[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-970PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brandon Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
KAREN BASS, California, Chair
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota Ranking Member
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania RON WRIGHT, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Fomunyoh, Dr. Christopher, Senior Associate for Africa, National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs................. 8
Bekoe, Dr. Dorina, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense
Analyses....................................................... 20
Temin, Mr. Jon, Director, Africa Program, Freedom House.......... 29
Meservey, Mr. Joshua, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the
Middle East, The Heritage Foundation........................... 39
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 59
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 60
Hearing Attendance............................................... 61
OPENING STATEMENT
Opening statement submitted for the record from Chair Bass....... 62
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Statement submitted for the record from Representative Smith..... 68
Statement submitted for the record from Adotei Akwei of Amensty
International.................................................. 75
Unanimous Consent for Representative Sherman..................... 85
Wednesday, September 30, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Bass. The Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global
Human Rights, and International Organizations will come to
order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the subcommittee at any point, and all members will
have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and
questions for the record subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
To insert something into the record, please have your staff
email the previously mentioned address or contact full
committee staff. I see that we have a quorum and I will now
recognize the ranking member for his opening statement.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Bass,
for convening today's very important hearing on a very
disturbing topic, the backsliding we have seen to sub-Saharan
Africa when it comes to democracy and governance.
And I thank you for the courtesy of letting me go first. I
am also the ranking member on the China Commission and we have
a hearing at 10 o'clock on Tibet and I have opening comments
there I need to make, so I am going to go and come back. So I
do thank you for that courtesy. It is very kind of you.
Madam Chair, according to the metrics put out by the
Economist Intelligence Unit earlier this year, democracy in
sub-Saharan Africa has been on the retreat, declining between
2018 and 2019, when its Democracy Index recorded its lowest
total since 2010. With postponements of elections in 2020
attributed to COVID-19 and subsequent lockdowns serving
sometimes as a pretext for stifling dissent, I fear that 2020
may see an even greater decrease in democracy on the continent.
Today's hearing is also timely as elections are approaching
next month in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast, both countries
which appear to be on a downward trajectory in terms of
governance in respect for civil and political rights. And I
want to note that Chairwoman Bass has introduced legislation
with respect to Tanzania and I am very proud to be a co-sponsor
of it and I thank her for that leadership.
We also see the role of outside actors facilitating a
downward race to the bottom. In particular, China, which seeks
to export its bad governance model throughout Africa, but also
the Gulf States, Turkey, and even African countries such as
Rwanda, which has had a sustained disruptive impact on its
neighbors for many years, particularly in the DRC.
I suspect we will hear about the U.S., what the U.S. is
doing to promote democracy and good governance throughout
Africa, and we have as one of our witnesses, our distinguished
witnesses, Dr. Chris Fomunyoh. Thank you for your work at NDI.
And along with its sister organization, the IRI, they have
dedicated much of their work to promotion of democracy in sub-
Saharan Africa. I also hope that we will take a closer look at
our missteps as well. For example, it is quite obvious to
outside observers in the DRC that the declared winner of the
latest Presidential election held in late 2018, Felix
Tshisekedi, received less votes than Martin Fayulu. Because of
a corrupt bargain between the outgoing strawman Joseph Kabila,
Tshisekedi, the Constitutional Court packed by Kabila, declared
him to be the winner.
What happened next was troubling, as our State Department
issued a statement that said, and I quote, ``The United States
welcomes the Congolese Constitutional Court certification of
Felix Tshisekedi as the next President of the DRC,'' which was
apparently driven by a handful of diplomats including our
Ambassador.
I believe this sent a terrible message, with ramifications
not only within the DRC but beyond as well. For example,
elections in Nigeria were first postponed by sitting President
Buhari and marred by irregularities in advance of the election
day, including arson attacks on the Independent National
Electoral Commission offices in opposition strongholds and
Buhari's removal of Supreme Court Justice Walter Onnoghen.
Nonetheless, there has also been progress too and we should
note that. Namibia is developing toward a stable democracy.
During the last elections in Namibia, we saw an incumbent
president win reelection with a reduced vote and a robust
opposition winning enough votes to deny the ruling party SWAPO
its supermajority in the legislature. Botswana is another
example of a country which is developing good democratic
habits. While there is room for improvement in both countries,
the overall trajectory is positive.
We also welcome with guarded optimism developments in Sudan
following the ouster of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir. Yet
at the same time, we need to temper our appraisal given the
continued role of people such as Hemetti and Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan, the real powers behind the throne. Both have been
implicated in past atrocities in Darfur and both must
ultimately be held to account for that.
Before Sudan is delisted as a State sponsor of terrorism, I
also believe there must be justice for all victims of its past
bad acts including the victims of 9/11, many of whom live in my
own State of New Jersey and in my district.
Ethiopia has made fitful progress since Prime Minister Abiy
assumed power. There was initial euphoria as he released
political prisoners in the free media. When Chairwoman Bass and
I met with him in August 2018 in Addis, he was riding a wave of
optimism. Since then, however, ethnic and religious tensions
have roiled Ethiopia with targeted attacks against ethnic and
religious minorities in certain States. Elections have been
postponed on account of COVID crisis and the government
response to violence has been mixed. Arrest of political
opponents, some of whom have themselves fomented violence, is
worrisome.
My personal view is that the Prime Minister is trying to
advance a pan-Ethiopian vision which transcends ethnicity and
religion, but he is also facing very strong headwinds. Respect
for democracy also demands that opposition figures behave
responsibly as well, in addition to the government which wields
these levers of power.
Finally, I want to note that in my position as past
chairman and now current ranking member, I have met many
African leaders as has our distinguished chairwoman, including
some with whom I took to task for offenses against democracy,
including Bashir when I met with him in 2005 in Khartoum, and
former President Meles. But there are others who have stood out
in a very positive way, including former President Benin whom I
met at the General Assembly 1 year ago and with whom we had a
very, very good exchange.
Unfortunately, his successor, President Patrice Talon, has
not preserved the gift that he was given. He has cracked down
on free speech, imposed restriction on political organizing,
shot demonstrators, and even detained for nearly 2 months his
predecessor who subsequently had to flee the country. I grieve
for Benin and its people and as I do, as we all do, for many in
Africa who have not realized the dream of democracy to which
they are entitled. I thank the chairwoman and yield back.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Representative Smith.
As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
on at all times even when you are not recognized by the chair.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves and
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
Consistent with H.R. 965 and the accompanying regulations,
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate,
when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background
noise.
Thank you for attending today's hearing on Democratic
Backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa which we believe is timely as
other parts of the world, including here, suffer similar
challenges. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses today
who will provide deeper insight into the dynamics contributing
to the erosion of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and the
impact this seemingly global trend will have on democratic
governance, economic growth, and improved access to health and
education resources.
We are here today because several countries across the
African continent are retreating from core democratic
principles which we refer to as democratic backsliding.
Democratic backsliding includes, but is not limited to, the
degradation of free and fair elections, infringement on freedom
of speech, impairment of political opposition to challenge the
government or hold it accountable, the weakening of the rule of
law such as limiting the autonomy of the judiciary, and the
manufacturing or overemphasizing of a national security threat
that allows the government to malign critics.
These actions singularly or collectively lead to State-
organized debilitation or elimination of political institutions
that can look like actions taken to uphold our strength and
democracy. Flawed elections remain an issue in most of Africa
with leaders manipulating laws, freedoms, and elections to
retain power. Most concerning is the situation in Tanzania,
which I recently addressed in House Resolution 1120, where
current leadership is repressing the opposition and basic
freedoms of expression and assembly in a blatant attempt to
retain power.
