[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-54]
U.S. POLICY IN SYRIA AND
THE BROADER REGION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 11, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-863 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Emma Morrison, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Esper, Hon. Mark T., Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense. 4
Milley, GEN Mark A., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Esper, Hon. Mark T., joint with GEN Mark A. Milley........... 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Golden................................................... 64
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 64
Mr. Kim...................................................... 63
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 64
U.S. POLICY IN SYRIA AND THE BROADER REGION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 11, 2019.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Let us go ahead and call the meeting to
order. I want to start by thanking our witnesses, Secretary
Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley, for
appearing before us to testify.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss our policy in
Syria, particularly in light of the events that happened just a
couple of months ago when Turkey invaded and drove the Kurds
out of portions of that.
But before I do that I do want to do one other--it is our
first hearing since Congressman Brindisi from New York has
joined the committee. I want to thank him. We have a lot of new
faces on this committee, but now they are a year into it. They
are not new faces anymore, but it is good to have another
freshman added to the committee. I appreciate him serving.
Welcome. Thank you.
As I said, the purpose of this hearing is to look into the
events around Syria. And there is a whole bunch of questions.
And the other big issue for us is just the ability of the
members of this committee to ask questions directly of the key
policymakers in an area that is of enormous importance to the
committee and to give them an opportunity to learn more about
that policy and also express their views. And that is a huge
part of oversight role in Congress and I think it would be
enormously important.
There are three sort of broad areas that I am interested
around this. First of all is where do we go from here? What is
now the mission on containing ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria] and ultimately defeating ISIS in the region? Because
without question, no matter how we got to the point where we
got, the Turkish incursion into Syria changed that equation. We
had built an alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces and
with the Kurds as a big part of that in the region. And the
history is important here. We were trying for years, quite a
long time, after the rise of ISIS to find a coalition as they
built a caliphate across Syria and across Iraq and threatened
our interests and the interests of the region. That was an
unchecked expansion for a substantial period of time.
In 2015, the Obama administration was able to cobble
together a coalition, primarily of Kurds in the YPG [People's
Protection Units] in Syria, but also with Syrian Democratic
Forces and then working with Iraqis as well to have a counter-
ISIS movement. And whatever else one can say about it, it
worked. The caliphate has been broken up because of that plan
started by the Obama administration and carried out by the
Trump administration. Now as we all know, it did not defeat
ISIS. ISIS is still a robust, transnational terrorist threat in
that region and beyond. But the breaking up of the caliphate
was a huge accomplishment. With the incursion from the north of
Turkey, it undermines that.
What is the new plan? What happens here going forward?
Because the biggest risk of this plan from the start was the
concern that the Turks would have about our alliance with the
Kurds and the YPG in particular. And the Obama administration
spent a lot of time trying to make sure that Turkey didn't do
what they ultimately wound up doing here. And we need a new
plan. So understanding what that plan is is important.
But the other piece that I think is important for members
is to understand how policy gets made between the Pentagon and
the White House and how we can be involved in it because there
certainly are a lot of concerns about how this came out. And I
would be very curious to have you tell us what actually
happened. But essentially, the President sent out a tweet, I
think it was a year ago now, in December saying and I don't
have it directly in front of me but basically we are pulling
out of Syria. And by the way, pulling out of Afghanistan, as
well, at the same time.
And in all the meetings that I had and this committee has
had the first we heard of that. There had been no discussion
about it. So the impression that is given is that it wasn't
like he sat down with the NSC [National Security Council] and
said hey, what is going on? What is the plan? He didn't sit
down with you guys and say, hey, this is a policy objective we
need to get to, how are we going to get there? He woke up one
morning and decided we were going to do it. That is
problematic, to my way of thinking. And we sort of backfilled
the policy afterwards.
We need greater transparency. I think the process is
important. I trust the job that you guys do. I trust a lot of
people at the Pentagon, a lot of people in the NSC. Their input
is important in developing a policy, not just sort of throwing
it out there and seeing what happens. So we would like to learn
more about how that works.
And there are other issues on that. There was recently
discussion of aid that we had approved for Lebanon. That aid
was held up for some period of time. We attempted to find out
why and it was kind of hard, basically. It was eventually
released, but we never really heard what was the point? Those
sorts of things really matter. I think they matter for the
executive branch, but they matter a lot for us, too. Because on
this committee, there are a lot of very bright, talented
people. We have people who have served in the military, people
who have served in the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], State
Department, people who are just policymakers, who want to be
part of that discussion to help as a co-equal branch of
government work towards a good policy. We want to improve upon
where we are at in that relationship.
Lastly, certainly ISIS is a huge concern in the region, but
there are other concerns in the region and we want to know how
the policies as we are dealing with Syria, with Bashar al-Assad
having held on to power and seemingly will for some time, how
does that impact the broader region? I personally have just got
back from a trip there and Ms. Slotkin joined me on that trip
as well with a couple of other members to the Middle East. And
while there are certainly challenges, I think there are also
opportunities there. There were protests in Iraq and Lebanon
against the Iranian involvement which we had never seen before.
People in the region are beginning to understand that Iran's
influence is malign and undermining their interests. There is
an opportunity there because in addition to containing ISIS,
that is their other largest goal in the region is to stop
Iran's destabilizing influence from Syria to Lebanon to Iraq to
Yemen, all across. How can we contain them? How can we build on
that and get an opportunity?
Also, the concern about Iran has given us, I think, a
historic opportunity to try to deal with the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis, enormous crisis in the Middle East. There
is now a much more of a connection between some key Arab states
and Israel because of their concern about Iran. Is there a way
to build on that to create a more stable Middle East?
So those are sort of the three broad policy areas that I am
interested in. Again, a huge part of this is to give members an
opportunity to better understand what the policy is. We are,
knock on wood, going to pass a defense bill today. That is our
effort and the more informed we are, the better that bill is
going to be. And with that, I am pleased to yield to the
ranking member, Mr. Thornberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
welcome both of our witnesses. I believe this is the first time
that you-all are up here in your current capacities together
and we appreciate you taking the time to be here with us.
As we think about Syria, I think all of us--there are those
who develop a Syria policy on paper in journal articles and so
forth. And it seems relatively simple and straightforward. What
you-all have to deal with is the real world including the
historical, the cultural, the religious, the ethnic background
and complications in this part of the world and that is the
world as you found it and as you have to deal with it. It is
not quite as simple as putting down points one, two, and three
on a piece of paper and assuming that everything will flow
easily from that.
You also have to deal with mistakes made by previous
administrations. I remember the Obama administration made a big
deal about pivoting to Asia, implying that we were pivoting
away from the Middle East. Well, it turns out that the Middle
East doesn't really let you get away from it with terrorism,
and as the chairman points out, the necessities of containing
Iran.
I remember the previous administration drawing a red line
in Syria and then failing to follow up which many people
believe has emboldened not only Assad, but others, to take
greater risks, that the U.S. would not follow through on
threats or statements that it made.
All of that is part of the quagmire that is Syria today,
that you-all have to deal with. But I agree completely, our
challenges are how do we reduce the terrorist threat,
especially to the homeland, from that region? And how do we
contain an aggressive, seemingly increasingly desperate Iran, a
revolutionary regime that seems bent on expansion and
disruption of key neighbors?
Of course, you-all can't fix the whole problem. What you
can do is tell us what your objectives are and what the
military role is in this. And we look forward to hearing on
both of those things today. Thank you for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you. With that, as I understand it, you
have one joint statement. Is that correct or are you both----
Secretary Esper. We submitted one joint statement, Mr.
Chairman. We both have separate statements, too.
The Chairman. All right, then I will yield to Mr. Esper.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Esper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
the security situation in Syria and the broader Middle East.
Before we begin, I would like to thank the committee for
its work on the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. I
encourage Congress to move swiftly on its passage, along with
the defense appropriations bill. This legislation is critical
to providing our service members the resources they need to
fully implement the National Defense Strategy.
I also want to offer my deepest condolences to the victims
and families of the tragic shooting that took place at Pearl
Harbor and Pensacola this week. In light of these events, we
are reviewing our vetting procedures for all foreign nationals
who come to the United States for military training, as well as
assessing our installation security procedures to ensure the
safety of our military community.
As reflected in the National Defense Strategy, the
Department of Defense prioritizes China and then Russia as our
Nation's top national security challenges. As we transition our
focus towards great power competition, we must also remain
vigilant in countering threats from rogue states like Iran and
violent extremist organizations such as ISIS. The United States
strategy in the Middle East seeks to ensure the region is not a
safe haven for terrorists, is not dominated by any power
hostile to the United States, and contributes to a stable
global energy market.
For the Department of Defense, this translates to the
following six objectives. First, utilize a dynamic U.S.
military presence with strategic depth to deter, and if
necessary, respond to aggression. Second, strengthen the
defensive capabilities of regional partners. Third, advance
partnerships and burden sharing with allies and partners to
address shared security concerns. Fourth, protect freedom of
navigation. Fifth, deny safe haven to terrorists that threaten
the homeland. And sixth, mitigate WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] threats.
Although there are a multitude of security issues to
discuss in the Middle East, today we will focus on two of the
most destabilizing players in the region, ISIS and Iran.
Beginning with ISIS, the United States has achieved success
alongside our partner forces in Syria and Iraq to destroy the
physical caliphate and to liberate 7.7 million people living
under its brutal rule. This includes the successful operations
that resulted in the death of ISIS's founder and leader, Bakr
al-Baghdadi, as well as one of his top deputies.
The Department of Defense remains committed to working with
our partners to ensure ISIS is unable to mount a resurgence.
Today, U.S. forces remain postured in Syria, operating in close
coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces. Although the
recent Turkish incursion has complicated this battlespace, the
Department of Defense remains confident that we can continue
the mission the President has given us in Syria which is to
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. We maintain our leadership
role in the Defeat ISIS campaign which brings together 76
nations and 5 international organizations to provide funding,
military capabilities, and political support.
In Iraq, we continue to work by, with, and through the
Iraqi Security Forces to enable a strong and independent state.
I was recently there to visit our troops and meet with our
Iraqi partners. Despite the turmoil at the political level, our
train, advise, and assist efforts with the Iraqi military
remain strong and continue to show progress.
Moving to Iran, over the past 18 months the Department of
Defense has supported the United States economic and diplomatic
maximum pressure campaign. These efforts seek to bring the
Iranian regime back to the negotiating table for a new and
better deal that addresses the full range of threats emanating
from Iran. Tehran's efforts to destabilize the region have
increased in recent months as it attacked targets in Saudi
Arabia, disrupted the commercial shipping through the Strait of
Hormuz, shot down a U.S. unmanned aircraft in international air
space, and provided support to numerous proxy groups. To
address these threats, we are taking a deliberate approach to
strengthen our defenses, to enable our partners to better
defend themselves, and to refine our response options.
Since May of this year, nearly 14,000 U.S. military
personnel have deployed to the region to serve as a tangible
demonstration of our commitment to our allies and our partners.
These additional forces are not intended to signal an
escalation, but rather to reassure our friends and buttress our
efforts at deterrence.
We are also focused on internationalizing the response to
Iran's aggression by encouraging increased burden sharing and
cooperation with allies and partners from around the world. The
International Maritime Security Construct which protects
freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman and
the more nascent integrated air and missile defense efforts led
by Saudi Arabia, are two such examples. Through these
activities, we are sending a clear message to Iran that the
international community will not tolerate its malign
activities.
Along with our allies and partners, we remain united in our
commitment to regional stability and to upholding longstanding
international rules and norms. Importantly, Iran should not
mistake the United States restraint for an unwillingness to
respond with decisive military force should our forces or
interests be attacked.
In conclusion, as the Department of Defense continues to
implement the National Defense Strategy, the stability of the
Middle East remains important to our Nation's security. As
such, we will continue to calibrate all of our actions to deter
conflict, to avoid unintended escalation, and to enable our
partners to defend themselves against regional aggressors. In
doing so, we will preserve the hard-won gains of the past and
ensure the security of the United States and our vital
interests.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Esper and
General Milley can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Milley.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
General Milley. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member
Thornberry, distinguished committee members, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the national security
challenges we face in the Middle East. And before I begin, I
would like to echo Secretary Esper's condolences and sympathies
to the victims and the families of the shootings at both Pearl
Harbor and Pensacola. On behalf of all the leaders both
uniformed and civilians in the United States military our
thoughts and prayers are with the fallen and we are thankful
for the heroism and the skill of the persons who responded to
put themselves in harm's way to save countless lives.
On the topic today on the Middle East, I just returned a
few days ago from an eight-country visit to Israel, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Oman. The
Middle East remains a challenge to U.S. national security
interests. ISIS, al-Qaida, and other terrorist groups thrive on
the instability in the region as they try to export violent
extremism around the world. We are not finished with that
fight. Iran exploits the volatility of the Middle East and
asserts itself through malign influence to achieve regional
dominance.
Our National Security Strategy, as Secretary Esper
outlined, has clear goals: a stable and secure Middle East; a
Middle East that is not a safe haven and a breeding ground for
violent extremists; a Middle East that is not dominated by a
nation hostile to the United States; and a Middle East that
contributes to a stable global energy market.
As the Secretary stated, the National Defense Strategy
provides military objectives to deter the destabilizing
activities of Iran and violent extremist organizations and he
outlined those six objectives. The National Military Strategy
describes how the joint force achieves those six objectives
through our five focus areas of responding to threats,
deterring strategic attacks that includes the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, deter conventional attacks, assure
our allies and partners, and compete below the level of armed
conflict.
Specifically, in Syria, we continue combined operations
with the Syrian Democratic Forces in order to complete the
enduring defeat of ISIS and prevent their reemergence. Iraq has
been an essential partner in defeating ISIS in the region and
we continue to work by, with, and through Iraqi Security Forces
in order to achieve a secure and stable Iraq, able to defend
itself against internal security threats of terrorism.
Our military strategy in Afghanistan is to continue to deny
Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist attacks on the
homeland and that has been our objective since October 7, 2001.
And we also support the effort to reach a political settlement
between the Taliban and the Afghan Government and Afghan-to-
Afghan negotiated settlements that ends this war in a
responsible way and meets U.S. national security objectives.
And Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of
terrorism and has increased instability in the region through
state and proxy actions. As you know, we have increased
recently our force posture in the response to Iran's recent
attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the continued
acts of aggression and malign influence throughout the region.
We will maintain the strategic depth of the joint force in the
region in order to deter Iran, assure our partners, and if
necessary, respond if deterrence fails.
In broad terms, our military strategy in the Middle East is
part of an interagency international effort to sustain the
conditions-based approach designed to one, defeat violent
extremism including the enduring defeat of ISIS; two, to
prevent regional dominance by Iran; and three, to assure our
allies and partners.
Thank you for your continued support to our men and women
in uniform. I look forward to an NDAA later on this afternoon
and I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today and I
look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Now we will move into
questions. Our two witnesses have a hard stop at noon which
means I am going to be even more aggressive about enforcing the
5-minute clock to make sure that we can get to as many members
as possible.
