    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      COMMERCIAL AND PASSENGER VESSEL SAFETY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

    =======================================================================

                                    (116-43)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                    COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 14, 2019

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
         transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                                 transportation

                                 ______

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     40-571 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2020

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                        PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,               SAM GRAVES, Missouri
      District of Columbia               DON YOUNG, Alaska
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD,
    RICK LARSEN, Washington                  Arkansas
    GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California      BOB GIBBS, Ohio
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,      RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
        Georgia                          ROB WOODALL, Georgia
    ANDRE CARSON, Indiana                JOHN KATKO, New York
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   BRIAN BABIN, Texas
    SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York       GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
    JARED HUFFMAN, California            DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
    JULIA BROWNLEY, California           MIKE BOST, Illinois
    FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida         RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
    DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey     DOUG LaMALFA, California
    ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California        BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
    MARK DeSAULNIER, California          LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania
    STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands   PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
        Chair                            GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey             Puerto Rico
    GREG STANTON, Arizona                TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
    DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida      ROSS SPANO, Florida
    LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas               PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
    COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas               CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
    SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas               GREG PENCE, Indiana
    ABBY FINKENAUER, Iowa
    JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
    CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
    ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
    HARLEY ROUDA, California
    Vacancy
                                    ------

            Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                     SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York, Chair
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              BOB GIBBS, Ohio
    STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands   DON YOUNG, Alaska
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
    ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice    CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
        Chair                            SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
    Vacancy
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
        Officio)
                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                       STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard
      and Maritime Transportation:

        Opening statement delivered by Hon. Rick Larsen..............     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
      Maritime Transportation:

        Opening statement............................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and
      Infrastructure:

        Opening statement............................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     6

                                   WITNESSES
                                    Panel 1

    Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme, Assistant Commandant for
      Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard:

        Oral statement...............................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................     9
    Hon. Richard A. Balzano, Deputy Administrator, Maritime
      Administration:

        Oral statement...............................................    11
        Prepared statement...........................................    13
    Brian Curtis, Director, Office Of Marine Safety, National
      Transportation Safety Board:

        Oral statement...............................................    15
        Prepared statement...........................................    17

                                    Panel 2

    Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), Senior
      Vice President of Global Maritime Policy, Cruise Lines
      International Association:

        Oral statement...............................................    36
        Prepared statement...........................................    37
    Adam W. Moilanen, Vice President of Health, Safety, Quality, and
      Environment, American Bureau of Shipping:

        Oral statement...............................................    43
        Prepared statement...........................................    45
    Aaron C. Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer, Offshore
      Marine Service Association:

        Oral statement...............................................    46
        Prepared statement...........................................    48
    Colleen Stephens, Vice President, Passenger Vessel Association:

        Oral statement...............................................    54
        Prepared statement...........................................    56
    Paul M. Sterbcow, President, Louisiana Association for Justice:

        Oral statement...............................................    58
        Prepared statement...........................................    60

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Letter of November 14, 2019, from Hon. Doris O. Matsui, a
      Representative in Congress from the State of California,
      Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen........................    71
    Statement on behalf of the International Cruise Victims
      Association, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen...........    71
    Educational paper, ``Spotlight On Safety: Why Accidents Are Often
      Not Accidental'' by International Organization of Masters,
      Mates & Pilots and Dalhousie University, Department of
      Industrial Engineering, July 2019, Submitted for the Record by
      Hon. Larsen....................................................    76

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast
      Guard..........................................................    87
    Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Richard
      V. Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S.
      Coast Guard....................................................    89
    Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme,
      Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard...    90
    Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast
      Guard..........................................................    90
    Questions from Hon. Stacey E. Plaskett for Rear Admiral Richard
      V. Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S.
      Coast Guard....................................................    91
    Questions from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast
      Guard..........................................................    91
    Questions from Hon. Chris Pappas for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast
      Guard..........................................................    92
    Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Vice Admiral Brian M.
      Salerno, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), Senior Vice President of
      Global Maritime Policy, Cruise Lines International Association.    92
    Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Adam W. Moilanen, Vice
      President of Health, Safety, Quality, and Environment, American
      Bureau of Shipping.............................................    95
    Questions from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal for Colleen Stephens, Vice
      President, Passenger Vessel Association........................    99

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                November 8, 2019

        SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

        TO:       Members, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        FROM:   Staff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        RE:       Subcommittee Hearing on ``Commercial and
    Passenger Vessel Safety: Challenges and Opportunities''

                                    PURPOSE

        The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    will meet on Thursday, November 14, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. in 2167
    Rayburn House Office Building to explore maritime vessel safety
    amid recent maritime casualties and to examine the
    effectiveness and implementation of safety legislation such as
    the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act as well as the Hamm
    Alert Maritime Safety Act. The Subcommittee will hear from the
    United States Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, National
    Transportation Safety Board, Cruise Lines International
    Association, American Bureau of Shipping, Offshore Marine
    Services Association, Passenger Vessel Association, and the
    Louisiana Association for Justice.

                                   BACKGROUND

        The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a global
    standard-setting authority for the safety, security, and
    environmental performance of international shipping \1\ housed
    under the United Nations. IMO's role is to develop and maintain
    a comprehensive regulatory framework for worldwide shipping.
    Flag countries can subsequently set more stringent safety
    requirements for their flag vessels that operate in the
    domestic and/or international trade. Oversight of these vessels
    in the United States typically fall under the responsibility of
    the United States Coast Guard with the assistance of other U.S.
    agencies.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ International Maritime Organization. Introduction to IMO.
        \2\ Depending upon the vessel and requirement, this can include the
    Environmental Protection Agency, and Customs and Border Protection.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
    (SOLAS) sets international standards for vessel safety that are
    agreed upon by nations that are parties to the convention. The
    United States is a party to this convention. The main objective
    of SOLAS is to specify minimum standards for the safe
    construction, equipping, and operation of ships, compatible
    with their safety. IMO updates SOLAS standards periodically.
    SOLAS applies to vessels operating internationally and
    establishes requirements for vessel construction and stability,
    firefighting systems, safety equipment, radio communications,
    safe navigation procedures, vessel management, and carriage of
    cargo. SOLAS is regarded generally as the most important of all
    international maritime treaties concerning the safety of
    merchant ships. Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention deals with
    safety of navigation, identifies certain navigation safety
    services, and sets forth operational provisions generally
    applicable to all vessels at sea. First adopted in 1914 in
    response to the TITANIC disaster, the current version of the
    treaty was adopted in 1974 and went into force in 1980.\3\
    SOLAS has been updated subsequently on several occasions
    through amendments which are adopted by its signatory nations
    after lengthy review and debate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ International Maritime Organization (IMO), International
    Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Marine safety management systems (SMSs) are programs
    designed to identify hazards and reduce risk in order to ensure
    safety at sea, prevent injury or loss of life, and avoid damage
    to the environment and vessels. An SMS provides procedures used
    aboard a vessel during normal operations or emergencies.
    Processes for conducting regular maintenance on the vessel and
    its equipment also are included. An SMS also includes an audit
    process to identify when the SMS is not followed and a system
    of corrective actions to address deficiencies.
        For vessels sailing under the regulations of SOLAS, SMS
    requirements are delineated in the International Safety
    Management (ISM) Code.\4\ Per the ISM Code, a flag state issues
    a Document of Compliance to a company that complies with the
    requirements of the code and issues a Safety Management
    Certificate to each vessel after verifying that the company and
    its shipboard management operate in accordance with an approved
    SMS. The U.S. Coast Guard affirms compliance with all SOLAS
    requirements during port state control inspections that occur
    when vessels arrive at a U.S. port, and flag state inspections
    for U.S. flag vessels.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PASSENGER VESSELS

        Passenger vessels include ferries, dive boats, tour boats,
    overnight boats, dinner boats, among others, that operate on
    U.S. domestic voyages and are typically classified by weight
    and number of passengers carried. These factors also determine
    what Coast Guard regulations the vessel is subject to. Vessels
    classified under 100 gross tons that carry 150 or fewer
    passengers or that have overnight accommodations for 49 or
    fewer passengers fall under subchapter T of Title 46 Code of
    Federal Regulations (CFR) for safety regulations.\5\ Subchapter
    T vessels are considered small passenger vessels, are required
    by law to be inspected once they carry more than six passengers
    and must include at least one passenger for hire.\6\ Passenger
    vessels that do not require inspection, otherwise known as
    ``uninspected passenger vessels'' (UPVs) carry up to 6
    passengers for hire, not including the Master and paid crew.
    These are also referred to as ``six-packs.'' These vessels
    include charted, rented or leased vessels with crew provided by
    the owner that carry 6 passengers or less.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ 46 CFR Subchapter T.
        \6\ Coast Guard. COMDTPUB P16700.4 NIVC 7-94. Navigation and Vessel
    Inspection Circular No. 7-94: Guidance on the Passenger Vessel Safety
    Act of 1993. September 30, 1994.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard also oversees the use of chartered vessels
    and considers them passenger vessels. Bareboat chartered
    vessels are passenger vessels that are chartered or rented from
    an owner but does not have as many requirements hence the
    ``bareboat'' name. Regarding bareboat charters, the owner
    generally does not provide the crew (i.e. licensed Master of
    appropriate route and tonnage) but must be inspected by the
    Coast Guard if carrying more than 12 passengers.\7\ Chartered
    vessels are required to be inspected when the owner provides
    crew for the vessel to the customer and when they carry more
    than 6 passengers.\8\ Since bareboat charters allow more
    passengers before being required to undergo inspection, they
    tend to have more requirements than the average chartered
    vessel. These stipulations that apply to bareboat charters
    include: the owner not stipulating or providing a master or
    crew; food, fuel and stores must be provided by the charterer;
    port changes and pilot fees paid by the charterer; and,
    charterer has complete command, control, and possession of the
    vessel.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Ibid.
        \8\ Ibid.
        \9\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ILLEGAL CHARTERS

        Illegal charters are when one of the above stipulations for
    bareboat charters are not followed or the charter does not
    undergo an inspection as required. They are a growing small
    passenger vessel enforcement issue for the Coast Guard. Charter
    violations are increasingly common in areas such as Miami,
    Florida, due to its large maritime tourism industry and pose
    increasing safety risks to passengers and operators alike.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Exemptions or ``grandfathering'' of certain passenger
    vessels from subchapter T requirements under title 46 CFR has
    occurred generally to allow older vessels to operate while
    gradually applying new regulations prospectively to newly built
    vessels. Passenger vessels with a keel laid date before March
    10, 1996, are inspected under the ``old T'' requirements, not
    the ``new T'' requirements published after 1994. Allowing older
    passenger vessels to continue to operate can have serious
    consequences. For example, early in the morning on September 2,
    2019, an overnight dive boat, the M/V CONCEPTION, caught fire
    off the coast of Santa Cruz, California, and sank resulting in
    the deaths of 33 passengers and one crew member and is the
    worst maritime disaster in 70 years.\11\ The CONCEPTION was a
    75-foot ``grandfathered'' passenger boat that fell under ``old
    T'' regulations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Gregory Wallace, Rene Marsh. CNN. NTSB preliminary report says
    Conception dive boat did not have crewmember on roving overnight watch
    as required. September 12, 2019.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Larger passenger vessels tend to fall under either
    subchapters K or H. Passenger vessels classified under 100
    gross ton with more than 150 passengers and/or more than 49
    overnight passengers fall under subchapter K regulations.\12\
    Passenger vessels over 100 gross tons fall under subchapter H
    regulations.\13\ These regulations do not apply to foreign
    flagged vessels whose country is a party to SOLAS. The Coast
    Guard sets these regulations and enforces them through regular
    inspections.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ 46 CFR Subchapter K
        \13\ 46 CFR Subchapter H
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CRUISE SHIPS

        Worldwide, the cruise line industry carried over 28.5
    million passengers in 2018 alone.\14\ In 2010, the North
    American Cruise line industry contributed an estimated $37.8
    billion to the U.S. economy.\15\ The U.S. Coast Guard regulates
    all commercial vessels, including cruise vessels, calling on
    U.S. ports, regardless of the vessel's flag state. The Coast
    Guard inspects each foreign-flagged cruise vessel calling on a
    U.S. port at least twice a year to ensure compliance with SOLAS
    and U.S. regulations governing safety, security, and
    environmental protections. The Cruise Vessel Security and
    Safety Act (CVSSA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-207) was enacted on July
    27, 2010, and later amended by Congress in 2013. It requires
    the following of all cruise vessels calling on U.S. ports:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Cruise Lines International Association, Inc. 2019 Cruise
    Trends and Industry Outlook.
        \15\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics. U.S. Department of
    Transportation. Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Safety railings must be at least 42 inches above
    the deck.
          Cabin doors must have peepholes, latches, and
    time sensitive key cards.
          Vessels must maintain video surveillance and
    provide access for law enforcement agencies investigating as
    incident.
          Vessels must integrate technology that can
    capture images of passengers or detect passengers that fall
    overboard to the extent the technology is available.
          Passengers must have access to a safety guide
    informing them of security and medical personnel aboard, as
    well as variances in laws that will occur as the ship enters
    different jurisdictions.
          Victims of sexual assault must have access to
    trained medical personnel and rape kits, and national response
    hotlines.
          Vessels must record all complaints and claims in
    an official logbook.
          Vessel owners must report all crimes to the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Crimes must then be
    reported on the Department of Transportation's (DOT) website.
          DOT must maintain a website containing a
    compilation of statics on crimes occurring on cruise vessels.
        In 2013 the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    conducted a study on the implementation of the CVSSA. Their
    study found that, at the time, most of the security and safety
    measures required under CVSSA had been implemented on cruise
    ships but auditors were concerned with the underreporting of
    crimes that occur in U.S. territorial seas, involve a U.S.
    national or take place on cruise vessels that visit a U.S.
    port.\16\ In the report, GAO highlights the limited usefulness
    and transparency of existing publicly reported data. For
    example, allegations for which investigations are not opened,
    are never published, and the data is not timely reported--due
    to the length of time of the investigations--which are
    published months or years later.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ Government Accountability Office. Cruise Vessels: Most
    Required Security and Safety Measures Have Been Implemented, but
    Concerns Remain about Crime Reporting. December 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    COMMERCIAL VESSELS

        On October 1, 2015, the SS El Faro, a 790-foot U.S.-flagged
    cargo ship owned by TOTE Service's Inc., sank in the Atlantic
    Ocean during Hurricane Joaquin. The result was a loss of life
    of all 33 crew members aboard.\17\ Both the Coast Guard and the
    National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the
    sinking was a preventable accident. There were multiple
    contributing factors to the sinking of SS EL FARO including:
    the master's insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin and
    use the most current weather information, the late decision to
    muster the crew, as well as ineffective bridge resource
    management, inadequacy of owner in voyage oversight, flooding
    in the cargo hold from an undetected open watertight scuttle,
    loss of propulsion due to low oil pressure from a sustained
    list, lack of an approved damage control plan, and lack of
    appropriate survival craft.\18\ The Coast Guard Marine Board of
    Investigation made 31 safety and four administrative
    recommendations to address the causes of the SS EL FARO
    sinking.\19\ In December 2017, the Commandant of the Coast
    Guard issued a Final Action Memorandum on the Marine Board's
    recommendation and concurred with 29 of the 31 safety
    recommendations and three of the four administrative
    recommendations.\20\ The NTSB issued 29 recommendations for the
    Coast Guard, two recommendations for the Federal Communications
    Commission, one recommendation for the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration, nine recommendations for the
    International Association of Classification Societies, one
    recommendation for the American Bureau of Shipping, one
    recommendation for Furuno Electric Company, and 10
    recommendations for TOTE Services Inc.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Susan Miller. USA Today. Captain's mistakes led to El Faro
    sinking, Coast Guard report says. October 1, 2017.
        \18\ National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB/MAR-17/01 PB2018-
    100342. Sinking of US Cargo Vessel El Faro Atlantic Ocean, Northest of
    Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas, October 1, 2015. December 12,
    2017.
        \19\ Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation. Steam Ship El Faro
    (O.N. 561732) Sinking and Loss of the Vessel with 33 Persons Missing
    and Preseumed Deceased Northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas
    on October 1, 2015 Marine Board's Report. September 24, 2017.
        \20\ U.S. Coast Guard. Steam Ship EL FARO (O.N. 561732) Sinking and
    Loss of the Vessel with 33 Persons Missing and Presumed Deceased
    Northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas on October 1, 2015
    December 19, 2017.
        \21\ National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB/MAR-17/01 PB2018-
    100342. Sinking of US Cargo Vessel El Faro Atlantic Ocean, Northest of
    Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas, October 1, 2015. December 12,
    2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On October 11, 2018, the Save our Seas Act of 2018 (P.L.
    115-265) was enacted that included the Hamm Alert Maritime
    Safety Act of 2018 in response to the sinking of the SS EL FARO
    in 2015. This Act used many of the final action memo actions
    and includes requirements such as:
          A website documenting domestic vessel compliance
    with subtitle II of Title 46 that includes flag state detention
    rates and identifying organizations that failed to recognize a
    major non-conformity.
          GAO audit of the Coast Guard's oversight and
    enforcement of safety management plans.
          Outfitting of ships with distress signaling and
    location technology.
          Maintaining records regarding vessel weight
    changes by the owners of the vessel.
          The Commandant of the Coast Guard will enter into
    agreements with IMO on free-floating standards for voyage data
    recorders on vessels.
          Equipment that can attach a radio or Automated
    Identification System strobe or beacon to an object not
    immediately available to retrieve.
          Increase in personnel training regarding marine
    inspections.
          Flag-state guidance for all freight vessels to
    include comprehensive damage control information in safety
    management plans.
          Enhanced Coast Guard oversight of recognized
    organizations that conduct 3rd party inspections on behalf of
    the Coast Guard.
          Improvement of quality and timeliness of weather
    forecasts available to masters and mariners.
          Establishment of an anonymous safety alert pilot
    program.
        Following this casualty and subsequent enactment of the
    Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act, there has been increased focus
    on the use of ``recognized organizations'' conducting
    inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard and their oversight of
    these organizations. Flag states may delegate the issuance of
    Documents of Compliance and Safety Management Certificates to
    ``recognized organizations,'' which are generally
    classification societies. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
    is a recognized organization authorized by the Coast Guard. As
    such, ABS issued ISM certificates and was required to inform
    the Coast Guard when either a Document of Compliance or a
    Safety Management Certificate was rescinded. The Coast Guard's
    use of 3rd party inspectors raises conflict of interest
    concerns in light of the fact that these inspectors are being
    paid by the owners of the vessel that they are inspecting which
    could in turn result in a substandard inspection and unsafe
    vessel. Section 215 of the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act
    requires the Coast Guard to establish an office that conducts
    oversight of all recognized organizations not later than two
    years after the date of enactment.
        While there are concerns regarding oversight of recognized
    organizations, there is also concern with the increasing strain
    placed on limited Coast Guard resources for prevention and
    inspection activities. In 2018, the Coast Guard began
    implementation of newly updated 46 CFR Subchapter M
    requirements for towing vessels. These regulations established
    an inspection requirement for towing vessels.\22\ These new
    regulations allow for the use of 3rd party inspectors. The
    success of the new subchapter M requirements rests on the Coast
    Guard's ability to create and oversee important regulations
    that determine 3rd party inspectors. In addition, the Coast
    Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
    282) required the Coast Guard to initiate a new examination
    program for all commercial fishing vessels. The Coast Guard has
    yet to fully implement this requirement, a failure attributed
    by the Service to lack of resources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ U.S. Coast Guard 9/5/2019: Updated Subchapter M FAQs Now
    Available. September 5, 2018.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  WITNESS LIST

    PANEL I

          Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme, Assistant
    Commandant for Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard
          The Honorable Richard Balzano, Deputy
    Administrator, United States Maritime Administration
          Mr. Brian Curtis, Director, Office of Marine
    Safety, National Transportation Safety Board

    PANEL II

          Vice Admiral Brian Salerno, USCG, Ret., Senior
    Vice President, Maritime Policy, Cruise Lines International
    Association
          Mr. Adam W. Moilanen, Vice President of Health,
    Safety, Quality & Environment, American Bureau of Shipping
          Mr. Aaron Smith, President and Chief Executive
    Officer, Offshore Marine Service Association
          Ms. Colleen Stephens, Vice President, Passenger
    Vessel Association
          Mr. Paul Sterbcow, President, Louisiana
    Association for Justice

      COMMERCIAL AND PASSENGER VESSEL SAFETY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2019

                      House of Representatives,
              Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
                                        Transportation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:11 p.m., in
    room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sean Patrick
    Maloney (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
    order.
        I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
    declare recesses during today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
    subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
    today's hearing and ask questions.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I am sitting in for Chair Maloney today, who is otherwise
    detained, and I want to say good afternoon and welcome to this
    afternoon's hearing on commercial and passenger vessel safety.
        As we approach the anniversaries of important maritime
    safety legislation, we need to know that Coast Guard-inspected
    vessels will be reliably safe, sound, and operable, especially
    in light of recent maritime casualties.
        Over the past 19 years, we have seen a string of maritime
    casualties here in the United States, from the catastrophic
    Conception dive boat fire that cost the lives of 33 passengers
    and 1 crewmember, the capsizing of the Golden Ray in Georgia,
    and countless other vessels, the past years have provided a
    continuous list of maritime casualties that is too long and
    tragic.
        I want to share my deepest condolences to the families of
    victims of these maritime tragedies.
        It is our responsibility as Congress to prioritize the
    lives and safety of crew and passengers over profits. This
    hearing is needed to evaluate the oversight of commercial and
    passenger vehicles and identify what is working and what needs
    improvement.
        The U.S. has a history of taking a reactionary approach to
    safety, creating maritime safety laws that follow tragedy,
    rather than preemptively strengthening safety requirements for
    a more robust fleet, one that is effectively regulated and
    inspected.
        Just last week, the L.A. Times described a contentious
    relationship between the Coast Guard and the National
    Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB. The Coast Guard's
    repeated failure to embrace and act on the NTSB's
    recommendations on passenger vessels has emerged as a
    persistent thread in recent maritime casualties.
    Recommendations from prior casualties continue to resurface in
    later accidents, and yet, the Coast Guard refuses to act. And I
    share the NTSB's concerns.
        Recent accidents on small passenger vessels demonstrate
    that poor preventive maintenance, lax fire prevention, and
    inadequate crew training, all continue as contributing factors
    leading to calamity. The Coast Guard is making a critical
    mistake by not acting more assertively on these
    recommendations.
        Moreover, the grandfathering of passenger vessels under the
    old T regulations emphasize these concerns. Revisions to
    subchapter T regulations for passenger vessels in 1994 were
    intended to create safer vessels, yet by grandfathering in
    older vessels, passenger vessel safety has been compromised by
    keeping older, less safe vessels in service far longer than
    desired. All of this could lead to additional and more deadly
    accidents in the future.
        Last year, Congress passed the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety
    Act of 2018 in wake of the sinking of the cargo vessel El Faro.
    This legislation focused on the Coast Guard's inspection
    program and oversight of recognized organizations. It also
    highlights the importance of safety management systems, or
    SMSs, on all vessels to prepare them for emergency scenarios.
        One year later, I expect to hear from the Coast Guard and
    the American Bureau of Shipping on a concrete action step they
    have taken to implement the act.
        Cruise vessels as well pose unique risks and
    vulnerabilities for passengers as safety on the high seas not
    only applies to the physical maintenance of the vessel, but to
    help passengers taken care of while at sea.
        When massive cruise ships embark, they are essentially
    floating cities. They have their own security and oversee
    thousands of individuals with high exposure to risk.
        In 2010, nearly a decade ago, Congress passed the Cruise
    Vessel Security and Safety Act to provide U.S. citizens more
    protections while vacationing on cruise ships. It was last
    amended in 2012, and has not been revisited since.
        In this environment, the chances of crime, especially
    sexual assault, are high, and the resources available to
    victims, scant. I look forward to hearing from Admiral Salerno
    on what the industry has done to implement the act.
        From cruise ships to cargo ships, from large ferries to
    small passenger vessels, one constant remains true: Oversight
    of safety measures is vital to protecting lives and property.
    It is the Government's and industry's responsibility to provide
    a safe and reliable maritime industry, and it is the work of
    this committee to do its oversight to make that happen so
    everyone who steps on a vessel safely reaches the end of their
    voyage.
        [Mr. Maloney's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney, a Representative in
      Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
                    Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
        Good afternoon, and welcome to this afternoon's important hearing
    on commercial and passenger vessel safety.
        As we approach the anniversaries of important maritime safety
    legislation, we need to know that Coast Guard inspected vessels will be
    reliably safe, sound, and operable--especially in light of recent
    maritime casualties.
        Over the past 19 years we have seen saw a string of maritime
    casualties here in the United States. From the catastrophic CONCEPTION
    dive boat fire that cost the lives of 33 passengers and 1 crew member,
    to the capsizing of the GOLDEN RAY in Georgia, and countless other
    vessels, the past years have provided a continuous list of maritime
    casualties that is too long and tragic. I share my deepest condolences
    to the families of victims of these maritime tragedies.
        It is our responsibility as Congress to prioritize the lives and
    safety of crew and passengers over profits. This hearing is needed to
    evaluate the oversight of commercial and passenger vessels, and
    identify what is working, and what needs improvement.
        The United States has a history of taking a reactionary approach to
    safety; creating maritime safety laws that follow tragedy rather than
    preemptively strengthening safety requirements for a more robust fleet,
    one that is effectively regulated and inspected.
        Just this week the Los Angeles Times described a contentious
    relationship between the Coast Guard and the National Transportation
    Safety Board (NTSB). The Coast Guard's repeated failure to embrace and
    act on the NTSB's recommendations on passenger vessels has emerged as a
    persistent thread in recent maritime causalities.
        Recommendations from prior casualties continue to resurface in
    later accidents, and yet the Coast Guard refuses to act.
        I share the NTSB's concerns: recent accidents on small passenger
    vessels demonstrate that poor preventative maintenance, lax fire
    prevention and inadequate crew training all continue as contributing
    factors leading to calamity. The Coast Guard is making a critical
    mistake by not acting more assertively on these recommendations.
        Moreover, the grandfathering of passenger vessels under the ``old
    T'' regulations emphasize these concerns. Revisions to subchapter T
    regulations for passenger vessels in 1994 were intended to create safer
    vessels, yet by grandfathering in older vessels, passenger vessel
    safety has been compromised by keeping older, less safe vessels in
    service far longer than desired. All of this could lead to additional
    and more deadly accidents in the future.
        Last year Congress passed the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of
    2018 in the wake of the sinking of the cargo vessel EL FARO. This
    legislation focused on the Coast Guard's inspection program and
    oversight of recognized organizations. It also highlights the
    importance of Safety Management Systems (SMSs) on all vessels to
    prepare them for emergency scenarios.
        One year later, I expect to hear from the Coast Guard and American
    Bureau of Shipping on the concrete action steps they have taken to
    implement this Act.
        Cruise vessels pose unique risks and vulnerabilities for
    passengers, as safety on the high seas not only applies to the physical
    maintenance of the vessel, but to how passengers are taken care of
    while at-sea. When massive cruise ships embark, they are essentially
    floating cities: they have their own security and oversee thousands of
    individuals with high exposure to risk.
        In 2010, nearly a decade ago, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel
    Security and Safety Act to provide U.S. citizens more protections while
    vacationing on cruise ships. It was last amended in 2012 and not been
    revisited since. In this environment the chances of crime, especially
    sexual assault, are high and the resources available to victims scant.
    I look forward to hearing from Admiral Salerno on what the industry has
    done to implement the Act.
        From cruise ships to cargo ships, from large ferries to small
    passenger vessels, one constant remains true: oversight of safety
    measures is vital to protecting lives and property. It is the
    government's and industry's responsibility to provide a safe and
    reliable maritime industry, and it is the work of this committee to do
    its oversight to make that happen so everyone who steps on a vessel
    safely reaches the end of their voyage.

        Mr. Larsen. Before continuing, I ask unanimous consent to
    insert statements from Congresswoman Matsui, the International
    Cruise Victims Association, and a paper from the International
    Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots into the hearing
    record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information is on pages 71-85.]
        Mr. Larsen. And now I would call on the ranking member of
    the subcommittee, Mr. Gibbs, for an opening statement.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
        Last Sunday marked the 44th anniversary of the sinking of
    the Edmund Fitzgerald on Lake Superior, made famous in the
    modern-day folk song, ``The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald.''
    The entire crew of 29 was lost, so it is appropriate that we
    hold this hearing on maritime safety this week.
        Sadly, we have had three significant marine casualties in a
    U.S.-flagged vessel in the last 4 years in which nearly 90
    lives were lost: The El Faro, the Missouri duck boat, and most
    recently, the Conception.
        In response to the Commandant of the Coast Guard's El Faro
    accident Final Action Memo, Congress adopted the Hamm Alert
    Maritime Safety Act to ensure the recommendations in that memo
    were implemented.
        The subcommittee looks forward to receiving the Final
    Action Memo on the Conception tragedy when it is complete.
        Today's witnesses will discuss changes made in the year
    since Congress passed the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act and in
    the near decade since Congress passed the Cruise Vessel
    Security and Safety Act of 2010.
        We will also examine the dramatically expanded Coast Guard
    maritime safety workload and how the Service is coping with
    that increased workload.
        In 2004, Congress brought ferries under Coast Guard
    inspection. In 2006, Congress brought towing vessels under an
    inspection regime, though that regime is only now being
    implemented. Finally, in 2010, Congress established a new
    examination and classification requirements for fishing
    vessels.
        Having brought nearly 75,000 vessels under additional
    security, the Coast Guard has received virtually no additional
    resources to carry out its marine safety work. This has led to
    increased use of third-party inspections. I look forward to
    hearing today what actions have been taken to ensure that the
    Coast Guard has sufficient authority to oversee this increased
    use of our third-party inspectors, and to maintain its own in-
    house expertise.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I
    look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and I yield back.
        [Mr. Gibbs' prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
    the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                            Maritime Transportation
        Last Sunday marked the 44th anniversary of the sinking of the
    Edmund Fitzgerald on Lake Superior, made famous in the modern-day folk
    song, ``The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald.'' The entire crew of 29 was
    lost, so it is appropriate that we hold this hearing on maritime safety
    this week.
        Sadly, we have had three significant marine casualties on U.S.-flag
    vessel in the last four years on which nearly 90 lives were lost--the
    El Faro, the Missouri duck boat, and most recently the Conception. In
    response to the Commandant of the Coast Guard's El Faro accident Final
    Action Memo, Congress adopted the HAMM Alert Maritime Safety Act to
    assure the recommendations in that memo were implemented. The
    Subcommittee looks forward to receiving the Final Action Memo on the
    Conception tragedy when it is complete.
        Today's witnesses will discuss changes made in the year since
    Congress passed the HAMM Maritime Alert Act, and in the near-decade
    since Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act of
    2010.
        We will also examine the dramatically expanded Coast Guard maritime
    safety workload and how the Service is coping with that increased
    workload. In 2004, Congress brought ferries under Coast Guard
    inspection. In 2006, Congress brought towing vessels under an
    inspection regime, though that regime is only now being implemented.
    Finally, in 2010, Congress established new examination and
    classification requirements for fishing vessels.
        Having brought nearly 75,000 vessels under additional scrutiny, the
    Coast Guard has received virtually no additional resources to carry out
    its marine safety work. This has led to increased use of third-party
    inspections. I look forward to hearing today what actions are being
    taken to ensure the Coast Guard has sufficient authority to oversee
    this increased use of third-party inspectors, and to maintain its own
    in-house expertise.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

        Mr. Maloney [presiding]. Well, I thank the gentleman. And I
    apologize to the panel for arriving late. We are dealing with
    some extraordinary circumstances that probably need no
    explanation.
        But you probably also realize that between Chairman DeFazio
    and Chairman Larsen, you have two gentlemen who have forgotten
    more about these issues than I am likely to ever learn. So you
    are in very capable hands.
        And with that, I would be happy to recognize the chairman
    for any remarks he might wish to make.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        The most important function of this committee is to ensure
    that all of the modes which are under our jurisdiction are as
    safe as is humanly possible.
        And as people know, we have been pretty much submerged--I
    guess wrong metaphor--but anyway, we have been working a lot on
    aviation with the MAX fatalities. But that doesn't mean that we
    aren't concerned about other modes in surface. We have
    fatalities increasing, pedestrian and cycling and et cetera.
    But here we are today to talk about maritime issues.
        In my vice chair's district, Salud Carbajal, the Conception
    disaster happened. And for the life of me--I live on a boat,
    and this is the third boat I have lived on, and there is always
    another exit. And I guess in this case both exits were blocked.
    I don't know how that happened. We don't have everything
    definitive from NTSB.
        We have the fishing boat burning and sinking off Barbers
    Point, Hawaii, and then the capsized and unsalvageable RoRo off
    of St. Simons Island, Georgia. So I think it is very
    appropriate that we are here today to revisit some of these
    issues.
        Some might remember the hearing we held on El Faro a few
    years ago. Thirty-three people died in that disaster. We held
    followup and oversight hearings, and we felt that we had to
    legislate, because the Coast Guard had allowed its marine
    safety branch to essentially atrophy, and we were depending
    upon classification societies and others.
        And I have always had concerns about the classification
    societies, because: ``Hey, come inspect my ship. Oh, wait a
    minute, you found all of those problems. I am going to hire
    someone next time to inspect the ship who might overlook those
    problems.'' I think there is an inherent conflict of interest
    there. I am not 100 percent certain how we can solve that,
    except from this committee's perspective: much more expertise
    and oversight by the Coast Guard of those classification
    societies, and check up actual inspections to see that they
    were conducted properly is really very critical.
        So we are going to talk today about the Hamm Alert Maritime
    Safety Act reforms that we adopted, and we want a status update
    from the admiral on that.
        I also want to learn if the cruise industry has fully
    complied with the requirements adopted in 2010 with the
    passenger Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act. It is a very
    lucrative industry, and they can well afford to implement all
    of the provisions of that law.
        There is an old saying, all Coast Guard safety regulations
    are written in blood, as each new regulation reflects lessons
    learned from the latest marine disaster. What we want to do is
    get ahead of these issues as much as we humanly can. The sea is
    a difficult place. Accidents are still going to happen, but we
    want to avoid any that are preventable.
        [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
         Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chairman, Committee on
                       Transportation and Infrastructure
        Chairman Maloney, thank you for scheduling this important maritime
    safety oversight hearing.
        One of the most important functions of the Transportation and
    Infrastructure Committee is our solemn responsibility to ensure that
    all the various modes of transportation under our jurisdiction are
    reliable, and most of all, safe to use by millions of people daily.
        As I am sure most people are aware, the Committee has been consumed
    of late with aviation safety, especially concerning the circumstances
    and issues surrounding two fatal air crashes involving the 737 MAX
    aircraft. Let me assure you that I am committed to using all the tools
    at my disposal as Chair to get answers that we need regarding problems
    related to the design, development, and certification of the 737 MAX,
    and moving forward with reforms to address whatever deficiencies we
    uncover.
        This afternoon we turn to maritime safety. Judging from the recent
    spate of high-profile marine casualties--a dive boat fire off the
    Channel Islands in California; a fishing boat burning and sinking off
    Barbers Point in Hawaii; and a capsized and unsalvageable RO-RO vessel
    off St. Simon's, Georgia--this hearing could not come at a better time.
        If anything, these maritime disasters remind us that when it comes
    to maritime safety, the sea remains a relentless threat; one that can
    strike without warning, without mercy, and at any time.
        Such was the case in 2015 with the loss of the cargo ship EL FARO,
    when a series of events left the vessel powerless and floundering in a
    sea whipped wild by Hurricane Joaquin resulting in the loss of the
    vessel along with her entire crew of 33 shipmates.
        This fatal marine accident, along with the investigations and
    reports filed by the Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety
    Board, prompted this Committee to enact a substantial package of marine
    safety reforms contained in the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018.
        Among these reforms, most prominent were new requirements for the
    Coast Guard to rebuild its internal marine inspection competence and
    proficiency. The Coast Guard had allowed this vital capability to
    atrophy over the past ten to twelve years as the agency annually
    ``stole from Peter to pay Paul'' to plug funding shortfalls and
    maintain front line operations. This must stop, and the Coast Guard
    must rebuild competency in this area.
        Related, the Hamm Alert reforms also targeted the poor performance,
    or lack thereof, of the recognized organization--mostly Classification
    Societies--that conduct 3rd party vessel inspections on behalf of the
    Coast Guard.
        The use of 3rd party inspectors--itself a strategy adopted by the
    Coast Guard to meet the increased demand for vessel inspections while
    having fewer resources and people available--has always struck me as
    being compromised by an inherent conflict of interest whereby the
    person conducting the inspection is being paid by the vessel owner.
        The Hamm Alert reforms now require the Coast Guard to adopt
    transparency and accountability measures to ensure that all 3rd party
    inspectors remain clear of any conflict of interest, and most
    important, that they remain committed to conducting their important
    work with safety as the paramount interest, and nothing less.
        These are just a couple issues about which I will be interested to
    hear from our witnesses this afternoon. I also want to learn if the
    cruise industry has fully complied with the requirements adopted by
    Congress in 2010 with the passage of the Cruise Vessel Security and
    Safety Act.
        Considering the industry's rather substantial annual profits,
    especially from its North American and Caribbean markets, the cruise
    industry certainly has had more than enough money to comply with all
    the Act's requirements.
        In closing, there is an old saying that all Coast Guard safety
    regulations are written in blood as each new regulation reflects the
    lessons learned from the latest marine disaster.
        The reality is that we will never be able to eliminate the risks of
    going to sea. What we can do, however, is remain steadfast in our
    commitment to ensure that for those who go to sea, they do so on
    vessels that are built, maintained and operated as safely as possible.
    We should all honor that pledge. Thank you.

        Mr. DeFazio. With that, I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Maloney. Well, I thank the gentleman. And I thank him
    for his leadership on issues of safety in this context and so
    many others, his career dedicated to safety, first and
    foremost.
        And I am pleased to welcome our witnesses today. I do want
    to express my thanks for your appearance. I am glad you got to
    hear my opening remarks, and I want to thank Mr. Larsen for
    doing that. I don't want my absence to be interpreted as a lack
    of concern for these issues. I think the work that you do in
    this space and the attention we are paying to it is critically
    important. So, again, thank you for being here.
        Happy to introduce our panel. We are blessed to be joined
    by Rear Admiral Richard Timme, Assistant Commandant for
    Prevention Policy for the United States Coast Guard; the
    Honorable Richard Balzano, Deputy Administrator for the United
    States Maritime Administration; and Mr. Brian Curtis of the
    Office of Marine Safety for the National Transportation Safety
    Board. Thank you again for your appearances.
        Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
    included in the record. Since your written testimony is in the
    record, we would request that you limit your oral testimony to
    5 minutes so we may proceed with Members' questions.
        And with that, I am pleased to recognize Admiral Timme.
        You may proceed, sir.

         TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD V. TIMME, ASSISTANT
       COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD; HON.
          RICHARD A. BALZANO, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, MARITIME
     ADMINISTRATION; AND BRIAN CURTIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MARINE
              SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

        Admiral Timme. Good afternoon, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
    Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. passenger
    vessel fleet and the Coast Guard's role in advancing a safe,
    secure, and environmentally responsible U.S. maritime industry.
        I ask that my written testimony be entered into the record.
        Mr. Maloney. Without objection.
        Admiral Timme. First, let me express our sincere
    condolences on the passing of Congressman Elijah Cummings,
    former chairman of this subcommittee, and staunch supporter of
    the Coast Guard. Without question, his conviction and passion
    to public service made us a better Coast Guard.
        The U.S. maritime transportation system supports $5.4
    trillion in economic activity, and more than 30 million jobs.
    As the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, I set
    standards for safety, security, environmental stewardship,
    commercial vessels, facilities, mariners, and ensure the
    compliance with those standards and conduct investigations into
    violations and accidents across the system.
        On behalf of the Coast Guard, I would, once again, express
    our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of those
    who have perished in recent marine casualties. These tragedies
    are at the forefront of our minds as we strive to enhance the
    marine safety program.
        As I begin my role in this job, my priorities include
    reviewing the marine safety, regulatory, and policy framework;
    modernizing our marine safety workforce; and leveraging and
    assuring an effective oversight of third parties.
        We are working closely with the National Transportation
    Safety Board to determine the cause of recent casualties, and
    identify improvements to strengthen the framework and
    ultimately prevent future incidents. However, we are not
    waiting for final investigations to implement urgent and
    necessary safety action.
        The vessel compliance program is the systemic safety net
    designed to prevent accidents from occurring. All elements of
    that framework are interdependent and must function well for
    the system to work.
        The Coast Guard provides a critical mandated level of
    oversight, and is responsible for verifying U.S.-flagged
    vessels comply with applicable laws and regulations, and for
    foreign vessels, the Coast Guard conducts examinations to
    ensure each vessel is in substantial compliance with
    international convention.
        Equally important, a vessel's master and crew play
    essential roles and should be the first to recognize problems
    and take early corrective action. The vessel owner is obligated
    to support the master and crew's ability to maintain the vessel
    and operate it safely, and additionally, classification
    societies, recognized organizations, or third parties, should
    provide an expertise to ensure vessel systems are operating
    properly, and that the company and crew are fulfilling their
    roles in the safety net. All elements of this framework must be
    functioning well in the system.
        This is a challenge, given the current U.S.-inspected
    passenger fleet is technologically and operationally diverse.
    There are over 6,300 U.S.-inspected passenger vessels,
    including large inland river cruise ships, high-speed
    catamarans, large amphibious vessels, long-distance sport
    fishers, to name a few. Vessels in this fleet operate in
    diverse environments from the Bering Sea to the Great Lakes,
    from the Pacific to the Atlantic to the gulf coast. They may
    carry as few as 7 passengers, or as many as 1,000, and operate
    in a journey of a few minutes or many days.
        The U.S. fleet carries more than 200 million passengers
    annually. The cruise ship industry, comprised mostly of foreign
    vessels, adds to the fleet, and these vessels carry more than
    14 million passengers annually, making almost 10,500 arrivals
    at U.S. ports each year.
        The Coast Guard must have an adaptive and proficient marine
    safety workforce capable of operating in this complex
    environment, and we must continue to work effectively to
    implement marine inspector learning systems, and put oversight
    regimes in place that enable industry to safely embrace
    technology and advances in vessel design and operations as well
    as emerging passenger and crew demands.
        To this end, the Coast Guard will strive to continuously
    improve. We will get better. We will closely examine findings
    of all marine casualty investigations to improve that
    framework. We will wholly fulfill our regulatory oversight role
    to keep the maritime public safe. We take our responsibility to
    protect and safeguard those traveling aboard foreign and
    domestic passenger vessels seriously. It is my priority, and I
    will keep you informed as we move forward.
        Again, thank you for your enduring support of the Coast
    Guard, and I look forward to your questions.
        [Admiral Timme's prepared statement follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme, Assistant
               Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard
                                  introduction
        Good afternoon Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to be here today to discuss the state of passenger vessel
    safety and the Coast Guard's role in advancing a safe, secure, and
    environmentally responsible U.S. maritime industry.
        I would like to begin my testimony by expressing the Service's
    sincere condolences on the passing of Congressman Elijah Cummings, a
    former Chairman of this Subcommittee. Chairman Cummings was a
    tremendous and tireless supporter of the Coast Guard, as well as a
    caring legislator who challenged the Service to continue to improve. We
    are indeed a better Coast Guard because of his conviction, passion, and
    public service. The Coast Guard's marine inspection program recently
    celebrated the anniversary of its creation on October 1, 2019, as we
    marked the 181st year since the Congressional Act that served as the
    foundation of the Steamboat Inspection Service was passed. The first
    marine inspector, Captain Edward Tripp, was initially appointed
    steamboat inspector in the Port of Baltimore; coincidentally in
    Maryland's 7th District, Chairman Cummings' hometown.
        The Coast Guard has a long and proud tradition of serving the
    American boating public and marine industry through a robust and very
    professional Marine Safety program. Modern day Coast Guard personnel
    working in our compliance and standards programs likewise serve as the
    safety bedrock for the various passenger vessel fleets across America
    and its territories.
        Over a year ago, the Commandant released the Coast Guard Maritime
    Commerce Strategic Outlook to communicate the Service's vision for
    facilitating and enabling safe maritime commerce throughout the U.S.
    Marine Transportation System (MTS). From its origin, with the
    establishment of the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard has
    facilitated maritime safety and security to promote and safeguard
    American commerce for more than 229 years.
        Today, the transportation of cargo on water by the global maritime
    industry is the most economical, and efficient mode of transport. An
    estimated 90 percent of U.S. imports and exports move by ship through
    361 commercial ports, along 95,000 miles of shoreline and 25,000 miles
    of navigable river and coastal waterways. The MTS supports $5.4
    trillion in economic activity and more than 30.8 million jobs.
    Passenger vessels are a key component of the MTS, serving not only as
    recreational and leisure activities, but also as ferries and water
    taxis, as well as providing employment to owners, operators,
    shipbuilders, insurers and many others.
                             the prevention program
        The Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy is
    responsible for setting the standards for safety, security, and
    environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities, and
    mariners; ensuring compliance with those standards; and conducting
    investigations of violations and accidents. The Coast Guard's role in
    regulating passenger vessels and the challenges the vessel compliance
    program faces as the Service exercises its authorities to protect these
    commercial passengers touches on all of these responsibilities.
        Commercial passenger vessels are an essential part of the MTS and
    the American way of life, and provide consumers the opportunity to
    fully experience and enjoy the marine environment in ways that cannot
    be accomplished ashore. Paying passengers come from every area of the
    country and around the world, and bring the full range of experience,
    from maritime first timers, to seasoned mariners. Aboard passenger-
    carrying boats and ships, these passengers then become concentrated in
    a single location on the water, in groups ranging from less than six,
    to upwards of almost 9,000 combined passengers and crew aboard today's
    largest and most modern cruise ships. Given the potential associated
    risks, protecting passengers aboard these vessels is one of the
    Service's most vital missions as these vessels are carrying what we
    consider the ``world's most precious cargo.''
                       passenger vessel safety compliance
        The passenger vessel compliance program may be viewed as a systemic
    safety net that works to prevent accidents from occurring. The Coast
    Guard provides a critical level of mandated oversight. For U.S. flagged
    vessels, the Coast Guard is responsible for verifying that these
    vessels comply with laws and regulations and for ensuring the overall
    safety net is functioning as designed. For foreign vessels, the Coast
    Guard exercises Port State Control authorities and conducts
    examinations on foreign vessels to ensure each vessel is in substantial
    compliance with international conventions.
        Just as importantly, a vessel's master and crew are the front line
    of the program as they are often the first to recognize a problem and
    take early corrective action. The vessel owner has an obligation to
    support the master and crew's ability to maintain the vessel and
    operate it safely. Additionally, and where applicable, Classification
    Society, Recognized Organization, or Third-Party inspectors should
    provide effective technical expertise to ensure vessel systems are
    operating properly and the company and crew are fulfilling their roles
    in the safety net.
        The Coast Guard works closely with the Service's various
    Congressional oversight bodies, sister agencies, and industry
    stakeholders to assist in passenger vessel safety. Bodies such as this
    Subcommittee, as well as partners here today, including the National
    Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Maritime Administration
    (MARAD), combine efforts and authorities to help build the passenger
    vessel safety framework. Additionally, numerous other maritime
    stakeholders are key contributors in implementing the marine safety
    regime and ultimately ensuring the safe transport of all passengers
    aboard vessels.
                    complexity of the passenger vessel fleet
        The passenger vessel fleet is materially complex, as well as
    technologically and operationally diverse. For example, in San Diego, a
    vintage boiler vessel built in 1898 met the requisite requirements to
    hold a Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection. Meanwhile, under
    construction in San Francisco, the Coast Guard is working with the
    maritime industry to design, build, and safely operate the first
    hydrogen fuel cell ferry. There will also soon be LNG-fueled cruise
    ships departing U.S. ports carrying thousands of passengers equipped
    with state of the art engineering automation and environmental control
    systems.
        Passenger vessels may be in the form of a sail boat, charter
    fishing boat, water taxi, dinner cruise ship, ferry, or amphibious
    vehicle and be constructed of steel, aluminum, wood, or fiberglass.
    Operationally, these vessels may carry passengers overnight or
    underwater, maneuver at high speed as ``thrill'' rides, or have
    passengers dive below, tow behind or float via parasail beyond the
    confines of the vessel. The diversity of vessels and operations create
    a challenge for the industry and the Coast Guard alike. To safely
    operate, Coast Guard Marine Inspectors and vessel owners and operators
    must all understand the limitations, required maintenance, and
    potential risks for each vessel while ensuring the vessel meets a
    complex regulatory framework that is often based upon when the vessel
    was built.
        Unlike many other regulators, the Coast Guard manages almost all
    aspects of vessel safety under its regulatory authority. The Coast
    Guard publishes regulations and participates in the international
    bodies which outline the requirements for passenger vessels on
    international voyages. The Coast Guard reviews plans for vessels being
    built and supervises the construction to ensure they meet applicable
    standards. Once the vessel meets required regulations, a Coast Guard
    Certificate of Inspection or Certificate of Compliance is issued as
    proof of compliance, and Coast Guard Marine Inspectors conduct annual,
    semi-annual, or quarterly inspections as applicable. Likewise, the
    Coast Guard issues Merchant Mariner Credentials to the crew, which
    signify that the crew meets safety and competency standards assessed by
    the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also investigates marine casualties
    and mariner misconduct and makes recommendations to improve safety or
    to remove a mariner's credential, if warranted.
        Our passenger vessel compliance model relies upon verification of
    the vessel's material condition and a sampling of exercises to assess
    the crew's performance. It is difficult for the regulatory regime to
    keep with the pace of change of technology. Vessels built 50 years ago,
    while in satisfactory condition and deemed safe to operate, may not
    meet the design expectations of modern passengers.
        Additionally, recent casualties have demonstrated that material
    condition is just one aspect in the overall safety of the vessel. The
    human factor--the master and crew--serves a vital role in the early
    detection and avoidance of potential hazards that may have severe
    consequences to life and property on these complex vessels.
        Finally, there are increasing cyber-related risks facing the MTS,
    and the Coast Guard is actively working to address these emerging
    risks. Related to the shipboard environment, the Coast Guard is working
    to address cyber vulnerabilities through the development of a cyber
    risk management regime incorporated within the existing conventions of
    the International Maritime Organization. The Coast Guard is also
    sponsoring the development of an industry specific cybersecurity
    framework profile for Passenger Vessel Operations with the National
    Institute of Standards and Technology.
        The Coast Guard will continue to modernize the Service's vessel
    compliance model to incorporate risk based inspection criteria, third
    party oversight, cybersecurity, and increased focus on mariner and
    human factor performance. The Coast Guard will also continue to improve
    the Marine Inspector Training Program, and will remain focused on
    successfully fulfilling our role in the safety net to advance a safe,
    secure, and environmentally responsible U.S. maritime industry.
                                   conclusion
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today regarding
    passenger vessel safety. This topic has the Coast Guard's utmost
    attention, and we will continue to evolve the Coast Guard's Marine
    Safety mission to keep pace with industry and consumer change, as we
    strive to ensure the continued safety, security and environmental
    compliance of this key component of the MTS.
        Thank you for all that you do for the men and women of the United
    States Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions.

        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Balzano.
        Mr. Balzano. Good afternoon, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
    Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the subcommittee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
    Maritime Administration, MARAD's, role in promoting the safety
    and security of the U.S.-flagged commercial fleet.
        I request that my full written testimony be submitted in
    the record.
        Mr. Maloney. Without objection.
        Mr. Balzano. Secretary Chao's number one priority is
    safety, and that focus extends to MARAD's programs. The
    maritime environment is remote, dangerous, and repetitive,
    which can increase the risk of accidents. MARAD plays an
    important role in educating and training U.S. mariners to face
    the challenges and hazards of living and working at sea.
        At MARAD, we believe a well-trained mariner is a safer
    mariner. MARAD educates and trains U.S. merchant mariners at
    the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and supports the six State
    Maritime Academies and the Seafarers International Union, all
    of which adhere to the U.S. Coast Guard and international
    training requirements.
        At the academies, deck and engineering cadets must complete
    training and assessments required to obtain a U.S. Coast Guard
    Unlimited License as a 3rd Mate or 3rd Assistant Engineer.
    These training courses and assessment take place during the
    academies' 4-year curricula, which include classroom and hands-
    on shipboard training.
        U.S. Merchant Marine Academy cadets spend 1 year working
    and learning at sea on commercial U.S.-flagged vessels.
    Building on knowledge from the classroom, this hands-on
    experience solidifies the best working and safest practices on
    board commercial vessels.
        Cadets at the State Maritime Academies receive most of
    their at-sea training aboard MARAD-provided training vessels. I
    would like to thank the Congress for funding two new modern
    training ships. The national security multimission vessel,
    which is currently in procurement, will greatly enhance our
    training capability.
        Additionally, MARAD supports the Department of Defense's
    strategic sealift requirements through our Government-owned
    Ready Reserve Force Fleet, and assured access to commercial
    vessels in the Maritime Security Program.
        As a fleet owner and operator, MARAD is committed to
    staying abreast of maritime industry safety and security
    trends, incorporating lessons learned from the real-world
    incidents.
        Security is another major concern for MARAD and the
    maritime industry. MARAD provides U.S.-flagged vessels with
    timely information on security threats through interagency
    coordinated maritime alerts and advisories.
        Moreover, DOT ensures proper and accurate reporting of
    incidents occurring on cruise vessels by collecting the data
    directly from the FBI and publishing it on our Department
    website.
        Safety and security regulations do not always keep pace
    with technology and practices. As a result, national and
    international industry standards often fill the gap. MARAD
    collaborates with the U.S. Coast Guard, the maritime industry,
    and technology developers, to develop industry standards that
    guide equipment requirements and usage.
        MARAD is currently working with the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration on a project to install automated weather
    stations on U.S.-flagged ships to improve weather forecasting
    and warning and provide for greater vessel-operational safety.
    Pairing this system with other onboard global positioning
    systems, GPS, may also assist in detecting GPS interference,
    which is a growing cybersecurity threat.
        The U.S. maritime workforce is a critical component of our
    Nation's economic and national security. Recognizing this,
    MARAD is looking at advances in remote operations to help to
    reduce the risk to mariners.
        MARAD recently partnered with industry to demonstrate
    remote operations of a spill response vessel that can help
    minimize mariner exposure to toxic and explosive environments
    responding to a hazardous spill.
        MARAD is exploring additional applications of data-driven
    systems, particularly in enhancing shipboard and port
    operations optimization.
        MARAD looks forward to continuing collaboration with our
    Federal partners in the maritime industry to improve vessel
    safety and security.
        I appreciate this subcommittee's interest and support of
    the U.S. merchant marine, and I am happy to answer any
    questions you may have.
        [Mr. Balzano's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard A. Balzano, Deputy Administrator,
                            Maritime Administration
        Good afternoon, Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members
    of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
    the Maritime Administration's (MARAD) role in promoting the safety and
    security of U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Secretary Chao's number one
    priority is safety, and that focus extends to MARAD's programs. Safe
    operation of MARAD's National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and Ready
    Reserve Force (RRF), the privately-owned commercial Maritime Security
    Program (MSP) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) fleets,
    and all other U.S.-flag vessels is critically important to our maritime
    industry. MARAD is actively engaged with U.S.-flag commercial vessel
    operators to alert them to security threats and collaborate with them
    on emerging technologies and best practices to improve safety at sea.
    MARAD also plays an important role in educating and training U.S.
    mariners to ensure they are ready to face the challenges of living and
    working at sea, which includes encountering sometimes hazardous
    environments.
                                mariner training
        The marine environment can be dangerous by its very nature, so a
    well-trained workforce is critical to safe vessel operations. MARAD
    educates and trains U.S. merchant mariners at the U.S. Merchant Marine
    Academy (USMMA) and facilitates mariner education through the support
    we provide to the State Maritime Academies (SMAs). The U.S. Coast Guard
    (USCG) establishes training requirements that maritime academies must
    meet, and the USMMA and the SMAs modify their curricula accordingly. In
    addition, MARAD encourages the academies to incorporate lessons learned
    from real world incidents.
        At the academies, deck and engineering cadets must complete
    training and assessments required to obtain USCG Unlimited Licenses as
    3rd Mate and 3rd Assistant Engineer and the corresponding international
    Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping endorsements as
    well. These training courses and assessments take place during the
    academies' four-year curricula. In addition to classroom and practical
    training ashore, cadets and midshipmen receive hands-on shipboard
    training on commercial vessels, the academies' training vessels, or a
    combination of both.
        For example, cadets at the USMMA receive formalized safety training
    throughout the curriculum. They learn everything from first aid and the
    proper use of personal safety equipment to aquatic survival and
    firefighting. As part of their education and training, USMMA cadets
    spend one year working and learning at sea on commercial U.S.-flag
    vessels, most of which are either MSP vessels or ships operated by the
    Military Sealift Command and crewed by civilian mariners. The cadets
    are integrated into the crews aboard these ships, which are actively
    engaged in commerce around the globe. Building on knowledge from the
    classroom, this first-hand experience solidifies the best working
    practices onboard the vessels, including safe vessel operations.
        Cadets at the SMAs receive most of their at-sea training aboard
    vessels MARAD provides. One of the ways MARAD supports quality training
    for these cadets is providing them with safe and modern training
    vessels. Congress has appropriated funds the past two years to replace
    the oldest vessels in the aging training vessel fleet. The new training
    ships will provide state-of-the-art platforms to allow for future
    mariners to keep up with the ever-evolving global maritime industry.
    The new vessels have been designed specifically to provide a robust
    training environment including a second bridge, multiple simulators,
    and laboratories and classrooms designed to provide focus on specific
    curricula. While these vessels will primarily be used by SMA cadets, we
    anticipate that USMMA cadets will also gain required sea time aboard
    them.
                               maritime security
        In addition to supporting U.S. mariner training, MARAD supports DOD
    strategic sealift requirements through our Government-owned vessels in
    the NDRF and RRF, as well as through assured access to commercial
    vessels in the MSP and VISA program. Security is a major concern for
    mariners who operate our ships and those who operate the broader
    commercial fleet. While we stay abreast of maritime security threats to
    our own assets, which include piracy, terrorism, criminal activity, or
    cyber-attack, MARAD also provides U.S.-flag vessels with timely
    information on those threats through interagency coordinated Maritime
    Alerts and Advisories. MARAD cooperates with the Departments of State,
    Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the Intelligence
    Community, in providing those advisories. MARAD is also DOT's principal
    coordinator for maritime domain awareness functions and serves as a key
    facilitator between maritime industry and government agencies providing
    expert maritime security advice and assistance on issues involving the
    global maritime transportation system.
        Moreover, the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA)
    directed DOT to ensure proper and accurate reporting of incidents
    occurring on cruise vessels. This information is collected from the FBI
    and made publicly available on the Department's website on a quarterly
    basis. The CVSSA also permitted MARAD to create a Training Provider
    Certification Program to help certify companies that provide commercial
    CVSSA training to cruise vessel members. Since its creation in 2015,
    this voluntary program has certified that training provided by these
    companies adheres to the training standards and curricula jointly
    developed by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    and MARAD. These training standards are enforced by the Coast Guard and
    include ensuring proper maintenance of video surveillance systems,
    displaying U.S. Embassy and Consulate information, and adhering to fire
    safety and emergency requirements for passengers.
              technology and innovation to improve maritime safety
        Safety regulations do not always keep pace with new technologies
    and practices. As a result, national and international industry-
    developed consensus standards often fill the gap. MARAD collaborates
    with the USCG, maritime industry, and scientific and technological
    innovators to develop voluntary consensus standards that guide
    equipment requirements and usage. For example, in response to the surge
    in interest to use liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a marine fuel, MARAD
    led the development of standards for LNG transfer hoses and associated
    equipment. MARAD also uses its RRF and training vessels as platforms to
    demonstrate innovations in safety technology, including anti-snapback
    mooring lines and marine evacuation systems, where existing equipment
    poses risks to mariner safety.
        MARAD is currently working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on a
    project to automate weather reporting from vessels. After prototype
    testing on MARAD vessels, automated weather stations are being
    installed on U.S.-flag ships for further demonstration and validation.
    These systems report weather data at three minute intervals through the
    ship's automated identification system (AIS). Additional weather data
    obtained from ships much more frequently should improve weather
    forecasting and warnings, and hence improve vessel operational safety.
    Pairing this system with other on-board Global Positioning Systems
    (GPS) applications may also assist in detecting GPS spoofing (e.g.,
    altering vessel location information), which is a growing cyber
    security threat.
        The U.S. maritime workforce is a critical component to our Nation's
    economic and national security. Recognizing this, MARAD is looking at
    advances in remote operations that help to reduce hazards to mariners.
    MARAD recently partnered with industry to demonstrate remote operation
    of a spill response vessel that can help minimize mariner exposure to
    toxic chemicals. Similar remote technologies could be used in other
    areas where mariner risks are high, such as emergency response or
    vessel inspections. Remote systems also have a role to play in
    preventing intrusion and monitoring risks during maritime operations.
    MARAD is exploring additional applications of data driven systems
    particularly in enhancing engineering and navigation systems.
                                   conclusion
        MARAD looks forward to continued collaboration with our Federal
    partners and the maritime industry to improve vessel safety and
    security. I appreciate this subcommittee's interest and support for the
    U.S. merchant marine and am happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Curtis.
        Mr. Curtis. Good afternoon, Chairman DeFazio, Chairman
    Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and subcommittee members. Thank
    you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board,
    NTSB, to discuss marine safety today.
        I request my written testimony be admitted into the record.
        The NTSB investigates accidents in all modes of
    transportation, determines the probable cause, and issues
    safety recommendations to prevent future accidents.
        Today, we will focus on two topics: small passenger vessel
    safety, and the importance of safety management systems, or
    SMS, on passenger vessels.
        On July 19th, 2018, the World War II-era amphibious
    passenger vessel, Stretch Duck 7, sank during a storm near
    Branson, Missouri, resulting in 17 fatalities. We continue to
    investigate this accident in parallel, but separate from the
    U.S. Attorney's criminal investigation. We have identified two
    safety issues we have seen before: insufficient reserve
    buoyancy, leaving these vessels vulnerable to rapid flooding
    and sinking, and impediments to passenger vessel emergency
    ingress/egress.
        We saw these same two issues 20 years ago in the 1999
    sinking of the Miss Majestic, another amphibious passenger
    vessel, that claimed 13 lives. Survivors from that accident
    confirmed that the vessel sank less than a minute after the
    deck edge submerged, leaving little opportunity for passengers
    to escape. Further, the vessel's canopy impeded their ability
    to safety egress from the vessel.
        We recommended at the time that the Coast Guard require
    greater stability and reserve buoyancy in amphibious passenger
    vessels. Until that was done, we urged the Coast Guard to
    require canopies be removed during waterborne operations, or
    that such vessels install a Coast Guard-approved canopy that
    does not restrict passenger escape. After the Coast Guard did
    not require our recommended improvements, we classified those
    recommendations as closed, unacceptable action.
        Now, we know that insufficient reserve buoyancy and a
    canopy that impeded the passengers' ability to escape served to
    worsen the tragic death toll when the Stretch Duck 7 sank last
    year.
        Accordingly, yesterday, the Board issued two new safety
    recommendations. We, again, call on the Coast Guard to require
    sufficient reserve buoyancy and the removal of canopies from
    those amphibious vessels that do not have sufficient reserve
    buoyancy. These known safety issues should no longer go
    unaddressed, or be left to voluntary compliance.
        On another front, late last year, we completed our
    investigation of the fire aboard the small passenger vessel
    Island Lady near Port Richey, Florida. One passenger died, and
    14 others were hospitalized. During the voyage, the captain
    encountered an engine alarm. Rather than shut the engine down,
    he left it idling, allowing it to continue to generate heat,
    which, in turn, ignited the exhaust system and surrounding
    structures, eventually consuming the vessel.
        Although Federal regulations require small passenger
    vessels to have fire detection and suppression systems in the
    engine rooms, the regulations do not require such systems in
    unoccupied spaces outside the engine room, which is where we
    determined the fire started. A recommendation to the Coast
    Guard has been issued related to this very matter.
        The NTSB has long advocated to the Coast Guard that all
    passenger vessels should implement a safety management system,
    a comprehensive, documented system, ensuring oversight of all
    vessel and shoreside operational safety aspects. An SMS is
    essential for enhancing safety on board passenger vessels, and
    the NTSB feels the Coast Guard should ensure such systems are
    required.
        In the case I just described, an SMS would likely have
    ensured greater adherence to completing crew training drills,
    ensuring appropriate responses to emergencies, and improved
    recordkeeping of training and maintenance, which is required of
    oceangoing vessels in international service.
        Finally, on September 2 of this year, the dive boat
    Conception caught fire and sank near Santa Cruz Island,
    California, with the loss of 33 passengers and 1 crewmember.
    Our investigators continue to gather information and review
    current regulations for vessels of this age, type, and
    operation, specifically regarding fire detection and alarm
    systems, evacuation routes, and crew training.
        The deadly loss of the Conception, just feet from shore,
    should remind the small passenger vessel industry that the
    potential for catastrophe is always present.
        The loss of the Island Lady reminds us that an SMS and
    robust preventive maintenance systems are necessary to improve
    the safety of any marine enterprise.
        Our investigation findings and recommendations represent
    lessons learned at the highest price. Action on NTSB
    recommendations provides a return in lives saved, injuries
    prevented, and property loss and environmental damage avoided.
        Thank you for your time today. I would be pleased to take
    any questions you might have.
        [Mr. Curtis' prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Brian Curtis, Director, Office of Marine Safety,
                      National Transportation Safety Board
        Good afternoon Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    subcommittee members. Thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of
    the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to discuss our marine
    accident investigations and the safety lessons that we have learned
    from them.
        The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with
    investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and
    significant accidents in other modes of transportation--highway, rail,
    marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the accidents
    we investigate, and we issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing
    future accidents. In addition, we conduct special transportation
    studies and coordinate the resources of the federal government and
    other organizations to assist victims and their family members who have
    been impacted by major transportation disasters. Recommendation
    recipients can include any entity that can improve safety, including
    the United States Coast Guard (USCG).
        The NTSB is not a regulatory agency; we do not promulgate operating
    standards, nor do we certificate organizations and individuals.
    Instead, we advance safety through our most important product: safety
    recommendations. The goal of our work is to foster safety improvements
    for the traveling public. Although action might take years,
    recommendation recipients eventually act favorably on four out of five
    NTSB recommendations.
        Today, I would like to share some of the lessons we have learned
    from the roughly 50 marine accidents that we typically investigate each
    year. In particular, I will focus on safety issues related to small
    passenger vessel operations, the importance of safety management
    systems (SMSs) in marine operations, and some of the vital lessons
    learned from our investigation of the October 1, 2015, sinking of the
    cargo ship El Faro.
        We work closely with the USCG to investigate marine accidents, and
    my sincerest thanks go out to the USCG for its outstanding assistance
    in our investigative efforts. Our marine investigations are carried out
    contemporaneously with the USCG's; sometimes we reach the same
    conclusions, sometimes not. We greatly appreciate that the USCG sees
    our work as adding value, even if that means we must be at times
    critical of the organization's regulations and processes. Our
    relationship with the USCG is a collaboration focused on improving
    marine safety.
                         small passenger vessel safety
        Over a 4-year period in the mid-1990s, we included ``Small
    Passenger Vessel Safety'' on our Most Wanted List of transportation
    safety improvements (MWL).\1\ Although not all safety recommendations
    we have made regarding small passenger vessels have been addressed,
    small passenger vessel safety continues to improve by the
    implementation of the safety recommendations already issued. In
    addition, the Passenger Vessel Association developed crew emergency
    procedures and standards, including preincident planning for a variety
    of shipboard emergencies, which it distributed to its members. The
    association also agreed that its members would routinely provide
    predeparture emergency safety orientations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ See the We Are Safer page [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/
    Pages/was6.aspx] regarding small vessel passenger safety on the Most
    Wanted List section of our website.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, we have investigated at least three significant accidents
    involving small passenger vessels in recent years, which indicates that
    there still are significant safety gaps to be addressed.
    Branson, Missouri: Stretch Duck 7
        On July 19, 2018, the 33-foot-long, modified World War II-era DUKW
    \2\ amphibious passenger vessel, Stretch Duck 7, sank during a storm
    that developed rapidly on Table Rock Lake near Branson, Missouri. We
    continue to investigate this accident in parallel with the US
    Attorney's criminal investigation, which has delayed our access to
    information vital to determining the probable cause of this accident.
    However, the information we have so far has helped us identify two
    safety issues for these types of amphibious passenger vessels:
    insufficient reserve buoyancy (leaving vessels vulnerable to flooding
    and sinking) and impediments to passenger emergency egress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ DUKW (pronounced ``duck'') is an acronym that signifies the
    characteristics of the WWII amphibious vessel: D = 1942 (the year of
    design); U = utility; K = front-wheel drive; and W = two rear-driving
    axles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is worth noting that these safety issues are not new. In fact,
    they were identified almost 20 years prior to the Stretch Duck 7's
    sinking, after the 1999 sinking of the Miss Majestic, another DUKW
    amphibious passenger vessel, on Lake Hamilton, near Hot Springs,
    Arkansas. As a result of that sinking, 13 passengers died. Survivors of
    the Miss Majestic accident confirmed that the vehicle sank less than a
    minute after the deck edge at the stern was submerged, leaving
    insufficient opportunity for passengers to escape. Vessel maintenance,
    reserve buoyancy, and survivability--specifically, impediments to
    passenger egress caused by the vessel's canopy--were among the major
    safety issues identified by our investigation of the Miss Majestic
    accident.
        As a result of the Miss Majestic sinking, we recommended that the
    USCG require greater stability and reserve buoyancy in amphibious
    passenger vessels.\3\ Further, until the goals of that recommendation
    were achieved, we urged the USCG to require--among other measures--that
    canopies be removed from waterborne vessels, or that such vessels have
    installed a USCG-approved canopy that does not restrict horizontal or
    vertical escape by passengers in the event of sinking.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Safety Recommendation M-02-1. [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
    safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-02-001]
        \4\ Safety Recommendation M-02-2. [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
    safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-02-002]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard agreed with the intent of our recommendations but
    sought to address them through Navigation and Vessel Inspection
    Circular (NVIC) 1-01, a guidance document that relies on voluntary
    compliance. After the USCG refused to require the recommended
    improvements, we classified Safety Recommendations M-02-1 and M-02-2
    ``Closed--Unacceptable Action.''
        We believe that some of the fatalities that occurred when the
    Stretch Duck 7 sank likely resulted from the canopy and its framing
    preventing emergency egress. Our position on canopies on DUKW vessels
    has not changed since the Miss Majestic sinking, and the number of
    fatalities resulting from the Stretch Duck 7 sinking shows that
    canopies currently installed on modified DUKW vessels continue to pose
    an unacceptable risk.
        Accordingly, on November 6, 2019, we issued two safety
    recommendations to the USCG.

    [M-19-016]
          Require DUKW amphibious passenger vessels (commonly referred to
    as original ducks and/or stretch ducks) to have sufficient reserve
    buoyancy through passive means so that they remain upright and afloat
    with a full complement of passengers and crewmembers in the event of
    damage or flooding.

    [M-19-017]
          For DUKW amphibious passenger vessels without sufficient reserve
    buoyancy (commonly referred to as original ducks and/or stretch ducks)
    require the removal of canopies, side curtains, and their associated
    framing during waterborne operations to improve emergency egress in the
    event of sinking.
    Port Richey, Florida: Island Lady
        Late last year, we completed our investigation into the fire aboard
    the small passenger vessel Island Lady near Port Richey, Florida, on
    January 14, 2018. The vessel, operated by Tropical Breeze Casino Cruz,
    shuttled passengers to and from an offshore casino vessel. As a result
    of the accident, one passenger died and 14 others on board were
    hospitalized.
        During the voyage, the captain received a high-temperature alarm
    for the port engine's jacket-water system. Rather than shut the engine
    down, he left it idling, allowing it to continue to generate excessive
    heat, which in turn affected the exhaust tubing and ignited its
    surrounding structure.
        The vessel owner had not given its vessel captains specific
    guidance about how to respond to high-temperature alarms. Although
    federal regulations require small passenger vessels to have fire
    detection and suppression systems in spaces containing propulsion
    machinery (such as engine rooms), the regulations do not require such
    systems in unoccupied spaces with engine exhaust tubing, which is where
    we suspect the fire on board the Island Lady started (in the
    lazarette). Further, the Island Lady's crewmembers lacked sufficient
    understanding of firefighting principles, and their training drills
    were infrequent or incomplete.
        This accident was particularly notable because of its commonalities
    with the 2004 fire aboard the small passenger vessel Express II,
    operated by the same company, in the same geographic location.\5\
    Despite preventive maintenance and firefighting programs put in place
    in response to recommendations from the Express II investigation,
    crewmembers aboard the Island Lady were not sufficiently trained, and
    the maintenance program did not prevent noncompliant plastic tubing
    from being used where heat-resistant material was required.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ These were not the only issues we found as a result of this
    accident investigation. For more information, see the full report, Fire
    On Board US Small Passenger Vessel Island Lady, Pithlachascotee River
    Near Port Richey, Florida, January 14, 2018. [https://www.ntsb.gov/
    investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1802.pdf]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In response to this accident, we issued new recommendations to
    Tropical Breeze Casino Cruz to develop and apply an oversight system to
    its maintenance program, and to revise its training programs.\6\
    Although we request responses to recommendation letters within 90 days
    of their issuance, we have not received any reply from Tropical Breeze
    Casino Cruze to either of these December 2018 recommendations which are
    currently classified ``Open--Await Response.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Safety Recommendations M-18-11 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
    safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-18-011]
    and -12. [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/
    ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-18-012]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We also issued two recommendations to the USCG to require fire-
    detection systems in unoccupied spaces with machinery or other
    potential heat sources on board small passenger vessels, and to issue a
    Marine Safety Information Bulletin regarding the need to use only
    approved material and components in fuel tank level-indicator
    systems.\7\ The USCG has not replied to either of these recommendations
    which are also currently classified ``Open--Await Response.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Safety Recommendations M-18-13 and -14.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Santa Cruz Island, California: Conception
        Shortly after 3:00 a.m. on Monday, September 2, 2019, the 75-foot
    commercial diving vessel Conception, with 39 persons on board, caught
    fire while anchored in Platts Harbor, off Santa Cruz Island in
    California. The Conception was on the last night of a 3-day diving
    trip. Thirty-three passengers and one crewmember died, making this the
    largest loss of life in a US marine casualty in decades.
        Initial interviews of three crewmembers revealed that no mechanical
    or electrical anomalies were reported. A crewmember sleeping in the
    wheelhouse berths was awakened by a noise and got up to investigate. He
    saw a fire at the aft end of the sun deck, rising up from the salon
    compartment below. The crew attempted to access the salon and
    passengers below that deck, but were unable to do so. The vessel burned
    to the waterline by morning and subsequently sank in about 60 feet of
    water.
        The NTSB is the lead federal agency for this investigation.
    Investigators are scrutinizing the wreckage, as well as reviewing
    current regulations regarding vessels of this type, year of build, and
    operation; early warning and fire detection alarm systems; evacuation
    routes; training; and current company policies and procedures. We will
    keep the subcommittee informed of developments in this investigation as
    they occur.
                        safety management systems (sms)
        The NTSB has long advocated for all passenger vessel operators to
    implement an SMS: a comprehensive, documented system to enhance safety.
    Regardless of a company's size, an SMS ensures that each crewmember is
    given standard and clear procedures for routine and emergency
    operations. An SMS specifies crewmember duties and responsibilities, as
    well as delineates supervisory and subordinate chains of command, so
    that each crewmember understands what to do during critical vessel
    operations and emergency scenarios. Developing an SMS includes creating
    plans for crewmember responses to a range of possible emergency
    situations. SMSs also include procedures for performing and tracking
    preventive maintenance, as well as, procedures for crew training,
    emergency preparedness, documentation and oversight, and other actions
    that make safe operations a priority.
        The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires that US
    vessels engaged in oceangoing international service operate under an
    SMS, but such a requirement is not in place for the domestic passenger
    vessel fleet. Following the 2010 allision of passenger ferry Andrew J.
    Barberi with a terminal at Staten Island, New York, in which 50 people
    were injured, we again recommended that the USCG require all operators
    of US-flagged passenger vessels to implement an SMS.\8\ After the Coast
    Guard initially responded that it was developing appropriate
    regulations for all US-flagged passenger vessels (part of Public Law
    111-281), we classified Safety Recommendation M-12-3 ``Open--Acceptable
    Response.'' However, in April 2014, after more than 3 years since
    Congress authorized the Coast Guard to mandate SMS, and nearly 1 year
    since the Coast Guard (in its response to Recommendation M-12-3)
    expressed its intent to initiate rulemaking, we classified the
    recommendation ``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Safety Recommendation M-12-3 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
    safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-12-003].
    See also Safety Recommendations M-05-6 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
    safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-05-006]
    to the Coast Guard, and M-05-2 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-
    recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-05-002] to the
    New York City Department of Transportation resulting from the 2003
    Andrew J. Barberi allision with a pier at Staten Island, New York; M-
    10-7 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/
    Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-10-007] to ferry operator Interstate
    Navigation Co. resulting from the 2008 collision between its vessel
    Block Island and Coast Guard cutter Morro Bay on Block Island Sound,
    Rhode Island; and M-14-7 [https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
    _layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=M-14-007] to ferry
    operator Seastreak, LLC resulting from the 2013 allision of its vessel
    Seastreak Wall Street with a pier at Manhattan, New York.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We continue to believe that an SMS is an essential tool for
    enhancing safety on board all US passenger vessels, and that the USCG
    is the appropriate authority to ensure such systems are implemented and
    enforced. In the case of the Island Lady and Tropical Breeze Casino
    Cruz, a Coast Guard requirement for an SMS would likely have ensured
    greater adherence to completing crew training drills, appropriate
    responses to emergencies such as alarms and fires, and improved record-
    keeping of training and maintenance-related documents. Implementing an
    SMS on all domestic passenger vessels would further enhance operators'
    ability to achieve the higher standards of safety that the Coast Guard
    requires of US oceangoing vessels in international service. Currently,
    numerous operators of domestic small passenger vessels have voluntarily
    implemented SMSs that include integral preventive maintenance programs.
        In the Island Lady investigation, we reiterated recommendations
    that the USCG require preventative maintenance programs for companies
    operating domestic passenger vessels (M-02-5) and that it require that
    vessel operators implement an SMS (M-12-3).\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ For more information, see page 46 of the full report, Fire On
    Board US Small Passenger Vessel Island Lady, Pithlachascotee River Near
    Port Richey, Florida, January 14, 2018 [https://www.ntsb.gov/
    investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1802.pdf]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We continue to support a federal requirement for small passenger
    vessel operators to implement an SMS.
    Atlantic Ocean, Northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas: El
            Faro
        On October 1, 2015, the US-flagged cargo ship El Faro sank in the
    Atlantic Ocean about 40 nautical miles northeast of Acklins and Crooked
    Island, Bahamas, during Hurricane Joaquin, claiming the lives of all 33
    crew members. Our investigation identified several major safety issues,
    including the captain's actions, currency of weather information,
    bridge resource management, company oversight, damage control plans,
    and survival craft suitability.
        On September 29, 2015, the El Faro departed its homeport in
    Jacksonville, Florida, on a 1,100-nautical-mile (nm) planned voyage to
    San Juan, Puerto Rico, slated to arrive in the early morning hours of
    October 2. However, the ship sailed directly into the path of Hurricane
    Joaquin, a Category 3 storm that reached Category 4 strength shortly
    after the El Faro sank, at approximately 8:00 a.m. on October 1.
        The captain's insufficient action to avoid Hurricane Joaquin due to
    his failure to use the most current weather information and the lack of
    appropriate survival craft for the conditions were critical factors in
    the probable cause of El Faro's sinking and the loss of 33 lives.
    Although the ship and its crew should never have found themselves
    sailing into the storm, many other factors, including ineffective
    bridge resource management, inadequate company oversight and safety
    management, flooding, propulsion loss, and the lack of an approved
    damage control plan also contributed to the sinking.
        On December 12, 2017, following a 26-month investigation, we
    determined the probable cause of the sinking and made 53 safety
    recommendations (we issued 10 urgent recommendations prior to the Board
    meeting). This was the most resource-intensive marine investigation in
    the NTSB's history. The resulting 63 safety recommendations, if acted
    upon, will yield a generational advance in marine safety.
        The USCG has been responsive to the recommendations we made as a
    result of the El Faro investigation; however, changing the Coast
    Guard's regulations alone would have little impact in the international
    realm because, in international waters, International Maritime
    Organization (IMO) regulations hold sway. Even in US waters, it is not
    always the case that the United States is the ``flag state'', since
    there are many foreign-flagged vessels plying our waters. In the case
    of El Faro, the United States was the flag state; however, since the
    accident lessons are applicable to other oceangoing vessels, we
    recommended that the Coast Guard propose changes to the IMO on behalf
    of the United States. We believe these changes would save lives in
    waters around the world.
        We also issued recommendations to the American Bureau of Shipping--
    the US classification society--and to the International Association of
    Classification Societies. Classification societies establish and
    maintain standards for the construction and operation of ships.
        Our recommendations also recognized a systemic problem with
    lifesaving equipment. The El Faro was outfitted with open lifeboats,
    which, for about 30 years before the sinking, would not have been legal
    on an otherwise equivalent new vessel. El Faro was ``grandfathered
    out'' of this requirement. We recommended that the Coast Guard, at
    regular intervals not to exceed 20 years, review all lifesaving
    appliances on such vessels.
                                   conclusion
        The loss of El Faro shook the marine shipping world, and
    Conception's loss, just feet from shore, reminded the small passenger
    vessel world that the potential for catastrophe is always present. SMSs
    and required preventive maintenance are necessary to improve the safety
    of any marine enterprise, including that of small passenger vessels.
        Our accident findings and recommendations represent lessons learned
    at the highest price. To put safety recommendations into action
    provides a return on investment in lives saved, injuries prevented, and
    property loss and environmental damage avoided.
        Thank you for your consideration of these important marine safety
    matters. I would be pleased to take any questions you might have.