We see similar patterns in Cote d'Ivoire as the executive
branch legalizes the deviation and democratic institutions to
codify nondemocratic actions. We have similar concerns about
Guinea and are going to be very watchful of upcoming elections
there, and in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Gabon, Ghana, Niger, and Somalia. The actions of these
governments to suppress freedom of expression, including social
media, to exclude opposition participation in the electoral
process and to use police and military resources against
protestors, undermine democracy and jeopardize the rights and
very lives of their citizens.
There are many sub-Saharan countries of concerns and I look
forward to hearing which countries we should monitor closely
and the witnesses' recommendations for how we can support them.
What concerns me most is that democratic backsliding is not
limited to Africa and we seem to be in a place of retreat from
democracy that I only hope is an anomaly.
In Europe, we see the egregious behavior of Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko who claimed success in a
disputed August 9th election and sought support from extra-
national resources such as Russia to justify his claim to
power. Thousands of Belarusians openly protested against the
election results for more than 50 days, suffering multiple
incidents of police brutality. This democratic backsliding
comes approximately 1 year after the U.S. and Belarus agreed to
exchange Ambassadors after a 15-year pause as a result of
significant democratic progress of the Belarusian Government.
Other European countries experiencing democratic
backsliding include Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
Serbia, and Turkey, to which we must continue to lend our
support and protect the dignity and rights of their citizens.
In Asia and Latin America, we have to be extremely vigilant to
help strengthen democracy in some of the largest and most
populous countries in the world such as Brazil, India, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
In Brazil, President Bolsonaro is challenging the autonomy
of the judiciary and Congress to investigate the excessive
presence of the military in civil public services. President
Duterte of the Philippines is accused of lawfare or weaponizing
the law to deter or defeat freedoms, personalities, and
establishments that promote human rights, press freedoms, and
rule of law, while also cracking down on individual freedoms.
These countries have experienced erosion in democratic
institutions and human rights exemplified by the imposition of
tighter State control over multiple political institutions that
result in more authoritarian forms of government and increased
human suffering. I have only mentioned a few, but there are
other nations suffering from democratic backsliding, or
democratic failure. In these countries, human suffering and
poverty correlate directly to authoritarianism and corruption.
Now, finally, in our own country, the United States is
witnessing an erosion of democracy as various institutions are
misused to solidify power. The threat of a non-peaceful
transition of power and other electoral irregularities such as
delegitimizing the use of mail-in ballots during a global
pandemic, the use of rhetoric to instill fear and disunity
among the citizenry, threatening to send people to the polls to
intimidate voters while also expediting the appointment of a
new supreme court justice to support the incumbent in case of a
contested election, these are only a few examples of democratic
backsliding in the United States.
And as the global champion for democracy, the U.S. cannot
allow these actions to continue or prevail. It is of paramount
importance that the United States set the highest example and
use our democratic institutions such as the Constitution,
freedom of expression, assembly and association, and fair and
free elections to preserve and advance democratic leadership
around the world. The world is watching us and we can, if we
are not careful, conveniently become an excuse for others'
backsliding.
Although backsliding is not new, we notice a particular
pattern of change also caused by COVID-19 global pandemic that
has led to subtle, incremental, democratic erosion as some
sitting leaders use safety measures to prevent the spread of
the virus to debilitate freedom of expression and infringe upon
human rights. Tanzania offers a stark example of this behavior
by denying the existence of COVID-19 in the country and
suppression of information related to the pandemic that places
citizens' health at risk and violates citizens' freedom of
speech and right of access to information.
We also have been guilty of mishandling the COVID-19
pandemic through misinformation, politicizing public health
guidance, and the failure to develop a national strategy and
participate in international efforts to eradicate the disease.
Most alarming is the President's attempt to discredit the
election process by threatening not to accept defeat and
alleging election fraud should he lose, and by challenging the
legality of mail-in ballots which are extremely important
during a global pandemic that requires sheltering in place.
The impacts of global democratic backsliding are severe and
threaten the very foundation of human advancement as we have
seen its extreme forms in Mali, Hungary, the Philippines, and
Venezuela. Clearly, our work is cut out for us, but we can be
hopeful in the fact that democracy is an enduring institution
that has survived for centuries.
According to the International Report on the Global State
of Democracy, addressing the ills and reviving the promise
democracy is a resilient form of government and remains in
strong demand around the world. Eighty-one of the ninety-seven
democracies have enjoyed uninterrupted democratic status since
their democratic transitions. The report further notes
democratic nations enjoy a higher level of gender equality and
human development and lower levels of corruption, ideals for
which we must unceasingly strive to be enjoyed by all peoples
of the world.
I look forward to hearing the views, perspectives, and
recommendations of the panel of witnesses we have here today.
Without objection--Mr. Sherman is coming? Okay.
All right--let me move to introduce our witnesses.
Our first witness is Dr. Chris Fomunyoh, is the senior
associate for Africa and regional director at the National
Democratic Institute. He has led international election
observation missions and supervised democracy support programs
in various African countries. He is an adjunct faculty at the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies and a former adjunct
professor of African politics and government at Georgetown
University.
Our second witness is Dr. Dorina Bekoe, is a research staff
member with the Africa program at the Institute for Defense
Analyses. Previously, she was an associate professor of
conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution at the Africa
Center for Strategic Studies. She is the editor of Voting in
Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her areas of
expertise include Africa's political development, conflict
resolution and peacebuilding, peace agreements, electoral
violence, and institutional reform.
Dr. Jon Temin is the director of the Africa program at the
Freedom House. From 2014 to 2017, he was a member of the U.S.
Department of State Policy Planning Staff, providing strategic
guidance and long-term thinking to the Secretary of State. He
also served as director of the U.S. Institute of Peace Africa
Program, leading the Institute's effort to help end conflicts
and prevent new violence.
Our final witness, who will be online, is Joshua Meservey,
is the senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at
the Heritage Foundation. He studies African geopolitics and
counterterrorism. He is a returned Peace Corps volunteer who
served in Zambia before joining a refugee settlement
organization based out of Nairobi, Kenya.
I would like to welcome Dr. Fomunyoh.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE FOR
AFRICA, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Dr. Fomunyoh. Chairman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, on behalf of the
National Democratic Institute, I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss democratic backsliding in sub-Saharan Africa and issues
of institutional fragility, freedoms, and human rights. NDI has
over three decades of technical assistance to, and support for,
democratic institutions and processes in Africa, and currently
runs active programs in 20 countries.
On a personal note, I have served with the Institute for
over 25 years and remember NDI's first initiative in Africa, a
conference on multipartism held in Dakar, Senegal in 1985. A
few years ago, after that Senegal conference on multipartism,
the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the
anti-apartheid hero Nelson Mandela regained his freedom in
South Africa.
And that began a cascade of events in the late 1980's and
early 1990's that jump-started a wave of democratization across
the entire continent. By Freedom House's ratings, Africa then
went from two-thirds of the countries classified as ``not
free,'' and only two countries, Botswana and Mauritius,
``free'' in 1989, to two-thirds of all African countries
classified as either free or partly free by 2009.