I have had my opportunities before, so I am not going to
ask questions. I will yield to Mrs. Davis for the first set of
questions, 5 minutes. Thanks.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both
of you, Dr. Esper and General Milley, for joining us.
I appreciate your statement and I wonder if you will just
perhaps in a more refined fashion, why is our military presence
essential in Syria? And what can we not achieve actually
through other means to fulfill our strategic objectives?
And I wonder if you could in that answer take us into 3
years with that military posture and touch briefly on the
diplomatic mission as well. Thank you.
Secretary Esper. Thank you, Congressman. I will take the
first stab, and then let General Milley flesh out operational
aspects of it.
In short, the mission remains the enduring defeat of ISIS.
We do that through this partnership with the SDF [Syrian
Democratic Forces] on the ground. The SDF has been a great
partner in the sense of providing very capable ground forces.
What we provide for them are the enablers, principally the air
support and intelligence, things like that that help us defeat
ISIS as we see ISIS pops up.
And Chairman, I don't know if you want to provide more
operational details.
General Milley. Yes. Why is it necessary? It is because
ISIS still exists. ISIS as an entity, as an organization, is
more than just an organization. It is also an ideology. It is
an inspirational group, and so on and so forth.
They have been defeated, the caliphate, the physical
entity, the proto-state called the caliphate. That was
destroyed, defeated. But the organization itself still exists.
There are still members and they are generally, more or less,
not 100 percent, but generally in the lower Euphrates River
Valley. In order to provide for the enduring defeat and working
by, with, and through allies and partners, Iraqi Security
Forces in Iraq and the SDF in Syria, that enables us to
continue to maintain intelligence collection and strike
capability to continue to rip apart the remnants of what is
ISIS. If we fail to do that, ISIS will reemerge. The conditions
will come back and they will reemerge as a capable threat to
the region and our interests.
Mrs. Davis. And so what are the conditions then that would
allow us to withdraw? Does that mean that ISIS would absolutely
have to be defeated? And we obviously know that the situation
in Afghanistan is very critical in that way as well.
Secretary Esper. So one thing I will add first and then I
will answer your question directly. We are fighting ISIS right
now all the way from Africa into Afghanistan. We have
operations conducting there against ISIS and its derivatives.
The metric that we have set out for this in terms of when
we could consider redeploying, if you will, would be when we
feel confident that local security and police forces are
capable of handling any type of resurgence, if you will, of
ISIS. I think the defeat, if you will, will be hard because it
is an ideology. I don't think we ever--it is hard to foresee
any time soon that we would stamp it out, but when we get to
the point where local police and security forces can handle the
actual threat of ISIS activities, then that would be a metric.
Mrs. Davis. And looking to Turkey and Syria, what can we
see in the next few years in terms of their handling those
objectives that you have outlined?
Secretary Esper. Well, I think Turkey and Syria have
different objectives. This is our priority with regard to
Syria. Turkey's objective, and I hesitate to speak for them,
but in my discussions with the Turks, their number one concern
are Kurdish terrorists, the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party],
coming into Turkey and conducting attacks on the Turkish
people.
Close behind that is the presence of 2 to 3 to 4 million
refugees in Turkey and their ability to sustain that, so their
focus is a little bit different than what ours is right now on
that front.
Mrs. Davis. Could you speak to the whole-of-government
approach there, as well, because obviously, this is the Armed
Services Committee, but we also know that if we don't have a
full picture of where the State Department is in this and their
capacity at this time to be dealing with it, that that is a
real problem for us.
I am not asking you to be the Secretary of State, but
please.
Secretary Esper. Secretary of Defense is challenging
enough. The State Department, in the context of Syria, the
State Department is working through a U.N. [United Nations]
process we call the Geneva process that brings the key players
in Geneva to discuss a resolution to the war in Syria, the
civil war in Syria. That process has had its ups and downs over
the years and I am sorry, but I can't give you a current update
as to where things stand. Progress has not been sufficient
enough for our likes, if you will.
Mrs. Davis. And General Milley, could you comment as well
on your optimism, pessimism, in terms of the support of the
diplomatic mission there?
General Milley. I wouldn't characterize it as optimistic or
pessimistic. I just think that we, the U.S. military, have a
requirement not just in the Middle East but throughout the
world to support diplomatic efforts. In the words of a previous
Secretary of Defense, it is much better that foreign countries
deal with the Department of State than the Department of
Defense. So we want to act in support all the time of
diplomatic efforts.
With respect to Syria or Iran for that matter and the
topics of today, there are a variety of diplomatic efforts
ongoing and we are directly in support of those.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman, I will yield to Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. And I thank both of
you for being here today. America is fortunate to have such
leadership and I know military families appreciate, Mr.
Secretary and General, your service. It is so meaningful.
And Mr. Secretary, I appreciated earlier this year, I had
an opportunity to welcome you to Fort Jackson. I saw your
empathy in relationship with the military, the troops. It was
so positive and I fully supported the promotion that you
received to be Secretary of Defense and it is just reassuring
again to our allies, to the American people, to military
families. So thank you.
And with that, I am grateful to be the ranking member of
the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism
Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We understand
any strategy in Syria should be both diplomatic and political.
And so what is the relationship of the Department of Defense
and State Department to try to promote stability in the region?
Secretary Esper. Well, thank you for your comments, Mr.
Wilson. We collaborate constantly with State Department at all
levels to include myself speaking often with Secretary Pompeo.
We are brought together in the NSC process where we have
committee deputies, principal committee meetings to discuss
these issues. And so in each of them we were hand in glove.
As the Chairman mentioned, as I have stated before, part of
our job is to enable our diplomats. I want to do that as much
as possible. In some cases maybe providing security, if you
will, for the distribution of humanitarian aid. In other cases,
it is making sure that we are using our military presence to
reassure and reinforce allies and partners which is what we
have been doing in Saudi Arabia with Saudi Arabia. So those are
just two examples of the close coordination that happens
between us. And by the way, other players in that realm as
well, whether it is Treasury, USAID [United States Agency for
International Development], all the key players, a whole-of-
government approach.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. I am very grateful you
pointed out USAID, too, because they play such a vital role.
I believe that ISIS materialized, Mr. Secretary, because of
the vociferous withdrawal from Iraq under the previous
administration which followed the unfulfilled red line. This
premature decision based on a timeline rather than conditions
based, led to the re-engagement to have to defeat ISIS.
With the President's recent comments about pulling our
troops out of Syria and keeping quote a peacekeeping force, how
will this force accomplish any of the six objectives that you
and General Milley have highlighted in your statements?
Secretary Esper. Mr. Wilson, the force, the residual force
in Syria right now is not a peacekeeping force. It is a force
focused on the enduring defeat of ISIS. They are working
closely day in and day out with the SDF to perform a number of
tasks underneath that overarching goal and strategy. So that is
their mission. That is what they are deployed to do and they
are conducting those operations day by day.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And General Milley, again, thank you
for your service. It is so reassuring to military families.
You have already cautioned that a reemergence of ISIS is
possible. Can you cite further the assessment of ISIS
capabilities and potential to reemerge absent a U.S. presence?
General Milley. My assessment at this point is that if we
do not retain a capability, an intelligence capability that
allows us to collect and see and then act with a strike
capability on ISIS in Syria, then the conditions for
reemergence of ISIS will happen. It will take some time. It
will probably take maybe 6 to 12 months something like that,
but ISIS would reemerge if the United States went to zero.
Now having said that, there are other forces in the area
that also have interest in attacking and suppressing ISIS. But
left unattended whatsoever, I think they would reemerge,
absolutely.
Secretary Esper. I would add that in Syria, we are also
there with allied forces which we can't discuss in this
session, but we have partners there as well, that are working
with us and working, supporting the SDF and that is very
important to our efforts as well.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you, because to me this provides
sadly safe havens for terrorists to attack American families
around the world and back home. So thank you for what you are
doing.
And then General, the plan for the ISIS detainees held by
the Syrian Democratic Forces, what is the status of maintaining
the detainees as where they are or encouraging their return?
General Milley. The current status is that there are 24
detention center prisons that are manned by the SDF throughout
different parts of Syria and they are still under adequate
control based on the reporting that I have. So there is no risk
at this point that I can see of some mass escape, that sort of
thing. The SDF clearly has them under their control.
In the Turkish incursion zones, it is the responsibility of
the Turkish Government in that 30-kilometer incursion zone in
the northern portion of Syria, northeastern, that is the
responsibility of the Turkish Government, but in the rest of
Syria, the SDF has control.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. We have faith in both of you. Thank
you very much.
Secretary Esper. I would just add, this is where the 81
members of the ISIS campaign helps because they provide funding
for the SDF to do that.
The Chairman. One thing I didn't mention up front is I try
to keep it to the 5 minutes, not to ask a 4 minutes and 59
second question. I will give you a chance to wrap up, but when
you see the clock go off, if you could wrap up, that would be
great.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
General Milley, thank you for your service. Thank you for your
testimony here today.
To follow up on that question, that was one of the main
things I wanted to get to in terms of the status of the 11,000
ISIS prisoners. Obviously, the thing that most worries me is
the threat to the homeland and obviously their escape would be
very troubling for our security, as well as that of our allies.
I appreciate the answer you gave, but is there any
intention to transfer any of these prisoners to another entity?
And if so, how would the U.S. ensure an orderly transfer of
custody?
Secretary Esper. I will take the first stab at that, Mr.
Langevin. First of all, if you look at the 10,000, if we went
into closed session and we were able to provide, I would tell
you most of them are not the threat that we might think they
are in terms of fighters. There is a hard-core group that I
think we watch closely. So I want to make sure you understand
this is a spectrum of fighters. Some are more violent, if you
will, than others.
That said, of the 10,000, if I remember my statistics
right, 2,000, 2,200 or so are foreign fighters. We are trying
to work with our allies and partners to have them repatriated
and brought to justice. I have had numerous discussions with
our European allies on this fact. I have discussed it with our
Iraqi partners and others. And so we continue to engage on that
front. Beyond that, there is no plan to--no other plans to
transfer them anywhere other than to repatriate them back to
their nations of origin, their home nations.
Mr. Langevin. And Secretary Esper, what additional changes
to the disposition of U.S. forces in Syria are planned for the
next 6 months and are there changes to disposition plans for
the region?
Secretary Esper. Right now, there is no disposition plans
that I am tracking. Of course, that could change if a threat
changes or the commander needs to make changes on the ground,
but I will defer to General Milley to see if he has anything to
add.
General Milley. That is correct. The current disposition is
what we anticipate for the next 6 months depending on unless
there is some kind of significant change in conditions. But
right now, we don't anticipate that.
Mr. Langevin. And Mr. Secretary and General Milley, what do
you anticipate will happen to the Syrian Democratic Forces
given the President's decision to withdraw U.S. forces from the
Syrian-Turkish border? They were strong allies, partners with
us and I am concerned about what is going to happen to them
now.
Secretary Esper. My current assessment is that the
situation up there is generally stabilized. There is--you know,
the no cease-fire is perfect, if you will. I think the wild
card is always the Turkish surrogate forces that are out there,
but, generally, my sense is that things have roughly stabilized
in northeast Syria. But again, the Chairman was just in the
region. He may have heard something different.
General Milley. I haven't heard anything particularly
different. I think it has settled down a little bit, but I
would also caution that it is probably a little bit early to
tell. These things take a while to unfold. The 30-kilometer or
so buffer zone that was established by Turkey in the center and
then by Syria and the Russians on either side of that, that is
still an area of dynamic movement back and forth between those
forces. We are watching it all very closely. With respect to
what will happen with the SDF, the SDF has already made
adjustments in that particular area. We are still working with
them in the eastern portion of northeast Syria and then they
are working with Russian and Syrian regimes in other parts of
Syria. So they are continuing their cause and their fight
against various entities that are inside Syria.
Secretary Esper. I would like to add one thing now that I
have thought a little bit more about your question. I think the
other thing we have to watch out for here in the coming months
is as Turkey begins to resettle the internally displaced
persons within Turkey, like I said, 2 to 4, more like 3 million
Syrians, what is that going to cause in terms of disruptions
with the Kurds as they move them back into Kurdish areas and
what not. So there will be some turmoil, I expect as that
happens. That is beginning to happen now and I think we are
going to watch that very carefully.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. And lastly, do we expect any
escalation in Iran's activity in terms of intelligence reports
that we are receiving? What do we expect within the next 6
months? Are we tracking anything in particular that we need to
be ready for?
Secretary Esper. Obviously, we can't discuss intelligence
matters in this open session, but we see a lot of regime under
stress right now, both through the maximum pressure campaign.
We see a lot of turmoil in the streets of many cities of Iran,
suppression through various means that are happening. So you
know, you hope for the best, but we are planning for the worst
and as we see things happen or we see upticks in activity, we
certainly will adjust our forces, adjust our posture
accordingly.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you
have a tough job. Syria is both a difficult and a contested
environment. Washington is both a difficult and contested
environment. The House recently passed a resolution disagreeing
with the President's decision to withdraw troops from Syria. On
the same day, the House would have been unable to pass a
resolution authorizing keeping troops in Syria.
You do not have an authorization for use of force to
counter Russian influence in Syria, to hold back Iran's
influence in Syria, to support the Kurds, to support the Syrian
Democrat Forces in their civil war against Syria, to protect
civilians and how they are being attacked by the Syrian
Government itself, or to counter the Assad regime. But yet,
those are criticisms that you receive every day that you are
not accomplishing in your goals of Syria.
How difficult is it for you to operate and formulate policy
when you don't have an updated authorization use of force for
the changing environment that you have in the Middle East?
Secretary Esper. Mr. Turner, we think we have sufficient
authorities right now under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
[Authorizations for Use of Military Force] to conduct what--to
do what we need to do in Syria. Those are holding up fairly
well and so we think we can do what we need to do at this point
in time.
General Milley. I would echo that. I mean the 2001 AUMF
allows us to conduct offensive strike operations against
terrorists, al-Qaida, et cetera. ISIS, we all should remember,
is a direct derivative of al-Qaida and it is al-Qaida in Iraq
rebranded as ISIS. Zarqawi was its leader at one point. So the
AUMF grants us the authorities to conduct operations and
continue operations for the enduring defeat of ISIS.
Mr. Turner. Well, it has been a significant debate, both in
the House and in the Senate, as to whether or not the scope of
what you currently have. I agree with you that the scope, I
think, allows you to vigorously pursue ISIS and I appreciate
you doing that. I do believe that there are a number of goals
and objectives that are being placed upon you that do not cover
the goals and objectives of the original AUMF, Authorization
for Use of Military Force, and I don't think that their policy
objectives are currently within your assignment.
With that, I yield the rest of my time to Don Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Turner, and thank you, gentlemen,
for being here.
My question to you is when is enough enough when it comes
to Iran? When is our restraint being interpreted by them as
weakness?
