

**MARKUP OF H.R. 6986, 7990, 7673,
8409, 4507, 8428, 8405, 8259, 4636,
4326, 7954, 8438, H.Res. 1012, 697,
1100, 751, 1077, 672, 17, 823, 996,
958, 825, 1121, 1115, 768, 1150, 1145**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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1012, 697, 1100, 751, 1077, 672, 17, 823, 996, 958,
825, 1121, 1115, 768, 1150, 1145**

Thursday, October 1, 2020

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Washington, DC,

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Mr. ENGEL. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point. Pursuant to Committee Rule 4, the chair may postpone further proceedings on approving any measure or matter or adopting an amendment.

Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous material subject to the length limitations in the rules on today's business. To insert something into the record, please have your staff email the previously mentioned address, or contact full committee staff.

As a reminder, the members, staff, and all others physically present in this room, per guidance from the Office of Attending Physician, masks must be worn at all times during today's markup except when a member is speaking at a microphone. Please also sanitize your seating area. The chair views these measures as a safety issue and, therefore, an important matter of order and decorum for this proceeding.

As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your video function on at all times even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with H.Res. 965 and the accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members, as appropriate, when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.

I see that we have a quorum. As members were notified yesterday, we intend to first consider 26 measures and their amendments en bloc, then we will move on to consider the remaining measures and their amendments. Any roll call votes will be rolled to the end of the markup.

Pursuant to the notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up the measures and their amendments that were previously circulated to member offices, which, without objection, will be considered en bloc and each measure is considered as read, and the amendments to each are considered as read and are agreed to.

Without objection, after remarks, the committee will vote to order the measures favorably reported en bloc, as amended, if amended, and each amendment on to each bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The measures in the en bloc package are: H.R. 6986, Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act; H.R. 7990, FENTANYL Results Act; H.Res.1012, Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the transformation of the United States-Korea Alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership.

H.Res.697, Recognizing the significance of a genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding; H.Res.1100, Reaffirming the strategic relationship between the United States and Mongolia and observing the 30th anniversary of democracy in Mongolia; H.Res.751, Reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the African Union and recognizing the importance of diplomatic, security, and trade relations.

H.Res.1077, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the continued importance of the United States-Lebanon relationship; H.R. 8409, Department of State Student Internship Program Act; H.Res.672, Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security.

H.Res.17, Expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice, and for other purposes; H.Res.823, Condemning the Government of Iran's State-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights; H.Res.996, Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners.

H.Res.958, Condemning the practice of politically motivated imprisonment and calling for the immediate release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and urging action by the U.S. Government to impose sanctions with respect to persons responsible for that form of human rights abuse; H.R. 8428, Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act of 2020; H.R. 8405, American Values and Security in International Athletics Act.

H.R. 8259, To prohibit Russian participation in the G7, and for other purposes; H.Res.825, Recognizing the importance of entry into force of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT; H.R. 4636, Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International Cleaner Seas Act; H.Res.1121, Urging the Government of Burma to hold free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections on November 8th, 2020.

H.Res.1115, Calling for the immediate release of Trevor Reed, a United States citizen who was unjustly sentenced to 9 years in a Russian prison; H.Res.768, Calling on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa; H.Res.1150, Urging the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, opposition

leaders, and all citizens to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in October 2020.

H.Res.1145, Condemning the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and calling for a robust United States and international response; H.R. 4236, Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act; H.R. 7954, Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020; H.R. 8438, to reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

[The Bills and Amendments offered en bloc follow:]

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6986

To encourage the protection and promotion of internationally recognized human rights during the novel coronavirus pandemic, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 22, 2020

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. MALINOWSKI, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. BILIRAKIS, and Mr. RASKIN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To encourage the protection and promotion of internationally recognized human rights during the novel coronavirus pandemic, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Protecting Human
5 Rights During Pandemic Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The United States led the drafting of the
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which en-

1 shrines the commitment of countries around the
2 world to the protection and promotion of universal
3 human rights and values that are indispensable for
4 human dignity, including the rights to life, liberty,
5 security of person, freedom of movement, religion,
6 speech, peaceful assembly, association, freedom of
7 expression and the press, and freedom from arbi-
8 trary detention, discrimination, or invasion of pri-
9 vacy.

10 (2) Authorities in more than 83 countries, in-
11 cluding the United States, have declared states of
12 emergency and restricted the movement of people
13 due to the threat of the novel coronavirus, which
14 causes COVID-19, and which the World Health Or-
15 ganization designated a global pandemic on March
16 11, 2020.

17 (3) During public health emergencies, it may be
18 necessary and appropriate for governments to take
19 extraordinary action to halt the spread of disease
20 through steps such as restricting the movement of
21 people, closing businesses, and limiting access to
22 public spaces.

23 (4) States are legally obligated to continue to
24 protect the human rights of their citizens at all
25 times, subject to the principles of limitation and

1 derogation, even and especially during national
2 emergencies.

3 (5) In many countries with COVID–19 cases,
4 governments have taken steps that violate the
5 human rights of their citizens without clear scientific
6 or public health justifications, or any end date or
7 functional oversight.

8 (6) In some countries, including China and
9 Russia, governments are using existing and emerg-
10 ing surveillance technologies, including artificial in-
11 telligence and facial recognition software, without
12 appropriate safeguards, which violates the human
13 rights of their citizens, such as the rights to privacy
14 and freedom of movement, while claiming such ac-
15 tions are necessary to combat the novel coronavirus.

16 (7) In some countries, including Azerbaijan, El
17 Salvador, Hungary, Kazakhstan, and the Phil-
18 ippines, governments with a history of repressing
19 human rights are exploiting the current crisis to
20 consolidate power, sideline representative legislative
21 bodies, and silence criticism.

22 (8) In several countries, including Algeria,
23 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Hon-
24 duras, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Russia, South Africa,
25 Tajikistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey,

1 Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, govern-
2 ments have restricted the ability of journalists and
3 other individuals to distribute or publish information
4 related to the novel coronavirus, including by impos-
5 ing criminal penalties, which violates the universal
6 human rights of free speech and freedom of the
7 press, and limits people’s access to information.

8 (9) Governments in countries with a history of
9 discrimination against minority populations, includ-
10 ing India and Uganda, have used the novel
11 coronavirus pandemic response to further discrimi-
12 nate against vulnerable populations.

13 (10) Actions taken by foreign governments,
14 under the guise of the coronavirus, that weaken
15 democratic institutions and restrict internationally
16 recognized human rights, contrary to the principles
17 of limitation and derogation, pose a threat to the
18 health, economic, and national security interests of
19 the United States.

20 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that—

22 (1) the United States should lead the inter-
23 national community in its efforts to respond to the
24 novel coronavirus pandemic;

1 (2) the United States, in implementing emer-
2 gency policies at home and through its diplomacy
3 and foreign assistance abroad, should promote the
4 protection of internationally recognized human
5 rights during and after the coronavirus pandemic;

6 (3) the Department of State and the United
7 States Agency for International Development (re-
8 ferred to in this Act as“ USAID”) should provide
9 assistance and implement programs, directly or
10 through nongovernmental organizations or inter-
11 national organizations, that—

12 (A) support democratic institutions, civil
13 society, free media, and other internationally
14 recognized human rights during, and in the
15 aftermath of, the novel coronavirus pandemic;
16 and

17 (B) ensure attention to countries in which
18 the government’s response to the pandemic vio-
19 lated human rights and democratic norms; and

20 (4) in implementing emergency policies in re-
21 sponse to the novel coronavirus pandemic—

22 (A) governments should fully respect and
23 comply with internationally recognized human
24 rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and
25 security of the person, the freedoms of move-

1 ment, religion, speech, peaceful assembly, asso-
2 ciation, freedom of expression and of the press,
3 and the freedom from arbitrary detention, dis-
4 crimination, or invasion of privacy;

5 (B) emergency restrictions or powers that
6 impact internationally recognized human rights,
7 including the rights to freedom of assembly, as-
8 sociation, and movement should be—

9 (i) narrowly tailored, proportionate,
10 and necessary to the government's legiti-
11 mate goal of ending the pandemic;

12 (ii) limited in duration;

13 (iii) clearly communicated to the pop-
14 ulation;

15 (iv) subject to independent govern-
16 ment oversight; and

17 (v) implemented in a nondiscrim-
18 inatory and fully transparent manner;

19 (C) governments—

20 (i) should not place any limits or
21 other restrictions on, or criminalize, the
22 free flow of information; and

23 (ii) should make all efforts to provide
24 and maintain open access to the internet
25 and other communications platforms;

1 (D) emergency measures should not dis-
2 criminate against any segment of the popu-
3 lation, including minorities, vulnerable individ-
4 uals, and marginalized groups;

5 (E) monitoring systems put in place to
6 track and reduce the impact of the novel
7 coronavirus should, at a minimum—

8 (i) abide by privacy best practices in-
9 volving data anonymization and aggrega-
10 tion;

11 (ii) be administered in an open and
12 transparent manner;

13 (iii) be scientifically justified and nec-
14 essary to limit the spread of disease;

15 (iv) be employed for a limited dura-
16 tion of time in correspondence with the
17 system's public health objective;

18 (v) be subject to independent over-
19 sight;

20 (vi) incorporate reasonable data secu-
21 rity measures; and

22 (vii) be firewalled from other commer-
23 cial and governmental uses, such as law
24 enforcement and the enforcement of immi-
25 gration policies; and

1 (F) governments should take every feasible
2 measure to protect the administration of free
3 and fair elections.

4 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

5 It is the policy of the United States—

6 (1) to encourage the protection and promotion
7 of internationally recognized human rights at home
8 and abroad at all times and especially during the
9 novel coronavirus pandemic;

10 (2) to support freedom of expression and free-
11 dom of the press in the United States and elsewhere,
12 which freedoms are critical to ensuring public dis-
13 semination of, and access to, accurate information
14 about the novel coronavirus pandemic, including in-
15 formation authorities need to enact science-based
16 policies that limit the spread and impact of the
17 virus, while protecting human rights;

18 (3) to support multilateral efforts to address
19 the novel coronavirus pandemic; and

20 (4) to oppose the use of the novel coronavirus
21 pandemic as a justification for the enactment of
22 laws and policies that use states of emergency to vio-
23 late or otherwise restrict the human rights of citi-
24 zens, inconsistent with the principles of limitation
25 and derogation, and without clear scientific or public

1 health justifications, including the coercive, arbitrary,
2 arbitrary, disproportionate, or unlawful use of surveillance
3 technology.

4 **SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.**

5 In this Act:

6 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional
7 committees” means—
8

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
10 the Senate;

11 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
12 the Senate;

13 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
14 the House of Representatives; and

15 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
16 the House of Representatives.

17 (2) **INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.**—The term “internationally recognized
18 human rights” means—
19

20 (A) the human rights enshrined in the
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to life, liberty, security of person,
22 the freedom of movement, religion, speech,
23 peaceful assembly, association, freedom of expression and the press, the freedom from arbitrary
24
25

1 trary detention, discrimination, or invasion of
2 privacy; and

3 (B) all other rights indispensable for
4 human dignity.

5 **SEC. 6. FUNDING FOR PROGRAMS AND COUNTRIES.**

6 (a) PROGRAM PRIORITIES.—Amounts appropriated
7 pursuant to section 9 may be made available for fiscal
8 years 2020 through 2025, to carry out the Foreign Assist-
9 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including pro-
10 grams to support democratic institutions, freedom of the
11 press, civil society, and human rights defenders in coun-
12 tries where government measures taken in response to the
13 novel coronavirus pandemic, including emergency meas-
14 ures, violated or seriously undermined internationally rec-
15 ognized human rights according to the principles set forth
16 in section 3(4). Programs carried out under this sub-
17 section shall be designed—

18 (1) to strengthen and support all internationally
19 recognized human rights, freedom of the press,
20 human rights defenders, and civil society; and

21 (2) to restore and strengthen democratic insti-
22 tutions.

23 (b) STRATEGY.—

24 (1) INITIAL STRATEGY.—Not later than 30
25 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

1 Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID
2 shall jointly submit an initial strategy for carrying
3 out the programs referred to in subsection (a) to the
4 appropriate congressional committees.

5 (2) STRATEGIC PLAN.—Not later than 90 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
7 retary of State and the Administrator of USAID
8 shall submit a 5-year strategic plan to the appro-
9 priate congressional committees that lays out the
10 steps the Department of State and USAID will take,
11 through diplomacy and foreign assistance, to address
12 the persistent issues related to internationally recog-
13 nized human rights in the aftermath of the novel
14 coronavirus response, including identifying the re-
15 sources necessary to implement such strategic plan.

16 (c) CONDITIONING OF SECURITY SECTOR ASSIST-
17 ANCE.—Section 502B(a)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act
18 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304) is amended—

19 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or” at
20 the end;

21 (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period
22 at the end and inserting “; or”; and

23 (3) by adding at the end the following:

24 “(C) has engaged in the systematic viola-
25 tion of internationally recognized human rights

1 through the use of emergency laws, policies, or
2 administrative procedures.”.

3 **SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.**

4 (a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
6 State shall publish on the Department of State website,
7 and submit to the appropriate congressional committees,
8 a report that describes—

9 (1) for each country and territory included in
10 the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
11 tices, whether and how each country or territory has
12 adhered to the principles set forth in section 3(4) in
13 responding to the novel coronavirus pandemic;

14 (2) with regard to each country in which the re-
15 sponse to the novel coronavirus pandemic violated or
16 seriously undermined internationally recognized
17 human rights in a manner inconsistent with the
18 principles of limitation and derogation, a description
19 of—

20 (A) the actions of the United States Gov-
21 ernment to address such restrictions through
22 diplomacy and the use of foreign assistance;
23 and

1 (B) any efforts made by each country to
2 respond to and resolve such human rights con-
3 cerns;

4 (3) with regard to each country in which the re-
5 sponse to the coronavirus pandemic violated or seri-
6 ously undermined internationally recognized human
7 rights, a description of the impact of noncompliant
8 policies on—

9 (A) the population’s access to health care
10 services;

11 (B) the population’s access to services for
12 survivors of violence and abuse;

13 (C) women and ethnic, religious, sexual,
14 and other minority, vulnerable, or marginalized
15 populations; and

16 (D) the government’s efforts and ability to
17 control the pandemic;

18 (4) whether any foreign person or persons with-
19 in a country have been determined to have com-
20 mitted gross violations of internationally recognized
21 human rights during the novel coronavirus pandemic
22 response, including any sanctions imposed on such
23 persons in accordance with United States law;

24 (5) actions taken by the Global Engagement
25 Center established under section 1287 of the Na-

1 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) to counter
3 disinformation related to the novel coronavirus pan-
4 demic; and

5 (6) the United States Government's efforts
6 around the world—

7 (A) to counter disinformation related to
8 the novel coronavirus pandemic; and

9 (B) to disseminate accurate information
10 about the pandemic.

11 (b) MONTHLY REPORTS.—Not later than 30 days
12 after the publication of the report required under sub-
13 section (a), and monthly thereafter until the date that is
14 60 days after the date on which the World Health Organi-
15 zation declares that the novel coronavirus pandemic has
16 ended, the Department of State and the United States
17 Agency for International Development shall provide, to the
18 appropriate congressional committees—

19 (1) a briefing containing updates on any new
20 developments related to issues covered in the report
21 published under subsection (a); and

22 (2) a list of the countries that have removed
23 coronavirus-related emergency restrictions impacting
24 internationally recognized human rights, including
25 details regarding the restrictions that were removed.

1 (c) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after
2 the date on which the World Health Organization declares
3 that the novel coronavirus pandemic has ended, the Sec-
4 retary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
5 congressional committees that—

6 (1) lists the countries whose emergency meas-
7 ures or other legal actions limiting internationally
8 recognized human rights in a manner inconsistent
9 with the principles of limitation and derogation ex-
10 tended beyond the end of the pandemic;

11 (2) describes such countries' emergency meas-
12 ures, including—

13 (A) how such procedures violate or seri-
14 ously undermine internationally recognized
15 human rights; and

16 (B) an analysis of the impact of such
17 measures on—

18 (i) the government's efforts and abil-
19 ity to control the pandemic within the
20 country;

21 (ii) the population's access to health
22 care services;

23 (iii) the population's access to services
24 for survivors of violence and abuse; and

1 (iv) women and ethnic, religious, sexual,
2 and other minority, vulnerable, or
3 marginalized populations;

4 (3) describes—

5 (A) any surveillance measures implemented
6 or utilized by the governments of such countries
7 as part of the novel coronavirus pandemic response;
8

9 (B) the extent to which such measures
10 have been, or have not been, rolled back; and

11 (C) whether and how such measures impact
12 internationally recognized human rights;
13 and

14 (4) indicates whether any foreign person or persons
15 within a country have been determined to have
16 committed gross violations of internationally recognized
17 human rights during the novel coronavirus pandemic
18 response, including a description of any
19 resulting sanctions imposed on such persons under
20 United States law.

21 **SEC. 8. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 116(f)(1) of the Foreign
23 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(f)(1)) is amended—
24 ed—

1 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as sub-
2 paragraph (D); and

3 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the fol-
4 lowing:

5 “(C) A description of—

6 “(i) any misuse by the government of such
7 country of any emergency powers;

8 “(ii) any failure by the government of such
9 country—

10 “(I) to state the specific duration of
11 the powers referred to in clause (i);

12 “(II) to clearly articulate the purposes
13 of such powers; or

14 “(III) to notify the United Nations re-
15 garding the use of such powers, as re-
16 quired by applicable treaty;

17 “(iii) any failure by the government of
18 such country—

19 “(I) to abide by the stated purposes of
20 the powers referred to in clause (i); or

21 “(II) to cease the use of such powers
22 after any specified term expires;

23 “(iv) any violations by the government of
24 such country of non-derogable rights;

1 “(v) any discriminatory implementation by
2 such government of the powers referred to in
3 clause (i);

4 “(vi) the impact of such powers on the ac-
5 cess of the people of such country to health care
6 services; and

7 “(vii) any development and proliferation of
8 surveillance technologies in such country, in-
9 cluding new or emerging technologies used by
10 the government of such country in the surveil-
11 lance of civilian populations in ways that are in-
12 consistent with the standards described in sec-
13 tion 3(4)(E)(i) through (vii) of the Protecting
14 Human Rights During Pandemic Act.”.

15 (b) HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 502B(b) of the For-
17 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(b)) is
18 amended by inserting “Each report under this sec-
19 tion shall include the information described in sec-
20 tion 116(f)(1)(C).” after “the Secretary of State.”.

21 (2) BRIEFING.—The Assistant Secretary of
22 State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
23 shall be available to brief the Committee on Foreign
24 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
25 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives regard-

1 ing the annual Country Reports on Human Rights
2 Practices during the 90-day period beginning on the
3 date on which the reports are released.

4 **SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

5 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
6 as may be necessary to carry out—

- 7 (1) the strategy described in section 6(b)(1);
8 (2) the 5-year strategic plan described in sec-
9 tion 6(b)(2); and
10 (3) the reporting requirements set forth in sec-
11 tion 7.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 6986
OFFERED BY MRS. WAGNER OF MISSOURI**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Protecting Human
3 Rights During Pandemic Act”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) The United States led the drafting of the
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which en-
8 shrines the commitment of countries around the
9 world to the protection and promotion of universal
10 human rights and values that are indispensable for
11 human dignity, including the rights to life, liberty,
12 security of person, freedom of movement, religion,
13 speech, peaceful assembly, association, freedom of
14 expression and the press, and freedom from arbi-
15 trary detention, discrimination, or invasion of pri-
16 vacy.

17 (2) Authorities around the world, including in
18 the United States, have declared states of emergency

1 and restricted the movement of people due to the
2 threat of the novel coronavirus, which causes
3 COVID-19, and which the World Health Organiza-
4 tion designated a global pandemic on March 11,
5 2020.

6 (3) During public health emergencies, it may be
7 necessary and appropriate for governments to take
8 extraordinary action to halt the spread of disease
9 through steps such as restricting the movement of
10 people, closing businesses, and limiting access to
11 public spaces.

12 (4) Countries are legally obligated to continue
13 to protect the human rights of their citizens at all
14 times, subject to the principles of limitation and
15 derogation, even and especially during national
16 emergencies.

17 (5) In many countries with COVID-19 cases,
18 governments have taken steps that violate the
19 human rights of their citizens without clear scientific
20 or public health justifications, or any end date or
21 functional oversight.

22 (6) In some countries, governments are using
23 existing and emerging surveillance technologies, in-
24 cluding artificial intelligence and facial recognition
25 software, without appropriate safeguards, violating

1 human rights such as the rights to privacy and free-
2 dom of movement while claiming that such actions
3 are necessary to combat the novel coronavirus.

4 (7) In some countries, governments with a his-
5 tory of repressing human rights are exploiting the
6 current crisis to consolidate power, sideline rep-
7 resentative legislative bodies, and silence criticism.

8 (8) In several countries, governments have re-
9 stricted the ability of journalists and other individ-
10 uals to distribute or publish information related to
11 the novel coronavirus, including by imposing crimi-
12 nal penalties, which violates the universal human
13 rights of free speech and freedom of the press, and
14 limits people's access to information.

15 (9) Governments in countries with a history of
16 discrimination against minority populations have
17 used the novel coronavirus pandemic response to fur-
18 ther discriminate against such vulnerable popu-
19 lations.

20 (10) Actions taken by foreign governments
21 under the guise of the coronavirus that weaken
22 democratic institutions and restrict internationally
23 recognized human rights contrary to the principles
24 of limitation and derogation pose a threat to the

1 health, economic, and national security interests of
2 the United States.

3 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the United States should lead the inter-
6 national community in its efforts to respond to the
7 novel coronavirus pandemic;

8 (2) the United States, in implementing emer-
9 gency policies at home and through its diplomacy,
10 foreign assistance, and security cooperation abroad,
11 should promote the protection of internationally rec-
12 ognized human rights during and after the
13 coronavirus pandemic;

14 (3) foreign and security sector assistance pro-
15 vided by the Department of State and the United
16 States Agency for International Development
17 (“USAID”), whether directly or through nongovern-
18 mental or international organizations, should—

19 (A) support democratic institutions, civil
20 society, free media, and other internationally
21 recognized human rights during, and in the
22 aftermath of, the novel coronavirus pandemic;

23 (B) include nongovernmental entities in
24 countries in which the government’s response to

1 the pandemic violated human rights and demo-
2 cratic norms; and

3 (C) provide incentives to foreign military
4 and security force units to abide by their
5 human rights obligations, and in no way con-
6 tribute to human rights violations; and

7 (4) in implementing emergency policies in re-
8 sponse to the novel coronavirus pandemic—

9 (A) governments should fully respect and
10 comply with internationally recognized human
11 rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and
12 security of the person, the freedoms of move-
13 ment, religion, speech, peaceful assembly, asso-
14 ciation, freedom of expression and of the press,
15 and the freedom from arbitrary detention, dis-
16 crimination, or invasion of privacy;

17 (B) emergency restrictions or powers that
18 impact internationally recognized human rights,
19 including the rights to freedom of assembly, as-
20 sociation, and movement should be—

21 (i) grounded in law, narrowly tailored,
22 proportionate, and necessary to the govern-
23 ment's legitimate goal of ending the pan-
24 demic;

25 (ii) limited in duration;

1 (iii) clearly communicated to the pop-
2 ulation;

3 (iv) subject to independent govern-
4 ment oversight; and

5 (v) implemented in a nondiscrim-
6 inatory and fully transparent manner;

7 (C) governments—

8 (i) should not place any limits or
9 other restrictions on, or criminalize, the
10 free flow of information; and

11 (ii) should make all efforts to provide
12 and maintain open access to the internet
13 and other communications platforms;

14 (D) emergency measures should not dis-
15 criminate against any segment of the popu-
16 lation, including minorities, vulnerable individ-
17 uals, and marginalized groups;

18 (E) monitoring systems put in place to
19 track and reduce the impact of the novel
20 coronavirus should, at a minimum—

21 (i) abide by privacy best practices in-
22 volving data anonymization and aggrega-
23 tion;

24 (ii) be administered in an open and
25 transparent manner;

- 1 (iii) be scientifically justified and nec-
2 essary to limit the spread of disease;
- 3 (iv) be employed for a limited dura-
4 tion of time in correspondence with the
5 system's public health objective;
- 6 (v) be subject to independent over-
7 sight;
- 8 (vi) incorporate reasonable data secu-
9 rity measures; and
- 10 (vii) be firewalled from other commer-
11 cial and governmental uses, such as law
12 enforcement and the enforcement of immi-
13 gration policies; and
- 14 (F) governments should take every feasible
15 measure to protect the administration of free
16 and fair elections.

17 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 It is the policy of the United States to—

- 19 (1) encourage the protection and promotion of
20 internationally recognized human rights at home and
21 abroad at all times;
- 22 (2) support freedom of expression and freedom
23 of the press in the United States and elsewhere,
24 which are critical to ensuring public dissemination
25 of, and access to, accurate information about the

1 novel coronavirus pandemic, including information
2 authorities need to enact science-based policies that
3 limit the spread and impact of the virus, while pro-
4 tecting human rights;

5 (3) support multilateral efforts to address the
6 novel coronavirus pandemic; and

7 (4) oppose the use of the novel coronavirus pan-
8 demic as a justification for the enactment of emer-
9 gency laws, policies, or other administrative meas-
10 ures to violate or otherwise restrict the human rights
11 of citizens in a manner that is inconsistent with the
12 principles of limitation and derogation and without
13 clear scientific or public health justifications, includ-
14 ing the coercive, arbitrary, disproportionate, or un-
15 lawful use of surveillance technology.

16 **SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.**

17 (a) REPORT ON COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.—
18 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
19 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
20 the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agen-
21 cies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
22 tees a report on all actions taken by the United States
23 Government to counter disinformation and disseminate ac-
24 curate information abroad related to the novel coronavirus
25 pandemic.

1 (b) REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.—Not later than 90
2 days after the date on which the World Health Organiza-
3 tion declares that the novel coronavirus pandemic has
4 ended, and having consulted with the appropriate congres-
5 sional committees, the Secretary of State shall submit to
6 the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

7 (1) identifies the countries in which emergency
8 measures or other legal actions taken in response to
9 the novel coronavirus pandemic were inconsistent
10 with the principles described in section 3(4) or oth-
11 erwise limited internationally recognized human
12 rights in a manner inconsistent with the principles
13 of limitation and derogation;

14 (2) identifies the countries in which such meas-
15 ures or actions continued beyond the end of the
16 novel coronavirus pandemic;

17 (3) with respect to each country identified pur-
18 suant to paragraph (1), describes such emergency
19 measures, including—

20 (A) the manner and extent to which such
21 measures violated or seriously undermined
22 internationally recognized human rights; and

23 (B) the impact of such measures on—

1 (i) the government's efforts and abil-
2 ity to control the pandemic within the
3 country;

4 (ii) the population's access to health
5 care services;

6 (iii) the population's access to services
7 for survivors of violence and abuse; and

8 (iv) women, ethnic, religious, sexual,
9 and other minority, vulnerable, or
10 marginalized populations;

11 (4) describes—

12 (A) any surveillance measures implemented
13 or used by the governments of such countries as
14 part of the novel coronavirus pandemic re-
15 sponse;

16 (B) the extent to which such measures
17 have been, or have not been, rolled back; and

18 (C) whether and how such measures im-
19 pact internationally recognized human rights;

20 (5) indicates whether the United States has de-
21 termined that any foreign persons in such country
22 have committed gross violations of internationally
23 recognized human rights in the course of responding
24 to the novel coronavirus pandemic, including a de-

1 description of any United States sanctions imposed on
2 such persons; and

3 (6) provides recommendations relating to the
4 steps the United States Government should take,
5 through diplomacy and foreign assistance to address
6 the persistent issues related to the violation of inter-
7 nationally recognized human rights in the aftermath
8 of the novel coronavirus pandemic.

9 (c) STRATEGIC PLANNING.—The Secretary of State
10 and the Administrator of USAID shall ensure that—

11 (1) the findings of the reports submitted pursu-
12 ant to subsections (a) and (b) and the recommenda-
13 tions developed in accordance with paragraph (6) of
14 subsection (b) are taken into consideration in annual
15 and multiyear strategic planning processes for each
16 of fiscal years 2021 through 2026; and

17 (2) the annual and multiyear strategic plans of
18 the Department of State and of USAID address the
19 persistent issues related to the violation of inter-
20 nationally recognized human rights in the aftermath
21 of the novel coronavirus pandemic.

22 **SEC. 6. FUNDING FOR PROGRAMS AND COUNTRIES.**

23 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of
24 fiscal years 2021 through 2026 such sums as may be nec-
25 essary to carry out programs pursuant to the Foreign As-

1 sistence Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to support
2 democratic institutions, freedom of the press, civil society,
3 and human rights defenders in countries in which govern-
4 ment measures taken in response to the novel coronavirus
5 pandemic, including emergency measures, violated or seri-
6 ously undermined internationally recognized human rights
7 according to the principles set forth in section 3(4). Such
8 programs shall be designed to—

9 (1) strengthen and support all internationally
10 recognized human rights, freedom of the press,
11 human rights defenders, and civil society; and

12 (2) restore and strengthen democratic institu-
13 tions.

14 **SEC. 7. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.**

15 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as
16 follows:

17 (1) In section 116 (22 U.S.C. 2151n), by add-
18 ing at the end the following new subsection:

19 “(h) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DUE TO MISUSE
20 OF EMERGENCY POWERS.—The report required by sub-
21 section (d) shall include, wherever applicable, a description
22 of any misuse by the government of any country of any
23 emergency powers or measures resulting in a violation of
24 or seriously undermining internationally recognized

1 human rights in a manner inconsistent with the principles
2 of limitation and derogation.”.

3 (2) In section 502B(b) (22 U.S.C. 2304(b)),
4 by—

5 (A) redesignating the second subsection (i)
6 (relating to child marriage) as subsection (j);
7 and

8 (B) adding at the end the following new
9 subsection:

10 “(k) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DUE TO MISUSE
11 OF EMERGENCY POWERS.—The report required by sub-
12 section (b) shall include, wherever applicable, a description
13 of any misuse by the government of any country of any
14 emergency powers or measures resulting in a violation of
15 or seriously undermining internationally recognized
16 human rights in a manner inconsistent with the principles
17 of limitation and derogation.”.

18 **SEC. 8. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
19 **FINED.**

20 In this Act:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
22 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees” means—

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14

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
2 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
3 resentatives; and

4 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
5 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7990

To prioritize efforts of the Department of State to combat international trafficking in covered synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 7, 2020

Mr. TRONE (for himself and Mr. McCAUL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To prioritize efforts of the Department of State to combat international trafficking in covered synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Fighting Emerging
5 Narcotics Through Additional Nations to Yield Lasting
6 Results Act” or the “FENTANYL Results Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS OF THE DEPART-**
2 **MENT OF STATE TO COMBAT INTER-**
3 **NATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN COVERED SYN-**
4 **THETIC DRUGS.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
6 prioritize efforts of the Department of State to combat
7 international trafficking in covered synthetic drugs by car-
8 rying out programs and activities to include the following:

9 (1) Supporting increased data collection by the
10 United States and foreign countries through in-
11 creased drug use surveys among populations, in-
12 creased use of wastewater testing where appropriate,
13 and multilateral sharing of that data.

14 (2) Engaging in increased consultation and
15 partnership with international drug agencies, includ-
16 ing the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
17 Drug Addiction, and regulatory agencies in foreign
18 countries.

19 (3) Carrying out the program to provide assist-
20 ance to build the capacity of foreign law enforcement
21 agencies with respect to covered synthetic drugs, as
22 required by section 3.

23 (4) Carrying out exchange programs for govern-
24 mental and nongovernmental personnel in the
25 United States and in foreign countries to provide
26 educational and professional development on demand

1 reduction matters relating to the illicit use of nar-
2 cotics and other drugs, as required by section 4.

3 (b) REPORT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
7 gressional committees a report on the implementa-
8 tion of this section.

9 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
11 propriate congressional committees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
13 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
14 of Representatives; and

15 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
16 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
17 Senate.

18 **SEC. 3. PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO BUILD THE**
19 **CAPACITY OF FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT**
20 **AGENCIES WITH RESPECT TO COVERED SYN-**
21 **THETIC DRUGS.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 660 of
23 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420), the
24 Secretary of State shall establish a program to provide as-
25 sistance to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies

1 of the countries described in subsection (c) to help such
2 agencies to identify, track, and improve their forensics de-
3 tection capabilities with respect to covered synthetic drugs.

4 (b) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall
5 prioritize assistance under subsection (a) among those
6 countries described in subsection (c) in which such assist-
7 ance would have the most impact in reducing illicit use
8 of covered synthetic drugs in the United States.

9 (c) COUNTRIES DESCRIBED.—The foreign countries
10 described in this subsection are—

11 (1) countries that are producers of covered syn-
12 thetic drugs;

13 (2) countries whose pharmaceutical and chem-
14 ical industries are being exploited for development or
15 procurement of precursors of covered synthetic
16 drugs; or

17 (3) major drug-transit countries as defined by
18 the Secretary of State.

19 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
20 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry
21 out this section \$4,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
22 2021 through 2025.

1 **SEC. 4. EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR GOVERNMENTAL AND**
2 **NONGOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL TO PRO-**
3 **VIDE EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DE-**
4 **VELOPMENT ON DEMAND REDUCTION MAT-**
5 **TERS RELATING TO ILLICIT USE OF NAR-**
6 **COTICS AND OTHER DRUGS.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall carry
8 out an exchange program for governmental and non-
9 governmental personnel in the United States and foreign
10 countries to provide educational and professional develop-
11 ment on demand reduction matters relating to the illicit
12 use of narcotics and other drugs.

13 (b) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The program re-
14 quired by subsection (a)—

15 (1) shall be limited to individuals who have ex-
16 pertise and experience in matters described in sub-
17 section (a);

18 (2) in the case of inbound exchanges, may be
19 carried out as part of exchange programs and inter-
20 national visitor programs administered by the Bu-
21 reau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the De-
22 partment of State, including the International Vis-
23 itor Leadership Program; and

24 (3) shall include outbound exchanges for gov-
25 ernmental and nongovernmental personnel in the
26 United States.

1 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the
2 amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out ex-
3 change programs and international visitor programs ad-
4 ministered by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Af-
5 fairs of the Department of State for each of the fiscal
6 years 2021 through 2025, there is authorized to be appro-
7 priated to the Secretary to carry out this section
8 \$1,000,000 for each such fiscal year.

9 **SEC. 5. AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS**
10 **CONTROL PROGRAM.**

11 (a) INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRAT-
12 EGY REPORT.—Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance
13 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding
14 at the end the following:

15 “(10) SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS AND NEW
16 PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES.—

17 “(A) SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS.—A separate
18 section that contains an assessment of the
19 countries likely involved in the manufacture,
20 production, or transshipment of synthetic
21 opioids, including fentanyl and fentanyl ana-
22 logues, to include the following:

23 “(i) The scale of legal domestic pro-
24 duction and any available information on

1 the number of manufacturers and pro-
2 ducers of such opioids in such countries.

3 “(ii) Information on any law enforce-
4 ment assessments of the scale of illegal
5 production, including a description of the
6 capacity of illegal laboratories to produce
7 such opioids.

8 “(iii) The types of inputs used and a
9 description of the primary methods of syn-
10 thesis employed by illegal producers of
11 such opioids.

12 “(iv) An assessment of the policies of
13 such countries to regulate licit manufac-
14 ture and interdict illicit manufacture, di-
15 version, distribution, and shipment of such
16 opioids and an assessment of the effective-
17 ness of the policies’ implementation.

18 “(B) NEW PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES.—
19 A separate section on the policies of responding
20 to new psychoactive substances (as such term is
21 defined in section 7 of the FENTANYL Results
22 Act), to include the following:

23 “(i) Which governments have articu-
24 lated policies on scheduling of such sub-
25 stances.

1 “(ii) Any data on impacts of such
2 policies and other responses to such sub-
3 stances.

4 “(iii) An assessment of what policies
5 the United States may want to consider
6 articulating.”.

7 (b) DEFINITION OF MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG PRO-
8 DUCING COUNTRY.—Section 481(e) of the Foreign Assist-
9 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)) is amended—

10 (1) in paragraph (2)—

11 (A) by striking “means a country in
12 which—” and inserting “means—

13 “(A) a country in which—”;

14 (B) by striking “(A) 1,000” and inserting
15 the following:

16 “(i) 1,000”;

17 (C) by striking “(B) 1,000” and inserting
18 the following:

19 “(ii) 1,000”;

20 (D) by striking “(C) 5,000” and inserting
21 the following:

22 “(iii) 5,000”;

23 (E) in subparagraph (A)(iii), as redesign-
24 nated by this subsection, by adding “or” at the
25 end; and

1 (F) by adding at the end the following:

2 “(B) a country which is a significant direct
3 source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs
4 or other controlled substances significantly af-
5 fecting the United States.”; and

6 (2) in paragraph (5) to read as follows:

7 “(5) the term ‘major drug-transit country’
8 means a country through which are transported il-
9 licit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other con-
10 trolled substances significantly affecting the United
11 States.”.

12 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

13 It is the sense of Congress that—

14 (1) the President should direct the United
15 States Representative to the United Nations to use
16 the voice and vote of the United States at the
17 United Nations to advocate for more transparent as-
18 sessments of countries by the International Nar-
19 cotics Control Board; and

20 (2) bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral inter-
21 national cooperation is essential to combating the
22 flow of covered synthetic drugs.

23 **SEC. 7. DEFINITION.**

24 In this Act:

25 (1) The term “covered synthetic drug” means—

1 (A) a synthetic controlled substance (as de-
2 fined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Sub-
3 stances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), including
4 fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue; or

5 (B) a new psychoactive substance.

6 (2) The term “new psychoactive substance”
7 means a substance of abuse, or any preparation
8 thereof, that—

9 (A) is not—

10 (i) included in any schedule as a con-
11 trolled substance under the Controlled
12 Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.); or

13 (ii) controlled by the Single Conven-
14 tion on Narcotic Drugs signed at New
15 York, New York, on March 30, 1961 or
16 the Convention on Psychotropic Substances
17 signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21,
18 1971;

19 (B) is new or has reemerged on the illicit
20 market; and

21 (C) poses a threat to the public health and
22 safety.

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**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 7990
OFFERED BY MR. TRONE OF MARYLAND**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Fighting Emerging
3 Narcotics Through Additional Nations to Yield Lasting
4 Results Act” or the “FENTANYL Results Act”.

**5 SEC. 2. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS OF THE DEPART-
6 MENT OF STATE TO COMBAT INTER-
7 NATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN COVERED SYN-
8 THETIC DRUGS.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
10 prioritize efforts of the Department of State to combat
11 international trafficking in covered synthetic drugs by car-
12 rying out programs and activities to include the following:

13 (1) Supporting increased data collection by the
14 United States and foreign countries through in-
15 creased drug use surveys among populations, in-
16 creased use of wastewater testing where appropriate,
17 and multilateral sharing of that data.

1 (2) Engaging in increased consultation and
2 partnership with international drug agencies, includ-
3 ing the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
4 Drug Addiction, and regulatory agencies in foreign
5 countries.

6 (3) Carrying out the program to provide assist-
7 ance to build the capacity of foreign law enforcement
8 agencies with respect to covered synthetic drugs, as
9 required by section 3.

10 (4) Carrying out exchange programs for govern-
11 mental and nongovernmental personnel in the
12 United States and in foreign countries to provide
13 educational and professional development on demand
14 reduction matters relating to the illicit use of nar-
15 cotics and other drugs, as required by section 4.

16 (b) REPORT.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
19 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
20 gressional committees a report on the implementa-
21 tion of this section.

22 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
23 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
24 propriate congressional committees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
3 of Representatives; and

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate.

7 **SEC. 3. PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO BUILD THE**
8 **CAPACITY OF FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT**
9 **AGENCIES WITH RESPECT TO COVERED SYN-**
10 **THETIC DRUGS.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 660 of
12 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420), the
13 Secretary of State shall establish a program to provide as-
14 sistance to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies
15 of the countries described in subsection (c) to help such
16 agencies to identify, track, and improve their forensics de-
17 tection capabilities with respect to covered synthetic drugs.

18 (b) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall
19 prioritize assistance under subsection (a) among those
20 countries described in subsection (c) in which such assist-
21 ance would have the most impact in reducing illicit use
22 of covered synthetic drugs in the United States.

23 (c) COUNTRIES DESCRIBED.—The foreign countries
24 described in this subsection are—

1 (1) countries that are producers of covered syn-
2 thetic drugs;

3 (2) countries whose pharmaceutical and chem-
4 ical industries are being exploited for development or
5 procurement of precursors of covered synthetic
6 drugs; or

7 (3) major drug-transit countries as defined by
8 the Secretary of State.

9 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
10 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry
11 out this section \$4,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
12 2021 through 2025.

13 **SEC. 4. EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR GOVERNMENTAL AND**
14 **NONGOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL TO PRO-**
15 **VIDE EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DE-**
16 **VELOPMENT ON DEMAND REDUCTION MAT-**
17 **TERS RELATING TO ILLICIT USE OF NAR-**
18 **COTICS AND OTHER DRUGS.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall carry
20 out an exchange program for governmental and non-
21 governmental personnel in the United States and foreign
22 countries to provide educational and professional develop-
23 ment on demand reduction matters relating to the illicit
24 use of narcotics and other drugs.

1 (b) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The program re-
2 quired by subsection (a)—

3 (1) shall be limited to individuals who have ex-
4 pertise and experience in matters described in sub-
5 section (a);

6 (2) in the case of inbound exchanges, may be
7 carried out as part of exchange programs and inter-
8 national visitor programs administered by the Bu-
9 reau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the De-
10 partment of State, including the International Vis-
11 itor Leadership Program; and

12 (3) shall include outbound exchanges for gov-
13 ernmental and nongovernmental personnel in the
14 United States.

15 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the
16 amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out ex-
17 change programs and international visitor programs ad-
18 ministered by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Af-
19 fairs of the Department of State for each of the fiscal
20 years 2021 through 2025, there is authorized to be appro-
21 priated to the Secretary to carry out this section
22 \$1,000,000 for each such fiscal year.

1 **SEC. 5. AMENDMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS**
2 **CONTROL PROGRAM.**

3 (a) INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRAT-
4 EGY REPORT.—Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance
5 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding
6 at the end the following:

7 “(10) SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS AND NEW
8 PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES.—

9 “(A) SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS.—Information
10 that contains an assessment of the countries
11 significantly involved in the manufacture, pro-
12 duction, or transshipment of synthetic opioids,
13 including fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, to
14 include the following:

15 “(i) The scale of legal domestic pro-
16 duction and any available information on
17 the number of manufacturers and pro-
18 ducers of such opioids in such countries.

19 “(ii) Information on any law enforce-
20 ment assessments of the scale of illegal
21 production, including a description of the
22 capacity of illegal laboratories to produce
23 such opioids.

24 “(iii) The types of inputs used and a
25 description of the primary methods of syn-

1 thesis employed by illegal producers of
2 such opioids.

3 “(iv) An assessment of the policies of
4 such countries to regulate licit manufac-
5 ture and interdict illicit manufacture, di-
6 version, distribution, and shipment of such
7 opioids and an assessment of the effective-
8 ness of the policies’ implementation.

9 “(B) NEW PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES.—
10 Information on the policies of responding to
11 new psychoactive substances (as such term is
12 defined in section 7 of the FENTANYL Results
13 Act), to include the following:

14 “(i) Which governments have articu-
15 lated policies on scheduling of such sub-
16 stances.

17 “(ii) Any data on impacts of such
18 policies and other responses to such sub-
19 stances.

20 “(iii) An assessment of what policies
21 the United States may want to consider
22 articulating.”.

23 (b) DEFINITION OF MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG PRO-
24 DUCING COUNTRY.—Section 481(e) of the Foreign Assist-
25 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(e)) is amended—

- 1 (1) in paragraph (2)—
- 2 (A) by striking “means a country in
- 3 which—” and inserting “means—
- 4 “(A) a country in which—”;
- 5 (B) by striking “(A) 1,000” and inserting
- 6 the following:
- 7 “(i) 1,000”;
- 8 (C) by striking “(B) 1,000” and inserting
- 9 the following:
- 10 “(ii) 1,000”;
- 11 (D) by striking “(C) 5,000” and inserting
- 12 the following:
- 13 “(iii) 5,000”;
- 14 (E) in subparagraph (A)(iii), as redesign-
- 15 ated by this subsection, by adding “or” at the
- 16 end; and
- 17 (F) by adding at the end the following:
- 18 “(B) a country which is a significant direct
- 19 source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs
- 20 or other controlled substances significantly af-
- 21 fecting the United States.”; and
- 22 (2) in paragraph (5) to read as follows:
- 23 “(5) the term ‘major drug-transit country’
- 24 means a country through which illicit narcotic or
- 25 psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances

1 significantly affecting the United States are trans-
2 ported.”.

3 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the President should direct the United
6 States Representative to the United Nations to use
7 the voice and vote of the United States at the
8 United Nations to advocate for more transparent as-
9 sessments of countries by the International Nar-
10 cotics Control Board; and

11 (2) bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral inter-
12 national cooperation is essential to combating the
13 flow of covered synthetic drugs.

14 **SEC. 7. DEFINITION.**

15 In this Act:

16 (1) The term “covered synthetic drug” means—

17 (A) a synthetic controlled substance (as de-
18 fined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Sub-
19 stances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), including
20 fentanyl or a fentanyl analogue; or

21 (B) a new psychoactive substance.

22 (2) The term “new psychoactive substance”
23 means a substance of abuse, or any preparation
24 thereof, that—

25 (A) is not—

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1 (i) included in any schedule as a con-
2 trolled substance under the Controlled
3 Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.); or

4 (ii) controlled by the Single Conven-
5 tion on Narcotic Drugs signed at New
6 York, New York, on March 30, 1961 or
7 the Convention on Psychotropic Substances
8 signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21,
9 1971;

10 (B) is new or has reemerged on the illicit
11 market; and

12 (C) poses a threat to the public health and
13 safety.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1012

Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 22, 2020

Mr. BERA (for himself and Mr. YOHO) submitted the following resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership.

Whereas June 25, 2020, marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of Korean war when the Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) attacked the Republic of Korea (South Korea) on June 25, 1950;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950, recommending "Members of the United Nations furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea" and Resolution 84 on July 7, 1950, recommending members make military forces and other assist-

ance available “to a unified command under the United States of America”;

Whereas, on July 27, 1953, an Armistice Agreement was signed by United States Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr., representing the United Nations Command with the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army to “ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”;

Whereas the Armistice Agreement remains in force today and that by its terms has neither formally ended the Korean war nor constituted a permanent settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula;

Whereas, on October 1, 1953, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea (5 UST 2368) was signed in Washington with ratification advised by the Senate on January 26, 1954, and remains in force today “to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security”;

Whereas during the Korean war, 1,789,000 United States soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines served in theater, 36,574 paid the ultimate sacrifice with their lives in defense of freedom in the Republic of Korea, and over 7,500 United States servicemembers remain classified by the Department of Defense as missing in action;

Whereas, on October 7, 2016, H.R. 1475, entitled the “Korean War Veterans Memorial Wall of Remembrance Act”, was introduced in Congress by Representative Sam Johnson of Texas and became Public Law 114–230;

Whereas according the House Report 114–433 to accompany H.R. 1475, H.R. 1475 authorizes a Wall of Remem-

brance to be added to the Korean War Veterans Memorial with the names of those that died in theater, are listed as missing, or prisoners of war, and would also list the number of members of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) that were killed in action, wounded in action, prisoners of war, or are listed as missing in action;

Whereas the Korean war is no longer “The Forgotten War” but “The Forgotten Victory” and June 25, 1950, is considered the symbolic start of the ironclad United States-Korea alliance that was forged in blood;

Whereas in the 70 years since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the United States-Korea alliance has transformed itself from a security relationship into a comprehensive global partnership;

Whereas the Republic of Korea is considered one of the greatest success stories in the post-World War II era and constitutes one of the lynchpins of United States foreign policy in Northeast Asia;

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have stood shoulder to shoulder in all four major conflicts the United States has faced since the Korean war while maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula;

Whereas this partnership has contributed to regional and global prosperity through the shared values of democracy, free market economy, human rights, and the rule of law;

Whereas it is in the national interest of the United States to maintain its forward deployed presence in the Republic of Korea through United States Forces Korea (USFK), a premier Joint Force that is “well led, disciplined, trained and ready to Fight Tonight and win”;

Whereas the 70-year transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial partnership has recently led to important coordination and cooperation in confronting global pandemics including H1N1 in 2009, and COVID-19 in 2020;

Whereas the Republic of Korea has made significant contributions to the global community in combating and containing COVID-19, including the manufacture and export of Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) test kits to the United States Government and various States;

Whereas, on May 8, 2020, the Republic of Korea donated 500,000 masks to be distributed to Korean war veterans throughout the United States, including the Navajo Nation, in a gesture of gratitude and in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war; and

Whereas, on May 10, 2020, the Republic of Korea donated 2,000,000 masks to the United States to help fill shortages in hospitals most impacted by COVID-19: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) commemorates the 70th anniversary of the
3 start of the Korean war and the beginning of the
4 United States-Republic of Korea alliance;

5 (2) honors the men and women of both the
6 United States and Republic of Korea who have com-
7 mitted and sometimes sacrificed their lives for the

1 alliance during the Korean war and in subsequent
2 conflicts;

3 (3) reaffirms the role the alliance plays in en-
4 suring peace and stability in Asia and the world;

5 (4) celebrates the close and continuing ties be-
6 tween the people and governments of the two na-
7 tions;

8 (5) commends the lifesaving cooperation be-
9 tween the Republic of Korea and the United States
10 during the COVID-19 pandemic at each country's
11 moment of need; and

12 (6) recommits the United States to ensuring
13 the relationship between the United States and Re-
14 public of Korea continues to grow and thrive into
15 the foreseeable future.

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**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.RES. 1012
OFFERED BY MR. BERA OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950, recommending “Members of the United Nations furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea” and Resolution 84 on July 7, 1950, recommending members make military forces and other assistance available “to a unified command under the United States of America”;

Whereas, on July 27, 1953, an Armistice Agreement was signed by United States Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr., representing the United Nations Command with the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army to “ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved”;

Whereas the Armistice Agreement remains in force today and that by its terms has neither formally ended the Korean war nor constituted a permanent settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula;

Whereas, on October 1, 1953, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea (5 UST 2368) was signed in Washington with ratification advised by the Senate on January 26, 1954, and the shared commitment to recognize an armed attack on either of the Parties as dangerous to each’s own peace and

security and to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [each’s] constitutional processes” and remains in force today;

Whereas during the Korean war, 1,789,000 United States soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines served in theater, 36,574 paid the ultimate sacrifice with their lives in defense of freedom in the Republic of Korea, and over 7,500 United States servicemembers remain classified by the Department of Defense as missing in action;

Whereas, on October 7, 2016, H.R. 1475, entitled the “Korean War Veterans Memorial Wall of Remembrance Act”, was introduced in Congress by Representative Sam Johnson of Texas and became Public Law 114–230;

Whereas according to House Report 114–433 to accompany H.R. 1475, H.R. 1475 authorizes a Wall of Remembrance to be added to the Korean War Veterans Memorial with the names of those that died in theater, are listed as missing, or prisoners of war, and would also list the number of members of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) who were killed in action, wounded in action, prisoners of war, or are listed as missing in action;

Whereas the Korean war is no longer “The Forgotten War” but “The Forgotten Victory” that preserved the freedom of South Korea from North Korean rule, and June 25, 1950, is considered the symbolic start of the ironclad United States-Republic of Korea alliance that was forged in blood;

Whereas in the 70 years since the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the United States-Republic of Korea alliance has

transformed itself from a security relationship into a comprehensive global partnership;

Whereas the Republic of Korea is considered one of the greatest success stories in the post-World War II era and constitutes a lynchpin of United States foreign policy in Northeast Asia;

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have stood shoulder to shoulder in all major military conflicts the United States has faced since the Korean war while maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula;

Whereas this partnership has contributed to regional and global prosperity through the shared values of democracy, free market economy, human rights, and the rule of law;

Whereas it is in the national interest of the United States to maintain its forward deployed presence in the Republic of Korea through United States Forces Korea (USFK), a premier Joint Force that is “well led, disciplined, trained and ready to Fight Tonight and win”;

Whereas the 70-year transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial partnership has recently led to important coordination and cooperation in confronting global pandemics including H1N1 in 2009, and COVID-19 in 2020;

Whereas the Republic of Korea has made significant contributions to the global community in combating and containing COVID-19, including the manufacture and export of Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) test kits to the United States Government and various States;

Whereas, on May 8, 2020, the Republic of Korea donated 500,000 masks to be distributed to Korean war veterans

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throughout the United States, including the Navajo Nation, in a gesture of gratitude and in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war; and

Whereas, on May 10, 2020, the Republic of Korea donated 2,000,000 masks to the United States to help fill shortages in hospitals most impacted by COVID-19: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) underscores the continuing and crucial role
3 of the alliance between the United States and the
4 Republic of Korea in ensuring peace and stability in
5 Asia and the world, including by providing security
6 from the threat posed by the Democratic People's
7 Republic of Korea and its repeated provocations;

8 (2) reaffirms the importance of close coopera-
9 tion between the United States and the Republic of
10 Korea in the Indo-Pacific, including on issues rang-
11 ing from infrastructure and development financing
12 to promoting good governance;

13 (3) encourages the continued close and con-
14 tinuing ties between the people and governments of
15 the two nations, as well as the contributions the

1 near two million Korean-Americans have made to
2 both societies;

3 (4) commits to continuing and expanding
4 United States-Republic of Korea medical and sci-
5 entific and research collaboration, particularly since
6 cooperation between the two countries has saved
7 countless lives during the COVID-19 pandemic;

8 (5) urges both countries to prioritize ongoing
9 Special Measures Agreement negotiations and to
10 reach mutually agreeable terms; and

11 (6) recommits the United States to ensuring
12 the relationship between the United States and Re-
13 public of Korea continues to grow and thrive into
14 the foreseeable future.

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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H. RES. 1012
OFFERED BY MR. BERA OF CALIFORNIA**

In the preamble, strike “the Korean war is no longer ‘The Forgotten War’ but ‘The Forgotten Victory’ that preserved the freedom of South Korea from North Korean rule, and June 25, 1950, is considered the symbolic start of the ironclad United States-Republic of Korea alliance that was forged in blood” and insert “the ongoing conflict separated countless Korean families from one another, and an estimated 3,000 elderly South Koreans die every year without reuniting with their loved ones”.



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 697

Recognizing the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 13, 2019

Mr. YOHO (for himself, Mr. McCAUL, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. MCGOVERN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Recognizing the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding.

Whereas the three principal commitments that the Dalai Lama has articulated are the promotion of human values, promotion of religious harmony, and preservation of Tibetan culture and religion;

Whereas the Dalai Lama has stated, “I remain convinced that most human conflicts can be solved through genuine dialogue conducted with the spirit of openness and reconciliation”;

Whereas, in 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent struggle for the liberation of Tibet and proposed Middle Way Policy to end the Sino-Tibet Problem;

Whereas, in 2006, the United States Congress passed the Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act (Public Law 109–287) to award the Dalai Lama the United States Congressional Gold Medal, the highest civilian honor awarded by Congress, for his contributions to peace, nonviolence, human rights, and religious understanding;

Whereas there are over 6,000,000 Tibetans in the world, spanning over 40 countries;

Whereas there are over 31,000 individuals of Tibetan descent living in North America;

Whereas 2019 marked 60 years of friendship between the United States and the Tibetan people;

Whereas there is overwhelming bipartisan Congressional support for the Tibetan people’s aspirations for internationally recognized human rights and freedoms and the protection of their distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and national identity;

Whereas under the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–228), it is the policy of the United States to support economic development, cultural preservation, health care and education, and environmental sustainability for Tibetans inside of Tibet;

Whereas, in 2018, the Secretary of State convened the first-ever Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, during which the Dalai Lama addressed over four hundred

heads of religious organizations and civil societies by video;

Whereas, in May 2019, United States Ambassador to China Terry Branstad traveled to Tibet, the first trip to the region by an American envoy in four years, during which he met with senior Tibetan religious and cultural leaders; and

Whereas, in October 2019, United States Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom, Samuel D. Brownback, traveled to Dharamsala, India, to meet with the Dalai Lama to discuss ways to advance religious freedom: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) recognizes the cultural and religious signifi-
3 cance of a genuinely autonomous Tibet and the deep
4 bond between the American and Tibetan people;

5 (2) commends the 14th Dalai Lama for his
6 commitment to global peace and nonviolence; and

7 (3) determines that it would be beneficial to
8 convene a bipartisan, bicameral forum, either
9 through a Joint Meeting of Congress, a teleconfer-
10 ence broadcast in the Auditorium at the Capitol Vis-
11 itor Center, or roundtable, between Members of Con-
12 gress and His Holiness the Dalai Lama to discuss
13 peaceful solutions to international conflicts.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 697
OFFERED BY MR. YOHO OF FLORIDA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the Dalai Lama's principal commitments include cultivation of warm-heartedness and such human values as compassion and forgiveness; promotion of religious harmony; and preservation of Tibetan language and culture and protection of Tibet's natural environment;

Whereas the Dalai Lama has stated, "I remain convinced that most human conflicts can be solved through genuine dialogue conducted with the spirit of openness and reconciliation";

Whereas, in 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his nonviolent struggle for the liberation of Tibet, his advocacy for peaceful solutions to preserve Tibetans' historical and cultural heritage, and his constructive, forward-looking proposals for resolving international conflicts, human rights issues, and global environmental problems;

Whereas Congress has consistently shown overwhelming, bipartisan, bicameral support for the Tibetan people's aspirations for internationally recognized human rights and freedoms and the protection of their distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity, including by passing the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note);

Whereas, in 2006, Congress passed the Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act (Public Law 109–287; 31 U.S.C. 5111), and in October 2007, President George W. Bush, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, and other Congressional leaders awarded the Dalai Lama the United States Congressional Gold Medal, the highest civilian honor awarded by Congress, for his contributions to peace, nonviolence, human rights, and religious understanding;

Whereas Members of Congress have on multiple occasions met with the Dalai Lama during congressional delegations overseas, including a bipartisan delegation led by then-House Speaker Pelosi to meet with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exiled community in 2008, a bipartisan delegation led by then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi in 2017, and a bipartisan delegation from the House Democracy Partnership in 2019, to spotlight the unjust oppression against the Tibetan people;

Whereas the Dalai Lama has on multiple occasions visited the United States Capitol, including most recently in June 2016, during which he met with congressional leadership to promote respectful inter-religious harmony and protection of the Tibetan people’s identity, culture, language, and environment;

Whereas the Department of State finds in its 2020 Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as required by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–330), that the Chinese Government systematically impeded travel to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan areas outside the TAR for United States diplomats and officials, journalists, and tourists in 2019;

Whereas, in 2018, the Secretary of State convened the first-ever Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, during which the Dalai Lama addressed hundreds of members of religious organizations and civil society by video;

Whereas under the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, it is the policy of the United States to support economic development, cultural preservation, health care, and education and environmental sustainability for Tibetans inside Tibet;

Whereas the human rights situation in Tibet has significantly deteriorated since the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 was signed into law;

Whereas the Government of the People's Republic of China's repeated insistence that it must control the selection of the next leader of Tibetan Buddhism, a religion with adherents across the globe including in Mongolia, where a 2010 census reports 53 percent of individuals ages 15 and older self-identify as Buddhists, is a gross violation of international religious freedom;

Whereas the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.R. 4331, the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019, which reiterates support for the Tibetan community and the need to hold Chinese officials responsible for religious freedom abuses targeting Tibetan Buddhists;

Whereas after 35 years, the United States Consulate in Chengdu, which was responsible for operations in and providing diplomatic reporting on developments concerning Tibetan populations in southwestern China and the Tibet Autonomous Region, closed on July 27, 2020; and

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Whereas on September 12, 2020, the Dalai Lama addressed a virtual session of the Group of Seven annual meeting of Speakers and Heads of Parliament hosted by Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

- 1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—
2 (1) affirms the cultural and religious signifi-
3 cance of the goal of genuine autonomy for the people
4 of Tibet and the deep bond between the American
5 and Tibetan people;
6 (2) supports the efforts of the Dalai Lama and
7 the Tibetan leadership to achieve genuine autonomy
8 for Tibetans through negotiations without pre-
9 conditions with the People’s Republic of China;
10 (3) supports the 14th Dalai Lama’s commit-
11 ment to global peace, nonviolence, human rights,
12 and environmental protection and sustainability;
13 (4) urges the swift enactment of the Tibetan
14 Policy and Support Act of 2019 to update United
15 States policy toward Tibet, particularly on issues re-
16 lated to the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai
17 Lama, water security and environmental concerns in
18 the Tibetan plateau, and support for the Tibetan
19 community, language, culture, and religion;

1 (5) stresses the urgency of addressing the ongo-
2 ing climate crisis, including in the Tibetan Plateau,
3 and working toward environmental and economic
4 justice and equality;

5 (6) encourages United States diplomats and
6 other officials, journalists, and other citizens to seek
7 access to Tibetan areas and demand that China pro-
8 vide access and treatment reciprocal to access and
9 treatment the United States provides to Chinese dip-
10 lomats and other officials, scholars, and others in
11 the United States;

12 (7) calls on the Secretary of State to mitigate
13 any potential impact the closure of the United
14 States Consulate in Chengdu may have on the De-
15 partment of State's ability to provide timely report-
16 ing on and support for Tibetan communities, such
17 as by allocating additional resources to other United
18 States missions in China to improve coverage; and

19 (8) determines that it would be beneficial to
20 continue years of bipartisan and bicameral engage-
21 ment with the leaders of the Tibetan people, includ-
22 ing between Members of Congress and His Holiness
23 the 14th Dalai Lama.

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Amend the title so as to read: “A resolution affirming the significance of the advocacy for genuine autonomy for Tibetans in the People’s Republic of China and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding.”.

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116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1100

Reaffirming the strategic partnership between the United States and Mongolia and observing the 30th anniversary of democracy in Mongolia.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 4, 2020

Ms. TITUS (for herself, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. YOHO, and Mr. PRICE of North Carolina) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

RESOLUTION

Reaffirming the strategic partnership between the United States and Mongolia and observing the 30th anniversary of democracy in Mongolia.

Whereas the United States and Mongolia established diplomatic relations in January 1987, and since that time the relationship has grown stronger based on shared strategic interests, security cooperation, democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights;

Whereas, since its peaceful democratic revolution in 1989, Mongolia has charted, through a series of initiatives, a successful path to multiparty democracy and a free market economy;

Whereas, in 1990, the Government of Mongolia declared an end to a one-party, authoritarian, political system and adopted democratic and free market reforms;

Whereas, in 1992, Mongolia adopted a constitution establishing a parliamentary democracy, becoming the first country in Asia to transition from communism to democracy;

Whereas Mongolia has shown its commitment to a “third neighbor” relationship with the United States by sending troops to support United States operations in Iraq from 2003 through 2008 and Afghanistan since 2009, and Mongolia has a strong record of troop contributions to international peacekeeping missions;

Whereas successive Mongolian governments have taken notable steps to strengthen civil society, battle corruption, and spur economic development;

Whereas the Parliament of Mongolia, the State Great Khural, has engaged with Congress, including through the House Democracy Partnership, thereby promoting responsive and effective governance through peer-to-peer cooperation;

Whereas Mongolia began as a partner to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2004, graduated to become a participating state in 2012, and participates actively in the work of the OSCE for stability, peace, and democracy;

Whereas Mongolia has regularly invited the OSCE and other organizations to send monitoring teams to its Presidential and parliamentary elections;

Whereas Mongolia has also been an active member of the Community of Democracies (CoD), a global coalition of

countries that support adherence to common democratic values and standards, and Mongolia has not only remained active since the founding of the CoD in 2000 but also successfully chaired the CoD from 2011 through 2013;

Whereas, in addition to supporting the OSCE and CoD, Mongolia supports democratic initiatives while participating in a wide range of other global institutions;

Whereas most recently, on June 24, 2020, Mongolia successfully organized parliamentary elections, strengthening its commitment to democracy and the rule of law;

Whereas the success of Mongolia as a democracy and its strategic location, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and ability to pursue an independent foreign policy are highly relevant to the national security of the United States;

Whereas the United States has provided support to Mongolia through the Millennium Challenge Corporation through an initial compact signed in 2007 designed to increase economic growth and reduce poverty and a second compact signed in 2018 involving investments in water infrastructure, including supply and wastewater recycling, as well as water sector sustainability;

Whereas, on September 20, 2018, the United States and Mongolia signed a joint statement and the Roadmap for Expanded Economic Partnership, outlining the intent to deepen the bilateral commercial relationship through full implementation of the obligations under the Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment between the United States of America and Mongolia, signed at New York, September 24, 2013 (in this preamble referred to as the “United

States-Mongolia Transparency Agreement”), and to collaborate in supporting Mongolian small- and medium-sized enterprises through various programs and projects;

Whereas, according to the Bureau of the Census, trade between the United States and Mongolia is modest but growing, with a total value of trade in 2019 between the two countries of approximately \$217,500,000, including \$192,700,000 in United States exports to Mongolia and \$24,800,000 in United States imports from Mongolia;

Whereas Mongolia is a beneficiary country under the Generalized System of Preferences program, but its use of the program remains low, as in 2018 only \$3,300,000 of exports from Mongolia to the United States entered were under the program; and

Whereas, on July 31, 2019, the United States and Mongolia declared the bilateral relationship a “Strategic Partnership” and noted the shared desire—

(1) to intensify cooperation as strong democracies based on the rule of law through safeguarding and promoting democratic values and human rights, including the freedoms of religion or belief, expression, including internet and media freedom, assembly, and association, anticorruption and fiscal transparency, and youth and emerging leader development;

(2) to cooperate in promoting national security and stability across the Indo-Pacific region so that all countries, secure in their sovereignty, are able to pursue economic growth consistent with international law and principles of fair competition;

(3) to deepen national security and law-enforcement ties through collaboration on bilateral and multilateral security, judicial, and law-enforcement efforts in the region;

(4) to strengthen cooperation in multilateral engagements such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster preparedness and relief operations;

(5) to expand trade and investment relations on a fair and reciprocal basis, support private sector-led growth, fully implement the United States-Mongolia Transparency Agreement, promote women's entrepreneurship, and continue to explore support for infrastructure under the new United States International Development Finance Corporation with the new tools provided under the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.);

(6) to strengthen border security, prevent illegal transshipment and trafficking, expand cooperation on civil aviation safety and oversight, and efficiently facilitate legitimate travel between Mongolia and the United States;

(7) to increase cooperation in addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, transnational organized crime, pandemics, and other emerging nontraditional security threats;

(8) to continue to develop an environment in which civil society, social media, and a free and independent media can flourish; and

(9) to maintain high-level official dialogues, encourage bilateral exchanges at all levels of government, and further develop people-to-people exchanges to deepen engagement on issues of mutual interest and concern: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

1 (1) recognizes the importance of the relation-
2 ship between the United States and Mongolia and
3 remains committed to advancing this Strategic Part-
4 nership in the future;

5 (2) emphasizes the importance of free and fair
6 elections in Mongolia;

7 (3) applauds the continued engagement of Mon-
8 golia in the Organization for Security and Coopera-
9 tion in Europe, the Community of Democracies, con-
10 gressional-parliamentary partnerships including con-
11 tinued high-level parliamentary exchange, and other
12 institutions that promote democratic values, which
13 reinforces the commitment of the people and the
14 Government of Mongolia to those values and stand-
15 ards;

16 (4) encourages the United States Government
17 to help Mongolia use its benefits under the General-
18 ized System of Preferences program and other rel-
19 evant programs to increase trade between the United
20 States and Mongolia;

21 (5) urges the United States International De-
22 velopment Finance Corporation to expand activities
23 in Mongolia to support economic development, diver-
24 sification of the economy of Mongolia, and women-
25 owned small- and medium-sized enterprises;

1 (6) urges private and public support to help di-
2 versify the economy of Mongolia through increased
3 cooperation and investments, as well as infrastruc-
4 ture and other vital projects;

5 (7) urges the Department of State, the United
6 States Agency for International Development, and
7 other relevant agencies to continue to support Mon-
8 golia's democratic and economic development and ef-
9 forts on anticorruption;

10 (8) reaffirms the importance of civil society to
11 the continued democratic development of Mongolia;

12 (9) encourages the Government of Mongolia to
13 build a regulatory system that supports and encour-
14 ages the growth and operation of independent non-
15 governmental organizations and continues to pursue
16 policies of transparency that uphold democratic val-
17 ues; and

18 (10) encourages the Government of Mongolia to
19 continue legal reform, build institutional capacity,
20 and improve the independence of other democratic
21 institutions.

