[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
JOINT HEARING: STRENGTHENING BIOLOGICAL
SECURITY: TRADITIONAL THREATS AND
EMERGING CHALLENGES
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JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLIFERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOINT WITH
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 2, 2020
__________
Serial No. 116-109
Serial No. 116-94
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-965 WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation
BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman,
DINA TITUS, Nevada TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
AMI BERA, California
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN MAST, Florida
JOHN CURTIS, Utah
Don MacDonald, Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
JIM COOPER, Tennessee SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
RO KHANNA, California AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair DON BACON, Nebraska
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JIM BANKS, Indiana
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
Bess Dopkeen, Professional Staff Member
Eric Snelgrove, Professional Staff Member
Caroline Kehrli, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Lasseter, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 10
Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 25
Moore, Jonathan, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 35
Dolliff, Phillip, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation
Programs, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State..................... 40
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 63
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 65
Hearing Attendance...............................................
STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD
Opening statement of Chairman Bera............................... 67
Open...................................................................
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 74
JOINT HEARING: STRENGTHENING BIOLOGICAL SECURITY: TRADITIONAL THREATS
AND EMERGING CHALLENGES
Friday, October 2, 2020
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
Nonproliferation,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
joint with the
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ami Bera
[chairman of the subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and
Nonproliferation] and Hon. James R. Langevin [chairman of the
subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and
Capabilities] presiding.
Mr. Bera [presiding]. This joint subcommittee hearing with
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific,
and Nonproliferation and the House Armed Services Subcommittee
on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities will come
to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules. To insert something into the record, please have
your staff email either subcommittee clerk.
As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
Consistent with H.Res. 965 and the accompanying regulations,
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate,
when they are not under recognition to eliminate background
noise.
I see we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself for
opening remarks. I will, then, be followed by the acting
ranking member, Mr. Perry; Chairman Langevin, and then, Ranking
Member Stefanik. I will, then, recognize members in order of
seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans and
Foreign Affairs and Armed Services members.
Before we get started and before I do my opening statement,
I think it would be remiss for us not to mention the President
and the First Lady and know that they are in our thoughts and
prayers and hope for a speedy recovery; and also, the tens of
thousands of Americans that test positive every day for this
virus. They are in our thoughts.
And it does underscore that this is a virus. This is a
viral threat. It does not know if we are a Democrat or a
Republican. It does not know what God we worship, what our
country of origin is. It is a virus, and it does underscore the
importance of this topic that we are talking about today, but
it does underscore that this is naturally occurring events, but
what bad actors may see, as they see a threat like this that
really has brought the entire world to its knees and certainly
has wreaked economic havoc, both here domestically, but
internationally.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Both
having the Department of Defense and the State Department again
underscores the importance of this. In my focus as subcommittee
chairman, under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot
of time talking about nuclear threats, but what we are seeing
right now is the real vulnerability to biologic threats.
Just to put that into context, we have not had an aircraft
carrier brought to its knees by a kinetic force, a missile or
anything like that, but we just saw in this past year an
aircraft carrier brought to port because of a virus. And that
really does underscore what I worry about.
And when I think about this, I think about it in a couple
of different ways. It is very difficult to obtain nuclear
capabilities and nuclear technology. Yet, we dedicate hundreds
of personnel and international organizations like the IAEA and
others to reduce that nuclear threat. That is totally
appropriate. We want to make sure nuclear technology and
weaponry does not end up in the hands of bad actors.
But if I put my doctor-scientist hat on, the availability
of technologies to alter viruses and do genetic editing, the
knowhow and the capabilities are rapidly increasing. And that
is something that keeps me awake at night. Again, we know there
are bad actors out there. Certainly, post-9/11, many of us
prepared. We saw anthrax; we saw other threats. We worried
about smallpox, and so forth. And that is something that I
think in a bipartisan way Congress, working with the
administration, should really think about what are the things
that we have to do to move ahead.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. There are
several areas that I think about and I am going to be curious
about from the witnesses. As we defeat COVID-19, and spend the
billions of dollars, and build the infrastructure to defeat
this virus, I also think we should strategically be thinking
about how we use those resources to also prepare for
biosurveillance, to be ready for the next--whether it is a
naturally occurring virus or a biologic threat--but also think
about how we have those dual-use capabilities as we build that
infrastructure to do biosurveillance for manmade threats.
Also, as we move forward, we have got the biological, the
BWC, but I think we need stronger, multilateral organizations
with like-minded allies that we can work with. And again, I
would be curious how DoD and State are thinking about creating
those multilateral institutions.
And then, last, when I think about the ethics of gene
editing and where that is going, and the technology, we really
have not created the standards and norms that say this is
appropriate for advancing of science, but this really is a
little bit dangerous and you probably ought not to be playing
around with genes in this particular way, and creating those
standards and norms and what that would look like. And again, I
think that is an appropriate place where the scientific
community, Congress, again working with the administration,
ought to put those standards in place, not just for the United
States, but for the international community.
So, again, our thoughts and prayers are with the President
and First Lady and those thousands of Americans. And I would be
remiss if I did not just put my doctor hat on for a second. As
we enter the fall and winter, let's do what we can to keep
everyone safe. Let's wear face coverings. Let's continue to
practice physical distancing. Let's continue to wash our hands
and practice good hygiene. Let's avoid large indoor gatherings
that we have seen really do act as super-spreading events. And
the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter
the fall is everyone go out there and get your flu shot. Please
get your flu shot.
So, with that, let me recognize the ranking member, Mr.
Perry, for 5 minutes of opening statements.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
And thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your
counsel today.
The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for
increased biosecurity threats and what can happen when
irresponsible actors disregard international agreements for the
sake of self-prevention. A strong international biosecurity
regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it
work. We need to assess the shortcomings of U.S. multilateral
engagements and determine where improvements need to be made.
The 2005 International Health Regulations went into force
in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012.
However, by 2012, only about 20 percent of all countries were
compliant, and even today, most countries have still not
complied with the 2005 regulations.
This administration has taken a significant amount of
criticism for questioning U.S. engagement in institutions like
the World Health Organization. Let me be clear about this. The
World Health Organization's complicity in spreading the
coronavirus should not be rewarded with the United States'
indifference to its failures. The WHO's strong affiliation with
the Global Health Security Agenda also raises significant
questions about GHSA's long-term efficacy.
There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the
international community. Different levels of investment in
biosecurity lend itself to a permanent condition of moral
hazard, where select communities like the United States are
compensating for the lack of investment from other States.
Despite our best efforts to stymie the threat of biothreat,
there is only so much we can do alone.
Key programs like the State Department's Biosecurity
Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like China,
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria, despite the fact that
several of these countries have experimented with biological
weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses.
Countries like North Korea have a clearly offensive
biological weapons program with no end in sight. How do we
confront the fact that we have an unreliable international
biological weapons control regime? More importantly, in
measuring success against the spread of biothreats, what
exactly does success look like when China dominates several key
institutions? As it stands, China has provided a gift to non-
State actors that wish us harm. They have shown us and the
world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the
American economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of
life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the
coronavirus, and this timely hearing will be confronting that
uncomfortable truth.
I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today,
as they speak more about synthetic biology and gene
manipulation. We need to find out more about the national
security implications that synthetic biology can pose to the
United States, especially in light of the fact that several
countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens in
subpar laboratory settings.
All that being said, I do also offer my prayers and best
wishes to the First Family, to Hope Hicks, and to anybody that
has been affected by the virus, whether they have contracted or
whether it has occurred in their family members, loved one, or
community. We are all dealing with it one way or the other.
I certainly thank the chairman for the time, and I yield
the balance.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
Let me now recognize the chairman of the Intelligence and
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed
Services Committee, Chairman Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
And I want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that
the President and the First Lady and the First Family are in my
thoughts and prayers. I know they are all in our thoughts and
prayers right now, and the people around the President's
administration who may also be experiencing effects of the
virus. We pray that they all have a quick and a full recovery.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleagues on the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and
Nonproliferation, and particularly, you, Chairman Bera, and
Ranking Member Yoho. And I know Mr. Perry is standing in for
the ranking member right now. I want to thank you all for
hosting this timely joint hearing on biosecurity. I recognize
Ranking Member Stefanik as well as my colleagues on the
Subcommittee Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
Capabilities.
