    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 116-62]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

      SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                        REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                         STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

                         FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS

                        DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                               FEBRUARY 11, 2020

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    40-509                 WASHINGTON : 2020

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                   JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman

    RICK LARSEN, Washington              ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii                RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    RO KHANNA, California                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    JASON CROW, Colorado, Vice Chair     DON BACON, Nebraska
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JIM BANKS, Indiana
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
                    Bess Dopkeen, Professional Staff Member
                   Eric Snelgrove, Professional Staff Member
                             Caroline Kehrli, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
      Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
      Capabilities...................................................     1
    Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
      Capabilities...................................................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Office
      of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
      Sustainment....................................................     8
    Shaffer, Hon. Alan R., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
      Acquisition and Sustainment and Acting Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs,
      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
      Sustainment....................................................     5
    Szymanski, VADM Timothy G., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
      Operations Command.............................................     7
    Whelan, Theresa M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Office of the
      Under Secretary of Defense for Policy..........................     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Langevin, Hon. James R.......................................    27
        Oxford, Vayl.................................................    64
        Shaffer, Hon. Alan R.........................................    40
        Szymanski, VADM Timothy G....................................    53
        Whelan, Theresa M............................................    29

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Ms. Houlahan.................................................    89

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
                   REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,

                  POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS

                    OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
         Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and
                                                  Capabilities,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 11, 2020.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:39 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
    Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
     FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
                   EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

        Mr. Langevin. The hearing will come to order. I want to
    welcome everyone to today's hearing on reviewing the Department
    of Defense strategy, policy, and programs for countering
    weapons of mass destruction.''
        Before we get started, I want to introduce and thank our
    four witnesses before us for their contributions on this
    important issue: first, Ms. Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
    Security in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy; the Honorable Al Shaffer, Deputy Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the current Acting
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs; Vice Admiral Timothy Szymanski,
    the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command,
    now the coordinating authority for CWMD [Countering Weapons of
    Mass Destruction]; and last but not least, Mr. Vayl Oxford,
    Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
        Welcome to everyone.
        Over the past few years, both Russia and North Korea have
    employed chemical weapons and nerve agents. In Syria, pro-
    regime and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] forces use
    chemical weapons on civilian populations to achieve their
    tactical and strategic objectives.
        Advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and gene
    editing are rapidly changing the playing field to allow
    countries and individuals acting with nefarious intent, or even
    just by chance, to produce biological agents in a scope and
    scale not yet encountered.
        And adversaries are working on the development of
    hypersonic weapons to deliver warheads faster, possibly faster
    than our ability to counter them.
        All of these advances are exacerbating the complexity of
    the world's WMD threats.
        Indeed, the current coronavirus outbreak and global panic
    underscores how important scientific research and preparedness
    across the interagency is for our national and economic
    security.
        Our four witnesses hold positions that comprise the bulk of
    the Department's assigned roles and responsibilities associated
    with aligning CWMD policy and strategy and programs, executing
    those programs, delivering current and future personal
    protective equipment and other capabilities to our warfighters,
    and eliminating our remaining U.S. stockpiles of lethal
    chemical agents.
        So I am told that our witnesses have been directed by the
    Office of Management and Budget not to speak today to the
    fiscal year 2021 President's budget request, despite this
    hearing taking place after the budget was released yesterday.
    For the record, I am deeply disappointed by this directive,
    which violates longstanding precedent regarding congressional
    oversight. We have much to oversee on policy, programs, and
    strategy, and that oversight will be limited without a full
    understanding of the fiscal year 2021 budget request.
        I look forward to hearing about the Department's activities
    to manage and counter the threat of a drastically morphing CWMD
    landscape.
        This year, we tasked GAO [Government Accountability Office]
    to review the preparedness of U.S. forces to counter North
    Korean chemical and biological weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
    GAO has already highlighted many unsettling issues.
        Most pressingly, we questioned whether U.S. Forces Korea
    planners have access to the relevant intelligence on North
    Korean chemical and biological weapon sites needed to
    effectively plan and, if necessary, conduct counter-WMD
    operations.
        I am deeply concerned that our preparedness for a
    significant state-level WMD event is wholly inadequate. We owe
    it to the men and women in uniform to ensure that they are
    trained and equipped to successfully operate and perform in a
    contaminated environment.
        In closing, there is much work to be done to strengthen
    CWMD policy, programs, and preparedness. This includes
    understanding the 2014 strategy in the context of today's
    threat landscape, the budget request alignment to the current
    strategy, and how the Department's strategy and end states are
    consistent with the national-level strategy and whole-of-
    government effort.
        So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and note
    that following this discussion we will move to a closed,
    classified session.
        So, with that, before we turn to the witnesses, I would now
    want to turn to Ranking Member Stefanik for any comments she
    may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
    Appendix on page 27.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
    YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING
                        THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Langevin.
        And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
        The intent of this first subcommittee posture hearing of
    the new year is to review the Department's strategy, policy,
    and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction. As I
    have stated previously, while the DOD [Department of Defense]
    faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose
    sight of the critically important mission of countering weapons
    of mass destruction.
        This is especially true given recent events, as we respond
    and contain the global impacts of the coronavirus outbreak.
    This evolving threat should serve as a reminder for how
    important our involvement is in this arena, through activities
    like the Biological Threat Reduction Program; nuclear,
    chemical, and biological preparedness plans; crisis response
    exercises; and the development of sound policy that guides our
    collective response to these types of events.
        And, most importantly, it should serve as a reminder that
    events of this magnitude require a whole-of-government
    response, not limited to just the four DOD organizations
    represented here today, but inclusive of HHS [Department of
    Health and Human Services], the CDC [Centers for Disease
    Control and Prevention], DHS [Department of Homeland Security],
    State Department, and State and local officials. The
    relationships that you build with these agencies and the
    repetitions in times of peace will underpin the effectiveness
    of your partnerships in times of crisis.
        I appreciate the relentless efforts of the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency; USSOCOM [United States Special Operations
    Command]; OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy;
    Acquisition and Sustainment; and countless other organizations
    to prevent, prepare, and respond to CWMD events around the
    globe.
        While our collective conscience hopes that these weapons
    will never be used to wage war in the future, we need only look
    to the Syrian, North Korean, and Russian regimes for proof that
    this is not the reality of the world we live in. The pursuit,
    proliferation, and potential use of weapons of mass destruction
    remains a high-consequence threat that we must plan for.
        Finally, I am interested to hear from our witnesses today
    how recent efforts to streamline and provide additional
    leadership and accountability to this problem have matured.
        I am also interested in any lessons learned from the
    Department's response and contributions to the coronavirus
    efforts and how these insights are evolving our CWMD posture
    and our view of the criticality of the domestic industrial base
    and the Strategic National Stockpile.
        And while I know we are not going into specific fiscal year
    2021 budget numbers today, I ask each of the witnesses to
    highlight any specific interest items relevant to the
    discussion today that the committee should be focused on during
    our reviews of the President's budget request.
        Thank you to our witnesses, and I yield back to the
    chairman.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member Stefanik.
        And we will now hear from the witnesses and then move into
    a question-and-answer session after that.
        I thank all of you for the contributions you are making to
    our national security.
        And, with that, I would like to recognize Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary Whelan to begin.