We look back to 1979 with the taking of our hostages for
over a--or diplomats for over a year. Beirut barracks bombing,
Khobar Towers where I lost a friend. USS Cole bombing. I think
there was a recent analysis out of the Pentagon that 608
Americans were killed in Iraq by Shia militias or proxies of
Iran. We can go on and on.
At what point do they interpret this as weakness or lack of
restraint? I would love to hear your thoughts.
Secretary Esper. Thank you, Mr. Bacon. It is a great
question. It is one thing, it is something that we wrestle with
in the interagency and the Chairman and I discuss it a lot
because your assessment of that determines how much force you
put on the ground or the activities you do in order to deter
further aggression. And if deterrence fails, then how do you
respond? So obviously, we have a great intelligence community
that helps us with that. We talk a lot with our friends and
allies. The Chairman just came back from the region. I was in
the region 4 or 5 weeks ago listening to them. And also sending
messages through them, sending messages publicly. And I will
repeat it again, the Iranians should not mistake our restraint
for weakness. We are prepared to act if our forces or our
interests are attacked. So the question you are asking is a key
one and we think about it every day.
General Milley. We all think about Beirut and Khobar Towers
and lots of other things and I commanded in Iraq and lost
soldiers to Iranian-supported surrogates with various munitions
that were provided by the Iranians. So there is no illusion on
any of our part about the malign influence of Iran.
But when is enough enough? I firmly believe that the use of
military force should be a last resort, not a first resort, and
that diplomatic efforts should be exhausted and all non-
military methods to resolve a given problem should be used
first.
Secondly, I think that you have to have clear, unambiguous
objectives. Thirdly, I think you have to have a reasonable
prospect of success if you are going to use military force.
So we have to be careful, deliberate, thoughtful. And I
think restraint in this particular situation is an appropriate
response up until this point. The ball is in the Iranian court.
It depends on what they do, how big, size, scope in the future
and that will determine what we do.
We are in a--as one of the other Congressmen said, we are
in a period, I think, of heightened risk with respect to Iran
and I know this is a public hearing and we are not going to
talk intel, but I would caution Iran publicly to be very, very
cautious as to how they proceed.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. I do want
to follow up with Mr. Turner's point and I know to some degree
he hates when I do this, but I agree with him on the AUMF
issue. I just want to put a little more flavor on it.
I don't think it is acceptable----
Mr. Turner. Can we put that in the record twice that you
agree with me?
The Chairman. There is a little bit of disagreement which
we will get to in a second here, but I don't think it is a good
idea for us to be relying on the 2001 and 2002 AUMF in 2019. We
can talk about what is in the 2001 AUMF and how it applies to
now. I think that thing has been stretched beyond all
recognition. But the 2002 AUMF, it's just ridiculous that we
are still saying that this is an authority. I was here and I
voted for that. The 2002 AUMF was to remove Saddam Hussein from
power and stop the threat that he posed.
The idea that now, today, the Pentagon is using that as the
authority for military action, to say that that was
legislatively approved, most of these people here don't even
know what the hell I am talking about. They weren't here,
didn't apply to it. So I think it is really important that we
update that and that is the part where I am with Mr. Turner.
And Chairman Milley, you made a very good point when we
have spoken before that public support for what you are doing
matters enormously. We are representatives of the public for
good and for ill and if we are not saying anything about it, it
gets further and further away from that public. I think we
really need to update what we are doing here, as difficult as
it may be, and not simply rely on authorities that I think are
being twisted. So I want to work with Mr. Turner and others to
figure out how we can do that in a more sensible way.
With that, I will yield to Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2018, the
administration issued the National Defense Strategy. And in
that strategy they talked about big power competition, China
and Russia, and specifically raised the issue of Russia's
influence. Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its
periphery in terms of their governmental autonomy and
diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and change Europe and Middle Eastern security and
economic structures in its favor.
The withdrawal of American forces in the northern portion
of Syria led to Russia occupying American bases as we withdrew
after we had bombed our own bases. And it is now clear that
Russia and Syria are very tight allies. Russia is improving its
air bases and its naval bases in Syria, and apparently has a
nice, cozy relationship with Iran, so much so that they are now
providing very advanced missile air defense systems to Turkey.
I am wondering if, in fact, the Department of Defense has
abandoned the National Defense Strategy as laid out in the 2018
National Defense Strategy.
So Mr. Esper, could you please tell us if, in fact, we are
engaged in countering Russia in the Middle East?
Secretary Esper. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. I think
Mr. Smith, Chairman Smith said it in his opening remarks.
History matters. So the relationship between Russia and Syria
goes back, of course, to the Cold War, when it was the USSR
[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]. They have a base at
Tartus for many years. That relationship in the post-Soviet
Russia was reinvigorated----
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse. This history lesson will take
several months. But specifically today----
Secretary Esper. I promise I will get there in 20 seconds.
The relationship was reinvigorated in 2013 or 2014 when Russia
moved in under Assad and began working closely with Syrian
forces. So look, back to your question about the National
Defense Strategy [NDS], the principal way that I see us
countering Russia consistent with the NDS is through our NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance, through our
partners. We have seen a lot of good success there. I was just
at the London meeting last week. The NATO allies are spending
$140 billion more annually than they had been before. We are
focused on the NATO Readiness Initiative which----
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, sir. Can you please focus on
Syria, Turkey?
Secretary Esper. Sure. My biggest concern with Syria and
Turkey is actually Turkey-Russia. The concern is that Turkey is
moving out of the NATO orbit, as I have said publicly on
several occasions. I think our challenge is to figure out how
we can get them back closer into the NATO alliance because I
think they are a critical and longstanding 70-year, nearly 70-
year partner of ours.
Mr. Garamendi. And the withdrawal of American troops from
the northern Syria, how did that help carry out the goal you
have just stated?
Secretary Esper. So I think when you look at the situation
at the time, we faced maybe one or two scenarios. One would
have been to allow our troops to stand there in the face of a
Turkish onslaught which both Chairman Milley and I agreed
wasn't worth risking our soldiers' lives.
Option two would have been an incredible option which is
fighting a longstanding NATO ally.
Mr. Garamendi. I think you missed one step that preceded
that and that is the President's decision to withdraw. How did
that address the big power competition? Did that allow Russia
to exert its influence in the area, including its troops,
displacing American troops?
Secretary Esper. The decision to withdraw was precipitated
by months of events leading up to that. It culminated in
President Erdogan speaking to the President and saying very
clearly that he is going into Turkey. He is going into Syria
The Chairman. I am sorry, Mr. Esper. I think we may be
talking about the decision--not the decision to withdraw the
last couple of dozen, but the decision 8 months earlier to
withdraw period. That decision, the signal that sent.
Mr. Garamendi. Actually, the decision you just described
preceded the ultimate decision that did lead to the withdrawal
of American troops and the replacement of American troops by
the Russians and the Turks and the Syrians. My question really
goes to the heart of the National Defense Strategy which
presumably is big power competition in which case we have
seriously lost a major element of our position in the region.
Secretary Esper. So I think, I am a little over time, but
if I could----
The Chairman. Just quickly, yes.
Secretary Esper. I think the bottom line--I have said this
privately, I have said this publicly--is I am looking at
everywhere we are in the world to include the Middle East, to
withdraw forces, to draw down forces responsibly, so that we
could reallocate them toward great power conflict in Europe and
principally in Asia, INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific
Command].
Mr. Garamendi. And then----
The Chairman. I am sorry, we are over time. I think that is
an excellent point. The great power competition isn't just in
Europe and Asia.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of you
for being here and for your service and sacrifice for our
country.
Secretary Esper, in your opening statement, you said that
the stability of the Middle East remains vital to our national
interest. And you also listed it as a priority to--or the
mission priority was to deny safe haven to those who would do
us harm.
Now there are some in the Congress and on this committee,
who believe that it is time to immediately pull out all of our
troops from Afghanistan. What would be the consequence to those
two priorities if we did, in fact, remove all troops?
Secretary Esper. In the context of Afghanistan--and I don't
want to upset negotiations that may be happening presently with
the Taliban and others--I would say this much. We have an
important counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. That means
that we have got to make sure that Afghanistan never becomes
again a safe haven for terrorists to strike the United States.
Our commanders, I have spoken with them, General Milley
has, so that we could reduce our force presence there and still
be able to conduct that mission. I am interested in reducing
our force presence for the same reason I just outlined for Mr.
Garamendi. I want to reallocate forces. So I think we need to
make sure we can do that and the best way forward in
Afghanistan is through a political agreement that allows us a
long-term, sustainable path that ensures that the government in
charge does not allow that safe haven to exist.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. General Milley, in our work on the
Homeland Security Committee, we have been tracking a group that
goes by HTS, which stands for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This group
seems to be primarily composed of Nusra Front fighters and has
publicly broken with al-Qaida.
Can you tell us much about this group and their
capabilities?
General Milley. In an unclassified session, they are a
small bunch of groups of al-Qaida that is operating in the
region. They are quite dangerous. They are quite violent. And
they are quite ideologically committed to their cause and they
are willing to die for their cause. They are probably an
irreconcilable group. Some groups, like the Taliban, who we
negotiated with and we will see where that negotiation goes.
Other groups like al-Qaida, ISIS, HTS, and so on are very
deeply committed to their cause and there is really only one
way to deal with them and that is to kill them or to capture
them. And HTS falls into that category.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield the
balance of my time to Banks from Indiana.
Mr. Banks. I thank the gentleman for yielding. While we are
focused today on Syria, the situation in the Middle East, the
fight against ISIS today, I want to talk about the future for a
moment. As both of you know, I am co-chairing the Future of
Defense Task Force with Mr. Moulton on the other side of the
aisle.
Secretary Esper, could you talk for a moment about the new
capabilities that we will have and be able to use when JEDI
[Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure] goes live and why
that is so important and why delays would be costly in our
fight against terrorism specifically?
Secretary Esper. Sure. First of all, we have migrated many
things to many clouds so far. The key piece about the next
element, the JEDI piece, is that you can get a lot of the
warfighting capabilities if you are into the cloud. And once
you are able to do that, where you have that cloud base, you
have two things. First of all, you have better security. But
secondly, is you can then put on top of that AI, artificial
intelligence, and allow you to think and act a lot more quickly
when you are in a warfight and through multiple domains. So it
is critical that we move to the cloud as quickly as possible.
I underwent an education process, if you will, and I
entered this job again in July and took a couple of months and
I have had a chance to talk with many of you about JEDI. It is
vitally important that we move to the cloud quickly,
particularly this cloud. Again, that is underway and we will
continue to move that.
Mr. Banks. Can you elaborate on what further delays will
cost us?
Secretary Esper. Well, first of all, we will lose ground to
the likes of the Chinese in terms of their ability to act,
think, and fight us quicker than we are able to fight them.
Secondly, if we don't move this piece quickly into the cloud,
what we may force the services to do is to go in their separate
directions with separate clouds or uncoordinated IT
[information technology] plans. So that is why it is very
important that we move as quickly as we can and onto the JEDI.
Mr. Banks. Can you talk for a moment about the current
contest by Amazon. You are still moving forward in the
contracting process so that we don't afford further delay, is
that correct?
Secretary Esper. My understanding is that we are still
moving forward. I don't want to comment any further because
obviously another lawsuit has been raised, so it probably would
be imprudent for me to say anything.
Mr. Banks. But the bottom line, as you have said already,
any further delays are costly, not just in our strategic
competition with China and Russia, but in the fight against
terrorism?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Absolutely, and I think there is
bipartisan agreement that we need to move quickly in terms of
into the cloud and into this next domain of warfare.
Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Davis [presiding]. Thank you. Ms. Speier is next.
Ms. Speier. Thank you both for being here. Secretary Esper,
how many troops did we have in Syria before the President's
conversation with President Erdogan?
Secretary Esper. I can't recall the specific numbers, but
over a thousand.
Ms. Speier. Over a thousand.
Secretary Esper. A little over a thousand.
Ms. Speier. And then the President had the phone call, then
Turkey began its Operation Peace Spring. The President said we
were removing all of our troops on October 14th. And then it
was said that we were only going to stay in Syria to guard the
oil. And how many troops were going to be there to guard the
oil?
Secretary Esper. Well, first of all, the initial plan was
to retain some troops at An-Tanf garrison down south. So that
was never off the table, if you will. We can talk in closed
session about that number.
The current number in northern Syria is somewhere between
500 and 600 at this point.
Ms. Speier. Now are we there to guard the oil or are we
there to repel ISIS?
Secretary Esper. We are there to ensure the enduring defeat
of ISIS, so a subtask of that is we have directed to our
commander on the ground is to deny ISIS's access to the oil
because whoever controls that oil controls the resource that
allows them to buy weapons, equipment----
Ms. Speier. I understand that.
Secretary Esper [continuing]. Fighters, to provide for
their communities, et cetera.
Ms. Speier. Ambassador Jeffrey and Amnesty International
have indicated that there are isolated war crimes going on in
Syria by Turkish troops. Can you speak to the ethnic cleansing
that I think all of us have been concerned about going on there
by the Turkish forces?
Secretary Esper. I am not aware of any of those in
particular. I will tell you the first week that the Turks moved
in I spoke out publicly that if there were reports on the
battlefield coming through the media that war crimes may have
been committed and I said very clearly those should be
investigated and persons held accountable.
Ms. Speier. Persons being the Turkish----
Secretary Esper. Well, whoever. First of all, whoever
committed them on the ground and then whoever sanctioned them
or directed them in the chain of command.
Ms. Speier. So you haven't been in contact with Ambassador
Jeffrey about the incidents that they have reported?
Secretary Esper. No, I have not.
Ms. Speier. All right. Chairman Milley, you referenced
earlier in your comments that you want to see Afghan-to-Afghan
talks taking place in terms of a ceasefire. So my question is
why aren't the Afghans at the table and negotiating with the
Taliban?
General Milley. It is really, I think, Congresswoman, the
other way around. It is my understanding anyway that the
Taliban is refusing to formally negotiate with the Government
of Afghanistan because they don't recognize the legitimacy of
the government. So the Taliban is not going to negotiate. They
have got this three-way negotiation happening with the United
States being the third partner. And then there are other
players involved as well.
So the direct negotiations, the formal direct negotiations
between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, to my
understanding is not happening not because the government
doesn't want to do it, but because the Talibans don't want to
do it. But I think, and I don't want to presuppose outcomes
here, but I think we are closer rather than further away on
that particular task happening on Afghan-to-Afghan
negotiations. And that would be a good thing because the war
must come to an end and the only responsible way to do that is
Afghans talking to Afghans.
Ms. Speier. So you will make sure that there are female
Afghanis at the table then?
General Milley. I am not running the negotiations. That is
part of the Department of State and Zal Khalilzad is the
ambassador to do that and we are not--we are supporting with
military operations on the ground, but we are not part of those
negotiations. So we don't have the responsibility to do that.
Ms. Speier. All right. I think there has been a lot of
concern about discipline and the respect for the law of war as
a reason to keep our troops safe and maintain command authority
needed to fight effectively. Yet, last month, the President
pardoned three war criminals. Chairman Milley, how does that
impact our ability to maintain discipline in the ranks?
