    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 116-71]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                        FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET REQUEST

            FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 3, 2020

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    41-409               WASHINGTON : 2021

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROB BISHOP, Utah
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          MO BROOKS, Alabama
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
        Chair
                   Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
                    Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
                               Zach Taylor, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
    Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Bawden, Allison B., Director, Natural Resources and Environment
      Team, Government Accountability Office.........................    10
    Clark, Lt Gen Richard M., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
      Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Department of the
      Air Force......................................................     8
    Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration........................................     3
    Mercado, Victorino G., Performing the Duties of Assistant
      Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,
      U.S. Department of Defense.....................................     5
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs, Department of the Navy...............................     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Bawden, Allison B............................................    86
        Clark, Lt Gen Richard M......................................    76
        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    31
        Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E..................................    32
        Mercado, Victorino G.........................................    49
        Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    64

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

     FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY
                               DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 3, 2020.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:29 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order.
        We would like to welcome the distinguished guest witnesses
    we have today: The Honorable Lisa Gordon-Hagerty; Victorino
    Mercado, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
    Defense--that has to be the longest title I have ever seen;
    Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe; Lieutenant General Richard Clark;
    and Allison Bawden of the GAO [Government Accountability
    Office].
        This subcommittee hearing has to be on one of the most
    important, most complicated topics of any subcommittee hearing.
    So I hope that all members will try to stick to the 5-minute
    rule so that we can have plenty of time in closed session
    following the public hearing. I am planning on deferring my
    time to the closed session.
        As I mentioned in last week's subcommittee hearing, the
    main issues seem to be budgetary, and we have that high-class
    problem of unexpected largesse from the administration, a
    nearly $3 billion increase for NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] over fiscal year 2020. Although we appreciate
    the nearly 20 percent increase, the burden of proof is on the
    Administrator to justify the amounts, particularly in view of
    the NNSA's $8 billion in uncosted funds.
        Now let me recognize the ranking member for his opening
    statement.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like
    extend a warm welcome to all of our witnesses today. We do have
    a very large panel, but you all contribute to our work here on
    the House Armed Services Committee in unique and meaningful
    ways, and I appreciate your expertise that you bring to the
    table.
        The budget request for the entire nuclear enterprise across
    both the Department of Energy [DOE] and the Department of
    Defense [DOD] for fiscal year 2021 is approximately $49
    billion. This request includes consistent predicted cost growth
    for nuclear modernization programs within the DOD, nuclear
    weapons stockpile surveillance within the DOE, and the nuclear
    command and control systems across the government.
        As we have continued to hear from DOD leadership,
    supporting our nuclear modernization efforts remains the number
    one priority of the Department of Defense. In partnership with
    the National Nuclear Security Administration, the United States
    will continue to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    deterrent.
        The DOD budget request for fiscal year 2021 invests
    approximately $17.7 billion to support modernization of all
    three legs of the nuclear triad. This year's budget request for
    the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent is $1.5 billion. That
    money will ensure that the replacement for our only ground-
    based intercontinental ballistic system, which has seen
    continuous service for 60 years, will be able to enter its next
    phase of use and development.
        There is no margin for slip in this program. We must
    continue to support it while ensuring the best value for our
    government. The budget request also supports the B-21 bomber at
    $2.18 billion and Long Range Standoff weapon, LRSO, at $744
    million. The LRSO is meant to replace our aging air-launched
    cruise missile, which entered service 40 years ago.
        This year's budget request supports the Navy's strategic
    deterrence requirements with the Columbia-class submarine, the
    Trident D5 modernization, and the initiation of the work for
    the Mark 7 reentry vehicle, which will receive the W93 warhead.
        The National Nuclear Security Administration also has a
    robust and necessary $19.7 billion budget request for fiscal
    year 2021. That includes $15.6 billion in their weapons
    activities programs to support the life extension and
    modifications to existing warheads, stockpile surveillance, and
    investment in strategic materials like plutonium and uranium
    enrichment.
        NNSA is an essential partner in the nuclear enterprise, and
    while we have started to improve upon the decrepit
    infrastructure, we have a long way to go. Additionally, the W93
    is a critical program of record to the NNSA. I look forward to
    today's testimony on the requirements and path ahead for this
    warhead.
        Last week we heard from Admiral Richard, the commander of
    Strategic Command, about the military requirements for nuclear
    modernization and the consequences of delay or failure. I
    appreciate his candidness when he said that we are approaching
    irreversible points of no return with regard to our nuclear
    modernization. He testified that we are approaching a point
    where, if we do not support these nuclear modernization
    efforts, that we will be starting down a path of unilateral
    nuclear disarmament.
        While we debate whether or not we will support the budget
    request for nuclear modernization of our existing stockpile,
    Russia and China continue to increase their nuclear arsenals at
    an alarming rate. Russia continues to increase the number and
    type of nuclear delivery systems, and specifically, they will
    continue to develop and field new non-treaty-accountable
    systems that indicate a more aggressive deployment strategy.
        Russia remains in violation of their obligations under the
    Open Skies Treaty and continues to exploit the loopholes in the
    New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty to their advantage,
    after, of course, having violated the INF [Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces] Treaty. China will find its own nuclear triad--
    excuse me, China will field its own nuclear triad in the next
    decade with the development of a nuclear-capable strategic
    bomber, road-mobile ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic
    missiles], and sub-launched ballistic missiles.
        China also continues to build and employ new intermediate-
    range ballistic missiles, outpacing the United States. China
    has never been subject to the limits in transparency required
    by an arms control treaty, and it is unclear how to incentivize
    them to join such a regime.
        This year's budget request for nuclear modernization is
    just enough and just in time. None of these programs have any
    margin. Any attempt to delay, defund, or otherwise deprioritize
    our nuclear enterprise will leave us less safe in an era of
    near-peer strategic competition.
        And I want to thank our Administrator for both your
    integrity and commitment and also your advocacy during this
    budgetary process. And to all the witnesses, I want to thank
    you again for being here today, and we look forward to their
    testimony. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. Now let's hear from the
    witnesses.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty.

       STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
    and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
    to present the President's fiscal year 2021 budget request for
    the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.
        As always, it is a privilege to testify before you today
    representing the extraordinary men and women that make up the
    DOE NNSA enterprise. We are grateful for your demonstrated
    strong bipartisan support for the NNSA's national security
    missions and the people who execute them every day.
        Chairman Cooper, a written statement has been provided to
    the subcommittee, and I respectfully request it be submitted
    for the record.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
        2020 marks the 20th anniversary of the NNSA's establishment
    by Congress. Although, of course, our heritage goes back much
    further to the Manhattan Project and to the Atomic Energy
    Commission. And, as has always been the case, the effectiveness
    and credibility of America's nuclear weapons capability
    reassures our friends and allies and serves as the ultimate
    deterrent against a nuclear attack by those who wish to harm
    us. In this regard, NNSA is unique in our responsibilities to
    support our Nation's nuclear security missions.
        The $19.8 billion fiscal year 2021 budget request for NNSA
    reflects President Trump's strong commitment to ensuring
    America has a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for
    many decades to come. This funding also affirms the
    administration's continued work to reduce threats posed by
    nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as well as to
    provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion for the United
    States Navy fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.
