[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                   JOINT HEARING: STRENGTHENING BIOLOGICAL 
                     SECURITY: TRADITIONAL THREATS AND 
                     EMERGING CHALLENGES

=======================================================================

                              JOINT HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                               JOINT WITH

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING 
                      THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 2, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-109

                           Serial No. 116-94

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                        
                      
                    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

		ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota	             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              

                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

         Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation

                  BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman,

DINA TITUS, Nevada                   TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
AMI BERA, California
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia

                                     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
                                     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
                                     BRIAN MAST, Florida
                                     JOHN CURTIS, Utah

                     Don MacDonald, Staff Director
  


                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
   SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii                RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
RO KHANNA, California                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair     DON BACON, Nebraska
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JIM BANKS, Indiana
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
                Bess Dopkeen, Professional Staff Member
               Eric Snelgrove, Professional Staff Member
                         Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Lasseter, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. Department of 
  Defense........................................................    10
Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................    25
Moore, Jonathan, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and 
  International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. 
  Department of State............................................    35
Dolliff, Phillip, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation 
  Programs, Bureau of International Security and 
  Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State.....................    40

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    63
Hearing Minutes..................................................    65
Hearing Attendance...............................................

                       STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD

Opening statement of Chairman Bera...............................    67
Open...................................................................

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    74

 
 JOINT HEARING: STRENGTHENING BIOLOGICAL SECURITY: TRADITIONAL THREATS 
                        AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

                        Friday, October 2, 2020

                          House of Representatives,
            Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
                                  Nonproliferation,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                             joint with the
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and 
                                      Capabilities,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                                     Washington, DC

    The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., 
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ami Bera 
[chairman of the subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 
Nonproliferation] and Hon. James R. Langevin [chairman of the 
subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities] presiding.
    Mr. Bera [presiding]. This joint subcommittee hearing with 
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, 
and Nonproliferation and the House Armed Services Subcommittee 
on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities will come 
to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have 
5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and 
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in 
the rules. To insert something into the record, please have 
your staff email either subcommittee clerk.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. 
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and 
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with H.Res. 965 and the accompanying regulations, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate, 
when they are not under recognition to eliminate background 
noise.
    I see we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself for 
opening remarks. I will, then, be followed by the acting 
ranking member, Mr. Perry; Chairman Langevin, and then, Ranking 
Member Stefanik. I will, then, recognize members in order of 
seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans and 
Foreign Affairs and Armed Services members.
    Before we get started and before I do my opening statement, 
I think it would be remiss for us not to mention the President 
and the First Lady and know that they are in our thoughts and 
prayers and hope for a speedy recovery; and also, the tens of 
thousands of Americans that test positive every day for this 
virus. They are in our thoughts.
    And it does underscore that this is a virus. This is a 
viral threat. It does not know if we are a Democrat or a 
Republican. It does not know what God we worship, what our 
country of origin is. It is a virus, and it does underscore the 
importance of this topic that we are talking about today, but 
it does underscore that this is naturally occurring events, but 
what bad actors may see, as they see a threat like this that 
really has brought the entire world to its knees and certainly 
has wreaked economic havoc, both here domestically, but 
internationally.
    I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Both 
having the Department of Defense and the State Department again 
underscores the importance of this. In my focus as subcommittee 
chairman, under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot 
of time talking about nuclear threats, but what we are seeing 
right now is the real vulnerability to biologic threats.
    Just to put that into context, we have not had an aircraft 
carrier brought to its knees by a kinetic force, a missile or 
anything like that, but we just saw in this past year an 
aircraft carrier brought to port because of a virus. And that 
really does underscore what I worry about.
    And when I think about this, I think about it in a couple 
of different ways. It is very difficult to obtain nuclear 
capabilities and nuclear technology. Yet, we dedicate hundreds 
of personnel and international organizations like the IAEA and 
others to reduce that nuclear threat. That is totally 
appropriate. We want to make sure nuclear technology and 
weaponry does not end up in the hands of bad actors.
    But if I put my doctor-scientist hat on, the availability 
of technologies to alter viruses and do genetic editing, the 
knowhow and the capabilities are rapidly increasing. And that 
is something that keeps me awake at night. Again, we know there 
are bad actors out there. Certainly, post-9/11, many of us 
prepared. We saw anthrax; we saw other threats. We worried 
about smallpox, and so forth. And that is something that I 
think in a bipartisan way Congress, working with the 
administration, should really think about what are the things 
that we have to do to move ahead.
    I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. There are 
several areas that I think about and I am going to be curious 
about from the witnesses. As we defeat COVID-19, and spend the 
billions of dollars, and build the infrastructure to defeat 
this virus, I also think we should strategically be thinking 
about how we use those resources to also prepare for 
biosurveillance, to be ready for the next--whether it is a 
naturally occurring virus or a biologic threat--but also think 
about how we have those dual-use capabilities as we build that 
infrastructure to do biosurveillance for manmade threats.
    Also, as we move forward, we have got the biological, the 
BWC, but I think we need stronger, multilateral organizations 
with like-minded allies that we can work with. And again, I 
would be curious how DoD and State are thinking about creating 
those multilateral institutions.
    And then, last, when I think about the ethics of gene 
editing and where that is going, and the technology, we really 
have not created the standards and norms that say this is 
appropriate for advancing of science, but this really is a 
little bit dangerous and you probably ought not to be playing 
around with genes in this particular way, and creating those 
standards and norms and what that would look like. And again, I 
think that is an appropriate place where the scientific 
community, Congress, again working with the administration, 
ought to put those standards in place, not just for the United 
States, but for the international community.
    So, again, our thoughts and prayers are with the President 
and First Lady and those thousands of Americans. And I would be 
remiss if I did not just put my doctor hat on for a second. As 
we enter the fall and winter, let's do what we can to keep 
everyone safe. Let's wear face coverings. Let's continue to 
practice physical distancing. Let's continue to wash our hands 
and practice good hygiene. Let's avoid large indoor gatherings 
that we have seen really do act as super-spreading events. And 
the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter 
the fall is everyone go out there and get your flu shot. Please 
get your flu shot.
    So, with that, let me recognize the ranking member, Mr. 
Perry, for 5 minutes of opening statements.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    And thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your 
counsel today.
    The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for 
increased biosecurity threats and what can happen when 
irresponsible actors disregard international agreements for the 
sake of self-prevention. A strong international biosecurity 
regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it 
work. We need to assess the shortcomings of U.S. multilateral 
engagements and determine where improvements need to be made.
    The 2005 International Health Regulations went into force 
in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. 
However, by 2012, only about 20 percent of all countries were 
compliant, and even today, most countries have still not 
complied with the 2005 regulations.
    This administration has taken a significant amount of 
criticism for questioning U.S. engagement in institutions like 
the World Health Organization. Let me be clear about this. The 
World Health Organization's complicity in spreading the 
coronavirus should not be rewarded with the United States' 
indifference to its failures. The WHO's strong affiliation with 
the Global Health Security Agenda also raises significant 
questions about GHSA's long-term efficacy.
    There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the 
international community. Different levels of investment in 
biosecurity lend itself to a permanent condition of moral 
hazard, where select communities like the United States are 
compensating for the lack of investment from other States. 
Despite our best efforts to stymie the threat of biothreat, 
there is only so much we can do alone.
    Key programs like the State Department's Biosecurity 
Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like China, 
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria, despite the fact that 
several of these countries have experimented with biological 
weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses.
    Countries like North Korea have a clearly offensive 
biological weapons program with no end in sight. How do we 
confront the fact that we have an unreliable international 
biological weapons control regime? More importantly, in 
measuring success against the spread of biothreats, what 
exactly does success look like when China dominates several key 
institutions? As it stands, China has provided a gift to non-
State actors that wish us harm. They have shown us and the 
world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the 
American economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of 
life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the 
coronavirus, and this timely hearing will be confronting that 
uncomfortable truth.
    I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today, 
as they speak more about synthetic biology and gene 
manipulation. We need to find out more about the national 
security implications that synthetic biology can pose to the 
United States, especially in light of the fact that several 
countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens in 
subpar laboratory settings.
    All that being said, I do also offer my prayers and best 
wishes to the First Family, to Hope Hicks, and to anybody that 
has been affected by the virus, whether they have contracted or 
whether it has occurred in their family members, loved one, or 
community. We are all dealing with it one way or the other.
    I certainly thank the chairman for the time, and I yield 
the balance.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
    Let me now recognize the chairman of the Intelligence and 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, Chairman Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    And I want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that 
the President and the First Lady and the First Family are in my 
thoughts and prayers. I know they are all in our thoughts and 
prayers right now, and the people around the President's 
administration who may also be experiencing effects of the 
virus. We pray that they all have a quick and a full recovery.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues on the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
Nonproliferation, and particularly, you, Chairman Bera, and 
Ranking Member Yoho. And I know Mr. Perry is standing in for 
the ranking member right now. I want to thank you all for 
hosting this timely joint hearing on biosecurity. I recognize 
Ranking Member Stefanik as well as my colleagues on the 
Subcommittee Intelligence and Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities.
    This is a topic which, as we have seen of late, is vital to 
our nation's security. I am very pleased that we are holding 
this very important joint hearing.
    Emerging biological techniques such as gene sequencing, 
gene editing, and synthetic biology are rapidly changing the 
scope and scale of biological threats and could lead to an 
increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge, 
biological threats are easier to create than other weapons of 
mass destruction. Used in concert, cyber weapons and biologic 
weapons enable a rogue actor to inflict major damage on a 
military power.
    Just last month, the Republic of Georgia's health ministry 
suffered a cyber-attack from abroad on the data base that 
stores medical documents and national COVID-19 pandemic 
management information. We know Russian hackers have targeted 
organizations involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine 
development, including those in the U.S., the U.K, and Canada.
    So, these attacks and the current global pandemic 
underscore the import of collective scientific research 
preparedness and security across the interagency and with our 
allies, and for national and economic security. In a time when 
the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a 
novel, highly infectious pathogen, we must ensure the 
interagency is working together to respond to the current 
pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen 
biological security across the range of threats.
    The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, though its execution 
of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction/
Biological Threat Reduction Program, and its Technical Reach 
back analysis cell, has been receiving foreign partner requests 
for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety, 
biosecurity, and biosurveillance support to aid in detection, 
diagnosis, reporting, and modeling related to the COVID-19 
outbreak.
    There have been many good examples of the BTRP-trained 
local professionals in countries like Guinea, Liberia, Cape 
Verde, Jordan, and Thailand. They diagnosed and confirmed the 
first cases of COVID-19 in their countries.
    Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats, 
and the impact they could have on our national security and 
economy, and as a pandemic that could, arguably, present the 
single biggest threat to our country while starting to spread 
across the globe, the President's budget request was delivered 
to the Hill in February with a 36 percent cut to the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program's funding from last year's 
enacted level. At a time when the United States is struggling 
to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus, we 
are alarmed by the Department's significant reduction in the 
budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting 
biological threats to the United States.
    Thankfully, the House has acted. In our fiscal year 2021 
National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 6395 added back $135 
million to the CTR Program. Eighty-nine million dollars of that 
was additional funding for the Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program.
    Additionally, the Department of Defense's Chemical and 
Biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in 
the fight against COVID-19. Its medical program funds and 
manages efforts to develop medical countermeasures, vaccines, 
therapeutics, and pretreatments. Its Physical Program funds and 
manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection 
technologies, diagnostics, personal protective equipment, and 
decontamination systems.
    To prepare against potential unknown threats, CBDP built 
expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens, making 
it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of novel 
coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the 
program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in 
the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    So, these are obviously challenging times, and we need to 
double down on these programs. And we need to make sure that we 
our, in fact, prepared for the next biological or chemical 
event that could affect the country and make sure that we have 
all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively to 
keep our country and, indeed, perhaps the world, safe.
    We look forward to hearing more about the many efforts of 
both departments today, what we can do to help ensure your 
organizations have the authorities and resources needed to 
prepare for the emerging threats of both today and tomorrow, 
and how we can ensure that your departments are ready and able 
to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis.
    So, I joint the host in thanking all of you, and especially 
our witnesses, for joining us today. And I yield back to 
Chairman Bera.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
    Let me now recognize the ranking member of the Intelligence 
and Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, Ranking Member Stefanik.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    I also want to echo my colleagues and send, on behalf of 
New York's 21st congressional District, our thoughts and our 
prayers with the First Family, the White House staff, and all 
the American people who have been impacted by the COVID virus.
    I would like to express my appreciation to you, Chairman 
Bera and Ranking Member Yoho, as well as Chairman Langevin and 
my colleague, Mr. Perry, for hosting this hearing, and thank 
you to the members of the two subcommittees.
    Thanks to the witnesses from the Departments of Defense and 
State for being here today.
    The issue of biosecurity is one of national importance. As 
I have stated previously, while the Department of Defense faces 
urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of 
the critically important mission of countering weapons of mass 
destruction and, in particular, biological threats.
    The unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we 
continue to adapt our approach and iterate our response. We 
must learn from the current crisis and adjust our strategy to 
more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next 
event. This will surely not be the last biological crisis this 
nation and this world faces.
    I am particularly interested in how your organizations and 
the Federal Government writ large can more effectively use new 
datasets and artificial intelligence to truly modernize our 
biosurveillance efforts. We must mature our capacity to 
anticipate and monitor when and where a biological event may 
occur and model how a pathogen, either naturally occurring or 
manmade, is likely to spread.
    This obviously must be a global effort. And the 
partnerships that the Department of Defense and the Department 
of State have developed will be critical early warning beacons 
to inform our collective domestic response.
    Programs like the Cooperative Threat Reduction, and 
specifically, the Biological Threat Reduction Program are 
essential to maintaining our global footprint and the building 
of the relationships that protect our forward-deployed service 
members and national interests.
    The current COVID crisis has served as an affirmation that 
biological threats require a whole-of-government response, not 
just the two departments represented here today, but inclusive 
of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and our State 
and local officials. The strength of the partnership between 
your organizations and the quality of these relationships you 
develop with our foreign partners and domestic agencies will 
underpin the effectiveness of our future biosecurity efforts.
    Thank you again to our witnesses, and I yield back to the 
chair.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
    And before I introduce the witnesses, I ask unanimous 
consent that non-committee, if any, be allowed to participate 
in today's hearing after all committee members have had an 
opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection?
    [No response.]
    Without objection, non-committee members will be recognized 
at the appropriate time.
    Let me now go ahead and introduce our witnesses. First is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Mr. David Lasseter. Mr. Lasseter oversees all 
CWMD policy issues at the Department. This includes preventing 
the proliferation of WMD-related materials, the Defense 
Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and 
chemical, biological, radiologic, and nuclear defense.
    Next, we will hear from the Director of the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, Mr. Vayl Oxford. Mr. Oxford leads DTRA's 
mission to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from weapons of 
mass destruction. DTRA spearheads the Defense Department's 
Biological Threat Reduction Program.
    From the State Department, we will first hear from Acting 
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, r. Jonathan Moore.
    And finally, we will hear from the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs at the Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation, Mr. Phillip 
Dolliff. He currently oversees a range of State Department 
nonproliferation programs, including Cooperative Threat 
Reduction and Export Control Programs which work to reduce 
nonproliferation threats worldwide.
    I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes. And 
without objection, your prepared written statements will be 
made part of the record.
    I will first call on Mr. Lasseter for his testimony.

