[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND 
                             THE CARIBBEAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
          THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY, AND TRADE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-116

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
        
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Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
41-943 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2021                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada                   ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California                 FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                                   
                                     
                                     
                            MIKE GUEST, Mississippi

                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director

              Brendan Shields,  Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

  Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade

                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida, Ranking 
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                    Member
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             TED S. YOHO, Florida
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 JOHN CURTIS, Utah
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              KEN BUCK, Colorado
JUAN VARGAS, California              MIKE GUEST, Mississippi

 
                  Alexander Brockwehl, Staff Director
                  
                  
                  
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SIRES

Opening statement of Chairman Sires..............................     3

                               WITNESSES

De Bolle, Dr. Monica, Professor, Latin American Studies Program, 
  School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins 
  University, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International 
  Economics......................................................    11
Camilleri, Michael, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, 
  Inter-American Dialogue........................................    17
Farnsworth, Eric, Vice President, Council of the Americas........    21

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    34
Hearing Minutes..................................................    35
Hearing Attendance...............................................    36

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record 
  from Chairman Sires............................................    37
Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record 
  from Chairman Sires............................................    46
Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record 
  from Representative Castro.....................................    53
Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record 
  from Representative Castro.....................................    56


THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND 
                             THE CARIBBEAN

                      Tuesday, September 15, 2020

                          House of Representatives,
            Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
                       Civilian Security and Trade,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC,

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:02 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Albio Sires (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our 
witnesses for being here today. This hearing, entitled ``The 
Health, Economic, and Political Challenges Facing Latin America 
and the Caribbean'' will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have 
5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions 
for the record subject to the list of limitations in the rules. 
To insert something into the record, please have your staff 
email the previously mentioned address.
    As a reminder to members, please keep your video function 
on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. 
Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and 
please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
    Consistent with H.R. 965 and the accompanying regulations, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate, when 
they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself 
for opening remarks.
    For the last 6 months, countries throughout Latin America 
and the Caribbean have been devastated by the coronavirus 
pandemic. This region has suffered nearly one-third of all 
coronavirus deaths globally. Some governments took COVID-19 
seriously and enacted strict lockdown measures, but still 
struggled to contain the virus, due in part to structural 
challenges like the high levels of informal employment, which 
made it impossible for workers to make a living while under 
quarantine.
    Other leaders, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, regrettably 
followed the lead of President Trump who intentionally 
downplayed the virus and dismissed the guidance of public 
health experts, with profoundly tragic consequences.
    Even today, as case numbers have become to level off in 
some places, five of the 10 countries with the most coronavirus 
cases globally are in Latin America. This virus is far from 
being under control.
    We also know that the region will be confronting the 
secondary impact of the pandemic for decades to come. In Haiti, 
where the United States has invested billions in taxpayer 
assistance, international organizations are worried that 
infant, child----
    [audio malfunction.]
    Ms. Hallman. Hi, everyone. It looks like we are 
experiencing some technical difficulties with the chairman. We 
will get right back online in 1 second.
    Mr. Sires. Can everybody hear me?
    Thank you.
    In Venezuela, the Maduro dictatorship has predictably 
exploited the pandemic to further crush dissent and targeting 
journalists, doctors, and aid workers who are there to speak 
out.
    In Bolivia, the interim government has persecuted over 100 
opposition leaders on charges that Human Rights Watch contends 
were politically motivated.
    In Honduras, attacks on human rights defenders have 
continued with complete impunity, including the kidnapping of 
four Garifuna community leaders by individuals dressed in 
police uniforms on July 18.
    At this difficult moment, the United States should be 
offering a steady and helping hand to our neighbors and allies 
and providing consistent principled leadership in our 
hemisphere. Unfortunately, President Trump has shown he is not 
interested in bringing people together or providing value-based 
global leadership. Instead of offering safe haven to those 
fleeing political persecution, his Administration has exploited 
the pandemic to expand its policies of using cruelty to deter 
asylum seekers.
    Two weeks ago, six colleagues and I sent letters to 
President Trump condemning his Administration's action after 
three Nicaraguan asylum seekers, who had been tortured by the 
Ortega regime, were expelled at the U.S. border. President 
Trump has talked tough on Nicaragua, but when it came time to 
stand with those who put their lives on the line to challenge 
the Ortega regime, his Administration placed its radical anti-
immigrant agenda above protecting American values in U.S. 
foreign policy and interests.
    I hope we can explore ways for the U.S. Government to 
ensure our diplomatic and foreign assistance tool to help our 
partners and allies in the region. I believe the U.S. has a 
critical role to play in helping to lift up this hemisphere as 
it emerges from a period of such darkness.
    Today, on the first day of Hispanic Heritage Month, we must 
reaffirm our shared commitment to working with countries across 
this hemisphere as they combat the coronavirus pandemic, and 
the many economic and political challenges that the pandemic 
have exposed or exacerbated.
    Thank you.
    And I now turn to Ranking Member Rooney for his opening 
statement.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sires follows:]
    
