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**SECURITY UPDATE ON
THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

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SECURITY UPDATE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 28, 2020.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. I will call the meeting to order. Welcome.

This is a hearing to get an update on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. This morning we have the Office of Secretary of Defense represented by John Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and, from the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General David Allvin, who is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the J5.

Obviously, there are many challenges in the world, but North Korea is one of the more prominent ones. I think it is very appropriate to get an update because we have sort of reached yet another turning point, I believe, in our relationship with North Korea as negotiations appear to have stalled and there is a definite unpredictability about the immediate future in terms of what North Korea is going to do. And we need to hear from our leadership about what that strategy is going forward.

For my part, containing North Korea is a very worthy objective with the ultimate goal of a denuclearized North Korea, admitting that that will be a difficult goal to achieve.

I do want to say, in the last couple of years tensions have calmed considerably between North and South Korea as the negotiations began in earnest and there is a real desire to find peace. But the stumbling block continues to be a regime that is a rogue regime, that does not adhere to international norms, that has continued, even in the last year, to have, I think, over a dozen missile tests in violation of U.N. [United Nations] security agreements, and also continues to maintain its nuclear stockpile with no intention of getting rid of it.

As I said, the ultimate objective is to reintegrate North Korea into the rest of the world, get rid of their weapons, and begin focusing on their economy, but that is a very, very difficult challenge.

The other big part of this challenge, of course, is our relationship with South Korea, which I think is very positive and very strong and enormously important to maintaining our interests in the region, not just with regard to North Korea but obviously our con-

cerns about China and how we deal with their malign activity in Asia.

We want to maintain a strong relationship with South Korea, and we would love to hear from our witnesses today about where they see that relationship going. There has been an ongoing discussion about the security arrangement with South Korea, basically how much will they pay. And the administration made a rather substantial ask in terms of increasing that amount, I believe from just over a billion dollars to somewhere north of \$5 billion.

I worry that that approach could potentially jeopardize our relationship with South Korea. I think we get a lot out of that relationship. We are not just there to protect South Korea. Our interests in stability in the region are paramount. So I hope we will consider that when we look at what South Korea pays and then how it matches up against our interests.

So we have many challenges there. I look forward to the testimony to hear where we plan to go.

I will note for members that at the conclusion of this we will have a classified brief upstairs in 2212 if there are questions that go outside the range of what we can discuss in a public setting.

And with that, I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry, for any opening statement he might have.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing.

I think it is one of the defining characteristics of our time that we face so many diverse national security threats and challenges all at the same time. And there is no question that a nation like North Korea may try to take advantage of what they perceive as of us being distracted in the Middle East or vice versa.

And so keeping our eye on this security challenge is very important. And I believe that we have to be, while the President is trying a number of initiatives, we have to be clear-eyed about the threat that emanates from North Korea, not only against us, but our allies.

I want to mention one other thing just briefly, because I believe that every member of this committee takes pride in not only our mission, but our ability to get things done. It was a close-run thing, but for the 58th straight year we were able to pass and be signed into law by an overwhelming margin the defense authorization bill last December.

I am concerned, however, that what is happening on the floor this week threatens our ability to work together. In a hundred years at least, no party has denied a motion to recommit on a significant issue on the floor. So this week we are going to vote on life-and-death, war-and-peace issues with minimal debate, no amendments, and now, as I understand it, not even a motion to recommit, the last vestige of having an alternative view expressed. Again, it has not happened in a hundred years.

I think that ought to alarm all of us who care about this institution and care about our ability to work together on behalf of the

country's national security. I think we are going to hear a lot about that this week, and I wanted to put it on the radar screen of every member of this committee, because, again, we are the exception around here, and it will be harder and harder for us to be insulated from the partisan waves that overwhelm us if something like this takes place.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And just so we are clear, the issues in question did not come out of this committee. I believe those are Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I am sorry. You are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman. This was not your decision or come out of this committee. I just wanted to raise it, because I think that the interests of this committee could be affected.

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough.

Mr. Rood.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary ROOD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Thornberry. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee today. Lieutenant General Allvin and I have a longer written statement, Mr. Chairman, that I would ask be placed in the record, and we will summarize.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Secretary ROOD. Thank you.

North Korea remains a security challenge and we continue to pursue its denuclearization. By any measure, North Korea poses an ongoing credible threat to the United States homeland, our allies in South Korea and Japan, in addition to undermining international arms control regimes and engaging in egregious human rights violations and abuses.

For DOD [Department of Defense], our partnership with the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, is very important. Our goal is to maintain and strengthen our alliance while also transforming it to meet the needs of the future.

As you know, the U.S. alliance with the ROK [Republic of Korea] was forged and bonded in blood. Soldiers from the United States with the ROK and many other states of the U.N. Command answered the call to defend the people they never met in a country they never knew against North Korea's invasion.

After the signing of the armistice in 1953, the United States and ROK signed a mutual defense treaty that established an ongoing U.S. commitment to the security of the ROK. This commitment and the security it provided has allowed the ROK to develop into a proud, prosperous, peaceful democratic state with whom we share many values and goals.

In the military domain, the ROK is home to three United States-led military commands: the U.N. Command, which is charged with implementing the armistice; U.S. Forces Korea, a major sub-unified command that administers, trains, and equips the over 28,500 U.S. troops deployed to the peninsula; and the Combined Forces Command, which is the U.S.-ROK combined fighting force.

We are modernizing and transforming our alliance on a number of fronts. First, we are working to transition wartime operational control from the Combined Forces Command, led by a U.S. officer, to one led by an ROK officer. To meet the requirements necessary to assume operational control during wartime, the ROK is undertaking a major military modernization program. Additionally, the State Department is leading negotiations for the 11th Special Measures Agreement.

Looking to the future, we are adapting by investing more robustly in our defense, and asking our partners and allies, particularly our wealthy ones, to shoulder a larger share of the burden of maintaining peace, security, and stability.

Though we are engaged in tough negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement, we remain committed to reaching a mutually beneficial and equitable agreement that will strengthen our alliance and our combined defense.

Let me speak about readiness for a moment. The U.S.-ROK alliance is both broad and deep, built not only on common security concerns, but also political, military, and economic ties and our values between our people.

The alliance is best displayed in two phrases, one, "We go together," and the other, "Fight Tonight!" It remains our goal to maintain a strong and ready force to enable the diplomatic space that is necessary for diplomacy to succeed.

The President's North Korea strategy is multifaceted. The U.S. Government is working across the spectrum of national power with the aim of complete denuclearization of North Korea. North Korea must understand that its only path out of economic isolation is for it to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations toward complete denuclearization.

DOD's role is to provide a credible force and to field the capabilities necessary, to include that the U.S. is always negotiating from a position of strength. DOD must be prepared for conflict, for as George Washington said, being prepared for conflict is the surest way to preserve peace.

North Korea has the world's fourth-largest standing army, comprising over a million men under arms. Aged and obsolete equipment is offset by targeting and aggressive modernization of conventional weapons, as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological programs.

Over the last decade, North Korea's leaders have prioritized increasing the range, survivability, complexity, and lethality of key military systems such as ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and long-range artillery.

One of DOD's most visible lines of effort is implementing and enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea. The U.S. operates a multinational Enforcement Coordination Cell out of Yokosuka, Japan, where eight nations work together toward this effort. This effort is primarily focused on illicit North Korean exports of coal and refined petroleum.

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, let me just say in closing that we are very pleased that the 55 boxes of remains from the Korean War that the North Koreans returned to us, that we continue to do the analysis and make identifications. Thus far, 43 U.S. service mem-

bers missing from the Korean War have been identified, and more than 100 identifications are expected from those remains. This is a sacred duty, obviously, that we have on behalf of the Armed Forces that fight.

And so thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today.

General Allvin.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Rood and General Allvin can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

**STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID W. ALLVIN, USAF, JOINT STAFF,
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND POLICY, J5**

General ALLVIN. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members, for the opportunity to speak before this committee and discuss security on the Korean Peninsula.

As the Secretary alluded to, North Korea remains a credible military threat to the U.S., its allies, and to the region. Over the past decade, North Korean leadership have prioritized the development of military capabilities, such as the ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and long-range artillery that the Secretary alluded to. These modernization efforts have continued despite the ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea].

As for the U.S. and Republic of Korea alliance, we are addressing these challenges by focusing on building a more lethal force, modernizing key capabilities, and maintaining the readiness on the peninsula.

Although we have made some prudent adjustments to military activities in order to enable diplomacy, the focus on skills, readiness, and interoperability remains, as demonstrated through the more than 200 training events completed in 2019.

While adjusting our exercise size, scope, volume, and timing, the U.S. and the ROK training still ensures that "fight tonight" readiness and the overall defensive posture remain strong.

Outside of the Korean Peninsula, the bilateral, multilateral operations and exercises with our allies and partners, including the multinational effort to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions against the DPRK, they serve as a force multiplier and demonstrate the continued resolve of like-minded nations to defense against common threats to global security.

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I just want to drill down on the one point in terms of our relationship with South Korea. What is sort of the policy idea behind such a large request for the increase in their contribution to our mutual defense interests there, and are you worried that South Korea will view that in a way that could potentially damage our relationship with them?

And I guess, lastly, I met with the South Korean ambassador, and obviously they want to downplay it to some extent because they want to maintain the relationship, and they said they were quite confident they could work it out. They asked for \$5 billion.

They were willing to give \$1 billion. So they figured that, you know—it seemed like a larger problem than he was saying. Are we going to back off of that, or how are we going to walk our way through that rather difficult situation?

Secretary ROOD. With respect to the policy objective, Mr. Chairman, the President has asked that we ask allies to shoulder a larger share of the burden of the cost for protecting shared interests.

I fully agree with your statement earlier that this is not simply about the U.S. offering some form of protection to the ROK, but rather a shared objective, and the combined nature of our forces on the peninsula to me are a testament to that. So the objective is larger burden sharing of the costs associated with these activities.

I do share your concern that we have to manage the negotiations in a way that doesn't unduly strain the alliance. This is the 11th time that we are negotiating a Special Measures Agreement. I think it is fair to say throughout our history of those negotiations in the past and in the present negotiations, there are times where they are tough negotiations, and our Korean colleagues are no pushovers in this regard.

So I think, though, we have to recommit ourselves to maintaining the ironclad nature of that alliance and try to manage that in a way where we can steer this to a successful conclusion.

I would hasten to add the State Department leads those negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Secretary ROOD. We at DOD play a supporting role.

The CHAIRMAN. You play—I mean, I know Secretary Esper was over there and he was part of making the ask, so DOD is definitely involved. I do understand that lead. And also it is building up to we also have to get—renew the contract, if you will, with Japan as well, and I realize that is not the purpose of this hearing.

But with our base on Okinawa there is rising controversy now over the new base that we are building. I heard about it a lot this past week. People are concerned about our plans for the base on Okinawa and the plans to build out that could affect the environment there. It is something we will have to work on. We need to maintain those relationships.

One final question, on North Korea's tests. How do we plan to react going into this year if North Korea continues to do testing, and what is your feeling on the likelihood that they will ramp that up in this year? They have promised that they were going to do things; they haven't to date. Do you have a guess as to why and where that might go?

Secretary ROOD. Predicting North Korea's future behavior is always hazardous, as you know. I started my career as a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] analyst and used to follow them closely, so I have some experience of being right and sometimes not getting accurate the prediction. But let me just say that we are watching very carefully what they are doing.

We don't know fully the reasons why the North Koreans did not engage in more provocative behavior, which they seemed to be hinting that they were planning to do in December. But as you mentioned in your opening statement, there were a number of missile launches last year, short-range missile launches, which do vio-

late the U.N. Security Council resolution. So there was clearly a message as well as a developmental activity in that activity.

We could very well see some additional missile tests or other activities by the North Koreans, but that is very speculative at this stage.

Our message to them has been that obviously we would regard those things as provocative activities, in an attempt by the State Department to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table, which is what we think would be more constructive and productive. But certainly we have got to be alert for the possibility that we could see the North conduct those type of tests.

The CHAIRMAN. Understood. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Rood, from a policy standpoint, would you say that overall the European defense fund, European stability fund, has been a success?

Secretary ROOD. If you are referring to the European Defence Fund to fund things like the Permanent Structured Cooperation on defense, I have had some concerns about that along with my colleagues in the Defense Department, because while on the one hand we do encourage our European partners to improve their defense capabilities and to invest more, there has been some portions of that that have been rather exclusionary in nature.

And we have been engaged in a long-term dialogue with the Europeans about whether, for instance, would subsidiaries of American companies in Europe, European companies, be permitted to participate? What about American companies who wish to participate in this activity?

So it is an ongoing dialogue that we have with the European Union on this matter.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think I misspoke. I was talking about the European Defense Initiative where we go help fund infrastructure. I am sorry. And that was completely my fault.

Secretary ROOD. No. No. I misunderstood, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I know you don't do budgets. What I am trying to get at is, it seems to me, and correct me if you see this differently, that having a fund of money to put basically our money where our mouth is on these alliances and being able to work together has been successful in Europe.

