    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND
                                 THE CARIBBEAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
              THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-116

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

                               or www.govinfo.gov

                                 ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    41-943 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2021

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California                 FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                                MIKE GUEST, Mississippi

                        Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director

                  Brendan Shields,  Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

      Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade

                       ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida, Ranking
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                    Member
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             TED S. YOHO, Florida
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              KEN BUCK, Colorado
    JUAN VARGAS, California              MIKE GUEST, Mississippi

                      Alexander Brockwehl, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                      OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SIRES

    Opening statement of Chairman Sires..............................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    De Bolle, Dr. Monica, Professor, Latin American Studies Program,
      School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
      University, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
      Economics......................................................    11
    Camilleri, Michael, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program,
      Inter-American Dialogue........................................    17
    Farnsworth, Eric, Vice President, Council of the Americas........    21

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    34
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    35
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    36

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record
      from Chairman Sires............................................    37
    Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record
      from Chairman Sires............................................    46
    Responses to questions for Dr. De Bolle submitted for the record
      from Representative Castro.....................................    53
    Responses to questions for Mr. Camilleri submitted for the record
      from Representative Castro.....................................    56

    THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA AND
                                 THE CARIBBEAN

                          Tuesday, September 15, 2020

                              House of Representatives,
                Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
                           Civilian Security and Trade,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC,

