[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GLOBAL TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND, PART II
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 30, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
40-463 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Mike Rogers, Alabama
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Peter T. King, New York
Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey John Katko, New York
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Mark Walker, North Carolina
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Xochitl Torres Small, New Mexico Debbie Lesko, Arizona
Max Rose, New York Mark Green, Tennessee
Lauren Underwood, Illinois Van Taylor, Texas
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan John Joyce, Pennsylvania
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Dan Crenshaw, Texas
Al Green, Texas Michael Guest, Mississippi
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Val Butler Demings, Florida
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Chris Vieson, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 8
Witnesses
Hon. Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. Russell Travers, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Director of National Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. David J. Glawe, Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................. 33
For the Record
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Lousiana:
Article........................................................ 77
Letter From the Congressional Black Caucus..................... 80
Article........................................................ 81
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Kevin McAleenan.......... 85
Question From Ranking Member Mike Rogers for Kevin McAleenan..... 86
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Christopher Wray......... 86
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Russell Travers.......... 86
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for David J. Glawe........... 87
GLOBAL TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND, PART II
----------
Wednesday, October 30, 2019
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G.
Thompson, [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Richmond, Rice, Correa, Small, Rose, Underwood, Cleaver, Green
of Texas, Clarke, Titus, Coleman, Barragan, Demings; Rogers,
King, McCaul, Katko, Higgins, Green of Tennessee, Taylor,
Joyce, Crenshaw, Guest, and Bishop.
Chairman Thompson. We are going to convene the Committee on
Homeland Security.
We are going to ask the members of the press to please part
the center aisle so Members can have access to the witnesses.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland, Part II.''
Good morning. The committee, as I indicated, is meeting to
hear from 4 expert witnesses on where we are as of this date
with threats to the homeland.
This committee was created in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the
committee has focused on ensuring the Department is fulfilling
its mission to secure the homeland.
I take this responsibility seriously, as has every Chairman
of this committee.
That is why it has been the committee's practice to hold a
hearing to assess global threats to the homeland and evaluate
the Federal Government's efforts to confront them. Congress and
the American people deserve to hear about the threats we face
directly from the officials charged with our Nation's security.
Today, I am deeply concerned about the state of the
Department of Homeland Security. It has been 203 days since the
Department last had a confirmed Secretary, and Acting Secretary
McAleenan recently announced he is leaving after just 6 months
on the job. His replacement will be the fifth person to lead
DHS in fewer than 3 years.
Even though Acting Secretary McAleenan is leaving tomorrow,
from what I understand, the President has yet to announce who
his replacement will be.
What is the delay?
Overnight, we learned the White House may be trying to find
a legal loophole to install the President's pick, who is not in
the Department's order of succession, as Acting Secretary.
This is completely unacceptable, and such a decision would
raise serious Constitutional questions.
Also unacceptable is the fact that the Transportation
Security Administration's administrator has been dual-hatted as
acting deputy secretary of Homeland Security for the last 6
months. TSA administrator and deputy secretary of Homeland
Security are not part-time jobs. They each require someone's
full attention.
Beyond the Secretary and deputy secretary, 11 components
and offices within DHS are operating with acting leaders, and
in all but 2 cases the President has yet to nominate anyone to
fill these vacancies.
This is an unprecedented situation with real consequences
for the Department and the more than 240,000 men and women of
DHS working to secure the homeland. Indeed, at no time during
my tenure on this committee have I been more concerned about
DHS's ability to carry out its mission.
The chaos is not limited to the Department, unfortunately.
The President is also on his sixth National Security Advisor,
fifth Secretary of Defense, third FBI Director, and third
Director of National Intelligence, including acting officials.
He also no longer has a Homeland Security Advisor or a
White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. The President needs to
fill positions critical to U.S. National security.
At the same time, terrorism threats to the homeland, both
international and domestic, are unrelenting. Just over 2 weeks
ago, President Trump pulled American troops out of Syria. This
abrupt exit put an end to U.S. counterterrorism missions with
the Kurds and complicated the Pentagon's raid on ISIS leader
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Fortunately, their mission was successful thanks to the
bravery and skill of our military members and intelligence
professionals, and we honor them for their heroic service to
our country.
While al-Baghdadi is dead, the ISIS detainees who escaped
Kurdish prisons pose a renewed threat to the United States, and
conditions on the ground are ripe for ISIS to reconstitute.
Moreover, we abandoned our Kurdish allies, prompting them
to make a deal with our adversary, the Russian-backed Syrian
government.
I want to hear from our witnesses today about how these
developments affect the global threat picture and what the
implications are for the homeland.
Here at home, domestic terrorism is on the rise. One year
ago, 11 members of the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh
were gunned down by a perpetrator motivated by anti-Semitism
and white supremacy.
This year, congregants at a synagogue in Poway, California
and shoppers at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas were killed by
white supremacists.
These attacks are increasingly linked to groups and
individuals abroad, and many are exploiting social media to
proliferate violent extremist content and incite others around
the world.
Recent reports indicate the National Counterterrorism
Center has begun to look at domestic terrorism, and last month
DHS released its first Strategic Framework for Countering
Terrorism and Targeted Violence. I hope we can hear about their
efforts today.
For too long this issue was not given the attention it
deserved, and much more remains to be done.
Finally, I would note that the 2020 elections are just a
year away. Despite the intelligence community's ringing the
alarm about foreign interference in our elections, the
President has refused to accept their conclusion that Russia
interfered in the 2016 election. His refusal to ensure the
integrity of our elections by leading on this issue from the
White House sends the wrong message to our adversaries.
It also calls into question whether the many agencies
working to defend our elections are getting the support and
resources they need. I hope we can speak to that issue as well.
As I said at the outset, this committee must take its
responsibility to oversee the Department of Homeland Security
seriously. The security of the homeland is at stake, and our
constituents expect no less.