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**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.RES. 1100
OFFERED BY MS. TITUS OF NEVADA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the United States and Mongolia established diplomatic relations in January 1987, and since that time the relationship has grown stronger based on shared strategic interests, security cooperation, democratic values, good governance, and respect for human rights;

Whereas, since its peaceful democratic revolution in 1989, Mongolia has charted, through a series of initiatives, a successful path to multiparty democracy and a free market economy;

Whereas, in 1990, the Government of Mongolia declared an end to a one-party, authoritarian, political system and adopted democratic and free market reforms;

Whereas, in 1992, Mongolia adopted a constitution establishing a parliamentary democracy, becoming the first country in Asia to transition from communism to democracy;

Whereas, in 1999, the Government of Mongolia invited the Peace Corps to establish its program in the country and has since hosted 1,437 volunteers in English and health education;

Whereas Mongolia has shown its commitment to a “third neighbor” relationship with the United States by sending troops to support United States operations in Iraq from

2003 through 2008 and Afghanistan since 2009, and Mongolia has a strong record of troop contributions to international peacekeeping missions;

Whereas successive Mongolian governments have taken notable steps to strengthen civil society, battle corruption, and spur economic development;

Whereas the Parliament of Mongolia, the State Great Khural, has engaged with Congress, including through the House Democracy Partnership, thereby promoting responsive and effective governance through peer-to-peer cooperation;

Whereas Mongolia began as a partner to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2004, graduated to become a participating state in 2012, and participates actively in the work of the OSCE for stability, peace, and democracy;

Whereas Mongolia has regularly invited the OSCE and other organizations to send monitoring teams to its Presidential and parliamentary elections;

Whereas Mongolia has also been an active member of the Community of Democracies (CoD), a global coalition of countries that support adherence to common democratic values and standards, and Mongolia has not only remained active since the founding of the CoD in 2000 but also successfully chaired the CoD from 2011 through 2013;

Whereas, in addition to supporting the OSCE and CoD, Mongolia supports democratic initiatives while participating in a wide range of other global institutions;

Whereas most recently, on June 24, 2020, Mongolia successfully organized parliamentary elections, strengthening its commitment to democracy and the rule of law;

Whereas the success of Mongolia as a democracy and its strategic location, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and ability to pursue an independent foreign policy are highly relevant to the national security of the United States;

Whereas climate change in Mongolia has contributed to severe droughts, higher temperatures, and extreme winter weather conditions, resulting in mass deaths of livestock and economic hardship for people living in rural communities, especially the nomadic population;

Whereas the United States has provided support to Mongolia through the Millennium Challenge Corporation through an initial compact signed in 2007 designed to increase economic growth and reduce poverty and a second compact signed in 2018 involving investments in water infrastructure, including supply and wastewater recycling, as well as water sector sustainability;

Whereas, on September 20, 2018, the United States and Mongolia signed a joint statement and the Roadmap for Expanded Economic Partnership, outlining the intent to deepen the bilateral commercial relationship through full implementation of the obligations under the Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment between the United States of America and Mongolia, signed at New York, September 24, 2013 (in this preamble referred to as the “United States-Mongolia Transparency Agreement”), and to collaborate in supporting Mongolian small- and medium-sized enterprises through various programs and projects;

Whereas according to the Bureau of the Census, trade between the United States and Mongolia is modest but growing, with a total value of trade in 2019 between the two countries of approximately \$217,500,000, including \$192,700,000 in United States exports to Mongolia and \$24,800,000 in United States imports from Mongolia;

Whereas Mongolia is a beneficiary country under the Generalized System of Preferences program, but its use of the program remains low, as in 2018 only \$3,300,000 of exports from Mongolia to the United States entered were under the program; and

Whereas, on July 31, 2019, the United States and Mongolia declared the bilateral relationship a “Strategic Partnership” and noted the shared desire—

(1) to intensify cooperation as strong democracies based on the rule of law through safeguarding and promoting democratic values and human rights, including the freedoms of religion or belief, expression, including internet and media freedom, assembly, and association, anticorruption and fiscal transparency, and youth and emerging leader development;

(2) to cooperate in promoting national security and stability across the Indo-Pacific region so that all countries, secure in their sovereignty, are able to pursue economic growth consistent with international law and principles of fair competition;

(3) to deepen national security and law-enforcement ties through collaboration on bilateral and multilateral security, judicial, and law enforcement efforts in the region;

(4) to strengthen cooperation in multilateral engagements such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster preparedness and relief operations;

(5) to expand trade and investment relations on a fair and reciprocal basis, support private sector-led growth, fully implement the United States-Mongolia Transparency Agreement, promote women's entrepreneurship, and continue to explore support for infrastructure under the new United States International Development Finance Corporation with the new tools provided under the BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.);

(6) to strengthen border security, prevent illegal transshipment and trafficking, expand cooperation on civil aviation safety and oversight, and efficiently facilitate legitimate travel between Mongolia and the United States;

(7) to increase cooperation in addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, transnational organized crime, pandemics, and other emerging nontraditional security threats;

(8) to continue to develop an environment in which civil society, social media, and a free and independent media can flourish; and

(9) to maintain high-level official dialogues, encourage bilateral exchanges at all levels of government, and further develop people-to-people exchanges to deepen engagement on issues of mutual interest and concern: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) underscores the importance of the relation-
3 ship between the United States and Mongolia and
4 remains committed to advancing this Strategic Part-
5 nership in the future;

6 (2) encourages the United States Government
7 to help Mongolia use its benefits under the General-
8 ized System of Preferences program and other rel-
9 evant programs to increase trade between the United
10 States and Mongolia;

11 (3) urges the United States International De-
12 velopment Finance Corporation to expand activities
13 in Mongolia to support economic development, diver-
14 sification of the economy of Mongolia, and women-
15 owned small- and medium-sized enterprises;

16 (4) urges Mongolia to address climate change
17 and continue to work with the UN Environment
18 Programme, the Global Climate Fund, and other
19 global institutions to strengthen climate change re-
20 siliance;

21 (5) urges private and public support to help di-
22 versify the economy of Mongolia through increased

1 cooperation and investments, as well as infrastruc-
2 ture and other vital projects;

3 (6) supports the resumption of the Peace Corps
4 program in Mongolia once the COVID-19 pandemic
5 has subsided;

6 (7) urges the Department of State, the United
7 States Agency for International Development, and
8 other relevant agencies to continue to support Mon-
9 golia's democratic and economic development and ef-
10 forts on anticorruption;

11 (8) calls for the continued engagement of Mon-
12 golia in the Organization for Security and Coopera-
13 tion in Europe, the Community of Democracies, con-
14 gressional-parliamentary partnerships, including con-
15 tinued high-level parliamentary exchange, and other
16 institutions that promote democratic values, which
17 reinforces the commitment of the people and the
18 Government of Mongolia to those values and stand-
19 ards;

20 (9) reaffirms the importance of civil society to
21 the continued democratic development of Mongolia;

22 (10) encourages the Government of Mongolia to
23 build a regulatory system that supports and encour-
24 ages the growth and operation of independent non-
25 governmental organizations and continues to pursue

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1 policies of transparency that uphold democratic val-
2 ues;

3 (11) urges Mongolia to continue their commit-
4 ment to free, fair and credible elections; and

5 (12) encourages the Government of Mongolia to
6 continue legal reform, build institutional capacity,
7 and improve the independence of other democratic
8 institutions.

Amend the title so as to read: “A resolution re-
affirming the importance of the strategic partnership be-
tween the United States and Mongolia.”.

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 751

Reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the African Union and recognizing the importance of diplomatic, security, and trade relations.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 9, 2019

Ms. BASS (for herself, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. GRIJALVA) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the African Union and recognizing the importance of diplomatic, security, and trade relations.

Whereas President George W. Bush formally recognized the African Union as an international organization in 2005, and initiated the United States Mission to the African Union in 2006, making the United States the first non-African country to establish a diplomatic mission to the African Union;

Whereas President Barack Obama was the first sitting President of the United States to visit the African Union headquarters and deliver an address to the assembly in July 2015;

Whereas the pillars for the partnership between the United States and the African Union Commission are peace and security; economic growth, trade, and investment; democracy and governance; and promoting investment opportunities and development, which are aligned with the African Union's strategic development framework, referred to as Agenda 2063;

Whereas the United States supports the African Union through assessed contributions to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Office to the African Union, and other United Nations organs and agencies that provide technical support and capacity enhancement to the African Union;

Whereas the African Union participates in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which boosts economic cooperation and trade with 40 sub-Saharan African countries and whose benefits have been extended to 2025;

Whereas during the sixth annual High-Level Dialogue between the United States and the African Union Commission in November 2018, the United States affirmed its support to the African Continental Free Trade Area, acknowledged the progress attained on its establishment, and pledged to enhance discussion on how to complement and support the agreement;

Whereas the United States has provided technical assistance to support the launch of the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit, which coordinates the African Union's participation in election observation and implements the African Union Commission's program for the promotion of democracy on the continent;

Whereas the United States has provided logistical and financial assistance to past and current African Union peace support operations in Somalia, the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and in the Lake Chad Basin;

Whereas the United States provides multiyear technical support to the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which emerged from the United States decision to provide \$10 million to the African Union to deploy African health workers and deliver medical equipment to address the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa; and

Whereas with the assistance of the United States, the African Union has positively influenced its member states by advancing rule of law, accountable governance, and respect for human rights: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) recognizes the importance of the partner-
3 ship between the United States and the African
4 Union and remains committed to advancing this
5 strategic partnership in the future;

6 (2) reaffirms the mutually beneficial ties be-
7 tween the United States and the African Union,
8 based on a strong desire for regional security, inclu-
9 sive development, and stronger trade relations;

10 (3) acknowledges that the African Union recog-
11 nizes the African diaspora as the “sixth region” of
12 the continent, and celebrates the contributions of 47

1 million Americans of African descent to the culture
2 and society of the United States; and

3 (4) encourages greater collaboration with the
4 African Union to achieve the goals of socioeconomic
5 transformation of the continent over the next 50
6 years, as articulated in Agenda 2063.

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116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1077

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the continued importance of the United States-Lebanon relationship.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 31, 2020

Mr. LAHOOD (for himself, Ms. SHALALA, Mr. STIVERS, and Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the continued importance of the United States-Lebanon relationship.

Whereas the security, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, a pluralistic democracy in the Middle East, is in the interest of the United States and its allies in the region;

Whereas, for more than a decade, the United States has provided robust assistance to Lebanon, including training and equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), development assistance through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), funding for schools and hospitals in Lebanon through the American Schools and Hospitals

Abroad (ASHA) Program, and funding for the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI);

Whereas the integrity and independence of the LAF serves a United States national security interest;

Whereas the LAF has been a critical stabilizing force in Lebanon with a longstanding partnership with the United States military;

Whereas the United States has provided over \$1,000,000,000 in foreign military and security assistance to the LAF;

Whereas the LAF, as the primary institution entrusted with Lebanon's defense, security, and sovereignty, is an important force to support the safety and security of Lebanon;

Whereas international support for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remains necessary to counteract destabilizing forces in Lebanon and help lower tensions at the Lebanon-Israel border;

Whereas UNIFIL has been effective in facilitating tripartite dialogues between the Lebanese and Israeli military officials and in conducting numerous border patrols in partnership with the LAF, to deescalate the possibilities of "unintended consequences leading to violent conflict";

Whereas United States support for American institutions in Lebanon through programs such as ASHA, MEPI, and ESF assistance are vital for fostering democratic ideals and principles throughout Lebanon;

Whereas Lebanon hosts an estimated 1,500,000 refugees, a population equal to almost one-third of its native population and the highest refugee-per-capita ratio in the world, despite challenges within its own social and economic sectors;

Whereas Hezbollah alongside corrupt elites have taken advantage of the Lebanese economy, government, and its citizens;

Whereas Iran seeks to eliminate Lebanon's sovereignty and its history as a strong United States ally and democratic actor in the Middle East;

Whereas Hezbollah continues to harm the Lebanese people by violating United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), perpetuating undue foreign influence from Iran, harming the distinct demographic and social equilibrium of Lebanon, stoking sectarian violence, weakening the Lebanese economy, and supporting corruption and violence within Lebanon;

Whereas corruption in the Lebanese public sector remains unchecked, despite calls for efforts to combat corruption in all government and social society sectors;

Whereas the harmful politicization of the independent judiciary in Lebanon is untenable and is being met with strong disagreement by the Lebanese people and international actors; and

Whereas respect for the rule of law and democratic principles of an independent and free press, long supported in Lebanon, must persist at the highest levels: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) notes that the United States provides assistance to the people of Lebanon in order to support
3 services and security for Lebanese citizens, particularly to counter the growing influence and negative
4 impact of Hezbollah and other destabilizing actors;
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1 (2) encourages the Government of Lebanon to
2 work actively to combat corruption in government,
3 execute structural reforms and anticorruption meas-
4 ures, and work with international financial institu-
5 tions like the International Monetary Fund and
6 World Bank to undertake necessary reforms in order
7 to stabilize the economy;

8 (3) calls on the Lebanese Government to secure
9 the safety, freedom of movement, and access for
10 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon troops
11 and mitigate any destabilizing effects on Lebanon
12 and while supporting robust enforcement of United
13 Nations Security Council Resolution 1701;

14 (4) supports the right of the people of Lebanon
15 to engage in peaceful demonstration and assembly to
16 achieve accountability in government, democratic po-
17 litical representation, increased civil rights, and
18 anticorruption reforms;

19 (5) recognizes the Lebanese Armed Forces
20 (LAF) as the sole institution entrusted with the de-
21 fense of the sovereignty of Lebanon and supports
22 strengthening United States partnerships with the
23 LAF to prevent terrorist groups such as Hezbollah,
24 ISIS, and Al Qaeda from gaining influence in Leb-
25 anon; and

1 (6) recognizes the role of Lebanon and its insti-
2 tutions, such as an independent judiciary, free press,
3 and multid denominational, representative government
4 as historic examples of democratic values in the Mid-
5 dle East and expresses support for the continuation
6 of democracy and democratic ideals in Lebanon.

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**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 1077
OFFERED BY MR. DEUTCH OF FLORIDA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the security, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon, a pluralistic democracy in the Middle East, is in the interest of the United States and its allies in the region;

Whereas, for more than a decade, the United States has provided robust assistance for Lebanon, including training and equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), development assistance through the Economic Support Fund, funding for schools and hospitals in Lebanon through the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program, and funding through the Middle East Partnership Initiative;

Whereas the integrity and independence of the LAF serves a United States national security interest;

Whereas the LAF has a longstanding partnership with the United States military;

Whereas the LAF, as the primary institution entrusted with Lebanon's defense, security, and sovereignty, is an important force to support the safety and security of Lebanon;

Whereas international support for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remains necessary to counteract destabilizing forces in Lebanon and help lower tensions at the Lebanon-Israel border;

Whereas, on August 28, 2020, the United Nations Security Council unanimously extended and expanded UNIFIL's mandate and called on the Lebanese Government to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by United Nations peacekeepers for investigation, urged freedom of movement and unimpeded access for peacekeepers to all parts of the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, and condemned in the strongest terms all attempts to restrict United Nations troop movements and attacks on mission personnel;

Whereas United States support for American institutions in Lebanon through humanitarian and bilateral economic assistance is vital for fostering democratic ideals and principles throughout Lebanon;

Whereas Lebanon hosts an estimated 1,500,000 refugees, the highest refugee-per-capita ratio in the world, despite challenges within its own social and economic sectors;

Whereas endemic corruption and mismanagement by elites and the terrorist organization Hezbollah has led Lebanon to the brink of economic collapse, with one of the highest rates of public debt, food insecurity, and hyperinflation in the world;

Whereas Iran undermines Lebanon's sovereignty and its history as a strong United States ally and democratic actor in the Middle East;

Whereas Iran's terrorist proxy Hezbollah continues to harm the Lebanese people by violating United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), perpetuating undue foreign influence from Iran, harming the distinct demographic and social equilibrium of Lebanon, stoking sec-

tarian violence, weakening the Lebanese economy, and supporting corruption and violence within Lebanon;

Whereas, on August 4, 2020, 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated at the Port of Beirut, killing approximately 200 people and injuring thousands more;

Whereas the dangerous and highly explosive material had been unsafely stored at the Port of Beirut since 2014, despite repeated warnings over the threat the stockpile posed to the surrounding civilian population;

Whereas the explosions destroyed vast swaths of infrastructure across Beirut and displaced up to 300,000 people;

Whereas the explosions destroyed or damaged the entire Port of Beirut, through which Lebanon imports the bulk of its food, including the destruction of approximately 120,000 metric tons of desperately needed food stocks, according to the United Nations;

Whereas, prior to the explosions, nearly 1,000,000 people in the Beirut metropolitan area, including more than 500,000 children, did not have the means to buy basic essentials, including food;

Whereas the United States Government has longstanding concerns about Hezbollah's use of and influence over the Beirut Port as a transit and storage point for its terrorist enterprise;

Whereas the people of Lebanon across the political spectrum have renewed demands for a meaningful change in Lebanon's political leadership, government accountability, and transparency;

Whereas the United States has provided nearly \$19,000,000 in humanitarian assistance to aid the people of Lebanon following the explosions to support lifesaving medical re-

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sponses and relief including food aid for 300,000 people and medical and pharmaceutical support for up to 60,000 people; and

Whereas a stable Lebanon with a credible, transparent government free from Iranian and Hezbollah interference and based on the rule of law and democratic principles is in the interests of the Lebanese people, the United States, and United States partners and allies: Now, therefore, be it

Strike the resolved clause and insert the following:

- 1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—
- 2 (1) extends its heartfelt condolences to, and
- 3 stands with, the people of Lebanon following the
- 4 tragic events of August 4;
- 5 (2) calls on the Government of Lebanon to ad-
- 6 vance the interests of the people of Lebanon by root-
- 7 ing out corruption in government, executing struc-
- 8 tural reforms and anticorruption measures, and
- 9 working with international financial institutions like
- 10 the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
- 11 to undertake necessary reforms in order to stabilize
- 12 the economy;
- 13 (3) supports the right of the people of Lebanon
- 14 to engage in peaceful demonstration and assembly to
- 15 achieve accountability in government, democratic po-

1 litical representation, increased civil rights, and
2 anticorruption reforms;

3 (4) calls on the Government of Lebanon to ad-
4 dress the root causes of instability and mismanage-
5 ment that allowed the tragic August 4 blast to take
6 place, including by responding to calls for account-
7 ability and reform by the people of Lebanon;

8 (5) calls on the Lebanese Government, includ-
9 ing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to take all
10 appropriate action to fully implement United Na-
11 tions Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) and
12 any successor resolutions and to secure the safety,
13 freedom of movement, and access for United Nations
14 Interim Force troops in Lebanon;

15 (6) recognizes the LAF as the sole institution
16 entrusted with the defense of the sovereignty of Leb-
17 anon and supports United States partnerships with
18 the LAF to counter terrorist groups such as
19 Hezbollah, ISIS, and Al Qaeda in Lebanon;

20 (7) supports United States efforts to provide
21 emergency humanitarian relief in concert with other
22 governments and international partners;

23 (8) affirms that United States assistance should
24 be delivered directly to the Lebanese people through
25 properly vetted channels, organizations, and individ-

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1 uals, without risk of diversion to terrorist groups;
2 and
3 (9) calls on the Government of Lebanon to con-
4 duct a credible, impartial, and transparent investiga-
5 tion into the cause of, and responsibility for, the Au-
6 gust 4 explosions, and include impartial inter-
7 national experts as part of the investigation team.

Amend the title so as to read: “Resolution express-
ing the sense of the House of Representatives on the con-
tinued importance of the United States-Lebanon relation-
ship and expressing solidarity with the Lebanese people
following the devastating explosions at the Port of Beirut
on August 4, 2020.”.

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.....
 (Original Signature of Member)

116TH CONGRESS
 2D SESSION

H. R. _____

To establish the Department of State Student Internship Program as a paid internship program to provide students with the opportunity to learn about a career in diplomacy and foreign affairs, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. CASTRO of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To establish the Department of State Student Internship Program as a paid internship program to provide students with the opportunity to learn about a career in diplomacy and foreign affairs, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Department of State
 5 Student Internship Program Act”.

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 8409
OFFERED BY MR. CASTRO OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Department of State
3 Student Internship Program Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDENT INTERNSHIP
5 PROGRAM.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es-
7 tablish the Department of State Student Internship Pro-
8 gram (in this section referred to as the “Program”) to
9 offer internship opportunities at the Department of State
10 to eligible students to raise awareness of the essential role
11 of diplomacy in the conduct of United States foreign policy
12 and the realization of United States foreign policy objec-
13 tives.

14 (b) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to participate in the
15 Program, an applicant shall—

16 (1) be enrolled, not less than half-time, at—

1 (A) an institution of higher education (as
2 such term is defined section 102 of the Higher
3 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)); or

4 (B) an institution of higher education
5 based outside the United States, as determined
6 by the Secretary of State;

7 (2) be able to receive and hold an appropriate
8 security clearance; and

9 (3) satisfy such other criteria as established by
10 the Secretary.

11 (c) SELECTION.—The Secretary of State shall estab-
12 lish selection criteria for students to be admitted into the
13 Program that includes the following:

14 (1) Demonstrable interest in a career in foreign
15 affairs.

16 (2) Academic performance.

17 (3) Such other criteria as determined by the
18 Secretary.

19 (d) OUTREACH.—The Secretary of State shall adver-
20 tise the Program widely, including on the internet,
21 through the Department of State's Diplomats in Resi-
22 dence program, and through other outreach and recruiting
23 initiatives targeting undergraduate and graduate students.
24 The Secretary shall actively encourage people belonging to
25 traditionally under represented groups in terms of racial,

1 ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity, and disability
2 status to apply to the Program, including by conducting
3 targeted outreach at minority serving institutions (as such
4 term is described in section 371(a) of the Higher Edu-
5 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

6 (e) COMPENSATION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Students participating in the
8 Program shall be paid at least—

9 (A) the amount specified in section 6(a)(1)
10 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
11 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)), or

12 (B) the minimum wage of the jurisdiction
13 in which the internship is located, or
14 whichever is greatest.

15 (2) HOUSING ASSISTANCE.—

16 (A) ABROAD.—The Secretary of State
17 shall provide housing to a student participating
18 in the Program whose permanent address is
19 within the United States if the location of the
20 internship in which such student is partici-
21 pating is outside the United States.

22 (B) DOMESTIC.—The Secretary of State is
23 authorized to provide housing to a student par-
24 ticipating in the Program whose permanent ad-
25 dress is within the United States if the location

1 of the internship in which such student is par-
2 ticipating is more than 50 miles away from
3 such student's permanent address.

4 (3) TRAVEL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of
5 State shall provide a student participating in the
6 Program whose permanent address is within the
7 United States financial assistance to cover the costs
8 of travel once to and once from the location of the
9 internship in which such student is participating, in-
10 cluding travel by air, train, bus, or other transit as
11 appropriate, if the location of such internship is—

12 (A) more than 50 miles from such stu-
13 dent's permanent address; or

14 (B) outside the United States.

15 (4) ASSISTANCE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.—
16 For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
17 any amount which (but for this paragraph) would be
18 includible in gross income of the eligible recipient by
19 reason of housing assistance described in paragraph
20 (2) or travel assistance described in paragraph (3)
21 shall be excluded from gross income.

22 (f) WORKING WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDU-
23 CATION.—The Secretary of State is authorized to enter
24 into agreements with institutions of higher education to
25 structure internships to ensure such internships satisfy

1 criteria for academic programs in which participants in
2 such internships are enrolled.

3 (g) TRANSITION PERIOD.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than three years
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State shall transition all unpaid internship
7 programs of the Department of State, to the max-
8 imum extent practicable and excluding internships
9 not administered by the Department, to internship
10 programs that offer compensation, such as the Pro-
11 gram and the Foreign Service Internship Program.

12 (2) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of
13 State may waive the transition requirement under
14 paragraph (1) for a period of not more than one
15 year if the Secretary of State—

16 (A) determines that such a waiver is nec-
17 essary; and

18 (B) submits to the Committee on Foreign
19 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
20 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
21 a report providing a justification for such a
22 waiver.

23 (h) REPORTS.—Not later than 18 months after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
25 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the

1 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
2 Relations of a Senate a report that includes the following:

3 (1) Information regarding the number of stu-
4 dents, disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender, insti-
5 tution of higher learning, home State, State where
6 each student graduated from high school, and dis-
7 ability status, who applied to the Program, were of-
8 fered a position, and participated.

9 (2) Information on the number of security
10 clearance investigations started and the timeline for
11 such investigations, including whether such inves-
12 tigation were completed or if, and when, an interim
13 security clearance was granted.

14 (3) Information on expenditures on the Pro-
15 gram.

16 (4) Information regarding the Department of
17 State's compliance with subsection (g).

18 (i) VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may
20 be construed to compel any employee of the Depart-
21 ment of State to participate in the collection of the
22 data or divulge any personal information. Depart-
23 ment employees shall be informed that their partici-
24 pation in the data collection contemplated by this
25 title is voluntary.

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1 (2) PRIVACY PROTECTION.—Any data collected
2 under this section shall be subject to the relevant
3 privacy protection statutes and regulations applica-
4 ble to Federal employees.

☒

1 **SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDENT INTERNSHIP**
2 **PROGRAM.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es-
4 tablish the Department of State Student Internship Pro-
5 gram (in this section referred to as the “Program”) to
6 offer internship opportunities at the Department of State
7 to eligible students to raise awareness of the essential role
8 of diplomacy in the conduct of United States foreign policy
9 and the realization of United States foreign policy objec-
10 tives.

11 (b) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to participate in the
12 Program, an applicant shall—

13 (1) be a current student at—

14 (A) an institution of higher education (as
15 such term is defined section 102 of the Higher
16 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)); or

17 (B) an institution of higher education
18 based outside the United States, as determined
19 by the Secretary of State;

20 (2) be able to receive and hold an appropriate
21 security clearance; and

22 (3) satisfy such other criteria as established by
23 the Secretary.

24 (c) SELECTION.—The Secretary of State shall estab-
25 lish selection criteria for students to be admitted into the
26 Program that includes the following:

1 (1) Demonstrable interest in a career in foreign
2 affairs.

3 (2) Academic performance.

4 (3) Such other criteria as determined by the
5 Secretary.

6 (d) OUTREACH.—The Secretary of State shall adver-
7 tise the Program widely, including on the internet,
8 through the Department of State’s Diplomats in Resi-
9 dence program, and through other outreach and recruiting
10 initiatives targeting undergraduate and graduate students.
11 The Secretary shall actively encourage people belonging to
12 traditionally under represented groups in terms of racial,
13 ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity, and disability
14 status to apply to the Program, including by conducting
15 targeted outreach at minority serving institutions (as such
16 term is described in section 371(a) of the Higher Edu-
17 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

18 (e) COMPENSATION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Students participating in the
20 Program shall be paid at least—

21 (A) the amount specified in section 6(a)(1)
22 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
23 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)), or

24 (B) the minimum wage of the jurisdiction
25 in which the internship is located, or

1 whichever is greatest.

2 (2) HOUSING ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of
3 State shall provide housing to a student partici-
4 pating in the Program whose permanent address is
5 within the United States if the location of the in-
6 ternship in which such student is participating is
7 outside the United States.

8 (3) TRAVEL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of
9 State shall provide a student participating in the
10 Program whose permanent address is within the
11 United States financial assistance to cover the costs
12 of travel once to and once from the location of the
13 internship in which such student is participating, in-
14 cluding travel by air, train, bus, or other transit as
15 appropriate, if the location of such internship is—

16 (A) more than 100 miles from such stu-
17 dent's permanent address; or

18 (B) outside the United States.

19 (4) ASSISTANCE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.—
20 For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
21 any amount which (but for this paragraph) would be
22 includible in gross income of the eligible recipient by
23 reason of housing assistance described in paragraph
24 (2) or travel assistance described in paragraph (3)
25 shall be excluded from gross income.

1 (f) WORKING WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDU-
2 CATION.—The Secretary of State is authorized to enter
3 into agreements with institutions of higher education to
4 structure internships to ensure such internships satisfy
5 criteria for academic programs in which participants in
6 such internships are enrolled.

7 (g) TRANSITION PERIOD.—Not later than one year
8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
9 of State shall transition all unpaid internship programs
10 of the Department of State to internship programs that
11 offer compensation, including the Foreign Service Intern-
12 ship Program.

13 (h) REPORTS.—Not later than 18 months after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
15 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
17 Relations of a Senate a report that includes the following:

18 (1) Information regarding the number of stu-
19 dents, disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender, insti-
20 tution of higher learning, home State, State where
21 each student graduated from high school, and dis-
22 ability status, who applied to the Program, were of-
23 fered a position, and participated.

1 (2) Information on the number of security
2 clearance investigations started and the timeline for
3 completion of such investigations.

4 (3) Information on expenditures on the Pro-
5 gram.

6 (4) Information regarding the Department of
7 State's compliance with subsection (h).

8 (i) VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may
10 be construed to compel any employee of the Depart-
11 ment of State to participate in the collection of the
12 data or divulge any personal information. Depart-
13 ment employees shall be informed that their partici-
14 pation in the data collection contemplated by this
15 title is voluntary.

16 (2) PRIVACY PROTECTION.—Any data collected
17 under this section shall be subject to the relevant
18 privacy protection statutes and regulations applica-
19 ble to Federal employees.

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 8409
OFFERED BY MR. CASTRO OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Department of State
3 Student Internship Program Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDENT INTERNSHIP
5 PROGRAM.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es-
7 tablish the Department of State Student Internship Pro-
8 gram (in this section referred to as the “Program”) to
9 offer internship opportunities at the Department of State
10 to eligible students to raise awareness of the essential role
11 of diplomacy in the conduct of United States foreign policy
12 and the realization of United States foreign policy objec-
13 tives.

14 (b) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to participate in the
15 Program, an applicant shall—

16 (1) be enrolled, not less than half-time, at—

1 (A) an institution of higher education (as
2 such term is defined section 102 of the Higher
3 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)); or

4 (B) an institution of higher education
5 based outside the United States, as determined
6 by the Secretary of State;

7 (2) be able to receive and hold an appropriate
8 security clearance; and

9 (3) satisfy such other criteria as established by
10 the Secretary.

11 (c) SELECTION.—The Secretary of State shall estab-
12 lish selection criteria for students to be admitted into the
13 Program that includes the following:

14 (1) Demonstrable interest in a career in foreign
15 affairs.

16 (2) Academic performance.

17 (3) Such other criteria as determined by the
18 Secretary.

19 (d) OUTREACH.—The Secretary of State shall adver-
20 tise the Program widely, including on the internet,
21 through the Department of State's Diplomats in Resi-
22 dence program, and through other outreach and recruiting
23 initiatives targeting undergraduate and graduate students.
24 The Secretary shall actively encourage people belonging to
25 traditionally under represented groups in terms of racial,

1 ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity, and disability
2 status to apply to the Program, including by conducting
3 targeted outreach at minority serving institutions (as such
4 term is described in section 371(a) of the Higher Edu-
5 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

6 (e) COMPENSATION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Students participating in the
8 Program shall be paid at least—

9 (A) the amount specified in section 6(a)(1)
10 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
11 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)), or

12 (B) the minimum wage of the jurisdiction
13 in which the internship is located, or
14 whichever is greatest.

15 (2) HOUSING ASSISTANCE.—

16 (A) ABROAD.—The Secretary of State
17 shall provide housing to a student participating
18 in the Program whose permanent address is
19 within the United States if the location of the
20 internship in which such student is partici-
21 pating is outside the United States.

22 (B) DOMESTIC.—The Secretary of State is
23 authorized to provide housing to a student par-
24 ticipating in the Program whose permanent ad-
25 dress is within the United States if the location

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1 of the internship in which such student is par-
2 ticipating is more than 50 miles away from
3 such student's permanent address.

4 (3) TRAVEL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of
5 State shall provide a student participating in the
6 Program whose permanent address is within the
7 United States financial assistance to cover the costs
8 of travel once to and once from the location of the
9 internship in which such student is participating, in-
10 cluding travel by air, train, bus, or other transit as
11 appropriate, if the location of such internship is—

12 (A) more than 50 miles from such stu-
13 dent's permanent address; or

14 (B) outside the United States.

15 (4) ASSISTANCE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.—
16 For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
17 any amount which (but for this paragraph) would be
18 includible in gross income of the eligible recipient by
19 reason of housing assistance described in paragraph
20 (2) or travel assistance described in paragraph (3)
21 shall be excluded from gross income.

22 (f) WORKING WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDU-
23 CATION.—The Secretary of State is authorized to enter
24 into agreements with institutions of higher education to
25 structure internships to ensure such internships satisfy

1 criteria for academic programs in which participants in
2 such internships are enrolled.

3 (g) TRANSITION PERIOD.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than three years
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State shall transition all unpaid internship
7 programs of the Department of State, to the max-
8 imum extent practicable and excluding internships
9 not administered by the Department, to internship
10 programs that offer compensation, such as the Pro-
11 gram and the Foreign Service Internship Program.

12 (2) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of
13 State may waive the transition requirement under
14 paragraph (1) for a period of not more than one
15 year if the Secretary of State—

16 (A) determines that such a waiver is nec-
17 essary; and

18 (B) submits to the Committee on Foreign
19 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
20 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
21 a report providing a justification for such a
22 waiver.

23 (h) REPORTS.—Not later than 18 months after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
25 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the

1 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
2 Relations of a Senate a report that includes the following:

3 (1) Information regarding the number of stu-
4 dents, disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender, insti-
5 tution of higher learning, home State, State where
6 each student graduated from high school, and dis-
7 ability status, who applied to the Program, were of-
8 fered a position, and participated.

9 (2) Information on the number of security
10 clearance investigations started and the timeline for
11 such investigations, including whether such inves-
12 tigation were completed or if, and when, an interim
13 security clearance was granted.

14 (3) Information on expenditures on the Pro-
15 gram.

16 (4) Information regarding the Department of
17 State's compliance with subsection (g).

18 (i) VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may
20 be construed to compel any employee of the Depart-
21 ment of State to participate in the collection of the
22 data or divulge any personal information. Depart-
23 ment employees shall be informed that their partici-
24 pation in the data collection contemplated by this
25 title is voluntary.

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1 (2) PRIVACY PROTECTION.—Any data collected
2 under this section shall be subject to the relevant
3 privacy protection statutes and regulations applica-
4 ble to Federal employees.

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116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 672

Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 31, 2019

Ms. KAPTUR (for herself, Mr. KINZINGER, Mr. KEATING, Mr. SIRES, Mr. PENCE, Mr. GOODEN, Mr. COSTA, Mr. ROONEY of Florida, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. HECK, Mr. TURNER, Mr. QUIGLEY, and Mr. PRICE of North Carolina) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security.

Whereas, in 2015, 12 Central and European nations of the European Union established the Three Seas Initiative to increase energy autonomy and resilience through support of collective financing for new infrastructure projects to connect the region between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas;

Whereas the United States pledged support and willingness to serve as a steadfast partner of the Three Seas Initiative's effort at the July 2017 Warsaw summit;

Whereas the Three Seas Initiative will advance economic growth, resilience, and energy security in this strategic region, thereby increasing the national security of the United States;

Whereas the President of the European Commission recognized the Three Seas Initiative as a "catalyst for the cohesion and convergence of the EU and for the strengthening of the transatlantic link";

Whereas Soviet-imposed communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe left the region with a significant infrastructure deficit, especially in the realm of north-south transportation and energy lines;

Whereas the current state of infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe nations restricts energy, water, and telecommunications interconnectivity across the region;

Whereas the infrastructure deficit leaves these nations overly dependent on Russia for their energy and additional economic needs;

Whereas Russia seeks to undermine democratic institutions and liberty in Europe through hybrid means, including using energy as a tool for coercion;

Whereas Russian gas pipeline projects, such as Nord Stream II and Turk Stream, are political and seek to undermine Europe's energy security;

Whereas diversification of energy sources and supply routes, including development of renewable energy sources and technology, is critical to bolstering energy security;

Whereas members of the Three Seas Initiative have prioritized key energy projects such as the Krk, Croatia LNG terminal, Gas Interconnector Republic of Poland-Republic of Lithuania, the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA) gas interconnector, and other cross-border interconnections;

Whereas members of the Three Seas Initiative have also prioritized key digital infrastructure and transportation projects to support modern and vibrant economies including the Three Seas Initiative Digital Highway, the Viking Train, the Adriatic TEN-T Core Network Corridor, and the FAIRway Danube, among others; and

Whereas the Three Seas Initiative includes vital allies of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) supports the Three Seas Initiative in its ef-
3 forts to increase energy resilience and infrastructure
4 connectivity across Central and Eastern Europe and
5 to further the process of building a Europe that is
6 undivided, secure, prosperous, and free;

7 (2) encourages Three Seas Initiative nations to
8 take action on joint financing of projects to
9 strengthen energy infrastructure projects in Central
10 and Eastern Europe, including through national
11 contributions to the Three Seas Initiative Infrastruc-
12 ture Fund;

13 (3) reaffirms the authority of the President
14 under the Build Act of 2018 (division F of Public

1 Law 115–254) to provide the United States financ-
2 ing to the Three Seas Initiative and its projects in
3 cases that advance national economic or foreign pol-
4 icy interests of the United States and would produce
5 significant developmental outcomes or provide devel-
6 opmental benefits to the poorest population;

7 (4) encourages the Three Seas Initiative mem-
8 ber nations to boost cross-border cooperation and fi-
9 nancing on diversification of energy sources, includ-
10 ing clean energy sources and infrastructure;

11 (5) encourages Three Seas Initiative nations to
12 extend this vision of enhanced regional
13 infrastructural connectivity to non-EU member
14 states in the Three Seas region, including Ukraine,
15 Moldova, and those in the Western Balkans; and

16 (6) strongly condemns any efforts of Russia to
17 weaponize energy as a means to put pressure on or
18 to undermine liberty and democracy in Europe.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 672
OFFERED BY MR. KINZINGER OF ILLINOIS**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas, in 2015, 12 Central and European nations of the European Union established the Three Seas Initiative to increase energy, infrastructure, and digital communications autonomy and resilience through support of collective financing for new infrastructure projects to connect the region between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas;

Whereas the United States pledged support and willingness to serve as a steadfast partner of the Three Seas Initiative's effort at the July 2017 Warsaw summit;

Whereas, in February 2020, the Secretary of State announced a United States commitment of up to \$1,000,000,000 in financing for Three Seas Initiative countries to promote energy security and economic growth;

Whereas the Three Seas Initiative will advance economic growth, resilience, transport and digital connectivity, and energy security in this strategic region, thereby increasing the national security of the United States;

Whereas the President of the European Commission recognized the Three Seas Initiative as a "catalyst for the cohesion and convergence of the EU and for the strengthening of the transatlantic link";

Whereas Soviet-imposed communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe left the region with a significant infrastructure deficit, especially in the realm of north-south transportation and energy lines;

Whereas the current state of infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe nations restricts energy, water, and telecommunications interconnectivity across the region;

Whereas the infrastructure deficit leaves these nations overly dependent on Russia for their energy and additional economic needs;

Whereas Russia seeks to undermine democratic institutions and liberty in Europe through hybrid means, including using energy as a tool for coercion;

Whereas Russian gas pipeline projects, such as Nord Stream II and Turk Stream, are political and seek to undermine Europe's energy security;

Whereas the Three Seas Initiative provides a positive alternative for financing for transport, energy and digital connectivity projects in the Three Seas region to China's 17+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives, which have exported corruption, debt traps, and poor labor and environmental standards;

Whereas diversification of energy sources and supply routes, including development of renewable energy sources and technology, is critical to bolstering energy security;

Whereas members of the Three Seas Initiative have prioritized key energy projects such as the Krk, Croatia LNG terminal, Gas Interconnector Republic of Poland-Republic of Lithuania, the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA) gas interconnector, and other cross-border interconnections;

Whereas members of the Three Seas Initiative have also prioritized key digital infrastructure and transportation projects to support modern and vibrant economies including the Three Seas Initiative Digital Highway, the Viking Train, the Adriatic TEN-T Core Network Corridor, and the FAIRway Danube, among others; and

Whereas the Three Seas Initiative includes vital allies of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) supports the Three Seas Initiative in its ef-
3 forts to increase energy resilience and infrastructure
4 connectivity across Central and Eastern Europe and
5 to further the process of building a Europe that is
6 undivided, secure, prosperous, and free;

7 (2) encourages Three Seas Initiative nations to
8 take action on joint financing of projects to
9 strengthen energy, infrastructure, and digital com-
10 munications projects in Central and Eastern Eu-
11 rope, including through national contributions to the
12 Three Seas Initiative Infrastructure Fund;

13 (3) reaffirms the authority of the President
14 under the Build Act of 2018 (division F of Public
15 Law 115–254) to provide United States financing to
16 the Three Seas Initiative and its projects in cases

1 that advance national economic or foreign policy in-
2 terests of the United States and would produce sig-
3 nificant developmental outcomes or provide develop-
4 mental benefits to the poorest population;

5 (4) reaffirms the authority of the United States
6 International Development Finance Corporation
7 under the European Energy Security and Diver-
8 sification Act of 2019 (title XX of division P of Pub-
9 lic Law 116–94) to provide support for the Three
10 Seas Initiative and its energy infrastructure projects
11 in countries with upper-middle-income or high-in-
12 come economies in cases described in paragraph (3)
13 or if such support is necessary to preempt or
14 counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the
15 United States to secure significant political or eco-
16 nomic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive
17 technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an
18 ally or partner of the United States;

19 (5) encourages the Three Seas Initiative mem-
20 ber nations to boost cross-border cooperation and fi-
21 nancing on diversification of energy sources, includ-
22 ing clean energy sources and infrastructure;

23 (6) encourages Three Seas Initiative nations to
24 extend this vision of enhanced regional
25 infrastructural connectivity to non-European Union

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1 member states in the Three Seas region, including
2 Ukraine, Moldova, and those in the Western Bal-
3 kans; and

4 (7) strongly condemns any efforts of Russia to
5 weaponize energy as a means to put pressure on or
6 to undermine liberty and democracy in Europe.



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 17

Expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 2019

Mr. GREEN of Texas submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

RESOLUTION

Expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice, and
for other purposes.

Whereas Austin Tice is a 37-year-old veteran, having served in the Marine Corps as an infantry officer, a Georgetown law student, and a graduate of Georgetown University, from Houston, Texas;

Whereas Austin is an Eagle Scout, National Merit Scholarship finalist, and eldest of seven children;

Whereas Austin was a contributing freelance journalist to McClatchy Newspapers, the Washington Post and other media outlets and a recipient of the 2012 George Polk Award for War Reporting;

Whereas, in May 2012, Austin crossed the Turkey-Syria border to report on the intensifying conflict in Syria;

Whereas, on August 11, 2012, Austin celebrated his 31st birthday in Darayaa, Syria;

Whereas, on August 14, 2012, Austin departed for Beirut, Lebanon, was detained at a checkpoint near Damascus, Syria, and contact with family, friends, and colleagues ceased;

Whereas, in late September 2012, a video clip appeared on YouTube showing Austin blindfolded and being prodded up a hillside by masked militants;

Whereas in the more than 2,300 days since Austin's disappearance, no group has claimed responsibility for his capture;

Whereas the Syrian government has never acknowledged detaining Austin and has denied the same to Austin's parents;

Whereas officials of the United States believe Austin is alive and the government of Bashar al-Assad or a group affiliated with it is holding him;

Whereas Austin Tice's parents, Mare and Debra Tice, have been diligent in their efforts to find their son, repeatedly meeting with senior officials of the United States Government, the Syrian government, the United Nations, and many others;

Whereas the Tices have traveled to the Middle East multiple times, most recently in December 2018, seeking Austin's safe release, and Debra Tice spent four months living in Damascus, Syria, for the same purpose;

Whereas the Tices have partnered with Reporters Without Borders to launch campaigns with nearly 270 newspapers and media organizations, highlighting Austin's case in their publications and on their websites;

Whereas institutions and organizations including Georgetown University, Georgetown Law Center, the National Press Club, the Committee to Protect Journalists, McClatchy, and the Washington Post have collaborated to raise and maintain public awareness of Austin's detention; and

Whereas, on November 13, 2016, United States Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, Robert C. O'Brien, said that the United States Government believes Austin Tice is alive: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) expresses its ongoing concern regarding the
3 capture of Austin Tice near Damascus, Syria, in Au-
4 gust 2012, and his continuing detention;

5 (2) encourages the Department of State, the in-
6 telligence community, and the interagency Hostage
7 Recovery Fusion Cell to jointly continue investiga-
8 tions and to pursue all possible information regard-
9 ing Austin's detention;

10 (3) encourages the Department of State and
11 the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs
12 to engage directly with officials of the Syrian gov-
13 ernment to facilitate Austin's safe release and re-
14 turn;

1 (4) encourages the Department of State to
2 work with foreign governments known to have diplo-
3 matic influence with the Government of Syria; and

4 (5) requests that the Department of State and
5 the intelligence community continue to work with
6 and inform Congress and the family of Austin Tice
7 regarding efforts to secure Austin's safe release and
8 return from detention in Syria.

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 17
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas Austin Tice is a 39-year-old veteran, having served in the Marine Corps as an infantry officer, a Georgetown law student, and a graduate of Georgetown University, from Houston, Texas;

Whereas Austin is an Eagle Scout, National Merit Scholarship finalist, and eldest of seven children;

Whereas Austin was a contributing freelance journalist to McClatchy Newspapers, the Washington Post and other media outlets, and a recipient of the 2012 George Polk Award for War Reporting;

Whereas, in May 2012, Austin crossed the Turkey-Syria border to report on the intensifying conflict in Syria;

Whereas, on August 11, 2012, Austin celebrated his 31st birthday in Darayaa, Syria;

Whereas, on August 14, 2012, Austin departed for Beirut, Lebanon, was detained at a checkpoint near Damascus, Syria, and contact with family, friends, and colleagues ceased;

Whereas, in late September 2012, a video clip appeared on YouTube showing Austin blindfolded and being prodded up a hillside by masked militants;

Whereas in the years since Austin's disappearance, no group has claimed responsibility for his capture;

Whereas the Syrian government has never acknowledged detaining Austin and has denied the same to Austin's parents;

Whereas officials of the United States believe Austin is alive and being held in Syria and that the Syrian government should assist in locating and returning Austin to his family;

Whereas Austin Tice's parents, Marc and Debra Tice, have been diligent in their efforts to find their son, repeatedly meeting with senior officials of the United States Government, the Syrian government, the United Nations, and many others;

Whereas the Tices have traveled to the Middle East multiple times, most recently in December 2018, seeking Austin's safe release, and Debra Tice spent four months living in Damascus, Syria, for the same purpose;

Whereas the Tices have partnered with Reporters Without Borders to launch campaigns with nearly 270 newspapers and media organizations, highlighting Austin's case in their publications and on their websites;

Whereas institutions and organizations, including Georgetown University, Georgetown Law Center, the National Press Club, the Committee to Protect Journalists, McClatchy, and the Washington Post, have collaborated to raise and maintain public awareness of Austin's detention;

Whereas, on November 18, 2018, then-United States Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, Robert O'Brien, said that the United States Government believes Austin Tice is alive;

Whereas at a press briefing on March 19, 2020, President Trump expressed concern for Austin and called on the Syrian government to release him;

Whereas Majd Kamalmaz is a 62-year old Syrian-American psychotherapist, father of four, and resident of Texas;

Whereas Majd is a well-known mental-health professional with experience in disaster relief and post-traumatic care;

Whereas in February 2017 Majd traveled to Syria to visit an elderly family member and aid civilians traumatized by the Syrian civil war;

Whereas on February 16, 2017 Majd's family received word that he had been detained at a checkpoint on his way to Ghouta, outside of Damascus, Syria;

Whereas since February 2017 Majd's family has not heard from him;

Whereas the Syrian government has never publicly acknowledged detaining Majd;

Whereas Majd's family and the Syrian-American community have advocated tirelessly for his immediate release; and

Whereas in July 2020, United States Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens publicly stated, "The U.S. Government is in frequent contact with the Kamalmaz family to provide support and information" and that "Bringing home Majd, along with all U.S. citizens held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad, has the attention of the highest levels in the U.S. government.": Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) expresses its ongoing concern regarding the
3 capture of Austin Tice in August 2012 and Majd
4 Kamalmaz in February 2017, and their continuing
5 detention;

6 (2) encourages the Department of State, the in-
7 telligence community, and the interagency Hostage
8 Recovery Fusion Cell to jointly continue investiga-
9 tions and to pursue all possible information regard-
10 ing Austin and Majd's detention;

11 (3) encourages the Department of State and
12 the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs
13 to engage the Syrian government to facilitate Austin
14 and Majd's safe release and return;

15 (4) encourages the Department of State to
16 work with foreign governments known to have diplo-
17 matic influence with the Syrian government; and

18 (5) requests that the Department of State and
19 the intelligence community continue to work with
20 and inform Congress and the families of Austin Tice
21 and Majd Kamalmaz to the extent possible regard-
22 ing efforts to secure their safe release and return
23 from detention in Syria.

Amend the title so as to read: “A resolution expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice and Majd Kamalmaz, and for other purposes.”.



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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H. RES. 17
OFFERED BY MR. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

At the appropriate place in the text proposed to be inserted in the preamble, insert the following:

Whereas, as described in the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note), Congress calls on the regime of Bashar al-Assad to release all political prisoners forcibly held within its prison system and to allow access to the same facilities for investigations by appropriate international human rights organizations;



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 823

Condemning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 30, 2020

Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. McCAUL, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SCHNEIDER, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. MEEKS, and Mrs. WAGNER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Condemning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights.

Whereas, in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018, Congress declared that it deplored the religious persecution by the Government of Iran of the Baha'i community and would hold the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all Iranian nationals, including members of the Baha'i faith;

Whereas, since 1979, authorities have killed or executed more than 200 Baha'i leaders, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed from government and university jobs;

Whereas the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/74/188) dated July 18, 2019, provides, in part—

(1) the Iranian authorities and the Iranian criminal justice system regard the Baha'is as “unprotected infidels”; the Baha'i faith is also “regarded as a misguided sect”; and “Baha'i worship and religious practices are deemed heresy.”;

(2) “Baha'is have been murdered with impunity and violations of their human rights have not been investigated.”;

(3) members of the Baha'i faith “frequently face charges, such as, ‘breaching national security’, ‘propaganda against the holy regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran’, or ‘propaganda activities against the regime in the interests of the Baha'i sect’”;

(4) “Since August 2005, more than 1,168 Baha'is have been arrested and charged with vaguely worded offences.”;

(5) “There were a total of 95 Baha'is reportedly arrested in 2018, compared with at least 84 in 2017 and 81 in 2016.”;

(6) “On 1 January 2019, the court of appeal of Isfahan reportedly condemned, in separate judgments, nine Baha'i citizens to a total of 48 years of prison. They had been charged with ‘membership of the illegal Baha'i community and propaganda against the regime by spreading the Baha'i faith in the society.’”;

(7) directed by a 2007 letter from the Security Unit of the Public Place Supervision Office of the Islamic Republic of Iran to police commanders throughout the country, Iranian authorities continue to apply economic pressure against the Baha'i community, by banning them from specific professions and "halting their entry to 'high earning businesses.'"; and

(8) "Since 2013, there have been more than 803 incidents of violations of economic rights of the Baha'is, including arbitrary shop closures, unfair dismissals from employment and the actual or threatened revocation of business licenses.";

Whereas the Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, Iran section, provides, in part—

(1) "Non-Shia Muslims and those affiliated with a religion other than Islam, especially members of the Baha'i community, continued to face societal discrimination and harassment, and employers experienced social pressures not to hire Baha'is or to dismiss them from their private sector jobs."; and

(2) "The law bars Baha'is from founding their own educational institutions. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Baha'is from access to higher education or expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known.";

Whereas, on March 13, 2019, the Department of State released the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 and, in connection with Iran, the report provides, in part—

(1) Iranian authorities "barred Baha'i students from higher education", and in September 2018, denied enroll-

ment to more than 50 Baha'i college applicants because of their religious affiliation; and

(2) "The country materially contributed to human rights abuses . . . in Yemen, through its support for Houthi rebels and directing authorities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to harass and detain Baha'is because of their religious affiliation.";

Whereas the 2019 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom provides, in part—

(1) "There are more than 300,000 Baha'is in Iran, who together constitute the largest non-Muslim religious majority in the country.";

(2) "Shiraz city councilman Mehdi Hajati was arrested on the order of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court after criticizing the arrests of Baha'is in his city."; and

(3) "Security forces also prevented the burial of two deceased Baha'i individuals in a Baha'i cemetery in Kerman after it was sealed in March 2018. In October, the body of a deceased Baha'i woman was exhumed four days after her burial and abandoned in a desert area outside the town of Jaban.";

Whereas the Baha'i International Community has documented more than 26,000 items of anti-Baha'i hate propaganda in Iran's official and semi official media since January 2014;

Whereas the Government of Iran is a party to the International Covenants on Human Rights and is in violation of its obligations under such covenants;

Whereas section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514) authorizes the President to impose sanctions on in-

dividuals “responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12, 2009”; and

Whereas the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–158) amends and expands the authorities established under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195) to sanction Iranian human rights abusers: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) condemns the Government of Iran’s state-
3 sponsored persecution of its Baha’i minority and its
4 continued violation of the International Covenants
5 on Human Rights;

6 (2) calls on the Government of Iran—

7 (A) to immediately release all imprisoned
8 or detained Baha’is, together with all other
9 prisoners held solely on account of their reli-
10 gion;

11 (B) to end its state-sponsored campaign of
12 hate propaganda against the Baha’is; and

13 (C) to reverse state-imposed policies deny-
14 ing equal opportunities to higher education,
15 earning a livelihood, due process under the law,
16 and the free exercise of religious practices;

1 (3) calls on the President and the Secretary of
2 State, in cooperation with responsible nations, to im-
3 mediately condemn the Government of Iran's contin-
4 ued violation of human rights and demand the im-
5 mediate release of prisoners held solely on account
6 of their religion; and

7 (4) urges the President and the Secretary of
8 State to utilize available authorities to impose sanc-
9 tions on officials of the Government of Iran and
10 other individuals directly responsible for serious
11 human rights abuses, including abuses against the
12 Baha'i community of Iran.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 823
OFFERED BY MR. DEUTCH OF FLORIDA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas, in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018, Congress declared that it deplored the religious persecution by the Government of Iran of the Baha'i community and would hold the Government of Iran responsible for upholding the rights of all Iranian nationals, including members of the Baha'i faith;

Whereas, since 1979, Iranian authorities have killed or executed more than 200 Baha'i leaders, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed from government and university jobs;

Whereas the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/74/188) dated July 18, 2019, provides, in part—

(1) the Iranian authorities and the Iranian criminal justice system regard the Baha'is as “unprotected infidels”; the Baha'i faith is also “regarded as a misguided sect”; and “Baha'i worship and religious practices are deemed heresy.”;

(2) “Baha'is have been murdered with impunity and violations of their human rights have not been investigated.”;

(3) members of the Baha'i faith "frequently face charges, such as, 'breaching national security', 'propaganda against the holy regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran', or 'propaganda activities against the regime in the interests of the Baha'i sect'";

(4) "Since August 2005, more than 1,168 Baha'is have been arrested and charged with vaguely worded offences.";

(5) "There were a total of 95 Baha'is reportedly arrested in 2018, compared with at least 84 in 2017 and 81 in 2016.";

(6) "On 1 January 2019, the court of appeal of Isfahan reportedly condemned, in separate judgments, nine Baha'i citizens to a total of 48 years of prison. They had been charged with 'membership of the illegal Baha'i community and propaganda against the regime by spreading the Baha'i faith in the society.'";

(7) directed by a 2007 letter from the Security Unit of the Public Place Supervision Office of the Islamic Republic of Iran to police commanders throughout the country, Iranian authorities continue to apply economic pressure against the Baha'i community, by banning them from specific professions and "halting their entry to 'high earning businesses'"; and

(8) "Since 2013, there have been more than 803 incidents of violations of economic rights of the Baha'is, including arbitrary shop closures, unfair dismissals from employment and the actual or threatened revocation of business licenses.";

Whereas the Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report for 2019, Iran section, provides, in part—

(1) “Non-Shia Muslims and those affiliated with a religion other than Islam, especially members of the Baha’i community, continued to face societal discrimination and harassment, and employers experienced social pressures not to hire Baha’is or to dismiss them from their private sector jobs.”; and

(2) “The law bars Baha’is from founding their own educational institutions. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Baha’is from access to higher education or expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known.”;

Whereas, on March 11, 2020, the Department of State released the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 and, in connection with Iran, the report provides, in part—

(1) Iranian authorities “barred Baha’i students from higher education”, and in 2019, denied enrollment to at least 22 Baha’i college applicants solely because of their religious affiliation despite passing the national admissions test;

(2) “The country materially contributed to human rights abuses . . . in Yemen, through its support for Houthi rebels and directing authorities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to harass and detain Baha’is because of their religious affiliation.”; and

(3) “In July 2019, Iran Wire, a human rights reporting agency, reported the case of Hamed Rezvani, a Baha’i musician and teacher, who left his

home in Isfahan in December 2018 and has not been heard from since. Repeated requests by the Rezvani family for information from police and local intelligence have not produced any information about his disappearance.”;

Whereas according to the 2020 Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)—

(1) “There are more than 300,000 Baha’is in Iran, who together constitute the largest non-Muslim religious minority in the country.”;

(2) “Security forces also prevented the burial of two deceased Baha’i individuals in a Baha’i cemetery in Kerman after it was sealed in March 2018. In October, the body of a deceased Baha’i woman was exhumed four days after her burial and abandoned in a desert area outside the town of Jaban.”;

(3) There is a “particular uptick in the persecution of Baha’is”, including of local government officials who advocated on behalf of Baha’is, and the Iranian government blamed Baha’is, without evidence, for wide-spread popular protests in 2019; and

(4) “In July 2019, Twitter banned several official Iranian media accounts for incitement against Baha’is in Iran.”;

Whereas the Baha’i International Community documented a more than 50 percent increase in hate propaganda directed against the Baha’is in the twelve-month period ending August 2020 compared to prior years with more than 9,500 such articles, videos, or web pages appearing in Iranian government-controlled or government-sponsored media;

Whereas Iran is a member of the United Nations and a signatory to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among other international human rights treaties, without reservation;

Whereas section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514) authorizes the President to impose sanctions on individuals “responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12, 2009”; and

Whereas the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–158) amends and expands the authorities established under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 to sanction Iranian human rights abusers: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

- 1 That the House of Representatives—
- 2 (1) condemns the Government of Iran’s state-
- 3 sponsored persecution of its Baha’i minority and its
- 4 continued violation of the Universal Declaration of
- 5 Human Rights and the International Covenant on
- 6 Civil and Political Rights;
- 7 (2) calls on the Government of Iran—

1 (A) to immediately release all imprisoned
2 or detained Baha'is, together with all other
3 prisoners held solely on account of their reli-
4 gion;

5 (B) to end its state-sponsored campaign of
6 hate propaganda against the Baha'is; and

7 (C) to reverse state-imposed policies deny-
8 ing Baha'is and members of other religious mi-
9 norities equal opportunities to higher education,
10 earning a livelihood, due process under the law,
11 and the free exercise of religious practices;

12 (3) calls on the President and the Secretary of
13 State, in cooperation with responsible nations, to
14 continue to condemn the Government of Iran's con-
15 tinued violation of human rights and demand the
16 immediate release of prisoners held solely on account
17 of their religion; and

18 (4) urges the President and the Secretary of
19 State to utilize available authorities to impose sanc-
20 tions on officials of the Government of Iran and
21 other individuals directly responsible for serious
22 human rights abuses, including abuses against the
23 Baha'i community of Iran.

Amend the title so as to read: "A resolution con-
demning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored perse-
cution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation

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of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 996

Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 11, 2020

Mr. ENGEL (for himself, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. KEATING, and Mr. KINZINGER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners.

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is a Russian national who has maintained close personal ties with President Vladimir Putin since the early 2000s;

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is the patron and funder of the Wagner Group, also known as the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner, a Russian mercenary organization staffed by current and former military and intelligence officers, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), an organization engaged in online influence operations;

Whereas the IRA has conducted online information operations against the United States in an attempt to sow division and discord among the American electorate, as well as the electorates of our European allies and partners;

Whereas entities funded by Yevgeniy Prigozhin have been used by the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct military action, subversive operations, and disinformation campaigns on its behalf while giving it an appearance of plausible deniability;

Whereas the Wagner Group was involved in the Russian Federation's military invasion and illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region in February and March 2014, and in the subsequent insurgencies in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk;

Whereas the Wagner Group has been providing military support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria since 2015, fighting alongside its forces and helping it recapture significant parts of the country;

Whereas, on February 7, 2018, the Wagner Group led an armed assault on United States troops near the city of Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, prompting a United States counterattack, in what has been described as "the deadliest U.S.-Russia clash since the Cold War";

Whereas the Wagner Group has supported Khalifa Haftar and his "Libyan National Army" by providing mercenaries, artillery, tanks, drones, and ammunition, with Yevgeniy Prigozhin personally attending a meeting between Haftar and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow on November 7, 2018;

Whereas a United Nations report made public on May 6, 2020, concluded that the Wagner Group has operated up

to 1,200 military contractors in Libya, including snipers and specialized military teams, serving as “an effective force multiplier” for Haftar’s army.

Whereas mercenaries from the Wagner Group were deployed to Venezuela in January 2019 to provide support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in the face of popular protests against his rule;

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities have spearheaded operations with the intent to influence political processes in Africa on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation in several countries, including Madagascar, South Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe;

Whereas the Wagner Group has deployed mercenaries to the Central African Republic since 2018 and has provided security detail for Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, including Russian national Valery Zakharov, a former security official with close ties to the Wagner Group, who serves as the National Security Adviser;

Whereas, on July 31, 2018, Russian journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Kirill Radchenko, and Alexander Rastorguyev were murdered in the Central African Republic while working on a documentary about the activities of the Wagner Group in that country;

Whereas according to an investigation by the London-based Dossier Center, the journalists had been tracked by officers of the Central African Republic gendarmerie who were in close communication with Russian nationals tied to the Wagner Group, including Valery Zakharov and Alexander Sotov;

Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin were reported to discuss plans to set up camps “for combat prep and training in sabotage” with the goal of stoking racial violence and carrying out domestic terror attacks in the United States in the run-up to the November 3, 2020, presidential election;

Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin have set up online influence operations based in Ghana and Nigeria to target social media audiences in the United States with the goal of inflaming racial tensions and provoking social unrest in the run-up to the November 3, 2020, presidential election;

Whereas, on December 20, 2016, the Department of the Treasury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin under Executive Order 13661, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, for having “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, senior officials of the Russian Federation”;

Whereas, on June 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury designated the Wagner Group under Executive Order 13660, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, for being “responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine”;

Whereas, on March 15, 2018, the Department of the Treasury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin, his affiliated entities, including the Internet Research Agency, and his subordinates under Executive Order 13694, “Blocking the Prop-

erty of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” for being “involved in interfering with [U.S.] election processes or institutions”; and

Whereas current and former Administration officials have affirmed that the malign activities of Yevgeniy Prigozhin around the world pose a significant threat to United States national security interests: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) condemns any and all attempts by the Gov-
3 ernment of the Russian Federation and its proxy ac-
4 tors to harmfully influence the domestic politics of
5 other countries and sow division among their peo-
6 ples, particularly the United States and its allies and
7 partners;

8 (2) condemns the activities of Russian national
9 Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities that
10 pose a threat to the democratic values and security
11 of the United States and its allies and partners;

12 (3) urges countries engaging with Yevgeniy
13 Prigozhin and his affiliated entities in business or
14 advisory capacities to cease these engagements;

15 (4) calls for seriously considering additional
16 sanctions against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affli-
17 ated entities for continued interference in United
18 States democratic processes and in the democratic
19 processes of United States allies and partners;

1 (5) urges our European Union partners to seri-
2 ously consider adopting similar sanctions regimes
3 against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities
4 for continued interference in the domestic politics of
5 European Union member states; and

6 (6) calls for close coordination between the
7 United States Government and the governments of
8 United States allies and partners to ensure that
9 sanctions regimes against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and
10 his affiliated entities are tightly coordinated.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 996
OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is a Russian national who has maintained close personal ties with President Vladimir Putin since the early 2000s;

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin is the patron and funder of the Wagner Group, also known as the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner, a Russian mercenary organization staffed by current and former military and intelligence officers, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), an organization engaged in online influence operations;

Whereas the IRA has conducted online information operations against the United States in an attempt to sow division and discord among the American electorate, as well as the electorates of our European allies and partners;

Whereas entities funded by Yevgeniy Prigozhin have been used by the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct military action, subversive operations, and disinformation campaigns on its behalf while giving it an appearance of plausible deniability;

Whereas the Wagner Group was involved in the Russian Federation's military invasion and attempted annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region in February and March 2014, and in the subsequent insurgencies in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk;

Whereas the Wagner Group has been providing military support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria since 2015, fighting alongside its forces and helping it recapture significant parts of the country;

Whereas, on February 7, 2018, the Wagner Group led an armed assault on United States troops near the city of Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria, prompting a United States counterattack, in what has been described as “the deadliest U.S.-Russia clash since the Cold War”;

Whereas the Wagner Group has supported Khalifa Haftar and his “Libyan National Army” by providing mercenaries, artillery, tanks, drones, and ammunition, with Yevgeniy Prigozhin personally attending a meeting between Haftar and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow on November 7, 2018;

Whereas a United Nations report made public on May 6, 2020, concluded that the Wagner Group has operated up to 1,200 military contractors in Libya, including snipers and specialized military teams, serving as “an effective force multiplier” for Haftar’s army.