        The weapons activities request of $15.6 billion will allow
    us to modernize the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and
    infrastructure and meet national security requirements after
    several decades of neglect. It will modernize the stockpile
    with five weapons modernization programs, execute stockpile
    sustainment activities, and conduct annual assessment
    activities on all weapons systems.
        With this request, we will continue the dismantlement and
    disposition of weapons and components from weapons retired from
    the stockpile and support production modernization activities
    for nonnuclear components and strategic materials, including a
    two-site plutonium pit strategy.
        We will also continue to recapitalize NNSA's aging
    infrastructure, including the Y-12 Uranium Processing Facility,
    the NNSS [Nevada National Security Site] U1a complex
    enhancements project, and the high-explosive science and
    engineering facility at Pantex.
        As many of you have witnessed firsthand, our entire
    enterprise continues to age with much of our infrastructure
    operating far beyond its design life. With this increase, we
    will finally be able to modernize the infrastructure, which is
    old.
        Our defense nuclear nonproliferation [DNN] budget request
    of $2 billion dollars marks the third year in a row that the
    Trump administration has sought increased funding for NNSA's
    nonproliferation and counterterrorism activities and fully
    funds all DNN priority program requirements.
        This reflects the administration's strong commitment to
    reducing global nuclear threats and to arms control efforts
    that advance U.S., allied, and partner security. It will enable
    us to continue to build domestic and international capacity to
    secure and, where possible, eliminate nuclear and radioactive
    materials and prevent nuclear smuggling.
        Further, this request allows us to maintain a robust
    nuclear counterterrorism capability to respond to nuclear and
    radiological incidents, including nuclear forensics activities,
    to attribute the source of material used in a terrorist attack.
    We would advance our capabilities for detecting and monitoring
    foreign nuclear material and weapons production activities.
        Equally important is the Naval Reactors' budget request of
    $1.7 billion. It enables us to provide for the continued safe,
    reliable, and long-lived operation of the U.S. Navy's nuclear
    fleet, which account for more than 40 percent of the Navy's
    major vessels.
        Finally, our Federal salaries and expenses budget request
    of $454 million will allow us to recruit, train, and retain a
    highly skilled workforce of 1,858 Federal employees.
        Mr. Chairman, it is true that our timeline for modernizing
    the nuclear stockpile and recapitalizing the necessary
    infrastructure is aggressive. In some cases, we are asking our
    sites and our partners to do in 10 years what would normally
    take 15 to 20 years.
        But in the 2 years since being confirmed, I have seen
    firsthand the Nuclear Security Enterprise workforce passion and
    dedication and what we can accomplish. Consequently, while the
    schedule may be aggressive, I believe it is achievable.
    However, without doing so with consistent and sustained funding
    and, most importantly, our continued relationship with
    Congress, we will not achieve it.
        At this time, I would like to personally thank Vice Admiral
    Johnny Wolfe, Lieutenant General Clark, and ASD [Assistant
    Secretary of Defense] Mercado, and all of our DOD colleagues
    for their professionalism, your collegiality, and for your
    service to our great Nation. And I also look forward to working
    with GAO on future matters of mutual interest.
        Thank you again for the strong support of this subcommittee
    and for the opportunity to testify before you today. I stand
    ready to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Gordon-Hagerty can be found
    in the Appendix on page 32.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Mercado.

      STATEMENT OF VICTORINO G. MERCADO, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND
                CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Mercado. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        With your permission, I also have a longer statement for
    the record and will just make a few opening remarks.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered. We will accept
    your written statement for the record.
        Mr. Mercado. Sir, today the United States faces an
    increasingly complex global security environment in which the
    central challenge to our prosperity and security is a
    reemergence of great power competition with China and Russia.
    This remains a central theme of our National Defense Strategy,
    which we are implementing. Moreover, regimes such as North
    Korea and Iran have mature and very capable ballistic missile
    programs with aspirations to be able to deliver nuclear weapons
    with these missiles.
        The foundation for our success in great power competition
    with nuclear powers China and Russia and dealing effectively
    with North Korea and Iran is a safe, secure, survivable,
    flexible, and effective nuclear deterrent embodied by our
    nuclear triad. For this reason, nuclear deterrence is the
    Department's highest priority mission.
        For this important mission, the U.S. seeks only what it
    needs to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, in contrast to
    Russia, who maintains about 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons
    and are pursuing and fielding other novel nuclear capabilities.
    We have no desire or intent to engage in an arms race nor match
    weapon for weapon the capabilities being fielded by Russia.
    Again, our objective is a credible nuclear deterrent supported
    by flexible capabilities residing in the nuclear triad that are
    tailorable to any potential adversary.
        After decades of deferred recapitalization, we must proceed
    with modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and add additional
    flexibility consistent with our Nuclear Posture Review, such as
    the sea-launched cruise missile, to ensure that there are no
    gains to be made through the use of any nuclear weapon,
    strategic or otherwise.
        The Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security
    Administration are critical partners in maintaining and
    modernizing our nuclear triad to address the challenges we
    collectively face and appreciate the support that we enjoy from
    this committee. Funding these critical requirements ensures
    that modern replacements will be available before the Nation's
    legacy systems reach the end of their extended service lives
    and we lose them all together.
        The fiscal year 2021 budget request for nuclear forces is
    $28.9 billion or roughly 4.1 percent of the total DOD budget
    request. Modernization or recapitalization of our nuclear
    forces is about 1.7 percent of the total DOD budget request.
    The Nation's nuclear modernization program is affordable.
        Lastly, nuclear attack is the only existential threat to
    the United States, and our nuclear arsenal is the Nation's only
    ultimate insurance policy against such attack. Our nuclear
    triad underwrites every U.S. military operation around the
    world and also provides extended deterrence guarantees to over
    30 allies and partners, precluding the need for them to pursue
    their own nuclear arsenals. This is the return on investment of
    our nuclear forces.
        I thank this committee for its support, and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mercado can be found in the
    Appendix on page 49.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe.

        STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
           STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the Department of Defense's budget
    request for nuclear forces. I am honored to be here today. I
    would like to thank this subcommittee for its continued support
    of the Navy's deterrent mission. I ask you that you please
    accept my written statement for the record.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Admiral Wolfe. The Nation's nuclear triad of
    intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and
    submarines equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles
    is the bedrock of our ability to deter aggression, assure our
    allies and partners, achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence
    fail, and hedge against an uncertain future.
        Nuclear modernization is the Department of Defense's number
    one priority. Nuclear modernization is the Navy's number one
    priority, and nuclear modernization must be fully funded. The
    Navy's Strategic Systems Programs, or SSP, fiscal year 2021
    budget request reflects investment in our responsibility to
    maintain a safe and secure deterrent that is effective,
    flexible, and adaptable for the strategic environment.
        This investment is imperative both to sustaining and to
    recapitalizing the sea-based strategic deterrent. Our budget
    request represents the faith and trust that the Congress and
    this Nation have placed in the Navy to responsibly steward the
    strategic deterrent mission. Our nuclear deterrent is credible,
    but it is aging. Our modernization efforts are underway, but we
    have much to accomplish over this decade.
        As I look to the future of our submarine-launched ballistic
    missile force, I must urgently express a critical juncture that
    we have reached. National capabilities and technologies that
    underpin our needed recapitalization efforts have eroded and
    atrophied. We are feeling today the consequences of historical
    decisions, and we have reached the inflection point.