  STATEMENT OF DAVID LASSETER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, U.S. 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Lasseter. Good morning, Chairmen Langevin and Bera, 
Ranking Member Stefanik, Acting Ranking Member Perry, and all 
committee members.
    I, too, want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the 
President and First Lady----
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Lasseter, is your microphone on?
    Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bera. Okay.
    Mr. Lasseter. It is on. Can you hear me better now?
    I first want to also extend my thoughts and prayers to the 
President and First Lady and all those impacted by COVID-19.
    Thank you for the opportunity to present on behalf of the 
Department of Defense and highlight some of the critical work 
we are doing to counter biological threats.
    I also want to acknowledge DoD's sincere appreciation for 
the continued support that Congress lends our threat reduction 
mission.
    As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, I have the privilege to work 
alongside by colleagues here today. Our strong partnership 
enables the broad U.S. Government effort to reduce WMD threats, 
including biological threats worldwide.
    DoD's biothreat mission aligns with the objectives in the 
National Security and Defense Strategies, as well as Secretary 
Esper's priorities; namely, to increase the lethality of the 
U.S. military, build alliances, and improve DoD's efficiency. 
We also draw guidance from strategies such as the National 
Biodefense Strategy and the Global Health Security Strategy.
    DoD's focus on protecting the health and readiness of U.S. 
forces, countering the destabilizing effects of outbreaks on 
U.S. interests, and ensuring that DoD remains focused on 
priority defense objectives to meet emergency needs during an 
outbreaks makes us a complementary tool in the U.S. threat 
reduction arsenal.
    We work daily to ensure DoD is positioned to address the 
full range of WMD threats, to include the constantly changing 
biological threat landscape. This shifting dynamic includes 
naturally occurring outbreaks and accidental or deliberate 
release of biological agents; threats posed by State and non-
State actors, international and domestic incidents, and 
concerns with existing and emerging technologies.
    COVID-19's global reach and destabilizing influence has 
further altered the threat landscape, potentially inspiring 
nefarious actors to replicate COVID's impacts through a 
deliberate use of a biological agent. My team develops 
strategic guidance for CWMD activities, spanning the prevent, 
detect, and respond continuum to mitigate the impacts of such 
threats regardless of origin.
    We work closely with other DoD stakeholders and coordinate 
through groups such as our Unity of Effort Council and the 
COVID-19 Task Force. DoD also works with key interagency and 
international partners as we develop priorities for countering 
biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage 
each other's capabilities and lessen the security burden on 
DoD. Pooling resources and working toward common objectives is 
vital to ensuring the greatest threat reduction impacts are 
achieved.
    Since 2004, CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program has 
provided equipment and training to over 30 countries to improve 
their ability to detect, diagnose, and report biological 
incidents. In the current environment, we know that partner 
nations have leveraged previously provided CTR capabilities to 
bolster their abilities to detect and diagnose COVID-19.
    To close, I want to thank the subcommittees again, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lasseter follows:]
    