Whereas mercenaries from the Wagner Group were deployed to Venezuela in January 2019 to provide support for the regime of Nicolas Maduro in the face of popular protests against his dictatorship;

Whereas Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities have spearheaded operations with the intent to influence political processes in Africa on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation in several countries, including Madagascar, South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Central African Republic;

Whereas the Wagner Group has deployed mercenaries to the Central African Republic since 2018 and has provided security detail for Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera, including Russian national Valery Zakharov, a former security official with close ties to the Wagner Group, who serves as the National Security Adviser;

Whereas, on July 31, 2018, Russian journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Kirill Radchenko, and Alexander Rastorguyev were murdered in the Central African Republic while working on a documentary about the activities of the Wagner Group in that country;

Whereas according to an investigation by the London-based Dossier Center, the journalists had been tracked by officers of the Central African Republic gendarmerie who were in close communication with Russian nationals tied to the Wagner Group, including Valery Zakharov and Alexander Sotov;

Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin were reported to discuss plans to set up camps “for combat prep and training in sabotage” with the goal of stoking racial violence and carrying out domestic terror attacks in the United States in the run-up to the November 3, 2020, presidential election;

Whereas associates of Yevgeniy Prigozhin have set up online influence operations based in Ghana and Nigeria to target social media audiences in the United States with the goal of inflaming racial tensions and provoking social unrest in the run-up to the November 3, 2020, presidential election;

Whereas, on December 20, 2016, the Department of the Treasury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin under Executive Order 13661, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, for having “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, senior officials of the Russian Federation”;

Whereas, on June 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury designated the Wagner Group under Executive Order 13660, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, for being “responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine”;

Whereas, on March 15, 2018, the Department of the Treasury designated Yevgeniy Prigozhin, his affiliated entities, including the Internet Research Agency, and his subordinates under Executive Order 13694, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber- Enabled Activities,” for being “involved in interfering with [U.S.] election processes or institutions”;

Whereas on July 15, 2020, under Executive Orders 13848, 13694 (as amended), and 13661, the Department of the Treasury designated entities located in Sudan, Hong Kong, and Thailand that have enabled Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s ability to evade United States sanctions as well as Prigozhin-linked entities that have attempted to suppress and discredit protestors seeking reforms in Sudan;

Whereas, on September 23, 2020, pursuant to Executive Orders 13848, 13694 (as amended), and 13661, the Department of the Treasury designated a network of entities and individuals working on behalf of Yevgeniy Prigozhin seeking to advance Russia's influence in the Central African Republic; and

Whereas current and former Administration officials have affirmed that the malign activities of Yevgeniy Prigozhin around the world pose a significant threat to United States national security interests: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) condemns any and all attempts by the Gov-
3 ernment of the Russian Federation and associated
4 actors to influence the domestic politics of other
5 countries and sow division among their peoples, par-
6 ticularly the United States and its allies and part-
7 ners;

8 (2) condemns the activities of Russian national
9 Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities that
10 pose a threat to the democratic values, democratic
11 institutions, and security of the United States and
12 its allies and partners;

13 (3) urges countries and entities engaging with
14 Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities in

1 business or advisory capacities to cease these en-
2 gagements;

3 (4) supports the additional designations made
4 by the Department of the Treasury on September
5 23, 2020, and calls on the United States Govern-
6 ment to continue to target the ability of Yevgeniy
7 Prigozhin and his affiliated entities to conduct oper-
8 ations globally and to interfere in the democratic
9 processes of the United States and its allies and
10 partners;

11 (5) urges European Union partners of the
12 United States to seriously consider implementing
13 similar sanctions against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his
14 affiliated entities for their continued interference in
15 the domestic affairs of European Union member
16 states; and

17 (6) calls for close coordination between the
18 United States Government and the governments of
19 United States allies and partners to ensure that
20 sanctions regimes against Yevgeniy Prigozhin and
21 his affiliated entities are enforced and coordinated.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 958

Condemning the practice of politically motivated imprisonment and calling for the immediate release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and urging action by the United States Government to impose sanctions with respect to persons responsible for that form of human rights abuse.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 8, 2020

Mr. ENGEL (for himself and Mr. McCaul) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Condemning the practice of politically motivated imprisonment and calling for the immediate release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and urging action by the United States Government to impose sanctions with respect to persons responsible for that form of human rights abuse.

Whereas the right to liberty and security of a person and the protection from arbitrary imprisonment are among the principal human rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

Whereas the Russian Federation, as member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe, is bound by international commitments with regard to human rights and the rule of law;

Whereas, on October 3, 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1900 (2012) which defined anyone whose “detention has been imposed in violation of one of the fundamental guarantees set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols” and “is the result of proceedings which were clearly unfair and . . . appears to be connected with political motives of the authorities” as a political prisoner;

Whereas based on the criteria of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1900 (2012), the Memorial Human Rights Center, a Russian nongovernmental organization, estimates that there are currently more than 300 political prisoners in the Russian Federation—a six-fold increase since 2015;

Whereas the Memorial Human Rights Center list of Russian political prisoners includes journalists, civil society activists, human rights advocates, participants of peaceful organizations, and Ukrainian citizens from illegally annexed Crimea;

Whereas the Russian Federation’s longest-detained political prisoner, Alexey Pichugin, has been incarcerated since June 19, 2003, in violation of two rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and the opinion by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention;

Whereas, investigative journalist and former editor of the independent newspaper *Noviye Kolyosa*, Igor Rudnikov

has been in pretrial detention since November 1, 2017, for alleged extortion charges;

Whereas Igor Rudnikov's detention and charges were criticized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and Reporters without Borders, calling them "clearly trumped-up" and "an act of political revenge", respectively;

Whereas opposition activist Konstantin Kotov was sentenced to 1.5 years' imprisonment on April 20, 2020, for participating in peaceful demonstrations, in a ruling Amnesty International has described as "a profound injustice";

Whereas Anastasia Shevchenko, an activist in the Open Russia movement, has been held under house arrest since January 23, 2019, on the charge of belonging to an "undesirable" organization and has been designated by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience;

Whereas Yuri Dmitriev, a leader of Memorial Human Rights Center's branch in the Republic of Karelia region of the Russian Federation who has worked to document mass burial sites from Stalin-era executions, is being held in pretrial detention on charges of child pornography that Human Rights Watch has described as "bogus" and part of an ongoing "smear campaign";

Whereas Dennis Christensen, a Jehovah's Witness and a Danish citizen, was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment on February 6, 2019, in a decision condemned by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom as part of the broader pattern of the Russian Government "engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom";

Whereas, on February 10, 2020, seven activists from Russia’s Penza Oblast were sentenced to terms of six to eighteen years for alleged membership in a terrorist group following a detention marked by torture, ill-treatment to extract confessions, and periods held incommunicado;

Whereas Human Rights Watch described the case as an example of the Russian authorities “abusing counterterrorism laws to silence critics and deny fundamental human rights”;

Whereas, on June 18, 2019, the Department of State affirmed that “the United States is deeply concerned by the growing number of individuals . . . identified by credible human rights organizations as political and religious prisoners held by the Government of the Russian Federation” and called on the Government of the Russian Federation “to release all those identified as political or religious prisoners immediately and cease its use of the legal system to suppress dissent and peaceful religious practice”; and

Whereas, on January 28, 2020, 43 parliamentarians from 16 European countries introduced a Resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to appoint a rapporteur “to examine the growing crisis with politically motivated imprisonments in the Russian Federation”: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) condemns the practice of politically moti-
3 vated imprisonment in the Russian Federation that
4 violates the country’s international obligations on
5 human rights and the rule of law and expresses its

1 solidarity with all those unjustly imprisoned in the
2 Russian Federation;

3 (2) calls on the Government of the Russian
4 Federation to immediately release individuals des-
5 ignated by the Memorial Human Rights Center as
6 political prisoners under the criteria of the Par-
7 liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Reso-
8 lution 1900 (2012), including Alexey Pichugin, Igor
9 Rudnikov, Konstantin Kotov, Anastasia Shevchenko,
10 Yuri Dmitriev, and Dennis Christensen;

11 (3) urges the United States Government, in all
12 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
13 Federation, to raise individual cases of Russian po-
14 litical prisoners and advocate for their release; and

15 (4) calls on the Secretary of State and the Sec-
16 retary of the Treasury to use their authority under
17 the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
18 Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208), the
19 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
20 (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328), and
21 other applicable United States statutory authorities
22 to designate officials of the Government of the Rus-
23 sian Federation who are responsible for human

- 1 rights abuses in the form of politically motivated im-
- 2 prisonment.



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 958
OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the right to liberty and security of a person and the protection from arbitrary imprisonment are among the principal human rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

Whereas the Russian Federation, as member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe, is bound by international commitments with regard to human rights and the rule of law;

Whereas, on October 3, 2012, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1900 (2012) which defined anyone whose “detention has been imposed in violation of one of the fundamental guarantees set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols” and “is the result of proceedings which were clearly unfair and . . . appears to be connected with political motives of the authorities” as a political prisoner;

Whereas based on the criteria of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1900 (2012), the Memorial Human Rights Center, a Russian nongovern-

mental organization, estimates that there are currently more than 300 political prisoners in the Russian Federation, a six-fold increase since 2015;

Whereas the Memorial Human Rights Center list of Russian political prisoners includes journalists, civil society activists, human rights advocates, participants of peaceful organizations, and Ukrainian citizens from illegally annexed Crimea;

Whereas the Russian Federation's longest-detained political prisoner, Alexey Pichugin, has been incarcerated since June 19, 2003, in violation of two rulings by the European Court of Human Rights and the opinion by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention;

Whereas investigative journalist and former editor of the independent newspaper *Noviye Kolyosa*, Igor Rudnikov was held in pretrial detention from November 1, 2017, until June 17, 2019, on alleged extortion charges, which were later dropped by the court;

Whereas Igor Rudnikov's detention and charges were criticized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and Reporters without Borders, calling them "clearly trumped-up" and "an act of political revenge", respectively;

Whereas opposition activist Konstantin Kotov was sentenced to 1.5 years imprisonment on April 20, 2020, for participating in peaceful demonstrations, in a ruling Amnesty International has described as "a profound injustice";

Whereas Anastasia Shevchenko, an activist in the Open Russia movement, has been held under house arrest since January 23, 2019, on the charge of belonging to an "un-

desirable” organization and has been designated by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience;

Whereas Yuri Dmitriev, a leader of Memorial Society’s branch in the Republic of Karelia region of the Russian Federation who has worked to document mass burial sites from Stalin-era executions, has been held in detention since June 28, 2018, on charges of child pornography that Human Rights Watch has described as “bogus” and part of an ongoing “smear campaign”, and was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison on July 22, 2020;

Whereas Dennis Christensen, a Jehovah’s Witness and a Danish citizen, was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment on February 6, 2019, in a decision condemned by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom as part of the broader pattern of the Russian Government “engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom”;

Whereas, on February 10, 2020, 7 activists from Russia’s Penza Oblast were sentenced to terms of 6 to 18 years for alleged membership in a terrorist group following a detention marked by torture, ill-treatment to extract confessions, and periods held incommunicado;

Whereas Human Rights Watch described the case as an example of the Russian authorities “abusing counterterrorism laws to silence critics and deny fundamental human rights”;

Whereas, on August 6, 2020, a court in Moscow sentenced seven activists to between four years suspended and seven years in prison for participating in an alleged extremist organization, “The New Greatness”, after an investigation marked by the use of provocateurs, torture,

ill-treatment, and forced confessions, in what the Memorial Human Rights Center and the Moscow Helsinki Group have described as a “politically motivated case” aimed at “suppressing the freedom of expression”;

Whereas, on June 18, 2019, the Department of State affirmed that “the United States is deeply concerned by the growing number of individuals . . . identified by credible human rights organizations as political and religious prisoners held by the Government of the Russian Federation” and called on the Government of the Russian Federation “to release all those identified as political or religious prisoners immediately and cease its use of the legal system to suppress dissent and peaceful religious practice”;

Whereas, on January 28, 2020, 43 parliamentarians from 16 European countries introduced a Resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to appoint a rapporteur “to examine the growing crisis with politically motivated imprisonments in the Russian Federation”; and

Whereas, on June 29, 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Legal Affairs Committee appointed Icelandic lawmaker Thorhildur Sunna Aevarsdottir to serve as the rapporteur on political prisoners in Russia: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

- 1 That the House of Representatives—
- 2 (1) condemns the practice of politically moti-
- 3 vated imprisonment in the Russian Federation that

1 violates the country's international obligations on
2 human rights and the rule of law and expresses its
3 solidarity with all those unjustly imprisoned in the
4 Russian Federation;

5 (2) calls on the Government of the Russian
6 Federation to immediately release individuals des-
7 ignated by the Memorial Human Rights Center as
8 political prisoners under the criteria of the Par-
9 liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Reso-
10 lution 1900 (2012), including Alexey Pichugin,
11 Konstantin Kotov, Anastasia Shevchenko, Yuri
12 Dmitriev, and Dennis Christensen;

13 (3) urges the United States Government, in all
14 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
15 Federation, to raise individual cases of Russian po-
16 litical prisoners and advocate for their release; and

17 (4) calls on the Secretary of State and the Sec-
18 retary of the Treasury to use their authority under
19 the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
20 Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208), the
21 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
22 (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328), and
23 other applicable United States statutory authorities
24 to designate officials of the Government of the Rus-
25 sian Federation who are responsible for human

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1 rights abuses in the form of politically motivated im-
2 prisonment.



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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H. RES. 958
OFFERED BY MR. ENGEL OF NEW YORK**

In the 11th clause of the preamble, strike “3.5 years in prison on July 22, 2020” and insert “13 years in prison on September 29, 2020”.



.....
(Original Signature of Member)

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. _____

To provide for temporary protected status for residents of Hong Kong, and
for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MALINOWSKI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on _____

A BILL

To provide for temporary protected status for residents of
Hong Kong, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Hong Kong People’s
5 Freedom and Choice Act of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

7 For purposes of this Act:

8 (1) **JOINT DECLARATION.**—The term “Joint
9 Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the

1 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
2 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
3 People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
4 Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered
5 into force on May 27, 1985.

6 (2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The
7 term “Priority Hong Kong resident” means—

8 (A) a lawful permanent resident of Hong
9 Kong who—

10 (i) holds no right to citizenship in any
11 country or jurisdiction other than the Peo-
12 ple's Republic of China (referred to in this
13 Act as “PRC”), Hong Kong, or Macau as
14 of the date of enactment of this Act;

15 (ii) has been verified as a Hong Kong
16 resident by the Secretary of State or Sec-
17 retary of Homeland Security in accordance
18 with the procedures described in section
19 6(b) of this Act; and

20 (iii) has resided in Hong Kong for not
21 less than the last 10 years; or

22 (B) is the spouse of a person described in
23 subparagraph (A), or the child of such person
24 as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of
25 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un-
2 married person under twenty-seven years of
3 age.

4 (3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—
5 The term “Hong Kong National Security Law”
6 means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
7 Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
8 Special Administrative Region that was passed
9 unanimously by the National People’s Congress (re-
10 ferred to in this Act as “NPC”) and signed by
11 President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020 and promul-
12 gated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
13 gion (referred to in this Act as “SAR”) on July 1,
14 2020.

15 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
16 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
17 mittees” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
19 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
20 Representatives; and

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
22 and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
23 ate.

24 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

25 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro-
2 mulgated on July 1, 2020—

3 (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the
4 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (re-
5 ferred to in this Act as “the Basic Law”) that
6 provides in Article 23 that the Legislative
7 Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation re-
8 lated to national security;

9 (B) violates the PRC’s commitments under
10 international law, as defined by the Joint Dec-
11 laration; and

12 (C) causes severe and irreparable damage
13 to the “one country, two systems” principle and
14 further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s
15 commitment to international law.

16 (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the pro-
17 mulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
18 President Trump signed an Executive Order on
19 Hong Kong Normalization that, among other policy
20 actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong
21 Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the
22 issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

23 (3) The United States has a long and proud
24 history as a destination for refugees and asylees flee-
25 ing persecution based on race, religion, nationality,

1 political opinion, or membership in a particular so-
2 cial group.

3 (4) The United States also shares deep social,
4 cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong
5 Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy,
6 to the rule of law, and to the protection of human
7 rights.

8 (5) The United States has sheltered, protected,
9 and welcomed individuals who have fled authori-
10 tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol-
11 lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in
12 Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the peo-
13 ple of the United States and those individuals seek-
14 ing to contribute to a free, open society founded on
15 democracy, human rights, and the respect for the
16 rule of law.

17 (6) The United States has reaped enormous
18 economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel-
19 coming successive generations of scientists, doctors,
20 entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free-
21 dom-loving people fleeing Fascism, Communism, vio-
22 lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive
23 ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany,
24 the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled Central Eu-
25 rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.

1 (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the
2 United States in its long-term strategic competition
3 with the Communist Party of China is the ability of
4 people from every country in the world, irrespective
5 of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to
6 the United States and become American citizens.

7 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

8 It is the policy of the United States—

9 (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set
10 forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
11 1992 (Public Law 102-383), namely that—

12 (A) the United States has “a strong inter-
13 est in the continued vitality, prosperity, and
14 stability of Hong Kong”;

15 (B) “support for democratization is a fun-
16 damental principle of United States foreign pol-
17 icy” and therefore “naturally applies to United
18 States policy toward Hong Kong”;

19 (C) “the human rights of the people of
20 Hong Kong are of great importance to the
21 United States and are directly relevant to
22 United States interests in Hong Kong and
23 serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued eco-
24 nomic prosperity”; and

1 (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently
2 autonomous from the PRC to “justify treat-
3 ment under a particular law of the United
4 States, or any provision thereof, different from
5 that accorded the People’s Republic of China”;
6 (2) to continue to support the high degree of
7 autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of
8 the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—
9 (A) the Joint Declaration;
10 (B) the International Covenant on Civil
11 and Political Rights, done at New York Decem-
12 ber 19, 1966; and
13 (C) the Universal Declaration of Human
14 Rights, done at Paris December 10, 1948;
15 (3) to continue to support the democratic aspi-
16 rations of the people of Hong Kong, including the
17 “ultimate aim” of the selection of the Chief Execu-
18 tive and all members of the Legislative Council by
19 universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law;
20 (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite
21 its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to
22 Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong
23 Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of
24 autonomy and without undue interference, and en-
25 suring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right

1 to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the
2 Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suf-
3 frage;

4 (5) to support the establishment of a genuine
5 democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and
6 elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the es-
7 tablishment of open and direct democratic elections
8 for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Coun-
9 cil;

10 (6) to support the robust exercise by residents
11 of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press,
12 and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the
13 Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the Inter-
14 national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

15 (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw-
16 ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong
17 Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the
18 Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant
19 on Civil and Political Rights;

20 (8) to draw international attention to any viola-
21 tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda-
22 mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as pro-
23 vided by the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
24 litical Rights, and any encroachment upon the au-

1 tonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law
2 and the Joint Declaration;

3 (9) to protect United States citizens and long-
4 term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as
5 well as people visiting and transiting through Hong
6 Kong;

7 (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties
8 that provide significant benefits to both the United
9 States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement
10 of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to
11 Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;

12 (11) to coordinate with allies, including the
13 United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the
14 Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and
15 human rights in Hong Kong; and

16 (12) to welcome and protect in the United
17 States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or
18 otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by
19 the Government of the PRC of the fundamental
20 rights of the people of Hong Kong.

21 **SEC. 5. TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG KONG**
22 **RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.**

23 (a) DESIGNATION.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 244
25 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as if it had
2 been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C) of that
3 section, subject to the provisions of this section.

4 (2) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial pe-
5 riod of the designation referred to in paragraph (1)
6 shall be for the 18-month period beginning on the
7 date of enactment of this Act.

8 (b) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the designa-
9 tion made under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to sat-
10 isfy the requirements under paragraph (1) of section
11 244(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
12 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph (3) of such section, if the
13 alien—

14 (1) was a lawful permanent resident of Hong
15 Kong at the time such individual arrived into the
16 United States and is a national of the PRC;

17 (2) has been continuously physically present in
18 the United States since the date of the enactment of
19 this Act;

20 (3) is admissible as an immigrant, except as
21 otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such sec-
22 tion, and is not ineligible for temporary protected
23 status under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and

1 (4) registers for temporary protected status in
2 a manner established by the Secretary of Homeland
3 Security.

4 (c) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland
6 Security shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in
7 accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigra-
8 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to
9 an alien who is granted temporary protected status
10 pursuant to the designation made under subsection
11 (a) if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the
12 Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency and
13 extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the
14 alien require the alien to depart for a brief, tem-
15 porary trip abroad.

16 (2) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien re-
17 turning to the United States in accordance with an
18 authorization described in paragraph (1) shall be
19 treated as any other returning alien provided tem-
20 porary protected status under section 244 of the Im-
21 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).

22 (d) FEE.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any other fee
24 authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
25 rity is authorized to charge and collect a fee of \$360

1 for each application for temporary protected status
2 under section 244 of the Immigration and Nation-
3 ality Act by a person who is only eligible for such
4 status by reason of subsection (a).

5 (2) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland Se-
6 curity shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of
7 any fees associated with filing an application re-
8 ferred to in paragraph (1).

9 **SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR IMMI-**
10 **GRATION PURPOSES.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
12 sion of law, during the 5 fiscal year period beginning on
13 the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date of
14 enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be
15 considered a foreign state separate and apart from the
16 PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration
17 and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for
18 purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas
19 under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and
20 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).

21 (b) PROCEDURES.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
24 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
25 Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal

1 Register, an interim final rule implementing this
2 section. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5,
3 United States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an
4 interim basis, immediately upon publication, but
5 may be subject to change and revision after public
6 notice and opportunity for comment. The Secretary
7 of State shall finalize such rule not later than 1 year
8 after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such
9 rule shall establish procedures—

10 (A) for individuals to register with any
11 United States embassy or consulate outside of
12 the United States, or with the Department of
13 Homeland Security in the United States, and
14 request designation as a Priority Hong Kong
15 Resident; and

16 (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify
17 the residency of registered individuals and des-
18 ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong
19 Residents.

20 (2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures de-
21 scribed in paragraph (1) shall include the collection
22 of—

23 (A) biometric data;

1 (B) copies of birth certificates, residency
2 cards, and other documentation establishing
3 residency; and

4 (C) other personal information, data, and
5 records deemed appropriate by the Secretary;

6 (3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after
7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
8 of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en-
9 hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send
10 and receive information to and from the United
11 Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners
12 for purposes of rapid verification of lawful perma-
13 nent residency in Hong Kong and designation of in-
14 dividuals as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

15 (4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
17 State shall submit a report to the House Committees
18 on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary and the Senate
19 Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary
20 detailing plans to implement the requirements de-
21 scribed in this subsection.

22 (e) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in this
23 section shall be construed to prevent a Priority Hong
24 Kong Resident from seeking refugee status under section
25 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1 1107) or requesting asylum under section 208 of such Act
2 (8 U.S.C. 1108).

3 **SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Secretary
5 of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in con-
6 sultation with other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall
7 submit a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
8 tees, detailing for the previous fiscal year—

9 (1) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents
10 who have applied for U.S. visas or immigration ben-
11 efits, disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben-
12 efit, including asylum, refugee status, temporary
13 protected status, and lawful permanent residence;

14 (2) the number of approvals, denials, or rejec-
15 tions of applicants for visas or immigration benefits
16 described in paragraph (1), disaggregated by visa
17 type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;

18 (3) the number of pending refugee and asylum
19 applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the
20 length of time and reason for which such applica-
21 tions have been pending; and

22 (4) other matters deemed relevant by the Secre-
23 taries relating to efforts to protect and facilitate the
24 resettlement of refugees and victims of persecution
25 in Hong Kong.

1 (b) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) shall
2 be submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-
3 searchable, publicly-available website of the Department of
4 State and the Department of Homeland Security.

5 **SEC. 8. STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON**
6 **HONG KONG.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United
8 States—

9 (1) to support the people of Hong Kong by pro-
10 viding safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who
11 are nationals of the PRC following the enactment of
12 the Hong Kong National Security Law that places
13 certain Hong Kong persons at risk of persecution;
14 and

15 (2) to encourage like-minded nations to make
16 similar accommodations for Hong Kong people flee-
17 ing persecution by the Government of the PRC.

18 (b) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation
19 with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate,
20 shall develop a plan to engage with other nations, includ-
21 ing the United Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to—

22 (1) provide refugee and asylum protections for
23 victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecu-
24 tion in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities
25 or other authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;

1 (2) enhance protocols to facilitate the resettle-
2 ment of refugees and displaced persons from Hong
3 Kong;

4 (3) identify and prevent the exploitation of im-
5 migration and visa policies and procedures by cor-
6 rupt officials; and

7 (4) expedite the sharing of information, as ap-
8 propriate, related to the refusal of individual appli-
9 cations for visas or other travel documents sub-
10 mitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based
11 on—

12 (A) national security or related grounds
13 under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
14 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or

15 (B) fraud or misrepresentation under sec-
16 tion 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Na-
17 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).

18 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
20 consultation with the heads of other Federal agencies, as
21 appropriate, shall submit a report on the plan described
22 in subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional commit-
23 tees.

1 **SEC. 9. REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF**
2 **HONG KONG.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in subsection (b)
4 may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee
5 under sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality
6 Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such
7 Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded
8 fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
9 ality, membership in a particular social group, or political
10 opinion by asserting such a fear and a credible basis for
11 concern about the possibility of such persecution.

12 (b) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in this
14 subsection if such alien—

15 (A) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
16 and—

17 (i) had a significant role in a civil so-
18 ciety organization supportive of the pro-
19 tests in 2019 and 2020 related to the
20 Hong Kong National Security Law and the
21 encroachment on the autonomy of Hong
22 Kong by the PRC; or

23 (ii) was arrested, charged, detained,
24 or convicted of an offense arising from
25 their participation in an action as de-
26 scribed in section 206(b)(2) the United

1 States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22
2 U.S.C. 5726) that was not violent in na-
3 ture;

4 (B) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
5 spouse or child of an alien described in sub-
6 paragraph (A);

7 (C) is the parent of an alien described in
8 subparagraph (A), if such parent is a citizen of
9 the PRC and no other foreign state; or

10 (D) has had their citizenship, nationality,
11 or residency revoked for having submitted to
12 any United States Government agency a non-
13 frivolous application for refugee status, asylum,
14 or any other immigration benefit under the im-
15 migration laws (as defined in section 101(a) of
16 that Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

17 (2) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary of
18 Homeland Security, in consultation with the Sec-
19 retary of State, may designate other categories of
20 aliens for purposes of establishing a well-founded
21 fear of persecution under subsection (a) if such
22 aliens share common characteristics that identify
23 them as targets of persecution in the PRC on ac-
24 count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
25 particular social group, or political opinion.

1 (3) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of
2 clause (i) of subsection (b)(1)(A), a significant role
3 shall include, with respect to the protests described
4 in such clause—

5 (A) an organizing role;

6 (B) a first aid responder;

7 (C) a journalist or member of the media
8 covering or offering public commentary;

9 (D) a provider of legal services to one or
10 more individuals arrested for participating in
11 such protests; or

12 (E) a participant who during the period
13 beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June
14 30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or
15 convicted as a result of such participation.

16 (d) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of this
17 section, a determination of whether an alien is a child shall
18 be made using the age of the alien on the date on which
19 the alien files an application for refugee or asylum status
20 with the Secretary of Homeland Security.

21 (e) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—
22 Aliens provided refugee status under this section shall not
23 be counted against the numerical limitation on refugees
24 established in accordance with the procedures described in

1 section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
2 U.S.C. 1157).

3 (d) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
6 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Sec-
7 retary of Homeland Security shall submit a report
8 on the matters described in paragraph (2) to—

9 (A) the Committee on the Judiciary and
10 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
11 ate; and

12 (B) the Committee on the Judiciary and
13 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
14 of Representatives.

15 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report
16 required by paragraph (1) shall include—

17 (A) the total number of refugee and asy-
18 lum applications that are pending at the end of
19 the reporting period;

20 (B) the average wait-times for all appli-
21 cants for refugee status or asylum pending—

22 (i) a prescreening interview with a re-
23 settlement support center;

24 (ii) an interview with U.S. Citizenship
25 and Immigration Services; and

1 (iii) the completion of security checks;

2 (C) the number of approvals, referrals in-
3 cluding the source of the referral, denials of ap-
4 plications for refugee status or asylum,
5 disaggregated by the reason for each such den-
6 nial; and

7 (D) the number of refugee circuit rides to
8 interview populations that would include Hong
9 Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and
10 the number planned for the subsequent 90 day
11 period.

12 (3) FORM.—Each report required by paragraph
13 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
14 include a classified annex.

15 (4) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of State
16 shall make each report submitted under this sub-
17 section available to the public on the internet website
18 of the Department of State.

19 **SEC. 10. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING ALLIES**
20 **AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOM-**
21 **MODATIONS.**

22 It is the policy of the United States to encourage al-
23 lies and partners of the United States to make accom-
24 modations similar to the accommodations made in this Act
25 for residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-

1 gion who are fleeing oppression by the Government of the
2 People's Republic of China.

3 **SEC. 11. TERMINATION.**

4 Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this Act
5 shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act.

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.....
 (Original Signature of Member)

116TH CONGRESS
 2D SESSION

H. R. _____

To direct the Department of State to ensure persons representing the United States in international athletic competitions in certain countries are appropriately informed, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. McCAUL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To direct the Department of State to ensure persons representing the United States in international athletic competitions in certain countries are appropriately informed, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “American Values and
 5 Security in International Athletics Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) In 2017, the International Olympic Com-
2 mittee (IOC) revised its Host City Contract to re-
3 quire host countries to “protect and respect human
4 rights and ensure any violation of human rights is
5 remedied in a manner consistent with international
6 agreements, laws and regulations applicable in the
7 Host Country and in a manner consistent with all
8 internationally-recognised human rights standards
9 and principles, including the United Nations Guiding
10 Principles on Business and Human Rights, applica-
11 ble in the Host Country”.

12 (2) The Olympic Charter states the goal of
13 Olympism is “to place sport at the service of the
14 harmonious development of humankind, with a view
15 to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the
16 preservation of human dignity”.

17 (3) The IOC set up an advisory committee on
18 human rights in December 2018, and IOC President
19 Thomas Bach said, “Promoting humanistic values in
20 sport has been a core feature of the IOC since its
21 beginning. Our mission, to put sport at the service
22 of humanity, goes hand-in-hand with human rights,
23 which is part of our DNA.”.

24 (4) In the report, “The Cybersecurity of Olym-
25 pic Sports: New Opportunities, New Risks”, the UC

1 Berkley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity listed
2 the “hacking and release of sensitive athletic data”
3 as one of the four significant categories of
4 cyberattacks on major sporting events.

5 (5) According to the State Department’s 2019
6 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the
7 People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Public Se-
8 curity employs “tens of millions of surveillance cam-
9 eras” to monitor the general public, as well as “po-
10 litical dissidents, religious leaders and adherents, Ti-
11 betans, and Uyghurs”.

12 (6) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Gov-
13 ernment’s extensive use of artificial intelligence sur-
14 veillance technology, including facial and voice pat-
15 tern recognition technology, poses grave humani-
16 tarian, privacy, and security concerns. PRC authori-
17 ties have used surveillance technology to monitor,
18 control, and repress an estimated 1.8 million
19 Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the
20 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. PRC State
21 media has confirmed that “voice, image, position
22 and behavior recognition technologies” will be used
23 in the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics.

1 **SEC. 3. HUMAN RIGHTS AWARENESS FOR AMERICAN ATH-**
2 **LETIC DELEGATIONS.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that individuals representing the United States at
5 international athletic competitions in foreign countries
6 should have the opportunity to be informed about human
7 rights and security concerns in such countries and how
8 best to safeguard their personal security and privacy.

9 (b) IN GENERAL.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
12 retary of State shall devise and implement a strategy
13 for disseminating briefing materials, including infor-
14 mation described in subsection (c), to individuals
15 representing the United States at international ath-
16 letic competitions in a covered country.

17 (2) TIMING AND FORM OF MATERIALS.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—The briefing materials
19 referred to in paragraph (1) shall be offered not
20 later than 180 days prior to the commencement
21 of an international athletic competition in a
22 covered country.

23 (B) FORM OF DELIVERY.—Briefing mate-
24 rials related to the human rights record of cov-
25 ered countries may be delivered electronically or
26 disseminated in person, as appropriate.

1 (C) SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.—Informa-
2 tion briefing materials related to personal secu-
3 rity risks may be offered electronically, in writ-
4 ten format, by video teleconference, or
5 prerecorded video.

6 (3) CONSULTATIONS.—In devising and imple-
7 menting the strategy required under paragraph (1),
8 the Secretary of State shall consult with the fol-
9 lowing:

10 (A) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of
11 the House of Representatives and the Com-
12 mittee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, not
13 later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
14 ment of this Act.

15 (B) Leading human rights nongovern-
16 mental organizations and relevant subject-mat-
17 ter experts in determining the content of the
18 briefings required under this subsection.

19 (C) The United States Olympic and
20 Paralympic Committee and the national gov-
21 erning bodies of amateur sports that play a role
22 in determining which individuals represent the
23 United States in international athletic competi-
24 tions, regarding the most appropriate and effec-
25 tive method to disseminate briefing materials.

1 (c) CONTENT OF BRIEFINGS.—The briefing mate-
2 rials required under subsection (b) shall include, with re-
3 spect to a covered country hosting an international athletic
4 competition in which individuals may represent the United
5 States, the following:

6 (1) Information on the human rights concerns
7 present in such covered country, as described in the
8 Department of State’s Annual Country Reports on
9 Human Rights Practices.

10 (2) Information, as applicable, on risks such in-
11 dividuals may face to their personal and digital pri-
12 vacy and security, and recommended measures to
13 safeguard against certain forms of foreign intel-
14 ligence targeting, as appropriate.

15 (d) COVERED COUNTRY DEFINED.—In this section,
16 the term “covered country” means, with respect to a coun-
17 try hosting an international athletic competition in which
18 individuals representing the United States may partici-
19 pate, any of the following:

20 (1) Any Communist country specified in sub-
21 section (f) of section 620 of the Foreign Assistance
22 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)).

23 (2) Any country ranked as a Tier 3 country in
24 the most recent Department of State’s annual Traf-
25 ficking in Persons Report.

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1 (3) Any other country the Secretary of State
2 determines present serious human rights concerns
3 for the purpose of informing such individuals.

4 (4) Any country the Secretary of State, in con-
5 sultation with other cabinet officials as appropriate,
6 determines presents a serious counterintelligence
7 risk.

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 8259

To prohibit Russian participation in the G7, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Mr. MEEKS (for himself, Mr. CONNOLLY, Mr. KEATING, Mr. COHEN, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. TRONE, Mr. DEUTCH, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. KINZINGER, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. SUOZZI, and Mr. TED LIEU of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To prohibit Russian participation in the G7, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN**
4 **THE G7.**

5 (a) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
6 sion of law, no Federal funds are authorized to be appro-
7 priated, obligated, or expended to take any action to sup-
8 port or facilitate—

1 (1) the participation of Russia in a Group of
2 Seven proceeding; or

3 (2) the reconstitution of the Group of Eight to
4 include Russia.

5 (b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall cease to
6 have any force or effect after the date on which—

7 (1) the Secretary of State and the Director of
8 National Intelligence, in consultation with the Sec-
9 retary of Homeland Security and the Director of the
10 Federal Bureau of Investigation, certify to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees and leadership
12 that the Government of Russia, and all persons act-
13 ing as an agent of or otherwise on behalf of such
14 government, has halted all interference in United
15 States elections or elections of the other members of
16 the Group of Seven, members of the North Atlantic
17 Treaty Organization and the European Union, and
18 other allies and partners;

19 (2) the Secretary of State, in consultation with
20 the Director of National Intelligence, determines and
21 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
22 and leadership that the Government of Russia, and
23 all persons acting as an agent of or otherwise on be-
24 half of such government, has—

1 (A) ended its illegal occupation of Crimea
2 and is fully complying with its commitments
3 under the Minsk agreement with respect to
4 Eastern Ukraine;

5 (B) ended its illegal occupation of South
6 Ossetia and Abkhazia and will support efforts
7 for the reintegration of these regions with the
8 Republic of Georgia; and

9 (C) withdrawn its troops and armaments
10 from Transnistria and fully respects Moldova's
11 sovereignty and territorial integrity; and

12 (3) the Director of National Intelligence, in
13 consultation with the heads of any other appropriate
14 executive departments and agencies, shall provide
15 the appropriate congressional committees and lead-
16 ership an assessment on the support by the Govern-
17 ment of Russia, and all persons acting as an agent
18 of or otherwise on behalf of such government, for
19 Taliban linked militants, including—

20 (A) the provision of defense articles, de-
21 fense services, or technology (as such terms are
22 defined and described in the Arms Export Con-
23 trol Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)) or financial
24 assistance for purposes that undermine or run
25 counter to the principles agreed upon in the

1 Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
2 entered into on February 29, 2020;

3 (B) financial transactions, including trans-
4 actions made through the hawala system, be-
5 tween the individuals and entities of the Gov-
6 ernment of Russia, or individuals or entities
7 acting in connection with that government, to
8 Taliban-linked militants, other militants with
9 connections to Afghanistan, and their inter-
10 mediaries; and

11 (C) any alleged program created to
12 incentivize the killing of American and NATO
13 coalition soldiers by the Government of Russia
14 or any other foreign government.

15 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
16 AND LEADERSHIP.—In this section, the term “appropriate
17 congressional committees and leadership” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
19 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
20 mittee on Homeland Security, and the Speaker, the
21 majority leader, and the minority leader of the
22 House of Representatives; and

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
24 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on

- 1 Homeland Security, and the majority leader and the
- 2 minority leader of the Senate.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 8259
OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 **SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN**
2 **THE G7.**

3 (a) **LIMITATION.**—Notwithstanding any other provi-
4 sion of law, no Federal funds are authorized to be appro-
5 priated, obligated, or expended to take any action to sup-
6 port or facilitate—

7 (1) the participation of Russia in a Group of
8 Seven proceeding; or

9 (2) the reconstitution of the Group of Eight to
10 include Russia.

11 (b) **TERMINATION.**—Subsection (a) shall cease to
12 have any force or effect after the date on which—

13 (1) the Secretary of State and the Director of
14 National Intelligence, in consultation with the Sec-
15 retary of Homeland Security and the Director of the
16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, certify to the ap-
17 propriate congressional committees and leadership
18 that the Government of Russia, and all persons act-

1 ing as an agent of or otherwise on behalf of such
2 government, has halted all interference in United
3 States elections or elections of the other members of
4 the Group of Seven, members of the North Atlantic
5 Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
6 Union, and other allies and partners; and

7 (2) the Secretary of State, in consultation with
8 the Director of National Intelligence, determines and
9 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
10 and leadership that the Government of Russia, and
11 all persons acting as an agent of or otherwise on be-
12 half of such government, has—

13 (A) ended its illegal occupation of Crimea
14 and is fully complying with its commitments
15 under the Minsk agreement with respect to
16 Eastern Ukraine;

17 (B) ended its illegal occupation of South
18 Ossetia and Abkhazia and will support efforts
19 for the reintegration of these regions with the
20 Republic of Georgia; and

21 (C) withdrawn its troops and armaments
22 from Transnistria and fully respects Moldova's
23 sovereignty and territorial integrity.

24 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
25 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in

1 coordination with the Director of National Intelligence
2 and in consultation with the heads of other relevant Fed-
3 eral departments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-
4 priate congressional committees and leadership a report
5 on the threats and challenges of Russia to NATO and the
6 United States in Afghanistan and to United States efforts
7 to counter such threats and challenges, including—

8 (1) an assessment of support provided by the
9 Government of Russia, and all persons acting as an
10 agent of or otherwise on behalf of such government,
11 for Taliban-linked militants, including—

12 (A) the provision of defense articles, de-
13 fense services, or technology (as such terms are
14 defined and described in the Arms Export Con-
15 trol Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)) or financial
16 assistance for purposes that undermine or run
17 counter to the principles agreed upon in the
18 Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan
19 entered into on February 29, 2020;

20 (B) financial transactions, including trans-
21 actions made through the hawala system, be-
22 tween the individuals and entities of the Gov-
23 ernment of Russia, or individuals or entities
24 acting in connection with that government, to
25 Taliban-linked militants, other militants with

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1 connections to Afghanistan, and their inter-
2 mediaries; and

3 (C) any alleged program to incentivize the
4 killing of United States or NATO coalition sol-
5 diers by the Government of Russia or any other
6 foreign government;

7 (2) a description of United States Government
8 efforts to engage in diplomatic efforts with Russia
9 and the governments of NATO coalition allies and
10 partners to counter Russian malign influence in Af-
11 ghanistan; and

12 (3) a description of the views of the govern-
13 ments of other NATO members, including heads of
14 government, political leaders, and military com-
15 manders in the region on Russian interference and
16 malign influence in Afghanistan.

17 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
18 AND LEADERSHIP.—In this section, the term “appropriate
19 congressional committees and leadership” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
21 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
22 mittee on Homeland Security, and the Speaker, the
23 majority leader, and the minority leader of the
24 House of Representatives; and

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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
3 Homeland Security, and the majority leader and the
4 minority leader of the Senate.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 825

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognizing the importance of the NPT's continued contributions to United States and international security, and commemorating United States leadership in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the dawn of the nuclear era.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 30, 2020

Mr. SHERMAN (for himself, Mr. BANKS, Mr. FOSTER, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, Mr. LUJÁN, Mr. ROONEY of Florida, Mr. BERA, Mr. NEWHOUSE, Mr. VIS-CLOSKY, Mr. YOHO, and Ms. SPANBERGER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognizing the importance of the NPT's continued contributions to United States and international security, and commemorating United States leadership in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the dawn of the nuclear era.

This resolution may be cited as the "NPT at 50 Resolution".

Whereas the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a bedrock principle of United States foreign policy since 1945;

Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union averted a catastrophic nuclear exchange during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements to reduce the chances of nuclear war and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that as many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons by 1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons;

Whereas the nuclear nonproliferation regime, led by the United States, has been strengthened by a complex network of complementary treaties, and agreements, the cornerstone of which is the NPT;

Whereas the NPT was signed by the United States, alongside the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, on its first day of opening for signature, July 1, 1968;

Whereas the United States ratified the treaty on March 13, 1969, with a vote on ratification of 83 to 15;

Whereas the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970;

Whereas the NPT provides important stability for United States and international security, and its success has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all State Parties of the treaty's three mutually reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

Whereas United States leadership has been and will contribute to be indispensable to the development and success of the nuclear nonproliferation regime;

Whereas, on May 11, 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely;

Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 State Parties, making an irreplaceable contribution to international security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons;

Whereas only one nonnuclear weapon state that was a party to the treaty has acquired nuclear weapons;

Whereas the United States has led the NPT's disarmament pillar by negotiating bilateral arms control agreements, achieving dramatic reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, in support of Article VI and the disarmament aims of the NPT, such as 1972 SALT I, 1979 SALT II, 1991 START I, 1993 START II, SORT, and New START;

Whereas the United States has promoted the NPT's non-proliferation pillar by supporting states which relinquished their nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa;

Whereas the United States has also been a lead supporter of many regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, including Latin America, Central Asia, the South Pacific, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and bans on nuclear weapons on the seabed, in outer space, and on the Moon;

Whereas the United States has worked to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards programs, including the Additional Protocol;

Whereas every President has supported the NPT, such as when President Donald Trump noted in a message to the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference September 16, 2019, "For nearly 50 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has prevented the spread of nuclear weapons";

Whereas, on September 18, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford recalled a President Trump statement in which he called the Additional Protocol “the international standard”, and then Ford noted that “consistent with that message, the AP should be universalized”;

Whereas the United States has been a strong supporter of the implementing bodies of the nonproliferation and export control regimes, such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group;

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty”;

Whereas, on June 28, 2018, the 50th anniversary of the treaty first being signed, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russian governments released a joint statement, reaffirming their commitment to work toward “the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, as set forth in the NPT”;

Whereas Congress has often been at the forefront of advocating for nonproliferation, including through the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, the McMahon Act of 1946, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; and

Whereas the 10th NPT Review Conference will occur during the treaty's 50th year in New York, from April 27 to May 22, 2020: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) reaffirms its support for the Treaty on the
3 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to
4 prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further re-
5 duce the number of nuclear weapons, and to pro-
6 mote the peaceful use of nuclear energy as it has
7 over the past 50 years;

8 (2) reaffirms that a strong nonproliferation re-
9 gime is in the United States interests; and

10 (3) urges the United States to continue to be
11 a leader on supporting the NPT and the non-
12 proliferation regime, by—

13 (A) continuing to encourage all State Par-
14 ties to the NPT to comply fully with the treaty;

15 (B) maintaining support for the Inter-
16 national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
17 through its assessed and voluntary contribu-
18 tions and promoting the universal adoption of
19 the IAEA Additional Protocol;

20 (C) continuing to encourage opportunities
21 for cooperation with other nuclear possessing
22 states to reduce the number and role of nuclear
23 weapons in their national military strategies;

- 1 (D) encouraging universality of the NPT
2 and the Additional Protocol;
- 3 (E) encouraging all states with nuclear en-
4 ergy programs to purchase nuclear fuel on the
5 international market and discouraging national
6 enrichment and reprocessing programs;
- 7 (F) encouraging the continuation of the
8 global moratorium on nuclear testing; and
- 9 (G) working toward a successful 2020
10 NPT Review Conference.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 825
OFFERED BY MR. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas on December 4, 1961, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution supporting an international agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a bedrock principle of United States foreign policy since 1945;

Whereas the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis nearly led the United States and the former Soviet Union to a catastrophic nuclear exchange;

Whereas the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements to reduce the chances of nuclear war and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

Whereas on August 17, 1965, the United States submitted its first draft of such a treaty to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee;

Whereas in May 1966, the Senate adopted S. Res. 179 supporting the President's efforts to negotiate such a treaty;

Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on its first day of opening for signature on July 1, 1968;

Whereas the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the NPT on March 13, 1969, by a vote of 83 to 15;

Whereas the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970, the date it was ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union;

Whereas the NPT provides stability that is critical for United States and international security, and its success has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all State Parties of the NPT's three mutually-reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament;

Whereas United States leadership has been and will continue to be indispensable to the development and success of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime;

Whereas on May 11, 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely;

Whereas North Korea is the only non-nuclear weapon state that was a party to the NPT before acquiring nuclear weapons;

Whereas the United States has supported the NPT's disarmament goals by negotiating bilateral arms control agreements and achieving dramatic reductions in its own and other states' nuclear weapons stockpiles through these treaties, including the 1972 SALT I Treaty, the 1987 INF Treaty, the 1991 START I Treaty, the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and the 2010 New START treaty;

Whereas the United States has promoted the NPT's nonproliferation pillar by supporting states that relinquished their nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa;

Whereas the United States has worked to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards programs, including the Additional Protocol;

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty.”;

Whereas on June 28, 2018, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russian governments released a joint statement, reaffirming their commitment to work toward “the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, as set forth in the NPT”; and

Whereas Congress has long been a leading voice for non-proliferation, including through the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, the McMahon Act of 1946, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Prevention Act of 1994, and other legislative efforts: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

- 1 That the House of Representatives—
- 2 (1) calls for continued support for the Treaty
- 3 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

1 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further
2 reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and to pro-
3 mote the peaceful use of nuclear energy as it has
4 over the past 50 years;

5 (2) reaffirms that a strong nonproliferation re-
6 gime is in the United States interest;

7 (3) recognizes that the United States, through
8 its network of alliances, has led the world upholding
9 the pillars of the NPT and continues to work to-
10 gether to strengthen the NPT; and

11 (4) urges the United States to continue to be
12 a leader in supporting the NPT and the global non-
13 proliferation regime, by—

14 (A) continuing to encourage all States
15 Party to the NPT to comply fully with the
16 NPT;

17 (B) maintaining support for the Inter-
18 national Atomic Energy Agency through its as-
19 sessed and voluntary contributions and promote
20 the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional
21 Protocol;

22 (C) continuing to encourage opportunities
23 for cooperation with other nuclear weapons
24 states to reduce the number and role of nuclear
25 weapons;

1 (D) encouraging universality of the NPT
2 and the Additional Protocol;

3 (E) discouraging the unlawful spread of
4 uranium enrichment technologies and ensuring
5 such technologies covered under the NPT are
6 properly verified;

7 (F) developing policies to prevent with-
8 drawal of additional states parties from the
9 Treaty;

10 (G) maintaining global moratoria on nu-
11 clear explosive testing, which is in the national
12 security interest of the United States; and

13 (H) working towards a successful 2021
14 NPT Review Conference.

Amend the title so as to read: "A resolution urging the United States to continue to be a leader in supporting the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the global nonproliferation regime to reap the benefits the NPT and such regime bring to United States and international security."



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4636

To authorize the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to prioritize and advance efforts to improve waste management systems and prevent and reduce plastic waste and marine debris, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 11, 2019

Mr. McCaul (for himself and Mr. Engel) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To authorize the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to prioritize and advance efforts to improve waste management systems and prevent and reduce plastic waste and marine debris, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Partnering and
5 Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International
6 Cleaner Seas Act” or the “PLASTICS Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) Eight million metric tons of plastic enter
4 the ocean every year. Marine debris damages the
5 health of marine life, impedes local economic devel-
6 opment, and threatens health systems. Ten river sys-
7 tems carry an estimated 90 percent of the plastic
8 waste that ends up in the ocean.

9 (2) Mismanaged plastic waste has the highest
10 risk of contaminating rivers and oceans. China con-
11 tributes the largest share of this mismanaged waste,
12 followed by Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam,
13 Thailand, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. The
14 United States is the world's second-largest producer
15 and consumer of plastics products, and the top ex-
16 porter of plastic scrap.

17 (3) Most marine debris, particularly plastics,
18 enters the oceans from land-based sources, mainly in
19 developing countries, that lack the capacity to ade-
20 quately manage waste and prevent dumping.

21 (4) During the Our Ocean Conference in Octo-
22 ber 2018, the United States announced assistance to
23 prevent marine debris from entering the ocean
24 through development of waste management systems
25 and reduce plastics in marine protected areas in the
26 Indo-Pacific.

1 (5) During the June 2019 G20 Summit in
2 Osaka, Japan, the United States joined other G20
3 members in endorsing the “Osaka Blue Ocean Vi-
4 sion” to reduce additional pollution by marine plas-
5 tic litter to zero by 2050 and the G20 Implementa-
6 tion Framework for Actions on Marine Plastic Lit-
7 ter, which outlines a commitment to prevent and re-
8 duce plastic debris in the oceans through waste man-
9 agement and clean-up efforts to remove marine plas-
10 tic debris and prioritizes efforts to advance innova-
11 tive solutions and international cooperation to sup-
12 port such initiatives.

13 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

14 It is the policy of the United States to consult, part-
15 ner, and coordinate with the governments of foreign coun-
16 tries, international organizations, private and civil society
17 entities, and other stakeholders in a concerted effort to—

18 (1) prevent and reduce marine debris and plas-
19 tic waste, including through reduced consumption,
20 greater transparency in global trade of plastic waste,
21 and support for integrated waste management sys-
22 tems in developing countries;

23 (2) advance innovative market-based solutions
24 and catalyze private capital to prevent and reduce
25 marine debris and plastic waste, support integrated

1 waste management systems, and improve market de-
2 mand for recycled material;

3 (3) build the capacity of national and sub-
4 national governments in other countries to develop
5 and implement integrated waste management sys-
6 tems, measure and report progress in reducing plas-
7 tic waste, and prevent plastic waste from entering
8 rivers and oceans;

9 (4) support local economic development through
10 programs that assist community members, particu-
11 larly women, youth, and marginalized populations, to
12 derive economic benefit from waste products and
13 participation in waste management systems; and

14 (5) engage in international and regional co-
15 operation to prevent and reduce marine debris and
16 plastic waste, share best practices, and empower na-
17 tional and subnational governments, local commu-
18 nities, civil society, and the private sector to engage
19 in such efforts.

20 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that, in pursuing the pol-
22 icy described in section 3, the President should direct
23 United States representatives to appropriate international
24 bodies to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
25 States to advocate support for the following:

1 (1) Efforts to improve transparency in global
2 trade of plastic waste, improve plastic waste regula-
3 tion to ensure the safety of humans and the environ-
4 ment, strengthen integrated waste management sys-
5 tems, and prevent, reduce, reuse, and recycle plastic
6 waste, to the extent practical.

7 (2) Collaborative approaches to establish meas-
8 urable targets and objectives, with related action
9 plans, for reducing marine debris and plastic waste
10 from all sources and sharing best practices in waste
11 prevention and management systems to prevent plas-
12 tic waste.

13 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO IMPROVE WASTE**
14 **MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND PREVENT AND**
15 **REDUCE MARINE DEBRIS.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the
17 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
18 national Development, in coordination with the heads of
19 relevant Federal departments and agencies, are authorized
20 to prioritize and advance ongoing global efforts to—

21 (1) prevent and reduce marine debris and plas-
22 tic waste, including through reduced consumption,
23 greater transparency in global trade of plastic waste,
24 and support for integrated waste management sys-
25 tems in developing countries;

1 (2) advance innovative market-based solutions
2 and catalyze private capital to prevent and reduce
3 marine debris and plastic waste, support integrated
4 waste management systems, and improve market de-
5 mand for recycled material;

6 (3) build the capacity of national and sub-
7 national governments in other countries to develop
8 and implement integrated waste management sys-
9 tems, measure and report progress in reducing plas-
10 tic waste, and prevent plastic waste from entering
11 rivers and oceans; and

12 (4) support local economic development through
13 programs that assist community members, particu-
14 larly women, youth, and marginalized populations, to
15 derive economic benefit from waste products and
16 participation in waste management systems.

17 (b) COORDINATION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR.—The
18 Secretary and the Administrator, in coordination with the
19 Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Development Finance
20 Corporation and the Chief Executive Officer of the Millen-
21 nium Challenge Corporation and in consultation with the
22 heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, are
23 authorized and encouraged to work with entities in the
24 private sector and with nongovernmental organizations to
25 leverage sources of public and private capital to com-

1 plement the efforts described in subsection (a), including
2 by financing infrastructure investments, supporting capac-
3 ity-building activities, and entering into cost-sharing, cost-
4 matching, and other cooperative agreements to support
5 and finance such efforts.

6 (c) MONITORING AND EVALUATION.—The Secretary
7 and the Administrator shall establish monitoring and eval-
8 uation mechanisms, including measurable goals, objec-
9 tives, and benchmarks, to ensure the effective use of
10 United States foreign assistance to achieve the objectives
11 described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a).

12 (d) DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION.—In car-
13 rying out the authority under subsection (a), the Secretary
14 and the Administrator, in coordination with the heads of
15 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to
16 provide technical assistance to mobilize the domestic re-
17 sources of recipient countries in order to increase cost-
18 sharing, self-reliance, and host country ownership of waste
19 prevention and management programs.

20 (e) COST LIMITATION.—No additional funds are au-
21 thorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act.

22 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
23 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Ad-
24 ministrator, in consultation with the heads of relevant
25 Federal departments and agencies, shall jointly submit to

1 the appropriate congressional committees a report on on-
2 going programs and monitoring and evaluation mecha-
3 nisms to carry out the authority under subsection (a) that
4 includes a description of—

5 (1) the monitoring and evaluation plans and in-
6 dicators used to measure performance of assistance
7 programs, in accordance with subsection (d);

8 (2) best practices and lessons learned in imple-
9 menting the efforts authorized under subsection (a);

10 (3) the extent to which recipient countries have
11 demonstrated a commitment and willingness to co-
12 operate to advance the efforts described in sub-
13 section (a) and to dedicate resources to support
14 waste prevention and management initiatives;

15 (4) the extent to which host country govern-
16 ments and other governments in the region are in-
17 vesting resources to advance initiatives to prevent or
18 reduce marine debris and plastic waste and develop
19 integrated waste management systems; and

20 (5) the extent to which other funding sources,
21 including through private sector investment, have
22 been identified to advance waste prevention and
23 management initiatives.

1 (g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

2 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
3 gressional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
5 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
6 resentatives; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 4636
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Partnering and
3 Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International
4 Cleaner Seas Act” or the “PLASTICS Act”.

5 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

6 Congress finds the following:

7 (1) Eight million metric tons of plastic enter
8 the ocean every year. Marine debris damages the
9 health of marine life, impedes local economic devel-
10 opment, and threatens health systems. Ten river sys-
11 tems carry an estimated 90 percent of the river-
12 based plastic waste that ends up in the ocean.

13 (2) Mismanaged plastic waste has the highest
14 risk of contaminating rivers and oceans. China con-
15 tributes the largest share of this mismanaged waste,
16 followed by Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam,
17 Thailand, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. The
18 United States is the world’s second-largest producer

1 and consumer of plastics products, and the top ex-
2 porter of plastic scrap.

3 (3) Most marine debris, particularly plastics,
4 enters the oceans from land-based sources, mainly in
5 developing countries, that lack the capacity to ade-
6 quately manage waste and prevent dumping.

7 (4) During the Our Ocean Conference in Octo-
8 ber 2018, the United States announced assistance to
9 prevent marine debris from entering the ocean
10 through development of waste management systems
11 and reduce plastics in marine protected areas in the
12 Indo-Pacific.

13 (5) During the June 2019 G20 Summit in
14 Osaka, Japan, the United States joined other G20
15 members in endorsing the “Osaka Blue Ocean Vi-
16 sion” to reduce additional pollution by marine plas-
17 tic litter to zero by 2050 and the G20 Implementa-
18 tion Framework for Actions on Marine Plastic Lit-
19 ter, which outlines a commitment to prevent and re-
20 duce plastic debris in the oceans through waste man-
21 agement and clean-up efforts to remove marine plas-
22 tic debris and prioritizes efforts to advance innova-
23 tive solutions and international cooperation to sup-
24 port such initiatives.

1 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 It is the policy of the United States to consult, part-
3 ner, and coordinate with the governments of foreign coun-
4 tries, international organizations, private and civil society
5 entities, and other stakeholders in a concerted effort to—

6 (1) prevent and reduce marine debris and plas-
7 tic waste, including through reduced consumption,
8 greater transparency in global trade of plastic waste,
9 and support for integrated waste management sys-
10 tems in developing countries;

11 (2) advance innovative market-based solutions
12 and catalyze private capital to prevent and reduce
13 marine debris and plastic waste, support integrated
14 waste management systems, and improve market de-
15 mand for recycled material;

16 (3) build the capacity of national and sub-
17 national governments in other countries to develop
18 and implement integrated waste management sys-
19 tems, measure and report progress in reducing plas-
20 tic waste, and prevent plastic waste from entering
21 rivers and oceans;

22 (4) support local economic development through
23 programs that assist community members, particu-
24 larly women, youth, and marginalized populations, to
25 derive economic benefit from waste products and
26 participation in waste management systems; and

1 (5) engage in international and regional co-
2 operation to prevent and reduce marine debris and
3 plastic waste, share best practices, and empower na-
4 tional and subnational governments, local commu-
5 nities, civil society, and the private sector to engage
6 in such efforts.

7 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

8 It is the sense of Congress that, in pursuing the pol-
9 icy described in section 3, the President should direct
10 United States representatives to appropriate international
11 bodies to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
12 States to advocate support for the following:

13 (1) Efforts to improve transparency in global
14 trade of plastic waste, improve plastic waste regula-
15 tion to ensure the safety of humans and the environ-
16 ment, strengthen integrated waste management sys-
17 tems, and prevent, reduce, reuse, and recycle plastic
18 waste, to the extent practical.

19 (2) Collaborative approaches to establish meas-
20 urable targets and objectives, with related action
21 plans, for reducing marine debris and plastic waste
22 from all sources and sharing best practices in waste
23 prevention and management systems to prevent plas-
24 tic waste.

1 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO IMPROVE WASTE**
2 **MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND PREVENT AND**
3 **REDUCE MARINE DEBRIS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the
5 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
6 national Development, in coordination with the heads of
7 relevant Federal departments and agencies, are authorized
8 to prioritize and advance ongoing global efforts to—

9 (1) prevent and reduce marine debris and plas-
10 tic waste, including through reduced consumption,
11 greater transparency in global trade of plastic waste,
12 and support for integrated waste management sys-
13 tems in developing countries;

14 (2) advance innovative market-based solutions
15 and catalyze private capital to prevent and reduce
16 marine debris and plastic waste, support integrated
17 waste management systems, and improve market de-
18 mand for recycled material;

19 (3) build the capacity of national and sub-
20 national governments in other countries to develop
21 and implement integrated waste management sys-
22 tems, measure and report progress in reducing plas-
23 tic waste, and prevent plastic waste from entering
24 rivers and oceans; and

25 (4) support local economic development through
26 programs that assist community members, particu-

1 larly women, youth, and marginalized populations, to
2 derive economic benefit from waste products and
3 participation in waste management systems.

4 (b) COORDINATION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR.—The
5 Secretary and the Administrator, in coordination with the
6 Chief Executive Officer of the United States International
7 Development Finance Corporation and the Chief Execu-
8 tive Officer of the Millennium Challenge Corporation and
9 in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal depart-
10 ments and agencies, are authorized and encouraged to
11 work with entities in the private sector and with non-
12 governmental organizations to leverage sources of public
13 and private capital to complement the efforts described in
14 subsection (a), including by financing infrastructure in-
15 vestments, supporting capacity-building activities, and en-
16 tering into cost-sharing, cost-matching, and other coopera-
17 tive agreements to support and finance such efforts.

18 (c) MONITORING AND EVALUATION.—The Secretary
19 and the Administrator shall establish monitoring and eval-
20 uation mechanisms, including measurable goals, objec-
21 tives, and benchmarks, to ensure the effective use of
22 United States foreign assistance to achieve the objectives
23 described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a).

24 (d) DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION.—In car-
25 rying out the authority under subsection (a), the Secretary

1 and the Administrator, in coordination with the heads of
2 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to
3 provide technical assistance to mobilize the domestic re-
4 sources of recipient countries in order to increase cost-
5 sharing, self-reliance, and host country ownership of waste
6 prevention and management programs.

7 (e) COST LIMITATION.—No additional funds are au-
8 thorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act.

9 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
10 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Ad-
11 ministrator, in consultation with the heads of relevant
12 Federal departments and agencies, shall jointly submit to
13 the appropriate congressional committees a report on on-
14 going programs and monitoring and evaluation mecha-
15 nisms to carry out the authority under subsection (a) that
16 includes a description of—

17 (1) the monitoring and evaluation plans and in-
18 dicators used to measure performance of assistance
19 programs, in accordance with subsection (d);

20 (2) best practices and lessons learned in imple-
21 menting the efforts authorized under subsection (a);

22 (3) the extent to which recipient countries have
23 demonstrated a commitment and willingness to co-
24 operate to advance the efforts described in sub-

1 section (a) and to dedicate resources to support
2 waste prevention and management initiatives;

3 (4) the extent to which host country govern-
4 ments and other governments in the region are in-
5 vesting resources to advance initiatives to prevent or
6 reduce marine debris and plastic waste and develop
7 integrated waste management systems; and

8 (5) the extent to which other funding sources,
9 including through private sector investment, have
10 been identified to advance waste prevention and
11 management initiatives.

12 (g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
13 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
14 gressional committees” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
16 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
17 resentatives; and

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
19 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.



**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4636
OFFERED BY MR. RESCENTIALER OF
PENNSYLVANIA**

Page 8, after line 19, add the following:

1 **SEC. 6. PLASTIC WASTE REDUCTION INITIATIVE.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Chief Executive Officer of the
3 United States International Development Finance Cor-
4 poration is authorized to establish, in coordination with
5 relevant Federal departments and agencies and incor-
6 porating any existing programs of the Corporation for
7 such purposes, an initiative to pursue investment opportu-
8 nities to address plastic waste pollution and support im-
9 proved, integrated waste management systems in devel-
10 oping countries, including by catalyzing global public and
11 private-sector investments to prevent and reduce marine
12 debris and plastic waste in such countries.

13 (b) REFERENCE.—The initiative established under
14 subsection (a) may be referred to as the “Plastic Waste
15 Reduction Initiative”.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1121

Urging the Government of Burma to hold free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections on November 8, 2020.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 17, 2020

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan (for himself, Mr. CHABOT, and Mr. ENGEL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Urging the Government of Burma to hold free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections on November 8, 2020.