        The SSP fiscal year 2021 budget request wholly funds the
    sustainment of today's deterrent, but it also begins the
    investment needed to build and reenergize capabilities,
    technologies, workforce, and critical skills required of any
    nuclear nation. This very foundation is timeless, is agnostic
    to a future warfighter solution, and will be a collaborative
    effort with the United States Air Force.
        Today SSP continues to extend the life of the Trident D5
    strategic weapons system and to demonstrate its highly reliable
    performance. Just last month we reached 178 successful flight
    tests, an exceptional record for any weapon system. Our current
    life extension is designed to meet today's form, fit, and
    function to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to
    serve as the initial weapon system on the Columbia-class
    submarine.
        As the Navy carefully manages the transition of our SSBN
    [ballistic missile submarine] force so too must we manage the
    age-out and attrition of our strategic weapons system. The SSP
    fiscal year 2021 budget reflects important investments in our
    follow-on Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 needed for strategic
    deployment no later than 2039. This funding focuses on
    technical maturation of complex and fundamental technologies
    and opportunities to provide flexibility and adaptability in a
    dynamic and evolving threat environment.
        As our triad's delivery systems and platforms are exceeding
    their planned service lives, our modernization efforts will
    produce just-in-time replacements. Deferred recapitalization
    has left no margin for unanticipated challenges in technical
    work that we had not executed in over 30 years.
        Historical timelines from our first life extension coupled
    with the increased complexity and scope of the D5 Life
    Extension 2 signal that we must begin now. Now is the right
    time to ensure that the sea-based deterrent continues to meet
    strategic requirements.
        From a warhead perspective, the Navy and our partners at
    the National Nuclear Security Administration have successfully
    completed the refurbishment of the W76 warhead family and have
    modified a small number of warheads to fill the low-yield
    option to address an identified deterrence need.
        As we continue to refurbish today's aging warheads, we have
    revised the timeline for completion of the W88 alteration 370
    program, which is now scheduled to reach first production unit
    next year. The fiscal year 2021 budget also reflects the
    Department of Defense's direction to pursue a W93 Mark 7
    warhead, an aeroshell program of record.
        The W93 Mark 7 will address an evolving threat environment
    and ballistic missile warhead modernization requirements, will
    improve operational effectiveness for U.S. Strategic Command,
    and will mitigate technical, operational, programmatic, and
    geopolitical risk in the sea-based leg of the deterrent.
        The Navy's funding request supports solution-agnostic
    reentry body components and materials and is the first step
    toward rebuilding a national industrial base to produce
    aeroshells and other critical components, which the United
    States has not exercised since the early 1990s.
        This investment is also critically important to our other
    U.S. programs and to our United Kingdom partners as they too
    face significant recapitalization demands and execute an
    independent but parallel warhead effort.
        As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent
    the men and women of SSP comprising approximately 1,700
    sailors; 1,000 Marines; 300 coastguardsmen; 1,200 civilians;
    and thousands of contractor personnel. It is my personal goal
    to ensure that they are poised to execute the mission with the
    same level of success, passion, and rigor both today and
    tomorrow as they have since our program's inception since 1955.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
    the men and women who truly make nuclear deterrence their
    life's work. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in
    the Appendix on page 64.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
        Now, General Clark.

      STATEMENT OF LT GEN RICHARD M. CLARK, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
        STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION,
                      DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

        General Clark. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to discuss the Air Force contributions to the
    nuclear triad. And thank you for your support in ensuring the
    Department of the Air Force has the required resources to
    execute our nuclear deterrence mission.
        I prepared a written statement that conveys the current
    status of the Air Force portion of the nuclear enterprise, and
    I respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        General Clark. Thank you, sir.
        In addition to my written statement, I would like to
    emphasize three points before the subcommittee today. First, we
    are grateful for the men and women of the U.S. Air Force who
    built and currently maintain the resilient nuclear triad and
    the nuclear command, control, and communications systems we are
    using today. It is a testament to their ingenuity and hard work
    that the systems built to deter their generation's nuclear
    threats are still meeting America's deterrent needs today.
        But those systems are now decades past their intended
    service lives. Minuteman III is 39 years past its planned
    retirement, and the air-launched cruise missile is 26 years
    past its original service life. Decades of airmen have
    performed valiantly to sustain the capabilities and credibility
    of these systems, but we no longer have the luxury of deferring
    these systems' upgrades or replacements to future generations.
        Second, we need your continued support. There is very
    little margin between the age-out of our existing systems and
    the fielding of the replacement capabilities. We need the
    support of Congress to establish stable funding for the
    National Nuclear Security Agency and all of our DOD nuclear
    systems, both in sustaining current capabilities and developing
    future capabilities. Without stable funding, we cannot deliver
    these systems on time and run the risk of a deterrence gap that
    will put our national security at risk.
        Third, and most importantly, these capabilities will
    backstop the next generation of American security and
    diplomacy. Future airmen will see GBSDs [Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent] replace Minuteman IIIs as the ready and responsive
    ICBM force deterring tomorrow's threats. They will see B-21s
    take up the bomber mission from B-2s, giving America the
    flexibility of a tailored deterrent response visible to
    adversary and ally alike.
        Men and women across this country will live in a world
    where future American ambassadors can conduct diplomacy with
    the confidence underwritten by stealthy, survivable Columbia-
    class submarines, and together our airmen and sailors will
    connect with the warriors of the Space Force to guarantee
    seamless command and control of nuclear forces all day, every
    day without fail.
        These points may sound grandiose, but to me it is very
    real. My son Milo is heading to college this fall, and he
    desires an Air Force career. He may find himself as one of the
    airmen fielding, operating, or sustaining these systems. My
    hope is that we set up his generation and the generation to
    follow with a nuclear deterrent every bit as robust as the one
    that was bestowed upon us.
        So, in summary, please let me reiterate my three points.
    First, past generations have given us a credible and effective
    nuclear deterrent, but a day is coming in the future where it
    will be impossible to sustain it; next, we need your continued
    support to stabilize funding so we can modernize and
    recapitalize these systems to maintain their credibility; and,
    finally, the investments we make today will ensure tomorrow's
    generation and the generations that follow have the
    capabilities they need for the continued defense of our Nation.
        Through all of this, the nuclear enterprise remains the
    number one responsibility of the Department of Defense, and my
    fellow airmen and I are proud of the role we play in
    maintaining a credible and capable nuclear deterrent. Again, I
    appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts on strategic
    deterrence, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in
    the Appendix on page 76.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General.
        Ms. Bawden.

    STATEMENT OF ALLISON B. BAWDEN, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
           ENVIRONMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Bawden. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
    discuss GAO's views on NNSA's plans for modernizing the
    Nation's Nuclear Security Enterprise and aligning its efforts
    with DOD's to modernize delivery systems. These remarks should
    be viewed as helping NNSA set itself up for success.
        I also have submitted a written statement for the record
    and ask that it be entered.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Bawden. The Nuclear Security Enterprise is embarking on
    its most ambitious level of effort since the Cold War era. NNSA
    is currently managing four weapon modernization programs,
    proposing a fifth, and undertaking infrastructure projects that
    affect every strategic material and component used in nuclear
    weapons.