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:02 a.m.,
    via Webex, Hon. Albio Sires (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.
        Mr. Sires. Good morning, everyone. Thank you to our
    witnesses for being here today. This hearing, entitled ``The
    Health, Economic, and Political Challenges Facing Latin America
    and the Caribbean'' will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess of the committee at any point, and all members will have
    5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions
    for the record subject to the list of limitations in the rules.
    To insert something into the record, please have your staff
    email the previously mentioned address.
        As a reminder to members, please keep your video function
    on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and
    please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
        Consistent with H.R. 965 and the accompanying regulations,
    staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate, when
    they are not under recognition, to eliminate background noise.
        I see that we have a quorum, and will now recognize myself
    for opening remarks.
        For the last 6 months, countries throughout Latin America
    and the Caribbean have been devastated by the coronavirus
    pandemic. This region has suffered nearly one-third of all
    coronavirus deaths globally. Some governments took COVID-19
    seriously and enacted strict lockdown measures, but still
    struggled to contain the virus, due in part to structural
    challenges like the high levels of informal employment, which
    made it impossible for workers to make a living while under
    quarantine.
        Other leaders, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, regrettably
    followed the lead of President Trump who intentionally
    downplayed the virus and dismissed the guidance of public
    health experts, with profoundly tragic consequences.
        Even today, as case numbers have become to level off in
    some places, five of the 10 countries with the most coronavirus
    cases globally are in Latin America. This virus is far from
    being under control.
        We also know that the region will be confronting the
    secondary impact of the pandemic for decades to come. In Haiti,
    where the United States has invested billions in taxpayer
    assistance, international organizations are worried that
    infant, child----
        [audio malfunction.]
        Ms. Hallman. Hi, everyone. It looks like we are
    experiencing some technical difficulties with the chairman. We
    will get right back online in 1 second.
        Mr. Sires. Can everybody hear me?
        Thank you.
        In Venezuela, the Maduro dictatorship has predictably
    exploited the pandemic to further crush dissent and targeting
    journalists, doctors, and aid workers who are there to speak
    out.
        In Bolivia, the interim government has persecuted over 100
    opposition leaders on charges that Human Rights Watch contends
    were politically motivated.
        In Honduras, attacks on human rights defenders have
    continued with complete impunity, including the kidnapping of
    four Garifuna community leaders by individuals dressed in
    police uniforms on July 18.
        At this difficult moment, the United States should be
    offering a steady and helping hand to our neighbors and allies
    and providing consistent principled leadership in our
    hemisphere. Unfortunately, President Trump has shown he is not
    interested in bringing people together or providing value-based
    global leadership. Instead of offering safe haven to those
    fleeing political persecution, his Administration has exploited
    the pandemic to expand its policies of using cruelty to deter
    asylum seekers.
        Two weeks ago, six colleagues and I sent letters to
    President Trump condemning his Administration's action after
    three Nicaraguan asylum seekers, who had been tortured by the
    Ortega regime, were expelled at the U.S. border. President
    Trump has talked tough on Nicaragua, but when it came time to
    stand with those who put their lives on the line to challenge
    the Ortega regime, his Administration placed its radical anti-
    immigrant agenda above protecting American values in U.S.
    foreign policy and interests.
        I hope we can explore ways for the U.S. Government to
    ensure our diplomatic and foreign assistance tool to help our
    partners and allies in the region. I believe the U.S. has a
    critical role to play in helping to lift up this hemisphere as
    it emerges from a period of such darkness.
        Today, on the first day of Hispanic Heritage Month, we must
    reaffirm our shared commitment to working with countries across
    this hemisphere as they combat the coronavirus pandemic, and
    the many economic and political challenges that the pandemic
    have exposed or exacerbated.
        Thank you.
        And I now turn to Ranking Member Rooney for his opening
    statement.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sires follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Chairman Sires, for organizing this
    important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for joining
    us under these challenging circumstances.
        The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are among
    the hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. With almost 6 million
    confirmed cases, the region makes up almost 28 percent of
    worldwide cases. Five countries, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia,
    Peru, and Argentina, currently rank among the top 10 in total
    number of cases globally, and Peru now has the worst COVID-19
    death rate per capita in the world. With almost 280,000 deaths,
    the human toll on the region has been disastrous. However, the
    economic forecast for the region are increasingly troubling.
        According to the International Monetary Fund's world
    economic outlook update, the region is expected to see an
    economic contraction of 9.4 percent, with almost every country
    in the region in a recession. If these projections continue to
    fruition, the region would be facing the worst economic
    recession on record.
        The countries of the Caribbean alone are projected to see a
    GDP decline of 10.3 percent in 2020, following the impact of
    the pandemic on the tourism industries.
        There are also serious concerns that economic downturn in
    the region will aggravate political and social instability that
    was boiling over prior to the pandemic. The pandemic is also
    straining the region's already fragile democratic institutions,
    and testing the governance capacity of the region's
    governments. These governments are challenged by systemic
    corruption, and now the pandemic has contributed to increased
    operations by the region's transnational criminal organizations
    as the chairman referred to.
        A recent research brief published by the United Nation's
    Office on Drugs and Crime States that organized criminal
    organizations are placing controls on items, such as masks and
    disinfectants. The issue is especially concerning for the
    countries of the Northern Triangle in Central America and
    Colombia.
        Further authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, and
    Nicaragua, as the chairman referred to, are exploiting the
    pandemic to further oppress their people.
        The Maduro regime's response to the pandemic is worse than
    the already dire social and economic conditions in Venezuela
    and has added to the suffering of the Venezuelan people.
        In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime has failed to disclose the
    real number of cases in the country, and continues to disregard
    the threat. As the chairman referred to, we have a little of
    that problem ourselves.
        Lastly, the Castro regime in Cuba is trafficking Cuban
    doctors and exploiting them under the context of the pandemic
    for political purposes.
        This pandemic has also exposed the malign nature of the
    Chinese Communist Party. As the virus has spread, we learn more
    about the Chinese Communist Party's failure to respond and
    share relevant information with global health authorities that
    could have stemmed the spread. However, unfortunately, we were
    also briefed in January many times, and February as well.
        The authoritarian regime in China, however, bleeds into
    their entire global engagement, and I think that we need to
    worry about them a great amount right now.
        The pandemic provides an opportunity for the United States
    to strengthen its engagement with other countries in Latin
    America, and the Caribbean particularly, to demonstrate that we
    are their preferred partner instead of China. It is clear that
    China will attempt to capitalize on this pandemic, and is doing
    it right now. This will require the U.S. to take a strategic
    approach to supporting the region and combating the virus and
    economic recovery efforts.
        As always, the U.S. has stepped up to the plate to provide
    $141 million in aid to the region, including PPE and masks and
    ventilators, but we can always do more. The U.S. International
    Development Finance Corporation will play a crucial role in
    investments in the region, which I believe can help the
    recovery and also its long-term economic well-being.
        I also recognize and applaud the weekend's election of
    Mauricio Claver-Carone as the new president of the Inter-
    American Development Bank, but I also think it is important
    that for him to be appointed, Latin America needs to be
    consulted and have a role in this.
        Actions taken now by the U.S. to instigate greater recovery
    efforts in the Western Hemisphere will showcase our commitment
    and desire to see the region prosper. Challenges originating
    due to the pandemic will continue to emerge for many months to
    come, but I am confident the pandemic can strengthen our
    partnerships with Latin America and the Caribbean.
        The United States must remain adaptable in our strategies
    not only to help contain the virus, but to right against
    exploitive transactional criminal organizations, as the
    chairman referred to earlier, and corrupted authoritarian
    regimes, as well as the growing and very malign influence of
    China.
        I look forward to the testimoneys of our witnesses, and
    thank you again, Chairman Sires, for holding this hearing.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Rooney.
        I will now introduce our witnesses.
        First we have Dr. Monica de Bolle. She is a professor in
    the Latin America Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University,
    and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
    Economics. She previously worked as a director for the
    Institute for Economic Policy Research in Brazil, and was also
    an economist at the International Monetary Fund.
        In 2014, Ms. de Bolle was named Honored Economist by the
    Order of Brazilian Economists for her contributions to the
    Brazilian policy debate. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in
    economics from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de
    Janeiro, and a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of
    Economics.
        Dr. de Bolle, we welcome you to the hearing.
        We will then hear from Mr. Michael Camilleri. He is
    director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-
    American Dialogue. From 2012 to 2017, he served as the Western
    Hemisphere adviser on the Secretary of State's policy-planning
    staff, and as director for Andean Affairs at the National
    Security Council in the Obama Administration. Mr. Camilleri was
    also a human rights specialist at the Organization of the
    American States, and worked as a senior staff attorney at the
    Center for Justice and International Law. He holds a Bachelor
    of Arts degree in history from the University of Notre Dame and
    J.D. From Harvard Law School.
        Mr. Camilleri, thank you for joining us today.
        Finally, we will hear from Mr. Eric Farnsworth. He is the
    vice president of the Council of the Americas where he leads
    his Washington office. Prior to joining the Council of the
    Americas in 2003, he had a long career in government working in
    the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau, at the Department of
    State at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and a
    senior advisor to the White House special envoy for the
    Americas during the Clinton Administration.
        Previously, Mr. Farnsworth was managing director of
    ManattJones Global Strategies, and advisory and strategic
    consulting group. He holds a master's degree in public affairs
    from Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
        Mr. Farnsworth, thank you for joining us today.
        I ask the witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5
    minutes and, without objection, your prepared written
    statements will be made as part of the record.
        We have been called to vote, and I would like to recess for
    about 45 minutes until we finish our voting so we can get back
    and not have any interruptions in the witnesses comments and
    questions, so we will recess for about 45 minutes.
        Thank you very much and thank you for your patience.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Sires. Monica, I think you are first with your 5-minute
    comments.

      STATEMENT OF DR. MONICA DE BOLLE, PROFESSOR, LATIN AMERICAN
      STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
    JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR
                        INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