This is a topic which, as we have seen of late, is vital to
our nation's security. I am very pleased that we are holding
this very important joint hearing.
Emerging biological techniques such as gene sequencing,
gene editing, and synthetic biology are rapidly changing the
scope and scale of biological threats and could lead to an
increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge,
biological threats are easier to create than other weapons of
mass destruction. Used in concert, cyber weapons and biologic
weapons enable a rogue actor to inflict major damage on a
military power.
Just last month, the Republic of Georgia's health ministry
suffered a cyber-attack from abroad on the data base that
stores medical documents and national COVID-19 pandemic
management information. We know Russian hackers have targeted
organizations involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine
development, including those in the U.S., the U.K, and Canada.
So, these attacks and the current global pandemic
underscore the import of collective scientific research
preparedness and security across the interagency and with our
allies, and for national and economic security. In a time when
the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a
novel, highly infectious pathogen, we must ensure the
interagency is working together to respond to the current
pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen
biological security across the range of threats.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, though its execution
of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction/
Biological Threat Reduction Program, and its Technical Reach
back analysis cell, has been receiving foreign partner requests
for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety,
biosecurity, and biosurveillance support to aid in detection,
diagnosis, reporting, and modeling related to the COVID-19
outbreak.
There have been many good examples of the BTRP-trained
local professionals in countries like Guinea, Liberia, Cape
Verde, Jordan, and Thailand. They diagnosed and confirmed the
first cases of COVID-19 in their countries.
Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats,
and the impact they could have on our national security and
economy, and as a pandemic that could, arguably, present the
single biggest threat to our country while starting to spread
across the globe, the President's budget request was delivered
to the Hill in February with a 36 percent cut to the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program's funding from last year's
enacted level. At a time when the United States is struggling
to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus, we
are alarmed by the Department's significant reduction in the
budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting
biological threats to the United States.
Thankfully, the House has acted. In our fiscal year 2021
National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 6395 added back $135
million to the CTR Program. Eighty-nine million dollars of that
was additional funding for the Cooperative Biological
Engagement Program.
Additionally, the Department of Defense's Chemical and
Biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in
the fight against COVID-19. Its medical program funds and
manages efforts to develop medical countermeasures, vaccines,
therapeutics, and pretreatments. Its Physical Program funds and
manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection
technologies, diagnostics, personal protective equipment, and
decontamination systems.
To prepare against potential unknown threats, CBDP built
expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens, making
it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of novel
coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the
program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in
the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
So, these are obviously challenging times, and we need to
double down on these programs. And we need to make sure that we
our, in fact, prepared for the next biological or chemical
event that could affect the country and make sure that we have
all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively to
keep our country and, indeed, perhaps the world, safe.
We look forward to hearing more about the many efforts of
both departments today, what we can do to help ensure your
organizations have the authorities and resources needed to
prepare for the emerging threats of both today and tomorrow,
and how we can ensure that your departments are ready and able
to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis.
So, I joint the host in thanking all of you, and especially
our witnesses, for joining us today. And I yield back to
Chairman Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
Let me now recognize the ranking member of the Intelligence
and Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed
Services Committee, Ranking Member Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
I also want to echo my colleagues and send, on behalf of
New York's 21st congressional District, our thoughts and our
prayers with the First Family, the White House staff, and all
the American people who have been impacted by the COVID virus.
I would like to express my appreciation to you, Chairman
Bera and Ranking Member Yoho, as well as Chairman Langevin and
my colleague, Mr. Perry, for hosting this hearing, and thank
you to the members of the two subcommittees.
Thanks to the witnesses from the Departments of Defense and
State for being here today.
The issue of biosecurity is one of national importance. As
I have stated previously, while the Department of Defense faces
urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of
the critically important mission of countering weapons of mass
destruction and, in particular, biological threats.
The unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we
continue to adapt our approach and iterate our response. We
must learn from the current crisis and adjust our strategy to
more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next
event. This will surely not be the last biological crisis this
nation and this world faces.
I am particularly interested in how your organizations and
the Federal Government writ large can more effectively use new
datasets and artificial intelligence to truly modernize our
biosurveillance efforts. We must mature our capacity to
anticipate and monitor when and where a biological event may
occur and model how a pathogen, either naturally occurring or
manmade, is likely to spread.
This obviously must be a global effort. And the
partnerships that the Department of Defense and the Department
of State have developed will be critical early warning beacons
to inform our collective domestic response.
Programs like the Cooperative Threat Reduction, and
specifically, the Biological Threat Reduction Program are
essential to maintaining our global footprint and the building
of the relationships that protect our forward-deployed service
members and national interests.
The current COVID crisis has served as an affirmation that
biological threats require a whole-of-government response, not
just the two departments represented here today, but inclusive
of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and our State
and local officials. The strength of the partnership between
your organizations and the quality of these relationships you
develop with our foreign partners and domestic agencies will
underpin the effectiveness of our future biosecurity efforts.
Thank you again to our witnesses, and I yield back to the
chair.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
And before I introduce the witnesses, I ask unanimous
consent that non-committee, if any, be allowed to participate
in today's hearing after all committee members have had an
opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection?
[No response.]
Without objection, non-committee members will be recognized
at the appropriate time.
Let me now go ahead and introduce our witnesses. First is
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Mr. David Lasseter. Mr. Lasseter oversees all
CWMD policy issues at the Department. This includes preventing
the proliferation of WMD-related materials, the Defense
Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and
chemical, biological, radiologic, and nuclear defense.
Next, we will hear from the Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Mr. Vayl Oxford. Mr. Oxford leads DTRA's
mission to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from weapons of
mass destruction. DTRA spearheads the Defense Department's
Biological Threat Reduction Program.
From the State Department, we will first hear from Acting
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, r. Jonathan Moore.
And finally, we will hear from the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs at the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, Mr. Phillip
Dolliff. He currently oversees a range of State Department
nonproliferation programs, including Cooperative Threat
Reduction and Export Control Programs which work to reduce
nonproliferation threats worldwide.
I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes. And
without objection, your prepared written statements will be
made part of the record.
I will first call on Mr. Lasseter for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LASSETER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Lasseter. Good morning, Chairmen Langevin and Bera,
Ranking Member Stefanik, Acting Ranking Member Perry, and all
committee members.
I, too, want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the
President and First Lady----
Mr. Bera. Mr. Lasseter, is your microphone on?
Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bera. Okay.
Mr. Lasseter. It is on. Can you hear me better now?
I first want to also extend my thoughts and prayers to the
President and First Lady and all those impacted by COVID-19.
Thank you for the opportunity to present on behalf of the
Department of Defense and highlight some of the critical work
we are doing to counter biological threats.
I also want to acknowledge DoD's sincere appreciation for
the continued support that Congress lends our threat reduction
mission.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction, I have the privilege to work
alongside by colleagues here today. Our strong partnership
enables the broad U.S. Government effort to reduce WMD threats,
including biological threats worldwide.
DoD's biothreat mission aligns with the objectives in the
National Security and Defense Strategies, as well as Secretary
Esper's priorities; namely, to increase the lethality of the
U.S. military, build alliances, and improve DoD's efficiency.
We also draw guidance from strategies such as the National
Biodefense Strategy and the Global Health Security Strategy.
DoD's focus on protecting the health and readiness of U.S.
forces, countering the destabilizing effects of outbreaks on
U.S. interests, and ensuring that DoD remains focused on
priority defense objectives to meet emergency needs during an
outbreaks makes us a complementary tool in the U.S. threat
reduction arsenal.
We work daily to ensure DoD is positioned to address the
full range of WMD threats, to include the constantly changing
biological threat landscape. This shifting dynamic includes
naturally occurring outbreaks and accidental or deliberate
release of biological agents; threats posed by State and non-
State actors, international and domestic incidents, and
concerns with existing and emerging technologies.
COVID-19's global reach and destabilizing influence has
further altered the threat landscape, potentially inspiring
nefarious actors to replicate COVID's impacts through a
deliberate use of a biological agent. My team develops
strategic guidance for CWMD activities, spanning the prevent,
detect, and respond continuum to mitigate the impacts of such
threats regardless of origin.