        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentlemen for their statements.
        We will now proceed to Members' questions, observing the 5-
    minute rule.
        I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        Admiral Timme, you heard in my opening statement some of
    the concerns raised by the Los Angeles Times recently. I wanted
    to give you an opportunity to correct anything you think I said
    through my colleague, Mr. Larsen, that might have been unfair
    or incorrect. And I would love to get the thoughts of the NTSB.
    I think you understand the issue. You understand the issue is
    whether we are sufficiently implementing recommendations of the
    NTSB, and if not, why not? I want to give you an opportunity to
    respond.
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Conception fire is a tragedy. And upon learning of it,
    we dispatched our lead marine investigator, the head of our
    investigation shop, to go out there. And he was there the next
    day, along with NTSB, to begin looking at the circumstances.
    And as alluded to, that investigation continues.
        One of the things that we also did was to charter a small
    passenger vessel task force internally, as well as direct a
    concentrated inspection campaign on all vessels of that type
    carrying overnight passengers across the country. That happened
    immediately after.
        I have asked my team to take the results of that, when they
    are complete, as well as the NTSB recommendations, and we need
    to look at that framework now and reevaluate post--what we
    learned from this short-term walk as well as the long-term
    Marine Board investigation, but relook at, including NTSB's
    recommendations, what to do with our small passenger framework.
        Mr. Maloney. Mr. Curtis, do you have anything to add to
    that?
        It is not required, but it is--I want to give you an
    opportunity to comment.
        Mr. Curtis. I would say we look forward to the
    implementation of our recommendations. Some of these have been
    outstanding for an extended period of time, and those more
    recent ones, we feel are critical to the safety of passenger
    vessels. So we look forward to working with the Coast Guard on
    these recommendations to get these implemented.
        Mr. Maloney. Admiral, can you give us an update on the
    Coast Guard's assistance in developing MOB standards with the
    IMO?
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The MOB standards, for
    man overboard standards, as part of the Cruise Vessel Security
    and Safety Act. We are working with IMO and the International
    Standards Organization, and together have created a standard, a
    draft standard, for the MOB.
        We worked through that international process to come to an
    official standard that we hope to adopt into the rulemaking,
    adopt and make the standard. So we are looking forward to that
    within the next year to be able to then promulgate the rule.
        Mr. Maloney. And so what is your timeframe for promulgating
    a rule?
        Admiral Timme. I would say we are looking at the next 12
    months as we work with the International Standards
    Organization, and that body to approve it and then incorporate
    it.
        Mr. Maloney. And how long have we been working on the rule?
        Admiral Timme. Sir, we have been working on it since its
    passage in 2010 and 2012, and then immediately put into action
    11 of the 15, self-executing, and have been working with
    industry and cruise ships to make sure that was in place, but
    this is an outstanding piece that we need to continue to work.
        Mr. Maloney. We look forward to that being completed, sir.
        I yield the balance of my time.
        Mr. Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
        Admiral, since 2004, the Congress enacted legislation to
    bring ferries and towing vessels under inspection, require
    examination and classification for fishing vessels and increase
    the safety requirements on, as you know, cruise vessels.
        The question is, has the Coast Guard been able to keep up
    with these increased statutory requirements in terms of--I got
    three points here. The first point would be services budget and
    the number of personnel needed. I will just go through it.
    Expertise, able to cope to the breadth of the U.S.-flag fleet
    from our old steamships, which we rely on to meet our military
    sealift needs, and the new state-of-the-art vessels just coming
    into service; and the third would be the Service's ability to
    effectively oversee the third-party inspectors now doing much
    of the day-to-day inspection work. So those three points. What
    is the status?
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Congressman.
        So to your point about the ability of resources and
    expertise to take on the challenges that you have outlined, it
    is, in fact, a challenge for us, and we have to divide among
    our lines of effort the ability to address each of those
    problems or each of those challenges.
        For instance, the expertise issue, steam, we have created a
    new steam course, in working with our partners, and that was
    part of, I believe, the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act as well.
        We also have gone into the modernization of our marine
    inspections workforce with a program that will baseline how we
    train this workforce. The expertise in that workforce is
    critical to being able to handle the capacity of demand that
    you have mentioned. So we have put resources into that this
    year, in a 2-year program that will conclude next year with new
    training, new delivery methods, blended training, both online
    and in person, that is more in keeping with modern education
    for our workforce.
        We have to look at risk-basing our framework. We will have
    to prioritize our limited finite resources to the highest risk.
    We continue to do that in all our fleets, and we need to
    develop that in the small passenger vessel fleet as well.
        And third parties is the other portion you mentioned. We
    have continued to develop that for--subchapter M, the towing
    vessel fleet, is a crucial piece to handle the nearly 6,000
    vessels that are added through that. But, really, to revamp it
    post-El Faro and Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act, revamp our
    relationship with recognized organizations who act on our
    behalf, and inject the discipline into that so that they, when
    acting on our behalf, are carrying out our desires with regards
    to the framework.
        And so we have worked hard with our partners to, one,
    publish a framework on our interpretation of the International
    Safety Management Code, to set a baseline for the third parties
    to look at, and then to make a more robust relationship from
    the port level, where our inspectors work with the surveyors of
    DNV and ABS and the rest, up to leadership level.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. I want to get to the next question. I
    am running out of time.
        But on September 12th, the Coast Guard's Great Lakes
    Pilotage Advisory Committee unanimously agreed to recommend
    that in April of each year, they meet with the Coast Guard and
    stakeholders to facilitate what the rates will be for the
    pilots. The Coast Guard, do you intend to work with this
    committee, unanimously made this recommendation, to work
    together to figure out what the rates should be for the fees?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, the Federal advisory committee
    for the Great Lakes is absolutely one of the valuable advisory
    committees that we take in order to perform our job across all
    of the missions.
        We have had a great 3 years working with GLAC-PAC, or the
    Great Lakes Advisory Committee, on rate setting. There are
    challenges to that, and we make sure that we are transparent
    and sit down with that committee. And we are happy to continue
    to sit with them as we go through that framework to set the
    rates.
        Mr. Gibbs. I would think it should be an open process and
    work together to facilitate that.
        During the inspection requirements, Admiral, subchapter T
    vessels, subject to the post-1996 regulations and those
    grandfathered small passenger vessels subject to pre-1996
    regulations, will the Coast Guard casualty investigation look
    at whether this application of post-1996 regulations might have
    changed the outcome of the passengers aboard the Conception
    accident?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, that is exactly what this
    Marine Board of Investigation is tasked at looking at. All of
    the pieces of the framework that are involved, from the
    construction standard you mentioned to the operation of the
    crew and the owner, to the maintenance post-certification of a
    Coast Guard inspection.
        If the investigation comes back and points to the pre-1996
    standard as a causal factor, we will react to that with policy
    and/or rule.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you.
        Amount of time yield back.
        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        Also in my absence, I know we expressed our condolences and
    concerns for the victims of the Conception tragedy. I know we
    are also pleased to be joined by Representative Salud Carbajal,
    who represents the district in which that tragedy occurred. We
    thank the gentleman for his appearance today. I know he has
    been in the forefront of efforts to respond to that
    appropriately. And we look forward to his questioning on
    today's panel. At this time, I would like to recognize Mr.
    Lowenthal.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Chairman Maloney.
        Admiral Timme, in the recent past, we know the Coast Guard
    has placed an increased emphasis on combating illegal charters
    in light of multiple fatalities and other significant safety
    concerns from commercial passenger vessels.
        For example, one tragic casualty occurred near St.
    Petersburg, Florida, from the vessel, Jaguar, in 2017 where a
    crewmember unsuccessfully attempted to rescue a fatigued
    passenger in the water during rough weather, which resulted in
    both men losing their lives. And we understand that there is an
    active criminal investigation going on at this time. But can
    you describe the importance of crew training and man overboard
    drills?
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Congressman. Absolutely. You
    point to critical factors in this framework for passenger
    vessel safety.
        Not only the certification of the construction of the
    vessel that carries passengers, but the training of the captain
    and crew who are responsible for their safety. That would
    require for any passenger, any paying passenger, six-pack and
    above--excuse me, seven and above, that is a Coast Guard
    license of a certain level, and at six-pack and below, that is
    also another license, that is ensured first aid training, basic
    seamanship, things designed to keep the person in charge from
    making decisions that put their passengers at risk, like going
    into an area and making a swim call in conditions that were not
    warranted.
        We have worked hard with outreach and education across the
    country, particularly in the pockets where illegal charters are
    more common, to make sure that this is addressed, and work with
    the U.S. Attorney's to prosecute in those areas.
        This last weekend in Fort Myers, a public outreach campaign
    of a Coast Guard station with local television crew was out
    doing the outreach and actually did termination of an illegal
    charter. So those are the steps we are out there doing to
    address that.
        Mr. Lowenthal. I have a question also to follow up, and
    maybe you have answered it. But just to be clear, is crew
    training required on uninspected--not inspected--but
    uninspected passenger vessels?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, on an uninspected passenger
    vessel, the only crew that would be required would be the
    captain.
        Mr. Lowenthal. That is the only training?
        Admiral Timme. And the captain would receive the basic
    training that went with that uninspected passenger vessel
    license, basic seamanship, first aid.
        Mr. Lowenthal. So you are saying that commercial passenger
    vessel, besides the captain, has no requirement to have crew
    training in emergency situations?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, to your question--and happy to
    take specifics on this. But when we talk about six-pack and
    below--six passengers and below--that is the way I took your
    question. If I took that wrong, I will correct that.
        Mr. Lowenthal. OK.
        Admiral Timme. But for six and below, it is just the
    captain.
        To a regular T boat, what we call the small passenger
    vessel fleet, there is, indeed, training for the captain, but
    the crew may or may not--a deckhand may or may not be trained
    and licensed.
        Mr. Lowenthal. So there is no requirement?
        Admiral Timme. Correct.
        Mr. Lowenthal. So could the Coast Guard provide us with
    investigation statistics regarding crew training on uninspected
    and inspected passenger vessels?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, I will take that for the
    record. Absolutely.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I appreciate your testimony highlighting the increasing
    cybersecurity risk to our maritime transportation system and
    the Coast Guard's efforts to establish cybersecurity standards
    for passenger vessels operating operations with NIST.
        Can you give us an update on these efforts, when can we
    expect the framework or the standards to be completed?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, we addressed cyber across many
    parts of the new transportation system. We have worked with IMO
    since 2016 to create an international standard for assessment
    of risks; and then 1 year later, we led the effort at IMO,
    internationally, to require cyber be addressed in safety
    management systems for ships.
        Here, we work at this area level, or the port level, to
    ensure every port will do an assessment of cyber risks in the
    port. Below the port level, we get to the facilities. The
    facilities themselves will be required--not required, but
    advised, through policy, to work off of a National Institute of
    Standards and Technology framework. At least that is what a
    draft of our current guidance showed.
        We will then bring that down to the vessel level as well,
    where we recommend that industry begin to lead themselves to
    compliance with cyber standards of hygiene and assessment. This
    is where the risk lies for them.
        Mr. Lowenthal. I thank you, Admiral.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Mast.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
        And, thank you, Admiral, Mr. Balzano, Mr. Curtis, for
    sharing the information that you have with each of us.
        I want to talk about safety, but from a little bit
    different perspective. And I believe this question will be
    directed towards Mr. Curtis--I think you are the most suited to
    answer this, but I open this up to any of you that feel you can
    answer this.
        I want to talk about markers, aids to navigation,
    specifically, that we put out there to hopefully allow for
    mariners to navigate safety, and navigate in times of reduced
    visibility.
        Now, I was prompted to ask this question because my
    community was recently rocked when a mother and a 1-year-old
    child were on a vessel that struck a navigational beacon in a
    time of reduced visibility, and they were killed. And so that
    prompts this line of questioning.
        I am trying to understand, what is the rationale that
    exists for why there may be a day beacon used, or a light used
    or if a can or a nun has a light on it, or whether bridge
    markers or pilings, other aids to navigation, you know, whether
    they are marked in a lit fashion or not? And specifically
    looking at Florida where this occurred, inland waterways and
    intercoastal waterways, maybe to be more specific.
        Mr. Curtis. Thank you for the question, sir. I am not
    familiar with that accident. We have done some accidents
    involving aids to navigation, very few, not recently. I don't
    want to throw it over, but maybe the admiral may be better
    suited to answer your question, sir.
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, thank you for the question.
        So there are a couple of different ways when you look at a
    port area that we will seek to establish what aids to
    navigation are appropriate for that.
        We will do either a waterway assessment, which is typically
    from our navigation office here at headquarters, working with
    local stakeholders, and that is done on a rotating basis in the
    port areas, to look at what new needs might be arising from the
    waterway for its navigation.
        The other one is a port and waterway safety assessment,
    again, done locally by the captain of the port or the OCMI,
    that office there, working with stakeholders like pilots,
    Harbor Safety Committees, industry, recreational groups, to
    look at traffic and what type of aids to navigation would be
    appropriate there to change that. There is a process to change
    it, if they need to be updated.
        Mr. Mast. Can you discuss a little bit further, in the time
    remaining, the process to upgrade and change?
        Admiral Timme. I am sorry, sir. I missed the first part.
        Mr. Mast. Could you discuss, in the time remaining, the
    process of go out there and upgrade and change some of these
    aids to navigation, to make them be in a lit fashion?
        Admiral Timme. So the overall process--and I was able to do
    one of these in Tampa Bay around 2002. It is a multiday
    workshop process that would start with invitations to the
    stakeholders. And again, this is the big process. An individual
    who wanted to petition for a change could come directly to
    Coast Guard headquarters or the local county port. But the
    larger process is a transparent one, where we bring in
    particularly the Pilots Association, the Harbor Safety
    Committee, local industry, recreational boaters is typically
    important, port authorities that deal with what vessels are
    coming in, and so--because that is important to the
    characteristics of turning basins and other aids to navigation.
        So over a 2- to 3-day workshop, they will do a risk
    assessment, they will score it, they will rank it, and they
    will make a recommendation at the end in a report that will go
    to Coast Guard headquarters. And then, my office of navigation
    will look at that and update typically in the next aids to
    navigation cycle what would go there.
        Floating aids are much easier than fixed aids. Fixed aids
    are a little more resource-intensive. And particularly larger
    aids, like ranges, range lights, would be particularly
    challenging to do in a quick budget cycle.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        And, Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Brown.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today and
    your commitment to improving our waterway safety.
        I wanted to ask you, Admiral, a question or two about the
    Towing Safety Advisory Committee. And as you know, that is the
    Federal advisory committee for towing and industry safety. And,
    apparently, brought to my attention by some of my constituents
    who have been actively involved or engaged with the work of the
    committee, that the Coast Guard was unable to secure the
    Department of Homeland Security's reapproval of the committee's
    charter prior to its expiration in early July.
        The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 reauthorized the
    Towing and Safety Advisory Committee under a new name, the
    National Towing Safety Advisory Committee.
        So my question is, essentially, what is the status of
    reconstituting, or establishing, this newer iteration of the
    Towing Safety Advisory Committee? Do you anticipate that
    members that were currently serving on that committee are being
    considered and perhaps may serve on this newly constituted
    committee?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, we have clarified with
    congressional staff, the committee staff, our take on that
    direction from the Authorization Act, and we intend to keep the
    committees in place, as-is, through their intended expiration
    at the end of 2020.
        So we will reconstitute as-is the current membership, the
    current charter, as we work on renewing all of the Federal
    advisory committees in accordance with congressional intent, so
    that they are redone under the new names, new charters at the
    end of next year. That is when membership may change, if we
    resolicit for membership, but I am happy to follow up on any
    membership issues with you.
        Mr. Brown. And then just to clarify as a followup. So
    during the period that we are in right now, are you continuing
    to formally solicit input from the existing members of the
    Towing Safety Advisory Committee?
        Admiral Timme. That is my intent, to use the existing
    committee members as the advisory to the framework. But again,
    there are often many opportunities for different stakeholders
    that would be on that committee to bring input to the Coast
    Guard. But as constituted, we will take that membership advice.
        Mr. Brown. All right. And again, all of this is just
    clarification. I know that the Towing Safety Advisory Committee
    works on several tasks. And so this task work, does that
    continue today?
        Admiral Timme. That is correct, Congressman, it should be.
        Mr. Brown. OK. Great. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman.
        I would now like to recognize Mr. Gallagher for 5 minutes
    of questioning or shaving, whichever he prefers.
        Mr. Gallagher. Wow. That was a low blow, Mr. Chairman. I am
    not sure of all the products available in Wisconsin, so I just
    want to give the gentleman every opportunity.
        It is called a hunting beard.
        So to follow up on the questioning about the Towing Safety
    Advisory Committee, which provided recommendations to the Coast
    Guard in 2015 on the improvement of marine casualty reporting,
    the 2016 Coast Guard Reauthorization Act required the Coast
    Guard to provide a report to Congress on the actions the agency
    would take to implement its recommendations.
        A lot of my constituents believe that the report shows that
    the Coast Guard has not gone far enough in implementation. They
    believe that the Coast Guard's vast amount of marine casualty
    data should be systematized so that the maritime community can
    better use it to improve commercial and passenger vessel
    safety.
        So I guess the question I would have, Admiral, is how is
    the Coast Guard addressing the challenge of making marine
    casualty reporting data more valuable and more available to the
    maritime community in order to improve maritime safety?
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Congressman.
        I concur. We need to make the data we have more valuable,
    not just to the maritime community, but to the Coast Guard
    itself, as we seek to modernize our IT systems and our data
    systems. And that is one of the priorities the Commandant has,
    to make sure that we have a 21st-century information technology
    backbone.
        In 2015, when that guidance went out with regards to marine
    casualties, we saw a significant drop in the casualty reporting
    the next year. I point that out, because it did, in fact,
    clarify for those stakeholders you are talking about, where and
    when they had to report, much to their satisfaction is what--
    that is what had been advised. So we saw a real change in the
    reporting. The challenge now becomes, as you point out,
    modernizing that data for use, both internally and externally.
        We do keep the data that we do have available on the Port
    State Information Exchange on casualties and investigations for
    the public. And we, unfortunately, would be at a FOIA request
    for other data at this point.
        Mr. Gallagher. OK. And then you have a great team in my
    district of coastguardsmen who do outreach to the community.
    But there is some concern I hear about sort of big Coast Guard
    or Coast Guard staff in DC who have an intersection with a lot
    of the regulatory aspects.
        Is there a way to sort of plug them in to the Great Lakes
    region and have more feedback and interaction? I guess less of
    a question, but more of whether you would be amenable to a
    followup conversation with me and my staff on how we can
    improve that communication and find a way to sort of satisfy
    some of the concerns that my constituents have.
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, I look forward to that
    conversation.
        Mr. Gallagher. Fantastic.
        Mr. Chairman, I just would say, you know, on behalf of
    people with beards everywhere--I will not be silent.
        Mr. Maloney. Does the gentleman yield? I am going to
    recommend he just let it go.
        As someone who has got hair challenges, I should probably
    not be speaking. Appreciate the gentleman's indulgence.
        With that, I am going to recommend Ms. Plaskett.
        Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. And I have a petition started for
    Mr. Gallagher called ``Keep the Beard,'' so long as we get to
    go hunting with you.
        Mr. Maloney. Who said bipartisanship was dead?
        The gentlelady may proceed.
        Ms. Plaskett. Admiral, I wanted to ask you about passenger
    vessels. In the Virgin Islands, passenger vessels play a really
    important role in the part of our local economy, and safety is
    a very important issue.
        I have heard concern from constituents about the issue of
    illegal vessels, illegal charters specifically. Companies come
    down without a business license and don't have the right
    certification. Licensed charters are in competition with these
    vessels, which may have safety gear issues--they may have the
    safety gear, but not certification to be operating with dozens
    of passengers.
        I realize this is a problem nationally, in light of
    multiple fatalities and other safety concerns from commercial
    passenger vessels.
        Can you provide us with an update on the Coast Guard's
    efforts and strategy to combat these illegal charters?
        Admiral Timme. Congresswoman, the Virgin Islands is one of
    those places, as an island, it is absolutely dependent on that
    waterway.
        I ran the Coast Guard detachment in St. Croix from 1997 to
    1999, and am very familiar with the unique aspects of the
    passenger vessel there.
        We are looking at outreach, education, partnership, and
    enforcement as the approach to illegal charters around the
    country. We have sought to educate the public with regards to
    what they should look for when renting a vessel, including a
    licensed captain and a certificated vessel, if it is above six
    people.
        We have done outreach at the port level by walking the
    docks, posting signs. We have worked with local news crews to
    highlight the problem. And then lastly, we have partnered--not
    partnered-, but gone to the U.S. Attorney, where appropriate,
    for egregious violations of the laws with regards to charters
    and passenger vessels.
        It disadvantages those you just pointed out, those who
    legitimately take the time to certificate their vessels, to do
    the training that is expected, to carry passenger vessels in
    this country, and it is a disadvantage for them. So we continue
    to attack it.
        Ms. Plaskett. Are there additional resources, or do you
    feel that you have sufficient manpower and resources on the
    ground to get that done?
        Admiral Timme. Like all of our mission sets, we prioritize
    for mission accomplishment with the finite resources we do
    have. We meet mission with those resources. But additional
    resources always go to more optimal solution sets.
        Ms. Plaskett. Great. One of the other things I wanted to
    talk with you about in terms of this travel and survival craft
    regulations, when vessels sailing internationally are generally
    required to carry out-of-water survival craft. This is intended
    for vessels like cruise ships, large deep draft vessels, oil
    rigs, et cetera.
        I know that in the past, there has been an exemption to
    subchapter 11 where the conditions of the voyage would render
    specific requirements unreasonable and unnecessary. You know,
    in the U.S. Virgin Islands, there is a lot of international
    voyage to the British Virgin Islands, and in some places, that
    is a span of less than 5 miles. We do understand that it is
    pretty treacherous water in between there.
        Numerous operators in the district have requested
    subchapter W exemptions due to the unreasonable cost for such
    voyage in warm weather.
        What is the Coast Guard's commitment to operating this in a
    very fair risk-base, and at the same time, keeping safety in
    mind?
        Admiral Timme. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        From your question, you can see that the intricacies that
    go into the different variables for making a decision with
    regards to lifesaving on certain vessels: route, amounts of
    passengers, the conditions.
        And so, the best tool we have is local knowledge. It is the
    local officer in charge of marine inspection. In this case, out
    of San Juan, Puerto Rico, or the detachments in St. Croix and
    in St. Thomas, that would be most familiar with the routes,
    most familiar with the vessels, and most familiar with what
    would be appropriate.
        I am happy to get back to you on the record or follow up
    with you on any particular vessel.
        Ms. Plaskett. Great. I appreciate that.
        And Deputy Administrator Balzano, before my time runs out,
    under the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010,
    information on who to contact in the event of a crime is
    required to be posted by a cruise vessel and easily accessible
    to victims when the FBI is doing investigations.
        How do victims receive this information? Where is it
    posted? And what has MARAD done to help standardize training of
    crews on evidence and crime scene preservation?
        Mr. Balzano. Well, ma'am, that is a good question, but a
    lot of that falls into the Coast Guard's area of
    responsibility. MARAD's responsibility is to collect the data
    of FBI incidents and report that on the Department's website.
        Additionally, the other role that we have with that act is
    that we provide voluntary certification of companies who do
    training to cruise vessel security programs. And that is the
    only two roles we have, ma'am.
        Ms. Plaskett. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Maloney. Thank the gentlelady.
        It is my understanding that Mr. Young would like to yield
    his time to Mr. Gibbs.
        The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Gibbs. Admiral, the answer you gave regarding the
    safety advisory committee is actually contrary to the answers
    that the Coast Guard has provided the subcommittee previously.
    And regarding the advisory committees, whose members have been
    told the committees are in abeyance, I just have a request that
    the Coast Guard provide to the subcommittee a briefing on this
    issue as soon as possible.
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, we will follow up with you at
    your convenience.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you.
        Mr. Maloney. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Carbajal is recognized.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        On September 2nd, we tragically lost 34 lives when the
    Conception dive boat caught on fire at 3:14 a.m. Off the coast
    of my district in California. This was the worst maritime
    disaster in 70 years. My condolences go out to the families of
    those victims.
        Let me say that I am very grateful to the Coast Guard for
    their help in the search and rescue operations, and to the NTSB
    for their continued investigation into what went wrong.
        And while I want to recognize the Coast Guard men and women
    for just doing an heroic job day in and day out on their
    mission--and I have a number of Coast Guard service officers in
    my district that do an outstanding job--I must say that when
    you look at the track record of implementing the NTSB's
    recommendations, it is not a good track record. And since, over
    the years, we have seen tragedy after tragedy after tragedy
    happen, and the Coast Guard has a track record of inaction.
        While it is my understanding the NTSB is still conducting
    their investigation, I am disturbed by some of the reporting
    following this tragedy.
        Admiral Timme, I am particularly concerned by the fact that
    the NTSB has continuously, for many years, advocated for the
    Coast Guard to implement procedures, to conducting regular
    inspections, reporting maintenance needs for all of the boats'
    systems and crew training, yet the Coast Guard has ignored many
    of these recommendations.
        What action has the Coast Guard taken to make sure those
    recommendations are implemented, and why have they not been
    implemented to date?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, the Conception fire is an
    absolute tragedy, and our hearts go out to the families of the
    victims. And we look forward to a full and complete
    investigation with the Marine Board of Investigation.
        To your question with regards to the NTSB's
    recommendations, we work with them side by side on the
    investigations we do. And when we come to a recommendation, the
    NTSB makes a recommendation in the framework of a protocol to
    make a safety recommendation. We would have to take that
    recommendation into a different framework, into the framework
    of not just the recommendation itself, but the rulemaking, the
    guidance, the workforce, and the ecosystem it would go into.
        In this particular case, after the Conception, I chartered
    a team to look at--immediately, without waiting for the Marine
    Board of Investigation, but immediately, to look at that class
    of vessel, after a 30-day inspection campaign on that type of
    vessel, come back, look at what we found, without waiting for
    the full MBI, and make recommendations to me regarding their
    findings and what needs to change in the safety framework,
    including rules and policy around these passenger vessels, and
    that includes relooking at the National Transportation Safety
    Board's recommendations with regard to that. And I look forward
    to doing that.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        It has been brought to my attention that the Conception was
    working under ``old T''--quote, unquote, ``old T'' safety
    requirements, meaning they were not following the most up-to-
    date safety rules.
        What are some of the safety implications to continue to
    operate under this framework? And why do we need to wait until
    another tragedy to change our current safety rules?
        Admiral Timme. Congressman, the old subchapter T and new
    subchapter T both have many vessels in the fleet that operate
    under those construction standards. They are valid construction
    standards today, as long as the vessels continue to be
    maintained in accordance with, as constructed under that
    regime.
        We--to your question, we do not have to wait moving forward
    to look at what needs to change in that subchapter. In fact,
    that team I reference will look at that, including if the
    Marine Board of Investigation finds that there was a point that
    had to do with the old construction standard, we will
    absolutely look at that.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Mr. Curtis, do you care to add to that?
        Mr. Curtis. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
        Certainly we have issued recommendations in the past in
    these areas. Particular to the Conception, we are going to take
    a close look in this investigation at subchapter T as the
    admiral alluded to, not just for the existing and the old T,
    new T, but whether even the new T is adequate as it addresses
    means of escape, crew responsibilities, and the likes of that.
        So certainly this is a tragedy, and we are taking a close
    look at all of these regulations, a fresh look at old
    subchapter T, new subchapter T, just for the validity on that
    very subchapter, to make sure that this doesn't happen again.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much to both of you.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Maloney. I thank the gentleman. We will now proceed to
    the second panel. Thank you all.
        Oh. Pardon me. Forgive me. We have one more Member who has
    not had an opportunity to question. Forgive me.
        Mrs. Miller is recognized, and at that time, we will
    proceed to the second panel. Thank you.
        And we have been joined by Mr. Carson. Forgive me. We will
    have two more Members of Congress do their questioning, and we
    will proceed to the second panel. Forgive me.
        The gentlewoman is recognized.
        Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although my district
    in southern West Virginia may be far from the coast, maritime
    transportation is essential for my district that exports the
    natural resources and manufactured products that power this
    country and the world. It is so important that we protect the
    mariners that go out on our rivers, lakes, and seas while
    making sure that our industry can remain competitive in
    international commerce and trade.
        Rear Admiral Timme, how has the domestic commercial
    shipping industry taken on the responsibility to ensure that
    their vessels are safe for their mariners and communities?
        Admiral Timme. Congresswoman, I see the evidence of the
    attention of the fleet to the safety and security of their
    cargoes, passengers, and the environment through many
    stakeholder frameworks that we have, not just the fact that
    they comply with the regulations that we put on them. They come
    to the advisory committees that we have referenced here today.
        The Federal advisory committees are full of the marine
    professionals you talk about who are there to advise the Coast
    Guard and other regulating bodies about how to do the job
    better. They participate at the local level with the Harbor
    Safety Committees in each port on the rivers.
        Huntington, West Virginia, I think is the nearest Harbor
    Safety Committee you are going to have there. With that local
    industry, particularly, the chemical and oil industry, given
    the refining capability there works closely with the Coast
    Guard to ensure that that communication to achieve a joint goal
    of a safe and secure maritime system is achieved.
        Mrs. Miller. What are the biggest challenges that the Coast
    Guard faces when it comes to ensuring that vessels are in
    compliance with the Federal regulations and international
    standards?
        Admiral Timme. Looking ahead, we see emerging technologies
    that will challenge the inspection regime and the inspection
    workforce. We are looking at new means of propulsion with
    liquified natural gas as a fuel. We are looking at dynamically
    positioning ships in the offshore. We are looking at the
    incorporation of technology into bridges of ships that we
    hadn't seen or envisioned 30 years ago. This challenges both
    the industry and the Coast Guard to keep pace.
        Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
        Admiral Balzano, what steps have the Maritime
    Administration taken to work with industry stakeholders to
    improve safety in passenger and commercial safety?
        Admiral Balzano. Well, ma'am, as the admiral mentioned, we
    host many different industry days. We cooperate and coordinate
    with the Coast Guard, the maritime industry, and our Federal
    partners as well. We don't have any enforcement or regulatory
    responsibility for safety, so we try to take all the lessons
    learned so we can apply those to our own fleets that we
    operate, and that is the extent of our responsibility.
        Mrs. Miller. Thank you. I yield back my time.
        Mr. Carbajal [presiding]. Thank you. Now I would like to
    recognize Representative Carson.
        Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman, and Ranking Member Gibbs
    for holding this very important hearing and for allowing me to
    join the subcommittee today. Although I am not assigned to this
    subcommittee, maritime safety is very important to my
    constituents, especially the Coleman family members who
    survived the duck boat tragedy in Branson, Missouri, last year.
        Director Curtis, I was very pleased to see in your
    testimony, sir, recommendations for duck boats to have
    sufficient buoyancy so that they remain upright and afloat with
    passengers in the event of damage or flooding. NTSB also
    recommended the removal of canopies for vessels without
    sufficient buoyancy.
        I have introduced legislation H.R. 2799 which would require
    implementation of these recommendations and a number of other
    recommendations made previously after other duck boat
    fatalities. Sir, do you believe the changes you have
    recommended can prevent future fatalities like the tragedy in
    Branson?
        Mr. Curtis. Thank you for your question, sir.
        Well, certainly those two recommendations that we spoke
    about that were new recommendations yesterday, the intent there
    is when these duck boats--historically when they go down, once
    they submerge, they sink very quickly. The intent of the
    recommendation, A, is to have reserve buoyancy so when they do
    get to the water level with the passengers on board, they will
    remain at the water level to enhance the ability of the
    passengers to egress.
        And additionally, if they do not have the reserved
    buoyancy, we would like to see the canopies removed and the
    hardware over them. So the challenge has been when these
    vessels sink that the passengers become entrapped. They sink
    quickly, and they are trapped inside, so that is the intent of
    those two recommendations. If they ever do encounter problems
    and take on water, they will stay at least at the water line to
    allow responders to help as well as keep the vessel on the
    surface.
        Mr. Carson. Is there more action that the committee should
    consider, including maybe enforcement of existing requirements?
        Mr. Curtis. Well, certainly we appreciate the endorsement
    of the safety recommendations and get them implemented. These
    were made originally very close to the same language 20 years
    ago. I think they are critical to the survivability. Vessels
    can always take on water, but it is really about survivability,
    keeping them on the surface and not being encumbered by the
    canopies.
        So certainly we feel these two recommendations are
    critical, and we really urge the implementation of these by the
    Coast Guard.
        Mr. Carson. Thank you all.
        Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Are there any other questions?
        Having none, I want to thank the witnesses for their
    testimony and for answering questions today. It has been very
    insightful and helpful. Thank you so much. We will now move on
    to the second panel.
        Good afternoon. I would like now to welcome our next panel
    of witnesses. We have a number of individuals.
        First, we have Vice Admiral Brian Salerno, senior vice
    president of global maritime policy for the Cruise Lines
    International Association.
        We also have Mr. Adam W. Moilanen, vice president of
    health, safety, quality, and environment for the American
    Bureau of Shipping.
        We have Mr. Aaron Smith, president and CEO for the Offshore
    Marine Service Association.
        We have Ms. Colleen Stephens, vice president of the
    Passenger Vessel Association.
        And Mr. Paul Sterbcow. Did I get that right?
        Mr. Sterbcow. Close enough.
        Mr. Carbajal. President of the Louisiana Association for
    Justice. I have a hard name to pronounce too, so I sympathize.
        Thank you to all of you for being here. I look forward to
    your testimony and attendance. I want to recognize
    Representative Young who wants to make an introduction of one
    of his constituents who happens to be here on the panel today.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would just make
    one comment ahead of time. I have been involved with the Coast
    Guard now for 60 years. And if we want to solve some of the
    problems of the Coast Guard, we have to start funding them
    better than we have been doing in the past. That is one of our
    biggest challenges. We give them responsibilities, and yet we
    don't give them the money to do the job.
        But my pleasure now, Mr. Chairman, is to welcome my fellow
    Alaskan, Colleen Stephens, to the Transportation and
    Infrastructure Committee. Colleen Stephens is the president of
    her family's business, Stan Stephens Glacier & Wildlife Cruises
    and the national vice president of the Passenger Vessel
    Association.
        Stan Stephens Cruises has been in operation for 48 years,
    the same length I have been in Congress, and operates two 149-
    passenger sightseeing vessels in Prince William Sound, carrying
    18,000 persons per year. Her company embodies a great maritime
    tradition we have in Alaska. I understand Colleen joined the
    family business at a very early age and worked her way up
    through all aspects of the company to her present role.
        I am proud to know that an Alaskan is here to serve as the
    voice of the U.S.-flagged passenger vessel industry which is
    very important to the State of Alaska. We in Alaska know how
    vital this industry is to the State and to the future in Alaska
    and nationally is predicted and continues to improve in their
    safety.
        I appreciate all the work that you and your colleagues have
    done in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Subcommittee to ensure the safety of your passengers, and I
    look forward to the testimony that we can do better. Thank you
    for being here.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Representative Young.
        Again, thank you for being here today. I look forward to
    your testimony.
        Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
    included in the record. As with the previous panel, since your
    written testimony has been made a part of the record, the
    subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5
    minutes each.
        With that, we will start with Admiral Salerno. You may
    proceed.

     TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL BRIAN M. SALERNO, U.S. COAST GUARD
    (RET.), SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF GLOBAL MARITIME POLICY, CRUISE
        LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION; ADAM W. MOILANEN, VICE
    PRESIDENT OF HEALTH, SAFETY, QUALITY, AND ENVIRONMENT, AMERICAN
        BUREAU OF SHIPPING; AARON C. SMITH, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
    EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION; COLLEEN
      STEPHENS, VICE PRESIDENT, PASSENGER VESSEL ASSOCIATION; AND
     PAUL M. STERBCOW, PRESIDENT, LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

