testimony, you discuss the 
massacres committed in the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Did 
the United States provide training, funding, or arms to the 
Cameroonian security forces who committed those massacres?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, for your 
question. That has been an issue of concern, because prior to 
the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon in 2016, Cameroon was a 
partner with the United States and a number of other countries 
in fighting Boko Haram in the extreme north of the country 
around the Lake Chad basin countries in collaboration with 
Nigeria, Chad, and Niger Republic.
    But what we have seen in recent years, especially in the 
last 2 years, has been that some of the resources that were 
initially donated to the government of Cameroon to help the 
fight against Boko Haram in the extreme northern part of the 
country have moved both in terms of materiel and personnel into 
the Anglophone regions of the country where there is an ongoing 
armed conflict.
    And that is extremely worrying, because we are beginning to 
see some of the tactics and gross violations of human rights in 
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon that had been recorded in 
incidents happening in the extreme north of the country and 
that is something to be watchful about.
    I should just remark briefly that the United States had 
been forced, the State Department had been forced to reduce 
some of its assistance, military assistance to Cameroon as a 
recognition that some of the units that may have been trained 
to fight Boko Haram in the extreme north had been involved in 
human rights violations as well.
    Ms. Omar. All right. So I assume that that would be sort of 
a yes. So did the Malinian military officers who led the recent 
coup, Assimi Goita, receive U.S. military training? And if you 
could just say yes or no, because I have a few more questions 
and we have limited time.
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Well, I do not have specific information on 
that point, but there have been reports of capacity building 
for Malinian military as it has been fighting the violent 
extremists in the northern and middle part of the country and 
that some of those soldiers or units may have trained alongside 
U.S. forces in the Sahel.
    Ms. Omar. I appreciate that. Thank you so much.
    Madam Chair, I would like to introduce into the record an 
article from the Washington Post about the U.S. military 
training that Colonel Goita received.
    Ms. Bass. Yes, thank you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    [The Washington Post article mentioned above from 
Representative Omar was not available at press time]

    Ms. Omar. The article includes a quote I will read here: 
``'Helping the Nation's troops fight rapidly spreading 
extremism is critical for regional stability,' U.S. military 
official said.''
    That quote stood out to me because last year we cutoff 
security aid to Cameroon and we suspended security aid to Mali 
this year. Yet, U.S. military officials are quoted in this 
article saying that our counterterrorism policy is critical for 
regional stability. And this trend of supporting militarized 
brutality in the name of counterterrorism in the continent is 
widespread in the continent. I have mentioned Cameroon and 
Mali, but I could easily mention Somalia, Mozambique, Kenya, or 
a number of other countries in the continent.
    Dr. Fomunyoh, you were quite right to say that violent 
extremism is a threat to democracy in Africa, but I would also 
like to ask, is it time we start wondering if our militarized 
counterterrorism strategy is also a threat to democracy in 
Africa?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. That is a 
very excellent point and that is a point that NDI and our 
sister organization IRI, the International Republican 
Institute, that we continue to make to our partners that 
whether it is our funders or the African countries in which we 
work, that counterterrorism has to be a holistic approach that 
involves not just a militaristic technical assistance or 
building the capacity of the military, but also working with 
civilian institutions, parliaments to exercise oversight, civil 
society to engage in healthy relations with the executive and 
legislative branches of government.
    And I would cite as an example a country that you know 
well, Congresswoman, in terms of Niger that is really in the 
middle of a very difficult neighborhood but that is managing 
very well to bring to the table all of the levers, the 
instruments of governance that range all the way from the 
military to legislators and civil society in its efforts 
against counterterrorism. And fortunately for Niger Republic it 
seems to be holding its own and doing relatively well in a very 
difficult neighborhood, so your point is well taken.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    Ms. Omar. Appreciate that. Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. Representative Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you to all of you all for being here today. I 
really genuinely would love an answer to this question, a 
legitimate answer, because it is very concerning to me. And I 
will start with some data that we prepared before last 
evening's debate and then a conversation about our debate here 
in our Nation last night, and then a genuine question that I 
would love to hear from you all on.