I look forward to the witnesses' valuable testimony and
Members' important questions today.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
October 30, 2019
This committee was created in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Since the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security, the committee has focused on ensuring
the Department is fulfilling its mission to secure the homeland. I take
this responsibility seriously, as has every Chairman of this committee.
That is why it has been the committee's practice to hold a hearing
to assess global threats to the homeland and evaluate the Federal
Government's efforts to confront them. Congress and the American people
deserve to hear about the threats we face directly from the officials
charged with our Nation's security.
Today, I am deeply concerned about the State of the Department of
Homeland Security. It has been 203 days since the Department last had a
confirmed Secretary, and Acting Secretary McAleenan recently announced
he is leaving after just 6 months on the job. His replacement will be
the fifth person to lead DHS in fewer than 3 years. Even though Acting
Secretary McAleenan is leaving tomorrow, the President has yet to
announce who his replacement will be. What is the delay?
Overnight, we learned the White House may be trying to find a legal
loophole to install the President's pick, who is not in the
Department's order of succession, as Acting Secretary. This is
completely unacceptable, and such a decision would raise serious
Constitutional questions.
Also unacceptable is the fact that the Transportation Security
Administration Administrator has been dual-hatted as acting deputy
secretary of Homeland Security for the last 6 months. TSA administrator
and deputy secretary of Homeland Security are not part-time jobs--they
each require someone's full attention.
Beyond the Secretary and deputy secretary, 11 components and
offices within DHS are operating with acting leaders, and in all but 2
cases the President has yet to nominate anyone to fill these vacancies.
This is an unprecedented situation with real consequences for the
Department and the more than 240,000 men and women of DHS working to
secure the homeland. Indeed, at no time during my tenure on this
Committee have I been more concerned about DHS's ability to carry out
its mission.
The chaos is not limited to the Department, unfortunately. The
President is also on his sixth National Security Advisor, fifth
Secretary of Defense, third FBI director, and third director of
national intelligence, including acting officials. He also no longer
has a Homeland Security advisor or a White House cybersecurity
coordinator. The President needs to fill positions critical to U.S.
National security.
At the same time, terrorism threats to the homeland--both
international and domestic--are unrelenting. Just over 2 weeks ago,
President Trump pulled American troops out of Syria. This abrupt exit
put an end to U.S. counterterrorism missions with the Kurds and
complicated the Pentagon's raid on ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Fortunately, their mission was successful thanks to the bravery and
skill of our military members and intelligence professionals, and we
honor them for their heroic service to our country.
While Al-Baghdadi is dead, the ISIS detainees who escaped Kurdish
prisons pose a renewed threat to the United States, and conditions on
the ground are ripe for ISIS to reconstitute. Moreover, we abandoned
our Kurdish allies, prompting them to make a deal with our adversary--
the Russian-backed Syrian government.
I want to hear from our witnesses today about how these
developments affect the global threat picture and what the implications
are for the homeland.
Here at home, domestic terrorism is on the rise. One year ago, 11
members of the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh were gunned down by
a perpetrator motivated by anti-Semitism and white supremacy. This
year, congregants at a synagogue in Poway, California and shoppers at a
Walmart in El Paso, Texas were killed by white supremacists. These
attacks are increasingly linked to groups and individuals abroad, and
many are exploiting social media to proliferate violent extremist
content and incite others around the world.
Recent reports indicate the National Counterterrorism Center has
begun to look at domestic terrorism, and last month DHS released its
first Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted
Violence. I hope we can hear about their efforts today. For too long
this issue was not given the attention it deserved, and much more
remains to be done.
Finally, I would note that the 2020 elections are just a year away.
Despite the intelligence community ringing the alarm about foreign
interference in our elections, the President has refused to accept
their conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. His
refusal to ensure the integrity of our elections by leading on this
issue from the White House sends the wrong message to our adversaries.
It also calls into question whether the many agencies working to
defend our elections are getting the support and resources they need. I
hope we can speak to that issue as well.
As I said at the outset, this committee must take its
responsibility to oversee the Department of Homeland Security
seriously. The security of the homeland is at stake, and our
constituents expect no less.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Rogers, for an opening statement.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses for taking the time to be
here today. I especially want to point out Acting Secretary
McAleenan, and I am pleased that you came today. Our committee
deserves to hear from you as the head of the Department of
Homeland Security.
As tomorrow is your last day at the Department, I want to
thank you for your years of service. The 9/11 attacks motivated
you to serve our country. Your patriotism cannot be questioned.
I wish you Godspeed in your next adventures.
Director Wray, Acting Director Travers, and Under Secretary
Glawe, thank you all for taking the time to come here. I know
it takes time to prepare for these and it is inconvenient, but
it helps us do our jobs better.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is important. The threats to
our homeland are real. Every day terrorists plot to disrupt and
destroy our way of life.
It is important that we as Members of this committee
understand those threats. What we do at this committee on a
bipartisan basis is vital to protect the homeland.
Just this weekend, we all were reminded of the evil that
still seeks to attack our shores. The killing of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi was an important victory in the fight against ISIS.
ISIS is responsible for the public execution of 2 U.S.
journalists. James Foley and Steven Sotloff were doing their
jobs, and ISIS killed them both.
American aid worker Kayla Mueller was kidnapped, tortured,
and killed by ISIS.
At least 7 terrorist attacks have been carried out in ISIS'
name in the West. Who knows how many more attacks Baghdadi was
planning?
Yet his death does not end the ISIS threat to our homeland,
and ISIS is not the only threat that we face. I look forward to
hearing more about how we are countering the threat from ISIS,
al-Qaeda, and others who seek to harm us.
Mr. Chairman, I do need to address the subpoena issue
before I yield back.
I am very frustrated at how the events of last week
unfolded. I am frustrated that you were put in the position
where you thought issuing subpoenas was necessary. If someone
gives you their word, Mr. Chairman, they should keep it. I
would like the same respect.
