[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS AND
PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY:
IS VA DOING ITS JOB?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-41
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-246 WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
MARK TAKANO, California, Chairman
JULIA BROWNLEY, California DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee, Ranking
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York Member
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice- GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
Chairman AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,
MIKE LEVIN, California American Samoa
MAX ROSE, New York MIKE BOST, Illinois
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SUSIE LEE, Nevada JIM BANKS, Indiana
JOE CUNNINGHAM, South Carolina ANDY BARR, Kentucky
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR., DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania
California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota CHIP ROY, Texas
GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN, W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida
Northern Mariana Islands
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Ray Kelley, Democratic Staff Director
Jon Towers, Republican Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Chairman
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Ranking
MAX ROSE, New York Member
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR., AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,
California American Samoa
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota MIKE BOST, Illinois
CHIP ROY, Texas
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs are also
published in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the
official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare
both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process
of converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
Honorable Chris Pappas, Chairman................................. 1
Honorable Jack Bergman, Ranking Member........................... 2
WITNESSES
Dr. Tamara Bonzanto, Assistant Secretary for Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs... 4
The Honorable Michael Missal, Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Veteran Affairs............................................. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements of Witness
Dr. Tamara Bonzanto Prepared Statement........................... 25
The Honorable Michael Missal Prepared Statement.................. 30
PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS AND PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY:.
IS VA DOING ITS JOB?
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20p.m., in
room 210, House Visitors Center, Hon. Chris Pappas (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Pappas, Rice, Rose, Cisneros,
Bergman, and Bost.
Also present: Representative Takano.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS PAPPAS, CHAIRMAN
Mr. Pappas. Today's hearing will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time.
I ask unanimous consent for our colleague Representative
Biggs to participate in today's hearing, should he be able to
attend, and, without objection, so ordered.
I would also like to welcome our Full Committee chairman,
Mark Takano, who is with us here today too.
Today's Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee hearing is
entitled ``Protecting Whistleblowers and Promoting
Accountability: Is VA Doing Its Job?''
In June, the subcommittee held a hearing to discuss the
importance of VA whistleblowers. We heard testimony from people
inside the VA who raised major questions and concerns about
critical problems that affect the health and well-being of
veterans. These witnesses were willing to blow the whistle even
when it risked their livelihood and their careers. However, all
three of the VA employees that day testified they are still
experiencing retaliation as whistleblowers and, unfortunately,
they are not alone. My office hears from other whistleblowers
describing similar outrageous stories of retaliation and how
the VA turns a deaf ear to their plight.
In July, Assistant Secretary Bonzanto, the top official
from the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection
(OAWP), appeared before our subcommittee. I was not satisfied
with her testimony at the time, and I think it is fair to say
that the subcommittee members expressed the need for VA to
change its culture and ensure it is listening to and protecting
whistleblowers, and that has to be the highest priority.
Last week, the Inspector General (IG) released its report
that examined the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection. The IG's findings in this report right here are
stark and damning, describing a failure by VA to perform basic
missions and investigating allegations and protecting
whistleblowers.
The IG report states that the office floundered in its
mission to protect whistleblowers. Leaders created an office
that was, quote, ``sometimes alienating to the very individuals
it was meant to protect.''
According to press statements, VA is trying to spin the
report as simply problems of the past; this is a misreading of
the IG's report.
Clearly, the early leaders of OAWP made major missteps.
However--and this must be clearly stated--the IG also describes
how major failures continue to this day. The IG report lays out
22 recommendations for VA and the Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection, 22; all of these recommendations
remain open. Oddly, the VA has stated publicly that a number of
these recommendations have been resolved and I do not believe
this is true, and I hope Mr. Missal will clarify that in his
testimony.
I would go further to say this, that this inability to
admit failure is also part of the problem that we face. The VA
has not recognized how badly it treats whistleblowers and the
culture of retaliation that exists.
On September 30th, I joined the Full Committee chair, Mark
Takano, in sending a letter to VA, pointing out that OAWP is
not performing its basic missions for protecting
whistleblowers. The Secretary is not receiving proposals for
action that would hold VA leaders accountable, nor is the
office training VA supervisors about the rights and protections
of whistleblowers, and this is simply unacceptable.
I have said this before and it needs to be repeated:
whistleblowers are an important source of information and they
can not be ignored. Their rights must be protected, so that
future whistleblowers will have confidence that their stories
will be heard and assurance that their allegations will be
investigated without reprisal.
So far, the office has not achieved this basic mission. We
need to have a complete explanation as to how Dr. Bonzanto will
get the job done. Whistleblowers are waiting and empty promises
will not do.
With that, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Bergman
for 5 minutes for any opening remarks he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF JACK BERGMAN, RANKING MEMBER
Mr. Bergman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start by thanking Inspector General Missal and
his staff for their work on this thorough and well-reasoned
report; I am confident that they have left no stone unturned.
Accountability at all levels of the Department of Veterans
Affairs is one of my, and I know the entire staff's, highest
priorities. When we first examined the Office of Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection, OAWP, in July 2018, I expressed
my concern to Mr. O'Rourke about a breakdown in the
Department's chain of command. Dr. Roe cautioned that, while
well-intentioned, OAWP may come to constitute another layer of
bureaucracy and, worse, seek to expand beyond the intent of the
Accountability Act.
Given OAWP's lack of any written policies and procedures at
the time, several different members of the committee questioned
Mr. O'Rourke about the rationale for and the propriety of the
office's activities. We now know that the situation was even
worse than we believed. This OIG report leaves no doubt that
OAWP misinterpreted its statutory mandate, conducted unsound
and biased investigations on multiple occasions, and failed to
establish safeguards to protect whistleblowers from
retaliation.
Many of the report's findings seem to be indicative of a
cynical or self-serving attitude in OAWP under the previous
leadership. There is no doubt OAWP was badly in need of top-to-
bottom housecleaning to fully turn the page on this disturbing
era.
Mr. Chairman, the OIG report makes clear that these
leadership deficiencies were the root cause of many of OAWP's
problems. I hope we will now focus on the future of OAWP, whose
mission you and Chairman Takano described as critical to
veterans, rather than dwell in the past regarding individuals
who are no longer with the VA.
I am encouraged that Dr. Bonzanto is now leading OAWP. I am
pleased to hear that she has already submitted information
responsive to ten of the recommendations and I believe--I think
I heard you say 22, so we are almost at 50-percent response
already; however, this is only the beginning of the office's
rehabilitation. This afternoon, I expect to hear what she has
accomplished since her confirmation on January 7th, 2019, as
well as what her plan looks like to tackle the challenges that
remain within her office. I want specifics, including dates, as
to when additional reforms will be implemented.
Above all else, OAWP needs to return to focusing on its
core statutory mission. This organization has to learn to walk
before it can run. The report details example after example of
OAWP investigating individuals beyond its authority, while at
the same time arbitrarily narrowing the scope of alleged
wrongdoing to be considered. Sometimes the investigations
appeared to be personally motivated. Many times OAWP would
simply refer an investigation back to the office where the
allegations originated. All too often, investigations were
conducted as disciplinary actions in search of evidence rather
than as comprehensive and fair-minded inquiries into all the
available evidence.
It would be unreasonable for an office of roughly 100
people to adjudicate misconduct allegations originating from a
workforce of over 350,000 people. Let me be clear, I am not
advocating super-sizing OAWP to do all these things; rather, we
need to see a more effective OAWP with a laser-like focus on
its statutory mission of receiving, reviewing, and
investigating executive misconduct, retaliation, and poor
performance, as well as any sort of whistleblower retaliation
by senior leaders and managers. Although OAWP's work is
difficult, I have no doubt that most of the employees believe
in the mission and work hard to do the right thing, even under
the previous leadership.
The OIG report notes that many of the original employees
were human resources specialists. Human resources and
administrative investigations are very different disciplines
and it is possible that these employees were never put in a
position to succeed. I want to see VA's strategy to recruit and
place seasoned investigators in these critical positions. The
current strategic pause on recommending new personnel actions
makes sense until quality is established, but what comes next?
Holding senior leaders accountable is a core function of
this office. I hope that there is some capacity for OAWP to
perform reviews at this time and I would like to know what the
plan is.
Finally, I expect OAWP to treat whistleblowers with care in
all its activities. The report paints a disturbing picture of
cavalier culture and careless practices. I think it is not only
right, but necessary to hold OAWP to the highest standards of
integrity in order for the VA workforce to have confidence in
the office's actions. Whistleblowers, to entrust it with their
futures, OAWP must project the values of fairness, honesty, and
incorruptibility.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you for your comments, Mr. Bergman. We
will now hear from our witnesses.
First I would like to introduce Dr. Tamara Bonzanto, she is
the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection. The subcommittee thanks you for appearing before us
today and, Dr. Bonzanto, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF TAMARA BONZANTO
Ms. Bonzanto. Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today about VA's Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection, OAWP.
OAWP's establishment is meant to highlight the need for
accountability in VA. Since my appointment in January, I have
expeditiously undertaken actions to ensure that a culture of
accountability exists within OAWP, with a goal of regaining the
trust of employees, whistleblowers, and veterans.
My written testimony addresses reforms underway in OAWP;
however, I want to highlight a few examples.
OAWP's staff was signing off on recommendations not to take
disciplinary action without sending those recommendations to me
for review. When I identified this was happening, I immediately
put a stop to this practice; I now review all recommendations.
In reviewing recommendations for disciplinary actions, I
identified several deficiencies, including investigative
reports that did not contain witness interviews. To improve
oversight for investigations, I established smaller
investigative teams with ten investigators per supervisor. I
also brought in a new leadership team, which include
individuals with substantial experience managing whistleblower
retaliation investigations. I established a quality control
team to independently review investigative reports for
thoroughness and accuracy.
OAWP is working on standard operating procedures for
investigations and customized investigator training.
With regard to the timeliness of investigations, OAWP takes
around 215 days to complete an investigation. This resulted in
a backlog of 572 cases, some dating back to 2017. My goal is to
reduce this timeframe to 120 days and eliminate the backlog by
the end of the next calendar year. Some of the above reforms
will help us achieve this goal.
I also realigned staff, so that we have investigators.
Because of the extensive time that an OAWP investigation takes,
I mandated that staff regularly update individuals about the
status of their matters. OAWP is leveraging best practices from
across the Government to help us ensure that our investigations
are timely.
I recognize that individuals have to trust OAWP for them to
share information with us. Around August 2019, I found out
about a list of individuals that was sent to prior OAWP
leadership. This list contained detailed information about the
allegation raised by individuals and OAWP staff opinions about
the individuals and their allegations. According to OAWP staff,
this list was requested by former OAWP leadership and was
related to a whistleblower mentorship program, which I have now
canceled.
Regardless of the intent, it was inappropriate to utilize
whistleblower information to establish such a list and provide
opinions about individuals who raised allegations of
wrongdoing.
The deficiencies in OAWP have had a substantial impact on
whistleblowers and VA employees who disclose wrongdoing. The
organizational changes underway bring OAWP into compliance with
the law and reflect a fundamental change in the way we do
business. I will continue to engage with stakeholders,
including OAWP employees, as we address the deficiencies.
As a registered nurse, Navy veteran, and former
investigator on this committee, I am committed to
accountability in VA. I have the support of the Secretary and
VA leadership as I continue to address the deficiencies in
OAWP.
I ask for your support and I appreciate the input from you
and your staff as I continue to ensure that OAWP does a better
job at improving the culture of accountability in VA and
protecting whistleblowers.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the
committee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[The Prepared Statement Of Tamara Bonzanto Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much.