    The Freedom House's global freedom score for the U.S. is 86 
out of a hundred, so I think that is about a B, and is number 
52 on the Freedom House rank of free countries. Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden fill the top three spots, each with scores 
of a hundred. Last evening, in our own debate here in this 
country, our President, our commander-in-chief, would not 
denounce white supremacists and he would not commit to a 
peaceful transition of power.
    How does all of this play into how we are seen and 
respected as leaders and beacons in democracy? I am genuinely 
interested in what has happened over the last several years in 
terms of our standing and our credibility in this particular 
area, particularly in Africa.
    Mr. Temin, is it? Perhaps we could start with you.
    Mr. Temin. Sure. And thank you for the question. It hurts 
our standing and it hurts our ability to support the American 
values of democracy that we seek to enhance around the world. I 
think many of us who have watched Africa for some time and have 
been outspoken in our critique of anti-democratic moves in 
countries on the continent are seeing some of those things come 
to pass in our own country and are deeply concerned by that.
    I would also say though that there are a lot of lessons 
from around the world in how to respond when these threats 
happen and we would do well to listen to people who have pushed 
back against these kinds of threats to democracy and ask 
ourselves if some of their experience and some of their lessons 
applies to what is happening here. Because we have a lot to 
learn in how to respond to these things as we also seek to help 
the rest of the world learn on democracy promotion.
    Ms. Houlahan. And what specific lessons learned might we 
benefit from from other nations that have struggled with this?
    Mr. Temin. We have seen in other countries the vital role 
of journalists in holding government to account, in exposing 
corruption and other misdeeds. We have seen the vital role of 
civil society in staying strong and being a voice for people 
who feel like they are not represented by the government, if 
not targeted by the government. We have seen the vital role of 
human rights defenders who put their lives on the line in many 
places in defense of the values that they hold dear.
    There is nothing unique about Africa or any other part of 
the world in what makes these segments of society so important 
and I would think they apply to the U.S. as well.
    Ms. Houlahan. I would love to hear from the other members 
of the panel as well, if you have something to add.
    Doctor.
    Dr. Bekoe. I think----
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    Ms. Bekoe [continuing]. One message is that democratic 
progress does not have an endpoint. It is a constant struggle 
and it also requires, you know, all stakeholders to play their 
role, to be vigilant, to kind of move the process along. And we 
do not get to a place where we say, you know, this is the end 
and we can rest on our laurels.
    Ms. Houlahan. No, I think that is very, very fair. It is 
very precious and that we definitely need to protect it.
    Doctor, do you have anything to add?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Yes. I would just add to what has been said 
by my co-panelists that Africans--the world has become a global 
village and Africans themselves are also following very closely 
what happens with other democracies, established democracies, 
around the globe, and that back in May when we had the George 
Floyd murder in Minnesota that in a number of African countries 
people were actually astonished that incidents like those could 
occur in the United States.
    But what we saw also was a number of U.S. embassies on the 
African continent issuing statements to clarify for the African 
people what had actually transpired. And I think the hope for 
African democrats as they look to developments around the world 
is to see confirmation that in democracies institutions really 
matter and that democracies have a propensity to self-correct. 
That, ultimately, when things go wrong and institutions work 
and people have their voices heard and people organize 
themselves to have a seat at the table that, ultimately, their 
voices will count and democracies will self-correct.
    Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate that. A very hopeful way to end 
and I yield back to the chair. Thank you.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you, Representative.
    You know, it is my understanding that all 50-plus nations 
on the continent registered a protest at the United Nations 
over police brutality in the United States as an act of 
solidarity.
    Representative Sherman, without objection, we are glad to 
welcome you here to participate in the subcommittee meeting. 