Whereas the Union Election Commission of Burma announced that the country will hold general elections on November 8, 2020;

Whereas Burma's previous elections were characterized by controversy, conflict, and disenfranchisement instigated by the military of Burma (the "Tatmadaw"), including in May 1990, November 2010, the April 2012 special elections, and November 2015;

Whereas the ongoing Tatmadaw offensives in Rakhine, southern Chin, Kachin, and northern Shan states continue to cause significant displacement of ethnic groups, creating

substantial challenges for the Union Election Commission to generate a verified comprehensive voter list and set up polling stations in conflict affected areas;

Whereas provisions in the 2008 Constitution of Burma allocate 25 percent of parliamentary seats to the military, conferring exceptional powers to the Tatmadaw and thereby affording the Tatmadaw considerable power to suppress basic rights, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and association;

Whereas constitutional amendments proposed by the Union Parliament's Charter Amendment Committee that aimed to democratize the Burmese Constitution and ensure equal rights, including voting rights, for all citizens of Burma were defeated by military lawmakers, further enabling the military to exercise outsized power and influence the country's electoral processes;

Whereas the National League of Democracy political party has repeatedly failed to uphold and protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities since coming to power in 2015;

Whereas, as of March 31, 2020, during the first four years of Aung San Suu Kyi's civilian government, over 500 lawsuits against more than 1,000 individuals have used Burma's legal system to repress peaceful expressions critical of the Tatmadaw, civilian government, and Aung San Suu Kyi, resulting in the imprisonment of journalists, such as Reuters reporters Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, ethnic activists, and student protestors;

Whereas the Political Parties Registration Law of 2010 limits the right to form and join political parties only to full citizens, thereby severely curtailing the political participa-

tion of religious and ethnic minorities, including Rohingya, those of Chinese and Indian descent, internally displaced populations across Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, and Burmese refugees in Thailand, Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the region, many of whom had citizenship documents canceled and who face multiple hurdles in gaining citizenship documentation;

Whereas the Government of Burma instituted a blackout, that is still ongoing as of September 1, 2020, of mobile internet services and restricted internet service quality in Rakhine and Chin States, beginning in June 2019, thereby inhibiting the ability to hold free and fair elections in these areas and further exacerbating difficulties in aid distribution and access to potentially life-saving information since the onset of COVID-19;

Whereas the Government of Burma continues to curtail freedom of the press and civil society—which are critical foundations for free and fair elections—as evidenced by government directives to block independent and ethnic media sites, and the anticipated restrictions by the Union Election Commission on voter education and election observation activities;

Whereas Burma's 2015 election saw the disenfranchisement of significant segments of the population, particularly of Rohingya ethnicity, but also including those of Chinese and Indian descent, Muslims, and other internally displaced persons;

Whereas ongoing conflict in 2015 was used to justify the cancellation of elections in 7 townships and more than 400 ward and village tracts, mostly in Kachin, Shan, and Kayah states;

Whereas Burma's 1982 citizenship law stripped Rohingya of their Burmese citizenship and subsequent policies rendered them stateless and disenfranchised, despite having the right to vote as recently as 2010 and ability to serve in parliament as recently as 2015;

Whereas in 2017, the Tatmadaw commenced a genocide against Rohingya civilians in Rakhine state, causing over 740,000 Rohingya refugees to flee into Bangladesh, joining over 200,000 who had been previously displaced in prior waves of anti-Rohingya violence, resulting in more than 1,000,000 Rohingya refugees not present in Burma for the election;

Whereas the Government of Burma has not created conditions conducive to repatriation and political and electoral participation of Rohingya refugees and has not made progress on the most crucial of the 88 recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission identified by Rohingya refugees as prerequisites to voluntary repatriation, including freedom of movement, provision of civil documentation, and a transparent pathway to restoration of full citizenship;

Whereas the Tatmadaw's senior generals have been sanctioned by the United States Government for perpetrating gross human rights violations and are subject to ongoing investigations into their conduct by both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice; and

Whereas the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar stated on July 13, 2020, "The people of Myanmar deserve a free and fair election this November and this includes respect for the right to vote regardless of one's race, ethnicity or reli-

gion, freedom of expression and assembly, and access to information and a free press. It will also require that steps are taken now to assure that those in conflict areas will be able to exercise their rights.”; Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) recognizes the importance of free, fair, in-
3 clusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elec-
4 tions in Burma and that the 2020 elections mark a
5 critical juncture in Burma’s democratic process;

6 (2) stands with the people of Burma in their
7 ambition for sustainable peace, a genuine democ-
8 racy, and the realization of fundamental human
9 rights for all;

10 (3) calls upon the President and the Secretary
11 of State to—

12 (A) support Burma’s democratic transi-
13 tion, including by emphasizing the importance
14 to that transition of this election as well as of
15 the Government of Burma undertaking a cred-
16 ible and sustainable process of genuine national
17 and ethnic reconciliation;

18 (B) support free, fair, inclusive, trans-
19 parent, participatory, and credible elections in
20 Burma, including by working to ensure that the
21 Tatmadaw and its affiliates do not interfere

1 with vigorous public debate or the mechanism
2 of the electoral process and that other govern-
3 ment officials do not use official resources for
4 electioneering;

5 (C) call for a ceasefire in all Burmese
6 states and localities to ensure that conflict is
7 not used as an excuse to deny people the right
8 to vote;

9 (D) support the right to vote for internally
10 displaced persons, refugees, and other Burmese
11 communities outside of Burma, with specific at-
12 tention to the disenfranchised Rohingya people;

13 (E) condemn any action taken by the gov-
14 ernment, political parties, military, or Union
15 Election Commission to limit civil society par-
16 ticipation in the election, including prohibitions
17 on voter education and election observation, or
18 otherwise restrict civil society or humanitarian
19 space in the lead up to the election or in the
20 post-election period;

21 (F) ensure that United States-based social
22 media companies, including Facebook, not allow
23 their platforms to be used as vehicles for
24 spreading misinformation or advocating violence

1 or voter intimidation to suppress voter partici-
2 pation; and

3 (G) ensure that the Department of State's
4 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Prac-
5 tices includes an extensive evaluation of the
6 Burmese election, including an assessment of
7 inclusivity, participation, and interference;

8 (4) calls upon the United States Government,
9 in partnership with the international community, to
10 ensure that the Union Election Commission func-
11 tions as an independent electoral management body
12 that establishes a regulatory framework that fosters
13 fair, open, and transparent electoral processes, and
14 that the Tatmadaw publicly affirms that it will
15 honor the results of such elections;

16 (5) calls upon the Secretary of State and the
17 Administrator of the United States Agency for
18 International Development to work with like-minded
19 regional and international organizations, such as the
20 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the
21 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
22 Assistance, the Asian Network for Free Elections,
23 People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE),
24 and the Carter Center, to ensure that the general
25 elections in Burma meet international standards of

1 free and fair elections, including by seeking full and
2 unimpeded access to all aspects of the electoral proc-
3 ess for international and domestic observers; and
4 (6) calls on the President to consider sanc-
5 tioning individuals within the Government of Burma,
6 the Tatmadaw, and among military associated busi-
7 nesses and ultranationalist groups, whom the United
8 States Government determines undermine free, fair,
9 inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible
10 elections in Burma or the safety of such elections.

○

AMENDMENT TO H. RES. 1121
OFFERED BY MR. LEVIN OF MICHIGAN

Page 7, beginning line 19, strike “, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the Asian Network for Free Elections, People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), and the Carter Center.”.

Page 8, strike lines 4 through 10 and insert the following:

1 (6) calls on the President to consider actions,
2 including the further use of existing sanctions au-
3 thorities such as those authorized under the Global
4 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub-
5 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328), in sup-
6 port of the rights of Burmese citizens to obtain, ex-
7 ercise, defend, and promote human rights and free-
8 doms.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1115

Calling for the immediate release of Trevor Reed, a United States citizen who was unjustly sentenced to 9 years in a Russian prison.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 16, 2020

Mr. CONAWAY (for himself, Mr. McCAUL, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. HURD of Texas, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. BABIN, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. MARCHANT, Mr. ARRINGTON, Mr. THORNBERRY, Mr. ROY, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. GOODEN, Mr. FLORES, Mr. CRENSHAW, Mr. VEASEY, Mr. CUELLAR, Mr. GONZALEZ of Texas, Mr. GREEN of Texas, Mr. CASTRO of Texas, Ms. GRANGER, and Mr. WILLIAMS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Calling for the immediate release of Trevor Reed, a United States citizen who was unjustly sentenced to 9 years in a Russian prison.

Whereas United States citizen Trevor Reed is a resident of Granbury, Texas, and a United States Marine Corps veteran;

Whereas Trevor Reed traveled to Moscow to visit his girlfriend on May 16, 2019;

Whereas Moscow's Police Service detained Trevor Reed on August 16, 2019;

Whereas Trevor Reed was accused of grabbing the arm of the police officer driving the vehicle and elbowing another officer while en route to the police station, causing the vehicle to swerve and therefore endangering the lives of the police officers;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Moscow has filed numerous diplomatic complaints with the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding Trevor Reed being denied consular access, communications, medical treatment, family visitations, and other violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

Whereas Trevor Reed's defense team presented video evidence to the courts that disproves the police officers' statements of supposed endangerment and wrongdoing;

Whereas Trevor Reed's defense team was denied access to additional video evidence from the police vehicle and police station that had the potential to prove his innocence;

Whereas the police officers claimed emotional and physical damages, but did not sustain any visible injury, or claim any time missed from work;

Whereas the Constitutional Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Second Court of Cassation of General Jurisdiction concurred that Russian procedural law was violated in the way that Trevor Reed's bail was revoked;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Moscow has filed complaints with the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding denial of communications with Trevor Reed;

Whereas during the trial, the defense counsel presented 59 minutes of traffic camera video that showed the police car—

(1) did not change direction or leave its lane;

- (2) did not swerve; and
- (3) did not stop or slow down;

Whereas, on July 30, 2020, Golovinsky District Court Judge Arnout read a verdict that dismissed all defense evidence, witnesses, and government experts and included information from the investigator's case files that were not discussed or read into the court files;

Whereas the judge sentenced Trevor Reed to 9 years in prison camp and was ordered to pay 100,000 rubles to each police officer for moral and physical injuries;

Whereas Trevor Reed had already been detained in Russia for 1 year at the time of the judge's verdict; and

Whereas, the United States Ambassador to Russia, John Sullivan, upon Trevor's sentencing, stated that the prosecution's case and the evidence presented against Mr. Reed were "so preposterous that they provoked laughter in the courtroom", the conviction and sentence were "ridiculous", and "justice was not even considered": Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) expresses support for Trevor Reed, Paul
3 Whelan, and all prisoners unjustly imprisoned in the
4 Russian Federation;

5 (2) condemns the practice of politically moti-
6 vated imprisonment in the Russian Federation,
7 which violates the commitments of the Russian Fed-
8 eration to international obligations with respect to
9 human rights and the rule of law;

1 (3) urges the United States Government, in all
2 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
3 Federation, to raise the case of Trevor Reed and to
4 press for his release;

5 (4) calls on the Government of the Russian
6 Federation to immediately release Trevor Reed and
7 all other prisoners arrested for political motivations;

8 (5) urges the Government of the Russian Fed-
9 eration to provide unrestricted consular access to
10 Trevor Reed while he remains in detention;

11 (6) calls on the Government of the Russian
12 Federation—

13 (A) to provide Trevor Reed any necessary
14 medical treatment and personal protective
15 equipment;

16 (B) to notify the United States Amba-
17 sador to Russia of any medical problems or
18 complaints that arise during his detention; and

19 (C) to provide the United States Embassy
20 in Moscow with full access to all of Trevor
21 Reed's medical records;

22 (7) urges the Government of the Russian Fed-
23 eration to respect Trevor Reed's universally recog-
24 nized human rights; and

1 (8) expresses support to the family of Trevor
2 Reed and commitment to bringing Trevor Reed
3 home.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 1115
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas United States citizen Trevor Reed is a resident of Granbury, Texas, and a United States Marine Corps veteran;

Whereas Trevor Reed traveled to Moscow to visit his girlfriend on May 16, 2019;

Whereas Moscow's Police Service detained Trevor Reed on August 16, 2019;

Whereas Trevor Reed was accused of grabbing the arm of the police officer driving the vehicle and elbowing another officer while en route to the police station, causing the vehicle to swerve and therefore endangering the lives of the police officers;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Moscow has filed numerous diplomatic complaints with the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding Trevor Reed being denied consular access, communications, medical treatment, family visitations, and other violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

Whereas Trevor Reed's defense team presented video evidence from traffic camera footage to the courts that disproves the police officers' statements of supposed endangerment and wrongdoing;

Whereas Trevor Reed's defense team was denied access to additional video evidence from the police vehicle and police station that had the potential to prove his innocence;

Whereas the police officers claimed emotional and physical damages, but did not sustain any visible injury, or claim any time missed from work;

Whereas the Constitutional Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Second Court of Cassation of General Jurisdiction concurred that Russian procedural law was violated in the way that Trevor Reed's bail was revoked;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Moscow has filed complaints with the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding denial of communications with Trevor Reed;

Whereas during the trial, the defense counsel presented 59 minutes of traffic camera video that showed the police car—

- (1) did not change direction or leave its lane;
- (2) did not swerve; and
- (3) did not stop or slow down;

Whereas, on July 30, 2020, Golovinsky District Court Judge Arnout read a verdict that dismissed all defense evidence, witnesses, and government experts and included information from the investigator's case files that were not discussed or read into the court files;

Whereas the judge sentenced Trevor Reed to 9 years in prison camp and was ordered to pay 100,000 rubles to each police officer for moral and physical injuries;

Whereas Trevor Reed had already been detained in Russia for 1 year at the time of the judge's verdict; and

Whereas, the United States Ambassador to Russia, John Sullivan, upon Trevor's sentencing, stated that the prosecu-

tion's case and the evidence presented against Mr. Reed were "so preposterous that they provoked laughter in the courtroom", the conviction and sentence were "ridiculous", and "justice was not even considered": Now, therefore, be it—

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

- 1 That the House of Representatives—
- 2 (1) expresses support for Trevor Reed, Paul
- 3 Whelan, and all prisoners unjustly imprisoned in the
- 4 Russian Federation;
- 5 (2) condemns the practice of politically moti-
- 6 vated imprisonment in the Russian Federation,
- 7 which violates the commitments of the Russian Fed-
- 8 eration to international obligations with respect to
- 9 human rights and the rule of law;
- 10 (3) urges the United States Government, in all
- 11 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
- 12 Federation, to raise the case of Trevor Reed and to
- 13 press for his release;
- 14 (4) calls on the Government of the Russian
- 15 Federation to immediately release Trevor Reed and
- 16 all other prisoners arrested for political motivations;
- 17 (5) urges the Government of the Russian Fed-
- 18 eration to provide unrestricted consular access to
- 19 Trevor Reed while he remains in detention as re-

1 quired under the Vienna Convention on Consular
2 Relations;

3 (6) calls on the Government of the Russian
4 Federation—

5 (A) to provide Trevor Reed any necessary
6 medical treatment and personal protective
7 equipment;

8 (B) to notify the United States Embassy
9 in Moscow of any medical problems or com-
10 plaints that arise during his detention; and

11 (C) to provide the United States Embassy
12 in Moscow with full access to all of Trevor
13 Reed's medical records;

14 (7) urges the Government of the Russian Fed-
15 eration to respect Trevor Reed's universally recog-
16 nized human rights; and

17 (8) expresses support to the family of Trevor
18 Reed and commitment to bringing Trevor Reed
19 home.



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 768

Calling on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 17, 2019

Ms. BASS (for herself and Mr. SMITH of New Jersey) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Calling on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa.

Whereas access to information and freedom of expression are pillars of an open, free, and democratic society;

Whereas open and secure access to the internet enables the exercise of human rights and freedom of expression, allowing people to connect, access information, and participate in a global society;

Whereas according to Access Now, there were 21 instances of partial or total internet shutdowns in Africa in 2018, compared with only 4 in 2016;

Whereas governments, including those of Chad, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, have restricted

access to the internet and disrupted networks, online applications, and services to censor and interfere with the flow of information during politically sensitive moments, including elections, political protests, and mass demonstrations, when unfettered journalism, public oversight, and political participation are crucial to bolster democratic processes and the rule of law;

Whereas governments often attempt to justify partial or total internet shutdowns for purposes of security or to stop the spread of false information;

Whereas the frequency of internet shutdowns has increased across Africa, levying broad economic costs and directly violating citizens rights to freedom of expression and access to information;

Whereas African whistleblowers, journalists, bloggers, and other media workers often lack legal protection and suffer harassment and detention at the hands of government authorities, often facilitated by invasive and unauthorized surveillance, with the encouragement, technical expertise, and financial support of foreign entities and governments;

Whereas some African governments have introduced taxes to discourage citizens from sharing and accessing information in the digital space, and have imposed laws and regulations that often target journalists, bloggers, activists, and others, banning speech and discouraging expression in the digital space;

Whereas those operating independent news websites and blogs are obstructed through blocking and censorship, burdensome licensing requirements, and regulatory meas-

ures that effectively limit their audience and their livelihoods;

Whereas many African governments lack robust data protection and privacy laws, and the systems to implement such laws, leaving the privacy of citizens exposed and susceptible to infringement;

Whereas the Communist government in China, through the desire to build a “digital Silk Road”, has increased cyber activity in Africa through telecommunications contracts and fiber optic networks which can expose individuals to greater monitoring and surveillance, and has exported technology and training to authoritarian officials that have made it easier to restrict internet access in many African countries;

Whereas Huawei Technologies has reportedly sold products and services to African governments that have been used to support spying on political opponents; and

Whereas Russia has been testing new disinformation techniques and tactics through a series of online networks linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch indicted by the United States for meddling in the United States Presidential election in 2016, in African countries that include Sudan, Cameroon, Libya, and Mozambique: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) strongly condemns the restriction or disruption of the internet through methods including network shutdowns, disruptions, use of “kill switches”,
3 bandwidth throttling, high taxes, and the blocking of
4 applications and services across Africa, and any ef-

1 forts by foreign governments to facilitate such activ-
2 ity;

3 (2) urges African governments to—

4 (A) promote inclusive and meaningful par-
5 ticipation by all stakeholders in the development
6 of policies on telecommunications, internet gov-
7 ernance, information and communications tech-
8 nologies, and infrastructure;

9 (B) prevent the use of broad and invasive
10 surveillance technologies that violate privacy
11 and discourage the freedom of expression of all
12 users, particularly journalists, bloggers, and
13 their sources, and to ensure accountability for
14 crimes against them;

15 (C) actively pursue laws and policies that
16 protect and promote human rights online and
17 offline and review laws that criminalize free
18 speech that are used to harass and prosecute
19 those who offer dissenting views and informa-
20 tion;

21 (D) resist new contracts with authoritarian
22 states, like China, and avoid digital governance
23 models that enable technoauthoritarianism and
24 invasive surveillance capabilities that undermine

1 human rights and restrict fundamental free-
2 doms; and

3 (E) work closely with technology compa-
4 nies and social media services to prevent or
5 take down disinformation, including
6 disinformation disseminated by Russia and
7 other actors;

8 (3) urges telecommunications providers and
9 internet platforms to employ legal, operational, and
10 technical measures to promote and facilitate the ex-
11 ercise of human rights online, and disclose requests
12 from governments or other parties to hand over user
13 data and to disrupt networks, and their responses
14 thereto;

15 (4) urges businesses operating in Africa to fa-
16 cilitate open and secure access to the internet, and
17 work with stakeholders to prevent, mitigate, and
18 remedy harms from internet shutdowns and other
19 disruptions to the free flow of information online;
20 and

21 (5) urges businesses operating in Africa to af-
22 firm the United Nations Guiding Principles on Busi-
23 ness and Human Rights, and adhere to best prac-
24 tices, scrutinizing government or other third-party
25 requests to interfere with networks, applications,

- 1 services, and personal data for any potential human
- 2 rights impacts.



**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H. RES. 768
OFFERED BY MS. BASS OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas access to information and freedom of expression are pillars of an open, free, and democratic society;

Whereas open and secure access to the internet enables the exercise of human rights and freedom of expression, allowing people to connect, access information, and participate in a global society;

Whereas according to Access Now, there were 21 instances of partial or total internet shutdowns in Africa in 2018, compared with only 4 in 2016;

Whereas governments, including those of Chad, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, have restricted access to the internet and disrupted networks, online applications, and services to censor and interfere with the flow of information during politically sensitive moments, including elections, political protests, and mass demonstrations, when unfettered journalism, public oversight, and political participation are crucial to bolster democratic processes and the rule of law;

Whereas governments often attempt to justify partial or total internet shutdowns for purposes of security or to stop the spread of false information;

Whereas the frequency of internet shutdowns has increased across Africa, levying broad economic costs and directly

violating citizens rights to freedom of expression and access to information;

Whereas African whistleblowers, journalists, bloggers, and other media workers often lack legal protection and suffer harassment and detention at the hands of government authorities, often facilitated by invasive and unauthorized surveillance, with the encouragement, technical expertise, and financial support of foreign entities and governments;

Whereas some African governments have introduced taxes to discourage citizens from sharing and accessing information in the digital space, and have imposed laws and regulations that often target journalists, bloggers, activists, and others, banning speech and discouraging expression in the digital space;

Whereas those operating independent news websites and blogs are obstructed through blocking and censorship, burdensome licensing requirements, and regulatory measures that effectively limit their audience and their livelihoods;

Whereas many African governments lack robust data protection and privacy laws, and the systems to implement such laws, leaving the privacy of citizens exposed and susceptible to infringement;

Whereas the People's Republic of China, through initiatives associated with their "digital Silk Road", has facilitated the building of telecommunications infrastructure and fiber optic networks that can enhance monitoring and surveillance of individuals by African governments;

Whereas the People's Republic of China also facilitated the export of technology and training to African governments

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that have made it easier for those governments to exercise greater control over internet access in those African countries;

Whereas Huawei Technologies has reportedly sold products and services to African governments that have been used to support spying on political opponents; and

Whereas Russia has been testing new disinformation techniques and tactics through a series of online networks linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch indicted by the United States for meddling in the United States Presidential election in 2016, in African countries that include Sudan, Cameroon, Libya, and Mozambique: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolved clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) strongly condemns the restriction or disruption
3 tion of the internet through methods including network
4 shutdowns, disruptions, use of “kill switches”,
5 bandwidth throttling, high taxes, and the blocking of
6 applications and services across Africa, and any efforts
7 by foreign governments to facilitate such activity;
8

9 (2) urges African governments to—

10 (A) promote inclusive and meaningful participation
11 by all stakeholders in the development
12 of policies on telecommunications, internet gov-

1 ernance, information and communications tech-
2 nologies, and infrastructure;

3 (B) prevent the use of broad and invasive
4 surveillance technologies that violate privacy
5 and discourage the freedom of expression of all
6 users, particularly journalists, bloggers, and
7 their sources, and to ensure accountability for
8 crimes against them;

9 (C) actively pursue laws and policies that
10 protect and promote human rights online and
11 offline and review laws that criminalize free
12 speech and are used to harass and prosecute
13 those who offer dissenting views and informa-
14 tion; and

15 (D) establish digital governance models
16 that protect privacy and prevent invasive sur-
17 veillance that undermines human rights and re-
18 stricts fundamental freedoms;

19 (3) urges telecommunications providers and
20 internet platforms to promote and facilitate the exer-
21 cise of human rights online, including by disclosing
22 requests from governments or other parties to hand
23 over user data and to disrupt networks, and their re-
24 sponses thereto;

1 (4) urges businesses operating in Africa to fa-
2 cilitate open and secure access to the internet, and
3 work with stakeholders to prevent, mitigate, and
4 remedy harms from internet shutdowns and other
5 disruptions to the free flow of information online;
6 and

7 (5) urges businesses operating in Africa to af-
8 firm the United Nations Guiding Principles on Busi-
9 ness and Human Rights, and adhere to best prac-
10 tices, scrutinizing government or other third-party
11 requests to interfere with networks, applications,
12 services, and personal data for any potential human
13 rights impacts.



116TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. RES. 1150

Urging the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all citizens to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in October 2020.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 24, 2020

Mr. PHILLIPS (for himself, Ms. BASS, and Mr. YOHO) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Urging the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all citizens to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in October 2020.

Whereas it is in the interest of the United States to maintain a strong relationship with a democratic, peaceful, stable, and economically prosperous Côte d'Ivoire whose leaders prioritize good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights;

Whereas the United States and Côte d'Ivoire have a strong bilateral relationship with important cooperation on economic interests, regional stability, and counterterrorism priorities, and efforts to advance health and development objectives;

Whereas Côte d'Ivoire has a presidential election scheduled for October 31, 2020;

Whereas previous transitions of power have been marred by conflict and violence against civilians, including most recently in 2010–2011, when 3,000 civilians were killed during an election-related dispute;

Whereas the root causes of past political violence—including religious and ethnoregional tensions, contestation over land, politicization of the judiciary and concerns over due process, and a lack of professionalism, adequate training, and civilian control over the security forces—have not been adequately addressed;

Whereas political leaders have previously manipulated and exploited religious, ethnic, and regional identities and economic grievances to incite violence including through incidents of hateful and divisive speech occurring both in person and online;

Whereas President Ouattara's decision to stand for a third term, despite a two-term limit in the constitution, has heightened tensions, and several citizens have been killed and dozens more injured or arrested amid protests against his candidacy;

Whereas political violence in Côte d'Ivoire could threaten the region's stability and economic development prospects, and undermine efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorist activity;

Whereas the Government of Côte d'Ivoire must protect the health and safety of its citizens and prevent the spread of COVID–19 while also ensuring credible elections and enabling the participation of all voters;

Whereas the Government of the United States is deeply committed to efforts to prevent conflict and atrocities and address the root causes of fragility, as evidenced by the enactment of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018; and

Whereas the United States Embassy in Côte d'Ivoire issued a statement on August 25, 2020, "supporting free, transparent, and inclusive elections in Côte d'Ivoire" and urging "all parties, groups and individuals to refrain from violence and hateful/divisive speech and to choose dialogue to find peaceful solutions to their disagreements": Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) reaffirms that the United States will con-
3 tinue to stand with the people of Côte d'Ivoire in
4 support of peace, democracy, religious and ethnic
5 tolerance, and stability;

6 (2) calls upon the Government of Côte d'Ivoire
7 and all political parties to—

8 (A) protect all civilians from violence and
9 support their right to peacefully demonstrate;

10 (B) condemn all forms of hate speech and
11 incitement of violence while maintaining citi-
12 zens' open access to information;

13 (C) publicly commit to free, fair, peaceful,
14 and transparent elections and make clear that
15 all Ivorians, including security forces, govern-

1 ment officials, political opposition members, and
2 the media, will be held accountable for inciting
3 or perpetrating violence;

4 (D) support an independent investigation
5 into the killings of civilians during demonstra-
6 tions;

7 (E) support efforts to implement public
8 health protocols to prevent further spread of
9 COVID-19 and ensure safe participation of all
10 voters on election day; and

11 (F) request the electoral observation serv-
12 ices of the African Union or the Economic
13 Community of West African States, and grant
14 full access to election observers;

15 (3) encourages civil society organizations, local
16 communities, and religious leaders to—

17 (A) remain united in calls for peace, non-
18 violence, tolerance, and democracy; and

19 (B) work to educate voters about the elec-
20 toral process in order to combat disinformation
21 and violence; and

22 (4) calls upon the United States Government
23 and international partners to—

24 (A) continue to condemn violence against
25 peaceful demonstrators and hate speech that

1 promotes such actions, including posts on social
2 media, and urge all political parties to publicly
3 commit to free, fair, peaceful, and transparent
4 elections;

5 (B) continue to support election prepara-
6 tion efforts, including through assistance to the
7 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), ca-
8 pacity building for civil society and local lead-
9 ers, voter education programs, development of
10 election day protocols, violence prevention pro-
11 grams, support for election observation, and
12 human rights and atrocities prevention moni-
13 toring; and

14 (C) call for and support an independent in-
15 vestigation into the killings of civilians during
16 demonstrations.

○

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. RES. 1145

Condemning the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and calling for a robust United States and international response.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 23, 2020

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. MALINOWSKI, and Mr. SMITH of New Jersey) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Oversight and Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

RESOLUTION

Condemning the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and calling for a robust United States and international response.

Whereas Alexei Navalny is a well-known anticorruption activist and leader of the political opposition in Russia;

Whereas Mr. Navalny garnered 27 percent of the vote in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election;

Whereas since that election, Mr. Navalny and his party have been repeatedly denied the opportunity to compete in elections;

Whereas Mr. Navalny has been imprisoned multiple times for participating in unsanctioned protests;

Whereas Mr. Navalny was attacked twice with a chemical substance in 2017 and potentially poisoned in 2019 while in prison;

Whereas over the years a number of Russian journalists, human rights activists, politicians, whistleblowers, and others have been killed or died under mysterious circumstances, in Russia and overseas, including—

(1) former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko (in London) and investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006;

(2) human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov, journalist Anastasia Baburova, and human rights activist Natalya Estemirova in 2009; and

(3) opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015;

Whereas, on August 20, 2020, Mr. Navalny fell ill while on a domestic flight in Russia;

Whereas, on August 22, 2020, Mr. Navalny was evacuated by airlift from Omsk, Russia, to Berlin, Germany, for his protection and to ensure he would receive a high standard of health care to improve his chances of recovery;

Whereas German chemical weapons experts conducted tests and found “unequivocal” evidence that Mr. Navalny had been poisoned with a Soviet-era Novichok chemical nerve agent;

Whereas specialized laboratories in France and Sweden confirmed that Mr. Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from the Novichok group;

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation has repeatedly denied that Mr. Navalny was poisoned;

Whereas the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has called on the Government of the Russian Federation to open an investigation into Mr. Navalny's case;

Whereas the Russian Federation is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);

Whereas Article 6 of the ICCPR states that "Every human being has the inherent right to life" and "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life";

Whereas Article 9 of the ICCPR states that "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.";

Whereas the Russian Federation is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

Whereas respect for human rights is key to the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and therefore the OSCE monitors the human rights situation in its 57 participating states;

Whereas Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208) and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328) in 2016 which provide the United States Government with authorities to respond to grave violations of human rights and corruption in Russia; and

Whereas in response to a previous Novichok attack against a United Kingdom national and his daughter in 2018, the United States Government imposed two rounds of sanctions on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.);
Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

•HRES 1145 IH

1 (1) condemns the apparently purposeful poi-
2 soning on August 20, 2020, of Russian
3 anticorruption activist and opposition leader Alexei
4 Navalny;

5 (2) expresses its appreciation for the prompt
6 and generous efforts of the Cinema for Peace Foun-
7 dation and the Government of the Federal Republic
8 of Germany to ensure high-quality health care for
9 Mr. Navalny after he was poisoned by facilitating his
10 transfer by airlift from Russia to Germany;

11 (3) welcomes reports that Mr. Navalny has
12 emerged from a medically induced coma and is
13 gradually recovering from the poisoning;

14 (4) hopes for Mr. Navalny's full and complete
15 recovery so that he may promptly resume his life
16 and work;

17 (5) urges multilateral human rights monitoring
18 bodies to monitor the case of the August 2020 poi-
19 soning of Alexei Navalny as a probable violation of
20 his fundamental human rights and to respond ac-
21 cordingly;

22 (6) calls on the Government of the Russian
23 Federation to cooperate with an independent, impar-
24 tial, and thorough investigation of the reported poi-
25 soning of Alexei Navalny;

1 (7) calls on the United States Government to
2 support international or multilateral efforts to en-
3 sure an independent, impartial, and thorough inves-
4 tigation of the reported poisoning of Alexei Navalny;

5 (8) urges the United States Government, in all
6 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
7 Federation, to raise the case of the poisoning of
8 Alexei Navalny and underscore the necessity of
9 bringing the organizers and perpetrators to justice;

10 (9) calls on the Secretary of State and the Sec-
11 retary of the Treasury to use their authority under
12 the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
13 Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208) and
14 the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
15 Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328)
16 to designate individuals whom they determine upon
17 investigation to have been involved in the poisoning
18 of Alexei Navalny as perpetrators, organizers, or
19 masterminds, on the list of specially designated na-
20 tionals and blocked persons maintained by the Office
21 of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
22 Treasury, freezing their assets and making them in-
23 eligible to receive United States visas; and

24 (10) supports the 60-day review period trig-
25 gered by the submission of a letter to the President

1 by the Chair and Ranking Member of the Foreign
2 Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
3 to investigate whether the poisoning of Alexei
4 Navalny constitutes use of a chemical weapon by the
5 Government of the Russian Federation in contraven-
6 tion of international law, and if so, to impose sanc-
7 tions pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weap-
8 ons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
9 (Public Law 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).

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**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.RES. 1145
OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY**

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas Alexei Navalny is a well-known anticorruption activist and leader of the political opposition in Russia;

Whereas Mr. Navalny garnered 27 percent of the vote in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election;

Whereas since that election, Mr. Navalny and his party have been repeatedly denied the opportunity to compete in elections;

Whereas Mr. Navalny has been imprisoned multiple times for participating in unsanctioned protests;

Whereas Mr. Navalny was attacked twice with a chemical substance in 2017 and potentially poisoned in 2019 while in prison;

Whereas over the years a number of Russian journalists, human rights activists, politicians, whistleblowers, and others have been killed or died under mysterious circumstances, in Russia and overseas, including—

(1) former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko (in London) and investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006;

(2) human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov, journalist Anastasia Baburova, whistleblower lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, and human rights activist Natalya Estemirova in 2009; and

(3) opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015;

Whereas, on August 20, 2020, Mr. Navalny fell ill while on a domestic flight in Russia;

Whereas, on August 22, 2020, Mr. Navalny was evacuated by airlift from Omsk, Russia, to Berlin, Germany, for his protection and to ensure he would receive a high standard of health care to improve his chances of recovery;

Whereas German chemical weapons experts conducted tests and found “unequivocal” evidence that Mr. Navalny had been poisoned with a Soviet-era military-grade chemical nerve agent from the Novichok group;

Whereas specialized laboratories in France and Sweden confirmed that Mr. Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from the Novichok group;

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation has repeatedly denied that Mr. Navalny was poisoned;

Whereas the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has called on the Government of the Russian Federation to open an investigation into Mr. Navalny’s case;

Whereas the Russian Federation is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);

Whereas, in November 2019, after Russian agents used a Novichok-class nerve agent in an attempted assassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in March 2018, CWC parties agreed to add the Novichok group of nerve agents to “Schedule 1”, a list of chemicals classified as chemical warfare agents that are subject to declaration requirements and other restrictions;

Whereas, on September 4, 2020, NATO strongly condemned the attack on Mr. Navalny and called on the Russian Federation to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on an impartial, international investigation;

Whereas the G7 foreign ministers issued a statement on September 8, 2020, that called on the Government of the Russian Federation “to urgently and fully establish transparency on who is responsible for this abhorrent poisoning attack and, bearing in mind Russia’s commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to bring the perpetrators to justice”;

Whereas the Russian Federation is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);

Whereas Article 6 of the ICCPR states that “Every human being has the inherent right to life” and “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”;

Whereas Article 9 of the ICCPR states that “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”;

Whereas the Russian Federation is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

Whereas respect for human rights is key to the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security and therefore the OSCE monitors the human rights situation in its 57 participating states;

Whereas pressure on Germany to reconsider its support for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from the United States and international community, including many European Union countries, as well as from leading politicians within Germany, has grown since the attack on Mr. Navalny;

Whereas Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208) and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328) in 2016 to provide the United States Government with authorities to respond to grave violations of human rights and corruption in Russia; and

Whereas in response to the Novichok-class nerve agent attack described in this preamble against United Kingdom national and former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in 2018, the United States Government imposed two rounds of sanctions on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.): Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolved clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) condemns the apparently purposeful poi-
3 soning on August 20, 2020, of Russian
4 anticorruption activist and opposition leader Alexei
5 Navalny;

6 (2) expresses its appreciation for the prompt
7 and generous efforts of the Cinema for Peace Foun-
8 dation and the Government of the Federal Republic
9 of Germany to ensure high-quality health care for
10 Mr. Navalny after he was poisoned by facilitating his
11 transfer by airlift from Russia to Germany;

1 (3) welcomes reports that Mr. Navalny has
2 emerged from a medically induced coma and is
3 gradually recovering from the poisoning;

4 (4) hopes for Mr. Navalny's full and complete
5 recovery so that he may promptly resume his life
6 and work;

7 (5) urges the Organization for Security and Co-
8 operation in Europe and multilateral human rights
9 monitoring bodies to monitor the case of the August
10 2020 poisoning of Alexei Navalny as a probable vio-
11 lation of his fundamental human rights and to re-
12 spond accordingly;

13 (6) calls on the Government of the Russian
14 Federation to cooperate with independent, impartial,
15 and thorough investigations by competent authorities
16 and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chem-
17 ical Weapons of the reported poisoning of Alexei
18 Navalny;

19 (7) calls on the United States Government to
20 support international or multilateral efforts to en-
21 sure an independent, impartial, and thorough inves-
22 tigation by competent authorities and the Organiza-
23 tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of the
24 reported poisoning of Alexei Navalny;

1 (8) urges the United States Government, in all
2 its interactions with the Government of the Russian
3 Federation, to raise the case of the poisoning of
4 Alexei Navalny and underscore the necessity of
5 bringing the organizers and perpetrators to justice;

6 (9) calls on the Secretary of State and the Sec-
7 retary of the Treasury to use their authority under
8 the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
9 Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208) and
10 the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
11 Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328)
12 to designate individuals whom they determine upon
13 investigation to have been involved in the poisoning
14 of Alexei Navalny as perpetrators, organizers, or
15 masterminds, on the list of specially designated na-
16 tionals and blocked persons maintained by the Office
17 of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
18 Treasury, freezing their assets and making them in-
19 eligible to receive United States visas; and

20 (10) supports the 60-day review period trig-
21 gered by the submission of a letter to the President
22 by the Chair and Ranking Member of the Foreign
23 Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives
24 to investigate whether the poisoning of Alexei
25 Navalny constitutes use of a chemical weapon by the

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1 Government of the Russian Federation in contraven-
2 tion of international law, and if so, to impose sanc-
3 tions pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weap-
4 ons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
5 (Public Law 102-182; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).



116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4326

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 relating to determinations with respect to efforts of foreign countries to reduce demand for commercial sex acts under the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 12, 2019

Mrs. WAGNER (for herself, Mr. JEFFRIES, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, and Mr. WALBERG) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To amend the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 relating to determinations with respect to efforts of foreign countries to reduce demand for commercial sex acts under the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Sex Trafficking De-
5 mand Reduction Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) It has been the longstanding position of the
2 United States to reduce the demand for sex traf-
3 ficking victims. There is also a wide international
4 consensus on the necessity of demand reduction in
5 order to prevent human trafficking.

6 (2) The United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
7 Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
8 cially Women and Children, Supplementing the
9 United Nations Convention Against Transnational
10 Organized Crime of 2000 (also referred to as the
11 “Palermo Protocol(s)”) expressly addresses the re-
12 quirement that nations make serious efforts to re-
13 duce demand for trafficked persons.

14 (3) Article 9, addressing prevention of human
15 trafficking, specifically directs that, “States Parties
16 shall adopt or strengthen legislative or other meas-
17 ures, such as educational, social or cultural meas-
18 ures, including through bilateral and multilateral co-
19 operation, to discourage the demand that fosters all
20 forms of exploitation of persons, especially women
21 and children, that leads to trafficking.”.

22 (4) The United Nations Protocol, the Europe
23 Convention on Action against Human Trafficking,
24 and the 2011 European Union Directive of the Eu-
25 ropean Parliament and the Council on preventing

1 and combating trafficking in human beings also spe-
2 cifically address the need to prevent human traf-
3 ficking by reducing demand for trafficking victims.

4 (5) Research has shown that legal prostitution
5 increases the demand for prostituted persons and
6 thus increases the market for sex. As a result, there
7 is a significant increase in instances of human traf-
8 ficking.

9 (6) In 2012, researchers Seo-Young Cho, Axel
10 Dreher, and Eric Neumayer published their findings
11 in World Development establishing that, “The scale
12 effect of legalized prostitution leads to an expansion
13 of the prostitution market, increasing human traf-
14 ficking On average, countries where prostitu-
15 tion is legal experience larger reported human traf-
16 ficking inflows.”.

17 (7) In 2005, a study focused on 11 European
18 Union countries requested by the European Par-
19 liament’s committee on Women’s Rights and Gender
20 Equality and performed by Transcrime found that
21 stricter prostitution laws are correlated with fewer
22 human trafficking victims.

23 (8) Case studies published by researchers
24 Niklas Jakobsson and Andreas Kotsadam support
25 the possibility of a causal link between harsher pros-

1 titation laws and reduced human trafficking. Ja-
2 kobsson and Kotsadam found that trafficking of per-
3 sons for commercial sexual exploitation is least prev-
4 alent in countries where prostitution is illegal and
5 most prevalent in countries where prostitution is le-
6 galized.

7 (9) Further data has demonstrated the correla-
8 tion between the adoption of legislation that crim-
9 inalizes demand and reductions in sex trafficking.

10 **SEC. 3. AMENDMENT RELATING TO DETERMINATIONS**
11 **WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS OF FOREIGN**
12 **COUNTRIES TO REDUCE DEMAND FOR COM-**
13 **MERCIAL SEX ACTS UNDER THE MINIMUM**
14 **STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAF-**
15 **FICKING.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (12) of section 108(b)
17 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
18 U.S.C. 7106(b)) is amended to read as follows:

19 “(12) Whether the government of the country
20 has made serious and sustained efforts to—

21 “(A) prohibit the purchase of commercial
22 sex acts to the extent such prohibition is within
23 the authority of the central government or im-
24 plement a policy against the purchase of com-
25 mercial sex acts to the extent that prohibition

1 is not within the authority of the central gov-
2 ernment;

3 “(B) educate buyers of commercial sex on
4 how traffickers exploit prostituted persons for
5 human trafficking; and

6 “(C) reduce demand for participation in
7 international sex tourism by nationals of the
8 country.”.

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
10 subsection (a) takes effect on the date of the enactment
11 of this Act and applies with respect to determinations
12 under subsection (a)(4) of section 108 of the Trafficking
13 Victims Protection Act of 2000 that are made on or after
14 such date of enactment.

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 4326
OFFERED BY MRS. WAGNER OF MISSOURI**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Sex Trafficking De-
3 mand Reduction Act”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) It has been the longstanding position and
7 commitment of the United States to reduce the de-
8 mand for victims of severe forms of trafficking in
9 persons. There is also a wide international consensus
10 on the necessity of demand reduction in order to
11 prevent human trafficking.

12 (2) The United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
13 Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
14 cially Women and Children, Supplementing the
15 United Nations Convention Against Transnational
16 Organized Crime of 2000 (also referred to as the
17 “Palermo Protocol(s)”) expressly addresses the re-

1 quirement that nations make serious efforts to re-
2 duce demand for trafficked persons.

3 (3) Article 9 of the Palermo Protocols, address-
4 ing prevention of human trafficking, specifically di-
5 rects that, “States Parties shall adopt or strengthen
6 legislative or other measures, such as educational,
7 social or cultural measures, including through bilat-
8 eral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the
9 demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of per-
10 sons, especially women and children, that leads to
11 trafficking.”.

12 (4) The United Nations Protocol, the Europe
13 Convention on Action against Human Trafficking,
14 and the 2011 European Union Directive of the Eu-
15 ropean Parliament and the Council on preventing
16 and combating trafficking in human beings also spe-
17 cifically address the need to prevent human traf-
18 ficking by discouraging or reducing demand that fos-
19 ters all forms of exploitation of persons.

1 **SEC. 3. AMENDMENT RELATING TO DETERMINATIONS**
2 **WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS OF FOREIGN**
3 **COUNTRIES TO ADOPT EDUCATIONAL MEAS-**
4 **URES TO REDUCE DEMAND FOR TRAF-**
5 **FICKING VICTIMS UNDER THE MINIMUM**
6 **STANDARDS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TRAF-**
7 **FICKING.**

8 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Paragraph (12) of section 108(b)
9 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
10 U.S.C. 7106(b)) is amended to read as follows:

11 “(12) Whether the government of the country
12 has made serious and sustained efforts to—

13 “(A) reduce the demand for commercial
14 sex acts;

15 “(B) reduce the demand for participation
16 in international sex tourism by nationals of the
17 country; and

18 “(C) adopt educational measures to dis-
19 courage the demand that fosters severe forms of
20 trafficking in persons.”.

21 (b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendment made by
22 subsection (a) takes effect on the date of the enactment
23 of this Act and applies with respect to determinations
24 under subsection (a)(4) of section 108 of the Trafficking

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1 Victims Protection Act of 2000 that are made on or after
2 such date of enactment.



116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7954

To reauthorize the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Act of
1998.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 7, 2020

Mr. CHABOT (for himself and Mr. SHERMAN) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To reauthorize the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef
Conservation Act of 1998.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Tropical Forest and
5 Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.**

7 Section 806(d) of the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef
8 Conservation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 2431d(d)) is amend-
9 ed by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

10 “(9) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2021.

- 1 “(10) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
- 2 “(11) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
- 3 “(12) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.
- 4 “(13) \$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.”.

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 (Original Signature of Member)

116TH CONGRESS
 2D SESSION

H. R. _____

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. McCAUL, Ms. KAP-
 TUR, Mr. KINZINGER, and Mr. KEATING) introduced the following bill;
 which was referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Belarus Democracy,
 5 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
 8 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
 9 to read as follows:

1 **“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 “Congress finds the following:

3 “(1) The Government of Belarus, led by
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
5 pattern of clear and persistent violations of human
6 rights and fundamental freedoms.7 “(2) The Government of Belarus, led by
8 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
9 pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of basic
10 principles of democratic governance, including
11 through a series of fundamentally flawed presi-
12 dential and parliamentary elections undermining the
13 legitimacy of executive and legislative authority in
14 that country.15 “(3) The Government of Belarus, led by
16 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou-
17 sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace-
18 ful protesters to harassment, beatings, and imprison-
19 ment, particularly as a result of their attempts to
20 peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assem-
21 bly and association.22 “(4) The Government of Belarus, led by
23 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to suppress inde-
24 pendent media and journalists and to restrict access
25 to the internet, including social media and other dig-
26 ital communication platforms, in violation of the

1 right to freedom of speech and expression of those
2 dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr
3 Lukashenka.

4 “(5) The Government of Belarus, led by
5 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic
6 campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of
7 nongovernmental organizations, including inde-
8 pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a
9 climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil
10 society and social solidarity.

11 “(6) The Government of Belarus, led by
12 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un-
13 dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ-
14 ence by making Belarus’ political, economic, cul-
15 tural, and societal interests subservient to those of
16 Russia.

17 “(7) The Government of Belarus, led by
18 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to reduce the
19 independence of Belarus through integration into a
20 so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the control of
21 Russia.

22 “(8) On August 9, 2020, the Government of
23 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was
24 fraudulent and did not meet international standards.
25 There were serious irregularities with ballot counting

1 and the reporting of election results. The Govern-
2 ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas-
3 ures that impeded the work of local independent ob-
4 servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the
5 OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec-
6 tions, as is customary.

7 “(9) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
8 election, the Government of Belarus responded to
9 the peaceful opposition protests, which are the larg-
10 est in Belarus’ history, with a violent crackdown, in-
11 cluding, according to the United Nations Special
12 Rapporteur, the detention of more than 10,000
13 peaceful protestors as of September 18, 2020.

14 “(10) Thousands of employees at Belarusian
15 state-owned enterprises, who have been seen as
16 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s traditional base during his
17 26-year rule, went on strike across the country to
18 protest Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the
19 subsequent crackdowns, including at some of
20 Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck
21 plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk
22 Automobile Plant.

23 “(11) Women have served as the leading force
24 in demonstrations across the country, protesting the
25 police brutality and mass detentions by wearing

1 white, carrying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’,
2 and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest
3 demonstrators.

4 “(12) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
5 election, the Government of Belarus has sought to
6 stop the work of the Coordination Council, which
7 was formed by the leading opposition presidential
8 candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to facilitate a
9 peaceful transition of power by subjecting the Coun-
10 cil’s senior members to violence, detention, and
11 forced exile.

12 “(13) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
13 election, the Government of Belarus restricted the
14 free flow of information to silence the opposition and
15 to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace-
16 ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita-
17 tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets,
18 disrupting internet access, limiting access to social
19 media and other digital communication platforms,
20 and detaining and harassing countless journalists.

21 “(14) Before the European Parliament on Au-
22 gust 25, 2020, Tsikhanouskaya stressed that a
23 ‘peaceful revolution’ was underway in Belarus, and
24 that ‘It is neither a pro-Russian nor anti-Russian
25 revolution. It is neither an anti-European Union nor

1 a pro-European Union revolution. It is a democratic
2 revolution.’.

3 “(15) Against the will of the majority of the
4 Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin
5 has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime,
6 including by offering security assistance, providing
7 significant financial support, and sending Russian
8 propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime propa-
9 ganda on Belarus’ state television.

10 “(16) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
11 election, the United States, the European Union, the
12 United Kingdom, and Canada condemned the violent
13 crackdown on peaceful protestors, refused to accept
14 the results of the fraudulent election and called for
15 new free and fair elections under independent obser-
16 vation.

17 “(17) On September 8, 2020, Secretary of
18 State Michael R. Pompeo said, ‘The United States,
19 in coordination with our partners and Allies, is con-
20 sidering additional targeted sanctions to promote ac-
21 countability for those involved in human rights
22 abuses and repression in Belarus.’.

23 “(18) Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Sep-
24 tember 23, 2020, secret inauguration, the United
25 States, the European Union, numerous European

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1 Union member states, the United Kingdom, and
2 Canada announced they did not recognize him as the
3 legitimately elected leader of Belarus.”.

4 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

5 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
6 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
7 to read as follows:

8 **“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

9 “It is the policy of the United States to—

10 “(1) condemn the conduct of the August 9,
11 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi-
12 tion candidates, senior members of the Coordination
13 Council, peaceful protestors, employees from state-
14 owned enterprises participating in strikes, inde-
15 pendent election observers, and independent journal-
16 ists and bloggers;

17 “(2) continue to call for the immediate release
18 without preconditions of all political prisoners in
19 Belarus, including all those individuals detained in
20 connection with the August 9, 2020, presidential
21 election, a leading opposition figure Maryia
22 Kalesnikava, and United States citizen Vitali
23 Shkliarov;

1 “(3) continue to support the aspirations of the
2 people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and
3 the rule of law;

4 “(4) continue to support the aspirations of the
5 people of Belarus to exercise their religion freely, in-
6 cluding the head of the Catholic Church in Belarus
7 Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz who was barred
8 from entering the country after criticizing
9 Belarusian authorities;

10 “(5) continue to support actively the aspirations
11 of the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve
12 the independence and sovereignty of their country;

13 “(6) not to recognize any incorporation of
14 Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so-
15 called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab-
16 sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali-
17 tarian Soviet Union;

18 “(7) continue to reject the results of the fraud-
19 ulent August 9, 2020, presidential election in
20 Belarus, and to support calls for new presidential
21 and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner
22 that is free and fair according to OSCE standards
23 and under the supervision of OSCE observers and
24 independent domestic observers;

1 “(8) refuse to recognize Alyaksandr
2 Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of
3 Belarus;

4 “(9) continue to call for the fulfillment by the
5 Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely under-
6 taken obligations as an OSCE participating state
7 and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na-
8 tions;

9 “(10) support an OSCE role in mediating a
10 dialogue within Belarus between the government and
11 genuine representatives of Belarusian society;

12 “(11) recognize the Coordination Council as a
13 legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on
14 a peaceful transition of power;

15 “(12) urge an expanded United States diplo-
16 matic presence in Belarus to advocate for the aspira-
17 tions of the people of Belarus for democracy, human
18 rights, and the rule of law;

19 “(13) continue to work closely with the Euro-
20 pean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and
21 other countries and international organizations, to
22 promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law
23 and human rights in Belarus; and

24 “(14) remain open to reevaluating United
25 States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de-

1 monstrable progress made by the Government of
2 Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act as stat-
3 ed in this section.”.

4 **SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-**
5 **CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.**

6 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
7 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

8 (1) in the section heading to read as follows:

9 **“ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL**
10 **SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.”;**

11 (2) in subsection (a)—

12 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “Euro-
13 pean” and inserting “Trans-Atlantic”; and

14 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and
15 (3) as paragraphs (3) and 4, respectively; and

16 (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the
17 following:

18 “(2) To assist the people of Belarus in building
19 the sovereignty and independence of their country.”;

20 (3) in subsection (b)—

21 (A) by inserting “and Belarusian groups
22 outside of Belarus” after “indigenous
23 Belarusian groups”; and

24 (B) by inserting “and Belarusian sov-
25 ereignty” before the period at the end;

- 1 (4) in subsection (c)—
- 2 (A) by striking paragraph (8);
- 3 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3)
- 4 through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), re-
- 5 spectively;
- 6 (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
- 7 following:
- 8 “(3) countering internet censorship and repres-
- 9 sive surveillance technology that seek to limit free
- 10 association, control access to information, and pre-
- 11 vent citizens from exercising their rights to free
- 12 speech;”;
- 13 (D) in paragraph (8) (as redesignated), by
- 14 striking “and” at the end; and
- 15 (E) by adding at the end the following:
- 16 “(9) supporting the work of women advocating
- 17 freedom, human rights, and human progress;
- 18 “(10) supporting the development of Belarusian
- 19 language education;
- 20 “(11) enhancing the development of the private
- 21 sector, particularly the information technology sec-
- 22 tor, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including
- 23 by increasing the capacity of private sector actors,
- 24 developing business support organizations, offering

1 entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to
2 finance for small and medium enterprises;

3 “(12) supporting political refugees in neigh-
4 boring European countries fleeing the crackdown in
5 Belarus;

6 “(13) supporting the gathering of evidence on
7 and investigating of the human rights abuses in
8 Belarus;

9 “(14) supporting the public health response, in-
10 cluding filling the information void, in Belarus dur-
11 ing the COVID-19 pandemic; and

12 “(15) other activities consistent with the pur-
13 poses of this Act.”;

14 (5) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
15 section (g);

16 (6) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
17 lowing:

18 “(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that, in light of the political crisis in Belarus and
20 the unprecedented mobilization of the Belarusian people,
21 United States foreign assistance to Belarusian civil society
22 should be reevaluated and increased to carry out the pur-
23 poses described in subsection (a) and to include the activi-
24 ties described in subsection (c).

1 “(e) COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS.—
2 In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and
3 further the achievement of the purposes described in sub-
4 section (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordina-
5 tion with the European Union and its institutions, the gov-
6 ernments of countries that are members of the European
7 Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

8 “(f) REPORT ON ASSISTANCE.—Not later than one
9 year after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
10 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, the
11 Secretary of State, acting through the Office of the Coor-
12 dinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, and
13 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
14 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
15 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
16 the programs and activities carried out to achieve the pur-
17 poses described in subsection (a), including an assessment
18 of whether or not progress was made in achieving those
19 purposes.”; and

20 (7) in subsection (g) (as redesignated)—

21 (A) by striking “AUTHORIZATION OF AP-
22 PROPRIATIONS” and all that follows through
23 “‘There are’” and inserting “‘AUTHORIZATION OF
24 APPROPRIATIONS.—There are’”;

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1 (B) by striking “fiscal years 2007 and
2 2008” and inserting “fiscal years 2021 and
3 2022”; and

4 (C) by striking paragraph (2).

5 **SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
6 **DOM AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
7 **BELARUS.**

8 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
9 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
10 to read as follows:

11 **“SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
12 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
13 **BELARUS.**

14 “(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that—

16 “(1) the President should support and reallo-
17 cate resources to radio, television, and internet
18 broadcasting in languages spoken in Belarus by
19 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to the people of
20 Belarus;

21 “(2) the United States should also support
22 other independent media providing objective infor-
23 mation to the Belarusian people, particularly in the
24 Belarusian language;

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1 “(3) the President should provide the United
2 States Agency for Global Media with a surge capac-
3 ity (as such term is defined in section 316 of the
4 United States International Broadcasting Act (22
5 U.S.C. 6216)) for programs and activities in
6 Belarus;

7 “(4) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
8 States Agency for Global Media, working through
9 the Open Technology Fund and in coordination with
10 the Secretary of State, should expand and prioritize
11 efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and
12 services to journalists and civil society in Belarus in
13 order to enhance their ability to safely access or
14 share digital news and information without fear of
15 repercussions or surveillance; and

16 “(5) the United State should continue to con-
17 demn the Belarusian authorities’ crackdown on inde-
18 pendent media, including the harassment and mass
19 detentions of independent and foreign journalists
20 and the denial of accreditation.

21 “(b) STRATEGY TO PROMOTE EXPANDED BROAD-
22 CASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO INFOR-
23 MATION IN BELARUS.—

24 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
25 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-

1 moeracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
2 2020, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
3 States Agency for Global Media and the Secretary of
4 State shall jointly submit to the appropriate congres-
5 sional committees a comprehensive strategy, includ-
6 ing a cost estimate, to carry out the following:

7 “(A) Expand independent radio, television,
8 live stream, and social network broadcasting
9 and communications in Belarus to provide news
10 and information, particularly in the Belarusian
11 language, that is credible, comprehensive, and
12 accurate.

13 “(B) Support the development and use of
14 anti-censorship and circumvention technologies
15 by the Open Technology Fund and the Bureau
16 of Democracy Human Rights and Labor that
17 enable the citizens of Belarus to communicate
18 securely and undertake internet activities with-
19 out interference from the Government of
20 Belarus.

21 “(C) Assist efforts to overcome attempts
22 by the Government of Belarus to disrupt inter-
23 net access and block content online.

24 “(D) Monitor the cooperation of the Gov-
25 ernment of Belarus with any foreign govern-

1 ment or organization for purposes related to the
2 censorship or surveillance of the internet, in-
3 cluding an assessment of any such cooperation
4 in the preceding ten years.

5 “(E) Monitor the purchase or receipt by
6 the Government of Belarus of any technology or
7 training from any foreign government or orga-
8 nization for purposes related to the censorship
9 or surveillance of the internet, including an as-
10 sessment of any such purchase or receipt in the
11 preceding ten years.

12 “(F) Assist with the protection of journal-
13 ists who have been targeted for free speech ac-
14 tivities, including through the denial of accredi-
15 tation.

16 “(G) Provide cyber-attack mitigation serv-
17 ices to civil society organizations in Belarus.

18 “(H) Provide resources for educational ma-
19 terials and training on digital literacy, bypass-
20 ing internet censorship, digital safety, and in-
21 vestigative and analytical journalism for inde-
22 pendent journalists working in Belarus.

23 “(I) Build the capacity of civil society,
24 media, and other nongovernmental and organi-
25 zations to identify, track, and counter

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1 disinformation, including from proxies of the
2 Government of Russia working at Belarusian
3 state television.

4 “(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
5 (1) shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
6 may contain a classified annex.”.

7 **SEC. 6. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF**
8 **BELARUS.**

9 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
10 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

11 (1) in subsection (b)—

12 (A) by striking “December 19, 2010” each
13 place it appears and inserting “August 9,
14 2020”;

15 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting “,
16 peaceful protesters,” after “all opposition activ-
17 ists”; and

18 (C) by striking paragraphs (3) and (6) and
19 redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (7) as
20 paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively;

21 (2) in subsection (c)—

22 (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting
23 “AND RUSSIAN INDIVIDUALS COMPLICIT IN
24 THE CRACKDOWN THAT OCCURRED AFTER

1 THE AUGUST 9, 2020, ELECTION” after
2 “BELARUS”;

3 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and
4 (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively;

5 (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the
6 following:

7 “(4) is a member of the Central Election Com-
8 mission of Belarus or assisted the Commission in
9 manipulating the presidential election of August 9,
10 2020;”;

11 (D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated) to
12 read as follows:

13 “(5) is a member of any branch of the security
14 or law enforcement services of Belarus, including the
15 KGB, Interior Ministry and OMON special police
16 unit, and is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
17 controlling, materially assisting, sponsoring, or pro-
18 viding financial, material, or technological support
19 for, or otherwise directing, the crackdown on opposi-
20 tion leaders, journalists, and peaceful protestors that
21 occurred in connection with the presidential election
22 of August 9, 2020; or”; and

23 (E) by adding at the end the following:

24 “(7) is a government official, including at the
25 Information Ministry, responsible for the crackdown

1 on independent media, including revoking the ac-
2 creditation of journalists, disrupting internet access,
3 and restricting online content;

4 “(8) is an official in the so-called ‘Union State’
5 between Russia and Belarus (regardless of nation-
6 ality of the individual); or

7 “(9) is a Russian individual that has signifi-
8 cantly participated in the crackdown on independent
9 press or human rights abuses related to political re-
10 pression in Belarus, including the Russian
11 propogandists sent to replace local employees at
12 Belarusian state media outlets.”;

13 (3) in subsection (d)(1), by striking “the Over-
14 seas Private Investment Corporation” and inserting
15 “the United States International Development Fi-
16 nance Corporation”;

17 (4) in subsection (e), by striking “(including
18 any technical assistance or grant) of any kind”; and

19 (5) in subsection (f)—

20 (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “or
21 by any member or family member closely linked
22 to any member of the senior leadership of the
23 Government of Belarus” and inserting “or by
24 the senior leadership of the Government of
25 Belarus or by any member or family member

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1 closely linked to the senior leadership of the
2 Government of Belarus, or an official of the so-
3 called ‘Union State’ with Russia’; and

4 (B) in paragraph (2)—

5 (i) in subparagraph (A), by adding at
6 the end before the semicolon the following:

7 “, or an official of the so-called ‘Union
8 State’ with Russia’; and

9 (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting
10 “, or the so-called ‘Union State’ with Rus-
11 sia,” after “the Government of Belarus”.

12 **SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

13 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
14 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
15 to read as follows:

16 **“SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

17 “It is the sense of Congress that the President should
18 continue to coordinate with the European Union and its
19 institutions, European Union member states, the United
20 Kingdom, and Canada to develop a comprehensive, multi-
21 lateral strategy to—

22 “(1) further the purposes of this Act, including,
23 as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take
24 measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus

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1 that are similar to measures described in this Act;
2 and

3 “(2) deter the Government of Russia from un-
4 dermining democratic processes and institutions in
5 Belarus or threatening the independence, sov-
6 ereignty, and territorial integrity of Belarus.”.

7 **SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

8 Section 8 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
9 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
10 to read as follows:

11 **“SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

12 **“(a) REPORT ON THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND**
13 **INDEPENDENCE OF BELARUS.—**

14 **“(1) IN GENERAL.—**Not later than 120 days
15 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
16 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
17 2020, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
18 the Director of National Intelligence, shall transmit
19 to the appropriate congressional committees a report
20 on the threat the Government of Russia poses to the
21 sovereignty and independence of Belarus.

22 **“(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—**The report
23 required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(A) An assessment of how the Govern-
2 ment of Russia is exploiting the current polit-
3 ical crisis in Belarus to push for deeper political
4 and economic control of or integration with
5 Belarus.

6 “(B) A description of the economic and en-
7 ergy assets in Belarus that the Government of
8 Russia, including Russian state-owned or state-
9 controlled companies, controls.

10 “(C) A description of Belarus’ major en-
11 terprises that are vulnerable of being taken over
12 by Russian entities amid the country’s wors-
13 ening financial crisis.

14 “(D) A description of how and to what
15 ends the Government of Russia seeks to aug-
16 ment its military presence in Belarus.

17 “(E) A description of Russian influence
18 over the media and information space in
19 Belarus and how the Government of Russia
20 uses disinformation and other malign tech-
21 niques to undermine Belarusian history, cul-
22 ture, and language.

23 “(F) A description of other actors in
24 Belarus that the Government of Russia uses to

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1 advance its malign influence, including vet-
2 erans' organizations and extrajudicial networks.

3 “(G) A description of efforts to undermine
4 Belarusian language, cultural, and national
5 symbols, including the traditional red and white
6 flag and the ‘Pahonia’ mounted knight.

7 “(H) An identification of Russian individ-
8 uals and government agencies that are signifi-
9 cantly supporting or involved in the crackdown
10 on peaceful protestors and the opposition or the
11 repression of independent media following the
12 August 9, 2020, presidential election.

13 “(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
14 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
15 may contain a classified annex.

16 “(b) REPORT ON PERSONAL ASSETS OF
17 ALYAKSANDR LUKASHENKA.—

18 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
19 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
20 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
21 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
22 with the Secretary of State and the Director of Na-
23 tional Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
24 congressional committees a report on—

1 “(A) the total assets under the direct or
2 indirect control of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in-
3 cluding estimated assets and known sources of
4 income of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his im-
5 mediate family members, including assets, in-
6 vestments, bank accounts, and other business
7 interests; and

8 “(B) an identification of the most signifi-
9 cant senior foreign political figures in Belarus,
10 as determined by their closeness to Alyaksandr
11 Lukashenka.

12 “(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
13 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
14 may contain a classified annex.”.

15 **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

16 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
17 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

18 (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the
19 following:

20 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
21 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
22 mittees’ means—

23 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
24 the Committee on Financial Services, and the

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1 Committee on Appropriations of the House of
2 Representatives; and

3 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
4 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
5 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Approp-
6 riations of the Senate.”; and

7 (2) in paragraph (3)(B)—

8 (A) in clause (i), by inserting “members of
9 the security and intelligence services,” after
10 “prosecutors,”; and

11 (B) in clause (ii), by inserting “, electoral
12 fraud, online censorship, or restrictions on inde-
13 pendent media and journalists” after “public
14 corruption”.

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4507

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 26, 2019

Mr. CONNOLLY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
5 Dissidents Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and
9 Washington Post columnist, was killed and dis-

1 membered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Tur-
2 key on October 2, 2018, by agents with close ties to
3 the Government of Saudi Arabia.

4 (2) Khashoggi was a longtime resident of the
5 United States, living in Virginia under an “O” visa
6 and was in the process of applying for a permanent
7 residency. Two of his four children are United
8 States citizens.

9 (3) For many years, Khashoggi wrote on Saudi
10 political and cultural issues and after criticisms of
11 Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, Khashoggi
12 chose to reside in the United States due to his grow-
13 ing fear of arrest in Saudi Arabia. From a self-im-
14 posed exile, he wrote monthly columns in the Wash-
15 ington Post, including columns that criticized var-
16 ious Saudi policies.

17 (4) On October 2, 2018, Khashoggi visited the
18 Saudi consulate in Istanbul with his fiancée to con-
19 duct routine consular matters. She waited for him
20 for over ten hours outside the consulate, but he
21 never re-emerged. The Turkish authorities subse-
22 quently reported that Khashoggi was murdered in-
23 side the Saudi consulate.

24 (5) For over two weeks following the murder,
25 Saudi Arabia denied any knowledge of Khashoggi’s

1 whereabouts and claimed the allegations were
2 “false” and “baseless”. However, on October 20,
3 2018, state television in Saudi Arabia reported that
4 the journalist was murdered in a “rogue operation”
5 under the orders of intelligence officers.

6 (6) Though Saudi Arabia has detained 21 peo-
7 ple, dismissed two senior officials, and charged elev-
8 en people for Khashoggi’s murder, the Government
9 of Saudi Arabia has denied that Saudi leadership or-
10 dered the killing and has refused to extradite any
11 suspects to Turkey.

12 (7) To date the United States Government has
13 taken no actions to force an independent, inter-
14 national investigation of the killing of Jamal
15 Khashoggi nor shown any willingness to hold ac-
16 countable the highest levels of Saudi leadership.

17 **SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTI-**
18 **CLES AND SERVICES, ANY DESIGN AND CON-**
19 **STRUCTION SERVICES, AND ANY MAJOR DE-**
20 **FENSE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.**

21 (a) INITIAL PERIOD.—During the 120-day period be-
22 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the
23 President may not transfer, sell, or authorize a license for
24 export of any defense articles or services, any design and
25 construction services, or any major defense equipment

1 under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et
2 seq.), regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
3 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or law
4 enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Government
5 of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an agent of
6 or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality.