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Lasseter.
    I will now recognize Mr. Oxford for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION 
               AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Oxford. Chairman Langevin, Chairman Bera, Ranking 
Member Stefanik, Ranking Member Yoho, and Mr. Perry, standing 
in this morning, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittees, thank you for your continued support to DTRA.
    I am proud to appear to you today with my colleagues from 
both DoD as well as the State Department to update you on our 
collective efforts to protect the U.S. national interests in a 
rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. It is an honor 
to represent the DTRA workforce, whose commitment to our 
mission and strong relationships with our partners here today 
makes our organization successful.
    Today, we find ourselves in unprecedented times, as we 
respond to the global pandemic. As we reflect on the loss of 
over 200,000 of our fellow citizens, we must think about the 
future threat landscape where gene editing, DNA sequencing, and 
synthetic biology offer our adversaries the opportunity to 
capitalize on the observed lessons learned from our response. 
And they potentially could launch future attacks with little 
warning or attribution.
    As we capture our lessons learned from the COVID-19 event, 
we have to accept the fact that others will also be learning 
and that the very nature of the biological threat landscape has 
changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the 
course of the last 6 months is that partner nations have 
benefited greatly by the training and equipping they receive 
through the DoD CTR Program, and specifically, BTRP.
    BTRP facilitates the detection and reporting of diseases 
caused by dangerous pathogens, whether deliberately released or 
naturally occurring, including diseases such as COVID-19. BTRP 
works with over 30 foreign partners to reduce biological 
threats by enhancing their biosecurity, biosafety, and 
biosurveillance capabilities.
    The ongoing COVID pandemic has demonstrated to the global 
community that health security is a critical part of national 
security. Countries need an effective biosurveillance system to 
detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks of dangerous pathogens. 
The U.S. relies on the biosurveillance systems of other nations 
to provide early warning of an outbreak before it reaches the 
homeland.
    Some recent examples of BTRP success in responding to the 
pandemic:
    In partnership with USAID, BTRP's efforts enabled local 
officials in Thailand to detect the first case of a novel 
coronavirus outside of China on 13 January 2020, only days 
after its initial discovery in Wuhan, China.
    Within a month of a request from the U.S. Ambassador 
Fischer in Morocco, BTRP transferred a supply of PPE to the 
National Institute of Health and Hygiene in Rabat, Morocco. The 
equipment went directly to protect Morocco's frontline health 
care workers in the fight against COVID. Ambassador Fischer 
stated, ``The equipment transfer is part of over 7 years of 
close cooperation between DTRA and the government of Morocco. 
This partnership focuses on saving lives and mitigating threats 
to ensure the national security of both countries.'' I will 
report, to date, Morocco has reported 126,000 with 2200 deaths.
    In Georgia, BTRP-trained scientists and the BTRP-
constructed Richard Lugar Center developed a diagnostic testing 
capability for COVID. This enabled Georgia to implement 
extensive testing to inform outbreak control. The center was 
lauded by the Georgian government as being integral in 
controlling the COVID outbreak. Within Georgia, they have 
reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths.
    BTRP continues to receive foreign partner requests for 
support related to COVID. As of September 18th, BTRP had 
fulfilled 40 requests from 18 countries, plus the African 
Union, for disease control.
    In summary, by building a partner nation's capacities and 
capabilities, it builds their sense of national pride and 
increases their willingness to work with the U.S. in other 
ways. By providing partners with better self-sustaining 
solutions, the U.S. demonstrates that we are the partner of 
choice rather than our strategic competitors. These 
partnerships act as force multipliers in the competition for 
influence and reinforce the strategic messaging that the U.S. 
has their nations' interests in mind.
    Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
    
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    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Oxford.
    I will now recognize Mr. Moore for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN MOORE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU 
   OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
               AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Moore. Good morning, Chairman Bera, Chairman Langevin, 
Ranking Member Stefanik, and other esteemed Members of the 
House.
    It is an honor to be here with you today together with 
distinguished colleagues from the State Department and the 
Department of Defense, as well as DTRA. I look forward to 
discussing how our Bureau, the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, plays a 
role in this process. Our normal portfolio ranges from the 
depths of the oceans to the vastness of space. We also host the 
State Department's Office of International----
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Moore, could I have you have the microphone a 
little closer to you?
    Mr. Moore. Sorry. Thank you.
    We also host the State Department's Office of International 
Health and Biodefense, and that is the capacity in which I am 
here today.
    I will focus my remarks on our efforts to prevent, detect, 
and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. COVID-19, which, 
as we see, has had an impact even on the President and the 
First Lady, and millions of Americans, highlights the 
importance of U.S. leadership to advance global health security 
and pandemic preparedness. This is crucial to stopping 
outbreaks at their source and protecting U.S. health and 
safety, promoting economic prosperity, and defending national 
security interests.
    Our team at OES is working through and on COVID-19, 
together with interagency partners, advancing U.S. Government 
priorities through diplomacy. Beyond COVID-19, OES combats a 
range of other public health threats, including Ebola, 
influenza, Dengue, polio, and antimicrobial resistance.
    The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge, and the 
Department of State remains committed to working closely with 
our partners as part of a collective global response. We are 
using all of our means to slow and stop the pandemic. U.S. 
health diplomacy has two primary areas of effort: promoting 
transparent information-sharing and disease surveillance, and 
encouraging a multisectoral approach to building global health 
security capacity, including other nations, nongovernmental 
organizations, international organizations, and the private 
sector.
    We deeply appreciate Congress' appropriations of over 1.6 
billion U.S. dollars in COVID-19 supplemental funding to the 
State Department and to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. We have used these funds to provide a broad range 
of assistance specifically aimed at helping governments, 
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 
fight the pandemic.
    The assistance is saving lives by strengthening public 
health education, improving the quality and cleanliness of 
health care facilities, and increasing laboratory disease 
surveillance and rapid response capacity in more than 120 
countries, as well as providing humanitarian and economic 
support to mitigate impacts of the pandemic.
    Additionally, the United States has invested more than $10 
billion to bring safe and effective vaccines to the global 
market faster. OES helps develop State Department messaging, 
including global public health encountering malign influence.
    As the first to know about the coronavirus, the Chinese 
Communist Party had a special responsibility to inform the rest 
of the world about this threat. Instead, they withheld 
information and censored medical professionals, scientists, and 
journalists. The CCP has since used the pandemic to further its 
geopolitical agenda by highlighting its donations of masks and 
other supplies to reshape the narrative and distract from its 
role in this crisis. Both Russia and the CCP have made 
grandiose and irresponsible claims about the creation of 
vaccines, raising serious questions about quality and efficacy 
that we are addressing through active public diplomacy.
    An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is a 
proverb that is as familiar as it is true. If we prioritize 
health security investments, we can contain outbreaks before 
they become pandemics and mitigate and prevent second-and 
third-order impacts.
    OES plays a key role in pandemic prevention, including 
through support for the Global Health Security Agenda. GHSA, 
which is still a work-in-progress, is a partnership of nearly 
70 nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
stakeholders that uses a whole-of-government, multisectoral 
approach to address outbreaks.
    OES annually coordinates U.S. expert implementing agencies 
to provide carefully targeted programming in priority 
countries, to make global health security improvements along 
specific metrics. Its approach to combating outbreaks is 
reflected in the United States 2017 National Security Strategy, 
2018 National Biodefense Strategy, and the 2019 Global Health 
Security Strategy.
    OES leadership has been fully engaged in coordinating 
interagency investments, helping 19 U.S. partner countries 
prevent, detect, and respond to a range of infectious disease 
threats at their source. These are just a few examples of OES's 
wide-ranging engagement on infectious disease risks which are 
crucial to countering biological threats.
    We greatly appreciate your interest and look forward to 
your questions. Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]
    