        Admiral Salerno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Gibbs, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an
    honor to appear before you as a representative of the Cruise
    Lines International Association, or CLIA, to discuss passenger
    vessel safety.
        CLIA is the world's largest cruise industry trade
    association. It includes among its membership approximately 95
    percent of the global cruise capacity. This year, our members
    anticipate carrying 30 million passengers on their 272 ships.
    Half of all passengers will sail from ports in the United
    States which remains the largest cruise market globally.
        The number of passengers carried has grown by approximately
    1 million per year over the last decade as ships have likewise
    grown in complexity and capability.
        The safety and security of our passengers is of paramount
    importance. These are the fundamentals without which our
    industry could not succeed. It is what our guests and our
    crewmembers rightly expect. And thanks to sustained efforts by
    our members, objective data shows that cruising is, indeed,
    among the safest vacation experiences available anywhere.
        According to renowned maritime industry analyst and
    researcher G.P. Wild, the cruise industry has expanded its
    capacity by 55 percent over a 10-year period from 2009 to 2018.
    Meanwhile, the rate of operational incidents has declined by 35
    percent. The kinds of incidents analyzed includes fires,
    groundings, collisions, loss of propulsion, and persons going
    overboard.
        These positive trends did not occur by chance. They result
    from an industry making a concerted effort to operate safely
    and with due regard for the safety and comfort of its guests.
        Nine years ago Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security
    and Safety Act which raised the bar on passenger safety and
    security. CLIA supported that legislation. At that time, the
    subcommittee was under the leadership of Chairman Elijah
    Cummings who, as you all know, was a passionate advocate for
    maritime safety and for seafarers.
        We note with sadness his recent passing. His legacy
    endures, however, and we are pleased to report that the
    industry has embraced the requirements contained in the CVSSA
    and has made them part of standard operating procedures.
    Railing heights and stateroom security measures are built into
    our member ships.
        Medical facilities and trained providers are available in
    the event of a medical emergency. And although crimes remain
    rare events, when they do occur, trained security personnel
    preserve evidence and coordinate with shoreside law
    enforcement. Crimes involving U.S. passengers are reported to
    the FBI and the Coast Guard, and quarterly crime statistics are
    published online by the Department of Transportation.
        As for the rate of crime, noted criminologist Dr. James Fox
    of Northeastern University has compared reported incidents on
    cruise ships to the national FBI crime statistics, the uniform
    crime reporting program, and concluded that major crimes on
    cruise ships occur at significantly lower rates as compared to
    those occurring on land.
        Safety is essential to the operation of our cruise ships.
    However, our commitment to maritime safety is not limited to
    our own ships. Most of our members are active participants in
    AMVER, the Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue system.
    Through the AMVER system, our members make their vessels
    available to rescue coordination centers around the world to
    respond when needed to aid mariners in distress. Although this
    means itinerary disruptions and delays, cruise ships typically
    respond without hesitation when called upon, often placing
    their own crewmembers at risk to save others.
        Each year cruise ships are recognized for their lifesaving
    efforts by the AMVER program and here in the Capital by the
    Association for Rescue at Sea.
        Equally important to our industry is environmental
    stewardship. Just as safety and security is a prerequisite for
    our guests' willingness to book a cruise, they also expect that
    their vacation is not going to despoil the very places they
    want to visit and enjoy.
        It is in our long-term interests as an industry to protect
    the seas and the destinations we visit. That fact has provided
    the impetus behind the more than $22 billion invested so far
    across the industry in new technologies to protect the seas
    from overboard discharges and the air from stack emissions. In
    fact, the cruise industry has been a leader in the development
    and adoption of new shipboard environmental technologies.
        In conclusion, it is a well worn cliche to say that safety
    is a journey, not a destination. Nevertheless, that is how we
    in CLIA view it. It is how our members view it. Safety,
    security, and environmental stewardship have our ongoing
    focused attention.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [Admiral Salerno's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, U.S. Coast Guard
     (Ret.), Senior Vice President of Global Maritime Policy, Cruise Lines
                           International Association
        Thank you, Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    distinguished members of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you to discuss
    ``Commercial and Passenger Vessel Safety: Challenges and
    Opportunities.''
        Having served 36 years in the U.S. Coast Guard, retiring in 2012 at
    the rank of Vice Admiral and Deputy Commandant for Operations and
    having worked on a broad range of Coast Guard operational missions with
    a particular focus on maritime safety, my entire professional life's
    work has been devoted to marine safety.
        I am currently the Senior Vice President for Global Maritime Policy
    for the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), which is the
    world's largest cruise industry trade association representing more
    than 95 percent of the global cruise capacity. CLIA represents 36
    oceangoing cruise lines as well as 15,000 travel agencies, including
    the largest agency hosts, franchises and consortia, 30,000 travel
    agents, and 300 industry partners who provide products and services to
    the cruise industry.
        Thirty million passengers are expected to cruise in 2019 globally,
    and nearly half of those passengers are sourced or cruise from the U.S.
    The number of people enjoying cruise vacations has increased, on
    average, by more than one million new cruisers every year over the last
    decade. It is safe to say that cruising is one of the most popular
    vacation experiences. The industry enjoys a high customer satisfaction
    rate with nearly 90 percent of cruisers saying they will cruise again.
    Fifty-two percent of vacationers who have never cruised say they are
    open to a cruise holiday. Families and other groups often cruise on an
    annual basis, booking the next trip during their cruise or immediately
    upon returning to port. These individuals appreciate the convenience of
    cruising and feel safe while doing so.
        CLIA promotes the policies and practices that foster a safe,
    secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship environment for our guests
    and crewmembers. Our Cruise Line Members participate in ongoing,
    specialized committees, working groups, task forces and other forums to
    develop and promote industry-wide policies. CLIA and its members
    routinely meet with regulators and enforcement officials to promote
    efficiency and best practices throughout the world. Through these
    varied groups, and aided by a professional technical staff,
    consultants, and maritime authorities, our members share information,
    review and assist in developing applicable national and international
    legal requirements, and identify best industry practices for all to
    adopt.
                               cruise line safety
        Safety of passengers and crew is the cruise industry's number one
    priority! Providing a safe, secure, healthy and sustainable cruise ship
    environment is fundamental to the success of the cruise industry.
        Cruise ships are among the most scrutinized vessels at sea. Using
    comprehensive design, construction and operating standards developed at
    the International Maritime Organization (IMO), flag and port State
    authorities, and vessel classification societies provide strict safety
    oversight throughout a ship's operational life. IMO member States
    (nations) have implemented the International Convention for the Safety
    of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to help ensure maritime
    security and safety worldwide. Among other criteria, SOLAS also
    provides that companies and vessels should comply with the requirements
    of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which was first
    adopted by IMO in 1993.
        In addition to safety standards, the cruise industry follows
    comprehensive security protocols, both prior to departure and at sea.
    Passengers, crew, and baggage must pass through rigorous security
    checkpoints before boarding. In addition to video surveillance and
    around-the-clock onboard emergency contacts, cruise ships keep an
    official manifest that lists everyone onboard. Proof of identity is
    required to access a cruise ship, and only crew, ticketed passengers
    and those on a pre-approved list may enter.
        Every cruise ship must be equipped with enough survival craft,
    including lifeboats and liferafts, to accommodate at least 125 percent
    of the number of persons on board. In addition, all survival craft must
    meet rigorous mandatory international standards in design,
    construction, maintenance and operations.
        Crewmembers receive robust training in safety, security and first
    aid to prevent and respond to potential emergency situations. Ship
    security personnel are on call 24/7. Major cruise lines have
    sophisticated security departments which in many cases are run by
    former federal, state and military law enforcement officials. Every
    ship sailing to or from the U.S. must have at least one crewmember
    onboard specifically trained in crime prevention, detection, and
    reporting.
        As evidenced in a study titled Report on Operational Incidents 2009
    to 2018, G.P. Wild (International) Limited concluded that significant
    operational incidents have been reduced by 33 percent over the last ten
    years. (Operational incidents include such events as: fire, engine
    failure, collisions, groundings.) Other key findings include:
          ``From 2009 to 2018, significant operational incidents
    have been on a downward trend with an average of 18.2 incidents a year
    . . .
          ``An average of 20 minor operational incidents are
    reported from 2009 to 2018, a figure which is also declining. It is
    noteworthy that the figure of 15 incidents in 2018 and 16 in 2017 were
    the lowest recorded in the ten years covered by this report.
        Onboard staff must be trained in first aid and public health
    practices, as well as in emergency procedures, signals and alarms;
    evacuation procedures; and fire prevention and fire safety.
        CLIA and its Cruise Line Members constantly work to improve safety
    by reviewing operational procedures to enhance both processes and
    technology. With new policies implemented and ongoing work with an
    Independent Panel of Experts comprised of top maritime and
    transportation professionals to provide advice on measures to enhance
    safety, the cruise industry is always looking to improve and is doing
    so.
                              cvssa implementation
        In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act
    (CVSSA) with the support of the cruise industry. With a record 30
    million passengers now cruising, the industry goes to great lengths to
    maintain the safety and security of passengers and crew. As a result,
    cruising is safer than ever.
        A recent study of crime data covering a three-year period by
    renowned criminologist Dr. James Alan Fox shows that there are 25 times
    fewer allegations of major crime (homicide, sexual assault and assault)
    on cruise ships than are seen with comparable data on land-based crime
    allegations that are tracked by the FBI. Furthermore, Dr. Fox says in
    his report that ``cruise lines do an exceptional job of securing and
    providing surveillance in addition to screening their populations and
    generally providing a high level of security aboard ships.''
        The CVSSA, along with existing laws and regulations, provides broad
    and stringent safety and security oversight of the cruise industry. The
    CVSSA was amended in 2014 to further expand public reporting of alleged
    incidents, which is a requirement that does not currently exist in any
    other travel sector. The cruise industry has embraced the requirements
    of the CVSSA and believes that the outcomes have benefited cruise
    passengers and the industry itself.
    Reporting of Crimes and Missing Persons
        Unlike any comparable industry ashore, cruise lines are subject to
    strict legal requirements for the reporting of crimes on board cruise
    ships. Incidents are to be reported orally, as soon as possible, to the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a written report of an
    incident is to be completed as soon as possible and directed to the FBI
    and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). These are tracked on an internet website
    maintained by the Department of Transportation.
        In addition to various operational and structural requirements to
    enhance shipboard security and safety, the CVSSA codified the
    industry's 2007 agreement for reporting of serious incidents on cruises
    to or from the United States, and dramatically increased penalties for
    non-reporting as compared to those under the preceding regime
    implemented under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The CVSSA also
    requires that passengers shall have available contact information for
    the appropriate law enforcement authorities. All passengers and crew
    must have access to information regarding the locations of the U.S.
    embassy and consulate in each country the vessel will visit during the
    voyage. In addition to the CVSSA requirements, CLIA Cruise Line Members
    have adopted a policy that all passengers and crew are to be provided
    the means and assistance to contact law enforcement authorities. In
    addition, cruise ships sailing to or from the U.S. are required by the
    CVSSA to record all complaints of crimes and thefts over $10,000 in a
    log that is subject to inspection by law enforcement officials.
        Beyond these U.S. legal requirements, other flag or port States
    have enacted additional requirements or established protocols
    concerning the reporting of alleged criminal activity. Also, CLIA
    Cruise Line Members have adopted a policy that serious incidents as
    defined in the 2007 agreement with the FBI and USCG, and codified by
    the CVSSA, are to be reported to the ship's flag State. Under this
    policy these serious incidents are also to be reported to local law
    enforcement when appropriate, depending on the specific circumstances
    including the location of the ship when the incident occurred.
    Security Measures
        Cruise lines make every effort to deter criminal activity on board
    their ships while also ensuring that ship security staff are prepared
    to effectively respond to an alleged incident. One source typically
    utilized to train shipboard staff is the model training standards
    covering crime prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and
    reporting of criminal activities in the international maritime
    environment cooperatively established by the FBI, USCG and the Maritime
    Administration (MARAD).
        Cruise line incident response procedures are based on national
    (flag State) and international rules and regulations, as well as other
    applicable laws and/or legal directives. Cruise line procedures
    emphasize the responsibility of ship Security Officers to exercise best
    efforts to provide for the safety and welfare of passengers,
    crewmembers, and ships. The procedures also include requirements for
    ship Security Officers to effectively preserve incident evidence for
    investigation by the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
    Medical Facilities
        CLIA and its Cruise Line Members have taken a proactive role in
    addressing the quality of shipboard medical care. Many cruise ship
    physicians are members of the American College of Emergency Physicians
    (ACEP) and serve on that organization's Cruise Ship and Maritime
    Medicine Section.
        As a result of cooperative efforts between experienced cruise ship
    physicians and ACEP, CLIA's Cruise Line Members traveling regularly on
    itineraries beyond the territorial waters of the coastal State, have
    agreed on a mandatory basis to meet or exceed the requirements of the
    ACEP Health Care Guidelines for Cruise Ship Medical Facilities. ACEP's
    guidelines address facilities, staffing, equipment and procedures.
    Patients requiring more comprehensive facilities or treatment are
    typically referred to a shoreside medical facility.
        The guidelines are generally intended to foster the goals of
    providing reasonable emergency medical care for passengers and crew
    aboard cruise vessels, stabilizing patients and/or initiating
    reasonable diagnostic and therapeutic intervention, and facilitating
    the evacuation of seriously ill or injured patients when deemed
    necessary by a shipboard physician.
    Man Overboard (MOB) Incidents
        Man overboard (MOB) incidents on cruise ships are rare and
    unfortunate events. A recent study conducted by GP Wild analyzed man
    overboard (MOB) incidents involving both passengers and crew between
    2009 and 2018, identifying on average 18.7 incidents per year with some
    fluctuations from year to year. When compared with the growth in
    capacity in the industry over the years analyzed, man overboard
    incidents were on a downward trend between 2009 and 2018:
          While number of man overboard incidents have fluctuated
    over this ten-year period, the number of incidents in 2018 was 23,
    unchanged from 2009.
          Incidence rate decreased \1\ due to a 54.4% increase in
    active lower berths (synonymous with a cabin's bed) during that same
    ten-year period.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ There were 0.0000425 (4.2510-5) overboard reports
    per active lower berth in 2018, compared to 0.0000657 (6.5710-
    5) in 2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Passenger fatalities from man overboard incidents also
    decreased from 15 in 2009 to 13 in 2018.
          Crew fatalities remain around the period average of five
    per year, around one in every 50,000 crew serving in the fleet at any
    one time in 2018.
          Persons rescued remains around 25% of fatalities; one in
    four is rescued.
        As noted in the GP Wild study, in every case where the cause of the
    MOB was established following a careful investigation it was found to
    be the result of an intentional or reckless act. MOB incidents are
    primarily linked to human behavior (suicide, recklessness, etc.) rather
    than existing ship safety features, including the minimum 42" high
    railings mandated by the 2010 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act
    (CVSSA).
        In 2018, with 28.5 million cruise passengers globally, MOB
    incidents on cruise ships resulted in about one passenger fatality per
    2.19 million cruise passengers annually--or 0.0456 fatalities per
    100,000 cruise passengers annually. By way of comparison, recent data
    from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
    reports \2\ the U.S. suicide rate to be 14 events per 100,000 people
    annually. Given the average length of a cruise is about a week, this
    would equate to about 0.27 suicide events per 100,000 people per week.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Suicide Mortality by State, National Center for Health
    Statistics, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention https://
    www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/suicide-mortality/suicide.htm, last
    accessed August 23, 2019.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Cruise ships today are the safest that ever sailed due to the
    enhanced rules, regulations and technological innovations that govern
    their design and operation. Safety regulations such as minimum railing
    and balcony heights, structural barriers and other requirements prevent
    passengers who are acting responsibly from simply falling off a cruise
    ship.
        The 2010 CVSSA specifically requires cruise ships that embark or
    disembark passengers in the United States to use technology to capture
    images of passengers or detect passengers who have fallen overboard, to
    the extent that such technology is available. To comply with this
    requirement, cruise lines have invested in video surveillance systems.
    Several cruise lines have also installed MOB detection systems on a
    developmental basis in order to evaluate their effectiveness and
    accuracy. A principle concern in the evaluation of these systems is
    high false-positive rates, which can ultimately cause damage to a
    ship's safety culture and be counterproductive to effectively detecting
    instances of MOB.
        The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is working
    to complete a standard for MOB detection technologies, which will allow
    operators and other stakeholders to evaluate new and existing systems
    against an established set of technical criteria, to ensure that
    installed systems function to a high degree of accuracy and
    reliability. As the Coast Guard stated in their 2017 MOB report, ``Once
    an international standard is developed with the input of all involved
    stakeholders, it will be easier to determine the feasibility of
    overboard detection technologies.'' CLIA fully welcomes the
    finalization of this ISO standard.
                           environmental stewardship
        The health of the cruise industry is inextricably linked to a clean
    and healthy marine environment. Our guests expect to sail on clean
    oceans and visit scenic pollution free destinations. More importantly,
    preserving and protecting the environment is simply the right thing to
    do. That is why environmental sustainability has therefore become a
    dominant theme in cruise line management.
        Each cruise ship receives dozens of inspections each year from the
    ports they visit, countries where they are registered and other
    independent agencies, including checks of equipment and practices for
    waste management, emission reduction and wastewater treatment. In U.S.
    waters, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast
    Guard enforce rigorous requirements on air, water, power, and waste,
    including provisions of the Clean Water Act. The cruise industry also
    participates in International Maritime Organization (IMO) working
    groups and committees to develop ever more stringent global regulations
    to protect the environment.
        As previously mentioned, over 30 million passengers are expected to
    cruise this year. While cruise ships comprise far less than 1 percent
    of the global number of internationally trading ships, the cruise
    industry is at the forefront of developing sustainable environmental
    practices and innovative technologies, and has invested over $22
    billion in new energy efficient ships, technologies and cleaner fuels.
    Onboard, the cruise lines encourage environmental awareness by
    educating crew and guests regarding cruise ship environmental programs.
    Cruise line crewmembers take part in comprehensive training programs,
    and many ships employ a dedicated environmental officer who oversees
    the environmental program and ensures strict compliance.
        With 272 oceangoing cruise ships in operation, CLIA Cruise Line
    Members continue to transform the modern fleet to protect the oceans,
    air and destinations enjoyed by millions of passengers each year by
    following established industry practices including operation of
    advanced wastewater treatment systems, innovative exhaust gas cleaning
    systems, energy efficiency management programs, and shoreside
    electricity technologies.
    Emission Reductions
        Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of
    Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) specifically addresses air pollution
    prevention requirements. Specific pollutants targeted by Annex VI
    include: Sulfur Oxides, Nitrogen Oxides, Greenhouse Gases and
    Particulate Matter. The requirements of Annex VI are implemented
    through US Legislation (Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships--APPS) and
    the related US Coast Guard and EPA regulations.
        To meet these requirements, the industry has pursued sustainable
    environmental innovations, new technologies and alternative fuels.
    Among these advancements adopted by the industry has been exhaust gas
    cleaning systems (EGCS), which reduce sulfur oxide emissions in a
    ship's exhaust by as much as 98 percent, and particulate matter by well
    over 50 percent, including elemental and organic carbon and black
    carbon. Catalytic filters and other systems further reduce particulate
    matter by over 30% and nitrogen oxides by up to 12%. Over 68 percent of
    the industry's current fleet capacity utilizes EGCS to meet or exceed
    air emissions requirements.
        The international maritime industry has also begun exploring the
    potential for cleaner fuels for future new builds or retrofit projects.
        A cleaner fuel already being adopted by several cruise lines is
    liquefied natural gas (LNG). The industry has invested over $8 billion
    in LNG propulsion technology due to its clean emissions profile. LNG
    releases virtually no Sulfur Oxides or particulates and 85 percent less
    Nitrogen Oxides. It also reduces CO2 emissions by approximately 20%.
    Currently, 26 LNG-powered ships are on order or under construction. 75
    percent of new ships not relying on LNG will have EGCS installed. In
    addition to design measures, cruise lines have also implemented Ship
    Energy Efficiency Management Plans to reduce fuel consumption and
    thereby limit carbon emissions.
        In 2018, the IMO adopted the Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of
    GHG Emissions from Ships, which established definitive levels of
    ambition and put the maritime industry on the pathway to reducing
    annual GHG emissions by at least 50 percent by 2050 as compared to
    2008, while pursuing efforts towards phasing them out entirely this
    century. CLIA and its cruise line members have specifically committed
    to a first major step in support of the IMO Strategy by agreeing to
    reduce the carbon intensity, or rate of C02 emissions, by at least 40
    percent by 2030, as compared to 2008. Cruise lines are actively making
    their fleets more energy efficient through operational practices,
    retrofits of equipment on existing ships, and installation of energy
    efficient technologies and practices on new build vessels. Development
    of zero-carbon fuels and propulsion technologies for transoceanic
    shipping remains imperative in order to meet longer term IMO goals to
    decarbonize the maritime sector as soon as possible this century.
    Waste Management
        CLIA and its cruise line members recognize that proper waste
    management is fundamental to the protection of the environment. The
    cruise industry demonstrates its commitment to protecting the
    environment using a broad spectrum of waste management technologies and
    procedures employed on its vessels. Through the International Maritime
    Organization (IMO) and flag and port States, cruise lines are subject
    to comprehensive, consistent and uniform international standards under
    Annex V of MARPOL, as well as the national, state and/or local
    regulations that apply to all vessels. For example, the IMO Action Plan
    to Address Marine Plastic Litter from Ships was adopted in 2018 to
    formalize efforts to reduce the production of marine plastic litter by
    the maritime industry. Cruise lines are already taking steps to reduce
    the amount of plastic litter onboard with efforts such as reducing
    single-use plastics, banning plastic straws, and optimizing recycling
    methods.
        To improve environmental performance, many cruise lines have
    installed advanced wastewater treatment systems (AWTS) that utilize
    tertiary-level treatment to generate effluent discharges often
    equivalent to the best shoreside treatment plants. CLIA members
    cooperate fully with national and local requirements in planning
    wastewater discharges where permitted and encourage the provision of
    adequate shoreside reception facilities for wastewater where discharge
    is a concern. All the industry's new ships on order are specified to
    have these systems, which, consistent with CLIA policy, are well beyond
    international requirements. Due to the efforts of highly trained waste
    management professionals onboard, some cruise ships repurpose 100
    percent of the waste generated--by reducing, reusing, donating,
    recycling and converting waste into energy. Cruise lines recycle 80,000
    tons of paper, plastic, aluminum and glass each year.
    Energy Efficiency
        CLIA and its cruise line members place a high priority on energy
    efficiency as part of their environmental protection programs.
    Innovative investments include energy-efficient engines and hull
    coatings that reduce friction and fuel consumption, as well as energy-
    saving LED lights and higher efficiency appliances. By switching to
    low-energy LED lights, newer cruise ships can improve lighting energy
    efficiency by nearly 80 percent.
        To further reduce emissions, 88 percent of our industry's new ships
    will be fitted with shore-side electricity systems or configured to add
    shore-side power in the future. Currently, cruise ships may operate on
    shoreside electricity at 16 ports worldwide where the shoreside
    infrastructure supports the technology.
    Social Responsibility
        The industry has proactively engaged with partners who provide
    efficient and sustainable strategies for waste and recyclables landed
    ashore. Cruise industry representatives also participate in regional
    ocean planning efforts with maritime stakeholders and provide direct
    input and feedback to address ocean management challenges and the
    sustainable use of oceans.
        The cruise industry remains committed to wildlife and nature
    conservation. Cruise lines actively train their employees and educate
    travelers through ads and printed materials, and champion creative
    campaigns, to raise awareness of the crucial role consumers play in
    ending illegal wildlife trade. CLIA has joined these efforts by
    partnering with the U.S. National Park Service to develop a pilot whale
    mapping program in Alaska's Glacier Bay; United for Wildlife to combat
    illegal wildlife traffickers, and The U.S. Wildlife Trafficking
    Alliance to reduce the purchase and sale of illegal wildlife products.
            contribution of the cruise industry to the u.s. economy
        According to the Business Research and Economic Advisors study on
    The Contribution of the International Cruise Industry to the U.S.
    Economy in 2018:
          An estimated 13.09 million cruise passengers were sourced
    from the U.S.
          A total of 12.68 million cruise passengers embarked on
    their cruises from U.S. ports during 2018. Florida, whose ports handled
    7.5 million embarkations, accounted for more than 59 percent of all
    U.S. cruise embarkations.
          The cruise lines and their passengers and crew directly
    spent $23.96 billion on goods and services in the U.S., a 10.5 percent
    increase from 2016 and a 33 percent increase from 2010. The cruise
    lines spent $19.28 billion while passengers and crew spent $4.67
    billion.
          Within the U.S., spending by the cruise lines with their
    direct suppliers was up from $11.17 million in 2016 to $11.74 in 2018.
          The cruise industry generated the direct employment of an
    estimated 172,326 workers with U.S. businesses, who, in return,
    received $8.32 billion in wages and salaries during 2018.
          Including the indirect economic impacts, the spending of
    the cruise lines and their crew and passengers was responsible for the
    generation of $52.67 billion in gross output in the U.S., a 10.3
    percent increase from 2016.
          Including the indirect economic impacts, the spending of
    the cruise lines and their crew and passengers in 2018 was responsible
    for the generation of 421,711 jobs throughout the country.
          Total wages and salaries paid to these workers was $23.15
    billion
        The economic benefits of the cruise industry positively impact
    every state. This involves travel agency and travel agent sale of
    cruise bookings, and the procurement of products and services from
    numerous industry sectors.
    Serving the Wider Maritime Industry and Communities
        CLIA members strive to do their part to be positive contributors
    within the wider maritime community. In particular, our Member Line
    cruise ships routinely cooperate with Rescue Coordination Centers and
    serve as search and rescue resources to aid mariners in destress at
    sea. CLIA members actively participate in the Automated Mutual
    Assistance Vessel Rescue System--or AMVER--which is a worldwide
    voluntary reporting system sponsored by the U.S. Coast Guard. It is a
    computer-based global ship-reporting system used worldwide by search
    and rescue authorities to arrange for assistance to persons in distress
    at sea. With AMVER, rescue coordinators can identify participating
    ships in the area of distress and divert the best-suited ship or ships
    to respond. CLIA members voluntarily give their time and resources to
    assisting those in need on the high seas, and they are often recognized
    for the lives they have saved at AMVER events around the world and
    annually by the Association for Rescue at Sea (AFRAS) held here on
    Capitol Hill.
        CLIA members are also actively engaged in providing relief and
    assistance leading up to and following hurricanes and tropical storms.
    Following the devastation from Hurricane Maria in 2017 and Hurricane
    Dorian in 2019, CLIA members assisted with evacuations, temporary
    housing, multiple tons of palates with food, water, medical supplies,
    and many other provisions, as well as millions of dollars in donations
    to support the efforts of non-profit international relief
    organizations.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony to
    the Committee. I hope the information is helpful in addressing the
    substantial oversight and accountability of cruise lines, both in the
    U.S. and internationally. We remain fully and deeply committed to
    continuous enhancement of the safety of our guests and crewmembers, as
    it is without question our top priority. In addition, we will continue
    to be a leader in environmental stewardship in the maritime community.
    I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Admiral Salerno.
        Next, Mr. Moilanen, you may proceed.
        Mr. Moilanen. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
    Member, and members of the committee.
        First of all, I want to thank the committee for giving the
    American Bureau of Shipping or ABS the opportunity to attend
    this hearing today. My name is Adam Moilanen. I am vice
    president of the American Bureau of Shipping, and I cover the
    health, safety, quality, and environmental management system. I
    would like to provide the committee an overview of ABS and who
    we are and what we do.
        ABS is a mission-focused, not-for-profit organization
    dedicated to the promotion of safety for the marine and
    offshore industries. ABS was founded in 1862. And we are the
    sole American classification society. We are an organization of
    about 2,800 people made up of naval architects, marine
    engineers, and other highly technical and experienced
    professionals with alumni from each State Maritime Academy,
    including the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and U.S. Merchant Marine
    Academy and with a number of employees who are active
    reservists and retired from the U.S. armed services.
        With safety as our core value, ABS has now achieved over 3
    years of zero lost time work-related injuries for our
    workforce. ABS has implemented an ongoing safety excellence
    program as well as life safety rules which includes a stop work
    obligation, authorizing all employees to intervene if safety is
    in question in any aspect of their work.
        The actual day-to-day work of ABS includes research and
    rule development, design review, survey during new construction
    of vessels and units including the associated material and
    equipment, surveys during operational life of those vessels and
    units, and performing safety audits of companies in their
    vessels and units. Note that our rules are a mechanism by which
    we publish technical safety standards for the industry.
        We also publish the ABS Record which provides an up-to-date
    status of all vessels and offshore units that are classed with
    ABS. Training of our qualified workforce is supported by a
    centralized learning organization and ABS Academy.
        ABS has also delegated statutory work on behalf of 110
    national flag states or countries where vessels and marine-
    related facilities are registered. In this capacity, ABS and
    other class societies are referred to as recognized
    organizations or ROs.
        For nearly 100 years, ABS has been the official class
    society of the United States under the Merchant Marine Act of
    1920. ABS has maintained a long and valued relationship with
    the U.S. Coast Guard, and along with other class societies,
    performs delegated inspections on behalf of the U.S. Coast
    Guard which includes the alternate compliance program or ACP.
        As stated, ABS plays an important role in marine and
    offshore safety, but ABS is only one component of the overall
    safety chain. Shipowners, crews, shipyards, equipment and
    material manufacturers, port states, flag states, charters, and
    underwriters all have vital roles as well to support the safety
    of the vessel, the crew, and the environment.
        The control environment for ABS is robust and transparent
    and includes an extensive internal quality management system.
    Over 4,000 documented policies, procedures, and work
    instructions guide our employees in their day-to-day work.
        Secondly, we conduct more than 100 internal audits
    ourselves to assess the quality of our work, and there are more
    than 50 external audits of ABS every year. External audits are
    conducted by flag states, including the U.S. Coast Guard and
    International Association of Class Societies or IACS, among
    others.
        Continuous improvement is an important element of our
    quality system with input for change from employees, from
    clients, from audits, and lessons learned. Port state control,
    where vessels are boarded when entering port, is an external
    indicator of the quality of ABS service delivery. In fact, last
    year ABS maintained its leading position in overall port state
    control performance, being one of the top performing ROs in all
    three of the most active regions in the world for the last 3-
    year period from 2016 to 2018.
        For ABS, our objective remains the same as ever, to set
    standards for safety and excellence in marine and offshore
    design, construction, and operation and to verify adherence to
    those standards.
        Again, I would like to thank the committee for its time and
    look forward to answering your questions.
        [Mr. Moilanen's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Adam W. Moilanen, Vice President of Health,
         Safety, Quality, and Environment, American Bureau of Shipping
        Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the
    Committee. First of all, I want to thank the Committee for giving the
    American Bureau of Shipping, or ABS, the opportunity to participate in
    this hearing today. My name is Adam Moilanen and I am Vice President of
    ABS overseeing our Health, Safety, Quality and Environmental Management
    System.
        I'd like to provide the Committee an overview of ABS, of who we are
    and what we do. ABS is a mission-focused not-for-profit organization
    dedicated to the promotion of safety in the marine and offshore
    industries.
        ABS was founded in 1862 and we are the sole American classification
    society. We are an organization of about 2,800 people, made up of naval
    architects, marine engineers, and other highly technical and
    experienced professionals, with alumni from each State Maritime Academy
    in the USA, as well as the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and U.S. Coast
    Guard Academy, and with a number of employees who are active reservists
    or retired from our U.S. armed services.
        With safety as our core value, ABS has now achieved over three
    years of zero lost-time work related injuries for our workforce. ABS
    has implemented an ongoing safety excellence program as well as Life
    Safety Rules, which includes a Stop Work Obligation authorizing all
    employees to intervene if safety is in question in any aspect of their
    work.
        The actual day-to-day work of ABS includes research and Rule
    development; design review; survey during new construction of vessels/
    units including associated material and equipment; surveys during the
    operational life of those vessels/units and performing safety audits of
    companies and their vessels/units. Note that our Rules are the
    mechanism by which we publish technical safety standards for industry.
    We also publish the ABS Record which provides an up-to-date status of
    all vessels and offshore units that are classed by ABS. Training of our
    qualified workforce is supported by a centralized learning organization
    and ABS Academy.
        ABS also is delegated statutory work on behalf of 110 national flag
    states/countries where vessels and marine related facilities are
    registered. In this capacity, ABS and other Class Societies are
    referred to as Recognized Organizations, or ROs.
        For nearly 100 years, ABS has been the official classification
    society of the United States, under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
    ABS has maintained a long and valued relationship with the U.S. Coast
    Guard and, along with other Class Societies, performs delegated
    inspections on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard, which includes the
    Alternate Compliance Program or ACP.
        As stated, ABS plays an important role in marine and offshore
    safety, but ABS is only one component of the overall safety chain.
    Shipowners, crews, shipyards, equipment and material manufacturers,
    port states, flag states, charterers and underwriters all have vital
    roles as well to support the safety of the vessel, the crew and the
    environment.
        The control environment at ABS is robust and transparent and
    includes an extensive internal quality management system. Over 4,000
    documented policies, procedures and work instructions guide our
    employees in their day-to-day work. Secondly, we conduct more than 100
    internal audits ourselves to assess the quality of our work, and there
    are more than 50 external audits of ABS every year. External audits are
    conducted by flag states, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the
    International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), among
    others.
        Continuous improvement is an important element of our quality
    system with input for change from employees, clients, audits and
    lessons learned.
        Port State Control, where vessels are boarded when entering port,
    is an external indicator of the overall quality of ABS service
    delivery. In fact, last year, ABS maintained its leading position in
    overall Port State Control performance, being one of the top performing
    ROs in all three of the most active regions of the world for the three-
    year period of 2016 to 2018.
        For ABS, our objective remains the same as ever: to set standards
    for safety and excellence in marine and offshore design, construction
    and operation and to verify adherence to those standards.
        Again, I would like to thank the Committee for its time today, and
    I look forward to answering your questions.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Moilanen.
        Next, Mr. Smith, you may proceed.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs,
    and distinguished members of this subcommittee.
        My name is Aaron Smith, and I have the pleasure of serving
    as president and CEO of the Offshore Marine Service Association
    or OMSA. I want to thank you for allowing me to speak here.
        Safety is a culture in our industry, and I am honored to be
    here to share with you how the domestic maritime industry not
    only strives to ensure that everyone goes home at the end of
    their hitch but also explain how this committee can help
    enforce current laws that safeguard American lives, American
    jobs, and our national security.
        Mr. Chairman, my organization represents the U.S.-flagged
    vessels and associated supply chain engaged in constructing,
    maintaining, and servicing offshore energy infrastructure,
    including the oil and gas fields of the Gulf of Mexico, and
    increasingly, the offshore wind fields of the east coast. We
    represent in total 170 member companies across the United
    States, and we are proud to report that our collective TRIR
    incident rate is more than two times better than the general
    oil and gas production industry.
        OMSA has two complementary purposes, to increase industry
    safety and to ensure proper enforcement of the Jones Act which,
    as this committee knows, is vital to our national homeland and
    economic security. And while the offshore energy industry
    continues to strive for zero incidents, our achievements could
    not happen without the United States Coast Guard. They serve as
    our regulator, but they also serve as our first responders.
        And we think what this committee has done to advance
    legislation to ensure that our 42,000 Coast Guard men and women
    who protect our Nation and protect our industry will never
    again miss a paycheck because of politics.
        While safety is intrinsic to our industry, the flag state
    laws governing United States vessels are some of the more
    stringent in the world. However, many of these laws are not
    applied to the foreign vessels operating here. The net result
    is the U.S. has created an unlevel playing field that favors
    foreign vessels and mariners doing business in our Nation's own
    waters.
        As a few examples, when here, foreign vessels are not
    required to report the same level of incident data that we have
    to report to the United States Coast Guard. Additionally,
    foreign vessels can and do employ foreign nationals who may not
    follow the same safety standards as U.S. mariners and are paid
    a fraction of what OMSA members pay their U.S. mariners,
    creating a lucrative cost advantage for these vessels.
        Use of these mariners also causes security problems as many
    come from non-aligned nations such as Russia and China and are
    issued 5-year visas with little oversight. Moreover, U.S. law
    requires all persons on board a U.S.-flagged vessel to have a
    merchant mariner credential.
        Conversely, almost every foreign nation allows only the
    marine crew to have such a license. The cost differential
    caused by this requirement can stretch to $1,000 per person.
        Outside of mariners, our industry utilizes modules to
    customize every vessel for each operation or contract.
    Regardless of complexity or risk, the Coast Guard requires the
    U.S.-flagged vessels to be subjected to lengthy plan approval
    and physical inspections. The cost and delays associated with
    this requirement which are not enforced on foreign vessels have
    directly cost OMSA members jobs and work.
        Considering the higher safety standard carried by U.S.-
    flagged vessels, one of the best ways to protect mariner safety
    is to fully enforce the Jones Act. Unfortunately, between 1976
    and 2009, Customs and Border Protection created numerous
    loopholes to the Jones Act which have allowed foreign-flagged
    vessels to transport energy equipment between U.S. points in
    contravention to the law and in detriment to U.S. mariners.
        Since 2009, CBP has openly acknowledged three times that
    they wrongly exceeded their authority. The first two times, CBP
    failed to follow through with their promised remedy. The third
    time came last month.
        In this instance, CBP also sought to revoke the so-called
    Koff or heavy lift rulings where they had correctly enforced
    the law and prevented foreign-flagged vessels from moving heavy
    lifts between two U.S. points. In place of the Koff ruling, CBP
    has proposed legally dubious definitions which not only help
    foreign vessels to conduct all lifts in contravention to the
    law but create new loopholes in the Jones Act. These
    definitions are outside the law and are unnecessary.
        This committee in its wisdom and in its constitutional
    authority has already created and passed through the House a
    legal, transparent, and safe ways for these heavy lifts to be
    conducted.
        The U.S. offshore industry has now been waiting for 10
    years and 1 month to see the Jones Act properly enforced and
    put our American mariners back to work. Without proper
    enforcement of the Jones Act, we instead cede this work to
    foreign vessels which do not comply to the same safety standard
    as U.S. vessels. They also do not comply to the same standards
    we have for environmental safety or security laws.
        For these reasons, we hope the committee will join us in
    working towards correct enforcement of the Jones Act, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [Mr. Smith's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Aaron C. Smith, President and Chief Executive
                  Officer, Offshore Marine Service Association
        Chairman Maloney, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to speak at this important
    hearing. My name is Aaron Smith, and I have the pleasure of serving as
    the President and CEO of the Offshore Marine Service Association
    (OMSA).
                                   who we are
        OMSA is the association for the domestic offshore marine
    transportation industry. Traditionally, many of our members own and
    operate the U.S.-flagged vessels engaged in constructing, maintaining,
    and servicing oil and gas infrastructure on the Outer Continental Shelf
    (OCS). More recently and in increasing numbers, OMSA members are
    engaged in constructing and servicing the offshore wind market along
    the East Coast.
        OMSA's members also include many shipyards that construct,
    maintain, repair, and modernize both privately and government-owned
    U.S. fleets. In addition, we represent associated suppliers and allied
    companies that provide supplies, services, and training to these vessel
    operators and shipyards.
        In total, OMSA represents approximately 170 companies and their
    approximately 12,000 employees. While these companies and employees are
    primarily based in the Gulf Coast, OMSA has an increasing presence on
    the East and West Coasts. In addition to geographic disparity, we also
    represent business of varying size, from large publicly traded
    companies to small family-owned businesses. Some of our members have
    hundreds of vessels while others operate only one or two.
            importance of safety to our organization and membership
        OMSA has two stated and complementary purposes. Our organization
    exists to promote the highest standards of safety. Specifically, we
    work to constantly improve the training of mariners and offshore
    workers and ensure international and domestic laws and regulations are
    written and implemented in a way that benefits mariners, contractors,
    workers, vessel operators, the general public, and the environment.
        Toward this end, OMSA is one of three accreditation bodies to
    conduct SafeGulf training. SafeGulf is a standardized safety
    orientation program that ensures everyone who works in the energy
    industry--onshore or offshore--receives the same comprehensive,
    independently audited safety training. Additionally, as a member of the
    SafeGulf Advisory Group, OMSA helps set the standards for this program,
    working to ensure that as the offshore energy industry changes, the
    SafeGulf orientation changes with it.
        Additionally, OMSA created their own system dynamic positioning
    operator (DPO) training and certification scheme, one which exceeded
    the existing industry standards.
        Dynamic positioning (DP) is used to hold vessels in position in
    situations where mooring or anchoring cannot be utilized; usually, this
    means when two vessels or a vessel and an installation are close to
    each other. As such, DP operations are, by their very nature, safety
    critical activities. The existing training system did not adequately
    account for this criticality. Thus, OMSA created its own program,
    called the Offshore Service Vessel Dynamic Positioning Authority
    (OSVDPA). This DPO certification program is an improvement upon the
    existing industry standard, including increased assessments, increased
    experience verification systems, and true-to-life simulations.
        I am proud to also run the OSVDPA and via my work with the OSVDPA,
    I also sit on the Marine Technology Society DP Committee's Guidance and
    Standards Subcommittee. This committee sets design, operational, and
    competency standards intended to improve the safety of the DP industry.
    Also, I am currently part of an Oil Company International Marine Forum
    (OCIMF) ad hoc working group to re-write the OCIMF DP risk assurance
    guidelines.
        The importance of safety and the constant drive toward zero
    incidents is operationalized by OMSA members. You see it in the safety
    management systems of OMSA members. These systems include the policies
    and procedures which are utilized to prevent, respond to, and correct
    incidents. The specificity of these systems is truly impressive.
        They include not only training requirements, procedures for big
    operations, requirements for job safety analyses (or JSAs), and stop
    work authority. They include seemingly minor components like how
    workers should park their cars and admonishments about using cell
    phones while driving to and from work.
        The result of these systems is quantifiable. Every year OMSA
    collects Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) data from its member
    companies. Last year, the collective OMSA TRIR was 0.29. For
    comparison, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)
    reported that the TRIR for the oil and gas production sector was 0.8,
    drilling and well operations was 0.6, and construction and
    decommissioning was 0.7. In short, the OMSA Member TRIR is
    significantly lower than any peer group.
          importance of industry partnership with the u.s. coast guard
        While OMSA, OMSA Members, and the offshore energy industry have
    taken immense measures to improve the safety of our industry, there is
    another party that must be recognized as one of the primary factors for
    the safety of our industry. Specifically, the safety advancements
    achieved by our industry could not have happened without the U.S. Coast
    Guard. The Coast Guard is not only our industry's regulator, they are
    also who the offshore industry calls when everything has gone wrong.
    They are our first, and often only responders.
        The roles of regulator and rescuer are in addition to the roles our
    Coast Guardsmen and women play as part of our national and homeland
    security apparatus, protecting our borders--both land and sea borders--
    and conducting drug interdictions on our Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
    and on the high seas beyond.
        For all of these reasons, it is unconscionable that 2018 started
    with a 35-day period where our 42,000 Coast Guardsmen protected our
    industry and our nation were not receiving a paycheck for doing so. In
    my mind, the single most important thing this Subcommittee, Committee,
    and Congress can do to provide for the safety of our industry is to
    ensure that disagreements in Washington never cause those protecting or
    rescuing us from being paid for doing so.
                        safety of the u.s.-flagged fleet
        When these two parties, the U.S. offshore marine industry, and the
    U.S. Coast Guard work together the result is the impressive safety
    record indicated by the TRIR stats previously cited.
        Beyond the safety culture of OMSA members and the professionalism
    of the U.S. Coast Guard, this record is also in many cases a result of
    U.S. Coast Guard regulations covering the U.S.-flagged fleet which are
    more stringent than those governing foreign-flagged vessels that
    operate in U.S. waters. The net result is that the U.S. has created an
    uneven playing field that favors foreign vessels and mariners in our
    own waters.
        While most nations meet the standards set by the International
    Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions, such as the International
    Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
    Seafarers (STCW), International Convention for the Safety of Life at
    Sea (SOLAS), and the International Convention for the Prevention of
    pollution from Ships (MARPOL), these are only minimum standards. Above
    those conventions each flag state has more extensive regulations for
    the ships in their registry.
        The U.S. Coast Guard's regulations and policies are some of the
    more stringent within IMO White List nations. However, many of these
    regulations are only applicable or are only applied to U.S.-flagged
    vessels. OMSA has compiled a list of some of the more ready examples.
    Incident Reporting
        At 46 C.F.R.  4 is the requirement for U.S.-flagged vessels
    reporting marine casualties to the U.S. Coast Guard. This regulation is
    more stringent than those same requirements for foreign flagged vessels
    operating in U.S. waters. Specifically, when a vessel is operating
    beyond the boundary line (12 nautical miles from shore) U.S.-flagged
    vessels must report incidents resulting in injuries to less than five
    people; groundings; allisions; loss of propulsion steering, or other
    impairment of the vessel its components and cargo; adverse impact to
    the vessel's seaworthiness; and significant harm to the environment
    must be reported.
        Obviously, that is all information that is good for a safety
    regulator to have. It is especially problematic to think that the
    foreign-flagged vessels operating in U.S. waters are not reporting this
    information when such vessels are often in U.S. waters for days, week,
    months, and even years without coming into port. As such, unless the
    vessel operator or the charterer proactively reports an incident to the
    Coast Guard, the Coast Guard may never know about--as purely
    hypothetical examples--a foreign-flagged accommodation vessel losing
    power and floating through a crowded field, or a foreign-flagged tug
    hitting an installation.
    Foreign Manning
        The differences in U.S.-flagged vessel regulations and foreign-
    flagged vessel regulations are not constrained to the vessel itself. 33
    C.F.R.  141.5 allows vessels with an ownership structure that is more
    than 50 percent foreign to employ foreign nationals in U.S. waters.
    Specifically, these foreign mariners are provided a five-year visa to
    come and work as a mariner in the U.S. Moreover, the employer of such a
    mariner does need to prove that there is a lack of U.S. mariners before
    the visa is issued. In fact, the vessel operator does not need to even
    regularly prove the vessel is more than 50 percent foreign owned; once
    this determination is made one time, it is good for the life of the
    vessel. Finally, when foreign mariners work in U.S. waters, there is
    not a requirement that they are paid U.S. wages. As such, many of these
    mariners will be paid a fraction of what a U.S. mariner would be paid,
    thereby creating a lucrative cost advantage for the foreign vessel
    operators.
        The problems with how these regulations are implemented extend
    beyond the economic disadvantages to U.S. vessel operators. The
    implementation of these regulations also causes situational awareness
    and security problems for the U.S. Coast Guard on our OCS. These
    foreign mariners are issued visas with little oversight. Which is a
    problem when you consider the critical nature of the work that is done
    on the OCS and the catastrophic results that can occur when things go
    wrong. The problem is further exacerbated when one considers that many
    of these mariners come from nations that cannot be considered allies.
    Specifically, one of the largest pools of mariners for the offshore
    energy industry are Russian nationals.
    Mariner Versus Industrial Worker
        On the topic of mariners is a provision in the U.S. Code which
    disadvantages U.S. vessel operators. 46 U.S.C.  8701 requires all
    persons aboard a U.S.-flagged vessel to have a merchant mariner
    credential, essentially a Coast Guard license. Conversely, almost every
    foreign-flagged vessel only requires the marine crew to have such a
    license. This law has only recently been enforced by the U.S. Coast
    Guard; however, it is very costly for U.S. vessel operators. The amount
    of training and other requirements which are part of a U.S. Coast Guard
    license is at least $7,000, plus the time it takes to secure such a
    license.
        This is especially problematic because as offshore energy
    operations have gotten more complex, and the safety culture of vessel
    operators, charterers, and third parties has improved, more and more
    personnel have been added to the lists of people on board a vessel.
    These additional personnel are remote operated vehicle (ROV) pilots,
    crane operators, acoustic data experts, representatives of the
    charterers and vendors, and other professionals. They are not engaged
    in the operation of the vessel nor are they ever unescorted in critical
    areas. For this reason, in almost every country in the world, they are
    not required to be a licensed mariner. However, they are in the U.S.
    system. This is another U.S. regulation that makes a U.S. flagged
    vessel more expensive than a similarly equipped foreign-flagged vessel.
    Portable Accommodation Modules (PAMs)
        Offshore energy vessels are designed to be versatile so that they
    can perform a variety of missions. To customize these vessels, owners,
    charterers, or third-party vendors and contractors will install modules
    on a vessel. These modules can be as simple as a completely
    freestanding shipping container with a light and a workbench inside or
    as complex as living quarters completely integrated into a vessel's
    power, water, and HVAC systems.
        As the risk level varies greatly between the above examples,
    international industry standards have differing inspection
    requirements. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) has internationally
    accepted guidelines which distinguish between Portable Accommodation
    Modules (PAMs), which must be inspected, and industrial modules which
    do not ``so long as the modules are unmanned during heavy weather and
    sufficient space for the entire complement of personnel assigned to
    work in the unit(s) is provided in a deckhouse, superstructure, or
    module complying fully with applicable structural requirements.''
        In contrast to the existing industry standards, in 2016, the USCG
    released the CG-ENG Policy Letter 01-16, Portable Accommodation Module
    (PAM) Guidance, (PAM Policy Letter), which applies to ``any non-
    integral enclosed space that is installed on a host vessel or facility,
    and occupied by personnel for berthing, recreational, service, or
    industrial purposes''--essentially any module placed on a vessel.
        Not only does the PAM Policy Letter apply a single standard to
    modules with varying risk profiles, its requirements are onerous. The
    Policy Letter requires all plans, arrangements, and specifications for
    the module itself, where it will be placed on the vessel, and how it
    will be attached to the vessel and/or connected to any vessel system to
    be submitted to the relevant Coast Guard inspector, the Authorized
    Classification Society (ACS), and/or the Marine Safety Center (MSC).
        In addition to plan approval, a physical inspection is required by
    the USCG. This requirement is difficult to comply with, as scheduling
    these inspections requires a minimum of two weeks. With the ``just-in-
    time'' nature of the offshore energy industry these timelines can
    simply not be adhered to.
        That fact would not be as problematic if every vessel operating on
    the U.S. OCS had to comply with the PAM Policy Letter. However, that is
    not true. The PAM Policy letter again applies only to U.S.-flagged
    vessels. Foreign-flagged vessels have been able to take advantage of
    this requirement, taking jobs from U.S. vessels based upon the fact
    they could get the work done sooner because they did not have to wait
    for Coast Guard inspections.
    Inspection Forms
        Additionally, in the last year our industry has noticed a new
    enforcement regime on U.S-flagged vessels. For example, the U.S. Coast
    Guard has long used CG-835V ``Vessel Inspection Requirements'' to
    document deficiencies found on U.S.-flagged vessels. In the past,
    minor, immediately corrected items found during an inspection were not
    recorded on an 835 but were, instead, addressed on the spot, or
    documented on a ``work list'' and addressed immediately after the
    inspection. This system reflected the lower risk profile carried with
    addressing these items.
        However, OMSA members no longer find these accommodations to be
    provided. Instead, every single deficiency is now documented by USCG
    personnel on an 835. While that might not sound like much of a burden,
    the problem is all deficiencies documented on an 835 need to be
    corrected and then the correction needs to be inspected in a follow up
    by a Coast Guard or other third-party inspector. Which means the vessel
    operator either has to wait for a Coast Guard inspector to become
    available or pay a third party to have the repair inspected. This
    change in strategy means that it might cost a vessel operator thousands
    of dollars and a day at the dock to have the changing of a light bulb
    inspected.
        Once again, the 835-inspection system is only for U.S.-flagged
    vessels, thereby creating a cost and time-based competitive
    disadvantage for U.S.-flagged vessels when compared to their foreign-
    flagged competitors.
                         lack of jones act enforcement
        The above are just a few examples of how U.S.-flagged vessels carry
    a higher standard of safety and security when compared to foreign-flag
    vessels operating in the same space and providing the same services.
    Thus, one of the best ways the safety of the maritime industry can be
    increased is to fully enforce the Jones Act. Enforcement of this
    statute is OMSA's second primary mission, one complementary of our
    mission to increase the safety of our industry.
        Unfortunately, the Jones Act is not currently fully enforced as it
    relates to the offshore energy industry. Specifically, for the last
    three decades, the Federal Government has allowed foreign vessels to do
    work the Jones Act reserves for U.S.-flagged vessels. In addition to
    benefiting foreign companies, foreign ships, and foreign mariners to
    the detriment of U.S. mariners, shipyard works and U.S. taxpayers it
    also increases the number of vessels on our OCS that comply with a
    lower safety standard.
        Unfortunately, CBP has allowed this to happen by confusing and
    degrading the clear standard proffered by the Jones Act by issuing
    interpretations of the statute that are directly contrary to the Jones
    Act's text, structure, and purpose.
        Specifically, between 1976 and 2009, CBP issued several letter
    rulings which allowed foreign flag vessels to transport offshore energy
    cargos (called ``merchandise'' under the Jones Act) from U.S. ports to
    locations on the U.S. OCS. These letter rulings are CBP's responses to
    private correspondence. They were issued without any notice or comment
    before their publication.
        Without any basis in law, CBP's letter rulings have green lit
    proposals by foreign vessel operators to transport merchandise to and
    from U.S. points on the OCS, using vessels that do not comply with the
    standards that U.S.-flagged vessels have to meet.
        The problem started in Letter Ruling HQ 101925 (also known as T.D.
    78-387 Oct. 7, 1976). In this letter, CBP permitted the foreign-built
    vessel to transport pipeline connectors, pipe and repair materials,
    wellhead equipment, and other materials from the U.S. mainland to a
    point on the OCS. CBP has applied--and extended--the flawed reasoning
    of that letter ruling dozens of times.
        Furthermore, CBP has issued letter rulings that improperly narrow
    the definition of ``merchandise'' that must be transported by Jones Act
    qualified vessels. By its plain language, the Jones Act applies to the
    all transportation of ``merchandise,'' and defines that term with
    broad, sweeping language by specifically including even ``valueless
    material'' in 46 U.S.C.  55102(b), and prescribing only limited,
    explicit exceptions for narrow categories of merchandise, such as empty
    cargo containers--and only then when a foreign government extends
    reciprocal privileges to such items. Despite this binding law by
    Congress, CBP has mis-interpreted ``merchandise'' in an unlawfully
    narrow fashion, labeling as ``vessel equipment'' exempt from the Jones
    Act large categories of articles, such as oilfield equipment, that are
    transported by a vessel from a port and installed on the OCS by vessels
    that comply with a lower safety standard enforced by the U.S. Coast
    Guard.
                             2009 revocation effort
        CBP realized its errors and in 2009 issued a notice that it
    intended to revoke many of these flawed letter rulings. That notice was
    very candid when it admitted that the agency had not been following the
    law:

            CBP recognizes that allowing a foreign-flagged vessel to
            transport articles that are not needed to navigate, operate, or
            maintain that vessel or for the safety and comfort of the
            persons on board that vessel, but rather to accomplish a[n]
            activity for which that vessel would be engaged, would be
            contrary to the legislative intent of [the Jones Act] (Proposed
            Modification and Revocation of Ruling Letters Relating to the
            Customs Position on the Application of the Jones Act to the
            Transportation of Certain Merchandise and Equipment between
            Coastwise Points, 43 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 61 (July 17,
            2009)) (2009 Notice).