We work closely with other DoD stakeholders and coordinate
through groups such as our Unity of Effort Council and the
COVID-19 Task Force. DoD also works with key interagency and
international partners as we develop priorities for countering
biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage
each other's capabilities and lessen the security burden on
DoD. Pooling resources and working toward common objectives is
vital to ensuring the greatest threat reduction impacts are
achieved.
Since 2004, CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program has
provided equipment and training to over 30 countries to improve
their ability to detect, diagnose, and report biological
incidents. In the current environment, we know that partner
nations have leveraged previously provided CTR capabilities to
bolster their abilities to detect and diagnose COVID-19.
To close, I want to thank the subcommittees again, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lasseter follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Lasseter.
I will now recognize Mr. Oxford for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Oxford. Chairman Langevin, Chairman Bera, Ranking
Member Stefanik, Ranking Member Yoho, and Mr. Perry, standing
in this morning, and distinguished members of the
subcommittees, thank you for your continued support to DTRA.
I am proud to appear to you today with my colleagues from
both DoD as well as the State Department to update you on our
collective efforts to protect the U.S. national interests in a
rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. It is an honor
to represent the DTRA workforce, whose commitment to our
mission and strong relationships with our partners here today
makes our organization successful.
Today, we find ourselves in unprecedented times, as we
respond to the global pandemic. As we reflect on the loss of
over 200,000 of our fellow citizens, we must think about the
future threat landscape where gene editing, DNA sequencing, and
synthetic biology offer our adversaries the opportunity to
capitalize on the observed lessons learned from our response.
And they potentially could launch future attacks with little
warning or attribution.
As we capture our lessons learned from the COVID-19 event,
we have to accept the fact that others will also be learning
and that the very nature of the biological threat landscape has
changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the
course of the last 6 months is that partner nations have
benefited greatly by the training and equipping they receive
through the DoD CTR Program, and specifically, BTRP.
BTRP facilitates the detection and reporting of diseases
caused by dangerous pathogens, whether deliberately released or
naturally occurring, including diseases such as COVID-19. BTRP
works with over 30 foreign partners to reduce biological
threats by enhancing their biosecurity, biosafety, and
biosurveillance capabilities.
The ongoing COVID pandemic has demonstrated to the global
community that health security is a critical part of national
security. Countries need an effective biosurveillance system to
detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks of dangerous pathogens.
The U.S. relies on the biosurveillance systems of other nations
to provide early warning of an outbreak before it reaches the
homeland.
Some recent examples of BTRP success in responding to the
pandemic:
In partnership with USAID, BTRP's efforts enabled local
officials in Thailand to detect the first case of a novel
coronavirus outside of China on 13 January 2020, only days
after its initial discovery in Wuhan, China.
Within a month of a request from the U.S. Ambassador
Fischer in Morocco, BTRP transferred a supply of PPE to the
National Institute of Health and Hygiene in Rabat, Morocco. The
equipment went directly to protect Morocco's frontline health
care workers in the fight against COVID. Ambassador Fischer
stated, ``The equipment transfer is part of over 7 years of
close cooperation between DTRA and the government of Morocco.
This partnership focuses on saving lives and mitigating threats
to ensure the national security of both countries.'' I will
report, to date, Morocco has reported 126,000 with 2200 deaths.
In Georgia, BTRP-trained scientists and the BTRP-
constructed Richard Lugar Center developed a diagnostic testing
capability for COVID. This enabled Georgia to implement
extensive testing to inform outbreak control. The center was
lauded by the Georgian government as being integral in
controlling the COVID outbreak. Within Georgia, they have
reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths.
BTRP continues to receive foreign partner requests for
support related to COVID. As of September 18th, BTRP had
fulfilled 40 requests from 18 countries, plus the African
Union, for disease control.
In summary, by building a partner nation's capacities and
capabilities, it builds their sense of national pride and
increases their willingness to work with the U.S. in other
ways. By providing partners with better self-sustaining
solutions, the U.S. demonstrates that we are the partner of
choice rather than our strategic competitors. These
partnerships act as force multipliers in the competition for
influence and reinforce the strategic messaging that the U.S.
has their nations' interests in mind.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Oxford.
I will now recognize Mr. Moore for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN MOORE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Moore. Good morning, Chairman Bera, Chairman Langevin,
Ranking Member Stefanik, and other esteemed Members of the
House.
It is an honor to be here with you today together with
distinguished colleagues from the State Department and the
Department of Defense, as well as DTRA. I look forward to
discussing how our Bureau, the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, plays a
role in this process. Our normal portfolio ranges from the
depths of the oceans to the vastness of space. We also host the
State Department's Office of International----
Mr. Bera. Mr. Moore, could I have you have the microphone a
little closer to you?
Mr. Moore. Sorry. Thank you.
We also host the State Department's Office of International
Health and Biodefense, and that is the capacity in which I am
here today.
I will focus my remarks on our efforts to prevent, detect,
and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. COVID-19, which,
as we see, has had an impact even on the President and the
First Lady, and millions of Americans, highlights the
importance of U.S. leadership to advance global health security
and pandemic preparedness. This is crucial to stopping
outbreaks at their source and protecting U.S. health and
safety, promoting economic prosperity, and defending national
security interests.
Our team at OES is working through and on COVID-19,
together with interagency partners, advancing U.S. Government
priorities through diplomacy. Beyond COVID-19, OES combats a
range of other public health threats, including Ebola,
influenza, Dengue, polio, and antimicrobial resistance.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge, and the
Department of State remains committed to working closely with
our partners as part of a collective global response. We are
using all of our means to slow and stop the pandemic. U.S.
health diplomacy has two primary areas of effort: promoting
transparent information-sharing and disease surveillance, and
encouraging a multisectoral approach to building global health
security capacity, including other nations, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, and the private
sector.
We deeply appreciate Congress' appropriations of over 1.6
billion U.S. dollars in COVID-19 supplemental funding to the
State Department and to the U.S. Agency for International
Development. We have used these funds to provide a broad range
of assistance specifically aimed at helping governments,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
fight the pandemic.
The assistance is saving lives by strengthening public
health education, improving the quality and cleanliness of
health care facilities, and increasing laboratory disease
surveillance and rapid response capacity in more than 120
countries, as well as providing humanitarian and economic
support to mitigate impacts of the pandemic.
Additionally, the United States has invested more than $10
billion to bring safe and effective vaccines to the global
market faster. OES helps develop State Department messaging,
including global public health encountering malign influence.
As the first to know about the coronavirus, the Chinese
Communist Party had a special responsibility to inform the rest
of the world about this threat. Instead, they withheld
information and censored medical professionals, scientists, and
journalists. The CCP has since used the pandemic to further its
geopolitical agenda by highlighting its donations of masks and
other supplies to reshape the narrative and distract from its
role in this crisis. Both Russia and the CCP have made
grandiose and irresponsible claims about the creation of
vaccines, raising serious questions about quality and efficacy
that we are addressing through active public diplomacy.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is a
proverb that is as familiar as it is true. If we prioritize
health security investments, we can contain outbreaks before
they become pandemics and mitigate and prevent second-and
third-order impacts.
OES plays a key role in pandemic prevention, including
through support for the Global Health Security Agenda. GHSA,
which is still a work-in-progress, is a partnership of nearly
70 nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental
stakeholders that uses a whole-of-government, multisectoral
approach to address outbreaks.
OES annually coordinates U.S. expert implementing agencies
to provide carefully targeted programming in priority
countries, to make global health security improvements along
specific metrics. Its approach to combating outbreaks is
reflected in the United States 2017 National Security Strategy,
2018 National Biodefense Strategy, and the 2019 Global Health
Security Strategy.
OES leadership has been fully engaged in coordinating
interagency investments, helping 19 U.S. partner countries
prevent, detect, and respond to a range of infectious disease
threats at their source. These are just a few examples of OES's
wide-ranging engagement on infectious disease risks which are
crucial to countering biological threats.
We greatly appreciate your interest and look forward to
your questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Moore.
Let me now recognize Mr. Dolliff for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP DOLLIFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Dolliff. Good morning, Chairman Bera, Chairman
Langevin, Ranking Members, and Honorable Representatives.
We appreciate the leadership you have shown on these
important issues. Thank you for inviting me here today to share
how the Department of State's Bureau of International Security
and Nonproliferation, or ISN, works to address some of the most
urgent and challenging biological threats to U.S. national
security.