I will now recognize our second witness, Mr. Michael
Missal, the VA Inspector General. Mr. Missal, you have 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MISSAL
Mr. Missal. Thank you. Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member
Bergman, Chairman Takano, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Office of
Inspector General's report, ``Failures Implementing the VA
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.''
In June 2018, we received a request from Members of
Congress raising concerns that VA was not properly implementing
the Act. In addition, we received complaints directly from VA
employees and others relating to concerns about OAWP's
operations. We were also denied access by VA leaders to
information about the operations of the OAWP.
In response, we conducted a review focusing on the OAWP's
operations from June 23rd, 2017 through December 31st, 2018.
During this review, additional allegations arose as new OAWP
leaders began making changes, prompting further related work
through August 2019.
As detailed in our report, we identified significant
deficiencies in the operations of the OAWP. We made six overall
findings: first, that the OAWP misinterpreted its statutory
mandate, resulting in failures to act within its investigative
authority; second, that the OAWP did not consistently conduct
procedurally sound, accurate, thorough, and unbiased
investigations and related activities; third, they struggled
with implementing the act's enhanced authority to hold
executives covered by the act accountable; fourth, the OAWP
failed to fully protect whistleblowers from retaliation; fifth,
VA failed to implement various requirements under the act,
including revising supervisors performance plans and developing
supervisors training regarding whistleblowers rights; and,
sixth, the OAWP lacked transparency in its information
management practices.
We recognize that organizing the operation of any new
office is challenging, but OAWP leaders made avoidable mistakes
early in its development that created an office culture that
was sometimes alienating to the very individuals it was meant
to protect. Those leadership failures distracted the OAWP from
its core mission, and likely diminished the desired confidence
of whistleblowers and other potential complainants in the
operations of the office.
VA employees who identify serious misconduct must feel
protected when coming forward with complaints. They are
essential to helping VA spot and address significant problems
that may otherwise go undetected and persist, which could
increase veterans' risk of harm.
Our report highlights significant failings by OAWP's former
leaders that have had a chilling effect on complainants still
being felt today.
To address the issues identified, we made 22
recommendations. VA concurred with all recommendations and
provided action plans for implementation. However, some of the
planned actions lacked sufficient clarity or specific steps to
ensure corrective actions will adequately address the
recommendations. All 22 recommendations remain open and we will
monitor implementation of VA's planned and recently implemented
actions to ensure that they have been effective and sustained.
We recognize that there have been changed made by Assistant
Secretary Bonzanto to attempt to establish the trust of
whistleblowers and other complainants due to missteps and a
culture set by former leaders. Recent communications to the OIG
hotline, however, indicate that some individuals continue to
harbor a fear of OAWP retaliation or disciplinary action for
reporting suspected wrongdoing. The OIG wants the goals of the
act to be accomplished. Whistleblowers play a critical role in
oversight and they need to have confidence that their concerns
will be heard and properly considered, and that their
identities will be protected.
The OAWP leaders and staff who are committed to improving
VA programs and operations face considerable challenges in
overcoming the deficiencies identified in our report.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I am happy
to answer any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee may have.
[The Prepared Statement Of Michael Missal Appears In The
Appendix]
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr.
Missal.
We will now move to the question portion of the hearing
today and I would like to start by recognizing myself for 5
minutes.
Dr. Bonzanto, thanks for your testimony. One of your main
responsibilities as Assistant Secretary to provide
recommendations for disciplinary action to the Secretary. You
have acknowledged that over your tenure you have sent one
single recommendation for action so far; is that correct?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pappas. I would like to be frank. In light of that, is
that adequate? Are you meeting the responsibilities of your
job?
Ms. Bonzanto. At this time, I can say that I am also
equally frustrated that I have not been able to send additional
recommendations to the Secretary for disciplinary action, but
as the IG highlighted and I found in the recommendations I
reviewed, there was significant deficiencies in the
investigative report and it needed to be sent back for review.
Mr. Pappas. Sure. I understand you have those quality
concerns about the office's investigations and rightfully so,
given what Mr. Missal has found. No one would suggest that you
should recommend disciplinary action based on shoddy
investigations, but the office continues to conduct
investigations without procedures for how they should be done
and in fact, despite your stated concerns over quality, you
increased the number of investigations that each investigator
is expected to handle.
Help me understand the logic behind that. Why are you
directing your staff to continue investigations when you have
not developed necessary guidance or training to address your
concerns about quality, and is your office going to have to go
back and redo some of these investigations?
Ms. Bonzanto. No. To your address your concern regarding
the staff training, staff has had training in the past prior to
my arrival, they also had training when I came on board. The
staff also, we have a quality team that is going to be
reviewing the investigations and increasing the number of
investigations that they are carrying. When I came on board,
the staff were carrying two investigations per investigator on
average and that resulted in a significant backlog, there was a
lack of oversight. To improve that, we also made the teams
smaller and had smaller teams with at least ten investigators
per supervisor.
Before those recommendations come to me, they are getting
reviewed by a supervisor, getting reviewed by a quality team,
and then being sent up for review by myself.
Mr. Pappas. What about the standard operating procedures?
Ms. Bonzanto. The standard operating procedures is
currently in development. We most recently in September
published our directive and we needed the framework for
investigations, that framework will then be used to develop our
internal processes, and that is currently in draft and I expect
that to be completed by the end of this calendar year.
Mr. Pappas. By the end of 2019?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, could you be clear about one major
point here. The major failures that you identified in your
report continue today?
Mr. Missal. We have not closed out any of the
recommendations, so the report is our most current information.
Mr. Pappas. The 22 recommendations have not been closed
out, all remain open. You did say in your testimony that some
of the actions lacked specificity and you still have concerns
about the action plan; is that correct?
Mr. Missal. That is correct.
Mr. Pappas. Dr. Bonzanto, we hear from whistleblowers that
they often experience retaliation in the form of a hostile work
environment, things like being isolated in a basement office,
about being assigned to a room without working air conditioning
or heat, not being given the tools an individual needs to
complete his or her job.
In June, we heard from Mr. Jeff Dettbarn, a VA X-ray
technologist who described the retaliation he has experienced
after blowing the whistle on concerns about the quality of
veterans' care. It has been years since Mr. Dettbarn reported
concerns to OAWP, yet he continues to face a hostile work
environment and has had his duties reduced to only menial
tasks.
Other than placing stays on terminations, how else does
your office protect whistleblowers like Mr. Dettbarn?
Ms. Bonzanto. Since I have been on board, I have actually
mandated that staff reaches out to whistleblowers and
communicate with them. Communication and transparency is key in
building trust with the whistleblowers that we are serving and
the VA employees that are coming forward. This way it is giving
us the opportunity to identify if they are facing retaliation
early in the process.
Also, improving investigations and improving the work
product of the team will help protect whistleblowers, because
then we can have thorough and accurate investigations.
Mr. Pappas. Well, what about the fear that some individuals
have--and Mr. Missal cited it here today--of the fear that they
have in reaching out to OAWP, that they are not going to be
protected or have the advocate in their corner that they need,
is that of concern to you?
Ms. Bonzanto. That is of concern. As the IG report
highlighted, the fear was substantiated in the investigations
that were done and there were a lot of examples in there where
whistleblowers themselves were not interviewed. That fear is
real and I acknowledge that. I have taken--as I said, we have
taken a totally different direction. I want to be transparent
with whistleblowers, I want them to trust that they can come
forward and know that we are here to hear their concerns and
protect them from retaliation.
Mr. Pappas. Well, I know we have spoken about this and I
really want you to be an advocate for whistleblowers across the
VA system. It is critically important that these individuals
who are just looking out for veterans have the ability to come
forward to talk about waste, fraud, and abuse that they see,
and to be a part of improvements ultimately for veterans in the
end.
I think we need to continue to see more work on that front,
we need to continue to insist that you meet some of the dates
that you have said here today in your testimony about how you
are going to introduce, you know, some of these proposals to
move OAWP forward.
With that, my time is up. I would like to turn it over to
Ranking Member Bergman for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bonzanto, you know and being in the Navy, you join a
command, you become part of a command, in some cases you are
the commander, and it is the commander's responsibility to
establish a command climate and also that command culture. When
you are a commander coming into a unit that is already
established, good or bad, you inherit what you inherit. It is
what it is and it is not necessarily what you want it to be
yet. That is where you put your fingerprints on it and your
stamp on it to make it that superior command that you want to
pass along to the next person.
Having said that, I know you are doing everything you can
at this point given what you were given. Your office is
responsible for actions by senior leaders and executives, as
well as managers, when whistleblower retaliation is alleged.
Approximately how many VA employees fall within this
jurisdiction, how many senior leaders and executives?
Ms. Bonzanto. I would say around 540 falls in that core
group----
Mr. Bergman. Okay.
Ms. Bonzanto.--of senior executives.
Mr. Bergman. Basically, that is a relatively small subset
of the VA total workforce. I understand that you put
disciplinary recommendations on hold out of concerns for the
quality of the investigations, but I hope you have some current
capacity, and we kind of talked about this already, investigate
properly. What is your plan to lift the hold and resume a full
level, if you will, of investigative capability?
Ms. Bonzanto. Currently--so, coming on board, we actually--
what I saw, there was a need for oversight, so these are some
of the steps I have taken to get to this point right now. We
have increased the oversight operation by having smaller teams.
We have also--I am now reviewing all the investigative reports
for recommendation and for closure. Whistleblowers are
contacted every 14 days; that improves transparency in the
process. I have also realigned the organization to basically
eliminate duplicative efforts that was happening within the
teams.
We have issued a directive of hired most recently
investigative leadership with a background in investigating
whistleblower retaliation cases and doing administrative
investigations. We have also implemented a case management
system, which allows us to track cases and have a platform for
staff to document, and we have the quality review team that is
in place.
Those are the things that are currently done. The
priorities to continue working on this is to hire additional
leadership for stability to establish the Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for the investigators to be able to do their
job, and to establish performance standards for the
investigators, so that they can be held accountable for doing
their jobs.
Mr. Bergman. Dr. Bonzanto, if I was a whistleblower working
at VA and suffering retaliation by my supervisor today, should
I have confidence in OAWP to handle my allegations competently
and fairly?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
Mr. Bergman. Is it perfect or have you still got some
improvements?
Ms. Bonzanto. Sir, we still have a lot of work to do.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Mr. Missal, do you agree with that?
Mr. Missal. I think it still remains to be said. Certainly,
from our review, we found that they were not handling the
investigations appropriately. I know Dr. Bonzanto is trying to
make changes, but it is going to take some time for them to go
through.
I would just like to add one thing that is somewhat
disturbing, it is if you look at the organizational chart that
Dr. Bonzanto included in her testimony, there are a lot of
empty positions and, as she just pointed out, she needs to fill
those positions. Until that leadership structure gets filled
out, it is going to be really hard to make the changes that I
know she wants to make.
Mr. Bergman. Dr. Bonzanto, is OAWP still closing and
declining to investigate matters that fall within your
statutory authority?
Ms. Bonzanto. No, sir.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Is OAWP still opting to investigate
individuals in matters outside of its jurisdiction?
Ms. Bonzanto. OAWP is investigating matters with an
authorized scope, sir.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Dr. Bonzanto, is OAWP now cooperating
with the Office of Inspector General and can give me some
tangible examples of how this is--you know, it is changed that
you are cooperating?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir. Mr. Missal and I actually meet
monthly or as needed, as often as we need to do with the staff.