      STATEMENT OF THERESA M. WHELAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY,
          OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

        Ms. Whelan. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin and Ranking
    Member Stefanik and members of the subcommittee. I am honored
    to testify today regarding the Department of Defense's
    countering weapons of mass destruction efforts.
        The DOD CWMD enterprise's mission--to dissuade, deter, and,
    when necessary, defeat actors who threaten or use WMD against
    the United States or our interests, and to be prepared to
    respond to and mitigate the effects of WMD use--is, as you both
    mentioned, extensive and complex.
        Mission success requires the expertise and collaboration of
    many DOD components. OSD Policy develops CWMD policy,
    strategies, and implementation guidance to ensure the effective
    development of capabilities and activities. OSD Policy also
    leads related interagency and international engagements.
        The threats of WMD use and proliferation are rising. All of
    the National Defense Strategy's ``2+3'' actors--China, Russia,
    North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations--have or
    are pursuing WMD capabilities that could threaten the United
    States or U.S. interests.
        Further, the WMD threat landscape is continuously changing.
    Rapid biotechnology advances are increasing the potential,
    variety, and ease of access to biological weapons. Converging
    enabling technologies, such as artificial intelligence,
    heighten concerns about these developments.
        OSD Policy works with DOD components and other departments
    and agencies to raise awareness and develop strategies to
    mitigate potential threats, while ensuring the United States is
    postured to realize the benefits offered by emerging
    technologies.
        Through proactive collaboration and coordination, the
    Department leverages the distributed nature of its CWMD
    expertise to address WMD threats across the mission spectrum,
    from preventing acquisition and proliferation, to containing
    and reducing threats, to responding to WMD-related incidents
    and contingencies.
        The DOD CWMD Unity of Effort Council is our collaborative
    and crosscutting venue for raising awareness of issues,
    identifying shortfalls and opportunities, and driving toward
    solutions. In 2019, the Council focused on four primary issues:
    two on the potential use of pharmaceutical-based agents as
    chemical weapons, one on joint force readiness for a Korea
    contingency, and one on enterprise-wide prioritization. The
    Council also continued working issues raised in 2018.
        I want to conclude by highlighting OSD Policy's work to
    advance the three NDS [National Defense Strategy] lines of
    effort in the CWMD context.
        The first is restoring readiness through lethality. One of
    our primary objectives is to ensure that our forces can operate
    and win in a CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear]-contaminated environment, which denies adversaries the
    benefits of using WMD.
        Even before its charter was signed, the CWMD Unity of
    Effort Council began working with INDOPACOM [United States
    Indo-Pacific Command] to review CWMD-related readiness
    requirements and ensure it is prepared to meet them. The
    Council actively monitors DOD progress towards meeting
    requirements and, where appropriate, is addressing identified
    shortfalls to ensure our forces are more agile and lethal.
        OSD Policy is also working to reform the Department for
    greater performance and accountability. To ensure the best
    return on investment, OSD Policy is leading an effort, through
    the CWMD Unity of Effort Council, to prioritize WMD threats and
    provide related policy guidance for the Department to organize
    DOD CWMD operations, activities, and investments around a
    cohesive threat picture.
        The CWMD Unity of Effort Council prioritization anticipates
    DOD components will align their prioritization efforts. For
    example, OSD Policy will incorporate the Council's WMD
    prioritization guidance into our cooperative threat reduction
    methodologies.
        Finally, a core tenet of many of our CWMD programs is
    strengthening alliances and building partnerships. Through work
    to reduce WMD threats, the Department's CTR [Cooperative Threat
    Reduction] program empowers partners to detect, prevent, and
    reduce WMD threats on their own. This reduces the burden on DOD
    resources, allows for greater interoperability, and reduces WMD
    threats worldwide.
        The DOD CWMD enterprise's agility and expertise will enable
    us to address the existing and emerging WMD threats of 2020 and
    beyond. Thank you for your continued support for our CWMD
    mission, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan can be found in the
    Appendix on page 29.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Whelan.
        Secretary Shaffer is now recognized.

     STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN R. SHAFFER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT AND ACTING ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
    DEFENSE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                      ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT

        Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member
    Stefanik, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for
    inviting us to testify on the Department of Defense's efforts
    to counter threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
        I have prepared a written statement for the record, but, in
    the interest of time, I would like to highlight just a few key
    points for you now.
        While the Department-wide efforts for countering weapons of
    mass destruction have many key players, the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense Programs, which I am charged to lead, is responsible
    for developing and fielding capabilities to deter and defend
    against the use of weapons of mass destruction and to provide
    the means to respond effectively should these weapons be used.
        In that effort, we work very closely with each of the
    panelists before you as well as other DOD, interagency, and
    international counterparts to provide U.S. forces these
    capabilities that they need.
        I think it is instructive to provide the priorities of my
    office. As I said, my office is the office responsible for
    developing and fielding capabilities for defense against
    chemical and biological weapons and for the safety, security,
    and modernization of the nuclear deterrent, in partnership with
    most offices in the Pentagon.
        Consistent with the National Defense Strategy, our highest
    priority is maintaining the viability and modernization of the
    nuclear triad as an effective deterrent. At nearly the same
    level, we aim to ensure that no soldier, sailor, airman, or
    marine is harmed by chemical or biological weapons and,
    specifically, to increase emphasis on the emerging chemical and
    biological warfare threats that we are seeing come into the
    field now.
        Our third major priority is to accelerate the destruction
    of existing stocks of old chemical weapons--the stockpile of
    our chemical weapons and to develop the capability to safely
    dispose of chemical weapons and biological weapons our forces
    might encounter in hostile environments.
        Finally, we need to continue to emphasize rebuilding an
    effective and diverse workforce to be able to handle the
    threats of the future.
        We are in an interesting time for countering weapons of
    mass destruction, as the convergence of a number of scientific
    disciplines, including artificial intelligence, synthetic
    biology, molecular engineering, and system-level autonomy, are
    opening the door for development of new challenges.
        Whether it is Russia or China upgrading their nuclear
    forces with new and advanced nuclear weapons or the use of
    novel chemical weapons in 2018 in the suburbs of Salisbury,
    England, threats from WMD continue to evolve, modernize, and
    expand. In many ways, we have thrown off the old norms.
        In particular, I am very concerned that, as the norms
    against the use of weapons of mass destruction continue to
    erode, those seeking to develop novel chemical weapons or push
    the boundaries of biology and genetic engineering for nefarious
    purposes continue to expand. I look forward to discussing these
    issues with the committee.
        In closing, I will continue to work with my interagency
    stakeholders, my partners around this table, and our
    international allies to provide the capabilities to deter,
    confront, and defeat the use of weapons of mass destruction.
    Our Nation and our forces deserve this.
        I appreciate the committee's continued support for these
    efforts, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Shaffer can be found in the
    Appendix on page 40.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary Shaffer.
        Admiral Szymanski, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF VADM TIMOTHY G. SZYMANSKI, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
                    U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Szymanski. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin,
    Ranking Member Stefanik, and members of the subcommittee. I am
    honored to appear before you today on behalf of the U.S.
    Special Operations Command in its role as the Department's
    coordinating authority for countering weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Special operation forces have a longstanding operational
    role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. As coordinating authority for countering weapons
    of mass destruction, SOCOM is also responsible for coordinating
    across the joint force to conduct campaign planning, assess
    execution of the campaign plan, and make recommendations to the
    Department leadership.
        In its coordinating authority role, SOCOM relies on the
    guidance and partnership of the distinguished Department
    leaders here at this table. Our work is nested tightly within
    national Department policy and strategy, as conveyed by the
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
    Defense and Global Security, to ensure unity of effort with the
    rest of the Department and U.S. Government.
        We partner closely with the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
    Programs to support a robust nuclear, chemical, and biological
    defense posture for the joint force.
        And the Defense Threat Reduction Agency supports as a
    combat supporting agency, providing timely information-sharing,
    intelligence and planning coordination, and technological
    solutions for the joint and special operation forces.
        In the 10 months since I last updated you on SOCOM's work
    as the coordinating authority, world events have driven a
    number of changes in the landscape of nuclear, chemical, and
    biological threats, while other changes continue to evolve in
    ways that are harder to measure. Additionally, SOCOM remains
    focused on countering the global threat from violent extremist
    organizations, but the command and coordinating authority role
    have oriented to also address great power competition.
        What has not changed is the need for informed, coordinated
    action across the U.S. Government and a close relationship of
    trust with our partners and allies. As DOD coordinating
    authority, our goal is to position the Department to support
    just such coordinated action and nurture those key
    relationships to prevent the emergence of weapons of mass
    destruction capabilities, protect the United States and its
    citizens and our national interests from threat actors either
    developing new or advancing existing programs, and respond to
    and mitigate the effects of any use.
        I refer you to my written statement for additional
    information regarding our approach to this mission and look
    forward to your questions.
        In closing, I would like to thank the members of this
    subcommittee once more for their support of this important
    national security mission. It is a privilege to work together
    with Ms. Whelan, Mr. Shaffer, and Mr. Oxford every day to keep
    our country safe from nuclear, chemical, and biological
    threats. I look forward to our continued partnership with them,
    with Members of Congress, and with our interagency and
    international partners to ensure our safety now and into the
    future.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Szymanski can be found
    in the Appendix on page 53.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral Szymanski.
        Director Oxford is now recognized.

     STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
         AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                      ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT

        Mr. Oxford. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Stefanik,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
    continued support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    [DTRA].
        I am pleased to join my colleagues appearing before you
    today. They represent the key leaders in the Department to
    counter the threats associated with weapons of mass
    destruction.
        I also am proud to represent the men and women of the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an agency that in the last
    year was designated as a mission assurance center of excellence
    for the Department based on our vulnerability assessments of
    defense critical infrastructure around the world.
        We advanced the development of advanced nuclear weapons
    effects to help STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command]
    based on NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] requirements. We
    participated in a New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty
    mission and the exhibition of Russia's newest strategic
    delivery system, the RS-18 variant 2 ICBM [intercontinental
    ballistic missile] Avangard, that is designed to deliver the
    hypersonic glide vehicle that is to be nuclear capable.
        We expanded the application of artificial intelligence and
    machine learning to a variety of our data analytics efforts, to
    include applications to build 3D models of underground
    facilities based on intelligence and geospatial data.
        Our Integrated Munitions Effects Assessment was designated
    as the enterprise solution for supporting the warfighter for
    combating weapons of mass destruction and hardened and deeply
    buried targets.
        Catapult, our mission-driven data analytics platform that
    integrates over 1,100 data sources, was approved as a program
    of record.
        Continued support with CENTCOM [United States Central
    Command] and SOCOM was necessary to counter Iranian nuclear
    ambitions and to continue to pursue the D-ISIS [Defeat ISIS]
    campaign and to confront the Taliban threat in Afghanistan.
        Since appearing before you last, the Agency has continued
    its pivot towards the goals of the National Defense Strategy
    and to confront the ever-complex and dynamic threat environment
    composed of state and non-state actors, along with their
    proxies and surrogates. This environment places increasing
    demands of working across DOD, the interagency, and with
    international partners.
        Further, the adversaries we have faced have spent decades
    developing globally connected networks, requiring us to adopt
    global partnerships and a global perspective to fully identify
    the threat networks associated with China, Russia, Iran, and
    the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. To address
    this global nature of the threat, we have amplified our
    partnership with USSOCOM to take on additional support for the
    geographical commanders responsible for dealing with these
    adversaries.
        Beginning in 2018, I directed a full bottom-up review of
    the Agency's programs and personnel to make sure that we were
    aligned and focused our efforts on strengthening the nuclear
    deterrent, tailoring our support to the conventional force, and
    evolving our counter-threat network capabilities from a unique
    focus on VEOs [violent extremist organizations] to a threat-
    based focus on all the adversaries in the National Defense
    Strategy.
        In doing so, we recognized that we must confront and
    overcome several key challenges: scaling our network analysis
    approach from the D-ISIS, Taliban, and al-Qaida threats to a
    globally connected nation-state threat; recognizing that
    actions against nation-states to compete in the gray zone
    requires a different decision calculus than countering
    terrorist networks, thus necessitating even closer
    relationships with the combatant commanders, OSD, the Joint
    Staff, the interagency, and our international partners; and,
    most importantly, recognizing the need to more fully understand
    the intentions and motivations of near-peer competitors.
        I will close with two recent examples of long-term efforts
    paying off in significant ways.
        First, the CTR program's biosurveillance program work with
    Thailand enabled their officials to detect their country's
    first case of the novel coronavirus outbreak, thus helping them
    mitigate further spread of the disease.
        Second, the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] recently
    licensed the first and only Ebola virus disease vaccine, made
    possible by DTRA research and development. With hundreds of
    thousands of doses now administered across the U.S., the EU
    [European Union], and Africa, it is protecting healthcare
    workers, reducing the allure of Ebola as a threat agent, and
    better protecting the warfighter.
        Again, thank you for your support of the Agency, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford can be found in the
    Appendix on page 64.]
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director Oxford.
        Members will now be recognized for 5 minutes. I will begin
    by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
        Secretary Whelan, how is the Department thinking about
    biotechnology and synthetic biology and other nontraditional
    materials and capabilities that could be used to cause mass
    destruction?
        Ms. Whelan. Thanks, Congressman, for the question.
    Actually, this is a very important issue, and we are glad that
    you are raising it and raising the awareness. It is one of
    great concern to us that we have been looking at from a policy
    perspective, and I will let my colleagues also comment on what
    they are doing specifically in their areas of expertise.
        We have actually funded the National Academy of Sciences to
    do a study for us on the changing nature of biodefense threats
    and potential security vulnerabilities to give us some
    overarching perspectives on it.
        But we are very concerned about the linkage between new
    biotech capabilities and new computer-based AI, artificial
    intelligence, that can enable and lower barriers to access
    capabilities to use new biotechnology in nefarious ways.
        So this is something the Department is concerned about, and
    I will ask my colleagues if they would like to comment on what
    they are doing specifically to address the issues.
        Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, if I could, when we look at the
    nefarious ways that synthetic bio could be used, it can be used
    to direct modifications to the human genome, allowing for new
    pathogens to be created. Known pathogens can be started from
    scratch without a lot of advance warning. They can engineer and
    produce novel pathogens that have never existed before. We can
    make pathogens more dangerous, more transmissible, more
    virulent in their makeup.
        Within the Agency, working with Mr. Shaffer's NCB [Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense] office, we have undertaken
    several different initiatives to counter this threat.
        First of all, we are increasing our hazardous assessment of
    emerging threats based on large datasets to inform future
    capability development.
        We are developing new hazard prediction models with data
    produced from threat agent science.
        We are also developing detectors capable of detecting broad
    levels of emerging threats; similarly, developing diagnostics
    to rapidly provide the warfighters assessments of the threats
    they face.
        We are also developing medical countermeasures to start to
    address some of these novel agents that may appear on the
    battlefield in the future.
        Those are just a few of the examples of what the chem-bio
    development research program that we execute on behalf of Mr.
    Shaffer's office is attempting to satisfy.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Director.
        Secretary Whelan, there has been increasing attention to
    disease surveillance and response globally, particularly as the
    coronavirus crisis accelerates. A global biological pandemic
    would arguably present the single biggest threat to the U.S.
    short of a nuclear war.
        Considering the ongoing response to the coronavirus, what
    are you learning about the gaps in the Department's ability to
    respond to large-scale biological events, whether manmade or
    naturally occurring?
        Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Congressman.
        So we have been--we are actually still in the middle,
    obviously, of supporting our colleagues, particularly at HHS
    and DHS and CDC, in responding to the coronavirus. And
    certainly, within DOD, our Health Affairs Office has issued
    some of its own guidance to the force for their health
    protection.
        We are still assessing how this could impact us more
    broadly. We have our office's NORTHCOM [United States Northern
    Command] and our defense planning offices have looked at
    planning for pandemics. We have faced this problem before with
    H1N1 [influenza A, swine flu] back about 10 years ago, and then
    we recently faced it looking at Ebola in West Africa. So we are
    constantly absorbing the lessons learned and using them to
    address our force protection.
        But let me turn to Mr. Shaffer for some of his comments.
        Mr. Langevin. Yes. I am particularly interested in the gaps
    in the Department's ability to respond.
        Mr. Shaffer. Sir, I think that, as Ms. Whelan said, we are
    still in the middle of analysis. I have the Defense Logistics
    Agency that comes underneath my portfolio. They are involved
    every day in a whole-of-government approach in a telecon and
    emergency response meeting.
        They are gathering up where we are with respect to ability
    to fulfill the supply chain. I do think we have to look at
    ability to mass-produce vaccines, develop and mass-produce
    vaccine in a very short order. We have to balance some of the
    FDA restrictions on rapidly deploying vaccines with the help
    that they will give.
        But I think it will take some time to deconstruct where we
    saw the specific gaps in the supply chain. My job is worrying
    about the supply chain and then in other parts of the policy
    response. We are committed to doing that. And I will come back
    with a supply chain answer after we have a chance to analyze
    it.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay, good. Thank you.
        Director Oxford, any comment?
        Mr. Oxford. So, Mr. Chairman, one thing I would bring to
    light is what we talked about when we talk about synthetic bio
    and couple that with the announcement that was made last night
    with the Chinese hacking Equifax. If you couple that with the
    other hacking they have done over time, of Anthem, Marriott, et
    cetera, OPM [United States Office of Personnel Management], the
    large database that is being created, in conjunction with what
    we do in outsourcing our genetic engineering to the Chinese