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    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Moore.
    Let me now recognize Mr. Dolliff for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF PHILLIP DOLLIFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 
           NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Dolliff. Good morning, Chairman Bera, Chairman 
Langevin, Ranking Members, and Honorable Representatives.
    We appreciate the leadership you have shown on these 
important issues. Thank you for inviting me here today to share 
how the Department of State's Bureau of International Security 
and Nonproliferation, or ISN, works to address some of the most 
urgent and challenging biological threats to U.S. national 
security.
    I am honored to appear before you, alongside by colleague 
from the Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs Bureau, and by my colleagues from the Department of 
Defense.
    Through diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, 
the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau works to 
prevent rogue States, terrorists, and other malign actors from 
obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. The 
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau has been 
working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges posed by 
the full spectrum of these threats, whether they are 
deliberately spread, accidently released, or naturally 
occurring.
    The COVID-19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage 
a single pathogen can cause to U.S. national and international 
security. Through diplomacy, our International Security and 
Nonproliferation Bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks, 
including the Biological Weapons Convention and the Australia 
Group. And I note the chairman made remarks on this very issue.
    This year, as the President of the G7, we are leading the 
international community in making significant progress on 
biological issues, including issuing G7 statements on the 
international COVID-19 pandemic and response. Similarly, in the 
global partnership, we have led efforts to launch a dedicated 
biosecurity capacity-building initiative.
    For decades, ISN has invested significant resources into 
combating the full range of WMD and related delivery system 
threats, including over $450 million over the past 15 years 
toward mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich 
history of biosecurity capacity-building where we have trained 
thousands of foreign partners on biosecurity in over 50 
countries. These WMD threat reduction investments long preceded 
the pandemic. Yet, they are contributing to slowing its spread.
    We recognized early on the threat that the pandemic posed 
to our international security, and we began to quickly 
incorporate COVID-19 topics in our trainings, leveraging remote 
and distance learning platforms to deliver critically needed 
help in a timely manner.
    We are also in the process of programming an additional $18 
million via our Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund toward 
controlling this pandemic and preventing future catastrophic 
biological events, as well as adding additional experts to our 
efforts and expanding the offices we have working on these 
issues. Representative Perry noted moments ago that there are 
limitations to our authorities, and I will note that we did 
propose broader authority to address these limitations.
    Of course, we are not alone and we are deeply grateful for 
the decades of very close partnership we have enjoyed with our 
Department of Defense colleagues to coordinate our mutually 
reinforcing efforts.
    In looking to the future, we are also working hard to keep 
pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology. And I 
note that several of the members indicated concern about this 
very issue. Let me assure you the full range of U.S. national 
security departments and agencies are focusing on and analyzing 
these efforts.
    Our International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is 
using our diplomatic and capacity-building tools to prevent the 
application of dual-use technologies to do harm, such as the 
development of biological weapons. For example, Chairman Bera 
noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to 
address this issue. And we are, indeed, working in this area 
and have had multilateral dialogs on this very issue.
    In conclusion, we are very proud of the work we do to 
combat infectious disease threats using our diplomatic and 
foreign assistance tools in support of U.S. national security. 
We deeply appreciate the support of the Congress to provide us 
with the necessary resources to carry out our threat reduction 
mission, and we recognize that our work is far from over.
    Thank you, Chairman Bera, Chairman Langevin, members of the 
committee. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dolliff follows:]