        Today I will discuss the schedule risks presented by the
    integrated nature of NNSA's and DOD's nuclear modernization
    efforts, budget and schedule estimates for implementing the
    overall program, and the importance of NNSA setting priorities
    among its efforts in the event of budget shortfalls or cost or
    schedule overruns.
        First, on the schedule risks, because NNSA's modernization
    program is highly integrated, any delay could have a
    significant cascading effect on the overall effort. Here are
    three scenarios. First, weapons programs depend on the
    completion of certain infrastructure projects. For example, the
    W87-1 program will require all new components, including
    plutonium pits. The construction schedule for pit facilities is
    aggressive, and a delay could have an impact on the schedule
    for the weapons programs it supports.
        Also, because NNSA uses the same production infrastructure
    for each weapon program and capacity is limited, each program
    schedule can impact the next. In addition, NNSA's weapons
    programs schedules must remain aligned with the schedules for
    DOD's new delivery systems to ensure essential testing is
    completed at critical times. This is especially true for the
    W80-4 warhead and the Air Force's long-range standoff missile,
    as well as the W87-1 warhead, and the Air Force's ICBM
    replacement. The current schedules have little margin for
    delay.
        Second, on budget and schedule estimates, in the past GAO
    has been critical of NNSA's performance on a number of weapon
    modernization programs and major construction projects. We
    identified poor planning and overly optimistic assumptions
    about performance that contributed to cost overruns, schedule
    delays, and program and project cancellations.
        NNSA has made improvements to management controls for these
    efforts, especially around cost and schedule estimating, and is
    increasingly paying attention to program and project management
    capacity. As NNSA undertakes an increased scope of work, it is
    essential that its overall plans reflect realistic cost and
    schedule estimates rather than best case estimates. For
    example, while NNSA has not yet fully developed its schedule
    for constructing pit facilities, its own analysis of
    alternatives suggests current dates will be difficult to
    achieve.
        Finally, on setting priorities. The President's fiscal year
    2021 budget request includes a 25 percent increase for NNSA's
    modernization program and anticipates sustaining this increased
    funding level for at least the next 5 years.
        In 2017, GAO reviewed NNSA's long-term plans for its
    modernization program. At the time, we found that NNSA planned
    to defer work to a period beyond its 5-year programming window.
    We concluded that these deferrals created a significant bow
    wave of funding needs in future years to undertake the
    simultaneous weapons programs and construction projects it
    planned. The requested budget increase for next year suggests
    this bow wave has arrived.
        Requesting a funding increase is one way to address the bow
    wave and maintain the overall scope of planned modernization
    efforts. However, actual funding in future years could fall
    short of budget estimates, and programs or projects could and
    have encountered cost overruns or schedule delays.
        GAO recommended in 2017 that, to increase the credibility
    of its modernization plans, NNSA should develop a portfolio
    approach as a way to manage these risks. Such an approach would
    present options that could be exercised if budget or schedule
    risks materialize. This would include identifying programs for
    which starts could be deferred. Any such plan would need to be
    put forward in collaboration with DOD.
        NNSA's most recent long-term plan includes an assessment of
    whether its budget requests fall within the range of its
    program cost estimates. However, it has not yet adopted a
    portfolio approach to setting its priorities should cost or
    schedule risks materialize. NNSA's planning could further
    benefit from this approach in light of the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review and additional programs it anticipates.
        I appreciate your time this afternoon, and I am happy to
    answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bawden can be found in the
    Appendix on page 86.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
        I am going to hold most of my questions for the closed
    session. But I would like to ask Ms. Gordon-Hagerty about a
    sentence of her testimony on page 11. It reads, ``Additionally,
    the request for M3,'' that is Material Management Minimization
    program, ``supports the removal and disposal of weapons-usable
    nuclear material, with priority on removing surplus plutonium
    from the State of South Carolina.''
        I was wondering about the urgency of that given the fact
    that the second site for pit production is supposed to be the
    State of South Carolina. Why are we so interested in getting
    plutonium out of South Carolina if we are just going to be
    returning plutonium to South Carolina?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, the removal of the
    material from South Carolina is through a program for our
    nonproliferation needs. That resulted in the agreement that we
    had with the former Soviet Union, with Russia to remove 34
    metric tons of excess plutonium from the world, and we were
    planning on doing that through the MOX [Mixed Oxide Fuel]
    program at Savannah River Site.
        But since MOX was over construction, over budget--under
    construction and over budget, we decided to bring that program
    to termination, and we made that decision, Secretary Perry did,
    in 2018.
        Subsequently, we have been working aggressively to remove
    the 9.5 metric tons of material still in the State of South
    Carolina, and we are committed to that approach. We are
    committed to removing 34 metric tons of excess plutonium from
    the United States, and we are doing it through a tried and true
    process called dilute and dispose or surplus plutonium
    disposition.
        So that is material that would not otherwise be used in our
    stockpile. It is excess material. It is not in a good form, and
    we would have to put it through quite a number of steps before
    we were able to use it for the stockpile. That material will go
    through a process and then be ultimately buried at WIPP, at the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
        We have made a commitment to the State of South Carolina,
    and we are sticking with our commitment. In fact, last year we
    were under court order to remove a metric ton of material from
    the State of South Carolina. We did it in 6 months ahead of
    schedule, and so we are moving on that. And we have an
    aggressive schedule, but it is a doable schedule. We have got
    long lead procurements going on for the State of South
    Carolina. We have got a program to undertake that mission at
    South Carolina.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I first want to open by giving the heartfelt sorrow, I
    think, from everybody in the room, about the tornados that have
    hit your community. It is very difficult. My community last
    summer had eight tornados that hit the city of Dayton and the
    surrounding areas. It did not make the extent of damage that
    you have had, but I know to what extent a community has to
    rally, and I want you to know that certainly you have our
    support and sympathy.
        So I am a big fan of GAO because, I mean, your reports
    are--they are almost prophetic, right. You go back and you read
    them, and you think: Gosh, I wish we had done that.
        So, you know, I appreciate really just the extent to which
    you pore over things.
        And, gosh, Allison, looking at your resume and bio, what a
    great, you know, academic work you have done. I appreciate you
    have dedicated yourself to the GAO.
        I am going to ask the group a question that I am going to
    ask you slightly differently because it applies to you slightly
    differently, right. So I am going to begin by reading the
    quote. So, last week, Admiral Richard, the commander of
    STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], testified before
    this subcommittee and I read this quote in my opening
    statement. He stated, quote: The entire triad is reaching the
    end of its useful life, and so either we replace what we have
    now or we start to divest almost on a path to unilateral
    disarmament in the face of this growing threat.
        I am going to ask each of you if you agree with that, and
    then, with Allison, I am just going to ask, does GAO disagree,
    because you are not really in a position to agree, but I don't
    think you disagree. So, to our Administrator, do you agree with
    that quote?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Mercado.
        Mr. Mercado. Yes, sir, I do.
        Mr. Turner. Vice Admiral Wolfe.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir, I do.
        Mr. Turner. General Clark.
        General Clark. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Mr. Turner. Does GAO disagree with that quote?
        Ms. Bawden. No.
        Mr. Turner. Great. Excellent.