    because it is cheaper, you can imagine what the potential
    outcomes are.
        So we ought to be looking at this as not necessarily a
    dangerous road but we ought to be looking at it from what we
    can understand about transmissibility and those kinds of things
    in case there were a separate kind of outbreak.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Director.
        Ms. Stefanik is now recognized.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Oxford, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has
    been a valuable tool that DOD uses to proactively reduce the
    threat posed by weapons of mass destruction through
    partnerships with foreign countries. And, in fact, I have had
    the opportunity to learn more about those as I have led
    congressional delegations.
        Last year, Congress increased the amount authorized and
    appropriated by $35 million. Can you explain the return on
    investment of the CTR program and also explain its importance
    nested under the National Defense Strategy?
        Mr. Oxford. Yes. Thank you for the question. And, again,
    when we receive adds like that, what we do is we sit down with
    Mr. Shaffer's office and Ms. Whelan's office and we go through
    a prioritization across the globe to make sure we are applying
    those in the most applicable way.
        Since I took office, I have made an emphasis of not only
    accounting for the National Defense Strategy priorities but
    also working more directly with the combatant commanders to
    make sure we are operating in the right locations within their
    geographical areas, as they understand the region better than
    we might in DC, just to make sure we are putting the right
    pressure points on the system.
        So I think what you have found over time, when you go to
    places like Jordan, when you see the Philippine coastal watch
    center, and what I mentioned about the work that we have done
    in Thailand that identified the coronavirus very quickly, there
    is value added throughout the world with these programs.
        Ms. Stefanik. Next question is for Mr. Shaffer. This is
    somewhat of a follow-up to the chairman's question.
        Obviously, in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak,
    concerns have been raised that the Strategic National Stockpile
    isn't sufficiently prepared to deal with emerging diseases.
    There are legitimate concerns about shortages of medicines,
    health supplies, surgical masks, and vulnerabilities in our
    supply chain when the manufacturing of these items has moved to
    China.
        So how is DOD building resilience into its stockpile of
    chemical and biological supplies? And what are we learning from
    this particular instance with the coronavirus experience?
        Mr. Shaffer. Congresswoman, that is a terrific question.
        As I tried to explain, we are still in the process of
    understanding where our gaps and shortfalls are. I think we all
    recognize that, not just in the chemical-biological agent area
    but in a large number of areas, we have outsourced our
    manufacture of critical equipment. You talk about chemical-
    biological effects. I look at microelectronics, where we don't
    have nearly enough indigenous capacity. I think that is a
    nationwide problem.
        We are going to come back and take a look at what we have
    to do for chemical and biologic defense for our troops. And
    then, getting beyond that, we will work with CDC and other
    parts of government for a whole-of-government response.
        My concern really is for our troops that we deploy and
    making sure those troops and the families that are with them
    have the protection that they need, have the right antidotes,
    have the right protective gear. But it is something I think we
    all have to step back and take a look at, are we prepared for
    this type of event.
        Ms. Stefanik. And the reason I emphasize it, I know it is
    repetitive of the chairman's question, but it is really
    important to learn the lessons. And there are concerns on both
    sides of the aisle to make sure that we apply what we are
    learning today of the shortfalls and make sure that we address
    in the future.
        Admiral, SOCOM has now been the coordinating authority
    capacity for 2\1/2\ years. Can you explain how SOCOM views this
    responsibility and what specific actions the command has taken
    to better coordinate countering-WMD activities across the
    Department?
        Admiral Szymanski. Yes. Maybe I can start with the second
    half of the question first, on the coordination piece, because
    I think, since we briefed you last year, we have aligned with
    the NDS in concert with, you know, my great colleagues here at
    the table.
        But we have been able to take--if you recall, our
    functional campaign plan is based on a model of pathway defeat,
    in the opening statement from Secretary Whelan, from
    acquisition to use.
        We have been able to take key objectives and tasks and
    lines of efforts in that and build that into the global
    campaign plans of three other combatant commands. Two of those
    are still in draft, two of the threat actor nations that the
    other geographical combatant commanders have that global
    campaign response for across the lines of prepare, protect, and
    respond.
        So that is one. We have been able to actually integrate
    some of the concepts, the key tasks and objectives, into our
    globally integrated exercises that the Chairman is using, and
    we have been able to develop a common operating picture, with
    the great help of DTRA, on all of our DOD-wide operations,
    activities, and investments to see that in real time on the
    Joint Staff's common integrated--COP [Common Operational
    Picture].
        What was the first part of your question? I answered the
    second.
        Ms. Stefanik. You know, you are 2 years into being the
    coordinating authority. It was broad; how you view this
    responsibility, and then what specific action. So I think you
    covered it, and we can get more into detail in the closed
    session.
        I will yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik.
        Mr. Larsen is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
        Mr. Shaffer, soon after coronavirus was discovered, the
    Chinese mapped the genome and blasted that out into the
    scientific community so that folks could start working on
    diagnostics and vaccine development. Now, the diagnostic kit
    was developed fairly quickly, but the vaccine is probably 4
    months away, 5 months away from test and probably a year away
    or maybe slightly less from being okayed.
        What role are you all playing here in the United States,
    maybe with the CDC or without, to kind of facilitate a solution
    on that? And then what is the broader lesson as well?
        Mr. Shaffer. Thank you, sir.
        So I think you hit it in your question. The role of the
    Department of Defense is to support HHS and CDC in developing a
    vaccine. We won't take lead in that. We will make our
    facilities available for test, but we are in a support role for
    the greater health emergency.
        I do think we have to take a look at lessons learned, at
    how long does it take to create a vaccine that can be used, and
    then how do we think about taking time out of that equation.
    And I think that is something we are all going to have to
    discuss over the next coming months.
        There are ways to cut some time out. It comes with risk.
    And it is like everything, it is going to be a risk-versus-
    value assessment. But we need to look at taking time out, and
    we will support the CDC in every way possible.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay.
        So, Mr. Oxford, the downside of this is that the genome of
    the coronavirus was mapped pretty quickly and blasted out to
    the rest of the world, and you probably saw it and said, ``Oh,
    no, I have to do something in defense about this.'' As opposed
    to an offense, create a vaccine, you have to figure out what
    this might mean for defending against its use against anybody,
    including our folks.
        How have you all approached that at DTRA?
        Mr. Oxford. So, again, you know, our posture this time
    versus the Ebola outbreak is really to be in support of HHS.
    They have a lot of leadership there that didn't exist in 2014,
    so they have taken the reins on this.
        What we are looking at are things similar to what I
    mentioned before. If this were a different kind of virus that
    posed a lot more serious consequence, what should we be doing
    at that point in time?
        And Mr. Shaffer has hit on this as well, that, you know,
    one of the things, if you are in the offensive chemical
    business, you do, you develop countermeasures alongside of
    that. We don't have that luxury. So what we have to do is get
    out in front of it with the science, as I mentioned before,
    looking at what the potential emerging threats are and starting
    to look at broad-based medical countermeasures ahead of the
    threat.
        In the closed sessions, we can talk about some of the other
    research that we know are going on and what measures we are
    already taking, because we know they are happening.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
        So coronavirus presumably is a natural bio threat, but
    synthetic drugs like fentanyl aren't. And so I think we can
    probably all relate, as Members of Congress, in our districts
    to the opioid crisis and the role that opioids play, including
    fentanyl.
        But that is as a domestic crisis. Are you looking at
    fentanyl as a bioweapon, a synthetic bioweapon? And what steps
    are you taking?
        Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. In fact, we have done this, again,
    in conjunction with the chem-bio defense program under Mr.
    Shaffer's guidance. Since we were last before you, we have
    actually done field trials with live agent. We have done it
    here in the U.S., as well as with the Brits in the U.K. [United
    Kingdom].
        I can tell you in the open session that the results of
    those tests say that fentanyl is about equal to VX [nerve
    agent, synthetic chemical compound] in terms of its lethality.
    Carfentanyl is a thousand times. So, if you reverse that, what
    that means is a lot less agent to cause the same kind of damage
    as VX.
        We also know that the materials, fentanyl and carfentanyl,
    will persist in the environment, soil and water, for weeks to
    months. So it is not something that just goes away, as chlorine
    will. So it poses other challenges for long-term operations.
        We can talk about force protection and some of the other
    features in the closed session.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
        And then in your testimony and in our discussion in the
    last couple weeks, you talked about the transition more from
    threat-based to network-based, looking at threats to more
    networks. Can you discuss any of that in this open session?
        Mr. Oxford. We can talk a lot more in the closed session,