We have had great communication between us since I have been on
board. We have been collaborating on a lot of the improvements
or I have been actually asking his staff for best practices of
things they are doing well. Those are the examples I can give
you and I am sure there is more.
Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Missal. Yes. There is certainly jurisdiction that
overlaps, and so what really needs to be done is to ensure that
the right organization is handling a particular matter. Aside
from OAWP, there is the Office of Special Counsel, there is the
Office of Resolution Management, there are a number of
different avenues a complainant can go to. Unless all of those
offices coordinate their efforts and communicate together, it
is going to make it really tough.
I would agree with Dr. Bonzanto that the lines of
communication between our office and OAWP has drastically
improved since she came on board.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Bergman.
I would now like to recognize Chairman Takano for 5
minutes.
Mr. Takano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bonzanto, you have expressed a lot of concerns about
the quality and consistency of the work that OAWP has done,
some of which was prior to your confirmation as Assistant
Secretary. Are all these issues surprising to you given the
lack of standard operating procedures for investigations?
Ms. Bonzanto. These issues were not surprising given the
fact that there are a lot of leadership vacancies in the
organization, so it goes beyond the standard operating
procedures. I need to fill those vacancies in order to be able
to have a team, to build a team out.
Mr. Takano. Well, but there is a connection to the quality,
the lack of quality, and the consistency of the work, and the
lack of standard operating procedures?
Ms. Bonzanto. I would say I need investigators with a
background in investigations and the H.R. staff that I
currently have on board also to ensure that they have the
training to be able to do the investigations, then establish.
We recently----
Mr. Takano. Well, let me ask you, is it correct that it
took 9 months after your appointment to publish a basic policy
on investigations?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
Mr. Takano. Your office still does not have standard
operating procedures to guide investigations; is that true?
Ms. Bonzanto. Right. We published in September the
framework and now we are developing the standard operating
procedures based on that framework.
Mr. Takano. They are still yet to be established this many
months into your tenure.
Ms. Bonzanto. Basically, it has taken time to get to this
point. As the IG found, there were substantial issues with the
office and operations of the office. I identified a lot of
issues that were deep-rooted and started addressing those
issues. Then I had vacancies in leadership that also slowed
progress and I wanted to ensure that the changes----
Mr. Takano. Well, in claiming my time, I need to get to--I
am sorry.
Ms. Bonzanto. Okay.
Mr. Takano. Mr. Missal, can you speak to how the office's
lack of standard operating procedures contributes to all of the
failures that your report has identified?
Mr. Missal. It is very critical. If you do not have
standard operating procedures, you are going to have
inconsistencies, and if one of the goals is to earn and get the
trust of whistleblowers, it is hard for them to have that trust
if they recognize that the office to whom that they are going
to make a complaint does not have standard operating procedures
to do investigations.
Mr. Takano. This many months into Dr. Bonzanto's tenure,
you know, it is critical--I mean, this is a missing piece, a
critical missing piece of the standard operating procedures and
it seems to be, as you said, the heart of gaining the
confidence of potential whistleblowers to come to the office.
Mr. Missal. It is one of the missing pieces, along with
filling out the leadership team.
Mr. Takano. Okay, great.
Dr. Bonzanto, you have cited the need for training for your
staff to appropriately conduct investigations and perform
quality assurance steps, and you noted that your staff has
received initial training on these topics. The Project on
Government Oversight recently reported major concerns about the
quality of this training. In one surprising point, their
analysis shows that portions of the training materials appear
to be pulled from Wikipedia. The article even noted that
participants referred to the training as, quote, ``not even
remotely useful,'' end quote, and that the instructors had to
make changes to the material on the fly.
Dr. Bonzanto, has this training provided you any more
confidence that your office will be able to produce high-
quality investigations?
Ms. Bonzanto. I want to take this opportunity to address
that concern in the article regarding the training. I just want
to say that the contractor that was identified was a veteran-
owned small business contract. We started working on this
contract for the training sometime in June. My staff raised
concerns during the contract about the qualifications of the
contractor. We were informed by the contracting office that we
will get the product that we are requesting. We provided edits
and feedback to the contracting office. We were also again
assured around August-September timeframe that the product will
be delivered. The product that we requested from contracting
was not what we requested, what we were told we were going to
get, and we are now working with contracting to address those
issues.
Mr. Takano. Well, so let me get this straight. You are not
able to do your job because you are concerned about the quality
of your office's work; you have many staff that have been
reassigned to perform investigations that they have no
experience conducting; you tried to get your staff quickly
trained, but the contractor you paid simply pulled from
Wikipedia and other online sources instead of developing
useful, detailed training materials.
I am just--this is incredulous to me and to be frank, Dr.
Bonzanto, I do not have confidence in this office. If I am
approached by a whistleblower from my district, I cannot in
good conscience direct them to work with your office, and I, as
a Member of Congress, have had to do that with VA facilities,
and that is not going to change until I actually see some real
progress.
Thank you for your testimony today. Thank you.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Chairman Takano.
I would now like to recognize Mr. Bost for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bonzanto, your testimony states that Secretary Wilkie
and yourself, and I quote, ``recognize the intent for
transparency,'' and that is end quote, behind the statutory
requirements to report to Congress within 60 days when your
disciplinary recommendations are not implemented. Okay?
Recognizing that the intent is one thing, but we are
talking about a law. Okay? Will you commit to provide these
reports in every instance the law requires?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bost. Okay, I want to make sure of that.
Inspector General Missal, do you believe the culture of
accountability exists right now within the OAWP?
Mr. Missal. We did not find that when we were conducting
the investigation. We are obviously going to take another look
as we assess the implementation of the recommendations.
Mr. Bost. Dr. Bonzanto, do you agree with that, or does a
culture of accountability now exist?
Ms. Bonzanto. A culture of accountability now exists in
OAWP, sir, and I am working on improving it.
Mr. Bost. Okay. Mr. Missal, it is my understanding that the
OAWP submitted information seeking to close ten of the OIG's
recommendations; when do you think that will be complete and
that you could actually start seeing some things that you can
make a decision for these closures?
Mr. Missal. It is hard to say when we are going to get the
information. What was produced to us was, as Dr. Bonzanto said,
the framework of certain guidance that they are going to have.
They still need to fill all that in.
The way our process works is 90 days after a report is
published, we then meet with the responsible parties and start
talking through what are they doing to close the
recommendations, and we are very transparent about what we need
to get them closed, so that will be part of the process. If the
party wants to try to close them earlier, we are always happy
to meet with them.
Mr. Bost. Dr. Bonzanto, let me ask this. I think that
Ranking Member Bergman brought this up about taking and
assuming a command when you could inherit some problems. The
question that is really before this committee is because, as
the chairman said, you know, we each have our own--when we are
dealing with those people who are whistleblowers and we want
them to make sure that they feel comfortable in the fact of the
reporting to make sure that the VA operates better, see the
problems that are really existing, but the concern is, is that
when--you have inherited the problem and I understand you are
trying to fix it, but we are a long time into it.
The general public out there, even though they may know
there is a problem and you inherited a problem, they want it
fixed correctly, but they also want it fixed quickly. I think
that the ability for us to go back to our constituents and say,
yes, we are getting this problem straightened out, we need to
know that you are doing everything you can as fast as you can.
Now, we want it right, but we also need it very quickly, and I
think that is the concern that we are dealing with here.
It is my hope that when I am sure we are going to continue
in this committee to monitor this that you can come back with
some very positive reports very quickly. Working with the
Inspector General, it is fantastic that you are doing that, but
I spend way too much time in my life, not only with the VA, but
everything in government, especially on this Federal Government
level after being in the State government, which I was in
Illinois, there are a lot of problems there, but to try to
explain to people that it takes--when the problems were
identified, we are going to be over a year getting them
straightened out. The people that are suffering and the
employees that are being put in these situations where they are
not comfortable at work because they actually brought something
up we have got to try to fix, but thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Bost.
I would now like to recognize Mr. Cisneros for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bonzanto, just to kind of follow up on the chairman's
question, is there an ETA for getting your standard operating
procedures in place?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir, the end of the calendar year.
Mr. Cisneros. Is that on track right now, are we going to
get that done, or will it be delayed?
Ms. Bonzanto. It is on track right now, sir.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. You know, there have been a lot of
situations where there has been retaliation against
whistleblowers from middle and senior management when they have
come out and spoken up against them. What is the office of
OAWP, how are they addressing these issues? What penalties or
disciplinary action are they taking, is OAWP taking against
these middle managers and senior executives that are going
after people that are coming and blowing the whistle on them?
Ms. Bonzanto. OAWP recommends disciplinary action when
allegations are substantiated, we do not take the disciplinary
action. Then there is a notification process in place that if
the recommendation that is given by myself to the proposing
official is not taken within 60 days, notification is sent to
Congress if the action falls out of my recommendation.
Mr. Cisneros. Do you have data on that?
Ms. Bonzanto. Currently, I have only submitted one
recommendation for disciplinary action, sir.
Mr. Cisneros. Only one?
Ms. Bonzanto. We are still within the 60-day timeframe,
correct.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Dr. Bonzanto, recommendation 7 of the
IG's report speaks to setting up of a quality assurance
function in the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection to help address the investigative issues the IG
identified. The agency's response to the recommendation states
the VA has completed action to address this recommendation,
although the IG stated here today that all 22 recommendations
remain open. How does the OAWP stand up to quality assurance
functions if it has not yet developed standard operating
procedures to guide the underlying investigations in the first
place?
Ms. Bonzanto. We have actually had the quality team set up
and we have actually when found--we have checklists in place.
We actually have a draft, we are drafting the SOPs. We have a
checklist in place of critical things like, for example, a
simple did you interview a witness, we have the checklist for
the quality staff to be reviewing the investigative reports.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Just to follow up on the question
regarding training that the chairman stated was being pulled
off of the Internet and Wikipedia. Who authorized that contract
to that vendor, the VA?
Ms. Bonzanto. The VA contracting office, yes, correct.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. Going forward with the training, I
mean, is there a new contract in development, has one been
issued now, or what is going on with the new contract for
training?
Ms. Bonzanto. We do not have a new contract for training,
sir. Currently, I have actually most recently brought on new
leaders with a background in investigation and we are working
internally to develop customized training for the
investigators.
Mr. Cisneros. Is that same vendor still under contract?
Ms. Bonzanto. No, sir. We are actually working with the
contracting office to address the concerns that were raised
regarding the quality of the product we received.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Cisneros.
I would now like to recognize Miss Rice for 5 minutes.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Bonzanto, you just said that you have only made one
recommendation for disciplinary action since January of this
year; is that correct?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, ma'am.
Miss Rice. Out of how many cases?
Ms. Bonzanto. About 16 I reviewed personally myself that I
was only able to send one recommendation for disciplinary
action.
Miss Rice. Well, those are 16 that you reviewed?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
Miss Rice. Were there more?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, ma'am. There were 42 cases that were
reviewed by the quality team that was sent back to
investigations to be reviewed, to be completed.
Miss Rice. You only looked at 16 of those?
Ms. Bonzanto. Sixteen of those--I did not look at any of
the 42. Once the quality team was in place, they started
reviewing the cases before I got the cases. 16 actually came
completed with recommendations to me and this is earlier before
the quality team was established----
Miss Rice. What happened to the difference between 42 and
16?
Ms. Bonzanto. Those 16 were totally separate from the 42
cases. Those 16, some of them are still being worked out.
Miss Rice. I guess my question is, so 42 cases and there is
only one recommendation made, what happened to the other ones?
What were the findings of the other ones?