        So, Administrator, you have been just dogmatic in ensuring
    that people understand that you need infrastructure, that you
    need production, that in order for there to be a viable
    deterrent that then there has to be production and that your
    system has not been in a production mode for a very, very long
    time; that in order for us to just stay with what we have, we
    have to invest to be able to respond.
        Now, most people don't understand that, in NNSA, under the
    Department of Energy, is actually where these things are made,
    where you have to invest in the nuclear infrastructure in order
    for you to be able to perform and to deliver.
        Give us a picture of what you are facing because the--you
    know, as Allison from GAO was saying, you know, all these are
    critical paths, which means if we don't fund these, we miss. I
    mean, you have got to deliver. You can't make a mistake. But we
    have got to deliver first or you surely can't. So tell us what
    you are facing as to why currently we have to fund this bill.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Mr. Turner, let me state by saying I am
    very proud to be able to represent the 50,000 men and women
    that support our Nuclear Security Enterprise. And in that
    regard, we are talking about an infrastructure that was
    developed and built in the Manhattan Project. Thirty percent of
    our facilities were built and constructed in the Manhattan
    Project, and we are operating in those facilities.
        Now, we are operating to the point of obviously past their
    lifetime. More than 50 percent of our facilities are more than
    40 years old. Most of our facilities are in the single point of
    failure where we don't have replication, where we don't have a
    resilient and responsive infrastructure.
        We have waited for almost three decades now. We have
    endured budget caps. We have endured promises to be able to
    increase and to modernize our infrastructure as well as our
    capacity to support the Department of Defense requirements. We
    are at a turning point, Representative Turner. We have got to
    get on with this. We have no margin built in any longer for
    infrastructure or modernization.
        And on top of all of that, while over the last 20 years we
    were effectively working on one major modernization program,
    that of the 76-1, which we completed ahead of schedule and on
    budget, we are now committed to supporting five major
    modernization efforts of the Department of Defense.
        So we are working. We have a schedule. We are working. We
    are committed, and we are completely aligned with the
    Department of Defense, with our colleagues who are sitting with
    me today at the table, but we have very little margin for
    error. We know we have got the schedule. We know we can commit
    to, and we can execute. However, we have limited capacity.
        What we saw recently with the issue--with the capacitor
    issue with the 61-12 and the 88 was a result of the fragility
    of our complex, we have allowed programs to basically evaporate
    our business sector, if you will, our--pretty much our defense
    industrial complex, of which we are our own defense industrial
    complex.
        You can't go out and buy plutonium or put out a bid for
    things like that and for manufacturing the unique components
    that we put into our nuclear weapons systems. Those programs
    are long gone. And so what we are doing is basically building
    up capacity from the ground up.
        We would have liked to have avoided the situation that we
    find ourselves in with the 61 and the 88. That said, we have
    had lessons learned from that. We are able to apply them to our
    other systems under which we are operating now and which we are
    modernizing. We are working closely to continue to be aligned
    with the Department of Defense.
        So we are really at, as I said before, a tipping point. We
    have no more margin for error. We have got facilities that need
    to be modernized. We have got personnel that need to be hired
    so we can undertake and execute our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
        Mr. Turner. Two more quick questions for you,
    Administrator. You talked--you used numbers, 61, 88----
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. My apologies.
        Mr. Turner. No. No. Could you tell us what those relate to?
    Where do those numbers come from, 61, 88?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I am sorry. So the B61 Mod 12 is the
    gravity bomb that the U.S. Air Force deploys. That is a
    modernization program. It was actually fielded. The first B16
    was fielded in the early 1960s.
        Mr. Turner. Okay. That is what I wanted you to get to. So
    61 refers to like 1961?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Pretty much roughly the age at which--
    about the time where it was deployed.
        Mr. Turner. And 88?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. And the 88 was 1988 or so.
        Mr. Turner. Okay. So can you tell us how long has it been
    since we have called on you to do this? Because there--I mean,
    it has been over 20 years, has it not----
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Turner [continuing]. Since your--the NNSA has been
    required to actually construct the pit, the nuclear weapon
    portion of a weapon.
        Now, what is important about that--now, I want to hear what
    the year is, how long you think it has been, because people
    think that once you have a nuclear weapon you have a nuclear
    weapon. But if you have it and it sits there for 20, 30, 40
    years, it begins to degrade. So you are going to have to
    replace it. And I think the understanding that people have of
    this, that once you buy one, you have got one, is contrary to
    what your experience is. Could you speak about that for a
    moment?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Let me state by beginning my
    statement by saying that the United States is the only nuclear
    weapons state that is neither designing nor fielding new
    nuclear weapons. We are modernizing our current nuclear weapons
    stockpile, a stockpile that was built for approximately 20
    years for the weapons when they were fielded.
        We have stockpile modernization programs for all of the
    stockpile--of all the weapons that are in our stockpile
    currently. And to your point, we are modernizing them, so we
    are providing--what we are doing, just like I referred to the
    W76-1, that was introduced into the stockpile, into the
    deployable stockpile in the mid-1970s.
        We modernized that over a 20-year plan. It took 10 years to
    develop the technical modernization programs, and then we did
    the production for another 10 years, and we finished that in
    the beginning of 2019. That gives you some idea about the
    progress that it took, but that was the only modernization
    program we had at that time. We are now going through
    significant--some major modernization programs, life extension
    programs for other systems that are currently in the stockpile.
        At some point, however, to your point, sir, that we are not
    going to be able to life extend our way out of our current
    nuclear weapons stockpile. It talks--it speaks to the
    unbelievable talent of our laboratories, plants, and our sites
    that they designed and fielded nuclear weapons for
    approximately 20 years, and we are going to have weapons in our
    stockpile for 60-plus years.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. I
    have additional questions for the rest of them but I will hold
    those until afterwards. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for forbearing.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to all of you for being here and joining with
    us and doing the exceptional work that you do.
        I wanted to just turn first, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, to
    you, because as you may know, there was bipartisan concern
    expressed in our hearing of last week, and it goes back to the
    fact that last year you told us that you needed $16.9 billion
    for fiscal year 2021 to execute the program of record. And now
    only 1 year later, we are speaking about another $3 billion
    more than you planned for just a year ago.
        So I want--if you could express for us, do you consider it
    important that this committee understand why a Virginia-class
    submarine was cut to pay for this increase? General Milley
    specifically said in the last hearing that he did not think
    that this was good prioritization.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The administration has made it clear,
    as has the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense,
    that modernization of our nuclear triad is the number one
    priority. And NNSA is part and parcel of that process.
        And so the requirements that we laid out for our 2021
    request was something that went like this: This was a
    requirements-based, yearlong approach that I shepherded
    personally with our laboratory, plant, site, field office, and
    headquarters leadership to look at every single requirement
    across our enterprise, what was executable and we can execute
    at this level of funding, what were our priorities, what were
    our commitments based on the requirements set forth by the
    Department of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        This was not just a number that we grabbed. This was a
    number that we said: Can you execute? And I asked in our
    internal discussions with our labs, plants, and sites
    leadership, will you be able to execute if we receive these
    resources if they are appropriated by Congress. And the answer
    was a resounding yes.