        The Notice also stated:

            CBP recognizes that allowing foreign-flagged vessels to
            transport merchandise from one U.S. point and install that
            merchandise at another point on the OCS on the condition that
            it merely be accomplished 'on or from that vessel' would be
            contrary to the legislative intent of [the Jones Act] (2009
            Notice).

        CBP failed, however, to revoke the unlawful letter rulings. On
    September 15, 2009, at the urging of foreign vessel owners and
    charterers of vessels who were benefiting from CBP's unlawful opinions,
    CBP made a final decision to withdraw its proposed action and announced
    that a ``new notice . . . will be published in the Customs Bulletin in
    the near future.'' While the suspension of the 2009 Notice of
    Revocation was disappointing, CBP did not reverse its determination
    that its letter rulings were inconsistent with the Jones Act.
                      after the 2009 notice of revocation
        Three things happened after CBP suspended their 2009 Notice of
    Revocation. First, relying on CBP's promise to act ``in the near
    future,'' OMSA members invested $2 billion in U.S. shipyards to
    construct dozens of the state-of-the-art vessels required to do the
    work covered by the Revocation notice. Not only were these vessels
    built with the latest technology, they also were, obviously, U.S.-
    flagged, and therefore subject to increased safety standards when
    operating in U.S. waters, when compared to foreign-flagged vessels as
    evidenced by the above examples.
        Second, OMSA spent countless hours meeting with CBP and documenting
    violations of the Jones Act that exist under the faulty letter rulings.
        Finally, CBP issued letter rulings which accurately upheld the law.
    Specifically, it issued three rulings referred to as the ``Koff''
    rulings (HQ H 225102) (September 24, 2012); (HQ H235242) (November 15,
    2012); and (HQ H242466) (July 3, 2013). In these rulings, CBP correctly
    enforced the Jones Act, stating that a foreign-flag heavy lift vessel
    could not move merchandise between two points on the U.S. OCS, even
    though the moves made by this vessel were relatively short in distance.
    These rulings were viewed as problematic within the offshore energy
    community for two reasons. First there were not U.S. vessels to conduct
    the operations at issue in the letter rulings. The vessels necessary
    are large, highly specified vessels that conduct very rare but very
    important projects. These projects are so rare that the small fleet of
    vessels that perform these operations need a worldwide steam of
    projects--and heavily government subsidized shipyards--to be
    profitable.
        While the Jones Act community was pleased that these letters
    represented CBP adhering to the statute, those who sought to utilized
    these vessels were not pleased, not only because of the specific
    operations in question--which again happen only rarely--but also
    because the denial of these letter ruling requests represented the
    apparent change in enforcement posture evident in the Koff rulings
    could spill into the countless other areas of projects that happen on a
    daily basis in which CBP had been allowing foreign vessels to engage.
                           2017 notice of revocation
        The ``near future'' promised by the suspension of the 2009
    revocation effort appeared to come on January 18, 2017 with CBP issuing
    another notice of revocation. The 2017 Notice proposed the revocation
    or modification of 25 letter rulings which allow foreign-flagged
    vessels to move energy related merchandise from U.S. ports to locations
    on the U.S. OCS.
        Like the 2009 notice, the 2017 Notice demonstrated remarkable and
    laudable honesty, stating that it had created wholesale exceptions to
    the Jones Act that were not found in the statute. It also stated that
    the CBP-created loopholes were not found in statute and should be
    withdrawn. (See ``Proposed Modification and Revocation of Ruling
    Letters Relating to Customs Application of the Jones Act to the
    Transportation of Certain Merchandise and Equipment between Coastwise
    Points,'' 51 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 3, at 4 (Jan. 18, 2017)) (2017
    Notice).
        OMSA and numerous OMSA members submitted comments in support of the
    2017 Notice. In addition to these comments, 34 U.S. Representatives--
    including half of the members of this Subcommittee--and 10 U.S.
    Senators sent letters in support of CBP's 2017 Notice.
        Despite this second acknowledgement that they were not enforcing
    the laws that Congress had passed and the widespread support this
    Notice received, on May 10, CBP once again made a final decision to
    withdraw their revocation notice stating, ``[b]ased on the many
    substantive comments [it] received,'' it needed ``further research on
    the issue'' and was therefore ``reconsider[ing]'' whether to withdraw
    and/or revoke the letter rulings identified in the 2017 Notice
    (Withdrawal of Proposed Modification and Revocation of Ruling Letters
    Relating to Customs Application of the Jones Act to the Transportation
    of Certain Merchandise and Equipment between Coastwise Points, 51 Cust.
    B. & Dec. No. 19, at 11 (May 10, 2017)).
        This notice and comments from CBP personnel to congressional staff
    are unfortunate because they seem to indicate that CBP's sustained
    acknowledgment that its letter rulings flouting the Jones Act do not
    matter. Further, the comments by CBP imply that the Administration is
    allowed to discuss and study if it wants to comply with the laws passed
    by Congress.
                      after withdrawal of the 2017 notice
        It is clear who benefited from the withdrawal of the 2017 Notice.
    Foreign vessel owners and their trade associations claimed victory. One
    email I received from a London-based trade association for the
    international competitors of OMSA members called it a ``fantastic
    result'' and that everyone should ``celebrate a positive result.''
        OMSA members were not in a celebratory mood. In fact, 12 days after
    CBP withdrew the 2017 Notice, one OMSA member lost a lucrative job to a
    foreign flag vessel. The job in question was work that was covered by
    the revocation notice. The foreign vessel that took this contract was
    able to do so by not complying with the above-described U.S.
    regulations and was able to underbid the OMSA member by 25 percent.
        Again, OMSA attempted to work with CBP and the Administration to
    help them find a way to follow the law. As part of these discussions,
    it became apparent that CBP would not be able to move our issue forward
    until it was able to find a solution to the ``heavy lift'' problem.
        This ``problem'' is the plain reading of the Jones Act and its
    prohibition on foreign-flagged vessels engaging in ``any part'' of the
    transportation of merchandise. Understanding that the U.S. market did
    not have any of these heavy lift vessels because of the factors listed
    above, OMSA worked with members of this committee and Congressional
    leaders, including Chairman DeFazio, Congressman Graves of Louisiana,
    Congressman Garamendi, Congressman Scalise, and Congressman Lowenthal
    to develop a legislative solution.
        We worked with this Committee and these members because OMSA
    understood that if changes to the Jones Act are necessary, Congress
    should enact them. Our solution was based on an existing legislative
    solution that provides market transparency and the ability to utilize
    foreign-flagged heavy lift vessels when there is not a suitable U.S.
    vessel available.
                             2019 revocation effort
        Last month, CBP again issued a revocation notice. (See Customs
    Bulletin (Vol. 53, No. 38, October 23, 2019) ``Proposed modification
    and revocation of ruling letters relating to CBP's application of the
    Jones Act to the transportation of certain merchandise and equipment
    between coastwise points'') (2019 Notice).
        Just as the 2009 and 2017 Notices had before, the 2019 notice again
    confirmed that a number of previously issued letter rulings are not
    consistent with the Jones Act and must be revoked or modified.
        Unfortunately, CBP did not follow the heavy lift solution proposed
    by this Committee and adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives.
    Instead, the 2019 notice revokes the previously mentioned Koff Rulings
    and replaces them with interpretive guidance which will allow for
    foreign-flagged vessels to transport merchandise when engaged in
    lifting operations. This definition does not only cover those very
    specialized and rare operations I mentioned before. Instead, the
    loophole offered by CBP applies to the lifting of any offshore subsea
    merchandise. These are operations that the dozens of U.S. vessels that
    have been built since the 2009 notice conduct on a daily basis--at
    least, those that haven't been idled.
        This definition is also very problematic because it proposes to
    create loopholes in the Jones Act which would allow for foreign-flagged
    vessels to move merchandise on the OCS, provided the foreign-flagged
    vessels claim such movements are necessary for safety or practical
    purposes.
        As previously stated, OMSA and OMSA members view safety as vitally
    important and we stand behind the safety of the U.S.-flagged maritime
    industry. We have doubts that the reasoning CBP adopts will actually
    increase safety; that is, the CBP proposal effectively encourages
    additional lifts of merchandise by multiple vessels, instead of using
    U.S. vessels that can transport from shore and have cranes to lift.
    Moreover, in the statute there is not a safety exemption to the Jones
    Act, and we worry about operators using this flawed reasoning by CBP as
    a pretext to violate the law and use cheap foreign vessels. In
    addition, we agree that heavy lift operations need to happen; for that
    reason we worked with this committee to provide for a legally viable
    way for these operations to happen in a safe and transparent manner.
    And again, the CBP's new loophole covers the work that can and is
    conducted by U.S.-flagged vessels, vessels that when operated in U.S.
    waters adhere to a higher safety standard than their foreign-flagged
    counterparts. If safety is the goal, these U.S.-flagged vessels should
    be utilized.
        For all of the reasons stated above, OMSA will continue to strive
    for increases in safety in our industry and increased Jones Act
    enforcement. We believe these goals will complement each other. We are
    grateful for the support for this mission provided by this Committee
    and we look forward to continuing to work with you on these important
    missions.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee on
    such an important matter. I look forward to your questions.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
        Ms. Stephens, you may proceed.
        Ms. Stephens. Thank you, and thank you, Congressman Young,
    for the kind introduction. It is nice to hear from a fellow
    Alaskan.
        I am here today on behalf of the Passenger Vessel
    Association. It is a trade association representing the owners
    and operators of U.S. Coast Guard inspected vessels. Our
    membership has approximately 1,500 vessels, 600 business owners
    and businesses represented.
        PVA and the industry that we represent has a responsibility
    to be vigilant in addressing safety concerns. An essential
    reason for PVA's existence is to promote safety among its
    members and, indeed, among the operators of passenger vessels.
        To meet this responsibility, PVA develops and offers
    effective training programs and tools that vessel operators can
    easily implement. Some of these tools include preventive
    maintenance and guidance and documents, deckhand training
    manuals, and video training tools on firefighting, lifesaving,
    and other systems.
        PVA has its own safety management system for domestic
    passenger vessels. We call this Flagship. In June of 2017, the
    Coast Guard Director of Inspections and Compliance
    characterized Flagship as a remarkable achievement that meets
    the objectives and functional requirements for an SMS and a
    voluntary program that can be accepted by the Coast Guard. All
    of PVA's safety products can use and benefit smaller businesses
    like me or larger businesses with multiple vessels in their
    fleet.
        PVA interacts with the Coast Guard in a formal body known
    as the Coast Guard PVA Quality Partnership or QP. In our most
    recent QP meeting at Coast Guard headquarters last week, we
    discussed, among other things, what PVA has done to communicate
    safety information to members following the fire on the
    California dive boat, the Conception, who was not a PVA member.
    Over the years, the National Transportation Safety Board has
    made several recommendations to PVA, and we have responded to
    each of those appropriately.
        PVA's efforts to promote safety on passenger vessels depend
    on an engaged, well-trained, and adequately funded Coast Guard
    marine safety workforce. Coast Guard inspectors visit and
    rigorously examine domestic passenger vessels at least once a
    year. Having this direct Coast Guard presence on passenger
    vessels is essential and has successfully promoted safety.
        In the early 2000s as the Coast Guard made security a
    priority, the agency allowed the marine safety function to
    deteriorate. This situation became alarming enough that in
    2007, this committee under the leadership of Chairmen Oberstar
    and Cummings, pressed the Coast Guard to reinvigorate its
    marine safety mission. The result was the Coast Guard's action
    plan entitled ``Enhancing the Coast Guard's Marine Safety
    Program.''
        Are the action plan's objectives being met? Are the goals
    for the number and competence of the marine inspectors being
    satisfied? Some have suggested that the Coast Guard should
    delegate inspection functions of domestic passenger vessels to
    a third-party organization as has been done for towing vessels
    and certain deep draught vessels. PVA adamantly believes that
    this would be a mistake in policy. It would deprive the Coast
    Guard marine safety personnel of the intimate knowledge of the
    domestic passenger fleet.
        Furthermore, third-party organizations do not have the
    expertise regarding domestic passenger vessels. Direct Coast
    Guard inspection of domestic passenger vessels is the best way
    to promote safety.
        In the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993, Congress
    determined that a vessel carrying more than six passengers for
    hire must meet rigorous safety standards and be inspected by
    the Coast Guard at least annually. These requirements exist
    primarily for safety of the paying passengers. They ensure that
    the vessel is constructed properly, that its master and crew
    have the proper documents and training, and that it has the
    appropriate fire protection, communications, and lifesaving
    equipment.
        Far too frequently, persons with full knowledge of Coast
    Guard requirements try to take illegal regulatory shortcuts and
    make a quick buck by using an uninspected vessel to carry more
    than six passengers for hire. This is unlawful and jeopardizes
    the passenger safety.
        In my written statement, you will find details about two
    recent incidences in Florida in which passengers on illegal
    charters died as a result of improper training and inactions by
    the boat crew. The problem of illegal charters has always
    existed, but it seems to have become much worse. It is simple
    to market an illegal charter to any audience on boat-sharing
    websites. This happens all over the country. The Coast Guard
    has recognized the problem and has begun to crack down. PVA
    applauds the Coast Guard, but unfortunately, the temptation for
    people to engage in illegal charters is so compelling that the
    enforcement seems to be a constant game of whack-a-mole for
    them to keep up with.
        Thank you very much for this opportunity to participate in
    the hearing. PVA encourages the subcommittee to stand by the
    statutory and regulatory requirements for safety on vessels
    that carry passengers for hire. Congress can best ensure safety
    on domestic vessels by strongly supporting and adequately
    funding the Coast Guard and marine safety mission. Thank you.
        [Ms. Stephens' prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Colleen Stephens, Vice President, Passenger
                               Vessel Association
                                  introduction
        Good afternoon. I am Colleen Stephens of Valdez, Alaska. My
    company, Stan Stephens Glacier & Wildlife Cruises, operates two 149-
    passenger Coast Guard-inspected sightseeing vessels. We offer multi-
    hour cruises to view glaciers and wildlife in Prince William Sound. We
    have been in business 48 years and carry roughly 18,000 persons each
    year from May to September.
        I testify in my capacity as Vice President of the Passenger Vessel
    Association (PVA). PVA is the national trade association representing
    owners and operators of U.S.-flagged, Coast Guard-inspected passenger-
    carrying vessels of all types, including sightseeing and excursion
    vessels, vehicle-carrying and passenger-only ferries, dinner cruise
    boats, whalewatching vessels, gaming vessels, ``small-ship'' overnight
    cruise vessels, and windjammers. Our members operate approximately
    1,500 vessels. Our total membership is about 600 companies, including
    associate members who are shipyards, engine manufacturers, naval
    architects, marine equipment suppliers, and insurance companies.
                             pva's roots in safety
        PVA and the industry that we represent have a responsibility to be
    ever-vigilant in addressing safety concerns. An essential reason for
    PVA's existence is to promote safety among its members and indeed among
    all operators of domestic passenger vessels. We believe strongly that
    this is a primary mission of our association. To meet this
    responsibility, PVA develops and offers effective training programs and
    tools that vessel operators can easily implement.
        PVA has deep roots in safety. In fact, the association was formed
    nearly 50 years ago around a need to identify reliable sources of
    marine insurance and to work with the Coast Guard on regulatory matters
    and vessel inspection issues.
        In those early days, PVA (then the National Association of
    Passenger Vessel Owners) was made up of a relatively small group of
    individuals who operated primarily on the U.S. Inland River System.
    These operators were industry pioneers, who in many cases fashioned
    their businesses to reflect the romance associated with our country's
    rich riverboat history. While they built their businesses, they also
    recognized the need to expand training to protect passengers and crew.
    As the association grew, its members became more diverse, and PVA
    started attracting other types of vessel operators as members. A prime
    attraction for these new members was their desire access safety
    training tools produced by PVA.
        An essential component of PVA is its Safety, Security and Risk
    Management Committee. The committee's volunteer members have produced
    and released an array of new training tools, manuals and guidelines for
    PVA members to use in company training programs. These include:
          Preventative Maintenance checklists and guidance
    documents;
          Deckhand and Senior Deckhand training manuals;
          PVA/Coast Guard Risk Guide;
          Rail Jumper Guidance;
          Crew Drug Testing tools;
          Video training tools on firefighting, line handling,
    lifesaving equipment, personal safety for crew members, and preventing
    slips, trips, and falls; and
          A white paper focusing on combatting ``slips, trips and
    falls'' aboard passenger vessels.
        More recently, PVA launched an online crew training program to help
    PVA members make their safety and risk management programs and training
    even easier, effective, and more sophisticated.
        Following enactment of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Act of 2010, PVA developed its own Safety Management System (SMS)
    expressly for domestic passenger-carrying vessels. We call it
    ``Flagship.'' In June 2017, the Coast Guard's Director of Inspections
    and Compliance characterized the Flagship SMS as a ``remarkable
    achievement'' and advised PVA that ``Flagship SMS meets the objectives
    and functional requirements for a SMS as per 33 Code of Federal
    Regulation (CFR) Part 96, and this voluntary program can be accepted by
    the Coast Guard as it endeavors to enhance regulatory compliance and
    safety on domestic passenger vessels.''
        All PVA safety products are such that they can be used by and
    benefit smaller vessel operators, such as myself, as well as larger
    organizations with fleets of 20 or more vessels.
        PVA works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and the National
    Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Its relationships with both
    government entities helps to continuously raise the bar on safety. We
    interact with the Coast Guard in many venues, but especially in a
    formal body known as the Coast Guard-PVA Quality Partnership (QP) in
    which leaders of both organizations meet at least twice a year to
    examine pressing issues. At our most recent QP meeting at Coast Guard
    Headquarters last week on November 7, we discussed what PVA has done to
    communicate safety information to members following the fire on the
    California dive boat Conception (not a PVA member). Over the years, the
    NTSB has made several recommendations to PVA, and we have responded
    appropriately to them. For example, PVA has convened two ``summits'' of
    amphibious vehicle operators to discuss best safety practices in this
    segment of the industry.
                   importance of coast guard's safety mission
        PVA's efforts to promote safety by passenger-carrying vessel
    operators depend heavily on an engaged, well-trained, and adequately-
    funded Coast Guard Marine Safety Mission. Coast Guard inspectors visit
    and rigorously examine domestic passenger vessels at least once a year.
    Any detected deficiencies must be corrected. Having this direct Coast
    Guard presence on passenger vessels is essential and has successfully
    promoted safety.
        It is imperative that the Coast Guard safety function be preserved.
    In the early 2000s, as the Coast Guard made security a priority after
    enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the
    agency allowed its Marine Safety function to deteriorate. The situation
    became alarming enough that in 2007 this committee, under the
    leadership of Chairmen Oberstar and Cummings, convened a hearing to
    press the Coast Guard to reinvigorate its marine safety mission. Then-
    Commandant Thad Allen promised corrective action, and the result was
    the action plan entitled Enhancing the Coast Guard's Marine Safety
    Program. After its issuance, things improved. However, PVA encourages
    this Subcommittee to review the objectives of Enhancing the Coast
    Guard's Marine Safety Program. Are they still being met? Specifically,
    are the goals for number of marine inspector billets being filled?
        Occasionally, some have suggested that a response to Coast Guard
    budgetary constraints would be to delegate inspection functions of
    domestic passenger vessels to a third-party organization, as has been
    done for towing vessels and certain deep-sea vessels. PVA adamantly
    believes that this would be a mistaken policy. It would deprive Coast
    Guard marine safety personnel of intimate knowledge of the domestic
    passenger fleet and would ``drive a wedge'' into the current good
    relationship between passenger vessel operators and Coast Guard
    personnel. Furthermore, third-party organizations such as
    classification societies do not have expertise regarding smaller
    passenger vessels that operate on domestic routes. The current
    commitment to direct Coast Guard inspection of domestic passenger
    vessels is the preferable policy and is the best way to promote safety.
                                illegal charters
        Many years ago, Congress determined that a vessel that carries six
    or more passengers ``for hire'' must satisfy numerous and rigorous
    safety standards and that it must be inspected by the Coast Guard at
    least once annually to ensure compliance. The key statute is the
    Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993.
        These requirements exist primarily for the safety of paying
    passengers. A person who purchases a ticket to ride on a compliant
    commercial vessel should be confident that the vessel is constructed
    properly, that its master and crew are properly certified and trained,
    and that it has appropriate fire protection, communications, and
    lifesaving equipment. The annual Coast Guard inspection ensures that
    the vessel meets these requirements.
        Far too frequently, a person with full knowledge of the Coast Guard
    requirement tries to take a regulatory ``short cut'' and make a buck by
    using an uninspected vessel to carry passengers for hire. This is
    illegal and jeopardizes the safety of passengers.
        Last year in Miami, the unlicensed captain of an illegal charter
    vessel killed a paying passenger by losing track of the number of
    swimmers in the water and running the boat over an unaccounted-for
    customer. The Coast Guard had previously issued an order telling the
    vessel owner to cease offering illegal charters. The captain pleaded
    guilty to violating the Seaman's Manslaughter Act and has received a
    prison term.
        In March 2017 off the coast of St. Petersburg, Florida, a swimming
    passenger from an illegally-operated charter vessel carrying 15
    passengers was swept away from the boat. Violating well-understood
    safety rules, an untrained deckhand dived into the sea attempting to
    save the passenger. Both the passenger and the deckhand drowned.
        The problem of illegal charters has always existed, but it seems to
    have become much worse with the proliferation of boat-sharing web
    sites. In the past, the illegal operator had to ``advertise'' locally
    by word of mouth. Now it is simple to market an illegal charter to a
    nationwide audience with a listing on a boat-sharing web site. There
    are many such web sites. The sponsor of the web site doesn't know or
    care whether the vessel is operating legally, and it's virtually
    impossible for the potential customer to tell.
        The Passenger Vessel Association has been ``sounding the alarm''
    about the prevalence of illegal charters to the Coast Guard for several
    years. We are gratified that the Coast Guard, especially in certain
    geographic areas, recognizes the problem and has cracked down. Coast
    Guard units in Chicago, Miami, and elsewhere have undertaken extensive
    education and enforcement actions. Individual illegal charter voyages
    have been halted, owners and captains have been assessed civil fines,
    Captain of the Port orders to cease operations have been issued, and
    now we are beginning to see criminal penalties imposed on repeat
    offenders. PVA applauds the Coast Guard for these actions, but the
    temptation for people to engage in illegal charters is so compelling
    that enforcement often seems to be a game of ``whack-a-mole.''
        PVA encourages this Subcommittee to stand by the statutory and
    regulatory requirements for safety on vessels that carry passenger
    ``for hire'' and to signal to the Coast Guard that enforcement actions
    against operators of vessels that carry passengers illegally should
    remain a high safety priority.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this hearing. An
    essential reason for PVA's existence is to promote safety among its
    members and indeed among all operators of domestic passenger vessels.
    Congress can best support safety on domestic passenger vessels by
    strongly supporting and adequately funding and staffing the existing
    Coast Guard Marine Safety Mission with direct inspection of passenger
    vessels. Combatting the proliferation of illegal passenger vessel
    charters is an important component of that safety mission.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Ms. Stephens.
        Mr. Sterbcow, you may proceed.
        Mr. Sterbcow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Gibbs, and members of the committee. I thank you for the
    opportunity to speak to you from the perspective of an attorney
    who has represented those injured in marine disasters and the
    survivors of those who have been killed in marine disasters for
    32 years.
        My experience and our experience dictates that safety in
    the marine environment is a product of accountability, pure and
    simple. Whether we are talking about a $100 million drill ship
    that sinks in the Gulf of Mexico or a jet ski that is rented at
    the beach, the goal must be to protect people, and that goal is
    only reached by holding those responsible accountable.
        Some examples of the law that applies to these cases that
    is severely lacking, in our opinion, is number one, the Death
    on the High Seas Act. It was passed in 1920. The Death on the
    High Seas Act applies to marine deaths occurring more than 3
    nautical miles from the coast of the United States or any
    Territory. The act limits recovery of damages to economic
    losses and funeral and burial expenses.
        Therefore, in cases where the victim is a child, a retiree,
    or a stay-at-home parent, those survivors who seek redress for
    the death of the decedent are limited to funeral and burial
    expense recovery. There is no accountability. That is not
    protecting people.
        Second, and an example--actually, a recent example of this
    that I would like to point out to you is in August of 2017, you
    may recall that the USS John S. McCain was rammed in the
    Singapore Strait by a freighter. Ten sailors were killed. The
    sailors hailed from New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
    Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, Missouri, and Texas. Unless any of
    these sailors were supporting others economically or had
    economic dependents, their survivors are limited in damage
    recovery to their funeral and burial expenses. There is no
    accountability. There is no protecting people. And in this
    example, we are not protecting our servicepeople.
        A second example of inadequate legislation is what is known
    as the Limitation of Liability Act. Passed first in 1851, the
    act allows a vessel owner to limit its liability in cases of
    personal injury and death to the value of the vessel after the
    catastrophe. The vessel owner actually is the plaintiff in this
    case. The vessel owner files suit and alleges in Federal court
    his or her ability to limit liability growing out of a marine
    disaster to the value of the boat following the casualty.
        One need only look at the Conception to see the inequity,
    the gross inequity of the statute. Thirty-four people burned
    alive in a boat. Within 72 hours and before the Coast Guard had
    completed its investigation, the owner of the Conception filed
    suit in Federal court in California alleging an ability to
    limit its liability to the families of these 34 people to zero
    dollars, the value of the vessel as she sat burned at the
    bottom of the Pacific Ocean. It's unconscionable, there is no
    accountability, and it should change.
        A third example of inadequacy, not so much in maritime law
    but in the maritime setting in terms of protecting people is
    forced arbitration. Forced arbitration in maritime employment
    agreements and in passenger vessel boarding agreements are
    grossly unfair.
        A passenger vessel boarding agreement example that I am
    currently familiar with is a family from Ohio who drives down
    to the Alabama gulf coast for a weeklong beach vacation. They
    decided to take a parasail trip. In order to board the parasail
    vessel, they are required to sign a boarding agreement which
    requires either a complete waiver of liability for any and all
    problems, or alternatively, forced arbitration.
        They go parasailing. The father, the breadwinner of the
    family, suffers a severe injury that has disabled him and
    prevented him from going back to work. So this family is now
    faced with the prospect of either facing a complete waiver of
    liability, or in the alternative, being forced to go to a
    secret arbitration proceeding where there is no accountability,
    and most importantly, their right to seek redress in the State
    or Federal court system and their Seventh Amendment right to a
    jury trial is denied them. No accountability, no protecting
    people, and encourages, frankly, ongoing unsafe practice.
        In conclusion, the Death on the High Seas Act and the
    Limitation of Liability Act are antiquated. Forced arbitration
    in this maritime setting is grossly unfair. The common thread
    among all three is that they all protect the wrongdoer. None of
    them protect the people who are being injured or the survivors
    of those who are killed.
        I stand ready to address any questions and make any
    recommendations on these laws or other areas of the maritime
    legal regime, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you
    today.
        [Mr. Sterbcow's prepared statement follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Paul M. Sterbcow, President, Louisiana
                            Association for Justice
        Chairman DeFazio and members of the subcommittee:
        I am honored to testify today. Thank you for inviting me.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Curriculum Vitae.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am Paul M. Sterbcow. I live in New Orleans, Louisiana with my
    wife, Laurie, and youngest child. I am the Managing Partner of the law
    firm of Lewis, Kullman, Sterbcow & Abramson, LLC in New Orleans. I
    received my Bachelor of Science in Political Science from Tulane
    University, and my law degree from Tulane Law School. I have
    represented injured individuals and the families of persons killed in
    maritime catastrophes for over thirty-two years. I practice primarily
    in federal court in New Orleans and other Gulf Coast cities. I have
    authored over forty-five continuing legal education papers and have
    been published in the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce and the
    Loyola University New Orleans Maritime Law Journal. I was a member of
    the Plaintiff's Steering Committee and co-lead trial attorney in the
    liability trial arising out of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
    subsequent largest oil spill in the history of the United States. The
    incident led to the largest civil litigation in United States History.
        I have been asked to comment on three discreet areas: (1) the Death
    on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.  30301, et seq. (DOHSA); (2) the
    Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.  30501, et seq. (LOLA); and (3)
    Forced Arbitration in cases falling within the Maritime Jurisdiction of
    the United States.
                                    overview
        The founding fathers knew that the United States needed a uniform,
    distinct and strong body of national maritime law if the young
    democracy was to compete and prosper in maritime commerce. As a result,
    Article III of the U.S. Constitution extended the judicial power of the
    United States to ``all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction''
    in order to ensure that maritime law remained federal and consistent
    among the states.\2\ In addition to federal statutes enacted by
    Congress as part of its legislative function, the federal courts have
    exercised this unique constitutional authority to create a body of
    common law applicable to cases within admiralty jurisdiction, generally
    referred to as the ``general maritime law.'' Therefore, admiralty law,
    including maritime personal injury and death, is federal law over which
    Congress can and should exercise its legislative authority.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ U.S. Const. art. III,  2, cl.1.
        \3\ U.S. Const. art. I,  8, cl.18.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Against this background, DOHSA, LOLA and Forced Arbitration have a
    common thread--they arbitrarily, unfairly and without cause deprive
    maritime personal injury and death victims of rights and remedies
    afforded other classes of tort victims. The inequity is compounded by
    the fact that by their very nature, maritime torts, which frequently
    involve unforgiving perils of the sea, typically have severe and long-
    lasting consequences for the victims. Given the significant
    advancements in marine safety systems, procedures and technology,
    combined with the steady and precipitous decline in U.S. commercial
    shipbuilding,\4\ the damage limitations of DOHSA, LOLA and forced
    arbitration are not justifiable. Indeed, DOHSA and LOLA stem from
    antiquated notions of having to protect otherwise ``innocent'' vessel
    owners from calamities at sea occurring out of their control and
    incentivizing shipbuilding. This rationale is demonstrably invalid
    today. Respectfully, these antiquated laws need to be updated to
    reflect the changes and progress in technology and society in our
    constitutional democracy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ In the 1950's, U.S. shipyards built most of the world's fleets.
    Today, America ranks nineteenth in the world in commercial
    shipbuilding, accounting for less than 1% of new construction. See:
    Klein, Aaron, Decline in U.S. Shipbuilding Industry: A Cautionary Tale
    of Foreign Subsides Destroying U.S. Jobs, Emo Transportation Weekly,
    September 1, 2015.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     the death on the high seas act (dohsa)
        Congress passed DOHSA on March 30, 1920. DOHSA created a right to
    sue in court for the death of a spouse, parent, child or dependent
    relative.\5\ The Act applies to a tort occurring on the high seas
    beyond a marine league (three nautical miles) from the shore of any
    state, or the District of Columbia, or the territories or dependencies
    of the United States.\6\ The Federal Courts have defined ``High Seas''
    as including territorial waters of another country as long as the
    disaster site is more than one marine league from United States
    waters.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ 46 U.S.C.  30302 (formerly 46 U.S.C.  761).
        \6\ Id.
        \7\ Motts v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F. 3d 565 (5th Cir. 2000).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DOHSA specifies the remedies available to the survivor Plaintiffs.
    Recovery is limited to `` . . . the pecuniary loss sustained by the
    individuals for whose benefit the action is brought . . . .'' \8\
    ``Pecuniary loss'' includes loss of economic support from the decedent
    and funeral and burial expenses.\9\ The statute contemplates only the
    death of the family breadwinner. The statute as written does not
    provide compensation for the emotional loss of survivors with the one
    limited exception described below. When the decedent is a person not in
    the workforce, such as a retiree, a child or a stay-at-home parent, the
    statute's combination of only providing compensation for loss of
    economic support and not recognizing emotional loss is inadequate and
    unfair. Further, the statute does not provide for pre-death pain and
    suffering of the decedent, another unjustifiable inequity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ 46 U.S.C.  330303 (formerly 46 U.S.C.  762(a))
        \9\ Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1309
    (S.D. Fla. 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress has amended DOHSA only once since 1920. Following the
    crash of TWA Flight 800 in international waters off the New York coast
    on July 17, 1996, the victims of which included a number of high school
    students from Pennsylvania, the statute's unreasonable recovery limits
    understandably became a significant political issue. The families of
    those children correctly persuaded lawmakers that their losses should
    be accorded the same respect as those associated with accidents over
    land. As a result, Congress amended former Sections 761 and 762 of
    DOHSA to limit DOHSA coverage in commercial aviation disasters beyond
    twelve nautical miles from the shore and to add `` . . . compensation
    for non-pecuniary damages for wrongful death of a decedent . . . for
    death resulting ``from a commercial aviation accident . . . .'' ``Non-
    pecuniary damages'' is statutorily defined as ``damages for loss of
    care, comfort and companionship.'' \10\ Therefore, the lone DOHSA
    amendment in the eighty-nine years of the statute's existence extends
    the jurisdictional line from three out to twelve nautical miles from
    shore and affords the survivors of commercial aviation accident victims
    damages for the wrongful death of their loved one, a remedy previously
    unavailable. However, damages for the pre-death pain and suffering of
    the deceased victim remain prohibited.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ 46 U.S.C.  30307.
        \11\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Unfortunately, this limited exception does nothing to address the
    clear inequity caused by DOHSA's recovery limitations in the vast
    majority of deaths covered by DOHSA, those being non-commercial
    aviation accidents occurring on the high seas. I personally know of
    numerous examples of the injustice caused by DOHSA over the years. The
    following are some examples:
    Example #1:
            A current example is a July 4, 2019 helicopter crash in the
            Bahamas that took the life of a prominent West Virginia coal
            producer and six others, including his 25-year-old daughter and
            three of her 25-year-old friends. My firm is privileged to
            represent the families of two of the girls killed when the
            helicopter transporting them from the Bahamas to Florida
            crashed shortly after takeoff in the Atlantic Ocean. The
            families of these beautiful young ladies, one of whom had just
            earned her registered nurse license and the other had scored
            highly on her first MCAT medical school entrance examination,
            may be limited to recovering insured funeral and burial
            expenses if DOHSA's statutory limit on damages is held to
            control their claims. If so, the claims are worthless. If the
            same helicopter accident occurred on land, the families would
            be entitled to damages for the pre-death pain and suffering of
            their daughters, and loss of care, comfort and companionship
            for their daughters' wrongful deaths. The fortuity of the
            incident's location should not control the measure of damages
            and certainly should not cheapen the lives of these girls.
            DOHSA as presently written does just that.
    Example #2:
            Another example is the tragic August 21, 2017 collision between
            the ALNIC MC Liberian-flagged tanker and the U.S.S. John S.
            McCain in the Singapore Straits. The tanker negligently rammed
            into the destroyer and killed ten Navy sailors. While there is
            clear liability on ALNIC's part, DOHSA limits recovery to
            nothing more than funeral and burial expenses for the families
            of any unmarried sailors who were not supporting anyone
            financially. This is a travesty and horribly disrespectful to
            the sailors who gave their lives for their country.

        Unfortunately, there are also numerous instances of otherwise
    meritorious cases that maritime attorneys refuse to accept due to
    DOHSA's injustice. Two examples are:
    Example #1:
            A 61-year-old cruise ship passenger became ill at sea. The
            medical center diagnosed stomach flu. Six days later, while
            still on the cruise, the passenger died of acute pyelonephritis
            \12\ and urinary tract infection. The ship's physician missed
            the obvious diagnosis, and the lack of treatment allowed the
            infection to convert to sepsis. Timely treatment would have
            resulted in a complete recovery. The passenger left behind a
            son with whom she had a very close and loving relationship, but
            who was not dependent on her financially. The case was not
            pursued because DOHSA limited the son's recovery to funeral and
            burial expenses for which his mother had a pre-paid plan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Pyelonephritis is an infection that generally begins in the
    urethra or bladder and spreads to one or both kidneys.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Example #2:
            A 70-year-old physically fit male cruise ship passenger went to
            the ship's doctor complaining of acute left shoulder pain. His
            blood pressure was extremely high. The passenger sat unattended
            in the ship's infirmary for approximately three hours before
            cardiac evaluation and appropriate care was instituted.
            Approximately one hour later, the passenger went into cardiac
            arrest and died on the vessel. Again, the case was rejected by
            the evaluating attorney because DOHSA limited the recovery of
            the decedent's spouse and daughter to funeral and burial
            expenses.

        In summary, if the decedent is unmarried, a minor, a stay-at-home
    parent or a retired parent/grandparent or person who does not support
    others financially, then those left behind are constrained to sue for
    funeral and burial expenses, which in many cases are either pre-paid or
    insured. It is time for DOHSA to fully compensate the survivors for the
    pre-death pain and suffering of their lost loved ones, all economic
    losses resulting from the death, and their own lost care, comfort and
    companionship. Anything less is unjust.
        Recommendation: Amend the Death on the High Seas Act so that all
    decedents have the same remedies, and personal injury and death victims
    on the high seas are treated the same as those on land. Such an
    amendment will necessarily include recovery for economic loss, loss of
    care, comfort and companionship of the survivors, and pre-death pain
    and suffering of the decedent.
                     the limitation of liability act (lola)
        In 1851, Congress enacted a law exonerating an owner of any vessel
    from liability to any person or any loss or damage caused by fire on
    board the vessel unless the fire was caused by the design or neglect of
    the vessel owner.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Formerly 46 U.S.C.  182 (1851).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 1871, this vessel owner liability limitation was extended to
    owners and masters of vessels carrying valuable commodities such as
    precious metals, precious stones, jewelry, china, furs, etc. unless the
    cargo owner provided the master or vessel owner written notice of the
    ``true character and value thereof'' and entered the same information
    on the bill of lading.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Formerly 46 U.S.C.  181 (1871).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The purpose of these laws, which the courts held had to be
    liberally construed in the ship owner's favor, was to encourage ship
    building and protect an otherwise innocent ship owner from catastrophes
    at sea over which the ship owner had no control or ability to prevent.
    America was emerging as a leader in maritime commerce, the exclusive
    method for transporting goods to Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific.
    Although the use of iron instead of wood as the primary material of
    ships' hulls began in the 1830's, this advance was limited primarily to
    war ships. Commercial vessels remained wooden and were therefore more
    vulnerable to fire, weather and cargo damage. Modern vessel design,
    safety and navigational systems, and storm warning systems were not
    imaginable. Congress decided that ship owners needed liability
    protection to ensure their profitability and encourage investment in
    maritime commerce.
        In 1935, Congress expanded these liability limitations. The new law
    limited vessel owner liability in the case of `` . . . any loss,
    damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, manner, or thing, loss,
    damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the
    privity of knowledge'' of the vessel owner.\15\ In such cases, vessel
    owner liability shall not exceed ``the amount or value of the interest
    of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.'' \16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ 46 U.S.C.  30505 (formerly 46 U.S.C.  183(a) (1935)).
        \16\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Article III (federal) courts developed a procedure somewhat
    unique to maritime law to handle LOLA proceedings. The vessel owner
    files a lawsuit as the plaintiff alleging entitlement to exoneration
    or, alternatively, limitation of liability per LOLA. Any personal
    injury or death claims arising out of the catastrophe forming the basis
    of the LOLA proceeding must then be filed into the pending LOLA
    lawsuit, which actions are immediately stayed. This becomes a concursus
    \17\ proceeding, whereby the federal judge having exclusive
    jurisdiction decides whether the vessel owner is exonerated (i.e., did
    not cause injury or death). If the court finds fault (i.e., denies
    exoneration), then the judge decides whether the owner can limit its
    liability to the value of the vessel and pending freight based on the
    privity or knowledge statutory test. If the incident occurred without
    the owner's privity or knowledge, then the owner's damages exposure is
    limited to the vessel's post-accident value, regardless of the severity
    of the catastrophe or the number of injuries or deaths involved. Like
    its predecessor limitation statutes, section 30505 was intended to
    encourage ship building and induce capital investment in the marine
    industry. As one court stated, the section, providing for limited
    liability of vessel owners, was designed to induce the heavy financial
    commitments the shipping industry requires by mitigating threat of a
    multitude of suits and hazards of vast unlimited liability as the
    result of maritime disaster.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Concursus is a procedural method staying legal proceedings in
    a LOLA action after the ship owner's limitation fund has been created.
    The primary purpose of the concursus is to avoid a multiplicity of
    suits and actions. It contemplates a proceeding leading to a single
    judgment that resolves all issues between all parties.
        \18\ Petition of Wood, 124 F. Supp. 540 (D.C.N.Y. 1954).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While requiring multiple claimants to file claims against a vessel
    owner for a marine disaster in one proceeding is laudable, the
    limitation of the vessel owner's liability to the value of the vessel
    and freight pending can no longer be justified. Encouragement of
    investment in ship building should no longer be accomplished on the
    backs of victims of maritime torts. In the age of international
    corporate vessel ownership, marine insurance, contractual claim
    limitation, and technology that provides ship owners the ability to
    retain complete operational control over vessels at sea, it is patently
    unfair to penalize those injured and the families of those killed in
    shipboard catastrophes. Every blue water commercial vessel operating in
    international waters can be tracked in real time.\19\ Direct shore to
    ship communication is easy and occurs in real time. Navigational
    technology allows ship operation in virtually any environmental
    condition without the risk of encountering an unknown hazard or
    situation out of the vessel owner's control. There is no reason to
    allow the owner to limit its liability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ GPS tracking systems allow vessel owners to track and control
    any vessel, regardless of size or geographical scope of navigation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is particularly true with respect to coastal trade and
    hydrocarbon exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico. In
    Louisiana, the center of the offshore exploration and production
    industry, limitation of liability is regularly sought by owners of
    inland tugs, river push boats and oilfield supply boats that neither
    venture into open water nor travel more than 100 miles from the coast.
    It is even more ludicrous that the owners of pleasure boats and jet
    skis, both deemed vessels for purposes of LOLA, can attempt to limit
    their liability to the value of the boat or jet ski and force the
    victim to participate in the concursus proceeding with the potential of
    no recovery. The proceeding prevents the marine personal injury or
    death victim from pursuing a lawsuit in a court of competent
    jurisdiction until such time that the concursus is completed and the
    judge lifts the standard limitation stay order.\20\ The delay is often
    lengthy and is unnecessary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ In a single claimant limitation proceeding (i.e., when only
    one person is hurt or killed), the claimant is more apt to obtain a
    lift of the stay order early in the proceeding. However, if there are
    more than one claimant (including property damage and insurance
    indemnity claimants) then all must agree on a stipulation as a
    prerequisite to lift the stay order. This occurs very rarely.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moreover, because of draconian limitation periods built into the
    law, ship owners attempt to misuse the statute to deprive victims of
    remedies by defaulting them, without appropriate due process. If
    victims do not file claims within a short time period (ranging from 60
    to 120 days), they could forever be barred from seeking any
    compensation--even if the LOLA action is frivolous and the owners have
    no factual basis to achieve limitation or exoneration. Often federal
    courts allow notice to victims, which is intended to inform victims of
    their rights and requirements to file a claim, to be posted in
    classified sections of obscure local newspapers. In instances of
    tragedies where families have lost loved ones to a maritime disaster
    (examples below), families often are in a state of shock and just
    beginning the mourning process in these early days. Yet, under the
    current law, they may lose all their rights and remedies if they do not
    take the necessary legal steps within a short period of time.
        Some examples of maritime disasters that prompted ship owners to
    hastily seek protection under LOLA are:
    Example #1:
            A current and compelling example of the extreme injustice of
            LOLA is the disaster involving the 75-foot commercial diving
            vessel Conception. On September 2, 2019, at 3:14 a.m., the U.S.
            Coast Guard received a distress call from the vessel, anchored
            215 nautical miles south-southwest of Santa Barbara,
            California. Thirty-nine people were on board for a three-day
            diving trip. A crew member awoke to a fire aboard the vessel.
            Although the crew saved themselves, thirty-three passengers
            burned to death because they were unable to escape. The vessel
            burned to the waterline and sank in sixty feet of water.