We have committee rules that need to be followed, and you
gave me your word in a colloquy that we would work together on
subpoenas. None of that happened this time around.
Just 2 months ago, we jointly issued a subpoena for Jim
Watkins of 8chan. I have been willing to engage with you in the
subpoena process. I have been with you every step of the way to
defend this committee's mission and oversight responsibilities.
But the rules exist to protect the rights of the Minority
in this body. You know that from your time in the Minority.
Rule XII and our agreement that requires us to speak
beforehand, we sat in these same chairs for a markup last week
about 24 hours before you issued the subpoenas. You did not say
a word about them.
I asked to discuss this issue on Monday this week, and I
have not heard back from you since.
You have also accused me of providing the Acting Secretary
with ``faulty information'' in a letter this weekend. I find
that implication outrageous.
A quick conversation with me, an email, or a phone call
would have prevented all of this. To be very clear, I probably
would have voted for the subpoenas. You would have seen that if
you had ever kept your promise to our Members and marked them
up.
Our relationship to each other is the only way anything
gets done around here. We have to set the tone. Going forward,
I hope that we can conduct the committee's business openly and
in accordance with the rules.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Rogers follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Mike Rogers
October 30, 2019
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. Acting
Secretary McAleenan, I am pleased you came to testify. Our committee
deserves to hear from you as the head of the Department of Homeland
Security.
As tomorrow is your last day at the Department, I want to thank you
for your years of service.
The 9/11 attacks motivated you to serve our country. Your
patriotism cannot be questioned. I wish you Godspeed in your next
adventures.
Director Wray, Acting Director Travers, and Under Secretary Glawe,
thank you all for coming before us. Your input today will help us as
policy makers confront the global terror threats this Nation faces.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is important. The threats to our
homeland are real. Every day, terrorists plot to disrupt and destroy
our way of life. It's important that we as Members of this committee
understand those threats.
What we do at this committee on a bipartisan basis is vital to
protect the homeland. Just this weekend, we all were reminded of the
evil that still seeks to attack our shores. The killing of Abu-Bakar
al-Baghdadi was an important victory in the fight against ISIS.
ISIS is responsible for the public execution of two U.S.
journalists. James Foley and Steven Sotloff were doing their jobs and
ISIS killed them. American aid worker Kayla Mueller, was kidnapped,
tortured, and killed by ISIS.
At least 7 terrorist attacks have been carried out in ISIS' name in
the West. Who knows how many more attacks Baghdadi was planning. Yet,
his death does not end the ISIS threat to our homeland.
ISIS is not the only threat we face. I look forward to hearing more
about how we are countering the threat from ISIS, al-Qaeda, and others
who seek to do us harm.
Mr. Chairman, I do need to address the subpoena issue before I
yield back.
I am frustrated at how the events of the last week unfolded. I am
frustrated that you were put in the position where you thought issuing
subpoenas was necessary.
If someone gives you their word, Mr. Chairman, they need to keep
it. I would like the same respect. We have committee rules that need to
be followed. And you gave me your word in a colloquy that we would work
together on subpoenas.
None of that happened this time around. Just 2 months ago, we
jointly issued a subpoena for Jim Watkins of 8Chan. I've been willing
to engage with you in the subpoena process. I've been with you every
step of the way to defend this committee's mission and oversight
responsibilities.
But the rules exist to protect the rights of the Minority in this
body. You know that from your time in the Minority. Rule XII and our
agreement require us to speak beforehand.
We sat in these same chairs for a markup last week about 24 hours
before you issued the subpoenas. You didn't say a word about them.
I asked to discuss this issue with you on Monday and did not hear
back from you. You also accused me of providing the Acting Secretary
with ``faulty information'' in a letter over the weekend. I find that
implication outrageous.
A quick conversation with me, an email, or a phone call could have
prevented all of this.
To be very clear, I probably would have voted for the subpoenas.
You would have seen that if you'd kept your promise to our Members
and marked them up. Our relationship with each other is the only way
anything ever gets done around here. We set the tone. Going forward, I
hope that we can conduct the committee's business openly and in
accordance with the rules.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Let me just say that I hear you, Mr. Ranking Member. We
have information shared with you and your staff that we
provided notification of what we were about to do, and----
Mr. Rogers. That is absolutely false.
Chairman Thompson. Well, OK. I do not want to get into
the----
Mr. Rogers. I do.
Chairman Thompson. Mechanics of it.
Well, that is fine, but you are not Chairman. So you are
going to have to bide your time.
So apart from that, we will go forward. I am comfortable
with the fact that we followed the rules of the committee.
Mr. Rogers. You did not follow the rules of the committee,
and I have got them here. This is a black letter rule. This is
not arbitrary. This is not as the Ranking Member.
Chairman Thompson. All right. I am going to try to be
deferential to you, and if you want to speak, ask to be
recognized, and I will recognize you. But I am not going to
allow you just to blurt out.
So apart from that, I responded to it accordingly, and the
rules were changed by Republicans in this committee. At one
point the Chair and Ranking Member jointly had to agree on
issuing subpoenas.
The rules have changed, and I do not have to get your
approval to sign a subpoena, and that is the rules we operate
on. We can provide information to you, but at the end of the
day, it is the Chair's call.
Mr. Rogers. May I be recognized, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Thompson. You are recognized.
Mr. Rogers. Would you put the rules up on the board for
people to see?
I would like to offer this for the record.
Let me read to you what we say in the rules.
``A. Authorization. The power to authorize and issue
subpoenas is delegated to the Chairman of the full committee as
provided under Rule 2(m)(3)(A)(i) of Rule XI of the Rules of
the House of Representatives.''
``The Chairman shall notify the Ranking Member prior to
issuing any subpoena under such authority. To the extent
practicable, the Chairman shall consult the Ranking Member at
least 24 hours in advance of a subpoena being issued under such
authority, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal
holidays.''
That is language that you demanded be put in the rules
under the last Congress when Mr. McCaul was Chairman. That is
your requirement.