Secretary ROOD. Yes, sir. I agree with that.

Mr. THORNBERRY. And so my question is, 2 or 3 years ago this committee authorized a similar fund for Asia to, again, try to put our money where our mouth is, especially focused on China, but also the North Korean threat that we are talking about today. And yet, the administration has never put any budget resources into that fund.

And I know you don't do budgets, but I am trying to understand why we are missing this opportunity to convey to allies, partners, and people we want to work with that we can come to you and develop a greater capability to defend you from missile attack or to do some other things posed by the North Korean threat.

Secretary ROOD. I believe the fund you are referring to is the Maritime Security Initiative.

Mr. THORNBERRY. No. So this is Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative.

Secretary ROOD. Okay. Yes. I am tracking with you now, sir. Sorry to be slow on the uptake.

We do support efforts to work with our partners in the region, and as you know, there is a large infrastructure that the United States maintains in that area. It is one of the things General Allvin and I and others are participating in trying to, as we always do, looking at our present locations and are we properly structured. Working with partners to invest in that area is a priority.

Sir, I will get back to you, but there are some other security assistance activities that we are doing that I believe match what you are talking about, but I will provide you some more information separately, if I may.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I would appreciate that.

The last point I would just make is, obviously Japan, Republic of Korea very important when we are talking about containing the threat coming from North Korea. But North Korea poses a regional threat, a number of other nations are interested, concerned, and it just seems to me we could do more to enlist their assistance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for joining us today.

I want to focus for a second really on what is going on on the peninsula. As we know, I think you would agree, that talks have broken down. The North appears ready for further provocative action.

So does the Department plan on restarting exercises on the Korean Peninsula? Can you elaborate on our current situation?

Secretary ROOD. The short—I will start, and then, if I may, General Allvin will continue—which is we continue—we, being the U.S. Government, led by the State Department—continue to try to persuade the North Koreans to come to the negotiating table.

The pace of those negotiations and when Kim Jong-un has engaged with the President or his subordinates with other officials has not always followed, as you know, a very predictable sort of measured pace.

And so we continue to stay after that, and that is our aim. We do need to maintain our readiness, and that is something that General Allvin can speak to, and that is part of the plan.

General ALLVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I agree with the Secretary, and this really needs to be folded into a larger negotiation piece. But from the joint force perspective, your point is spot on. We need to ensure that we maintain our readiness.

And so General Abrams, who is the commander on the ground there, has been creative and ensured that of the roughly 307 training events that are traditionally woven into larger exercises, through varying the size, scope, volume, and timing of them, they were able to execute over 88 percent of those actual activities.

And so by doing it in a manner that offers some room for negotiation and for diplomacy and the show of good faith while at the same time ensuring the minimum effective readiness for our forces

as well as the Republic of Korea forces, because we are obviously doing this together ensuring operability, his assessment is that we still have the readiness required to be able to respond to any aggression.

And we think as long as we are holding up that end of the bargain as far as the joint force, then it does allow for whatever waxing and waning that the rest of the government would do.

Mrs. DAVIS. Does it send a message though? I mean, we have been training on the Korean Peninsula for forever. And so that is what we are funding, and that is what sends a clear message, I think. So that is why I am just wondering, is it a real—it may be a substitute and it may be one that is practical at the moment, but I am also interested in what our plans are. Then how do we get back to that? How do we continue to make sure that we are actually doing the training where it has the most impact?

General ALLVIN. I think the short answer is that we are still maintaining the readiness required. We are trying to do that in support of the whole-of-government approach that will allow the negotiations to continue and give us some more leverage at the table, saying we have done this, but always making sure that we have the readiness.

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there certain conditions under which we would begin that again, though? I mean, in earnest of that, again, is the focus.

General ALLVIN. I would have to refer you to General Abrams and the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] commander, as well as the Chairman and the Secretary. But I think in general, as long as we maintain the foundational readiness as it is a part of a whole-of-government approach, we as a minimum have to ensure our readiness, and we are doing that right now.

Mrs. DAVIS. In terms of the operating concern around verified denuclearization of North Korea, do we think it is still possible to achieve that?

Secretary ROOD. We do, although I will say from personal experience, early in my career I supported negotiations, for example, for the 1994 Agreed Framework through Republican and Democratic administrations over a long period of time. This has been an objective of ours.

I don't think we should give up on that objective. I don't think that we should accept North Korea as a nuclear power and move on or something. I think that is a central concern of ours, and it is a large concern, not only North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and what that means, but the possibility they might proliferate them.

So I understand implied in your remarks is this is a substantial challenge. On that I would agree. But nonetheless, I think it is one that we should take on still.

Mrs. DAVIS. From the point of view of negotiations as well, how much weight do we put into the fact that Kim Jong-un and other members of the Kim family have just demonstrated that they are going to continue to commit atrocities? And how do we square that with rejoining the community of nations?

Secretary ROOD. It would be a very difficult challenge, but it is the hand that we are offering them at this stage.

And to be sure, the North Korean brand of socialism and communism is the most virulent one that has really been pursued around the world, even in a historical sense, if you think about the human rights treatment of their own people, how severe that has been.

So starting from that standpoint, we won't be alone, though, in this regard. The ROK, as the chairman mentioned, is a very strong partner in that respect. We also have others, Japan and other nations, that would join us in that.

The CHAIRMAN. And I am sorry, the gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How confident are you that the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets we have on the peninsula are sufficient to meet the threat capabilities there?

Secretary ROOD. General Allvin may have more to add. But we certainly feature that in our planning, and that is a large-scale activity, because as you well know, in a closed society like that, without very many people who visit the North, as well as, frankly, they are very protective of their information, and so counterintelligence capabilities by the DPRK are quite noteworthy, and so we do rely on standoff ISR for substantial understanding.

But, General Allvin?

So we do think that we have resources devoted that are adequate to that.

But you may want to add.

General ALLVIN. No, I associate myself with the Secretary's remarks here in that truly ISR, as this committee and most throughout Congress understand, is one of the things that comes up every year. We always want to know, since the dawn of warfare, we always want to know more information so we can deter the war, and if eventually we have to fight it, we can actually prevail in it.

As we look at the distribution of ISR across the entire globe, and that is really how this plays out, given the resources that we have, we try and distribute them and make them dynamic enough in a way to where they can serve several threats, not only the North Korean threat but those posed by China, a revanchist Russia, et cetera, et cetera.

And again, what I believe is interesting, but the gentleman on the ground, General Abrams, who is responsible for this I think would associate with this, in that they do have sufficient to maintain adequate visibility. Like everything else, we would always want more. But they believe that they have the sufficient ISR to maintain situational awareness sufficient to the threat.

Mr. ROGERS. How confident are you all that our troops in both Japan and Korea are adequately protected with the current missile defense capabilities architecture that we have in place?

Secretary ROOD. That is another area where in an ideal world having greater capabilities would be desirable.

Now, when we look at the progression of the threat, clearly the North Koreans and the North Korean missile program have not stood still. And I know how closely you follow this, Congressman. That threat has increased in a noteworthy way.

And so one of the challenges for us is to continue in our program planning to have sufficient resources devoted and the readiness of things, such as our Patriot force, high enough. That is a very high-demand asset around the world. There are lots of competing demands for them.

But we live in a budget-constrained world, and so the debates we have inside the Pentagon at the budget season principally last fall can get pretty intense around this, and that is always one of the push-and-pull items, that be how much do we place there versus all of the other areas competing for funds.

Mr. ROGERS. Given the Chinese reaction to our basing of the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] on the Korean Peninsula, has that affected in any way our ability to protect our troops there?

Secretary ROOD. It was a disruption, but we have worked through the arrangements and the system is in place. The South Korean Government worked through some land swaps and other things to provide the necessary facilities. And so it is in place.

I don't know if you want to add anything.

General ALLVIN. I would say from the context of its ability to protect the forces, it certainly is an uplift to be able to—the situations that were worked through, through policy in the rest of the government and back and forth with the Republic of Korea, were certainly successful enough to ensure, as the Secretary said, those capabilities remain, and they are definitely an uplift with respect to protection of the forces in the region.

Mr. ROGERS. My last question is about shifting over to Guam. INDOPACOM has indicated they would like to increase our missile defense capability in Guam. What would that look like? You know, what do we as a committee need to be doing this year to facilitate whatever that capability would be?

Secretary ROOD. Well, presently at Guam, as you know, there is a THAAD missile defense battery there. Some of the discussions have been whether that should either be augmented or are there alternate ways to provide that sort of missile defense coverage.

Again, THAAD, very high-demand asset. And so it is a matter of compared to what. And there have been some proposals INDOPACOM has put forward, for instance, whether you could have some sea-based, not placed on land, Aegis Ashore capabilities and things of that nature.

Mr. ROGERS. To layer that in addition to the THAAD or in place of the THAAD?

Secretary ROOD. Potentially as a replacement for. But a decision has not been made to do that. The present plan is for THAAD to continue in that role.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for your briefing this morning.

We know that North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles that could hit South Korea. We know they are developing a long-range alternative. We know they have a chemical weapons stock-

pile. They intend to develop an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] to hit the United States. They continue to test missiles. And I am clueless about what our policy and strategy is with North Korea, besides romantic letters that are exchanged between our President and the leader of North Korea.

Could you articulate what our strategy is?

Secretary ROOD. Well, first, it is to deter aggression by North Korea, which we do through a variety of means. As you know, we maintain a missile defense system. And this committee, of course, authorizes those activities and the funding for that.

We do maintain to protect against long-range missile attack against the United States a substantial missile defense capability. There are also, as discussed, fielded capabilities for shorter range missiles.

So, first, we want to deter aggression. That is not done merely through defenses, but also through offensive forces and maintaining the readiness of our capabilities to try to prevent that.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Rood, excuse me for interrupting, but we have not deterred North Korea at all as they have continued to test missiles and build the equivalent of ICBMs and continue to have a chemical stockpile. We aren't getting them to do anything to reduce that. Isn't that supposed to be part of our strategy?

Secretary ROOD. That is. And I would add, it has not been merely the objective to address those threats of the present administration, but through my entire working career in the national security realm that has been the objective for Republican and Democratic administrations alike. So I share the objective.

What I was merely trying to address is that we do try to deter aggression. It is a harder thing to deter the production and the pursuit of those capabilities, but certainly we are trying to do that through negotiations. And the President has been very clear in his desire to see a negotiated outcome for those things.

We work very closely with the ROK and our other allies, like Japan, in the pursuit of those objectives. And a maximum pressure campaign undergirds, because without that pressure, without that element of the policy to create pressure on North Korea to come to the negotiating table, we do not think that a negotiated outcome is feasible.

Ms. SPEIER. So your belief is that a negotiated outcome is not feasible with North Korea. So what is our next strategy there?

Secretary ROOD. I may have—just to clarify, I have not said that we do not think a negotiated outcome is feasible. We think without pressure the North Koreans will not come to the negotiating table and negotiate in an earnest way. You have to have both, in my opinion, and that is the approach we have been taking.

Ms. SPEIER. And what is the pressure we have imposed on North Korea besides giving them the world stage on which to be recognized?

Secretary ROOD. U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing economic restrictions, and then those are enforced by different nations, to include the U.S.

Ms. SPEIER. And we know that China is not complying with that, among other countries.

Secretary ROOD. We have seen China enforce the sanctions. I think, perhaps diplomatically, I would say we would like to see them do a better job of enforcing those as their performance has been inconsistent.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Rood, you had been requested to appear before the committee about Iran and have not done so. When do you intend to do that?

Secretary ROOD. It is scheduled for tomorrow in closed session for the committee.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here and for what you are doing for our country.

Given the growing North Korean ballistic missile threat to our homeland, I would like to ask some questions about our missile defense. We have asked about regional threats, but to the homeland there is also a growing threat.

So, Secretary Rood, according to NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command], while we can be confident in our current GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] posture to counter a North Korean threat for the next 5 to 6 years, at the rate North Korea is developing their ICBM capabilities we must begin assuming increased risk around 2025 and beyond.

Do you agree with that assessment? And if so, whatever you can say in this open session, what is the administration's plan to mitigate that risk?

Secretary ROOD. First, I do share that assessment with NORTHCOM. We do have to watch the North Korean missile program and their associated other special weapons programs, because their rate of progress is very substantial and it continues.

I think that what you will see in the President's budget submission that will come forward, and obviously it has not been submitted to the Congress yet, but I think what you will see is a continued support for our missile defense program. That is embodied in the policy document called the Missile Defense Review that the President unveiled. And it states very clearly in there that our objective is to prevent North Korea from having the ability to coerce or threaten the United States credibly with their offensive missile force and commits us to having a defense sufficient to deal with that threat.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you.

I would like to drill down a little bit more and talk about an underlayer.

According to warfighters at NORTHCOM and the engineers and scientists at Research and Engineering, an underlayer composed of the SM-3 IIA or Extended-Range THAAD would be an excellent complement to our current GMD and help address the growing threat, not just of North Korea but Iran also.