        Dr. de Bolle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and
    members of the committee. Good afternoon to you all. It is a
    pleasure to be here.
        So I will dive right in. The COVID-19 pandemic struck Latin
    America in late February 2020. Governments in the region had at
    least 2 months to prepare for the pandemic by adopting public
    health strategies, economic rescue plans, and policies to
    protect millions of informal and vulnerable workers throughout
    the region. Despite the time advantage, none of these
    preparations occurred.
        Why? First, because of weak leadership, poor capacity, and
    because some leaders, including President Andres Manuel Lopez
    Obrador in Mexico and President Jay Bolsonaro in Brazil,
    minimized the dangers posed by a new and emerging disease.
        As a result of these failures, the impact in Latin America
    has been tragic. As of September 11, the region's five largest
    economies combined, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and
    Argentina, registered 6.8 million cases of COVID-19, or about
    400,000 more than the United States, and hundreds of thousands
    of deaths. The numbers may have been greater because of
    substantial underreporting, lack of testing capacity, and no
    systematic contact tracing protocols.
        The toll of the disease has been particularly harsh. The
    region's economies have suffered unprecedented drops in GDP,
    rampant unemployment, and a full-blown humanitarian crisis
    falling disproportionately on the poor.
        Latin America's economy was already fragile before the
    pandemic struck, leaving little room in public sector fiscal
    stimulus. Even so, the response failure has made the situation
    worse with the misguided view that policymakers had to choose
    between public health policies, such as lockdowns, and
    preserving the economy. Countries failed to control both the
    disease and its economic fallout.
        No sustained economic recovery can occur in the absence of
    measures to control the epidemic. The absence of these measures
    has led to uncontrolled epidemics throughout Latin America, and
    they are unlikely to abate over the next several months.
        As countries have returned to nearly normal conditions
    since the first months of the pandemic, social distancing and
    other restrictive measures have become politically and socially
    untenable.
        The outlook for the region is, therefore, grim.
    Uncontrolled epidemics will continue the ravage the vulnerable
    population, exacerbating already very high inequality and
    poverty levels.
        While many countries in the region have public health
    systems, whether partial or fully public, these systems have
    suffered from insufficient resources and financing, even during
    the pandemic. Hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel are
    heterogeneously distributed across most companies, adding to
    the daunting task of vaccinating tens of millions, or even
    hundreds of millions of people in different countries.
        Brazil has been especially hard-hit by COVID-19 because of
    its erratic leadership and mismanagement of the epidemic in its
    early stages. The disease, which at first struck urban centers,
    quickly spread through the country, hitting poor States in the
    north and the northeast, where public health resources are
    broadly unavailable. Strict lockdown measures were at first
    imposed in some States, but President Bolsonaro consistently
    undermined these efforts by blaming Governors for letting their
    economies decline. Because of his callous indifference,
    Brazil's leader was largely responsible for the failure of
    early efforts to contain the epidemic. And notwithstanding his
    disastrous performance in the GDP contraction of 11 percent in
    the second quarter, President Bolsonaro's standing in opinion
    polls has improved over the past few months.
        Why? In April, Congress approved an emergency basic income
    program of a generous cash payout to last 3 months, but with
    the possibility of further extensions. Initially, Bolsonaro
    resisted the program, but it then received unanimous
    congressional approval, leading him to reap political gains.
        Brazil's emergency basic income program has been a saving
    grace in a dismal situation. The program eventually reached
    about half of the country's population, or nearly 100 million
    people, and helped sustain poor and vulnerable families
    throughout the epidemic. It provided some support to the
    economy. Its success not only helped President Bolsonaro's
    political standing, but left the opposition without a viable
    political narrative to highlight his failures.
        Looking ahead, a major challenge will be addressing the end
    of the program in early 2021, especially as unemployment will
    remain likely in the double digits. Widespread bankruptcies, a
    credit crunch, and questions over fiscal sustainability will
    likely hamper efforts to reenact a similar cash transfer
    program in the near future.
        As the Brazilian economy was already weak before the
    pandemic, and since there are no expectations that it will
    improve much with an uncontrolled epidemic in place, the
    outlook for Latin America's largest economy is nothing short of
    grim.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. de Bolle follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Monica.
        Michael.

      STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL CAMILLERI, DIRECTOR, PETER D. BELL
              RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE

        Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Rooney, members of the subcommittee. It is really a pleasure to
    appear before you today and testify on the health, economic,
    and political challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean.
    Honored as well to join my fellow witnesses whose expertise I
    admire greatly.
        I think as you, Mr. Chairman, the ranking member, and Dr.
    de Bolle have discussed, the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound
    public health and economic impacts in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. I will focus my opening remarks on the second order
    consequences of the pandemic for democratic governance in the
    region, which I think could be equally significant.
        While regional experiences surely vary, it is already clear
    that the pandemic is exposing and exacerbating many of Latin
    America's preexisting challenges. Income inequality, labor
    informality, and weak social safety nets obligated millions of
    citizens to choose between protecting their health and feeding
    their families. Strained public finances and regressive tax
    systems limited the steps governments could take to stimulate
    their economies and support those most in need. Weak public
    services and discrimination left vulnerable populations such as
    migrants, prisoners, and indigenous and Afro-descendent
    communities particularly exposed to COVID-19.
        Food insecurity, already aggravated by factors such as
    climate change, grew still worse as a consequence of COVID.
    Corrupt public officials and cynical profiteers exploited the
    health emergency for their own gain. And in some countries,
    politicians used the pandemic to polarize society, while
    authoritarian leaders exploited fragile checks and balances to
    concentrate power and further erode civil liberties.
        This last trend is worthy of particular attention.
    Unsurprisingly, the strongmen leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua, and
    Venezuela have used the health crisis to reinforce their grip,
    including by persecuting those who criticized their pandemic
    responses, or simply attempted to share accurate public health
    information.
        Unfortunately, we observe authoritarian tendencies in some
    of the region's democracies as well. A recent Inter-American
    Dialogue report details several troubling examples of
    restrictions on free speech under the cover of combating COVID-
    19, including in Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, and
    Honduras.
        The case of El Salvador is perhaps the most alarming.
    President Bukele's pandemic response included deploying the
    military and police to arbitrarily detain those accused of
    violating stay-at-home orders, and then defying Supreme Court
    rulings against these measures. Lately, Bukele has used his
    private platform and his government agencies to attack the free
    press, particularly ``El Faro,'' one of Central America's
    leading investigative journalism outlets, which, last week,
    broke the story of Bukele's secret negotiations with MS-13.
    Most disturbing of all, Bukele seems to believe he enjoys the
    support of the U.S. Government despite these actions.
        In short, this is a highly challenging and uncertain time
    in Latin America and the Caribbean. Strong, steady, principled
    partnership from the United States will be vital to the
    region's economic recovery and democratic trajectory. Today,
    however, U.S. engagement with the region is inconsistent and
    ideologically driven. Often, it is also counterproductive.
        Cutting aid to Central America and abandoning
    anticorruption missions only fuels instability and migration.
    Loose talk of military options in Venezuela neutralizes the
    democratic opposition and hands the Maduro regime a pretext for
    further oppression. Indiscriminate tariffs disincentivize
    nearshoring and deepen the region's reliance on China. Staying
    silent on democratic abuses by friendly governments undermines
    the United States' credibility to confront Latin American
    dictators, while separating children from their families, gives
    those dictators an easy retort to our invocations of human
    rights.
        And withdrawing from the World Health Organization in the
    midst of a global pandemic sends the message that Latin America
    should hedge its bets and look beyond the hemisphere for
    reliable partners.
        As the saying goes, hard times reveal true friends. The
    present moment is one of deep challenges in our hemisphere, but
    it offers the United States an opportunity to reinforce bonds
    of cooperation and partnership with Latin America and the
    Caribbean. By redoubling our focus and recalibrating our
    approach, we can more effectively support our regional
    partners, and advance U.S. values and interests in the
    Americas.
        Thank you once again. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Camilleri follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. You are on. You have to unmute yourself.
        Thank you.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC FARNSWORTH, VICE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF
                              THE AMERICAS