    but one of the things--I would go back to some of the other
    questions about getting out in front of these--these--the
    exporting of capability, for example, to China.
        We need to be looking at the supply-chain network both
    incoming and outcoming from this country. We need to identify
    what components others may be relying upon U.S. technologies
    that we want to identify up front, as well as what they may be
    exploiting within universities and those kinds of things.
        So there is a lot there that the network analysis will
    illuminate, as the ranking member mentioned. What this does is
    allow us to use the authorities of the interagency, like
    Commerce and Treasury, to act on information the Department of
    Defense can develop.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Conaway is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Panel, thank you all.
        Turning to something a little more mundane, but can we get
    an update on our Chemical Demilitarization Program? It has had
    a couple of Nunn-McCurdy breaches in the last 8 years. We have
    another billion in spending this year. Are we going to make the
    2023 deadline?
        And I guess I would ask Mr. Shaffer--you looked like you
    were about to answer that--can you give us a status on that
    overall program?
        Mr. Shaffer. Yes, sir, we will make the December 2023
    deadline, and we will actually beat it. We have a new program
    manager that we put in place of it.
        When we get upstairs, I will have a placemat to put in
    front of you.
        The destruction has gone up remarkably in Colorado at the
    Pueblo Arsenal. And we have started destruction in Bluegrass in
    Kentucky against the other major stockpile.
        We are also bringing on line three additional static
    detonation chambers. To a layperson, you can think of, we heat
    the thing to such a degree that it vaporizes the entire
    munition.
        Yeah, we are going to make it.
        Mr. Conaway. On our budget?
        Mr. Shaffer. Oh, absolutely. We will not be asking--well,
    it depends, sir. On our original budget estimate or what we
    have right now? We will make it on the budget estimate for
    right now. We will not go higher.
        Mr. Conaway. The other question was, the report that you
    just said you had, you were looking at accelerating--or ways to
    accelerate the destruction. And that is what you are talking
    about there, that you may get it in ahead of time?
        Mr. Shaffer. Yeah, bringing on--so we have done a number of
    things. We are bringing on additional static detonation
    chambers. We are working with the local State environmental
    agencies to increase our throughput. We are going to 24-hour
    operations in some cases.
        And the increase in the rate of destruction of the existing
    stockpile is remarkable. I think, as of a year ago, we were
    somewhere under 20 percent. I have Dr. Charles Ball behind me,
    who is responsible for this. Within the next couple of weeks,
    we will be over 50 percent destroyed at Pueblo.
        Mr. Conaway. All right. Good news.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
        Ms. Houlahan is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Shaffer, my first question is for you. It is my
    understanding that the GAO completed a report about 5 years ago
    that established that the Department had made progress at
    researching, developing, and making available medical
    countermeasures against biological threats but did not use its
    established process for annually updating its list of threat
    priorities.
        From there, it is my understanding, as well, that the
    Department concurred with the GAO's findings and identified
    steps to address their recommendations.
        Can you, in this environment, possibly share with us what
    the Department has done over the last few years to implement a
    process to ensure that the biological threats list is
    prioritized appropriately?
        Mr. Shaffer. So, ma'am, I hate to say this, but 5 years ago
    I was departing the Department, going for a great 3 years in
    Paris, and no one has talked to me about this GAO report. So
    let me take this one for the record and get a better answer
    back to you.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I would appreciate that one.
        Mr. Shaffer. Yes.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 89.]
        Ms. Houlahan. And my second question actually sort of
    relates to that as well. I am concerned that we don't give
    enough attention to biological and chemical weapons and spend a
    lot more time thinking about nuclear threats than we possibly
    should. And I am just trying to make sure that we have a
    really--what are we doing to make sure that we think about
    these issues and that we are addressing these in an adequate
    way?
        How are we making sure that we are having adequate
    investments in biological threats and that we are not spending
    our time in threats that are potentially antiquated in some
    ways?
        Mr. Shaffer. Yes, ma'am. I presume that is for me. So I
    will answer this in kind of a broad perspective.
        When I took over responsibility, I looked at where we were,
    what our investment priorities were. I had to hire a new Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical-Biological Defense
    Programs. My charge to her was, we have got to increase
    emphasis on nontraditional agents.
        Nontraditional agents include fourth-generation nerve
    agents, they include pharmaceutically based agents, and they
    include biological agents from either genetic modifications,
    synthetic biology, and that like.
        Her job is to increase our investment, shift our investment
    portfolio. I have run that up through the leadership.
        This will be crass, but one of my first tasks to her--I
    will clean it up--was by this April develop a scare-the-heck-
    out-of-them briefing for senior leadership within the
    Department. We will be happy to bring it over to you. When we
    get into the classified environment, the things that we are
    seeing are among the most worrisome that I have seen. I came on
    Active Duty--I shouldn't tell you this--in 1976. I am concerned
    with where the threat space is going----
        Ms. Houlahan. So, sir----
        Mr. Shaffer [continuing]. And she has to get it right.
        Ms. Houlahan. So, sir, I am deeply concerned as well, and
    I, you know, did not come on Active Duty in 1976 but, rather,
    in 1989, but these are the things that keep me up at night. Do
    you feel as though the President's new proposed budget
    adequately, kind of, reflects these priorities and where the
    threat currently is vis-a-vis nuclear versus biological versus
    chemical?
        Mr. Shaffer. So I will tell you that the President's budget
    does have a fairly good investment for chemical-biological
    programs.
        Within that portfolio, I have tasked Dr. Vann [Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological
    Defense] to shift the emphasis. We can do some of that within
    the year of execution. I am actually really targeting fiscal
    year 2022 to come in with a significantly altered investment
    profile.
        We are where we are, but we are going to work it very hard
    to get the profile right.
        Ms. Houlahan. And do you think, proportionate to the
    nuclear threat, that the President's budget is a good
    representation, an accurate representation of our concern, the
    things that keep you and I up at night?
        Mr. Shaffer. So my answer will probably surprise you. Yes,
    it does, only because of what I am seeing also in the nuclear
    enterprise in China and Russia.
        We are seeing just really, really aggressive behavior in
    all three forms of weapons of mass destruction from those
    nations, from Iran, from North Korea. So I have a hard time
    parsing out any particular weapon that could kill literally
    hundreds of thousands of people. It could be chemical, it could
    be biological, it could be nuclear. All three are very, very
    challenging threats.
        Ms. Houlahan. And you would probably be surprised, as well,
    to hear that I am also concerned about all of those three
    threats, and I just want to make sure we get it right----
        Mr. Shaffer. Good. So do I.
        Ms. Houlahan [continuing]. Spend the right kind of
    resources.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan.
        Mr. Scott is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As we talk about countering these threats, it is obviously
    not just the U.S. but our partner nations that are helping us
    counter them.
        And, Mr. Oxford, you mentioned the Chinese hacking Equifax.
    There is public reporting that China has threatened Germany,
    Denmark, and France that if Huawei is discriminated against or
    not selected in the development of their networks that there
    will be retaliation, economic retaliation, from China towards
    companies from those countries.
        We have seen the U.K. move forward with Huawei network
    integration. That is obviously a concern for many of us on this
    committee and throughout the United States. And we expect that
    other nations--obviously, some have chosen not to and are being
    threatened. Some will choose to use the cheaper solution.
        My concern is with regard to intelligence-sharing and the
    potential exposure of sources if we share across with an ally
    that is using the Huawei network.
        So my question, Mr. Shaffer, I guess is for you. When we
    talk about acquisition efforts with the United Kingdom or with
    other partner nations who are using Huawei or other companies
    that we deem to be not safe for us to transmit sensitive
    information through, what issues do you see moving forward with
    these types of bilateral engagements with countries that are
    our friends and partners if they are using Huawei to design
    their networks?
        Mr. Shaffer. Sir, the use of Huawei by our closest allies
    and friends is a concern. There is an awful lot of activity
    going on at the diplomatic level. If we do not believe a nation
    can protect information, we will not share it with them. And I
    think anything else we say is probably best saved for the
    closed session.
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        Mr. Shaffer. But you hit upon a very strong concern. It is
    a strong concern by Secretary Esper. It is a strong concern by
    both myself and my boss. And when you look at the convergence
    of digitization of data with artificial intelligence that Mr.
    Oxford just talked about, there is a substantive threat to the
    Nation. And I will just leave it at that.
        Mr. Scott. I will accept that. And I would just make one
    further statement. I mean, hacking is something that you expect
    from a rogue nation or from a terrorist organization. China is
    one of the largest nations in the world, one of the three most
    powerful nations in the world. The fact that they conduct
    themselves this way is of great concern to me and, I know, the
    committee as a whole. And I will leave it at that and wait