I am honored to appear before you, alongside by colleague
from the Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs Bureau, and by my colleagues from the Department of
Defense.
Through diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs,
the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau works to
prevent rogue States, terrorists, and other malign actors from
obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. The
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau has been
working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges posed by
the full spectrum of these threats, whether they are
deliberately spread, accidently released, or naturally
occurring.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage
a single pathogen can cause to U.S. national and international
security. Through diplomacy, our International Security and
Nonproliferation Bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks,
including the Biological Weapons Convention and the Australia
Group. And I note the chairman made remarks on this very issue.
This year, as the President of the G7, we are leading the
international community in making significant progress on
biological issues, including issuing G7 statements on the
international COVID-19 pandemic and response. Similarly, in the
global partnership, we have led efforts to launch a dedicated
biosecurity capacity-building initiative.
For decades, ISN has invested significant resources into
combating the full range of WMD and related delivery system
threats, including over $450 million over the past 15 years
toward mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich
history of biosecurity capacity-building where we have trained
thousands of foreign partners on biosecurity in over 50
countries. These WMD threat reduction investments long preceded
the pandemic. Yet, they are contributing to slowing its spread.
We recognized early on the threat that the pandemic posed
to our international security, and we began to quickly
incorporate COVID-19 topics in our trainings, leveraging remote
and distance learning platforms to deliver critically needed
help in a timely manner.
We are also in the process of programming an additional $18
million via our Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund toward
controlling this pandemic and preventing future catastrophic
biological events, as well as adding additional experts to our
efforts and expanding the offices we have working on these
issues. Representative Perry noted moments ago that there are
limitations to our authorities, and I will note that we did
propose broader authority to address these limitations.
Of course, we are not alone and we are deeply grateful for
the decades of very close partnership we have enjoyed with our
Department of Defense colleagues to coordinate our mutually
reinforcing efforts.
In looking to the future, we are also working hard to keep
pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology. And I
note that several of the members indicated concern about this
very issue. Let me assure you the full range of U.S. national
security departments and agencies are focusing on and analyzing
these efforts.
Our International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is
using our diplomatic and capacity-building tools to prevent the
application of dual-use technologies to do harm, such as the
development of biological weapons. For example, Chairman Bera
noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to
address this issue. And we are, indeed, working in this area
and have had multilateral dialogs on this very issue.
In conclusion, we are very proud of the work we do to
combat infectious disease threats using our diplomatic and
foreign assistance tools in support of U.S. national security.
We deeply appreciate the support of the Congress to provide us
with the necessary resources to carry out our threat reduction
mission, and we recognize that our work is far from over.
Thank you, Chairman Bera, Chairman Langevin, members of the
committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dolliff follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Dolliff.
I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes
of questioning our witnesses.
Because of the hybrid format of this hearing, I will
recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between
Democrats and Republicans, and between both subcommittees. If
you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will
circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute
your microphone and address the chair verbally.
I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Both Mr. Oxford and Mr. Dolliff talked about the advances
in technology. And as a doctor, I look at what we have been
able to do with biologics. Conditions, cancers that we would
have to treat palliatively, we now actually have therapies and
precision medicine to often cure some of these cancers and
other ailments. And I think the vast majority of scientists are
pursuing and using this technology for the advancement of
common good.
But I also know those same gene-editing techniques, and so
forth, can certainly be used to cause us harm as well as,
inadvertently, a scientist that may be looking for a cure may
inadvertently create something that unintentionally causes
harm.
Mr. Dolliff, you touched on, as I said in my opening
statement, how do we create these norms and standards for
ethical use of this technology in a multilateral way? And then,
also, working with our corporate sector as well because,
obviously, our pharmaceutical sector and others are looking for
novel therapies. Right now, I get the sense that there really
isn't the standard and norm. Maybe you could start off, Mr.
Dolliff, and then, from the DoD perspective, how we do this in
a multilateral way.
Mr. Dolliff. So, thank you, Chairman Bera, for raising this
important set of questions.
First, I take your point. Medical technology is, indeed,
advancing very quickly, especially in some parts of biosector.
And we face this challenge across the board with technologies.
Almost all technologies have applications, as you point out,
for enormous good and can cause substantial harm.
We have been working on the issue of norms and standards
for over a decade. And what we have done is tried to work
through amongst other instrumentalities--the National Academies
in cooperation with national academies in other countries. We
have engaged other international organizations to try to
address this subject, and we have also worked in partnership
with other governments.
We have included working with the corporate sector. For
example, we work closely with partners in India. And in those
outreach and trainings that we do in India, we include both the
government sector and the corporate sector, as well as NGO's,
as we try to build biosecurity, including through building
norms.
I will note I think building norms is always challenging,
and it is probably at least as challenging at the moment in the
midst of the pandemic. But I take the chairman's point that
this is a particularly important area, and we will continue to
increase our efforts in this area.
Mr. Bera. Great.
And Mr. Moore touched on the billions that we have already
provided in global health security funding in some of the
COVID-19 supplementals. And no doubt as we look to defeat this
virus, both here domestically through vaccine distribution and
development, but also globally--maybe I will look at some of
the DoD colleagues or, Mr. Moore, if you want to answer this.
As we are spending that, how can we do that in a very strategic
way that allows us to start building the surveillance tools,
and what should those tools look like? And what is the best
practice? Maybe, Mr. Lasseter, if you want to.
Mr. Lasseter. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very important.
And I would just add on the biotechnology front that we
view it as a promise-in-peril scenario. So, there is a whole
lot of promise and the U.S. bio economy is strong. We must keep
it No. 1. And there is a lot of peril, which you have
described.
From a vaccine standpoint, as you asked, it is vitally
important that we continue to work as an interagency together.
We have also got to provide information, flow information,
across international organizations, those that have been
mentioned previously. But it is incumbent upon us to share the
information. So, we work with our partners and allies and we
expect dependable, clear information to come back. And that is
vital. If we are not sharing the information, and if we are not
doing it effectively and clearly, then we run the risk of
having more severe outbreaks as the technology advances and as
a globalized economy increases.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Oxford, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As an implementing organization, we are in a position to
help train, educate, and enforce some of the norms that would
be created. But I would point out that, in today's biological
threat world, it is really hard to distinguish between nation-
State, non-nation-States, and their proxies in terms of who is
responsible for these actions. So, getting to norms is a much
more complicated issue. In the past where we had mostly nation-
States where we would worry about this, now we have a much
bigger playing field to try to figure out. And that complicates
not only norms and standards, it complicates attribution and
accountability for these kinds of things. So, I think it is a
noble goal, but it is much more complicated in the kind of
diverse world we are facing.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
I see my time is up. Let me recognize the ranking member,
acting ranking member, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman.
And to our panel, thank you.
Mr. Oxford just mentioned some of the non-State actors, and
I am going to talk about some of the non-State and the State
actors. So, as you know, in 2018, Russian agents used the
Soviet-developed Novichok class nerve agent in an attempt at
assassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the
United Kingdom. And early this year, it was used again against
opposition figure Alexei Navalny.
I wonder what we could--you know, it is hard to prove,
right? We are pretty sure, but it is hard to prove. It is kind
of like the coronavirus and the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We
have got some pretty strong opinions about it, but it is hard
to prove them. How can we, or how can the international
community, enforce accountability for State actors who do such
things?
Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Perry, that is a really tough question,
as you know. I mean, just getting to the accountability on this
case, and that is why I mentioned accountability in my previous
comment. A lot of this can be denied. The actual scientific
evidence wasn't necessarily shared immediately with us. We do
now have people in this country that have been provided some of
the samples. So, we are able to get in there and actually do
some of the assessments.
So, as Mr. Lasseter said, a lot of this is about agreements
on information-sharing, so we rapidly come together as allies
to be able to actually put the blame where it is necessary. But
it is a very hard problem, given that we have not spent enough
time and effort in this country on bioattribution. We have
spent years on nuclear attribution, but we have not spent any
time on bioattribution.
Mr. Perry. Yes, watching what happened to Skripal, and now
Navalny, and others, quite honestly, we tend to think that that
happens over there, so to speak, but the U.K. is obviously a
close friend and an ally, and I find that exceptionally
concerning. And I understand. I am sure you are thinking about
it. I just do not know if you had any answers to impart. And
maybe if you have some, you do not want to have them in an open
session.