        We know we have an aggressive schedule. I also recognize
    last year we had not asked for or sought this amount of--these
    amount of resources, but that was because we have a budget
    caps, and we were operating under other situations. This is the
    number. This is a realistic number to get us to resolve the
    decades-long neglect that has been applied to NNSA and our
    enterprises.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
        I want to just turn now to Ms. Bawden because--and you can
    answer this with either a yes or no, if you wish. Are you
    confident that NNSA can execute an unplanned $3 billion, 20
    percent increase in a single year?
        Ms. Bawden. It will be very challenging.
        Mrs. Davis. So we are kind of faced with both of those
    somewhat realities, I guess.
        Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, so given past practice, NNSA is
    likely to only increase its uncosted balances in fiscal year
    2020 given the large increase NNSA received. Is that correct?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. There is a great deal----
        Mrs. Davis. Those are going to grow a lot.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Well, there has been a great deal
    talked about the uncosted balances in the Department of Energy
    at NNSA in particular. I am happy to report by the--at the end
    of fiscal year 2019, NNSA had a net funds of only $637 million.
    That $8 billion carryover, despite the impressive number, is,
    in fact, a reasonable amount for NNSA to carry over when you
    look at $100 billion program over the next 5 years.
        In fact, we are comparable to or less than most other
    Federal agencies when it comes to major construction and the
    life extension programs and all of the other programs that we
    have to administer.
        Mrs. Davis. And can I turn to you again, Ms. Bawden, and
    forgive me for going back and forth like this, but the reality
    is that I think this is helpful for us to get a sense of the
    evaluation on both ends. Can you comment on what the Secretary
    has said? How likely are we to see significant increases in the
    already very large $8 billion uncosted and unobligated balances
    if NNSA were to receive all the money that it is requesting?
        Ms. Bawden. It is a great question, and it really depends
    on how quickly NNSA can ramp up its spending rate. There are
    really two ways to do that, which is through hiring people and
    increasing activity on their contracts. There are plans to do
    that. The Administrator spoke about the Federal salaries and
    expenses increase that is being requested, and we do see, you
    know, a lot of hiring activity among the contractors, but that
    spend rate has to go up very quickly to not see those balances.
        Mrs. Davis. To do that, yeah.
        And, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, so one of the issues, of
    course, is that the NNSA didn't share their budget information
    in a timely manner. So part of the concern here is that we want
    to be certain that the proper planning was done for this budget
    if it was not shared with the DOD in a timely manner. So, in
    fact, they had no way of responding to your request.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time is expired. If you could
    give us a quick answer here, that would be great.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We worked through the Nuclear Weapons
    Council process, and we worked collaboratively with our
    counterparts in the Department of Defense to ensure that we
    continued to be aligned with the requirements set forth by DOD.
        Mrs. Davis. So, in the future, that information would be
    shared with DOD in a timely fashion?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. We will continue to work through the
    executive branch process.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank each of you for being here today. And,
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, I want to thank you very much,
    several weeks ago visiting the Savannah River Site, hosting
    Chairman Adam Smith to witness the crucial national security
    work that NNSA does at the site.
        And I am also very happy to extend a warm welcome to any of
    my colleagues who would like to visit the site to see the
    critical work that has taken place there, and it is especially
    meaningful to me. I am the only Member of Congress who has ever
    worked at the Savannah River Site, and so I know how capable
    the people are who are there on behalf of the American
    citizens.
        With that, Administrator, how is the site progressing with
    the conceptual design for the proposed Savannah River plutonium
    processing facility, and what is the current schedule for the
    crucial Decision 1 package?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Representative Wilson, we are making
    great progress in conceptual design, and we are hopeful that
    the contractor that is working that process at Savannah River
    Site will have that to us this year. Critical Decision 1, or
    CD-1, will be available, will be provided, and will be executed
    in fiscal year 2021 with the request for our funding at $442
    million.
        Mr. Wilson. That is very encouraging. And I know my
    constituents are very happy about any expedition and expedited
    effort.
        Admiral Wolfe, the Navy fielded the W76-2 low-yield warhead
    earlier this month. The Nuclear Posture Review identifies the
    requirement to modify a small number of submarine-launched
    ballistic missile warheads to combat potential adversaries,
    such as Russia, who believe that employment of the low-yield
    nuclear weapons give them an advantage over the United States.
        However, the W76-2 is one of two varieties of W76 which
    just completed its life service extension program. These
    systems will require modernization in the coming years as their
    cores are increasingly older. What are the steps the Department
    is taking to ensure seamless modernization of these systems and
    to ensure that readiness is not impacted given the growing
    nuclear threat of other countries? Additionally, what steps are
    being taken to ensure that the U.S. maintains its nuclear
    deterrence?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
        So the answer to your first part of that is we continue to
    work within NNSA, as Ms. Gordon-Hagerty said, on the
    modernization, on the life extension, particularly the 76, and
    as we went through that program we were lockstep with NNSA. And
    so as we have received custody of those and started to deploy
    those, we have absolute confidence that those weapons are what
    they need to be.
        As we look to the future, as I said, the W88 as we continue
    the Alt 370 for that particular weapon, that will give us
    additional life extension for it. So that will give us the
    deterrent that we need for the W88. And then, in the future,
    that is the whole reason why we are moving forward with NNSA on
    the new program of record, the W93 Mark 7.
        That will give us what we need going into the future to
    help what a STRATCOM requirement is, to meet that, as well as
    make sure that we have a viable deterrent, we have a viable
    path forward for everything that we do both on Ohio and with
    what we are doing with our modernization for the Columbia
    submarine as well.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And, indeed, peace through
    strength, So thank you for what you are doing.
        And, General Clark, I appreciate the administration is
    undergoing review of the U.S. participation in the Open Skies
    Treaty. There is significant cost associated with modernizing
    our Open Skies aircraft for arguably little payoff.
    Additionally, Russia has violated the treaty by restricting our
    access for certain areas of flyovers and also using the treaty
    for surveillance of our President and his home and the nuclear
    command and control.
        With commercial providers able to provide the same, if not
    better, imagery for our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] allies, is there any strategic reason to remain
    in this outdated treaty?
        General Clark. Sir, thank you for your question. And
    currently we are executing Open Skies completely as an Air
    Force to execute it within the bounds of the treaty, and we are
    also moving forward on modernization of the programs until told
    otherwise.
        Regarding whether or not we should be in the treaty, from
    an Air Force perspective, we are in favor of any treaty that is
    verifiable, enforceable, equitable, and to the best interest of
    the United States. But you are correct that we have noted some
    violations by Russia in the treaty, and really it is up to the
    administration to make a decision on the cost benefit of
    whether or not it is worth us staying in. But until that
    decision is made, the Air Force will continue to abide by the
    treaty and execute as appropriate.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you again.
        General Clark. Thank you again.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Ms. Bawden, the NNSA is requesting $15.6 billion for
    weapons activities in fiscal year 2021. The request is $2.8
    billion above the NNSA's plan to request for fiscal year 2021
    as of the fiscal year 2020 budget plan. How concerned are you
    about the long-term affordability of the NNSA's nuclear weapons
    sustainment and modernization plans, and what steps, if any, is
    the NNSA taking to ensure the affordability and executability
    of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?
        Ms. Bawden. Thank you. We are concerned about the long-term
    affordability of the plans. The request that was made for this
    year is sustained over the next 5 years, and we await the long-
    term 25-year plan from NNSA to see what is anticipated as
    budgetary needs beyond that.