Are you ready with questions?
    Mr. Sherman. I am indeed.
    Ms. Bass. Take it away.
    Mr. Sherman. And, Chairwoman Bass, thank you so much for 
allowing me to participate in this subcommittee. And I want to 
build on some of the comments you have made, because I have 
been somewhat embarrassed in talking to leaders not only from 
Africa but around the world. Because we are working for 
democracy, we are sometimes critical of democratic institutions 
or the lack thereof in other countries, and it is somewhat 
embarrassing to have a President who says that he might not 
accept the outcome of an election. I have seen that happen in 
Africa. Perhaps one of our witnesses can comment on how a 
country--and give us an example or two of how countries have 
been affected when there has been an election, the incumbent 
has been turned out of office, and the incumbent doesn't want 
to go.
    I will direct it at Dr. Bekoe.
    Dr. Bekoe. Well, the country that comes to mind is Gambia. 
The incumbent did not want to leave office and it required the 
intervention of the regional economic community to mediate his 
exit.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, I hope we do not have to adopt the 
Gambia model here in the United States. We have much to learn 
from countries around the world, but hopefully we will not need 
that learning.
    And it is--we are in an ideological contest with China and 
others who are trying to make the world safe for 
authoritarianism and their effort is to discredit democracy. 
Africa is one place where we say that democracy is important 
and China says the opposite and says that democracy does not 
work, and I think that what I saw last night on my television 
screen did not help our argument.
    Dr. Fomunyoh, we spend money promoting democratic 
institutions, government accountability. Can you give us 
examples of where efforts have been successful, where a country 
has moved substantially toward democracy and the rule of law 
and what would be the impact of Trump's proposed 37 percent 
decrease in that funding?
    Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    First, if I could just add to my co-panelist, Dr. Bekoe, on 
the examples where elections have helped to strengthen 
democracies and where they have been under threat. Cote 
d'Ivoire is another example to keep in mind and to know that in 
2010, because of disagreement over the outcome of the 
Presidential elections, the country converted into a crisis 
that left 3,000 Ivorians dead. It has taken 10 years for Cote 
d'Ivoire to recover from that crisis. Our hope is that going 
into the 2020 elections, Ivorians will make efforts to not have 
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
    On the other hand, in Africa's largest democracy, which is 
Nigeria with over 200 million inhabitants, we went through an 
experience in 2015 that was very heartening in the sense that 
the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan lost the elections, 
and even before the Independent Election Commission could call, 
make the call on the elections, he picked up his phone and 
called his opposition, the current President Muhammadu Buhari, 
and that brought tensions down considerably in Nigeria.
    And that phone call that went from President Goodluck 
Jonathan to President Buhari has helped stabilize Nigeria's 
democracy up until this point. So there are some happy stories 
to report. And in a country such as Nigeria, with support from 
USAID, the International Republican Institute, NDI, CIPE, and 
Solidarity Center have conducted programs in the past two 
decades that have allowed Nigeria to make the transition from 
being ruled by the military up until 1999, to now a functioning 
democracy for the first time in Nigerian history that Nigeria 
has been governed by civilian democratic governments for over 
20 years.
    Mr. Sherman. I thank you. I am going to try to--can I 
squeeze in one more question?
    And thank you for reminding us how important it is that 
after all the ballots are counted that whoever is the loser in 
our election acknowledges that and concedes.
    The one more question is for Mr. Temin. We, the chairwoman 
and I and others, have come to know Bobi Wine. We know he has 
been severely beaten on various occasions. How would you 
classify the situation in Uganda leading up to the February 
Presidential election?
    Mr. Temin. Very concerning and not getting as much 
attention as it probably should. Uganda is talking about what 
they are calling scientific elections in response to COVID, 
which means no physical campaigning for the most part, doing a 
lot of it virtually, online. I think that this gives 
significant advantage to the ruling party and it is not clear 
that the ruling party is willing to stick to all those rules, 
but they will probably be more strictly enforced with the 
opposition, I am guessing.