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    Mr. Bera. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Dolliff.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And 
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of questioning our witnesses.
    Because of the hybrid format of this hearing, I will 
recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between 
Democrats and Republicans, and between both subcommittees. If 
you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will 
circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute 
your microphone and address the chair verbally.
    I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    Both Mr. Oxford and Mr. Dolliff talked about the advances 
in technology. And as a doctor, I look at what we have been 
able to do with biologics. Conditions, cancers that we would 
have to treat palliatively, we now actually have therapies and 
precision medicine to often cure some of these cancers and 
other ailments. And I think the vast majority of scientists are 
pursuing and using this technology for the advancement of 
common good.
    But I also know those same gene-editing techniques, and so 
forth, can certainly be used to cause us harm as well as, 
inadvertently, a scientist that may be looking for a cure may 
inadvertently create something that unintentionally causes 
harm.
    Mr. Dolliff, you touched on, as I said in my opening 
statement, how do we create these norms and standards for 
ethical use of this technology in a multilateral way? And then, 
also, working with our corporate sector as well because, 
obviously, our pharmaceutical sector and others are looking for 
novel therapies. Right now, I get the sense that there really 
isn't the standard and norm. Maybe you could start off, Mr. 
Dolliff, and then, from the DoD perspective, how we do this in 
a multilateral way.
    Mr. Dolliff. So, thank you, Chairman Bera, for raising this 
important set of questions.
    First, I take your point. Medical technology is, indeed, 
advancing very quickly, especially in some parts of biosector. 
And we face this challenge across the board with technologies. 
Almost all technologies have applications, as you point out, 
for enormous good and can cause substantial harm.
    We have been working on the issue of norms and standards 
for over a decade. And what we have done is tried to work 
through amongst other instrumentalities--the National Academies 
in cooperation with national academies in other countries. We 
have engaged other international organizations to try to 
address this subject, and we have also worked in partnership 
with other governments.
    We have included working with the corporate sector. For 
example, we work closely with partners in India. And in those 
outreach and trainings that we do in India, we include both the 
government sector and the corporate sector, as well as NGO's, 
as we try to build biosecurity, including through building 
norms.
    I will note I think building norms is always challenging, 
and it is probably at least as challenging at the moment in the 
midst of the pandemic. But I take the chairman's point that 
this is a particularly important area, and we will continue to 
increase our efforts in this area.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    And Mr. Moore touched on the billions that we have already 
provided in global health security funding in some of the 
COVID-19 supplementals. And no doubt as we look to defeat this 
virus, both here domestically through vaccine distribution and 
development, but also globally--maybe I will look at some of 
the DoD colleagues or, Mr. Moore, if you want to answer this. 
As we are spending that, how can we do that in a very strategic 
way that allows us to start building the surveillance tools, 
and what should those tools look like? And what is the best 
practice? Maybe, Mr. Lasseter, if you want to.
    Mr. Lasseter. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very important.
    And I would just add on the biotechnology front that we 
view it as a promise-in-peril scenario. So, there is a whole 
lot of promise and the U.S. bio economy is strong. We must keep 
it No. 1. And there is a lot of peril, which you have 
described.
    From a vaccine standpoint, as you asked, it is vitally 
important that we continue to work as an interagency together. 
We have also got to provide information, flow information, 
across international organizations, those that have been 
mentioned previously. But it is incumbent upon us to share the 
information. So, we work with our partners and allies and we 
expect dependable, clear information to come back. And that is 
vital. If we are not sharing the information, and if we are not 
doing it effectively and clearly, then we run the risk of 
having more severe outbreaks as the technology advances and as 
a globalized economy increases.
    Mr. Bera. Mr. Oxford, do you want to add anything?
    Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As an implementing organization, we are in a position to 
help train, educate, and enforce some of the norms that would 
be created. But I would point out that, in today's biological 
threat world, it is really hard to distinguish between nation-
State, non-nation-States, and their proxies in terms of who is 
responsible for these actions. So, getting to norms is a much 
more complicated issue. In the past where we had mostly nation-
States where we would worry about this, now we have a much 
bigger playing field to try to figure out. And that complicates 
not only norms and standards, it complicates attribution and 
accountability for these kinds of things. So, I think it is a 
noble goal, but it is much more complicated in the kind of 
diverse world we are facing.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    I see my time is up. Let me recognize the ranking member, 
acting ranking member, Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. Thanks. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman.
    And to our panel, thank you.
    Mr. Oxford just mentioned some of the non-State actors, and 
I am going to talk about some of the non-State and the State 
actors. So, as you know, in 2018, Russian agents used the 
Soviet-developed Novichok class nerve agent in an attempt at 
assassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the 
United Kingdom. And early this year, it was used again against 
opposition figure Alexei Navalny.
    I wonder what we could--you know, it is hard to prove, 
right? We are pretty sure, but it is hard to prove. It is kind 
of like the coronavirus and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We 
have got some pretty strong opinions about it, but it is hard 
to prove them. How can we, or how can the international 
community, enforce accountability for State actors who do such 
things?
    Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Perry, that is a really tough question, 
as you know. I mean, just getting to the accountability on this 
case, and that is why I mentioned accountability in my previous 
comment. A lot of this can be denied. The actual scientific 
evidence wasn't necessarily shared immediately with us. We do 
now have people in this country that have been provided some of 
the samples. So, we are able to get in there and actually do 
some of the assessments.
    So, as Mr. Lasseter said, a lot of this is about agreements 
on information-sharing, so we rapidly come together as allies 
to be able to actually put the blame where it is necessary. But 
it is a very hard problem, given that we have not spent enough 
time and effort in this country on bioattribution. We have 
spent years on nuclear attribution, but we have not spent any 
time on bioattribution.
    Mr. Perry. Yes, watching what happened to Skripal, and now 
Navalny, and others, quite honestly, we tend to think that that 
happens over there, so to speak, but the U.K. is obviously a 
close friend and an ally, and I find that exceptionally 
concerning. And I understand. I am sure you are thinking about 
it. I just do not know if you had any answers to impart. And 
maybe if you have some, you do not want to have them in an open 
session.
    Did you have something to add there, Mr. La?
    Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I would just say that, yes, the further 
use--obviously, a chemical weapon--but the further use and 
seemingly acceptability across the world has to be confronted. 
As Director Oxford said, there is significant effort being put 
into this particular incident across the U.S. Government and 
across the international community. So, efforts are underway to 
at least work on the international norm piece of response.
    I would say that, you know, you mentioned threats, and from 
the biological threat perspective, although much information 
would be required at a higher level, we can say at an 
unclassified level that Russia, at least the State Department 
has said that there is no way to confirm their adherence to the 
Biological Weapons Convention. Pretty certain that China is not 
adhering to it, both from an Article I and Article II 
perspective. So, it grows and grows in concern, and the help of 
Congress and across the interagency is vital to get after these 
threats.
    Mr. Perry. Okay. And I appreciate--you know, look, I know 
it is difficult, and that is why we are here--so, we appreciate 
your efforts in this regard and any help that we can offer.
    On the non-State actor side, you have got anything from a 
recently arrested Canadian woman crossing into the United 
States and mailing the President of the United States and a 
sheriff in Texas a letter containing ricin. We have seen 
similar things in the past.
    But we have also seen the Islamic State procure--I think 
there was a mustard gas attack in northern Iraq in 2015 and 
2016. Now, when I was in Iraq, the stuff was, quite honestly, 
fairly prevalent. So, it should be no surprise how they found 
that.
    But, in those two instances, I am just wondering what is 
the status of the illicit chemical weapons trade or bio weapons 
trade, or availability of things like ricin, and how you guys 
are working with either overseas counterparts or among each 
other. I mean, maybe not even overseas, right? Canada is right 
across the border. So, what are you guys doing with those type 
of things and what is the status of that, the trade?
    Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Perry, I can tell you in the Middle 
East scenario what we have seen. Through the counterterrorism 
activities, we have been able to take most of the chemical 
expertise off the battlefield, so to speak. They have tried to 
resurrect periodically, but they have not been successful. So, 
it is a matter of the expertise.
    Ricin has been attempted multiple times. Usually, it has 
never gotten to weapons grade. So, maybe we have dodged a 
bullet. But there is the need to look across that spectrum, and 
the terrorist groups have had this intention. They just have 
not had the expertise, and we need to make sure that they do 
not gain that expertise.
    Mr. Perry. Mr. Dolliff.
    Mr. Dolliff. If I could add to that a little bit, on the 
diplomatic side, we have worked very closely with international 
partners against this particular threat. We also have 
programmatic elements working in key States to address the 
specific State and the specific set of non-State threats. We 
have diplomatic efforts. We have integrated our concerns about 
WMD into broader international diplomatic discussions about 
counterterrorism.
    With regard to your question about trade, we do strengthen 
international controls on chemical and biological precursors. 
But I will say that, in general, I believe the evidence is that 
much of these efforts use chemicals and precursors that are 
procured within a State. So, we will continue to tighten up in 
that area. But most of it appears home-grown.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield.
    Mr. Bera. Let me go ahead and now recognize Chairman 
Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    Mr. Bera. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses again for their testimony and 
the important work that you are doing in this area on behalf of 
the country.
    I want to go back. In my opening statement, I talked about 
the concerns I had about the significant cut to the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program. So, compared to the 2020 levels, the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was cut by $135 million in 
the President's budget request this year. And within that 
program, the cooperative biological engagement effort was cut 
the most, by over $55 million. So, given the pandemic in which 
we find ourselves, we are alarmed by the Department of 
Defense's significant cut to this mission of detecting and 
confronting biological threats in the United States.
    So, I want to begin, Director Oxford, this is a program 
that Congress clearly supports. What additional work would DTRA 
be able to perform if Congress is, in fact, able to restore the 
funding to the fiscal year enacted level, and especially, what 
other work would you be able to do under the Bio Threat 
Reduction Program, which was cut the most?
    And to Mr. Lasseter, I want to know how the Department's 
perspective on the importance of the Biological Threat 
Reduction Program evolved over the past 6 months of the 
pandemic, and how is the Department served to support the 
COVID-19 fight?
    But let's start with Director Oxford.
    Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, based on the House mark, we have looked at the 
programs. We would be able to restore activities in 22 
countries with the entire House mark. In addition, 15 of those 
would be within the BTRP program. We can provide the committees 
with the specific examples of what countries would be restored. 
Plus, we would be able to restore activities on a regional 
basis with EUCOM, CENTCOM, as well as AFRICOM and INDOPACOM. 
So, we would be able to restore some of the original emphasis 
in this area, which gives us broader coverage across those 
regions in question. But we would be able to restore activities 
for BTRP in 15 countries as well as those regions I mentioned.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. We are going through, obviously, 
the conference process with the Senate, and also, we are 
dealing still with Appropriations. But it is our intent to 
restore that funding.
    Mr. Lasseter, on the question of the 6 months of the 
pandemic and how your work has evolved.
    Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, if I could add that 
we do want to give appreciation--I know the witnesses have--for 
the longstanding support that this committee, these 
committees--pardon me--and both sides of the Hill, both sides 
of the aisle have given toward the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program.
    And I would say that the Biological Threat Reduction 
Program, as you know, has been operating for over 16 years in 
over 30 countries doing great work. As far as the last 16 
months, the DoD effort--obviously, the international effort is 
led by our colleagues in the State Department----
    Mr. Langevin. No, in the last 6 months of it.
    Mr. Lasseter [continuing]. And USAID. Yes, sir. And from a 
DoD perspective, managed through the Stability and Humanitarian 
Affairs Office. And so, they managed it over the course of the 
last 6 months and nearly about $100 million in DoD support to 
over 100 countries.
    As it relates specifically to BTRP, as you know, most of 
the support is historical in nature. So, a lot of the training, 
a lot of the lab support, has been over the course of this 16 
years to these willing partners. And so, that work, that 
information flow is what is most vital.
    I can say, specifically, for BTRP direct funding in 
response to COVID, it is around $7 million. Much of it is PPE, 
but a lot of it is training. And it goes back to the historical 
relationships with these countries where we provide robust 
training and information flow. And so, that has been the focus, 
is making sure that these partner countries know they have a 
reach back resource and that we can, and Director Oxford's team 
can, provide that information to those partner nations.
    Mr. Langevin. Director Oxford, let me go back to you, 
because we appreciate all DTRA's efforts to lean forward out of 
this COVID fight. Can you tell us about the work DTRA has been 
doing to help with the COVID R&D effort through Chem-Bio 
Defense Program funding? You know, DARPA early on was using its 
R&D funding early on to meet the challenge, the crisis. 
Describe what you have been able to do. Or have you been 
hamstrung because of lack of support of authorities?
    Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Chairman, I think a lot of people have 
made comparisons between our response to Ebola versus the COVID 
threat. The Ebola pathogen was declared as a threat pathogen by 
CDC, which allowed DoD to expend its resources against a 
threat. COVID-19, considered a pandemic and a disease, 
prevented us from using Chem-Bio Defense Program money, but we 
have used our expertise in several ways. Using CARES Act money, 
we have been able to actually benefit from that.
    We have a program underway that is looking at the rapid 
assessment of environments. We call it the RATE program. In 
this case, using wearable technologies, we are looking at 
identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses, not 
specifically COVID, but it would give us some advance notice 
that an illness may be on the way 48 hours earlier than 
projected, so the appropriate testing could take place. So, our 
expertise has been applied, but not specifically the Chem-Bio 
Defense Funding.
    Mr. Langevin. I know my time has expired, but thank you. We 
obviously have some work to do in these areas to strengthen the 
authorities. You should be able to use those R&D funds at a 
time like this, and we will work with you to make sure that 
that happens.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from 
Washington, Mr. Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So, the first question, I think it is probably for Mr. 
Oxford. I was just wondering if you can help us understand with 
regards to the biological threat kind of what that role is for 
DTRA for a response, and then, what that role is for DTRA in 
terms of contributing to the future thinking about what to do. 
Are you strictly responding to requests or do you have a role 
in planning ahead and proliferating that information about what 
to do when you plan ahead?
    Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    We actually play two roles in the CTR Program. We are 
actually not really in a response role, but in the COVID 
environment, as Mr. Lasseter said, the years' worth of work 
that we had done to prepare some of those nations, they were 
able to rapidly respond. They need an infusion of some 
capabilities, for example, PPE, test kits, and those kind of 
things. Morocco specifically, there were 199 trained laboratory 
technicians that we had trained through the CTR Program. So, 
with $100,000 worth of PPE, we were able to get them in a 
situation where they could start doing the response. So, we are 
not really a response program in that regard, but we are able 
to benefit from what we have done over the decades or so of 
working with them.
    In the Chem-Bio Defense Program, we are actually on the 
cutting edge of all the research and development. So, we are 
looking forward, as we have made reference, to things like 
synthetic bio. We fully understand, based on the technical 
expertise, what the nefarious ways that synthetic bio can be 
used. So, on the flip side, we are also looking for the 
offensive advantage we might gain by understanding synthetic 
bio, by making detectors better able to resolve things faster. 
So, we do have that forward look through the Science and 
Technology Program that we operate.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. And, Mr. Lasseter, kind of on that point, 
this is two approaches. One is, I noted in your testimony, your 
written testimony, you talk about how you are organized in your 
role in cooperation with the Department of Defense R&E, 
Research and Engineering. Can you discuss that a little bit?
    And second--and I do not know if this would be for Mr. 
Lasseter or Mr. Oxford--the combination of where emerging 
technologies meet, I think that is in Mr. Lasseter's written 
testimony, a discussion about drone technology and 
dissemination of biological agents. Maybe you could touch on 
that, what we ought to be thinking about in the future.
    Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congressman Larsen. Appreciate the 
questions very much. Very important.
    We are spending, you know, quite a bit of time and 
resources across the Department. So, I had mentioned research 
and engineering, they are vital to the efforts to ensure we 
have going forward what we need, what our war fighters need to 
fight and win in a contaminated environment.
    As Director Oxford noted, the Chem Bio Defense Program is 
vital in that. With respect to some of these technologies, they 
are concerning. The Department, though, is right-sized and 
fitted to respond to them.
    So, the way we are organized, at least across the CWMD 
enterprise, quite robust. A number of organizations, as you can 
imagine, from the Joint Staff, from our policy perspective, the 
Combatant Commands for the services.
    So, we, we come together fairly regularly in an effort I 
think would be highlighted, and it is important for you to know 
about, is the CWMD Unity of Effort Council, 3-star level 
council. Director Oxford and I, obviously, participate in that.
    And in that forum we are able to flow these issues up for 
discussion and decision. It is an area that we can get full 
information across the Department and make decisions at the 
highest level. And so we think that is vital to some of these 
issues that you highlight.
    Now, obviously, you know, in this setting a little harder 
to get into some of those issues. I know you recognize that. 
But we are, we are resourced properly and we are right-sized to 
go after those threats, sir.
    Mr. Larsen. If I could just follow up on part of that. You, 
obviously, you do not run DoD's research and engineering, that 
is under a division that is pretty high up, obviously, on the 
org chart at the Pentagon. Do you have that--not the 
opportunity, has R&E come to recognize this as a higher 
priority now, or is that something you are having to battle out 
with research and engineering in their list of priorities that 
they have already had?
    Mr. Lasseter. Well, you know, I speak fairly regularly with 
Dr. Michelle Rosa who covers down on this issue set. As you 
have recognized, a lot of tremendous talent at the Department 
across the intelligence community that flows us information on 
a daily basis, if not hourly basis.
    So, if we need to flex--and that is one thing that Mr. 
Oxford, Director Oxford's organization DTRA they are very 
agile. So if we need to adjust to go after a threat, we can do 
it. But we, we do welcome the interest and support of Congress 
in doing so.
    Mr. Larsen. Well, we welcome giving you the support and, 
more importantly, the interest in doing so. Thanks so much.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me recognize the gentleman from the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank our witnesses.
    I was, as a member of both Armed Services and Foreign 
Affairs I want to thank you both for having this joint hearing. 
But I want to address, you know, how the sharing that was 
mentioned by the witnesses before of information is critical.
    And so, I want to ask, as the COVID-19 pandemic progressed 
and military intelligence followed it and saw that escalation, 
just from a timeframe what, what kinds of levels of alert 
occurred in January and February during that period? Was there 
a change in the level of alert based on military intelligence 
during that period? And did it occur in January and February, 
or February?
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir, for that question.
    What I can tell you is that in February Secretary Esper 
identified three priorities to combat COVID:
    First, being to protect our people;
    Second, to maintain mission readiness;
    And, three, to ensure that we were supporting the whole of 
government effort.
    With that came, you know, at least internally within DoD, 
different health protection levels. And so pretty early, as you 
will probably recall, in March at least as it relates to the 
Department of Defense we were put in HRECON situation that 
reduced the number of folks present at their jobs. So, with 
that information flow did happen, and does happen.
    I think we have pointed out to all of us here today that 
information flow is vital. While the intelligence community can 
collect and does collect information, analyzes it and gets it 
out to policymakers, and to include Congress, there must be 
flow of information across the entire globe. And it must happen 
from all parties and all countries. We cannot expect just the 
United States and our allies----
    Mr. Keating. To get to the point.
    Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir. Go ahead, please.
    Mr. Keating. Was there a level of alert change that 
corresponded with that in as early as February?
    Mr. Lasseter. Well, sir, as early as February, in March was 
when, I believe--and I would have to go back for the exact 
date--but that's when the HRECON changed. Obviously over the 
course of those months before information was continuing to 
flow and the proper, you know, resources applied to analyzing 
that information.
    Mr. Keating. Was there a change to a Level 1 alert in 
February?
    Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I----
    Mr. Keating. That would have been the first time in our 
history that a pandemic raised itself to that level. Did that 
occur?
    Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I cannot tell you the exact date. I 
would need to go back and get that and provide that information 
to you and the committee, please.
    Mr. Keating. Let's assume that it might have. Would you 
transfer that information immediately to our State agencies and 
our agencies of State, State Department and Congress?
    Mr. Lasseter. Sir, as you know, the intelligence community 
is quite large. And so, you know, all the organizations today 
have an intelligence portion to them. And so that information 
is shared across the intelligence community. I say ``that,'' 
but information generally is shared across the intelligence 
community.
    And so, we do that on a daily basis and we flow information 
back and forth.
    Mr. Keating. I see. Well, my concern is that Congress was 
not notified in as timely a fashion to those changes. So, if 
you can get back to the respective committees, tie down that 