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    Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for organizing this 
important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for joining 
us under these challenging circumstances.
    The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are among 
the hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. With almost 6 million 
confirmed cases, the region makes up almost 28 percent of 
worldwide cases. Five countries, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru, and Argentina, currently rank among the top 10 in total 
number of cases globally, and Peru now has the worst COVID-19 
death rate per capita in the world. With almost 280,000 deaths, 
the human toll on the region has been disastrous. However, the 
economic forecast for the region are increasingly troubling.
    According to the International Monetary Fund's world 
economic outlook update, the region is expected to see an 
economic contraction of 9.4 percent, with almost every country 
in the region in a recession. If these projections continue to 
fruition, the region would be facing the worst economic 
recession on record.
    The countries of the Caribbean alone are projected to see a 
GDP decline of 10.3 percent in 2020, following the impact of 
the pandemic on the tourism industries.
    There are also serious concerns that economic downturn in 
the region will aggravate political and social instability that 
was boiling over prior to the pandemic. The pandemic is also 
straining the region's already fragile democratic institutions, 
and testing the governance capacity of the region's 
governments. These governments are challenged by systemic 
corruption, and now the pandemic has contributed to increased 
operations by the region's transnational criminal organizations 
as the chairman referred to.
    A recent research brief published by the United Nation's 
Office on Drugs and Crime States that organized criminal 
organizations are placing controls on items, such as masks and 
disinfectants. The issue is especially concerning for the 
countries of the Northern Triangle in Central America and 
Colombia.
    Further authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua, as the chairman referred to, are exploiting the 
pandemic to further oppress their people.
    The Maduro regime's response to the pandemic is worse than 
the already dire social and economic conditions in Venezuela 
and has added to the suffering of the Venezuelan people.
    In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime has failed to disclose the 
real number of cases in the country, and continues to disregard 
the threat. As the chairman referred to, we have a little of 
that problem ourselves.
    Lastly, the Castro regime in Cuba is trafficking Cuban 
doctors and exploiting them under the context of the pandemic 
for political purposes.
    This pandemic has also exposed the malign nature of the 
Chinese Communist Party. As the virus has spread, we learn more 
about the Chinese Communist Party's failure to respond and 
share relevant information with global health authorities that 
could have stemmed the spread. However, unfortunately, we were 
also briefed in January many times, and February as well.
    The authoritarian regime in China, however, bleeds into 
their entire global engagement, and I think that we need to 
worry about them a great amount right now.
    The pandemic provides an opportunity for the United States 
to strengthen its engagement with other countries in Latin 
America, and the Caribbean particularly, to demonstrate that we 
are their preferred partner instead of China. It is clear that 
China will attempt to capitalize on this pandemic, and is doing 
it right now. This will require the U.S. to take a strategic 
approach to supporting the region and combating the virus and 
economic recovery efforts.
    As always, the U.S. has stepped up to the plate to provide 
$141 million in aid to the region, including PPE and masks and 
ventilators, but we can always do more. The U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation will play a crucial role in 
investments in the region, which I believe can help the 
recovery and also its long-term economic well-being.
    I also recognize and applaud the weekend's election of 
Mauricio Claver-Carone as the new president of the Inter-
American Development Bank, but I also think it is important 
that for him to be appointed, Latin America needs to be 
consulted and have a role in this.
    Actions taken now by the U.S. to instigate greater recovery 
efforts in the Western Hemisphere will showcase our commitment 
and desire to see the region prosper. Challenges originating 
due to the pandemic will continue to emerge for many months to 
come, but I am confident the pandemic can strengthen our 
partnerships with Latin America and the Caribbean.
    The United States must remain adaptable in our strategies 
not only to help contain the virus, but to right against 
exploitive transactional criminal organizations, as the 
chairman referred to earlier, and corrupted authoritarian 
regimes, as well as the growing and very malign influence of 
China.
    I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses, and 
thank you again, Chairman Sires, for holding this hearing.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Rooney.
    I will now introduce our witnesses.
    First we have Dr. Monica de Bolle. She is a professor in 
the Latin America Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University, 
and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. She previously worked as a director for the 
Institute for Economic Policy Research in Brazil, and was also 
an economist at the International Monetary Fund.
    In 2014, Ms. de Bolle was named Honored Economist by the 
Order of Brazilian Economists for her contributions to the 
Brazilian policy debate. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
economics from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de 
Janeiro, and a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of 
Economics.
    Dr. de Bolle, we welcome you to the hearing.
    We will then hear from Mr. Michael Camilleri. He is 
director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-
American Dialogue. From 2012 to 2017, he served as the Western 
Hemisphere adviser on the Secretary of State's policy-planning 
staff, and as director for Andean Affairs at the National 
Security Council in the Obama Administration. Mr. Camilleri was 
also a human rights specialist at the Organization of the 
American States, and worked as a senior staff attorney at the 
Center for Justice and International Law. He holds a Bachelor 
of Arts degree in history from the University of Notre Dame and 
J.D. From Harvard Law School.
    Mr. Camilleri, thank you for joining us today.
    Finally, we will hear from Mr. Eric Farnsworth. He is the 
vice president of the Council of the Americas where he leads 
his Washington office. Prior to joining the Council of the 
Americas in 2003, he had a long career in government working in 
the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau, at the Department of 
State at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and a 
senior advisor to the White House special envoy for the 
Americas during the Clinton Administration.
    Previously, Mr. Farnsworth was managing director of 
ManattJones Global Strategies, and advisory and strategic 
consulting group. He holds a master's degree in public affairs 
from Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
    Mr. Farnsworth, thank you for joining us today.
    I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 
minutes and, without objection, your prepared written 
statements will be made as part of the record.
    We have been called to vote, and I would like to recess for 
about 45 minutes until we finish our voting so we can get back 
and not have any interruptions in the witnesses comments and 
questions, so we will recess for about 45 minutes.
    Thank you very much and thank you for your patience.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Sires. Monica, I think you are first with your 5-minute 
comments.

  STATEMENT OF DR. MONICA DE BOLLE, PROFESSOR, LATIN AMERICAN 
  STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR 
                    INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