General Milley. Well, let me, first, all three cases are
different. Only one of them, Lieutenant Lorance, was convicted
of war crimes and served 7 years in prison for those war
crimes. The second case, Gallagher was convicted of a war crime
taking a photograph of a dead body. He was not convicted of
murder. That was an allegation. So he wasn't convicted in a
court of law of that. In the third case, Golsteyn, he never
went to trial, so we don't know if he was convicted or not
because he never went to trial. In this country, you are
innocent until proven guilty and he was never proven guilty. So
I mean each one of those is different and I don't want to group
them and say they are, in fact, war criminals because you have
to be proven that in a court of law. That is point one.
Point two, I think for all of us to remember and I have
mentioned this to all of us in uniform, the President of the
United States is part of the process. He is the Commander in
Chief. So he has the full authority under the Constitution.
The Chairman [presiding]. I apologize. We are over time and
I will just take a stab. That is not what she is asking. She is
asking how does it affect overseas, the way you phrased it. I
am sorry.
General Milley. Well, I was getting there. As part of the
process, and good order and discipline is maintained in a lot
of different ways, but one of them is to maintain adherence to
the process and the President of the United States is part of
the process. And we are maintaining good order and discipline
within our military.
The Chairman. I am sorry, we have got to move on. It is an
important topic, but it was brought up before.
Ms. Speier. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I ask my
question, I want to commend you and the ranking member for an
agreement on the NDAA. We have all worked hard, but the two of
you have put in countless hours and we appreciate that. No one
ever gets everything they want, but I think we have a product
that we can all be proud of. So I want to thank you for that.
And I also want to thank Representative Wilson for his work
on the widows' tax, in particular.
Okay, my question is about Iran. Conventional wisdom has it
that Iran, the Persians, if you will, control four Arab
capitals in the region. And there is a lot of angst about what
they are doing in Syria. What are they doing militarily in
Syria and what are we doing about it? For both of you, please.
Secretary Esper. Well, thank you, sir, for that question.
Clearly, Iran has a lot of influence in many capitals in many
parts, and not just the Middle East, but also Africa, in
Afghanistan as well. It is hard to discuss that in this
session. We would have to go to closed session, but you know,
it is everything from monetary support, payment of fighters,
arms, arms trafficking. It is political support as well, so
that is to just kind of give you the wave tops of what that
looks like. But I will say the maximum pressure campaign and
again, we can't get into this in this session, but as the
revenues have dried up as a country, it has also affected their
ability to pay and do some of those things. And that is a good
thing.
Mr. Lamborn. General Milley.
General Milley. As the Secretary mentioned, there is not a
lot we can actually say specifically here in this session, but
Iran is very, very active with their various special forces and
other capabilities, not only in Syria, but also in Iraq.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I am going to yield the balance of
my time to my friend and colleague who has the honor of
representing Pensacola, Representative Matt Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr.
Secretary, I want to thank you and I want to thank the
President for instituting a review of the Saudi program. I also
wish I had more time to reflect on the heroism of the sailors
who ran toward gunfire and who also informed on the location of
the shooter during this terrorist attack. During this review
that you are conducting is the program paused? Are we going to
be taking in new Saudi students?
Secretary Esper. So first of all, my condolences to your
constituents. And you are right. There was a lot of heroism on
the ground that day, a very tragic day for everybody.
So yes, we have directed, if you will, a standdown that
would limit Saudi participation in our U.S.-based training to
classroom training only until we can do expedited vetting of
all Saudi students here in the United States.
I spoke to the Deputy Defense Minister yesterday, by the
way, a graduate of Pensacola Naval Air Training. He agreed. He
fully supports this. They are going to do parallel vetting as
well to make sure we understand----
Mr. Gaetz. During that time, new incoming students or not
new incoming students?
Secretary Esper. I can't answer that affirmatively, but I
would have to get back to you on that.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Secretary, this is an issue of great
importance to my constituents.
Secretary Esper. It is a very fair question, but----
Mr. Gaetz. I would hope that very soon, perhaps within the
day, you would be able to make a public statement as to whether
or not we are taking in new students while you are undergoing
that vetting process.
Secretary Esper. I think I know the answer, but I don't
want to tell you something. I want it to be affirmative when I
tell you. I think it is a very reasonable thing to do, right?
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you. There are a number of Saudis that are
currently with us on your base, NAS [Naval Air Station]
Pensacola. Who currently has access to those people during the
investigation?
Secretary Esper. Of the dozen or so that were immediate
friends, acquaintances, et cetera of the alleged killer, the
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Department of Justice
[DOJ] has control of them on the base.
Mr. Gaetz. So who has access to those people? I
specifically want to know are embassy personnel, clerics,
others speaking with, talking to, perhaps providing
communication with these people who we are holding for
questioning.
Secretary Esper. I don't know exactly. I want to say a Navy
Muslim chaplain they have access to them. Certainly, the FBI,
DOJ does.
Mr. Gaetz. Do any other Saudis have access?
Secretary Esper. I think the Saudi commander has access to
them. He is the one who is keeping them restricted onto that
site.
Mr. Gaetz. How about embassy personnel, Saudi embassy
personnel?
Secretary Esper. I don't know.
Mr. Gaetz. That is also really important because to me,
this is----
Secretary Esper. I can assure you, somebody knows. I just
don't know right here as I sit here. We will get back to you on
that, too.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Gaetz. I appreciate your prompt attention to this
because again, that is something that I think deeply informs on
what we can do as policymakers to try to improve this
relationship with the kingdom. Because at some point, there is
only so much of this that we are going to be able to take or
the kingdom tells us there is some quirky part of the royal
family, you know, that is off doing some different thing.
These Saudi students, they are connected folks when they
end up in Pensacola and I would appreciate your great effort
and I look forward to those answers. I thank the chairman for
his indulgence, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The Chairman. Thank you, and I want to echo those concerns.
I mean certainly the tragic event in Pensacola deserves our
attention and sympathy and admiration for the people who
responded. But the broader issue Mr. Gaetz gets at, the
vulnerabilities that we might face from Saudi presence in the
U.S., is something we need to address now and be as transparent
as possible. So I appreciate your answers on that and look
forward to the followup as well.
I am sorry, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Esper. And just to expand. Of course, I agree
with what we are saying here, but to expand, we are going to
look not just--we are going to look at all foreign nationals
coming into the United States to make sure we have the best,
strongest vetting procedures we have so we are confident that
regardless of where folks come from, we know who is coming to
our country. It is a very important program. We just have got
to get it right. We have to do it better.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Esper, I would like to start with you. Regarding
Iran, my understanding is the administration's three objectives
for Iran are to limit their nuclear weapons capabilities, to
deter regional aggression, and to bring Iran back to the
negotiating table to get a stronger deal. Is that correct?
Secretary Esper. I am going to cast it a little bit
differently. Our overall goal is to get Iran to be a normal
country that behaves normally. The key aspects that we are
focusing on, actually four things. Nuclear weapons; they can't
have access to nuclear weapons and the means to produce them.
Number two, missiles. Number three, their aggressive, malign
behavior throughout the region and beyond. And then number four
is hostage taking.
Mr. Moulton. Okay, so hostage taking has never been stated
before, but let us focus on the first three.
Secretary Esper. Sure.
Mr. Moulton. That we can all agree on. Since President
Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, against the best
advice of Secretary Mattis, Secretary of Defense; Chairman
Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; literally
hundreds of military and national security professionals, even
many who were opposed to signing the deal initially, but
recognized the national security risk of pulling out and
breaking our word as a country, breaking our word to our
closest allies in the world. Since doing that, have you seen
any evidence of success for the administration's strategy?
Secretary Esper. Yes, I have, in the context of maximum
pressure campaign has denied them resources because of the
dramatic effect it has had on their economy. We have seen the
Europeans make movements in our direction. You saw Europeans
expressing concern about how Iran has been violating----
Mr. Moulton. I am sorry, but Europeans were not listed as
part of the goals of the administration's strategy. These are
the goals. The goal is to limit their nuclear weapons
capability and Iran is now advancing their nuclear weapons
capability. They are much closer to having a nuclear bomb than
they were under the deal. International and American inspectors
verified they were following the deal. Since pulling out, Iran
has advanced their nuclear weapons capability.
Now the second point was deterring aggression. Now Iran was
attacking us before. Iran attacked Americans in Iraq. I have
friends who were grievously wounded and killed by Iranian
weapons in Iraq. Iran has now rejoined those attacks and we
have gone through all the ways in which Iran's regional
aggression has picked up. But it was pretty quiet under the
deal. There was no question that those attacks have picked up
as we have pulled out.
Secretary Esper. I am not sure. What we saw after the deal
was consummated and money was returned to them, we saw action
uptick in activities and in terms of their missile program as
well.
Mr. Moulton. Oh wait, so you would say that there is less
activity now than when we had the deal? I mean they weren't
attacking Saudi oil fields. That is just an absurd conclusion.
It is obviously not true.
Now on the third point, getting Iran to the negotiating
table, we were with them at the negotiating table. We had lines
of communication with them while under the JCPOA [Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action]. We do not have those lines of
communication now. Have you seen any evidence that they are
coming back to the negotiating table to negotiate a stronger
deal to further limit their nuclear weapons capability?
Secretary Esper. No, but that is the----
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Secretary Esper. Well, but there is more of an answer to
this question.
Mr. Moulton. No, no, no. I understand the administration
wants to talk about the maximum pressure campaign and all the
ways it is hurting their economy and everything. But I am just
holding you to your stated strategy, to your stated strategy.
And on all three points the administration's strategy is
failing. The administration is worse off. We are worse off. We
are less safe than we were under the JCPOA.
Secretary Esper. I am not sure----
Mr. Moulton. I have only a minute left so I want to----
Secretary Esper [continuing]. I am not sure you can make
that statement. I think strategies take time to play out and I
think if you look, not everybody agrees to include the United
States----
Mr. Moulton [continuing]. You might be right in the future,
but we are talking about today. There is no evidence that this
is working.
The Chairman. Let us have one person talking at a time if
we could.
Mr. Moulton. General Milley, I think I will just go on to
you. Thank you for your earlier clarifications about the three
servicemen because to your point innocent until proven guilty,
only two of them have been convicted of war crimes. So we have
two out of three who are war criminals.
Now I received a text from a sergeant major of the Marines.
This happened. And he said Trump involving himself in all the
cases of these guys who conducted themselves inappropriately in
a combat zone like Eddie Gallagher is appalling, basically
setting a precedent that the rule of law in a combat zone
doesn't apply. It encourages folks to start burning villages
and pillaging like Genghis Khan. That, and if you don't like
your ruling, just tell Trump personally and he will overturn
it. The man has greatly marginalized the positions of the
service leaders.
Is this sergeant major of Marines wrong?
General Milley. I think that the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and the means by which we maintain good order and
discipline, are a critical element in order to maintain that
capability in some level of humanity in combat zones. I think
it is critical. I understand where the sergeant major is coming
from. And I know the advice that was given which I am not going
to share here, but the President of the United States is part
of the process and he has the legal authority to do what he did
and he weighed the conditions and the situation as he saw fit.
He is part of the process.
We do maintain and we will maintain good order and
discipline. We will not turn into a gang of raping, burning,
and pillaging throughout as the sergeant major implied. That is
not going to happen or anything else.
Mr. Moulton. I appreciate the effort. Let us just be
careful here. This is a sergeant major of the Marines. He has
got a Purple Heart and Navy Cross.
General Milley. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. And we are defending the actions of a draft
dodger.
General Milley. I am not defending----
The Chairman. I am sorry. Mr. Moulton, this could go on for
a very long time and----
General Milley [continuing]. And I respect your views and
the sergeant major's views.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think I would just say, yes, the President
is part of the process. But what we are concerned about is the
way he is being part of the process right now is unhelpful, as
Mr. Moulton describes.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, when we have
these meetings, I bring my computer so that I can pull up the
map of the Middle East and every time I pull that map up it
reminds me of the need to have partners that have common values
and common interests. And we seem to have very few that have
both of those. We obviously have Jordan. We have Israel. But
when I look at the others, I will tell you that I think that
the vote of disapproval or whatever the proper term is with
regards to the withdrawal of the troops, I trust your judgment
on that, even though I voted for that resolution. I think that
was--my vote as many votes was indicative of the fact that we
believe that the Kurds have been a good partner and we believe
that as of today, Turkey is a partner of necessity, but not a
good partner. And I think that we recognize that we need Turkey
to be a good partner. And we hope that that happens sooner
rather than later.
I have been to the refugee camps in Turkey. I have been to
the ones in Jordan. It is a tough scenario. It is basically--
the Middle East is a kaleidoscope. Every time one thing
changes, a whole bunch of other things change.
I do have a little bit of an issue with the statement on
the AUMF. I think that the AUMF does absolutely give us, give
you the authority on behalf of the United States to strike
terrorists and terrorist cells where you see them. I do not
believe that the AUMF of 2001 and 2002 gives us the authority
to base in countries uninvited. And I think that is a further
discussion that Congress needs to have and whether or not we
are allowed to base uninvited in countries almost 20 years
after an Authorization for Use of Military Force that did not
include those countries was passed.
So with that said, if I can focus more narrowly on one
thing. General Mattis, who I have a tremendous amount of
respect for, wanted to move to preparing for China and Russia.
One of the victims of that was the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System] program, the E-8C. They are no
longer flying in CENTCOM [United States Central Command]. They
have just been removed.
My question is are the ground forces in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility receiving the proper intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance [ISR] coverage they need to detect and
counter the ground threats and what additional things do you
need from this committee to make sure that the forces have the
adequate coverage?
General Milley. The commander, General McKenzie, he has not
requested additional ISR. In fact, CENTCOM for the last many,
many years has the preponderance of ISR of the U.S. military.
PACOM [United States Pacific Command] gets a lot and EUCOM
[United States European Command] gets a lot, but CENTCOM gets a
lot. So I don't think they are at a lack of adequate ISR, that
which we have. There is not a commander out there who doesn't
want more ISR. Everybody wants more all the time, but General
McKenzie has not come up on the net and said hey, I need this,
that, or the other thing immediately sort of thing. And if he
did, we would give it to him.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Secretary, I understand that the E-8C, the
recap [recapitalization] of the JSTARS was not a system that we
would have necessarily used against Russia and China or near-
peer competitors. But I do believe it was a mistake to not go
forward with the recap of that program. It is a low-cost
program that we could have used certainly anywhere in the
Western Hemisphere it would have helped us, and Africa, we
could have used it in the majority of the areas where we are
currently operating. And while I recognize this decision was
made under a previous Secretary, I just wanted to express my
belief that it was a mistake not to go ahead and recap. I think
that it will be seen as the same mistake as canceling the F-22
buy before the replacement system, before the F-35 had proven
itself.
So I respect both of you. You know, I do think the
committee needs to look at whether or not the AUMF from 2001
and 2002 gives us the authority to base in a country uninvited.