        I talked earlier about a recommendation the GAO made in
    2017 concerning the importance of prioritizing programs should
    there be budgetary shortfalls or should programs experience
    cost overruns or schedule delays. And we continue to believe it
    is important that NNSA move toward those kinds of plans in case
    those risks are experienced.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Mr. Mercado, the New START Treaty expires in less than 1
    year. While the administration has said they intend to pursue a
    nuclear arms control agreement with Russia and China, China has
    publicly rejected negotiations. What is the path forward to
    engage with China and pursue an arms control agreement, and
    what is the strategy if China will not participate?
        Mr. Mercado. Mr. Carbajal, sir, I believe as we assess
    China's intent, I think they see more benefit to be part of an
    agreement for the purposes of just to gain information, you
    know, to understand, you know, they have leverage because they
    are expanding their nuclear arsenal while we and Russia have a
    fairly robust, mature arsenal.
        So what they would gain from trying to be part of a treaty
    and still preserve the right to continue to expand, we believe
    that there may be an incentive for them to want to participate.
    However, we have to continually assess their motives. So, as
    you state, Russia and China and us are in very different states
    of our nuclear capabilities. So we have to be very careful
    about that.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        The next questioner was Ms. Cheney, but I believe she has
    left, so Mr. Khanna.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My understanding is that we have about 6,550 nuclear
    weapons. Russia has about 6,800, and China has about 270. Is
    that correct, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, or whoever knows the answer?
    Ballpark.
        Mr. Mercado. Sir, I think China seems about right. And I
    think our--we are capped at roughly about 1,500 or so deployed.
        Mr. Khanna. How many nuclear weapons do we have? My
    understanding is Russia has about 6,800, and we have 6,550. It
    seems like a pretty basic question. I think we should know how
    many nuclear weapons we have.
        Mr. Turner. If the gentleman would yield, the question is
    to deployed weapons and long range and short range, and as they
    just said, we are going to go to classified session. Perhaps it
    would be best for that to be answered there.
        But the distinction, while they were all deer in the
    headlights when you asked the question, is that you have got to
    give them questions based on categories so they are not going
    to--no one--they are not going to be answering a question as
    just an aggregate because of the way things break down. But we
    do have a classified session that the chairman has arranged.
        Mr. Khanna. I guess, what I am trying to understand also
    is, and maybe this would be in classified setting, I mean, 10
    years from now, let's say we didn't do anything, because I
    appreciate Representative Turner's point--at some point, these
    weapons deteriorate, but that is over 20, 30 years. In 10
    years, do we have--do we track how many weapons would we still
    have operational in 10 years and 20 years and 30 years?
        Admiral Wolfe. So, from our perspective, sir, for the Navy,
    absolutely. I mean, but, again, the fundamental discussion goes
    back to what Ms. Gordon-Hagerty said, what we have been saying
    is. But even those in the stockpile, they age every day.
    Whether they are deployed or not, they are aging. And so, you
    know, the physics of all of this starts to take over. So you
    can't just look at this from a pure numbers perspective
    because, as we built these 30, 40 years ago, they will continue
    to age, and so, at some point, to remain credible you have to
    start modernizing.
        Mr. Khanna. Well, we have--and maybe you could present this
    in a classified setting or others--we have a chart saying, you
    know, like a corporation would. Here is when these weapons
    would no longer be good, and here is--you know, in 2030, we are
    going to have these many weapons that work; in 2035, these
    many. Is that correct, somewhere that exists?
        General Clark. Sir, I think, from my perspective, our plans
    for modernization aren't about increasing the numbers of the
    weapons. It is about increasing the quality and modernizing
    them so that they are still credible, capable into the future.
    But as far as greater numbers of weapons is not the direction
    that we are headed.
        Mr. Khanna. No. No. But I guess it would be different,
    right, I mean, it would make a difference for people to know
    whether in 2030 we are going to have 100 weapons that work or
    whether in 2030 we are going to have 2,500 weapons that work.
        You know, I mean, I guess the question is on deterrence,
    right. I mean, I believe--I mean, you may disagree--that there
    is no way in the world--and people can--this is on tape--that
    Russia is going to launch a nuclear weapon against China, even
    though China only has 270 weapons.
        So the question is, what is--is their thinking on what a
    deterrence stockpile is, on what a second credible threat is,
    how many weapons we need to sufficiently achieve deterrence and
    a second strike because it is all priorities? I mean, my bigger
    concern is, is Russia going to launch a cyber attack or
    election interference? And so are people doing that kind of
    analysis?
        Mr. Mercado. Sir, in a closed session, we can go into what
    we have observed and assessed with regard to Russia's recent
    exercise that they have conducted just late last year, to try
    to glean their doctrine and their intent with regard to nuclear
    weapons.
        Mr. Khanna. And my final question, I don't know if you can
    answer it in open session, is what is Russia's strategy in
    terms of--I mean, let's say they have 6,000 and they go to
    15,000. I mean, what are they hoping--what strategic advantage
    does that afford them? Because they would know even if we had
    5,000, we could obliterate them if they struck. So what does
    the marginal advantage of going from 6,000 to whatever give
    Russia?
        Mr. Mercado. Sir, as I said in my opening remarks is that
    our biggest concern at this point, one of the biggest concerns
    is the 2,000 numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons that
    Russia is maintaining and how they are updating that arsenal.
    And I guess we can go again in closed session about, you know,
    how we see their doctrine of employing those 2,000 nonstrategic
    nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Khanna. All right. My final point for the record is I
    fundamentally believe Russia is a has-been power. They are
    about one-tenth of our economy. They are not nearly as
    innovative. We won the Cold War. I think they are the last
    grasp. I am far more concerned about the rise of China and
    other nations.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Bawden, could you explain what a portfolio management
    approach is compared to what NNSA is doing now and why that
    would be better?
        Ms. Bawden. Thank you.
        Mr. Larsen. In the opinion of GAO.
        Ms. Bawden. Sure. So a portfolio management approach
    essentially looks at the big picture. It looks across all of
    the programs and projects, and it would think about sort of
    where are the performance cliffs, what has to be done by a
    certain date, and what are potential tradeoffs? And it
    identifies what that trade space is so that the agency can
    select between programs and projects if such a thing was
    necessary.
        Mr. Larsen. And are you arguing in your report that that is
    more likely to happen and therefore NNSA ought to take that
    approach?
        Ms. Bawden. What we are arguing is that it is an effective
    risk mitigation strategy, and that it should sort of be in
    their back pocket should it be needed. And effectively
    communicating that strategy, we believe, would engender a level
    of trust to understand what requests they are putting forward,
    what that request funds, and what options are should what they
    have requested differ from what actually happens.
        Of course, looking back historically, there have been
    differences between what NNSA and the President have requested
    in their budgets and what has been actually received. So we
    feel that this is an effective risk mitigation strategy should
    that be needed.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, thanks for coming.
    And I don't mean this question--because I respect you and I
    respect the work that you are doing, so I don't mean this
    question to be too snarky, but it seems like the risk strategy
    right now is to throw more money at the enterprise instead of
    manage the portfolio. Tell me where I am wrong.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. I would respectfully disagree with your
    comment. What we have done, as I said, we took a yearlong
    approach. It was requirements based, meaning the priorities set
    forth by the Nuclear Weapons Council and by all of the
    requirements set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review and all of
    the documents that are guiding requirements for the NNSA----
        Mr. Larsen. Can I stop you there, though?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yeah.