    Dr. de Bolle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and 
members of the committee. Good afternoon to you all. It is a 
pleasure to be here.
    So I will dive right in. The COVID-19 pandemic struck Latin 
America in late February 2020. Governments in the region had at 
least 2 months to prepare for the pandemic by adopting public 
health strategies, economic rescue plans, and policies to 
protect millions of informal and vulnerable workers throughout 
the region. Despite the time advantage, none of these 
preparations occurred.
    Why? First, because of weak leadership, poor capacity, and 
because some leaders, including President Andres Manuel Lopez 
Obrador in Mexico and President Jay Bolsonaro in Brazil, 
minimized the dangers posed by a new and emerging disease.
    As a result of these failures, the impact in Latin America 
has been tragic. As of September 11, the region's five largest 
economies combined, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and 
Argentina, registered 6.8 million cases of COVID-19, or about 
400,000 more than the United States, and hundreds of thousands 
of deaths. The numbers may have been greater because of 
substantial underreporting, lack of testing capacity, and no 
systematic contact tracing protocols.
    The toll of the disease has been particularly harsh. The 
region's economies have suffered unprecedented drops in GDP, 
rampant unemployment, and a full-blown humanitarian crisis 
falling disproportionately on the poor.
    Latin America's economy was already fragile before the 
pandemic struck, leaving little room in public sector fiscal 
stimulus. Even so, the response failure has made the situation 
worse with the misguided view that policymakers had to choose 
between public health policies, such as lockdowns, and 
preserving the economy. Countries failed to control both the 
disease and its economic fallout.
    No sustained economic recovery can occur in the absence of 
measures to control the epidemic. The absence of these measures 
has led to uncontrolled epidemics throughout Latin America, and 
they are unlikely to abate over the next several months.
    As countries have returned to nearly normal conditions 
since the first months of the pandemic, social distancing and 
other restrictive measures have become politically and socially 
untenable.
    The outlook for the region is, therefore, grim. 
Uncontrolled epidemics will continue the ravage the vulnerable 
population, exacerbating already very high inequality and 
poverty levels.
    While many countries in the region have public health 
systems, whether partial or fully public, these systems have 
suffered from insufficient resources and financing, even during 
the pandemic. Hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel are 
heterogeneously distributed across most companies, adding to 
the daunting task of vaccinating tens of millions, or even 
hundreds of millions of people in different countries.
    Brazil has been especially hard-hit by COVID-19 because of 
its erratic leadership and mismanagement of the epidemic in its 
early stages. The disease, which at first struck urban centers, 
quickly spread through the country, hitting poor States in the 
north and the northeast, where public health resources are 
broadly unavailable. Strict lockdown measures were at first 
imposed in some States, but President Bolsonaro consistently 
undermined these efforts by blaming Governors for letting their 
economies decline. Because of his callous indifference, 
Brazil's leader was largely responsible for the failure of 
early efforts to contain the epidemic. And notwithstanding his 
disastrous performance in the GDP contraction of 11 percent in 
the second quarter, President Bolsonaro's standing in opinion 
polls has improved over the past few months.
    Why? In April, Congress approved an emergency basic income 
program of a generous cash payout to last 3 months, but with 
the possibility of further extensions. Initially, Bolsonaro 
resisted the program, but it then received unanimous 
congressional approval, leading him to reap political gains.
    Brazil's emergency basic income program has been a saving 
grace in a dismal situation. The program eventually reached 
about half of the country's population, or nearly 100 million 
people, and helped sustain poor and vulnerable families 
throughout the epidemic. It provided some support to the 
economy. Its success not only helped President Bolsonaro's 
political standing, but left the opposition without a viable 
political narrative to highlight his failures.
    Looking ahead, a major challenge will be addressing the end 
of the program in early 2021, especially as unemployment will 
remain likely in the double digits. Widespread bankruptcies, a 
credit crunch, and questions over fiscal sustainability will 
likely hamper efforts to reenact a similar cash transfer 
program in the near future.
    As the Brazilian economy was already weak before the 
pandemic, and since there are no expectations that it will 
improve much with an uncontrolled epidemic in place, the 
outlook for Latin America's largest economy is nothing short of 
grim.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. de Bolle follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]     
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Monica.
    Michael.

  STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL CAMILLERI, DIRECTOR, PETER D. BELL 
          RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE

    Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Rooney, members of the subcommittee. It is really a pleasure to 
appear before you today and testify on the health, economic, 
and political challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Honored as well to join my fellow witnesses whose expertise I 
admire greatly.
    I think as you, Mr. Chairman, the ranking member, and Dr. 
de Bolle have discussed, the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound 
public health and economic impacts in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. I will focus my opening remarks on the second order 
consequences of the pandemic for democratic governance in the 
region, which I think could be equally significant.
    While regional experiences surely vary, it is already clear 
that the pandemic is exposing and exacerbating many of Latin 
America's preexisting challenges. Income inequality, labor 
informality, and weak social safety nets obligated millions of 
citizens to choose between protecting their health and feeding 
their families. Strained public finances and regressive tax 
systems limited the steps governments could take to stimulate 
their economies and support those most in need. Weak public 
services and discrimination left vulnerable populations such as 
migrants, prisoners, and indigenous and Afro-descendent 
communities particularly exposed to COVID-19.
    Food insecurity, already aggravated by factors such as 
climate change, grew still worse as a consequence of COVID. 
Corrupt public officials and cynical profiteers exploited the 
health emergency for their own gain. And in some countries, 
politicians used the pandemic to polarize society, while 
authoritarian leaders exploited fragile checks and balances to 
concentrate power and further erode civil liberties.
    This last trend is worthy of particular attention. 
Unsurprisingly, the strongmen leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela have used the health crisis to reinforce their grip, 
including by persecuting those who criticized their pandemic 
responses, or simply attempted to share accurate public health 
information.
    Unfortunately, we observe authoritarian tendencies in some 
of the region's democracies as well. A recent Inter-American 
Dialogue report details several troubling examples of 
restrictions on free speech under the cover of combating COVID-
19, including in Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, and 
Honduras.
    The case of El Salvador is perhaps the most alarming. 
President Bukele's pandemic response included deploying the 
military and police to arbitrarily detain those accused of 
violating stay-at-home orders, and then defying Supreme Court 
rulings against these measures. Lately, Bukele has used his 
private platform and his government agencies to attack the free 
press, particularly ``El Faro,'' one of Central America's 
leading investigative journalism outlets, which, last week, 
broke the story of Bukele's secret negotiations with MS-13. 
Most disturbing of all, Bukele seems to believe he enjoys the 
support of the U.S. Government despite these actions.
    In short, this is a highly challenging and uncertain time 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Strong, steady, principled 
partnership from the United States will be vital to the 
region's economic recovery and democratic trajectory. Today, 
however, U.S. engagement with the region is inconsistent and 
ideologically driven. Often, it is also counterproductive.
    Cutting aid to Central America and abandoning 
anticorruption missions only fuels instability and migration. 
Loose talk of military options in Venezuela neutralizes the 
democratic opposition and hands the Maduro regime a pretext for 
further oppression. Indiscriminate tariffs disincentivize 
nearshoring and deepen the region's reliance on China. Staying 
silent on democratic abuses by friendly governments undermines 
the United States' credibility to confront Latin American 
dictators, while separating children from their families, gives 
those dictators an easy retort to our invocations of human 
rights.
    And withdrawing from the World Health Organization in the 
midst of a global pandemic sends the message that Latin America 
should hedge its bets and look beyond the hemisphere for 
reliable partners.
    As the saying goes, hard times reveal true friends. The 
present moment is one of deep challenges in our hemisphere, but 
it offers the United States an opportunity to reinforce bonds 
of cooperation and partnership with Latin America and the 
Caribbean. By redoubling our focus and recalibrating our 
approach, we can more effectively support our regional 
partners, and advance U.S. values and interests in the 
Americas.
    Thank you once again. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Camilleri follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]     
        