7 (b) SUBSEQUENT PERIODS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the 120-day period
9 beginning on the day after the end of the 120-day
10 period described in subsection (a), and every 120
11 days thereafter, the President may not transfer, sell,
12 or authorize a license for export of any defense arti-
13 cles or services, any design and construction serv-
14 ices, or any major defense equipment under the
15 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.),
16 regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
17 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or
18 law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the
19 Government of Saudi Arabia, or to any person act-
20 ing as an agent of or on behalf of such agency or
21 instrumentality, unless the President submits to the
22 chairman and ranking member of the appropriate
23 congressional committees a certification described in
24 paragraph (2) with respect to such 120-day period.

1 (2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described
2 in this paragraph is a certification that contains a
3 determination of the President that—

4 (A) the Government of Saudi Arabia is co-
5 operating with an independent, international in-
6 vestigation into the murder of Jamal
7 Khashoggi;

8 (B) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
9 released any individual who is a journalist,
10 blogger, human rights defender, advocate for
11 religious freedom, or civil society activist de-
12 tained by the Government of Saudi Arabia for
13 such individual's work;

14 (C) the Government of Saudi Arabia is re-
15 fraining from arresting, detaining, and
16 harassing individuals for blasphemy and apos-
17 tasy, and is protecting the equal rights of all
18 citizens to freedom of religion or belief;

19 (D) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
20 taken verifiable steps to end the torture of de-
21 tainees; and

22 (E) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
23 disbanded any units of its intelligence or secu-
24 rity apparatus dedicated to the forced repatri-

1 ation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other
2 countries.

3 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
4 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congress-
5 sional committees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
7 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
8 resentatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
10 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

11 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
12 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
13 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
14 **STATES.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

16 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
17 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses may
18 be issued to any country determined by the Presi-
19 dent to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
20 of intimidation or harassment directed against indi-
21 viduals in the United States.

22 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
23 further requires the President to report any such de-
24 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of
25 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs

1 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
2 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
3 Senate.

4 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
5 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
6 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
8 the Senate a report on whether any official of the Govern-
9 ment of Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of
10 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against Jamal
11 Khashoggi or any individual in the United States.

12 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
13 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
14 a classified annex.

15 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
16 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
17 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

18 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
20 the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
21 appropriate congressional committees a report covering
22 the three year period before such date regarding whether
23 and to what extent covered persons used diplomatic cre-
24 dentials or covered facilities to monitor, track, surveil, har-

1 ass, or harm other Saudi nationals living in the United
2 States.

3 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act and an-
6 nually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of
7 State shall, if the Secretary determines that such is
8 the case, submit to the appropriate congressional
9 committees a certification that covered persons are
10 not using diplomatic credentials or covered facilities
11 to monitor, track, surveil, harass, or harm Saudi na-
12 tionals living in the United States during the time
13 period covered by each such certification.

14 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
15 the Secretary of State does not submit a certifi-
16 cation under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall—

17 (A) close one or more covered facilities for
18 such period of time until the Secretary does
19 submit such a certification; and

20 (B) submit to the appropriate congres-
21 sional committee a report that contains—

22 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
23 Secretary is unable to make such a certifi-
24 cation; and

1 (ii) an identification of the locations
2 of the covered facilities referred to in sub-
3 paragraph (A).

4 (c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a)
5 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
7 a classified annex.

8 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
13 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
14 of the House of Representatives; and

15 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
16 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
17 Senate.

18 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
19 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
20 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

21 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
22 person” means a Saudi national credentialed to a
23 covered facility.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
2 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
4 Community Directive 191 provides that—

5 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
6 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
7 and specific information indicating an impending
8 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
9 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must
10 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
11 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

12 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
13 the threat information rises to the threshold of
14 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
15 favor of warning the intended victim.

16 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
17 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
18 telligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
19 committees a report with respect to—

20 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
21 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
22 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
23 munity Directive 191; and

24 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
25 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-

1 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
2 fulfill this duty.

3 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
4 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
5 a classified annex.

6 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
8 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
11 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
12 of the House of Representatives; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
15 Senate.

16 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
17 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
18 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
19 2015.

20 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
21 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
22 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
23 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

○

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
3 Dissidents Act of 2020”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident,
7 Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,
8 was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate
9 in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018, by at least
10 14 intelligence officers of the Government of Saudi
11 Arabia. Khashoggi was lured to the consulate under
12 the false cover of needing to address a consular mat-
13 ter. Following the killing, 17 officers from the Saudi
14 intelligence service, or Mabahith, reportedly visited
15 Istanbul and cleansed the crime scene.

16 (2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was
17 living in Virginia under an “O” visa and was in the
18 process of applying for a permanent residency.

1 (3) A subsequent, highly-credible investigation
2 by the United Nations concluded that Khashoggi's
3 killing was premeditated and that the mission was
4 endorsed, planned, and overseen by senior Saudi of-
5 ficials.

6 **SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTI-**
7 **CLES AND SERVICES, DESIGN AND CON-**
8 **STRUCTION SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE**
9 **EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 120
11 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
12 dent may not sell, authorize a license for the export of,
13 or otherwise transfer any defense articles or services, de-
14 sign and construction services, or major defense equip-
15 ment under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751
16 et seq.), regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
17 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or law
18 enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Government
19 of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an agent of
20 or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality, unless the
21 President has submitted to the chairman and ranking
22 member of the appropriate congressional committees a
23 certification described in subsection (b).

24 (b) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this
25 subsection is a certification that contains a determination

1 of the President that, during the 120-day period preceding
2 the date of submission of the certification, the Government
3 of Saudi Arabia has not conducted any activities through
4 its intelligence, internal security, or law enforcement agen-
5 cies or instrumentalities that constitute forced repatri-
6 ation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

7 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the restric-
8 tions in this section if the President determines and sub-
9 mits to the appropriate congressional committees written
10 notice and justification not later than 15 days before the
11 granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the na-
12 tional security interests of the United States.

13 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
14 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
15 gressional committees” means—

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
17 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
18 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives; and

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
21 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
22 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.

1 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
2 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
3 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
4 **STATES.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
7 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses or
8 other authorizations may be issued for the export of
9 goods or services to any country determined by the
10 President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of
11 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against
12 individuals in the United States.

13 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
14 further requires the President to report any such de-
15 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of
16 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
17 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
18 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
19 Senate.

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
22 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

23 (1) whether any official of the Government of
24 Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
25 of intimidation or harassment directed against

1 Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United
2 States; and

3 (2) whether any United States-origin defense
4 articles were used in the activities described in para-
5 graph (1).

6 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
7 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
8 a classified annex.

9 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
10 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
11 gressional committees” means—

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
13 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
14 House of Representatives; and

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
16 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

17 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
18 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
19 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

20 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
22 to the appropriate congressional committees a report cov-
23 ering the three-year period preceding such date of enact-
24 ment regarding whether and to what extent covered per-
25 sons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities

1 to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harass-
2 ment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
3 in the United States.

4 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
7 President shall, if the President determines that
8 such is the case, submit to the appropriate congress-
9 sional committees a certification that covered per-
10 sons are not using diplomatic credentials, visas, or
11 covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking,
12 surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other na-
13 tionals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States
14 during the time period covered by each such certifi-
15 cation.

16 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
17 the President does not submit a certification under
18 paragraph (1), the President shall—

19 (A) close one or more covered facilities for
20 such period of time until the President does
21 submit such a certification; and

22 (B) submit to the appropriate congress-
23 sional committee a report that contains—

1 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
2 President is unable to make such a certifi-
3 cation;

4 (ii) a list and summary of engage-
5 ments of the United States Government
6 with the Government of Saudi Arabia re-
7 garding the use of diplomatic credentials,
8 visas, or covered facilities described in
9 paragraph (1); and

10 (iii) a description of actions the
11 United States Government has taken or in-
12 tends to take in response to the use of dip-
13 lomatic credentials, visas, or covered facili-
14 ties described in paragraph (1).

15 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
16 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the restric-
20 tions in this section if the President determines and sub-
21 mits to the appropriate congressional committees written
22 notice and justification not later than 15 days before the
23 granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the na-
24 tional security interests of the United States.

25 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
5 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
6 of the House of Representatives; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
8 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 Senate.

10 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
11 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
12 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

13 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
14 person” means a national of Saudi Arabia
15 credentialed to a covered facility.

16 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
17 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
19 Community Directive 191 provides that—

20 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
21 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
22 and specific information indicating an impending
23 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
24 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must

1 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
2 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

3 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
4 the threat information rises to the threshold of
5 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
6 favor of warning the intended victim.

7 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
8 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
9 telligence, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
10 United States intelligence agencies, shall submit to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees a report with respect
12 to—

13 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
14 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
15 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
16 munity Directive 191; and

17 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
18 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-
19 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
20 fulfill this duty.

21 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
22 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
23 a classified annex.

24 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
5 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
6 of the House of Representatives; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
8 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 Senate.

10 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
11 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
12 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
13 2015.

14 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
15 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
16 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
17 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

18 (4) RELEVANT UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
19 AGENCY.—The term “relevant United States intel-
20 ligence agency” means any element of the intel-
21 ligence community that may have possessed intel-
22 ligence reporting regarding threats to Jamal
23 Khashoggi.



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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA**

Page 3, line 6, strike “silencing” and insert “intimidation”.

Page 3, after line 6, insert the following (and redesignate subsequent subsections accordingly):

- 1 (e) FORM.—The certification required by subsection
2 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may con-
3 tain a classified annex.



**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
3 Dissidents Act of 2020”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident,
7 Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,
8 was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate
9 in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018, by at least
10 14 intelligence officers of the Government of Saudi
11 Arabia. Khashoggi was lured to the consulate under
12 the false cover of needing to address a consular mat-
13 ter. Following the killing, 17 officers from the Saudi
14 intelligence service, or Mabahith, reportedly visited
15 Istanbul and cleansed the crime scene.

16 (2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was
17 living in Virginia under an “O” visa and was in the
18 process of applying for a permanent residency.

1 (3) A subsequent, highly-credible investigation
2 by the United Nations concluded that Khashoggi's
3 killing was premeditated and that the mission was
4 endorsed, planned, and overseen by senior Saudi of-
5 ficials.

6 **SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIO-**
7 **LATIONS AGAINST SAUDI DISSIDENTS**
8 **ABROAD.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
11 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a deter-
12 mination of whether, during the 120-day period preceding
13 the date of submission of the determination, the Govern-
14 ment of Saudi Arabia conducted any activities through its
15 intelligence, internal security, or law enforcement agencies
16 or instrumentalities that constitute forced repatriation, si-
17 lencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

18 (b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—If the President de-
19 termines that the Government of Saudi Arabia has con-
20 ducted any activities described in subsection (a), the Presi-
21 dent shall impose one or more of the sanctions described
22 in section 1263(b) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
23 Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) with respect to
24 one of more officials of the Government of Saudi Arabia

1 whom the President determines has engaged in such ac-
2 tivities.

3 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—

4 (1) TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEAD-
5 QUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under para-
6 graph (1) of section 1263(b) of the Global
7 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act shall
8 not apply with respect to a foreign person who is an
9 official of the Government of Saudi Arabia described
10 in subsection (b) if admitting or paroling the foreign
11 person into the United States is necessary to permit
12 the United States to comply with the Agreement re-
13 garding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
14 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
15 into force November 21, 1947, between the United
16 Nations and the United States, or other applicable
17 international obligations.

18 (2) TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.—
19 The following activities shall be exempt from sanc-
20 tions under this section:

21 (A) Activities subject to the reporting re-
22 quirements under title V of the National Secu-
23 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

24 (B) Any authorized intelligence or law en-
25 forcement activities of the United States.

1 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

2 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
3 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
4 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
5 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
6 this section and shall issue such regulations, li-
7 censes, and orders as are necessary to carry out this
8 section.

9 (2) PENALTIES.—Any person that violates, at-
10 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
11 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
12 order issued to carry out paragraph (1) shall be sub-
13 ject to the penalties provided for in subsections (b)
14 and (c) of section 206 of the International Emer-
15 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the
16 same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
17 act described in subsection (a) of that section.

18 (e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-
19 ment in subsection (b) if the President determines and
20 submits to the appropriate congressional committees writ-
21 ten notice and justification not later than 15 days before
22 the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the
23 national security interests of the United States.

1 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
5 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
6 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives; and

8 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
9 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
10 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.

11 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
12 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
13 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
14 **STATES.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

16 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
17 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses or
18 other authorizations may be issued for the export of
19 goods or services to any country determined by the
20 President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of
21 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against
22 individuals in the United States.

23 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
24 further requires the President to report any such de-
25 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of

1 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
2 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
3 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
4 Senate.

5 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
6 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
7 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

8 (1) whether any official of the Government of
9 Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
10 of intimidation or harassment directed against
11 Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United
12 States; and

13 (2) whether any United States-origin defense
14 articles were used in the activities described in para-
15 graph (1).

16 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
20 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
21 gressional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
24 House of Representatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

3 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
4 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
5 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

6 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
7 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
8 to the appropriate congressional committees a report cov-
9 ering the three-year period preceding such date of enact-
10 ment regarding whether and to what extent covered per-
11 sons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities
12 to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harass-
13 ment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
14 in the United States.

15 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
18 President shall, if the President determines that
19 such is the case, submit to the appropriate congress-
20 sional committees a certification that covered per-
21 sons are not using diplomatic credentials, visas, or
22 covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking,
23 surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other na-
24 tionals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States

1 during the time period covered by each such certifi-
2 cation.

3 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
4 the President does not submit a certification under
5 paragraph (1), the President shall—

6 (A) utilize existing authorities to respond
7 appropriately to the monitoring, tracking, sur-
8 veillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other
9 nationals of Saudi Arabia within the United
10 States; and

11 (B) submit to the appropriate congres-
12 sional committee a report that contains—

13 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
14 President is unable to make such a certifi-
15 cation;

16 (ii) a list and summary of engage-
17 ments of the United States Government
18 with the Government of Saudi Arabia re-
19 garding the use of diplomatic credentials,
20 visas, or covered facilities described in
21 paragraph (1); and

22 (iii) a description of actions the
23 United States Government has taken or in-
24 tends to take in response to the use of dip-

1 diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered faci-
2 ties described in paragraph (1).

3 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
4 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
5 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
6 a classified annex.

7 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-
8 ment in subsection (b) if the President determines and
9 submits to the appropriate congressional committees writ-
10 ten notice and justification not later than 15 days before
11 the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the
12 national security interests of the United States.

13 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
15 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
18 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
19 of the House of Representatives; and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
21 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 Senate.

23 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
24 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
25 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

1 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
2 person” means a national of Saudi Arabia
3 credentialed to a covered facility.

4 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
5 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
7 Community Directive 191 provides that—

8 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
9 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
10 and specific information indicating an impending
11 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
12 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must
13 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
14 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

15 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
16 the threat information rises to the threshold of
17 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
18 favor of warning the intended victim.

19 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
20 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
21 telligence, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
22 United States intelligence agencies, shall submit to the ap-
23 propriate congressional committees a report with respect
24 to—

1 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
2 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
3 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
4 munity Directive 191; and

5 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
6 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-
7 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
8 fulfill this duty.

9 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
10 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
11 a classified annex.

12 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

13 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
14 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
15 mittees” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
17 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
18 of the House of Representatives; and

19 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
20 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
21 Senate.

22 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
23 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
24 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
25 2015.

Mr. ENGEL. I recognize myself now to speak on the en bloc package. I support all these bipartisan measures and am grateful to all our members on both sides of the aisle for their hard work. The legislation we are considering covers a massive range of global concerns from Iran's persecution of religious minorities to the challenge posed by fentanyl and other synthetic drugs to cleaning up our oceans. I will mention a few in particular.

Let me start with a bill introduced by Mr. Meeks, Mr. Kinzinger, and others that would set a red line about our expectations of Russian behavior. More than 6 years after Russia was kicked out of the G8 for invading Ukraine, it has only grown bolder and more aggressive. This bill would prohibit any funding for Russian participation in the G7 or a reconstituted G8 unless Russia, among other things, stops its efforts to meddle in our elections—that is the U.S. elections—and ends its occupations of sovereign Ukrainian and Georgian territory. I strongly support this measure and hope all my colleagues will do the same.

Next, I will turn to the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act from Mr. Smith who has worked on these issues for years and years. This timely bill updates existing law to account for the most recent fraudulent elections and violent crackdowns by the Lukashenko regime. This bill would reauthorize assistance efforts, target offenders in the August Presidential election with sanctions, and help ensure we have a unified approach to Belarus with our partners and allies.

I am also proud to support these resolutions relating to Russia's aggressive and abusive behavior inside Russia and around the world. These condemn the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, underscore the absolutely rampant political imprisonments in Russia, and put the House on record saying that Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliates, individuals all closely linked to election interference efforts, pose a threat to the United States and allied security and interests. I am glad that we have so many bipartisan measures today dealing with the serious challenge that Russia poses.

We also have a resolution from Mr. LaHood and Ms. Shalala recognizing the importance of the friendship between the United States and Lebanon. And I am glad Mr. Deutch offered an amendment that recognizes the tragic explosion in Beirut that has left Lebanon in shambles. In the wake of this tragedy, the Lebanese people are demanding greater accountability from their government. I stand with them and I urge support for this measure.

Next, Mr. Green's resolution calls attention to the continued detention of American journalist Austin Tice and American doctor Majd Kamalmaz. They have been gone from their families for too long. Let me be clear, this resolution in no way seeks to legitimize the brutal Assad regime in Syria or their tactics of using American hostages as leverage. In fact, it is the opposite. Any regime that holds innocent civilians hostage for political purposes lacks any legitimacy whatsoever.

Let me thank Mr. Malinowski for this bill that would provide Hongkongers fleeing oppression from the Chinese Government the opportunity to participate in American society. With China's passage of a national security law to undermine Hong Kong's auton-

omy and put many Hongkongers in jeopardy, it is vital that we not close our doors to those who may seek refuge in our country.

I was glad to join as an original co-sponsor of Mr. Levin's resolution urging the Government of Burma to ensure a free, fair, inclusive, and credible election on November 8th. This is another chance for Burma to move toward a democratic society in which all citizens are equally protected and enfranchised. This resolution calls on social media companies to make sure their platforms are not used to spread disinformation or misinformation or hate speech, and that is happening in Burma, here in the United States, and everywhere else.

I am also glad to support Mr. Phillips' measure calling for a free, fair, transparent, and peaceful election in Cote d'Ivoire. There has been a history of violence surrounding political transitions in Cote d'Ivoire. This measure reaffirms the ties between our countries and underscores our support for the Ivoirian people if they stand up for peace and democracy.

We also have a resolution from Chairwoman Bass and Mr. Smith calling on African governments to promote human rights through internet freedom. Too often, we have seen governments use internet shutdowns as a way to stifle dissent, oftentimes of unrest or around elections. In Africa, this problem has gotten worse in recent years. This measure emphasizes the importance of open and secure internet access as a way to promote human rights and free speech.

I strongly support all the measures we are considering today and I urge all members to do the same. And I will now recognize our ranking member, my friend Mr. McCaul of Texas, for his remarks.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this markup. Today—over the last 21 months I have been proud to work with you on countless measures including those we will consider here today. I know this will not be my last opportunity, but I want to say thank you, Chairman Engel, for advancing so many important bipartisan measures and for your personal friendship.

And I know I speak for everyone here today when I say that you will be missed. I just hope the next Congress can work as bipartisan as this one has, because if we do not, we do not get anything done. That is the one thing I have learned in eight terms of Congress, if you do not work across the aisle effectively, it is really hard to get good things done for the American people and that is what the American people really want. And you have been a shining example of that, sir, and it has been an honor to serve with you.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

[Applause.]

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. MCCAUL. I would like to start by discussing an issue very close to my heart, an issue close to the heart of many Texans and Americans. Today, we are considering a resolution introduced by Mr. Conaway and myself, calling for the release of Trevor Reed, a Texan and former U.S. Marine, who is being held as a political prisoner in Russia.

Earlier this month, I was joined by Trevor's mother, Paula, when we introduced the resolution. She told me about her son, an Eagle Scout and former U.S. Marine who had served his country with dis-

tion. She told me how he was pursuing the American dream and that the Putin regime had taken that away from him when he sentenced Trevor to 9 years in a Russian labor camp on baseless charges.

Passing this resolution will show that we in the Congress are committing to standing with Trevor, Paula, and his entire family every day until we can finally bring Trevor home and give him back his future. This resolution will also send a strong message to the Putin regime that America will not stand idly by as Putin and his cronies hold U.S. citizens as political pawns.

I will also be offering an amendment today on a resolution calling for the release of Austin Tice and Majd Kamalmaz, two Texans who have been wrongfully detained in Syria for many, many years. I have met with Austin Tice's parents many times and have seen the pain in their eyes as they describe the 8 years they have spent trying to bring their son home while he sits in a Syrian prison in the worst conditions.

I want to thank the administration for doing everything they have done to bring home Trevor, Austin, Majd, and all the Americans detained abroad. Congress will not rest and I will not rest until they have been safely reunited with their families.

Today, we will be considering 28 measures, total. And while we, unfortunately, could not agree on all of them, even the bills where we disagree on the details, we agree on the problems we face. And while I cannot highlight all the good bills we will be considering, I want to thank some of my Republican colleagues for working on several bills for the markup. Specifically, Ms. Wagner for her work on the Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act; Mr. Chabot for his work on the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation and Reauthorization Act; and Mr. Smith for his work on reauthorizing the Belarus Democracy Act.

I am also pleased that we will be considering two bills I introduced with Chairman Engel, the PLASTICS Act and the American Values and Security in International Athletics Act. The Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International Cleaner Seas or PLASTICS Act would authorize the State Department and USAID to prioritize efforts to improve waste management systems and prevent and reduce plastic waste in developing countries.

Every year, eight million metric tons of plastic enter the oceans through the rivers. China contributes the largest share of this mismanaged waste, followed by other developing countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. This bill prioritizes U.S. leadership and supports partnerships with the private sector in order to support market-based solutions and leverage private capital. Our work to combat plastic waste is an investment in future generations and the health of our oceans and communities.

The American Values and Securities in International Athletics Act would direct the State Department to establish a briefing program for American athletic delegations on human rights and privacy concerns in certain countries. The Chinese Communist Party used the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics to whitewash its image and now is set to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. Ensuring Team USA is appropriately informed about human rights issues and in-

trusive surveillance will help prevent the CCP from using the Olympics to generate undeserved positive publicity.

The Chinese Communist Party is the greatest long-term national security threat to the interests of the United States of America. The American people have woken up to their malign influence, and yesterday Republicans released our policy blueprint to address their harmful behavior, two-thirds of which, Mr. Chairman, are bipartisan bills. And I look forward to working with my friends across the aisle to help address this generational challenge.

So with that, Chairman Engel, I again want to thank you for holding this markup and for your leadership and also your friendship. I ask unanimous consent, also, to enter into the record a statement by Mr. Conaway on the Trevor Reed resolution.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

Because of the hybrid, virtual format of this markup, I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans for the purpose of speaking on the en bloc package. If you miss your turn to speak on the en bloc, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally.

Does anyone wish to speak on the en bloc?

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for bringing forward an impressive group of bipartisan measures for the committee to consider, for working behind the scenes to make sure that those measures were bipartisan and that the committee will do a tremendous amount of work today. But I especially want to join the ranking member in praising you for your decades of service to this House and for your last 2 years of leadership of this committee.

I support all the measures that we are considering today. I have co-sponsored most of them. I particularly want to thank the chairman for bringing forward so many of my bills this Congress, and in particular H.Res.825 urging the United States to continue to be a leader on the Nonproliferation Treaty and the entire global nonproliferation regime.

This is the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, going into effect. Certainly, in the years after World War II, most political scientists and theorists would have thought we would have fought several nuclear wars by now. But, in fact, I believe the NPT has been the most important diplomatic accomplishment in our lifetimes. And while there are nine nuclear countries, without the NPT there would be scores of nuclear countries.

There are a number of pressing nonproliferation challenges today and U.S. leadership will continue to be indispensable. This resolution calls for the U.S. to continue leading on issues of nonproliferation, including encouraging full compliance, promoting universal adoption of the additional protocol, discouraging the unlawful spread of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies, preventing a withdrawal of additional States, maintaining global moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, and building toward a 2021 NPT Review Conference.

I have enjoyed working with Mr. Chabot and joining with him on the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act. This debt-for-nature program has been a critical tool to protect tropical rainforests and coral reefs. This will extend the program through 2025. Our climate crisis is real and this is part of a response to that crisis.

A number of us have thought that the full committee should focus more on Africa and we begin to do that today by considering four pieces of legislation, three from the chair of the African Subcommittee, and I commend Karen Bass for the three bills that she has brought forward today.

I also want to thank Dean Phillips for his important resolution addressing the upcoming election in Cote d'Ivoire, H.Res.1150. It is important for the government there to publicly commit itself to free, fair, peaceful, and transparent elections, elections which upon the conclusion will lead to the winner assuming peacefully the reins of government. I believe it is outside the jurisdiction of this committee to pass a resolution saying the same thing about the United States, but let me take this opportunity to say that fair, free, peaceful elections and peaceful transfers of power are to be admired everywhere in the world.

I want to commend Dina Titus for her work on H.Res.1100, affirming the strategic partnership with Mongolia, and Tom Malinowski for his important bill, the Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act. And we have heard from activists Nathan Law and Brian Leung testify about the crackdown in China's new security law. I believe this important measure along with my Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which was signed into law last month, is an appropriate response to China's violation of its commitments under the "one country, two systems" agreement.

Finally, I want to thank Andy Levin for H.Res.1121 urging the Government of Burma to hold fair, free, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections, and I would point out that this could be done only—it would fully be met only if the Rohingya people, whether they be in Burma/Myanmar or whether they be in refugee camps, be given a chance to participate.

So I thank the chairman for not only bringing these bipartisan bills forward, but for your work behind the scenes in designing a package of bills that have such universal support. I thank you for your service to this committee. I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. Mrs. Wagner.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership, for your service to this committee and to this Congress. We are grateful to you. I want to thank the ranking member too for all the work that he has done on all of our behalf to advance this bipartisan piece of legislation, so many of them at this markup, including my Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act and the Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, which I am proud to co-lead with Representative McGovern.

I introduced H.R. 4326, the Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act to improve U.S. efforts to end demand for trafficked persons worldwide, a key element in preventing human trafficking. The international community, NGO's, international organizations, and human trafficking experts agree that ending the scourge of mod-

ern-day slavery requires countries to prioritize reducing the demand for trafficked persons.

The United Nations and the European Union have established protocols and directives expressly addressing the need to prevent human trafficking by reducing demand that fosters exploitation. These protocols are founded in a body of research demonstrating the correlation between the adoption of policies that reduce or prohibit demand for commercial sex acts and advancements in the fight to end trafficking.

The United States is also committed to reducing the demand for victims of trafficking, and I have been proud to work with the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Office to ensure the annual TIP reports address a country's laws and policies around demand. The TIP reports have the power to encourage foreign countries to bolster their anti-trafficking measures and coordinate international work to end trafficking.

My bill requires the TIP Office to consider a country's work to reduce demand for commercial sex acts, discourage participation in sex tourism, and educate people on the exploitation involved in sex trafficking in its annual report and country tier rankings. I am gratified by the strong bipartisan support for this bill, and I thank in particular my co-lead, Representative Hakeem Jeffries, for his work to end demand for victims of trafficking. I also thank fantastic advocates like Exodus Cry, Shared Hope, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Rights4Girls, and the National Center on Sexual Exploitation for their efforts in advancing my bill and legislation.

I also urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6986, the Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, which will improve the United States' ability to prevent human rights violations connected to the pandemic and improve its response to the future of public health catastrophes. As countries around the world have sought to contain the virus and protect their citizens, some bad actors are using coronavirus response efforts as a pretext to chip away at the rights of their citizens, stifle protests, and limit the freedom of speech and of the press.

We must hold accountable the authoritarians who see COVID-19 as an opportunity to suppress dissent. The Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act directs the United States to use a robust toolkit including reporting foreign assistance programming and guidance to protect basic human rights during this time of uncertainty. I urge this committee to pass the Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act and the Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, and I again thank the chairman and ranking member for including these important bills in today's markup. I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Ms. Wagner. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me first join with what Ranking Member McCaul and Congressman Sherman said about your leadership and your service. You are a great New Yorker, and your service to our country has been magnificent. You are indeed a true patriot and an individual that understands the significance of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And your presence here and your—will be missed, but I will not allow our friendship to be

missed because we will stay close, and I look forward to that. But thank you for your years of service.

Let me first say thank you to Rep. Kinzinger and Rep. McCaul for your cooperation in supporting the passing of H.R. 8259. Here, again, is where we put aside differences to work together. H.R. 8259 prohibits the use of Federal funds to bring Russia back into the G7 before they end their occupations of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and stop interfering in elections here and across Europe, none of which will happen during the U.S. presidency of the G7 which ends on January 2021.

The G7 is organized on shared values, and unfortunately we do not share the same approach to freedom, rule of law, and democracy as Russia. Congress should not—Congress should be on the record on this position, which is identical to the position of our allies in the G7. The U.K., for example, said that unless Russia ceases its aggressive and destabilizing activity, U.K. “would not support the country’s readmission to the group.” The bill calls for reporting from the DNI on what the Administration knows about Russia incentivizing the harm and killing of American soldiers by the Taliban, and I am proud that we came together on this because we are one America.

I also want to strongly support H.Res.751 by Rep. Bass which reaffirms the partnership between the United States and the African Union. I commend her on her work which reaffirms that partnership, and we should all encourage Africa cooperation to address the largest socioeconomic and local problems of the continent. Whether it be climate change, water management, peace and security, or sustainable development, a multilateral approach will be needed to come up with lasting solutions.

Also I would like to voice my support for two pieces of legislation designed to make sure the State Department doubles down on its commitment to diversity and hiring in the workplace. So thank you again to Rep. Bass and Rep. Castro for those efforts on H.R. 7673 and 8409 which address entry in mid-level positions. A diplomatic corps that reflects the diversity of this country is better placed to represent and espouse our values abroad. These are piecemeal but important steps in addressing forms of discrimination in hiring practices and at the workplace at State. I look forward to continuing our work on these issues.

Resolution 1145 which condemns the poisoning of Alexai Navalny, who only recently was able to leave the hospital bed in Germany, the poisoning of one of Putin’s fearless critics using a powerful nerve agent is more than deeply concerning as was said by Secretary Pompeo. It underscores the reason why we cannot welcome today’s Russian leadership into the G7 grouping.

And last, H.R. 8438, I speak up, which was Rep. Smith and Kaptur, and I want to speak up in support of the reauthorization of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. With a deep commitment to preserving and strengthening liberty and democracy and human rights in Europe, the international community has condemned Belarus’ August 9th Presidential election as illegitimate. In response, the Belarusian people took to the streets demanding dignity and an election that reflects the will of the people.

More to come, and I look forward to continuing to shine a light on the brave people in the streets of Belarus and compliment Congressmen Smith and Kaptur. With that I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all join my colleague Michael McCaul and others in thanking you for your extraordinary leadership as chairman. You and I have worked on so many issues from Northern Ireland to Kosovo, so many places in the world that have been hard-pressed with human rights abuses, and I just want to thank you for that friendship, your bipartisanship. You have been a class act, and we will miss you deeply. So thank you, Chairman Engel, for your leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you as well for bringing the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, and thank you to Ranking Member McCaul for his leadership on this, and Chairman Keating and Mr. Kinzinger for their leadership as well, and Marcy Kaptur who is also one of the co-sponsors, originals, of this bill.

Belarus is perhaps the Nation most mired in its Soviet past, with an inefficient economy and a strongman autocrat in charge for over two and a half decades. Yet the irrepressible spirit of freedom stirred among the people of Belarus and when a patently false election result was announced on August 9th declaring Alexander Lukashenko the winner, the people took to the streets. Now the world continues to recognize what the people of Belarus have been saying loud and clear for over two and a half decades, but especially since August 9th with their massive rallies that the recent election was so fraudulent and lacked no credibility with anybody except Lukashenko and perhaps Russia.

I was reading over a hearing last night that I had chaired 10 years ago after another fraudulent election with Alexander Lukashenko, and he resorted to the same tactics but on a smaller scale. There weren't as many people out in the streets, but he just busted heads, tortured people, threw them in prison, and his bul- lies had their way with women and sexually abused them. Horrible stuff. The problem then was that the international community was strong at first, and then that fervor began to dissipate and busi- ness as usual began to reemerge.

We are now approaching almost 2 months since the fraudulent poll, and the people of Belarus, despite the brutal crackdown, are still organizing rallies of 100,000 people or more demanding that Lukashenko leave power and leave Belarus to the people to whom it belongs. I would note to my colleagues that according to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, more than 10,000 peaceful protestors have been detained as of September 18th, and they need our help. Re- cent reports indicate that the police are using now, today, increas- ingly violent tactics against these peaceful demonstrators.

We do have a window of opportunity, and we need to seize it with everything that we have. As my colleagues know, the leading opposition Presidential candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who won the election by most accounts—of course, there is not access to the ballots, but it seems clear that she won the election—formed

the Coordination Council. Sviatlana is an incredibly brave woman. She ran a brilliant campaign, but today she is in exile in Lithuania where she continues to rally the Belarusian people and the world.

I want to thank Mr. Keating for putting together that Webex of a few weeks ago with her and some of the coordination leaders from the Council. We all saw anew and afresh just how important it is that we stand behind her and behind all of the people of Belarus who have aspirations for free and fair elections and for democracy.

This bill today updates the Belarus Democracy Acts of 2004, 2006, and 2011 that I authored and renews the personal economic sanctions on an expanded list of bad actors in the Belarusian Government and—this is new—Russian individuals complicit in the crackdown. It calls for new elections. It recognizes the Coordination Council as a legitimate institution to participate in a dialog on a peaceful transition of power.

It calls for the release of all political prisoners. It supports the aspirations of the people of Belarus to exercise their religious freedom. It authorizes assistance to promote democracy and civil society in Belarus. It unequivocally states that it is the policy of the United States “not to recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a union State with Russia.” It requires a U.S. strategy to promote broadcasting, internet freedom, and access to information.

It requires a report on the personal assets of Alexander Lukashenko. We know he has acquired wealth. We need to know how much it is, and the people of his country who have been repressed by him for so long need to know what a kleptocrat he has been. In addition, it also gives much-needed support to the Belarusian media and the IT sector.

So I just want to thank my colleagues. It is a totally bipartisan bill. I want to thank Katie Earle for her work on the bill. I want to thank Jackie Ramos, Pierre Totsi, Patrick to Doug Anderson. There are just many who have worked together fast, quickly, and effectively, and members, to put together this bipartisan legislation. We need to stand in solidarity with the great people of Belarus.

And I yield back and I thank my good friend for recognizing.

Mr. ENGEL. Well thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith, and thank you for those kind words. And of course, I thank everyone for those kind words, people who spoke before.

Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Hello, Mr. Chairman. I want to say kind words about you also. I want to thank you for your friendship. I want to thank you for always being there for me, working with me, letting me be part of the committee and always being very helpful to me on issues that are important to me. So I thank you, and I wish you nothing but the best.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. SIRES. I want to speak briefly about H.R. 8259 which would prohibit Russian participation in the G7. I would also like to thank my colleague, Congressman Meeks, for introducing this important legislation. Last year, this committee and the House of Representatives passed the bipartisan resolution I sponsored that would disapprove Russia's future inclusion in G7 summits until it respects

the territorial integrity of its neighbors and adheres to the standards of democratic societies.

In the months since my resolution was passed, Russia has not stopped its aggressive behavior and continues to undermine democratic institutions around the world. This legislation builds on the House's disapproval of Russian inclusion in the G7, and it makes it clear that the United States does not accept Russia's blatant effort to influence elections.

Protecting the integrity of our electoral system should be a bipartisan priority, and we must show that there are consequences for foreign interferences. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Sires. Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I get into the bills, I too would like to say some nice things about you and they are very heartfelt. I have been on this committee for 24 years now. You have been here a little longer than that, but you have been an inspiration to a lot of us. We do not agree on everything obviously, we are different parties, but you have always treated us with the utmost respect in the majority as you are now and when you were in the minority as well.

You were able to accomplish great things because of the person you are. You literally are one of the nicest people in this institution on either side, and that goes a long way I think. You know, you are just a very kind and decent person, and it matters to a lot of us and it lets us get things done. And you have accomplished great things, you really have.

You could probably move to Albania and become the leader of that nation. So and there may be other countries around the globe where that is the case. Kosovo, absolutely. So I would encourage you perhaps to consider that, but you deserve a rest after what you have been put through over the years, especially over the last year. But thank you so much for that. Thank you for working with us, both in the majority and the minority.

That is one of the great things about this committee. We tend to work together. I am the ranking member of the Small Business Committee. That is another committee we actually have a very good working—Nydia Velazquez and I work together closely. You know, some committees it is better than others, but just thanks for everything you have done for our country and the world really, you know, thanks for being who you are.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. I appreciate it very much. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. I do not know if I have any time to talk about the bills now, but I am going to try. We have quite a few good bills in the en bloc package, 26 might be a record.

First, I would like to focus on my bill, quickly, here, the H.R. 7954, the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020. It is bipartisan legislation that I introduced along with my friend, Mr. Sherman, who is a really nice guy too. Not as nice as Mr. Engel, but pretty damn—pretty nice.

And earlier this summer, we introduced, it is a companion bill to legislation led by Senator Portman in the Senate. Some of the most endangered and biologically diverse tropical forests and coral

reefs are in developing countries, and it is in the interests of the whole world to protect and responsibly manage these resources so that they are there for our children and our grandchildren.

Today's legislation simply extends the act that set up a debt forgiveness program under which developing nations can have debt they owe the United States forgiven in exchange—and I want to emphasize “in exchange”—for investing in local conservation work to sustain their critical ecosystems. Agreements under this program not only support conservation, but also strengthen local economies and responsibly use these resources as well as civil society groups and partner nations that conduct conservation work.

Essentially the program follows the old adage of teaching a man to fish by helping developing countries learn how to better manage their natural resources. Further, many developing countries are no doubt considering Chinese investment. This program gives the State Department one more tool as it tries to counter Chinese investment and its often nefarious consequences.

I would next like to briefly turn to three resolutions quickly that I am also co-sponsoring. H.Res.1121 calls for free, fair, and inclusive elections in Burma. And I want to thank Mr. Levin for asking me to be the lead Republican on this measure. Due to its civil war and ethnic divisions, Burma has a long way to go to consolidate its fledgling democracy. Holding a credible election that includes all ethnic groups as well as those like the Rohingya who have fled the country is a critical step toward that goal.

Second, we have H.Res.1077 which reaffirms our support for the U.S.-Lebanon relationship. Lebanon is suffering right now after the horrific explosion in Beirut this summer and under terrible economic conditions brought on by the chronic mismanagement of the country by leadership that is beholden to Hezbollah. We need to continue to support the Lebanese people and help to see them through these tough times.

And finally H.Res.823 which condemns the Iranian Government's persecution of the Baha'i minority. The Baha'i faith espouses the virtues of peace and unity, cooperation, service and education, and an end to prejudice. The Iranian people therefore have nothing to fear from the Baha'i, and the Iranian Government's hatred of the Baha'i shows their true colors. I am pleased to support this legislation.

So with these considerations in mind, I would urge my colleagues to support the en bloc package, and I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Chabot, and thank you again for those kind words. They are very much appreciated. Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, of course, you are not leaving us yet, but thank you for such a long and distinguished career and for the spirit in which you have managed this committee both as the ranking member and as now the chairman, in empowering members and seeing that their substantive work comes to fruition. And that is not an easy job. I look around this room and I see the portraits of past chairs and I have known every one of them going back to Clem Zablocki who is over there. And I hope it makes your heart full to be in that distinguished com-

pany. And as somebody once said, losing, like winning, is a passing phenomenon in politics, so be comforted. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to be brief. Thank you for bringing all of these, you and Mr. McCaul, for bringing the en bloc bills before us. We cover a lot of waterfront. I particularly want to commend the H.R. 1012, Ami Bera's bill, on recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. We had one colleague left who served in the Korean War, Charlie Rangel, and, you know, this relationship has come a long way and Korea has gone from being an absolutely bottom of the pile poor country to being a star among Asian tigers and a lot of that has to do with this alliance and this relationship.

I also want to commend Mr. Yoho for H.Res.697 on Tibet. I led the first congressional staff delegation to Tibet in 1986 and saw firsthand some of the ravages of the Cultural Revolution and other depredations inflicted on the Tibetan culture and people, especially in the exercise of their worship in Tibet, at the hands of the Chinese. I also had the privilege of meeting with His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India, where he is living, last year, and was really struck with the spirit of peaceful reconciliation with which he still tries to approach his Chinese adversaries, and it is very admirable.

I also want to thank you for bringing up H.R. 8489, the Department of State's Student Internship Program, because internships in the Federal Government are spotty. They are not systematic and they are not well-used for recruitment of new employees like the private sector. So I think this bill helps move at least the State Department in that direction and I know that my assignment in my other committee, we are going to continue to pursue that.

Finally, I want to thank Mr. Meeks for his leadership on making sure that Russia is not invited to any G7 meeting until we see Russia's behavior significantly improve and that they, as Mr. Chabot and I have said year in and year out, and until they leave Crimea. That is an illegal annexation and we are not going to recognize it.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of my colleagues for a set of really very useful bills that are going to move forward our foreign policy agenda and I wish you well. With that I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Conolly.

Now my traveling partner to North Korea, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Eliot Engel and lead Republican Michael McCaul, for calling this markup today. There are many measures before us today due to the dedicated bipartisan leadership of Chairman Eliot Engel who my family, particularly led by my wife Roxanne, knows as a Statesman. And, indeed, I appreciate you raising that, that you and I are the only two Members of Congress who have been to Pyongyang, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

And that is why the first resolution I mention is so significant, the 70th anniversary, and to see the contrast of North Korea to South Korea. There could not be a greater contrast of the difference between freedom and democracy and totalitarian existence in the Korean Peninsula. So again, congratulations on your success.

First, I would like to thank the committee for bringing House Resolution 1012 recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War and the transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial global partnership. Based on our mutual sacrifices, the United States and South Korea have laid a foundation of freedom, democracy, and extraordinary economic prosperity. I am grateful to serve as co-chair of the congressional Korea Caucus and encourage my colleagues to support this important measure.

I am also grateful for Chairman Engel's leadership on the two resolutions dealing with Putin, House Resolution 958 and House Resolution 996. By making these two resolutions today, the committee is shedding much needed light on the growing crisis with political prisoners in Putin's Russia as well as the malign proxy wars in Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and beyond.

I would also like to commend the chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, Ted Deutch, for his leadership on human rights in Iran with House Resolution 823 condemning Iran's State-sponsored persecution of the Baha'i minority. I was grateful to serve as the Republican lead for this resolution and I hope today's meeting will highlight Iran's long history of violations to the international covenants on human rights. We in Congress will never cease to advocate for the liberty of the freedom-loving and deserving people of Iran who have been hijacked and oppressed by the terrorist regime in Tehran.

Last, I would like to comment on House Resolution 17 regarding the illegally detained Austin Tice. We as the U.S. Congress always will support efforts to free Americans held abroad by terrorist groups and rogue regimes. But I am concerned that this approach here today of publicly endorsing engagement with Assad, a mass murderer and war criminal, is misguided. Assad has presided over the genocide of his own people by gassing his people, and he has butchered innocent Syrians and holding thousands as we speak today. We should never take a public stance of legitimizing such a regime.

Now this bill is just a resolution, but I want to make it clear to the Assad regime today that the U.S. Congress will never legitimize you. We will never give you diplomatic recognition. And we will always call for you to be held accountable for the atrocities committed and continue to commit against humanity and your citizens.

Chairman Engel, in your landmark Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act, you have made clear that sanctions relief for the Syrian regime should not be on the table until all political prisoners in Syria are free. I wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment. I hope that all members of this committee will stand to ensure that it is indeed what happens.

My amendment today reiterates the Caesar bill's call to the criminal Assad regime to release all political prisoners and allow international human rights organizations access to the prisons. Thank you, Chairman and Republican leader, for including the amendment today. With that I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, for those kind words.

Ms. Bass.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul, for bringing these important bills to the committee today. And you know, of course, Mr. Chairman, I have to join in with all of my other colleagues in thanking you for your service. And I know this is not our last meeting, but I look forward to celebrating your leadership in future meetings. I know that there is still a few more months for you to serve, but I have really enjoyed your friendship, your openness and your leadership, and your bipartisan way that you have run this committee.

I would like to speak in favor of H.Res.751, 768, 7673, 1150, and 8409. I will begin with our need to reaffirm our support to the African Union as proposed in H.R. 751 that I am doing in conjunction with Ranking Member Chris Smith. This bill recognizes the important role of the African Union and expresses bipartisan support for the AU so that this institution can take the lead in diplomacy, security, health, and trade across Africa. I also look forward to, in the future, looking to other ways that we can strengthen the African Union and our relationship with the AU.

I now turn to H.Res.768, which I am also doing with Ranking Member Smith, which calls on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa. Some African governments suppress internet freedoms and digital integration by blocking internet sites, censorship of content, onerous licensing requirements, and illicit monitoring and surveillance.

Information and freedom of expression are pillars of an open, free, and democratic society, and this bill encourages governments to actively pursue laws and policies that protect and promote human rights online and offline. The bill also highlights how China and Russia's digital activity across Africa exposes individuals to greater monitoring, surveillance and disinformation, and encourages countries and technology companies to resist contracts with authoritarian States like China and work closely with technology companies and social media services to prevent or take down disinformation by Russia and other actors.

Additionally, I encourage you to support Mr. Phillips' bill, H.Res.1150, to encourage the Government of Cote d'Ivoire, the opposition, and its citizens to respect democratic principles and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections.

I also urge you to support H.R. 8409, the Department of State Student Internship Program. The State Department currently offers paid and unpaid internships through the academic year and over the summer. Unpaid internships, however, limit the pool of candidates to those who have the financial means to participate. The bill authorizes the Department to pay all participants in its Student Internship Program as well as provide housing and travel assistance under certain circumstances.

The bill makes it possible for students from all parts of the country, all socioeconomic levels, and all backgrounds to participate in internship programs, thereby diversifying our Foreign Service and national security work force. I urge you to support this bill and all the other bills en bloc. And I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Bass.

Mr. Yoho.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I too stand with everybody else and ditto what everybody else says. You have been a great friend and New York is going to lose a great representative.

Today, I rise in support of H.Res.697, a bill I introduced 1 year ago to recognize the work of the Dalai Lama who has done much to promote peace and understanding and to further strengthen U.S.-Tibet relationships. As many of you know, the people of Tibet have faced harsh and oppressive treatment at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party in the Tibet Autonomous Region since 1959 when the Dalai Lama had to flee for his life. Most recently, reports have emerged that the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, is also building forced labor camps and reeducation centers in Tibet, similar to the ones found across Xinjiang where the Uyghurs and other ethnic populations like the East Turkestans, are subject to brainwashing, slave labor, torture, rape, and even death.

And if you think about brainwashing, basically, it is renouncing one's beliefs through intimidation. It is changing the way people look at their politics and forces them to change their personal attire or how they dress, how they talk. It changes how you educate your children and one's personal religious beliefs, a right in this country our Founding Fathers felt so strongly about they put it in our First Amendment.

We must not let the fate of the Tibetan people mirror that of the people of Xinjiang. Congress stands united here today in support of the Tibet struggle for autonomy, freedom, and religious freedom while the Chinese Communist Party works to destroy over an estimated two-thirds of its people's temples and mosques to cancel or erase their existence.

Although I do not wholly support all the pieces of legislation in this en bloc amendment process and the markup, I am reminded of the great British philosopher, Sir Mick Jagger, who says you cannot always get what you want, but if you try real hard you get what you need. And so I support this and am proud to do that. Thank you and I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.

Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank for holding this markup today. I want to thank you personally on our work we have done together, sometimes abroad, having fun exchanging good humor and good work around the world, and I want to thank you for your decades of leadership and commitment here in Congress where you have worked so hard to preserve democracy here at home and advance it significantly throughout the world. You have definitely made your mark.

Now I wanted to take up a number of measures that we are dealing with today that affect the region that we have addressed in our Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment including improving sustainability of energy diversification, Russian malign activities, and upholding democracy. Most of the bills I have co-sponsored. Many of them I have been an original sponsor of including the PLASTICS Act. I represent what is considered the largest coastal district in the House and my constituents know that the ocean health is vital to our community and our interconnected

ecosystems, and marine debris must be addressed both at home and abroad. Also included is H.Res.672 which supports energy independence and the Three Seas Initiative for which the U.S. support is critical.

Several bills today also focus on those imprisoned, poisoned, or killed supporting democracy and speaking out against authoritarianism. One condemns political prisoners in Russia. One condemns the recent poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexai Navalny. And still another stands alongside political dissidents like the murdered Jamal Khashoggi.

We also have under consideration today, resolutions expressing our concern for ongoing detention of Austin Tice and Trevor Reed. Also included is Paul Whelan, who is the brother of one of my constituents, and a recent 16-year prison sentence he received is just one example of the harsh punishment given to those unjustly imprisoned in Russia.

And I also am an original co-sponsor of additional efforts to stand up against Putin and authoritarian leaders in the region. H.R. 8259 prohibits Russia's participation in the G7 until it ends its illegal occupation of its neighbors and financing murder abroad, including American troops. And H.Res.996 condemns the malign activities of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, including attempts to sow discourse in the U.S. and allied countries. And we have addressed these critical issues in multiple hearings in my subcommittee and it is important we take up these measures today.

I want to thank Representative Smith for his work, the committee chair, the ranking member, and my ranking member Representative Kinzinger as well as Congressman Kaptur, whose work on the committee even though she is not a member is always present. That bill reauthorizes the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, and in light of the illegitimate August 19th elections and the brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators across Belarus is extremely important.

We recently had a briefing, an international briefing, with opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and we also held a hearing on the situation there and on further erosion of democratic norms in the region during this pandemic, which is why I am so glad to join colleagues as a co-sponsor of 6986, the Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act, because democratic backsliding is occurring around the world related to this pandemic and it is important that we stand up for democratic ideals and institutions here and abroad.

There are many important issues under consideration including the work I joined with Representative Trone on with the FENTANYL Results Act. That is a scourge that is killing too many Americans today and this is an effort to deal with that on an international basis. So I want to congratulate the chair again, continue looking forward to working with you the rest of this year, and hopefully as friends beyond that. And with that I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Keating.

Mr. Kinzinger.

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And at the behest of reiterating reiterations, I want to say to you how much I have enjoyed our friendship and working with you. I have often

tried to jealously guard the, you know, water's edge theory when it comes to foreign policy, and I know you have too. And your service to this country, to this committee will never be forgotten and I know you are going to continue to do great things. So I just want to say thank you for that, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the markup today.

I support many of the bills before us and I would like to take some time to focus on four of my bipartisan measures. I introduced H.Res.672 with Representative Kaptur to express Congress's support for the Three Seas Initiative. This important collaboration between Eastern European countries will help to strengthen their regional interconnectivity with the hopes of pushing back on Russia's use of energy as a weapon.

Representative Kaptur and I introduced this legislation last year to show our allies that we stand with them in their push to diversify and protect their energy sources. That is why I am proud to see this ambitious project has received bipartisan support, transatlantic support, and overwhelming support from the administration and the secretary, Secretary Pompeo.

Earlier this year, Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States was providing one billion in financing for the Three Seas Initiative, which further demonstrates our commitment to the transatlantic partnership. I commend the Three Seas partner States, the State Department, and Congress for their support. I also want to thank my chairman on the committee, Chairman Keating, for that.

Next, I would like to talk about H.R. 8259, legislation I introduced with Representative Meeks to bar Russia from joining the G7 until the Kremlin changes their ways. We have seen Vladimir Putin invade allies, interfere in democratic elections, support genocide in Syria, and attempt to destabilize the Middle East.

It is clear that Vladimir Putin believes these actions make him look strong. In reality, all they have led to is crippling sanctions from the United States and the EU, a drop in his popularity among Russian voters, and an economy that could contract by almost 10 percent this year. Until our diplomatic and intelligence community can ensure us that the Kremlin is no longer working to undermine and stifle freedom around the world, they should not have a seat at the grownup table. Vladimir Putin is the reason his country is being held back; the Russian people deserve better.

And, quickly, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act. It became clear as the peaceful protests unraveled in Hong Kong that the Chinese Communist Party would stop at nothing to maintain their grip on power. This bipartisan legislation which I introduced with Representative Malinowski would provide those Hongkongers most in need of protection safe passage to the United States.

And, finally, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 8438 which would reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. Following the fraudulent elections in Belarus, I had hoped the Lukashenko would hear the calls from his people and resign peacefully. Unfortunately, he doubled down and with the backing from Vladimir Putin was sworn in as President during a secret ceremony last week.

While there remains hope that Lukashenko will step down, we must act to protect the freedoms of the Belarusian people. By reauthorizing the Belarus Democracy Act we will be providing much needed assistance to the Belarusian people to counter internet censorship while sanctioning those responsible for the fraudulent election and ensuing crackdown.

I am proud to support this bipartisan legislation and I thank the committee for their hard work. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger. Appreciate the words. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Cicilline.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would like to begin by thanking you for your extraordinary leadership of this committee, your wonderful friendship, and your decades of ensuring that American foreign policy reflect our values, and for that I am in your debt, as the entire nation is. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this markup today as we consider important legislation that will protect human rights as we battle COVID, hold Russia accountable for its nefarious behavior on the world stage, and support Belarusian fighting hard for democracy.

I am proud to support and co-sponsor each of these bills and would like to speak about three in particular.

We are seeing the impact of Russia's malign behavior everywhere. They have meddled in the 2016 Presidential election and U.S. intelligence agencies report that they are actively engaged in promoting chaos as we go into the 2020 Presidential elections.

Around the world Vladimir Putin is continuing his long history of sowing discord, wreaking havoc, and turning citizens against each other to increase his power and destabilize the Western world.

The United States has an important role in promoting democracy around the world and standing firm and unwavering in our support of international law and against foreign aggression.

H.R. 8259, to prohibit Russian participation in the G-7, offered by our colleague, Gregory Meeks, is this House's response to Russia's continued flouting of international law in their attempt to create chaos across the globe.

Their attempted annexation of Crimea, occupation of South Ossetia, and denying citizens of these regions the same rights and freedoms that other people enjoy cannot be ignored.

As if invading other countries was not enough, Russia has had the audacity to pay Taliban-linked militants to attack U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Russian bounties on U.S. soldiers are an absolute outrage.

At every turn, sadly, this administration has fawned over the President Putin. On the campaign trail repeatedly complimenting him, in 2016 denying that Russia meddled in the election, in 2017 when Bill O'Reilly said Putin is a killer, the president responded, "There are a lot of killers. Do you think our country is so innocent?"

And in 2018 at the Helsinki Summit, the president, incredibly, sided with Putin over his own intelligence community about Russian interference with the election.

The time of the United States allowing Russia to run roughshod over international law and undermining the national security interests of the United States must end. We must stop their effort to confuse, terrorize, and oppress American voters and people in their own region.

I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 8259.

I would also like to express my support for Congressman Smith's bill, H.R. 8438 to reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

Progress toward democracy comes with the efforts of citizens willing to fight for it over time, sometimes over generations. The people of Belarus are well aware of that fact and have been advocating for and fighting for democracy for years.

They have been risking their lives to advance the cause of freedom and democracy, recently facing Lukashenko government's violent crackdown after the fraudulent election in August.

This bill would address that crackdown by reauthorizing previous assistance measures to counter internet censorship and surveillance and support the work of those advocating for democracy and human rights.

When leaders break the law to preserve their own power and lash out and violently attack their own citizens, we must act. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 8438 to reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

Finally, I would like to thank Chairman McGovern for introducing H.R. 6986, the Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act. Authoritarian leaders are using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse for greater crackdowns, more surveillance, and the targeting of opposition.

Democratic institutions that were already weak or under threat are facing even greater stress and significant decline. We need to devote more resources and consistent programming designed to preserve democratic institutions, civil society, privacy, and the free press.

This bill would serve as a critical backstop to human rights at a time when authoritarian governments are using every tool at their disposal, including this terrible pandemic, to harm their opposition and weaken civil society.

I urge support of all of these measures including the en bloc package this morning and, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Zeldin.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the committee's consideration of these measures in the en bloc package today. I would like to express my support for the Department of State Student Internship Program Act.

The vast majority of Federal Government internships are unpaid. One of the best ways to increase diversity at the State Department is to provide economic opportunities for lower and middle income Americans from beyond the Washington, DC. beltway to participate in these internships.

This bill would provide paid internships at the State Department with no additional funding needed. Instead, it is a program to be phased in and paid through existing unobligated balances to cover the cost.

Any student in a higher education institution program who can hold a security clearance and has an interest in foreign affairs will be eligible. The program will be advertised widely and outreach targeted universities including minority-serving institutions.

We all remember our first internship or entry level job and the impact that opportunity, or lack thereof, can have on our future aspirations. To represent the United States to the world, the State Department should have a work force that reflects the diversity of our country.

By providing paid internships, more students from across the country will be able to afford the opportunity to pursue their interest in foreign affairs and, hopefully, return to serve.

I am proud to have worked with Chairman Castro on this bill, which is a result of bipartisan efforts on the Oversight Investigation Subcommittee to improve diversity at the State Department.

I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Bera.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also too want to associate myself with the comments on both sides of the aisle for your leadership and your friendship.

And I do not want this to be like a eulogy because I hope you are not leaving the scene and you will continue to be a resource for all of us and continue your strong advocacy for U.S. global leadership.

I would like to, you know, take a moment and commend both Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul for this markup on many bipartisan measures.

In particular, I would like to speak to my measure, H. Res. 1012, which honors the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance. I would also like to thank my ranking member on the Asia Subcommittee, Mr. Yoho, for introducing this important resolution with me.

As co-chair of the Korea Caucus and as co-chair of the congressional Study Group on Korea, I do travel to Korea fairly frequently and meet with their parliamentarians and so forth.

The friendship on the people-to-people relationship or legislator-to-legislator relationship is one of our finest alliances and, as Mr. Connolly mentioned earlier, the Korean Miracle, you know, 40 years ago was one of the most impoverished countries in the world, and when you look at them today it is one of the most advanced economies and, you know, is doing remarkable things.

And, in fact, I want to thank our friends in the Republic of Korea during this pandemic for helping our State in California with resources, PPE, testing ability, et cetera.

So this is a very important friendship.

I also want to speak to H. Res. 1121. I applaud Mr. Levin for his resolution urging the government of Burma to hold free, fair, and inclusive elections in November.

Now, earlier my subcommittee had a hearing on what is happening with the Rohingya, et cetera, and, you know, it is quite devastating, and, you know, it is up to us as the leaders of the free world to continue to push Burma to recognize its democratic principles, to understand that the Rohingya are part of Burma.

And, again, I applaud Mr. Levin for that resolution.

I would also like to speak to H. Res. 825, recognizing the importance of the entry into force, or the NPT. I really want to recognize my good friend from California, Mr. Sherman, for his long work on advancing nonproliferation and trying to make the world a safer place.

I also want to recognize our nonproliferation fellow, Shervin Taheran, who was working on this bill for Mr. Sherman and, you know, I understand there has been a lot of work into this bill.

So this is incredibly important. Mr. Deutch and I had a joint hearing earlier this year, recognizing the importance of the NPT and understanding the 75 years that have passed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Working together, we have been able to make the world a safer place but we still have work to do. So, again, I applaud Mr. Sherman.

And, last, I would like to speak to H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act, by Ms. Bass. I recognize that we are not considering the facts in the en bloc but would like to touch briefly on Ms. Bass's bill.

Diversity is incredibly important to the State Department and this bill offers an important pathway for minorities to join the State Department.

We know our strength is—you know, making sure that our agencies in the State Department look like the United States because the United States looks like the rest of the world.

So, again, I appreciate Ms. Bass's leadership on this, and with that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Curtis.

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am only hopeful that somebody who is not paying close attention might think that they are watching your funeral today, and I, with my colleagues, want to thank you for friendship but, particularly, to me and my wife. We have traveled together. I certainly understand your kindness and goodness.

I wish to speak in support of the Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act. The unified text includes portions of my bill, the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act.

Similar to the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, this bill would designate Hongkongers as refugees, streamlining the refugee admission process and instructs the Secretary of State to work with like-minded allied countries to accept refugees from Hong Kong.

From the Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, it gives emphasis to supporting those who had a significant role in the Hong Kong protest including those who had an organizational role, acted as first responders, covered the protests as journalists, provided legal services to individuals arrested, and those who were formally charged, detained, or convicted for his or her participation in these protests.

Since the passage of the national security law, we have had and seen arbitrary and intimidating detentions of activists and crackdowns on the free press. This bill addresses the humanitarian crisis and shows Hongkongers that the United States has their backs in the struggle for basic freedoms and dignity.

I commend my colleague, Representative Malinowski, for working with all sides so hard. I know, personally, how hard he has worked to get this bill and its unified support, and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Curtis.

Ms. Titus.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for all that you have done to lead this committee with intelligence, compassion, and grace. We, certainly, must learn from your example.

I support all of the measures before us and I am a co-sponsor of several of them, but I want to speak specifically on the resolution concerning Mongolia.

I appreciate the committee including my resolution, which reaffirms the strategic partnership between the United States and Mongolia and as part of this en bloc package.

I am proud to serve as the co-chair of the Mongolian Caucus and as a member of House Democracy partnership, which has given me an opportunity to visit Mongolia and meet parliamentarians and young leaders committed to advancing democratic principles in their country.

This year marks the 30-year anniversary since Mongolia declared an end to one-party authoritarian political system and adopted democratic and free market reforms. Now Mongolia boasts one of the highest Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties in all of Asia.

At a time when countries are struggling with how to safely manage the coronavirus pandemic and at the same time hold fair and free elections, Mongolia sets a good example. They were able to successfully organize parliamentary elections this June with a record turnout of 73 percent, and they have not had a single death from COVID-19.

It is an important and strategic democratic partner in a challenging neighborhood. Mongolia shares land that borders only with Russia and China, both countries eagerly working to spread their influence beyond their borders and into Mongolia.

Mongolia considers the United States, though, its third neighbor and has shown its commitment to this relationship by sending troops to support U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has a strong record of troop contributions to international peacekeeping missions.

But, unfortunately, the country continues to face real pressures from those neighbors I mentioned that threaten its sovereignty through economic measures, political influence, and even attempts to promote corruption in the country to undermine democracy.

This resolution before you today is an opportunity to show Mongolia that we are committed to further cooperation, building off the

strategic partnership that was announced between the United States and Mongolia in July 2019.

Especially in a time when we are witnessing democratic backsliding around the world exacerbated by the pandemic, it is crucial that we bolster collaboration with countries that have committed to safeguarding and promoting democratic values and human rights, including the freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association, anti-corruption and fiscal transparency, and doing all this they are encouraging youth and emerging leadership development, as Mongolia has declared in that partnership—strategic partnership statement declaration signed with us last year.

The resolution also further supports economic development in Mongolia by urging the U.S. Government to help Mongolia through trade programs and urging the Development Finance Corporation to expand activities there to help diversify its economy and support women-owned, small, and medium sized enterprises like in textiles.

As the State Department has announced, Secretary Pompeo will be traveling to Mongolia next week. So committee passage of this resolution would signify United Support for the U.S.-Mongolia Strategic Partnership from both Congress and the administration. So it comes at a perfect time.

I urge your vote in favor of this resolution to recognize and strengthen our ties with an important ally in a dangerous neighborhood and send that strong messages to Mongolia.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentlewoman yields back. Thank you, Ms. Titus.

Ms. Wild.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the last word. But, first, I have to join in my colleagues in thanking you for your service and, even more so, thanking you for allowing me and asking me, as a freshman Member of Congress, to serve on this committee.

I consider it to be one of my great privileges that I came to Congress in time to serve with you, and thank you so much.

I also would like to thank the committee for convening this markup and Chairwoman Bass for her leadership on the Africa Subcommittee of which I am proud to serve as vice chair.

I would also like to thank Representative Bass and the committee for introducing two important resolutions, H. Res. 751, which reaffirms the importance of the U.S.-African Union Partnership, and H. Res. 768, which urges African governments to protect internet freedom on the continent.

In 2006, the United States became the first non-African country to dedicate a diplomatic mission to the African Union.

We recognized early on that there existed a shared benefit in peace, security, economic growth, trade, and investment. I am glad we will be passing a resolution applauding those efforts and urging greater collaboration in the future.

I thank Chairwoman Bass for taking the gavel and reframing how we look at U.S. relationships in the continent. Humanitarian assistance where needed is certainly important. But it is equally important to consider our partnership with the AU as dealings between equals.

Failure to make additional business and trade investments with the African Union and the continent as a whole is misguided and it creates a vacuum through which our adversaries can attempt to exploit the continent, its people, and its riches.

I urge a yes vote on H. Res. 751 because the AU deserves to know that the House of Representatives and this committee have prioritized this relationship and that we hold it in high regard.

As part of that ongoing relationship, I also support H. Res. 768 and urge a yes vote because telecommunication providers and businesses operating in Africa should facilitate open and secure internet access on the continent.

In an increasingly interconnected world, our relationship cannot reach its full potential if there are regular, partial, or total internet shut downs, shut downs that have, unfortunately, become more common since 2016, and certainly politically motivated internet shut downs that are aimed at stifling dissent frustrate the shared purpose that the U.S. is trying to cultivate on the continent, and it hurts people both living in African countries and living here in the United States.

I hope that others will see this markup as important relationship maintenance that will benefit African countries, the United States, and the world.

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentlewoman yields back. Thank you, Ms. Wild.

Mr. Deutch.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Engel, I will add my voice to the list of colleagues of yours who are so proud of the work that you have done and so thrilled to have had the opportunity to serve. But I look forward to a future opportunity when we can extol you greatly.

Thanks also to the ranking member for holding this markup and I am glad that we have such a full agenda, and I am appreciative that we are advancing so many important bills this morning, soon to be this afternoon.

H. Res 823, a resolution that I introduced, condemns the Iranian government's persecution of the Baha'i. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iranian government has executed hundreds of Baha'i leaders and dismissed thousands from jobs.

The systematic oppression of the Baha'i is continuing and it is accelerating, and this resolution puts Congress for the twentieth time since 1982 on record deploring the persecution of Iran's Baha'i community and other religious minorities, and holding the Iranian government responsible for upholding the rights of all Iranians including members of the Baha'i faith.

I would also like to express my support for two other resolutions related to the Middle East. The first, H. Res. 1077 emphasizes the continued importance of the U.S.-Lebanon relationship. Lebanon is facing terrible changes from economic meltdowns from COVID-19 to the horrific August 4th blast at the port of Beirut that left over 200 dead.

The United States stands with the people of Lebanon as they rebuild following the explosion and U.S. officials must continue to engage the Lebanese government, reject Hezbollah, and encourage

much needed reforms that will benefit Lebanese stability, the economy, and public.