        Mr. Farnsworth. Well, Mr. Chairman, what a privilege it is
    to appear again before you and Mr. Rooney and the subcommittee,
    and I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify in this
    virtual hearing on such an important topic. Both of you, as
    well as the other members of the subcommittee, continue to
    offer sound and meaningful leadership on issues that impact
    literally hundreds of millions of people in the United States
    and across the Americas, and we acknowledge, and very much
    appreciate your efforts, and particularly during these
    unsettled and challenging times in the hemisphere, so thank you
    again.
        Unfortunately, as we have heard already from both
    witnesses, the near-term health and economic outlook for the
    region, already suffering from a pre-pandemic downturn, is
    challenging. But the good news is that the situation is not at
    all hopeless. To be sure, the pandemic has amplified and
    accelerated a number of preexisting trends.
        Issues including the world's highest levels of inequality,
    substandard housing, uneven healthcare and sanitation, and
    patchwork social safety nets have made the pandemic much worse
    across the region than it might otherwise have been. Of equal
    importance, significant percentages of workers are stuck in the
    informal economy, making economic shutdowns and quarantines
    difficult, if not impossible, to implement and enforce. And
    this does not even begin to account for the collapse of
    Venezuela, whose economy and democracy have been destroyed by
    Chavismo and where estimates suggest between 5-and 6 million
    Venezuelans are now refugees in neighboring countries who are
    hard-pressed to absorb them.
        The World Bank has estimated that regional growth will
    approach negative 10 percent this year, the worst performance
    since meaningful records began to be kept in 1901. Projections
    for a 2021 recovery are welcome, but, nonetheless, are in the 2
    to 3 percent range for most countries which is well below
    regional potential.
        Latin America and the Caribbean are in a difficult
    position. And China, for one, sees this reality and has already
    laid the groundwork for stronger relations going forward. As I
    have written frequently and previously testified, China's
    agenda goes well beyond economic management and engagement,
    encapsulating a growing spectrum of activities that seeks to
    bend regional politics and relationships toward Beijing's world
    view.
        The novel coronavirus pandemic offers new opportunities to
    expand efforts to win regional hearts and minds, which Beijing
    has already seized, including the promise of a $1 billion
    facility for regional vaccine procurement. This promise may or
    may not, in the end, be fulfilled, but it has captured regional
    attention and gained significant goodwill. Now, it is incumbent
    on the United States to recognize the shifting ground and to
    react appropriately.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, both of you and others on
    this subcommittee have pointed to these as priority issues and
    noted both the strength of U.S. relations with the region and
    also our need to accelerate our efforts, particularly on the
    trade and investment side.
        Notably, Washington is taking actions to build a forward-
    looking economic recovery agenda, among them the Americas Crece
    program announced at the end of 2019 and enhanced financing
    facilities through the newly minted Development Finance
    Corporation.
        These are solid steps. But in my view, more can also be
    done to recapture the vision of a mutually supportive, open-
    market, democratic agenda fusing regional ambitions with U.S.
    national interests.
        Fortunately, the United States is slated to host the next
    Summit of the Americas in 2021. This will provide a tailor-made
    opportunity to develop the sort of recovery agenda the region
    is actively seeking, and which will be increasingly critical to
    implement the longer the pandemic lasts.
        In the first instance, addressing the healthcare crisis,
    including broad distribution and wide access for cost-effective
    vaccinations, will be paramount. It will also be an opportunity
    for democratically elected leaders to create a newly regional
    framework for health cooperation and pandemic management,
    incorporating private sector expertise to address future
    healthcare crises.
        Second, economic recovery must be at the forefront of the
    pending Summit of the Americas. Latin America already suffers
    from one of the lowest levels of intra-regional trade
    worldwide, for example. The gains from expanded intra-regional
    trade would establish sounder economic footing, while helping
    to moderate the cyclical nature of commodities markets. As
    well, nations across Latin America and the Caribbean can focus
    more attention on improving their respective investment
    climates, and Mr. Rooney, the ranking minority member, has made
    this case effectively many, many times.
        For its part, the United States should come to the 2021
    Summit with a robust economic expansion initiative. Absent a
    massive economic financial package of debt relief and new
    lending, renewal of the hemispheric trade and investment agenda
    will be the best way to promote regional recovery, support U.S.
    and regional economic interests, and renew a regional strategic
    posture that China has begun to challenge.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the invitation to provide
    testimony, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Farnsworth follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much for your comments.
        You can hear me, right?
        Okay. And we are now going to questions.
        You know, one of the biggest questions that I have in my
    mind is the situation in Venezuela. You know, Guaido goes up to
    January, he finishes. Maduro has his sham legislative election
    that he is planning on with all of his people are going to run,
    and, obviously, he is going to steal another election.
        So how does the United States continue to advocate
    democracy in Venezuela, you know, as a sham legislative
    election, and the end of Juan Guaido's mandate rapidly
    approaching? How do we do that?
        Well, do not all jump at once on this question.
        Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to jump in,
    although I am not sure my answer will be entirely satisfactory.
        I share your concern. Your leadership on this issue has
    been particularly important in calling attention to the
    significant issues that face Venezuelan people and indeed the
    hemispheric community because of the misrule and the
    misleadership of Nicolas Maduro and his cronies.
        The election that is scheduled for December 6th clearly is
    going to be a sham election, as you have said. It is not free.
    It is not fair. And the opposition has, by and large, suggested
    that the best way to counteract that would be to boycott the
    election so that there is no legitimacy lent to it.
        So, I think what the United States can do in the first
    instance is to, as we used to say in my State Department days,
    try to buck up the opposition so that they maintain a unified
    front, and so that there are not breakaway factions that are
    trying to contest an election where the results are already
    basically known.
        But the broader question is how can the United States,