Ms. Bonzanto. The other findings were some of the
deficiencies I identified in investigative reports where a
witness is not being interviewed, conclusive statements in the
case file that was not supported by evidence, and that is two
good examples I can give you that was consistent in some of the
deficiencies I found.
Miss Rice. The whistleblowers were not believed or were not
found to be credible?
Ms. Bonzanto. In instances they were not interviewed.
Miss Rice. They were not interviewed?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
Miss Rice. Ever?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes. The IG highlighted that occurred in the
office, correct.
Miss Rice. Here is my concern. We have a lot of rhetoric
right now in the public discourse about whistleblowers and
there is certain terminology being used to describe exactly
what they are by some people, specifically the President of the
United States and other people in his administration. How much
of the President's feeling about whistleblowers specifically,
how does that affect your job?
I mean, this administration set up this office, said they
were going to take care of whistleblowers within the VA,
because they have actually uncovered some really bad things
going on within the VA, just speaking about that agency. They
should be heard and they should be protected, but we have an
environment right now that is very hostile to whistleblowers.
How much of the big boss, right, the President's opinion about
whistleblowers, how does that affect people in your office and
how they look at whistleblowers?
Ms. Bonzanto. I can say from coming on this committee and
also working as an investigator on this committee, I value
whistleblowers. I took this position because I value the input
whistleblowers bring to improving VA.
As a veteran and a nurse, I also know the impact
whistleblowers have on an organization when they bring
information forward that can really change the operation of the
organization. I have informed my staff that it is critical that
they listen and they understand the view of the whistleblowers,
they understand that when they do not pay attention lives are
impacted, and they must listen to the whistleblower and get
both sides of the story when they conduct an investigation.
I expect thorough and accurate investigations and nothing
less. I know, I am equally as frustrated I could not put
recommendations forward, more than one, but that shows that we
need to improve and I am going to continue to improve. At this
time I can say that I am committed to the process and I am here
for that reason, because I believe in the value whistleblowers
bring to the organization.
Miss Rice. I appreciate your position, because if you do
not feel that way, we are in trouble, No. 1, but I still find
it very alarming that there has only been one recommendation
out of all of the cases that have been brought since January.
I guess, you know, you can only address this problem if you
train people on how to identify, you know, what to do in an
instance where you see something, how you report it, whatever
the training is. I mean, a big criticism that they were not
even--the trainers did not even know what they were talking
about, did not know how to train people.
I mean, how serious do you think whistleblowers take your
mission when you contract out for God knows how many millions
of dollars a service that you got really a poor quality work
product from?
Ms. Bonzanto. Basically, I want to say that the staff had
training prior to me coming on board from other Federal
entities. I started identifying deficiencies in March, they had
training again from the Office of Special Counsel. In August,
they had training from the Office of General Counsel. The staff
has consistently gotten training over time.
Based on the deficiencies and the number of deficiencies
that we were identifying, I needed to have a baseline. we went
back to basic investigation techniques, interviewing
techniques, and evidence gathering. The contract that we are
discussing and the issues with the contractor was the September
training, which was, again, to reset. Let us just start and we
get basic investigative training because of the deficiencies, I
still continued to identify deficiencies in the reports.
Miss Rice. Do you have input as to what contractor is used?
Ms. Bonzanto. The contracting office normally select the
most qualified vendor for us.
Miss Rice. Do you have any input? Do they ask you?
Ms. Bonzanto. I am not sure if we--I think they select
based on the--they select the contractor based on the
qualifications of the contract. I can not say for sure if--the
VA has input, obviously, but the contracting office does not
work directly for me, no.
Miss Rice. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Pappas. Thank you very much.
I just have a few more and perhaps the other members here
would like to ask a few more--Okay, I guess we are going to go
for a second round. Thank you very much for your answers to
date.
I just wanted to follow up on a comment that Mr. Missal had
made about the fact that there are a number of key positions
that are vacant where you are still recruiting an individual.
You had submitted as part of your testimony this org chart
here, which represents a realignment since August. You know, of
that, seven are filled, five you are still recruiting for, six
remain vacant, including the Deputy Executive Director
position.
You mentioned, for instance, developing standard operating
procedures, you are going to do that by the end of the year,
but yet the Chief of Policy position is vacant.
How are you going to, you know, deal with these 22
recommendations and make progress if you still have these
vacancies, and what is the action plan to fill out this
realigned org chart?
Ms. Bonzanto. We currently have six positions in
development for recruitment, five positions on active
recruitment, we are actually interviewing individuals for those
positions right now. We are still working.
The Chief of Policy is actually focused on policy, that is
not the standard operating procedures. The standard operating
procedures, I most recently hired a Deputy Director for
Investigations, and that individual is going to be working on
the standard operating procedures for investigations. The head
of the quality team is already in place and they are working on
the quality SOPs for that team.
Mr. Pappas. Mr. Missal, you had raised specifically in
terms of, you know, flagging this in her testimony. How much of
a concern is this for the IG in terms of the steps that OAWP
needs to take?
Mr. Missal. It is a very great concern for us, because you
obviously need policies and procedures in place, but before you
can really get started in changing around an organization that
we identified had so many problems, you really need to have not
only the people in place, you need to have the right people in
place, and it sometimes takes time when new people are put
together into an organization for them to work together as a
team to communicate well.
Until these positions are filled, it is going to be very
hard to make progress on a number of other avenues that they
need to improve.
Mr. Pappas. One measure of an organization coming together
and gelling and focusing on its mission is measuring employee
morale. You had indicated to me when we spoke that is something
you intend to measure. How would you characterize morale today
within OAWP?
Ms. Bonzanto. As I have told you, sir, morale is--I would
say it is at this time neutral. I have some parts of my team
saying we are heading in the right direction and some parts of
the team they are raising concerns about the direction we are
heading, because it is fundamentally different from what they
have done before.
I am doing my best to engage the staff. We have developed
teams around some of the work products we need to produce, to
encourage staff to engage and give us recommendations on what
the best practices are or they identify as the best practices
for improving operations.
We are also working with the VA's National Office of
Organizational Development to come in and do an assessment, and
also work with the new leaders as they come on board, so they
can provide us feedback of where we are as an organization and
also help coach the leaders as we are going through this
organizational change.
Mr. Pappas. Protecting whistleblowers is your mission, but
I am incredibly concerned to hear that multiple staff in your
office have actually filed whistleblower complaints themselves,
including allegations of retaliation with the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC). Perhaps more concerning is that in the office's
newly published directive on investigations OAWP employees are
specifically excluded from the definition of whistleblowers.
I am wondering if you could address this exclusion and
describe how whistleblowers in your office should come forward
and be a part of the change that needs to happen.
Ms. Bonzanto. Right. I can say that in OAWP I encourage
staff to come, you know, bring concerns, raise concerns to
their supervisors. If they are not concerned with the response,
they can raise concerns to me. I have an open-door policy to me
with employees. If they are not--you know, if they do not want
to come forward and bring those concerns to us, they have like
every other employee can go to the OSC, the IG, Congressional
Committees; they can exercise their right to raise concerns to
other entities, if they choose to.
I think it is a conflict for us to investigate employees
ourselves. If someone raised concerns to us, it is a conflict
of interest for us to investigate those employees, and we
actually had an example of that in the IG report of that
happening, and that is why the directive addresses that.
Mr. Pappas. One thing I wanted to ask about as well is
training of VA employees more generally speaking. This training
has taken over 2 years to develop and why is that the case?
This just seems very fundamental in terms of your charge.
Ms. Bonzanto. It is one of the things we are continuing to
work on. I know I had a deadline of October 15th for getting
that training up and we have not met the deadline for, you
know, completing the training. It was under legal review, legal
review just came back with edits, but we are expected to meet
our goal of having the training published on VA's Talent
Management System (TMS) website by the end of the calendar
year. That was our goal, the end of the calendar year.
Mr. Pappas. It is a revised goal, though; correct?
Ms. Bonzanto. No. The goal was the end of the calendar year
and October 15th was for us to actually have it uploaded in the
TMS system. It has not been uploaded yet.
Mr. Pappas. You have missed that mark----
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes.
Mr. Pappas.--but you hope to hit the mark for the end of
the year?
Ms. Bonzanto. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pappas. Well, I will turn it over to General Bergman
for additional questions.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I guess it is
just you and me as I look around.
I wish--unfortunately, as you know, our schedules are
extremely busy around here and I know our members had to go on
to something else, I hope equally as important. As I kind of
mentioned in my opening remarks, you inherit the command you
inherit. You know, George Washington was judged by historians
as being able to accept the world as it was, not how he wanted
it to be, so he accepted the reality.
As I listened to the questions being asked, sometimes we
just assume we are starting at a zero point and neutral point,
but in this particular case, if we were to put it on a linear
graph, we were kind of starting behind the power curve in a
negative, negative way.
Even though we are at neutral or slightly on the positive
side now, it does not look like much, because if you did not
think about it, we are just kind of assuming the zero starting
point, so the progress that has been made was just to kind of
clean up messes and get the ball rolling again in the right
direction. Usually it is not about the fact that things are
changed or you are moving forward, it is the rate at which you
are going.
Dr. Bonzanto, would you care to comment, do you have a rate
of change, if you will, that is a positive rate? Are you
accelerating, decelerating, you know, when it comes to
everything from your training to your SOPs to your, you know,
everything in the whole--how would you say it, is it
acceleration, deceleration, neutral?
Ms. Bonzanto. I would honestly like to move faster. As you
know, the H.R. in Federal Government is it takes time. It is
taking about an average of 90 to 120 days to on-board someone,
and that is from the job posting through the interview period.
If we can--that is my concern is I am not moving as fast as I
would like to and filling these vacancies as fast as I would
like to, but it is part of the process that I have to go
through.
Mr. Bergman. Well, as long as you are not comfortable, I
think we are comfortable; if you are comfortable, we are
uncomfortable. I think that is a trend in the right direction.
Mr. Missal, I firmly believe that all employees doing wrong
or failing to serve veterans should be held accountable
regardless of rank, position, or grade. You found in your
report that disciplinary officials sometimes mitigated OAWP's
recommended penalties based on their subjective, personal
judgment. You gave ten examples that run the gamut from a
removal reduced to a demotion, to suspensions reduced to no
penalty whatsoever. How commonplace is that?
Mr. Missal. It certainly was commonplace in what we found
with OAWP. You have to remember, there are disciplinary actions
going on throughout VA and they have different standards that
they apply, that going through OAWP they do not follow those
same standards.
For instance, outside of OAWP there is a VA disciplinary
chart which gives examples and guidance about certain actions
and where they should be. Making sure you have consistency in
your discipline is extremely important, again, to give
confidence in the office and to show those who commit
wrongdoing that they are going to be held accountable.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Again, Mr. Missal, given the gravity of
OIG's findings, I believe sustained oversight of OAWP is
warranted. What sort of follow up work do you intend to perform
to determine whether these problems have actually been
corrected?
Mr. Missal. We have, on the formal side, we will be working
with OAWP to assess how they are addressing the 22
recommendations that we have that are still open. Then, on the
more informal side, we meet regularly with OAWP just to discuss
current issues that come up, because, as I said, there are a
number of different places which are looking at potential
wrongdoing and so those different organizations have to
coordinate their efforts for it to be as effective as possible.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Pappas. Well, thank you very much. I do not have any
further questions. I do not know, General Bergman, if you would
like to give any closing comments before we conclude, but I
would like to take the privilege of having a few closing
comments, if you do not mind.
I want to thank our witnesses today, Dr. Bonzanto and Mr.