I was sitting in the chair with you the day before. We were
having a very wonderful relationship the day before you issued
the subpoenas. All you had to do was tell me, ``I think we need
to send some subpoenas out.''
I would have said, ``Let's do it.''
You never said a word to me, and this is your rule.
Now, 24 hours' notice was not followed. So I am not just
making this stuff up. You and I have had a great relationship
for many years. We have been on this committee together for 15
years. If you were the Ranking Member, you would be upset about
this.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
October 30, 2019
Chairman Thompson thank you for this opportunity to receive
testimony today during this second hearing on the topic of ``Global
Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland.''
I am pleased to know that the impasse that existed regarding the
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security's appearance before the Committee
today was resolved prior to our meeting.
I thank today's witnesses:
Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, Department
of Homeland Security (DHS);
Honorable Christopher A. Wray, director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI);
Mr. Russell E. Travers, acting director, National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); and
Honorable David J. Glawe, under secretary, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, DHS (Minority witness).
This hearing will allow committee Members to question Government
witnesses about world-wide terrorism threats and examine how the
Federal Government is addressing those threats to protect the homeland.
Members of this committee must focus on international terrorism
threats, including the threats to the homeland resulting from the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, and the rise in domestic
terrorism incidents and recent mass shootings, including those inspired
by or related to violent extremists with transnational links.
As a Member of Congress and a senior Member of the Committees on
Homeland Security and the Judiciary, both of which deal with National
security issues, I have long been committed and engaged in efforts to
develop policies that anticipate and respond to new and emerging
challenges to the security of our Nation and the peace and safety of
the world.
I will never forget September 11, 2001, when 2,977 men, women, and
children were murdered by 19 hijackers--15 of whom were Saudi
nationals, who took control of commercial aircraft and used them as
missiles.
I stood on the East Front steps of the Capitol on September 11,
2001, along with 150 members of the House of Representatives and sang
``God Bless America.''
September 11, 2001, remains a tragedy that defines our Nation's
history, but the final chapter will be written by those who are charged
with keeping our Nation and its people safe while preserving the way of
life that terrorists sought to change.
I visited the site of the World Trade Center Towers in the
aftermath of the attacks and grieved over the deaths of so many of our
men, women, and children.
I was heartbroken over the lives lost at the Pentagon.
Since September 11, 2001, it has been a priority of this Nation to
prevent terrorists, or those who would do Americans harm, from boarding
flights whether they are domestic or international.
Over the last 17 years, since enactment of the Homeland Security
Act, the mission of the Department of Homeland Security has expanded to
include cyber defense of civilian agency and private-sector networks;
protecting critical infrastructure in the form of the Nation's electric
grid, water delivery systems, transportation networks and Federal
election systems; and, most recently, fighting the international reach
of white nationalism, white supremacy, and violent acts targeting
religious minorities living within the United States.
The struggle against violent extremism began on September 11, 2001,
but it has extended to this day because of the continued attacks
against religious freedom, diversity, equal rights for women, and other
core principles that are foundational to our Nation's expression of a
democratic republic.
To succeed in the fight against violent extremism, our Nation's
leadership--in the Congress and the Executive branch must work
together.
I am supportive of efforts to employ effective approaches to
interdicting, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist networks.
The previous administration focused on how best to use our Nation's
soft power and military power for minimizing, eliminating, and
containing terrorists' threats in the region, with a full understanding
that over-aggressive actions militarily can pull our country into a
precipitous military struggle that would be open-ended.
We must strengthen and protect institutions--like our system of
Federal elections that is under pressure from Russia and other foreign
state actors.
We must also work to deter those in this Nation who may seek to
gain political advantage in domestic elections by deploying the tactics
used by Russia in the 2016 election.
We must support our strategic partners and find new allies who will
join us in our fight to defeat extremism.
separated children
We must not engage in immigration policy that is an afront to our
Nation's values and in direct opposition to our National interest.
As the founder and chair of the Children's Caucus and as a parent
and grandparent, I cannot think of a situation more devastating than
having the Government forcibly separate a parent from her child to a
place unknown, for a fate uncertain, absent from any form of
communication.
But for months the official policy of the United States under this
administration was to pursue a failed immigration policy that supported
forcible removal of children ranging in age from infants and toddlers
to adolescents from the care of adults who were fleeing violence,
oppression, and economic desperation of Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador.
Refugees are not criminals or terrorists, they are men, women, and
children seeking asylum.
While they hope to receive asylum, none of us expected that they
would be treated as criminals or that their children would be forcibly
separated from them.
But shamefully that is exactly what is happening under this
administration.
This failed policy has hurt the United States' standing around the
world and harmed our strategic interest in our own hemisphere.
The separation policy was not to stop a terrorist from entering the
United States, but it was effective in providing terrorist recruitment
efforts with material that may be used for decades to recruit
terrorists.
In an article in the Washington Post the ACLU reports that an
additional 1,500 migrant children were taken from parents by the Trump
administration than had been previously reported.
isis influence on tactics used by white nationalists
Another misstep by this administration occurred when President
Trump allowed Turkey to invade Syria to attack the Kurds our strongest
regional ally working with the United States to stop ISIS.
The Congress and the Executive branch have worked for well over 5
years to defeat ISIS, with the aid of a staunch ally in the Kurds.
The defeat of ISIS is being threatened by an invasion by Turkey in
the effort to attack Kurds who were essential in defeating ISIS.
It is reported that hundreds of ISIS fighters have escaped prisons
where they were being held by Kurdish forces who are in retreat from
the brutal onslaught of fighting caused by Turkish forces.
Over 100,000 Kurdish refugees have entered Iraq due to Turkish
actions making the region unstable.
Today's witnesses testify that we are in a new era of geopolitical
conflict.
It is no longer a matter of governments fielding armies or
combatants--but the emergence of what is best described as a new form
of geo-military transnational gang activity.