            Three days later, while bodies were still being recovered by
            the Coast Guard, the owners of the Conception filed a Petition
            for Exoneration and/or Limitation under LOLA in federal court
            in the Central District of California.\21\ The owner
            specifically pled the right to be exonerated from all liability
            or, if they are found to be negligent, to limit their exposure
            to the value of the vessel after the casualty, which is $0.00.
            Now the families of the thirty-three victims must act hastily
            in order to deal with the limitation concursus and the owner's
            quest to limit its liability to nothing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ In the Matter of the Complaint of Truth Aquatics, Inc., 2:19-
    cv-07693-PA-MRW (C.D. Ca. Sept. 5, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Example #2:
            A second prominent example of LOLA's unfairness is the Missouri
            duck boat catastrophe. In July 2018, seventeen people were
            killed, including nine members of the same family, when a duck
            boat sank in bad weather on a lake near Branson, Missouri. The
            voyage should never have occurred, as the duck boat owner had
            ample warnings of approaching severe weather. Duck boats are
            not the safest means of maritime transport under the best of
            conditions. Here, the vessel was unable to handle the seas and
            quickly sank. Passengers might have survived, but they became
            entrapped in the duck boat's canopy, which the vessel owner had
            not removed in direct violation of an NTSB recommendation.

            The duck boat owner's use of LOLA is a ridiculous contortion of
            the law that should not be allowed as a means to escape legal
            responsibility. This duck boat owner was in direct and constant
            communication with the crew operating this vessel. Anyone with
            an operating marine radio, television or even a cell phone
            could have obtained real time weather and lake conditions. The
            fact is this disaster was easily foreseeable and readily
            preventable. Yet, the vessel owner has used LOLA to try to
            limit its liability to the families of seventeen drowned
            passengers to $0.00.
    Example #3:
            The most notorious example of the inequity created by LOLA is
            the Deepwater Horizon disaster. On April 20, 2010, the
            Deepwater Horizon drilling vessel exploded in the Gulf of
            Mexico approximately fifty miles south of the mouth of the
            Mississippi River after the crew lost control of the well. The
            steady flow of hydrocarbons feeding the fire prevented it from
            being extinguished. This resulted in the vessel sinking 5,000
            feet to the Gulf of Mexico floor two days after the
            explosion.\22\ This catastrophe caused eleven deaths, numerous
            severe injuries to the rest of the 126 people aboard the
            vessel, and billions of dollars in environmental damage. Yet,
            Transocean, the owner of the drilling vessel, sought protection
            under LOLA by filing a complaint for exoneration for limitation
            in federal court in Houston, Texas. Transocean claimed that the
            catastrophe occurred without the privity or knowledge of
            Transocean management. As a result, it claimed entitlement to
            limit its liability for all legal claims arising out of the
            explosion, vessel sinking and subsequent massive oil spill to
            approximately $27 million, the calculated salvage value of the
            Deepwater Horizon and her pending freight as she sat at the
            bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ This incident resulted in the largest pollution event in the
    history of the United States. The owner of the well, BP, was found
    grossly negligent by the federal judge handling the multidistrict
    litigation and has paid over $60 billion in damages.

        The fact that the owners of the Conception, the duck boat, and
    Transocean as owner of the Deepwater Horizon were legally able to take
    this step is unconscionable. The limitation funds could not adequately
    compensate the families of the people killed (recall two of the three
    are $0.00), much less the hundreds of thousands of other claims for
    damages in the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
        Ship owners will undoubtedly argue that elimination of their
    ability to pursue liability limitation will somehow put them out of
    business. There is no data or credible study to support this argument.
    Additionally, marine insurance is readily available. Indeed, LOLA is
    now being used to protect the marine insurance industry, not the ship
    owner, by allowing insurance companies to avoid their contractual
    responsibilities and risk. The truth is that a pre-Civil War law,
    designed to encourage shipbuilding in the United States, has turned
    into a tool to safeguard the bottom line of insurance companies at the
    expense of marine personal injury and death victims. This was never
    intended by Congress, nor should it be.
        The concerns of the marine industry regarding multiple suits in
    multiple jurisdictions arising out of a marine accident are valid. LOLA
    can still be used as a jurisdictional vehicle to consolidate all
    potential claims in one place to allow the ship owner to fully assess
    the severity of the disaster and potential financial exposure. However,
    there is no longer any social or economic justification to limit a ship
    owner's liability. Ship owners have extensive means to monitor and
    control the condition of the vessel at the outset of the voyage as well
    as her movements and crew conduct throughout the voyage. The extent of
    recovery for injury and death in these situations should not be
    dependent on an owner's privity or knowledge and should not be more
    restrictive than recovery afforded for land-based personal injury and
    death. Persons injured or killed in a boat accident should not have a
    more limited recovery than persons injured or killed in a train or
    commercial trucking accident. There is no principled reason to treat
    marine personal injury and death victims differently, particularly when
    Congress' motive for enacting the laws in the 1800's and 1935 no longer
    exist.
        Recommendation: Amend the Limitation of Liability Act to remove the
    vessel owner's ability to limit its liability to the vessel's value in
    cases of personal injury or death to passengers and crew.
                               forced arbitration
        The gross inequities of forced arbitration are well documented and
    publicized. Indeed, they were subject to much discussion and debate in
    the U.S. House of Representatives, which discussion resulted in passage
    of the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (``FAIR Act''). Although
    passage of the FAIR Act by the House addresses arbitration clauses in
    employment agreements, until the bill is passed by the U.S. Senate,
    maritime employees and others continue to be subject to forced
    arbitration. Some recent examples of forced arbitration in the maritime
    context are:
    Example #1:
            An American crewmember was working aboard a foreign-flagged
            cruise ship. During a voyage, the crewmember fell down a flight
            of steps injuring her shoulders, neck and back. Despite having
            a broken shoulder as well as other serious injuries, she was
            kept on the ship working for twenty-three days. After initially
            approving payment for her medical expenses, the cruise line
            mismanaged her benefits, which resulted in lengthy delays in
            her care and recommended surgeries. The delays resulted in her
            developing psychological issues, including documented anxiety
            and depression, due to the stress caused by her medical and
            financial issues. Her medical condition has continued to
            deteriorate, and she still has outstanding medical needs that
            require attention.

            Her employment agreement with the cruise line incorporates a
            Collective Bargaining Agreement (``CBA'') with the Norwegian
            Seaman's Union. She is not a member of this Union and has no
            voting or other rights provided to Union members. The CBA
            mandates binding arbitration in accordance with the laws of the
            Bahamas, ``notwithstanding any statutory claims for negligence,
            unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, failure to provide prompt
            proper or adequate medical care, personal injury, or property
            damages which might be available under the laws of any
            jurisdiction.'' Bahamian law does not provide the equivalent or
            anything close to the legal rights she would have under U.S.
            law. Expert testimony from Bahamian lawyers supports this
            conclusion. Moreover, the arbitration may take place overseas
            depending on whether the parties can agree on a location. As
            such, the U.S. crewmember is left at home to suffer while she
            undergoes a forced arbitration process, potentially on foreign
            soil, applying foreign law that deprives her of rights and
            remedies afforded a U.S. citizen. No U.S. citizen should be
            forced to suffer this type of mistreatment and humiliation
            without the protection of U.S. law, regardless of the
            circumstances of their employment.
    Example #2:
            A family traveled to the Gulf Coast for a beach vacation. They
            decided to go parasailing. The vessel owner required all
            parasailers to sign a ``Release of Liability, Assumption of
            Risk, Waiver of Claims, Indemnification and Binding Arbitration
            Agreement'' as a condition of boarding the vessel.

            According to the Complaint filed on the family's behalf, at the
            end of the ride, the father, who is the family breadwinner, was
            pulled into a winch positioned on the vessel stern that is used
            to play out and reel in the parasail. He suffered a severe
            pelvic fracture that required hip replacement surgery. He has
            remained out of work since the incident and may be physically
            foreclosed from returning to his job with a local gas company.

            If the binding arbitration language in the Release of Liability
            form is enforced, this family has no right to file a lawsuit
            against the vessel owner or obtain a trial by jury as is
            guaranteed by the 7th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As if
            this was not bad enough, the vessel owner in this case has also
            filed a Petition for Exoneration from or limitation of
            liability, claiming that its liability to this family should be
            limited to $86,000.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ In the matter of Fruisher, LLC, et. al., 1:19-cv-00618 (S.D.
    Ala. Sept. 6, 2019).

        Therefore, a person alleging severe injury through no fault of his
    own while on vacation at the beach is now subject to (1) forced
    secretive arbitration that deprives him of his right to seek redress in
    court; and (2) a LOLA concursus proceeding described herein and a
    potential recovery limit of $86,000 in a case that may reasonably be
    worth a far greater amount if justice is to be achieved.
        Recommendation: Adopt a clear and concise statute ending forced
    arbitration for all maritime employees and vessel passengers who are
    U.S. citizens.
                                   conclusion
        As has been shown, there has been no meaningful attempt to update
    federal statutory maritime law to ensure justice for passengers and
    crew members injured and killed on the high seas in a century. The last
    meaningful change to limitation of liability occurred in 1935, and it
    came to the detriment of those injured and killed in maritime
    catastrophes. The laws are antiquated. They do not promote
    accountability, which we know encourages safety and reduces injury and
    death. Further, commercial and recreational vessel owners now have
    insurance to adequately cover their risk, much of which further
    accountability will reduce or eliminate. Respectfully, Congress should
    act now to modernize DOHSA and LOLA and end the use of forced
    arbitration clauses in maritime recreational agreements and employment
    contracts. These steps will improve the current system, which
    arbitrarily, unfairly and without cause deprives maritime personal
    injury and death victims of rights and remedies afforded to other
    classes of tort victims.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Sterbcow.
        We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
    be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
    myself.
        Mr. Sterbcow, in relation to the Conception tragedy off the
    coast of my district, how does accountability improve overall
    maritime safety?
        Mr. Sterbcow. Well, it just--really, it extends beyond the
    maritime setting. It is particularly important in the maritime
    setting because there is no incentive on the part of vessel
    owners and operators to ensure that their vessels are safe,
    they are staunch, they are seaworthy unless there are
    consequences in the event that they set sail, and there are
    not.
        Accountability breeds attention to detail. Accountability
    breeds compliance with rules and regulations. We have heard a
    lot today from the Coast Guard, from the NTSB, from these
    various organizations who all do good work and have done good
    work for a long time.
        The problem is that despite this good work, we repeatedly
    see one maritime disaster after another, and the problem is
    that at the end of the day, if the vessel owner knows,
    regardless of the severity of the catastrophe, it could either
    limit its liability or walk away with no liability, then there
    is really no incentive at the end of the day to ensure that
    these vessels are fit for their intended purpose.
        Mr. Carbajal. It seems to me that the Limitation of
    Liability Act is no longer relevant to today's maritime
    industry given the advances in technology and changes in the
    ability of insurance and the corporate structure. It has
    outlived its purpose. Would you agree?
        Mr. Sterbcow. I totally agree. It was originally enacted in
    1851 when we were a fledgling country trying to compete in
    maritime exercises with European powers, at a time when boats
    were wooden, cargo was routinely ruined, and boats caught fire
    and sank in a matter of minutes. There was no modern
    communication. There was no ability of a vessel owner to
    control his ship once it left port.
        All of those considerations are now gone. Vessel owners can
    call ships regardless of their location in the world by cell
    phone just as you and I would talk by cell phone in Washington,
    DC. We track ships in real-time. We know exactly where they
    are. We know exactly where they are going. Crews are much
    better trained. They have safety management systems.
        The notion that there is an innocent vessel owner who needs
    to be protected from perils out of his control has long since
    passed, and all the Limitation of Liability Act does now in
    addition to eliminating accountability is it limits the
    liability of the marine insurer because none of these boats
    leave port without insurance. So what you are really doing is
    protecting the insurance industry and not the people riding the
    vessels.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. How do you propose we fix the law?
        Mr. Sterbcow. Limitation of liability is simple. It can be
    amended to eliminate the ability to limit liability in cases of
    injury or death. Very simple fix. You remove the problem, you
    increase the accountability.
        In terms of the Death on the High Seas Act, my
    recommendation would be to extend damages to include the
    preterminal pain and suffering of the person who unfortunately
    is the victim of a marine disaster and extend to the survivors
    the right to sue for what we typically call wrongful death
    damages.
        Those are damages for--say, if a child is killed, the
    parents of that child cannot sue at this point for their
    losses, for their emotional distress, loss of care, comfort,
    and companionship. Those, the parents, and the survivors of
    decedents in this situation should be permitted to recover
    those damages.
        And, by the way, there is precedent for this. In 1996,
    Congress carved out what is called the commercial aviation
    exception to the Death on the High Seas Act following the TWA
    800 disaster. If you remember, it went into the Atlantic Ocean
    off the coast of Long Island, and a group of students from
    Pennsylvania were killed.
        And when their parents learned that their recovery in that
    case was limited to funeral and burial expenses, it created a
    situation that ultimately made its way to Congress which
    ultimately led to what is called the commercial aviation
    exception which allows parents to recover their damages for the
    loss of a child in the limited case of a commercial aviation
    disaster more than 12 miles off the coast.
        My fix is very simple. Extend that to all disasters falling
    under DOHSA. There is no reason to treat a plane disaster
    different than a boat disaster, and after all, the vast
    majority of these cases involve vessels and not airplanes.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much for that thorough answer.
    Now I would like to recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith, in your written testimony, you talk about the
    safety of U.S.-flagged vessels carrying a higher standard of
    safety and security than foreign-flagged vessels, and you go on
    to say that if we fully enforce the Jones Act, that would
    enhance that but as it relates to we are not enforcing offshore
    energy, offshore energy. Can you expound on that and explain
    what is really going on so I can understand that better?
        Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. Starting in 1976, Customs and Border
    Protection started issuing kind of private correspondence to
    charters. They would request a determination if a certain
    activity violated the Jones Act or not. CBP would respond with
    a letter saying yes, it did, yes, it did not. In approximately
    160 of these letter rulings of customs provided basically
    loopholes to the Jones Act that are not found in the statute.
        These were concepts based on well, the vessel was only
    moving a small amount of cargo, or it was only moving cargo a
    small distance. Therefore, we should--or they were doing
    something legal, so they should also be able to do something
    illegal simultaneously.
        None of that--as I said, none of these exceptions are found
    in law. That is something that, as I said in my testimony, CBP
    has recognized three times now and has tried to revoke those
    letter rulings, has tried to close those loopholes two times.
    After announcing their intention to do so, they have
    backtracked and said no, we are not going to do that at this
    time.
        In fact, in 2009, when they retracted that, they said we
    will get back to this in the near future. In 2017, they said we
    received a lot of emails, so we need to study this. I didn't
    know you could not enforce a law because you got a lot of
    emails. I am sure that would change how your office operates,
    sir. So they have now again said we want to correctly enforce
    the law.
        Unfortunately, in doing so, they have also issued some new
    definitions which we believe create new loopholes to replace
    the old loopholes they are trying to close. That is probably
    not the best of situations.
        Mr. Gibbs. I would also, I guess, like to kind of follow up
    with the idea. I know LNG was exporting LNG, now largest
    producer in the world of natural gas and oil, and my
    understanding is because we pick up LNG shipments in the gulf
    area, and then they export to other countries, but to get LNG
    in needed areas of the country like our New England area, for
    example, they had to get it from foreign.
        What can we do to adjust or fix it? How do we handle that
    so Americans can burn LNG natural gas, the domestically
    produced LNG natural gas?
        Mr. Smith. Sure. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member
    Gibbs. The American maritime industry is willing to meet any
    challenge, and in fact, what we are best at is overbuilding a
    market.
        If you give us the signals that a market will be protected,
    we are probably going to build too many ships for it. And with
    the signals now that LNG is going to be protected by this
    administration, what we are seeing is even the European trade
    magazines are already saying that there is going to be U.S. LNG
    capacity.
        One of my members just launched an ATB, an articulated tug
    and barge, to transport LNG, and I know that they can take that
    design and are taking that design to produce more of those so
    we can have that.
        It is my understanding--although this isn't necessarily
    exactly what we do on a day-to-day basis, but it is my
    understanding that we are right now basically at the export
    of--there is no extra capacity in the export terminals. Once
    there is, we will have the vessels capable to carry that.
        Mr. Gibbs. That is good to know, because it just makes so
    much sense to do that, plus our U.S.-flagged vessels would be
    safer, probably, theoretically, anyway, than other ones
    especially carrying LNG.
        So glad to hear that because I think that makes a lot of
    sense, and we need to do that and open up the market because we
    need to move as much as we can out of the Permian Basin in
    Texas and of course the Dakotas and also produce a lot of
    natural gas in Ohio and Pennsylvania. So it would be great to
    be able to export as much as we can on American vessels. I am
    glad to hear that.
        Mr. Smith. Completely agree, Ranking Member Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Representative Gibbs.
        I think that pretty much concludes our hearing.
        Are there any further questions from members of the
    subcommittee?
        Seeing none, I would like to thank each of the witnesses
    for your testimony today. Your contributions to today's
    discussion have been informative and helpful.
        I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
    remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
    answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
    writing and unanimous consent that the record remain open for
    15 days for any additional comments and information submitted
    by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's
    hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
        If no other Member has anything to add, the subcommittee
    stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                           Submissions for the Record

                                  ----------

           Letter of November 14, 2019, from Hon. Doris O. Matsui, a
    Representative in Congress from the State of California, Submitted for
                           the Record by Hon. Larsen
                                                     November 14, 2019.
    Hon. Peter DeFazio
    Chairman
    House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. U.S. House of
            Representatives, Washington, DC.
        Dear Chairman DeFazio:
        I would like to request that the testimony submitted by the
    International Cruise Victims Association (ICV) on November 13th, 2019
    be included as part of the official record for the Transportation and
    Infrastructure's November 14th hearing entitled ``Commercial and
    Passenger Vessel Safety: Challenges and Opportunities.''
        As the original sponsor of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety
    Act (CVSSA) (P.L. 111-207), which was signed into law in 2010, I have a
    particular interest in these issues and am committed to continue the
    work of protecting passengers and victims of crime on cruise ships.
        Despite this success 10 years ago, it is clear that additional work
    is needed to implement safeguards that protect families and provide
    information to consumers in an open, accessible, and transparent manner
    before they ever board a cruise ship. Last Congress, I introduced
    follow-up legislation, the Cruise Passenger Protection Act (CPPA) to
    address shortcomings in reporting requirements, medical standards, and
    legal protections for victims. It is time for Congress to act to see
    that the law is implemented and carried out as we originally intended
    and that additional protections are secured to provide for the security
    and well-being of all cruise passengers.
        Today I have introduced an updated version of the Cruise Passenger
    Protection Act for the 116th Congress to bring attention to this issue
    just ahead of the 10th anniversary of House passage of the CVSSA. I
    look forward to working with ICV and this Committee to advance our bill
    and ensure these vital consumer protections become law.
            Sincerely,
                                                Doris O. Matsui
                                                     Member of Congress

     Statement on behalf of the International Cruise Victims Association,
                    Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
        Thank you Chairman Maloney and Chairman DeFazio, and thank you
    Ranking Members Bob Gibbs and Sam Graves. Thank you also to all
    distinguished members of this committee for allowing us to submit this
    statement.
        As long-time volunteer members of the victims advocacy organization
    known around the world as the International Cruise Victims Association
    (ICV), we are grateful for the opportunity to submit this statement on
    behalf of all those who have experienced trauma, tragedy or
    victimization while onboard a cruise ship. And we especially submit
    this in the memory of all those whom we have loved and lost while on
    what they hoped and dreamed would be their vacation of a lifetime.
        In 2006 four families, each having lost loved ones while on cruise
    vacations, banded together. With a common and dedicated goal to improve
    safety and increase the rights of cruise ship passengers the
    International Cruise Victims Association (ICV) was formed. Today, that
    grass-roots organization with its modest beginning has become the major
    voice for victims of crime at sea around the world. With an all-
    volunteer, unpaid staff and a history of highlighting the need for
    legislative action, increased passenger protection, and public
    awareness, ICV's membership has grown to include several hundred
    members in over 25 countries around the world.
        In 2010, ICV's efforts were rewarded when Congress passed the
    historic Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), which was first
    introduced in the House by Representatives Doris Matsui and Judge Ted
    Poe. Such bi-partisan support was subsequently echoed in the Senate
    when Senator John Kerry introduced the companion bill which passed
    unanimously. With the passing of that bill, our nation saw for the
    first time, a dedication and commitment to the safety and security of
    millions of vulnerable cruise ship passengers. However, despite this
    carefully crafted bill, safety and health incidents continue to happen
    on cruise ships. An appalling percentage of crimes are going
    unreported, and cruise ship compliance is uncertain. These concerns,
    together with tremendous advances in technology (marine and otherwise),
    stand to open the door for the strengthening, improving, and updating
    of the measures previously signed into law almost ten years ago.
        As cruise ships increase in size, so does the cruise ship
    industry's stream of revenue creating an environment where industry
    profit and its marketing emphasis on fun might be on the upswing but
    concern over people and safety has a lot of catching up to do.
    Circumstances and incidents, some of which we will highlight here in
    this statement, have exposed the fact that even with the CVSSA in
    place, cruise passengers remain vulnerable. In truth, the calculated
    disregard for passenger safety makes a mockery of the cruise lines'
    all-too-frequent public declaration that ``passenger safety is our
    number one priority.'' The inherent dangers that still exist for
    Americans who are considering a cruise vacation compel us to press
    forward with renewed commitment to stronger language that not only
    reinforces the CVSSA but adds additional protections as well.
        As a victims' advocacy organization, we hear tragic, heartbreaking
    stories nearly every week. What makes this unique is the fact that the
    stories aren't coming from police logs, or the newspaper headlines.
    Instead, they are coming from people who were taking the vacation of a
    life time until quite suddenly, when they least expected it, something
    went terribly wrong.
        We are always touched and amazed by the members of ICV who have
    been courageous and determined enough to share their stories, even the
    families of minors who have been affected, so that the real truth
    behind the cruise industry's glamorous ads and the constant claims that
    safety is their number one concern might be uncovered. Again and again,
    since 2006, we have gathered all the courage anyone could muster to
    walk the halls of Congress equipped only with our tragic stories in an
    effort to gain support for legislation. Many times we have been
    uplifted by members and their staff who, though shocked and saddened,
    have encouraged us by telling us to go back and tell our grassroots
    organization that we are doing the right thing by coming to
    Washington--that in America, this is how things get done.
        Still, as we have traveled and lectured around the world, we find
    that one of the most commonly asked questions we receive is, ``What
    could possibly go wrong on a cruise?'' So, today we submit to you a few
    abbreviated stories from some of our victims, each representing a
    different scenario of what could and does go wrong in hopes that it
    presents a clearer picture of how powerful they are to hear, yet
    difficult to tell and relive over and over again.
        In 2004, a 43 year old divorced mother of one, and daughter of Ken,
    one of the original four ICV founders, decides to take a cruise
    vacation to Alaska while her teen-aged daughter is visiting her father
    in England. After two days onboard, her cabin steward notices that her
    room has not been disturbed or slept in and reports his concern to his
    staff supervisor who downplays the situation as a possible ship-board
    romance. When her room remains the same for several more days, the
    steward again goes to his supervisor to report her as missing. The
    supervisor tells him to ``forget it.'' But when there was no sign of
    the woman by the time the voyage was to end, the steward asked his boss
    what he should do with her personal items. He was told to put them in a
    bag and lock them in a storage closet. He did what he was told to do,
    put the unclaimed items in a closet where they remained until the
    cruise line later discarded them. No one . . . no law enforcement, no
    family was notified that she was missing, no search was conducted, no
    announcement was made, no attention was paid. The woman and her baggage
    simply disappeared.
        Meanwhile, her daughter back in England, having no idea her mother
    had taken a cruise, kept trying to reach her at home but couldn't get
    an answer. With growing concern she called her maternal grandfather
    Ken, in Arizona, to see if he knew where she was. He did not. But he
    did contact the authorities in his daughter's hometown of Boston who
    entered her apartment and searched her belongings, eventually
    discovering a cruise ticket purchase for a voyage during the dates the
    woman went missing. The cruise line was contacted and their records
    revealed that she had gotten on the cruise ship but had never gotten
    off. The authorities in Boston ordered the ship to notify the
    authorities in Vancouver where the cruise ended so that they could
    investigate this as a missing person report. They did not. Instead, a
    week later the cruise lines notified the FBI, who by this time refused
    to open a case claiming they did not have jurisdictional authority to
    do so. This left the woman's family with no choice but to hire an
    attorney who then hired a private investigator who finally found the
    only person who ever saw the woman on the cruise, her cabin steward who
    kindly offered everything he knew which is all included in the
    statements above. The family asked for surveillance video but they were
    told they were too late, there was none by that point, and that if
    there had been they would not be able to share it with them for
    security reasons. Months later, as their personal costs, frustration
    and tears were mounting by the day, during a deposition, the family
    discovered the beginning of many lies and cover ups. There had been
    video when they requested it but it had not been shared with them and
    three months later it was destroyed by the cruise line. Now they were
    lost, there was no evidence, no case and no authority to care what
    happens to this family or their loved one Merrian. No one who knew the
    process or was willing to tackle this extreme consolidation of wealth
    and power with its nearly total freedom from a strong governmental
    hand--the cruise industry. Thus began ICV.
        The second tragic story involves Georgia, who is also one of the
    senior vice presidents of ICV. Georgia and her family became victims of
    one of the worst cruise ship disasters of recent history. On January
    13, 2012, the Costa Concordia Cruise ship crashed and nearly sunk in
    Italy. 32 people paid the ultimate price of losing their lives, and
    thousands of other passengers suffered with pain, fear, and emotional
    as well as physical traumas. The Costa Concordia disaster was
    especially difficult for her family, as they had been long time
    cruisers, and were devastated by the way they were treated by the
    cruise lines.
        ``It has been almost 8 years and we still have not been adequately
    compensated for the damages we suffered,'' Georgia explains, but ``more
    important than compensation for us though, is the need for the cruise
    line to take responsibility for their actions, to be transparent, and
    willing to put safety for their passengers at the forefront which they
    have refused to do.''
        Few tragedies in life are more devastating than the loss of a
    child. For many of us, it is difficult to imagine anything worse. But
    the unimaginable becomes the harshest reality for those whose children
    are lost due to the negligence of a ``trusted'' corporation;
    specifically a global one touting a business model that ``supports
    policies and practices that foster a safe, secure, healthy and
    sustainable environment.'' This is the story of Ashley. Her mother
    Jamie has served as president of ICV since 2007. She is also an
    ordained transitional Deacon in the Episcopal Church and will be
    ordained to the priesthood in January of 2020. But what precipitated
    her calling to the priesthood was the tragic loss of her only daughter
    Ashley Barnett on October 15, 2005. Ashely took a 3-day cruise from
    Long Beach, California down to Ensenada, Mexico with her boyfriend and
    several of his friends, six days before her 25th birthday. Less than
    24-hours later, she was dead. Her boyfriend, who was a recovering drug
    addict somehow managed to smuggle illegally obtained liquid methadone
    onto the ship in an emptied out bottle of Dayquil. And somehow, that
    methadone made its way into a non-drug using, adamantly and profoundly
    opposed to drugs of any kind, young lady's system. Having both
    anecdotal and scientific proof that she was not a drug user, the
    question of how this got into her system is of extreme interest and
    importance.
        Ashley and her boyfriend had an argument the first night of the
    cruise. He left her in their cabin and when he returned, she was
    asleep. He got into bed beside her. The next morning he got up and she
    was still sleeping according to his report. He left the cabin to meet
    up with his friends and plan the day, again according to his story.
    When he returned he found he couldn't wake her up and began to scream
    out into the hallway for help. A volunteer fireman rushed in and began
    CPR on Ashley. It is important to note that the fireman's story, quite
    different from that of the cruise lines, says that Ashley was viable,
    warm and with a slight, faint pulse at the time a nurse finally
    arrived, empty-handed from her office one flight directly below their
    cabin. She took over the resuscitation efforts and called for the
    doctor to come. When he got there they began to perform a few albeit
    unsuccessful life saving measures but none of the ones you would expect
    in a land based hospital, especially when the patient is suspected of
    having ingested methadone which her boyfriend finally admits is
    missing. No Narcan is administered, no line is put in, and over 20
    minutes go by before a defibrillator arrives. By this time, it is too
    late. She is pronounced dead.
        ``Once I was notified, an experience I will never recover from,''
    says Jamie, she was told the FBI and Mexico were investigating but the
    ship was requesting that her body be allowed to remain onboard in their
    small morgue and return along with everyone else to Los Angeles 36
    hours later. It would be months before she learned that in actuality
    her body had already been removed and left alone in a morgue in Mexico.
    No one stayed with her. The ship sailed on.
        Five days later, Jamie was able to get Ashley's autopsied, embalmed
    body back to Los Angeles where she was told she would have to hire a
    private forensic pathologists if she was ever to know what killed
    Ashley (other than the cruise line's medical negligence). And it had to
    be good one, because he or she would have precious little to work with
    when they received her.
        Meanwhile the FBI maintained that they could not discuss anything
    with Jamie. And the cruise line offered nothing in the way of
    information or help and the boyfriend, who was never charged with
    anything . . . not even illegal possession of drugs, or manslaughter,
    or reckless homicide, remained free. These were only some of the legal
    hurdles, the jurisdictional murkiness, the lack of laws and rights that
    victims of crime at sea or their survivors have, the pain, the sense of
    powerlessness and secondary victimization Jamie was beginning to become
    painfully familiar with.
        Our final story comes from Laurie, another senior vice president of
    ICV, who while on a Royal Caribbean cruise vacation with her best
    friend Michelle was brutally raped by a crew member who was employed as
    a janitor but who was at the time filling in as a security guard. The
    crew member followed Laurie to her cabin, forced his way in and
    sexually assaulted her. She was left unconscious and when she woke up
    she discovered that her pants had been removed and that she not only
    had an impacted tampon she also had had ligature marks on her neck from
    what she could suddenly recall must have been caused by the perpetrator
    holding her down while she was trying to kick and push him off of her.
        After Laurie reported the rape, two supervisors, the purser and the
    head of security, came to her cabin and sat on the bed where the rape
    occurred to interview her. When Laurie was interviewed by the men one
    of the questions they asked her was how much she had had to drink that
    evening, and Laurie's answer was that over the course of the afternoon
    and night, she probably had a total of four alcoholic beverages.
        The purser then rose, clasped his hands behind his back and turned
    to face Laurie, who thought he was now going to say that medical help
    was on the way. Instead what she heard was this, ``Ms. Dishman, it
    sounds to me like you need to control your drinking.''
        Several hours later, she was taken to the infirmary. There she and
    her friend Michelle were handed two trash bags and told to go back to
    their cabin and collect her own evidence. ``Everything with my case was
    horribly mishandled by the cruise line, and I was provided with no
    course of action,'' Laurie says. Eventually after finding an attorney
    to help her she says, ``I had a eight hour deposition where the cruise
    line attorneys questioned me the entire time about my character because
    they knew what had happened with the janitorial employee they put in a
    security guard uniform was going to be big trouble. He had already been
    in trouble for falsifying records, insubordination and harassing two
    women six weeks before he raped me.''
        Laurie later wrote to her Congresswoman, Doris Matsui, when it
    became clear that neither the FBI nor the DOJ could help her.
    Afterwards she made over 30 trips to Washington for hearings and to
    gain support for legislation which the Congresswoman introduced as the
    Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act. The bill was passed and signed
    into law July 27, 2010.
        The details involved in each of these cases and so many others
    points loudly to the fact that the cruise industry has, to an
    astonishing extent, functioned as a privatized society, ruled almost
    solely by their own corporate policies. This is an industry that has
    cleverly crafted a business model that allows them to ``enjoy virtually
    every benefit and protection of operating as an American company--
    indeed icons of Americana--without being required to shoulder any of
    the responsibilities commonly understood to accompany the privilege.
    For all intents and purposes, they pay no federal taxes, and contend
    with no labor restrictions. Modern ships have expanded to size to a
    small city--they can carry approximately 9000 passengers and crew.
    While most cruise customers are from the U.S., their workers come from
    impoverished nations like Indonesia, Honduras or the Philippines. Their
    corporate headquarters are often found in Miami yet instead of paying
    taxes and registering their ships here in the U.S. they pay nominal
    fees to countries like Liberia, Panama, or the Bahamas, which affords
    them the right to fly their ships under what is known as ``flags of
    convenience.'' Tragically, this means that the ships are now registered
    in countries which are essentially legal and regulatory vacuums, unable
    and largely unwilling to exercise oversight and control. Doing this
    allows them to not only avoid U.S. laws and standards such as OSHA, and
    other regulatory controls, but labor laws, hiring practices and
    conditions, and a host of other requirements that would significantly
    cut into their profit margins.
        Critics rightfully claim that the cruise industry is effectively
    being subsidized by the U.S. government. These claims are based on the
    fact that the cruise industry actually represents a significant
    government expense. First of all, its ships are highly attractive
    targets for terrorists with unparalleled potential for mass casualty
    given their powerful symbolism of American consumer culture. With that
    in mind, the U.S. has spent millions of taxpayer dollars to fund port
    security to safeguard these cruise ships. These funds include but are
    in no way limited to the U. S. Coast Guard's patrol of the ships coming
    into and going out of our ports, shoreside security, the FBI which has
    jurisdiction over crimes involving U.S. citizens, and customs agents.
    Even more egregious is the treatment of passengers who become victims
    of crime or other tragic acts of negligence on these ships while at
    sea. Typically, the passenger is an American, having bought their
    cruise ticket in America and boarded the ship in an American port.
    Naturally, if they even think of it at all, they assume that the
    rights, laws and protections they have as an American go with them as
    they step onto the ship. What they don't know is that as soon as their
    ship sails away, so does all of that. Not until something goes wrong do
    these unsuspecting passengers realize that they are instead trapped on
    a tiny piece of Liberia or Panama . . .
        Here we are today, in 2019 and the 25,000,000 passengers projected
    to take a cruise this year are still in jeopardy and in need of
    protection and awareness. Many could unknowingly fall victim to the
    number one crime occurring on cruise ships; sexual assault. And yet the
    cruise lines continue to shield the truth of how many of these crimes
    are actually occurring and how many of them involve minors. Thanks to
    Senate testimony, we do know and we feel that the public needs to know.
    On average, an appalling total of 33% of all sexual assaults on cruise
    ships are committed against minors.
        Without the efforts of ICV and the congressional action taken over
    the past nine years, no legislation would been passed to improve the
    safety of passengers. While our voice will not be heard at the current
    public hearing, we appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement
    of need for continued oversight and additional legislation. Beginning
    with the fact that reportable crime categories should be expanded to
    include all crimes, not only the ones included under the CVSSA but all,
    so that they too may be included in the crime statistics. As it appears
    now, the cruise lines themselves are able to decide and label any
    offense or crime, with the possibility of downgrading the seriousness
    of such crimes (i.e. instead of categorizing an incident as a sexual
    assault which is a reportable offense, the cruise line has the option
    of categorizing it as ``inappropriate touch'' which is not currently a
    reportable offense). Such limited and unchecked reporting serves to
    protect the cruise line rather than the passenger. This calls for your
    attention.
        Another issue of deep concern is the fact that cruise lines resist
    legislation claiming that they are already highly regulated. However,
    these claims are unsubstantiated and can be easily refuted. One need
    only refer to a statement submitted on a slide included in a power
    point presentation given by the International Maritime Organization
    (IMO) itself stating the following:

    ``Roles and Functions . . .
    IMO is not:
      A policeman
    IMO does not:
      Implement anything
      Develop standards for strength or determine design
        requirements
      Approve equipment and systems
      Have (m)any sanctions''

        Additionally one can only look with suspicion upon the Cruise Lines
    International Association (CLIA) self-adopted and promoted Passenger
    Bill of Rights--an obvious public relations initiative. Sadly, an
    evaluation of that claim reveals that while many of the promises
    included there seem reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper dive into
    them indicates it is filled with empty promises and lacks any legal
    substance or guarantee for passenger recourse when seeking fair
    compensation.
        Finally, unlike companies on land, cruise lines face virtually no
    financial exposure when their passengers die or disappear. Even if the
    cruise line is clearly negligent or acts maliciously. This is because
    of a nearly one hundred year old law known as the Death on the High
    Seas Act (DOHSA), which was originally passed to provide for a widow's
    ability to obtain limited recovery when her seaman husband died at sea.
    This same law is still being used--now as a shield by the cruise
    industry to avoid financial accountability for the wrongful deaths of
    passengers. Applied to the cruise lines, DOHSA today provides no
    recovery when the victim is a retiree or a child. This passenger
    demographic accounts for a significant portion of the 25 million
    passengers who cruise each year. Cruise lines and their insurance
    companies have profited enormously due to this ancient law.
    Understandably, many grieving passengers are not only floored when they
    learn of this, they are also made to feel victimized once again when
    told their loved one's life was worthless under current maritime law.
        ICV implores Congress to not only continue but to in fact
    strengthen its resolve to warn and protect the public from danger when
    they are the most vulnerable and the least aware: on a cruise ship. Our
    hope and our mission is to change the fact that even as we seek to
    increase safety, create awareness, and open up opportunities for the
    public to hear and know the details of tragic stories such as the
    victim members stories presented here, the cruise are engaged in
    efforts to shield and protect themselves while they shame and overwhelm
    the victims in many cases such as in the sexual assault of Laurie, or
    the costly PTSD Georgia, Dean, Valerie, and Cindy are still living with
    as a result of their harrowing evacuation of a sinking cruise ship off
    the coast of Italy. Not to mention the heartache and scapegoating
    tactics used after the fiery deaths of Richard, or Larry and Christy.
    Several ICV members can certainly speak to the medical negligence on
    the supposedly fun ships that led to the deaths of Ashley, Matthew, and
    Christina; or the truth behind the disappearance of Merrian, or
    Rebecca, or Blake, or Amy, or Daniel. And all of us could tell you the
    truth of what could have been done to prevent these tragedies.
        The congressional champions we have had along the way have made all
    the difference in our fight for answers and justice. There is an old
    African proverb that says, ``Until the lion tells the story, the hunter
    will always be the hero.'' While stories are most often told by the
    hunter--the customary hero--there is always another story. One that
    struggles to be told. In this case, the story struggling to be told is
    that of victims of crime on cruise ships. We are that lion--we have a
    story too. The world is counting on you to listen to that story.

     Educational paper, ``Spotlight On Safety: Why Accidents Are Often Not
     Accidental'' by International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots
     and Dalhousie University, Department of Industrial Engineering, July
                 2019, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Larsen
                                   __________
    [This educational paper is retained in committee files and appears in
    abridged form below. It is available in its entirety online at https://
    bridgedeck.org/actionnetwork/Spotlight-MMP-WMRC-Final071619.pdf.]

                                   __________

        This Paper is background information to the Poster Presentation at
    the World Maritime Rescue Congress, Vancouver, British Columbia,
    Canada, June 2019.
                                    abstract
        The best search and rescue (SAR) response is the one that does not
    have to take place. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
    the International Maritime Rescue Federation (IMRF) recognize that
    prevention is a key function of rescue organizations. If the number of
    maritime casualties is reduced, lives are saved, pollution averted and
    there are fewer risks to SAR personnel and lower costs for SAR
    organizations.
        The IMO, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and national
    and private regulatory bodies provide a regulatory regime which, if
    followed, substantially reduces the risk and severity of maritime
    casualties. In the shipping economy, however, commercial pressures may
    lead to conflicts with the regulatory regime. It is therefore no
    surprise that failure to comply with the regulatory regime is a factor
    in many maritime casualties.
        The General Maritime Law that governs international shipping has
    effectively insulated upper level managers from the consequences of
    regulatory noncompliance, provided that they can deny knowledge of it.
    The International Safety Management (ISM) Code, with its provision
    requiring that deficiencies be reported to a Designated Person Ashore,
    is designed to inform managers and bring them into the circle of
    responsibility. Although technology provides ship operators with the
    ability to have immediate knowledge of conditions aboard ship,
    including the degree of compliance with regulatory standards, there is
    a tendency to discourage reporting so as to maintain management's
    immunity from personal liability. It is difficult to establish a shared
    safety culture between the ship and management when the future of the
    master and crew may depend on not sharing safety information with
    management.
        This problem may be exacerbated by ``regulatory capture,'' which
    can happen when marine inspectors are pressured by their superiors to
    ``look the other way.''
        With modern technology, the burden of responsibility can, and must,
    extend to ship operators, ship owners, classification societies and
    flag states.
        In this paper, the International Organization of Masters, Mates &
    Pilots (MM&P), in conjunction with Dalhousie University, explores this
    complex problem, along with possible solutions. The authors also
    present their personal experiences in attempting to maintain safety
    standards.
                                    glossary
    ABS--The American Bureau of Shipping, a classification society, IACS
    member and Recognized Organization.