    Mr. Sires. You are on. You have to unmute yourself.
    Thank you.

 STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC FARNSWORTH, VICE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF 
                          THE AMERICAS

    Mr. Farnsworth. Well, Mr. Chairman, what a privilege it is 
to appear again before you and Mr. Rooney and the subcommittee, 
and I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify in this 
virtual hearing on such an important topic. Both of you, as 
well as the other members of the subcommittee, continue to 
offer sound and meaningful leadership on issues that impact 
literally hundreds of millions of people in the United States 
and across the Americas, and we acknowledge, and very much 
appreciate your efforts, and particularly during these 
unsettled and challenging times in the hemisphere, so thank you 
again.
    Unfortunately, as we have heard already from both 
witnesses, the near-term health and economic outlook for the 
region, already suffering from a pre-pandemic downturn, is 
challenging. But the good news is that the situation is not at 
all hopeless. To be sure, the pandemic has amplified and 
accelerated a number of preexisting trends.
    Issues including the world's highest levels of inequality, 
substandard housing, uneven healthcare and sanitation, and 
patchwork social safety nets have made the pandemic much worse 
across the region than it might otherwise have been. Of equal 
importance, significant percentages of workers are stuck in the 
informal economy, making economic shutdowns and quarantines 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement and enforce. And 
this does not even begin to account for the collapse of 
Venezuela, whose economy and democracy have been destroyed by 
Chavismo and where estimates suggest between 5-and 6 million 
Venezuelans are now refugees in neighboring countries who are 
hard-pressed to absorb them.
    The World Bank has estimated that regional growth will 
approach negative 10 percent this year, the worst performance 
since meaningful records began to be kept in 1901. Projections 
for a 2021 recovery are welcome, but, nonetheless, are in the 2 
to 3 percent range for most countries which is well below 
regional potential.
    Latin America and the Caribbean are in a difficult 
position. And China, for one, sees this reality and has already 
laid the groundwork for stronger relations going forward. As I 
have written frequently and previously testified, China's 
agenda goes well beyond economic management and engagement, 
encapsulating a growing spectrum of activities that seeks to 
bend regional politics and relationships toward Beijing's world 
view.
    The novel coronavirus pandemic offers new opportunities to 
expand efforts to win regional hearts and minds, which Beijing 
has already seized, including the promise of a $1 billion 
facility for regional vaccine procurement. This promise may or 
may not, in the end, be fulfilled, but it has captured regional 
attention and gained significant goodwill. Now, it is incumbent 
on the United States to recognize the shifting ground and to 
react appropriately.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, both of you and others on 
this subcommittee have pointed to these as priority issues and 
noted both the strength of U.S. relations with the region and 
also our need to accelerate our efforts, particularly on the 
trade and investment side.
    Notably, Washington is taking actions to build a forward-
looking economic recovery agenda, among them the Americas Crece 
program announced at the end of 2019 and enhanced financing 
facilities through the newly minted Development Finance 
Corporation.
    These are solid steps. But in my view, more can also be 
done to recapture the vision of a mutually supportive, open-
market, democratic agenda fusing regional ambitions with U.S. 
national interests.
    Fortunately, the United States is slated to host the next 
Summit of the Americas in 2021. This will provide a tailor-made 
opportunity to develop the sort of recovery agenda the region 
is actively seeking, and which will be increasingly critical to 
implement the longer the pandemic lasts.
    In the first instance, addressing the healthcare crisis, 
including broad distribution and wide access for cost-effective 
vaccinations, will be paramount. It will also be an opportunity 
for democratically elected leaders to create a newly regional 
framework for health cooperation and pandemic management, 
incorporating private sector expertise to address future 
healthcare crises.
    Second, economic recovery must be at the forefront of the 
pending Summit of the Americas. Latin America already suffers 
from one of the lowest levels of intra-regional trade 
worldwide, for example. The gains from expanded intra-regional 
trade would establish sounder economic footing, while helping 
to moderate the cyclical nature of commodities markets. As 
well, nations across Latin America and the Caribbean can focus 
more attention on improving their respective investment 
climates, and Mr. Rooney, the ranking minority member, has made 
this case effectively many, many times.
    For its part, the United States should come to the 2021 
Summit with a robust economic expansion initiative. Absent a 
massive economic financial package of debt relief and new 
lending, renewal of the hemispheric trade and investment agenda 
will be the best way to promote regional recovery, support U.S. 
and regional economic interests, and renew a regional strategic 
posture that China has begun to challenge.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the invitation to provide 
testimony, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Farnsworth follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]     
    