    working with the international community, move Venezuela toward
    the free and fair elections, which really is the condition
    precedent for the beginning of recovery in that country? It is
    a really difficult conundrum. The sanctions regime I believe
    has been important; but, obviously, Mr. Maduro is still in
    power. So, you know, should more of the same be done? Should
    less be done? I think that is the issue that is going to
    confront policymakers going into the new year, certainly
    working with the Congress.
        But the one thing I would say is this: There are huge
    amounts of illicit money being made and moved in Venezuela
    through illegal activities, illegal gold mining, drug
    trafficking, and the like, and one of the best ways, I think,
    to get at the regime is to stanch the flow of those financial
    resources, and, frankly, to identify and to freeze those funds,
    and then also to begin to seize them and take them back.
        Once the economic incentives for illegal behavior are
    removed, or at least reduced, perhaps the political dynamic in
    Venezuela will change so that people will begin to see that
    they really have to find a way out of this mess, frankly, that
    Nicolas Maduro has created.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Yes, Dr. de Bolle.
        Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
        I would just like to add that we face another daunting
    challenge with respect to Venezuela dealing with its possibly
    fraud--well, fraudulent elections in the middle of a pandemic.
    It will be very hard to get other Latin American countries to
    focus on the issues in Venezuela given that they have runaway
    epidemics in their own countries.
        And we should not lose sight of the fact that amongst the--
    the 10 countries that have the largest or the highest per
    capita death rate in the world right now are all in Latin
    America. So just to bring that in.
        Mr. Sires. Mr. Camilleri.
        Mr. Camilleri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would certainly associate myself with some of the
    comments that have already been made. Nicolas Maduro is clearly
    determined to hold on to his de facto power in Venezuela by
    whatever means necessary, and that includes, in all likelihood,
    presiding over a fraudulent election in December as he has in
    the past.
        I do not think that efforts, whether by actors within
    Venezuela, or by the European Union, to try to negotiate
    conditions approaching free and fair elections should be
    criticized. I think we have every reason to be skeptical of
    those efforts, but I do not think we should be in a position as
    the U.S. Government of sort of throwing cold water on those
    efforts, though ultimately opposition unity around a position
    and around a strategy looking forward will be important.
        I think, you know, the longer-term questions that Eric
    alluded to are critical. My view is that we need to be
    principled; we need to continue to stand for democracy and
    human rights in Venezuela; we also need to be realistic. And
    the fact is, unfortunately, the Guaido interim government, the
    National Assembly, the G4 are not in the same position they
    were in a year or a year-and-a-half ago. The balance of forces
    on the ground in Venezuela has tilted in favor of the Maduro
    regime. And so, that will require us to calibrate our own
    efforts. And, in my view, we need to be realistic about the
    fact that some sort of negotiated pathway to free and fair
    elections ultimately is the most realistic and the most
    peaceful, frankly, path out of the awful situation that the
    country finds itself in.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. I think everybody is so preoccupied with their
    own countries and their own problems with the pandemic that
    they are not really focusing on Venezuela. I do not think they
    are really even looking at it, because they are so wrapped up
    in their own issues that it is going to be very difficult to
    get a group of people again to support changes in Venezuela
    like we did in the past.
        Congressman Rooney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        [no response.]
        Mr. Sires. Congressman Sherman, you are on.
        Mr. Sherman. Hello, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    opportunity to participate in this hearing, even though I am
    not a member of this subcommittee. And I want to thank you for
    holding this hearing and allowing me to participate, because it
    has been a year-and-a-half since the full committee has had a
    hearing on Western Hemisphere, and Latin America, and that is
    far too long for those of us who are not members of the Western
    Hemisphere Subcommittee to focus on our own hemisphere. And the
    events in Latin America often intersect with events elsewhere
    in the world.
        Just a couple of days ago, I was speaking to the Guatemalan
    ambassador about an effort to grant GSP relief to Myanmar. So,
    that is the kind of thing that needs the whole committee to
    look at, because there are two reasons not to do it. One is
    that Myanmar's human rights record is just despicable, and we
    had hearings in the Asia Subcommittee about their treatment of
    the Rohingya. And the second is, we should not be undermining
    the help we provided the Guatemalan and other Central American
    textile industries by doing something for a regime that is so
    awful.
        We are all troubled by the reports that Central American
    refugees, women are being subject to forced hysterectomies.
    Obviously, that needs to be investigated. The fact that this is
    even--that we have an Administration in which it even needs to
    be investigated, where it is even possibly true, shows how far
    we have fallen. And, oh, my God, if it is turns out that this
    whistleblower's complaints are accurate, then we have fallen
    much lower than I ever thought we could.
        I want to thank the chair for his comments about the regime
    in Venezuela. And when it comes to fighting COVID, we can look
    to the Western Hemisphere and judge our own reaction. We see
    Brazil has taken a policy and has a Presidential personality
    perhaps similar to our own, and their results are terrible,
    along with our own, whereas Canada, a country where half of the
    population lives within 50 miles of the U.S. border--you could
    not have a country more closely related to ours--had zero COVID
    deaths on the 13th of this month, and that is averaging five,
    six, seven deaths a day, we are doing a much worse job here in
    the United States by a factor of over 10, even accounting for
    the difference in population.
        Returning to Mr. Maduro, I am confused as to how he has
    been able to turn a country with the largest petroleum reserves
    in the world into a country where people are starving to death,
    and I am confused as to why a country, which had the most
    vibrant oil industry in South America, now is needing to import
    oil or gasoline from Iran.
        So, I wonder whether Ms. de Bolle, or any of the other
    witnesses, can describe how he has so ruined the oil sector,
    and what is this relationship with Iran?
        Dr. de Bolle. Thank you. I would be happy to address the
    question of how Venezuela's economic ruin happened. It has
    actually been a process over many, many years, and it did start
    with Chavez. So, just to remind ourselves, Chavez ran Venezuela