So do you believe an underlayer would supplement our homeland missile defense and help mitigate the risk that we have talked about that is growing beyond 2025?

Secretary ROOD. I do think such an underlayer can make a substantial contribution to the defense of the United States. It is not a replacement for longer range missile defenses, which have a much greater capability through things such as the ground-based interceptors presently deployed in Alaska for much larger range, longer battlespace, if you will.

But certainly an underlayer can make an important contribution to defense of smaller areas, still very large areas, but smaller than that provided by the ground-based interceptors in Alaska.

Mr. LAMBORN. And to help make this supplement come about and become real, can you explain why the SM-3 IIA test against an ICBM target planned for later this year would be so helpful to mitigate the risk posed by North Korea's ICBM threat?

Secretary ROOD. As you mentioned, Congressman, that test is planned. The Missile Defense Agency will conduct it to validate what the analysis presently shows, that the SM-3 IIA would have a capability against longer range missiles if enabled by all the right sensors and in the right situation.

And so that is an important demonstration or validation of the capability that we already believe is resident in the system. But having been through a number of test cycles, it is always important to be on the test range and validate that, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am glad to hear that because, as you pointed out, this would be a supplement, not a substitute, but a supplement to what we need to beef up in our ICBM missile defense program.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This question is for Mr. Rood to begin.

How does Korea and the USFK play into our deterrence plans against China?

Secretary ROOD. Well, principally those organizations are focused, of course, on the threat from North Korea, but obviously having a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, and more importantly an alliance, a relationship with an important country like South Korea, plays an important role in trying to counter the spread of malign influence from China. And just in general, having more allies committed to the same type of values is quite important as we enter a long-term competition with China.

Mr. GALLEGO. So we can certainly say that the 30,000 American troops that we have there provide a deterrence to China then in addition to obviously a deterrence to North Korea?

Secretary ROOD. Their principal role is not oriented towards China or a set of military plans to counter China's advancement. They are really more focused on the North Korean threat.

But secondarily, obviously, having this kind of military relationship with the Republic of Korea is quite important in its own regard for our influence with respect to China.

Mr. GALLEGO. I am troubled that our Special Measures Agreement negotiators appear to be focused on the cost of our presence in Korea not the value of our mutually beneficial alliance. What is

the policy strategy for articulating the value of the alliance within the administration?

Secretary ROOD. Well, I agree with you that the alliance is very important. This has been a foundation of our defense strategy in that region, and I think we in the Defense Department are very committed to maintaining the quality of that relationship.

We have pointed out to our ROK allies that we consider our alliance commitments to be ironclad, that this is an area, and as we say, and it is not just a saying the Koreans use, we also say we go together in terms of our approach.

And so the Special Measures Agreement negotiations led by the State Department, the objective is to have a more equitable, a larger share of the burden of the cost borne by the South Koreans. But certainly we don't want that to undermine the value of the alliance.

Mr. GALLEGO. And just to continue following up, what are the ramifications of the Special Measures Agreement expiring in the coming weeks? And how do these possible steps affect our strategic planning going forward?

Secretary ROOD. Well, one of the issues is, of course, there are thousands of employees that are provided and funded by the South Korean Government who come to our U.S. military bases and provide many of the services and functions. And so if an agreement is not reached, the funding for those people would begin to dry up and we would have to see furloughs, which obviously has an effect on base operations, to state the blinding flash of the obvious. And so we are concerned about that. We are monitoring that quite closely.

We have been through this before in previous rounds. This is the 11th Special Measures Agreement. They have been tough negotiations at times in the past. And so the real solution is we have got to, as allies, hammer this out and get a durable agreement going forward.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Rood.

General Allvin, I have had conversations with USFK and PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] about munition stocks around the INDOPACOM AOR [area of responsibility]. What is the current state of our munitions stocks in theater right now?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, if I could maybe take the balance of that into the closed session.

Mr. GALLEGO. That is fine.

General ALLVIN. What I would say in general is, as often comes up in the budget requests, obviously munitions continue to be highlighted.

I would say that across the globe we always try and balance the distribution of those munitions across the globe consistent with the threat. So as munitions move into or out of the INDOPACOM theater, into other theaters, those decisions are taken with the full gravity that they imply, and that is with the consultation of all the combatant commanders, of the Joint Chiefs, of the Chairman as he proposes to the Secretary, to be able to balance the best distribution of those based on indications and warnings, the elevation and waxing and waning of threat.

So I would say that that distribution is something, given the scarcity and importance of all of those munitions in a global threat

environment, that is constantly revisited. And it will be different this week than it will be in a month from now.

Mr. GALLEGO. Okay. Thank you. I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your testimony, Mr. Rood, you talk about how North Korea is modernizing their conventional weapons as well as nuclear, chemical, biological, and you say over the past decades they prioritized increasing the range, survivability, complexity, and lethality.

I was just wondering, what is the role or do you see any role in Iran helping them with these modernization efforts?

Secretary ROOD. We have not seen Iran providing noteworthy assistance to the DPRK in that regard.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. That is good.

General Allvin, I wanted to visit with you about some specific capabilities. I had the opportunity to visit the South Korean Peninsula a couple years ago. I was very interested to visit with the Eighth Army.

Of course, I represent Fort Leonard Wood, which is the home to the Army's Engineer School. And I was very interested in the presentation they presented there about the subterranean fighting, which may be a reality if we were ever to get into a conflict with North Korea.

And there were some concerns with those missions at the time. Obviously a very dangerous mission. We hope and pray we never have to do it.

But what are we doing to improve the subterranean training and ensure readiness for fighting in that type of environment? And what is your level of confidence in our current ability to fight in a subterranean environment? And basically, are we prepared?

General ALLVIN. Congresswoman, this probably won't be the last time today, but you probably do have me at an information disadvantage of this. So if I could take that for the record, because I am not fully witting of all of the depth and breadth of the challenges there, and I wouldn't want to speculate without giving you a better, more fulsome answer. So if I could take that for the record, I would appreciate that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. It is important questions. I look forward to receiving that. Thank you very much.

I wanted to ask some questions about China. Some of my colleagues have asked similar questions. But just overall, what is the Department's assessment of the North Koreans' current relations with both China and Russia?

Secretary ROOD. The North Koreans enjoy a closer relationship with China than with Russia, but both they maintain friendly relations with.

With respect to their relations with China, we obviously don't know all the insights, and that waxes and wanes depending on a variety of factors, from what we can assess.

But the nation that North Korea depends on most for their economic well-being, for their assistance is China. The nation on

Earth with the greatest influence is China by far. And so one of the constant areas of discussion between the United States Government and the Chinese Government is about the degree to which they are prepared to use that influence in Beijing towards what they say is a shared objective.

But we have a long history on North Korea, as you know, with China from being on opposite sides of the Korean War, and so we sometimes see those questions differently based on that history and also a different perspective.

But from our point of view, they maintain a rather close, from what we can tell, generally positive relationship in China with North Korea.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So Representative Speier alluded to it, but as far as the economic sanctions, that is our main lever right now we are trying to use against them to get them to come to the bargaining table. China is such a key to that. How much are they helping with that or how much are they undermining the sanctions?

Secretary ROOD. China has helped in the sense that they do enforce the U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea. However, we have been concerned that the enforcement has not been at times stronger, it has not been consistent. It is fair to say this is an ongoing area of concern that we have about the performance of the Chinese Government in this regard.

And so from our point of view, we would like to see China step up and do much more in that area because, one, we really do think they have this level of influence. And two, you look at the border, you look at the amount of trade, you look at the ties between trading companies and others, that is where we would like to see China use its abilities, and we think they have got an international obligation to do so.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Are they currently reaching out to North Korea and trying to get them to come to the bargaining table?

Secretary ROOD. That is our understanding, although, again, we don't have complete insight into those activities. And our State Department is the principal ones talking to the Chinese Government about that. They would have a little bit better understanding. But my understanding is that, yes, the Chinese Government has encouraged the North Koreans to come to the negotiating table.

Mrs. HARTZLER. In my final 15 seconds, any insights on having Japan and South Korea come together on that intelligence sharing?

Secretary ROOD. We have tried to be very direct with both our allies that we think it is in all of our interest that this relationship between the ROK and Japan be much better than it is right now. There have been some tremendous strains on that relationship.

We were pleased, and we weighed in very heavily in this area, that the agreement you are mentioning allows for intelligence sharing between the two of them. At very late in the hour, the ROK agreed to suspend their desire to withdraw from that agreement. So the agreement still exists.

The CHAIRMAN. And I am sorry, the gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Carbajal.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Secretary Rood, it is no secret that China is North Korea's lifeline, as they are the regime's trading partner and provide essential food, crude oil, and financial investments.

What is your assessment of the level of influence China has on North Korea's decision making and the development of their ballistic missile program?

And two, can you provide an update on the Department's efforts to work with the Chinese in upholding the international sanctions that you referred to earlier on North Korea?

Secretary ROOD. Yes. First, you are correct, China does enjoy a very close relationship or a close trading relationship, economic relationship with North Korea. They are their closest friend in the world and the one that has the greatest influence.

With respect to persuading China to use that influence from the Defense Department, we do engage directly with Chinese officials. For instance, the Secretary of Defense meets with his counterpart. We have up and down the chain other agreements. We have just recently sent a member of my team to China to try to work out a schedule for those things for the coming year.

So that is important. The message we give them is one that if China wants to be a leader in the world, if they want to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, this is an opportunity for them to step up.

We have pointed out areas where we think China has not always met their obligations and not always enforced the sanctions. And so these are direct conversations, shall we say, that we also have.

The Chinese Government is not particularly pleased with some of the sanctions enforcement that we do out of Japan with not only U.S. military assets but, as I mentioned, eight other countries joining in that effort, but this is the nature of the dialogue we have with the Chinese.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

General Allvin, the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is an important component of the realignment strategy of U.S. forces in Okinawa to other locations in the INDOPACOM.

How has the Department engaged with the Government of Japan—and especially with the local government in Okinawa—to address local concerns that continue with the relocation of the air station and the continued presence there as well?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I can start that, but I will say the gentleman to my right has done a tremendous amount of work on that with the Japanese.

Having said that, it is highly important, it is very important, and the INDOPACOM commander, Admiral Davidson, has invested lots of time and energy into ensuring that those local concerns are not only fully understood but we are responding to them as well.

And we continue to relook at how we might be able to alter the posture in a way that adapts to an evolving Chinese threat, while at the same time holding true to the commitments that we have made to Japan as such a very close and vital ally in the region.

But specifically to getting to those facilities and the local concerns, there has been significant energy expended. I know that—I will turn it over to Secretary Rood—but he and his team across the Department with respect to policy to ensuring all the way up

to Mr. Abe understand that we are respectful of and are committed to the concerns of the leadership at Okinawa and throughout Japan.

I don't know, sir, if you have anything.

Secretary ROOD. I would just simply add that, as you noted, it is a very sensitive area, that British understatement, I mean it is extremely sensitive in that area, the performance of our troops, safety concerns, behavior off base. So there is a whole number of ways, and we work very closely with the Government of Japan in pursuit of that.

And as mentioned by one of your colleagues, there is substantial construction underway on things like the Futenma replacement facility that would allow us to adjust our posture to something we think is more sustainable. And we have reached agreements with the Government of Japan with respect to future plans and the activities there. But it is a very sensitive area, and we try to take that quite seriously.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Mrs. DAVIS [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time is up. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

Four years ago, this committee was addressed by some of our military leaders under then President Obama prior to the election, and those military leaders are still with the current administration. They advised us that the situation in North Korea would come to a head under the next administration no matter who was elected President.

And so I am thankful that, while some might want to question President Trump's negotiating style, I am glad that coming to a head didn't mean going to war in North Korea.

I do want to mention, while I have you, General Allvin, that I read the article from Lieutenant General Wesley where he was quoted as expressing concerns about the command and control aspect of new platforms that the Air Force is offering.

And while we talk about ISR and the needs for ISR on that peninsula, ISR in and of itself doesn't do a whole lot of good without the command and control aspect. And I am extremely concerned about the lack of progress with command and control, the command and control aspect of ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System]. So I will just mention that while I have you here.

My question for both of you gets to President Moon's transition, his goal of transitioning wartime operational control to South Korean military forces by 2022, which seems to me to be a very short timeline. There are some agreed-upon benchmarks that seem to be moving slowly.

They currently—South Korea currently, as has been discussed, bears only approximately a third of the cost associated with stationing U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. I certainly think that it is reasonable to ask that a larger share of the fiscal cost of the country's security than a third be borne by them.

But for both of you, do you see a push to transition the operational control by 2022 as realistic based on the current ROK de-

fense investments? And can you describe the future state of U.S. force employment in the Korean Peninsula if—if—operational control is fully transitioned to the Republic of Korea leadership?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I will start and then let Secretary Rood really expound on it.

But, first, I didn't want to let your first comment go unreplied upon with respect to the ABMS and General Wesley's concern.