Unfortunately, regrettably, by 2019, democratic trends
reversed, and there are now fewer democracies in Africa than
was the case 20 years ago. Notably, West Africa, previously
commended as a trailblazer region, has seen serious backsliding
as Mali experienced a military coup and major controversies
have arisen about candidacies of incumbent presidents in Guinea
Conakry and Cote d'Ivoire.
The Central Africa region remains stuck, with the highest
concentration of autocratic regimes with the three longest-
serving presidents in the world in that sub-region, notably,
Equatorial Guinea, 41 years; Cameroon, 38 years; and Congo-
Brazzaville, 38 years. In Southern and East Africa, continued
persecution of political opposition and civil society activists
in Zimbabwe, and similar worrying signs or patterns in Tanzania
since 2016, seriously diminish citizen participation in
politics and governance, and also stymie prospects for much
needed reforms.
The COVID-19 pandemic has not helped, as it has slowed or
impeded election preparations and generated fears that in some
countries with national elections scheduled to take place
before the end of the year, incumbents would use emergency
powers to limit freedoms of expression and assembly and further
shrink political space.
In my written testimony, I go into much more detail about
the domestic or internal ingredients of backsliding as well as
the external vectors that contribute to backsliding. I also
list in more detail the link, the linkage that I see between
constitutionalism or the lack of respect for constitutional
term limits, and authoritarianism, by taking a more detailed
look at the specific case of Cameroon, where an incumbent
president forced through a constitutional amendment in 2018, so
that even now at age 87 and after 38 years in office he could
continue to run for president for the rest of his life.
This fight--sorry, Madam Chair. Building a firewall against
democratic backsliding in Africa requires a combined effort
amongst Africans and democracy advocates, practitioners, and
champions worldwide. Below, I have a few recommendations that
could contribute to that collective endeavor.
The U.S. should revamp its Africa policy with a view to
consolidating investments made over the past three decades in
building democratic institutions and especially targeting that
assistance toward the generation that is 35 years or younger
that I term the ``democratization wave generation,'' which
constitutes 75 percent of Africa's population.
The international community at large should amplify public
diplomacy on measures that strengthen democracy and provide
avenues within the United Nations system, including the United
Nations Security Council, to discuss issues that pertain to
gross human rights violations and atrocities on the African
continent that shock the world and humanity's conscience.
Africans themselves should also intensify building
synergistic national and regional networks of democracy
advocates and champions to foster peer-to-peer review, support,
and encouragement.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fomunyoh follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. You will have a little more time
during the Q&A.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bass. Sure.
Dr. Bekoe.
STATEMENT OF DR. DORINA BEKOE, RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER, INSTITUTE
FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
Dr. Bekoe. Good morning, Chair Bass and Ranking Member
Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the invitation to testify on democratic backsliding in sub-
Saharan Africa. I am a research staff member at the Institute
for Defense Analyses, as you said----
Ms. Bass. You might want to pull the mic closer. It is hard
to understand you.
Dr. Bekoe. My remarks do not represent IDA or any of its
government sponsors. My remarks and views are my own, and my
testimony will focus on elections and political transition. So
today, all countries in Africa except Eritrea hold elections.
Africa's experience has been mixed. While there have been
notable strides and important innovations, worrisome trends
undermine Africa's governance and security.
Many hoped that elections would result in regular,
peaceful, predictable changes in government such as reducing
the number of coups, and they have, but coups still occur even
in the context of the predictability of a democratic
government. Mali's 2012 coup took place even though there was a
regularly scheduled election just 1 month away. And the coup in
August of this year took place despite the fact that in 2018
there was a Presidential election and last year there were
legislative elections.
Many hoped that elections would also end authoritarianism
by offering opportunities for changes in government. And while
21 countries on the continent have respected their
constitutionally mandated two-term limits, 14 countries have
modified or eliminated the term limit, and 8 countries have
never adopted them. In Africa today, there are ten leaders that
have served for 20 years or more and my colleague Chris
Fomunyoh highlighted a number of them.
An important aspect is understanding how African citizens
themselves rate the quality of their countries' elections and
here we turn to Afrobarometer, which is an independent pan-
African research institution, and their surveys indicate that
40 percent of Africa's citizens rated their countries as having
organized completely free and fair elections, so less than
half. And this average has held steady for over two decades, or
for the last two decades.
Citizens also communicate by turning out to vote, and
research that I have done with Stephanie Burchard showed that
reduced voter turnout is one of the many side effects of pre-
election violence. And we saw that in Kenya. Low voter turnout
also reflects low political engagement and we can look to Mali
on this as well. Sustained low voter turnout between 30 and 40
percent has often been cited as an indication of public
disengagement, disdain for corruption, and mistrust of the
country's democratic institutions, which some analysts feel
also facilitated the acceptance of a coup.
Electoral violence is an important indicator of democratic
backsliding and some highlights from research tell us that
approximately 65 percent of Africa's elections have experienced
violence. Most of that violence has been in the form of verbal
harassment, discouraging political aspirants, vandalizing
election materials, impeding the media. We also know that 95
percent of electoral violence is before the election.
Post-election violence, while it is less frequent, is
actually much deadlier, and Africa's worst incidents of
electoral violence have occurred afterwards. There are some
encouraging signs that I would like to point out, however. One,
Kenyan civil society has pioneered electronic platforms where
citizens can record incidents of fraud and harassment and that
has been replicated many places on the continent.
There are election situation rooms where information is
conveyed to a central location and steps are taken to mitigate
tension. Parallel vote tabulation is also widely practiced as a
check on official results, and other countries like Ghana have
developed national peace infrastructure to play an active role
in creating a peaceful environment. Judiciaries are also
playing an important role in leveling the playing field, but
they must be credible and independent.
I would like to just close with three recommendations. One
is to focus on the pre-election environment by identifying
hotspots of violence and developing mechanisms to reduce
tension. Two is to strengthen electoral dispute adjudication,
supporting viable and trusted avenues for addressing electoral
grievances whether through the courts, negotiations, or other
mechanisms. And then, finally, to provide support to
independent civil society organizations to enhance their
capacity to prevent electoral violence and enhance the quality
and credibility of elections.
So I will close with that. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to address the committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bekoe follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Temin.
STATEMENT OF MR. JON TEMIN, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, FREEDOM
HOUSE
Mr. Temin. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members of
the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you today. I
ask that my full written testimony be admitted into the record.
I will start by highlighting several trends we at Freedom
House observed in sub-Saharan Africa in the most recent version
of our Freedom of the World Report. First, we are seeing lots
of volatility in the State of freedoms and democracy. Of the 12
largest score declines globally in our recent report, seven are
in sub-Saharan Africa. But of the eight largest improvements,
six are in the region.
Second, West Africa, previously considered the democratic
leader among Africa's sub-regions, is of particular concern. Of
those seven large score declines, five are from countries in
West Africa. Third, freedom and democratic governance is
enjoyed by far too few Africans. Only 9 percent of people in
sub-Saharan Africa live in countries that Freedom House
categorizes as free.
Citizens bear the brunt of democratic backsliding. They are
attacked when they peacefully protest in opposition to the
government as in Guinea and Cameroon. They are unable to use
the internet when the government restricts access as in
Ethiopia and Chad. Civil society groups face excessive
limitations on their activity as in Tanzania and Burundi, and
journalists are threatened and detained as in Nigeria and
Zimbabwe.
Governments are developing new methods to limit citizen
activity such as requiring bloggers to meet stringent
registration requirements, as in Uganda, and using COVID-19 as
a pretext for closing political and civic space, to which I
will add that Freedom House strongly endorses H.R. 6986, the
Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, which is currently
under consideration.