    on an extremely populist platform. He spent way more, in terms
    of fiscal resources, than he ever had the capability of
    generating, even with a vibrant oil industry.
        So in the end, when he passed away, and when he handed off
    the country to Maduro, Venezuela was already in financial dire
    straits. And then from then on, complete economic
    mismanagement, together with, you know, Maduro's inclinations
    toward, you know, just finding other partners to work with,
    some of which illegal, led, you know, the country down this
    path of ruin that we see it now.
        Essentially what has happened is that over many years,
    Venezuela has been impoverished by its political leadership.
    And with that, given that it is a country that has always been
    extremely dependent on oil, it has been impossible for
    Venezuela actually to invest in the oil industry in the volumes
    needed to maintain that industry functioning at a reasonable
    level.
        So apart from corruption, which is certainly a problem in
    the oil sector, as well as in other parts of the Venezuelan
    economy, there has also been dramatic underinvestment in the
    oil industry, which has now led the country to this situation
    where rather than being a very big net oil exporter, as they
    used to be in the 1980's and the 1990's, they have now become a
    net oil importer, which shows exactly how much you can squander
    your country's resources and, you know, just basically run an
    economy to the ground.
        Mr. Sherman. So the refined petroleum they are getting from
    Iran actually exceeds the amount of unrefined petroleum that
    they are able to export to Iran or anywhere else? They really
    are a net energy importer?
        Dr. de Bolle. They are turning into a net energy importer,
    yes.
        Mr. Sherman. That is a level of mismanagement that I did
    not think was possible, but sometimes we are surprised.
        I yield back. And I thank the chairman for letting me
    participate in this hearing.
        Dr. de Bolle. Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Juan Vargas.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear
    me?
        Mr. Sires. Yes.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
        And I apologize, I had to run to vote, so I apologize for
    missing a bit.
        Dr. Monica de Bolle, you spoke quite a bit about Brazil in
    your testimony, and you, early on, said some things about
    Mexico, but you did not go into depth on Mexico, to be frank. I
    would be interested in knowing what you think about Mexico in
    the sense you said that, obviously, in Brazil, the early
    response was disastrous, but also not favorable to Bolsonaro,
    but there was unanimous consent to give money to people to
    allow them to at least support themselves and get the economy
    back on its feet.
        Could you talk a little bit more about Mexico?
        Dr. de Bolle. Absolutely. Thank you.
        So, Mexico actually had from--the starting position for
    Mexico was very similar to Brazil's. So the playing down of the
    seriousness and gravity of the epidemic, the whole issue of
    playing up health measures against the economy and sort of
    using this narrative that lockdowns and quarantines were going
    to hurt the economy and, therefore, should not be used, all of
    that was Mexican--Mexico and Brazil were basically doing the
    same thing, and spent months doing exactly that. Brazil is
    still doing it, and, to some extent, Andres Manuel Lopez
    Obrador in Mexico is still doing it as well.
        The difference, the main difference between the two
    countries is that while Brazil's economic policy management has
    been pretty bad, they have not actually responded adequately to
    the epidemic. So there is rampant, as I said, bankruptcies and
    credit crunches all over the place. They at least managed to
    enact this one emergency basic income program to sustain the
    vulnerable population.
        Mexico did not even get as far as doing anything similar to
    what Brazil did on that front, so--and this is curious, because
    Lopez Obrador, who is elected and who campaigned on, you know,
    buoying the vulnerable, helping the poor, and all of that, has
    actually left that segment of the population hanging dry in the
    middle of the pandemic. And what is happening in Mexico right
    now, just as in other Latin American countries, it is precisely
    the poor and the vulnerable who are being hardest hit by both
    the economic shock as well as, obviously, the shock coming from
    the public health crisis.
        Mr. Vargas. So, Doctor, if I could continue on this, and
    any of the other people can jump in. So I live on the border in
    San Diego. So, when I listen to the music, there is one
    particular station that actually comes from Tijuana, so they
    have to do these commercials about Mexico, about the political
    parties. And one of the things that his party continuously says
    is how they are helping the poor, how the poor really get the
    help during this epidemic, and then he comes on and says, you
    know, ``Before they always bail out the banks and the rich
    guys, we are doing it with the poor."
        But I do not see that. I mean, is that the case? I mean, it
    just sounds like rhetoric.
        Dr. de Bolle. It is rhetoric. There is no program. There is
    no sort of emergency basic income, cash transfer like, you
    know, supportive program, and these are all cash transfer
    programs at the end of the day. There is nothing of the sort
    going on in Mexico, and there is nothing of the sort going on
    in many other places in Latin America. There are a few places
    where something similar has been tried. Brazil is the one
    country that has really done a very generous benefit, one that
    does not actually fit with the fiscal restriction that the
    country faces. But leaving that aside, you know, it is mostly
    rhetoric in Mexico, which is surprising, because AMLO's
    approval ratings continue to be not bad.
        Mr. Vargas. I was going to ask that. It sounds like there
    is rhetoric and there is action. It seems like the rhetoric has
    gotten him political benefit. But is the prognosis for the
    economy bad? Are we going to see the 9.4 percent recession
    increase? What are we going to see in Mexico then, if it is all
    rhetoric?
        Dr. de Bolle. So the likely scenario for Mexico right now
    is that there will be a very deep recession this year. I think
    this is pretty much, you know, consensual amongst different
    Latin America countries. Brazil and Mexico, the two largest
    economies in the region, are the ones that are probably going
    to face the deepest recession in 2020. And then looking out
    into 2021, the situation does not get much better.
        So the prospects indicate that for Mexico at least--Brazil
    is a little different, but for Mexico at least, there is no
    case for thinking about a recovery in 2021. Because if you have
    not laid out the foundation this year for dealing with the
    economic problems that are going to continue into next year,
    then that, of course, does not improve your standings going
    into 2021.
        So if that turns out to be true, I do not expect his
    political approval to last much longer, or at least not beyond
    this year.
        Mr. Vargas. I see that my time has run out, Mr. Chairman. I
    want to thank--I guess I yield back. I cannot hear you. You are