    
    Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much for your comments.
    You can hear me, right?
    Okay. And we are now going to questions.
    You know, one of the biggest questions that I have in my 
mind is the situation in Venezuela. You know, Guaido goes up to 
January, he finishes. Maduro has his sham legislative election 
that he is planning on with all of his people are going to run, 
and, obviously, he is going to steal another election.
    So how does the United States continue to advocate 
democracy in Venezuela, you know, as a sham legislative 
election, and the end of Juan Guaido's mandate rapidly 
approaching? How do we do that?
    Well, do not all jump at once on this question.
    Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to jump in, 
although I am not sure my answer will be entirely satisfactory.
    I share your concern. Your leadership on this issue has 
been particularly important in calling attention to the 
significant issues that face Venezuelan people and indeed the 
hemispheric community because of the misrule and the 
misleadership of Nicolas Maduro and his cronies.
    The election that is scheduled for December 6th clearly is 
going to be a sham election, as you have said. It is not free. 
It is not fair. And the opposition has, by and large, suggested 
that the best way to counteract that would be to boycott the 
election so that there is no legitimacy lent to it.
    So, I think what the United States can do in the first 
instance is to, as we used to say in my State Department days, 
try to buck up the opposition so that they maintain a unified 
front, and so that there are not breakaway factions that are 
trying to contest an election where the results are already 
basically known.
    But the broader question is how can the United States, 
working with the international community, move Venezuela toward 
the free and fair elections, which really is the condition 
precedent for the beginning of recovery in that country? It is 
a really difficult conundrum. The sanctions regime I believe 
has been important; but, obviously, Mr. Maduro is still in 
power. So, you know, should more of the same be done? Should 
less be done? I think that is the issue that is going to 
confront policymakers going into the new year, certainly 
working with the Congress.
    But the one thing I would say is this: There are huge 
amounts of illicit money being made and moved in Venezuela 
through illegal activities, illegal gold mining, drug 
trafficking, and the like, and one of the best ways, I think, 
to get at the regime is to stanch the flow of those financial 
resources, and, frankly, to identify and to freeze those funds, 
and then also to begin to seize them and take them back.
    Once the economic incentives for illegal behavior are 
removed, or at least reduced, perhaps the political dynamic in 
Venezuela will change so that people will begin to see that 
they really have to find a way out of this mess, frankly, that 
Nicolas Maduro has created.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Yes, Dr. de Bolle.
    Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
    I would just like to add that we face another daunting 
challenge with respect to Venezuela dealing with its possibly 
fraud--well, fraudulent elections in the middle of a pandemic. 
It will be very hard to get other Latin American countries to 
focus on the issues in Venezuela given that they have runaway 
epidemics in their own countries.
    And we should not lose sight of the fact that amongst the--
the 10 countries that have the largest or the highest per 
capita death rate in the world right now are all in Latin 
America. So just to bring that in.
    Mr. Sires. Mr. Camilleri.
    Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would certainly associate myself with some of the 
comments that have already been made. Nicolas Maduro is clearly 
determined to hold on to his de facto power in Venezuela by 
whatever means necessary, and that includes, in all likelihood, 
presiding over a fraudulent election in December as he has in 
the past.
    I do not think that efforts, whether by actors within 
Venezuela, or by the European Union, to try to negotiate 
conditions approaching free and fair elections should be 
criticized. I think we have every reason to be skeptical of 
those efforts, but I do not think we should be in a position as 
the U.S. Government of sort of throwing cold water on those 
efforts, though ultimately opposition unity around a position 
and around a strategy looking forward will be important.
    I think, you know, the longer-term questions that Eric 
alluded to are critical. My view is that we need to be 
principled; we need to continue to stand for democracy and 
human rights in Venezuela; we also need to be realistic. And 
the fact is, unfortunately, the Guaido interim government, the 
National Assembly, the G4 are not in the same position they 
were in a year or a year-and-a-half ago. The balance of forces 
on the ground in Venezuela has tilted in favor of the Maduro 
regime. And so, that will require us to calibrate our own 
efforts. And, in my view, we need to be realistic about the 
fact that some sort of negotiated pathway to free and fair 
elections ultimately is the most realistic and the most 
peaceful, frankly, path out of the awful situation that the 
country finds itself in.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. I think everybody is so preoccupied with their 
own countries and their own problems with the pandemic that 
they are not really focusing on Venezuela. I do not think they 
are really even looking at it, because they are so wrapped up 
in their own issues that it is going to be very difficult to 
get a group of people again to support changes in Venezuela 
like we did in the past.
    Congressman Rooney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    [no response.]
    Mr. Sires. Congressman Sherman, you are on.
    Mr. Sherman. Hello, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 
opportunity to participate in this hearing, even though I am 
not a member of this subcommittee. And I want to thank you for 
holding this hearing and allowing me to participate, because it 
has been a year-and-a-half since the full committee has had a 
hearing on Western Hemisphere, and Latin America, and that is 
far too long for those of us who are not members of the Western 
Hemisphere Subcommittee to focus on our own hemisphere. And the 
events in Latin America often intersect with events elsewhere 
in the world.
    Just a couple of days ago, I was speaking to the Guatemalan 
ambassador about an effort to grant GSP relief to Myanmar. So, 
that is the kind of thing that needs the whole committee to 
look at, because there are two reasons not to do it. One is 
that Myanmar's human rights record is just despicable, and we 
had hearings in the Asia Subcommittee about their treatment of 
the Rohingya. And the second is, we should not be undermining 
the help we provided the Guatemalan and other Central American 
textile industries by doing something for a regime that is so 
awful.
    We are all troubled by the reports that Central American 
refugees, women are being subject to forced hysterectomies. 
Obviously, that needs to be investigated. The fact that this is 
even--that we have an Administration in which it even needs to 
be investigated, where it is even possibly true, shows how far 
we have fallen. And, oh, my God, if it is turns out that this 
whistleblower's complaints are accurate, then we have fallen 
much lower than I ever thought we could.
    I want to thank the chair for his comments about the regime 
in Venezuela. And when it comes to fighting COVID, we can look 