Did you have something to add there, Mr. La?
Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I would just say that, yes, the further
use--obviously, a chemical weapon--but the further use and
seemingly acceptability across the world has to be confronted.
As Director Oxford said, there is significant effort being put
into this particular incident across the U.S. Government and
across the international community. So, efforts are underway to
at least work on the international norm piece of response.
I would say that, you know, you mentioned threats, and from
the biological threat perspective, although much information
would be required at a higher level, we can say at an
unclassified level that Russia, at least the State Department
has said that there is no way to confirm their adherence to the
Biological Weapons Convention. Pretty certain that China is not
adhering to it, both from an Article I and Article II
perspective. So, it grows and grows in concern, and the help of
Congress and across the interagency is vital to get after these
threats.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And I appreciate--you know, look, I know
it is difficult, and that is why we are here--so, we appreciate
your efforts in this regard and any help that we can offer.
On the non-State actor side, you have got anything from a
recently arrested Canadian woman crossing into the United
States and mailing the President of the United States and a
sheriff in Texas a letter containing ricin. We have seen
similar things in the past.
But we have also seen the Islamic State procure--I think
there was a mustard gas attack in northern Iraq in 2015 and
2016. Now, when I was in Iraq, the stuff was, quite honestly,
fairly prevalent. So, it should be no surprise how they found
that.
But, in those two instances, I am just wondering what is
the status of the illicit chemical weapons trade or bio weapons
trade, or availability of things like ricin, and how you guys
are working with either overseas counterparts or among each
other. I mean, maybe not even overseas, right? Canada is right
across the border. So, what are you guys doing with those type
of things and what is the status of that, the trade?
Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Perry, I can tell you in the Middle
East scenario what we have seen. Through the counterterrorism
activities, we have been able to take most of the chemical
expertise off the battlefield, so to speak. They have tried to
resurrect periodically, but they have not been successful. So,
it is a matter of the expertise.
Ricin has been attempted multiple times. Usually, it has
never gotten to weapons grade. So, maybe we have dodged a
bullet. But there is the need to look across that spectrum, and
the terrorist groups have had this intention. They just have
not had the expertise, and we need to make sure that they do
not gain that expertise.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Dolliff.
Mr. Dolliff. If I could add to that a little bit, on the
diplomatic side, we have worked very closely with international
partners against this particular threat. We also have
programmatic elements working in key States to address the
specific State and the specific set of non-State threats. We
have diplomatic efforts. We have integrated our concerns about
WMD into broader international diplomatic discussions about
counterterrorism.
With regard to your question about trade, we do strengthen
international controls on chemical and biological precursors.
But I will say that, in general, I believe the evidence is that
much of these efforts use chemicals and precursors that are
procured within a State. So, we will continue to tighten up in
that area. But most of it appears home-grown.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield.
Mr. Bera. Let me go ahead and now recognize Chairman
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
okay?
Mr. Bera. Yes, we can.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses again for their testimony and
the important work that you are doing in this area on behalf of
the country.
I want to go back. In my opening statement, I talked about
the concerns I had about the significant cut to the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program. So, compared to the 2020 levels, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was cut by $135 million in
the President's budget request this year. And within that
program, the cooperative biological engagement effort was cut
the most, by over $55 million. So, given the pandemic in which
we find ourselves, we are alarmed by the Department of
Defense's significant cut to this mission of detecting and
confronting biological threats in the United States.
So, I want to begin, Director Oxford, this is a program
that Congress clearly supports. What additional work would DTRA
be able to perform if Congress is, in fact, able to restore the
funding to the fiscal year enacted level, and especially, what
other work would you be able to do under the Bio Threat
Reduction Program, which was cut the most?
And to Mr. Lasseter, I want to know how the Department's
perspective on the importance of the Biological Threat
Reduction Program evolved over the past 6 months of the
pandemic, and how is the Department served to support the
COVID-19 fight?
But let's start with Director Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, based on the House mark, we have looked at the
programs. We would be able to restore activities in 22
countries with the entire House mark. In addition, 15 of those
would be within the BTRP program. We can provide the committees
with the specific examples of what countries would be restored.
Plus, we would be able to restore activities on a regional
basis with EUCOM, CENTCOM, as well as AFRICOM and INDOPACOM.
So, we would be able to restore some of the original emphasis
in this area, which gives us broader coverage across those
regions in question. But we would be able to restore activities
for BTRP in 15 countries as well as those regions I mentioned.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. We are going through, obviously,
the conference process with the Senate, and also, we are
dealing still with Appropriations. But it is our intent to
restore that funding.
Mr. Lasseter, on the question of the 6 months of the
pandemic and how your work has evolved.
Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, if I could add that
we do want to give appreciation--I know the witnesses have--for
the longstanding support that this committee, these
committees--pardon me--and both sides of the Hill, both sides
of the aisle have given toward the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program.
And I would say that the Biological Threat Reduction
Program, as you know, has been operating for over 16 years in
over 30 countries doing great work. As far as the last 16
months, the DoD effort--obviously, the international effort is
led by our colleagues in the State Department----
Mr. Langevin. No, in the last 6 months of it.
Mr. Lasseter [continuing]. And USAID. Yes, sir. And from a
DoD perspective, managed through the Stability and Humanitarian
Affairs Office. And so, they managed it over the course of the
last 6 months and nearly about $100 million in DoD support to
over 100 countries.
As it relates specifically to BTRP, as you know, most of
the support is historical in nature. So, a lot of the training,
a lot of the lab support, has been over the course of this 16
years to these willing partners. And so, that work, that
information flow is what is most vital.
I can say, specifically, for BTRP direct funding in
response to COVID, it is around $7 million. Much of it is PPE,
but a lot of it is training. And it goes back to the historical
relationships with these countries where we provide robust
training and information flow. And so, that has been the focus,
is making sure that these partner countries know they have a
reach back resource and that we can, and Director Oxford's team
can, provide that information to those partner nations.
Mr. Langevin. Director Oxford, let me go back to you,
because we appreciate all DTRA's efforts to lean forward out of
this COVID fight. Can you tell us about the work DTRA has been
doing to help with the COVID R&D effort through Chem-Bio
Defense Program funding? You know, DARPA early on was using its
R&D funding early on to meet the challenge, the crisis.
Describe what you have been able to do. Or have you been
hamstrung because of lack of support of authorities?
Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Chairman, I think a lot of people have
made comparisons between our response to Ebola versus the COVID
threat. The Ebola pathogen was declared as a threat pathogen by
CDC, which allowed DoD to expend its resources against a
threat. COVID-19, considered a pandemic and a disease,
prevented us from using Chem-Bio Defense Program money, but we
have used our expertise in several ways. Using CARES Act money,
we have been able to actually benefit from that.
We have a program underway that is looking at the rapid
assessment of environments. We call it the RATE program. In
this case, using wearable technologies, we are looking at
identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses, not
specifically COVID, but it would give us some advance notice
that an illness may be on the way 48 hours earlier than
projected, so the appropriate testing could take place. So, our
expertise has been applied, but not specifically the Chem-Bio
Defense Funding.
Mr. Langevin. I know my time has expired, but thank you. We
obviously have some work to do in these areas to strengthen the
authorities. You should be able to use those R&D funds at a
time like this, and we will work with you to make sure that
that happens.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from
Washington, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, the first question, I think it is probably for Mr.
Oxford. I was just wondering if you can help us understand with
regards to the biological threat kind of what that role is for
DTRA for a response, and then, what that role is for DTRA in
terms of contributing to the future thinking about what to do.
Are you strictly responding to requests or do you have a role
in planning ahead and proliferating that information about what
to do when you plan ahead?
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
We actually play two roles in the CTR Program. We are
actually not really in a response role, but in the COVID
environment, as Mr. Lasseter said, the years' worth of work
that we had done to prepare some of those nations, they were
able to rapidly respond. They need an infusion of some
capabilities, for example, PPE, test kits, and those kind of
things. Morocco specifically, there were 199 trained laboratory
technicians that we had trained through the CTR Program. So,
with $100,000 worth of PPE, we were able to get them in a
situation where they could start doing the response. So, we are
not really a response program in that regard, but we are able
to benefit from what we have done over the decades or so of
working with them.