With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to return to
Syria and certainly express my concern that that was a grave
mistake that the President's decision to relocate our forces to
the northeast region of Syria and to essentially abandon our
partners, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. I think it runs
counter to your work, your effort, your responsibility, our
responsibility in the counterterrorism fight, but I also think
it runs counter to our objectives as stated in the National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy which is to
prepare for a great power competition, and in this case,
competition presented by Russia.
Just this Sunday, the commander in chief of the Kurdish-led
Syrian Democratic Forces, he wrote ``we know that we would have
to make painful compromises with Moscow and Bashar al-Assad if
we go down the road of working with them,'' certainly
expressing his lack of confidence in our support to him and his
forces. He goes on to say but if we have to choose between
compromises and the genocide of our people, we will surely
choose life for our people. We are seeing Russian flags that
are flying outside of the Turkey-Russia patrol area. We know
that Russia now has taken possession of military bases built by
U.S. taxpayers and Russia is essentially supporting the Syrian
Government in regaining control over the entire country and
establishing itself a sphere of influence for Russia.
Can you please tell us what concerns you have about
Russia's increasing presence in Syria?
Secretary Esper. Well, as I look at the global situation,
somebody mentioned before we compete with Russia all around the
globe, principally in Europe, but in other places, the Middle
East we discussed, and even Africa. My principal concern with
regard to the Kurds and the SDF specifically was that the
mission was the----
Mr. Brown. Actually, let me just fine tune it. It is
Russia. Are you concerned about Russia's growing influence in
Syria and what impact that will have in their ability to have
even an expanding influence in the entirety of the Middle East?
I am concerned about Russia.
Secretary Esper. I am concerned about Russia in other parts
of the Middle East.
Mr. Brown. Are you concerned about Russia in Syria?
Secretary Esper. Not as much because they have had a pretty
solid footprint there now for 4 or 5 years since they first
moved in.
Mr. Brown. Do you see that footprint expanding?
Secretary Esper. It has expanded in the last month and a
half.
Mr. Brown. Does that concern you?
Secretary Esper. Some, but I am more concerned about
Russian expansion into Egypt, into Saudi Arabia, into other
places, if you will. There is only so many resources and time
you can focus on and the bigger issue with Russia was the nexus
with Russia and Turkey. That is what really concerns me, is the
Russia-Turkey nexus.
Mr. Brown. And I don't have much time here. I have 2
minutes left. So let me turn to Afghanistan and both of you
mentioned Afghanistan in your opening comments and the presence
of ISIS in Afghanistan. You know, I traveled to Niger where we
have about 800, 900 troops there. In Syria, our number was
about 900. And using the various authorities, [section] 127
Echo, Triple 3 [section 333], we seem to have been effectively
supporting local partners in the counter-VEO [violent extremist
organization] efforts.
So we have got 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. Have you
developed, have you considered an option where we have a
minimal footprint purely for the purposes of counter-VEO
operations regardless of the stability and the viability of the
Afghan Government and their forces?
Secretary Esper. I will take the first stab, but again, the
Chairman, just have him come back, more in his lane. I will say
the short answer is yes. The commander on the ground will tell
you that in some ways you can't disaggregate the CT
[counterterrorism] from the train, advise, and assist mission,
if you will, because the Afghans are playing an increasingly
important role. And, of course, we have to protect our
intelligence people out there and that is probably as far as I
can go on that matter right now, right here.
Chairman.
General Milley. The short answer is yes. We have multiple
options. That is one of them.
Mr. Brown. And in the classified setting, would you be able
to brief us on what that minimal footprint looks like?
General Milley. Yes, we can do that.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
Secretary Esper and Chairman Milley for joining us today.
Secretary Esper, I wanted to focus on the outcome of my trip to
Turkey last year. I had some conversations with Erdogan defense
officials, Erdogan administration defense officials, defense
committee members from parliament. And we talked about a lot of
different issues, but one of the areas we talked about was the
relationship between Turkey, PKK, and YPG or really lack
thereof, and what that was doing to the U.S.-Turkey
relationship and how they saw things that were happening there.
I wanted to get your perspective on how do you think we
reconcile what appears to be an inconsistent approach in
training Syrian YPG forces that potentially as things ramp down
or they spread out from Syria could actually go back and join
the fight with PKK forces within Turkey which is really
inflammatory towards the Turks in how they see that. So is
there a way that we can tailor that policy to best suppress
ISIS forces in Syria without subsequent negative consequences
for Turkey? Because they look at it and just say how can you
support these folks that are perpetrating terrorism in Turkey.
And of course, what we are saying is listen, let us help defeat
ISIS in Syria and then we will make sure we turn back around.
But I wanted to get your perspective on that.
Secretary Esper. I think the fundamental difference, Mr.
Wittman, and thank you for the question, is that we have
fundamentally different views, we being the United States and
our NATO allies, on whether or not the YPG is a foreign
terrorist organization. We don't think they are, nor do many,
if not all of our NATO allies. But the Turks do. That is one
reason why they are holding up some actions in NATO right now
to the detriment of the alliance. So I think we have to
reconcile that. The State Department has the lead in terms of
how we designate foreign terrorist organizations.
I think you rightly noted, too, and it is fair to say there
is fluidity on the ground between people in these groups. And
it is hard to pin that down. But we make our best assessment as
to who we think really is a terrorist organization and who is
not. And Turkey wasn't happy with the SDF either because it
included members of YPG, but other groups as well. But the fact
that YPG members were part of that broader coalition was one of
the reasons why they didn't like the SDF. They didn't like the
SDF along the border, et cetera, et cetera.
Mr. Wittman. Yes, I think their concern was and they said
listen, we have clear evidence that YPG forces and even SDF are
infiltrating into PKK. We believe that they are part of
perpetrating those attacks within Turkey. So that is the basis
of their concern. I know that and we said the same thing that
you said and that is we are trying to distinguish forces that
are sympathetic to U.S. causes versus those that may perpetrate
harm against Turkey.
Secretary Esper. And we try to take those considerations
and address them. That is why we were working hard up and to
the point of the incursion to establish the safe zone, if you
will. And it was still unsatisfactory to the Turks with regard
to what we were doing. They had clear ambitions as to how far
they wanted to go, the depth, and the extent of their
operation, and what they wanted to do afterward.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. I am going to yield the balance of
my time to Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. Gentlemen, are you
familiar with the case of Staff Sergeant Robert Bales,
convicted of the Kandahar massacre in 2012?
General Milley. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. That was a sergeant who literally lost his mind,
walked into an Afghan village, and machine gunned 16 Afghans.
He is now convicted of that crime, of that war crime. He is in
life in prison. Do you have any indication that the President
is considering releasing, pardoning, Staff Sergeant Bales for
his war crimes that you know of?
Secretary Esper. No.
Mr. Waltz. I would submit to my colleagues that is a war
criminal and we need to be very careful about very loosely
throwing around that term. In the case of Navy SEAL [Sea, Air,
and Land teams] Chief Gallagher and by the way, I would remind
my colleagues, was acquitted of murder. He was convicted for
taking a photo with a dead body. He is now retiring. He is no
longer commanding SEALs. He is not going to be promoted. Is it
within the President's authority, given the balance of his
service, his multiple valor awards, his numerous combat tours,
to say that retiring, no longer commanding SEALs, not being
promoted, but also not being demoted, is that within his
authority?
Secretary Esper. Just to clarify, he was promoted, but he
is now retired. And all that was within the President's
authority.
Mr. Waltz. Do you believe that he deserves to be called a
war criminal?
Secretary Esper. I would have to review the crime that he
was charged with which was appearing with a corpse. I would
have to read it and understand it. I can come back to you on
that.
Mr. Waltz. But he was acquitted of the murder charge and in
fact, another SEAL admitted on the stand pretty dramatically
that he was the one that killed, and a mercy killing, knowing
that that ISIS fighter was----
Secretary Esper. He was acquitted of the murder charge, but
convicted of holding up the corpse. That would be a violation
of the law of armed conflict as I understand it during my time
as a military officer.
The Chairman. We are over time. The gentleman's time has
expired. Mr. Khanna.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary and General, for your service.
I want to follow up on the exchange you had with
Representative Speier. And I understand your position is that
the 2001 AUMF gives us the authority to fight ISIS and that we
are there to protect the oil because we don't want ISIS to get
it.
I disagree with that theory, but I want to bracket that and
see if you would at least acknowledge that we don't have the
authority to do what the President is calling for. President
Trump on October 27th stated clearly, ``we are leaving soldiers
to secure the oil. Now we may have to fight for the oil. That
is okay. Maybe somebody else wants the oil in which case they
have a hell of a fight. It can help us because we should be
able to take some also and what I intend to do, perhaps make a
deal with Exxon Mobil, one of our great companies.''
Would you acknowledge that this Congress has not authorized
in any way the United States to go in and steal Syrian oil and
make money off of it?
Secretary Esper. I am not aware of the Congress granting
any authority along those lines. I am also unaware of what
inherent authorities the President does or does not have in
this regard. I am focused on the military tasks denying ISIS
access to the oil.
Mr. Khanna. Can you assure us at this point that there are
no plans for us to try to take the oil and sell the oil?
Secretary Esper. All I can tell you is that I am not aware
of any plans right now.
Mr. Khanna. The second question I have is regarding the
bombshell Washington Post report on the Afghan Papers. I
imagine you read that. The bottom line is that top military
officials and civilian officials have known that the Afghan war
has been unwinnable and have been misleading the American
public for 20 years. Your predecessor, Secretary Rumsfeld, is
quoted there as saying I have no visibility into who the bad
guys are.
Are you embarrassed by Secretary Rumsfeld's comments and
the other people quoted? And do you believe they owe the
American public an explanation and an apology?
Secretary Esper. Congressman, I haven't read all the
stories frankly, and so before I comment on what Secretary
Rumsfeld purportedly said or didn't say, I would want to read
all of that and understand it and actually talk to him. But I
do know this much, the stories spanned multiple
administrations.
Mr. Khanna. Certainly.
Secretary Esper. Multiple uniformed and civilian officials.
And I think it is good to look back. I think at this point
where I am looking is forward and forward tells me is the path
to success, the win, is a political agreement between the
parties on the ground.
Mr. Khanna. But don't you think we have to have some
accountability so we don't make the mistake again?
Would you support this committee holding hearings on the
Afghan Papers and calling in front of Congress every official
who has misled the American public about whether this war was
winnable and all or not? Would 2,400 American soldiers dead,
775,000 Americans deployed, don't you think people owe this
country an explanation?
Secretary Esper. Many of those dead are my friends and
maybe some of my former soldiers, but look, it is the
committee's responsibility to determine what it has hearings
on. I don't think you want the executive branch making that
call.
Mr. Khanna. Mr. Chairman, I would request that this
committee hold hearings on the Afghan Papers and call before
Congress, with subpoena, every person who has misled this
country. And just like in the Pentagon Papers, I think that
should be one of our highest priorities in examining what has
come out in that bombshell report.
The Chairman. If I may, Mr. Khanna, we will pause your time
for the moment. I think it is appropriate to have hearings. I
will tell you right up front, just to set expectations
correctly, I am not going to call every single witness who has
anything to do with this. I do not believe that would be a
productive use of the committee's time.
I do think it is something we should take a look at and
then get explanations from because I agree with the overall
point. But I don't want to set unrealistic expectations about
how the committee should approach it. So--answer your question.
Mr. Khanna. I respect that. And, certainly, at least having
some of the prominent people come and explain to the American
public.
My final question concerns Yemen, and I appreciate that the
administration has voluntarily suspended the refueling of the
planes. But we have had a situation, of course, now our own
bases in Representative Gaetz's district, we have Saudi
nationals who are being trained and are attacking Americans.
And the question, I guess, that the American public is asking
is why in the world would we be providing the Saudi Air Force
with any possible logistical help to conduct bombing in Yemen
when 10 million civilians possibly face famine?
Secretary Esper. So, Congressman, we are not providing the
Saudis logistical help with regard to their activities in
Yemen. We are providing Saudis and 152 other countries training
in the United States. Why, because we have a distinct advantage
over Russia and China who don't have allies and partners. And I
think that it is important that we continue these programs so
that we have a broad network. That's what ensures our
security----
Mr. Khanna. But could you commit that we won't help the
Saudi Air Force to either logistically or in maintenance to do
anything in terms of their bombing in Yemen?
Secretary Esper. Well, you can define help pretty broadly,
right? We probably train Saudi personnel to do maintenance here
in the United States. I don't know, but.
Mr. Khanna. Could we stop doing any maintenance of the
Saudi aircrafts in Saudi Arabia and help--and not any of our
men and women assist the Saudis in their mission into Yemen?
Secretary Esper. Yeah, I would have to come back to you and
let you know what we are or are not doing with regard to the
Saudis and what the impact would be on not just the Saudis,
because keep in mind those same Saudi aircraft might be the
same Saudi aircraft we call upon to help us blunt an Iranian
assault in order to--or help us respond to it, an Iranian
attack. So you have got to be thoughtful in terms of how we
think through what actions we take or don't take.
The Chairman. And the gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the
previous administration struggled to effectuate a pivot to the
Pacific because its foreign policy got sucked into a black hole
in Syria. I think, despite a dramatically different approach to
Iran in this administration, we face a similar grand strategic
challenge, which is to say if we do not identify a high-impact,
light footprint approach in CENTCOM, it will suck up the
majority of resources, time, and attention and INDOPACOM will
not get the priorities and the resources that it needs. In
other words, we won't implement the NDS.
So with that in mind, I would like to ask a few questions
about China, not Syria, but the two things are linked in my
mind as I know they are in yours.
Secretary Esper. Sure.
Mr. Gallagher. The first is that on September 11th,
Representative Gallego and I joined Senator Cotton and Schumer
in sending you, Mr. Secretary, a letter about what is called
section 1237 of the fiscal year 1999 NDAA. It requires a
regularly updated list of Chinese Communist Party--Chinese
military-affiliated companies operating in the United States.
We are still waiting on a response. It is 20 years late. We
would really appreciate you delivering a response to this
letter as soon as possible.
Secretary Esper. Sure. I am sorry, but I am not tracking
that but we will get on it. It is a good question. I think it
is one of the things that concern me as somebody who has
studied China now for a quarter of a century. We need to be
very careful about all their activities in the United States
and you have touched on one of them.
Mr. Gallagher. I think given your background on the China
Commission, you are very well situated to talk about these
issues and, indeed, did talk very eloquently at the Reagan
Defense Forum. I salute you for that.
Almost one year ago, on February 2nd, Secretary Pompeo
announced that we would be exiting the INF [Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces] Treaty following NATO's unanimous determination
of Russia's material breach of its obligations under the
agreement. We formally withdrew on August 2nd. Since then, I
believe there has been only one INF-range demonstration test
with another coming up shortly.
Secretary Esper. Right.