    muted, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Sires. Do you have another question?
        Mr. Vargas. I did, but----
        Mr. Sires. Go ahead.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you. I apologize, I am going over. I do
    not want to take anyone else's time.
        But to the other two presenters, I mean, Mexico, obviously,
    is a neighbor of mine. We just heard from the doctor now, but
    do you see it the same way? I mean, I do not understand what
    their--and they have just been in denial, and they have got all
    sorts of COVID cases. I mean, how are they going to get out of
    this? How are they going to get out of this?
        Mr. Camilleri. Congressman, I very much agree with Dr. de
    Bolle's analysis of the situation. The lack of fiscal stimulus
    has been a surprise, given the ideology and the expressed
    priorities of AMLO's government, although this commitment to
    fiscal austerity has been a theme of his, really from the
    beginning. It is a little surprising he did not revisit that in
    the context of a pandemic that has really devastated the
    economy. But, nonetheless, this is a trend, and it is one that
    will put Mexico in a deep hole, and one that it will have to
    kind of dig itself out from over the next year.
        It is true that his approval ratings remain high, and I
    think you spoke to this a little bit when you alluded to his
    allusions to past corruption, to government that benefits the
    elites in the country. A lot of that is true. And AMLO came to
    power having sort of tapped into the broad public frustration
    with governing elites in the country. Unfortunately, he has
    been much less effective, I think, at building institutions and
    building systems of governance that actually address the
    corruption that he very, I think, accurately diagnosed. In
    fact, what we see is him turning to a kind of doubling down on
    a militarized approach to public security; as Monica mentioned,
    a very kind of poor pandemic response in terms of the
    deployment of public services, and even recognizing the gravity
    of the situation. And on the rule of law front, I think some
    real warning signs in terms of erosion of oversight bodies,
    independent agencies, regular attacks on the free press and
    civil society.
        So, I think, unfortunately, there is a lot to be concerned
    about south of the border, and not just the economic situation.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Vargas, may I make a comment or two?
        Mr. Vargas. Yes.
        Mr. Farnsworth. Thank you very much for the opportunity.
        I think over the medium term, recovery is going to have to
    be investment-led, and investment, you know, from the United
    States, from Canada, and the USMCA, domestic investments in
    Mexico and investments from elsewhere. But there does seem to
    be a bit of complacency, perhaps. Now that USMCA has passed,
    that investment flows are automatically and miraculously going
    to regenerate. If only that were the case. It is clearly an
    advantage to link Mexico to the rest of North America, but
    there is also a lot of work that has to be done within Mexico
    itself to draw the investment within the USMCA context.
        And what we are seeing is some concern in the investor
    community about actions that have been taken, perhaps on the
    backtracking on the reform agenda around energy in particular,
    but in other sectors as well, canceling contracts, that have
    been previously, you know, agreed upon, and some other actions
    like that.
        And the investment community is very cautious. And, yes,
    there are huge advantages that Mexico maintains, but also,
    there are some actions that have cut the other direction that
    have caused some concern.
        The one thing that I would suggest, however, though, is
    that there is a massive opportunity here, because as supply
    chains are beginning to shift, particularly out of China, but
    perhaps out of Asia more broadly, Mexico is perfectly
    positioned geographically, culturally, historically, et cetera,
    to build those supply chains with the United States, with North
    America and, frankly, with the rest of Latin America.
        Now is the time to be doing that. And I can tell you, with
    direct knowledge, that there are other countries around the
    region that are actively pursuing that approach, very
    aggressively and very successfully, in some cases. I think
    Mexico could do that as well, and that would clearly be one way
    to, you know, support recovery over the medium term.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you,
    and thank you for allowing me to go long. I apologize, but I
    really do appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Sires. You know, I want to talk a little bit about
    Colombia. I recently sent a letter to the President of
    Colombia, regarding the murder of five Afro-Colombians. It just
    seems to me that during this pandemic, doing the deal with the
    FARC, the securing long-lasting peace, enhancing the rule of
    law, and ensuring greater economic and social inclusion has
    taken a step backward. Can you comment on that in Colombia?
    Michael?
        Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Chairman, anyone in particular, or
    Michael, go ahead.
        Mr. Sires. Michael, go ahead.
        Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
    to speak on this. I fully share your concern and your
    perspective. You know, while it is the case that overall
    violence levels in Colombia have come down, there has been this
    spate of killings of human rights defenders, of social leaders,
    to demobilize FARC members, as well as, as you mentioned, this
    very brutal killing of the five Afro-Colombian teenagers in
    Cali, dozens of massacres in just the last few months.
        So this takes us back to really some of the dark times in
    Colombia, and I think you are right to shine a spotlight on
    this, and to ask the authorities there to focus on these
    challenges before they spiral out of control.
        In the case specifically of the five teens in Cali, my
    understanding is the alleged perpetrators have been identified
    and arrested. That is obviously extremely important. Impunity
    is one of the structural factors that leads to this kind of
    violence in Colombia, and we see over and over again that,
    especially Afro-descendant and indigenous communities are
    disproportionately impacted. They tend to be present in zones
    most afflicted by violence and conflict, and be marginalized
    from State presence and public services.
        So, thank you for your leadership on this, and I hope you
    will continue to call it to the attention of our government, as
    well as the authorities in Colombia.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Mr. Farnsworth. I am sorry, I missed that. You were----
        Mr. Sires. Would you like to add something to this?
        Mr. Farnsworth. Yes. Thank you, sir, just a very brief
    comment. You know, it is a bane of U.S. foreign policy, I
    think, to look at an issue and see an issue, and, perhaps,
    conclude an issue and then move on to the next thing and kind
    of forget sometimes about the need to maintain vigilance in
    various activities.
        I think Colombia, on a bipartisan basis, has been the top
    foreign policy success story of the United States and the
    Western Hemisphere for a long time. But having said that,
    absolutely, there continue to be challenges, which have been