In the Chem-Bio Defense Program, we are actually on the
cutting edge of all the research and development. So, we are
looking forward, as we have made reference, to things like
synthetic bio. We fully understand, based on the technical
expertise, what the nefarious ways that synthetic bio can be
used. So, on the flip side, we are also looking for the
offensive advantage we might gain by understanding synthetic
bio, by making detectors better able to resolve things faster.
So, we do have that forward look through the Science and
Technology Program that we operate.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. And, Mr. Lasseter, kind of on that point,
this is two approaches. One is, I noted in your testimony, your
written testimony, you talk about how you are organized in your
role in cooperation with the Department of Defense R&E,
Research and Engineering. Can you discuss that a little bit?
And second--and I do not know if this would be for Mr.
Lasseter or Mr. Oxford--the combination of where emerging
technologies meet, I think that is in Mr. Lasseter's written
testimony, a discussion about drone technology and
dissemination of biological agents. Maybe you could touch on
that, what we ought to be thinking about in the future.
Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congressman Larsen. Appreciate the
questions very much. Very important.
We are spending, you know, quite a bit of time and
resources across the Department. So, I had mentioned research
and engineering, they are vital to the efforts to ensure we
have going forward what we need, what our war fighters need to
fight and win in a contaminated environment.
As Director Oxford noted, the Chem Bio Defense Program is
vital in that. With respect to some of these technologies, they
are concerning. The Department, though, is right-sized and
fitted to respond to them.
So, the way we are organized, at least across the CWMD
enterprise, quite robust. A number of organizations, as you can
imagine, from the Joint Staff, from our policy perspective, the
Combatant Commands for the services.
So, we, we come together fairly regularly in an effort I
think would be highlighted, and it is important for you to know
about, is the CWMD Unity of Effort Council, 3-star level
council. Director Oxford and I, obviously, participate in that.
And in that forum we are able to flow these issues up for
discussion and decision. It is an area that we can get full
information across the Department and make decisions at the
highest level. And so we think that is vital to some of these
issues that you highlight.
Now, obviously, you know, in this setting a little harder
to get into some of those issues. I know you recognize that.
But we are, we are resourced properly and we are right-sized to
go after those threats, sir.
Mr. Larsen. If I could just follow up on part of that. You,
obviously, you do not run DoD's research and engineering, that
is under a division that is pretty high up, obviously, on the
org chart at the Pentagon. Do you have that--not the
opportunity, has R&E come to recognize this as a higher
priority now, or is that something you are having to battle out
with research and engineering in their list of priorities that
they have already had?
Mr. Lasseter. Well, you know, I speak fairly regularly with
Dr. Michelle Rosa who covers down on this issue set. As you
have recognized, a lot of tremendous talent at the Department
across the intelligence community that flows us information on
a daily basis, if not hourly basis.
So, if we need to flex--and that is one thing that Mr.
Oxford, Director Oxford's organization DTRA they are very
agile. So if we need to adjust to go after a threat, we can do
it. But we, we do welcome the interest and support of Congress
in doing so.
Mr. Larsen. Well, we welcome giving you the support and,
more importantly, the interest in doing so. Thanks so much.
Mr. Bera. Thank you.
Let me recognize the gentleman from the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank our witnesses.
I was, as a member of both Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs I want to thank you both for having this joint hearing.
But I want to address, you know, how the sharing that was
mentioned by the witnesses before of information is critical.
And so, I want to ask, as the COVID-19 pandemic progressed
and military intelligence followed it and saw that escalation,
just from a timeframe what, what kinds of levels of alert
occurred in January and February during that period? Was there
a change in the level of alert based on military intelligence
during that period? And did it occur in January and February,
or February?
Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir, for that question.
What I can tell you is that in February Secretary Esper
identified three priorities to combat COVID:
First, being to protect our people;
Second, to maintain mission readiness;
And, three, to ensure that we were supporting the whole of
government effort.
With that came, you know, at least internally within DoD,
different health protection levels. And so pretty early, as you
will probably recall, in March at least as it relates to the
Department of Defense we were put in HRECON situation that
reduced the number of folks present at their jobs. So, with
that information flow did happen, and does happen.
I think we have pointed out to all of us here today that
information flow is vital. While the intelligence community can
collect and does collect information, analyzes it and gets it
out to policymakers, and to include Congress, there must be
flow of information across the entire globe. And it must happen
from all parties and all countries. We cannot expect just the
United States and our allies----
Mr. Keating. To get to the point.
Mr. Lasseter. Yes, sir. Go ahead, please.
Mr. Keating. Was there a level of alert change that
corresponded with that in as early as February?
Mr. Lasseter. Well, sir, as early as February, in March was
when, I believe--and I would have to go back for the exact
date--but that's when the HRECON changed. Obviously over the
course of those months before information was continuing to
flow and the proper, you know, resources applied to analyzing
that information.
Mr. Keating. Was there a change to a Level 1 alert in
February?
Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I----
Mr. Keating. That would have been the first time in our
history that a pandemic raised itself to that level. Did that
occur?
Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I cannot tell you the exact date. I
would need to go back and get that and provide that information
to you and the committee, please.
Mr. Keating. Let's assume that it might have. Would you
transfer that information immediately to our State agencies and
our agencies of State, State Department and Congress?
Mr. Lasseter. Sir, as you know, the intelligence community
is quite large. And so, you know, all the organizations today
have an intelligence portion to them. And so that information
is shared across the intelligence community. I say ``that,''
but information generally is shared across the intelligence
community.
And so, we do that on a daily basis and we flow information
back and forth.
Mr. Keating. I see. Well, my concern is that Congress was
not notified in as timely a fashion to those changes. So, if
you can get back to the respective committees, tie down that
date, and what the significance was. Because it is my
understanding in terms of what is publicly accessible that
there was a change. It is my understanding that it was historic
in terms of the first time a pandemic was addressed with that
level of change.
And I am concerned about the sharing of information, which
was slow to Congress, whether it was also slow to our other
State Department agencies, and relevant agencies, and the
agencies appearing before the committee here today. Because,
indeed, if we are going to do this, what you have said as
witnesses, placing the importance on sharing that information,
it is critical. And it is my concern that that was not being
done in a timely fashion.
So, if you could get back to us, I would appreciate that.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
Let me recognize my good friend from the state of
California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. There has been discussion, I
believe by the first ranking member to the ``complicity'' of
the WHO. The WHO is a coordinating organization, it is not an
intel organization. It has no way to know whether what China is
saying is complete, and true, and transparent or not.
You know who does have an intel organization? The U.S.
Government. And our intelligence is designed to know when China
is not telling the truth.
In fact, the President was informed that this was breaking
out in Wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. He
chose to ignore that, that intelligence, just as he seems to
have ignored, much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his
wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this
disease and, unfortunately, misled millions of Americans as
well into not wearing masks.
We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars defending
ourselves from kinetic threats, and very little on defending
ourselves from anything else. We have--did not have civil
defense designed for either a deliberate or naturally occurring
plague. We did not have stockpiles of PPE. We did not have the
education. We did not have the ventilators, although we quickly
made some. And we did not have the capacity to do tracing.
This all, in spite of the fact that the national security
strategy recognized that biological incidents have the--this
was in 2017--the potential to cause catastrophic loss of life,
and the threats are growing, whether as a result of deliberate
attack, accident, or natural outbreak.
Which raises the question--and I know we are not in a
classified setting--what is the Administration's operating
assumptions or likelihood, or how would we assign percentage
likelihoods to the four possibilities as to how this plague
began?
We are told perhaps it came from the wet market. And it may
have come from the Wuhan lab which might have been engaged in
entirely peaceful activities and had a tragic release. It could
have come from a Wuhan lab that was engaged in military
activities but had an unintentional release. And I think least
likely at all, it could have come deliberately from a Wuhan
lab.
Do we have any operating assumptions? Are all of those
possible? Although I think the deliberate release is highly,
highly unlikely.
What does the Administration, what does the Administration
think is the cause of this?
Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congressman Sherman. It is an
important question.
I think we are, we as an international community but,
obviously, the U.S. Government are still, one, we are working
right now, presently, to respond to this crisis. As you are----
Mr. Sherman. So, you are saying any one of those
possibilities is possible and the U.S. Government does not have
much of an opinion on which is the cause?
Do the other witnesses agree with that? Mr. Moore?