I am currently in a joint position. I understand I am wearing a blue uniform. But I would say that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has responded to that positively and is committed as helping to lead the Department into this joint all-domain command and control, to understand General Wesley's concern that it get all the way down to the soldier to the tactical level, to your point.

It is not really intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance unless it has applicability. And so I would just like to impart that comment as it is being taken very seriously, because we cannot do this halfway. This is so important to the way we are going to do joint warfighting in the future.

To transition to the subject of the OPCON [operational control] transition, my only real statement would be that while 2022 is a goal, this truly is conditions based. And along with those conditions, there need to be the development of those capabilities, the assessment of the quality of the employment of those capabilities, the continued interoperability.

And so there are measures put in place along the way to ensure that we don't rush to a situation that would impact the readiness or the capability with an OPCON transfer. And so while the timeline may say 2022 as a goal, fundamentally it really is the conditions driving the pace, and those conditions have to fundamentally be underpinned by the deterrence and the response and the ability to respond to the aggression capabilities.

Mr. SCOTT. Are you in agreement with that?

Secretary ROOD. I am. The thing I would underscore is our policy is that this is conditions based. Once capabilities have been attained and demonstrated then we can, if you will, check that off. And once all of the conditions are attained, wartime operational control can therefore transition to the ROK.

Mr. SCOTT. Hopefully, that will never happen. But if it did happen, I expect that the U.S. would in the end be the lead. I mean, we are the ones that have the air power. We are the ones that have the command and control aspect of things. We are the ones that have the weapon systems that it takes to win in that scenario. And to give operational control of that to another country's commanders in that timeline is very concerning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Kim.

Mr. KIM. Hi. Thanks for coming out today.

I just wanted to dive into a few details, and just help me understand the current strength of the alliance and next steps here.

So, Secretary Rood, I just wanted to ask, for you, what is the total annual cost most directly associated with having U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

Secretary ROOD. Well, first, it depends on which costs you include, as you well know. But as we look at those costs, those were

a factor in going into the State Department's position in the Special Measures negotiations.

I would have to get from the comptroller the specific numbers. I cannot quote them from heart for you. But certainly we have that.

Mr. KIM. Well, look, that would be a huge help. So if you do not mind, would you be able to commit to getting us those numbers in the next 2 weeks, delineated by military service as well as appropriation categories? That would just be helpful for us to be able to understand where this is coming from.

Secretary ROOD. I will take the request back. I cannot commit the comptroller to anything in particular, but I certainly understand the request, sir.

Mr. KIM. Sure. Look, I mean, it would be helpful for us. I mean, as you just said in response to an earlier question, you are trying to find an agreement here about sharing that burden. You are saying that you wanted the Republic of Korea to take on a larger share of that burden. I am just trying to get a sense of what the overall burden is, what is it that is here.

I think we all share that belief and that goal that you have in your testimony about wanting to make sure that our goal here is to really strengthen the alliance. I think those were your words and your testimony. I agree with that wholeheartedly, and I really want to make sure that this 70-year alliance is strong for the next 70 years.

It is, as mentioned by many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, at the heart of our efforts vis-a-vis North Korea as well as China. And I want to make sure that this is being done in a way that is fair for all, fair on our side, fair on their side, and that we treat our allies and our partners with that type of respect.

So I am just trying to get a better sense of that, and it would be helpful for me to be able to understand the State Department's negotiations, as well as what the Defense Department shared with the State Department in terms of what that larger burden is. I look forward to hearing back from you on that.

And I will yield back the balance of my time.

Secretary ROOD. The brief response I would just add is that obviously the State Department leads the negotiations and the negotiating strategy, but we do try to impress on our colleagues there just the importance of this alliance. And it is a combined force in wartime. It is not the U.S. fights over here and the ROK fights over there. The way we have organized ourselves requires us to have this interoperability, and beyond interoperability, to be able to fight together.

And so the foundation to all that is the agreements that we reach as to our presence on the Korean Peninsula and how we are going to be allowed to operate and, of course, things like burden sharing. And burden sharing doesn't come just down to just dollars and cents, obviously. The Koreans have a very large commitment that they make to the funding of their Armed Forces, to the size of their Armed Forces, to the capabilities they procure.

So I agree with you on the importance of that. And this is part of our message to our State Department colleagues, that as you are approaching these negotiations, and everyone wants equitable bur-

den sharing, some consideration just needs to be given about maintaining the health of that alliance as we go forward.

Mr. KIM. Well, look, I get that. And I understand that the State Department is leading these negotiations. But obviously you are at the table there as well. And there was a recent op-ed in The Wall Street Journal that was coauthored between Secretary Esper and Secretary Pompeo. They were on the same page on that front.

So I just want to make sure that this isn't just something about trying to convince the State Department about this aspect of it, this was something that was very much in line between the two Secretaries.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I could just put the emphasis, it certainly publicly seems like it has been a very joint State Department-Defense Department position. I understand that at the end of the day the State Department signs off on it, but it seems like you guys have been right there with them. So I just want to amplify Mr. Kim's point and our concerns.

Secretary ROOD. We are partnered, and ultimately not just the State Department and ourselves, but the National Security Council and the President have formed up a unified position that we are pursuing, yes, sir.

Mr. KIM. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. We are just asking you to keep the State Department in line, as always.

Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. This week the Air Force Chief of Staff said: If I have to defeat China we can handle Iran. If we build a force to defeat Iran, we cannot defeat China.

Mr. Rood, in your opinion, does that same logic apply to North Korea and China?

Secretary ROOD. We have to have a force that can do many different capabilities. I will say the long-term threat that we are most concerned about is the threat from China and followed by Russia. In the near term, perhaps Russia is more lethal.

But North Korea is not going away. And as mentioned earlier in the hearing, these different activities can occur simultaneously and we are witnessing that today.

So actually this tour of mine in the Pentagon as compared to one when I was there 16, 17 years ago, that is one of the things I feel every day, is the degree to which this highly dynamic, highly concerning security situation, that there are a number of big actors and pulls on us that can occur at the same time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. So if I could paraphrase that, it seems you are suggesting we have to be able to do both?

Secretary ROOD. We have to have the ability not to be completely occupied with one thing at a time, but to have the ability to look in other areas of the world as well, if that is what you mean. I think we have to have a force that is capable of that, yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And that is the question we will confront on this committee over the next year, is how can DOD do both well? How can we confront two regional hazards with a "fight tonight" posture versus 15-year or longer competitions with China and Russia while the Defense Department budget flatlines for 2021.

I would suggest that that is impossible if it, indeed, flatlines, and we will have to make very tough decisions about how to increase and build upon the progress we have had in the last 3 years.

Secondly, it is reported that we have deferred or canceled about 13 exercises with South Korean partners as part of negotiations with Kim Jong-un. In your opinion, Mr. Rood, what is the impact of the lost training opportunities on the U.S. and ROK capabilities to deal with North Korea as a result of those canceled training exercises?

Secretary ROOD. In support of diplomacy there have been some adjustments, as mentioned, to our training and exercise program. General Allvin went through and can cite some of the statistics about how the U.S. Forces Korea commander is assessing the impact. And he is really the one that needs to make the value judgment about readiness and how it has been impacted.

But certainly we have made some of those adjustments, I would say, to try to create the right conditions in support of our colleagues at the State Department in the diplomacy.

Do you want to add on the readiness?

General ALLVIN. I would just agree with the Secretary in that, qualitatively, it is an easy statement to make, that obviously if you do less activities then there is some degree of lesser value that you can get out of the fewer activities.

However, General Abrams' reasoned judgment and his staff's analysis of the risk associated with those, with the remaining activities they were able to accomplish, the way they were able to alter them in sort of the size, scope, and volume and timing, his assessment is they still believe that they are able to maintain that level of readiness.

So it is, like I say, qualitatively, you can say that more is always better, it seems like. But as long as you can retain your ability to have that deterrence value and the confidence in your ability to be able to respond to aggression, yet while making room—successful or non-successful, that is not our job in the military—making room for potential diplomatic breakthroughs or shows of good faith in other elements of government, then that I think is the responsible thing. And General Abrams believes that we can still —

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then quickly, Under Secretary Rood, how—you described—you referenced this briefly in your testimony—how exactly, what was the nature of the economic coercion that China used against the Republic of Korea during the THAAD decision? And do you expect them to use a similar form of economic coercion as other allies in the region make difficult decisions about basing and interoperability with us?

Secretary ROOD. What we observed China do with respect to Korea is some slowdowns in trade, punishments in sort of the ability of Korean companies to operate in China itself, a range of those activities where it certainly appeared very coercive towards the Koreans.

The Koreans did not flag throughout that, as you know, and we presently have THAAD deployed in the Republic of Korea, which is a testament to the strength of the alliance, that they also see the benefit to that.

In terms of your question of whether China might use similar tactics with others, it is possible. Certainly, we have tried to discourage them from that kind of activity. But, unfortunately, as one of the tools of sort of Chinese statecraft, we do see them using economic coercion, not just with respect to basing of U.S. military facilities, but for a whole range of activities around the world.

Mr. GALLAGHER. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Horn.

Ms. HORN. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. We are addressing some incredibly important and complex issues.

Following up on my colleague Mr. Kim's conversations that relate to cost sharing, but turning our attention to our troops and to the readiness of our deployed troops in this region. As one of our major allies, South Korea, we have 28,500 troops in the region, and their presence, of course, I think has been vital to ensuring that we are continuing to address this volatile area and situation.

What I would like to ask about is an update on the readiness of these troops and the future challenges of our—the regional forward-deployed troops in this area.

General ALLVIN. Yes, Congresswoman. I could not agree more with the emphasis on readiness. That really is the key. And as the Defense Department and the joint force as a whole looks to support the overall administration and whole-of-government approach, that readiness has to underpin that.

And so as I previously mentioned, when taken at its core level, there were activities that were planned that were seen to be critical to enable the readiness. They used to be packaged differently, and they used to be put together in time and space differently, but through some creative reconfiguration, et cetera, General Abrams, along with his ROK counterpart, because these are exercises that are largely done together, of the 309 planned activities, they still completed 273 of them.

And that was sufficient, in General Abrams' mind and in the mind of the CFC [Combined Forces Command] together, that was sufficient to retain the required readiness while at the same time presenting the baseline to at least enable some of the diplomatic off-ramp opportunities through that sort of open hand to North Korea to exist.

So it is always unclear whether that is going to be the thing that helps the negotiations piece, but bottom line, just know that General Abrams, if he felt like he was not being able to achieve the readiness to accomplish the mission for which he was assigned, he would certainly come up voicing and we would be hearing about that.

Ms. HORN. Following up on that, facing North Korea, which has one of the—the most significant number of their troops forward deployed in that area, I just want to reiterate the importance of ensuring that we invest in the readiness and the preparedness while also exploring these other options.

And to that end, Secretary Rood, I would like to follow up on the other options about addressing North Korea's continued progress and seeking of increasing nuclear options.

In the context of China, we have talked about a number of things today, but beyond economic sanctions, beyond the pressure that we are placing on North Korea, what are the options of bringing in China? Is there really a pathway? And what other options are we looking at in terms of leveraging the pressure against North Korea to get them to come to the table?

Secretary ROOD. Well, the discussions with China have been around, what is our shared objective? And they do say that they support—in China—that they support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And they have tried to persuade the North Korean Government to come in earnest to participate in the negotiations.

You know, again, I have a long history of watching this, and that has been a goal for the 30 years I have been working in this area of respective administrations, and it has always been elusive to get China more involved. I think the largest effort we made was during the Bush administration where China hosted the Six-Party Talks, with the idea of trying to get them to be more invested. It worked somewhat, but, frankly, in some ways they played the role of a mediator and not an active participant in the way that we wanted at that time.

So there have been pressures placed upon the Chinese Government by the U.S. Government in different ways to try to encourage stronger implementation. As I mentioned, we have got an Enforcement Coordination Cell and aircraft and ships in and around the environment in North Korea, which is not something the Chinese Government finds pleasing. It is one of the areas of friction that they point out that we are operating in that area, but we point out smugglers are drawn to areas in which the enforcement is not as strong as it should be, and certainly a role for China to play that could improve that situation.

So we do try to do that. And it is not merely limited to China. And your question was, what else are we doing? We have gone around the world to try to persuade countries to tighten up their enforcement of all sanctions, but in particular those things that can aid North Korea's special weapons programs.

Ms. HORN. Thank you. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank you both for being here. And I have four questions, I guess, if I can get them all in.

But before I do I want to recognize General Allvin. We have served together since 1997 and multiple times thereafter, and I can just tell you the Air Force has done it right. They have promoted a stellar performer and have reached up.

So it is good to see you again.

My first question is for Secretary Rood.

Can you compare the South Korean contributions to help offset our costs, say, with, like, Germany, England, or Japan? Is it comparable, more or less?

Secretary ROOD. It is comparable in the sense that they provide a substantial offset. They provide, for instance, the Yongsan Relocation Plan, which was consolidating a number of U.S. facilities,

the ROK bore the cost of that. So that was certainly in a rough sense.