        Mr. Larsen. Because if it is requirements based, and I will
    grant you that, then it means you will always have to meet the
    requirements even if you run into delays, you run into the
    issues of programs, platforms and delivery platforms and
    weapons being integrated. If there is delays in one and not
    delay in the other, then the only way to address--meeting the
    requirement is to put more money at it.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Not necessarily, sir. What we do is we
    remain very closely aligned almost on a daily basis with our
    colleagues in the Navy and the Air Force through the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, through action officer groups to ensure that
    we remain aligned through all the programs if we have slips.
        We are working together. In fact, we had recently had one
    with the capacitor issue, and we remain fully aligned with our
    colleagues to ensure that any slippage in the program
    continues--remains fully aligned.
        Mr. Larsen. I would note that last week we perhaps heard
    that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not part of
    that group that is fully aligned with you in testimony where he
    didn't--he wasn't part of that decision making where the money
    was taken out of shipbuilding and put it into nuclear weapons.
    So you all might agree, but maybe it is not everyone is
    agreeing. I would just note that.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. If I may, sir, just one final thing, we
    have updated our weapons activities where we more modernized,
    if you will, or aligned our programs where all of our strategic
    materials now are in alignment. All of our bombs, all of our
    weapons, all of our systems are now aligned to reflect modern
    and future requirements that we have so that we find more
    efficiencies and find--continue to find efficiencies and
    improvements to apply higher fidelity to our programs
    throughout all of NNSA.
        Mr. Larsen. Sure.
        Ms. Bawden, you noted that in your report that NNSA has
    agreed to some of your recommendations and some of them are
    still open. Are they open because there is disagreement, or are
    they open because they haven't got around to them yet?
        Ms. Bawden. We don't see disagreement on this
    recommendation, but typically we measure implementation over a
    4-year period, which we haven't reached yet. We acknowledge
    some progress in terms of planning toward portfolio management.
    Their last long-term plan that was put out last year included
    an affordability analysis, but it didn't expose sort of what
    those tradeoffs might be should budget shortfalls or
    performance problems occur.
        Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Garamendi. I thought Ms. Horn was here, but it looks
    like she has departed as well. You are in luck.
        Mr. Garamendi. I think I prefer to get to the classified.
        Mr. Cooper. Classified session? You are my hero. What a
    great American.
        Mr. Garamendi. I will take what praise I can get.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Lamborn, our honorary member.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be
    part of this hearing and for having this hearing. I am going to
    have a question or two so I may not be as much of a hero at
    this moment.
        But, Ms. Gordon-Hagerty, let me just ask several questions
    drilling down a little bit on the W93. What is driving the
    requirements for the W93 that NNSA is pursuing?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The W93 Mark 7 is a Nuclear Weapons
    Council directed program, a program of record. It was endorsed
    by the--approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and at
    this time, NNSA is being directed to conduct a rigorous phase
    one study to inform us better on the W93. I would defer to my
    colleague from the Navy who sets the requirements for the W73
    Mark 7.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thank you. So I think you heard
    Admiral Richard last week talk about this is a STRATCOM
    requirement. He has a need. He has laid that requirement into
    the Nuke Weapons Council. The Nuke Weapons Council has
    validated that, and that is why the Nuke Weapons Council
    directed a new program of record called the Mark 93--or the W93
    Mark 7.
        My portion of that is the actual aeroshell development and
    all of the nonnuclear components that go with that, which is
    why, as we look into the future, this is an opportunity not
    only to meet a STRATCOM requirement, but as I said earlier, to
    really recapitalize everything that we do.
        We haven't developed aeroshells or built aeroshells in this
    Nation for almost 30 years. That is a technology that is very
    unique to our business, to the Air Force and to the Navy. And
    if we don't start now just looking at the basic technologies,
    and as I talked to the chairman about in a closed session
    recently, and look at where we get those materials, we will
    find ourselves short. And so we have got to start that now as
    we move into the future.
        Mr. Lamborn. How will this warhead have an effect on the
    British allies and their ability to support their modernization
    efforts? For either one of you.
        Admiral Wolfe. So as I said, sir, earlier, so the U.K.
    [United Kingdom] has a parallel program. They have just
    announced it to their Parliament under the Polaris Sales
    Agreement with what I do for the Navy. And I will let Ms.
    Gordon-Hagerty talk about the mutual defense agreement.
        But we are lockstep with the U.K. on what they need to do
    to modernize everything that they are doing in their business
    for the Navy's portion of this, the aeroshell and all the
    nonnuclear components. They will be involved with us. They will
    understand what we are doing so they can leverage that for
    their program. So it is absolutely critical for them to be able
    to do that as we move through our program of record.
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. And for the nuclear explosive package
    for which NNSA is responsible, we work very closely with our
    MOD [Ministry of Defence] counterparts through the Mutual
    Defense Agreement of 1958.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And, lastly, is this to be
    considered a new weapon or weapon system or a different
    configuration of previously produced components?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. The warhead, as we know it today, but
    that is what will inform us and that will be borne out in the
    phase one study as we undertake that phase one study. Right
    now, it is based on previously deployed and also previously
    tested nuclear explosive components. So it will not be
    considered in that vein of we will be producing a whole new
    system. We are, however, required to and will be borne out in
    the study that is called the phase one study. So answering
    questions about whether or not this is a new weapon or we will
    require pits for this, it is premature to answer those
    questions. We do not know, which is why we need to be fully
    informed by the phase one study.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. And on the Navy side, this will
    be--for the nonnuclear components outside of the aeroshell this
    will be a continued evolution and modernization of all of the
    nonnuclear components, electronics, things that are very unique
    to what we do in this business.
        For the aeroshell, we will start to look for all of those
    technologies, like I said, for 30 years that we haven't done,
    and we have basically got to look and figure out how we can
    even produce an aeroshell. Agnostic of whatever the final
    solution is from NNSA, we have got to have this for all of our
    systems as we move into the future. So the budget that we
    requested starting in 2021 goes to develop all those
    technologies so that as we marry up we have got a solution
    moving forward.
        Mr. Lamborn. When I look at what the Russians are doing
    with talk about a nuclear cruise--powered cruise missile or an
    underwater nuclear-tipped submarine, an unmanned submarine or
    some kind of vessel that goes at high speed, those to me are
    new weapons. But to me it strikes me and my personal opinion
    that this is an upgrade of an existing weapon. Would you share
    that perspective?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Our perspective is that these are new
    and novel approaches. They are not something that we would ever
    undertake.
        Mr. Lamborn. You mean the Russians?
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. That the Russians are undertaking. That
    is not something that is even anything we are even considering.
    And we think that those do not help with stability--strategic
    stability talks.
        Mr. Lamborn. But the W93 is an upgrade of an existing----
        Ms. Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, sir. And it will not--at this
    time, we believe that, because it is based on previously tested
    designs, we will not need to test. There will be no explosive--
    nuclear explosive testing required for this system.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. The honorary member was
    in danger of losing his honorary status there.
        The subcommittee will adjourn the public session and resume
    in 2337 as soon as we can get up there.
        [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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