to the Western Hemisphere and judge our own reaction. We see 
Brazil has taken a policy and has a Presidential personality 
perhaps similar to our own, and their results are terrible, 
along with our own, whereas Canada, a country where half of the 
population lives within 50 miles of the U.S. border--you could 
not have a country more closely related to ours--had zero COVID 
deaths on the 13th of this month, and that is averaging five, 
six, seven deaths a day, we are doing a much worse job here in 
the United States by a factor of over 10, even accounting for 
the difference in population.
    Returning to Mr. Maduro, I am confused as to how he has 
been able to turn a country with the largest petroleum reserves 
in the world into a country where people are starving to death, 
and I am confused as to why a country, which had the most 
vibrant oil industry in South America, now is needing to import 
oil or gasoline from Iran.
    So, I wonder whether Ms. de Bolle, or any of the other 
witnesses, can describe how he has so ruined the oil sector, 
and what is this relationship with Iran?
    Dr. de Bolle. Thank you. I would be happy to address the 
question of how Venezuela's economic ruin happened. It has 
actually been a process over many, many years, and it did start 
with Chavez. So, just to remind ourselves, Chavez ran Venezuela 
on an extremely populist platform. He spent way more, in terms 
of fiscal resources, than he ever had the capability of 
generating, even with a vibrant oil industry.
    So in the end, when he passed away, and when he handed off 
the country to Maduro, Venezuela was already in financial dire 
straits. And then from then on, complete economic 
mismanagement, together with, you know, Maduro's inclinations 
toward, you know, just finding other partners to work with, 
some of which illegal, led, you know, the country down this 
path of ruin that we see it now.
    Essentially what has happened is that over many years, 
Venezuela has been impoverished by its political leadership. 
And with that, given that it is a country that has always been 
extremely dependent on oil, it has been impossible for 
Venezuela actually to invest in the oil industry in the volumes 
needed to maintain that industry functioning at a reasonable 
level.
    So apart from corruption, which is certainly a problem in 
the oil sector, as well as in other parts of the Venezuelan 
economy, there has also been dramatic underinvestment in the 
oil industry, which has now led the country to this situation 
where rather than being a very big net oil exporter, as they 
used to be in the 1980's and the 1990's, they have now become a 
net oil importer, which shows exactly how much you can squander 
your country's resources and, you know, just basically run an 
economy to the ground.
    Mr. Sherman. So the refined petroleum they are getting from 
Iran actually exceeds the amount of unrefined petroleum that 
they are able to export to Iran or anywhere else? They really 
are a net energy importer?
    Dr. de Bolle. They are turning into a net energy importer, 
yes.
    Mr. Sherman. That is a level of mismanagement that I did 
not think was possible, but sometimes we are surprised.
    I yield back. And I thank the chairman for letting me 
participate in this hearing.
    Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Juan Vargas.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear 
me?
    Mr. Sires. Yes.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
    And I apologize, I had to run to vote, so I apologize for 
missing a bit.
    Dr. Monica de Bolle, you spoke quite a bit about Brazil in 
your testimony, and you, early on, said some things about 
Mexico, but you did not go into depth on Mexico, to be frank. I 
would be interested in knowing what you think about Mexico in 
the sense you said that, obviously, in Brazil, the early 
response was disastrous, but also not favorable to Bolsonaro, 
but there was unanimous consent to give money to people to 
allow them to at least support themselves and get the economy 
back on its feet.
    Could you talk a little bit more about Mexico?
    Dr. de Bolle. Absolutely. Thank you.
    So, Mexico actually had from--the starting position for 
Mexico was very similar to Brazil's. So the playing down of the 
seriousness and gravity of the epidemic, the whole issue of 
playing up health measures against the economy and sort of 
using this narrative that lockdowns and quarantines were going 
to hurt the economy and, therefore, should not be used, all of 
that was Mexican--Mexico and Brazil were basically doing the 
same thing, and spent months doing exactly that. Brazil is 
still doing it, and, to some extent, Andres Manuel Lopez 
Obrador in Mexico is still doing it as well.
    The difference, the main difference between the two 
countries is that while Brazil's economic policy management has 
been pretty bad, they have not actually responded adequately to 
the epidemic. So there is rampant, as I said, bankruptcies and 
credit crunches all over the place. They at least managed to 
enact this one emergency basic income program to sustain the 
vulnerable population.
    Mexico did not even get as far as doing anything similar to 
what Brazil did on that front, so--and this is curious, because 
Lopez Obrador, who is elected and who campaigned on, you know, 
buoying the vulnerable, helping the poor, and all of that, has 
actually left that segment of the population hanging dry in the 
middle of the pandemic. And what is happening in Mexico right 
now, just as in other Latin American countries, it is precisely 
the poor and the vulnerable who are being hardest hit by both 
the economic shock as well as, obviously, the shock coming from 
the public health crisis.
    Mr. Vargas. So, Doctor, if I could continue on this, and 
any of the other people can jump in. So I live on the border in 
San Diego. So, when I listen to the music, there is one 
particular station that actually comes from Tijuana, so they 
have to do these commercials about Mexico, about the political 
parties. And one of the things that his party continuously says 
is how they are helping the poor, how the poor really get the 
help during this epidemic, and then he comes on and says, you 
know, ``Before they always bail out the banks and the rich 
guys, we are doing it with the poor."
    But I do not see that. I mean, is that the case? I mean, it 
just sounds like rhetoric.
    Dr. de Bolle. It is rhetoric. There is no program. There is 
no sort of emergency basic income, cash transfer like, you 
know, supportive program, and these are all cash transfer 
programs at the end of the day. There is nothing of the sort 
going on in Mexico, and there is nothing of the sort going on 
in many other places in Latin America. There are a few places 
where something similar has been tried. Brazil is the one 
country that has really done a very generous benefit, one that 
does not actually fit with the fiscal restriction that the 
country faces. But leaving that aside, you know, it is mostly 
rhetoric in Mexico, which is surprising, because AMLO's 
approval ratings continue to be not bad.
    Mr. Vargas. I was going to ask that. It sounds like there 
is rhetoric and there is action. It seems like the rhetoric has 
gotten him political benefit. But is the prognosis for the 
economy bad? Are we going to see the 9.4 percent recession 
increase? What are we going to see in Mexico then, if it is all 
rhetoric?
    Dr. de Bolle. So the likely scenario for Mexico right now 
is that there will be a very deep recession this year. I think 
this is pretty much, you know, consensual amongst different 
Latin America countries. Brazil and Mexico, the two largest 
economies in the region, are the ones that are probably going 