They are structured very differently in terms of how the ROK provides that support versus the benefits we receive from the governments in Germany or elsewhere. But in sort of the most coarse sense, there are similarities to that support.

Mr. BACON. This seems, looking at the strategic picture, China is nearing our GDP [gross domestic product] in capability, with 1.4 billion people. Then we have Russia. We have to deter Iran. We have also North Korea. We are still fighting with al-Qaida and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].

We can't do this on our own. And to counter and be a leader of the free world, it is going to take more support from our allies and a more integrated approach. And granted it is a tough diplomatic dance we have to have with our friends, but if we are going to have the free world defend our values, human dignity, it is going to require more from our friends.

One other question on South Korea. Obviously, our military relationship is focused on North Korea. Do they see that they have any responsibility with us vis-a-vis China and being a deterrence towards them?

Secretary ROOD. First, I agree with you on the importance of allies stepping up. And we are asking allies around the world, not just in the ROK, to bear more of the burden.

And then with respect to your point about the role the ROK can play with China, they certainly can play a noteworthy role. And we talk very seriously with them about the emerging dangers we see there from China, the threats, the way the Chinese Government is behaving economically, politically, militarily. So that is a feature of our dialogue.

Certainly, they have a different perspective on that, given where they are at in their trading relationship and other things with the PRC [People's Republic of China]. But, I mean, I think there is a lot of commonality in our thinking about what we are concerned about and the threat to our values as well.

Mr. BACON. Hopefully, our relationship will evolve to include more of that, not just the North Korea, would be my point.

General Allvin, two questions for you. We are talking about the training or the reduction in training, the integrated larger training in South Korea with our forces. Do we see reciprocal reduced training from North Korea? I mean, are they doing the same thing?

General ALLVIN. So, Congressman, first, thank you for your kind comments, and I hope my responses don't change your opinion on the other side of this.

Mr. BACON. I will let you know in about 2 minutes.

General ALLVIN. But in point of fact, at this point, to date we have not seen that. We have not seen that. So, obviously, the return on investment that we are looking for, perhaps a reciprocation, it hasn't been an appreciable amount, which is why, whatever level we continue in, we want to ensure we do not go any further below the readiness.

So while the payoff is not what we would like, the cost is worth the burden that we bear in trying to enable other negotiations.

Mr. BACON. So I would recommend to the administration, say, if we are going to do a continued reduction in large training, the North Koreans should reciprocate. That should be a part of our back-and-forth negotiating with Kim Jong-un, it would appear to me.

But my final question is, I know in a phase III, phase IV environment—this is again for the general—we are going to need fifth-generation, eventually sixth-generation type aircraft stealth. But our day-to-day operations in Korea today, phase zero, phase I, how dependent are you or are our forces on the legacy, say, ISR platforms for what we need day to day today?

General ALLVIN. That is, unfortunately, a more complex question than for 30 seconds. But your point is really spot on, Congressman, in that today we are maximizing what we have with respect to, as we call them, the legacy ISR systems.

I think as we start to talk about evolving to fifth-generation and sixth-generation sensors and shooters with respect to lethality, if we don't match that with creative ways in the way that we conduct our ISR in a way that will match the speed of war going forward, we will be beyond the power curve. So when we think about speed, lethality, fifth generation, sixth generation, it can't just be with pointy-nosed aircraft, if you will.

Mr. BACON. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Mr. LANGEVIN [presiding]. Ms. Houlahan is recognized.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for coming. I have two questions, so I do not think I will be able to take up the entire 5 minutes, but I would love to hear from you specifically about biological and chemical weapons and the capabilities of North Korea in that area.

My understanding is we spend a lot of time focused on nuclear capability and the threat that is behind that, but that we do not necessarily have the same understanding nor do we spend the same amount of time appreciating chemical and biological capabilities.

Can you comment, if you are able to in this setting, on what we are doing to make sure that we understand those threats as well?

Secretary ROOD. North Korea maintains very substantial capabilities in both the chemical weapons area as well as in the biological area. And this is a very noteworthy concern of ours, both in terms of from an intelligence prioritization perspective—and in the closed session, obviously, we can speak in greater detail—but in the open session, certainly to say this has been a longstanding concern.

It is a concern about the capability and the effect it could have on U.S. and South Korean or other responding nations, and that is something we try to train for, exercise for, appropriate protective gear. And in the biological area, obviously, the concern, as we are seeing with the coronavirus, what begins in one place can rapidly move to others.

But it is emblematic of the type of regime we are dealing with, that these are the type of capabilities that we have worked through a series of agreements around the world with friendly nations to abolish but has not taken.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you.

General, do you have anything to add?

I would love to ask those same kinds of questions in the closed setting as well and understand if there is anything that we should be doing, and do have not only a concern about chemical and biological weapons, but also, as you mentioned, chemical and biological issues of disease that we have no intention of thinking about from a military perspective.

My second question has to do with what appears to be an open source evidence of two tests that were conducted on 7 December and 13 December. Commercial satellite imagery appears to reveal that this happened, on the Sohae Satellite imagery as evidence that this happened.

I know that you cannot confirm that this has happened, but I am curious what your thoughts are on what the implications would be for our future relationships and future negotiations if this, in fact, did happen.

Secretary ROOD. And the tests you are referring to, potential missile tests?

Ms. HOULAHAN. Yes, exactly.

Secretary ROOD. Certainly, when we look at what the DPRK or North Korea is doing in the missile area, we remain concerned about progress in their missile program. Last year, they did conduct a number of tests of short-range ballistic missiles, so flight tests. That is prohibited by the U.N. Security Council resolutions, but clearly the North Koreans had a message in mind with those tests and we have received the message. In case anyone is watching in Pyongyang, no need to send it again, we got the message.

But those things are concerning, and we need to have the appropriate defenses in place, the capabilities, we have to have the forces trained and equipped to handle that, with the aim of deterring and, if necessary, defeating it. And it is not merely through defenses. Obviously, offenses would play a role in responding to such an attack.

So we have to monitor that. We also go through a number of steps where we support the State Department and others to try to choke off supplies of the technology that could aid that sort of progression of North Korea's missile program. There are a variety of international regimes and activities. We work with suppliers around the world to try to impede the flow to North Korea.

General ALLVIN. I would just add, as one would characterize what those missiles, missile tests, if they happen, might imply for the forces, it is important for us to better characterize and understand if these are maturation of current capabilities or new capabilities that are going to require different ways of fighting on the peninsula, different ways of evolving the alliance, et cetera, et cetera.

So as we are looking at not only the technological evolution, we really have to look at the effect on the battlefield. So if it turns out that is something that might be interesting but does not really affect the way that we are going to fight, then we would treat it differently than if it has an impact on the way that we need to array our forces or the types of capabilities we would have to develop with the ROK's to be able to make sure we are on path to be able to deter that aggression.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And I do look forward to the closed session and having follow-on conversations on these issues.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

And actually, if I could take the temperature of the remaining members of the room, one idea is that we simply go ahead and move upstairs now. So of the people who are left here who have questions, how many—is there anyone here who really wants to ask it in public versus in classified, or would it be more useful to get up to the classified session more early?

So let me ask the question this way, show of hands: How many members want to ask questions in this public setting as opposed to the—okay.

Is it okay if we take those four—that would be a little out of order—and then move up, or—yeah, it is an unfair question to ask.

All right. Given that there are four, we will have to keep plowing ahead here, and we will go from there.

Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make it quick.

China is the number one trade partner of both North Korea and South Korea. I have concerns about China's economic influence in South Korea, especially in the field of telecommunications. Last week I introduced H.R. 5661 to reduce intelligence sharing with countries that use Huawei as part of their 5G national security networks.

Mr. Rood, should the United States be concerned with the security of South Korea's telecommunications and intelligence-sharing networks?

Secretary ROOD. I share your concern about the pedigree and the sort of security that comes with Huawei-installed equipment. It is one of the areas where the Chinese Government works with their state-owned companies in ways that we find concerning.

So we are trying to warn our allies against having insecure activities in their networks. And it is an area of ongoing dialogue, not just with the ROK but with others. And so if a trusted partner were to do that, one of the concerns we would have is the security of the information that we provide and is it continuing to be safeguarded.

Mr. BANKS. Should we have specific concerns about the ROK?

Secretary ROOD. If they were to proceed with the installation of this type of —

Mr. BANKS. Is there any evidence that they are proceeding to look at Huawei as a part of their security network?

Secretary ROOD. We do not have the concern that those things have been emplaced yet, but obviously one of the concerns we have is various telecommunications providers considering the installation of that type of equipment.

And so, short answer to your question, we have a concern. However, that concern has not manifested itself in a way that—with the installation of the equipment in a way that is problematic.

Mr. BANKS. Okay, fair enough.

As Congresswoman Hartzler also discussed earlier, in April 2019 South Korea withdrew from the intelligence-sharing pacts between Japan and South Korea amidst trading concerns. After heavy U.S.

pressure, South Korea agreed to delay its withdrawal from the agreement in November of 2019.

General Allvin, has the eroded relationship between the ROK and Japan resulted in operational challenges for our forces? And have there been any specific instances of a failure to share critical intelligence between South Korea, Japan, and the United States in the last year?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, the short answer to that is no, there really has not been any. However, from the military-to-military side, we do understand that having that relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan is important. However, we still maintain the intelligence sharing that we would need to maintain our collective situational awareness.

So I would characterize it as it has not had any deleterious military effects. But we are pleased to see, as Secretary Rood mentioned, that the Republic of Korea did suspend their withdrawal from it. So the idea that this can continue is still something that we are very pleased to see.

Mr. BANKS. Okay. The United Nations has documented North Korea's efforts to evade sanctions, including ship-to-ship transfers of oil and coal in the waters off China and Russia's coast.

In June of 2019, North Korean vessels were photographed performing illegal ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods. Subsequently, the U.S. Treasury was able to designate multiple individuals and international corporations on their sanctioned entities list.

General, what are we doing with our international partners to continue to tackle these illicit actions and enforce our sanctions on North Korea?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I think we can maybe go into a little bit more depth in the closed session. But in general, Secretary Rood mentioned this Enforcement Coordination Cell, this actually translates into the military. It is a total of us plus eight additional countries that are working together to enforce the sanctions. And that includes sharing the information with respect to those illicit ship-to-ship transfers, how we might be able to work together to garner the information to get to the sources of those, to put pressure on and/or at some point perhaps even interdict those shipments.

As we have seen, as a result the North Koreans continue to amend and change their approaches. They have become somewhat effective, but we continue to apply pressure, not only with us but with this eight-member coalition, if you will.

Mr. BANKS. Very good. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Luria.

Mrs. LURIA. Good morning.

Of specific interest to me is naval readiness, naval forces stationed in the theater. Specifically, we have a carrier strike group in Yokosuka. We have an amphibious readiness group in Sasebo.

It has been a great concern of mine over recent months that aircraft carrier readiness has not been on par for responding to a contingency within this region. I was wondering if you could comment on that. Was there any alternative planning done at the point when we could not or when in the future we might not be able to

meet our carrier response times to respond to a conflict in this theater?

General ALLVIN. Congresswoman, I believe the expert on that would probably have to reside more with the service itself. However, to reiterate—really, it is a response I made earlier—is those concerns are voiced, they are considered when looking at the global repositioning of assets, the global utilization of those assets in the context of evolving contingency or emerging crises.

But I think with respect to the long-term readiness impacts, et cetera, those are voiced and those are considered from not only the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], but through the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary.

So those are not dismissed, to be sure, and those are part of a more comprehensive decision.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. Moving on, my next question is similar but about strategic sealift. You might be aware that there was an exercise conducted recently where the results were less than satisfactory as far as doing an unannounced surge of our strategic sealift assets, both MSC [Military Sealift Command] and those belonging to MARAD [Maritime Administration].

My assessment of that report shows that we would not have been able to adequately respond with adequate square footage of our strategic sealift ships. Can you comment on that impact on any contingencies within the region?

General ALLVIN. Congresswoman, this is one of those good news/bad news stories from the point of view of the joint force. It was Secretary Esper's initiative to be able to drive this to figure out where we are falling short.

I would yield to probably the TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] commander. I can take it back for the record to go to the TRANSCOM commander, as well as our J4 [Director of Logistics], to better characterize the path ahead.

But to your point, certainly it was a point of learning for us to understand really just the state of that, and Transportation Command, working with INDOPACOM, can give a better feel for. And probably it would be more appropriate in a closed setting to get the answers you are probably seeking about the potential impacts of any of those shortfalls. And we will be sure and get back to you if I can take that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Mrs. LURIA. So it sounds to me like on both of these questions, carrier readiness and strategic sealift, which are critical for our national defense in this theater, you are in the discovery phase of determining what shortfalls that you have? That does not seem like a satisfactory response, General.