    ACP--The U.S. Alternate Compliance Program is a voluntary alternate
    inspection process for U.S.-flagged vessels in which an approved
    Classification Society (Recognized Organization) may issue certificates
    of inspection on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard.

    CAR--Corrective Action Report. Under the International Safety
    Management Code (ISM), ship operators are required to maintain Safety
    Management Systems (SMS). In the context of these systems, Corrective
    Action Reports are used to report safety deficiencies to management.

    Classification Societies--Classification societies are non-governmental
    organizations that establish and maintain technical standards for ship
    construction and operation. They confirm that ship designs and their
    underlying calculations meet published standards. They also carry out
    periodic surveys to ensure that ships continue to meet standards. Flag
    states may authorize classification societies to carry out surveys on
    their behalf.

    DPA--Designated Person Ashore. Under the ISM Code, DPAs serve as a link
    between shipboard personnel and top management ashore.

    Flag State--The nation in which a commercial ship is registered. Flag
    states have the legal authority and responsibility to enforce
    regulations (on inspection, certification, safety and pollution) on
    vessels registered under their flag.

    IACS--The International Association of Classification Societies. The
    IACS is a not-for-profit membership organisation of classification
    societies that establishes minimum technical maritime safety and
    environmental standards and requirements and ensures their consistent
    application. The IACS is recognized as the IMO's principal technical
    advisor.

    IMO--The International Maritime Organization. The United Nations
    specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of
    shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by
    ships. Its primary mission is to create a fair and effective regulatory
    framework that is universally adopted and universally implemented. It
    works to create a level playing field, one in which ship operators
    cannot address financial challenges by compromising on safety, security
    and environmental performance.

    ISM Code--The International Safety Management Code. It is intended to
    provide an international standard for the safe management and operation
    of ships and for pollution prevention.

    NGO--Non-Governmental Organization.

    Port State Control (PSC)--The inspection of foreign ships in national
    ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment
    complies with the requirements of international regulations and that
    the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules.

    Recognized Organization (RO)--An organization (principally a
    classification society) authorized to carry out survey and
    certification functions.

    SMS--Safety Management System. Under the International Safety
    Management Code (ISM), operators are required to maintain a Safety
    Management System (SMS). The SMS details: how a ship is to be operated
    on a day-to-day basis; emergency procedures; measures to be taken for
    safe operation; and requirements for reporting to the DPA ashore.

    SOLAS--The Safety of Life at Sea Convention, widely considered the most
    important international treaty on the safe operation of merchant ships.
     1) the maritime safety regulatory regime and commercial pressures vs.
                        regulatory compliance and safety
        The international maritime shipping sector, which carries 95
    percent of international trade and makes globalization possible, is
    dominated by the ``flag-of-convenience'' (FOC) system. This system
    allows a ship owner to register a ship under the flag of one of more
    than 30 foreign countries, usually small island nations that operate
    open registries.
        FOC registries are often managed by private corporations as for-
    profit enterprises that provide ships with an assumed nationality for
    tax and regulatory purposes. The system allows the ship owner to
    operate free of the taxes, regulations, labor and environmental laws of
    his or her home country. It also allows owners to crew their ships with
    seafarers from low-wage labor supply countries in the developing world.
        FOC registries compete with each other to offer the least
    burdensome tax and regulatory environment. In effect, they create an
    international industry that operates in a nearly stateless environment.
    This leads to an uneven playing field and a race to the bottom with
    substandard shipping enjoying a competitive advantage.
        To counter the destabilizing effect of the FOC system and bring
    some semblance of regulatory uniformity to international shipping, the
    United Nations has acted through its International Maritime
    Organization (IMO) to establish minimum safety, pollution and emission
    standards for ships in the international trade. The London-based IMO
    has 174 member states. There are also more than 60 non-governmental
    organizations (NGOs) with consultative status; they include industry
    trade associations, professional associations, class societies and
    maritime labor organizations. The IMO provides a forum for oversight
    and debate on amendments to more than 50 international conventions and
    codes covering all aspects of shipping, from design and construction to
    fire protection, equipment performance standards, manning, hours of
    work and rest, training, pollution and emissions, navigation safety,
    communications, search and rescue, and safety of life at sea.
        The IMO recognizes the International Association of Classification
    Societies (IACS) as its principal technical advisor in the development
    of technical and safety standards. The membership of the IACS consists
    of twelve class societies that verify the structural strength and
    integrity of essential parts of the ship's hull and its appendages, and
    the reliability and function of the propulsion and steering systems,
    power generation and other auxiliary systems. The IACS is the only NGO
    at the IMO that is able to develop and apply its own rules.
        It should be noted that the IMO has no enforcement power. Its
    function is to provide a forum for member states to debate both the
    adoption of new conventions and codes and the need for safety-related
    revisions in existing conventions and codes. Member states that are
    signatories to a specific convention have a contractual treaty
    obligation to conform their national laws to its terms.
        Enforcement remains at the national level, under the purview of the
    administration of each flag state. The majority of ships in
    international trade are registered in FOC flag states; as sovereign
    nations, they can interpret, implement and enforce their treaty
    obligations as best serves their national interests. FOC and
    traditional national flag states alike are reluctant to place their
    ships at a competitive disadvantage by implementing regulations that go
    beyond the international minimum standards as they interpret them.
        IMO conventions permit flag states to delegate ship inspection and
    surveying to class societies that meet the requirements of the IMO Code
    for a Recognized Organization (RO). This is a reflection of the fact
    that many flag state administrations do not have the technical
    experience, manpower or global coverage necessary to undertake all the
    IMO-required inspections and surveys on their own. It is for each flag
    state to decide how much authority to delegate. In most cases, the RO
    class society is empowered by the flag state to require repairs or
    other corrective action and to withdraw or invalidate the relevant
    certificates required to operate the ship if that action is not taken.
    Often, the RO class society and its surveyors are the frontline actors
    in the enforcement of regulations that address ship design and
    construction, along with the maintenance required to keep ships in safe
    condition over the course of their life cycles.
        Because the ship owner is free to choose which FOC flag state and
    class society to use, there is commercial pressure on flag states and
    class societies to satisfy their clients. This obviously puts pressure
    on RO class society employees, i.e., the surveyors and auditors
    responsible for certifying regulatory compliance and the condition of
    the ship. The ship owners themselves are under commercial pressure from
    other ship owners operating under competing FOC and RO systems of
    regulatory enforcement and compliance verification.
        The IMO's International Safety Management (ISM) Code contains
    regulations that govern the safe management and operation of ships,
    along with pollution prevention. The ISM Code requires that companies
    have a Safety Management System (SMS) that sets out their safety and
    pollution prevention policies and complies with all mandatory
    international and national regulations and maritime industry standards
    and guidance. The SMS contains company policy on all aspects of its
    safety program. As with other IMO regulations, the flag state can
    delegate to RO class societies the enforcement, auditing and issuance
    of certificates of compliance. Ship owners can also delegate to the
    same RO class societies the preparation of the company's SMS.
        One of the principal purposes of the SMS is to provide a link
    between onboard safety management and a designated person ashore (DPA)
    who has access to the highest level of management in the company. The
    designated person is responsible for monitoring the safety of the ship
    and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are
    provided.
        The system places responsibility on the master and the designated
    person to communicate information related to: onboard safety
    deficiencies and non-conformities and their possible causes;
    regulations pertaining to corrective actions; and recordkeeping of such
    actions. The intent is to make shore-side management directly
    responsible and liable for the safe condition and operation of the ship
    and for documenting the actions taken in this regard. This has major
    implications, as it undermines the ability of the company to limit its
    liability based on a lack of knowledge, or privity, of the unsafe
    conditions. It also calls for creation of a documented record of
    deficiencies that could prove a case of negligence on the part of the
    company.
        It was hoped that the ISM Code would lead companies to embrace a
    more positive safety culture. In a well-managed company with
    experienced staffers who have the authority and resources needed to
    take action, an SMS will contribute to the development of a positive
    safety culture. But not all companies are managed well or staffed with
    the resources necessary to support the master in maintaining a safely
    operated ship. In these cases, the reporting of deficiencies may be
    looked upon as a problem rather than as an opportunity to improve
    safety. In such companies, a master who brings safety management
    problems to the company is himself a problem and risks being replaced.
    This can have a chilling effect on other masters who then become
    reluctant to bring their own safety concerns to management.
        The underlying problem with maritime safety is that the regulatory
    system is subject to commercial pressure from the top down.
        Even at the highest level within the IMO, commercial considerations
    are taken into account in drafting and adopting regulations. To some
    extent this may be acceptable because, as is the case in any high-risk
    industry, there must be an appropriate balance between commercial
    viability and safety. The problem is that the IMO is not a regulatory
    body in that it does not implement or enforce the regulations in the
    conventions and codes that its member states adopt. It is left to
    member flag states to bring their national laws into compliance with
    the international regulations.
        Flag states in the FOC system are essentially competitive flags for
    hire. They dominate international shipping and they delegate most of
    their responsibilities and authority to private RO class societies. The
    RO class societies are employed by companies but act on behalf of flag
    states in implementing and enforcing international regulations.
    Companies, in turn, employ RO class societies to prepare their ISM Code
    safety management systems and conduct audits of SMS documentation and
    performance. The end result is that companies are regulated by private
    organizations that they themselves employ and have a choice in
    selecting.
        Despite the apparent conflict of interest, in most cases the system
    works well: the flag state, the RO class society, the company and
    shipboard personnel cooperate to achieve a quality operation. In many
    trades and maritime sectors, quality confers commercial benefits. But
    there are significant differences in the quality and integrity of FOC
    flag states and RO class societies, and companies take these
    differences into consideration when making the choice of which to
    select. A bad actor with a substandard ship may select a flag state and
    class society with a reputation for lax enforcement of standards. There
    may be a penalty for doing so, as it may subject the ship to more
    stringent Port State Control inspections because of the reputation of
    the flag state or class society. However, that may be a risk the owner
    is willing to take to gain a competitive advantage.
        Port State Control (PSC) is the inspection of foreign ships in
    national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its
    equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and
    that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with these rules.
        The inspections were originally intended to be a backup to flag
    state implementation, but experience has shown that they can be
    extremely effective--particularly in cases in which the regulatory
    organizations (flag state, class society) have not fully met their
    obligations.
        PSC came about partly in response to the March 1978 grounding of
    the VLCC Amoco Cadiz off the coast of Brittany, France, which caused a
    220,000-ton oil spill.
        Nine regional agreements on Port State Control--Memoranda of
    Understanding, or MoUs--have been signed: Europe and the North Atlantic
    (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo
    de Vina del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa
    (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean
    (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the
    Riyadh MoU. The United States Coast Guard maintains the tenth PSC
    regime.
        Where vigorously enforced, PSC has been effective in detaining
    substandard ships, discouraging them from operation in regions with
    effective PSC, banning substandard ships, publicizing and penalizing
    substandard ships, their operators, their flag state and the
    classification society. (In contrast, ships operating in domestic
    waters only, and not subject to PSC, are often less safe).
            2) maritime incidents--risk to life and the environment
        The shipping industry is prone to repetitive incidents, which have
    often resulted in loss of life and damage to the environment. With
    proper oversight--by ship management, inspectors, regulatory
    authorities, and crew--the deficiencies, which caused these incidents,
    would have been corrected before disaster struck. Many of the
    shortcomings identified during subsequent investigations of the
    casualties were related to survey items: machinery, hull structure or
    load line issues. Some were related to the operators' safety culture.
    In many cases, investigators found both survey issues and a lack of
    safety culture.
        In this section we highlight several serious incidents that
    resulted in loss of life. Although different on the surface and
    separated by time, distance and vessel type, they have at least one
    significant factor in common: in every case, the risks were obvious and
    predictable.
        Bulk Carriers: In March 2000, the bulk carrier Leader L sank in the
    North Atlantic off the eastern coast of Canada. Eighteen crew members
    died. The Leader L was one of about 100 bulk carriers to sink in the
    1990s; nearly 700 mariners were lost in bulk carrier casualties in this
    time period. (Associated Press, 2000). There were allegations of
    serious structural deficiencies in this ship.
        Efforts have been made to increase the safety of bulk carriers,
    which have been among the vessels most vulnerable to casualty (see
    illustration on the following page). But the ships continue to sink. As
    recently as March 2017, the bulk carrier Stellar Daisy, the largest
    such vessel ever to sink, went down in the South Atlantic, taking with
    it 22 of 24 members of the crew.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       Figure 1. Making bulk carriers safer (Bulk Carrier Guide, 2010a).

        Tankers: Although international efforts to improve the safety of
    tankers have met with some success, incidents still occur--often with
    catastrophic effects on the environment--and a flawed international
    regulatory system can shield those responsible.
        In 2002, the structurally deficient tanker Prestige sank off the
    coast of northern Spain, spilling over 60,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.
    In an outrageous case of injustice, the master of the vessel, 81-year-
    old Captain Apostolos Mangouros, was held accountable and imprisoned,
    even though the Spanish government had refused his request to provide a
    place of refuge when the foundering vessel was in distress (Maritime
    Executive, 2016). The owner of the ship had knowledge of its condition
    and should not have permitted it to sail. It subsequently broke-up,
    with disastrous effects on the Spanish coast. (Maritime Knowledge,
    2018).
        Ferries: The continuing loss of ferries and tour boats around the
    world has led to calls for improved regulation of these vessels.
        In the Philippines, the Sulpicio Lines ferry Princess of the Stars
    capsized in a typhoon in 2008, causing the death of more than 800
    people. In 1987, in what is considered the deadliest peacetime disaster
    in maritime history, another Sulpicio Lines vessel, the Dona Paz, sank
    after a fiery collision. The ferry was seriously overcrowded: nearly
    4,400 people died, many times the number that the company said it was
    certified to carry, and almost three times the number listed on its
    manifest. There were just 24 survivors.
        In 2009, in the South Pacific Kingdom of Tonga, another domestic
    ferry, the Princess Ashika, sank with considerable loss of life.
    Investigators were told later by an officer for the Ministry of
    Transport that ``any fool (could) tell how bad the ship was . . .''
    (Kavaliku, 2010, p. v).
        The Russian riverboat Bulgaria sank in 2011 on the Volga River; 122
    people died, many of them school children (Appendix F).
        A particularly horrifying ferry disaster occurred in 2014, when the
    Korean ferry Sewol capsized, trapping over 300 people--mostly students
    on a school trip--inside.
        The American-flag bulk carrier Marine Electric sank in 1983,
    largely due to its deteriorated condition. There were only three
    survivors; the other 31 members of the crew died. The Marine Electric
    has been referred to as `The Wreck That Changed the Coast Guard
    Forever' (Zilnicki, 2019). Yet the loss of the El Faro with all hands
    (33 souls) occurred in 2015, more than three decades after the Marine
    Electric sank.
        Did the safety culture really change as a result of the Marine
    Electric disaster?
         3) pressures on front line personnel: ships officers and crew
        Mariners are guided through darkness, fog, and foul weather by
    radar and a multitude of other electronic navigational aids. The
    electronic era, and Satellite Telephone, has in some cases also induced
    micro-management from ashore; often by managers with little or no
    seagoing experience. While the electronic age has given us new tools to
    assist in progressing from one port to another, intense commercial
    pressures have increased for: on time arrivals, timely departures, and
    fuel conservation wherever possible.
        The fact is, ships do not make money at the berth. So, while we
    have all of this electronic navigation to illuminate the way, and
    ``help'' from management ashore, what keeps the ship safe? The best set
    of eyes and ears to ensure safety and regulatory compliance for any
    ship is its crew. Unfortunately, the seamen are often underutilized in
    keeping a ship within regulatory compliance. Indeed, in some cases they
    are pressured to keep quiet and keep the ship moving. Ships make money
    at sea!
        Under the International Safety Management Code (ISM), operators are
    required to maintain a Safety Management System (SMS). A requirement of
    an approved SMS is reporting, and documentation, of deficiencies via
    ``Corrective Action Reports'' (CAR's). Maritime companies do not like
    having a documented trail of failures to comply with the ISM Code or
    other regulatory requirements. Multiple infractions may make them
    susceptible to increased scrutiny by Port State Control or other
    regulatory agencies. This could jeopardize schedules, increase repair
    costs at an inconvenient time, or leave a trail for a charge of
    negligence and liability in the event of an accident. Hence management
    can develop a negative attitude towards ship's personnel who originate
    CAR's and open up the documentation trail. Thus, officers can be
    reluctant to write CAR's for fear of retaliation, which can be subtle
    in nature, such as lack of advancement, or more acute as job loss.
        Any company intent on retaliation, no matter how subtle, will
    exploit an available issue to disqualify the complainant. Effectively,
    within the maritime industry, these companies work against the ISM Code
    to their own advantage, and to cover any wrongdoing at the management
    level. We have classification societies and Port State Control that
    visit ships but do not review CAR files, nor ask officers if there are
    any outstanding deficiencies not included in the CAR file. Often, the
    presumption by agencies is that because the ship has passed annual
    inspections and is properly certificated there are no problems. Closer
    scrutiny is definitely needed. If the CAR file is historically without
    mention of any safety violations or non-compliance issues, this should
    raise a red flag for the auditor.
        In addition, in the United States, we have the ``Alternate
    Compliance Program'' (ACP), under which classification societies
    perform marine inspection duties that were once the sphere of the U.S.
    Coast Guard. On the one hand, the classification society is there to
    inspect for noncompliance, which could possibly cause delays. On the
    other hand, it is being paid by the ship's owner to authorize the
    various certificates needed for marine operation, so the ship can sail.
    This manifests as a serious conflict of interest. Classification
    societies are self-financing and so require revenues to continue to
    operate, not to lose clients that can go to an alternative society. In
    the United States, under the ACP, the U.S. Coast Guard is the agency
    that issues the Certificate of Inspection, and other certificates,
    based on the inspection of the classification society. It should be a
    double check; it is not.
        One of the findings of the USCG Marine Board of Investigation into
    the sinking of the SS El Faro was the USCG's lack of manpower for
    marine inspection oversight. The Coast Guard, when under ACP, is
    relying heavily on the classification society to perform proper
    inspections. In the case of the SS El Faro, the Board's findings showed
    a distinct failure by both the ABS and the USCG.
        What was the operator's accountability in the loss of the El Faro?
    No official was held to account. Contrast this with a Russian court's
    decision in 2014 regarding the 2011 sinking of the riverboat Bulgaria.
    In this case, managers and others found guilty of failure to comply
    with regulations were imprisoned (see Appendix F). Alternatively, in a
    legal case of retaliation by a major U.S. shipping company, Captain
    John Loftus v. Horizon Lines, the ship's master was awarded over $1.154
    million dollars. The judge called the actions of management
    ``REPREHENSIBLE.'' Here, there was violation of federal law by some of
    the highest corporate executives in the company to cover their own
    mismanagement and to silence a ship's master who was reporting major
    safety issues to protect his ship and crew. (See Appendix A)
        The case parallels that of Jeff Hagopian, who was abruptly
    terminated from his job as captain of Noble Drilling's Noble Danny
    Adkins after filing a report of safety violations.
        Hagopian had been a captain with the company from 2010 to 2015.
    Each year, he had received highly positive, complimentary performance
    evaluations.
        He reported two violations to Noble's alternate designated person
    ashore: a false ``red entry'' in the logbook which claimed the crew had
    performed the quarterly launching and maneuvering of the lifeboats; and
    an attempt to mislead USCG inspectors during the vessel's annual
    Certificate of Compliance Inspection about the defective condition of
    the gravity davit that deploys the fast rescue craft.
        Eleven days after filing his report, he received a phone call from
    his direct supervisor and Noble's human resources manager claiming the
    company had ``lost confidence'' in his ``ability to manage the
    vessel.''
        Unbeknownst to Hagopian was the fact that his safety report had
    exposed directives by management to not be forthright with the U.S.
    Coast Guard. And while the company constantly stressed its safety
    policy, it had actually just begun four years of criminal probation
    after pleading guilty to eight felony counts related to safety and oil
    pollution violations and major non-conformities with the safety
    management system on the Noble Discoverer.
        Hagopian filed a lawsuit against Noble Drilling under the
    ``Seaman's Protection Act'' in U.S. District Court for the Southern
    District of Texas. It was settled out of court in February 2017 (case #
    3:2016-cv-00099).
        As Captain Hagopian has stated, ``Law enforcement, regulatory
    agencies and classification societies are all failing the mariner due
    to conflicts of interest, politics, cronyism and corporate pandering.
    Safety regulations should be enforced more vigorously to help support
    anyone who is trying to protect their crew and vessel without fear of
    retaliation.''
        Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas said it best in the Spring (2016) Issue
    of USCG Proceedings in discussing Safety Management Systems and the ISM
    Code: ``An effective SMS must not only be very well developed in terms
    of process and procedures; it must also be deployed from the boardroom
    to the boiler room. There shouldn't be any disconnect between the
    auditors and the surveyors, or between the CEO and the seaman. We all
    must work together to discover and eliminate such disconnects.'' (Rear
    Admiral Thomas, 2016, p. 4)
                       4) pressures on safety inspectors
        The safety inspection regulatory regimes, such as classification
    society and flag state, are the top level of the safety system. If they
    fail, the only safety check is an effective Port State Control regime,
    which does not apply in many cases.
        The pressures on the safety inspection system may come at several
    levels: the organization level,and, often as a result, the personal
    level.
    a) At the organizational level (``regulatory capture'')
        The Safety Inspection System is subject to conflicting pressures:
    on the one hand, pressure from industry seeking to reduce the
    regulatory burden and the ``cost'' of safety; on the other hand, public
    pressure to maintain safety. Industry pressure is generally ongoing,
    through public fear of job losses due to the cost of safety, and
    through political pressure (often as a result of lobbying and political
    contributions). Pressure from the public generally only comes after a
    major tragedy, such as the sinking of the El Faro or the Marine
    Electric, and usually subsides after a few years.
    b) At the level of individual safety inspectors
        Why do safety inspectors often pass over and not identify obvious
    deficiencies for needed repairs? In some cases, it may be a genuine
    oversight, or a lack of training (itself a serious issue). However, in
    many cases it is pressure from their managers, (themselves subject to
    pressure from more senior managers). There may also be pressure from
    colleagues to be ``part of the team,'' to not rock the boat.
        Those who endear themselves to management and get the job done on
    time and at less cost are likely to be rewarded with better personnel
    reviews as well as promotions. The desire for career advancement may
    interfere with taking the actions necessary to protect the safety of
    the public. Absent a collective response and/or legal protections, it
    may be difficult for individual inspectors within an organization to
    withstand these pressures. (See Appendix B)
                           5) pressures on management
            ``And in competitive markets, whatever is possible becomes
            necessary.''
            (Shaxson, 2011, p. 130)

        Pressures on ship management include the need to compete based on
    price and other factors such as timely delivery of cargo. Many ships
    are an important link in a ``just in time'' supply chain aimed at
    maximizing efficiency, minimizing cost and improving customer
    satisfaction.
        Delays, due perhaps to rectifying ``minor'' safety issues raised by
    ship's crew or the class society, can interrupt this supply chain, with
    a significant impact on the shipping firm's customers. These customers
    may seek another ``more reliable'' shipping firm, one where the crew
    does not cause delays by reporting defects, one where the
    classification society is ``more reasonable.'' Senior management is
    under pressure from the stock market, from shareholders, and from the
    board of directors, to keep costs down, to keep ships running on time.
    Middle managers, in turn, come under pressure from senior management to
    achieve these goals.
                               6) accountability
        The public has the right to expect, and must demand, that those
    tasked with protecting public safety be competent to perform the
    responsibilities they are assigned, act with integrity, and place their
    responsibilities to the public ahead of all other considerations.
        After the Marine Electric sank in 1983, the owner--Marine Transport
    Lines--pleaded guilty to criminal negligence and was fined $10,000. No
    one in senior management was convicted of a crime, or even penalized by
    the company. But, a few years later, the CEO and his team were removed
    because the cost of new (safer) ships had reduced the company's
    profitability.
        In the case of major marine incidents, the senior managers of
    shipping firms are very rarely successfully prosecuted. Senior
    management, albeit often not making the day-to-day front-line
    decisions, established the safety culture of the organization. In many,
    if not most cases, this corporate culture discouraged reporting of
    regulatory violations and safety concerns up the management chain,
    effectively insulating management from responsibility for the firm's
    actions.
        Earlier this year (2019), more than a decade after the Philippine
    ferry Princess of the Stars sailed into Typhoon Frank and capsized with
    the loss of over 800 lives, criminal charges of reckless imprudence
    were filed against Edgar S. Go, Sulpicio Lines first vice president and
    team leader of the firm's crisis management committee. (Supreme Court
    of the Philippines, 2019)
        The charging document alleged that ``the DOJ (Department of
    Justice) panel found that Go was involved in making decisions on
    whether a vessel should be allowed to sail such that he should have
    cancelled or discouraged the voyage considering the severe weather
    (Typhoon Frank) at that time.'' Originally, the loss was blamed solely
    on the master.
        In the case of the tourist boat Bulgaria, unlike most cases, not
    just operating personnel but senior company officials, regulatory
    officials and a senior inspector were sentenced to significant terms of
    imprisonment (see Appendix F).
        U.S. Coast Guard Final Action Memo on the October 2015 Sinking of
    the SS El Faro:

            ``This tragic story points to the need for a strong and
            enduring commitment at all elements of the safety framework.
            First and foremost, the company must commit to safety culture
            by embracing their responsibilities under the ISM Code.
            Secondly, Recognized Organizations (ROs) must fully and
            effectively perform their duties and responsibilities. Finally,
            the Coast Guard must, and will, provide the final safety net
            with sustainable policy, oversight, and accountability''
            (Commandant Admiral Zukunft, 2017, p. 3).
    7) conclusion: the way forward--effective regulatory oversight & a real
                                 safety culture
        We have shown that the regulatory framework, based on IMO
    standards, is generally adequate, and is capable of being periodically
    updated as may be required.
        In most cases it is the lack of compliance with existing standards,
    be they ship construction and maintenance, or safety management
    procedures, which is the root cause of safety incidents.
        The following proposals geared toward American regulations could be
    adopted worldwide:
        1.  Greater uniformity by flag and port states in implementation of
    international safety regulations, with strict enforcement by Port State
    Control, including the ability to look behind certificates of
    compliance issued by flag states or other inspection organizations.
        2.  The right and obligation of ship's officers to raise
    ``Corrective Action Reports'' (CAR's) and have them addressed in a
    timely manner.
        3.  Classification society inspectors, or USCG/port state control
    personnel, should be ``required'' to review the CAR file ``every'' time
    they board a vessel. There should be accountability to ensure
    compliance with the system as intended.
        4.  Consider ending, or modifying, the Alternate Compliance
    Program. ACP is a ``pay for play'' program, where there is a direct
    conflict of interest for the regulatory agency (such as ABS, or another
    classification society).
        5.  Protection of crew and other personnel by a legal framework,
    such as the American ``Seaman's Protection Act'' (See Appendix D), and
    by enforcement of the rights established under the Maritime Labour
    Convention of 2006.
        6.  Ensure the company's operational team includes management
    personnel with extensive seagoing experience who can review policy and
    be available for consultation with the ship's senior officers.
        7.  Legal (criminal) accountability, such as the Canadian ``Westray
    Bill'' (See Appendix E), for officers and directors of an organization
    as well as the organization itself, including Regulatory Organizations,
    where their action, or lack of action, results in injury or death.
                     8) authors' notes and acknowledgements
        This Paper is based on the authors' and contributors' professional
    knowledge and experiences. In particular, three of the contributors
    were penalized by their employers and ultimately terminated as a
    consequence of their attempt to comply with regulations and safety
    protocols.
        These whistle-blowers would like to take this opportunity to thank
    the many colleagues, including some in senior positions, who supported
    them; the many others, including prominent politicians, who understood
    the significance of their situation; and the families who stood by them
    through many frustrating times. They would also like to thank their
    lawyers, whose sense of fairness and justice led them to carry on, at
    some risk to themselves, without a clear prospect of reward.
        The authors also thank Jeff Hagopian, former captain at Noble
    Drilling, for sharing his safety experience on the Noble Danny Adkins.
        Finally, they would like to acknowledge the efforts and enthusiasm
    of student co-author Tara Sherrard, for whom this project presented an
    opportunity to learn the somewhat disillusioning difference between the
    `Paper' academic world, and the `Real' world experienced by many.
                                   references
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    Aboard Sinks off Bermuda. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/
    archives/la-xpm-2000-mar-25-mn-12610-story.html

    Bulk Carrier Guide. (2010a). Making bulk carriers safe [Diagram].
    Retrieved from http://bulkcarrierguide.com/survival-and-safety.html

    The Maritime Executive. (2016). Industry shocked as 81-year-old faces
    jail. Retrieved from: https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/
    industry-shocked-as-81-year-old-faces-jail

    Maritime Knowledge. (2018). Learn from the past: Prestige sinking, one
    of the worst oil spills in Europe. [Digital image]. Retrieved from
    https://safety4sea.com/cm-learn-from-the-past-prestige-sinkingone-of-
    the-worst-oil-spills-in-europe/

    Kavaliku, M. S. (2010). Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into
    the Sinking of the MV Princess Ashika. Retrieved from https://
    www.scribd.com/document/29878635/Ashika-Final-Report

    Supreme Court of the Philippines. (2019). SC reinstates criminal case
    against Sulpicio Lines Inc. official regarding MV Princess of the Stars
    tragedy. Retrieved from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/2596/

    Zilnicki, C. (2019). Marine Electric: The Wreck That Changed The Coast
    Guard Forever. The Maritime Executive. Retrieved from: https://
    www.maritime-executive.com/features/marine-electric-the-wreck-that-
    changed-the-coast-guard-forever

    Rear Admiral Thomas, F.P. (2016). Safety management systems: Assistant
    commandant's perspective. The Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security
    at Sea, Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council, 73(1), 4.
    https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
    Proceedings%20Magazine/Archive/2016/Vol73_No1_Spring2016.pdf?ver=2017-
    05-31-120938-307

    Shaxson, N. (2011). Treasure Islands: Tax havens and the men who stole
    the world. London, England: The Bodley Head.

    Commandant Admiral Zukunft, p. (2017). United States Coast Guard El
    Faro final action memo. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2017/
    Dec/21/2001859858/-1/-1/0/EL%20FARO%20FINAL%20ACTION%20memo.pdf

                                   __________

        [Appendixes A through F are retained in committee files and are
    available in the online version of the educational paper at https://
    bridgedeck.org/actionnetwork/Spotlight-MMP-WMRC-Final071619.pdf.]

                                    Appendix

                                  ----------

    Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme,
          Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. Are there any changes to vessel safety requirements or
    the processes used by the Coast Guard or ROs to enforce the
    requirements that warrant being amended to make them more efficient
    and/or effective?
        Answer. The Coast Guard will continue to evaluate safety
    regulations and associated processes for their effectiveness and to
    determine whether they warrant adjustment. The Coast Guard will also
    continue to work closely with Recognized Organizations to ensure they
    follow a similar process for their individual rule sets and ensure any
    updates align with national regulations. The Service does not recommend
    any changes to enforcement processes at this time.

        Question 2. How does the Coast Guard determine that U.S.-flagged
    commercial vessels have sufficiently addressed the new safety
    requirements?
        Answer. The Coast Guard generally conducts annual inspections on
    U.S. flagged commercial vessels that are subject to inspection to
    verify compliance with all applicable laws, policy, and international
    regulations. For new safety requirements, the Service provides
    compliance/enforcement guidance to field units and maritime
    stakeholders where necessary.
        If a vessel is not in compliance following the implementation date
    for a new safety requirement, a Coast Guard marine inspector will issue
    a deficiency, using Coast Guard Form 835V, where required, describing
    the regulation the vessel did not meet, the required actions to come
    into compliance, the timeline for resolution, and any operational
    restrictions as necessary.

        Question 2.a. To what extent does the Coast Guard review updated
    Safety Management System Plans for U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to
    ensure those vessels are in compliance with the new safety requirements
    vs. rely on third-parties (Recognized Organizations-RO), such as the
    American Bureau of Shipping and others, to review the updated plans?
        Answer. The International Safety Management (ISM) Code includes a
    framework to provide operators an outline of key elements required to
    be considered for inclusion in a Safety Management System (SMS)
    program. The Recognized Organizations (ROs) have the responsibility to
    verify compliance by auditing the vessel's program to ensure
    conformance with applicable statutes, laws, and conventions.
        Although the Coast Guard does not directly review a vessel's SMS or
    approve the SMS plan, Coast Guard marine inspectors examine/test crew
    knowledge of the vessel, emergency actions, and the vessel's material
    condition and its equipment/machinery during vessel inspections. If
    there are serious deficiencies noted in these areas, marine inspectors
    will determine if these deficiencies may be linked to a Safety
    Management issue and may require a RO or Third Party Organization (TPO)
    to conduct an audit of the vessel's SMS.
        Additionally, the Coast Guard established a new Flag State Control
    Division at Coast Guard Headquarters that is principally focused on
    oversight of ROs and TPOs. The Coast Guard also continues to revise and
    develop improved policies for third party inspections, audits, and
    monitoring activities for Coast Guard marine inspectors and third party
    surveyors. Finally, the Coast Guard is developing a robust set of
    performance measures and improving communications with field commands
    and third parties to ensure performance expectations are well known and
    widely understood.

        Question 2.b. To what extent does the Coast Guard conduct
    inspections of U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to ensure those vessels
    are in compliance with the new safety requirements vs. rely on third-
    parties (Recognized Organizations-RO), such as the American Bureau of
    Shipping and others, to conduct such compliance reviews?
        Answer. With the exception of towing vessels enrolled in the Towing
    Safety Management System (TSMS), the Coast Guard conducts annual exams
    on all certificated vessels even if a third party is conducting exams
    on behalf of the Coast Guard. These focused Coast Guard inspections
    encompass critical systems and new safety requirements.

        Question 3. Safety Management Systems, which include details
    ranging from safely conducting day-to-day operations to procedures for
    emergencies, drills, and training, are required by the US Code for
    certain classes of vessels.
        What is the current and future role and importance of Safety
    management System and how it relates to vessel safety?
        Answer. Safety Management Systems (SMS) are a structured and
    documented system that enable companies and personnel involved in
    vessel operations or management to effectively implement safety and
    environmental protection requirements. SMS are intended to be
    continuously updated by the companies who use them, based on observed
    non-conformities and lessons learned as a result of reviewing
    incidents. SMS facilitate a culture of safety and continuous
    improvement from the company's leadership down to the operational
    vessel level.
        Vessels engaged in international trade are required to establish a
    SMS under the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. Towing vessel
    owners or operators also have the option to implement these systems as
    an alternate compliance option under 46 CFR Subchapter M.

        Question 4. To the extent that the Coast Guard relies on Recognized
    Organizations to perform SMS plan reviews and vessel safety inspections
    on behalf of the Coast Guard, how does the Coast Guard ensure that
    these SMS plan reviews and vessel compliance inspections are conducted
    in line with requirements?
        Answer. The newly created Flag State Control Division within the
    Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance, established as a result of
    recommendations in the wake of the SS EL FARO tragedy, is responsible
    for monitoring Key Performance Indicators that measure Recognized
    Organization and Third Party Organization (TPO) performance.
        This Division also performs oversight of these entities, such as
    conducting quality assurance and vertical contract audits of third
    parties, actively monitoring and tracking findings to ensure corrective
    actions are being executed, and observing company and vessel audits to
    ensure adherence to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code to
    name a few.
        The Coast Guard has also increased outreach and coordination with
    these entities, including holding regular meetings and two TPO
    workshops within the past two years.

        Question 5. What types of compliance activities, if any, does the
    Coast Guard employ to ensure that the ROs are performing their review
    and inspection activities in line with requirements?
        Answer. The Coast Guard uses several compliance oversight
    activities to ensure Recognized Organizations (ROs) are performing
    their review and inspection services in line with requirements. Coast
    Guard Oversight activities of ROs include:

        1.  Plan Review Oversight
        2.  New Construction Oversight
        3.  Inspection Oversight
        4.  Additional Fleet Risk Oversight Exams
        5.  Safety Management Certificate (SMC) Audit Observation and
    Oversight
        6.  Document of Compliance (DOC) Audit Observation and Oversight
        7.  Direct observation of the RO's employees performing services
        8.  Observation of each authorized RO's external Quality System
    Audit

        The first six listed activities may also result in a formal request
    from the Coast Guard for the RO to conduct an internal review of their
    quality system to ensure statutory certification and services are
    performed in line with requirements.

        Question 6. What types of performance indicators, if any, does the
    Coast Guard employ to monitor and track the extent to which the ROs are
    performing their SMS plan reviews and vessel safety inspection
    activities in line with requirements?
        Answer. The Coast Guard monitors the following Key Performance
    Indicators (KPIs) and may publish the results in internal or public
    documents, as appropriate:

          KPI #1: Number of Recognized Organization (RO) issued
    statutory findings divided by the number of statutory surveys conducted
    (e.g. 100 findings / 10 surveys = KPI of 10).
          KPI #2: Number of RO Safety Management Certificate (SMC)
    and related Statement of Voluntary Compliance (SOVC) audit findings
    (total of observations, non-conformities, and major non-conformities)
    divided by the number of all types of SMC audits conducted.
          KPI #3: Number of RO Document of Compliance (DOC) and
    related SOVC audit findings (total of observations, non-conformities,
    and major non-conformities) divided by the number of all types DOC
    audits conducted.
          KPI #4: Number of RO associations to Port State Control
    Detentions under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding, Tokyo
    Memorandum of Understanding, and Coast Guard Port State Control
    programs.
          KPI #5: Number of International Association of
    Classification Societies Procedural Requirement 17s (IACS PR-17) issued
    divided by the total number of RO statutory surveys conducted.

        Question 7. To the extent the Coast Guard monitors and reports on
    the results of ROs' SMS plan reviews and vessel safety inspection
    activities, what metrics or data has the Coast Guard gathered on the
    results of the ROs' activities?
        Answer. Recognized Organizations (ROs) are required to notify the
    Coast Guard prior to conducting a management company Document of
    Compliance (DOC) Audit or a vessel's Safety Management Certificate
    (SMC) audit. The Coast Guard attends and observes certain DOC and
    International Safety Management (ISM) audits performed by ROs. Each
    audit attendance is documented in the Coast Guard Marine Information
    for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) system under a Management System
    Oversight (MSO) activity. Additionally, RO's audit findings are
    included in the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) data submitted by each
    RO on a quarterly basis.

        Question 8. How is the Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise
    working with MARAD and cruise lines to establish safety standards for
    the industry?
        Answer. The U. S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration (MARAD),
    and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jointly developed the
    training standard and curriculum for commercial providers of Cruise
    Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) training. Per Coast Guard
    policy, Coast Guard Foreign Passenger Vessel Examiners verify training
    for the prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting of
    criminal activities in the international maritime environment.
    Additionally, the Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise (CSNCOE) has
    developed a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures manual (TTP) to verify
    crewmembers are in compliance with these training requirements.

        Question 9. Under the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of
    2010, Vessel Owners are required to post information on how victims can
    report a crime and how to contact the FBI. How do victims receive this
    information? Where is it posted? And what has the Coast Guard done to
    work with the FBI on responding and investigating crimes occurring on
    Cruise Ships?
        Answer. Cruise lines disseminate information including consulate
    phone numbers and addresses and local Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI) contact information in several ways:

          Most cruise lines provide passengers contact information
    in the terms of agreement that are signed at the time of booking.
          Additionally, the cruise lines provide daily local
    information in either a book, newsletter, or on the television in each
    stateroom.
          Crew members with specific Cruise Vessel Security and
    Safety Act (CVSSA) training are also available to provide assistance in
    contacting law enforcement when a report of a crime is made.

        On a case-by-case basis, the Coast Guard has previously assisted
    the FBI, the lead investigating agency, with local investigations in a
    support capacity.

     Questions from Hon. Sean Patrick Maloney for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. During the hearing you mentioned that the Coast Guard
    put together a ``small passenger vessel task force'' in the wake of the
    Conception incident. Could you provide details on this taskforce and
    how it is working to implement improving passenger vessel safety?
        Answer. On November 8, 2019, the Assistant Commandant for
    Prevention Policy chartered the Small Passenger Vessel (SPV) Safety
    Task Force. This task force is comprised of naval engineers, marine
    inspectors, traveling inspectors, marine investigators, and data
    analytics personnel. The task force will review risk-based targeting,
    safety management systems, the results of the concentrated overnight
    accommodation vessel inspection campaign, and the results of SPV marine
    casualty investigations.

        Question 2. You gave an example of response the Coast Guard is
    providing in the wake of the Conception incident as a direct
    concentrated inspection campaign of all vessels carrying the type of
    overnight passengers that the Conception catered to. Please provide
    more details on this campaign and what the Coast Guard has found so
    far.
        Answer. Shortly after the passenger vessel CONCEPTION marine
    casualty, the Coast Guard released a Marine Safety Information Bulletin
    as guidance to owners and operators of passenger vessels with overnight
    accommodations to review their own operations and to reinforce items of
    concern found during the initial stages of the investigation.
        The Coast Guard also initiated a nationwide vessel inspection
    campaign of over 350 vessels to review overnight accommodations spaces,
    fire safety, and electrical installations. One purpose of the campaign
    was to take immediate action to ensure inspected small passenger
    vessels (SPVs) with overnight accommodations were complying with
    applicable regulations. The secondary purpose during the campaign was
    to educate vessel owners and operators about key safety concerns
    identified in the early stages of the Conception investigation, and
    recommend owners and operators take voluntary action to improve the
    safety of their vessels when warranted.
        The Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy has formed a task
    force to examine SPV issues. Information from the vessel inspection
    campaign will be shared with the SPV safety task force for
    consideration.

       Questions from Hon. Bob Gibbs for Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme,
          Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. Recently we have heard concerns from towing vessels
    operators working in South Louisiana on the lack of consistency in the
    interpretation and implementation of new safety standards under 46 CFR
    Subchapter M from one Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI)
    Zone to another. Within the Eighth District, operators have encountered
    inconsistencies in the way that OCMIs construe regulatory requirements,
    resolve implementation issues, and manage towing vessel certification
    and other processes. In a segment of the maritime industry as transient
    as the towing industry, where companies own and operate vessels that
    routinely cross OCMI boundaries and frequently change areas of
    operation, consistency is critical to facilitate maritime commerce and
    reduce compliance burdens on towing vessel operators and crewmembers.
    While I appreciate and support the Coast Guard's empowerment of OCMIs
    to act with discretion where local conditions compel a distinct
    approach, most OCMI Zones share similar operational environments and
    most towing vessels share similar operational characteristics.
        Will you work with your staff as well as stakeholders in the
    industry to identify or develop mechanisms through which you can
    elevate Subchapter M implementation issues, find reasonable and
    effective solutions, and promote the consistent application of those
    solutions by inspectors in the Coast Guard? Is the Coast Guard already
    taking any measures to increase consistency?
        Answer. Yes. Coast Guard members are engaged across Headquarters,
    Areas, Districts, and field units to promote consistency and facilitate
    timely and effective solutions. The Coast Guard continues to work with
    industry stakeholders to minimize inconsistencies in interpretation and
    enforcement of 46 CFR Subchapter M. Additionally, Pub. L. 115-282,
    enacted on December 4, 2018, established a formal mechanism to promote
    consistency in the interpretation of regulations starting at the local
    Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) level. The Coast Guard has
    implemented this process nationwide, and will continue to encourage
    field units to expedite appeals to the Headquarters level where local
    concurrence cannot be achieved.
        The Service also holds industry outreach days and regular meetings
    with industry organizations such as the American Waterways Operators to
    address potential areas for inconsistencies in regulatory
    interpretation.