Mr. Gallagher. Both of which stem from great work being
done by SCO [Strategic Capabilities Office]. What are you
doing, Mr. Secretary, to ensure that the two INF-range
capabilities under development by SCO are being incorporated by
the services into their fiscal year 2021 budget?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. We are supporting those
activities with money and technology and all the right people.
Having that capability is essential and not just to counter
what the Russians have already deployed in Europe, but also
maybe more importantly vis-a-vis China. China has thousands of
intermediate-range missiles along their periphery, along their
eastern coast, if you will. And our ability to either blunt or
respond to that will rely on intermediate-range missiles of our
own. And other ranges, too, but I think we need to move out on
that as well as with hypersonics and other means. And if the
commanders need it, we will deploy it.
Mr. Gallagher. And just to follow up on that, there was a
fiscal year 2020 NDAA prohibition on INF-range procurement and
deployment that I think could be mitigated because the
Department's current schedule for INF-range capabilities. But
if there was--in other words, you are not going to actually
deploy those missiles in the next year or so. But if a similar
provision were adopted for fiscal year 2021, what would be the
impact on the Department's ability to actually execute the NDS?
Secretary Esper. Well, I think you made the technical
point, it would depend on our current development and
deployment timelines. And again, I am assuming the commanders
would need the weapons. And if they do, I want to provide those
but it would take a tool out of our hands. Look, I don't see
any possibility that we are going backward. The NATO allies are
unanimous in terms of us getting out of INF and at this point
our means to either address it with our own system and also to
be able to defend against Russian systems.
Mr. Gallagher. And then back to where I started. You know,
CENTCOM's needs are obvious and apparent every day, sort of
open up a newspaper. But also, in EUCOM we have established a
European Deterrence Initiative [EDI] that has directed about
$17 billion in funding. We don't have a similar--we have an
authorized account for INDOPACOM, but we haven't actually
funded it in the way we have done for EDI. Given the NDS
priority on INDOPACOM and China, would a similar dedicated
funding mechanism for INDOPACOM be a useful step going forward?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Maybe. It depends on where you
take the money away from. You know, part of our efforts in both
Europe and INDOPACOM is to look at how we change our footprint
on the ground, so it gets to your point in that sense, in that
principal point, yes. But we are also trying to, with regard to
the allies and partners that can afford to, is help them help
us----
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
Secretary Esper [continuing]. As we expand that footprint.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, in a resource-constrained environment
we will have to make choices.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. And if I believe the logic of the NDS, as I
do, INDOPACOM should be the priority. We will have to assume
risk in other theaters.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. If I had to pour concrete in
some locations, if you will, build bases, I would rather
prioritize, should be prioritizing INDOPACOM over other
locations.
Mr. Gallagher. One final question, and I know this is about
Syria, but I don't often get the opportunity to talk directly
to both of you. It is my understanding that current DOD policy
prohibits the U.S. from exercising with the Taiwan Navy. Not as
a result of any decisions we made in the 1970s or 1980s, but
this has just been the policy for the last decade. Is it still
the policy of the Department of Defense to prohibit bilateral
naval exercises between the United States Navy and the Republic
of China Navy?
The Chairman. And beyond a yes or no, that is going to have
to be for the record unless you can get it done with a yes or a
no.
Mr. Gallagher. Yes or no will be fine.
Secretary Esper. I will have to get back to you.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
Dr. Esper and thank General Milley for being here and for your
extraordinary service. General Milley, your service is not only
extraordinary, but lengthy. If I am not correct just looking
back briefly on your bio, it goes back to maybe being in
Princeton in the ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps]; is
that correct? And right around 1980, and then----
General Milley. That is correct, Congressman, about almost
40 years now.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Thank you. It is extraordinary in
length. And I have a question for you, quickly, in that regard.
During that almost four decades, or four decades of service and
several Presidents, having served our country during that
period of time could you share with us other instances where
Presidents have pardoned war criminals in your experience since
you have been in the military during that time?
General Milley. Presidents have pardoned individuals many,
many times. As you know, for example, President Nixon, a very
famous case, pardoned Lieutenant Calley who murdered 130-some-
odd women----
Mr. Keating. Yeah, during your time though, during your
four decades.
General Milley. Yeah, in my 40 years----
Mr. Keating. Long time.
General Milley [continuing]. Someone who was alleged to
have committed war crimes----
Mr. Keating. No, but someone that was----
General Milley [continuing]. Or was convicted of war
crimes----
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Can you share with us?
General Milley [continuing]. I do not know of one that
comes to the top of my head.
Mr. Keating. I can't think of one either, General.
General Milley. But it has been done, historically.
Mr. Keating. I know, but that 40 years and several
Presidents, a long time.
General Milley. Correct.
Mr. Keating. So thank you for that.
In your joint statement, both of you said you are focused
on internationalizing the response to Iran's provocative
activities by encouraging increased burden sharing and
cooperation with allies and partners. It is a very important
issue.
And I also serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and very
recently we had a Special Representative for Syria, Mr.
Jeffrey, testifying. During that testimony, he did say and I
agree with him a hundred percent that it was a mistake, when he
was referencing the pullout of Syria without informing our
allies. And to me that is a critical point, because we have
something that probably the country that is our greatest
threat, China, doesn't. We have something they don't have. We
have something Russia doesn't have. We have this extraordinary
coalition. I think it is one of the biggest difference makers
that we have. And Special Representative Jeffrey, myself, a lot
of other people, we are concerned. Those allies weren't even
informed about what our actions would be even though they had
troops on the ground there. And I am concerned about----
General Milley. Yeah.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Not having that kind of
notification. What can we do, going forward, to really make
sure we have greater communication? I know that wasn't a
decision that you made or the military made. It was the
Commander in Chief----
General Milley. Well, but if I may, I know that I
personally called our allies and I believe, I won't speak for
the Secretary, I believe he did as well, and I believe some
people in the Department of State, perhaps Secretary Pompeo. I
don't know about the rest of them. But I know I personally
called our allies that were involved in Syria as soon as
decisions were made.
Mr. Keating. How much time was that?
General Milley. It was very quick.
Mr. Keating. Like what?
General Milley. It was quick.
Mr. Keating. Like what is quick?
General Milley. Fast.
Mr. Keating. What is fast?
Secretary Esper. My----
General Milley. I would have to go back and check the phone
records. It was very, very quick.
Mr. Keating. Days?
General Milley. No, much faster than that.
Mr. Keating. A day?
General Milley. Yeah, it was inside of that.
Mr. Keating. Inside of a day.
General Milley. Absolutely.
Mr. Keating. That is not what I call having--not that it is
your fault--great cooperation and communication.
Secretary Esper. I wanted--I just know----
Mr. Keating. I think it so important going forward to have
this.
Now you are also referencing in your joint statement, you
know, some of the other countries that are dealing with
maritime and navigation issues. And I am looking at the list
and there is U.K. [United Kingdom] and Australia, Albania,
Saudi Arabia, UAE [United Arab Emirates], Bahrain. There is
certain countries that are usual allies in many of these
activities with us. Are there instances or can you share this
with us where we have reached out or communicated to other
allies and they haven't done what they quite often do and join
us in these? I am just concerned.
Secretary Esper. I can speak to that, Congressman. On both
the International Maritime Security Construct and the
Integrated Air and Missile Defense effort, I personally made
calls to many allies in both Asia and Europe and asked for
assets and was told either not possible or we will think about
it, and you can see how many are there right now.
Mr. Keating. I can see how many who aren't there too, who
usually are there.
Secretary Esper. That is exactly----
Mr. Keating. That is a concern I have. My time is running
out.
Secretary Esper. But that is not--I will tell----
Mr. Keating. I want to thank you. I just want to highlight
this.
General Milley. Your point of allies and partners is
critical. We, the United States of America, depend upon for
access basing and other things in military operations, allies,
and we want to keep allies close. War is very hard----
The Chairman. And we will have to leave it there where we
are getting late, sorry.
General Milley [continuing]. And we are done, so.
Mr. Keating. Countries that have given blood too. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to make sure
that your call and Mr. Khanna's call for hearings on the Afghan
Papers is a bipartisan one. I believe that those are issues
that we ought to look into and I trust given your thoroughness
that we will address that. We have been trading the same
villages back and forth in Afghanistan for 20 years and I think
the American people deserve answers.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you and the ranking
member for your work on the NDAA and I intend to vote for it,
but I am deeply disappointed that it doesn't include the
amendment that Mr. Khanna and I worked on to constrain any
Authorization for Use of Military Force in a regime change war
with Iran.
The Chairman. And just for the record, I share your
disappointment. But we do have to work with the Senate and the
President, so----
Mr. Gaetz. I know that you worked hard on it.
The Chairman [continuing]. And they opposed it.
Mr. Gaetz. But it just is crazy to me in Washington, Mr.
Chairman, that something that passes the House with a very
robust majority, every Democrat, dozens of Republicans, it is
up in the Senate, more people vote for it than against it, but
I guess given the ways of Washington it can still not be in the
bill. And it just seems a little swampy to me.
The Chairman. If the gentleman would yield for a second, I
think you have a much better relationship with the person who
is responsible for that than I do, so I would urge you to work
on that relationship. The President does have to sign the bill.
Mr. Gaetz. I work to be a positive influence on everyone I
have a chance to speak with, Mr. Chairman. And I also would
suggest that a practical, restrained, and realistic view of
foreign policy is entirely consistent with the Trump doctrine.
And in that light, Mr. Secretary, it may be a minority view
in the Congress, it may be a minority view on this committee,
but I fully support the administration's decisions in the Syria
and Turkey theater. It is my belief that we ended up in this
mess in Syria as a consequence of the prior administration
being all over the place on regime change wars in Syria that
created second- and third-order effects that the Trump
administration is now having to deal with.
And as I see things, in a very challenging and complicated
environment where there has been a great deal of war for a
great deal of time, you have done all you can to balance
regional interests, reduce U.S. risk and the U.S. footprint,
and then secure the resources that will function as the
leverage for the Kurds to have the greatest opportunity to have
a say in their own future.
And this notion repeatedly reflected in this committee on
both sides of the aisle that because we are an ally with a
group of people in one instance, because our interests align in
that case, that that somehow morally binds us to every conflict
they have past, present, or future, is crazy to me. And if we
accept that doctrine it will not enhance the utility of our
future alliances, it will diminish them because we will not be
able to engage in those alliances given the complicated world
in which we live today.
I do want to go back to Pensacola for a moment because it
is very essential to the thinking of many of my constituents. I
understand that with the Saudi Government we have a status of
forces agreement that set this program up. That status of
forces agreement has within it, you know, various
accommodations for access. But to me, when the uniformed
military of another country, you know, attacks and kills my
constituents wearing the uniform of our country, maybe we don't
have to be as faithful to a contract regarding access, but we
should be more concerned about ensuring that we contain the
terrorism and hold those responsible.
So perhaps you can inform me on what role the status of
forces agreement is playing in the ongoing diplomatic stand-off
or negotiation that we are currently having with the kingdom
regarding those people currently in custody.
Secretary Esper. Sure, Congressman. It is a fair question.
Sorry. It is a good question. Honestly, I am not up to speed in
terms of what the SOFA [status of forces agreement] says with
regard to this case. I would have to get back to you on that.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Gaetz. Well, it is my sincere hope that that is not
limiting the work of the FBI or creating unique challenges by
having the kingdom make demands to have their embassy personnel
interact with people that we are currently holding.
And this is a question I get a lot from my constituents,
maybe you can elaborate on it. You know, when people who are
the active duty military of another country attack our military
in our country, why is that viewed as like a law enforcement
event rather than an event like more akin to an act of war
where we would hold these people as prisoners of war, people in
conflict, rather than like, you know, giving them the full
complement of the rights articulated in the status of forces
agreement?
Secretary Esper. Well, I will just say up front I think we
need to let the investigation play itself out. But in this case
I would say, obviously, Saudi Arabia is a partner. We are not
in war with them. We don't actually have any hostility with
them whatsoever, so in this case, I look upon it as the act of
an individual at this point. Now we need to find out whether
there was more behind it or not, but I certainly--it was not a
state-sponsored action as best I can tell at this point.
Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, I am not saying it is. But I don't think
that the statement that this is the work of an individual is
going to age well, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Esper. No, I said at this time that is all I am
willing to say is we know it is one. We need to let the
investigation tell us what else is out there.
Mr. Gaetz. At this time, I----
The Chairman. And that is another argument that we will
have to leave at that point. But I think that is something
worth investigating.
Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate both of
your testimony today and your accessibility. I found both of
you under your tenure to be very accessible to the committee
and I do appreciate that.
Notwithstanding some of my colleagues on this committee's
attempts here today to exercise some revisionist history with
regard to blaming issues on the prior administration, you know,
the bottom line is that this administration really has no
overarching policy in the Middle East and with respect to
Syria. It appears just to be a series of fairly ad hoc
decisions stumbling from one decision to the next.
And there is no greater illustration of the fact that the
first week of October I led a congressional delegation to the
region where we met with and discussed security issues with
numerous intelligence and military and diplomatic officials,
none of whom by the way had any idea that we were about to
exercise a precipitous withdrawal from northern Syria. And that
brings me to my first question, General Milley. Several of
those officials expressed a grave concern about the security of
those ISIS prisoners in the prisons in northern Syria and I
just wanted to clarify what I heard you say today, that you
don't have any concern, currently, even though the situation
seems to be less secure now than it was in early October given
our much lower footprint in that area. But you don't have any
concern about the security of those prisoners; is that
accurate?
General Milley. South of the 30-kilometer buffer zone the
reports I have indicate that the SDF is still securing the 24
prisons for which they are responsible for. Inside the 30-
kilometer buffer zone we don't have that level of visibility,
so I can't say one way or the other. I think there were seven,
if I am not mistaken, from memory, seven facilities inside that
30----
Mr. Crow. And, General, did we have that visibility before
our withdrawal? Did we have that visibility on those prisons
that you just indicated before our withdrawal and now we do
not?
General Milley. Sure, of course. I mean they were--were co-
located in some respects and the SDF had those detention
facilities. Since the Government of Turkey went into that
incursion zone it is their personal, or it is their legal,
internationally legal responsibility.
Mr. Crow. So from the first week of October, we are in a
less--we are in a worse position with respect to oversight of
those prisons than we were or are currently now than we were 2
months ago?
General Milley. I would say we have less visibility.
Mr. Crow. Okay.
General Milley. Because the Turkish Government has
responsibility and we don't have the visibility on those
detention facilities.
Mr. Crow. Next question is, there have been several public
media reports about Iranian drones called suicide drones
conducting overflight operations of our forward operating bases
in Syria, Iraq, and potentially Jordan. Standing here today, if
there is an Iranian drone attack on one of our forward
operating bases in those three countries, do those forward
operating bases and do our soldiers have the necessary
materiel, equipment, and intelligence to defend against those
attacks?
General Milley. I would say, first of all, it is a very
serious threat. We are aware of it and in some cases we have
some capabilities to mitigate the threat. But to say that we
can eliminate the threat, that would be a false statement. So,
no, we don't have everything we would absolutely want that
technology can provide.