The affiliations of violent extremists' individuals and groups are
loose, with membership remaining fluid--one individual or small group
may identify with al-Qaeda today, and switch its identification to ISIL
or al-Shabaab or Boko Haram, depending on which group is perceived to
be the strongest.
Added to the challenge of violent extremism is its ability to very
effectively use the tools of social media to reach far beyond the
battlefield to influence young people to join their cause.
These groups require weak governments to enter new territory and
must sow chaos in these areas to gain power by attacking institutions
and people regardless of their religious or ethnic traditions to
destabilize regions.
They act in the name of religion but institute intra- and inter-
Muslim faith conflicts against individuals and mosques to kill
thousands.
Violent extremism is not new--those who struggle to hold onto an
idyllic past or rigid view of their faith that does not tolerate non-
conformism has plagued societies throughout history.
Today, white nationalists are targeting domestic places of worship
for to commit violence.
The only tools that have succeeded in overcoming violent extremism
is the commitment of those most affected by their violence to stand
against them.
plight of kurdish forces
Unfortunately, this administration has diminished the role and the
capacity of the State Department to keep manageable threats in check,
while doing the hard work of coalition building so that there would be
effective burden-sharing for actions taken.
In the case of ISIS, the boots on the ground needed to defeat them
had to be Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, Kurdish, Peshmerga with
the full support of United States resources.
In the end it was the Kurdish people who ended the ISIS grip on the
Middle East.
The Kurds offered a real opportunity to have a strategic partner
and reliable Muslim ally in the region that the United States could
call upon, should another ISIS or al-Qaeda threat emerged.
How can the United States provide a credible bulwark against
terrorism abroad if we cannot get this administration to get over its
reticence to speaking before committees in this Congress?
Incredible as it is, the President was planning in September 2019
to meet with the Taliban at Camp David, an organization directly linked
to the September 11, 2001 attacks on our Nation, while at the same time
he discourages his political appointees and acting department heads to
participate in this hearing to assess the threats posed by
international terror groups, which include the Talban.
I firmly believe that the most important lesson over the last
decade is that the United States can want many things for the peoples
of the impacted region, but it is the people in the impacted regions
who must win these victories for themselves.
conclusion
We must remember that after the battles are all fought and decided
that the underlying causes for so many willing souls to commit
themselves to kill and die for ISIS and Boko Haram may be expanding to
other domestic groups aligned with white nationalist and white
supremist followers.
The battle against ISIS was won by creating a strong partnership
with the indispensable Kurdish forces.
There is no other group in the region to whom the United States can
turn who can field fighters to counter the threats posed by ISIS or
ISIS-like threats that will not require that we place troops in harm's
way.
The battle against extremism has entered a new phase in the United
States.
The demons of racism, intolerance, and racial supremacy are active
in engaging people in a hidden struggle in opposition to the diversity
that is our Nation's best hope for a prosperous future.
I am a firm supporter of getting to the source of problems that
come from the complexity of our interconnected world.
Our Nation needs our best efforts on the behalf of peace and
security abroad to assure that we have peace and security at home.
Homeland security and National defense are not and should not be
made into political issues.
The first thing that we must address is the leadership of the
Department of Homeland Security and a need to allow for Senate advice
and consent to secure the confirmation of the next Secretary of
Homeland Security.
history of middle east failures
Members of this committee and the witnesses before us today
understand that the fight against violent extremism is far from over
and the actions by this administration that has led to betrayal of a
valued ally can lead to erosion of the peace found at the apparent
demise of ISIS.
Past misdeeds in the region have led us to the insecurity that
exists in that region.
Part of the struggle for peace we face today is a direct
consequence of invading Iraq without provocation or reason.
Paraphrasing Secretary of State Colin Powell's advice to President
George W. Bush: ``if we break it--we will own it.''
He was warning President Bush about the folly of entering a war of
choice with Iraq and the complexities of that region of the world that
could spiral out of control.
I can offer a similar warning to the current President.
If you break the special relationship that the United States has
with the Kurdish people in joining to fight and defeat ISIS, then
future wars that cost American lives and treasure in that region are at
your feet.
Our work as Members of this committee has for well over a decade,
focused on potential links between international terror groups and
persons residing within the United States.
Today, our focus remains the same, but the domestic targets of
international terror have expanded to include members of white
nationalist groups, neo-Nazi, and white supremist adherents.
threats posed by biological weapons
I would offer that we must keep an open mind and vigilant stance
when considering threats posed by biologics.
Over the past 100 years, more than 500 million people died of
infectious diseases.
A percentage of these deaths were due to the deliberate release of
pathogens or toxins, mostly by the Japanese during their attacks on
China during the Second World War.
There are 2 international treaties that outlawed biological
weapons, but they have failed to stop countries from conducting
offensive bio-weapons research and large-scale production of biological
weapons.
There are legitimate fears that modified pathogens could constitute
devastating agents for biological warfare that may target people,
agriculture, or animals with disastrous consequences.
The ability of the United States to remain actively engaged in
policing this area of National defense is complicated by this
administration anti-trade and NATO policies that place the United
States at odds with long-time military and economic allies.
The Nation is at its greatest peril due to the lack of leadership
within key components within the Department of Homeland Security.
We must do all that we can to support the work of men and women on
the front lines of defending our Nation and our standing in the world.
I thank today's witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our
first witness is Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin
McAleenan, who has served in that role since April 2019.
Next, we have Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Christopher Wray. Director Wray has served in his
role since 2017.
Next, we are having Acting Director of National
Counterterrorism Center Russell Travers, who has served in the
role since August 2019.
Last, we have David Glawe, who has served as the under
secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security since 2017.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I will now ask each witness to summarize his or her
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Acting Secretary
McAleenan.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN K. McALEENAN, ACTING SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary McAleenan. Good morning, Chairman Thompson,
Ranking Member Rogers, Members of the committee.
I appear before you today to testify about the Department
of Homeland Security's vital National security mission and our
efforts to confront today's emerging world-wide threats.