The second is H. Res. 17, which expresses concern over the detention of Austin Tice. It has been more than 8 years since Austin, a Marine officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, was detained at a checkpoint in Syria where he was working as a journalist.

Austin represents the best of our country and this resolution reiterates that Congress remains committed to bringing him home and bringing all other Americans unjustly detained abroad home as well.

And I am glad that we are considering H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, and I thank Mr. Connolly for his tireless advocacy for justice for Jamal Khashoggi.

As we all know, it has been nearly 2 years since Jamal's horrific murder. His death sparked bipartisan outrage in the United States and led many to reassess our relationship with Saudi Arabia.

We must lead with our values, not only because of the inhumanity of his killing but also because of everything he worked for and everything that he continues to represent: accountability, freedom of speech, and other fundamental human rights. All of them are particularly important to us as Americans.

Similarly, today we will advance H. Res. 1145, which condemns the poisoning of Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny. His poisoning, unfortunately, is the latest in a long line of similar Kremlin efforts that have targeted political opponents, dissidents and others who challenge the power of Vladimir Putin.

America has historically been the global leader and the moral authority on basic freedoms and human rights, and we cede that leadership every day when we fail to denounce abuses abroad, whether the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, or any other atrocities that we do not speak out against.

And as a member of this committee, I am committed to honor Jamal and Alexei and other activists who have been imprisoned, poisoned or killed, and advocating for accountability, the rule of law, and human rights abroad.

I am proud to support all the measures that will advance today. I thank my colleagues for their work and, again, I thank the chairman and the ranking member and their staffs for their tireless efforts.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Castro.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you to the ranking member, Mr. McCaul, for bringing these measures before us today and for your leadership on this committee.

I want to congratulate all the members whose bills are being considered here today. We have a significant number of bills and resolutions today, a testament to the hard work of the members of this committee and also the members of their staff.

While these are all important measures, there are a few that I would like to mention in particular. Around the world, we see democracy in retreat as authoritarians crack down on civil liberties and human rights.

The situation in Hong Kong today is one of the most pernicious examples, where the Chinese government passed a draconian national security law that restricts freedoms in Hong Kong in violation of their own commitments to the international community.

This committee held an important hearing on this subject and one product of that hearing is Representative Malinowski's Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act of 2020, which I support.

I was proud to work with Representative Curtis on similar legislation earlier this year and am proud to support Representative Malinowski's bipartisan bill.

I also speak in support of the two resolutions introduced by my colleagues from Texas, Representative Conaway and Representative Green, that highlight the detention of Texan Marine Trevor Reed in Russia and the abduction of Texan journalist Austin Tice in Syria.

Mr. Reed faces an extraordinarily long sentence of 9 years in prison in Russia under allegations of a crime that fall far short of that sentence. His trial has been a farce and, clearly, politically motivated.

Congress must speak up to secure his release so he can be reunited with his family.

Mr. Tice, a Houston native and a journalist who was covering the Syrian civil war, has been missing for years after being kidnapped. This resolution is an important show of support from this committee to his family that we have not forgotten him and we are working to bring him home.

I also want to thank the members of the committee for considering my bill, the State Department Student Internship Act, and Representative Lee Zeldin, my counterpart on the Oversight Subcommittee.

Representative Zeldin has worked with me on a number of hearings and meetings on the issue of representation at the State Department and also has worked with me on this legislation.

These programs are an important way for students interested in public service or foreign policy to learn more about what such a career would look like.

But for too long they have been inaccessible to many who cannot afford to work for months without pay. As we all know, that is also a problem and has been a problem in the legislative branch.

This bill would ensure that the department provides compensation and assistance for travel and housing so that students of all backgrounds and means can start on their path to public service and advancing our Nation's foreign policy.

I urge you to support these measures, all of these measures considered today, and I yield back, Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Phillips.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul, for bringing this slate of overwhelmingly bipartisan measures up for consideration by our entire committee today.

And as Representative Chabot so eloquently expressed earlier in this hearing, the leadership of our chairman and ranking member, and the unique spirit of cooperation by members of our committee is, surely, a model to our entire Congress.

And while each of the measures being considered today is of great importance, I wish to focus my time on H. Res. 1150 urging the government of Cote D'Ivoire, its opposition leaders, its citizens, and all to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections next month.

Cote d'Ivoire is at a consequential crossroads. It can continue to enjoy a relative peace or regress to the ethnic violence that is a stain on its recent past.

Every political transition in the country's history has been accompanied by violence against civilians, most recently during the 2010 elections, and although such atrocities are not yet occurring in Cote d'Ivoire, the early warning signs surely are.

Despite a constitutional limit of two terms, President Ouattara's decision to run for a third term has led to violence protests resulting in deaths, injuries, and countless arrests.

It is imperative that we call attention to this dangerous situation and urge action to prevent violence and save lives.

My resolution, H. Res. 1150, does just that. By reaffirming the relationship between the United States and Cote D'Ivoire while raising concerns about the likelihood of instability stemming from the upcoming election.

The resolution calls on the Ivoirian government and all political parties to commit to free, fair, and peaceful elections, protect and support citizens and their access to valid information, and to combat disinformation, hate speech, and violence.

Finally, the resolution States that the United States will stand with the Ivoirian people in support of peace, democracy, religious and ethnic tolerance and stability.

I urge my colleagues to support this very time sensitive and important resolution, and the entire en bloc package.

And with that, I yield the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Phillips.

Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by adding voice to the avalanche of appreciation for you. We will have other opportunities to do that at greater length.

But I—from the first day I courted you to join the committee it has just been such a pleasure working with you. I have learned so much from you and you have been so kind to me, and I just deeply appreciate your leadership.

And, you know, I appreciate this markup and the incredible work of you and Mr. McCaul working together and so many of my colleagues, from Mr. Phillips with Cote d'Ivoire to Hong Kong to Tibet, all around this world the members of this committee are standing up for human rights and democracy, and I am proud to play a part in it.

And I really want to thank you specifically for considering Mr. Chabot's and my resolution urging the Burmese government to allow for free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections in Burma next month, this November.

When we pass this resolution today we will send a strong signal to the Burmese people that we are with you as you continue the often dangerous but absolutely essential work of democratizing

Burma and achieving sustainable peace and human rights for all there.

The past few years have been marred by terrible tragedy, none more devastating than the genocide of the Rohingya people.

At the same time, the government has oppressed other religious and ethnic minorities, restricted civil society and freedom of the press, silenced government critics, cutoff internet services. The list goes on and on.

These elections can be a chance to start turning the tide in Burma. Today, with one voice, we make clear that this body is united in its commitment and our commitment to seeing that tide turn.

I hope the administration will join us in supporting the Burmese people and work hard to see that these upcoming elections are free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and really credible.

We have to support the right to vote for communities that have been disenfranchised. We have to see to it that conflict is not used as an excuse to deny people the right to vote and we have to make sure U.S.-based social media companies do not allow their platforms—sound familiar? To be used as vehicles for spreading misinformation or advocating violence or voter intimidation.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to note that 1 year ago today I was on my way to Bangladesh where I visited Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar.

I have talked about this before, and let me just say it is so important that Burma create conditions for the voluntary return of the Rohingya people. That means freedom of movement, provision of civil documentation, and a transparent pathway to the restoration of full citizenship.

I heard one thing over and over again from the people I met last year, that they want to go home. For their sake, for all the Burmese people, I hope the elections in November are a step forward on the path of true democracy and real human rights for all.

I thank Mr. Chabot again for partnering with me on this, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you very much, Mr. Levin.

Ms. Omar.

[No response.]

Chairman ENGEL. Okay. We will move on to Mr. Malinowski.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaul, first, I just want to join all of my colleagues in thanking you for the cooperation and hard work that has enabled us to come together again and again in a bipartisan way to speak for America to the world, and we are doing that today in a number of respects, particularly on the issue of promoting human rights around the world.

There are several bills that I am particularly happy to see moving, the first of which has been mentioned by a number of my colleagues, the Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act of 2020.

We have discussed this before in committee and since then our worst predictions about the implications of Hong Kong's new national security legislation has started to come true.

Pro-democracy candidates have been banned from running for office. Protestors are being locked up, journalists imprisoned. Even today, thousands of police have been stopping and searching people en masse as demonstrators took to the streets on China's national day.

What this bill does is to simply take up the mantle of leadership that the United States has long held as a refuge for people fleeing some of the most repressive regimes of our time, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union to Cuba to the Arab dictatorships to Assad's Syria, and many more.

It says that those being persecuted in Hong Kong can have expedited access to the United States as refugees. Those already in the United States, Hongkongers who fear going back, will have protection here.

This is a good thing. It is a first step. I hope we continue to take further steps in this direction, including by opening our doors to a much wider range of people in Hong Kong who may want to make their lives in the United States and contribute their talents to us.

The message to Beijing is very, very simple, that if you continue your efforts to crush the people of Hong Kong you are going to lose the wealth and talent and energy of this extraordinary place to the United States and your loss will be very much America's gain.

Turning to Russia, I am also happy to offer the amendment in the nature of a substitute today for the McGovern resolution decrying Putin's attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny.

This is not the first attempt at poisoning by Putin. It is a preferred method of his, allowing him some plausible deniability for his actions while at the same time striking fear into the hearts of his opponent.

There have been numerous such attempts, some successful, some not. Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, Boris Berezovsky in 2013, Vladimir Kara-Murza 2015, and again in 2017 several others.

When you do not stand up to this kind of stuff it encourages even more or worse, and our resolution says enough. We are going to work with our allies to seek accountability for Putin's actions.

There are a lot of other really great bills. I want to particularly thank some of the folks we have worked with on the Hong Kong bill, which has been fully bipartisan—Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kinzinger, Mr. Castro—for their leadership on this issue.

I also want to thank some of the staff who have been deeply involved—Jen Hendrickson White on Mr. Engel's staff, Ami Shah on the Judiciary Committee, Troy Dougal with Mr. Curtis's office, Sid Ravishankar in Mr. Castro's office—for the long hours they spent developing the best possible legislative solutions for dealing with the crisis in Hong Kong.

And, of course, all the members who have joined on the Navalny resolution, the resolution that Mrs. Wagner offered as well—really, really important, expressing our interest in protecting human rights in countries that are taking advantage of the pandemic to crack down on their people.

All in all, I think we are sending some extraordinarily important messages today and I am very, very happy to work with you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaul, to move these forward.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Malinowski.

Ms. Omar.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairman.

First, I would like to speak to House Resolution 1012, recognizing the importance of our alliance with South Korea. I support this resolution, but I also feel that we, as a committee, have missed a real opportunity today.

The best way to truly demonstrate our commitment to our partnership with South Korea and with the Korean people is to call for a formal end to war, a war that even today keeps Korean families separated.

I hope this committee will take action soon.

I would also like to speak a little about sanctions. By my account, today's markup includes seven different pieces of legislation that authorize, encourage, and otherwise refer to sanctions.

And this is not unusual. I think in almost every markup we have held we have included some sanction legislation. But we have not taken a moment to consider the use of sanctions in a thoughtful way.

It is easy to justify each individual sanction. Yes, there must be consequences for election interference, for human rights violations, and for subverting democracy, though we need to ask ourselves are sanctions always the correct answer.

I am afraid that Congress has become too reliant on sanctions. We reach for them as the easiest solution to whatever problem we face.

But they are often not a solution at all. They are often deeply painful for the populations of the countries we sanction, the very people we are trying to help. They drive bad actors into the black market by cutting them off from international financial institutions.

They are extremely easy to implement but extremely difficult to remove. They put extra burdens on human rights organizations, peace building organizations, and people trying to do good and productive work in violent and repressive places.

We can say it is different when they are targeted. But I am not sure it is true. Above all, we do not even know if they work. I doubt they do in most cases.

If sanctions on a country would help lead them to democracy and human rights, North Korea would have been a thriving democracy in the 1960's. We all share the goal of accountability and justice. I just do not believe sanctions help us toward that goal most of the time.

I encourage this committee to think more deeply about what tools are available to us and to think more about the long-term consequences of our actions.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Trone.

Mr. TRONE. Thank you, Chairman Engel, for your leadership of this committee and for scheduling today's markup.

The last 2 years it has been a real honor and a pleasure working with you and your team. So thank you so much.

We are considering a number of important pieces of legislation today and I am proud to co-sponsor many of them, like the Represent America Abroad Act introduced by Chairwoman Karen Bass.

But I would like to primarily speak about a bill I introduced with Ranking Member Michael McCaul, H.R. 7990, the FENTANYL Results Act. Right now, millions of Americans are suffering from addiction.

I know this pain all too well. I watched and tried to help as my nephew battled addiction for 5 years before losing his life to Fentanyl overdose in 2016.

Unfortunately, this story is an all too common reality in America. Since his passing, we have seen dramatic and alarming increase in Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids across our country. This threat has only increased in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.

In parts of my district in Maryland, opioid overdose are up 50-plus percent this time over last year. To put it even more starkly, this year Fentanyl has been involved in 93 percent of all opioid-related deaths in Maryland.

We need to tackle this opioid crisis from every angle and that includes working with our international partners to curb drug trafficking.

That is why I introduced the Fighting Emerging Narcotics Through Additional Nations to Yield Lasting Results, or the FENTANYL Results Act, with Ranking Member McCaul. This bill will authorize two programs through the State Department to build foreign law enforcement capacity to detect synthetic drugs.

The FENTANYL Results Act is a serious step in the fight against global synthetic drug trade. I would like to thank Ranking Member McCaul for partnering with me on this important legislation and Chairman Engel for helping us get this bill where it is today.

It has been a privilege to be appointed by the speaker to the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking. There, I will work with my fellow commissioners to continue to develop bipartisan solutions to stop the flow of illicit opioids into America.

To put it simply, we have got to get it done. Lives are at stake. Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Are any other members seeking recognition?

[No response.]

Chairman ENGEL. Hearing no further requests for recognition, the committee will proceed.

[Pause.]

Chairman ENGEL. Okay. I am told there is a technical issue. So we are going to wait a couple of minutes to resolve it.

[Pause.]

Chairman ENGEL. Okay. We are going to take a brief recess for a few minutes until we get this straightened out. So the committee is now in recess.

[Brief recess.]

Chairman ENGEL. We now call the committee back in order. I understand our difficulties—technical difficulties—have been taken care of.

So hearing no further requests for recognition, are there any further requests for recognition?

[No response.]

Chairman ENGEL. Okay. Having no further requests, the committee will proceed to consider the noticed items en bloc.

Pursuant to the previous order, the question occurs on the measures en bloc as amended if amended. We will take a vote by voice. All members please unmute your microphones.

All right. All those in favor say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

The measures considered en bloc are agreed to, and pursuant to the previous order of the committee, each members is ordered favorably reported as amended if amended, and each amendment to each bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes.

Now on to the next item of business, consideration of H.R. 7673. Pursuant to notice for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act.

The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. ALEXANDER. H.R. 7673, to ensure the United States diplomatic work force at all levels reflects the diverse composition of the United States. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America and Congress assembled.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with. Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The Bill H.R. 7673 follows:]

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7673

To ensure the United States diplomatic workforce at all levels reflects the diverse composition of the United States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 20, 2020

Ms. BASS (for herself, Mr. MEEKS, Ms. LEE of California, Mr. SIRES, Ms. JUDY CHU of California, Mr. CASTRO of Texas, Mr. EVANS, Ms. JAYAPAL, Ms. HAALAND, Mrs. HAYES, and Ms. OMAR) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To ensure the United States diplomatic workforce at all levels reflects the diverse composition of the United States.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Represent America
5 Abroad Act of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) As the United States becomes more racially
9 and ethnically diverse, the Department of State

1 must continue to invest in policies to recruit, retain,
2 and develop the best and brightest from the full
3 spectrum of American society in order to be better
4 positioned to advance United States interests
5 abroad.

6 (2) Foreign Service officers are America's face
7 to the world. Thus, the workforce must represent the
8 United States commitment to inclusion and diversity
9 in order to effectively advance American values on
10 the world stage.

11 (3) The Department of State must embrace
12 policies that recruit professionals from the broadest
13 possible pool of talent and retain them in order to
14 significantly increase diversity in the Foreign Serv-
15 ice. Timely action to increase diversity at the mid-
16 levels is crucial, as it takes approximately nine years
17 for an entry level Foreign Service officer (class 6, 5,
18 4) to rise to the mid-ranks of the Foreign Service
19 (class 3, 2, or 1).

20 (4) A February 2020 report by the Government
21 Accountability Office found barriers to a diverse and
22 inclusive workforce at the Department of State, es-
23 pecially at the mid-career and senior levels. Individ-
24 uals who are racial or ethnic minorities comprise
25 only 24 percent of Foreign Service officers as a

1 whole. At the executive level, individuals who are ra-
2 cial or ethnic minorities comprise only 13 percent.
3 This means that the leadership is the least diverse
4 level within the Foreign Service.

5 (5) In the past, the Department of State has
6 acknowledged its lack of workforce diversity and
7 pledged to take concrete steps to address the prob-
8 lem. In 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
9 recognized a great diversity gap in the Department
10 of State and former Secretary of State John Kerry
11 noted that in order to represent the United States,
12 the Department of State must have a workforce that
13 reflects the rich composition of its citizenry. Yet
14 there has been no concrete plan to address the lack
15 of diversity at the mid-career and senior levels.

16 **SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST; STATE-**
17 **MENT OF POLICY.**

18 (a) DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST.—Con-
19 gress declares that it is in the national interest of the
20 United States to ensure that the members of the United
21 States Foreign Service workforce be representative of the
22 American people.

23 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
24 of the Department of State—

1 (1) to strengthen the Foreign Service workforce
2 by bolstering the diversity of those who represent
3 Americans abroad;

4 (2) to treat the people of the Foreign Service
5 as its primary asset, and as such, hold as a central
6 tenet making strides in increasing minority represen-
7 tation at all levels of the Foreign Service workforce
8 to secure the country's national interests; and

9 (3) in accordance with the Foreign Service Act
10 of 1980, to attract highly qualified, mid-career pro-
11 fessionals who are also American minorities, through
12 a pathway program for entry into the Foreign Ser-
13 vice.

14 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
17 shall establish a program, which shall be known as the
18 “Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service Entry
19 Program” (in this section referred to as the “Program”),
20 to be administered jointly by the Director General of the
21 Foreign Service and the Director of Global Talent Man-
22 agement, to identify, attract, and welcome mid-career pro-
23 fessionals who are from minority groups into the Foreign
24 Service.

25 (b) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM.—

1 (1) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary
2 of State shall carry out the following with respect to
3 the Program:

4 (A) Establish and publish on the Depart-
5 ment’s website eligibility criteria for candidates
6 to participate in the program.

7 (B) Carry out countrywide recruitment ef-
8 forts to attract highly qualified, mid-career pro-
9 fessionals from minority groups, such as the
10 following:

11 (i) Community agencies and organiza-
12 tions.

13 (ii) Faith-based organizations.

14 (iii) Community events.

15 (iv) Professional associations.

16 (v) Colleges and universities, including
17 historically Black colleges and universities
18 and other minority-serving institutions
19 such as Hispanic-serving institutions,
20 Asian American and Native American Pa-
21 cific Islander-serving institutions, Amer-
22 ican Indian Tribally controlled colleges and
23 universities, Alaska Native and Native Ha-
24 waiian-serving institutions, Tribal colleges
25 and universities, Predominantly Black In-

1 stitutions, and Native American-serving,
2 Nontribal institutions.

3 (vi) Diplomats in residence.

4 (vii) Job fairs.

5 (viii) Newspaper/magazines/journals.

6 (ix) Radio stations and programs.

7 (x) Websites, webcasts, podcasts, and
8 other online channels.

9 (C) Recruit eligible candidates for the Pro-
10 gram.

11 (D) Develop a structured program that in-
12 cludes as part of the initial training, a class or
13 module that specifically prepares participants
14 for life in the Foreign Service, including con-
15 veying to such participants essential elements of
16 the practical knowledge that is normally ac-
17 quired during a Foreign Service Officer's initial
18 assignments.

19 (E) Include appropriate mentorship and
20 other career development opportunities, such as
21 leadership training, for Program participants.

22 (2) OVERALL QUALIFICATIONS.—In recruiting,
23 training, and assigning members of the Program,
24 the Secretary of State should seek highly qualified

1 minority individuals who are mid-career profes-
2 sionals—

3 (A) with diverse work experience who have
4 capabilities, insights, techniques, and experi-
5 ences that would serve to enrich the Foreign
6 Service workforce and empower it to perform
7 more effectively;

8 (B) with demonstrated knowledge of, expe-
9 rience with, and interest in United States for-
10 eign policy and national security and inter-
11 national affairs, including knowledge of the af-
12 fairs, cultures, and languages of other coun-
13 tries;

14 (C) with demonstrable leadership skills and
15 the potential for further growth;

16 (D) that demonstrate a track record of col-
17 laboration, team-building, and stakeholder man-
18 agement skills;

19 (E) with demonstrated capacity for critical
20 thinking and analytical skills, including the
21 ability to synthesize information into clear and
22 concise recommendations;

23 (F) with strategic thinking, and ability to
24 solve complex problems;

1 (G) with flexibility, adaptability, and deter-
2 mination; and

3 (H) who are United States citizens with
4 worldwide service availability and who are able
5 to obtain appropriate security and medical
6 clearances.

7 (c) ADVANCEMENT FROM PROGRAM.—Candidates
8 who are accepted into the Program in accordance with the
9 qualifications and requirements of this section shall have
10 the opportunity to advance to the Foreign Service oral as-
11 sessment for potential entry as the appropriate class of
12 mid-level Foreign Service officer in accordance with the
13 candidate’s professional qualifications.

14 (d) MID-CAREER PROFESSIONAL DEFINED.—For
15 purposes of the Program, the term “mid-career profes-
16 sional” means an individual who has the skills and experi-
17 ence to serve as a mid-level Foreign Service officer (class
18 3, 2, or 1) and who meets any of the following criteria,
19 consistent with the merit-based principles and core pre-
20 cepts set forth in the Foreign Affairs Manual and Hand-
21 book and in accordance with applicable requirements of
22 the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

23 (1) An individual with 8+ years of professional
24 experience and a bachelor’s degree from an accred-
25 ited college or university in selected fields of study

1 representing the needs of the Department of State,
2 including public policy, public administration, inter-
3 national law, international relations, political science,
4 foreign languages, business administration, econom-
5 ics, history, sociology, geography, social or cultural
6 anthropology, statistics, or the humanities.

7 (2) An individual with 7+ years of professional
8 experience and a master's degree from an accredited
9 college or university in selected fields of study rep-
10 resenting the needs of the Department of State, in-
11 cluding any field listed in paragraph (1).

12 (3) An individual with 5+ years of professional
13 experience and doctoral degree from an accredited
14 college or university in selected fields of study rep-
15 resenting the needs of the Department of State, in-
16 cluding any field listed in paragraph (1).

17 **SEC. 5. REPORTS.**

18 (a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
20 submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
21 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
22 tions of the Senate a report on a plan to establish the
23 Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service Entry
24 Program.

1 (b) ANNUAL UPDATE.—Annually thereafter, the Sec-
2 retary shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
3 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
4 Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the status
5 of the Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service
6 Entry Program. Each such report shall include the fol-
7 lowing information with respect to the previous year:

8 (1) The number of candidates approved for the
9 program.

10 (2) The number of candidates who began par-
11 ticipating, including anonymized information on such
12 candidates' backgrounds with respect to education
13 and prior work experience and grade level at which
14 the candidate entered the Foreign Service.

15 (3) A breakdown of the number of participants
16 recruited into and advancing from the program by
17 ethnicity and sex.

18 (4) A disaggregation by Foreign Service cone
19 and post (including identifying whether the post is
20 hard-to-fill) assigned to each participant advancing
21 from the program.

22 (5) Program attrition rates and retention data,
23 including information on how such data compares to
24 the data reported in the most recent prior submis-
25 sion of such report.

1 (6) Information on the Department's recruiting
2 efforts for the program, including an outreach strat-
3 egy detailing resources allocated to outreach, as well
4 as where, how, and when outreach will be carried
5 out.

6 (7) Information on the Department's efforts to
7 improve the efficacy of the program and promote re-
8 tention of program participants.

○

Chairman ENGEL. I now offer the Bass amendment in the nature of a substitute that was noticed as base text. The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. ALEXANDER. Bass Amendment 106. Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 7673. Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: Section 1 short title. This act may be cited as the Represent America Abroad Act of 2020. Section 2—

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute will be considered original text for purposes of further amendment.

[The Amendment offered by Ms. Bass follows:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 7673
OFFERED BY MS. BASS OF CALIFORNIA**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Represent America
3 Abroad Act of 2020”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) As the United States becomes more racially
7 and ethnically diverse, the Department of State and
8 the United States Agency for International Develop-
9 ment (USAID) must continue to invest in policies to
10 recruit, retain, and develop the best and brightest
11 from the full spectrum of American society in order
12 to be better positioned to advance United States in-
13 terests abroad.

14 (2) Foreign Service officers are America’s face
15 to the world. Thus, the workforce must represent the
16 United States commitment to inclusion and diversity
17 in order to effectively advance American values on
18 the world stage.

1 (3) The Department of State and USAID must
2 embrace policies that recruit professionals from the
3 broadest possible pool of talent and retain them in
4 order to significantly increase diversity in the For-
5 eign Service. Timely action to increase diversity at
6 the mid-levels is crucial, as it takes approximately
7 nine years for an entry level Foreign Service officer
8 (class 6, 5, 4) to rise to the mid-ranks of the For-
9 eign Service (class 3, 2, or 1).

10 (4) February and June 2020 reports by the
11 Government Accountability Office found barriers to
12 a diverse and inclusive workforce within the ranks of
13 the Foreign Service, especially at the mid-career and
14 senior levels. Individuals who are racial or ethnic mi-
15 norities comprise only 24 percent at the Department
16 of State and 27 percent at USAID. At the executive
17 level, individuals who are racial or ethnic minorities
18 comprise only 13 percent at the Department of
19 State and 17 percent at USAID. This means that
20 the leadership is the least diverse level within the
21 Foreign Service.

22 (5) In the past, Secretaries of State have ac-
23 knowledged the lack of workforce diversity and
24 pledged to take concrete steps to address the prob-
25 lem. In 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

1 recognized a great diversity gap in the Department
2 of State and former Secretary of State John Kerry
3 noted that in order to represent the United States,
4 the Department of State must have a workforce that
5 reflects the rich composition of its citizenry. Yet
6 there has been no concrete plan to address the lack
7 of diversity at the mid-career and senior levels.

8 (6) USAID has previously identified under-rep-
9 resentation of specific groups in its workforce, but
10 staffing gaps, partly due to a lack of senior leader-
11 ship attention, prevent the agency from adequately
12 addressing the issue.

13 **SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST; STATE-**
14 **MENT OF POLICY.**

15 (a) DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST.—Con-
16 gress declares that it is in the national interest of the
17 United States to ensure that the members of the United
18 States Foreign Service workforce be representative of the
19 American people.

20 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
21 of the Department of State and of the United States
22 Agency for International Development—

23 (1) to strengthen the Foreign Service workforce
24 by bolstering the diversity of those who represent
25 Americans abroad;

1 (2) to treat the people of the Foreign Service
2 as its primary asset, and as such, hold as a central
3 tenet making strides in increasing minority represen-
4 tation at all levels of the Foreign Service workforce
5 to secure the country's national interests; and

6 (3) in accordance with the Foreign Service Act
7 of 1980, to attract highly qualified, mid-career pro-
8 fessionals who are also American minorities, through
9 a pathway program for entry into the Foreign Serv-
10 ice.

11 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
14 shall establish a program, which shall be known as the
15 “Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service Entry
16 Program” (in this section referred to as the “Program”),
17 to be administered jointly by the Director General of the
18 Foreign Service, the Director of Global Talent Manage-
19 ment of the Department of State, and the Chief Human
20 Capital Officer of the Office of Human Capital and Talent
21 Management of the United States Agency for Inter-
22 national Development, to identify, attract, and welcome
23 mid-career professionals who are from minority groups
24 into the Foreign Service.

25 (b) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM.—

1 (1) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary
2 of State shall carry out the following with respect to
3 the Program:

4 (A) Establish and publish eligibility cri-
5 teria for candidates to participate in the pro-
6 gram.

7 (B) Carry out countrywide recruitment ef-
8 forts to attract highly qualified, mid-career pro-
9 fessionals from minority groups, such as the
10 following:

11 (i) Community agencies and organiza-
12 tions.

13 (ii) Faith-based organizations.

14 (iii) Community events.

15 (iv) Professional associations.

16 (v) Colleges and universities, including
17 historically Black colleges and universities
18 and other minority-serving institutions
19 such as Hispanic-serving institutions,
20 Asian American and Native American Pa-
21 cific Islander-serving institutions, Amer-
22 ican Indian Tribally controlled colleges and
23 universities, Alaska Native and Native Ha-
24 waiian-serving institutions, Tribal colleges
25 and universities, Predominantly Black In-

1 stitutions, and Native American-serving,
2 Nontribal institutions.

3 (vi) Diplomats in residence.

4 (vii) Job fairs.

5 (viii) Newspaper/magazines/journals.

6 (ix) Radio stations and programs.

7 (x) Websites, webcasts, podcasts, and
8 other online channels.

9 (C) Recruit eligible candidates for the Pro-
10 gram.

11 (D) Develop a structured program that in-
12 cludes as part of the initial training, a class or
13 module that specifically prepares participants
14 for life in the Foreign Service, including con-
15 veying to such participants essential elements of
16 the practical knowledge that is normally ac-
17 quired during a Foreign Service Officer's initial
18 assignments.

19 (E) Include appropriate mentorship and
20 other career development opportunities, such as
21 leadership training, for Program participants.

22 (2) OVERALL QUALIFICATIONS.—In recruiting,
23 training, and assigning members of the Program,
24 the Secretary of State should seek highly qualified

1 minority individuals who are mid-career profes-
2 sionals—

3 (A) with diverse work experience who have
4 capabilities, insights, techniques, and experi-
5 ences that would serve to enrich the Foreign
6 Service workforce and empower it to perform
7 more effectively;

8 (B) with demonstrated knowledge of, expe-
9 rience with, and interest in United States for-
10 eign policy and national security and inter-
11 national affairs, including knowledge of the af-
12 fairs, cultures, and languages of other coun-
13 tries;

14 (C) with demonstrable leadership skills and
15 the potential for further growth;

16 (D) that demonstrate a track record of col-
17 laboration, team-building, and stakeholder man-
18 agement skills;

19 (E) with demonstrated capacity for critical
20 thinking and analytical skills, including the
21 ability to synthesize information into clear and
22 concise recommendations;

23 (F) with strategic thinking, and ability to
24 solve complex problems;

1 (G) with flexibility, adaptability, and deter-
2 mination; and

3 (H) who are United States citizens with
4 worldwide service availability and who are able
5 to obtain appropriate security and medical
6 clearances.

7 (e) ADVANCEMENT FROM PROGRAM.—Candidates
8 who are accepted into the Program in accordance with the
9 qualifications and requirements of this section shall have
10 the opportunity to advance to the Foreign Service oral as-
11 sessment for potential entry as the appropriate class of
12 mid-level Foreign Service officer in accordance with the
13 candidate's professional qualifications.

14 (d) MID-CAREER PROFESSIONAL DEFINED.—For
15 purposes of the Program, the term “mid-career profes-
16 sional” means an individual who has the skills and experi-
17 ence to serve as a mid-level Foreign Service officer (class
18 3, 2, or 1) and who meets any of the following criteria,
19 consistent with the merit-based principles and core pre-
20 cepts set forth in the Foreign Affairs Manual and Hand-
21 book and in accordance with applicable requirements of
22 the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

23 (1) An individual with 8+ years of professional
24 experience and a bachelor's degree from an accred-
25 ited college or university in selected fields of study

1 representing the needs of the Department of State,
2 including public policy, public administration, inter-
3 national law, international relations, political science,
4 foreign languages, business administration, econom-
5 ics, history, sociology, geography, social or cultural
6 anthropology, statistics, or the humanities.

7 (2) An individual with 7+ years of professional
8 experience and a master's degree from an accredited
9 college or university in selected fields of study rep-
10 resenting the needs of the Department of State, in-
11 cluding any field listed in paragraph (1).

12 (3) An individual with 5+ years of professional
13 experience and doctoral degree from an accredited
14 college or university in selected fields of study rep-
15 resenting the needs of the Department of State, in-
16 cluding any field listed in paragraph (1).

17 **SEC. 5. REPORTS.**

18 (a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
20 submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
21 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
22 tions of the Senate a report on a plan to establish the
23 Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service Entry
24 Program.

1 (b) ANNUAL UPDATE.—Annually thereafter, the Sec-
2 retary shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
3 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
4 Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the status
5 of the Represent America Mid-Career Foreign Service
6 Entry Program. Each such report shall include the fol-
7 lowing information with respect to the previous year:

8 (1) The number of candidates approved for the
9 program.

10 (2) The number of candidates who began par-
11 ticipating, including anonymized information on such
12 candidates' backgrounds with respect to education
13 and prior work experience and grade level at which
14 the candidate entered the Foreign Service.

15 (3) A breakdown of the number of participants
16 recruited into and advancing from the program by
17 ethnicity and sex.

18 (4) A disaggregation by Foreign Service cone
19 and post or mission (including identifying whether
20 the post is hard-to-fill) assigned to each participant
21 advancing from the program.

22 (5) Program attrition rates and retention data,
23 including information on how such data compares to
24 the data reported in the most recent prior submis-
25 sion of such report.

1 (6) Information on recruiting efforts for the
2 program, including an outreach strategy detailing
3 resources allocated to outreach, as well as where,
4 how, and when outreach will be carried out.

5 (7) Information on efforts to improve the effi-
6 cacy of the program and promote retention of pro-
7 gram participants.



Chairman ENGEL. At this time, I recognize Ms. Bass to speak on the measure.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

H.R. 7673, Represent America Abroad Act, is a partnership with my friend and colleague, Representative Chabot. We have worked together on bipartisan issues for many years.

H.R. 7673 addresses foreign policy areas that U.S. diplomats work on daily. However, that work cannot be realized without those who implement our goals abroad are Foreign Service Officers.

These diplomats are America's face to the world and, as such, its work force must represent the full spectrum of American society in order to effectively advance American values, including diversity and inclusion.

Earlier this year, the GAO office released two reports that found barriers to a diverse and inclusive work force within the Foreign Service, particularly at mid-career and senior levels.

But those findings are not new. A 1989 GAO report found that minorities and women were under represented at the mid and senior level, and the State Department has not addressed the issue nor did they have a plan to do so.

They also had no plan for addressing possible barriers to hiring or promoting under represented groups. Unfortunately, we find ourselves in the same place 30 years later. To highlight the point, according to the American Academy of Diplomacy, out of 189 Ambassadors serving overseas today, only three are African American. Just four are Hispanic.

In 2018, Asian career diplomats were represented at the senior levels at just 3 percent, and Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, Alaska Natives were represented at less than 2 percent.

These are unacceptable statistics which undermine our foreign policy objectives and must be overcome.

Think about it. All of us travel overseas. All of us go to embassies. All of us meet with the company teams. What type of diversity do you see when you travel?

I share the sentiments of former Ambassadors, Williams Burns, who served as deputy secretary of State, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who served as director general of the Foreign Service, essentially the chief human resource officers.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, they argue the lack of diversity in the diplomatic corps should be treated as a national security crisis. It not only undermines the powers of the U.S. example, it also suffocates the potential of the country's diplomacy.

They argue that State will have to incorporate ideas that in the past seemed unacceptable to the department and its career staff, but that today are inescapable. They call for the creation of mid-career pathways into the Foreign Service, including for Americans with unique skills and experience.

Additionally, in a letter to the secretary of State dated July 13th, 2020, AAD expressed support for efforts to make the Foreign Service more representative of the American people.

In response, H.R. 7673 proposes to assist the State Department to diversify the Foreign Service in critical skill sets at the mid-level career in H. Res. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act.

This diversification and inclusion program would target educated—educated—and experienced Americans who represent the full spectrum of American society. We believe these efforts would boost recruitment, retention, and promotion of a diverse education Foreign Service that represents the full composition of America.

For those who are concerned that this sounds like an affirmative action program, I assure you that it is not. There are no number requirements, no quotas. There are no differing standards for entry.

This is a recruitment program like the highly—regarded Rangel and Pickering Fellowships that are widely praised and highlighted by the State Department.

The State Department has known about the lack of diversity and barriers to promotion for more than 30 years. There is a lot of evidence that African American, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander diplomats who have the same experience, the same education, are not promoted in the same level, which is why the State Department also experiences numerous lawsuits.

Diplomats of color who represent and serve their countries abroad have had a glass ceiling over their heads. I know that we can do better. This is the time to do better.

Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent to enter in the record an article about the State Department being sued on bias charges. This article was written 33 years ago. But, yet, the situation is the same.

I look forward to your support—

Chairman ENGEL. Without—excuse me, Ms. Bass. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 6, 2020

The Honorable
Patrick Leahy
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Leahy:

Thank you for your July 7 letter regarding Dr. Saad Aljabri and the reported detention of his children in Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Aljabri has been a valued partner to the U.S. Government, working closely with us to ensure the safety of Americans and Saudis. For years, Dr. Aljabri was the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh's counterpart on shared counterterrorism efforts and responded around the clock to threats against our Mission and personnel. The United States appreciates Dr. Aljabri's contributions to keeping our citizens safe.

The Department of State is concerned by the alleged activities that led to Dr. Aljabri's exile in Canada. Any accusations of wrongdoing against Dr. Aljabri should be addressed through established legal channels with full transparency and respect for the rule of law. Should U.S. interests be involved, the Department and interagency partners have open lines of communication with Saudi authorities to clarify and share information.

Any persecution of Dr. Aljabri's family members is unacceptable. The Department has repeatedly requested the Saudi Arabian government to clarify the status and nature of the Aljabri children's detentions, and will continue to urge their immediate release, absent sufficient and compelling justification. The Department notes that several U.S. citizens are also wrongfully detained in Saudi Arabia and will continue to advocate for their wellbeing and release. As it does with all governments, the United States stresses the importance of respect for the rule of law and freedom from arbitrary detention.

The strength of the U.S.-Saudi partnership – which has benefited both nations for more than seven decades – permits us to engage in frank discussions in areas where we disagree. The Department, in coordination with the White House and interagency colleagues, will continue to engage Saudi counterparts to resolve this situation in a manner that honors Dr. Aljabri's service to our country.

-2-

We hope this information is helpful to you. Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ryan M. Kaldahl
Acting Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Ms. BASS. Thank you. We look forward to your support and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentlewoman yields back.

Mr. McCaul, do you seek recognition?

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. I think everyone here supports the goal of increasing diversity at the Department of State and that is why I supported our robust diversity and inclusion title in the State authorization bill and why I am an original co-sponsor for Mr. Castro's internship bill that we are marking up today.

And I agree with Ms. Bass that we need to do better job at recruitment, collecting viewpoints from under represented groups and analyzing data so that the Foreign Service looks more like the face of America.

However, I think an immediate, permanent, and mandatory expansion of the Foreign Service into the mid ranks tries to solve a problem without first understanding the cause.

It will also have a tremendous downstream effect on morale, placement, hiring, promotion, and budget, which is why the Foreign Service Association has voiced both its concern and opposition to this bill as currently written.

I know Ms. Bass cares deeply about this issue and I have tremendous respect for her, and I share her desire to make the department a more diverse and inclusive place.

Given the Foreign Service Association's opposition, though, I do think that the approach would be better as offered by Mr. Zeldin. It would be a more effective tool in the long run and address the acute issue in the short term.

And for that reason, Mr. Chairman, I plan to support the Zeldin amendment as the appropriate way forward on this issue. I want to thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

I now recognize myself.

In this committee, we spend a lot of time talking about the importance of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Our diplomats build bridges of friendship with governments and peoples. They represent our country's character and compassion in our conduct of foreign policy.

They are, in many ways, America's face to the world. That representation should reflect what our country actually looks like.

But despite a focus on this issue in recent years, there remains a troubling lack of diversity in the mid and senior levels of the Foreign Service.

In January, the Government Accountability Office produced a report that I requested, along with other colleagues, and made it clear that there exists serious barriers to diversity in the State Department.

GAO found that racial or ethnic minorities were less likely to be promoted than their white co-workers with similar education, occupation, or years of Federal service.

There was another GAO report that—there was another GAO report that dealt with this issue. It was titled "State Department Minorities and Women are Underrepresented in the Foreign Service" and it was published in 1989. It is really disheartening—my first

year in Congress, by the way—it is really disheartening that over three decades we have made so little progress grappling with this challenge.

We need to do better, and Chairwoman Bass's bill is a step in the right direction. It would direct those in charge of the Foreign Service to establish a lateral entry program for people who belong to traditionally under represented groups in order to attract more members of minority groups into the Foreign Service and address the under representation at the mid and senior levels.

This is a good bill. I want to thank Ms. Bass for her hard work. More than a quarter of House members have signed on as co-sponsors.

I look—let us see. These are real problems and ignoring them will not make them go away. We can do our part by trying to build a more diverse inclusive work force among those who serve our country and represent us overseas.

I am glad to support this measure and I urge all members to do the same.

I realize members wish to speak on the bill and that some members have amendments to offer. I will now recognize any other members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans for the purpose of speaking on the bill first.

If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. Then we will move on to amendments.

Do any other members wish to speak on the bill?

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Chairwoman Bass for this amendment. This is really important, and I heard Mr. McCaul's statement. But it is time—the studies really have been done already. Mr. Zeldin's bill is primarily talking about doing another study.

We have seen the studies. GAO has come out with a study. In fact, for most of us that are on this committee and who have traveled, all you got to do is travel and go look at the State Department and who represents us, who is in the Foreign Services. Just travel. The numbers are there.

So what this bill just says that we have seen the studies. We know that there is a problem. Now let us address the problem. It is not just good for the State Department. It is good for America.

We need to have this addressed. So when I think about how we fixed and addressed some issues before, say, like, in the armed services, there is actual recruitment from the armed services that go into Black and Hispanic neighborhoods. They go into the local schools. They go into colleges. They go to other institutions, trying to make sure that they get them to enlist in the military.

And that is a good thing. That is not a bad thing. But we should do the same thing in the State Department, because we know that diplomacy is just as important as the armed services.

And we need to go out and recruit folks because too often—I know in communities like mine—now, I got a good—what I think is a great public education.

I saw individuals coming into my schools to recruit for the armed services. But I had no idea at the time about the State Department and diplomacy and opportunities that were therein.

So all that Ms. Bass is saying is we need to go out. There is talent there. And make sure the State Department looks like America. So when we are out there our diplomats look like America, and that gives us greater credibility to lead, to show.

I mean, I often say that what makes our country the greatest country that this planet has ever seen is our diversity, people from all different parts of the world and people of different colors. But you got to open those doors. You cannot keep the doors closed and say we need another study.

The doors have been closed because we have not recruited, and the people say, oh, we cannot find anybody or we do not know anybody, when we never looked for anybody. We never trained anybody, and then we never made sure that within a culture that they could grow and elevate within that organization.

We should be doing it in the State Department and leading everybody else, and proud of what we are doing because that is what makes us America. We have overcome a lot.

We have got a lot more to overcome, and the State Department and the ever closing world where we have got to be more interconnected than ever should be representative of our country and diversity, and having people of color therein.

I wish I knew then—maybe that is why I love this committee so much because I love foreign affairs. Maybe I would not be in Congress now. Maybe I'd be in the State Department had those doors been open or had I knew such existed in my community at the time that I was growing up.

So let us be active. Let us support 7673. Let us be proactive and not just talk about another study. Let us resolve the problem and the issue, and I think that this bill takes us in the right direction and I ask all of us to support H.R. 7873.

And, again, I compliment Congresswoman Bass for this great fantastic bill that takes us to make the State Department representative of our great country.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. The gentleman yields back his time.

Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am running out of juice here on my iPad, but I think we have enough. Thank you very much.

I want to thank my colleague from California, Congresswoman Karen Bass, for introducing an important bill to ensure that our diplomats reflect the diversity of our country. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act of 2020.

As an immigrant who came here at the age of 11 and has made this country my home, I believe diversity is one of America's greatest strengths. I have also observed through my work on this committee and my trips abroad that our diplomats do essentially work to advance the interest of the United States. I think it is fair to say that many citizens and government officials in other countries

draw conclusions about who we are as a country based on the people who represent us at our embassies around the globe.

This bill is about ensuring that we put our best foot forward. What message are we sending the world by having a State Department that is far more white and far more male than our country's actual population? More importantly, how many times are diplomats, or future diplomats, being passed over or denied the opportunity to promote our interests abroad due to the structural barriers that persist in our State Department?

It is time that those who represent us abroad fully reflect our commitment to inclusion and diversity. This bill takes a big step in that direction by making it easier for people of color to join the Foreign Service as mid-level officers. It also provides a necessary nudge to ensure that the State Department takes tangible steps to recruit and retain talented candidates of color. The lack of adequate progress over the last two decades shows that we must be purposeful in our efforts to recruit a more diverse Foreign Service work force.

I thank Congresswoman Bass for her leadership, and I urge my colleagues to support this measure. And I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I support this bill because it is needed. One of the sort of dirty little secrets in the Nation's capital is how little diversity there actually has been historically in our Foreign Service ranks. Qualified, competent, good men and women, but it doesn't always reflect, and certainly usually hasn't, the face of America, the diversity of America. And in fact, we are experiencing right now a depletion in the ranks of minority personnel in the Foreign Service. There has to be an aggressive recruitment. There has to be an aggressive commitment to making the Foreign Service so that it looks like America. That is good for American diplomacy, but it is, more importantly, a clear and clarion statement about who we are and who we want to be. And so, promoting diversity is very important.

There are two studies underway, Mr. Chairman, one by the Council on Foreign Relations, the other by Harvard University Kennedy School, both looking at this subject and coming up with recommendations, which I am sure this committee will want to look at and hold hearings about probably next year. But this needed now.

And I fully support Ms. Bass' efforts in this bill and hope our colleagues will as well. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Cicilline.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank my colleague and friend, Congresswoman Karen Bass, for introducing H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act.

Americans around the country are protesting or standing with protestors who demand an end to systemic racism keeping black and brown Americans from equality. At the same time, our State Department faces deep challenges in hiring and retaining people of color and women in the Foreign Service. And there was a recent

hearing that was chaired by Chairman Castro that really underscored the urgency of this work and how serious this challenge is. We must work together to do what the Foreign Service Act set out to do, to create a work force at the State Department that is representative of America.

In order to reach that goal, H.R. 7673 takes the advice of many very senior current and former members of the Foreign Service and Civil Service and authorizes immediate career entry into the Foreign Service for candidates of color. I and many of my colleagues have been in discussions with senior and retired members of the Foreign Service, Ambassadors and storied civil servants who have lamented the lack of diversity at the State Department and particularly note how little progress has been made outside the Pickering and Rangel Fellowships, important programs to increase the number of outstanding young people of color entering the Foreign Service. They note that, above and beyond getting new recruits of color and retaining the professionals that we already have in the Foreign Service, much more work will need to be done to make the State Department's culture welcoming to all.

This is work that the committee must commit to. This committee has provided oversight to the State Department's diversity since at least 1973. We have made too little progress and we have to commit to working together to make much more progress.

As Americans around the country bravely and fiercely stand up for racial justice in their communities, let us stand up for a Foreign Service that harnesses the rich experiences of all Americans and represents the brilliant and beautiful diversity of our great country.

I urge my colleagues to support the Represent America Abroad Act and thank my colleague, Congressman Bass, for its introduction. I am proud to be an original cosponsor and urge all of my colleagues to support this important legislation.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Cicilline.

Mr. Lieu.

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Chairman Engel.

Let me first start off by joining the other members of this committee in praising you for your many decades of service and for your leadership on this committee. It is an honor to serve with you on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

I rise in support of this important legislation by Representative Bass. And let me tell you a story. First of all, this issue of the lack of diversity is a bipartisan issue. It has occurred in both Democratic and Republican administrations. And in my first term in Congress, I was on a CODEL with Nancy Pelosi and other Members and we were going to China. And we had a briefing by multiple agencies prior to our trip. We visited different places and met with very high-ranking officials in China. At the briefings that we had here in the U.S. prior to the trip, there were about a dozen people in the room from these different agencies. Not a single one of them was Asian-American. And it occurred to me halfway through the meeting that this is probably not good when you have the top-level people in our Federal Government working on the issue of China and everybody looks exactly the same. I think there

might be some expertise that does not occur when that happens that the U.S. loses on.

And so, I wholeheartedly support Representative Bass' diversify by the State Department. After this bill becomes law, I think we also need to simply change the culture at the State Department and change some other rules and regulations. There was an important hearing done last week where we had two State Department officials. This was a hearing that Representative Castro chaired and Representative Cicilline mentioned. And what we do know is, from surveys done by, for example, the Asian-American group at the State Department, assignment restrictions hamper our Foreign Service Officers. And so, some of them, for example, simply will not be assigned to different countries or high-profile countries just because of who they are.

And so, I asked a very simple question of these two State Department officials. I said, "If you are Russian-American, does that mean you are not allowed to work in Russia or work on Russian issues? Or if you are Chinese-American, are you barred from working on issues related to China?" They could not answer that question.

First of all, it is illegal. You cannot do that. You cannot discriminate against any Federal employee based purely on their ethnicity. So, the State Department has to stop doing that. And if there are assignment restrictions based on factors that may cause, for example, a national security risk, they have got to be valid.

So, I think there needs to be a wholesale change to the State Department. This has been going on for far too long in both Democrat and Republican administrations.

I, for example, am no less American than Chairman Engel. I am also no more American than Chairman Engel. We are all Americans. And the State Department needs to treat its Foreign Service exactly the same way. We are all Americans and should be treated that way. I wholeheartedly support Representative Bass' comments.

And I just have to end tonight saying how last night's comments by the President of the United States were utterly disgraceful when he somehow said an immigrant Member of Congress, how she was running our country. Well, guess what? We are all Americans. We are all trying to run our country the best that we can.

I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Ms. Titus.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am a cosponsor of this bill, and I strongly support it and thank our colleague, Ms. Bass, for bringing it forward.

I know that this particular bill has to do with racial and ethnic representation in the State Department, and I know it is certainly needed to make us look more like the face of America. But I would just like to put on the record that, as we turn to the State Department to diversify its ranks, let's not forget about those with disabilities. I am sure if you pulled up statistics of how many people working in the State Department were in a wheelchair or had some other kind of disability, it would be far less even than those with racial or ethnic identifications. For the record, as we move in this

direction, let's keep that in mind and see if we cannot make some improvements in that area as well.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Titus.

Do any other members wish to speak on the bill?

Hearing no further requests, we will move on to amendments.

For what purpose does Mr. Zeldin seek recognition?

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk and I ask for its consideration at this time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman is recognized for that purpose.

The clerk shall distribute the amendment. It has been done, I am told. For members currently in the hearing room, a member of the staff will bring a copy to you. Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment? Okay. They have.

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. "Zeldin Amendment No. 1. An amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 7673.

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

Section 1, Short Title. This Act may be cited as the Represent America Abroad Act of 2020."

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Zeldin follows:]

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AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 7673
OFFERED BY M. _____

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Represent America
3 Abroad Act of 2020”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) As the United States becomes more racially
7 and ethnically diverse, the Department of State and
8 the United States Agency for International Develop-
9 ment (USAID) must continue to invest in policies to
10 recruit, retain, and develop the best and brightest
11 from the full spectrum of American society in order
12 to be better positioned to advance United States in-
13 terests abroad.

14 (2) Foreign Service officers are America’s face
15 to the world. Thus, the workforce must represent the
16 United States commitment to inclusion and diversity
17 in order to effectively advance American values on
18 the world stage.

1 (3) The Department of State and USAID must
2 embrace policies that recruit professionals from the
3 broadest possible pool of talent and retain them in
4 order to significantly increase diversity in the For-
5 eign Service. Timely action to increase diversity at
6 the mid-levels is crucial, as it takes approximately
7 nine years for an entry level Foreign Service officer
8 (class 6, 5, 4) to rise to the mid-ranks of the For-
9 eign Service (class 3, 2, or 1).

10 (4) A January 2020 GAO report (GAO-20-237)
11 found that minority representation in the Foreign
12 Service had increased from 17 percent to 24 percent
13 between 2002 and 2018. The Government Account-
14 ability Office also found barriers to a diverse and in-
15 clusive workforce within the ranks of the Foreign
16 Service, especially at the mid-career and senior lev-
17 els. At the executive level, individuals who are racial
18 or ethnic minorities comprise only 13 percent at the
19 Department of State.

20 (5) Secretaries of State have acknowledged the
21 lack of workforce diversity and pledged to take con-
22 crete steps to address the problem. In 2017, then-
23 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recognized a great
24 diversity gap in the Department of State and former
25 Secretary of State John Kerry noted that in order

1 to represent the United States, the Department of
2 State must have a workforce that reflects the rich
3 composition of its citizenry.

4 (6) Secretary Pompeo called diversity in the
5 State Department's workforce a "necessity" in
6 terms of "race, religion, background, and more". In
7 an effort to increase diversity, Secretary Pompeo re-
8 cently announced an increase of 50 percent in the
9 number of Rangel and Pickering Fellows that will be
10 joining the ranks of the Foreign Service.

11 (7) Congress authorized the creation of a 3-year
12 lateral entry pilot project under section 404 of the
13 Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year
14 2017 (Public Law 114-323; 130 Stat. 1928) to
15 bring highly qualified individuals with special skills,
16 which the Department may lack, into the Foreign
17 Service at the mid-career level. Such a project would
18 not only allow the Foreign Service to supplement its
19 work force with those possessing complementary and
20 needed skills, but it would also serve as an avenue
21 to diversify the mid-level and senior ranks of the
22 Foreign Service.

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1 **SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST; STATE-**
2 **MENT OF POLICY.**

3 (a) DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INTEREST.—Con-
4 gress declares that it is in the national interest of the
5 United States to ensure that the members of the United
6 States Foreign Service workforce be representative of the
7 American people.

8 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
9 of the Department of State and of the United States
10 Agency for International Development—

11 (1) to strengthen the Foreign Service workforce
12 by bolstering the diversity of those who represent
13 Americans abroad; and

14 (2) to treat the people of the Foreign Service
15 as its primary asset, and as such, hold as a central
16 tenet making strides in increasing minority represen-
17 tation at all levels of the Foreign Service workforce
18 to secure the country's national interests.

19 **SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION.**

20 Section 404 of the Department of State Authorities
21 Act, Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–323; 130 Stat.
22 1928) is amended as follows:

23 (1) In subsection (a)—

24 (A) by striking “It is the sense of Congress
25 that the Foreign Service” and inserting the fol-
26 lowing: “It is the sense of Congress that—

1 “(1) the Foreign Service”;

2 (B) by striking the period at the end and
3 inserting “; and”; and

4 (C) by adding at the end the following:

5 “(2) the lateral entry pilot program authorized
6 under this section should be an avenue for the For-
7 eign Service to diversify its mid-level ranks by in-
8 cluding applicants from traditionally under-rep-
9 resented groups in terms of racial, ethnic, geo-
10 graphic, and gender diversity, and disability sta-
11 tus.”.

12 (2) By adding at the end of subsection (c) the
13 following:

14 “(6) Information regarding each program par-
15 ticipant, disaggregated by race, ethnicity, gender, in-
16 stitution of higher learning, and disability status.”.

17 (3) By redesignating subsection (c) (as amend-
18 ed by paragraph (2)) and subsection (d) as sub-
19 sections (d) and (e) respectively.

20 (4) By inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
21 lowing:

22 “(c) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The program au-
23 thorized under subsection (b) shall be implemented not
24 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
25 section, and the Secretary shall—

1 “(1) ensure that not fewer than 15 program
2 participants per year are placed in the Foreign Serv-
3 ice;

4 “(2) include recruitment outreach for program
5 participation to—

6 “(A) diversity officers in the private sector;

7 “(B) all members of the Department’s civil
8 service and recognized Department affinity
9 groups;

10 “(C) the civil service of other national se-
11 curity related federal agencies;

12 “(D) professional associations; and

13 “(E) colleges and universities, including
14 historically Black colleges and universities and
15 other minority-serving institutions such as His-
16 panic-serving institutions, Asian American and
17 Native American Pacific Islander-serving insti-
18 tutions, American Indian Tribally controlled
19 colleges and universities, Alaska Native and Na-
20 tive Hawaiian-serving institutions, Tribal col-
21 leges and universities, Predominantly Black In-
22 stitutions, land grant universities, and Native
23 American-serving, Nontribal institutions;

24 “(3) ensure that successful applicants include
25 applicants with experience in strategic communica-

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1 tion, financial instruments, and trade promotion,
2 and that such participants are placed in the eco-
3 nomic and public diplomacy cones of the Foreign
4 Service, respectively; and

5 “(4) advertise the program and publish eligi-
6 bility criteria for candidates to participate on a pub-
7 licly accessible website of the Department.”.



Chairman ENGEL. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support his the amendment.

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My amendment would strengthen and revamp a lateral entry program into the Foreign Service that has been law since December 2016, but has not yet been implemented. This gives us a unique opportunity to refocus our objectives. The lateral entry program would require outreach and inclusion of minorities and mandate recruitment and reporting of progress to Congress. This amendment recognizes the importance of diversity and the need to do more in the mid-level and senior ranks of the Foreign Service without harming the structure of the Foreign Service.

Ms. Bass' bill would disrupt the multi-step process of the Foreign Service by artificially elevating candidates who enter into a lateral entry program into mid-level status. The American Foreign Service Association, which represents over 28,000 active and retired Foreign Service employees, opposes that bill. I would request unanimous consent to enter a letter into the record from the American Foreign Service Association regarding the Bass bill.

[The information referred to follows:]



August 31, 2020

AFSA strongly believes that the Foreign Service is most effective when it attracts, retains, and promotes people who represent all our citizens.

This is both a question of representation – showing the world that America's strength is its people – and a matter of excellence. We are best when the ranks of our Service reflect the diversity of our country.

We at AFSA read with interest H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act. We would like to work with you to craft proposals that meet our shared goal of improving diversity at State. While we share your goals, we believe that aspects of this legislation would be detrimental to the effectiveness, morale, and cohesion of the Foreign Service at State. We are confident that if we pause and work together, we can make a lasting difference for this country.

Mid-level Foreign Service positions and responsibilities do not rely on country or subject knowledge alone, but also a demonstrated ability to promote U.S. interests effectively in an overseas environment. Without the experience that comes with starting at the entry level, the ability to function effectively and, in many cases, lead State Department and interagency teams in an overseas environment will likely be lacking.

The U.S. military does not appoint someone from the outside at the rank of major or lieutenant colonel for a reason – they do not have the requisite experience and training. Someone entering the legal or medical fields does not come in at a mid-level rank: they start with the same education, licensing, training, and tenure requirements as those who entered from the beginning of the process.

In addition to these drawbacks, there are important morale concerns. Entrance to the Foreign Service is a competitive, multi-step process, in keeping with the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The Foreign Service is also an up-or-out profession, like the U.S. military, where at every step one has a limited amount of time to receive tenure after entering, and then to be promoted to each grade.

To bring people in, as this legislation proposes, at the FS-03, FS-02 and FS-01 levels with less relevant experience than those who entered the Foreign Service competitively at the entry level potentially sets the mid-level entrants up for failure, and could easily be perceived as unfair to those who have worked as many as 15 years or more to reach the 01 level, and significant number of years to reach the 02 and 03 levels.

In addition to the morale problems such a program would create, management problems could also ensue. Outside mid-level entrants are not prepared to be supervisors in the Foreign Service


system, and to put them in that role is harmful to all – to them, to their more experienced subordinates, and to U.S. interests. Other concerns are more technical, such as slowing down promotions for all; creating a glut in the mid-level ranks, as happened a few years ago; and not having enough overseas Foreign Service positions to accommodate the number of mid-level officers.

We do not have a shortage of a mid-level officers. We do have a shortage of overseas mid-level positions that is already causing serious morale and retention problems. We do, of course, have a serious problem with diversity in the middle ranks of the Foreign Service, which in part is tied to retention and attrition.

There is no doubt that State could do more to address these failings, and we would like to work with you as well as with the employee affinity groups to identify solutions that we can support. I look forward to continuing this conversation.

Thank you for your concern for and commitment to the Foreign Service, and to the important goal of making it truly diverse and representative of the American people.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Eric S. Rubin".

Eric S. Rubin
President

Mr. ZELDIN. The American Foreign Service Association offered to work with the majority to improve the language because they are rightfully concerned that the way the language is currently drafted would be unfair to those Foreign Service Officers who have worked for many years to reach mid-level status.

The Foreign Service is similar to the Army in that you gradually rise through the ranks. You do not just skip steps. The original bill would permit participants of the lateral entry program to bypass years of service. These years of service are necessary to provide expertise on managing embassies abroad. That bill was drafted without input from the State Department and without working with the minority on changes.

I helped lead the effort on another bill in the en bloc package that was drafted with bipartisan input to create a paid internship program at State without drastically changing the structure of the Foreign Service, but organically increasing diversity. And I appreciate Chairman Castro's work on that bill.

Diversity and inclusion should play a central role in improving recruitment, retention, and career development efforts. However, we must be responsible about creating programs that unfairly impact current Foreign Service Officers who have spent years rising through the ranks.

To summarize, my amendment identifies the importance of attracting and maintaining a diverse Foreign Service through the mid and senior ranks. This amendment would revamp a pre-existing mandated lateral entry pilot program project by adding additional requirements for minority outreach and inclusion and require the State Department to report to Congress on those efforts.

I want to take this opportunity to thank Ms. Bass for her passion and leadership on this issue. She genuinely is working hard on this cause, and I appreciate that.

I want to respond to one comment one of my colleagues made a little while ago. Mr. Meeks said that the amendment was just a study, and it is important to note that there is actually nothing at all in the bill that references a study. It does have a mandate for a new recruitment guideline, and it is also not just some reporting requirement, but certainly nothing in the text with regards to a study.

I also want to take this opportunity to echo the praise and gratitude of my colleagues, as we have done throughout this day, for Chairman Engel. I have got to say, personally, even though I am on the other side of the aisle, I was saddened to learn the news that he is going to be moving on to other pursuits. Chairman Engel has worked hard throughout his career on many incredibly important issues related to strengthening U.S. foreign policy in our country, strengthening relationships with our allies like Israel, and is someone who will definitely be greatly missed in this chamber. So, I thank Chairman Engel for his friendship, his years of service, his chairmanship here on the committee, and I wish him the best of luck and fortune in everything that is still ahead in his life.

I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. I thank the gentleman for his kind words. Thank you very much.

Ms. Bass.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

While we appreciate the amendment offered that seeks to amend the lateral entry program into the Foreign Service that was passed into law in 2017, I must let you know that it does not tackle the issue head-on. The use of the words, quote, “should be an avenue for the Foreign Service to diversify” is no different from current recruitment into Foreign Service.

What we have learned is that traditional recruitment has been unsuccessful in recruiting historically underrepresented groups into the Foreign Service. And while my colleagues are concerned about the fact that this is skipping steps, and people who have been in the ranks for a while move up, the problem is that people in the Foreign Service who represent underrepresented groups who have the same qualifications, the same years of service, are not promoted. So, there is a problem within the Foreign Service.

I think that it is sad when we think about people being demoralized when we are talking about diversity, because the fact of the matter is, even when there are people of color in the Foreign Service, they do not stay long. They are not retained because of the glass ceiling. So, when we are concerned about the moral challenges at the State Department, we need to be concerned about the fact that people who face a glass ceiling in a building that is supposed to be a meritocracy do not receive the same treatment.

The more the national security work force reflects America, the more effectively it can advance American values on a global stage. Diversity and inclusion is a priority for all of us. It makes us safer as a country and it is the right thing to do.

The legislation that was passed in 2017, you are talking about the Foreign Service Association, they actually opposed that as well. And so, I think that there are not many times in history when we talk about diversion, I mean when we talk about diversity and inclusion, whether it is a trade union or other professional associations, when they have not opposed it. They oppose it, and then, they oppose it because they feel as though, when you say word “diversity,” that somebody is going to lose; people who are already in power are going to lose some of that power.

And so, there is a knee-jerk reaction to oppose it, as opposed to viewing that there is enough room for everyone, especially in the State Department right now. Because the fact of the matter is over the last few years the State Department has lost many, many people, and it is going to be a need to recruit people in the future. And so, there needs to be attention, a specific attention, to diversity when we are talking about that.

I also understand that there are concerns about potential litigation, but new legislation often faces these concerns. The legislation risk I am worried about is the committee’s failing to act, to not address the lack of diversity at the mid and senior ranks.

When the GAO—the GAO—finds that racial and ethnic minorities are promoted at lower levels than their white counterparts, when you control for language and education and other things, this strikes me as a potential vulnerability to the State Department. So, the risk I am worried about is what happens if we do nothing.

And as I mentioned before, all of us travel the world. All of us go to embassies. Who do you see when you go to embassies? I trav-

el a lot in Africa and it is a rare occasion that I see an African-American or a person of color in those embassies. And when they do see me, they rush over to spend time with me to talk to me, and privately will tell me about what it is like, the discrimination that they face, the way they have a glass ceiling and they are not able to move up. And frankly, I have talked to many Foreign Service Officers that I had to convince to stay in the Foreign Service because they were so demoralized. So, just having programs that encourage and do not do anything specific is not a way to resolve this problem.

I yield back my time.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentlewoman yields back.

Is there further debate on the amendment?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the amendment. We are going to take a vote by voice. All Members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it and the amendment is not agreed to.

Do any other member seek recognition?

Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question is to report H.R. 7673, the Represent America Abroad Act, to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass.

We are going to take a vote by voice. All Members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The measure is ordered favorably reported.

Without objection, staff is authorized to make technical and conforming changes.

OK. Pursuant to notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act. The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. "H.R. 4507, to protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes."

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with. Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The Bill H.R. 4507 follows:]

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4507

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 26, 2019

Mr. CONNOLLY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
5 Dissidents Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and
9 Washington Post columnist, was killed and dis-

1 membered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Tur-
2 key on October 2, 2018, by agents with close ties to
3 the Government of Saudi Arabia.

4 (2) Khashoggi was a longtime resident of the
5 United States, living in Virginia under an “O” visa
6 and was in the process of applying for a permanent
7 residency. Two of his four children are United
8 States citizens.

9 (3) For many years, Khashoggi wrote on Saudi
10 political and cultural issues and after criticisms of
11 Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, Khashoggi
12 chose to reside in the United States due to his grow-
13 ing fear of arrest in Saudi Arabia. From a self-im-
14 posed exile, he wrote monthly columns in the Wash-
15 ington Post, including columns that criticized var-
16 ious Saudi policies.

17 (4) On October 2, 2018, Khashoggi visited the
18 Saudi consulate in Istanbul with his fiancée to con-
19 duct routine consular matters. She waited for him
20 for over ten hours outside the consulate, but he
21 never re-emerged. The Turkish authorities subse-
22 quently reported that Khashoggi was murdered in-
23 side the Saudi consulate.