to face the deepest recession in 2020. And then looking out 
into 2021, the situation does not get much better.
    So the prospects indicate that for Mexico at least--Brazil 
is a little different, but for Mexico at least, there is no 
case for thinking about a recovery in 2021. Because if you have 
not laid out the foundation this year for dealing with the 
economic problems that are going to continue into next year, 
then that, of course, does not improve your standings going 
into 2021.
    So if that turns out to be true, I do not expect his 
political approval to last much longer, or at least not beyond 
this year.
    Mr. Vargas. I see that my time has run out, Mr. Chairman. I 
want to thank--I guess I yield back. I cannot hear you. You are 
muted, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. Do you have another question?
    Mr. Vargas. I did, but----
    Mr. Sires. Go ahead.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you. I apologize, I am going over. I do 
not want to take anyone else's time.
    But to the other two presenters, I mean, Mexico, obviously, 
is a neighbor of mine. We just heard from the doctor now, but 
do you see it the same way? I mean, I do not understand what 
their--and they have just been in denial, and they have got all 
sorts of COVID cases. I mean, how are they going to get out of 
this? How are they going to get out of this?
    Mr. Camilleri. Congressman, I very much agree with Dr. de 
Bolle's analysis of the situation. The lack of fiscal stimulus 
has been a surprise, given the ideology and the expressed 
priorities of AMLO's government, although this commitment to 
fiscal austerity has been a theme of his, really from the 
beginning. It is a little surprising he did not revisit that in 
the context of a pandemic that has really devastated the 
economy. But, nonetheless, this is a trend, and it is one that 
will put Mexico in a deep hole, and one that it will have to 
kind of dig itself out from over the next year.
    It is true that his approval ratings remain high, and I 
think you spoke to this a little bit when you alluded to his 
allusions to past corruption, to government that benefits the 
elites in the country. A lot of that is true. And AMLO came to 
power having sort of tapped into the broad public frustration 
with governing elites in the country. Unfortunately, he has 
been much less effective, I think, at building institutions and 
building systems of governance that actually address the 
corruption that he very, I think, accurately diagnosed. In 
fact, what we see is him turning to a kind of doubling down on 
a militarized approach to public security; as Monica mentioned, 
a very kind of poor pandemic response in terms of the 
deployment of public services, and even recognizing the gravity 
of the situation. And on the rule of law front, I think some 
real warning signs in terms of erosion of oversight bodies, 
independent agencies, regular attacks on the free press and 
civil society.
    So, I think, unfortunately, there is a lot to be concerned 
about south of the border, and not just the economic situation.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Vargas, may I make a comment or two?
    Mr. Vargas. Yes.
    Mr. Farnsworth. Thank you very much for the opportunity.
    I think over the medium term, recovery is going to have to 
be investment-led, and investment, you know, from the United 
States, from Canada, and the USMCA, domestic investments in 
Mexico and investments from elsewhere. But there does seem to 
be a bit of complacency, perhaps. Now that USMCA has passed, 
that investment flows are automatically and miraculously going 
to regenerate. If only that were the case. It is clearly an 
advantage to link Mexico to the rest of North America, but 
there is also a lot of work that has to be done within Mexico 
itself to draw the investment within the USMCA context.
    And what we are seeing is some concern in the investor 
community about actions that have been taken, perhaps on the 
backtracking on the reform agenda around energy in particular, 
but in other sectors as well, canceling contracts, that have 
been previously, you know, agreed upon, and some other actions 
like that.
    And the investment community is very cautious. And, yes, 
there are huge advantages that Mexico maintains, but also, 
there are some actions that have cut the other direction that 
have caused some concern.
    The one thing that I would suggest, however, though, is 
that there is a massive opportunity here, because as supply 
chains are beginning to shift, particularly out of China, but 
perhaps out of Asia more broadly, Mexico is perfectly 
positioned geographically, culturally, historically, et cetera, 
to build those supply chains with the United States, with North 
America and, frankly, with the rest of Latin America.
    Now is the time to be doing that. And I can tell you, with 
direct knowledge, that there are other countries around the 
region that are actively pursuing that approach, very 
aggressively and very successfully, in some cases. I think 
Mexico could do that as well, and that would clearly be one way 
to, you know, support recovery over the medium term.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you, 
and thank you for allowing me to go long. I apologize, but I 
really do appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. You know, I want to talk a little bit about 
Colombia. I recently sent a letter to the President of 
Colombia, regarding the murder of five Afro-Colombians. It just 
seems to me that during this pandemic, doing the deal with the 
FARC, the securing long-lasting peace, enhancing the rule of 
law, and ensuring greater economic and social inclusion has 
taken a step backward. Can you comment on that in Colombia? 
Michael?
    Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, anyone in particular, or 
Michael, go ahead.
    Mr. Sires. Michael, go ahead.
    Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity 
to speak on this. I fully share your concern and your 
perspective. You know, while it is the case that overall 
violence levels in Colombia have come down, there has been this 
spate of killings of human rights defenders, of social leaders, 
to demobilize FARC members, as well as, as you mentioned, this 
very brutal killing of the five Afro-Colombian teenagers in 
Cali, dozens of massacres in just the last few months.
    So this takes us back to really some of the dark times in 
Colombia, and I think you are right to shine a spotlight on 
this, and to ask the authorities there to focus on these 
challenges before they spiral out of control.
    In the case specifically of the five teens in Cali, my 
understanding is the alleged perpetrators have been identified 
and arrested. That is obviously extremely important. Impunity 
is one of the structural factors that leads to this kind of 
violence in Colombia, and we see over and over again that, 
especially Afro-descendant and indigenous communities are 
disproportionately impacted. They tend to be present in zones 
most afflicted by violence and conflict, and be marginalized 
from State presence and public services.
    So, thank you for your leadership on this, and I hope you 
will continue to call it to the attention of our government, as 
well as the authorities in Colombia.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Mr. Farnsworth. I am sorry, I missed that. You were----
    Mr. Sires. Would you like to add something to this?
    Mr. Farnsworth. Yes. Thank you, sir, just a very brief 
comment. You know, it is a bane of U.S. foreign policy, I 
think, to look at an issue and see an issue, and, perhaps, 
conclude an issue and then move on to the next thing and kind 