The men and women of DHS are dedicated professionals who
work to safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our
values. They represent some of the best of the country, and I
appreciate the continued support this committee shows for them
and the work they do each day.
The Department of Homeland Security, as you know, was
created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and was charged with
coordinating and unifying the Nation's homeland security
enterprise. Our mission is multi-dimensional built on the 5
pillars of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery.
I would like to focus on 5 significant trends we see in the
threat landscape and the efforts DHS is executing to combat
them, specifically the threats we face from foreign terrorist
organizations, domestic terrorism and targeted violence,
transnational criminal organizations, and from malicious cyber
activities and actors, and nation-state-level challenges to our
interests.
DHS was formed, first and foremost, to counter the threat
of international terrorism and has achieved significant
successes in mitigating the ability of foreign terrorist
organizations to present a threat to the homeland since 9/11.
We have achieved these successes by utilizing a range of
tools, particularly our world-class vetting programs and
capabilities to identify and detect foreign terrorist actors
and prevent them from entering the country.
In cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the intelligence community, the Department of State, Department
of Defense, and others, we prevent thousands of potential
terrorists from entering or traveling to the United States each
year through these efforts.
While we have enhanced our security greatly, the threat of
foreign terrorist organizations remains a significant concern.
Whether through direction or inspiration, these groups seek to
spur disaffected individuals to violence, encouraging them to
strike the heart of our Nation and attack the unity of our
vibrant and diverse society.
ISIS, al-Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, and their global
networks represent significant and persistent security threats
to the United States. We must work to ensure aggressively
across Government and with our international partners that we
are doing everything we can to pressure and disrupt these
organizations and their efforts to target the United States
homeland.
One of the most significant emerging threats over the past
years has been domestic actors' adoption of terrorist
techniques to inspire and direct individuals often via the
internet to carry out acts of terrorism and targeted violence.
Of specific concern has been an increase in racially- and
ethnically-motivated violence, particularly the threat posed by
violent white supremacist extremists. Last month, DHS
introduced a new strategic framework for countering terrorism
and targeted violence, which explains how we will adapt the
tools and expertise we have used to protect the country from
foreign terrorist organizations to address the evolving
challenges of today.
The prevalent trend of Americans driven by violent
extremist ideologies or personal grievances to commit acts of
terrorism or targeted violence with little apparent warning
creates a unique challenge to law enforcement investigation
tools. This framework explicitly recognizes the changing threat
landscape and calls for the whole-of-community efforts to
enhance prevention and resilience, identify individuals who are
on a pathway to violence, and to build off-ramps and
intervention points.
Importantly, the framework calls out the need to focus on
and protect our most vulnerable populations, particularly our
youth. It is intentionally forward-looking, and its
understanding of technology's role as a factor that can
exacerbate threats.
The next major threat category in the DHS mission space is
presented by powerful and violent transnational criminal
organizations, or TCOs. These TCOs have diversified their
multi-challenger businesses, profiting from drug and human
smuggling and the movement of weapons and money.
These TCOs organize and incentivize illicit mass migration
and engage in human trafficking. Their violent criminal
activity, including competition for territory, creates security
risks at our border and throughout the hemisphere.
DHS, on the cyber side, DHS works with the Government
partners and the private sector to enhance our Nation's overall
defensive posture against malicious cyber activity, protecting
the dot-gov networks and our critical infrastructure against
nation-state actors and cyber criminals.
In August 2019, DHS's Cyber and Infrastructure Security
Agency, or CISA, published its strategic intent: Defend today,
secure tomorrow. In this document CISA laid out its director's
operational priorities, calling out the threat from China, and
highlighting our need to focus on supply chain security, 5G
technology, election security, Federal cybersecurity, and
industrial control systems.
As acknowledged within the document, China presents the
most pressing long-term strategic risk to the United States in
these areas, and CISA is looking to reduce the risk of Chinese
supply chain compromise, whether through 5G or other
technologies.
The foreign intelligence threat faced by DHS in today's
global environment has also quickly evolved into one of the
most significant threats to our country. The leading state
intelligence threat to the U.S. interest will likely continue
to be China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, based on their
capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope.
In conclusion, every day the 240,000 men and women of the
Department of Homeland Security work to ensure the safety and
security of all Americans and are dedicated to building a
brighter and more secure Nation. They deserve our support and
our thanks.
I continue to appreciate their efforts on behalf of the
American people. It has been an honor to serve as their acting
secretary and as commissioner of CBP.
In closing, I want to note that the symmetry in this
hearing, my 27th overall and ninth before this committee and
its subcommittees, my first hearing was in front of then-
Subcommittee Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee, and both Chairman
Thompson and then-Ranking Member King attended.
So I think it is fitting that I close this stage of my
Government career in front of this committee again.
I want to thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Rogers, distinguished Members of the committee for the support
you and your staff have shown the Department of Homeland
Security and our men and women in providing the tools we need
to adapt to the changing landscape.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary McAleenan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin K. McAleenan
October 30, 2019
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members
of the committee, it is my honor to appear before you today to testify
about the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) vital National
security mission and explain how we are implementing policies to
confront today's emerging world-wide threats.
Let me first say that the men and women of DHS are exceptional and
dedicated professionals who work tirelessly to protect the homeland
from foreign and domestic threats. Their efforts play a vital role in
ensuring that all Americans can be confident in their homes, schools,
and houses of worship, as well as in public spaces. They represent the
core of our Department and the best of our country. I appreciate your
continued support for them and the various missions they undertake each
day.
the evolving threat environment since 9/11 attacks
As you know, our Department was created in the wake of the
devastating 9/11 attacks and was charged with coordinating and unifying
the Nation's homeland security enterprise. Our mission is multi-
dimensional, built on the 5 pillars of prevention, protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery. It is a calling that has been
heeded by thousands and a mission that has been achieved successfully
for nearly 2 decades.