24 (5) For over two weeks following the murder,
25 Saudi Arabia denied any knowledge of Khashoggi’s

1 whereabouts and claimed the allegations were
2 “false” and “baseless”. However, on October 20,
3 2018, state television in Saudi Arabia reported that
4 the journalist was murdered in a “rogue operation”
5 under the orders of intelligence officers.

6 (6) Though Saudi Arabia has detained 21 peo-
7 ple, dismissed two senior officials, and charged elev-
8 en people for Khashoggi’s murder, the Government
9 of Saudi Arabia has denied that Saudi leadership or-
10 dered the killing and has refused to extradite any
11 suspects to Turkey.

12 (7) To date the United States Government has
13 taken no actions to force an independent, inter-
14 national investigation of the killing of Jamal
15 Khashoggi nor shown any willingness to hold ac-
16 countable the highest levels of Saudi leadership.

17 **SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTI-**
18 **CLES AND SERVICES, ANY DESIGN AND CON-**
19 **STRUCTION SERVICES, AND ANY MAJOR DE-**
20 **FENSE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.**

21 (a) INITIAL PERIOD.—During the 120-day period be-
22 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the
23 President may not transfer, sell, or authorize a license for
24 export of any defense articles or services, any design and
25 construction services, or any major defense equipment

1 under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et
2 seq.), regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
3 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or law
4 enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Government
5 of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an agent of
6 or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality.

7 (b) SUBSEQUENT PERIODS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the 120-day period
9 beginning on the day after the end of the 120-day
10 period described in subsection (a), and every 120
11 days thereafter, the President may not transfer, sell,
12 or authorize a license for export of any defense arti-
13 cles or services, any design and construction serv-
14 ices, or any major defense equipment under the
15 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.),
16 regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
17 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or
18 law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the
19 Government of Saudi Arabia, or to any person act-
20 ing as an agent of or on behalf of such agency or
21 instrumentality, unless the President submits to the
22 chairman and ranking member of the appropriate
23 congressional committees a certification described in
24 paragraph (2) with respect to such 120-day period.

1 (2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described
2 in this paragraph is a certification that contains a
3 determination of the President that—

4 (A) the Government of Saudi Arabia is co-
5 operating with an independent, international in-
6 vestigation into the murder of Jamal
7 Khashoggi;

8 (B) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
9 released any individual who is a journalist,
10 blogger, human rights defender, advocate for
11 religious freedom, or civil society activist de-
12 tained by the Government of Saudi Arabia for
13 such individual's work;

14 (C) the Government of Saudi Arabia is re-
15 fraining from arresting, detaining, and
16 harassing individuals for blasphemy and apos-
17 tasy, and is protecting the equal rights of all
18 citizens to freedom of religion or belief;

19 (D) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
20 taken verifiable steps to end the torture of de-
21 tainees; and

22 (E) the Government of Saudi Arabia has
23 disbanded any units of its intelligence or secu-
24 rity apparatus dedicated to the forced repatri-

1 ation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other
2 countries.

3 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
4 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
5 sional committees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
7 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
8 resentatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
10 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

11 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
12 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
13 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
14 **STATES.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

16 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
17 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses may
18 be issued to any country determined by the Presi-
19 dent to be engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
20 of intimidation or harassment directed against indi-
21 viduals in the United States.

22 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
23 further requires the President to report any such de-
24 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of
25 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs

1 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
2 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
3 Senate.

4 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
5 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
6 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
8 the Senate a report on whether any official of the Govern-
9 ment of Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of
10 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against Jamal
11 Khashoggi or any individual in the United States.

12 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
13 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
14 a classified annex.

15 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
16 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
17 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

18 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
20 the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
21 appropriate congressional committees a report covering
22 the three year period before such date regarding whether
23 and to what extent covered persons used diplomatic cre-
24 dentials or covered facilities to monitor, track, surveil, har-

1 ass, or harm other Saudi nationals living in the United
2 States.

3 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act and an-
6 nually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of
7 State shall, if the Secretary determines that such is
8 the case, submit to the appropriate congressional
9 committees a certification that covered persons are
10 not using diplomatic credentials or covered facilities
11 to monitor, track, surveil, harass, or harm Saudi na-
12 tionals living in the United States during the time
13 period covered by each such certification.

14 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
15 the Secretary of State does not submit a certifi-
16 cation under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall—

17 (A) close one or more covered facilities for
18 such period of time until the Secretary does
19 submit such a certification; and

20 (B) submit to the appropriate congres-
21 sional committee a report that contains—

22 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
23 Secretary is unable to make such a certifi-
24 cation; and

1 (ii) an identification of the locations
2 of the covered facilities referred to in sub-
3 paragraph (A).

4 (c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a)
5 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
7 a classified annex.

8 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
13 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
14 of the House of Representatives; and

15 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
16 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
17 Senate.

18 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
19 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
20 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

21 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
22 person” means a Saudi national credentialed to a
23 covered facility.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
2 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
4 Community Directive 191 provides that—

5 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
6 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
7 and specific information indicating an impending
8 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
9 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must
10 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
11 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

12 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
13 the threat information rises to the threshold of
14 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
15 favor of warning the intended victim.

16 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
17 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
18 telligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
19 committees a report with respect to—

20 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
21 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
22 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
23 munity Directive 191; and

24 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
25 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-

1 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
2 fulfill this duty.

3 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
4 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
5 a classified annex.

6 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
8 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
11 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
12 of the House of Representatives; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
14 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
15 Senate.

16 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
17 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
18 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
19 2015.

20 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
21 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
22 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
23 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

○

Chairman ENGEL. I now offer the Connolly amendment in the nature of the substitute that was noticed as base text. The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. "Connolly Amendment No. 86. Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4507.

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

Section 1, Short Title. This Act may be cited as the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2020.

Section 2"——

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, the reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute will be considered original text for purposes of further amendment.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Connolly follows:]

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
3 Dissidents Act of 2020”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident,
7 Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,
8 was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate
9 in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018, by at least
10 14 intelligence officers of the Government of Saudi
11 Arabia. Khashoggi was lured to the consulate under
12 the false cover of needing to address a consular mat-
13 ter. Following the killing, 17 officers from the Saudi
14 intelligence service, or Mabahith, reportedly visited
15 Istanbul and cleansed the crime scene.

16 (2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was
17 living in Virginia under an “O” visa and was in the
18 process of applying for a permanent residency.

1 (3) A subsequent, highly-credible investigation
2 by the United Nations concluded that Khashoggi's
3 killing was premeditated and that the mission was
4 endorsed, planned, and overseen by senior Saudi of-
5 ficials.

6 **SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTI-**
7 **CLES AND SERVICES, DESIGN AND CON-**
8 **STRUCTION SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE**
9 **EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 120
11 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
12 dent may not sell, authorize a license for the export of,
13 or otherwise transfer any defense articles or services, de-
14 sign and construction services, or major defense equip-
15 ment under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751
16 et seq.), regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
17 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or law
18 enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Government
19 of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an agent of
20 or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality, unless the
21 President has submitted to the chairman and ranking
22 member of the appropriate congressional committees a
23 certification described in subsection (b).

24 (b) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this
25 subsection is a certification that contains a determination

1 of the President that, during the 120-day period preceding
2 the date of submission of the certification, the Government
3 of Saudi Arabia has not conducted any activities through
4 its intelligence, internal security, or law enforcement agen-
5 cies or instrumentalities that constitute forced repatri-
6 ation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

7 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the restric-
8 tions in this section if the President determines and sub-
9 mits to the appropriate congressional committees written
10 notice and justification not later than 15 days before the
11 granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the na-
12 tional security interests of the United States.

13 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
14 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
15 gressional committees” means—

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
17 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
18 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives; and

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
21 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
22 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.

1 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
2 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
3 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
4 **STATES.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
7 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses or
8 other authorizations may be issued for the export of
9 goods or services to any country determined by the
10 President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of
11 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against
12 individuals in the United States.

13 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
14 further requires the President to report any such de-
15 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of
16 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
17 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
18 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
19 Senate.

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
22 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

23 (1) whether any official of the Government of
24 Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
25 of intimidation or harassment directed against

1 Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United
2 States; and

3 (2) whether any United States-origin defense
4 articles were used in the activities described in para-
5 graph (1).

6 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
7 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
8 a classified annex.

9 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
10 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
11 gressional committees” means—

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
13 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
14 House of Representatives; and

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
16 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

17 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
18 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
19 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

20 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
22 to the appropriate congressional committees a report cov-
23 ering the three-year period preceding such date of enact-
24 ment regarding whether and to what extent covered per-
25 sons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities

1 to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harass-
2 ment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
3 in the United States.

4 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
7 President shall, if the President determines that
8 such is the case, submit to the appropriate congress-
9 sional committees a certification that covered per-
10 sons are not using diplomatic credentials, visas, or
11 covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking,
12 surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other na-
13 tionals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States
14 during the time period covered by each such certifi-
15 cation.

16 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
17 the President does not submit a certification under
18 paragraph (1), the President shall—

19 (A) close one or more covered facilities for
20 such period of time until the President does
21 submit such a certification; and

22 (B) submit to the appropriate congress-
23 sional committee a report that contains—

1 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
2 President is unable to make such a certifi-
3 cation;

4 (ii) a list and summary of engage-
5 ments of the United States Government
6 with the Government of Saudi Arabia re-
7 garding the use of diplomatic credentials,
8 visas, or covered facilities described in
9 paragraph (1); and

10 (iii) a description of actions the
11 United States Government has taken or in-
12 tends to take in response to the use of dip-
13 lomatic credentials, visas, or covered facili-
14 ties described in paragraph (1).

15 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
16 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the restric-
20 tions in this section if the President determines and sub-
21 mits to the appropriate congressional committees written
22 notice and justification not later than 15 days before the
23 granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the na-
24 tional security interests of the United States.

25 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
5 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
6 of the House of Representatives; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
8 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 Senate.

10 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
11 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
12 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

13 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
14 person” means a national of Saudi Arabia
15 credentialed to a covered facility.

16 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
17 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
19 Community Directive 191 provides that—

20 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
21 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
22 and specific information indicating an impending
23 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
24 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must

1 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
2 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

3 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
4 the threat information rises to the threshold of
5 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
6 favor of warning the intended victim.

7 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
8 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
9 telligence, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
10 United States intelligence agencies, shall submit to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees a report with respect
12 to—

13 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
14 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
15 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
16 munity Directive 191; and

17 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
18 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-
19 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
20 fulfill this duty.

21 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
22 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
23 a classified annex.

24 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
5 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
6 of the House of Representatives; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
8 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 Senate.

10 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
11 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
12 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
13 2015.

14 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
15 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
16 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
17 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

18 (4) RELEVANT UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
19 AGENCY.—The term “relevant United States intel-
20 ligence agency” means any element of the intel-
21 ligence community that may have possessed intel-
22 ligence reporting regarding threats to Jamal
23 Khashoggi.



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**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA**

Page 3, line 6, strike “silencing” and insert “intimidation”.

Page 3, after line 6, insert the following (and redesignate subsequent subsections accordingly):

- 1 (c) FORM.—The certification required by subsection
2 (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may con-
3 tain a classified annex.



Chairman ENGEL. And at this time, I recognize Mr. Connolly to speak on the measure.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair.

I want to remind my colleagues that tomorrow is the second anniversary of the brutal murder and dismemberment of my constituent, Jamal Khashoggi. And to this day, the Saudi government that preplanned in a calculated and bloody way Mr. Khashoggi's death has yet to be held to account. This bill seeks to focus on that accountability.

The Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act bans the sale of U.S. weapons to Saudi intelligence, law enforcement, or internal security until and unless the Secretary of State can certify that these agencies are not involved in forced repatriation, silencing, or the killing of Saudi dissidents in other countries, including our own.

It enhances congressional oversight whether the government of Saudi Arabia was engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United States, and whether any U.S.-origin defense articles were used in those activities.

It requires the President to close at least one Saudi diplomatic facility in the U.S. if—if—Saudi diplomats are using diplomatic credentials, visas, or diplomatic facilities, as they did in Istanbul, to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, harassment, or harm to other nationals of Saudi Arabia living here in the United States.

And finally, it improves congressional oversight of the intelligence community regarding the extent to which the intelligence community fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats to his life and liberty.

The bill, Mr. Chairman, has the support of numerous, well over a dozen, prestigious outside groups that care about human rights and advocate for them, including the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders, PEN America, the Project on Middle East Democracy, Freedom House, Freedom Initiative, Human Rights First, Freedom Forward, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Saudi American Justice Project, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom Now, among a number.

And I would ask unanimous consent that statements and letters of support from those organizations be entered into the record.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]



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President

Markus Dohle
Executive Vice President

Maha Gessen
Vice President

Tracy Higgins
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Mary Ann Newman
Christian Oberbeck
Hannah Pakula
Gregory Pardlo
Michael Pietsch
Marvin Putnam
Theresa Rebeck
Alix Ritchie
Fatima Shaik
Andrew Solomon
Jacob Weisberg
Jamie Wolf
Hanya Yanagihara

September 30, 2020

Representative Gerry Connolly
2238 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Connolly,

I write on behalf of PEN America to express our support for the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019, H.R. 4507. If enacted, this bill would constitute an important step towards holding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia accountable for its relentless attacks on dissidents, both domestically and abroad. I commend you for your leadership in sponsoring and advancing this vital legislation.

As you well know, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places severe restrictions on freedom of thought and expression—both in and outside of the country's borders. According to [PEN America's 2019 Freedom to Write Index](#), with at least 38 behind bars, Saudi Arabia is the world's second leading jailer of writers and public intellectuals. Those detained face harassment, legal charges, and even violence while in the country (including women's rights activists and [2019 Freedom to Write Award recipients](#) Nouf Abdulaziz, Loujain Al-Hathloul, and Eman Al-Nafjan). Meanwhile, critics of the government cannot escape similar reprisal abroad—including journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed nearly two years ago on the behest of Saudi government officials. Numerous other exiled Saudi journalists, activists, and dissidents face surveillance, intimidation, attempts to lure them back to Saudi soil, and occasionally similar threats of lethal violence. The second anniversary of Khashoggi's murder reminds us that no one is safe from KSA's brutal attempts to quell dissent. The international community must show strong, vocal opposition to the Kingdom's continued global encroachment on basic human rights both at home and abroad.

It is imperative that the United States take steps towards safeguarding dissidents from retaliation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—and more specifically, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—by seeking justice and providing protection for those who have been targeted. PEN America urges the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to favorably consider this legislation. The United States must seek justice for Jamal Khashoggi and continued safety for those who dare to speak.

Sincerely,

Thomas O. Melia
Washington Director

To Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

We, the undersigned organizations, write to applaud Representative Connolly's efforts to secure justice and accountability for Jamal Khashoggi and all Saudi Arabian dissidents, in House Resolution 4507, The Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019. H.R. 4507 would prohibit licenses for future weapons sales to Saudi Arabia if basic human rights protections for U.S. and Saudi citizens are not met.

Specifically, H.R. 4507 would require the President to certify that the Saudi Arabian government is taking the following measures:

1. Cooperate with an independent investigation into the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
2. Release any journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, or civil society activists detained for their work.
3. Protect the equal rights of all citizens to freedom of religion or belief
4. Take verifiable steps to end torture of detainees.
5. Disband any units of its intelligence or security apparatus dedicated to the forced repatriation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

It's been nearly two years since the heinous murder of Jamal Khashoggi on October 2nd 2018, and reports show that egregious violations of human rights of Saudi Arabia citizens are only increasing. Medical neglect of Saudi detainees is an ongoing concern, that has led to the tragic deaths of human rights activist Abdullah al-Hamid in April of 2020 and journalist Saleh al-Shehi in June of 2020. Women's rights activists, such as Loujain al-Hathloul, Samar Badawi, and Nouf Abdulaziz, remain in detention and are subjected to torture, inhumane degrading treatment, and sexual violence. Currently there are estimated to be over 3,000 political prisoners in Saudi Arabia who find themselves in severely compromised humanitarian circumstances and with almost no legal protections.

Furthermore, the lack of real accountability from the United States after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi has left many U.S. citizens and residents with ties to Saudi, in constant fear of retaliation by Saudi Arabia. One example was defected Saudi intelligence officer Saad Al-Jabri and his family who were reportedly victims of an international man-hunt in the United States and assassination attempt by Mohamed Bin Salman's mercenary group the "Tiger Squad."

Also, in April of 2019, dual US-Saudi citizens Salah al-Haidar and Badr Al-Ibrahim were detained at a time of mass arrests; both have been declared prisoners of conscience. Areej Al-Sadhan of California and Abdullah Al-Aoudh of Virginia, whose family members are detained in cases that violate their right to freedom of speech, have been subject to intimidation and harassment, and prevented from communicating with their

family members in prison. Horrendous stories like these are far too common and exactly what The Protecting Saudi Dissidents Act is trying to prevent.

Again we, the undersigned organizations, urge Members to work with Representative Connolly, to ensure justice and accountability for Jamal Khashoggi and all ongoing human rights violations to Saudi dissidents committed by the Saudi Arabian government. Thanks for the consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

Friends Committee on National Legislation
The Freedom Initiative
Freedom Forward
The Saudi American Justice Project

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair.

Now the facts of the case. Two years ago tomorrow, my constituent and lawful U.S. resident, a journalist, mild critic of the Saudi regime—he wanted to see reform, not revolution—Jamal Khashoggi, was lured into a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, because he needed paperwork to remarry. He was lured into that consulate under false assurances of his own personal security, where he was murdered in cold blood and dismembered by agents of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, reportedly, by our own intelligence community and Turkey’s intelligence community, at the direction of the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman himself. And with, as I said, false assurances of safety given to him by the Saudi Ambassador here in the United States at that time.

The U.S. intelligence community assessed that the Crown Prince ordered Mr. Khashoggi’s murder. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Killings concluded that Mr. Khashoggi has been the victim of a deliberate premeditated execution and extrajudicial killing for which the State of Saudi Arabia is responsible. That was the finding of the United Nations Special Investigator on this case.

And we know Jamal Khashoggi was neither the lone nor last victim of Saudi Arabia’s international campaign of intimidation, disappearances, and assassinations. Dr. Saad Aljabri and Loujain al-Hathloul, these are too all-familiar names on the long list of dissidents persecuted while overseas.

I would also ask at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record a series of articles, including New York Times article “Saudi Official Hid Abroad, His Family Became a Target at Home” by way of retaliation; a May 2019 New York Times article, “It wasn’t just Khashoggi: A Saudi Prince’s Brutal Drive to Crush Dissent;” a January 2019 New York article, “The Saudi Government’s Global Campaign to Silence Its Critics;” an October 2018 New York Times article, “Our Hands Can Reach You: Khashoggi Case Shakes Saudi Dissidents Abroad,” and a June 2019 report on Jamal Khashoggi’s killing by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Killings, at this point in the record.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

As Saudi Official Hid Abroad, His Family Became a Target at Home

Saad Aljabri knows “where the bodies are buried.” Now Saudi authorities are arresting his relatives to force him to return to the kingdom, his son says.

The New York Times | Ben Hubbard | May 21, 2020 | <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/middleeast/saudi-aljabri-detain.html?auth=login-email&login=email>



Dr. Saad Aljabri, far left, at a family wedding in Riyadh in 2016. To the right are Timothy A. Lenderking, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Gulf Affairs, and Joseph W. Westphal, then the American ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Credit...via Aljabri family

BEIRUT, Lebanon — For years, he was one of Saudi Arabia’s top intelligence officers, an expert in artificial intelligence who played key roles in the kingdom’s fight against Al Qaeda and in its security coordination with the United States.

But since 2017, Saad Aljabri has been lying low in Canada, fearing for his life and resisting increasing pressure from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to return to Saudi Arabia, according to his son and associates.

That pressure campaign has now snared Mr. Aljabri's family.

Since March, two of his adult children and one of his brothers have been arrested by the Saudi security forces and held incommunicado, Mr. Aljabri's son said in a telephone interview.

"It has been weeks and we don't know where they are," said the son, Dr. Khalid Aljabri, who is also living in Canada. "They were kidnapped from their beds. I don't even know if they are alive or dead."

The Saudi authorities have not confirmed the detentions, and officials at the Saudi embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment about Mr. Aljabri or the arrests.

It is common in some Middle Eastern countries for authorities to put pressure on someone by detaining or threatening their relatives. At the same time, the killing of the dissident Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in Istanbul in 2018 raised the stakes for people like Mr. Aljabri, who once felt safe outside the kingdom.

Mr. Aljabri's son and former United States officials who worked with him say that Prince Mohammed, widely known by his initials, M.B.S., wants to force Mr. Aljabri to return to Saudi Arabia because he fears leaving someone at large who had access to so much secret information.



Omar Aljabri, 21, and his sister Sarah, 20, were arrested from their home in Riyadh in March and have not been seen or heard from since. Credit...via Aljabri family

“The broader issue is that M.B.S. is nervous about anybody who is outside of his control,” said Gerald M. Feierstein, senior vice president at the Middle East Institute in Washington, who dealt with Mr. Aljabri while serving as the United States Ambassador to Yemen.

Mr. Aljabri was immersed in so many sensitive issues during his decades in intelligence that he would know “where the bodies are buried” in Saudi Arabia, possibly including unflattering information about Prince Mohammed, Mr. Feierstein said.

Mr. Aljabri’s intelligence career ended as a casualty of the struggle between two powerful princes over who would rule Saudi Arabia, and he has become the latest example of how far Prince Mohammed will reach to squelch potential threats.

Prince Mohammed, 34, has gone after numerous critics and perceived rivals at home and abroad, including Mr. Khashoggi, who was killed after publishing opinion columns critical of Prince Mohammed in *The Washington Post*.

Mr. Aljabri was never a public critic of Prince Mohammed’s but was a staunch ally of Prince Mohammed’s chief rival for crown prince, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.

Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who headed the Interior Ministry, was arrested in March, apparently because he had been complaining privately about how the crown prince was running the kingdom.



Mr. Aljabri’s career was a casualty of the struggle between two princes, Mohammed bin Salman, left, and Mohammed bin Nayef, seen together in 2016. Credit...Bandar Al-Jaloud/Agence France-Presse, via Saudi Royal Palace/Afp Via Getty Images

Mr. Aljabri, a linguist and computer scientist with a doctorate in artificial intelligence from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, worked in the Interior Ministry for nearly four decades, earning the rank of major general, serving as Prince Mohammed bin Nayef's right-hand man and being appointed to a cabinet-level position by King Salman.

He spoke better English and was more outgoing than his boss, and maintained relationships with intelligence officials from the United States, Britain and other countries.

American officials said Mr. Aljabri played a key role in many of the kingdom's most sensitive security matters, including the fight against Al Qaeda and the protection of Saudi oil facilities. Mr. Aljabri declined to comment for this article.

His primary American interlocutors were officials in the Central Intelligence Agency, but diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks detail his discussions with other officials on topics including Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, terrorist financing and Iran's regional ambitions.

"Saad Aljabri was a good guy, full stop, and I think everybody who dealt with him appreciated him," Mr. Feierstein said. "He was smart, he was serious, he worked hard and he was well-disposed to the U.S. — a good partner for us."

Mr. Aljabri developed such close relationships with United States officials that some attended his children's weddings.



Saad Aljabri with three of his children, from left, Naif, Omar and Sarah, in 2013. Credit...via Aljabri family

Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. official now at the Brookings Institution, said that the Interior Ministry's vast surveillance apparatus gave it a treasure trove of the kingdom's secrets, including the activities of members of the royal family, corruption schemes and crime.

“Their files will be the catalog of every untoward incident, from the truly illegal to the maybe just embarrassing,” Mr. Riedel said.

While Western officials presume that Mr. Aljabri’s knowledge of those secrets lies behind the crown prince’s efforts to return him to Saudi Arabia, two people briefed on his case, one American and one Saudi, said that Saudi authorities have justified the efforts by accusing Mr. Aljabri of corruption.

The two people, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to share the information, said that Mr. Aljabri is accused of using his position to amass a personal fortune and that the prince wanted the money back.

The Saudi authorities have not made public any corruption allegations against Mr. Aljabri.

Prince Mohammed rocketed to power after his father, King Salman, ascended the throne in 2015, and Mr. Aljabri’s standing faltered as Prince Mohammed’s rose.

In late 2015, Mr. Aljabri was fired from his job at the ministry by royal order, a decision he and his boss learned of only when it was broadcast on television.

He was abroad in 2017 when Prince Mohammed shoved aside Prince Mohammed bin Nayef to become crown prince. Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef was put under house arrest and had his assets frozen, and Mr. Aljabri, concerned that he would meet a similar fate, decided not to return to Saudi Arabia, his son said.

One of the people briefed on Mr. Aljabri’s case said he had not settled in the United States despite deep ties there because he was worried that the Trump administration would send him back to Saudi Arabia if Prince Mohammed asked. President Trump has made a close relationship with Saudi Arabia key to his Middle East policy, and his son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner, is close to Prince Mohammed.



President Trump, meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed in Japan last June, has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia. Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

When Mr. Aljabri left the kingdom, two of his eight children remained, and the Saudi authorities began putting restrictions on them to pressure their father to return, Dr. Aljabri said. The two remaining children — Sarah, 20, and Omar, 21 — had planned to study in the United States, Dr. Aljabri said, but within hours of Prince Mohammed's rise to crown prince, the siblings learned that they were barred from leaving the kingdom.

Later, their bank accounts were frozen and they were summoned for questioning and told to encourage their father to come home, Dr. Aljabri said.

On March 16, security forces came to the Aljabri home in Riyadh at dawn and took Sarah and Omar Aljabri from their beds, Dr. Aljabri said. Last week, the authorities arrested Mr. Aljabri's brother, Abdulrahman Aljabri, a U.S.-educated electrical engineering professor in his 60s, Dr. Aljabri said.

The family has grown increasingly worried as the weeks have passed with no news from their relatives. So in addition to breaking their silence in an interview with The New York Times, they hired a Washington lobbying firm to press for the release of their relatives.

"They are hostages and the ransom is my father's return," Dr. Aljabri said. "MBS is all about tying up loose ends, and he decided that my dad is the biggest one."

The Saudi Government's Global Campaign to Silence Its Critics

Mohammed bin Salman's effort to burnish his image as a modernizing force of liberal reform knows no boundaries.

The New Yorker | Sarah Aziza | Jan. 15, 2019 | <https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-saudi-governments-global-campaign-to-silence-its-critics>

On the morning of August 18, 2017, Rana deboarded her Saudia Airlines flight in Munich, Germany, bleary-eyed and clutching a small leather bag. Her husband, a near-stranger whom she had married two days earlier, in Riyadh, with the stroke of her father's pen, marched ahead of her. As the couple approached passport control, he reluctantly handed Rana her passport, which he had taken before landing. Rana stole a glance inside to insure that the note she had scribbled in the airplane's bathroom was still tucked between the newly minted pages. The line crawled forward. Rana's heart pounded. A German officer processed her husband's paperwork, then waved Rana over. Rana slid her documents to the official on the other side of the glass window. Inside, a short plea, written in English, read, "i want to apply for asylum." And then, in shaky German, "mein Mann weiß nicht"—"my husband doesn't know."

The moment had been a lifetime in the making. Rana's earliest memories were dominated by the violent fits of her father, whose abuse once drove her mother to run away, with Rana, then just a toddler, in tow. The experience served as an early lesson on Saudi Arabia's patriarchal norms. Rana's mother, under pressure from her family, abandoned her hopes for a divorce and returned to her husband. Later, she explained her reasoning to Rana: it is better to suffer abuse inside a respectable marriage, she said, than to live as a woman in disgrace.

At school, Rana chafed under long hours of religious instruction, which taught her to fear hellfire and respect men as fundamentally superior. At Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, a brief phase of online activism landed her at the disciplinary office, where the administration threatened police action. Later, while trying to help a friend suffering from domestic violence, Rana was rebuffed by authorities for attempting to file a police report. After college, Rana's hopes for a career as an English translator were repeatedly blocked by her father, who considered the prospect shameful. She was eventually able to start a small phone-repair business with several female friends, but she was soon confronted by her worst nightmare: her parents arranged for her marriage. On their first meeting, her young suitor informed her that he'd expect to start having children immediately, and that she would devote herself to child-rearing. "I saw him, and I saw the end of my life," she told me.

Rana, who was twenty-four at the time, was still unwilling to surrender. "I realized there would be no future for me in Saudi Arabia," she recalled. "I had no choice but to find a way out." In this, she made her new husband an unwitting accomplice: he agreed to take her on a honeymoon, giving her an alibi to obtain a passport and travel documents—something no Saudi woman can

do without the permission of her wali, or male guardian. He'd even been accommodating when she suggested that they travel to Germany, which she'd identified, after extensive research, as the best asylum destination in Europe.

Moments after handing over her passport in Munich—on her first day outside of her native country—Rana was escorted away from her husband, who quickly grew hysterical. For the next fourteen hours, she was shuttled between various holding facilities, each packed with migrants from around the world, before being assigned a room in a nearby halfway house. Collapsing into bed that night, numb with exhaustion and relief, her mind circled a single thought. “I had left behind a life that others chose for me, and, finally, I was choosing for myself,” she told me. “I thought, This choice is freedom.”

But, even as Rana slipped beyond the stifling grip of her husband and father, she unwittingly placed herself in the crosshairs of a new, more formidable foe. Back home, Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince popularly known as M.B.S., had come to dominate the Saudi royal court and was working tirelessly to project an image of himself as a liberal reformer. The young monarch had spent billions on an international P.R. campaign, touting a message of a Saudi renaissance, in which his subjects would enjoy unprecedented freedom and prosperity. This new Saudi Arabia would, in turn, become an “investment powerhouse” for global capital and a respected peer among the world’s most powerful economies. The crown prince frequently played up themes of women’s empowerment as evidence of his country’s liberal awakening, promising to increase the female workforce to thirty per cent by 2030 and to allow women to drive for the first time in the country’s history.

The crown prince’s ambitious agenda won him acclaim from many in the West, who hailed him as the harbinger of a more moderate, even democratic, Arabian Gulf. However, at home, M.B.S. was seizing power through blatantly autocratic means. By the end of 2017, about a year before the murder of the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, M.B.S. had locked up hundreds of people, including civilians and members of the royal family, in an effort to clamp down on opposition, both real and imagined. At the same time, the crown prince was overseeing a quiet campaign of suppression of Saudis abroad, working through Embassies and back channels to silence them through blackmail, intimidation, and forced repatriation. These efforts were not reserved for vocal dissidents like Khashoggi, who fled Saudi Arabia around the same time that Rana did. Increasingly, the Saudi government was widening its net of censorship and harassment to include private Saudi citizens who possessed little or no political profile.

The reason appeared to be a matter of image control: though Rana had refrained from publicizing her critical opinions of the government, she still represented a troubling demographic for M.B.S. The number of Saudi asylum seekers had increased dramatically since the beginning of the crown prince’s rise—from five hundred and seventy-five cases, in 2015, the year he emerged on the political scene, to more than twelve hundred, in 2017. (This was in addition to a swelling number of Saudis who, like Khashoggi, opted for self-exile under separate visa processes.) The implicit critique of this exodus was enough to stoke the ire of the crown prince. Rana would soon learn what the case of Khashoggi later taught the world: the young monarch’s obsessive need to control his reputation heeded no national boundaries.

It began with a WhatsApp message that appeared on Rana's phone a few weeks after her arrival in Germany. She had been moved to a small town in the northeast of the country, where she was staying in a complex reserved for refugee families. The message came from one of Rana's friends and former business partners in Riyadh, informing her that the small phone-repair shop she'd helped launch was in trouble with the government. On a recent trip to the bank, the partner had been informed that Rana's name had been flagged; as a result, authorities had frozen the company's assets. The news puzzled Rana, who had painstakingly set her affairs in order before fleeing Saudi Arabia, registering at two separate government offices, including the Ministry of Commerce and Investment, to grant power of attorney to her co-founders. Rana's associates hired a lawyer, who informed them that, while their paperwork was in order, the authorities would not reverse their decision. "Everything they tried failed," Rana said. "The authorities just insisted I had to go to the Embassy to fix the problem." (Rana's name, as well as the names of other women in this story, have been changed to protect their safety.)

The Saudi state frequently uses finances and other "national services" as leverage to lure its citizens into face-to-face meetings with government officials. One Saudi asylum seeker, who fled to Frankfurt, in the summer of 2018, received a text alert, as her plane touched down, that the government had frozen her bank account. She was later notified that her National Identification Card and all the privileges afforded to Saudi citizens, including passport renewals, e-banking, and residency permits, had been revoked. She was instructed to return to Saudi Arabia to fix the issue.

Saudi authorities have also used bank activity as a way of locating citizens, Adam Coogle, a Middle East researcher for Human Rights Watch, who focusses on Saudi Arabia, says. He cited a case of three Saudi women who fled to Lebanon, along with seven of their children, in 2016. "Twenty minutes after they swiped their credit card to register at a hotel, Lebanese authorities showed up to turn them over to the Saudis." Khashoggi's own case was predicated on paperwork—after seeking government documents for his upcoming marriage at the consulate in Istanbul, on September 28th, he was told to return a week later, during which time the trap was laid for his murder.

Rana, who is quiet and deliberate by nature, had serious misgivings about entering her country's Embassy in Berlin. While Khashoggi's murder was still months away, Rana had heard plenty of stories—some documented and others rumored—of Saudis disappearing abroad. "Inside the Embassy, I'm not in Germany. I'm in their territory," Rana said. "I could disappear and no one would know, or they wouldn't be able to help me." None of Rana's business partners had known in advance of her plan to flee the country, but all of them understood her hesitation about meeting with officials. "Now, especially under M.B.S., everyone is suspicious of the government," she said.

In the meantime, Rana tried to focus on her new, often confounding life in Germany. In the camp, she befriended a few Saudi women who, like her, had fled oppressive homes in hopes of a new life. She was particularly drawn to Farah, a twenty-five-year-old former BodyPump coach, from Riyadh, with a buoyant mane of dark hair and an athletic swagger. "She is very outgoing and bold," Rana said with a smile. "The opposite of me." One thing the two did have in common

was their troubling run-ins with the Saudi state. Within days of arriving in Germany, Farah began receiving messages on Twitter and Snapchat from pro-government accounts, warning her that she'd pay for disgracing the reputation of Saudi Arabia. Farah also began hearing from friends back in Saudi Arabia that authorities had been interrogating people associated with her. During questioning, her friends said, the investigators revealed personal information about Farah's life in Germany, including details about her whereabouts and activities. "That was different," Farah told me. "How did they know so much about my life? Did someone I knew feed them information?"

As Farah and I shared a hookah and milk chocolates in the drafty, bare-walled apartment that Rana now calls home, the subject turned to family. Rana emerged from the kitchen, carrying a tray of spaghetti and cream-cheese sauce—one of the few recipes that she'd mastered since acquiring a place of her own—and joined us on the couch, which doubles as her bed. Both women were aware that the government routinely penalizes the relatives of those it deems disloyal or dangerous to the state. Farah cited the case of Omar Abdulaziz, a Saudi activist currently living in Canada. After Abdulaziz flouted the Saudi government's efforts to silence him, the state arrested his two brothers back in Jeddah. Similarly, after Khashoggi fled the state, the government harassed his family members and placed his son, Salah, under a travel ban. Members of Farah's family were interrogated shortly after her escape and have since cut off their already strained communication. "I didn't want anything to happen to my family," Farah said, "even if we weren't close." Rana says that most of her relatives and friends are reluctant to speak with her for fear of reprisal. "Sometimes I get a little video or note from one of my younger siblings on Snapchat, but, mostly, that's it," she told me. "I don't miss Saudi Arabia at all, but I do miss my mother."

Still, the women strived to create a sense of normalcy, occupying themselves with German classes, Netflix, and part-time work. Their delicate calm was shattered, though, in April, 2018, when Farah encountered two strange Arab men outside of her apartment building. Their message, spoken in the Saudi dialect of Arabic, was ominous. "They told me they knew information about me, they knew who I was, a Saudi woman who had left the country," Farah explained. "They told me, 'You will be sorry.'" The men had not presented any government identification and made no specific threats. But Farah felt sure that they were loyalists of the regime. Around the same time, she received a cryptic photograph over WhatsApp from a man claiming to be an employee of the Interior Ministry. In the picture, a file containing Farah's name and photograph lay open on a desk. The document included an order for her arrest.

A few weeks later, two men driving a large white S.U.V. appeared on a deserted street where Farah was walking alone at night. As the vehicle was easing slowly toward her, Farah ducked behind a tree. The men got out, apparently searching for her. It was too dark to determine their identities, but Farah suspected that they were the same pair she'd encountered at her apartment. "I was so sure I was going to be kidnapped," she recalled, grabbing her face with her hands. "I thought, I will disappear tonight; this is the end." To her relief, two female pedestrians appeared on the street, and the men quickly returned to the S.U.V. and sped off.

Saudi Arabia has long used coercion against its citizens abroad, but evidence indicates that this practice has intensified under M.B.S. In October, a Saudi official told Reuters that the crown prince has issued “standing orders to negotiate the return of dissidents,” adding that this gives officials “the authority to act without going back to the leadership.” These efforts, which were often directed by Saud al-Qahtani, a former senior adviser to the crown prince who has been implicated in Khashoggi’s death, have been expanded to target defectors and non-activists alike. “Before M.B.S., most Saudis had a general sense of where the red lines were—if you stayed away from them, you would probably be safe,” Abdullah Alaoudh, a Saudi academic and senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, said. “But there is no way to know where the red line is anymore. The message from the government now is: you don’t even have to be political to be targeted. Just being slightly outspoken, even just on social or religious issues, could make you a target, and you could be harmed.”

Hala al-Dosari, a Saudi academic and scholar in residence at New York University’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, says that this strategy of preemptive censorship is a trademark of Saudi Arabia under M.B.S. “What M.B.S. wants is total control of the discourse,” Dosari said. “He has no tolerance for anyone who might challenge or even complicate his image.”

This chilling effect is also felt by many of the roughly ninety thousand Saudi students studying abroad on government scholarships. In recent years, many of them have had their tuition threatened or suspended in retaliation for perceived criticism of the government. In some cases, students report being contacted and asked to return to the kingdom, or to report to a local embassy or consulate, to negotiate the resumption of their scholarships. “I got a call from a woman who said she was working for the Saudi government,” Hani Albandi, a Saudi graduate of Indiana State, said. “They said my political tweets made me an enemy of the country, and if I didn’t stop they would cut all the school funding for me and my wife.” Fearful of jeopardizing his future, Albandi complied. A number of students also reported encounters with peers whom they feared were government informants. “Saudi students are getting both implicit and explicit messages to stay away from anything vaguely political,” Coogler, of Human Rights Watch, says. “We’re seeing increasing signs, especially under M.B.S., that their speech and campus activities are being monitored.”

In October, a day before Khashoggi’s disappearance, the Canadian research group Citizen Lab exposed an apparent plot by the Saudi government to use spyware to hack into the personal accounts of Abdulaziz, the Saudi student and activist studying in Quebec. (Abdulaziz had already had his scholarship revoked, in 2013, over his criticism of the Saudi government.) In a parallel drama, nearly nine thousand Saudi students studying in Canada had their government scholarships abruptly cancelled this August, as Ottawa and Riyadh clashed over the fate of jailed Saudi activists. Like Rana, many Saudis now fear that, in M.B.S.’s age of hyper-sensitivity and extra-territorial control, even their best attempts at self-censorship may not protect them.

Rana arrived outside the barricaded gates of the Saudi Embassy in Berlin a little before 9 a.m. Back home in Riyadh, her partners had been running into serious financial trouble. “The business was really suffering, because they couldn’t find any way to access their money,” she said. The

authorities only repeated their insistence that Rana present herself to the Saudi Embassy. “I asked other Saudi refugees, and they all warned me not to go.” Farah, too, was vehemently opposed to the idea, but Rana’s concern for her friends eventually trumped her fears for herself. “I felt so guilty for putting them in this position,” she said. “I decided to go, even if it was risky.”

Above the chrome-plated walls of the Embassy, the Saudi flag, emblazoned with Arabic calligraphy and a drawn sabre, fluttered in the warm breeze. Farah, who had insisted on accompanying Rana, would keep vigil on the sidewalk directly outside. Rana entered without an appointment; she’d wanted to avoid giving the Saudi authorities any advance warning of her visit. At the entrance, where the female staff were uniformed in abayas and hijabs, she copied down her identification details and surrendered her cell phone. Walking down the marble hallway to a waiting room, she felt bitterly alone.

It would be hours until she was called. She passed the time pacing the holding room, gazing intermittently out the window at a nearby playground. At last, a young woman in a headscarf arrived to escort her. The woman spoke to her with a mechanical cheerfulness, remarking on the many benefits of life in Saudi Arabia and boasting of the country’s numerous opportunities for women. Rana opted not to respond. A moment later, they arrived at a small room where two men were waiting—one overweight and pallid, another thin and dark-complexioned. A female officer sat beside them. “Peace to you,” they murmured, directing Rana to a chair. She sat with arms bolted to her sides, balling her hands into fists to hide their tremor.

Rana had hoped for a brief discussion about her Saudi bank account. Instead, she endured an hour-long interrogation. The three agents accused Rana of deliberately dishonoring the image of the Saudi state by falsely representing her case as a human-rights issue. “This is nothing more than a rebellion against your family,” Rana recalls them saying. “Wouldn’t you like to spend Ramadan with your family? We can arrange this. They miss you.” She politely explained that she had no interest in living in a country where she felt deprived of her rights. This answer elicited a fresh round of anger, even as the officials vowed that she would “not be arrested” in Riyadh. Their insistence struck Rana as an implicit threat. (The Saudi Embassy in Berlin did not respond to a request for comment.)

At one point, the thin man began insinuating that Rana had come to Germany to pursue sexual promiscuity, saying that he knew she didn’t live alone. (At the time, Rana shared an apartment with a boyfriend.) The officials also demanded that Rana give them her German identification card to photocopy for their records. She refused. Later, when her interrogators promised her, “Don’t worry, you will be able to take your passport and walk out of here today,” Rana felt that their intention was to remind her of their power to prevent such a peaceful exit.

Rana tried, in vain, to steer the conversation back to the issue of her partners. “I began to realize that they had no intention to help me with my business trouble,” she said. “After that, I focussed on just two things: don’t say anything more about human rights, and get out of there as soon as possible.” She told the group she’d “think about” going back to Saudi Arabia. As the disgruntled officials released her, they implied that her business partners would only continue to suffer as long as she remained in Germany.

Rana emerged from the Embassy in the late afternoon, exhausted and shaken. Outside, Farah's face was burnished with hours of anxious waiting. She had been preparing to call the police, she said, and now demanded to know what had happened inside. Rana offered only fragmented, defeated replies. Guilt and dread mingled with relief as the two made their way toward the train station. Had she just made the situation worse? Having shown her face but refused their wishes, would the government now intensify their harassment of her, or of her friends and family back home? Reflexively, Rana glanced over her shoulder, scanning for any sign of a pursuer.

Farah and Rana are still bewildered by the intensity with which they were targeted. "In the Embassy, they treated me as a criminal," Rana said, over beers and nachos, on a snowy evening in late 2018. "I didn't expect this. I'm not here trying to cause trouble. I'm not an activist. I just want a quiet life, to come back to my apartment each night in peace." Beside her, Farah's sharp brown eyes were ringed with shadows. "I'm afraid to even tweet now."

Shortly before New Year's, Rana and Farah shared hookah and tea with Leena, a recently arrived asylum seeker from Riyadh. To escape Saudi Arabia, she'd hacked into her father's phone and logged on to Absher, the popular mobile app linked to Saudi's Ministry of Interior. From there, Leena was able to use her wali's privileges to issue herself permission to travel and slipped away shortly after. Arriving in Germany, Leena learned that her family had reported her to the authorities. Her Saudi bank account and national I.D. number were promptly revoked, but Leena considered it a small price to pay for freedom. "After twenty-six years of abuse, anything is heaven compared to Saudi Arabia," she says.

But her future was thrown into doubt when the German government rejected her application for asylum. During her hearing, Leena said, the judge pushed back on Leena's plea by citing the "new freedoms and reforms" inaugurated by M.B.S. "They told me, 'Saudi Arabia is changed—go back. There are women's rights there now.'" At this, the three women chorused rough, cold laughter. Farah, too, was denied asylum this past summer. "They told me it was my fault for being an activist, and that the government was changing in Saudi Arabia anyway, so why was I causing trouble?" Both women are currently in the appeals process. (A spokesperson for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, in Berlin, told me, "In the personal hearing, the asylum seeker gets the chance to explain his or her personal reasons for flight. On the basis of this statement, the decision-maker examines if and what kind of protection must be given.")

Rana's case was approved, in the spring of 2018, but the majority of the Saudis she knows, including one gay asylum seeker in a nearby German city, have been rejected. "There's a sense that since we're not running away from a war, like the Syrians are, for example, our cases aren't really serious," she said. "A lot of people say, 'It's getting better for women under M.B.S.'"

While it's true that Saudi women can, as of June, 2018, drive cars, and that the Saudi government has scaled back some legal restrictions on women, Rana and her companions all fear prison or worse if they return. "My family would kill me," Leena said. "I am sure." Farah points out that women in prison in Saudi Arabia can only be bailed out by their wali. "My father would put me there and leave me there," she said. "It happens to disobedient women all the time." The same plea was made by Rahaf al-Qunun, in January, when she was intercepted, in Bangkok, by a

Saudi diplomat and Thai authorities as she attempted to escape to Australia. Barricading herself in the airport hotel, the eighteen-year-old tweeted cries for help and sent statements to Reuters via her phone. "My brothers and family and the Saudi embassy will be waiting for me in Kuwait," she told Reuters. "My life is in danger." (After a two-day standoff, Qunun was released into the care of the United Nations Refugee Agency, or U.N.H.C.R.)

Khashoggi's death and Qunun's near-capture have left Rana and her friends feeling more vulnerable than ever. "M.B.S. has showed us he can do anything he wants," Leena said. "The world let him get away with murder. So things are worse for us. He feels stronger, not weaker, now, like no one can touch him." The women frequently trade off apartments, spending the night in groups rather than sleeping alone. They also continue to avoid all semblance of activism or political speech—a partial win, perhaps, for M.B.S. But none of their precautions can shake the constant fear of their government's reach. "We're not like the people escaping war in their country," Rana says. "When they come here, the bombs are behind them, they are safe. But not us. The danger follows us."

It Wasn't Just Khashoggi: A Saudi Prince's Brutal Drive to Crush Dissent

The New York Times | Mark Mazzetti and Ben Hubbard | Mar. 17, 2019 |

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/middleeast/khashoggi-crown-prince-saudi.html>



A symbolic funeral for Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist killed in the Saudi Consulate, in Istanbul in November. Credit...Bulent Kilic/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

WASHINGTON — Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia authorized a secret campaign to silence dissenters — which included the surveillance, kidnapping, detention and torture of Saudi citizens — over a year before the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, according to American officials who have read classified intelligence reports about the campaign.

At least some of the clandestine missions were carried out by members of the same team that killed and dismembered Mr. Khashoggi in Istanbul in October, suggesting that his killing was a particularly egregious part of a wider campaign to silence Saudi dissidents, according to the officials and associates of some of the Saudi victims.

Members of the team that killed Mr. Khashoggi, which American officials called the Saudi Rapid Intervention Group, were involved in at least a dozen operations starting in 2017, the officials said.

Some of the operations involved forcibly repatriating Saudis from other Arab countries and detaining and abusing prisoners in palaces belonging to the crown prince and his father, King Salman, the officials and associates said.

One of the Saudis detained by the group, a university lecturer in linguistics who wrote a blog about women in Saudi Arabia, tried to kill herself last year after being subjected to psychological torture, according to American intelligence reports and others briefed on her situation.



Images of King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman projected on screens during a conference at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh in January. Credit...Tasneem Alsultan for The New York Times

The rapid intervention team had been so busy that last June its leader asked a top adviser to Prince Mohammed whether the crown prince would give the team bonuses for Eid al-Fitr, the holiday marking the end of Ramadan, according to American officials familiar with the intelligence reports.

Details about the operations come from American officials who have read classified intelligence assessments about the Saudi campaign, as well as from Saudis with direct knowledge of some of the operations. They spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of repercussions from

disclosing classified information or, in the case of the Saudis, from angering the Saudi government.

A spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington said the kingdom “takes any allegations of ill treatment of defendants awaiting trial or prisoners serving their sentences very seriously.”

Saudi laws prohibit torture and hold accountable those involved in such abuses of power, the spokesman said, and judges cannot accept confessions obtained under duress. The kingdom’s public prosecutor and the Saudi Human Rights Commission are investigating “recent allegations,” he said.

The Saudi government insists that the killing of Mr. Khashoggi — a dissident journalist living in the United States who wrote for The Washington Post — was not an assassination ordered from Riyadh. The decision to kill him was made by the team on the spot, government officials say, and those responsible are being prosecuted. Turkey and American intelligence agencies say the killing was premeditated.

The kingdom says that 11 Saudis are facing criminal charges for the killing and that prosecutors are seeking the death penalty for five of them, but officials have not publicly identified the accused.



Turkish forensic experts searching for the remains of Mr. Khashoggi at a villa in Turkey in November. Credit...Erdem Sahin/EPA, via Shutterstock

After the killing of Mr. Khashoggi, Saudi officials acknowledged that the Saudi intelligence service had a standing order to bring dissidents home. What they did not acknowledge was that a specific team had been built to do it.

Saudi officials declined to confirm or deny that such a team existed, or answer questions about its work.

Saudi Arabia has a history of going after dissidents and other Saudi citizens abroad, but the crackdown escalated sharply after Prince Mohammed was elevated to crown prince in 2017, a period when he was moving quickly to consolidate power. He pushed aside Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who oversaw the security services, giving the young prince sway over the intelligence agencies.

Since then, Saudi security forces have detained dozens of clerics, intellectuals and activists who were perceived to pose a threat, as well as people who had posted critical or sarcastic comments about the government on Twitter.

“We’ve never seen it on a scale like this,” said Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. analyst now with the Brookings Institution. “A dissident like Jamal Khashoggi in the past wouldn’t have been considered worth the effort.”

Mr. Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul and dismembered with a bone saw. Turkey used surveillance video and audio recordings to uncover the crime, identify the team that carried it out and leak their names and photos to the news media.

Mr. Riedel said the team’s sloppiness showed that it was used to operating freely inside the kingdom and not under the watchful eye of an adversary’s intelligence service.

The Rapid Intervention Group was authorized by Prince Mohammed and overseen by Saud al-Qahtani, a top aide whose official job was media czar at the royal court, American officials said. His deputy, Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, an intelligence officer who has traveled abroad with the crown prince, led the team in the field.

Another operative on the team was Thaar Ghaleb al-Harbi, a member of the royal guard who was promoted in 2017 for valor during an attack on a palace of Prince Mohammed’s.

Mr. Mutreb and Mr. al-Harbi are on trial in Riyadh for charges connected to Mr. Khashoggi’s death, a Saudi official said, while Mr. Qahtani is under house arrest, has been banned from travel and is under investigation, making it unclear whether the team is still operating.

American intelligence reports did not specify how involved Prince Mohammed was with the group’s work, but said that the operatives saw Mr. al-Qahtani as a “conduit” to the prince.

When Prince Mohammed locked hundreds of princes, businessmen and former officials in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton in 2017 on accusations of corruption, Mr. al-Qahtani and Mr. Mutreb worked in the hotel, helping pressure detainees to sign over assets, according to associates of detainees who saw them.



The Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh, where Prince Mohammed detained hundreds of princes, businessmen and former officials in 2017 on accusations of corruption. Credit... Tasneem Alsultan for The New York Times

Many of those detained at the Ritz were subject to physical abuse, and one died in custody, according to witnesses. It is not known whether members of the rapid intervention team were involved in the abuse. The Saudi government has denied that any physical abuse took place there.

But it was only after Mr. Khashoggi's killing that the extent of the team's work began to emerge. Mr. Mutreb and Mr. al-Harbi were both in the consulate when Mr. Khashoggi was killed, according to Turkish officials. American intelligence about the team's previous operations informed the assessment by the C.I.A. in November that Prince Mohammed had ordered Mr. Khashoggi's killing, United States officials said.

The C.I.A. declined to comment.

United States intelligence agencies do not appear to have conclusive proof that Prince Mohammed ordered the killing, but they have pieced together a pattern of similar operations carried out by Saudi operatives under the prince's authority.

The agencies continue to gather evidence about Prince Mohammed's role in the operations, and in December the National Security Agency produced a report saying that in 2017, the prince told

a top aide that he would use “a bullet” on Mr. Khashoggi if he did not return to the kingdom and end his criticism of the government.

Intelligence analysts concluded that Prince Mohammed may have not spoken literally — that he was not ordering Mr. Khashoggi to be shot — but that he intended to silence the journalist by killing him if the circumstances required it.

The C.I.A. assessment has created tension between American spy agencies and President Trump, who has made warm relations with the Saudis a cornerstone of his foreign policy. The crown prince has been a close ally of the Trump White House, especially Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and senior adviser. Despite the C.I.A.’s assessment that Prince Mohammed ordered the operation, Mr. Trump has said repeatedly that the evidence was not conclusive.



Aziza al-Yousef, a computer science professor, driving a car in Riyadh in 2014. She is one of the women’s rights activists who were detained last spring and summer. Credit...Hasan Jamali/Associated Press

The grisly killing of Mr. Khashoggi led to a storm of outrage in foreign capitals and a new scrutiny of the powerful crown prince, who had billed himself as a forward-thinking reformer with a grand vision to modernize the kingdom. But the journalist’s killing was just the latest in a string of clandestine operations against less high-profile Saudis, including members of the royal family.

American intelligence officials said that some of those detained in these operations were held at secret locations, including opulent palaces used by King Salman and his son, until November 2017, when many were moved to the compound surrounding the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton. At the time, the hotel was being used as a five-star jail in the kingdom's anti-corruption campaign.

That crackdown became a cover for clandestine operations against Saudi dissidents, who were moved into detention in the Ritz at that time, according to American officials.

The Rapid Intervention Group also appears to have been involved in the detention and abuse of about a dozen women's rights activists, who were detained last spring and summer. The activists, who had campaigned for lifting the kingdom's ban on driving by women, included several well-known figures: Loujain al-Hathloul, who had been jailed for trying to drive her car into the kingdom from the United Arab Emirates; Aziza al-Yousef, a retired computer science professor; and Eman al-Nafjan, the linguistics lecturer.

At first, the women were not held in a prison, but were detained informally in what appeared to be an unused palace in the Red Sea port city of Jidda, according to Ms. al-Hathloul's sister, Alia. Each woman was locked in a small room, and the windows were covered. Some of the women were frequently taken downstairs for interrogation, which included beatings, electric shocks, waterboarding and threats of rape and murder.

In an Op-Ed article for The New York Times, Alia al-Hathloul wrote that Mr. al-Qahtani was "present several times" when her sister was tortured, and that he threatened to kill her and throw her body in the sewer.



Loujain al-Hathloul, who was jailed for trying to drive her car into the kingdom from the United Arab Emirates. Credit...Reuters

The treatment was so harsh that Ms. al-Nafjan tried to commit suicide, according to a United States intelligence assessment.

The women were later moved to the Dhahban Prison in Jidda, where the physical abuse stopped and their relatives were allowed to visit, Ms. al-Hathloul said.

Their trial opened in Riyadh on Wednesday, but journalists and diplomats were not permitted to attend, and the government did not announce the charges against them.

The Saudi official said that Ms. al-Hathloul, Ms. al-Yousef and Ms. al-Nafjan were being tried "in connection with activities that threatened the kingdom's national security."

In the kingdom's effort to forcibly repatriate Saudi citizens living abroad, it was not always clear which operations were carried out by the rapid intervention team and which by other parts of the security services.

At least one Saudi who was detained in the Ritz and accused of corruption, Rami al-Naimi, a son of a former Saudi oil minister, was forcibly repatriated from the United Arab Emirates in November 2017. An associate of a senior member of the royal family, Faisal al-Jarba, was snatched in a midnight raid on an apartment in Jordan last June and returned to Saudi Arabia. His family has struggled to get information on where he is or why he is being held.

In August 2017, a minor prince, Saud bin al-Muntasir bin Saud, was sent back to the kingdom from Morocco. Last May, a university student who had dual Saudi-Qatari citizenship was arrested during a visit to Kuwait and sent home.

Saudi campaign to abduct and silence rivals abroad goes back decades

The Washington Post | Kareem Fahim and Loveday Morris | Nov. 4, 2018 | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-campaign-to-abduct-and-silence-rivals-abroad-goes-back-decades/2018/11/04/ce6b801c-dc8a-11e8-8bac-bfe01fcdc3a6_story.html



Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the country's de facto ruler, has been especially ruthless in his pursuit of dissidents abroad, analysts say, continuing the country's long history of abductions. (Nicolas Asfour/Pool/Getty Images)

ISTANBUL — Faisal al Jarba fled his native Saudi Arabia late last year as the danger drew near — after his patron, a powerful Saudi prince, was arrested and after a friend died in suspicious circumstances while in government custody.

Jarba, a leading sheikh in a large tribe, traveled to the Jordanian capital, Amman, joining relatives there. But that was not nearly far enough. Jordanian security officers surrounded his house one evening in early June and took him away for questioning, assuring his family he would be back soon.

Within days, however, he was driven to the border with Saudi Arabia and handed over to the Saudi authorities, according to two people familiar with the details of Jarba's forced repatriation, which has not previously been reported. There have been no charges filed against Jarba, 45, and

in the five months since he was captured, his family has received no proof that he is still alive, the people said.

Saudi Arabia's public prosecutor said Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had no knowledge of the operation. The CIA's latest findings contradict that assertion. (Joyce Lee, Jason Aldag, Monica Akhtar/The Washington Post)

The killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul last month by a team of Saudi agents dispatched from Riyadh has prompted fresh scrutiny of the kingdom's pursuit of Saudi nationals abroad, from ordinary dissidents to defectors from the tight ranks of the royal family.

The effort to silence Saudi critics abroad stretches back decades and over the tenure of several monarchs. But Crown Prince -Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto ruler, has pursued the practice with an especially ruthless zeal since gaining his position last year, analysts said, even making the return of dissenters abroad a formal policy of the state, according to a Saudi official, who insisted such returns were to be negotiated rather than coerced.

To repatriate its critics, the Saudi government has tried to lure them back or enlisted friendly regional governments to arrest them or even carried out brazen kidnappings in Europe.

Saudi nationals have vanished from hotel rooms, been snatched from cars or had planes they were flying on diverted. One Saudi dissident prince said in a court filing that he was injected in the neck and spirited away on a private jet from Geneva to Saudi Arabia. Years later, after he managed to leave the kingdom, he disappeared again and has not been heard from since.

"We know they can kill you; they can destroy your family or use them against you," said one Saudi women's rights activist who applied for political asylum in the United States last year. "It's always been like this," she said, adding that Mohammed's aggressive pursuit of critics had further rattled an already paranoid community of Saudi expatriates.

A Saudi government media office did not immediately respond to an email requesting comment on the abductions.

Jarba was not a dissident, but he may have been wanted because of his association with a branch of the royal family that had fallen out of favor with the Saudi leadership, according to the two people familiar with the circumstances of his capture.

He was a longtime friend and confidant of Prince Turki bin Abdullah, a son of the late King Abdullah. Turki was arrested last November as Saudi authorities detained hundreds of people, including royal family members, business executives and government officials, in what was billed as an anti-corruption operation.

Although Jarba's friends and relatives have had no contact with him, they have been able to piece together some details of his journey after he was taken into custody in the upscale Abdoun neighborhood in Amman. Following his arrest, Jarba was briefly held in the Saudi Embassy in Amman before being escorted to the border. Once in Saudi Arabia, he spent several weeks in Jiddah, which serves as the government's capital during the summer months. At some point, he

was taken to Turki's house and asked to open secured vaults inside. There were conflicting accounts about whether Jarba was able to do so.

Jarba had assumed he would be safe in Amman, the two people said, in part because he was a sheikh in a large tribe, the Shammari, that had strong relations with the Jordanian monarchy.

A spokeswoman for Jordan's government did not immediately reply to a request for comment on Jarba's case.

But Jordanian officials would later tell Jarba's family that they had been powerless to stop his abduction, according to one of the people briefed on Jarba's case.

"This is bigger than us," the Jordanian officials reportedly said.

The first reported case of state-sponsored abduction by Saudi Arabia came on Dec. 22, 1979, when the country's first major opposition figure, Nasser al-Saeed, disappeared from Beirut. He had fled the country after spending time in prison for organizing workers' strikes and revolts. He continued his criticism while in exile and praised the 1979 capture of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by militants as a popular uprising.

After he vanished, Saudi Arabia, ruled by King Khalid bin Abdulaziz at the time, said that reports that Saeed had been abducted and returned to Saudi Arabia by private jet were unfounded. It described Saeed as "insignificant."

While many who vanish are not heard from again, one victim, Prince Sultan bin Turki bin Abdul-aziz, a grandson of Saudi Arabia's founder, was able to make his kidnapping public, lodging a criminal case against senior Saudi officials in a Geneva court in 2014.

The complaint laid out details of an audacious abduction in 2003, during the reign of King Fahd, and named the king's son, Abdulaziz bin Fahd, and the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh, as participants in the plot.

Sultan, whom friends describe as a larger-than-life character — the kind of man who would order strawberry pie in the middle of the night — had been in Geneva for medical treatment. While abroad, he had been publicly critical of the kingdom, calling for economic reform and highlighting human rights issues.

"He was warned to stop and told to come back and everything would be fine," said Clyde Bergstresser, a lawyer based in Boston who was retained by the prince. But Sultan refused to return, so the king's son and the minister were sent to persuade him.

Sultan was invited to a residence of King Fahd on the outskirts of Geneva, the prince later recalled in interviews with Arabic satellite television channels.

He arrived with his German security guards, who later gave evidence that they watched Sultan speaking with a cousin at the swimming pool, before the two men walked into the library without the guards. A short time later, five masked men arrived.

“He was thrown to the floor and injected with an anesthetic in his neck and intubated,” Bergstresser said.

Sultan’s security guards were told he had decided to go back to the kingdom voluntarily.

After seven years, during which Sultan said he was held largely under house arrest, prison or in hospital, he was allowed to leave Saudi Arabia after becoming gravely ill with a respiratory disease. He flew to Boston for medical treatment and later lodged his legal case.

However, on Jan. 31, 2016, he made the mistake of boarding a Saudi plane, organized by the embassy in Paris, after his father invited him to visit Cairo.

Monitors on the aircraft that showed the plane’s route to Cairo suddenly went dark, according to Bergstresser. And the plane landed in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. “He was forcibly taken off the plane, yelling and screaming. I’ve not heard from him since,” Bergstresser said. He added that members of the prince’s entourage were held for several days and then released.

Around the same time, two other princes based in Europe disappeared. The cases were first reported by the BBC last year.

Prince Turki bin Bandar, who was known for his salacious tirades against the Saudi royal family, including accusations of murder, disappeared in 2015 after he had fled Saudi Arabia following a land dispute and taken up residence.

Another minor royal, Saud bin Saif al-Nasr, also vanished after he urged reforms in the kingdom and publicly endorsed a letter from an anonymous Saudi royal widely circulated in 2015 calling for regime change. He was persuaded to board a private plane to Italy for what he thought was a business trip but has not been heard from since, the BBC reported.

In an interview with the Russian news website Sputnik last year, Prince Turki al Faisal, a senior royal who heads the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, dismissed the cases of the “so-called princes,” saying there were Interpol notices issued for their arrests.

“We don’t like to publicize these things because we consider them our domestic affair,” he said. “Of course, there were people who worked to bring them back. They are here; they didn’t disappear. They are seeing their families.”

The government of Morocco recently said it had extradited Prince Turki bin Bandar to Saudi Arabia to comply with an Interpol warrant.

But in a statement, Interpol said that it had not issued a notice of any kind for him or Princes Saud and Sultan.

Like Khashoggi, who lived in Virginia, many self-exiled dissidents flee as far as they can from the Middle East, fearing that Saudi Arabia’s allies could extradite them.

In an interview with The Washington Post several months before his death, Khashoggi discussed the case of Loujain al-Hathloul, a Saudi women’s rights activist who was stopped in March while driving in Abu Dhabi, where she had been studying, and subsequently returned to Saudi Arabia

and told to stop posting on social media. A few months later, she was arrested, imprisoned and branded as a traitor in the state-run media.

As Hathloul was accosted in Abu Dhabi, her husband, Fahad Albutairi, a stand-up comedian, was kidnapped from his hotel room in Jordan and returned to Saudi Arabia, according to two people with knowledge of the incident.

“It is intimidation,” Khashoggi said. “Teaching these people a lesson, making people fearful.”

‘Our Hands Can Reach You’: Khashoggi Case Shakes Saudi Dissidents Abroad

The New York Times | Ben Hubbard | Oct. 8, 2018 | <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/world/middleeast/saudi-jamal-khashoggi-dissent.html?auth=login-email&login=email>



Tawakkol Karman, center, a Nobel laureate from Yemen, and Ayman Nour, center left, an Egyptian opposition politician, held pictures of Jamal Khashoggi at a rally at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on Monday. Credit...Ozan Kose/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

BEIRUT — A Saudi women’s rights activist was driving in the United Arab Emirates when she was pulled over by security officers, thrown on a plane to Saudi Arabia and jailed.

In Canada, when a Saudi student refused to stop making YouTube videos criticizing the kingdom’s rulers, two of his brothers back home were imprisoned.

So when a prominent Saudi critic, Jamal Khashoggi, disappeared after entering the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul last week, it hardly surprised Saudi dissidents living abroad — until Turkish officials said they believed he had been killed.

Even for a country that has long used fear and enticements to control dissent, the prospect that the state had killed a well-known dissident writer in a foreign country represented a startling escalation.

As Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has pushed his vision for modernizing Saudi Arabia, he has increasingly shown little tolerance for criticism. He has jailed women's rights activists, locked up businessmen and rival royals, and has reached across borders to keep Saudi expatriates in line, significantly raising the stakes of speaking out, even in foreign countries.

It remains unclear what happened to Mr. Khashoggi, who has not been seen since he entered the consulate last Tuesday. Turkish officials say he was killed by Saudi agents there and his body dismembered. Saudi officials deny it, saying Mr. Khashoggi left the consulate soon after he arrived.

But Saudi dissidents abroad have little doubt that their government targeted Mr. Khashoggi because of his prominence. A resident of the United States, he regularly appeared on television and contributed columns to *The Washington Post*.

"It's a message, very clear, that our hands can reach you wherever you are," said Ghanem al-Dosary, a longtime dissident in London who has a large social media following.

If Saudi agents are found to have killed Mr. Khashoggi, the reverberations could sabotage Saudi Arabia's international relations, starting with its neighbor Turkey.