Mr. Moore. Congressman Sherman, thank you for the question.
You have mentioned four possible scenarios. And certainly
in discussions in an open forum there is a--there are varying
levels of possibility. What we do know is that the virus
described as COVID-19 was described in academic research that
was published several years ago, including in the People's
Republic of China, identified as existing in animals. It is a
disease that is a virus of zoonotic origin. But exactly as you
say, sir, there are multiple possible----
Mr. Sherman. So, the idea that it was engineered is
probably dismissed by that.
And I will quickly ask, normally when there is a
catastrophe, the first thing anybody does is you close the barn
door. China has said that this has come from a wet market.
There are wet markets all over China. Has there been a massive
change in how exotic animals are sold for human consumption
throughout China?
Mr. Moore. That is an extremely important point, and also
something under the purview of the OES Bureau at State.
Wildlife trafficking in a huge problem. The People's Republic
of China continues to be the largest market for illegal
wildlife----
Mr. Sherman. Has there been a big change from early 2019 to
now, late 2020, in how these markets operate in China?
Mr. Moore. There has not been a fundamental permanent
change in blocking illegal wildlife trade, including its sale
at wet markets in the People Republic of China. It is a
practice which does exist in other countries as well. And we
are working to end it.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Bera. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for convening
this super-important hearing.
It is no secret to the rest of the world that the COVID-19
pandemic was allowed to spiral out of control when it reached
the United States. Over 200,000 Americans died. Case counts
were falling months ago, but the New York Times reports cases
are climbing at around the same pace as when New York City
cases were skyrocketing way back in March.
The whole world can see this happening, including those who
wish to do harm to our country.
So, let me pose this question to Mr. Oxford and Mr. Moore.
Do you believe that there would be a heightened interest on the
part of State and non-State actors in developing an important
biological weapon against Americans? And if yes, how would the
Department of State and Defense respectively prepare for that
possibility?
Either of you can go first.
Mr. Moore. I apologize, sir. The transmission was a little
imprecise. What exact question would you like me to respond to,
sir?
Mr. Levin. Sorry about that.
My question is do you think there will be a heightened
interest on the part of State and non-State actors in
developing an important biological weapon against Americans?
And if yes, how will the Departments of State and Defense
prepare for that possibility?
Mr. Moore. With regard to the development of biological
weapons, I think that would be better addressed to my colleague
Mr. Doliff from the ISN Bureau.
Mr. Levin. Okay.
Mr. Doliff. This is a difficult question to address in an
unclassified context. I guess what I can say is that we
continually review these issues.
We had a discussion 2 days ago with our colleagues who are
experts on these issues. I think I take your point that the
pandemic, as I testified to, poses a substantial, enormous
challenge to international security. And it must inherently be
the case that our adversaries, whether they are terrorists or
States, will take that into account in considering how to
evolve their weapons systems.
Mr. Levin. All right. Let me put another question.
Since January 2017 the CDC's presence, presence in China
has decreased from about 47 personnel to 14, with
epidemiologist professionals getting cut. The National Science
Foundation and USAID also closed their Beijing offices during
this time. And on top of that, the Department of Agriculture
transferred the manager of animal disease monitoring programs
out of China in 2018.
So, over the past 4 years we have gotten rid of a bunch of
people who, it seems to me, would have been helpful to have in
place as COVID-19 was emerging. At the very least, I think it
would be helpful to have reliable sources of information about
what was really happening on the ground.
Mr. Oxford and Mr. Moore, in general, why does the U.S.
have experts like epidemiologists stationed in other countries?
And how does this help defend us against biological threats?
Mr. Oxford. So, again, from a Defense Department
perspective, especially the implementing organization, you
know, we are not responsible for where CDC and others operate
overseas. So, I would have to yield to the State Department or
go back to those other departments that do those kind of
things.
Mr. Levin. All right, let's hear the State perspective.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. We would be pleased to offer a
more detailed time line of who was assigned under the authority
of the Chief of Mission in Beijing. At what time, I think the
context for individual agencies sending staff there or reducing
their staff there has a lot to do with both their needs, their
budgets, and, of course, the viability of the work that they
can actually do.
One of the constraints we face with regard to the People's
Republic of China is that we still have not received all of the
data. We would need to receive initial samples of the virus
that have been sought since the beginning of the pandemic, even
at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic, as is
the work of the People's Republic of China to prevent the World
Health Organization from declaring COVID-19 a public health
emergency of international concern when that topic initially
came up for discussion at the WHO in Geneva.
With regard to the specific agencies, with apologies, I
would have to take that question.
Mr. Levin. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me close by
saying that I think it is extremely problematic for us to talk
about what the WHO should do when we withdraw from it. I think
it is extremely problematic for us to reduce our capability of
scientific, and diplomatic, and public health experts to the
units in China and around the world during a global pandemic.
And with that, with great thanks I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
Since there are no Republicans in the room right now, the
chair recognizes Ms. Spanberger for 5 minutes.
Well, I think Ms. Spanberger is having some technical
issues.
Well, I am told that there are no other members in the room
right now. So, I would suggest is there, is Mr. Chairman Bera
going to come back after voting and should we recess right now?
I am waiting to hear back from our committee staff.
Mr. Larsen. Well, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Yes?
Mr. Larsen. This is Representative Larsen. I am the only
member in the room right now, and Representative Bera is
voting. And we are trying to get staff to answer your question
about his return.
So, folks, if you just want to----
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. We will not recess right now.
Perhaps just give us a few minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I am going to, what I will do then is I
will ask another question that I have. I do not know if we are
going to get to a second round now. But, until we get that
clarified or Ms. Spanberger comes back on, then I will
certainly yield to her.
But in the meantime let me go to Mr. Lasseter.
So, we have heard that there might have been direction to
not spend Chem Bio Defense Program funding on the COVID-19
fight, which troubles me if true, even though the program
specializes in developing countermeasures and vaccines,
therapeutics, and pre-treatments. What do you need from us to
ensure that you have the authority and the resources needed so
that the Department is in fact prepared to rise to the
challenge of emerging threats both today and tomorrow?
And is there work that you could be doing now to help the
country in the COVID-19 fight that you do not currently have
the authority or permission to do?
Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For you first question or your statement that there is no
Department prohibition or preclusion, I will say that the Chem
Bio Defense Program primary focus is on the statutory
requirements to develop and deliver capabilities that ensure
the war fighter's ability to fight and win in a chemical or
biological contaminated environment.
The COVID-19 support provided to the services and inter-
agency is a combination of subject matter expertise, leveraging
existing contracts to expedite delivery of capabilities, as an
example, assisting with testing and evaluation. From helping to
create detection, diagnostic, and treatment methods to
investigating vaccines, the Chem Bio Defense Program continues
to collaborate with the whole of government partners, and
industry, and academia.
It is important to note that the Chem Bio Defense Program
is a research, development, and acquisition program, and not
necessarily a response capability.
But, I will say to your follow-on question, sir, that the
Congress has been exceptionally helpful to the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program historically, as I referenced earlier,
and over the last number of years. And so, support that we had
asked for is really continued support for the program. We
appreciate the information flow between, you know, our
department, and I think I can say the same for the State
Department. In between our staffs it is exceptional. And we
look forward to continuing that communication flow.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. And no additional authorities that you are
asking for right now that would enhance your work?
Mr. Lasseter. Sir, I think at the moment we are good. I
know that our staffs have communicated historically. And I hope
that they can, can continue to do that--pardon me--and if we do
identify an issue or an authority that is necessary, we will be
absolutely certain to bring that to you and your team.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you. That concludes my questions
for right now.
Has anyone from the minority returned yet, or Ms.
Spanberger, has she returned? Okay.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, Mr. Chairman, this is Rick Larsen again. I
am still the only member in the room.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
I will yield now to Ms. Spanberger if she has returned.
Okay, I understand that she is not on.
Ms. Spanberger. Can you hear me? Can you hear me, Mr.
Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. Yes. I have you now. Go ahead, Ms.
Spanberger, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Spanberger. Excellent.
So, thank you very much to the witnesses for being here. I
appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about
staffing-related issues.
As a former CIA case officer I am aware of the importance
of detecting threats before they actually harm Americans. And
that must be our approach when it comes to biological security
as well. We have to get in front of biological and health
security risks before they can do significant damage like what
we have seen with COVID-19.