Although many years have passed since the pivotal moment that gave
us a permanent mission, we have not forgotten that day or relaxed at
our post. We cannot afford to, especially with the new threats that are
arising throughout the world.
Today, I will share with you 7 major shifts I see in the threat
landscape since 9/11, and the efforts DHS is executing upon to combat
them. Specifically, I would like to speak about the threats we face
from foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism, malicious cyber activities
and the illicit use of emerging technologies, counterintelligence and
foreign influence within the homeland, and the broad topic of the
illicit movement of people and goods, particularly in the Western
Hemisphere, which supports human smuggling and human trafficking, and
global illicit drug sales and distribution.
Underpinning nearly all these threat vectors is an increasing rise
in adversarial engagement from nation-states such as China, Russia, and
Iran. I would like to be clear at the outset that we face today nation-
state-level challenges to our interests and global democratic
principles of a degree that we have not faced in many, many years.
These nation-state adversaries seek to undermine, destabilize,
discredit, and damage the United States through dynamic and multi-
dimensional strategies that target not only our physical assets, but
also our social cohesion and our confidence in our very way of life.
foreign terrorist organizations
That said, the primary reason DHS was formed was to counter the
threat of terrorism. Therefore, the first issue I want to address in
the threat landscape is the threat posed by Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs), which remain a core priority of DHS's
counterterrorism efforts.
We have had significant successes mitigating the foreign terrorist
threat here at home since 9/11 and continue to make substantial
progress in our ability to detect, prevent, protect against, and
mitigate the threats that these groups pose. We have achieved these
successes by utilizing a range of tools to identify and detect foreign
terrorist actors and prevent them from entering the country. To ensure
that foreign terrorist actors cannot enter through designated ports of
entry or exploit the immigration system, the Department maintains
numerous vetting programs and capabilities. We prevent thousands of
terrorist-watchlisted individuals from entering or traveling to the
United States each year through these efforts, in cooperation with the
Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other
agencies. Additionally, DHS, particularly through Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), represents the largest
Federal contributor of personnel, outside of the FBI, to the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). At the JTTFs, DHS officers and agents
are engaged in a majority of counterterrorism investigations every year
and employ their unique authorities and capabilities every day to
identify, disrupt, and dismantle threats associated with foreign
terrorist organizations. Furthermore, our DHS component agencies patrol
and rigorously enforce land, air, and sea borders, offering a critical
final line of defense.
However, in spite of these successes, the threat of foreign
terrorist organizations remains a significant concern. Whether through
direction or inspiration, these groups seek to spur our youth and our
disaffected to violence--encouraging them to strike the heart of our
Nation and attack the unity of our vibrant, diverse society. ISIS, al-
Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, returning foreign terrorist fighters, and
those still in prison in theater represent significant, persistent, and
long-term National security threats to the United States.
Since 2011, the situation in Iraq and Syria has marked one of the
most significant challenges to our ability to track and combat foreign
terrorist actors. As many of you know, failed states and lawless areas
represent opportunities for the restructuring, rearmament,
consolidation, and emergence of FTOs. These organizations may target
our interests and aspire to target us here at home. Given the
opportunity to identify and control safe havens, they have proven
capable at directing such attacks beyond the boundaries of a geographic
region.
We must ensure that we continue to work aggressively across our
Government, and with our international partners, to pressure and
disrupt ISIS and other terrorist organizations targeting the United
States homeland. DHS will continue to work closely with our
international partners in the European Union and around the world to
ensure that we are leveraging our expertise in screening, vetting, and
border security--particularly in areas known to be vulnerable to large
influxes of migration from this region, as these locations offer
significant opportunities for exploitation by our FTO adversaries--to
enhance our partners' capabilities.
We need not only focus on detained ISIS fighters, but also on
gaining a better understanding of those individuals who have been
forced into displaced persons camps within the region and subsequently
potentially subjected to attempts from hardened ISIS fighters or
sympathizers to radicalize them to violence. Furthermore, we must
recognize that the threat from women and teenagers radicalized to
violence is potentially as critical today as that from men. We must
adapt to this reality.
dhs strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence
Perhaps one of the most significant evolutions over the past few
years has been domestic actors' adoption of FTO techniques to inspire
individuals via the internet to carry out acts of terrorism and
targeted violence. Of specific concern has been an increase in racially
and ethnically motivated violence. In September, DHS introduced a new
Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence,
which explains how we will use the tools and expertise that have
protected the country from foreign terrorist organizations to address
the evolving challenges of today. The Strategic Framework is
intentionally forward-looking in its understanding of technology's role
as a factor that can exacerbate problems, but also one that can provide
new solutions to combat the threats we confront. We have begun the
implementation of the Framework and will publish a public Action Plan
that captures how DHS is working alongside our interagency partners to
see this vision to fruition by the end of the calendar year.
The framework is designed to assess DHS's past and provide a
guidepost to its future. Today, we face a growing threat from domestic
actors inspired by violent extremist ideologies. The prevalent trend of
Americans driven by violent extremist ideologies or personal grievances
to commit acts of terrorism, mass violence, or targeted violence with
little apparent warning creates a unique challenge to traditional law
enforcement and investigation methods. We must address and prevent the
mass attacks that have too frequently struck our houses of worship, our
schools, our workplaces, our festivals, and our shopping spaces. The
Framework lays out a comprehensive approach to enhancing our prevention
capabilities here at home in an age of complex and multidimensional
threats, regardless of ideology. Importantly, the framework explicitly
recognizes the need to focus on and protect our most vulnerable
populations, particularly our youth.