General ALLVIN. I would not characterize it as in the discovery phase. I think we are refining potential solutions to that. And I think you constantly find yourself updating and responding to things as they emerge. And so I would not say we are in a discovery phase, but I would say that the Department is actively aware and paying attention to these particular elements and is addressing them through not only alternate ways of employing the

force, but I am sure they will show up in potential future budget considerations.

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you. That was going to be my next question, because as we have the ability to provide those resources that information is very meaningful to us to be able to make decisions to modernize strategic sealift in the future and ensure that we have adequate square footage, adequate trained personnel to conduct those missions. So thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

A couple things. I am going to get to Mr. Mitchell next.

We are going to be done with the open portion of the session at 11:50, so we can move upstairs to get to the closed portion. So we will get to whoever we can get to in that timeframe. And then we are going to move upstairs and do like a 5-minute break. We are not going to magically transform up there. So it will start at 11:55.

Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I will work on being brief.

A couple questions for you. I guess our basic most elementary objective with North Korea is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capability to other areas, to export that capability. You probably cannot answer in any great detail in this setting, but I think you can answer, is there any evidence, any assessment we have that North Korea is engaged in that at this point in time?

Secretary ROOD. North Korea has a long track record of proliferation of military capabilities, to include ballistic missiles, to a variety of countries. And so it is a pattern, if you will, a profile that they fit as a proliferator that causes us real concern.

Clearly, some of the questions that you, I think, are going to ask we can delve into in significant depth in the classified session.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you could pursue that. I cannot make the classified setting, but I would like to know basically yes/no, do we have any indication on nuclear capability, beyond all the other I am aware they are engaged in, that they are trying to use their nuclear knowledge basically to raise money to support their program? Have you seen any evidence of that?

Secretary ROOD. Again, in the past there have been some things, you know. And, again, I am trying to sort out in my mind what I can say in public. But certainly, the North Koreans have engaged in some proliferation behavior in the past in this area, but at present we are not seeing them engage in nuclear proliferation.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you could share that with the committee so I can get it from staff or other members in the closed setting. I will not be able to make it, but I would appreciate that. I think it is useful information as we look up to the objectives we have in North Korea, is to try to at least keep them from not spreading that further and creating greater risks in the world.

Secretary ROOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. A parallel question a little differently from Mr. Gallagher. You will find on this committee we have got a lot of perspectives.

The continuing budget growth long term in defense is literally not sustainable. And I was impressed with the Commandant of the

Marines' planning guidance where he started talking about investments, where we invest in, how we make those decisions.

Do we expect any feedback from the Marines, first in terms of what their changing priorities will be and how it is—do we expect any—is there any timing on that that you are aware of?

General ALLVIN. Congressman, I am not aware specifically of reporting back other than I would imagine that may come up during the posture settings with regard to the way forward. But I am not aware of the U.S. Marine Corps in specific coming back as a service to define their investment priorities.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a particular interest of a task force which you are aware was created with Mr. Moulton and Mr. Banks as co-chairs, a bipartisan task force, the defense of the future, is to try to assess what our military should look like down the road 10, 20, 25 years from now. That is important information that we could use.

And a parallel question, an additional question is, are the other services engaged in similar conversations? I don't think we can keep investing in what we have always done and hope that is adequate for the risks we face in the world.

General ALLVIN. Congressman, to that point, absolutely other services are. And to really expound upon that point, it is not just that each of the services need to do that, but if they do it individually without a coherent synthesizing joint warfighting concept, then we are really missing the boat on that.

And the Department recognizes that. There is some significant work being done within the Department to be able to wrap their heads around exactly how we take all the significant work which is being done by all the services. Because, to your point, sir, everyone understands that doing things the way that we have done is not only not sustainable, but it may not be relevant for the strategic environment within which we may have to fight.

Mr. MITCHELL. As much feedback as you folks have about that, I understand the Pentagon's timeframes may be a little different than the world over here, but our task force has a limited timeframe in which we function and are supposed to put out a report. I would rather it be relevant. I would rather it include the important information.

Again, I was impressed with the perspective of the Commandant of Marines, because I think it is relevant to our future financial posture in this Nation.

One other quick question and we are going to run out of time here. Maybe it is longer term for the record.

We fail to recognize sometimes on a holistic basis that China's threat to the world is not just military, it is economic. They couple the two arm in arm. Yet somehow this nation fails to adequately address that.

Have you and the State Department talked in more detail about how it is you link our economic capabilities with our military interests or national defense, forget military, our national interests to deal with North Korea, China? We do not seem to do that well, and I think it is causing us significant issues.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is not a 7-second question.

Mr. MITCHELL. No, it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, you are going to be out of time before he can answer in any substantive way. So that will have to be taken for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Mr. MITCHELL. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important that we have that conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cisneros.

Mr. CISNEROS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for both taking some time to be here.

We have talked about this before already, but the Special Measures Agreement we know has expired. We are asking the Government of South Korea to spend a fivefold increase in the amount that they pay to keep us there.

Have we looked into this? Like, how is that going to deter South Korea's defense capabilities, how is that going to affect their operational capabilities if we are asking them to spend more to keep us there rather than to spend it on their own defense? And have we looked into that at all?

Secretary ROOD. The short answer is yes, we have looked at that. And what we are asking the South Korean Government to do, and one of the wealthiest countries on Earth, to shoulder more of the cost of our joint operations, of the operation of U.S. forces there.

The South Korean Government, though, spends a noteworthy percentage of their GDP, well over 2 percent. It is about, if I recall correctly, about 2.6 percent of their GDP on their defense, which is very substantial, because they have a very large and capable armed force.

And one of the things, as you mentioned, that we work with them on is the modernization of that force. And they do it principally by purchasing equipment from the United States. So that is another added benefit that we receive from our partnership.

So it is something that we think that they can afford to increase their share of the cost that they bear. But, obviously, we do want them to continue to modernize, and that is one of the benchmarks as part of the transition of operational control to the ROK forces.

Mr. CISNEROS. Well, some would argue that their economy is struggling and it is becoming harder for them. And to ask them to continue to modernize their force while at the same time to pay us five times more to keep us there is something they may not be able to do.

But, on the other hand on that, I mean, really, asking them to pay—when the President goes out and the administration asks them to pay five times more than what they are currently paying and then the leader of North Korea is hearing this, do we not consider that, too, that maybe this is part of them, it is causing him to act out? Or is this just an empty threat for us? Are we going to carry this? Will we actually move our forces out if Korea does not kick in more money? And what are we doing here and why are we doing this?

Secretary ROOD. My strong hope and encouragement to our negotiators has been we have had tough negotiations in the past on pre-

vious Special Measures Agreements. We really need to hammer this one out and get to the point where we have got an agreement soon.

It is not in our interest, it is not in the Republic of Korea's interest to see this go on for an undue period of time. We are both committed to the alliance. We are just discussing the appropriate burden-sharing mechanism.

And we do have to be conscious, as you say, about not sending an inadvertent signal to the North Koreans that there is some division within the alliance that we cannot resolve, because we are partners together. We are very dependent on each other for executing that defense. And we need to work it out as partners, is my opinion.

Mr. CISNEROS. Then my last question is, and you have touched on this, both of you have touched on this before, but, again, the military intelligence agreement between Japan and South Korea. I know it was nipped at the bud before it was suspended before.

But, I mean, going forward, are we working with both of these governments to kind of make sure to kind of help them out and so that we do not come into a situation where two of our allies are no longer sharing information in a region that is important to all of us?

Secretary ROOD. We are trying very hard to encourage the two of them to maintain a closer relationship, to work through some of their differences.

As you probably know, the nature of the disputes in some cases are historical and the way those things work through, but we have tried to be very forceful with both of them.

From our perspective, the only person that gains from this is North Korea, this sort of inability to be working, functioning partners. And we really have shared concerns. We try to impress that upon both of them.

We were very fortunate. We put a lot of energy into trying to preserve the intelligence-sharing arrangement. We are grateful that the ROK suspended their withdrawal. But it is not something that we feel is working as well as we would like it to work. This is a continued area of emphasis for us with both governments.

Mr. CISNEROS. With that, I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bergman.

Mr. Khanna.

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rood, Lieutenant General Allvin, thank you for your service.

One of the areas where I have been supportive of President Trump's efforts is to seek a diplomatic solution in North Korea, and I have publicly said that we should be supportive of the administration's efforts to do that.

My understanding from Chung-in Moon, who is a senior adviser to President Moon, is that President Moon and Chung-in Moon would strongly encourage a peace declaration between the United States and North Korea as a first step.

Now, I understand that we cannot remove sanctions or take other actions before North Korea denuclearizes, but even President

Trump has said that there seems no harm to have a peace declaration. And this Congress passed in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] a resolution encouraging the President to do that. In fact, the President has said that he didn't understand why we are still at war with North Korea and that most Americans would find that very perplexing.

My understanding is that the President made this commitment to have this peace declaration, and then John Bolton basically torpedoed it. I am hopeful, given the current circumstances, that that may incentivize the President even more to follow through on going with the peace agreement.

But my question to you is, is there any harm in having a formal peace declaration with North Korea, especially considering President Moon and others in South Korea want this and they have the biggest risk of action from North Korea?

Secretary ROOD. As you mentioned, the 1953 armistice simply brought a cessation to the hostilities. It is not a long-term peace agreement. And it is something that the ROK government has sought, and previous administrations and the present administration in the United States would like to see a long-term peace agreement with North Korea.

I think our view has been we have sought to negotiate those type of activities with the North Koreans and this would be another subject of the negotiations that could be worked out with the North.

I would agree with you that that is desirable. We clearly have been in a state without a long-term agreement. The armistice was not intended to survive decade after decade after decade. And so if something like that could be negotiated with the North Koreans, I think that would be in our interest.

Mr. KHANNA. Could we make the first move? My understanding of what happened is that the President actually said, let us have a peace declaration, we can do the negotiation afterwards. Then you have to take steps to reduce your nuclear weapons, to denuclearize, and only then would we consider reduction of joint military exercises or reduction of sanctions.

And that was the President's approach. And then he got push-back by John Bolton and Secretary Pompeo. And Kim Jong-un thought that there was a commitment we would at least have a peace agreement.

My sense is the President's instincts were far better on this than his advisers'. And the question is, is there any possibility that we could, as a good faith gesture, have a peace agreement and then we can negotiate on the rest?

Secretary ROOD. I would have to consult with Secretary Pompeo as to his current thinking on that. He takes the lead role in that sort of tactical decision about when the United States would be willing to make offers to those kinds of agreements with the North Koreans.

But from the Defense Department perspective, again, if something like that could be negotiated with the North Koreans, we would see that as being a beneficial thing.

Obviously, you need the other party—other parties—involved to participate. You mentioned the South Koreans. But certainly the

North Koreans would have to be, in my view, a willing participant and come to the table to work that out.

Mr. KHANNA. Well, I appreciate anything you can do on the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Okay, we will move upstairs. So we will be taking a brief, like, 6-minute break to move into 2212 and proceed to a classified session. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee proceeded in closed session.]

A P P E N D I X

JANUARY 28, 2020

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JANUARY 28, 2020

John C. Rood
Under Secretary of Defense, Policy
U.S. Department of Defense

David W. Allvin
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

Joint Written Testimony on the Korean Peninsula

House Armed Services Committee

January 28, 2020

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and honorable members of this committee, thank you for your invitation for the Department of Defense to discuss its role on the Korean Peninsula. We are submitting a joint statement for the record, owing to the unique political and military dynamics that underpin our efforts on the Korean Peninsula. The overall theme of our remarks will center on our efforts to strengthen and transform the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance, the linchpin of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, while deterring aggression and demonstrating the long-term U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy both affirm the Indo-Pacific as a priority theater, and a nuclear North Korea as a principal threat.

The United States is a Pacific nation, and we are proud of the alliances, partnerships, and prosperity that the U.S. presence and activities in the region have underwritten. In addition to the Republic of Korea, the Indo-Pacific Region is home to great allies such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, and Thailand. We continue to invest in strong, growing security partnerships with countries such as Singapore, Vietnam, and India, which while they are not U.S. allies, are nations with whom we collaborate closely. We also face the ongoing and evolving security challenges posed by long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. China's economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st Century, and the Indo-Pacific is increasingly confronted by a more assertive China that is willing take risks to achieve its revisionist goals. Similarly, North Korea remains a security challenge for the Department of Defense while we pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea. By any measure, North Korea poses an ongoing, credible threat to the U.S. Homeland, our allies South Korea and Japan, in addition to undermining international arms control regimes and engaging in egregious human rights violations and abuses.

DoD's Role in South Korea

In the ROK, our goal is to maintain and strengthen our Alliance, while also transforming it to meet the needs of the future. As you know, the U.S. Alliance with the ROK was forged and bonded in blood—soldiers from the United States, Korea, and the many states of the United Nations Command answered the call to defend a people they never met in a country they never knew against the North Korean invasion. After the signing of the Armistice in 1953, the United

States and ROK signed a Mutual Defense Treaty that established an ongoing U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK. This commitment and the security it provided has allowed Korea to develop into a proud, prosperous, peaceful, and democratic state with whom we share innumerable values and goals.