Missal, for joining us. You know, the Inspector General once
again has produced a very comprehensive report, it is a page-
turner. If you have not looked at it, I urge you all to do so,
and we will be continuing to look at this report closely.
You and your staff performed an important service and the
report identifies a long list of problems, 22 recommendations
that must be addressed if the office is to succeed.
Unfortunately, I think this hearing has made clear that
OAWP is not providing critical protections and, on top of
retaliation, we often hear from whistleblowers about
frustration that they feel when working with OAWP. I feel a
sense of solidarity, because I feel similar frustrations today.
Dr. Bonzanto, you testified that you have established goals
for the office, but these are just the beginning steps and we
need to continue to insist on more progress. While the office
now has a high-level policy for investigations, this is not the
same as having a detailed standard operating procedures, nor is
it actually completing investigations. While it is good to hear
that OAWP will have training materials by the end of the year,
this is not the same as actually training the supervisors on
the rights of whistleblowers.
Dr. Bonzanto, whistleblowers in the VA are still waiting
for your office to perform basic mandates. I recognize that you
want to move OAWP in the right direction, I recognize that you
inherited a very complicated and difficult situation when you
assumed your position in January of this year, but your
testimony in response to questions does not provide a full
picture of how you are going to get there. We do not have all
the metrics and time lines for how your mission will be
achieved, and we need to continue to work with you to insist on
progress.
Ultimately, we are all working toward the same goal here.
We want OAWP and we want you to be successful in your role, and
that is ensuring that whistleblowers have the opportunity to be
heard without fear of retaliation. It is pivotal that we come
together and focus on this mission to improve protections for
whistleblowers and in turn improve our service to veterans.
With that, members will have 5 legislative days to revise
and extend their remarks, and include any extraneous materials.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements of Witnesses
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Prepared Statement of Tamara Bonzanto
Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
i. background
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) appreciates the opportunity
to answer questions and report progress about its implementation of the
VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (the Act),
Public Law 115-41. The Act, which is an unprecedented piece of
legislation, is an important priority for the Department. The Act is
another tool to help VA hold employees accountable and protect
whistleblowers who report wrongdoing. VA's Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) was established by the President of the
United States on April 27, 2017, under Executive Order 13793. OAWP was
statutorily established by the Act, and its functions are codified
under section 323 of title 38 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).
OAWP receives and investigates allegations of misconduct, poor
performance, and whistleblower retaliation against VA senior leaders;
and allegations of whistleblower retaliation against VA supervisors.
OAWP also receives whistleblower disclosures from VA employees and
applicants for VA employment and refers those allegations for
investigation within VA. OAWP is responsible for tracking and
confirming VA's implementation of recommendations from audits and
investigations carried out by OIG, VA's Office of the Medical Inspector
(OMI), the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). OAWP is also responsible for
advising the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on accountability and for
identifying trends based on data received by OAWP, so that VA can
proactively address systemic issues.
Trust is an important element for ensuring OAWP's success.
Individuals who report wrongdoing must trust OAWP with their
information. Those individuals must also trust OAWP to review and refer
or investigate their allegations in a thorough and timely manner.
Since my appointment in January 2019, I have heard from Veterans,
VA employees, whistleblowers, and Congress about their concerns with
OAWP operations and concerns about OAWP staff. As I assessed OAWP
operations, I came to the realization that most of these concerns were
valid. By April 2019, I identified several deficiencies that are now
highlighted in an OIG report, which needed to be corrected, including
staff who were making decisions on my behalf with little to no
oversight; teams who were duplicating efforts; investigators who were
conducting investigations without sufficient training; a lack of
communication with whistleblowers about the status of their matters; a
lack of written policies and standard operating procedures; and reports
and recommendations that displayed a lack of training. Fixing these
deficiencies is the first step toward regaining the trust that
individuals who report wrongdoing place with OAWP. Ensuring that the
information provided by those individuals is not used without their
consent or as otherwise permitted by law, is also essential to
regaining the trust that OAWP needs to succeed as an organization.
ii. overcoming challenges
Since my appointment, OAWP independently identified many of the
issues now substantiated by the OIG in its report issued on October 24,
2019. These issues can be attributed to a lack of oversight,
communication, and training for staff. Ten of the 22 recommendations
made by OIG have been addressed. VA is working to resolve the remaining
six recommendations.
The Act's establishment of OAWP is to ensure a culture of
accountability in VA. Unfortunately, as OIG recognized, OAWP lacked its
own culture of accountability for its first 2 years of operations as
reflected in the deficiencies I noted above. I am expeditiously
undertaking actions to ensure that such a culture exists within OAWP.
Significantly, these deficiencies identified by the OIG have an impact
on VA employees who report wrongdoing. In many instances, individuals
who lost their jobs or faced other forms of whistleblower retaliation
relied on OAWP to conduct a thorough investigation into their
allegations, only to be disappointed when staff failed to respond back
to them. This lack of oversight, communication, and training for staff
contributed to the lack of trust that individuals have in OAWP.
Once I assessed OAWP's deficiencies, I immediately began working to
correct them, including the following:
Reviewing all OAWP recommendations, including
recommendations for disciplinary action, or no action before a case
could be closed;
Implementing an information system to track
investigations and OAWP's recommendations. This system has an audit
trail and ensures that only authorized users can access certain case
files. This system will also help OAWP identify trends, as required by
the Act;
Stopping OAWP contractors from performing work unrelated
to OAWP's statutory functions;
Mandating that staff update whistleblowers about the
status of their matters;
Realigning OAWP's operations to ensure that teams were
not duplicating efforts and to increase the number of investigators;
\1\
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\1\ A pre-and post-realignment organizational chart can be found
in exhibit 1.
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Providing OAWP investigators with training on conducting
investigations. OAWP is currently developing a customized investigative
training course for its investigators. This training would resolve
recommendation 8 in OIG's report; and
Issuing VA Directive 0500, Investigation of Whistleblower
Disclosures and Allegations Involving Senior Leaders or Whistleblower
Retaliation. The directive governs how OAWP receives whistleblower
disclosures; allegations of senior leader misconduct, poor performance,
and whistleblower retaliation; and allegations of whistleblower
retaliation against supervisors. The directive covers a number of the
recommendations made by the OIG.
I also recognize the need for appropriate oversight within OAWP.
With that in mind, OAWP is working to fill its supervisory vacancies.
OAWP recently hired a deputy director for investigations and two
supervisory investigators. These individuals, who come from the
Department of Defense and other Federal agencies, have substantial
experience with managing administrative investigators; conducting
whistleblower retaliation investigations; and developing whistleblower
retaliation training.
I appreciate the concerns raised by OAWP employees to me about the
organizational changes underway. Many of these changes are significant
and represent a fundamental adjustment in the direction that OAWP was
taking during its first 2 years. As we work to improve OAWP, I want to
ensure that employees are engaged in these organizational changes.
I have met with several employees about their concerns and have
discussed the organizational changes underway with staff during town-
hall sessions. By the end of the year, OAWP will also establish
employee workgroups within OAWP to solicit feedback as OAWP continues
to improve its operations. The workgroups include a training workgroup,
which would provide feedback on training that is beneficial for OAWP
staff; a policy/process workgroup, which would provide feedback on
internal standard operating procedures and policies; an employee
engagement workgroup, which would advise on ways to improve employee
engagement; and a technology workgroup, which would advise on ways to
better utilize technology in OAWP.
The above actions, once addressed, will help strengthen OAWP
workforce engagement and satisfaction as we continue to improve OAWP
operations.
iii. improving oawp investigations
OAWP has a backlog of investigative cases, which can be defined as
a disclosure or submission that is open with OAWP for over 120 days.
Many of these backlogged cases date back to 2017 and 2018. The goal is
to eliminate the backlog by the end of the next calendar year and, per
VA Directive 0500, to have OAWP investigations conducted and
recommendations issued within 120 days from the date that a disclosure
or submission is received by OAWP. This newly established timeline
would decrease the average time to conduct an investigation by 44
percent. To reach these goals, OAWP has undertaken a multi-prong
approach, outlined below.
A. Increasing the number of OAWP investigators.
In August 2019, OAWP realigned resources to avoid a duplication of
efforts on investigative cases and ensure that we have more
investigators available. The realignment was based on input provided by
OAWP managers and a workload analysis of a sampling of OAWP staff.
With the realignment, OAWP now has 40 investigators rather than 30.
Investigators are also supervised in smaller teams of approximately 10
individuals, to ensure appropriate oversight. Since the realignment,
investigators carry an average of 6 investigations. This increase in
investigative case load brings them on-par with investigators who
handle equally complex work in other government investigative bodies.
B. Issuing policy to clearly define OAWP's investigatory scope.
VA Directive 0500 was issued. The directive governs how OAWP
receives whistleblower disclosures; allegations of senior leader
misconduct, poor performance, and whistleblower retaliation; and
allegations of whistleblower retaliation against supervisors. The
directive clearly defines what is within and outside OAWP's
investigatory scope.
C. Comprehensive training to improve the quality of investigations.
OAWP is developing a comprehensive training program for its
investigators.\2\ The program will cover investigative techniques,
including report writing. The program will incorporate best practices
from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), and other governmental and
non-governmental offices. This program will serve as the foundation for
continuous professional training and development that will be conducted
throughout this fiscal year.
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\2\ OAWP investigators have already been provided with
standardized investigation training in August and September 2019. This
supplements training that they received in the past but does not amount
to a comprehensive training program. In prior years, OAWP investigators
took different training courses on investigative techniques. This
resulted in disparate investigative reports and interviews. For
example, some investigators took a five-day investigative training
course conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
However, only two of the days in the course were applicable to OAWP
investigators. The remaining three days focused on ICE practices and
policies.
D. Developing standard operating procedures to ensure clear
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consistency.
OAWP is developing standard operating procedures (SOP) and
templates for investigators and staff, which are expected to be
completed before the end of the calendar year. This will ensure that
investigative reports, evidence gathering techniques, and interview
techniques are standardized across OAWP's 40 investigators.
E. Utilizing contractors to assist with investigations.
Given the significant backlog, OAWP also plans to utilize
contractors to assist in conducting investigations. This is a best-
practice utilized by other investigative entities.
F. Establishing a team to conduct quality reviews on
investigations.
Recognizing that quality control is essential, I have established
an independent team to ensure investigative reports are thorough and
accurate. This team received initial training on reviewing
investigative reports in September 2019. OAWP is developing a
comprehensive training program for individuals on the team to ensure
that investigations are done in a fair, unbiased, thorough, and
objective manner. The program will incorporate best practices from OSC,
CIGIE, and other governmental and non-governmental offices. The quality
review team is also developing SOPs, checklists, and a reporting
template to ensure consistent quality and timeliness with OAWP
investigations.
G. Ensuring that disciplinary action recommendations comply with
the Act.
Starting in April 2019, all recommendations, whether for
disciplinary action or no action, are reviewed by me or my designee.
During my review of these recommendations, I identified several
deficiencies, including the following:
Citing investigative reports where witnesses were not
interviewed;
Conclusory statements that were not tied into evidence;
and
Failing to properly address the elements required for
whistleblower retaliation.
In August 2019, OAWP developed checklists to ensure that
investigative reports and recommendations did not contain these types
of deficiencies. Quality staff have identified discrepancies in over 45
cases submitted to them as of September 2019. All cases where
deficiencies were found were routed back to investigations for further
review and resolution of the discrepancies.