On Monday, Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, demanded that the Saudis prove their claim that Mr. Khashoggi, who went to the consulate to pick up documents he needed to get married, had left the consulate.

"If he left, you have to prove it with footage," Mr. Erdogan said at a news conference in Budapest, according to the semiofficial Anadolu news agency.

Mr. Khashoggi's death could also undermine Saudi relations with the Trump administration, which has built close ties with the Saudi leadership.

"I am concerned about it," President Trump told reporters on Monday. "I don't like hearing about it. Hopefully that will sort itself out. Right now nobody knows anything about it, but there's some pretty bad stories going around. I do not like it."

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called on the Saudi government "to support a thorough investigation of Mr. Khashoggi's disappearance and to be transparent about the results of that investigation."

Crown Prince Mohammed, 33, the kingdom's day-to-day ruler, has pushed to liberalize Saudi society by letting women drive, weakening the once-powerful religious police and expanding entertainment opportunities by allowing concerts and movie theaters. But those reforms have come with a stronger authoritarian hand that has tried to silence critics at home and abroad.

Many Saudi dissidents living abroad have already felt government pressure.

Some have lost government scholarships. Others have been enticed to return home, only to be arrested or threatened if they didn't keep quiet. Some have had their relatives arrested or barred from traveling. A number said they now avoided other Saudis abroad for fear of spies, and didn't travel through other Arab countries, afraid that they could be nabbed and shipped home.

"They don't care if you are famous, if you have a big following or not," said the dissident in Canada, Omar Abdulaziz. "If you criticize us even a little bit, we are going to go after you."

The dissidents represent no monolithic organized opposition but are instead a smattering of activists, writers and social media personalities of various stripes who speak out about an array of issues. They range from those calling for toppling the monarchy to those who want more freedom inside the current system.

Loujain al-Hathloul, an outspoken women's rights activist, made her name in 2014 when she was jailed for 73 days for trying to drive her car into Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates, where she was living.

The government tried many times after that to silence her, arresting or interrogating her, her friends said. But in March, cars full of security officers stopped her on the highway in the United Arab Emirates, where she was studying for a master's degree. They handcuffed her, drove her to the airport and threw her onto a private jet to Saudi Arabia, where she was jailed for a few days.

Her husband, Fahad al-Butairi, a well-known Saudi actor and comedian, was acting in a project in Jordan. Security officers arrested him there. He was handcuffed, blindfolded and put onto a plane for Saudi Arabia, according to the couple's friends.

"It is like you are not immune," Manal al-Sherif, an activist and friend of the couple, said by telephone from Australia, where she now lives. "You can be arrested anywhere and deported forcefully."

After her release, Ms. Hathloul kept a low profile, until armed security officers stormed her home in May and arrested her as part of a wave of arrests of women who had campaigned for the right to drive. Most are still detained, and it is unclear whether they have been formally charged with any crime.

Ms. Hathloul's marriage ended, and Mr. Butairi deleted his Twitter account, where his bio had declared him her proud husband. In July, she turned 29 in prison.

"They wanted to break her because she is a very strong woman," Ms. Sherif said.

The Saudi government did not respond to a request for comment about its efforts to silence dissidents abroad.

But in an interview with Bloomberg last week, Crown Prince Mohammed said that some of the women arrested had been leaking information about the kingdom to the intelligence agencies of Qatar and Iran, both considered enemies of the kingdom.

He said that change in Saudi Arabia would not come without "a price," just as ending slavery in the United States did not come without a violent civil war.

“Here we are trying to get rid of extremism and terrorism without civil war, without stopping the country from growing, with continuous progress in all elements,” he said. “So if there is a small price in that area, it’s better than paying a big debt to do that move.” He added: “We’re trying to be sure that no one is harmed as much as we can.”

The kingdom wielded different techniques against Mr. Abdulaziz, the dissident in Canada. After he started criticizing the kingdom’s leaders on social media as a university student, his government scholarship was canceled, he said. He was told to return to the kingdom to sort out the problem, but he applied for political asylum instead, getting it in 2014.

Since then, he has built a large audience for YouTube videos in which he makes fun of the kingdom’s leadership and criticizes its human rights record.

Representatives of the Saudi government have tried to get him to shut down his videos and return to the kingdom, he said, but when he refused, two of his brothers and a number of his friends in Saudi Arabia were arrested.

In August, researchers at Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto concluded that hackers working for Saudi Arabia had infiltrated his cellphone using software purchased from an Israeli company.

A report by Citizen Lab said the hackers would have had access to his “contacts, private family photos, text messages and live voice calls from popular mobile messaging apps.” They also could have activated his camera and microphone to intercept conversations and other activities.

Mr. Abdulaziz, 27, was surprised at how far the government was going to silence him.

“Yes, I was criticizing the regime,” he said. “We were looking for freedom of speech, we were looking for human rights. But reaching out to the families of dissidents, hacking their phones, kidnapping journalists — this is crazy.”

“I am just a guy with a Twitter account and a YouTube channel,” he added. “So why is MBS, one of the most powerful men in the world, scared of me?”

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair.

It is important to note that this amendment in the nature of a substitute represents a sincere effort on my part to meet the request of the minority. So, the AINS reflects Republican-recommended changes.

We illuminated findings perceived by them as unduly critical of the Trump administration. We narrowed the purview of the bill to focus on the Saudi intimidation campaign abroad. We amended the immediate ban on arms sales to accommodate a 120-day period of oversight, review, and engagement with Saudi Arabia, in the hopes concerns can be addressed. That is 4 months. We included—reluctantly, but we included—a national security waiver in Section 3 dealing with arms sales limitations. And by the way, this bill does not address military sales to the Saudi military. That is not encompassed in this bill.

We had hoped to have support on the other side of the aisle with those changes, and I still hope we could. But the support of the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act would serve as a very strong and clear statement by this committee, representing the Congress of the United States, that the United States opposes the forced repatriation, intimidation, or killing of Saudi dissidents and critics abroad.

It would also reaffirm and ensure that the United States is in no way enabling human rights violations. Silence can be consent. We cannot afford to be silent, nor can we ever allow this kind of gross human rights violation to be seen as something in which we are complicit by our silence.

I think it is important, 2 years to the day tomorrow, that we honor a brave dissident who simply wanted reform in his home country, for which he was brutally murdered and dismembered. And it is time that we let the Saudi government know there is no place for that, as we look at international diplomacy within our purview.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Does Mr. McCaul seek recognition to speak on the underlying bill before we turn to other members and amendments?

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.

Let me just first say at the outset that the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist, was an outrageous and gruesome crime, as Mr. Connolly pointed out. And I am in complete agreement with him on that. And tomorrow is the 2-year anniversary of his killing. He should have lived these past 2 years and many more. We will continue to pursue justice for him. Intimidation and violence by any government against peaceful dissent must be strongly condemned by responsible nations. And if we do not respond forcefully, we invite future abuses.

And that is why I supported and worked with Mr. Malinowski on his Saudi Arabia Human Rights and Accountability Act, to ensure that those responsible for the savage killing of Mr. Khashoggi are held accountable. That balanced bill vindicated our strong support for human rights, as well as our critical national security interests.

I am concerned that today's bill, while well-intentioned, strikes a different balance. It proposes the solution is to ban arms sales outright. We have spent many hours in this committee and on the floor relitigating the issue of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. My concern for Saudi Arabia's human rights record is well-known, but our relationship with the Saudis covers many strategic interests as well, including the very real and deadly threat of Iran. Limiting arms sales to Saudi Arabia hurts our shared capacity to counter Iran, the world's leading State sponsor of terrorism.

Early this year, Iran attacked our embassy in Baghdad. Just over a year ago, Iran launched a major attack on Saudi oil facilities. Importantly, Congress already has this authority. We have the oversight over arms sales to Saudi Arabia on a case-by-case basis. Mr. Engel and I sign off on all foreign weapons sales or we deny them. If we have concerns about a sale, we hold that sale and voice our concerns to the administration. So, my point is there is already a process in place for this.

But I think a legislative ban outright does not give us the ability or flexibility to respond to this evolving lethal threat from the largest State sponsor of terror, and I would also be remiss if I did not mention at a time when we are having great success with peace talks with the Arab Gulf States on the Arabian Peninsula.

I appreciate the concessions Mr. Connolly has made. However, there are several that were declined, and I have proposals for elevating the issue of harassment of dissidents by Saudi Arabia while continuing to balance our strategic interest. And I think that is the right responsible approach, as we look at both human rights and our national security interests. Nothing is simple in the Middle East, and certainly this issue is not a simple one, either. But I think the committee, through the chairman and myself, have this authority on a case-by-case basis to review the sale of weapons, which gives us the flexibility without an outright ban being passed by this committee.

And so, while I agree with the well-intentioned sentiment of the gentleman from Virginia, and I think we agree on the problems, maybe just not the best tools to fix them. And I believe that is why I am offering this amendment in the nature of a substitute. I think it does strike the right balance here.

But we must be mindful on the 2-year anniversary that America will not sit by idly when American journalists are tortured and dismembered in such a grotesque fashion as was done to Mr. Khashoggi. My thoughts and prayers are with him and his family, and all the journalists out there who were close to him, many friends of mine, like Larry Wright from Austin, Texas. He knew Mr. Khashoggi very well. They were very good friends, and I know every day he wakes up and thinks about this brutal killing.

And so, it goes with a heavy heart as we have this debate. We will never forget what happened. We want those accountable to be held accountable. So, I think we share the same goal, just a different way to do.

And so, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just a clarification, and I know my friend from Texas would not mean to distort the intent of my bill. When he said “a ban on arms sales to Saudi Arabia,” he means, I hope, what the bill addresses. After 120 days of opportunity to try to fix co-operation, the ban on military sales would be to the intelligence and national security systems. I explicitly made it clear it would not affect military sales military-to-military. And I just want to make sure that Mr. McCaul meant what I meant. I thank my friend.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. I now recognize myself.

We are considering this measure as we approach the second anniversary, as was mentioned before, of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Unfortunately, we have not held Saudi Arabia accountable for this horrendous crime, and that sends a message. It sends a message to the Saudis and to other governments around the world that they can act with impunity, that the United States will not stand up for justice.

And since the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, we have learned that the killing was no anomaly. It was part of a larger plan to silence dissent abroad. Sadly, it is apparent that the Saudis will not abandon that plan if they know they won't face any consequences.

So, this legislation that Mr. Connolly is offering seeks to change that. This bill says that, if Saudi internal security forces want to continue using U.S.-made weapons, they need to stop attacking dissidents. It says that, if Saudi officials use diplomatic cover or diplomatic facilities in the United States to kidnap or assassinate dissidents, the United States is required to put a stop to it.

Look, Saudi Arabia is an important partner in the region, and we work with them on a host of counterterrorism issues and humanitarian challenges in the region. They have made recent important steps toward Israel that I want to recognize, but these matters dealing with human rights and the persecution of Saudi dissidents is separate and apart, and we cannot simply ignore them while we continue to engage the Saudis on other matters.

I thank Mr. Connolly for his leadership and tenacity on behalf of his late constituent Jamal Khashoggi, and I urge passage of this legislation. I realize some other members may wish to speak on the bill and that some members may have amendments to offer.

I will now recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans, for the purpose of speaking on the bill first. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. Then, we will move on to amendments.

Do any other members wish to speak on this legislation.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As co-chair of the Freedom of the Press Caucus, along with my Democratic colleague Adam Schiff, we have worked together in a bipartisan manner on a slew of media freedom issues over the years. Journalists speak truth to power. And unfortunately, too often those in power rely on force, instead of argument or reform, to shut down that criticism. Some like Jamal Khashoggi pay for their truth-telling and their opinions with their very lives.

So, I want to thank my good friend, Mr. Connolly, the gentleman from Virginia, the Commonwealth of Virginia. And Mr. Connolly and I have worked on a whole range of issues over the years, from Crimea to Turkey to the Global Health Security Act, and a whole lot of other things. So, I want to thank him for keeping the issue of Jamal Khashoggi on the front burner.

Saudi Arabia, and by extension the whole world, needs to know that America is willing to back up our rhetoric about First Amendment rights with consequences. As they say, however, the devil is in the details, which is why I am supportive of Mr. McCaul's substitute amendment.

Targeted sanction seems to me to be the right tool rather than a cessation of arms sales to hold human rights abusers accountable. The Middle East is a tough neighborhood, and most of our partners there have human rights issues. We have to be able to fight for our values without jeopardizing other priorities, which is why I do not think I can support this legislation today.

I am disappointed that we were unable to come to a bipartisan agreement on text. It is always better that we do. But I appreciate Mr. Connolly's effort on this and I know it is heartfelt.

And I was on the floor on a previous bill that we took up that just passed. The PPP Extension Act is my bill, and we have been trying to work by the discharge petition method to actually get a vote on this to save even more small businesses across the country who really need it. So, I wasn't here to comment on Ms. Bass' legislation.

So, I am going to very briefly just mention that, as a cosponsor of the Represent America Abroad Act, I would like to voice my support for that legislation which was introduced by my good friend, Karen Bass. We may not see eye to eye on a range of issues, but we are often able to work together, as I am with Mr. Connolly, like this bill. I appreciate her collegiality and her hard work and bipartisanship. That is why she gets so many things on this committee near done, just as Mr. Connolly does.

The Represent America Abroad Act seeks to fix a long-running problem at the State Department of low minority representation at the mid and upper echelons of the organization. That bill sets up a program similar to the highly regarded Rangel and Pickering Fellowships, but for mid-level positions. In doing so, it builds on the good work that we have done elsewhere, specifically that done by the Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul, and Chairman Engel in the diversity title in the State Department reauthorization bill that we passed earlier this year.

The United States was founded on the principle of the equality of every citizen. This idea has been practiced imperfectly over time, but it, nevertheless, defines Americans' views of themselves and

serves as a basis for our engagement with the rest of the world and the values we advocate through that engagement.

We can all agree that the State Department should reflect that principle. The men and women of the State Department who are responsible for representing U.S. interests abroad serve as America's face to the world. That Department should be able to show the world that, as a diverse country, which we certainly are, our representatives overseas reflect the entire country. That legislation that already passed here just a little while ago helps make that a reality. And so, I appreciate its passage.

And with that, I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank Mr. Connolly for bringing forth this legislation. As he points out, 2 years ago, Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S. resident, a journalist for The Washington Post, was brutally murdered in the Istanbul consulate. And so far, our response has been virtually nothing.

We have identified 17 thugs engaged who were actually hands-on in this brutal crime. And we have told them they cannot visit the United States. They will never see Disneyland. That is not sufficient. Mr. Khashoggi will not be forgotten, not only because of your efforts, but because of the brutal crime that Prince bin Salman commissioned.

I introduced legislation, also inspired by Mr. Khashoggi's brutal murder, to require that any nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia must meet the gold standard which Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid; must provide for international inspections by the IAEA, which Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid. And you can guess why. And that provision is now in the NDAA which is pending in conference.

I am going to say something a little bit gruesome, but it is not my language that is gruesome; it is the action of the Saudi government. If you cannot trust a regime with a bone saw, you should not trust them with nuclear weapons. And we should have no illusions. The reason that Saudi Arabia wants a nuclear program is not to lower the price of energy in Saudi Arabia. It is to give themselves the option to develop nuclear weapons.

This bill is an important step. One part of it requires reports on the efforts of Saudi diplomats to spy on and to intimidate Saudi citizens and Saudi-Americans here in the United States.

A second part, and the more controversial part, deals with the sale of certain military and lethal materials to certain Saudi agencies. The ranking member says, well, we already have a process to involve Congress in the sale of military items to Saudi Arabia. That is the very process that failed. That is the process that the Inspector General identified was violated criminally by the State Department through a phony declaration. So, certainly, it would behoove us to have better control.

But, second, as the gentleman from Virginia points out, his bill does not prohibit the sale of arms to the Saudi defense ministry. It deals only with selling military items to intelligence and police

officials. I am not thrilled to see military items and tanks, and whatever, entrusted to American law enforcement authorities. That is a separate controversy. But, having seen the actions of the intel and law enforcement authorities of Saudi Arabia, I see no reason for them to have items that we identify as appropriate for the military.

So, Mr. Khashoggi is not forgotten. This bill is an appropriate remembrance of him roughly 2 years after his death. And certainly, the intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia should not be getting military items from the United States.

And even with that, I would point out that the gentleman has added a waiver position to his bill, further undercutting the argument that it constitutes an undue restriction on sales of certain items to certain Saudi agencies.

I urge a yes vote, and I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia, Representative Connolly, for his tireless work on this issue, especially since it has been 2 years since Jamal Khashoggi's murder at the hands of the Saudi government. And as he indicated, this bill is about honoring his death and ensuring U.S. weapons do not get into the hands of those responsible for such brutal suppression.

I am often reminded, and I was reminded by a former colleague and a mentor of mine, former Member of this House Charles B. Rangel. He told me of the story when he was traveling abroad and there were individuals and families that were killed because they disagreed with the government of that country. And he said that, as he engaged one of those members of someone's family, he says, "We are here. I am here, my friend, and we want to help you." He says the individual then took him over to a pile of spent munitions and said, "Let me show you something, Mr. Rangel." And he showed him a sign that said, "Made in the USofA." And then, he asked Mr. Rangel, "You're my friend, but are you made in the USofA?"

One of the things that Mr. Connolly is doing in this bill is trying to make sure that there is a message to the dissidents in Saudi Arabia, the dissidents in other countries around this world, that we are not going to go and allow folks to utilize lethal weapons against them. And Mr. Connolly has put in provisions to try to make sure that its focus, as he said, is not a broad military ban, but it is trying to make sure that our standards, our morals, our concerns are taken care of and are produced, and we lead in that regard.

To this day, 2 years later, it still hurts me when I think of the hurt that the Khashoggi family and what his murder symbolizes. Therefore, it is important for Congress, a separate branch of government, to act where the administration has refused to. I think it is important for the others to know where the legislative branch of government stands.

And we have a duty to do this as an equal branch of government. We must demonstrate commitment to the dissidents around the world who want to look to America as they bravely seek democratic progress at home. It is a message of who we are and what we stand

for to the dissidents of the world, as well as to the governments who commit these egregious crimes in killing individuals like a reporter who happens to be a citizen of the United States, and the devastation to the Khashoggi family that has occurred.

So, I urge all of my colleagues, this is something we should stand together on. We all, from what I have listened to thus far, know how wrong the death was of Mr. Khashoggi. We know because of our intelligence who authorized the murder. Street language would say "the hit" on Mr. Khashoggi.

We cannot stand idly by, and Mr. Connolly has come up with a well-thought-out bill to prevent that from happening in the future. And I think all of us need to think about what that end is and support this bill. And I ask that we do just that.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Chairman ENGEL. Yes, you are recognized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you.

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement in favor of the bill by Mr. Cicilline.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

October 1, 2020

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you negotiate a trade deal between the United States and Kenya, we write to express our strong opposition to efforts to weaken Kenya's restrictions on importation or consumption of single-use plastic and other products responsible for plastic pollution.

Plastic pollution is a major global problem. Of the estimated 8.3 billion metric tons of plastic produced in the past 60 years, 6.3 billion metric tons have become plastic waste and much of that has polluted our natural environment leading to major blights on the environment, economies, and health of countries around the world.

Every year, enough plastic – about 8 million tons – escapes into the ocean that five grocery bags full of plastic trash would fit on every foot of coastline around the globe. In addition to ocean pollution, plastic is contaminating every area of the world, including miles above us in the form of micro-plastic pollution found in raindrops that fall in areas as remote as Rocky Mountain National Park.¹ With nearly 400 million tons of plastic produced globally each year and failed policies to reclaim and recycle that plastic, we are creating suffocating amounts of plastic that are harming our environment, our health, and our budgets.

In Kenya, plastic pollution has had a devastating impact on their health, environment, and economy. Plastic bag pollution has led to major issues, such as clogged drainage systems that contributed to mass flooding in rainy seasons. A study supported by the National Environmental Management Agency in 2018 found that more than 50% of cattle near urban areas in Kenya had plastic bags in their stomachs.² Plastic beverage bottles and other plastic containers are ubiquitous in landscapes, residential areas, rivers, and beaches.

Some of this pollution can be attributed to plastic that was exported from the United States. In 2019, the United States exported more than 1 billion pounds of plastic waste to 96 countries,

¹ *It is raining plastic*, by the United States Geological Survey (May 2019), <https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/ofr20191048>

² *The prevalence of plastic bag waste in the rumen of slaughtered livestock at three abattoirs in Nairobi Metropolis, Kenya and implications on livestock health*, by the National Environmental Management Agency (October 2018), <http://www.lrrd.org/lrrd30/11/clang30182.html>

including Kenya. While many Americans believe they are recycling their plastic when they sort it at home for collection, this plastic often ends up as waste in developing countries with poor waste management capabilities and ultimately finds its way into rivers, oceans, and landscapes. Indeed, even countries with excellent waste management systems cannot keep up with the ever-increasing amounts of plastic that is impossible to recycle.

As a result, this plastic waste is often buried in landfills, set on fire in open lots, or lost to the ocean and the environment, while many in industry blame these developing countries for the pollution that is found in rivers and oceans. This is a crisis that has captured the attention of the global community. In May of last year, 187 countries took a major step to limit the flow of plastic waste to developing countries under the Basel Convention. Additionally, more than 100 countries have expressed support for a new global agreement to address the full life-cycle of plastics.

In both cases, the United States has not only failed to be a leader, but instead is actively working against progress on tackling this pollution. The United States' solution to the plastic pollution crisis cannot be to simply open more markets abroad for plastic products and find destinations to send increasing amounts of plastic waste. This is totally at odds with the global policy solution to prevent plastic pollution—not to mention climate change.

Kenya's own response to mounting plastic pollution was to take action to restrict plastic bags in 2017 and recently to restrict single-use plastic products in certain protected areas. In addition, Kenya is one of the 187 countries to sign onto the Basel amendments restricting the flow of plastic waste to developing countries.

Actions taken by the United States to undermine global efforts to restrict plastic waste exports and strategies to reduce single-use plastic and other wasteful products may benefit private corporations and for-profit industries that have only share-holder returns in mind, but they are a bad strategy for United States' interests abroad and will make it difficult to reach more equitable trade agreements that promote sustainable jobs and protect our environment.

We strongly oppose using the trade negotiations with Kenya to undermine their domestic efforts to restrict importation or consumption of single-use plastic and other polluting products. We believe the United States should begin efforts to ratify the Basel Convention and cease to undermine the Basel plastic amendments in other forums to which that the United States belongs, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The United States should adopt a position like the European Union of not only prohibiting the export of hazardous waste to developing countries, but also include the recently agreed to plastic waste listings in the Basel Annex II.

The United States should make no attempts to undermine Kenya's, or any other developing nations, domestic laws or regional agreements developed to meaningfully protect the health and

environment of its people, such as bans on plastic bags and restrictions on single-use plastics. The United States should publicly affirm this position and begin a process of joining with other countries to proactively address plastic pollution internationally as well as at home.

Sincerely,



Tom Udall
U.S. Senator



Alan Lowenthal
U.S. Member of Congress



Jeffrey A. Merkley
U.S. Senator



Steve Cohen
U.S. Member of Congress



Earl Blumenauer
Chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade

Joined by,

Charles E. Schumer
U.S. Senator

Cory A. Booker
U.S. Senator

Emanuel Cleaver, II
Member of Congress

Richard J. Durbin
U.S. Senator

Deb Haaland
Member of Congress

Raúl M. Grijalva
Member of Congress

Patrick Leahy
U.S. Senator

Mike Quigley
Member of Congress

Juan Vargas
Member of Congress

Dianne Feinstein
U.S. Senator

Jamie Raskin
Member of Congress

Nanette Diaz Barragán
Member of Congress

Henry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr. Member of Congress	Mark DeSaulnier Member of Congress	Donald S. Beyer Jr. Member of Congress
Suzanne Bonamici Member of Congress	James P. McGovern Member of Congress	Nydia M. Velázquez Member of Congress
Jared Huffman Member of Congress	Barbara Lee Member of Congress	Lloyd Doggett Member of Congress
Tom Malinowski Member of Congress	Eliot L. Engel Member of Congress	Jesús G. "Chuy" García Member of Congress
Chellie Pingree Member of Congress	Francis Rooney Member of Congress	Andy Levin Member of Congress
Rashida Tlaib Member of Congress	Harley Rouda Member of Congress	Jimmy Panetta Member of Congress
Adriano Espaillat Member of Congress	Bennie G. Thompson Member of Congress	Judy Chu Member of Congress
Eleanor Holmes Norton Member of Congress	Yvette D. Clarke Member of Congress	Veronica Escobar Member of Congress
Grace Meng Member of Congress	Ayanna Pressley Member of Congress	Bonnie Watson Coleman Member of Congress
Alcee L. Hastings Member of Congress	Peter Welch Member of Congress	Suzan Delbene Member of Congress
Ro Khanna Member of Congress	Sharice L. Davids Member of Congress	Michael F.Q. San Nicolas Member of Congress
Lucille Roybal-Allard Member of Congress	Julia Brownley Member of Congress	Thomas R. Suozzi Member of Congress
Salud Carbajal Member of Congress	Diana DeGette Member of Congress	Adam Smith Member of Congress
Pramila Jayapal Member of Congress	Ted W. Lieu Member of Congress	Donna E. Shalala Member of Congress

David E. Price
Member of Congress

Zoe Lofgren
Member of Congress

John B. Larson
Member of Congress

cc:

The Honorable Robert E. Lighthizer, United States Trade Representative

The Honorable Michael R. Pompeo, United States Secretary of State

The Honorable Andrew R. Wheeler, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I also have letters from other Saudi families in the West, primarily here in the United States, who have been subject to harassment, surveillance, and death threats, including Saudi teams that have transited through the United States itself. And I ask now that those statements be entered into the record.

Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

September 30, 2020

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC

The Honorable Michael McCaul
Ranking Member, Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC

Dear Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul,

I am writing to express my support for the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019 (H.R. 4507), which will help hold Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and continued acts of intimidation and violence against my family and other innocent victims.

My father, Dr. Saad Aljabri, has been the target of a multi-year campaign orchestrated by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) to find, trap, and kill him. He served in the Saudi government from 1976 to 2015 with distinction, and in his position as a national security and counterterrorism expert became an "intelligence hero" with close relationships to the United States intelligence and security apparatus. As MBS attempted to secure support from the Trump Administration, the Crown Prince became deeply concerned by how much my father knew and how he might use that knowledge and his longstanding partnerships in the United States to undermine MBS. For example, it is understood that MBS believes my father was the catalyst for the CIA's conclusion that MBS personally ordered the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

Just two weeks after the "Tiger Squad" murdered and dismembered Jamal Khashoggi, MBS deployed operatives into the United States to track down my father and, upon finding him, dispatched members of the same 50-person kill team to murder him. As part of this conspiracy, MBS also kidnapped my siblings Omar and Sara and is now holding them as hostages in an attempt to lure my father to his death. This summer, the Canadian authorities thwarted another attempt against my dad's life by MBS. In August, my father filed a complaint against MBS in federal district court pursuant to the Torture and Victim Protection Act of 1991 for attempted extrajudicial killing and a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The provisions included in the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019, including those that would make arms sales contingent on Saudi Arabia meeting certain human rights conditions, will help hold MBS accountable for the human rights atrocities committed, and continues to commit, against my family and other innocent victims. I am proud to support this timely legislation and look forward to working with you and your colleagues on the House Foreign Affairs Committee in pursuit of accountability and justice.

Sincerely,

Dr. Khalid Saad Aljabri

Honorable Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

We, the undersigned organizations, write to applaud Representative Connolly's efforts to secure justice and accountability for Jamal Khashoggi and all Saudi Arabian dissidents, in House Resolution 4507, The Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019. H.R. 4507 would prohibit licenses for future weapons sales to Saudi Arabia if basic human rights protections for U.S. and Saudi citizens are not met.

Specifically, H.R. 4507 would require the President to certify that the Saudi Arabian government is taking the following measures:

1. Cooperate with an independent investigation into the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
2. Release any journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, or civil society activists detained for their work.
3. Protect the equal rights of all citizens to freedom of religion or belief
4. Take verifiable steps to end torture of detainees.
5. Disband any units of its intelligence or security apparatus dedicated to the forced repatriation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

It's been nearly two years since the heinous murder of Jamal Khashoggi on October 2nd 2018, and reports show that egregious violations of human rights of Saudi Arabia citizens are only increasing. Medical neglect of Saudi detainees is an ongoing concern, that has led to the tragic deaths of human rights activist Abdullah al-Hamid in April of 2020 and journalist Saleh al-Shehi in June of 2020. Women's rights activists, such as Loujain al-Hathloul, Samar Badawi, and Nouf Abdulaziz, remain in detention and are subjected to torture, inhumane degrading treatment, and sexual violence. Currently there are estimated to be over 3,000 political prisoners in Saudi Arabia who find themselves in severely comprised humanitarian circumstances and with almost no legal protections.

Furthermore, the lack of real accountability from the United States after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi has left many U.S. citizens and residents with ties to Saudi, in constant fear of retaliation by Saudi Arabia. One example was defected Saudi intelligence officer Saad Al-Jabri and his family who were reportedly victims of an international man-hunt in the United States and assassination attempt by Mohamed Bin Salman's mercenary group the "Tiger Squad."

Also, in April of 2019, dual US-Saudi citizens Salah al-Haidar and Badr Al-Ibrahim were detained at a time of mass arrests: both have been declared prisoners of conscience. U.S. citizen Areej Al-Sadhan, sister of detained humanitarian aid worker Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, and Abdullah AlAoudh of Virginia, son of detained reformer Salman Al-Odeh, have been subject to intimidation and harassment, and prevented from communicating with their family members in prison. Horrendous stories like these are far too common and exactly what The Protecting Saudi Dissidents Act is trying to prevent.

Again we, the undersigned organizations, urge Members to work with Representative Connolly, to ensure justice and accountability for Jamal Khashoggi and all ongoing human rights violations to Saudi dissidents committed by the Saudi Arabian government. Thanks for the consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

ALQST for Human Rights
 The Center for International Policy
 CODEPINK
 Freedom Forward
 The Freedom Initiative
 Friends Committee on National Legislation
 MENA Rights Group
 Reporters Without Borders
 The Saudi American Justice Project



SAUDI
 AMERICAN
 JUSTICE
 PROJECT



MENA
 Rights
 Group





As organizations that support human rights and press freedom—and accordingly advocate for accountability and justice for the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi—we are grateful to Representative Connolly and the original co-sponsors, Representatives Malinowski, Trone, Castro, and San Nicolas, for introducing H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019. This legislation would take an important step toward holding the Government of Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder of Mr. Khashoggi by limiting arms sales to the kingdom until Saudi authorities end their attacks on dissidents and critics of the Saudi regime.

As we mark two years since the brutal murder of the *Washington Post* columnist and U.S. resident, the Saudi government has failed to deliver justice. After repeatedly lying about what happened inside its own consulate, the kingdom eventually carried out a sham trial that resulted in eight unidentified individuals receiving prison sentences for the murder. Agnes Callamard, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, released a detailed report about the murder last year, describing the trial as a "parody of justice" and noting that the high-level officials involved in Mr. Khashoggi's assassination "have walked free from the start—barely touched by the investigation and trial."

Despite sanctioning 17 individuals for their involvement in the murder, the Trump administration has continued to protect senior Saudi officials from accountability. President Trump has bragged about protecting Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other senior Saudi government leaders from bipartisan congressional efforts to hold them accountable. The administration has gone so far as to refuse compliance with U.S. law (PL. 116-92, the FY20 NDAA) which requires production of an unclassified report listing those responsible for Khashoggi's murder. It has also refused to produce documents describing whether U.S. intelligence agencies knew of threats to Khashoggi before his murder.

This legislation will send an important message to Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian governments that stifling dissent does not come without consequence; as well as a message that the United States will protect fundamental freedoms of press and expression, internationally recognized human rights, and international law. It would also provide a deterrent to other

governments that might consider similar violent tactics to eliminate or otherwise silence those critical of their regime.

Our organizations support this legislation as a critical step toward addressing Saudi Arabia's mistreatment of its citizens—including journalists, women, human rights defenders, religious minorities, and civil society activists—and a reckless foreign policy that has violated the rights of U.S. citizens, clashed with U.S. interests, and broken diplomatic norms. Too many Saudis are languishing in prison or have been forced into exile fearing for their lives, as with Mr. Khashoggi. This legislation would provide the administration with additional leverage to press the Government of Saudi Arabia to end its attacks on dissenting citizens and independent journalists both inside the kingdom and abroad.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair.

Chairman ENGEL. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Omar.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairman.

It is quite strange to me that we talk about Saudi Arabia as a partner in peace and stability in the Middle East. Here is a country that exports its dictatorship and uses its diplomatic facilities to harass, intimidate, kidnap, disappear, and murder its nationals abroad.

Jamal Khashoggi is the most egregious example, but far from the only one. As we recognize the second anniversary of his murder at the Saudi diplomatic facility in Istanbul, I think Mr. Connolly's bill is an extremely appropriate response from this

[audio interference] as a consequence of Jamal's murder, but to prevent ourselves from being complicit in the next one.

A country that dismembers journalists because it doesn't like what they write is not a country that should see a single dime of American taxpayer money. If an embassy or a consulate is used as a base of operation for forced disappearances and murder of its own nationals, it loses its status as an embassy or a consulate.

I should also mention that the Saudi Ambassador has refused to meet with myself and several other Members of Congress, including members of this committee, Mr. Trone, Mr. Levin, and the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Schiff. So, it seems that the Saudi embassy is not even being used for diplomacy if that means having difficult conversations with its critics.

But we will not stop our criticism. We must stand in absolute solidarity with the Saudi dissidents who are being terrorized by the Saudi government and who can cross no border to finally reach safety.

I strongly recommend Mr. Connolly's bill for us to support, and I am grateful to have the opportunity to help move it through committee. I am looking forward to voting for it on the floor.

Thank you.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Do any other members wish to speak on the legislation?

Hearing no further requests, let's move on to amendments.

For what purpose does the ranking member seek recognition?

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman is recognized for that purpose. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to staff virtually.

For members currently in the hearing room, a member of the staff will bring a copy to you.

Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

[Pause.]

Chairman ENGEL. Has everyone received a copy of the amendment? Anyone who has not received one?

Okay. The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. McCaul Amendment No. 79. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4507. Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2020.

Section 2. Findings.

Congress finds the following:

1. Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident, Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist was killed and dismembered in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 2, 2019—

[The Amendment of Mr. McCaul follows:]

**AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE
NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4507
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Protection of Saudi
3 Dissidents Act of 2020”.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident,
7 Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,
8 was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate
9 in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018, by at least
10 14 intelligence officers of the Government of Saudi
11 Arabia. Khashoggi was lured to the consulate under
12 the false cover of needing to address a consular mat-
13 ter. Following the killing, 17 officers from the Saudi
14 intelligence service, or Mabahith, reportedly visited
15 Istanbul and cleansed the crime scene.

16 (2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was
17 living in Virginia under an “O” visa and was in the
18 process of applying for a permanent residency.

1 (3) A subsequent, highly-credible investigation
2 by the United Nations concluded that Khashoggi's
3 killing was premeditated and that the mission was
4 endorsed, planned, and overseen by senior Saudi of-
5 ficials.

6 **SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIO-**
7 **LATIONS AGAINST SAUDI DISSIDENTS**
8 **ABROAD.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
11 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a deter-
12 mination of whether, during the 120-day period preceding
13 the date of submission of the determination, the Govern-
14 ment of Saudi Arabia conducted any activities through its
15 intelligence, internal security, or law enforcement agencies
16 or instrumentalities that constitute forced repatriation, si-
17 lencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

18 (b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—If the President de-
19 termines that the Government of Saudi Arabia has con-
20 ducted any activities described in subsection (a), the Presi-
21 dent shall impose one or more of the sanctions described
22 in section 1263(b) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
23 Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) with respect to
24 one or more officials of the Government of Saudi Arabia

1 whom the President determines has engaged in such ac-
2 tivities.

3 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

4 (1) TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEAD-
5 QUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under para-
6 graph (1) of section 1263(b) of the Global
7 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act shall
8 not apply with respect to a foreign person who is an
9 official of the Government of Saudi Arabia described
10 in subsection (b) if admitting or paroling the foreign
11 person into the United States is necessary to permit
12 the United States to comply with the Agreement re-
13 garding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
14 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
15 into force November 21, 1947, between the United
16 Nations and the United States, or other applicable
17 international obligations.

18 (2) TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.—
19 The following activities shall be exempt from sanc-
20 tions under this section:

21 (A) Activities subject to the reporting re-
22 quirements under title V of the National Secu-
23 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

24 (B) Any authorized intelligence or law en-
25 forcement activities of the United States.

1 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

2 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
3 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
4 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
5 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
6 this section and shall issue such regulations, li-
7 censes, and orders as are necessary to carry out this
8 section.

9 (2) PENALTIES.—Any person that violates, at-
10 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
11 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
12 order issued to carry out paragraph (1) shall be sub-
13 ject to the penalties provided for in subsections (b)
14 and (c) of section 206 of the International Emer-
15 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the
16 same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
17 act described in subsection (a) of that section.

18 (e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-
19 ment in subsection (b) if the President determines and
20 submits to the appropriate congressional committees writ-
21 ten notice and justification not later than 15 days before
22 the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the
23 national security interests of the United States.

1 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
5 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
6 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
7 resentatives; and

8 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
9 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
10 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.

11 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF IN-**
12 **TIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED**
13 **AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED**
14 **STATES.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

16 (1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
17 (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that no export licenses or
18 other authorizations may be issued for the export of
19 goods or services to any country determined by the
20 President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of
21 acts of intimidation or harassment directed against
22 individuals in the United States.

23 (2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
24 further requires the President to report any such de-
25 termination promptly to the Speaker of the House of

1 Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
2 of the House of Representatives, and to the chair-
3 man of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
4 Senate.

5 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
6 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
7 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

8 (1) whether any official of the Government of
9 Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts
10 of intimidation or harassment directed against
11 Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United
12 States; and

13 (2) whether any United States-origin defense
14 articles were used in the activities described in para-
15 graph (1).

16 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
18 a classified annex.

19 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
20 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
21 gressional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
24 House of Representatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

3 **SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO**
4 **SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILI-**
5 **TIES IN THE UNITED STATES.**

6 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
7 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
8 to the appropriate congressional committees a report cov-
9 ering the three-year period preceding such date of enact-
10 ment regarding whether and to what extent covered per-
11 sons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities
12 to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harass-
13 ment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
14 in the United States.

15 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
18 President shall, if the President determines that
19 such is the case, submit to the appropriate congress-
20 sional committees a certification that covered per-
21 sons are not using diplomatic credentials, visas, or
22 covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking,
23 surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other na-
24 tionals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States

1 during the time period covered by each such certifi-
2 cation.

3 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
4 the President does not submit a certification under
5 paragraph (1), the President shall—

6 (A) utilize existing authorities to respond
7 appropriately to the monitoring, tracking, sur-
8 veillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other
9 nationals of Saudi Arabia within the United
10 States; and

11 (B) submit to the appropriate congres-
12 sional committee a report that contains—

13 (i) a detailed explanation of why the
14 President is unable to make such a certifi-
15 cation;

16 (ii) a list and summary of engage-
17 ments of the United States Government
18 with the Government of Saudi Arabia re-
19 garding the use of diplomatic credentials,
20 visas, or covered facilities described in
21 paragraph (1); and

22 (iii) a description of actions the
23 United States Government has taken or in-
24 tends to take in response to the use of dip-

1 diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered faci-
2 ties described in paragraph (1).

3 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
4 and the certification and report required by subsection (b)
5 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
6 a classified annex.

7 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-
8 ment in subsection (b) if the President determines and
9 submits to the appropriate congressional committees writ-
10 ten notice and justification not later than 15 days before
11 the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the
12 national security interests of the United States.

13 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
15 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
18 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
19 of the House of Representatives; and

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
21 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 Senate.

23 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term “covered
24 facility” means a diplomatic or consular facility of
25 Saudi Arabia in the United States.

1 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term “covered
2 person” means a national of Saudi Arabia
3 credentialed to a covered facility.

4 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF**
5 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence
7 Community Directive 191 provides that—

8 (1) when an element of the intelligence commu-
9 nity of the United States collects or acquires credible
10 and specific information indicating an impending
11 threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or
12 kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must
13 “warn the intended victim or those responsible for
14 protecting the intended victim, as appropriate”; and

15 (2) when issues arise with respect to whether
16 the threat information rises to the threshold of
17 “duty to warn”, the directive calls for resolution in
18 favor of warning the intended victim.

19 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
20 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
21 telligence, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
22 United States intelligence agencies, shall submit to the ap-
23 propriate congressional committees a report with respect
24 to—

1 (1) whether and how the intelligence community
2 fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats
3 to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Com-
4 munity Directive 191; and

5 (2) in the case of the intelligence community
6 not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in para-
7 graph (1), why the intelligence community did not
8 fulfill this duty.

9 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
10 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
11 a classified annex.

12 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

13 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
14 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
15 mittees” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
17 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
18 of the House of Representatives; and

19 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
20 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
21 Senate.

22 (2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term “duty to warn”
23 has the meaning given that term in Intelligence
24 Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21,
25 2015.

1 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term
2 “intelligence community” has the meaning given
3 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security
4 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

5 (4) RELEVANT UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
6 AGENCY.—The term “relevant United States intel-
7 ligence agency” means any element of the intel-
8 ligence community that may have possessed intel-
9 ligence reporting regarding threats to Jamal
10 Khashoggi.



Chairman ENGEL. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes to explain his amendment.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, all of us agree that the intimidation and harassment of dissidents anywhere is a grave offense. As discussed earlier, I have been adamant in seeking accountability for the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

I supported Mr. Malinowski's bill to impose sanctions on those who are guilty of his heinous murder.

My amendment to today's bill speaks directly to the heart of the matter. It would impose sanctions on the Saudi government officials responsible for abuses against dissidents like Jamal Khashoggi. The United States must take significant steps to ensure that no other dissident of any nationality is a victim of such brutality.

This committee has shown the ability to address difficult challenges, even when they come from our partners. And we must remember that Saudi Arabia is an important partner when it comes to countering Iran. Just this week Saudi's internal security services broke up an IRG cell in Saudi Arabia.

Today's bill would also force the closure of diplomatic facilities if there is harassment of dissidents in the United States. Any actions against dissidents in the United States is unacceptable and must be punished.

Closing diplomatic facilities may be an appropriate punishment, but I have serious concerns that mandating it could be harmful to Americans and U.S. interests overseas. Instead, my amendment calls for the President to take appropriate action in response to these offenses. We need to give the executive branch some discretion in the handling of these troubling and yet delicate situations.

So, I urge my colleagues to support the strategic and diplomatic approach to addressing this serious human rights issue without at the same impairing our national security interests.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend just yield.

Mr. MCCAUL. I yield back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. McCaul, would you—

Mr. MCCAUL. I just yielded back.

Chairman ENGEL. Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I am recognized?

Chairman ENGEL. Yes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I just wanted to say I appreciate what Mr. McCaul had to say. But what led to this bill was a lack of action by the Administration.

You know, Mr. McCaul talked about how this committee has purview and review of arms sales. But the fact of the matter is, the Administration overrode that purview and review by declaring an emergency to justify arms sales going forward to Saudi Arabia without interruption.

The fact of the matter is, the Administration refused to invoke the Magnitsky Act to hold Saudi individuals accountable.

The fact of the matter is, Secretary Pompeo, despite giving this committee assurances that this would be the highest priority and that we would hold Saudis to account for the murder of Mr. Khashoggi, no matter how high it went—and that was in direct response to my question to Secretary Pompeo—nothing has happened.

And as Mr. Sherman colorfully said, the worst that has happened is apparently some individuals involved or alleged to have been involved in the murder and the scheming of the murder have been banned from Walt Disney.

I just think that is—we have waited 2 years. And the death of this Saudi patriot and U.S. resident is not just distasteful or unpleasant, it is murder. And people cannot be allowed to use that kind of tragic incident, tactic, to further their diplomacy by silencing critics in the most extreme way possible.

And at some point, I would ask rhetorically, when does Congress assert itself? When do we say, that goes so far we are not going to put up with it; you will pay a heavy price?

As I said, I tried to respond to Republican concerns to tailor and refine the bill so that there was flexibility, it is not an absolute ban but it has some teeth in it. And I think, frankly, after 2 years some teeth are required.

I yield back. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

I recognize myself to make a point of order that the amendment is not germane. The chair—is there any debate?

Hearing none, the chair is prepared to rule.

And I find, again, that the amendment is not germane on a number of grounds.

Hearing no further requests for recognition, the question is to report H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, to the House with an amendment and a recommendation that the bill be passed.

We are going to take a vote by voice. All members please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

The question is to report H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, to the House, with the recommendation that the bill do pass.

All members, please turn on your video so you are visible to the chair, and wait to unmute your microphone until your name is called.

It passed by voice. The ayes have it. We do not have to do it again. So, so disregard what you heard me say.

OK. And now, Mr. McCaul, guess what, this concludes our business today.

Mr. McCAUL. Fantastic.

Chairman ENGEL. I thank Ranking Member McCaul, as usual, and all of the committee members for their contributions and assistance at today's markup.

Where is the gavel? Right here.

OK, let's make it official. Thank you very much, those who have stayed throughout the entire proceedings. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Eliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

October 1, 2020

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN markup of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building. Pursuant to H. Res. 965, Members who wish to participate remotely may do so via Cisco WebEx. The markup is available by live webcast on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>.

DATE: Thursday, October 1, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m., EDT

MARKUP OF: H.R. 6986, Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act

H.R. 7990, FENTANYL Results Act

H.R. 7673, Represent America Abroad Act

H.Res. 1012, Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the transformation of the United States – Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership

H.Res. 697, Recognizing the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding

H.Res. 1100, Reaffirming the strategic partnership between the United States and Mongolia and observing the 30th anniversary of democracy in Mongolia

H.Res. 751, Reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the African Union and recognizing the importance of diplomatic, security, and trade relations

H.Res. 1077, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the continued importance of the United States – Lebanon relationship

H.R. 8409, Department of State Student Internship Program Act

H.Res. 672, Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security

H.Res. 17, Expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice, and for other purposes

H.R. 4507, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act

H.Res. 823, Condemning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights

H.Res. 996, Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners

H.Res. 958, Condemning the practice of politically motivated imprisonment and calling for the immediate release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and urging action by the United States Government to impose sanctions with respect to persons responsible for that form of human rights abuse

H.R. 8428, Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act of 2020

H.R. 8405, American Values and Security in International Athletics Act

H.R. 8259, To prohibit Russian participation in the G7, and for other purposes

H.Res. 825, Recognizing the importance of entry into force of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

H.R. 4636, Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International Cleaner Seas Act

H.Res. 1121, Urging the Government of Burma to hold free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections on November 8, 2020.

H.Res. 1115, Calling for the immediate release of Trevor Reed, a United States citizen who was unjustly sentenced to 9 years in a Russian prison.

H.Res. 768, Calling on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa

H.Res. 1150, Urging the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all citizens to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in October 2020.

H.Res. 1145, Condemning the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and calling for a robust United States and international response

H.R. 4326, Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act

H.R. 7954, Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020

H.R. 8438, to reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

Day Thursday Date 10/01/2020 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 10:20 a.m. Ending Time 1:48 p.m.

Recesses (12:18 to 12:22) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Elliot L. Engel

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Executive (closed) Session

Stenographic Record

Televised

BILLS FOR MARKUP: *(Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)*

See attached.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

SFR - Connolly (4), McCaul

IFR - Engel, McCaul, Connolly (11)

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: *(Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)*

The measures considered en bloc were agreed to by voice vote, ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House. The two measures considered separately, H.R. 7673 and H.R. 4507, were ordered favorably reported, as amended, to the House.

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): *(Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)*

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 1:48 p.m.

Carilla Hallman
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE ATTENDANCE

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Eliot L. Engel, NY
X	Brad Sherman, CA
X	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
X	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
X	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
X	Karen Bass, CA
X	William Keating, MA
X	David Cicilline, RI
X	Ami Bera, CA
X	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Dina Titus, NV
X	Adriano Espaillat, NY
X	Ted Lieu, CA
X	Susan Wild, PA
X	Dean Phillips, MN
X	Ilhan Omar, MN
X	Colin Allred, TX
X	Andy Levin, MI
X	Abigail Spanberger, VA
X	Chrissy Houlahan, PA
X	Tom Malinowski, NJ
X	David Trone, MD
X	Jim Costa, CA
X	Juan Vargas, CA
X	Vicente Gonzalez, TX

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Michael T. McCaul, TX
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
X	Steve Chabot, OH
X	Joe Wilson, SC
X	Scott Perry, PA
X	Ted Yoho, FL
X	Adam Kinzinger, IL
X	Lee Zeldin, NY
	James Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI
X	Ann Wagner, MO
	Brian J. Mast, FL
	Francis Rooney, FL
X	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
X	John Curtis, UT
X	Ken Buck, CO
	Ron Wright, TX
X	Guy Reschenthaler, PA
X	Tim Burchett, TN
X	Greg Pence, IN
X	Michael Guest, MS
X	Mark Green, TN

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD

Statement for the Record
HFAC Full Committee Markup of Various Measures
10:00 AM, October 1, 2020
RHOB 2172
Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA)

I want to thank the Chair and Ranking Member for bringing this slate of bills to the Committee for en bloc consideration. The full agenda today is a credit to the hard work of my colleagues. Together, these measures strengthen our national security by bolstering our allies and partners, support diversity and inclusion at the Department of State, and advance human rights. There are a few bills in particular that I would briefly like to address.

H.R. 8259, To prohibit Russian participation in the G7

I am proud to be the lead cosponsor of this legislation with my good friend, Mr. Meeks of New York. I am glad this legislation takes a clear stand on Russia's forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea. That was Russia's original sin in Ukraine. It is the reason Russia's membership in the G8 was suspended in March 2014. We cannot dilute our position on this critical matter, which is fundamental to securing a Europe whole, free, and at peace. As the co-chair of the Congressional Georgia Caucus, I appreciate this legislation's firm opposition to Russia's continued illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I also welcome the addition of provisions ensuring accountability on Russian bounty payments in Afghanistan. We learned in June this year about Russia's offer and payment to Taliban-linked militants to kill U.S. and NATO coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to Senator Tammy Duckworth's daily tracker, President Trump has refused to address this disturbing revelation for 97 days, and as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I find that reprehensible, not only on behalf of the United States Government, but also out sympathy for the families of the American and NATO coalition troops we have lost in Afghanistan. The Trump Administration has failed time and again to respond proportionately to Russia's illegal and unacceptable behavior, including Russia's interference in our elections, and that is why I fully support this concrete, direct measure to punish and isolate Vladimir Putin.

H.R. 8428, Hong Kong People's Freedom and Choice Act of 2020

From large-scale, anti-government protests starting in mid-2019 to the implementation of a national security law in July that enabled the arrests of journalists and media executives, activists, and students leaders, human rights and democracy in Hong Kong continue on a downward spiral as the direct result of China's interference, actions, and policies. This legislation seeks to protect the Hong Kong people who are facing persecution or fleeing from persecution, and to provide temporary refuge to those already in the United States and fear persecution if they return to home. It is imperative that Congress maintains this great nation's long and proud history as a destination for refugees and asylees worldwide by supporting this legislation.

H.Res. 1012, Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership

The U.S.-South Korea Alliance is a cornerstone of U.S. national security and stability in East Asia. This alliance, forged in blood, is central to advancing U.S. interests and engagement in the region, based on shared commitments to democracy, free-market economics, human rights, and the rule of law. More than 2 million Korean Americans live in the United States and contribute to the diversity and prosperity of our nation. My congressional district is home to one of the most vibrant Korean American communities. As a cochairman of the Korea Caucus, I am proud to support this resolution.

H.Res. 697, Recognizing the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding

Promoting substantive dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Chinese government has been longstanding bipartisan U.S. policy and remains in the U.S. national interest. Despite this consistent policy of successive U.S. administrations, the Trump Administration has not yet reaffirmed this approach. Regardless, I have been proud to cosponsor the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (H.R. 1872) and H. Con. Res. 89, which both reaffirm U.S. policy toward Tibet. I also led the first joint Senate-House staff delegation to Tibet in 1986 and traveled to Dharamshala, India, last year with the House Democracy Partnership and met with the Dalai Lama. Tibetan rights autonomy will not be abandoned by the United States.

H.R. 8409, Department of State Student Internship Program Act

The need to build the next generation of federal employees has never been greater, and there's much to be done to attract recent college graduates and millennials to public service. Internships is a great means to identify and recruit public-oriented and mission-driven individuals for federal jobs. However, personal financial hardship or high cost of living might deter many talented university and graduate level students from pursuing internship opportunities. This bill proposes a practical solution in attracting young talent to the State Department and raising awareness about foreign policy and diplomacy. This is a critical issue I have worked on in the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and through enactment of the Federal Internship Improvement Act, which sought to standardize and better use what is otherwise a scattered approach to internships in the federal government. I applaud this resolution for tackling this issue head on.

Statement for the Record
HFAC Full Committee Markup of Various Measures
Thursday, October 1, 2020
2172 RHOB
Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA)

Thank you to Chairman Engel for bringing the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act (H.R. 4507) to markup one day before the solemn two-year anniversary of the brutal murder of my constituent and journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

The Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act:

- Bans the sale of U.S. weapons to Saudi intelligence, law enforcement, or internal security unless the Secretary of State can certify that these agencies are not involved in forced repatriation, silencing, or killing of Saudi dissidents in other countries;
- Enhances Congressional oversight on whether the Government of Saudi Arabia was engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United States and whether any United States-origin defense articles were used in those activities;
- Requires the President to close at least one Saudi diplomatic facility in the United States if Saudi diplomats are using diplomatic credentials, visas, or diplomatic facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States; and
- Improves Congressional oversight of the intelligence community regarding the extent to which the intelligence community fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats to his life and liberty.

This bill has the support of:

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| • Committee to Protect Journalists | • Project on Middle East Democracy | • Friends Committee on National Legislation |
| • Reporters Without Borders | • Freedom House | • Saudi American Justice Project |
| • PEN America | • Freedom Initiative | • Human Rights Watch |
| | • Human Rights First | • Freedom Now |
| | • Freedom Forward | |

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record various letters and statements of support from these organizations.

Now the facts of the case:

Two years ago, on October 2, 2018, my constituent and lawful U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi was lured into a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, where he was murdered in cold blood and dismembered by agents of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, reportedly at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and with the false assurances of safety given to Jamal by the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.

The U.S. intelligence community assessed that MBS ordered Mr. Khashoggi's murder. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary killings concluded that Mr. Khashoggi "has been the victim of a deliberate, premeditated execution, an extrajudicial killing for which the state of Saudi Arabia is responsible under international human rights law."

And we know Jamal was neither the lone nor last victim of Saudi Arabia's international campaign of intimidation, disappearances, and assassinations. Dr. Saad Aljabri, Loujain al-Hathloul – these are all too familiar names in the long list of dissidents persecuted while abroad.

I also ask unanimous consent to enter into the record:

- A May 2020 New York Times article "[As Saudi Official Hid Abroad, His Family Became a Target at Home](#)"
- A May 2019 New York Times article [It Wasn't Just Khashoggi: A Saudi Prince's Brutal Drive to Crush Dissent](#)
- A January 2019 New Yorker article "[The Saudi Government's Global Campaign to Silence Its Critics](#)"
- An October 2018 New York Times article "['Our Hands Can Reach You': Khashoggi Case Shakes Saudi Dissidents Abroad](#)"
- And the June 2019 [Report on Jamal Khashoggi's Killing by UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings](#)

It is important to note that this Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) represents a sincere effort to meet the requests of the minority.

- We eliminated findings that were perceived as unfairly critical of the Administration;
- We narrowed the purview of the bill to focus on the Saudi intimidation campaign abroad;
- We amended the immediate ban on arms sales to accommodate a 120-day period of oversight, review, and engagement with Saudi Arabia in the hopes we can address our concerns; and
- We included a national security waiver in Section 3 dealing with arms sales limitations.

We had hoped to have the support of the Ranking Member, but bipartisanship cannot be an end in itself. It is a means to getting things done. But after further Saudi abuses, no justice for Jamal, and what Jamal's editor at the Washington Post has referred to as a "two-year-long pageant of impunity" getting something done – at the very least – means ensuring that the United States is not an unwitting nor tacit enabler of the global Saudi intimidation campaign.

And that is what this bill does.

Your support of the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act in commemoration of the anniversary of Jamal Khashoggi's murder would serve as a strong and clear statement that the United States opposes the forced repatriation, intimidation, or killing of Saudi dissidents and critics abroad, and it would ensure that the United States is in no way enabling such human rights abuses. Please join me in sending a message to human rights defenders, dissidents, and journalists worldwide reaffirming the unshakable American commitment to basic rights and freedoms.

**Statement for the Record
Submitted by Representative Gerald Connolly**

**David N. Cicilline
Foreign Affairs Committee Markup of Various Measures
October 1, 2020
H.R. 4507, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act**

Thank you to my colleague Mr. Connolly for introducing H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act. As we approach the two-year anniversary of Jamal Khashoggi's brutal murder, it is even more important that we take a stand against Saudi Arabia's killing of Mr. Khashoggi and other dissidents.

This legislation does something important. It seeks to prevent U.S. involvement in Saudi attacks against Saudi dissidents. Because let's be crystal clear. If Saudi Arabia uses U.S. weapons in the disappearance or murder of those who speak against its government, we are complicit in their brutal actions.

H.R. 4507 would prohibit licenses for future weapons sales to Saudi Arabia if basic human rights protections for U.S. and Saudi citizens are not met. The bill would:

- Bar Saudi intelligence and internal security forces from access to US weapons if they are involved in forced repatriation, silencing or killing of dissidents in other countries.
- Close at least one Saudi diplomatic facility in the United States if the Saudi government is found to be using diplomatic facilities to attack dissidents.

And while it has been two years since the murder of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, other human rights activists and political prisoners in Saudi Arabia have been subject to brutal detentions and violence.

Let us come together to let the countries of the world know that we will not stand for violence against dissidents. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4507, the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act.

I yield back the balance of my time.

**Statement for the Record
Submitted by Representative Gerald Connolly
HFAC Full Committee Markup of Various Measures
October 1, 2020**

**Statement of Support for H.R. 4507
From Family of Loujain Alhathloul
September 30, 2020**

We, the siblings of Loujain Alhathloul forced into a diaspora outside our home country of Saudi Arabia, emphatically encourage all measures undertaken by the United States of America, as the main historical strategic partner of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to protect and shield Saudi citizens inside and outside Saudi Arabia from unjustifiable persecution.

The human rights situation in Saudi Arabia has been progressively deteriorating. The silencing and unfortunately silencing of any and all dissenting voices have become the norm.

The use of torture and enforced disappearances have become institutionalized, and with it the decay of institutions. Sliding the once consensus driven government of Saudi Arabia into a cruel one man autocratic rule.

Our sister Loujain went through painful and dehumanizing torture. Our sister sought salvation within, with a blunted and despondent response within existing institution in Saudi Arabia, including Saudi Arabia Human Rights Commission. Loujain is still imprisoned, with no charges brought forth by the government.

The decay of institutions and the intolerance towards upholding any measure of Human Rights can be directly correlated to my sisters ongoing suffering. Her advocacy to improve women's rights in Saudi Arabia being her crime. And in the absence of any institutions or channels to ensure us, her family, of her safety. We are beholden to legitimate fears that Loujain is still at a continued high risk of being tortured again.

Voting for an act to protect Saudi dissidents will undoubtedly echo far beyond from the chambers of the US Congress and will strongly signal that Saudi authorities must reset its relationship with its own critics and dissidents in diaspora.

INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

Congressman K. Michael Conaway (TX-11)

October 1, 2020

Statement for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Michael McCaul— House Foreign Affairs
Committee Markup H.Res. 1115

Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened our nation and bullied our allies and partners around the globe. His antagonism and animosity towards our nation, our people, and our ideals holds no bounds. We are now seeing our own innocent citizens and their families are caught in the middle of Putin's reprehensible political games.

This resolution calls for the immediate release of Trevor Reed, a United States Marine Corps veteran, Eagle Scout, and a resident of Granbury, Texas, who was unjustly sentenced to nine years in a Russian prison. Trevor was initially detained by Moscow's Police Service on August 16, 2019 for public intoxication, but after the Russian Federal Security Service identified him as a United States Marine, his charge was intensified for political purposes.

Trevor was accused of grabbing the arm of the police officer driving him to the station and elbowing another officer, supposedly causing the vehicle to swerve and endangering the lives of the police officers. However, this claim was undeniably disproved by Trevor's defense team, who presented 59 minutes of traffic camera video evidence showing that the vehicle never swerved, left its lane, or showed any signs of distress. His defense team was denied access to video evidence from the police vehicle and station that would have further proved his innocence. The accusation, and the lack of evidence to support it, was so absurd that even the Russian judge erupted in laughter during his trial. US Ambassador John Sullivan said, "justice was not even considered" in this case and described Trevor's trial as a "theater of the absurd."

Additionally, the Russian Foreign Ministry repeatedly violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations over the course of his detention, by denying Trevor consular access, medical treatment, communications, and family visitations—further proving the Putin Regime's refusal to conduct a fair trial process.

On July 30, 2020, the Russian judge disregarded all evidence, witnesses, and government experts by sentencing Trevor to the harshest punishment ever given for an alleged crime of this classification—9 years in a prison camp, on top of the year that he had already been detained, and a payment of 100,000 rubles to each police officer for their moral and physical injuries, despite neither police officer sustaining any visible injuries or requesting any time off work.

Trevor is clearly being used by the Putin regime as a political pawn. We cannot allow this Texan and American veteran to caught in the crossfire of Putin's animosity towards our nation. I join my colleagues in supporting this resolution and the Reed family by calling for the immediate release of Trevor Reed.

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POMPEO

Secretary Pompeo's Call with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud

READOUT | OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON | U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEPTEMBER 28, 2020

<https://www.state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-saudi-foreign-minister-faisal-bin-farhan-al-saud-2/>

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke yesterday with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed important work to advance humanitarian assistance and peace in Yemen, the need to overcome divisions between Gulf countries, and the historic Abraham Accords signing. They also discussed expectations for a productive U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue in October.

SUMMARY

10/01/2020 House Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary

The Chair called up the following measures and amendments, which were previously circulated to Members and considered *en bloc*:

- (1) H.R. 6986, Protecting Human Rights During Pandemic Act (McGovern)
 - Wagner, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 6986
- (2) H.R. 7990, FENTANYL Results Act (Trone)
 - Trone, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 7990
- (3) H.Res. 1012, Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the transformation of the United States-Korea alliance into a mutually beneficial, global partnership (Bera)
 - Bera, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1012
 - Bera, Amendment #75 to the Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1012
- (4) H.Res. 697, Recognizing the significance of the genuine autonomy of Tibet and the Tibetan people and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding
 - Yoho, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 697
- (5) H.Res. 1100, Reaffirming the strategic partnership between the United States and Mongolia and observing the 30th anniversary of democracy in Mongolia (Titus)
 - Titus, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1100
- (6) H.Res. 751, Reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the African Union and recognizing the importance of diplomatic, security, and trade relations (Bass)
- (7) H.Res. 1077, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives on the continued importance of the United States-Lebanon relationship (LaHood)
 - Deutch, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1077
- (8) H.R. 8409, To establish the Department of State Student Internship Program as a paid internship program to provide students with the opportunity to learn about a career in diplomacy and foreign affairs, and for other purposes (Castro)
 - Castro, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8409
- (9) H.Res. 672, Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security (Kaptur)
 - Kinzinger, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 672

- (10) H.Res. 17, Expressing concern over the detention of Austin Tice, and other purposes (Green)
- McCaul, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 17
 - Wilson, Amendment #75 to the Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 17
- (11) H.Res. 823, Condemning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights (Deutch)
- Deutch, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 823
- (12) H.Res. 996, Expressing the sense of Congress that the activities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities pose a threat to the national interests and security of the United States and of its allies and partners (Engel)
- Engel, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 996
- (13) H.Res. 958, Condemning the practice of politically motivated imprisonment and calling for the immediate release of political prisoners in the Russian Federation and urging action by the United States Government to impose sanctions with respect to persons responsible for that form of human rights abuse (Engel)
- Engel, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 958
 - Engel, Amendment #158 to the Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 958
- (14) H.R. 8428, To provide for temporary protected status for residents of Hong Kong, and for other purposes (Malinowski)
- (15) H.R. 8405, To direct the Department of State to ensure persons representing the United States in international athletic competitions in certain countries are appropriately informed, and for other purposes (McCaul)
- (16) H.R. 8259, To prohibit Russian participation in the G7, and for other purposes (Meeks)
- Meeks, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8259
- (17) H.Res. 825, Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognizing the importance of the NPT's continued contributions to United States and international security, and commemorating United States leadership in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the dawn of the nuclear era (Sherman)
- Sherman, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 825
- (18) H.R. 4636, Partnering and Leveraging Assistance to Stop Trash for International Cleaner Seas Act (McCaul)
- McCaul, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4636
 - Reschenthaler, Amendment #56 to the Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4636

- (19) H.Res. 1121, Urging the Government of Burma to hold free, fair, inclusive, transparent, participatory, and credible elections on November 8, 2020 (Levin)
 - Levin, Amendment #133
- (20) H.Res. 1115, Calling for the immediate release of Treavor Reed, a United States citizen who was unjustly sentenced to 9 years in a Russian prison (Conaway)
 - McCaul, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1115
- (21) H.Res. 768, Calling on African governments to protect and promote human rights through internet freedom and digital integration for all citizens across the continent of Africa (Bass)
 - Bass, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 768
- (22) H.Res. 1150, Urging the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, opposition leaders, and all citizens to respect democratic principles, refrain from violence, and hold free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections in October 2020 (Phillips)
- (23) H.Res. 1145, Condemning the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny and calling for a robust United States and international response (McGovern)
 - Malinowski, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 1145
- (24) H.R. 4326, Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act (Wagner)
 - Wagner, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4326
- (25) H.R. 7954, Tropical Forest and Coral Reef Conservation Reauthorization Act of 2020 (Chabot)
- (26) H.R. 8438, To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Smith)

The measures considered *en bloc* were agreed to by voice vote, ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House.

The Chair called up the following measures considered separately:

- (1) H.R. 7673, Represent America Abroad Act of 2020 (Bass)
 - Bass, Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 7673 (adopted by voice vote)
 - Zeldin, Amendment #1 (not adopted by voice vote)
- (2) H.R. 4507, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2019 (Connolly)
 - Connolly, Amendment in the nature of a substitute (adopted by voice vote)
 - McCaul, Amendment #79 to the Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4507 (ruled nongermane by the Chair)

Both measures were ordered favorably reported, as amended, to the House.

The Committee adjourned.

All measures can be found [here](#).