In the interest of time, I will focus the rest of my
remarks on recommendations. My first recommendation concerns
American messaging. While that messaging is often strongly
supportive of democracy, it is inconsistent. This is inevitable
as competing American interests will always lead to modulated
messaging based on the context. But we need to strive for
greater consistency across countries and regions in how we
speak about democracy. To cite one example, the United States
and much of the rest of the world has rightly criticized the
undemocratic change of power in Mali, a textbook example of a
coup.
But when leaders in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire and in Rwanda,
Chad, Uganda, and elsewhere before them sought to change the
rules of the game to extend their time in office, amounting to
an undemocratic extension of their tenure, the American voice
has been muted. This contradiction does not go unnoticed among
Africans and contributes to a sense that the United States
places security interests above democratic concerns and pulls
punches when issues involve our perceived allies.
Second, in building on my first recommendation, the United
States should consider changes to term and age limits that
allow incumbent leaders to extend their time in office as
essentially a coup against the constitution and respond
accordingly. These moves by leaders who have already served two
terms are an usurpation of power that deny the country and its
citizens the many benefits of leadership rotation. Most
important, they are broadly unpopular with citizens.
Polling by Afrobarometer consistently demonstrates that
approximately three-quarters of Africans favor two-term limits
for their leaders. Legislation requires that when a military
overthrows a duly elected government, many forms of assistance
to that country are suspended. As a matter of policy, the
United States should adopt a similar approach when a leader
changes the rules to benefit himself or herself.
That move should trigger an automatic, across-the-board
review of all assistance to the country, and elements of that
assistance that benefit the executive and upper echelons of
government should be suspended. Congress should consider
institutionalizing this policy through legislation. That way,
leaders will know that if they choose to change the rules to
benefit themselves, they will automatically face consequences.
This policy should apply globally, not just to Africa.
Third, countries where citizens are bravely seeking to move
past decades of authoritarianism deserve rapid and substantial
support from the United States. Opportunities to buttress
successful citizen-led movements for democracy are rare. In
Sudan, the long overdue process of removing the country from
the list of State sponsors of terrorism may soon conclude, but
that is not enough. The United States needs to support the
civilian component of Sudan's transitional government every
step of the long road toward democracy and do all that it can
to revive Sudan's economy.
In Ethiopia, there are deeply concerning signs that the
government is reaching for tools of repression that many hoped
were relegated to history. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains on a
tentative path to democratic elections that can be
transformative. In this context, the decision by the United
States to withhold development assistance from Ethiopia in a
quixotic and counterproductive effort to influence Ethiopia's
negotiating position concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam is bad policy that should be reversed. Now is not the time
to curtail support to Ethiopia's more than one hundred million
citizens and inhibit their efforts to democratize. Similar to
Sudan and Ethiopia, nascent democratic transitions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Gambia, and Angola also
call for strong U.S. support.
Permit me to conclude with a broader observation. The
ability of the United States to advance democracy around the
world, including Africa, is directly tied to the strength of
our democracy at home. The United States remains broadly
popular in the eyes of Africans, but many of them are closely
watching the strength of our institutions and how we manage our
differences through peaceful, democratic processes.
Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Temin follows:]
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FREEDOM HOUSE JOHN TEMIN
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Our final witness is Mr. Joshua
Meservey and he is online.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA
AND THE MIDDLE EAST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on this important topic. The
views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be
construed as representing the official position of the Heritage
Foundation.
I have been asked to focus my remarks on the role that
foreign powers may play in the democratic backsliding happening
in parts of Africa. The Chinese government is the staunchest
antidemocratic actor in Africa. The antipathy to democratic
values is inherent to the Chinese Communist Party's or CCP's
ideology which believes in the utter primacy of the Party over
all facets of life.
China's communist leadership believes that only complete
fidelity to its ideology can help it achieve its goals.
Democracy, with its devolution of power to citizens, is a
horrifying concept to the CCP. It is an existential threat, in
fact. It is unsurprising that the CCP crushes liberty at home
and battles it overseas. This manifests with varying levels of
intensity and obviousness across the African continent. And
while I believe that the Chinese government is deliberately
trying to undermine African democracy, some of its other
actions can have that same effect even if it is not by design.
Some of the ways the Chinese government threatens democracy
are as follows: First, it openly denigrates democracy, claiming
that it is a Trojan horse of the West to enable meddling in
African affairs. Beijing blames multiparty democracy for
bringing chaos and poverty to Africa and spreads the idea that
economic rights trump fundamental individual rights that form
the core of any successful democracy.
Second, since President Xi Jinping's ascension, Beijing
increasingly offers its own model of development, which is some
economic freedom with repressive governance, as a solution for
African nations. Third, Beijing's supposed no-strings-attached
aid policy allows regimes to use that aid to fuel patronage
networks that help them stay in power. Fourth, China supplies
the technology, training, and expertise for repression in some
African countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Fifth, Beijing provides scholarships and sponsors trips to
China for tens of thousands of African students, scholars,
politicians, and media professionals who will likely be exposed
to heavy doses of Marxism and Maoism. Whether any Africans are
persuaded by the ideology during their stays in China needs
further study, but it is an obvious risk. And sixth and
finally, Chinese economic practices such as the use of bribes
to win contracts and general favor or opaque lending and
tendering arrangements fuel corruption and are an obvious
challenge to accountable governance.
Now China is not the only influential country in Africa
that models illiberal governance. Turkey, which has grown
increasingly authoritarian under President Erdogan, has been
very active diplomatically, militarily, and economically on the
continent, while State monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Qatar, all of which we can assume have little love for
democracy, are spreading some of their fabulous wealth to parts
of Africa as well. These countries and others allegedly spread
cash around during Somalia's last electoral process to
influence that result, subverting an American goal of having
genuine democracy take root in that country.
Finally, Russia with its mercenaries, arms sales, and
economic agreements, is becoming increasingly important on the
continent. This should concern the U.S. for a number of
reasons, including because we care about democracy. The Gulf
States and Turkey do not attack democracy with the same
commitment that Beijing does; however, there is still the moral
example these countries set, and their willingness to tamper in
Somalia's electoral process suggest they are willing to do the
same elsewhere. There are a number of steps the U.S. can take
to try to strengthen democracy in Africa, but I will offer four
brief recommendations.
Confidently advocate for American values with the African
public and its leaders. Most people yearn for representative
government, rule of law, and individual freedom, and the U.S.
should unapologetically cheerlead for those values. Two,
strengthen civil society in Africa which is critical to the
development and maintenance of a responsive and honest
government.
Three, prioritize the fight against African government
which corrodes all efforts to broaden and deepen democratic
governance. And, finally, deepen cooperation on the continent
with pro-democracy allied countries. Thank you again for this
opportunity to testify and I look forward to any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Bass. Thank you. We will now move to questions and each
member will have 5 minutes. I now recognize myself.
I wanted to begin by letting Dr. Fomunyoh--you were getting
ready to offer recommendations, and if you would like to
continue. And then I also want to ask, after he is finished
with his recommendations, from our other panelists, if you
could provide some examples of which nations do you feel on the
continent are the strongest at maintaining their democracies
and have not participated in backsliding.