    exacerbated by COVID, which have been exacerbated by the
    collapse next door in Venezuela, by the polarization in
    Colombia itself politically. There are some real issues here.
        Having said that, I think it is entirely appropriate for
    the United States, which has invested billions of dollars in
    Colombia, alongside the Colombian people, to be very vigilant
    in promoting a value set that is critically important for
    Colombia to advance to the next stage of development--
    protection of human rights, protection of the value structure
    that we would hold dear ourselves in the United States. I think
    that is an entirely appropriate approach to take.
        But I would simply caveat that as well by saying the
    challenges in Colombia are very large. The issues have not,
    quote/unquote, been solved, and that partnership remains vital
    and has to continue to remain vital.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you.
        Monica, do you have anything you would like to add?
        Dr. de Bolle. No. The only thing I would add--and this goes
    not only for Colombia but for other countries in the region--we
    are at a very dangerous moment right now, because if we go back
    to 2019, we saw demonstrations in the second half of 2019 being
    sparked across the region. Colombia, they happened in Colombia
    as well. Of course, Colombia was not the center of them. Most
    of them were in Chile and Ecuador and other places. But at this
    point in time, with the pandemic running rampant in all of
    these places, with leadership being questioned, you know,
    representation of democracy being questioned across the region,
    the region is at a tipping point for another such social
    upheaval event that we should be on the watch for. Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. [inaudible] a little bit about Nicaragua--unless
    Mr. Vargas has a question. No? Go ahead, Mr. Vargas.
        Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I am also interested in
    the Nicaraguan response from our presenters. Thank you.
        Mr. Sires. OK. I recently sent a letter to the President
    regarding Valeska Aleman and Moises Alberto Ortega Valdivia,
    regarding the fact that there they were deported. These people
    were tortured in Nicaragua. They got to the border, and they
    were asking for asylum, and the Administration just ignored
    everything and sent these people back to Nicaragua, deported
    them.
        I mean, we got to stand for something. If we cannot give
    these people some political cover, how do we expect them to
    fight for democracy in their own country? Can anybody talk a
    little bit about that? Michael, you want to start?
        Mr. Camilleri. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to.
        Mr. Sires. I am sorry I am using your first name, but it is
    just a lot easier to see on the screen.
        Mr. Camilleri. Fair enough, fair enough. Mr. Chairman,
    thank you. Obviously, this flies in the face of the refugee
    protections enshrined in U.S. law and international law. It is,
    frankly, also really disheartening on a human level. These are,
    as you mentioned, people who are literally putting their lives
    on the line to defend the principles that we claim to stand for
    as a country. It is hard to understand, when the Trump
    Administration has been so vocal about the condemnation of
    human rights abuses by the Ortega regime, how this sort of
    thing could have happened.
        And if you will allow me a final comment, this is precisely
    the kind of hypocrisy, or perceived hypocrisy, that erodes, in
    my experience, U.S. credibility in the region, and feeds the
    false narrative that the defense of human rights is simply a
    political instrument that we, as a country and as a government,
    deploy selectively against adversarial governments.
        When we do not practice what we preach, it makes it that
    much harder for us to defend and promote the principles that I
    think we do stand for as a government. So, thank you again for
    calling attention to this.
        Mr. Sires. Anyone else want to add something?
        Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on.
        Mr. Sires. Sorry. Go ahead, Eric.
        Mr. Farnsworth. I think what Michael said is spot on. This
    is a tragic case. Hopefully, it was isolated and will not be
    repeated. The truth of the matter is, though, if we are asking
    people to stand up in their home countries, to take politically
    difficult, even life-threatening actions, when they do that, it
    is incumbent on us, in my view, to welcome them into our
    country, if they need assistance.
        Obviously, it is highly political, it is highly difficult
    to determine, you know, certain claims from other claims, but
    as a matter of principle, I think that should be the baseline,
    and then we try to identify the individuals who may or may not
    be seeking asylum in accordance with that.
        But in Nicaragua, this is a country that has clearly
    returned to authoritarian governance. Daniel Ortega did allow
    an election at the end of the 1980's, his first term, and he
    did respect that, but then, once he got reelected to office, he
    is most likely going to make sure that such a circumstance does
    not happen again.
        So this is a country that is clearly headed in the wrong
    direction. The human rights and democracy defenders within that
    country are taking real risks at personal cost, and I think it
    is incumbent on us to recognize that and to assist them where
    we can.
        Mr. Sires. Monica de Bolle.
        Dr. de Bolle. Now I would just like to add my whole voice
    to Michael's and Eric's. I completely agree with everything
    that was said, and I would add that, you know, once we think
    about the China issue and the concerns that we have about China
    building bridges into the region, this is another sensitive
    area that we should be well aware of.
        If we are going to have the sort of policies toward Latin
    America that actually leave the region in a worse place, then
    evidently that leaves a very large room for China to be
    involved in. So just wanted to add that comment.
        Mr. Sires. Well, thank you very much. Thank you all. You
    have been most gracious with your time and patience. I
    certainly appreciate it, and I am always very happy to see you,
    because I always get a lot of good information from you when
    you come before the committee. And unfortunately we have to do
    this through Zoom and it gets very complicated, but you are
    real troopers and you are always there to help the committee
    get informed on what is happening in the Western Hemisphere.
    And I just want you to know as chairman, and a representative
    of the other members, I do thank you for that. And we are going
    to close now. Thank you for joining us today.
        This virus has taken over 300,000 lives in Latin America
    and the Caribbean. As countries throughout the region struggle
    to get the coronavirus under control, we must further deepen
    our engagement in this hemisphere, lifting up our Latin
    American and Caribbean allies is in our interest, as the
    security and the prosperity and the strength of the democratic
    institution all have direct impact on us.
        I thank our witnesses and the members for participating.
    With that, the committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                    APPENDIX

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]