Secretary Esper. I would add that our ability to respond is
not unique to Iranian drones, it is a challenge we face writ
large. And that is why I recently reassigned the responsibility
for counter-UAS [unmanned aerial systems] systems to the Army
as the executive agent. We need to get ahead of this because
the offensive technology is changing more quickly than our
defensive means to deal with it.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Thank you, Secretary Esper.
Last question, General Milley, you are a Special Forces
officer and have worked with local forces a lot throughout your
career. There is bipartisan concern on the Hill about our lack
of kind of standing by our Kurdish and Syrian allies who fought
with us in northern Syria. And as a result of that several of
us have led a bipartisan bill called the Syrian Partner
Protection Act that would create an SIV [Special Immigrant
Visa] program for those fighters and their families and allow
them to come to the U.S. if they are in danger.
Could you speak very briefly as to the impact, the positive
impact that SIV programs have, you know, not only in Syria but
in Afghanistan and Iraq on our ability to demonstrate that we
will stand by our partners and continue to recruit partners
like that throughout the world?
General Milley. Well, I think for the United States as we
go forward, regardless of where it is in the world, maintaining
allies and partners in both nation-states but also indigenous
partners like the SDF are important to fulfill our national
security objectives and anything that we can do to assure them
and maintain good faith with them is a positive.
Mr. Crow. Okay, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Crow.
Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. And I am proud to join my colleague,
Representative Crow, in that expansion of the SIV program which
I think is critical to our local allies and to our ability to
move forward.
Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request to submit
to the record a letter from the commander in chief of the
Syrian Democratic Forces to this committee.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The letter referred to was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to return
very quickly to this issue of pardons and war crimes, and one
of the--the third case in First Lieutenant Lorance, I would
just kind of conclude that that line of thinking and the
previous conversation that Lieutenant Lorance did serve 6
years. I would submit to my colleagues, we need to be very
careful in equating mistakes, perhaps bad judgment calls, calls
that may even get you relieved of command, with a war crime.
And I too have received many texts and a lot of outreach
since these pardons and most of them said ``that could have
been me.'' And these split-second decisions in the heat of
combat, again, making a mistake does not necessarily equal a
war crime and I do think we have to be careful with the signals
that we send, and in this case a very chilling signal that if
you make a bad call that you could go to jail for 20 years. And
I would just ask both of you to consider that as we deal with
these going forward.
General Milley, I am glad that you mentioned that we are
and clarified that we are fighting ISIS from Africa to
Afghanistan. This is, in my view, a global insurgency by
extremists against American leadership of a world order based
on Western values and that includes Iran in that support of
extremism. Would you both agree with that characterization?
Secretary Esper. Yes.
General Milley. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. And that we are dealing with a multigenerational
war against extremism, against an ideology much like the war
that we fought against the ideology of Communism and that we
need a whole-of-government strategy to undermine the ideology,
everything from girls' education to women's empowerment,
economic opportunities, in addition to the military aspects of
that. Would you agree that we need that and, frankly, that it
has been lacking in the last 20 years of that whole-of-
government approach?
General Milley. Absolutely, I do. You have to get at the
root causes and delegitimize the ideology, absolutely.
Secretary Esper. I think we need it. I am not sure to what
degree. I would have to look back and understand whether it has
been lacking or not or where and when it has been lacking. But
the third piece of that is you have to have a culture of people
willing to accept those ideas as well and you have to have--it
has to be organic that some part of that population has to be
receptive to those ideas, so that is critical.
Mr. Waltz. So what we are talking, I mean we are talking
about individual battles here from Syria to Iraq to Afghanistan
in that I think that broader conflict where we do need that
whole-of-government approach. Do you believe, General Milley,
in your military opinion, do you believe that ISIS and al-Qaida
can and will resurge, will regain capability and has the intent
to attack the homeland if we allow it?
General Milley. The second one first, do they have the
intent to attack the homeland? Yes, they absolutely do. We know
that with certainty. But do I believe they will resurge if we
withdraw all of our capabilities and support to the indigenous
government and we don't continue to operate by, with, and
through them, then I believe that the conditions will be set
for resurgence.
Mr. Waltz. So you do not believe then, just approaching it
another way, that the Syrian Democratic Forces whether that is
in Syria, the Afghan National Security Forces in Afghanistan,
the Iraqi Security Forces, currently have the independent
capability without U.S. support to prevent that resurgence?
General Milley. I don't believe they have the independent
capability right this minute. That is true.
Mr. Waltz. So in the near term, a full withdrawal would
endanger the homeland?
General Milley. It is my belief that is correct.
Mr. Waltz. Okay, Syria in particular, I just want to focus
on that a moment. It just seems to me that we have discordant
objectives here. On the one hand, our objective is ensuring the
defeat of ISIS and the enduring defeat of ISIS, yet would you
agree that the Assad regime backed by Iran, backed by Russia,
with the war crimes that they have committed in bombing
hospitals and refugee camps are essentially driving Sunni
recruits to ISIS?
I mean on the one hand, by allowing Assad to continue its
streak of murderous attacks across Syria, we are furthering
ISIS. So my question is, what is our policy? And you can submit
that for the record. What is our policy toward Russia, the
Assad regime, and Iran--or, actually, I still have 20 seconds.
Secretary Esper. I will just say broad-based--this was
asked a couple times--our overarching goal with regard to Syria
is to come up with a U.N.-sponsored political settlement
between the parties that ends the civil war and hits those
three topics I have mentioned before, objectives: not a safe
haven for terrorists; not dominated by any power, in this case
Iran, hostile to the United States; and contributes to a global
security, strategic energy market.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. You can submit the rest for the record.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Hi, gentlemen. Thanks for being here. You
know, I want to go back to this decision, the President's
decision to allow the Turks to go into northern Syria. And I
would offer, Mr. Secretary, that the only reason you are
sitting here today is because General Mattis resigned almost
exactly a year ago today on the basis of the President
threatening this very decision, so I think it makes perfect
sense that we are talking about it.
Can I just ask, you know, I think this issue really
resonated with voters back home in our districts. Not because
they understand every in and out of where Syria is and who the
Kurds are and all the players; they understood that the
American handshake has to mean something and that when we shook
hands with the Kurds we gave them the commitment at the three-
and four-star level that we would work with them. And when they
died with us on the battlefield that that meant something to us
and we wouldn't create a situation where they are running for
their lives and their families are an internally displaced
people.
So, let me ask you a question. Is our plan in Syria and in
fighting terrorism from Africa to Afghanistan still working by,
with, and through local partners?
Secretary Esper. Yes, Congresswoman, it is. But let me go
back to what----
Ms. Slotkin. No, I am sorry. No.
Secretary Esper. But this is too important. You made a----
Ms. Slotkin. Mr. Secretary, no. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Esper. But you made a statement that is
inaccurate.
Ms. Slotkin [continuing]. You have said that that--you
working by, with, and through----
Secretary Esper. It is, but you made an inaccurate
statement and I want to clear----
Ms. Slotkin [continuing]. And what I want to understand--
what I want to understand is in the future of our terrorist
fights in West Africa, in all these places, the demonstration
of going to the Kurds and telling them that we are leaving
them, does that make it easier or harder to find partners to
work by, with, and through for the next terrorist threat? Just
harder--be honest.
Secretary Esper. I am being honest.
Ms. Slotkin. Be straight. And Secretary Mattis was as
straight as they come. Be honest.
Secretary Esper. The----
The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin, I am sorry. If you have a
statement to make----
Ms. Slotkin. I am sorry.
The Chairman [continuing]. You may make a statement.
And that is----
Ms. Slotkin. Does it make it easier or harder?
The Chairman. I will give you more time in a second. Yield
for just a moment. If you have a statement to make, you make
the statement. I don't want witnesses badgered up here. You
asked him a question. You have to give him a chance to answer.
If you want to make a statement, perfectly within your right,
but don't badger him when he is trying to answer the question.
Go ahead.
Secretary Esper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The handshake
with the Kurds, with the SDF in particular, was a handshake
that we would ensure the--we would defeat ISIS. It was not a
handshake that said yes, we would also help you establish an
autonomous Kurdish state. It was also not a handshake that said
yes, we would fight Turkey for you. That is the difference
there I am trying to make, the point we are trying to make.
Whenever we make these handshakes with by, with, and through,
which is our strategy, I think we need to be clearer going
forward as to what the extent of that relationship actually is.
Ms. Slotkin. Will that be harder or easier if you are in
Mali or Burkina Faso or other places? Do you think that these
partner groups would feel like they could trust us?
Secretary Esper. If we are clear and explicit with what the
relationship is up front, yes.
Ms. Slotkin. You are the Secretary of Defense and I know
folks have talked about the authorization of military force and
I agree with most of my colleagues here that it desperately
needs revision and that is actually Congress' responsibility,
which they have shirked. Can I ask right now, do you, as
Secretary of Defense, believe that you have authorization based
on any AUMF on the books, to go to medium- or long-term war
with Iran?
Secretary Esper. We always have the right of self-defense,
but to attack Iran, no. Not under--that is not as a state-on-
state attack, no.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay, thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I know we are a little over time, if you will indulge me
for just a minute here.
Ms. Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Secretary Esper and General
Milley, for being here today. I myself served in Pensacola, so
I do look forward to hearing about your investigations into the
foreign nationals on that base.
General Milley, you stated that our objective is a secure
Middle East. Given that we have defeated the physical caliphate
but knowing how important it is to protect those gains because
as Secretary Esper stated, we haven't defeated ISIS, and given
our relationship with our Kurdish allies who have certainly
done a great deal of fighting for our shared objectives, and
now given that we are still conducting combined operations
presumably with the, roughly, I think you said 500 troops that
we have remaining to fight in the region, I guess I fail to see
how the President's tweet to remove troops without coordination
with the Pentagon or our own Kurdish allies aids our objective
of a secure Middle East. So have you found that tweet, did you
find that tweet to be helpful?
General Milley. I am not sure which tweet we are talking
about. To say that the President made a decision without
coordination with the Secretary and I is not true. He did.
Ms. Sherrill. So he tweeted out that we were going to
remove troops from Syria and the Pentagon didn't know, but you
were both aware that he was going to make that tweet?
General Milley. I wasn't aware of a specific tweet, but the
sequencing, I am not exactly clear which tweet you are talking
about.
Ms. Sherrill. I am talking about the most recent tweet when
he said he was going to remove the troops from Syria, not the
months ago when he said we were going to do that under--when
Secretary Mattis resigned. I am talking about the one after
that.
General Milley. You are talking about the one in October
when we pulled troops out?
Ms. Sherrill. When we pulled troops out.
General Milley. Yeah. I think that tweet, I believe that
that tweet happened after we talked, but I am not sure. I would
have to go back and check. I guess my point is this. There was
coordination and there was discussion between senior advisors
and the President prior to him making a decision.
Ms. Sherrill. So these senior advisors knew, but none of
our allies across the world. I mean Mr. Crow, you know, was
just talking about his----
General Milley. Yeah.
Ms. Sherrill [continuing]. Discussion with allies----
General Milley. Right. Right.
Ms. Sherrill [continuing]. Who right before that tweet had
no idea that was coming. I will tell you, many people in the
Pentagon had no idea that was coming. But you had all discussed
it internally and decided to do it without working with the
Pentagon or our allies.
General Milley. I can assure you there were discussions and
deliberations done by members of the National Security Council
with the President of the United States.
Ms. Sherrill. Did you recommend that you pull out of Syria?
General Milley. I personally recommended that we pulled out
28 Special Forces soldiers in the face of 15,000 Turks that
were going to invade----
The Chairman. I'm sorry, would the gentleman yield? Will
the gentleman yield for just one quick second?
General Milley. Yes.
The Chairman. Because this is a question that's enormously
important, and that's great.
General Milley. Yes.
The Chairman. In December--now, you were in different jobs
at the time, but you were both in jobs----
General Milley. December, a year ago, you mean?
The Chairman. Last year.
General Milley. I thought you were talking about October,
this past October.
The Chairman. I'm going to a different place. It is a
simple yes or no question. Just bear with me.
General Milley. Okay. Yes.
The Chairman. In December, when you were the Secretary of
the Army, and you were the Army Chief of Staff, to your
knowledge, did anyone in the Pentagon, before the President
sent out his tweet saying that we were going to pull completely
out of Syria and Afghanistan, did anyone in the Pentagon know
that that announcement was coming when the President tweeted
it, to your knowledge?
General Milley. I don't know. I don't think I----
Secretary Esper. Chairman, I can't speak to that because
I----
The Chairman. All I'm asking--you can speak to that. To
your knowledge, as the Secretary of the Army and the Chair of
the--to your knowledge, did anyone in the Pentagon know that
that announcement was coming?
Secretary Esper. I don't know, and I am not trying to dodge
because it is not a yes or no. As a service----
The Chairman. It is to your knowledge. Is it yes or no?
Secretary Esper. But as a--I can't tell you. As a service
secretary I don't have----
The Chairman. You don't know what you know?
Secretary Esper. As a service secretary, no. Not--the
service secretaries do not have an operational role.
The Chairman. I just asked a very narrow question.
General Milley. I don't know.
The Chairman. You talk to people in the Pentagon. You are
telling me that you are the Secretary of the Army, and you are
the chairman--you're the Army Chief of Staff, you are hanging
out in the Pentagon--oh, we are pulling out of Syria?
General Milley. A year ago, I don't know if anyone was
told. October----
The Chairman. That is all I am asking.
General Milley [continuing]. I guarantee there were
deliberations.
The Chairman. I know about that. But the earlier decision
is the really important one here, in my opinion.
I am sorry to interrupt, Ms. Sherrill, please go ahead.
Ms. Sherrill. Well, I am also confused, because now--so it
is my understanding that you were deliberating with some number
of people and you suggested then the President pull out 28
troops?
General Milley. Let me review the bidding here. There were
a variety of intelligence reports going back as far as early
August of a considerable build-up of Turkish forces and
capabilities with the intent to invade northern Syria and
establish a buffer zone. President Erdogan went to the United
Nations and held up a map and did declaratory policy and said
he was going to do that.
When I became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
one of the very first calls I made was to the CHOD [Chief of
Defense] of Turkey to say, what are you doing? And he said we
are going to do this and we cannot guarantee the safety of the
American forces that are in the way. Those reports went to the
Secretary of Defense, the President----
Ms. Sherrill. So, sir.
General Milley. Hang on.
Ms. Sherrill. So our NATO allies said we are going to do
this----
General Milley. That is correct. That is exactly what
they----
Ms. Sherrill [continuing]. And we are going to run right
through American troops.
General Milley. That is right. That is exactly right.
Ms. Sherrill. And we did not talk to our allies and we did
not go through----
General Milley. We did talk to our allies.
Ms. Sherrill. Well, they seemed remarkably unaware that we
were going to do this.
General Milley. I don't know which allies you are referring
to.