The Secretary and I recognize the intent for transparency behind 38
U.S.C. Sec. 323(f)(2), which requires that VA report to Congress when
disciplinary recommendations that I make are not implemented. To
memorialize our commitment to the Act, VA Directive 0500 requires Under
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and other Key Officials, and their
designees, to respond to OAWP recommended disciplinary actions,
including providing a copy of the action taken or proposed and, if the
recommended disciplinary action was not taken or proposed, providing a
detailed justification why such an action was not taken or proposed
within 60 calendar days of OAWP's recommendation.
iv. improving communications and customer service
OAWP has mandated, through VA Directive 0500, that staff regularly
communicate with individuals about the status of their cases. OAWP is
collaborating with VA's Veterans Experience Office (VEO) to provide
customer service training to all OAWP staff. OAWP is working with VEO
to develop a customer survey to measure the impact of these customer
service improvements. Customer service, which is a priority for the
Secretary and me, will also be a critical element in all performance
standards for OAWP employees.
v. oawp's whistleblower mentor and outreach programs
In 2017, OAWP established the whistleblower mentorship program,
formerly known as the whistleblower reintegration program. After
receiving several complaints from VA employees and whistleblowers about
the program, I asked that it be placed on hold while we evaluated
whether there was appropriate governance and how applicants were
identified and interviewed.
After evaluating the program, I identified several deficiencies,
including how applicants were identified and interviewed. In light of
those deficiencies, the OIG's findings, and because the program was
operating outside of OAWP's authorized scope, I have decided to
discontinue the program. Instead, OAWP is assessing whether an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program, similar to OSC, should be
established with VA's existing ADR resources.
Prior to my appointment, OAWP also established a whistleblower
outreach program. The program was meant to provide whistleblowers with
information about wellness and other resources. However, in view of
OIG's findings about the whistleblower mentorship program, we have
decided to discontinue the program. Instead, whistleblowers will be
informed about services available to them through VA's employee
assistance program should they need assistance.
vi. whistleblower rights and protection training
Under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 733, VA is required to implement training for
all employees on whistleblower rights and protection. OAWP worked with
OSC and OIG to develop training required under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 733.
This training will address, among other things, methods for making a
whistleblower disclosure, prohibitions against taking an action against
an employee for making a lawful disclosure, and penalties for
whistleblower retaliation.
The training is being finalized and VA anticipates issuance of the
38 U.S.C. Sec. 733 training, including a specialized module for
supervisors through VA's Talent Management System, before the end of
the calendar year.
vii. implementing oawp's other functions, required by the act
As I address the deficiencies within OAWP, I am implementing its
statutory function of tracking and confirming VA's implementation of
recommendations from audits and investigations carried out by OIG, OMI,
OSC, and GAO. As required by law, I am also implementing a process to
identify trends based on data received by the office so that VA can
proactively address systemic issues.
OAWP is establishing a new VA compliance and oversight team to
track and confirm the implementation of recommendations from audits and
investigations. The target date for staffing the team and finalizing a
directive on these requirements is the end of the calendar year. OAWP
also began utilizing an information system in June 2019, to help us
identify trends based on the data received by the office.
viii. conclusion
I understand the sense of urgency to improve OAWP operations. I
also recognize the substantial impact that the deficiencies in OAWP
have had on whistleblowers and VA employees who disclose wrongdoing.
I have the support of the Secretary and VA leadership as I continue
to work on fixing those deficiencies. I ask for your support and I
appreciate the input from you and your staff as I continue to ensure
that OAWP fulfills its statutory mandate.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bergman, and Members of the Committee,
this concludes my statement. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the Committee today to discuss VA's implementation of the
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1246.001
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Prepared Statement of Michael J. Missal
Chairman Pappas, Ranking Member Bergman, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Office of
Inspector General's (OIG's) report, Failures Implementing the VA
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017(the Act).\1\ In
June 2018, one year after the Act's enactment, the OIG received
requests from the then ranking member of the House Veterans' Affairs
Committee and several senators raising concerns that VA was not
properly implementing the Act. In addition, the OIG received complaints
from VA employees and others relating to concerns about OAWP
operations. In response, the OIG conducted a review focusing on the
OAWP's operations from June 23, 2017, through December 31, 2018. During
the review, additional allegations arose as new OAWP leaders began
making changes, prompting further related work through August 2019.\2\
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\1\ Issued October 24, 2019; the law was signed on June 23, 2017,
and became Public Law 115-41
\2\ From June 23, 2017, until January 7, 2019, the OAWP operated
without an Assistant Secretary--a position called for by the Act. It
was led by Executive Director Peter O'Rourke from June 23, 2107, to
February 28, 2018, followed by Executive Director Kirk Nicholas until
January 7, 2019. The current Assistant Secretary for Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection took office on January 7, 2019, and soon began
implementing changes, some of which address matters identified
throughout the review.
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As detailed in the OIG's report and summarized here, the OIG
identified significant deficiencies in the operations of the OAWP. The
OIG recognizes that organizing the operations of any new office is
challenging, but OAWP leaders made avoidable mistakes early in its
development that created an office culture that was sometimes
alienating to the very individuals it was meant to protect. Those
leadership failures distracted the OAWP from its core mission and
likely diminished the desired confidence of whistleblowers and other
potential complainants in the operations of the office.
VA employees who identify serious misconduct must feel protected
when coming forward with complaints. They are essential to helping VA
spot and address significant problems that may otherwise go undetected
and persist, which could increase veterans' risk of harm. This report
highlights significant failings by OAWP's former leaders that have had
a chilling effect on complainants still being felt today. These
failings include the lack of relevant policies and procedures,
fundamental misunderstandings of investigative scope, not holding
individuals accountable, and inadequate protections for whistleblowers.
As a result, the current Assistant Secretary for Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection faces significant challenges in putting the
OAWP on a path to meet its statutory mission, mandates, and goals.
background
The VA Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP)
was established in 2017 to improve VA's ability to hold employees
accountable for specified misconduct; prevent retaliation against
whistleblowers and initiate action against supervisors who retaliate;
and address senior executives' poor performance.\3\
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\3\ See Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, P.L. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862 (June
23, 2017). The legislation codified the establishment of the OAWP
following an executive order issued in April 2017 to create an entity
to ``improve accountability and whistleblower protection'' at VA.
Improving Accountability and Whistleblower Protection at the Department
of Veterans Affairs, Exec. Order No. 13793, 82 Fed. Reg. 20539 (Apr.
27, 2017). See also Dep't of Veterans Affairs, News Release,
``Secretary David Shulkin Announces Establishment of Office of
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection and Names Peter O'Rourke as
its Senior Advisor and Executive Director'' (May 12, 2017).
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In comments to the OIG on the draft report, VA took issue with what
it characterized as the OIG's conclusion that the Act was designed to
target senior executives for discipline. VA noted that the Act included
expanded disciplinary authorities that apply to all VA employees. That
is an accurate summary of the statute but it misses the point. The
report focused on the OAWP's operations and efforts to implement
relevant sections of the Act. The expanded disciplinary authorities of
the Secretary over VA employees generally, although part of the same
legislation, are not directly relevant to OAWP's operations and, thus,
the OIG report. The Act did expand the Secretary's disciplinary
authority as to all VA employees, but that authority applies without
regard to any involvement or action by OAWP. Indeed, the Act provides
no role for OAWP in the disciplinary process of employees other than
its authority to recommend discipline based on its investigation of
allegations of misconduct, poor performance, and retaliation involving
certain senior executives (i.e., the defined categories of Covered
Executives \4\) and allegations of retaliation on the part of
supervisors.\5\ It is this authority of the OAWP with respect to
disciplinary proceedings that are addressed in this report.
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\4\ ``Covered Executives'' refers to VA personnel holding
statutorily enumerated senior-level positions as defined in 38 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 323(c)(1)(H)(i) and (ii).
\5\ 38 U.S.C. Sec. 323(c)(1)(H). The OAWP may also recommend
appropriate discipline for employees based on investigations carried
out by other entities such as the OIG, the Office of the Medical
Inspector, and the Office of Special Counsel. 38 U.S.C. Sec.
323(c)(1)(I).
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failures implementing aspects of the va accountability and
whistleblower protection act of 2017
The OIG's review focused on answering the following questions that
emerged from complaints and allegations to the OIG from various
sources:
1. Whether the OAWP was exercising its authority in accordance
with the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 and other applicable laws
2. Whether the OAWP conducted adequate, thorough, and
procedurally fair investigations of matters it investigated
3. Whether VA employees were held accountable by making
appropriate use of the authorities provided in the Act
4. Whether the OAWP was adequately protecting whistleblowers
from retaliation as required by the Act and other applicable
laws
5. Whether VA complied with other requirements of the Act,
including making timely and accurate reports to Congress.
A summary of key findings related to each of the review questions
follows. The OIG made 22 recommendations related to six key findings.
finding 1: the oawp misinterpreted its statutory mandate, resulting in
failures to act within its investigative authority
The OAWP misconstrued its statutory investigative mandate both by
accepting matters that it should not have and declining matters the Act
requires it to investigate. The OAWP also investigated individuals
outside the OAWP's scope of authority under the Act, which in some
instances introduced an appearance of bias. This included investigating
one of its own directors for allegations relating to the director's
earlier position at another VA office, which was not within the OAWP's
statutory authority to investigate. At the same time, it was too
narrowly interpreting the scope of what the office should investigate.
The OAWP inappropriately excluded investigations of misconduct and poor
performance of covered individuals if the person making the allegations
did not meet the statutory definition of whistleblower. The OAWP is not
limited to investigating allegations made only by whistleblowers--
defined as employees and applicants for employment--but rather can
investigate allegations from other complainants as well.
In addition to misinterpreting its statutory investigative mandate,
the OAWP also failed to refer matters for investigation to other more
appropriate investigative entities. Pursuant to regulation, VA
employees must, for example, refer to the OIG matters that may be
serious violations of criminal law related to VA. The OAWP investigated
criminal matters involving possible felonies that it was required to
refer to the OIG. Allegations of discrimination similarly should have
been referred to VA's designated equal employment opportunity (EEO)
office, the Office of Resolution Management (ORM), unless they fell
within the OAWP's authority to investigate. Although the law does not
require that the OAWP refer such matters to the ORM, filing with the
ORM is the only way for employees to preserve their EEO rights and it
has more expertise to handle investigations of discrimination.
A fundamental flaw identified by the OIG was OAWP's
misunderstanding of its statutory authority. The lack of clear and
consistent guidance contributed to many of the other deficiencies
identified in the report. The OIG made four recommendations related to
Finding 1. They focus on actions by the Assistant Secretary for
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection to ensure that the office
is acting within its statutory authority and develop policies and
procedures for working with VA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), ORM,
OIG, and the Office of the Medical Inspector to establish criteria and
procedures for the referral of matters to these entities. A complete
listing of all the report's recommendations are in Appendix A of this
statement.
finding 2: the oawp did not consistently conduct procedurally sound,
accurate, thorough, and unbiased investigations and related activities
Written policies and procedures are crucial to effective
operations. During the tenures of former Executive Directors Peter
O'Rourke and Kurt Nicholas, the OAWP did not adopt comprehensive
written policies and procedures on any topic. As of July 2019, it still
lacked OAWP-specific written policies and procedures.\6\ The failure to
put in place key systems and quality controls has resulted in OAWP
conducting investigations that were not always thorough, objective, and
unbiased--undermining OAWP's credibility among some VA employees.
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\6\ OAWP staff reported during the review that written policies
and procedures were being drafted.