And we have to work with our partners so that no matter
where a threat arrives, arises, we can contain it.
And if the offices in charge of preventing and responding
to these threats are understaffed, it is hard for us to get
ahead of that problem. So, I open this up to all members of the
panel.
U.S. national security agencies have long suffered from
high rates of vacancies in the past few years. And given how
long Federal hiring can take, we are likely to receive ripple
effects of this for years. Are vacancies or limited staffing
affecting your work currently? And, in your view, how can State
and DoD reform hiring practices to ramp up to the needed
capacity more quickly?
And a specific call-out on there, do your offices have
trouble finding and recruiting staff with the specialized
skills needed to focus on reducing biological security threats?
And I open it up to the panelists.
Mr. Lasseter. Thank you, Congresswoman Spanberger. It is a
great question. It is an age-old issue employing the right
staff.
I can say from a CWMD perspective, we have an immensely
talented team, full of professionals, from career civilians, to
uniformed personnel, to government contractors. So, it would be
hard to speak across the entire department, me personally doing
that. But I can tell you that we are right-sized. We obviously
always are looking or on the lookout for talent, and so we will
continue to do that and continue to, if we can find talent, to
bring them in the doors.
I will defer to my other colleagues.
Mr. Oxford. Ms. Spanberger, from a different point of view,
we operate a highly technical organization similar to some of
the career fields you are referring to. Our recruitment
strategy is healthy. Our retention rates are healthy. But we
continue to look for additional talent as necessary. But so far
our attribution rates, our rates are going steady.
So, I think in the chem-bio defense area that we operate,
as well as the rest of our R&D organization, our health and
welfare of the R&D community is very sound.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Mr. Moore. Ms. Spanberger, on behalf of the OES Bureau at
the State Department I am very pleased to report we have an
outstanding, very active, and extremely expert team of both
civil service, long-term colleagues, and Foreign Service
colleagues on usually 2-year assignments.
I am pleased to say that in recent months we have been able
to add to our staffing and bring on permanently a number of
colleagues, including fellows from the American Association for
the Advancement of Science. The State Department has a
longstanding cooperation with AAAS so that we benefit from
their technical and professional expertise.
The team is doing an outstanding job of dealing with COVID
on the home front and, of course, working on it professionally.
Thank you.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Mr. Doliff. This is Phil Doliff from State.
So, I think I would echo the remarks of my colleagues. I
think that vacancies have not been a substantial challenge in
our part of the Department on this issue. As I testified, we
have also been increasing our staff. We have added experts,
using the special authority that the Department has provided in
this regard. And we have added to the staffing of the offices
that deal with biological issues.
So, I think in general we do not have staffing challenges.
We, too, have a great partnership and fellowship to bring
us technical expertise. But I think recruiting technical
specialists is sometimes a challenge. And we, that is probably
the one area where at times it has been a bit of a challenge
for us.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much for sharing that. And I
hope the committee can be involved to whatever end is
appropriate in ensuring that you all can into the future
recruit to the staffing levels that are necessary.
I am going to ask for the next question, if you will
indulge me, because it will direct what my follow-up question
is.
By a show of hands, do your teams participate in a war game
exercise to train and prepare potential biological security
risks for even this awkward circumstance with virtual and
present? If you could just raise your hand if you do, because
my follow-up question depends very much on if it is divided or.
[Show of hands.]
Ms. Spanberger. So, I see two and two from here. Three?
Okay.
So, I am curious then with the majority of you
participating in war games, do you and your colleagues draw
upon the modeling and the simulation analysis to think through
what quickly changing threats could look like and how to
respond or be using this for biological threats?
And what have you learned from these tabletop exercises
recently as it relates to COVID-19?
And my time is limited, so if one of you wants to take this
one, I welcome you all to choose who goes next.
Mr. Oxford. So, Congresswoman, this is Mr. Oxford from
DTRA.
One of the things we do to sustain capability overseas with
the people who we have trained over the course of time in bio
responses, we do exercises periodically just to make sure they
are maintaining readiness and the standards that they have been
trained to.
It is one of the ways that we start to transfer the
responsibility of the CPR program to the host nations, but
exercises and training are one of the key aspects of us
understanding that their retention is there.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for the extra time. I yield back.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Spanberger.
Seeing that there are no additional members who have
questions, and it is always difficult in this virtual hybrid
in-person format. And then toss on top of that the voting call.
So, I am going to use the chair's prerogative and just make
a closing statement and then see if Chairman Langevin would
like to make a statement as well. But, actually maybe a closing
question.
The issue of bio-surveillance is something that I thought a
lot about in terms of pandemic preparedness, et cetera,
thinking about how we use some of the naturally occurring
technologies that are out there: social media, search words,
Google, et cetera. Yet, all of a sudden you see a jump in
people searching incidents of fever or flu-like symptoms, et
cetera. Some of that can be early warning systems for us to pay
close attention.
I know wireless thermometers, et cetera, or thinking about
how both in the midst of the pandemic, but then also, you know,
what are early warning systems for naturally occurring threats
and that are likely in use.
I do not know if folks from DoD or State could perhaps
comment on how we should be thinking about that?
Mr. Lasseter. Chairman Bera, it is an exceptional question.
And it is an all-of-above approach. You know, we have all
talked today about the information sharing. That is absolutely
vital. It is fundamental if we are going to ensure that we are
detecting, interdicting, but specifically on this issue
detecting threats and flowing that information really at this
point globally.
And so, you know, it is working with our interagency
colleagues, like we do on a daily basis here. It is also
working with our international friends and partners.
I know Phil Doliff, Dash Doliff had mentioned the Global
Partnership for Spread Against Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Materials. That is a perfect organization. The Global Health
Care Security Agenda is another effort that can provide
information flow to dozens of countries around the world.
So, the all-of-above approach is necessary, and it has to,
it has to apply information flow.
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, as you recall, in one of my
earlier answers I talked about regional approaches. When we
started the CPR Program it was mostly, you know, nation State-
specific, one program/one country. The regional approach allows
for this kind of information sharing across regional
boundaries. So, it enhances the overall protection within
regions as opposed to just looking at this solely by country.
So, it really does help in the broader understanding.
Mr. Doliff. I think the chairman raises a very good point
that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly add
to information sharing and biosurveillance. We wondered in the
pandemic how to expand the toolset that we have to additional
tools.
For example, in Uganda and in Africa there are a whole set
of cell phone-based tools that we had not previously used to
the degree we use now. And so, we are trying to take advantage
of the whole new toolset that is out there.
And I think the global pandemic, I think the chairman noted
that there is great infrastructure being built to deal with
this pandemic, and there are new technologies that are being
integrated in the biosurveillance. And this is a good example
of how we need to build out our capabilities and our data flows
to capture all the information that is available.
Mr. Bera. Well, great. I certainly want to thank all four
of our witnesses for their service to our country. And, again,
you know, make sure everyone is safe. And we will get through
this. But let's get through this in a more resilient way and a
stronger way, and a way that we can protect against the next
pandemic or future bio threats.
I do not know if Chairman Langevin is still on and if he
wants to make any closing statement?
Mr. Langevin. I am here, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your joint collaboration in putting this hearing together. And
I have enjoyed working with you on this. And certainly it is an
important hearing and very timely right now.
I, too, want to thank our witnesses. And, obviously, the
work in your portfolios, whether it is countering weapons of
mass destruction, or the work of DTRA, and our other witnesses,
your portfolios, these are, obviously, essential capabilities
that you bring to the table that are important to the Nation
and, indeed, the world.
So, we have continued work that we are going to continue to
do together. We want to make sure you get properly resources
and that we have the plans and the procedures in place to
respond effectively. And we can rest assured there will be some
future event that we are going to have to confront, and we want
to make sure that we are as prepared as possible and can
respond with the speed and agility that is necessary in order
to save lives, keep people healthy, and protect the country.
So, with that, I deeply thank you for the work you are
doing. I know that members may have additional questions, and I
ask that you respond in writing expeditiously.
With that, I have no further question. And I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
And, again, our thoughts and prayers are with everybody
around the world who is impacted by COVID-19, and certainly
with our President and First Lady, and the First Family.
And with that, again I want to thank the witnesses for
being here this morning, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BERA
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STATEMENT OF LANGEVIN
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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