Ms. Sherrill. I am talking about Jordan. I am talking about
allies throughout the region. I am talking about Israel. I am
talking about our allies in the region who seemed to not----
General Milley. It is not correct----
Ms. Sherrill [continuing]. Understand that we were going to
pull troops out. Which allies were you talking about, I guess,
is my question.
General Milley. I am talking about Britain, France, and
Israel. And they were personally called about the discussions
and the situation and they were all fully aware of the
possibilities and the discussions and the situation, the key
people. I am not going to speak for every member of the
government. And then----
Ms. Sherrill. Well, I will speak for Netanyahu and----
General Milley. I am not going to speak for Netanyahu. I
know who I called.
Ms. Sherrill [continuing]. Who seem to be----
General Milley. So, but my point being is there were
deliberations and there were 15,000 Turkish soldiers and we had
all the intelligence indicators to clearly indicate the orders
were written and sent and rehearsals were complete and they
were going to attack. There were 28 United States Special
Forces Green Berets and I am not going to allow 28 American
soldiers to be killed and slaughtered just to call someone's
bluff.
There has been a lot of criticism about----
Ms. Sherrill. I don't understand what these 28 troops that
you are referring to. We had a thousand troops, what, and you
wanted to pull 28?
General Milley. Along the access of advance----
The Chairman. Sorry, the initial access of advance. I
apologize. We----
General Milley [continuing]. Of their invasion we had 28
soldiers.
The Chairman. I apologize. I apologize. And again, I
really--if everyone--and I agree. Once the President made the
announcement 6 months before in a tweet that we were pulling
out of Syria--and this is absolutely what happened. When that
tweet was made everyone went, oh my god, what did he do? And
you all went, well, we have got to figure this out. And it is
my opinion everything you just said, sir, is what Erdogan did
after the President, unilaterally, without consulting the
Pentagon, to my knowledge without even consulting the National
Security Council, said we are pulling out of Syria.
It is my opinion and someone can disavow me of this notion
at some point, that was the moment when Erdogan said, okay, I
can do this. And then, yes, over the course of the next 6 to 7
to 8 months he planned it out, which then led to the series of
events which you have told us and described, and I think it is
accurate because the other thing is we had over 3,000 troops in
Syria when the President made that announcement.
By the time we got to all that you just described that
number was way down and it was way down--I am sorry, I will
just say this bluntly. It was way down not because it was in
the national security interest of the United States for it to
be way down, it was way down because the President was trying
to fulfill a campaign promise, and he did not consult the
Pentagon before he made that announcement and started us down
this path.
Now I am very sympathetic. Once we started down that path
you guys had to figure out how to make it work, and you really
worked hard at it. I know Secretary Dunford did as well. He
desperately tried to find partners who could fill in for us
leaving. He did. He was just unable to do it. But that is the
discussion I want to have. And I am sorry, it is frustrating
for me. We get--there were only 25 troops there. We couldn't
possibly defend them. I agree. I completely agree, but that was
started before then.
I do have to give Mr. Thornberry a chance to respond to
this point and then I do want to get to Ms. Escobar, if I
could. I said I would. I apologize. I know you guys are pushing
on time, but it is a really important point. And I am not, I am
really not trying to make a political point. But if we don't
understand that--I want someone to go over to the White House
and say we would really prefer you not to do this again, okay,
that we have a process; that tweets have far more power than
people realize on our policy. Let's try to calm that down. That
is what I am trying to accomplish.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman, it is a far more complicated
story than that. It is true in December, now a year ago, the
President issued his text. There were immediate conversations I
know personally between members of the House and the Senate
with the President and others at the White House related to
that tweet. And as without going into all of the ins and outs
over weeks, it is also true that there were other partners who
did step up to assist in the work in Syria. And again, I have
personal knowledge of a number of those conversations with
partners.
So the bottom line is the President made a tweet. There was
a lot of work and conversation. We did not withdraw from Syria
and we had partners working with us. I do not believe that it
was inevitable that what happened in October was going to come.
Now I understand your point that once he said that, it was
going to happen one way or another. I can just say it is, I
believe it is a more complicated story with a number of people
who have been emphasizing to the White House and to partners
that we all need to be there together because we had a lot at
stake. And there was some success with that and obviously
President Erdogan saw an opening.
And just to emphasize, I think the decision made by the
Secretary and the Chairman to safeguard American lives when
they made it was absolutely the right decision. I have qualms
with the original tweet, as you know. I don't think that was
right and that is part of the reason I was involved in some of
those conversations to ensure that we can continue to safeguard
American interests in that region.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Escobar, I apologize. I thought that was important. If
you could--I know we are over time here. Just give you a couple
quick minutes. Go ahead.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
you so much for being here and for your testimony. I am going
to pick up where my colleague, Ms. Sherrill, left off and I
just, I want to be clear in understanding this.
So, Chairman, you gave the recommendation because you had
gotten notice from Turkey that American troops, their safety
and security could not be guaranteed by our NATO ally and that
they were about to invade and if something happens to American
troops, well, something happens to American troops. Am I
understanding that correctly?
General Milley. That is about right. That is correct.
Ms. Escobar. Okay, so----
Secretary Esper. I would add that I made the recommendation
as well. It was my assessment in discussions I had with my
counterpart leading up to, in the weeks leading up to the
events of that date.
Ms. Escobar. Was there an effort to negotiate with Turkey
to ask them to be, to stand down, to not do it?
Secretary Esper. Yes.
General Milley. Yes.
Secretary Esper. A very intense effort.
Ms. Escobar. And how long did that effort go on before the
decision, before the recommendation was made?
Secretary Esper. Weeks. We had been working on this for
actually months with the Turks to restrain them by going
through a number of diplomatic actions, military actions on the
ground trying to set up a safe zone. All these things we were
trying to do diplomatically, militarily, et cetera, while the
build-up was happening that the Chairman described earlier, to
pull them back from crossing into northern Syria.
Ms. Escobar. Was the President involved? Did he pick up the
phone? Did he call our ally? Did he make the case himself for
Turkey not going forward with its plan?
General Milley. I don't know.
Secretary Esper. Well, I can't--I don't know all the calls
the President does or does not make, but even if I knew I
wouldn't convey that to you because it is, you know, those
conversations are private between me and the Commander in
Chief.
Ms. Escobar. I would be interested in a classified setting
to learn that information. This is----
Secretary Esper. I still wouldn't share it with you,
Congresswoman.
Ms. Escobar. Okay.
Secretary Esper. It is just as I wouldn't share a
conversation between me and you, publicly, or with anybody.
Ms. Escobar. I think this is an important point to me. Not
even as a Member of Congress, but as an American, to know that
we have troops that have been working side by side with allies.
And you are right. There was a handshake deal, not a specific
commitment. However, there is something to be said for a
handshake deal for a mutually beneficial relationship that has
benefited American safety and security tremendously that has
allowed us to push back on terrorism and on ISIS. And so you
will have to forgive me, but this idea that--while you are
correct that, you know, it wasn't in the fine print that we
were going to really be a good, strong ally, that is
distressing to me as an American.
Secretary Esper. And I appreciate that. And, look, we have
both been there. But not only was it not in the fine print, it
wasn't in the bold print. Never did we put on the table, in
fact, I have spoken to our commanders about this. Some of them
were very clear that we are not here--we are not going to
defend you against Turkey.
Ms. Escobar. And, but--and, Mr. Secretary, I understand
that. I think what is equally distressing to me is to hear that
a NATO ally was about to run roughshod over American troops and
I wonder if the President got involved. So that is a question
obviously that you are saying not even in a classified setting
you would be willing to answer. Do you all know how many----
Secretary Esper. I don't know the answer to begin with. I
said even if I did, I----
Ms. Escobar. Okay. Well, that is distressing as well
because if we are negotiating to protect American troops and to
prevent an ally from creating what is now a deeply unsettling
situation, I mean 200,000 civilians have been displaced. We
have seen genocide occurring. I am now concerned and I would
like your opinion. You know, part of what drives people into
the arms of ISIS and what promotes terrorism is that
instability, this feeling that you don't have a future. If
there is anything that I have learned while serving on this
committee is that that kind of hopelessness is a breeding
ground.
Secretary Esper. Right.
Ms. Escobar. Is there a breeding ground right now in Syria
for ISIS?
Secretary Esper. I can't comment on that. I just don't
know. But let me tell you this, what the Turks would say, and I
am not defending the Turkish action, but they would say, look,
this has gone on for them for decades, if not a couple hundred
years of this conflict between Kurds and Turks.
Ms. Escobar. But, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, we
had a situation that was far more under control before than it
is today, would you agree?
Secretary Esper. Yes and no, Congresswoman. If you will
recall from the earliest days when this SDF was first set up
under the Obama administration there was unhappiness, vocal,
public concern by the Turks about the relationship. And they
had made two previous incursions into Syria to address what
they thought was a terrorist problem. But none of these----
The Chairman. And we will--yeah, I don't want to--I know
you guys have been very generous with your time, and I think
that was a good point. I know you have to go. So I don't want
to cut you off, but at the same time I also want to respect
your time. And I thank you very much for being here. We are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
December 11, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 11, 2019
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 11, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
Mr. Kim. Addressing the root causes of state fragility in countries
like Syria is not just smart for our national security, but is also
cost effective--for every $1 we spend on conflict prevention, we save
$16 in response costs. The Global Fragility Act, legislation that
passed the House with broad bipartisan support, identifies addressing
state fragility as a U.S. government priority and requires an
interagency strategy to tackle this issue in conflict-affected areas
such as Syria. Can you share how improved coordination between DOD,
State, and USAID to address fragile and conflict-affected states would
make a difference for U.S. policy in the Middle East and around the
world?
Secretary Esper. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Kim. In your confirmation hearing earlier this year, you
commented on the importance of ``leveraging other parts of the
government'' such as the State Department and USAID to effectively
pursue the Administration's National Security Strategy. This is
especially true in Syria, where diplomacy will no doubt be critical to
a long-term solution. How have you been working alongside Special
Representative for Syria, James Jeffrey, to promote diplomacy in the
region, and how important do you see our commitment to the diplomatic
side of our engagement?
Secretary Esper. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Kim. Addressing the root causes of state fragility in countries
like Syria is not just smart for our national security, but is also
cost effective--for every $1 we spend on conflict prevention, we save
$16 in response costs. The Global Fragility Act, legislation that
passed the House with broad bipartisan support, identifies addressing
state fragility as a U.S. government priority and requires an
interagency strategy to tackle this issue in conflict-affected areas
such as Syria. Can you share how improved coordination between DOD,
State, and USAID to address fragile and conflict-affected states would
make a difference for U.S. policy in the Middle East and around the
world?
General Milley. The Global Fragility Act is an important step to
assist U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East and around the world.
On December 20, the President, as part of the FY2020 spending package,
signed the Global Fragility Act into law. The Act directs the
development of an integrated ten-year strategy (Global Fragility
Strategy), requires synchronization of implementation plans across the
USG through the Secretary of State, and provides the appropriations
necessary (over $1B to DOS over five years) for prevention and
stabilization efforts in conflict-affected areas. These actions will
help ensure DOD efforts support designated priority countries and
facilitate interagency synchronization on country plans for prevention
and stability.
The Global Fragility Act directs the President, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Secretary of Defense,
and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to
establish a comprehensive, integrated, ten-year strategy. This strategy
will contribute to the stabilization of conflict-affected areas,
address global fragility, and strengthen the capacity of the U.S. to be
an effective leader of international efforts to prevent extremism and
violent conflict. The Joint Staff will support the Department of
Defense's participation in the development of this strategy, including
the identification of priority regions and countries.
Preventing conflict and reducing state fragility protects U.S.
interests and investments by strengthening alliances and partnerships
and reducing the need for later costly interventions and efforts.
Addressing fragility, conflict, and violence in the Middle East or
around the world is critical to help countries achieve self-reliance
and reduce dependency on external aid. The Global Fragility Act,
combined with the Department of Defense's new authority in the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act to support DOS and USAID
stabilization operations, provides the tools necessary to help bring
about this objective.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Ms. Houlahan. As the number of refugees rises in the wake of the
recent Turkish incursion into Syria, what is the Department doing to
engage in efforts to counter violent extremism? More specifically, what
is the Department doing to engage women in CVE as more and more people
are displaced?
Secretary Esper. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. Would you agree that the Assad regime, backed by Iran
and backed by Russia, are essentially driving Sunni recruits to ISIS?
What is our policy towards Russia, the Assad regime and Iran?
Secretary Esper. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Waltz. Would you agree that the Assad regime, backed by Iran
and backed by Russia, are essentially driving Sunni recruits to ISIS?
What is our policy towards Russia, the Assad regime and Iran?
General Milley. Pro-regime operations at the outset of the Syrian
civil war drove a number of Sunni recruits to join ISIS; however, we
have not seen continued evidence of that trend as the conflict evolved
over the years. ISIS continues to utilize social media and online
propaganda to reach potential recruits in addition to targeting
socioeconomically marginalized segments of the population for
radicalization. For operational safety purposes, we regularly de-
conflict U.S. and Coalition D-ISIS operations with the Russian military
when operating in close proximity to Russian and/or pro-regime forces.
DOD supports the U.S. policy of reducing Iranian influence in Syria and
pressuring the Assad Regime and their Russian backers to support a
political resolution to the conflict in accordance with UN Security
Council Resolution 2254 in order to create the conditions for greater
regional stability.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. The Lead Inspector General Report to the U.S. Congress
on Operation Inherent Resolve warned that ISIS would likely exploit a
reduction in U.S.-led counterterrorism pressure to reorganize its
remaining forces in Syria.
The Report described CENTCOM's September 2019 assessment that
``ISIS had been growing its capability to support `hybrid military
operations' and to conduct them `when consistent counterterrorism
pressure is absent.' ''
We know from Iran's approach to hybrid warfare how potent and
destabilizing this strategy can be in the Middle East.
Please describe: (1) The threat posed by the current ability of
ISIS--despite having lost its territory--to conduct hybrid warfare in
Syria; (2) How this threat impacts the U.S. and its allies in the
region; and (3) How U.S. military operations prior to the October
Turkish incursion into Syria kept ISIS from further developing hybrid
warfare capabilities.
General Milley. While DOD adjusted its posture in response to the
October Turkish incursion into Syria, CT pressure against ISIS has not
diminished. ISIS today is not the threat it once was, but the group is
scrambling to regain some element of its former self to achieve its
vision. If CT pressure was significantly reduced, ISIS would likely
attempt to intensify its insurgency throughout Syria, expand its
influence in Sunni-majority areas, and rebuild its core capabilities,
potentially including its ability to conduct attacks in the West. The
group currently calculates that it lacks the capacity to seize and hold
territory, which is why ISIS is pursuing a deliberate ``hybrid''
strategy aimed at gradually setting the conditions for its eventual
reemergence as a territory-holding force. However, U.S. forces and the
Coalition continue to work with vetted Syrian opposition forces,
including the SDF, to apply pressure to ISIS in an effort to curb the
group's activities.