date, and what the significance was. Because it is my 
understanding in terms of what is publicly accessible that 
there was a change. It is my understanding that it was historic 
in terms of the first time a pandemic was addressed with that 
level of change.
    And I am concerned about the sharing of information, which 
was slow to Congress, whether it was also slow to our other 
State Department agencies, and relevant agencies, and the 
agencies appearing before the committee here today. Because, 
indeed, if we are going to do this, what you have said as 
witnesses, placing the importance on sharing that information, 
it is critical. And it is my concern that that was not being 
done in a timely fashion.
    So, if you could get back to us, I would appreciate that.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
    Let me recognize my good friend from the state of 
California, Mr. Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. There has been discussion, I 
believe by the first ranking member to the ``complicity'' of 
the WHO. The WHO is a coordinating organization, it is not an 
intel organization. It has no way to know whether what China is 
saying is complete, and true, and transparent or not.
    You know who does have an intel organization? The U.S. 
Government. And our intelligence is designed to know when China 
is not telling the truth.
    In fact, the President was informed that this was breaking 
out in Wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. He 
chose to ignore that, that intelligence, just as he seems to 
have ignored, much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his 
wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this 
disease and, unfortunately, misled millions of Americans as 
well into not wearing masks.
    We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars defending 
ourselves from kinetic threats, and very little on defending 
ourselves from anything else. We have--did not have civil 
defense designed for either a deliberate or naturally occurring 
plague. We did not have stockpiles of PPE. We did not have the 
education. We did not have the ventilators, although we quickly 
made some. And we did not have the capacity to do tracing.
    This all, in spite of the fact that the national security 
strategy recognized that biological incidents have the--this 
was in 2017--the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life, 
and the threats are growing, whether as a result of deliberate 
attack, accident, or natural outbreak.
    Which raises the question--and I know we are not in a 
classified setting--what is the Administration's operating 
assumptions or likelihood, or how would we assign percentage 
likelihoods to the four possibilities as to how this plague 
began?
    We are told perhaps it came from the wet market. And it may 
have come from the Wuhan lab which might have been engaged in 
entirely peaceful activities and had a tragic release. It could 
have come from a Wuhan lab that was engaged in military 
activities but had an unintentional release. And I think least 
likely at all, it could have come deliberately from a Wuhan 
lab.
    Do we have any operating assumptions? Are all of those 
possible? Although I think the deliberate release is highly, 
highly unlikely.
    What does the Administration, what does the Administration 
think is the cause of this?
    Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congressman Sherman. It is an 
important question.
    I think we are, we as an international community but, 
obviously, the U.S. Government are still, one, we are working 
right now, presently, to respond to this crisis. As you are----
    Mr. Sherman. So, you are saying any one of those 
possibilities is possible and the U.S. Government does not have 
much of an opinion on which is the cause?
    Do the other witnesses agree with that? Mr. Moore?
    Mr. Moore. Congressman Sherman, thank you for the question.
    You have mentioned four possible scenarios. And certainly 
in discussions in an open forum there is a--there are varying 
levels of possibility. What we do know is that the virus 
described as COVID-19 was described in academic research that 
was published several years ago, including in the People's 
Republic of China, identified as existing in animals. It is a 
disease that is a virus of zoonotic origin. But exactly as you 
say, sir, there are multiple possible----
    Mr. Sherman. So, the idea that it was engineered is 
probably dismissed by that.
    And I will quickly ask, normally when there is a 
catastrophe, the first thing anybody does is you close the barn 
door. China has said that this has come from a wet market. 
There are wet markets all over China. Has there been a massive 
change in how exotic animals are sold for human consumption 
throughout China?
    Mr. Moore. That is an extremely important point, and also 
something under the purview of the OES Bureau at State. 
Wildlife trafficking in a huge problem. The People's Republic 
of China continues to be the largest market for illegal 
wildlife----
    Mr. Sherman. Has there been a big change from early 2019 to 
now, late 2020, in how these markets operate in China?
    Mr. Moore. There has not been a fundamental permanent 
change in blocking illegal wildlife trade, including its sale 
at wet markets in the People Republic of China. It is a 
practice which does exist in other countries as well. And we 
are working to end it.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, 
Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for convening 
this super-important hearing.
    It is no secret to the rest of the world that the COVID-19 
pandemic was allowed to spiral out of control when it reached 
the United States. Over 200,000 Americans died. Case counts 
were falling months ago, but the New York Times reports cases 
are climbing at around the same pace as when New York City 
cases were skyrocketing way back in March.
    The whole world can see this happening, including those who 
wish to do harm to our country.
    So, let me pose this question to Mr. Oxford and Mr. Moore. 
Do you believe that there would be a heightened interest on the 
part of State and non-State actors in developing an important 
biological weapon against Americans? And if yes, how would the 
Department of State and Defense respectively prepare for that 
possibility?
    Either of you can go first.
    Mr. Moore. I apologize, sir. The transmission was a little 
imprecise. What exact question would you like me to respond to, 
sir?
    Mr. Levin. Sorry about that.
    My question is do you think there will be a heightened 
interest on the part of State and non-State actors in 
developing an important biological weapon against Americans? 
And if yes, how will the Departments of State and Defense 
prepare for that possibility?
    Mr. Moore. With regard to the development of biological 
weapons, I think that would be better addressed to my colleague 
Mr. Doliff from the ISN Bureau.
    Mr. Levin. Okay.
    Mr. Doliff. This is a difficult question to address in an 
unclassified context. I guess what I can say is that we 
continually review these issues.
    We had a discussion 2 days ago with our colleagues who are 
experts on these issues. I think I take your point that the 
pandemic, as I testified to, poses a substantial, enormous 
challenge to international security. And it must inherently be 
the case that our adversaries, whether they are terrorists or 
States, will take that into account in considering how to 
evolve their weapons systems.
    Mr. Levin. All right. Let me put another question.
    Since January 2017 the CDC's presence, presence in China 
has decreased from about 47 personnel to 14, with 
epidemiologist professionals getting cut. The National Science 
Foundation and USAID also closed their Beijing offices during 
this time. And on top of that, the Department of Agriculture 
transferred the manager of animal disease monitoring programs 
out of China in 2018.
    So, over the past 4 years we have gotten rid of a bunch of 
people who, it seems to me, would have been helpful to have in 
place as COVID-19 was emerging. At the very least, I think it 
would be helpful to have reliable sources of information about 
what was really happening on the ground.
    Mr. Oxford and Mr. Moore, in general, why does the U.S. 
have experts like epidemiologists stationed in other countries? 
And how does this help defend us against biological threats?
    Mr. Oxford. So, again, from a Defense Department 
perspective, especially the implementing organization, you 
know, we are not responsible for where CDC and others operate 
overseas. So, I would have to yield to the State Department or 
go back to those other departments that do those kind of 
things.
    Mr. Levin. All right, let's hear the State perspective.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. We would be pleased to offer a 
more detailed time line of who was assigned under the authority 
of the Chief of Mission in Beijing. At what time, I think the 
context for individual agencies sending staff there or reducing 
their staff there has a lot to do with both their needs, their 
budgets, and, of course, the viability of the work that they 
can actually do.
    One of the constraints we face with regard to the People's 
Republic of China is that we still have not received all of the 
data. We would need to receive initial samples of the virus 
that have been sought since the beginning of the pandemic, even 
at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic, as is 
the work of the People's Republic of China to prevent the World 
Health Organization from declaring COVID-19 a public health 
emergency of international concern when that topic initially 
came up for discussion at the WHO in Geneva.
    With regard to the specific agencies, with apologies, I 
would have to take that question.
    Mr. Levin. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me close by 
saying that I think it is extremely problematic for us to talk 
about what the WHO should do when we withdraw from it. I think 
it is extremely problematic for us to reduce our capability of 
scientific, and diplomatic, and public health experts to the 
units in China and around the world during a global pandemic.
    And with that, with great thanks I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
    Since there are no Republicans in the room right now, the 
chair recognizes Ms. Spanberger for 5 minutes.
    Well, I think Ms. Spanberger is having some technical 
issues.
    Well, I am told that there are no other members in the room 
right now. So, I would suggest is there, is Mr. Chairman Bera 
going to come back after voting and should we recess right now?
    I am waiting to hear back from our committee staff.
    Mr. Larsen. Well, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Langevin. Yes?
    Mr. Larsen. This is Representative Larsen. I am the only 
member in the room right now, and Representative Bera is 
voting. And we are trying to get staff to answer your question 
about his return.
    So, folks, if you just want to----
    Mr. Langevin. Okay.
    Mr. Larsen [continuing]. We will not recess right now. 
Perhaps just give us a few minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Well, I am going to, what I will do then is I 
will ask another question that I have. I do not know if we are 
going to get to a second round now. But, until we get that 
clarified or Ms. Spanberger comes back on, then I will 
certainly yield to her.
    But in the meantime let me go to Mr. Lasseter.
    So, we have heard that there might have been direction to 
not spend Chem Bio Defense Program funding on the COVID-19 
fight, which troubles me if true, even though the program 
specializes in developing countermeasures and vaccines, 
therapeutics, and pre-treatments. What do you need from us to 
ensure that you have the authority and the resources needed so 
that the Department is in fact prepared to rise to the 
challenge of emerging threats both today and tomorrow?
    And is there work that you could be doing now to help the 
country in the COVID-19 fight that you do not currently have 
the authority or permission to do?
    Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    For you first question or your statement that there is no 
Department prohibition or preclusion, I will say that the Chem 
Bio Defense Program primary focus is on the statutory 
requirements to develop and deliver capabilities that ensure 
the war fighter's ability to fight and win in a chemical or 
biological contaminated environment.
    The COVID-19 support provided to the services and inter-
agency is a combination of subject matter expertise, leveraging 
existing contracts to expedite delivery of capabilities, as an 
example, assisting with testing and evaluation. From helping to 
create detection, diagnostic, and treatment methods to 
investigating vaccines, the Chem Bio Defense Program continues 
to collaborate with the whole of government partners, and 
industry, and academia.
    It is important to note that the Chem Bio Defense Program 
is a research, development, and acquisition program, and not 
necessarily a response capability.
    But, I will say to your follow-on question, sir, that the 
Congress has been exceptionally helpful to the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program historically, as I referenced earlier, 
and over the last number of years. And so, support that we had 
asked for is really continued support for the program. We 