Doctor?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Chairman. And my
prepared remarks have got more elaborate recommendations. But
the three most important recommendations I thought the
committee should consider would be, first, address to U.S.
policymakers the need for them to revamp U.S.-Africa policy and
collaborate such engagement intensely on what I term ``the
democratization wave generation,'' which is this generation of
Africans 35 years or younger who constitute 75 percent of the
1.4 billion people who live on the African continent.
Second, that the international community at large should
open up global platforms within the United Nations system,
including within the United Nations Security Council, and take
actions for substantive discussions on Africa and actions that
can help put an end to the gross atrocities and human rights
violations that we see on the continent in undemocratic regimes
that shock the conscience of humanity.
And that third, I have recommendations for Africans
themselves, that Africans themselves need to build synergies of
national and regional networks or actors to consolidate best
practices and enhance peer-to-peer learning and support and
also invest intensely, or heavily, in empowering women and
youth as leaders to safeguard and promote greater and better
democratic performance.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bass. Dr. Bekoe.
Dr. Bekoe. Thank you. In terms of which nations are the
strongest, I would point to five that come to mind right away.
One is Ghana. They are getting ready to hold their eighth
election since 1992 and they have had three changes between the
political parties and so you have a lot of predictability
there. Senegal, in fact, in 2016, the Senegalese citizens
approved a referendum to reduce the number of years within the
terms from five to seven. Mauritius, Botswana, and South
Africa--those leap to mind right away in terms of strong
institutions.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Temin.
Mr. Temin. Thank you. And I would agree with Dr. Bekoe's
assessment, although I would caveat on Senegal. We are
concerned in our observations at Freedom House on their
trajectory. Two prominent opposition politicians were not
allowed to compete in the last election and that was very
concerning, and in fact, Senegal has gone from our category of
free to our category of partly free.
But Dr. Bekoe is correct. I would add, many of the island
nations do quite well--Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Sao
Tome, and Principe. Let me also mention one really good story
from this last year, which is Malawi, which had a deeply flawed
election process but there was a lot of resistance from civil
society, and the supreme court there played a very strong,
consistent role respecting rule of law that led to a rerun of
the election where the opposition was victorious. That is a
real bright spot and Malawi could join these other countries in
doing quite well.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Meservey.
Mr. Meservey. Yes, I agree with what my colleagues say. I
am not sure if Namibia was mentioned in their remarks, but I
would certainly add that country. And I echo Jon's comments
about Malawi. That was really, frankly, inspiring and
surprising, the outcome of that. So hopefully they can
consolidate those victories.
And then on the concerning side is Benin. Part of what
makes what is happening there so sad is that Benin was actually
a previous success story. It was the first country that--where
an incumbent was defeated at the polls, so I will add that on
the worrisome side.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Does anybody have an opinion about
ECOWAS, what ECOWAS's intervention in Mali, which is a little
problematic considering ECOWAS is not consistent.
Dr. Bekoe, are you----
Dr. Fomunyoh. Madam Chair, ECOWAS has had a highly rated
reputation in terms of respecting its protocols because ECOWAS
has got on the books the protocol on governance, good
governance and democracy that was adopted in 2001. And in a
number of countries, ECOWAS has come through in terms of
representing the interests of people and their commitment to
democratic governance.
Unfortunately, in recent weeks--sorry, in recent months, it
has been challenged by the military intervention in Mali and
has tried to muddle through a compromise solution in finding a
retired military officer who is now considered a civilian and
accepting that that civilian could govern Mali while the
country goes through a transition of 18 months.
So our hope is that Mali will be able to get back on the
democratic track with ECOWAS's support, but of course there are
concerns with regards to ECOWAS's standards in turns of
constitutional, respectful constitutional term limits.
Ms. Bass. It played a great role in the Gambia, but now we
will see what happens with Mali.
You, actually, are just in time, Mr. Ranking Member, if you
would like to ask questions.
Mr. Smith. Can I defer to Mr. Burchett?
Ms. Bass. Sure. Sure, sure.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Chairlady, if the ranking member would like
to go, I will yield to his wisdom and age.
Ms. Bass. He just yielded to you.
Mr. Burchett. Okay, great. We are very diplomatic on this
committee. I really dig that, Chairlady. Thank you so much. And
thank you all for being here. It is not in my notes, but
sometimes I get popped from some people back home on the
internet and they say, ``Burchett, what does any of this have
to do with the second congressional district?''
Well, dadgummit, it has a whole lot to do with it. Freedom.
Freedom is something we should all cherish and for good folks
in Africa that are trying to get it, and it ticks me off when
people try to take it from you all, and I appreciate every one
of you all being here and your testimoneys. And you all got
that one for free. It was not in my notes.
But I heard that some of the officers who took part in the
Mali coup d'etat had recently returned from Russia.
Additionally, I heard reports that some of the coup supporters
were spotted waving Russian flags after President--how do you
say his name, Chairlady, is it Keita? Is that how you say--
President Keita was deposed. What, if any, was the role of
Russia in this military coup?
Any of you all want to take that is fine with me.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Congressman, you are right. We have seen
those reports and we saw images in Bamako of demonstrations
after the coup of people waving the Russian flag. And also the
fact that the Russian ambassador in Bamako, the first
Ambassador, foreign Ambassador to meet with the junta. However,
we have not been able to trace any direct linkages in terms of
Russia's role, but that is certainly something that needs to be
watched very closely.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir. I suspect if they are carrying AK-
47s and waving Russian flags that is pretty evident of what the
heck is going on. Thank you.
How is the resulting political turmoil in Mali affecting
the security situation in the Sahel?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Unfortunately, Mali has turned out to be the
weak link as countries in the Sahel ranging from Niger
Republic, Burkina Faso, and countries that are part of the G5,
Sahel, which is a combination of Chad, Mauritania, Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Niger Republic, fight to curb the expansion of
violent extremists in the Sahel. As we all know, northern Mali
has been in turmoil since 2012, and so to have the government
in Bamako be undermined further aggravates what is already
predicting risk for the country that could be further realized
by violent extremism.
It is important that the Government of Mali regain its feet
and regain its commitment to democratic government, and
professional military that can help working with the partners,
for example, the French with the Operation Barkhane, and other
United Nations peacekeeping forces to curb this spread. Because
if Mali falls, if any one of the countries in the Sahel falls,
then the coastal countries along the West African coast are
going to be immediately hit and that would mean--that would be
very catastrophic for the rest of the continent.
Mr. Burchett. Okay, thank you so much.
Mr. Meservey, you published a report recently where you
documented that Chinese companies have built around 190 African
government buildings including over 20 houses of African heads
of State. Combine that with the reports that Huawei technology
is used during construction, and we are looking at the Chinese
having ample opportunities for spying and intelligence
gathering operations.
What more should we be doing to highlight the Chinese
Communist Party's attempt to undermine democratic governance
and support for authoritarian regimes?
Mr. Meservey. Yes, it is a challenge. I think that one of
the best things we can do, and it is a longer-term solution but
I also think it is the most effective chance we have here, is
to buttress civil society organizations in Africa. A number of
them have actually been effective in shining light on some
Chinese activity going on, so they have been able to expose
deals that were not to the benefit of the country. They were
able to stop projects that were going to be environmentally
disastrous.
So they have had a surprising amount of success and I think
the U.S. should double down on its support of those sorts of
organizations. That includes journalists. The Chinese
Government has made a very concerted effort to co-opt African
journalists all across the continent, so I think the U.S. needs
to launch sort of a counter-movement, if you will, where we,
you know, support independent, ferocious journalism on the
continent.