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The OIG identified deficiencies in the following areas:
The OAWP lacks comprehensive policies and procedures
suitable for its personnel. This is particularly important given that
individuals' reputations are at stake, whistleblowers' identities must
be protected, and the issues on which the OAWP is reporting affect
veterans' lives in tremendously significant ways. Staff were either
missing guidance or were piecing together direction largely based on
the mandates of a prior office that was not entirely aligned with
OAWP's legislative scope. The results were felt across OAWP divisions:
1. The Triage Division's procedures blurred the scope of OAWP
authority and called for acceptances or referrals of cases that
were not consistent with the OAWP's statutory authority.
2. Operational procedures were incomplete and outdated, leaving
staff without clear guidance.
3. The Investigations Division used selective portions of
preexisting VA procedures that provided insufficient guidance
and led to questionable results.
The absence of OAWP quality control measures is
particularly troubling given the hodgepodge of policies and procedures.
OAWP's Advisory and Assistance (A&A) Division identified issues with
the thoroughness of investigations. In some cases, investigators failed
to seek testimonial evidence from key witnesses, including in at least
one instance from the subject of the investigation. VA's OGC also
identified deficiencies in the work of the A&A Division and
Investigations Division. Although some investigatory inadequacies were
detected by disciplinary officials and VA's OGC, this de facto
oversight was not an effective or sustainable solution.
The OAWP has failed to provide the staffing and training
necessary to ensure it has the expertise, experience, and commitment
that yield objective and thorough investigations critical to OAWP's
success. Staff within OAWP that conducted investigations were not given
the training and access to expertise needed to perform at the level
expected of that office. While the Investigations Division has
broadened its staffing strategy to include more than Human Resource
specialists, it still lacked a coordinated strategy for training
specific to investigations.
The OAWP has fallen short of its commitment to conduct
``timely, thorough, and unbiased investigations'' in all cases within
its investigative jurisdiction. VA employees and other complainants
must be assured that OAWP investigations are conducted with the highest
ethical standards, which does not yet appear to have been achieved. A
contributing factor to both lack of thoroughness and appearance of bias
was the OAWP's practice of investigating to the ``substantial
evidence'' standard. That is, OAWP investigators did not conduct
investigations designed to ensure that all known or obviously relevant
evidence was obtained.\7\ Rather, in many instances, they focused only
on finding evidence sufficient to substantiate the allegations without
attempting to find potentially exculpatory or contradictory evidence.
One disciplinary official described OAWP investigations as ``a
[disciplinary] action in search of evidence.'' This standard and its
application contributed to limited and unbalanced investigations.
\7\ For example, the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, Quality Standards for Investigations (November 15,
2011) provide that all known or obviously relevant evidence should be
obtained during an investigation. While OAWP is not governed by these
standards, they provide relevant guidance for conducting thorough and
objective investigations in a similar context.
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The OAWP has statutory authority to investigate matters that
overlap with the authority granted to several other
investigative bodies, which means more than one entity can
potentially investigate the same matters. The OIG identified
instances in which the OAWP's objectivity was impaired by at
least the appearance of bias.\8\ In these instances, the OAWP
should have referred the matters elsewhere or implemented
measures sufficient to avoid the appearance of impropriety.\9\
Key to this process is having an effective apparatus for
triaging which issues should remain within the OAWP. Written
guidance and training for employing that judgment would help
ensure consistency and enhance the integrity of the office. The
report cites two examples related to OAWP investigations of
political appointees that had the appearance of bias.\10\
\8\ As discussed in Finding 1, the OAWP decided to investigate one
of its directors in a case outside its statutory scope. The appearance
of bias in that case was exacerbated by the slow progress of the matter
at the discipline stage. Some OAWP staff familiar with the
investigation questioned whether OAWP leaders were protecting a senior
staff member.
\9\ The OAWP has statutory authority to refer whistleblower
disclosures to other investigative entities, including the OIG. 38
U.S.C. Sec. 323(c)(1)(D).
\10\ See examples 11 and 12 of the report.
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The OIG received numerous complaints from whistleblowers who
felt that their submissions to the OAWP were not being handled
in a timely manner, and that they were not even sure that the
OAWP had accepted their allegations for investigation. Lengthy
processing times can discourage whistleblowers from making
further reports.\11\ The OIG recognizes, however, that
investigations must be afforded adequate time to ensure
accurate results. Still, the OIG evaluated the time taken by
the OAWP to resolve matters that were received by the OAWP
Triage Division and referred for administrative investigation
and found many took a year or more to close.\12\
\11\ GAO, Office of Special Counsel: Actions Needed to Improve
Processing of Prohibited Personnel Practice and Whistleblower
Disclosure Cases, GAO-18-400, (June 2018) 16, 21, https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/692545.pdf (discussing importance of timeliness in resolving
whistleblower claims).
\12\ The data show that from June 23, 2017, through December 31,
2018, the OAWP opened 628 matters for investigation and inherited 131
matters that had been pending with the OAR. Of the 628 OAWP matters,
299 were closed by the end of 2018, but 20 took more than a year to
resolve. Of the 329 matters still pending at the end of 2018, 52 had
been open more than a year. According to VA's Administrative
Investigations: Resource Guidebook (June 2004), ``[a]n administrative
investigation is an impartial inquiry, authorized by a facility
director or higher level manager, to be conducted at any time deemed
necessary, to determine facts and collect evidence in connection with a
matter in which the VA is or may be a part in interest.'' Directive
0700 also provides, ``The term `administrative investigation' refers to
a systematic process for determining facts and documenting evidence
about matters of significant interest to VA.''
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Dr. Bonzanto told OIG investigators that she prioritized the
need for prompt resolution of matters due in part to impacts on
the subjects of investigations. She also stated that she was
introducing standardized ``touchpoints'' with whistleblowers to
improve communication about case statuses. She told OIG
investigators that she instituted new expectations relating to
timeliness of investigations. Her stated goal is to reduce to
90 days the time it takes from the receipt of a submission to
the end of the A&A Division's involvement. Dr. Bonzanto
explained that she is instituting check-in points to ensure
that the staff of the Investigations Division are keeping up
with their workload.
The OIG made four recommendations related to this finding. Three
were to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection related to creating standard operating procedures, creating
a quality assurance program, and providing training to OAWP staff. The
other recommendation was to the OGC to review and update as needed VA
Directive 0700 and VA Handbook 0700 and clarify how they apply to OAWP,
if at all.
finding 3: va has struggled with implementing the act's enhanced
authority to hold covered executives accountable
A critical purpose of the Act was to facilitate holding Covered
Executives accountable for misconduct and poor performance. However, as
of May 22, 2019, VA had removed only one Covered Executive from Federal
service pursuant to the authority provided by the Act. The OIG found
that officials tasked with proposing and deciding disciplinary action
had insufficient direction for how to determine the appropriate level
of discipline that would ensure consistency and fairness for specific
acts of misconduct and poor performance. In many cases, a disciplinary
official mitigated the discipline recommended by OAWP as too severe or
based on advice from the OGC. In part, this was because of the absence
of clear guidance and the OAWP's practice of not always including
relevant exculpatory evidence, which would emerge later in the process
at the disciplinary stage.
The A&A Division adopted a practice of culling OAWP's investigative
files to prepare an evidence file that it provided to the OGC and the
proposing official. The A&A Division focused on including material in
the evidence file that supported the proposed disciplinary action,
rather than compiling all relevant evidence. According to the A&A
Director, the content of the evidence file was determined by the A&A
specialist and contained only the evidence that the specialist believed
supported the charges.
The A&A Division would provide additional information from the
investigative file if requested by the OGC. The OIG determined that
this practice was problematic because OGC attorneys might not know what
information to request. As one OGC attorney explained, neither the OGC
attorney nor the disciplinary officials know what other information is
in the investigative file until the subject responds, and even the
subject might not know what is in the investigative file.\13\
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\13\ This problem is exacerbated by the Act's timelines, which
provide only seven business days for the subject to respond and an
additional eight business days for the deciding official to process and
review new information before rendering a decision. An evidence file
provided by the proposing official to the deciding official with all
relevant information would reduce the information the subject must
collect and the deciding official must review.
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Under a pilot initiative implemented by Dr. Bonzanto, OGC attorneys
are now routinely provided access to the entire investigative file. The
results of that pilot were not yet available.
For Finding 3, the OIG made 3 recommendations. Two were directed to
the Secretary related to providing guidance and training on penalties
for actions taken pursuant to the Act, as well as guidance and training
for disciplinary officials to maintain compliance with mandatory
adverse action criteria outlined in the Act. The third recommendation
under this finding was to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection to make certain that all relevant evidence
is provided to the VA Secretary or the disciplinary officials
designated to act on the Secretary's behalf when OAWP recommends a
disciplinary action.
finding 4: the oawp failed to fully protect whistleblowers from
retaliation
From June 2017 to May 2018, the OAWP referred 2,526 submissions to
other VA program offices, facilities, or other components that were not
all equipped to undertake such investigations and without adequate
measures to track the referrals or sufficient safeguards to protect
whistleblowers' identities.\14\ While referring other submissions to
entities best positioned to address them is not inherently problematic,
complainants were not always advised of these referrals. Of those
referred, at least 51 involved allegations of whistleblower retaliation
by a supervisor (and so properly fell within the investigative
authority of the OAWP). The concerns raised by OAWP's referrals are
primarily threefold:
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\14\ In April and May 2019, Dr. Bonzanto directed, as part of an
effort to review all 539 investigations of whistleblower retaliation
allegations received from June 23, 2017, through April 15, 2019, to
determine if they were properly developed. A plan has been submitted
for reviewing 42 disclosures determined to need further review.
1. The recipient agency must be competent to conduct the
investigation of the type of matter being referred in a
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comprehensive, accurate, and balanced manner.
2. The OAWP must have tracking and monitoring processes to
determine if the recipient entity has reasonably and
appropriately handled the referral.
3. The OAWP must be transparent with complainants about the
referral process and have procedures in place to ensure that
complainants' identities will be protected--particularly from
individuals in VA who are the subject of the allegations or are
positioned to identify the complainant based on the nature of
the submission or other released information.
Other concerns regarding protecting whistleblowers from retaliation
include the following:
The OAWP took the position that allegations of
whistleblower retaliation could not be investigated unless the
whistleblower was willing to disclose his or her identity. The consent
to disclose allowed the OAWP to further disclose the whistleblower's
identity to other VA components. This policy places OAWP's obligation
to investigate whistleblower retaliation in conflict with its
obligation to maintain confidentiality of whistleblowers' identities.
An OAWP Senior Advisor told the OIG that the OAWP adopted this policy
because of the belief that to ``investigate retaliation, you have
almost no choice but to disclose the individual's identity.''
In 2017, the OAWP established a whistleblower
reintegration program, which was later renamed the Whistleblower
Mentorship Program. The OIG received complaints that the program was
being used inappropriately to target whistleblowers. The stated purpose
of the program was to provide whistleblowers who had made complaints
with transitional support resources if needed after the whistleblowing
experience. OIG interviews indicate that the motivation for the program
was also to break the perceived routine of whistleblowers to continue
reporting.
Ultimately, in its approximately 18-month existence, the
program served one whistleblower as a test case, which was
described by OAWP staff as successful. Dr. Bonzanto placed the
program on hold because her assessment revealed that it had not
met with identifiable or measurable success sufficient to
warrant devotion of the resources that would be required to
expand the program to serve more individuals.