appreciate the information flow between, you know, our 
department, and I think I can say the same for the State 
Department. In between our staffs it is exceptional. And we 
look forward to continuing that communication flow.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. And no additional authorities that you are 
asking for right now that would enhance your work?
    Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I think at the moment we are good. I 
know that our staffs have communicated historically. And I hope 
that they can, can continue to do that--pardon me--and if we do 
identify an issue or an authority that is necessary, we will be 
absolutely certain to bring that to you and your team.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you. That concludes my questions 
for right now.
    Has anyone from the minority returned yet, or Ms. 
Spanberger, has she returned? Okay.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes, Mr. Chairman, this is Rick Larsen again. I 
am still the only member in the room.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    I will yield now to Ms. Spanberger if she has returned.
    Okay, I understand that she is not on.
    Ms. Spanberger. Can you hear me? Can you hear me, Mr. 
Langevin?
    Mr. Langevin. Yes. I have you now. Go ahead, Ms. 
Spanberger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Spanberger. Excellent.
    So, thank you very much to the witnesses for being here. I 
appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about 
staffing-related issues.
    As a former CIA case officer I am aware of the importance 
of detecting threats before they actually harm Americans. And 
that must be our approach when it comes to biological security 
as well. We have to get in front of biological and health 
security risks before they can do significant damage like what 
we have seen with COVID-19.
    And we have to work with our partners so that no matter 
where a threat arrives, arises, we can contain it.
    And if the offices in charge of preventing and responding 
to these threats are understaffed, it is hard for us to get 
ahead of that problem. So, I open this up to all members of the 
panel.
    U.S. national security agencies have long suffered from 
high rates of vacancies in the past few years. And given how 
long Federal hiring can take, we are likely to receive ripple 
effects of this for years. Are vacancies or limited staffing 
affecting your work currently? And, in your view, how can State 
and DoD reform hiring practices to ramp up to the needed 
capacity more quickly?
    And a specific call-out on there, do your offices have 
trouble finding and recruiting staff with the specialized 
skills needed to focus on reducing biological security threats? 
And I open it up to the panelists.
    Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congresswoman Spanberger. It is a 
great question. It is an age-old issue employing the right 
staff.
    I can say from a CWMD perspective, we have an immensely 
talented team, full of professionals, from career civilians, to 
uniformed personnel, to government contractors. So, it would be 
hard to speak across the entire department, me personally doing 
that. But I can tell you that we are right-sized. We obviously 
always are looking or on the lookout for talent, and so we will 
continue to do that and continue to, if we can find talent, to 
bring them in the doors.
    I will defer to my other colleagues.
    Mr. Oxford. Ms. Spanberger, from a different point of view, 
we operate a highly technical organization similar to some of 
the career fields you are referring to. Our recruitment 
strategy is healthy. Our retention rates are healthy. But we 
continue to look for additional talent as necessary. But so far 
our attribution rates, our rates are going steady.
    So, I think in the chem-bio defense area that we operate, 
as well as the rest of our R&D organization, our health and 
welfare of the R&D community is very sound.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
    Mr. Moore. Ms. Spanberger, on behalf of the OES Bureau at 
the State Department I am very pleased to report we have an 
outstanding, very active, and extremely expert team of both 
civil service, long-term colleagues, and Foreign Service 
colleagues on usually 2-year assignments.
    I am pleased to say that in recent months we have been able 
to add to our staffing and bring on permanently a number of 
colleagues, including fellows from the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science. The State Department has a 
longstanding cooperation with AAAS so that we benefit from 
their technical and professional expertise.
    The team is doing an outstanding job of dealing with COVID 
on the home front and, of course, working on it professionally.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
    Mr. Doliff. This is Phil Doliff from State.
    So, I think I would echo the remarks of my colleagues. I 
think that vacancies have not been a substantial challenge in 
our part of the Department on this issue. As I testified, we 
have also been increasing our staff. We have added experts, 
using the special authority that the Department has provided in 
this regard. And we have added to the staffing of the offices 
that deal with biological issues.
    So, I think in general we do not have staffing challenges.
    We, too, have a great partnership and fellowship to bring 
us technical expertise. But I think recruiting technical 
specialists is sometimes a challenge. And we, that is probably 
the one area where at times it has been a bit of a challenge 
for us.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much for sharing that. And I 
hope the committee can be involved to whatever end is 
appropriate in ensuring that you all can into the future 
recruit to the staffing levels that are necessary.
    I am going to ask for the next question, if you will 
indulge me, because it will direct what my follow-up question 
is.
    By a show of hands, do your teams participate in a war game 
exercise to train and prepare potential biological security 
risks for even this awkward circumstance with virtual and 
present? If you could just raise your hand if you do, because 
my follow-up question depends very much on if it is divided or.
    [Show of hands.]
    Ms. Spanberger. So, I see two and two from here. Three? 
Okay.
    So, I am curious then with the majority of you 
participating in war games, do you and your colleagues draw 
upon the modeling and the simulation analysis to think through 
what quickly changing threats could look like and how to 
respond or be using this for biological threats?
    And what have you learned from these tabletop exercises 
recently as it relates to COVID-19?
    And my time is limited, so if one of you wants to take this 
one, I welcome you all to choose who goes next.
    Mr. Oxford. So, Congresswoman, this is Mr. Oxford from 
DTRA.
    One of the things we do to sustain capability overseas with 
the people who we have trained over the course of time in bio 
responses, we do exercises periodically just to make sure they 
are maintaining readiness and the standards that they have been 
trained to.
    It is one of the ways that we start to transfer the 
responsibility of the CPR program to the host nations, but 
exercises and training are one of the key aspects of us 
understanding that their retention is there.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
    And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for the extra time. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Spanberger.
    Seeing that there are no additional members who have 
questions, and it is always difficult in this virtual hybrid 
in-person format. And then toss on top of that the voting call.
    So, I am going to use the chair's prerogative and just make 
a closing statement and then see if Chairman Langevin would 
like to make a statement as well. But, actually maybe a closing 
question.
    The issue of bio-surveillance is something that I thought a 
lot about in terms of pandemic preparedness, et cetera, 
thinking about how we use some of the naturally occurring 
technologies that are out there: social media, search words, 
Google, et cetera. Yet, all of a sudden you see a jump in 
people searching incidents of fever or flu-like symptoms, et 
cetera. Some of that can be early warning systems for us to pay 
close attention.
    I know wireless thermometers, et cetera, or thinking about 
how both in the midst of the pandemic, but then also, you know, 
what are early warning systems for naturally occurring threats 
and that are likely in use.
    I do not know if folks from DoD or State could perhaps 
comment on how we should be thinking about that?
    Mr. Lasseter. Chairman Bera, it is an exceptional question. 
And it is an all-of-above approach. You know, we have all 
talked today about the information sharing. That is absolutely 
vital. It is fundamental if we are going to ensure that we are 
detecting, interdicting, but specifically on this issue 
detecting threats and flowing that information really at this 
point globally.
    And so, you know, it is working with our interagency 
colleagues, like we do on a daily basis here. It is also 
working with our international friends and partners.
    I know Phil Doliff, Dash Doliff had mentioned the Global 
Partnership for Spread Against Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Materials. That is a perfect organization. The Global Health 
Care Security Agenda is another effort that can provide 
information flow to dozens of countries around the world.
    So, the all-of-above approach is necessary, and it has to, 
it has to apply information flow.
    Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, as you recall, in one of my 
earlier answers I talked about regional approaches. When we 
started the CPR Program it was mostly, you know, nation State-
specific, one program/one country. The regional approach allows 
for this kind of information sharing across regional 
boundaries. So, it enhances the overall protection within 
regions as opposed to just looking at this solely by country. 
So, it really does help in the broader understanding.
    Mr. Doliff. I think the chairman raises a very good point 
that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly add 
to information sharing and biosurveillance. We wondered in the 
pandemic how to expand the toolset that we have to additional 
tools.
    For example, in Uganda and in Africa there are a whole set 
of cell phone-based tools that we had not previously used to 
the degree we use now. And so, we are trying to take advantage 
of the whole new toolset that is out there.
    And I think the global pandemic, I think the chairman noted 
that there is great infrastructure being built to deal with 
this pandemic, and there are new technologies that are being 
integrated in the biosurveillance. And this is a good example 
of how we need to build out our capabilities and our data flows 
to capture all the information that is available.
    Mr. Bera. Well, great. I certainly want to thank all four 
of our witnesses for their service to our country. And, again, 
you know, make sure everyone is safe. And we will get through 
this. But let's get through this in a more resilient way and a 
stronger way, and a way that we can protect against the next 
pandemic or future bio threats.
    I do not know if Chairman Langevin is still on and if he 
wants to make any closing statement?
    Mr. Langevin. I am here, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
your joint collaboration in putting this hearing together. And 
I have enjoyed working with you on this. And certainly it is an 
important hearing and very timely right now.
    I, too, want to thank our witnesses. And, obviously, the 
work in your portfolios, whether it is countering weapons of 
mass destruction, or the work of DTRA, and our other witnesses, 
your portfolios, these are, obviously, essential capabilities 
that you bring to the table that are important to the Nation 
and, indeed, the world.
    So, we have continued work that we are going to continue to 
do together. We want to make sure you get properly resources 
and that we have the plans and the procedures in place to 
respond effectively. And we can rest assured there will be some 
future event that we are going to have to confront, and we want 
to make sure that we are as prepared as possible and can 
respond with the speed and agility that is necessary in order 
to save lives, keep people healthy, and protect the country.
    So, with that, I deeply thank you for the work you are 
doing. I know that members may have additional questions, and I 
ask that you respond in writing expeditiously.
    With that, I have no further question. And I yield back, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
    And, again, our thoughts and prayers are with everybody 
around the world who is impacted by COVID-19, and certainly 
with our President and First Lady, and the First Family.
    And with that, again I want to thank the witnesses for 
being here this morning, and the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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                   OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA

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                         STATEMENT OF LANGEVIN

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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