    until we go behind closed doors.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remainder of my time.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Bacon is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I thought I wasn't next in
    line.
        First of all, I appreciate all of your expertise here
    today----
        Mr. Langevin. Mr. Bacon, I misspoke. I apologize.
        Mr. Bacon. Okay.
        Mr. Langevin. Mr. Gallagher is now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Bacon. That is what I was thinking, too.
        Mr. Langevin. Yeah.
        Mr. Gallagher. I assumed that it is because Bacon is a
    general and I am just a captain, but----
        Mr. Langevin. My apologies.
        Mr. Gallagher. That is fine. That is fine.
        I don't know who to direct this to. Possibly to Mr.
    Shaffer.
        How much have recent advances in synthetic biology and our
    ability to, sort of, literally print organisms--right? We are
    not just talking about CRISPR [clustered regularly interspaced
    short palindromic repeats], rearranging the A, T, C's, and G's.
    We are sort of printing sequences of A, T, C's, and G's. There
    is sort of a commercial market for that.
        Give us a sense of how that has changed the threat picture
    and where we are relative to the Chinese in that space.
        Mr. Shaffer. So I will tell you, I have a very good staff.
    I am not the biological expert, but my understanding is that
    the U.S. still leads in these technologies, but there is an
    awful lot of information, intellectual property flow to China.
        We know the Chinese are very good. We know that they are
    using advanced techniques. I think it is something we have to
    monitor very closely.
        And the whole business of academic freedom and academic
    research, coupled with national security, is something we all
    have to think about in the information age. What is the risk-
    payoff benefit between total openness of information and
    ability to do very exquisite data mining?
        And this is something I think we--as a technologist, I can
    explain where the opportunity is, where the threat is, but we
    are really opening up a really significant policy debate, sir.
        Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
        I don't know if anyone on the panel has thoughts on--I
    mean, we are seeing the emergence of companies that are
    manufacturing and printing organisms right now, which is
    stunning.
        To what extent does DOD think about that as an area where
    we need to invest further? I would just open it up, if anybody
    does study these issues.
        Mr. Oxford. I think, similar to the question that Ms.
    Houlahan asked before, it depends--I mean, there is plenty of
    money in chem-bio research; it is a matter of focus. So I think
    it is a matter of, what is our purpose for getting into that
    field versus what the Chinese and others may be doing.
        So I think it is really a matter of focus and intent that
    we have to look at. We would be doing this for the right
    reasons; they may not. So I think it is really the focus that I
    would go to.
        Mr. Gallagher. Quickly, and this may be relegated to a
    classified session, but to what extent when we war-game
    scenarios on the Korean Peninsula are we including the
    assumption that the DPRK will initially use biological and
    chemical weapons?
        For example, the thousands of artillery pieces that are
    built into Kaesong Heights that can range Seoul will be armed
    with chemical and biological weapons. Is that a worst-case
    scenario we plan against? Do we plan against it at all?
        Ms. Whelan. Congressman, yes, absolutely. I mean, we have
    to be ready to operate in a CBRN-contaminated environment.
        And, in fact, our readiness to operate in such an
    environment, we believe, hopefully, is a bit of a deterrent to
    the use. If we can show that no matter what you throw at us,
    our forces are still going to be able to operate effectively,
    we think that might actually serve as a deterrent.
        But, yes, we do plan for that. More detail would have to
    wait until the closed session. But it is absolutely on our
    radar screen.
        Mr. Gallagher. And just one quick follow-up. And I do hope
    we can follow up in classified session. I mean, it is one thing
    to allow our troops to operate in such an environment, but when
    you are dealing with the second-largest metropolitan area in
    the world, I mean, there are limits to our ability to minimize
    civilian casualties in such a scenario, correct?
        Ms. Whelan. Yes, there are. That is right.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay.
        Well, with that, in an effort to get to the classified
    session, I will yield the minute and 2 seconds I have left.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
        Ms. Slotkin is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Slotkin. I apologize. I am just coming in, so I am
    going to yield my time and just listen, because I don't want to
    take us off track.
        Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you very much.
        Now Mr. Bacon is recognized.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.
        And I appreciate you coming in and sharing your expertise
    today, to our great panel.
        I have three questions. I am going to direct them, and try
    to keep the answers succinct, if you would.
        My first question is to Ms. Whelan and Mr. Shaffer. If a
    WMD attack or accident occurs, the United States may need to be
    able to treat massive numbers of casualties quickly. This will
    likely create a demand on emergency and medical services that
    would overwhelm local or regional available resources. And so,
    like, at UNMC, or University of Nebraska Medical Center, we
    have a great capacity to treat bio emergencies, and we are
    trying to expand upon that.
        So my question is, to Ms. Whelan and Mr. Shaffer, what are
    we doing to ensure that we have the capacity at the national
    level to effectively respond to a WMD-scale event, in terms of
    medical facilities, beds, and specialized training?
        Thank you.
        Ms. Whelan. Thanks, Congressman.
        So, on the DOD side, we actually have a CBRN Response
    Enterprise that we have put together over the last two decades.
    And we have about 18,000-plus, give or take, Active and Reserve
    forces who are trained to be able to support the local first
    responders and, obviously, FEMA [Federal Emergency Management
    Agency].
        We work through FEMA at the national level and would only
    be engaged, at least with our Federal and Reserve forces,
    through FEMA at the national level. At the State level,
    obviously, the National Guard can come into play under State
    authority.
        So we are prepared to support if there is a domestic event.
        Mr. Bacon. Mr. Shaffer, anything else to add?
        Mr. Shaffer. No.
        Mr. Bacon. Okay.
        My second question is to Admiral Szymanski and Mr. Oxford.
    At the University of Nebraska Omaha, we have the National
    Strategic Research Institute, which is a university-affiliated
    research center that is focused on technologies for detecting
    and countering nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as
    well as disease outbreak.
        Can you speak to the importance of these kind of
    university-affiliated research centers in building our ability
    to detect and respond to WMD events?
        Mr. Oxford. Congressman, I think one of the things that
    would be interesting is we have used the center in Omaha to
    actually attract future talent. We fund some of the research
    out there.
        We have also used some of the staff expertise within the
    office to actually help us start to war-game some of the
    advanced threats. For example, we just ran a limited nuclear
    war game within the agency to find out what challenges we may
    have confronting, for example, Russian use of nuclear weapons.
    It was talent that was out at the facility that we actually
    used.
        Mr. Bacon. Uh-huh.
        Admiral Szymanski. I think, generically, to all those
    affiliated universities, SOCOM uses a number of universities
    for different aspects of SOCOM's enterprise and its portfolios.
    And just recently we conducted a conditions-based assessment or
    an overall assessment of our sensitive activities going
    forward. We can talk a little bit more about that. But we would
    not be able to get some of the analysis and the research done
    that is required otherwise without those affiliated
    universities.
        Mr. Bacon. Well, our University of Nebraska is very proud
    of what it does, and they want to continue supporting DOD.
        While Mr. Oxford is here, I would just like feedback on
    some questions on Open Skies. Can you give us an update on the
    Open Skies mission? You know, it has been a little bit under
    the microscope lately, and I am a big supporter, but I would
    like to get your update.
        Mr. Oxford. Sure. Thanks for the question.
        First of all, last fall, working with the Joint Staff-
    Policy and the National Security Council, there was a
    determination made to actually increase the strategic value of
    every mission that we flew. So we have actually, without going
    into detail, we have started flying in places within and over
    Russia that we hadn't before. We just completed a mission in
    late January that--we had never flown in January before.
        So this is a matter of using the strategic nature of the
    treaty that may not have been used the way it should have for
    the last 20 years. We have another mission going on right now,
    so back-to-back missions. And if we fly all the missions
    currently planned this year, it will be the busiest Open Skies
    season ever.
        Mr. Bacon. Great to hear.
        What is the value of Open Skies to our allies? Because I
    think that that is an area that we are missing in our
    discussions.
        Mr. Oxford. So, you know, when we talk about leaving Open
    Skies, we have a lot of consultation with our treaty partners.
    And they have been universal in the need for this dialogue,
    this ability to do that, and the ability, again, to continue to
    put pressure on Russia.
        I was at EUCOM [United States European Command] last week.
    We were talking about EUCOM's European strategy for 2020. And
    it is clear NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] was
    coming together, like it hasn't in many years, as a community,
    worried about Russian influence, and the ability to push back
    on Russia has become more of a NATO issue. So these kinds of
    capabilities, I think, they find very valuable.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        I yield.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
        I believe all members have had the opportunity to go
    around, one round of 5-minute questioning. So, with that, if
    there are no additional questions, we are going to recess now
    and move to the closed session.
        [Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                               February 11, 2020