So I, really, I always come back to civil society. I think
that is a critical part of what we need to be doing on the
continent.
Mr. Burchett. Okay.
Chairlady, thank you. I have gone over my time. Thank you
for your courtesy. I have to go to the Small Business
Committee. I apologize. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Bass. No problem. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Let me go to Representative Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, and greetings and
gratitude to all of our witnesses today in this important
hearing.
Strengthening democratic institutions----
Ms. Bass. Can you get closer to your laptop?
There you go.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. Is that a little better?
Ms. Bass. Yes.
Mr. Phillips. Okay. Thank you, everybody.
Strengthening democratic institutions and exposing
democratic backsliding is terribly important work and a
distinct priority of mine in Congress. The United States is not
perfect. We all see what is happening in our very own country
right now. But what is important is that we are constantly
working to improve, to strengthen, and to encourage free and
fair elections all around the world including in our own
country, and to use our voices powerfully, but also peacefully.
I would like to start to talk about--my question will be,
first, about Ethiopia. While Prime Minister Abiy advanced a
vision of national unity early in his term by releasing
political prisoners and unbanning certain political parties and
promising free and fair elections, it has become very clear
that there is a lot more work to be done relative to his reform
agenda. So I have heard a lot of concerns from my constituents
in Minnesota regarding restrictions on civil liberties,
violence perpetrated against civilians by State and non-State
actors, arrests of human rights activists in the smaller region
of Ethiopia, and detention of political opposition leaders.
So my first question is for you, Mr. Temin. What can Abiy's
government do to mitigate ethnic incitement in religious
conflict and hate speech without restricting civil liberties,
and going forward, how can the government more effectively
respond to ethnic and religious tensions in the country?
Mr. Temin. Thank you for the question and for raising some
very concerning issues in Ethiopia. There are no easy answers
to these questions. One of the most important steps is that the
Abiy government really seek to consult with the political
opposition and politicians across the spectrum, and they have
not been very good at doing that so far.
The decision they made to postpone elections was probably
the right one given COVID and logistical challenges, but they
did that in a vacuum without consultation and that has led to a
lot of the grievance that we are seeing now. Elections are now
supposed to happen in 2021, so the government needs to start
now a real process of consultation with the entire political
spectrum to talk about the road between here and those
elections and how those elections can be as free, fair, and
transparent as possible. Those elections really can be
transformative, but the government simply has to stop reaching
for these tools of past repression that we really thought were
relegated to history. And they need to be called out on that,
frankly.
The U.S. and the rest of the world should not be in the
business of celebrating Prime Minister Abiy--that probably
happened a little bit too much, a little bit too quickly even
given some of the remarkable early steps--but we need to be in
the business of strengthening Ethiopian institutions and
Ethiopian civil society and those who are investigating and
highlighting the abuses that are going on.
The ethnic violence is substantial and it is hard to
contain. I will note that there are voices that are fanning
this ethnic animosity across the spectrum, many of them
Ethiopian in Ethiopia. Some of them are outside of Ethiopia
too, and we do need to keep an eye on those voices including in
the diaspora who do sometimes fan the flames of ethnic tension.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, sir.
And, you know, we also have elections coming up in Cote
d'Ivoire, October 31st, I believe. Of course, it is clear that
the country is at risk as well for large-scale violence against
civilians. According to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,
early warning signs of mass atrocity are already visible and
certainly warrant attention. I just introduced House Resolution
1150 which highlights this important issue and urges the
government of Cote d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all
citizens to respect the democratic principles, refrain from
violence, and hold free and fair and transparent elections this
October.
Dr. Bekoe, regarding Cote d'Ivoire, what can the United
States and our embassy in particular do to support transparent
and peaceful elections in October and, for that matter, in
Ethiopia and Somalia? What can be done to create conditions for
those same free and fair elections next year in 2021?
Dr. Bekoe.
Dr. Bekoe. Yes. Thank you for that question. Yes, the
upcoming elections in Cote d'Ivoire are quite worrisome because
the violence has already started. We have seen that with
opposition forces or opposition supporters being attacked. The
important way to support civil society is to support efforts
that help civil society track what the State is doing, how to
substantiate results to make sure that there is inclusion in
voter registration.
Those are things that kind of fuel the violence, although
the underlying reason for the violence is the fact that the
incumbent is seeking to run for his third term. And so that is
the real issue that is fueling a lot of this violence.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Dr. Bekoe. And adhering to term limits is one way that that
will stop.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I did just
leave a hearing on China. As I mentioned before, I am ranking
member of the China Commission. And the discussion was on the
70 years of Tibetan oppression by the Chinese Government made
much worse more recently by Xi Jinping, as he has done to the
Muslims in Xinjiang, the Uyghurs.
I am concerned and I have been concerned, and as the
chairwoman knows, I have chaired a number of hearings when I
was chairman of this subcommittee on China's malign influence
on Africa, its ability to buy votes particularly at the United
Nations, its ability to build a soccer stadium or do something
else in order to gain benefits that are very tangible. There is
no foreign corrupt practices act, so when it comes to trade,
bribes help facilitate the deal.
But the biggest concern, I think, most of us are having, I
have as well, is China's bad governance model. And I am
wondering if you might speak, any of you who would like, about
this. You know, in 2019, the African leaders pledged to use the
Belt and Road to build a Sino-Africa Community of Common
Destiny. A China-Africa Institute was established to develop
new models in mutual learning and to facilitate policies,
synergy, and alignment in bringing this about.
Kenya's Vision 2030, Rwanda's Vision 2050, Uganda's Vision
2040, and South Africa's National Development Plan of 2030 are
examples of this strategic African blueprint that incorporate
elements of the Chinese government's model and envision ongoing
Chinese inputs as key catalysts, and I am wondering if you
would speak to this.
We know that in Zimbabwe the Chinese were providing Mugabe
with all kinds of help. There is very high profile--Bashir
found and Khartoum had found that China was a very willing
assistor and enabler of their terrible deeds for all those
years. But now we have, I think, this all-out effort to
sanction the kind of governance that China does to its own
people each and every day and that is cruel repression of the
Han Chinese, the Tibetans, the people of faith, the Falun Gong,
and the Muslim Uyghurs and others.
So could you speak to that? I mean how do we undo this
malign influence that I think is in ascendency throughout the
world, not just in Africa, as China--I mean look at the impact
they are having at the U.N. Human Rights Council. They are
barely held to account for anything that they do including this
ongoing genocide against the Muslims in Xinjiang.
So your thoughts on that because, you know, there are
always people in governments who want to do the right thing and
that is certainly, you know, with exclamation points what we
know so many people in Africa want to do. But then you get
these affiliations with people who say oppression works, secret
police works, jailing dissidents works--and that is the Chinese
model. So if you could speak to that I would appreciate it.
Mr. Temin. Thank you for the question. Let me just make a
brief point which is that in democracies Chinese misbehavior is
more likely to be scrutinized, and that is all the more reason
for the entire topic of the conversation today which is
American investment in democracy promotion and advancing
democracy in Africa.
In democracies, civil society organizations are more likely
to dig into what China is doing. In democracies, the government
is probably more willing to dig into that as well. And to
reiterate an important point that Josh made earlier, building
that capacity to better scrutinize Chinese activity is really
important and that is both within civilian society across
Africa and within African governments as well, to fully
understand the deals that they are signing up for, the long-
term consequences of those deals.