       Questions from Hon. Alan S. Lowenthal for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. During the hearing, you mentioned that you would
    provide investigation statistics regarding crew training on uninspected
    and inspected passenger vessels. Please provide those statistics.
        Answer. Reportable Marine Casualties (RMCs) involving U.S. flag
    Passenger Vessels (inspected and uninspected), 2017-2019

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     RMCs where Training was identified as a
                                                  Causal Factor
                                   -----------------------------------------
                                        2017          2018          2019
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Passenger Vessels (Inspected).           17            14             8
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Passenger Vessels                         1             4             1
     (Uninspected)................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Questions from Hon. Stacey E. Plaskett for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. While vessels sailing internationally are generally
    required to carry out-of-water survival craft, the Coast Guard has
    previously reviewed such a requirement for certain small vessels and
    determined that such vessels operating in certain environments do not
    need to carry such craft. Coast Guard regulations, under Subchapter W,
    allow for exemptions in situations where the conditions of voyage would
    render specific requirements unreasonable or unnecessary, and in which
    the course of the voyage is less than 20 miles from the nearest land.
        In the U.S. Virgin Islands, international voyages to the British
    Virgin Islands are commonly offered and, in many cases, span less than
    5 miles, and are shorter than a lot of domestic voyages. Meanwhile,
    longer inter-island domestic voyages do not require out-of-water
    survival craft because regulations on these voyages only require such
    craft on vessels operating in cold water.
        Numerous operators in my district have been granted exemption for
    these short international voyages in warm water, but I understand that
    this has only been granted through the end of this year.
        Will the Coast Guard provide risk-based consideration of continued
    requests for status quo treatment under reasonable circumstances?
        Answer. As with all exemption requests, the Coast Guard will
    conduct a comprehensive review of the request. The route, service,
    operations, and regulatory requirements will be thoroughly examined to
    ensure accurate risk analysis. Based on the risk appraisal, the Coast
    Guard will make a determination.

       Questions from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal for Rear Admiral Richard V.
      Timme, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. What additional steps could be taken to ensure that
    passenger vessels are safer in light of recent insides like the
    CONCEPTION and ISLAND LADY?
        Answer. Shortly after the passenger vessel CONCEPTION casualty, the
    Coast Guard (1) released Marine Safety Information Bulletin guidance to
    owners and operators of passenger vessels with overnight accommodations
    to review their own operations and to reinforce items of concern found
    during the initial stages of the investigation; and (2) initiated a
    nationwide vessel inspection campaign (including over 350 vessels) to
    review overnight accommodations spaces, fire safety and electrical
    installations. The nationwide campaign resulted in the issuance and
    correction of deficiencies with a focus on operating conditions, fire
    safety and escape routes.
        Additionally, the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy
    directed the creation of a task force to analyze the inspection data
    and implement enhancements to the small passenger vessel compliance
    program.

        Question 2. The NTSB believes the Coast Guard could be doing more
    to improve safety on small passenger vessels. Do you concur with the
    NTSB's recommendations increase safety regulations to required enhanced
    fire detection, protection and suppression technologies required on
    Passenger Vessels and require two routes of escape from passenger
    accommodations?
        Answer. The Coast Guard carefully considers National Transportation
    Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations through a deliberate process that
    involves multiple layers of review by subject matter experts and senior
    leaders responsible for implementing the potential policy and
    regulatory changes.
        Related to the passenger vessel CONCEPTION marine casualty, the
    Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation and NTSB are still conducting
    thorough and detailed investigations to determine the causal factors
    associated with this tragedy. Each agency will conduct an independent
    analysis of all the evidence and propose appropriate recommendations to
    improve passenger vessel safety.
        If the vessel's construction and equipment standards, or regulatory
    regime, are determined to be contributing factors, the Coast Guard will
    consider updates at that time as appropriate.

        Question 3. What is the current role of firefighting training on
    small passenger vessels and should firefighting training for all crew
    onboard play more of a role on small passenger vessels?
        Answer. To obtain a merchant mariner credential, small passenger
    vessel officers are required to demonstrate knowledge of firefighting
    during required exams. Additionally, the officer and non-credentialed
    crew (if any) are required to be familiar with a vessel's
    characteristics before they assume duties and responsibilities on a
    vessel, including the proper operation of the installed firefighting
    equipment.
        The main goal of firefighting on small passenger vessels is to
    ensure passengers remain safe on board or when abandoning the vessel.
    Establishing additional requirements for standardized hands-on
    firefighting training for the small passenger vessel industry would be
    challenging due to the varied construction and layout of vessels in
    this fleet.

      Questions from Hon. Chris Pappas for Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme,
          Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. As you know, offshore wind energy facilities along the
    Atlantic Coast are developing rapidly. We anticipate that several major
    projects on the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf will have steel in the
    water as early as next year. The Coast Guard's Office of Marine
    Transportation Systems has initiated a rulemaking project to establish
    an Atlantic Coast fairway based on recommendations within the 2017
    Atlantic Coast Port Access Route Study (ACPARS), a comprehensive
    analysis of the navigational and maritime safety impact of offshore
    wind projects planned off the Atlantic Coast. I also understand that
    the Coast Guard is actively engaged in discussions with BOEM to ensure
    that the proposed fairway preserves safe navigation lanes, and the
    Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 requires the Coast Guard to
    report back to Congress on its progress in implementing the ACPARS
    recommendations. Can you provide an update on how the Coast Guard is
    ensuring that the Atlantic Coast fairway rulemaking is released as soon
    as possible?
        Answer. The Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ``Shipping
    Safety Fairways Along the Atlantic Coast,'' was determined to be a high
    priority rulemaking project in September 2018. The rulemaking project
    is moving forward and currently under departmental review before
    entering interagency review.

    Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno,
       U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), Senior Vice President of Global Maritime
                 Policy, Cruise Lines International Association

        Question 1. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) of
    2010 was intended to introduce tighter security regulations and crime
    reporting requirements.
        While the CVSSA was a good start to tackle these issues, we
    continue to hear tragic stories from victims that shed light on the
    need for additional action. For example, while CVSSA mandated new
    requirements for cruise ships to report crimes to the FBI to provide
    for greater transparency to the public, there remain a number of issues
    that lead to underreporting of crimes.
        How soon is the FBI notified after a crime occurs?
        Answer. Allegations of serious incidents as identified in the CVSSA
    must be reported to the nearest FBI Field Office or Legal Attache by
    telephone as soon as possible. These provisions of the CVSSA were
    supported by the cruise industry as the law was being developed and
    reflect an earlier (2007) voluntary agreement between the industry and
    the FBI. In addition to those legal requirements, CLIA cruise lines
    have additionally agreed to and implemented a mandatory crime reporting
    policy which makes reporting allegations of serious crime to local law
    enforcement applicable worldwide.

        Question 2. Who gets to determine how a crime is categorized? The
    victim of the crime or a cruise ship employee?
        Answer. Crimes are categorized based upon how they are reported and
    conform to federal statutory definitions and the FBl's Uniform Crime
    Reporting program. All allegations are reported and thereby become
    subject to FBI investigations.

        Question 3. What actions have CLIA and its members taken to ensure
    that accurate and timely information regarding crimes onboard cruise
    ships is promptly conveyed to relevant federal agencies? What
    additional actions can be taken to improve these efforts?
        Answer. CLIA member policies underscore the need to report all
    allegations of serious crimes to the FBI and other law enforcement
    authorities, the vessel's flag state and other appropriate shoreside
    authorities. Implementation of CLIA Policies is a condition of
    membership and is certified annually by the CEO of each member cruise
    line. Security policy provisions are incorporated into the ship's
    Safety Management System (SMS) and subject to internal and third party
    auditing. The CVSSA imposes civil and criminal fines and penalties for
    non-compliance. CLIA is unaware of any prosecution of any cruise line
    member for violating the crime reporting requirements.

        Question 4. What actions have CLIA and its members taken to ensure
    that timely, accurate and accessible information regarding crimes
    aboard cruise ships is provided to the general public? What more can be
    done to improve public information efforts?
        Answer. CLIA members are required by the CVSSA, and as a condition
    of membership in CLIA, to report allegations of serious crimes as soon
    as possible. In accordance with the modifications to the CVSSA in 2014,
    all allegations of serious crimes are publicly reported on the
    Department of Transportation website; DOT publishes the crime
    statistics quarterly broken down by each cruise line. To further inform
    the interested public, CLIA provides a link on its website to a report
    produced by Dr James Fox of Northeastern University, which compares
    crime rates on cruise ships to those of comparably sized cities. Cruise
    ships are demonstrably safer in all categories analyzed: Homicides (119
    x safer), Sexual assault (3 x safer), and Aggravated Assault (130 x
    safer). Cruise lines must also provide a link on their websites to the
    DOT reporting data.

        Question 5. In your testimony you state that operational incidents
    have declined by 35% but also state that it only includes fires,
    groundings, collisions, los of propulsion and persons overboard, but do
    not state that it includes incidents of crime such as sexual assault.
    Recent articles by the Washington Post and Business Insider suggest an
    increasing trend of incidents of sexual assaults being reported on
    Cruise Vessels.
        How is the Cruise industry working to reduce these instances of
    sexual assault and protect passengers?
        Answer. The cruise industry works hard to provide a secure and safe
    environment for all of its guests. Overall, the rate of crime on board
    cruise ships, including sexual assaults, aggravated assaults and
    homicide, is a fraction of that committed on land in comparably sized
    U.S. cities. Looking at sexual assaults specifically, the rate on
    cruise ships occurs at 19.5 per 100,000 persons, compared to 63.8 per
    100,000 on land, or 1/3 the rate on land. Cruise lines security staffs
    work diligently to bring the shipboard rate to zero. Hiring and vetting
    programs reduce the likelihood of employing crewmembers who could pose
    a threat. CLIA also has a specific policy for vetting workers in Youth
    Activity Centers. On most new ships, crew entry into guest rooms for
    daily servicing can be electronically tracked, further reducing the
    likelihood of illegal contact. Company security officers and vessel
    security officers are trained in responding to allegations of criminal
    activity including preservation of evidence and coordination with law
    enforcement authorities. Per CLIA mandatory policy, medical teams must
    follow the guidelines developed by the American College of Emergency
    Physicians (ACEP) and care teams are available to provide emotional
    support to victims. Also, a number of CLIA cruise line members use the
    training and certification services provided by RAINN (Rape, Assault,
    Incest National Network), the nation's largest anti sexual violence
    organization.

        Question 6. What additional crime prevention actions have CLIA and
    its members taken to minimize crime occurring aboard cruise ships since
    implementation of the CVSSA?
        Answer. By policy, CLIA's members have agreed that all passengers
    and crew are to be provided the means and assistance to contact law
    enforcement authorities, even for cruises not otherwise covered by the
    CVSSA. CLIA's members have further agreed that these serious incidents
    are also to be reported to the ship's flag State. Voluntary, industry-
    led cooperative measures have been agreed regionally whereby cruise
    lines distribute security information to passengers and follow
    protocols and reporting practices. One prominent example is the
    Guidelines which have been developed between cruise operators and the
    Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP), to provide a high-level good
    practice guide for reporting and responding to allegations of crimes
    committed on-board cruise ships at sea in this region.

        Question 7. What actions have CLIA and its members taken to
    implement crew training related to crime aboard cruise ships (including
    such things as preservation of a crime scene, collecting evidence and/
    or treatment of crime victims)? Have there been attempts to create an
    industry wide standardization of crime scene preservation or evidence
    collection?
        Answer. CLIA member lines must comply with 46 U.S.C. Sec.  3508 for
    crime scene preservation training for passenger vessel crewmember and
    satisfy applicable MARAD certification requirements. CLIA policy
    further requires member lines to develop training for their crews and
    encourages use of incident scene management training materials prepared
    by the FBI. Topics covered in the FBI materials include: initial
    response, securing the scene, victim assistance, reporting and
    investigation. In 2013, the Legal Committee of the International
    Maritime Organization adopted a proposal which CLIA co-sponsored with
    IMO Member states on international standards for crime reporting,
    cooperation between governments, evidence preservation and pastoral and
    medical care for victims.

        Question 8. What is the status of efforts to improve crew training
    pertaining to crime victims and crime scenes aboard cruise ships? What
    benefits and challenges are associated with the provision of this
    training? Are there industry wide efforts to standardize these
    trainings?
        Answer. (Same as for 6 above.)

        Question 9. What more could be done to enhance the safety and
    security of cruise ship passengers?
        Answer. Cruise lines support an improved risk-based video
    surveillance approach to help ensure ship board awareness of
    potentially unsafe activity and providing forensic capability should an
    allegation of illegal activity occur. The risk-based approach would
    account for demographics (e.g., age), vessel configuration, and
    recognizes that cruises span a wide spectrum from mass appeal to niche
    markets.

        Question 10. By the time the CVSSA was enacted, to its credit, the
    cruise industry had already taken many actions to address the CVSSA's
    expected requirements. However, there are still several pending
    requirements (e.g. related to technology and technology information
    storage and crew training) for which the Coast Guard issued a proposed
    rule in 2015.
        How has the cruise industry been involved in this proposed
    rulemaking? To what extent, if at all, has industry already taken
    action to address the concerns that these proposed rules are expected
    to address?
        Answer. The cruise industry offered comments on the proposed
    rulemaking to the public docket which focused on the state of existing
    technology, and has remained in contact with the Coast Guard regarding
    the progress being made toward the development of a technical standard
    at the International Organization for Standardization.

        Question 11. Going further, the CVSSA calls for the installation of
    man overboard, or MOB, detection systems. Yet, these systems have not
    been fully implemented or really considered by the cruise industry
    often sighting the inaccuracy of the technology.
        In late 2017, MSC Cruises announced its first installation of MOB
    technology onto one of their vessels, the MSC MERAVIGLIA, and its
    intention to retrofit the rest of its vessels with MOB systems.
        What is the progress with this installation and is the technology
    working on this vessel?
        Answer. Detection equipment has been fitted on several cruise
    ships, including by several different cruise lines, on a developmental
    basis. A variety of different detection systems have been evaluated,
    with some performing better than others. One area of concern has been
    the high false alarm rate with this novel technology. The companies
    which have deployed these systems have also been working with CLIA and
    the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the ongoing
    effort to develop technical standards for these systems. So far, the
    ISO has issued a Publicly Available Specification (PAS) to aid in the
    evaluation phase of standard development and is working toward
    publication of an ISO standard for MOB detection equipment.

        Question 12. What are CLIA and its members current views on the use
    and efficacy of overboard technology, and data storage requirements for
    various types of video data? What are the benefits and challenges
    associated with having this technology in place onboard cruise ships?
        Answer. One challenge has been the high false alarm rate associated
    with several of the available systems. As the systems are improved,
    correcting this fault is a major objective. Currently, CLIA member
    lines comply with the requirements of the CVSSA, in that the statute
    allows for video capture in lieu of MOB detection systems, recognizing
    that reliable MOB system technology had yet to be developed.

        Question 13. In light of these developments, why haven't MOB
    systems been deployed more broadly within the cruise industry?
        Answer. CLIA member line ships operating from the US already comply
    with the CVSSA. Most are using video capture technology as allowed by
    the statute. MOB detection technology is improving, and several lines
    have been sharing their practical experiences with the ISO as it
    continues to work towards development of a MOB technical standard.

        Question 14. Would you object to a requirement that there be
    publicly available information on which ships have MOB systems in place
    and if so, why?
        Answer. Cruise ships operating from U.S. ports already comply with
    the provisions of the CVSSA in that they either have MOB detection OR
    video capture capability, as permitted by the statute. We would
    anticipate the number of ships fitted with MOB detection systems will
    increase once the ISO standard is finalized and the market can respond
    with reliable equipment.

        Question 15. Given how few cruise ships actually have MOB systems,
    can you describe the procedure that is followed once a person is
    declared missing on a ship? Is it immediately assumed they have gone
    overboard?
        Answer. Regardless of whether a ship is fitted with an MOB
    detection system, when a person is observed/detected going over the
    side of a ship at sea, the ship's bridge team can be immediately
    alerted and the alarm sounded for crew to prepare the ship for recovery
    of the MOB from the water using well-established procedures in the
    ship's Safety Management System. MOB incidents on cruise ships are the
    unfortunate result of an intentional or reckless act. When the cause of
    the MOB could be established following a careful investigation, it was
    determined to be the unfortunate result of an intentional or reckless
    act.
        From 2009 to 2018, although the number of man overboard incidents
    globally was unchanged, the incidence rate of 0.0000425 overboard
    reports per active lower berth (synonymous with a cabin's bed)
    decreased in 2018 compared to 0.0000657 in 2009 due to a 54.4% increase
    in active lower berths during that same period. During this same
    period, the number of passenger fatalities from man overboard incidents
    decreased from 15 to 13. Crew fatalities remain around the period
    average of five per year, around one in every 50,000 crew serving in
    the fleet at any one time in 2018.
        In 2018, with 28.5 million cruise passengers globally, MOB
    incidents on cruise ships resulted in about one passenger fatality per
    2.19 million cruise passengers annually--or 0.0456 fatalities per
    100,000 cruise passengers annually. By way of comparison, recent data
    from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
    reports the U.S. suicide rate to be 14 events per 100,000 people
    annually. Given the average length of a cruise is about a week, this
    would equate to about 0.27 suicide events per 100,000 people per week.

        Question 16. How much time would you say elapses before such a
    declaration is made and what entity ultimately conducts a search for
    the missing person? The cruise line itself, or Coast Guard?
        Answer. Absent direct observation of an MOB, once it has been
    determined that a person is not accounted for on the vessel,
    notification would be made by ship's bridge team to the responsible
    Rescue Coordination Center. In US waters, plus significant portions of
    the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans, and the Caribbean Sea,
    rescue operations would be coordinated by the U.S. Coast Guard. Cruise
    ships would follow the directions of the RCC/Coast Guard in conducting
    Search and Rescue efforts.

        Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio for Adam W. Moilanen, Vice
    President of Health, Safety, Quality, and Environment, American Bureau
                                  of Shipping

        Question 1. What new safety requirements, if any, has your company
    required to be incorporated into U.S.-flagged commercial vessels'
    safety management system (SMS) since the EL FARO sinking?
        Answer. First, ABS has fully complied with the recommendations of
    the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). ABS has also supported
    the Coast Guard in addressing and implementing the recommendations of
    the Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation and Final Action Memo.
    Further, we have gone above and beyond those recommendations internally
    to improve the safety of the vessels we class, by including new and
    updated training for our surveyors and further enhancing the
    requirements for surveying older vessels.
        It is also important to note that the International Safety
    Management Code (ISM), which sets forth the requirements of the Safety
    Management System (SMS), is an International Maritime Organization
    (IMO) initiative and the requirements contained therein are not driven
    by Classification Societies or Recognized Organizations (ROs). When any
    ISM Code change is made, ABS incorporates that change into its work
    instructions and audit processes, including any specific requirement by
    the Coast Guard.
        Following the EL FARO sinking, ABS did initiate training
    improvements for SMS by requiring all Surveyors and Auditors to
    complete a refresher training course in 2018. The training was enhanced
    in 2019, and all ISM Auditors were required to attend ISM refresher
    training in the first quarter of 2019.
        ABS also piloted an ISM Refresher course for shipowners/operators
    in October 2019. Our Corporate Learning Organization is addressing the
    feedback from this ``pilot'' course. We are now ready for delivery to
    additional shipowners/operators in the first quarter of 2020.
        Further, internal ABS work instructions have been updated,
    including additional guidance to Auditors for major nonconformities. In
    addition to requiring mandatory drills during full scope ISM audits,
    ABS has issued several new job aids which cover fire drills, lifeboat
    drills, enclosed space entry drills, and Guidance Notes on
    cybersecurity during ISM audits. ABS is currently developing an online
    training course to prepare ISM Auditors to verify that cybersecurity
    risks have been addressed in the Safety Management Systems of vessel
    operators for compliance with IMO Resolution MSC. 428 (98), which
    enters into force on January 1, 2021.
        In addition, quarterly meetings are being held between the Coast
    Guard's Officer-in-Charge of Marine Inspection and ABS Surveyors-in-
    Charge in various ports and sectors. ABS Surveyor meetings are held on
    a monthly basis in each port to discuss survey and audit issues.
        With regards to the Alternate Compliance Program (ACP), there are
    quarterly meetings at the headquarters level between Coast Guard, ABS
    Engineering, and ABS Operations to review ACP performance, including
    engineering, survey/inspection and audit issues.
        ABS has provided additional ACP training that addresses the latest
    ACP Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular and Supplement. The
    Supplement captures critical standards and certain operational
    requirements in Coast Guard regulations that are not adequately
    addressed in IMO instruments or the RO's Rules, and to provide any
    additional Flag Administration interpretations where necessary. To
    date, 382 ABS Surveyors have completed this training.
        Specifically, in order to document a vessel's condition, at each
    Annual Survey of a vessel 10 years of age and older, an additional ABS
    requirement has been implemented whereas the Surveyor is to take
    approximately 25 representative photos, including the following areas
    to support the annual survey report: Fire Dampers, Cable Penetrations,
    Load Line items including watertight closures, Air Pipes, Vents,
    Machinery space condition, Bilges, and Life Saving Appliances and
    Firefighting equipment.
        Lastly, ABS supported the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in
    evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of Safety Management
    System (SMS) plans for U.S.-flag vessels. This review was mandated by
    the Hamm Alert Maritime Safety Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-265) which asked
    GAO to evaluate Coast Guard's oversight of SMS plans, and review SMS
    plans for a range of vessel types and sizes. ABS facilitated this
    effort at the request of the GAO by requesting copies of the SMS
    manuals from selected U.S. vessel operators for onward transmittal to
    the GAO. ABS and the GAO then held meetings to discuss questions
    related to the SMS review and audit process.

        Question 2. To what extent has your company amended its SMS plan
    review procedures to verify compliance with the new safety requirements
    since the EL FARO sinking?
        Answer. See the response to No. 1 above. In addition, ABS internal
    work instructions for U.S.-flag ISM Code were amended in 2018 to
    include the Coast Guard's interpretations of the ISM Code.
        As stated earlier, there are quarterly meetings between the Coast
    Guard, ABS Engineering and ABS Survey Operations (including ISM
    auditing) to review ACP performance, including engineering, survey/
    inspection and audit issues. Coast Guard concerns, if any, are
    discussed and actions taken as appropriate. Similarly, ABS seeks
    clarifications on Coast Guard positions/interpretations on the ISM Code
    implementation (e.g. advance audit notification requirements to the
    Coast Guard, Coast Guard expectations on implementation of IMO Guidance
    documents, etc.). These clarifications are then implemented within the
    ABS work instructions for Surveyors, Auditors and Engineers to follow.

        Question 3. What controls, if any, does your company have in place
    to ensure that reviews of SMS plans are sufficiently thorough and
    verify that required safety elements/issues are addressed in the SMS
    plans?
        Answer. The main controls that ABS has put in place include the
    following:
          Selection of Surveyors/Auditors and Engineers is carried
    out per documented procedures (which includes requirements for minimum
    technical and industry experience).
          Classroom, web-based and on-the-job training is required
    for all Surveyors, Auditors and Engineers.
          100% report review by an experienced Surveyor/Auditor,
    and 100% task review by an experienced Engineer, are required for all
    design reviews.
          Internal audits are required, that include sampling SMS
    work activity.
          External audits (by the Coast Guard and other external
    entities) are required, which include sampling SMS work activity.
          Port State Control inspectors do inspect SMS during
    onboard inspections.
          Activity monitoring is carried out on 100% of all
    Surveyors, Auditors, and Engineers.

        Question 4. In your testimony you mentioned ABS performs internal
    and external audits. What additional controls, if any, does your
    company have in place to ensure that your company's inspections of U.S-
    flagged commercial vessels are sufficiently thorough and verify that
    required safety elements/issues are addressed? How does your company
    limit the possibility of an inherent conflict of interest during
    inspections and ensure that a fair, unbiased inspection is completed?
        Answer. In addition to those items detailed in item #1 to #3 above,
    the following have been put inplace:
          ABS requires that all Surveyors attending repairs of main
    propulsion boilers must be also certified for boiler surveys effective
    February 1, 2018.
          As of February 1, 2018, for Special Periodical Survey No.
    5 and subsequent surveys, the Principal Surveyor/Surveyor-in-Charge is
    to take part in the Special Survey of all self-propelled vessels, other
    than yachts, to confirm that the survey has been properly carried out
    and reported upon as required by the Rules.
          As of February 1, 2018, for U. S. Flagged vessels
    enrolled in ACP or Maritime Security Programs (MSP or MSP Select) that
    reach 10 years of age, ABS requires two qualified Surveyors to attend
    each subsequent annual survey and special survey.
          ABS has confirmed to the Coast Guard that ABS will have
    Surveyors available to attend Advanced Journeyman training at Yorktown.
    ABS has not been invited to attend these courses as of this date.
          ABS has sent a total of eight Surveyors to the Coast
    Guard's Steam Propulsion Course. An ABS Surveyor is now one of the
    instructors.
          ABS has been reconfirming the accuracy of the data
    contained in each vessel survey status and the details for the Load
    Line assignment (form LL-11-D).
          ABS requires all Surveyors to complete an annual web-
    based training course on statutory regulation and ABS Rule changes.
          Training presentations on the Coast Guard's ACP, MSP, and
    MSP Select are given to the ABS Special Committee and Ship Operations.
          ABS worked with IACS to require, starting at Special
    Survey No. 3 and subsequent Special Surveys, that structural down
    flooding ducts and structural ventilation ducts are to be internally
    examined as per the current version of IACS Unified Requirement UR Z7.
          A comprehensive review and update of the ACP Supplement
    and ABS check sheets has been completed.
          ABS continues to support the Coast Guard's efforts in
    developing a single US Supplement applicable to all ACP Vessels,
    including critical safety items.
          ABS has a ``Targeted Ship List'' (TSL) that allows ABS to
    identify and follow-up on vessels not considered to be satisfactorily
    maintained between surveys. Items that typically are identified include
    lack of maintenance on hull structure, main and essential auxiliary
    machinery, load-line items, safety equipment, oil pollution prevention
    equipment, etc. The objective of placing vessels on the TSL is to
    require the vessel's owner to maintain and improve the quality of their
    fleet. In 2019, ABS had 20 U.S. flagged vessels on our Targeted Ship
    List.
          ABS has implemented ABS Freedom, which includes improved
    controls within the workflow. ABS Freedom is the internal workflow
    application that all ABS Surveyors/Auditors use to complete and
    document their surveys/inspections and audits.
          The ABS Rule Change process has been enhanced to speed up
    the time that ABS can implement ABS Rule changes.

        ABS conducted two Regional Lead Auditor meetings in 2019 to address
    audit activity related matters and to improve performance.
        The Coast Guard is notified of all audits of U.S.-flag companies
    and vessels. Many of these audits are observed by the Coast Guard
    travelling inspectors and local Coast Guard staff.
        Regarding the possibility of conflicts of interest, there are
    numerous controls in place to address this possibility.
        First, ABS is a non-profit organization created with a Mission to
    protect life, property and the environment. As a non-profit, ABS does
    not have incentives to sacrifice quality or provide less than thorough
    professional and ethical services.
        Second, ABS uses a system of Principal Surveyors-in-Charge and Area
    Managers to provide support to the Surveyors/Auditors during surveys
    and audits. This is in addition to survey departments in each
    hemisphere that can provide detailed interpretations and guidance for
    policies and Rules and Regulations to the Surveyor/Auditor. Certain
    surveys require two Surveyors, which reduces the potential for conflict
    of interest and provides consistent application of the Rules/
    Regulations.
        Furthermore, the controls noted above such as internal and external
    audits, Flag State Inspections and Port State Control help to ensure
    that ABS conducts its activities in accordance with its Rules, with
    international standards, and with all Coast Guard guidance and
    requirements. The Coast Guard's oversight of ABS includes engineering
    design review activities, survey and audit activities, and involvement
    during external audits, too.
        Finally, ABS also has a Code of Ethics and a robust ethics and
    compliance program to manage any potential conflicts. All employees are
    required to conduct an annual review and acknowledgement of the
    Conflict of Interest. Each work order assigned requires the surveyor or
    auditor to confirm no conflict of interest.

        Question 5. Does your company track the results of SMS plan reviews
    and vessel inspections for internal control purposes and to determine
    the compliance rate of your clients? If so, what do those compliance
    data show in terms of compliance rates for (a) SMS plan reviews and (b)
    vessel inspections in recent years?
        Answer. As noted above, ABS does carry out a 100% review of our SMS
    activities.
        The results of SMS review and vessel inspections are recorded in
    the ABS reporting system to which the Coast Guard has access. Findings
    are recorded as ``major nonconformities, nonconformities and
    observations''. IACS procedures and Coast Guard instructions for
    handling these findings, including corrective action plans, are
    followed. No ISM certificate is issued or endorsed with an unresolved
    major nonconformity. The Coast Guard is notified when a major
    nonconformity is issued, or ABS has significant concern with the
    client's SMS implementation.
        Actual data from January 1, 2018 through November 7, 2019 shows
    that:
        a)  Of a total number of 329 Document of Compliance (DOC) audits
    (e.g. corporate audits) of U.S. flag operators' SMS, there were 188
    audits with no nonconformities. Those companies with audit
    nonconformities were documented and tracked for corrective action(s),
    as appropriate.
        b)  Of a total number of 1132 U.S. flag vessel SMC audits, there
    were 830 audits with no nonconformities. Those vessels with audit
    nonconformities were documented and tracked for corrective action(s),
    as appropriate.
        c)  All major nonconformities and nonconformities are documented
    and tracked until each one is followed up for confirmation of being
    fully resolved.

        Question 6. Are there any changes to vessel safety requirements or
    the processes used by the Coast Guard or ROs to enforce the
    requirements that warrant being amended to make them more efficient
    and/or effective?
        Answer. ABS maintains a commitment to continual improvement and is
    always open to additional improvements and opportunities to enhance the
    overall processes and work that we carry out.
        ABS is constantly updating our Rules and Guides based on feedback
    from the industry, ABS Technical Committees and ABS staff, as well as
    requirements from the Coast Guard, other Flag States and IACS. ABS also
    updates our internal quality system instructions to improve the
    guidance to Surveyors/Auditors and Engineers as result of survey and
    audit feedback, requirements from IMO and requests from individual flag
    administrations on whose behalf ABS conducts survey and audits. The
    purpose of these changes is to improve safety and to address the latest
    technology.
        In addition, ABS works within IACS at all levels to provide IMO
    proposed amendments and improvements to international conventions.
        Based upon this robust structure and improvements to date, no other
    changes have been identified at this time.

       Questions from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal for Colleen Stephens, Vice
                    President, Passenger Vessel Association

        Question 1. The NTSB believes the Coast Guard could be doing more
    to improve safety on small passenger vessels. Do you concur with the
    NTSB's recommendations increase safety regulations to required enhanced
    fire detection, protection and suppression technologies required on
    Passenger Vessels and require two routes of escape from passenger
    accommodations?
        Answer. The Passenger Vessel Association works closely with the
    National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB's Director of Marine
    Safety, at our invitation, will make a presentation at PVA's Annual
    Convention in Tampa this coming first week of February. In the past,
    when NTSB has made safety recommendations to PVA, our organization has
    responded appropriately, and the NTSB has classified PVA's actions as
    ``satisfactory.'' In fact, in one instance, the NTSB advised PVA that
    ``Your efforts exceed the level of implementation we expected for
    Safety Recommendation M-16-28, which is classified CLOSED--EXCEEDS
    RECOMMENDED ACTION.''
        PVA wishes the subcommittee to understand that while a relatively
    few of its members operate vessels with overnight accommodations for
    passengers, most of the membership does not. Of the no more than three
    dozen PVA vessels with overnight accommodations, nearly all have the
    passenger cabins above deck (not below deck, as was the case with the
    Conception, operated by a company not a member of PVA).
        With respect to the issues of two routes of escape from passenger
    accommodations, this is already required by Coast Guard regulations.
    For example, section 177.500 (``Means of Escape'') of title 46 Code of
    Federal Regulations reads: ``(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
    section, each space accessible to passengers or used by the crew on a
    regular basis, must have at least two means of escape, one of which
    must not be a watertight door. (b) The two required means of escape
    must be widely separated and, if possible, at opposite ends or sides of
    the space to minimize the possibility of one incident blocking both
    escapes.'' This regulation applies to a small passenger vessel of less
    than 100 gross tons with a passenger capacity of no more than 150 or
    with overnight accommodations for no more than 49 passengers (commonly
    referred to as a subchapter T vessel). Section 116.500 of title 46 Code
    of Federal Regulations has a similar requirement for a small passenger
    vessel of less than 100 gross tons with a passenger capacity of more
    than 150 or with overnight accommodations for more than 49 passengers
    (commonly referred to as a subchapter K vessel).
        PVA will gladly work with the Subcommittee and the Coast Guard for
    enhanced requirements regarding (1) the use of rechargeable devices on
    passenger-carrying vessels; (2) interconnected fire detection devices;
    and (3) monitoring devices for the required night watch on a vessel
    with overnight accommodations. In addition, PVA suggests a mandate for
    a monthly fire drill during the vessel's operating season. The current
    Coast Guard rule calls for quarterly firefighting training, as well as
    before a new crew member assumes his or her responsibilities. The Coast
    Guard would be charged to ensure that this enhanced training
    requirement is adhered to. The new crew member requirement should be
    retained as well.
        To ensure safety on U.S. passenger vessels and small passenger
    vessels, it is absolutely essential that the Coast Guard's safety
    functions be preserved. PVA reminds the Subcommittee that in 2007
    Chairmen Oberstar and Cummings convened a hearing to press the Coast
    Guard to reinvigorate its marine safety mission and resources, which
    had been allowed to deteriorate as the Coast Guard emphasized security
    after the 2001 terrorist attacks. Then-Commandant Thad Allen promised
    corrective action, and the result was the action plan entitled
    Enhancing the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program. After its issuance,
    things improved. However, PVA encourages this Subcommittee to review
    the objectives of Enhancing the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program.
    Are they still being met? Specifically, are the goals for the number of
    marine inspector billets being filled? With the intervening advent of
    the inspection program for thousands of towing vessels (subchapter M),
    does the number of marine inspector billets need to be increased? Has
    Congress appropriated enough funds to fill all required billets in the
    marine safety mission?

        Question 2. What measures does PVA take to encourage members to
    follow and go above current safety requirements set in place by the
    Coast Guard?
        Answer. PVA has developed and makes available to its vessel-
    operating members a Safety Management System (SMS) tailored to U.S.-
    flagged passenger vessels of all types, sizes, and routes. We call it
    FLAGSHIP. PVA conferred regularly with the U.S. Coast Guard as we
    developed FLAGSHIP, and Coast Guard officers participated in some
    drafting sessions that led up to production of the document. In June
    2017, the Coast Guard's Director of Inspections and Compliance
    characterized FLAGSHIP as a ``remarkable achievement'' and advised PVA
    that ``Flagship SMS meets the objectives and functional requirements
    for a SMS as per 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 96, and this
    voluntary program can be accepted by the Coast Guard as it endeavors to
    enhance regulatory compliance and safety on domestic passenger
    vessels.'' Please see the attached letter.
        In addition, PVA has produced other safety-related materials for
    use by its members. These include:
        1.  On-line training portal on which safety and security training
    materials are posted;
        2.  Five safety training manuals with videos, addressing the topics
    of firefighting; lifesaving equipment; line handling; preventing slips,
    trips, and falls; and personal safety;
        3.  Preventative maintenance checklists and guidance documents;
        4.  A template for those members who must have a Coast Guard-
    approved Nontank Vessel Response Plan;
        5.  A Coast Guard-approved Alternate Security Plan which can be
    used by PVA members to satisfy their obligations under the Maritime
    Transportation Safety Act (MTSA);
        6.  Rail jumper guidance;
        7.  Crew drug testing tools;
        8.  A white paper focusing on mitigating ``slips, trips, and
    falls'' aboard passenger vessels;
        9.  Numerous speakers and panels on safety issues at PVA's Annual
    National Convention and its five region meetings each fall. For
    example, at its upcoming Annual Convention in Tampa in early February,
    we have several presentations by senior Coast Guard officials and the
    head of the National Transportation Safety Board's marine division. In
    addition, there will be extensive information about conducting active
    shooter drills; and
        10.  Regular articles on safety topics in PVA's monthly magazine
    FOGHORN. See the attached article about the Subcommittee's recent
    hearing and the statement by PVA's witness, Colleen Stephens of Valdez,
    Alaska.

        Question 3. Does PVA provide supplemental safety training to its
    members in addition to required training?
        Answer. Please see the discussion to the question above about our
    extensive outreach to members on safety topics. While PVA does not
    conduct formal safety classes itself, our associate members have
    recently provided training and education on safety management systems.
    Additionally, last fall local Coast Guard units provided damage control
    training to our members at two of our region meetings.

        Question 4. Safety Management Systems, which include details
    ranging from safely conducting day-to-day operations to procedures for
    emergencies, drills, and training, are required by the US Code for
    certain classes of vessels. What is the current and future role and
    importance of Safety Management Systems in small passenger vessels and
    how they could improve vessel safety?
        Answer. Under current law, most U.S.-flagged vessels that operate
    on foreign voyages must have a Safety Management System that meets the
    criteria set out in section 3203(a) of title 46 United States Code.
    This requirement embraces a passenger-carrying vessel with a capacity
    more than 12 passengers. This statutory provision is how the U.S.
    implements the requirements of the International Safety Management
    (ISM) Code.
        In addition, in section 610 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of
    2010 (Public Law 111-281 ), Congress directed the Coast Guard to
    implement a rule that requires an appropriate SMS for certain
    passenger-carrying vessels in domestic service. See Sections 3202(b)
    and 3203(c) of title 46 United States Code. The Secretary of the
    department in which the Coast Guard is operating is to determine which
    domestic passenger-carrying vessels are to be subject to the SMS
    mandate based on ``the number of individuals on the vessel that could
    be killed or injured in a marine casualty.'' In developing the
    regulation, the Secretary is to consider ``(1) the characteristics,
    methods of operation, and nature of the service of these vessels; and
    (2) with respect to vessels that are ferries, the sizes of the ferry
    systems within with the vessels operate.''
        The Coast Guard has yet to issue a rule implementing section 610 of
    Public Law 111-281. With the availability of the FLAGSHIP SMS
    (discussed above), PVA believes that it and its members are well-
    positioned to comply with an eventual final rule on SMS for vessels
    within the domestic passenger fleet.
        As noted above, section 610 of Public Law 111-281 provides broad
    authority as to what domestic passenger vessels should be covered by
    the eventual SMS rule. However, PVA does not believe that it is
    necessary or efficient for every inspected domestic passenger vessel to
    have an SMS. Keep in mind that SMS represents an effort to ``go
    beyond'' regulatory requirements for vessel safety. Many domestic
    vessels are authorized to carry only limited numbers of passengers (in
    many cases, as few as 6), and their crews may consist of only a captain
    (frequently) the owner and a part-time mate. For such vessels, an SMS
    requirement is likely to be regulatory overkill.
        PVA recommends that the Subcommittee exert its efforts to seeing
    that the Coast Guard promptly finalizes a rule implementing section 610
    of the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act. Perhaps the leaders of the
    Subcommittee could send a letter to the Coast Guard Commandant
    emphasizing the importance of completing this regulatory project. If
    the Congress were to consider a legislative response, PVA offers the
    following possible statutory language:

            ``SEC.__. EXPEDITIOUS RULEMAKING FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.

            The Congress directs the Secretary of the Department in which
            the Coast Guard is operating to expeditiously finalize the
            required rulemaking on Safety Management System for certain
            passenger vessels and small passenger vessels, pursuant to
            section 610 of Public Law 111-281, the Coast Guard
            Authorization Act of 2010 (Title 46 section 3202(b) of United
            States Code).''

                                   __________

                     Attachments to Ms. Stephens Responses

                                     letter
                                                         June 12, 2017.
    Passenger Vessel Association
    Attn: Mr. John Groundwater
    103 Oronoco Street, Suite 200, Alexandria, VA 22314
        Dear Mr. Groundwater:
        This letter is a follow-up to my letter dated April 21, 2017, which
    was in response to your letter dated December 20, 2016, seeking review
    and acceptance of PVA's ``Flagship Safety Management System (SMS) for
    Members of the Passenger Vessel Association.'' The U.S. Coast Guard
    completed its review and has determined that Flagship SMS meets the
    objectives and functional requirements for a SMS as per 33 Code of
    Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 96, and this voluntary program can be
    accepted by the Coast Guard as it endeavors to enhance regulatory
    compliance and safety on domestic passenger vessels.
        With the recognition of Flagship by the Coast Guard, it is worth
    noting that external third party safety audits are not required under
    this program; however, if a participating company schedules an external
    audit, external auditing personnel shall be independent of the company
    being audited. Both external and internal audit results, and associated
    documentation, may be examined by the local Officer In Charge, Marine
    Inspection (OCMI) to help determine the effective implementation of
    Flagship.
        In addition, Flagship will be recognized and considered by the
    local OCMIs when carrying out the Coast Guard's risk-based decision
    making (RBDM) policy letter for small passenger vessels (CVC Policy
    Letter 16-05 (series)); and in particular when determining the proper
    scope for a vessel's annual inspection. It is important to point out
    that it is our intention that vessels with a history of being in
    substantial compliance with the regulations will be eligible for a
    reduced scope inspection, and a vessel's enrollment in a CG recognized
    SMS, such as Flagship, should improve the OCMI's factorization with the
    RBDM policy.
        This represents a significant milestone and I commend you, your
    staff, and members of the Flagship Working Group on this remarkable
    accomplishment, and look forward to our continued work on the
    development of policies and procedures that will enhance passenger
    vessel safety. It is also worth acknowledging this as an important
    first step in instilling a culture of safety industry wide, and I
    greatly value PVA's partnership and commitment to achieving this common
    goal.
        If you have any questions concerning this matter, please feel free
    to contact Captain Matt Edwards, Chief of the Office of Commercial
    Vessel Compliance (CG-CVC).
            Sincerely,
                                                  J.F. Williams
                                              Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
                                 Director of Inspections and Compliance
                                                           By direction

                                   __________
                                    article
        [The artcle entitled ``Passenger Vessel Casualties Prompt
    Congressional Legislation,'' by Ed Welch, PVA legislative director, is
    retained in committee files and appears below. It is also available
    online in the January/February 2020 issue of Foghorn Magazine on pages
    42-43 at http://foghornmagazine.com/issues/2020/0120_FH_flipbook/
    ?page=42 and http://foghornmagazine.com/issues/2020/0120_FH_flipbook/
    ?page=43]

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