In the military domain, the ROK is home to three U.S.-led military commands: the United Nations Command (UNC), forged during the Korean war now charged with implementing the Armistice; U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), a major sub-unified command that administers, trains, and equips more than 28,500 U.S. troops deployed to the Peninsula¹; and the Combined Forces Command (CFC), the U.S.-ROK combined fighting force and principle wartime element charged with the defense of the ROK.

We are modernizing and transforming our Alliance on a number of fronts. First, we are working to transition wartime operational control from a CFC commanded by an U.S. officer to one led by a ROK officer. To meet the requirements necessary to assume operational control during wartime, the ROK is undertaking a major military modernization program that includes more than a seven percent increase in its defense budget²; expansion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and strike capabilities; and comprehensive missile defense upgrades. Many of these acquisitions are procured from the United States, which help ensure interoperability, reliability, and quality.

Additionally, the Department of State is leading negotiations for the 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA). The ROK has made laudable contributions to the Alliance over the last few decades, for which we are grateful. Looking to the future, the challenges that we face together have grown more numerous and more complex. We are adapting by investing more robustly in our defense, and asking that our partners and allies—particularly our wealthier partners—shoulder a larger share of the burden of maintaining peace, security, and stability in the evolving strategic environment. Though we are engaged in tough negotiations, we remain committed to reaching a mutually beneficial and equitable agreement that will strengthen the alliance and our combined defense.

The Department has almost completed the Yongsan Relocation Plan, two decades in the making, to relocate the three commands and U.S. Eighth Army Headquarters from downtown metropolitan Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. It is now the largest overseas U.S. military base and almost completely funded by the ROK government. All that remains is relocating the headquarters of the Combined Forces Command and some other headquarters support buildings.

Finally, the United States has supported the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Agreement in the Military Domain, commonly known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which has reduced tensions in and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the waters surrounding the Northern Limit Line (NLL) by such actions as stopping propaganda broadcasts, disarming

¹ Average U.S. troop presence on Korea in 2019 was 32,159

² It was 7.9% for FY19 and 7.4% for FY20

Joint Security Area (JSA) personnel, removing observation posts, demining activities, and covering coastal/naval guns. The CMA has also allowed the United States and the ROK to resume remains recovery activities in some parts of the DMZ.

Readiness

The U.S.-ROK Alliance is broad and deep, built upon not only common security concerns, but also strong political, military, people-to-people, and economic ties and values. Our military alliance is best displayed in two ubiquitous phrases: “We go together” and “Fight Tonight!” It remains our goal to maintain a strong, capable, and ready force to enable the diplomatic space necessary for diplomacy to succeed. This was the basis for the bilateral alliance decision to pause major exercises in favor of a modified training schedule.

Since the President’s decision to suspend certain large-scale exercises in June 2018, we have conducted 273 training events. We have relocated some training events involving fifth generation and other advanced capabilities off the Peninsula, and relocated some combined fighter aircraft training to the United States. Other exercises have been modified to conduct various training events with the same standards to meet training objectives. This was done to create the space for negotiations by our diplomats regarding the denuclearization of North Korea.

Regional Relations

The international community has a long history of supporting allied efforts on the Korean Peninsula, dating back to the original 16 sending states that supported South Korea during the Korean War. Over the last three years, our allies and partners grew even more engaged with regard to supporting the security of the ROK, and in seeking possible ways to support the denuclearization of North Korea. The United Nations Command is the natural home of these valuable contributions; while Switzerland, Sweden and Poland support the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission -- providing enduring oversight of Korean Armistice compliance.

We are pleased that the ROK has agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which the United States views as an important tool in our common security. GSOMIA allows both parties to share breaking intelligence, deconflict, and discuss threats independent of the United States as an intermediary. These two great U.S. allies should be natural partners in a changing security environment. We have continued to emphasize the criticality of insulating our military and security relations from other tensions in their bilateral relationship. For those reasons we will continue to press for a forward-looking ROK-Japan relationship that learns from history but is not beholden to it.

We are optimistic that the ROK-China relationship will return to normal following China’s economic retaliation on South Korea for hosting a THAAD battery for the defense of the ROK.

DoD’s Role in North Korea Policy

The President's North Korea strategy is multi-faceted: the United States Government is working across the spectrum of national power to achieve the complete denuclearization of North Korea. North Korea must understand that its only path out of economic isolation is for it to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations towards complete denuclearization. The Department of Defense's role is to provide a credible force and to field the capabilities necessary to ensure that the United States is always negotiating from a position of strength. Our allies, partners, and adversaries must understand that we take our own security, as well as that of our allies, very seriously.

The Department of Defense must be prepared for conflict, for as George Washington noted, the surest way to preserve the peace is to be prepared for war. North Korea has the world's fourth largest standing army comprising one million people under arms in the (north) Korean People's Army. Aged and obsolete equipment is offset by targeted aggressive modernization of conventional weapons, as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. Over the last decade, North Korean leaders have prioritized increasing the range, survivability, complexity, and lethality of key military systems such as ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and long-range artillery.

In 2017, in a period marked by North Korean rhetoric and threats, North Korea test launched its first ICBM and performed what it claimed was an underground thermonuclear weapon test. In 2019, North Korea resumed testing short- and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. North Korea has hundreds of artillery pieces arrayed against the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area that makes North Korea capable of unleashing catastrophic damage on civilians with little to no warning. Finally, it has shown itself willing to use isolated attacks, including with special operations forces and chemical weapons, to achieve its objectives; as it did in with the 2015 landmine incident at the DMZ and the 2010 sinking of the ROK corvette CHEONAN and shelling of Yeonpyeong-do.

One of the Department's most visible lines of effort in support of the President's North Korea Strategy is implementing and enforcing sanctions related to North Korea. Under the President's leadership, the Department works closely with the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce, as well as the Intelligence Community, to identify, publicize, counter, and interdict illicit North Korean trade and impose sanctions on persons who violate U.S. sanctions that target trade with or involving North Korea, including exports, and persons designated pursuant to various statutes and Executive Orders for engaging in defined prohibited conduct with the regime. The United States operates a multinational Enforcement Coordination Cell out of Yokosuka, Japan where eight nations work together toward this effort. We are working side-by-side with partners from Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the ROK, and the United Kingdom to implement the international sanctions regime against North Korea—particularly in the maritime domain. This effort primarily focuses on illicit North Korean exports of coal and its import of refined petroleum. Much of this trade occurs via illicit ship-to-ship transfers, often in the waters near China's coast. We continue to call upon China to convey our expectation that it upholds its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions.

It is important to note some international successes brought on by our international diplomatic efforts, such as the U.S. seizure and disposal of the M/V Wise Honest and the impounding by our Japanese and ROK allies of other vessels involved in illicit activities. Our efforts have borne fruit, but there is still more work to do.

The sanctions regime is critical to convincing North Korea that its goal of simultaneous illicit weapons developments and economic growth cannot coexist. Numerous U.S. and international sanctions strengthen this effort. Domestically, Congress has strengthened our hand with tools and authorities such as: the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA); the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA); International Emergency Economic Powers Act; North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enforcement Act (NKSPEA), and the Otto Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North Korea Act (BRINK Act). North Korea has also been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since November 2017, and its government has been blocked since March 2016 pursuant to NKSPEA. Executive Orders aimed at trade with or involving North Korea have complemented statutory restrictions. Executive Order 13722 of March 15, 2016, for example, imposed certain restrictions on facilitation and new investment in North Korea by U.S. persons, wherever located. In addition, multiple, often unanimous, UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) demonstrate the U.S. Government's and international community's shared commitment to a denuclearized North Korea. UNSCR 1718 of October 14, 2006 provides the basis for the Department of Commerce's comprehensive restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations on the export to the regime of all dual-use items with the exception of certain foods and medicine. The most recent resolution, UNSCR 2397 passed on December 22, 2017, caps North Korea's refined petroleum imports at 500,000 barrels per annum, sets a 2019 deadline for all countries to expel North Korean overseas laborers, and authorizes countries to seize ships within their ports or territorial waters if the ship is found to be violating DPRK-related sanctions.

Remains Repatriation and Recovery

Before we close, we want to highlight one of our recent successes in recovery of the lost and missing from the Korean War. The Department of Defense, indeed the whole U.S. Government, considers the remains recovery and accountability mission a sacred duty for this Department. The 55 boxes of remains repatriated by the DPRK in July 2018 continue to be scientifically analyzed. To date, 43 U.S. Servicemen missing from the Korean War have been identified, and over 100 more identifications are expected over the next several months. More than 5,300 Americans remain missing or unaccounted for in North Korea.

Since the June 2018 Singapore Summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, the Department has had several communications with the Korean People's Army on the recovery of remains in North Korea, but have had no success completing an arrangement. The Secretary of State designated remains recovery as a humanitarian line of effort with North Korea, separate and distinct from denuclearization negotiations. The Department remains prepared to engage the KPA to resume remains recovery.

Concluding Remarks

In closing, allow us to once again thank Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and members of this Committee for the opportunity to speak with you this afternoon and for the continued support of the Congress as we work toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea, a stronger Alliance, and a more sustainable U.S. presence in the region. With that, we look forward to your questions.

John C. Rood
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

John C. Rood serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He assumed this position on January 9, 2018. In this role he serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy and leads the formulation and coordination of national security policy within the Department of Defense. Mr. Rood oversees integration of defense policies and plans to achieve desired objectives. He is responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation with U.S. friends and allies.

Mr. Rood brings more than three decades of public and private sector experience to this position, including over 20 years of service in the U.S. Government at the Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and as a Staff Member in the U.S. Senate. At the Department of State, he served as Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. Mr. Rood served in the Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy. He served twice at the National Security Council where he was a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterproliferation, as well as the Director of Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense. At the Central Intelligence Agency, he served as an analyst following missile programs in foreign countries. In addition, Mr. Rood worked as a Senior Policy Advisor to U.S. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona.

In the private sector, Mr. Rood was Senior Vice President of Lockheed Martin International where he led efforts to grow the corporation's international business. He also served as Vice President for Corporate Domestic Business Development at Lockheed Martin. Prior to joining Lockheed Martin, he was a Vice President at the Raytheon Company.

Mr. Rood holds a Bachelor of Science in Economics from Arizona State University.

Lt. Gen. David W. Allvin
Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy, J5

Lt. Gen. David W. Allvin is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He provides strategic direction, policy guidance, and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy. As the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, he enables the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

Allvin graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1986. He has commanded at the squadron and wing levels, including the 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. He has held major command staff assignments and served on the Joint Staff.

Allvin was the Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan, Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan and Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center (TACC); and Director, Strategy, Concepts, and assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He most recently served as Director, Strategy, and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany.

The general is a command pilot with more than 4,600 hours in more than 30 aircraft models, including 800 flight test hours.

EDUCATION

1986 Bachelor of Science, Astronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1989 Master of Science, Management, Troy State University, Troy, Ala.
 1992 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1998 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB Ala.
 2000 Air War College, by correspondence
 2004 Distinguished graduate, Master of Science, National Security Strategy, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 2006 Executive Leadership Seminar, Smcal Business College, Pennsylvania State University
 2008 Program for Senior Managers in National Security, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
 2008 Air Force Enterprise Leadership Seminar, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
 2009 Program for Senior Executive Fellows, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 2010 Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.
 2013 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 2014 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS

June 1986 - Aug 1987, student, undergraduate pilot training, 82nd Student Squadron, Williams AFB, Ariz.
 November 1987 - August 1990, C-12F copilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight examiner, 58th Military Airlift Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
 August 1990 - June 1993, C-141B copilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot and flight examiner, 36th Military Airlift Squadron, McChord AFB, Wash.
 June 1993 - June 1994, student, USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards AFB, Calif.
 June 1994 - July 1997, C-17 and C-130J experimental test pilot, flight commander, flight examiner and assistant operations officer, 418th Flight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, Calif.
 August 1997 - June 1998, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 July 1998 - June 1999, student, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

June 1999 - April 2001, assistant Chief, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
 April 2001 - June 2003, Commander, 905th Air Refueling Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
 June 2003 - June 2004, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 June 2004 - June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
 June 2005 - April 2006, special assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
 May 2006 - July 2007, Vice Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas
 August 2007 - July 2009, Commander, 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus AFB, Okla.
 August 2009 - August 2010, Senior Air Force Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.
 September 2010 - August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan
 September 2011 - April 2012, Vice Commander, 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill.
 April 2012 - Jun 2013, Commander, 618th Air and Space Operations Center (Tanker Airlift Control Center), Scott AFB, Ill.
 June 2013 - September 2014, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
 October 2014 - August 2015, Director, Strategy, Concepts, and Assessments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
 August 2015 - July 2018, Director, Strategy, and Policy, Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany
 August 2018 - February 2019, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
 February 2019- Present, Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

June 2004 - June 2005, Chief, Organizational Policy Branch, Policy Division, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel
 June 2005 - April 2006, special assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a colonel
 September 2010 - August 2011, Commanding General, NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul, Afghanistan, as a brigadier general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: command pilot
 Flight hours: more than 4,600
 Aircraft flown: C-12F, C-141A/B, KC-135R/T, C-17, C-130, C-130J, C-23, F-15, F-16 and T-38