of forget sometimes about the need to maintain vigilance in 
various activities.
    I think Colombia, on a bipartisan basis, has been the top 
foreign policy success story of the United States and the 
Western Hemisphere for a long time. But having said that, 
absolutely, there continue to be challenges, which have been 
exacerbated by COVID, which have been exacerbated by the 
collapse next door in Venezuela, by the polarization in 
Colombia itself politically. There are some real issues here.
    Having said that, I think it is entirely appropriate for 
the United States, which has invested billions of dollars in 
Colombia, alongside the Colombian people, to be very vigilant 
in promoting a value set that is critically important for 
Colombia to advance to the next stage of development--
protection of human rights, protection of the value structure 
that we would hold dear ourselves in the United States. I think 
that is an entirely appropriate approach to take.
    But I would simply caveat that as well by saying the 
challenges in Colombia are very large. The issues have not, 
quote/unquote, been solved, and that partnership remains vital 
and has to continue to remain vital.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Monica, do you have anything you would like to add?
    Dr. de Bolle. No. The only thing I would add--and this goes 
not only for Colombia but for other countries in the region--we 
are at a very dangerous moment right now, because if we go back 
to 2019, we saw demonstrations in the second half of 2019 being 
sparked across the region. Colombia, they happened in Colombia 
as well. Of course, Colombia was not the center of them. Most 
of them were in Chile and Ecuador and other places. But at this 
point in time, with the pandemic running rampant in all of 
these places, with leadership being questioned, you know, 
representation of democracy being questioned across the region, 
the region is at a tipping point for another such social 
upheaval event that we should be on the watch for. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. [inaudible] a little bit about Nicaragua--unless 
Mr. Vargas has a question. No? Go ahead, Mr. Vargas.
    Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I am also interested in 
the Nicaraguan response from our presenters. Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. OK. I recently sent a letter to the President 
regarding Valeska Aleman and Moises Alberto Ortega Valdivia, 
regarding the fact that there they were deported. These people 
were tortured in Nicaragua. They got to the border, and they 
were asking for asylum, and the Administration just ignored 
everything and sent these people back to Nicaragua, deported 
them.
    I mean, we got to stand for something. If we cannot give 
these people some political cover, how do we expect them to 
fight for democracy in their own country? Can anybody talk a 
little bit about that? Michael, you want to start?
    Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to.
    Mr. Sires. I am sorry I am using your first name, but it is 
just a lot easier to see on the screen.
    Mr. Camilleri. Fair enough, fair enough. Mr. Chairman, 
thank you. Obviously, this flies in the face of the refugee 
protections enshrined in U.S. law and international law. It is, 
frankly, also really disheartening on a human level. These are, 
as you mentioned, people who are literally putting their lives 
on the line to defend the principles that we claim to stand for 
as a country. It is hard to understand, when the Trump 
Administration has been so vocal about the condemnation of 
human rights abuses by the Ortega regime, how this sort of 
thing could have happened.
    And if you will allow me a final comment, this is precisely 
the kind of hypocrisy, or perceived hypocrisy, that erodes, in 
my experience, U.S. credibility in the region, and feeds the 
false narrative that the defense of human rights is simply a 
political instrument that we, as a country and as a government, 
deploy selectively against adversarial governments.
    When we do not practice what we preach, it makes it that 
much harder for us to defend and promote the principles that I 
think we do stand for as a government. So, thank you again for 
calling attention to this.
    Mr. Sires. Anyone else want to add something?
    Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on.
    Mr. Sires. Sorry. Go ahead, Eric.
    Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on. This 
is a tragic case. Hopefully, it was isolated and will not be 
repeated. The truth of the matter is, though, if we are asking 
people to stand up in their home countries, to take politically 
difficult, even life-threatening actions, when they do that, it 
is incumbent on us, in my view, to welcome them into our 
country, if they need assistance.
    Obviously, it is highly political, it is highly difficult 
to determine, you know, certain claims from other claims, but 
as a matter of principle, I think that should be the baseline, 
and then we try to identify the individuals who may or may not 
be seeking asylum in accordance with that.
    But in Nicaragua, this is a country that has clearly 
returned to authoritarian governance. Daniel Ortega did allow 
an election at the end of the 1980's, his first term, and he 
did respect that, but then, once he got reelected to office, he 
is most likely going to make sure that such a circumstance does 
not happen again.
    So this is a country that is clearly headed in the wrong 
direction. The human rights and democracy defenders within that 
country are taking real risks at personal cost, and I think it 
is incumbent on us to recognize that and to assist them where 
we can.
    Mr. Sires. Monica de Bolle.
    Dr. de Bolle. Now I would just like to add my whole voice 
to Michael's and Eric's. I completely agree with everything 
that was said, and I would add that, you know, once we think 
about the China issue and the concerns that we have about China 
building bridges into the region, this is another sensitive 
area that we should be well aware of.
    If we are going to have the sort of policies toward Latin 
America that actually leave the region in a worse place, then 
evidently that leaves a very large room for China to be 
involved in. So just wanted to add that comment.
    Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much. Thank you all. You 
have been most gracious with your time and patience. I 
certainly appreciate it, and I am always very happy to see you, 
because I always get a lot of good information from you when 
you come before the committee. And unfortunately we have to do 
this through Zoom and it gets very complicated, but you are 
real troopers and you are always there to help the committee 
get informed on what is happening in the Western Hemisphere. 
And I just want you to know as chairman, and a representative 
of the other members, I do thank you for that. And we are going 
to close now. Thank you for joining us today.
    This virus has taken over 300,000 lives in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. As countries throughout the region struggle 
to get the coronavirus under control, we must further deepen 
our engagement in this hemisphere, lifting up our Latin 
American and Caribbean allies is in our interest, as the 
security and the prosperity and the strength of the democratic 
institution all have direct impact on us.
    I thank our witnesses and the members for participating. 
With that, the committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
                                
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
            
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