Josh also made a really important point which I will
reiterate on investigative journalism. You know, I think there
is no better bang for the buck than investments in
investigative journalism and supporting those brave journalists
across the continent to really dig into Chinese activity.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Representative Omar.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman. Can you hear me?
Ms. Bass. I can.
Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman, for this important
committee hearing and grateful to our witnesses. I want to
start with Dr. Fomunyoh. In your testimony, you discuss the
massacres committed in the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Did
the United States provide training, funding, or arms to the
Cameroonian security forces who committed those massacres?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, for your
question. That has been an issue of concern, because prior to
the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon in 2016, Cameroon was a
partner with the United States and a number of other countries
in fighting Boko Haram in the extreme north of the country
around the Lake Chad basin countries in collaboration with
Nigeria, Chad, and Niger Republic.
But what we have seen in recent years, especially in the
last 2 years, has been that some of the resources that were
initially donated to the government of Cameroon to help the
fight against Boko Haram in the extreme northern part of the
country have moved both in terms of materiel and personnel into
the Anglophone regions of the country where there is an ongoing
armed conflict.
And that is extremely worrying, because we are beginning to
see some of the tactics and gross violations of human rights in
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon that had been recorded in
incidents happening in the extreme north of the country and
that is something to be watchful about.
I should just remark briefly that the United States had
been forced, the State Department had been forced to reduce
some of its assistance, military assistance to Cameroon as a
recognition that some of the units that may have been trained
to fight Boko Haram in the extreme north had been involved in
human rights violations as well.
Ms. Omar. All right. So I assume that that would be sort of
a yes. So did the Malinian military officers who led the recent
coup, Assimi Goita, receive U.S. military training? And if you
could just say yes or no, because I have a few more questions
and we have limited time.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Well, I do not have specific information on
that point, but there have been reports of capacity building
for Malinian military as it has been fighting the violent
extremists in the northern and middle part of the country and
that some of those soldiers or units may have trained alongside
U.S. forces in the Sahel.
Ms. Omar. I appreciate that. Thank you so much.
Madam Chair, I would like to introduce into the record an
article from the Washington Post about the U.S. military
training that Colonel Goita received.
Ms. Bass. Yes, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[The Washington Post article mentioned above from
Representative Omar was not available at press time]
Ms. Omar. The article includes a quote I will read here:
``'Helping the Nation's troops fight rapidly spreading
extremism is critical for regional stability,' U.S. military
official said.''
That quote stood out to me because last year we cutoff
security aid to Cameroon and we suspended security aid to Mali
this year. Yet, U.S. military officials are quoted in this
article saying that our counterterrorism policy is critical for
regional stability. And this trend of supporting militarized
brutality in the name of counterterrorism in the continent is
widespread in the continent. I have mentioned Cameroon and
Mali, but I could easily mention Somalia, Mozambique, Kenya, or
a number of other countries in the continent.
Dr. Fomunyoh, you were quite right to say that violent
extremism is a threat to democracy in Africa, but I would also
like to ask, is it time we start wondering if our militarized
counterterrorism strategy is also a threat to democracy in
Africa?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. That is a
very excellent point and that is a point that NDI and our
sister organization IRI, the International Republican
Institute, that we continue to make to our partners that
whether it is our funders or the African countries in which we
work, that counterterrorism has to be a holistic approach that
involves not just a militaristic technical assistance or
building the capacity of the military, but also working with
civilian institutions, parliaments to exercise oversight, civil
society to engage in healthy relations with the executive and
legislative branches of government.
And I would cite as an example a country that you know
well, Congresswoman, in terms of Niger that is really in the
middle of a very difficult neighborhood but that is managing
very well to bring to the table all of the levers, the
instruments of governance that range all the way from the
military to legislators and civil society in its efforts
against counterterrorism. And fortunately for Niger Republic it
seems to be holding its own and doing relatively well in a very
difficult neighborhood, so your point is well taken.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ms. Omar. Appreciate that. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Representative Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you to all of you all for being here today. I
really genuinely would love an answer to this question, a
legitimate answer, because it is very concerning to me. And I
will start with some data that we prepared before last
evening's debate and then a conversation about our debate here
in our Nation last night, and then a genuine question that I
would love to hear from you all on.
The Freedom House's global freedom score for the U.S. is 86
out of a hundred, so I think that is about a B, and is number
52 on the Freedom House rank of free countries. Finland,
Norway, and Sweden fill the top three spots, each with scores
of a hundred. Last evening, in our own debate here in this
country, our President, our commander-in-chief, would not
denounce white supremacists and he would not commit to a
peaceful transition of power.
How does all of this play into how we are seen and
respected as leaders and beacons in democracy? I am genuinely
interested in what has happened over the last several years in
terms of our standing and our credibility in this particular
area, particularly in Africa.
Mr. Temin, is it? Perhaps we could start with you.
Mr. Temin. Sure. And thank you for the question. It hurts
our standing and it hurts our ability to support the American
values of democracy that we seek to enhance around the world. I
think many of us who have watched Africa for some time and have
been outspoken in our critique of anti-democratic moves in
countries on the continent are seeing some of those things come
to pass in our own country and are deeply concerned by that.
I would also say though that there are a lot of lessons
from around the world in how to respond when these threats
happen and we would do well to listen to people who have pushed
back against these kinds of threats to democracy and ask
ourselves if some of their experience and some of their lessons
applies to what is happening here. Because we have a lot to
learn in how to respond to these things as we also seek to help
the rest of the world learn on democracy promotion.
Ms. Houlahan. And what specific lessons learned might we
benefit from from other nations that have struggled with this?
Mr. Temin. We have seen in other countries the vital role
of journalists in holding government to account, in exposing
corruption and other misdeeds. We have seen the vital role of
civil society in staying strong and being a voice for people
who feel like they are not represented by the government, if
not targeted by the government. We have seen the vital role of
human rights defenders who put their lives on the line in many
places in defense of the values that they hold dear.
There is nothing unique about Africa or any other part of
the world in what makes these segments of society so important
and I would think they apply to the U.S. as well.
Ms. Houlahan. I would love to hear from the other members
of the panel as well, if you have something to add.
Doctor.
Dr. Bekoe. I think----
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
Ms. Bekoe [continuing]. One message is that democratic
progress does not have an endpoint. It is a constant struggle
and it also requires, you know, all stakeholders to play their
role, to be vigilant, to kind of move the process along. And we
do not get to a place where we say, you know, this is the end
and we can rest on our laurels.
Ms. Houlahan. No, I think that is very, very fair. It is
very precious and that we definitely need to protect it.
Doctor, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Yes. I would just add to what has been said
by my co-panelists that Africans--the world has become a global
village and Africans themselves are also following very closely
what happens with other democracies, established democracies,
around the globe, and that back in May when we had the George
Floyd murder in Minnesota that in a number of African countries
people were actually astonished that incidents like those could
occur in the United States.
But what we saw also was a number of U.S. embassies on the
African continent issuing statements to clarify for the African
people what had actually transpired. And I think the hope for
African democrats as they look to developments around the world
is to see confirmation that in democracies institutions really
matter and that democracies have a propensity to self-correct.
That, ultimately, when things go wrong and institutions work
and people have their voices heard and people organize
themselves to have a seat at the table that, ultimately, their
voices will count and democracies will self-correct.
Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate that. A very hopeful way to end
and I yield back to the chair. Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Representative.