The OAWP also failed to establish safeguards sufficient
to protect whistleblowers from becoming the subject of retaliatory
investigations. One troubling instance involved the OAWP initiating an
investigation that could itself be considered retaliatory. At the
request of a senior leader who had social ties to the OAWP Executive
Director, the OAWP investigated a whistleblower who had a complaint
pending against the senior leader. After a truncated investigation, the
OAWP substantiated the senior leader's allegations without even
interviewing the whistleblower.
Former leaders of OAWP also directed funds for purposes
unrelated to OAWP's core mission. There were $2.6 million of OAWP's
Fiscal Year 2018 budget of $17.37 million (15 percent) obligated on two
separate contracts for process improvement and leadership development
services. Each contract had two subsequent option years which, if
exercised, would have brought the potential total obligation to over
$6.8 million. The first contract related to process improvements.
According to Dr. Bonzanto, shortly after she became Assistant
Secretary, she learned about the existence of the process improvement
contract. She told OIG investigators that the contractor ``was supposed
to be helping us with our directives and our workload,'' but she
learned after inquiring further that ``everything that they were doing,
none of it was related to OAWP.'' She also told the OIG that she
ordered then Deputy Director Todd Hunter to refocus the contractor to
``come back and start doing work that's related to OAWP.'' According to
Dr. Bonzanto, by March 2019 the contractor's work was redirected to
assisting the OAWP with developing its processes and procedures.
The services to be acquired under the second contract related
to leadership development and coaching, which former Executive
Director Nicholas intended for VA generally, not just the OAWP.
In response to the OIG's inquiry concerning the contracts, VA
suspended performance on the contract for leadership
development and coaching, which limited VA's cost to the
$88,000 already expended. The OIG did not find any evidence
that VA leaders requested that Mr. Nicholas initiate either
procurement or redirect OAWP funds to these contracts.
During its review, the OIG received several allegations from OAWP
employees pertaining to personnel decisions and other exercises of
discretion by OAWP management. These related to past practices as well
as events occurring between January and June 2019. The investigation of
individualized complaints of prohibited personnel practices was not
within the scope of this review. Witnesses raising allegations of
whistleblower retaliation or prohibited personnel practices were
encouraged to file complaints with the Office of Special Counsel. Some
of these allegations related to dissatisfaction with current OAWP
management's decisions. Reviews of these types of allegations were
declined when they amounted to reasonable policy differences that were
not appropriate or ripe for OIG oversight. Nonetheless some of these
allegations raised important issues that OAWP managers needed to
address. Accordingly, the OIG deidentified the complaints and
transmitted their general substance to OAWP in September 2019.
The OIG made three recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection regarding safeguards to
maintaining confidentiality of employees making submissions; conducting
an organizational assessment of OAWP employee concerns and developing
an appropriate action plan; and developing a process and training for
OAWP's Triage Division to identify and address potential retaliatory
investigations.
finding 5: va did not comply with additional requirements of the act
and other authorities
The OIG determined that VA failed to implement various requirements
under the Act, including revising supervisors' performance plans and
developing supervisors' training regarding whistleblower rights. VA
also has not provided whistleblower protection training for all other
employees. On numerous occasions, VA did not submit timely, responsive,
and/or accurate reports to Congress on whistleblower investigations and
related disciplinary actions as required by the Act. The causes of
these lapses included
OAWP's lack of an adequate data base system to capture
required information,
OAWP leaders' failure to understand their
responsibilities and deadlines under the Act and plan accordingly, and
OAWP's inadequate procedures or processes to track the
information requested by Congress.
In addition, VA has interpreted the requirement that it submit
reports to Congress when the Secretary ``does not take or initiate the
recommended disciplinary action'' within 60 days of receipt of a
recommendation in such a way that VA disciplinary officials' mitigation
or declination of OAWP's recommended actions are not reported to
Congress.\15\ By failing to meet these statutory obligations, the OAWP
has undermined Congress's intent to create greater transparency with
respect to employee accountability and whistleblower protection within
VA.
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\15\ 38 U.S.C. Sec. 323(f)(2).
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There are six recommendations related to Finding 5. Four
recommendations are for the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection, of which two relate to training; one deals
with performance plan requirements; and one addresses improvements to
systems to be capable of tracking the data required by the Act. Two
recommendations are for the VA Secretary and deal with ensuring
supervisor training is implemented and that VA comply with the 60-day
reporting requirements.
finding 6: the oawp lacked transparency in its information management
practices
In the course of the OIG review, staff identified issues outside
the initial scope regarding OAWP's information management practices. VA
has obligations under the Privacy Act of 1974 to disclose its uses of
information collected from individuals, and it has obligations under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to provide timely and accurate
responses to requests for information. The OAWP failed to publish
notices required by the Privacy Act concerning the collection of
information from individuals and VA's routine uses of that information.
The OIG also found that the OAWP did not communicate appropriately with
individuals who made submissions to the office, and that its responses
to requests for information pursuant to FOIA have not met statutory
deadlines and lag significantly behind other VA components.
The two recommendations associated with this finding are directed
to the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection. The first relates to publishing Systems of Record Notices
for each OAWP system of records. The OIG also recommended training,
staffing, and establishing procedures for the OAWP's FOIA Office in
order to comply with governing requirements.
va comments to the oig report
VA concurred with all recommendations and provided action plans for
implementation. However, some of the planned actions lacked sufficient
clarity or specific steps to ensure corrective actions will adequately
address the recommendations (see Appendix A for a listing of all
recommendations). In particular, the actions detailed in multiple
responses (specifically to Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19,
and 20) were identified by VA as completed as of October based on the
issuance of Directive 0500 on September 10, 2019, or other actions
taken in recent months. The OIG has not received sufficient
documentation to determine whether recent actions and attempts to
implement Directive 0500 fully address the recommendations. The OIG
notes that the planned actions for two recommendations (Recommendation
2 and 12) do not appear sufficient to address the findings and will
require updated action plans. The OIG considers all 22 recommendations
open and will monitor implementation of VA's planned and recently
implemented actions to ensure that they have been effective and
sustained. As stated earlier, VA's assertions that OAWP has broader
statutory authority is a clear misunderstanding of the office's
statutory scope. Moreover, VA's suggestion that it independently
identified problems and that the OIG failed to acknowledge progress
made by the office in the text of the report is refuted by the OIG in
the report section on responses to VA's comments.
conclusion
The OIG found that VA has failed to properly implement several key
provisions of the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of
2017, as well as other authorities. In particular, the OAWP's former
leaders failed to understand the office's statutory mandates and
investigative authority. They were also ineffective at establishing
clear policies, procedures, and training sufficient to ensure that the
OAWP and VA met their obligations to protect whistleblowers' identities
and hold VA employees accountable. Although the OIG recognizes that
there have been a series of improvements planned by the Assistant
Secretary in 2019, there are significant steps that must be taken to
restore the trust of whistleblowers and other complainants due to
missteps and a culture set by former leaders who did not appear to
value whistleblower contributions. The very office established to
protect whistleblowers and enhance accountability lacked the basic
structures needed to achieve its core mission. Recent communications to
the OIG hotline indicate that some individuals continue to harbor a
fear of OAWP retaliation or disciplinary action for reporting suspected
wrongdoing. The OAWP leaders and staff who are committed to improving
VA programs and operations face considerable challenges in overcoming
the deficiencies identified in the OIG review.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement and I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or the other members of the Subcommittee
may have.
appendix a: listing of recommendations from failures implementing
aspects of the va accountability and whistleblower protection act of
2017
FINDING 1
1. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection directs a review of the Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection's compliance with the VA Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 requirements in order to ensure
proper implementation and eliminate any activities not within its
authorized scope.
2. The VA Secretary rescinds the February 2018 Delegation of
Authority and consults with the Assistant Secretary for Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection, the VA Office of General Counsel, and
other appropriate parties to determine whether a revised delegation is
necessary, and if so, ensures compliance with statutory requirements.
3. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection, in consultation with the Office of General Counsel, Office
of Inspector General, Office of the Medical Inspector, and the Office
of Resolution Management establishes comprehensive processes for
evaluating and documenting whether allegations, in whole or in part,
should be handled within the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection or referred to other VA entities for potential action or
referred to independent offices such as the Office of Inspector
General.
4. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection makes certain that policies and processes are developed, in
consultation with the VA Office of General Counsel and Office of
Resolution Management, to consistently and promptly advise complainants
of their right to bring allegations of discrimination through the Equal
Employment Opportunity process.
FINDING 2
5. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection ensures that the divisions of the Office of Accountability
and Whistleblower Protection adopt standard operating procedures and
related detailed guidance to make certain they are fair, unbiased,
thorough, and objective in their work.
6. The VA General Counsel updates VA Directive 0700 and VA Handbook
0700 with revisions clarifying the extent to which VA Directive 0700
and VA Handbook 0700 apply to the Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection, if at all.
7. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection assigns a quality assurance function to an entity positioned
to review Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection
divisions' work for accuracy, thoroughness, timeliness, fairness, and
other improvement metrics.
8. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection directs the establishment of a training program for all
relevant personnel on appropriate investigative techniques, case
management, and disciplinary actions.
FINDING 3
9. The VA Secretary, in consultation with the VA Office of General
Counsel, provides comprehensive guidance and training reasonably
designed to instill consistency in penalties for actions taken pursuant
to 38 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 713 and 714.
10. The VA Secretary ensures the provision of comprehensive
guidance and training to relevant disciplinary officials to maintain
compliance with the mandatory adverse action criteria outlined in 38
U.S.C. Sec. 731.
11. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection makes certain that in any disciplinary action recommended by
the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection, all relevant
evidence is provided to the VA Secretary (or the disciplinary officials
designated to act on the Secretary's behalf).
FINDING 4
12. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection implements safeguards consistent with statutory mandates to
maintain the confidentiality of employees that make submissions,
including guidelines for communications with other VA components.
13. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection leverages available resources, such as VA's National Center
for Organizational Development and the Office of Resolution Management,
to conduct an organizational assessment of Office of Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection employee concerns and develop an appropriate
action plan to strengthen Office of Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection workforce engagement and satisfaction.
14. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection develops a process and training for the Triage Division
staff to identify and address potential retaliatory investigations.
FINDING 5
15. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection collaborates with the Assistant Secretary for Human
Resources and Administration, and the VA Secretary to develop
performance plan requirements as required by 38 U.S.C. Sec. 732.
16. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection ensures the implementation of whistleblower disclosure
training to all VA employees as required under 38 U.S.C. Sec. 733.
17. The VA Secretary makes certain supervisors' training is
implemented as required under Sec. 209 of the VA Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.
18. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection confers with the VA Office of General Counsel to develop
processes for collecting and tracking justification information related
to proposed disciplinary action modifications consistent with 38 U.S.C.
Sec. 323(f)(2).
19. The VA Secretary in consultation with the Office of General
Counsel and the Assistant Secretary for Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection ensures compliance with the 60-day reporting
requirement in 38 U.S.C. Sec. 323(f)(2) consistent with congressional
intent.
20. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection develops or enhances data base systems to provide the
capability to track all data required by the VA Accountability and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017.
FINDING 6
21. In consultation with the VA Office of General Counsel, the
Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower Protection
completes the publication of Systems of Records Notices for all systems
of records maintained by the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection, and adopts procedures reasonably designed to ensure that
the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection does not
create additional systems of records without complying with the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974.
22. The Assistant Secretary for Accountability and Whistleblower
Protection consults with the VA Chief Freedom of Information Act
Officer to ensure adequate training and staffing of the Office of
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection's Freedom of Information
Act Office, and establishes procedures to comply with FOIA requirements
including timeliness.
[all]