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Bronze Star Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Air Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Aerial Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 NATO Meritorious Service Medal
 Non-Article 5 NATO Medal (ISAF)

PUBLICATIONS

"Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next," Cadre Papers, Sept. 9, 2000

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986
 First Lieutenant May 28, 1988
 Captain May 28, 1990

Major Aug. 1, 1996
Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 2000
Colonel July 1, 2005
Brigadier General Sept. 2, 2010
Major General July 26, 2013
Lieutenant General Jan. 31, 2019

(Current as of February 2019)

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

JANUARY 28, 2020

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Secretary ROOD. Secretary Esper has reaffirmed that, per the National Defense Strategy, maintaining a military advantage that deters aggression in the Indo-Pacific is DOD's first priority. As DOD detailed in the Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative Plan provided to Congress in June 2019, the DOD budget as a whole makes significant investments in platforms and munitions, ally and partner capabilities, and force posture initiatives that are integral to maintaining our military superiority in the region. The President's Budget request represents the Secretary's best judgment on how to balance the competing demands on DOD resources, given our current topline. DOD will continue dialogue with Congress to optimize investments and enhance messaging to increase deterrence and reassure our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. [See page 8.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

General ALLVIN. I defer discussion on sensitive and emerging U.S. military capabilities to the closed session. That being said, underground or tunnel warfare has been the subject of much discussion among the unified combatant commands, including exercises exploring it at some of our senior leadership conferences. Underground warfare development is a current focus area for special operations forces. It requires unique capabilities and special training. I am confident in the ability of our military forces, but there is certainly more work to do. [See page 16.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA

General ALLVIN. U.S. Transportation Command, in coordination with the Navy will provide a response to your concerns. [See page 31.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MITCHELL

Secretary ROOD. The Department of Defense recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC) relies on a whole-of-system approach to achieve its goals. This pursuit is most evident in the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion (MFC) strategy, which works to combine civilian and military industry. The Department of Defense is working with the Department of State, and all other Departments and Agencies, to mitigate risks to the U.S. economy and our research institutions posed by PRC efforts to acquire and develop technologies for military end uses. This includes the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force (PCTFF), which is developing protection plans for critical technology areas in the defense industrial base. The Department of Defense is also leveraging American technological innovation through our Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), which is accelerating the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities, scaling the Department-wide impact of AI, and synchronizing DOD AI activities to expand our warfighting advantages. [See page 34.]

General ALLVIN. The Department of Defense (DOD) routinely monitors and incorporates the economic activities of China and the DPRK into its strategies and plans. China's economic activities are of particular interest in that it uses economic expansionism in a way that could constrain the ability of the U.S. to pursue its national interests, and it also undermines global order through economic support of the DPRK. The DPRK's activities are also of concern as DOD works within the administration's framework to pressure the DPRK through sanctions. Working closely with the Department of State and the National Security Council, the DOD supports the administration's policies to counter those economic activities that have an intersection with the capabilities of the Joint Force. [See page 34.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JANUARY 28, 2020

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK

Ms. STEFANIK. Last year, it was reported that a presidential Blue House official stated that South Korea used Huawei hardware for less than 10% of its fifth-generation cellular infrastructure with the rest provided by Samsung and other firms. The official also stated that the Huawei equipment was clearly isolated from their defense and security telecoms networks. Taking a much different approach from the United States on Huawei and 5G, how is the Department setting policy moving forward to continue to bolster relationships (under the NDS) and but also secure critical technologies and information?

Secretary ROOD. From a defense perspective, the new and distinct security challenges posed by 5G networks mean there is no safe place for Huawei, ZTE, and other untrustworthy vendors anywhere in U.S., ally, or partner 5G networks. The United States is on track for broad deployment by 2020 and is not using high-risk vendors. In fact, the United States is working with Samsung, a very capable, trusted, South Korean vendor, in building out our own 5G infrastructure. Strengthening alliances and partnerships is a key priority in implementing the National Defense Strategy, and so we will continue to work with partner countries to ensure high-risk vendors are not present in their 5G networks as well. We are encouraging our allies and partners to adopt risk-based security frameworks in line with the Prague Proposals, and to work with us to support the competitiveness of alternative suppliers.

Ms. STEFANIK. Last year, it was reported that a presidential Blue House official stated that South Korea used Huawei hardware for less than 10% of its fifth-generation cellular infrastructure with the rest provided by Samsung and other firms. The official also stated that the Huawei equipment was clearly isolated from their defense and security telecoms networks. Taking a much different approach from the United States on Huawei and 5G, how is the Department setting policy moving forward to continue to bolster relationships (under the NDS) and but also secure critical technologies and information?

General ALLVIN. South Korea is a great ally of the United States, and we do not dictate their domestic policies. What we do urge our allies and partners to do is to safeguard, to the greatest extent possible, their communication infrastructure by working with commercial entities that engage in principled operations, are independent of foreign government control, transparent in how they are structured, and accountable to the rule of law.

When South Korea launched its 5G network in April 2019, the largest local telecom providers (SK Telecom and KT Corporation) used Samsung, Ericsson, and Nokia base stations and equipment, while LG U Plus used Huawei equipment. Samsung was the largest supplier for 5G base stations in South Korea at launch, accounting for 53,000 of the 86,000 base stations installed across the country at the time, followed by Huawei at 18,000, with the remaining 15,000 provided by Ericsson and Nokia.

The United States remains very concerned about Chinese technology in our networks, specifically Huawei. The Department has expressed to our allies on multiple occasions, particularly during Secretary Esper's visits to the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels, that Chinese technology risks compromising our networks, which could further compromise our ability to conduct joint planning, and share information and intelligence. It could also compromise the security and efficacy of our alliance. So we continue to urge our allies and partners to take this all into consideration as they consider 5G.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM

Mr. KIM. Secretary Rood, North Korea conducted tests of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) on a dozen occasions in 2019. Public reports suggest that these SRBMs are maneuverable, leverage solid fuel systems, and pose a challenge to missile defense systems. Can you provide the committee an overview of the challenge posed by these capabilities?

Do the SRBMs tested by North Korea in 2019 represent an additional threat to our allies: South Korea and Japan?

Do the SRBMs tested by North Korea in 2019 violate U.N. Security Council Resolutions?

Secretary ROOD. I defer a discussion on specific capabilities of foreign systems and our defenses until the Department can send representatives to speak to you in a closed setting. On your question regarding short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) tests, yes, UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit all North Korean ballistic missile testing and activity. The Department of State is in the lead for the diplomatic efforts. From a military perspective, North Korea's development of ballistic missiles represents a credible threat to U.S. interests, and to the security of our allies and partners. The United States did condemn these SRBM launches and joined the statements of our allies at the UNSC closed sessions.

Mr. KIM. a. General Allvin, what are the benefits to U.S. national security of our forward posture in South Korea and Japan?

b. We have a current baseline of 28,500 troops in South Korea. Is reducing our posture below 28,500 today in U.S. national security interests? Would doing so undermine the national security interests of our allies in the region?

c. Has there been a reduction in the threat posed by North Korea in the last year? General ALLVIN. The United States maintains a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and a Mutual Security Treaty with Japan. USFK, in coordination with USFJ and USINDOPACOM, remains committed to deterring, defending, and if necessary, defeating any adversary that threatens those alliances. Our forward deployed forces serve several purposes. They are designed and sustained to deter unconventional attacks or conventional attacks, assure allies and partners, achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and serve as insurance in an unpredictable future.

The Department of Defense has no plan to withdraw U.S. Forces from the ROK as a result of the SMA or any other agreement, nor have we been instructed to plan for that contingency. Our commitment to the security of the ROK is ironclad, and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace and security in the region.

No. North Korea continues to pose a threat to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in the region. Pyongyang has advanced their ballistic missile and conventional weapons programs over the past year, and retains its WMD capabilities. The IC continues to assess that North Korea is unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles, delivery systems, and production capabilities. North Korea will continue to claim its development of nuclear weapons as self-defense against the United States, a nuclear power with a considerable military presence on the Korean Peninsula. From Pyongyang's perspective, it is forced to continue its nuclear proliferation despite Washington's repeated assertions that it has no intention of launching an offensive attack against the North.

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General ALLVIN. Over the past decade, North Korea has accelerated efforts to field missiles capable of threatening deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners in the region. Not only have they fielded more such missiles, but have also improved the performance of existing systems and developed new capabilities that include what appears to be new short range ballistic missiles. More advanced capabilities, such as a maneuverable ballistic missile, can complicate ballistic-missile defenses by making it more difficult for a fire-control system to predict the missile's path and impact point. These provocative activities continue to highlight North Korea's commitment to challenging regional stability by improving its offensive missile forces.

Japan and South Korea are each closely working with the United States to build missile defense systems that are increasingly interoperable with U.S. defenses and increasingly capable against regional offensive missile threats. Maneuverable and solid-fuel missiles present an increased challenge relative to the older missiles North Korea has in their inventory. However, the U.S. is committed to outpacing emerging missile threats and hedging against future uncertainties as essential elements of our missile defense strategy. We are steadily improving the reliability and lethality of current missile defense forces and enhancing the ability of U.S. active missile defenses to track, target, and destroy adversary offensive missiles with

greater precision. DOD has taken steps consistent with the annual budget process to improve or adapt existing systems and build new systems that will continue to maintain our relative technical advantage over North Korean capabilities.

Any ballistic missile test is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 OCT 2006, and UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 JUN 2009, both of which call for North Korea to suspend all ballistic missile activities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR

Ms. ESCOBAR. With regard to the soon-expiring cost-sharing agreement with Japan, public reports indicate that the Trump administration initially asked Japan to increase its cost-sharing contributions from \$2 billion to roughly \$8 billion annually.

What is the total annual cost of maintaining our military presence in Japan? What is the basis for requesting an exponential increase in contributions from Japan? Are there changes in the security environment are driving this request?

Secretary ROOD. OSD Policy defers to OSD Comptroller as the Department's principal entity for determining and accounting for costs necessary to support our overseas force presence in host nations worldwide. The current Host Nation Support agreement with the Government of Japan directly offsets U.S. costs for host nation labor, utilities, training relocation, and construction. The Host Nation Support agreement facilitates the Government of Japan's ability to defray the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. In that context, the amount to be requested will aim to offset a larger and fairer portion of the U.S. costs and reduce the burden on the U.S. taxpayer. The Department remains committed to reaching an agreement with Japan that is fair, achieving equitable burden-sharing between the United States and the Government of Japan.

Ms. ESCOBAR. In your view, do continued, tense, public negotiations over cost-sharing with an ally strengthen the alliance? If so, how?

Secretary ROOD and General ALLVIN. The first U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Special Measures Agreement was concluded in 1991. Since then, the United States and the ROK have periodically engaged in tough negotiations to conclude new SMAs that help offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK contributions to the Alliance over the last few decades are commendable, including the support the ROK provided through previous SMAs. However, looking to the future, we must be prepared to face more numerous and complex challenges together. To adapt and prepare for these challenges, the United States is investing more robustly in our combined defense, and we are asking the ROK to shoulder a larger, more equitable share of the burden of maintaining peace and security in an evolving strategic environment. Though we are engaged in tough negotiations, we remain committed to reaching a mutually beneficial and equitable agreement that will strengthen the Alliance and our combined defense.

Ms. ESCOBAR. In recent weeks, there have been reports of certain base support activities being suspended at Camp Humphreys because of ongoing cost-sharing disputes. Some 10,000 South Korean nationals work on the base to keep service running for our personnel and families. Has the Department taken any austerity measures to date to mitigate the necessity of possible furloughs? What additional measures are being considered to avoid furloughs if cost-sharing challenges persist?

General ALLVIN. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has taken the additional step to enable continuity of its operations by programming U.S. funds to sustain the salaries of its Korean National (KN) workforce. These U.S. funds will be exhausted on Tuesday, March 31, 2020, unless the ROK government agrees to materially increase its support for U.S. forces committed to the defense of the ROK. If agreement cannot be reached on a comprehensive new SMA, it will be necessary to furlough most KN employees on April 1, 2020, and suspend many construction and logistics activities.

USFK has been conducting continuous planning to mitigate risk to life, health, safety and minimize impacts to readiness. The Department of Defense will fund critical USFK logistics cost sharing contracts and the salaries of key USFK KN employees who provide these services. All other services supported by KN employees will need to be suspended in an orderly and deliberate fashion.

Furloughs may be avoided if the ROK agrees to a more equitable SMA. The United States remains committed to negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement which provides for fair and equitable burden sharing and strengthens the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Ms. ESCOBAR. With respect to Camp Humphreys, what services are being restricted or would be restricted if furloughs are necessary? What efforts are being

made to ensure service members and military families have access to services they rely on?

General ALLVIN. I defer to INDO-PACOM and USFK to provide the appropriate response.