You know, it is my understanding that all 50-plus nations
on the continent registered a protest at the United Nations
over police brutality in the United States as an act of
solidarity.
Representative Sherman, without objection, we are glad to
welcome you here to participate in the subcommittee meeting.
Are you ready with questions?
Mr. Sherman. I am indeed.
Ms. Bass. Take it away.
Mr. Sherman. And, Chairwoman Bass, thank you so much for
allowing me to participate in this subcommittee. And I want to
build on some of the comments you have made, because I have
been somewhat embarrassed in talking to leaders not only from
Africa but around the world. Because we are working for
democracy, we are sometimes critical of democratic institutions
or the lack thereof in other countries, and it is somewhat
embarrassing to have a President who says that he might not
accept the outcome of an election. I have seen that happen in
Africa. Perhaps one of our witnesses can comment on how a
country--and give us an example or two of how countries have
been affected when there has been an election, the incumbent
has been turned out of office, and the incumbent doesn't want
to go.
I will direct it at Dr. Bekoe.
Dr. Bekoe. Well, the country that comes to mind is Gambia.
The incumbent did not want to leave office and it required the
intervention of the regional economic community to mediate his
exit.
Mr. Sherman. Well, I hope we do not have to adopt the
Gambia model here in the United States. We have much to learn
from countries around the world, but hopefully we will not need
that learning.
And it is--we are in an ideological contest with China and
others who are trying to make the world safe for
authoritarianism and their effort is to discredit democracy.
Africa is one place where we say that democracy is important
and China says the opposite and says that democracy does not
work, and I think that what I saw last night on my television
screen did not help our argument.
Dr. Fomunyoh, we spend money promoting democratic
institutions, government accountability. Can you give us
examples of where efforts have been successful, where a country
has moved substantially toward democracy and the rule of law
and what would be the impact of Trump's proposed 37 percent
decrease in that funding?
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Congressman.
First, if I could just add to my co-panelist, Dr. Bekoe, on
the examples where elections have helped to strengthen
democracies and where they have been under threat. Cote
d'Ivoire is another example to keep in mind and to know that in
2010, because of disagreement over the outcome of the
Presidential elections, the country converted into a crisis
that left 3,000 Ivorians dead. It has taken 10 years for Cote
d'Ivoire to recover from that crisis. Our hope is that going
into the 2020 elections, Ivorians will make efforts to not have
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
On the other hand, in Africa's largest democracy, which is
Nigeria with over 200 million inhabitants, we went through an
experience in 2015 that was very heartening in the sense that
the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan lost the elections,
and even before the Independent Election Commission could call,
make the call on the elections, he picked up his phone and
called his opposition, the current President Muhammadu Buhari,
and that brought tensions down considerably in Nigeria.
And that phone call that went from President Goodluck
Jonathan to President Buhari has helped stabilize Nigeria's
democracy up until this point. So there are some happy stories
to report. And in a country such as Nigeria, with support from
USAID, the International Republican Institute, NDI, CIPE, and
Solidarity Center have conducted programs in the past two
decades that have allowed Nigeria to make the transition from
being ruled by the military up until 1999, to now a functioning
democracy for the first time in Nigerian history that Nigeria
has been governed by civilian democratic governments for over
20 years.
Mr. Sherman. I thank you. I am going to try to--can I
squeeze in one more question?
And thank you for reminding us how important it is that
after all the ballots are counted that whoever is the loser in
our election acknowledges that and concedes.
The one more question is for Mr. Temin. We, the chairwoman
and I and others, have come to know Bobi Wine. We know he has
been severely beaten on various occasions. How would you
classify the situation in Uganda leading up to the February
Presidential election?
Mr. Temin. Very concerning and not getting as much
attention as it probably should. Uganda is talking about what
they are calling scientific elections in response to COVID,
which means no physical campaigning for the most part, doing a
lot of it virtually, online. I think that this gives
significant advantage to the ruling party and it is not clear
that the ruling party is willing to stick to all those rules,
but they will probably be more strictly enforced with the
opposition, I am guessing.
You know, President Museveni has been in power a long time.
I do not see much indication of plans for what comes next or
for transition, and in any country that is worrisome because I
think we have seen in a number of instances the longer some
leaders stay in office and the less planning there is for what
comes next, the rockier that transition can be.
And I do not know if that transition comes with the next
election or later, but I think Uganda is of concern. It is
concerning because it has a very young population, one of the
youngest on the continent, and I think there is a good deal of
frustration amongst that youthful element of the population. So
it is one to watch, for sure.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. And I believe Representative Omar had
some additional questions. I will give Representative Omar
another 5 minutes.
And then when we come back before we conclude, Mr. Temin,
you made reference, or, actually, Representative Houlahan made
reference to the score of the United States on Freedom House,
and I wanted you to address that after Representative Omar's
questions.
Representative Omar, are you there?
Why do not you go ahead and address that and we will see if
we can get Representative Omar back on Webex.
Mr. Temin. Sure. What I can say about that is Freedom in
the World, which we do every year, rates every country in the
world; that includes the United States. The United States'
score was decreasing before this administration. We have seen a
slow slippage of democracy in America for some time based on
our scores. That decrease has accelerated under this
administration.
Ms. Bass. But what is it? You know, give me the specifics.
Mr. Temin. I do not have the data in front of me. I am sure
we can followup on that.
Ms. Bass. Well, you generally know how you do the scoring,
so----
Mr. Temin. I do. I am deeply involved when we do the Africa
scoring and less so with the U.S. scoring. You know, I think
part of it has to do with freedom for journalists. I believe
there has been some concern there. Part of it has to do with
corruption and some of the indications that we have seen of
corrupt activity within government.
I will leave it there. We are happy to go dig into that and
provide you more detail, and I am sure that when we look at the
scores again later this year there will be a robust
conversation on the United States.
Ms. Bass. Well, do you, when you consider, I mean I do not
know about other countries, but when you consider the United
States, do you consider racial issues such as police brutality
or systemic racism, or how do you----
Mr. Temin. Freedom in the World measures the freedoms that
citizens feel across the board----
Ms. Bass. Yep.
Mr. Temin [continuing]. In any country. We divide those
freedoms into political rights and civil liberties, and within
each one of those two categories there is a number of
indicators and subindicators. Certainly, the freedoms that all
people in society and all segments of society are absolutely
considered as we do those scores. And that would include
freedom from police brutality and excessive force used by
security forces.
When we are digging----
Ms. Bass. Incarceration rates, right to vote.
Mr. Temin. Again, I do not have all the indicators and the
subindicators in front of me, but absolutely, the right to vote
is a fundamental freedom that is definitely part of our
indicators, as is the ability to do so freely and to do so
without harassment. And security force brutality certainly
comes into our considerations in every country. I have been
involved in those conversations in the Africa context and there
is no reason that America would be any different.
Ms. Bass. Well, thank you. I will look forward to
understanding that. And I am sure incarceration rates have to
be a part of that as well, right, I mean the essence of
freedom.
Mr. Temin. We will followup with you, but I agree with you
that that is absolutely a core component of freedom. And I mean
the answer is yes, you know, when we have seen political
opponents and others jailed in African countries and elsewhere
that factors into our scores. And again, that applies globally.
It applies to the United States.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
It looks like Representative Omar will not be with us, so
let me just use this opportunity to thank our witnesses.
Appreciate your patience, especially with our challenge of how
we even conduct hearings in a COVID environment. So thank you
very much. And with this, our hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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