    You know, President Museveni has been in power a long time. 
I do not see much indication of plans for what comes next or 
for transition, and in any country that is worrisome because I 
think we have seen in a number of instances the longer some 
leaders stay in office and the less planning there is for what 
comes next, the rockier that transition can be.
    And I do not know if that transition comes with the next 
election or later, but I think Uganda is of concern. It is 
concerning because it has a very young population, one of the 
youngest on the continent, and I think there is a good deal of 
frustration amongst that youthful element of the population. So 
it is one to watch, for sure.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you. And I believe Representative Omar had 
some additional questions. I will give Representative Omar 
another 5 minutes.
    And then when we come back before we conclude, Mr. Temin, 
you made reference, or, actually, Representative Houlahan made 
reference to the score of the United States on Freedom House, 
and I wanted you to address that after Representative Omar's 
questions.
    Representative Omar, are you there?
    Why do not you go ahead and address that and we will see if 
we can get Representative Omar back on Webex.
    Mr. Temin. Sure. What I can say about that is Freedom in 
the World, which we do every year, rates every country in the 
world; that includes the United States. The United States' 
score was decreasing before this administration. We have seen a 
slow slippage of democracy in America for some time based on 
our scores. That decrease has accelerated under this 
administration.
    Ms. Bass. But what is it? You know, give me the specifics.
    Mr. Temin. I do not have the data in front of me. I am sure 
we can followup on that.
    Ms. Bass. Well, you generally know how you do the scoring, 
so----
    Mr. Temin. I do. I am deeply involved when we do the Africa 
scoring and less so with the U.S. scoring. You know, I think 
part of it has to do with freedom for journalists. I believe 
there has been some concern there. Part of it has to do with 
corruption and some of the indications that we have seen of 
corrupt activity within government.
    I will leave it there. We are happy to go dig into that and 
provide you more detail, and I am sure that when we look at the 
scores again later this year there will be a robust 
conversation on the United States.
    Ms. Bass. Well, do you, when you consider, I mean I do not 
know about other countries, but when you consider the United 
States, do you consider racial issues such as police brutality 
or systemic racism, or how do you----
    Mr. Temin. Freedom in the World measures the freedoms that 
citizens feel across the board----
    Ms. Bass. Yep.
    Mr. Temin [continuing]. In any country. We divide those 
freedoms into political rights and civil liberties, and within 
each one of those two categories there is a number of 
indicators and subindicators. Certainly, the freedoms that all 
people in society and all segments of society are absolutely 
considered as we do those scores. And that would include 
freedom from police brutality and excessive force used by 
security forces.
    When we are digging----
    Ms. Bass. Incarceration rates, right to vote.
    Mr. Temin. Again, I do not have all the indicators and the 
subindicators in front of me, but absolutely, the right to vote 
is a fundamental freedom that is definitely part of our 
indicators, as is the ability to do so freely and to do so 
without harassment. And security force brutality certainly 
comes into our considerations in every country. I have been 
involved in those conversations in the Africa context and there 
is no reason that America would be any different.
    Ms. Bass. Well, thank you. I will look forward to 
understanding that. And I am sure incarceration rates have to 
be a part of that as well, right, I mean the essence of 
freedom.
    Mr. Temin. We will followup with you, but I agree with you 
that that is absolutely a core component of freedom. And I mean 
the answer is yes, you know, when we have seen political 
opponents and others jailed in African countries and elsewhere 
that factors into our scores. And again, that applies globally. 
It applies to the United States.
    Ms. Bass. Thank you.
    It looks like Representative Omar will not be with us, so 
let me just use this opportunity to thank our witnesses. 
Appreciate your patience, especially with our challenge of how 
we even conduct hearings in a COVID environment. So thank you 
very much. And with this, our hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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