    =======================================================================

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               February 11, 2020

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               February 11, 2020

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

        Mr. Shaffer. While the rapid advances in technology have made it
    increasingly less practical or effective to maintain a threat list,
    following the outcome of the GAO report 14-442SU, the Chemical and
    Biological Defense Program (CBDP) established mechanisms to improve
    stakeholder awareness of existing and emerging threats, similar to how
    the intelligence community has moved to Dynamic Threat Assessments to
    allow continuous review and updates to the threat environment. The CBDP
    incorporates a series of threat reviews and discussions into our
    planning process referred to as Threats, Risks, and Vulnerabilities
    (TRV) discussions. The TRV is a classified forum with the intelligence
    community, Services, the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands to discuss
    both chemical and biological threats. This forum also considers our
    defensive capabilities to address those threats and is our primary
    mechanism for sharing threat priorities across the CBDP stakeholders.
    The CBDP Joint Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review process, led by the
    Army's Executive Agent Secretariat, and Medical Countermeasures (MCM)
    working groups subsequently hold follow-on discussions about the
    alignment of MCM research and development efforts with the threat
    information and the National Defense Strategy to ensure the CBDP
    medical portfolio addresses the highest priority threats while
    considering available MCM candidates and resources. These working
    groups meet throughout the year to address key programmatic changes,
    discuss program strategic guidance, address new information about
    changes to the threat environment, and evaluate Service vulnerabilities
    to inform priorities for resourcing and capability development. The
    CBDP is also developing an analytic methodology that will help inform
    these discussions by ``scoring'' existing and potential threat agents;
    an adversary's ability and intent to use the agents; and the ability of
    our defensive capabilities to mitigate the impacts of the threats. We
    anticipate having this capability available to inform our threat
    discussions in October 2020. We will document updated threat
    prioritizations in annual CBDP Planning Guidance. Additionally, the
    CWMD Unity of Effort (UOE) Council is working within the Department to
    develop a mechanism to ensure the department's priorities for CWMD,
    informed by threat, risk, and policy considerations, are clearly
    articulated across the Department. The CBDP efforts inform, and are
    informed by, the CWMD UOE work. In total, these efforts have improved
    the Department's ability to ensure that development of defensive
    capabilities against traditional and non-traditional threats are
    aligned and considered through holistic, threat-informed, and riskbased
    assessments.   [See page 16.]