The Strategic Framework also introduces a new annual assessment
that will examine the state of the threat to the Nation. This new
assessment will help to inform all levels of government and the broader
public about the various threats the homeland faces each year. Within
this report we will analyze the threat of white supremacist violent
extremism, one type of racially and ethnically motivated violent
extremism.
acts of ``domestic terrorism'' and targeted violence
There is no moral ambiguity on this issue. Racially- and
ethnically-motivated violent extremism, including violent white
supremacy extremism, is one the most potent forces driving acts of
domestic terrorism. Lone attackers, as opposed to cells or
organizations, generally perpetrate these attacks motivated by this
ideology, but they are also part of a broader movement. White
supremacist violent extremists, for example, have adopted an
increasingly transnational outlook in recent years, largely driven by
technological forces. Similar to how ISIS inspired and connected with
potential radical Islamist terrorists, white supremacist violent
extremists connect with like-minded individuals on-line.
At the Federal level, the FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
are the U.S. Government (USG) leads for investigating violent extremism
and acts of terrorism and prosecuting related individuals, while DHS
informs, equips, and trains our homeland security partners to enhance
their prevention and protection capabilities. DHS's primary
responsibilities include: (1) Informing, equipping, and training State,
local, Tribal, and territorial governments, civil society, and the
private sector to take preventative and protective actions. (2) In
conjunction with the FBI, DHS produces joint strategic products
identifying trends as well as findings and lessons learned from acts of
domestic terrorism.
To this end, in April, we announced the creation of the Office of
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP)--the primary entity
responsible for driving the prevention mission. TVTP is a program
office that uses awareness briefings, strategic engagements, technical
assistance, information sharing and grants to catalyze the formation
and expansion of locally-based prevention efforts. TVTP also looks
across the Department to identify complementary efforts that amplify
this work by addressing gaps through the creation and deployment of
prevention programs that support these State and local efforts. To
accomplish this, TVTP works alongside the United States Secret
Service's (USSS), National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC),
Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to ensure all of DHS's office and
components have the necessary tools to prevent domestic terrorism and
targeted violence.
weapons of mass destruction and health security
The Department fully concurs with the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) that the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat
continues to rise. Specific to the homeland, the period of sustained
chemical weapons use on battlefields in the Middle East (Syria and
Iraq), coupled with the ever-expanding on-line proliferation of related
expertise, could inspire chemical attacks against U.S. interests at
home and abroad. These attacks in Syria and Iraq, along with the very
public Russian Novichok use in the U.K. and North Korean VX use in
Malaysia, have flouted international norms against the use of chemical
weapons, raising the risk of more brazen attacks in the future.
Furthermore, the increased diversity in biological and health-
related threats is concerning. Advances in biotechnology are changing
the threat agent landscape, and the decreasing cost and access of dual-
use technologies and materials will inevitably expand the threat actor
landscape as well.
These issues, coupled with the already-complex risks from emerging
infectious diseases, and food, agricultural, and veterinary threats,
require an elevated integrator and broader all-hazards approach,
necessitating organizational change. To this end, in December 2018, the
passage of Pub. L. 115-387, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 2018 finalized the creation of DHS's Office of Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)--the primary entity responsible for
driving the CWMD planning, detection, and protection missions and the
Department's health security. We are actively working to overcome the
routine challenges of organizational transition as we build out this
new office.
The office is also the Department lead on CWMD issues and works
with interagency partners including the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human
Services, the National Nuclear Security Agency at the Department of
Energy, and Special Operations Command at the Department of Defense to
establish policy and operational plans to keep the United States secure
from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear and other emerging
threats.
cyber threats and emerging technologies
Cyber Threats
DHS, our government partners, and the private sector are all
engaging in a strategic and unified approach toward improving our
Nation's overall defensive posture against malicious cyber activity. In
2018, the Department published the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy,
outlining a strategic framework to execute our cybersecurity
responsibilities during the next 5 years. The National Cyber Strategy,
released later that year, reiterates the need to acquire U.S.
technology and capture U.S. data, communications, and intelligence
property to support its goal of collaboration being the world leader in
technology development and strengthens the Government's commitment to
work in partnership with industry to combat cyber threats and secure
our critical infrastructure. Together, the National Cyber Strategy and
DHS Cybersecurity Strategy guide DHS's cybersecurity efforts.
DHS is working with the U.S. Coast Guard to build out its
cybersecurity capacity in order to protect U.S. ports and shipping as
well as implement standards at those foreign ports that have a U.S.
National security interest. The U.S. Coast Guard is providing written
guidance to conduct cyber risk assessments of these ports.
The Cyberecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
operates at the intersection of the Federal Government, State and local
governments, the private sector, international partners, law
enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities. Division N of Pub.
L. 114-113, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, established DHS as the
Federal Government's central hub for the sharing of cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures. Additionally, Pub. L. 113-283, the
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, provides DHS
with key responsibilities for protecting Federal networks. CISA works
to enhance information sharing with partners and stakeholders,
domestically and internationally, to help critical infrastructure
entities and Government agencies strengthen their cyber posture.
By bringing together all levels of government, the private sector,
international partners, and the public, CISA strengthens the resilience
of our Nation's critical infrastructure and enables collective defense
against cybersecurity risks. Specifically, CISA is working through the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) structure
to engage with private-sector stakeholders, especially the
Communications and Information Technology Sector Coordinating Councils
and the Enduring Security Framework Operations Working Group to
collaborate on the posed by supply chain vulnerabilities and the
adoption of 5G technologies. DHS is also leading, in coordination with
the IT and Communications Sector Coordination Councils, the ICT Supply
Chain Risk Management Task Force with the critical mission of
identifying and developing consensus strategies that enhance ICT Supply
Chain security. The ICT SCRM Task Force's participants include 20
Federal partners, as well as 40 of the largest companies in the
Information Technology and Communications sectors.
Cyber threats remain one of the most significant strategic risks
for the United States, threatening our National security, economic
prosperity, and public health and safety. Nation-states, cyber
criminals, and criminal hackers, are increasing the frequency and
sophistication of their malicious cyber activities. In a 2018 report,
Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace, the United States' National
Counterintelligence and Security Center stated, ``[w]e anticipate that
China, Russia, and Iran will remain aggressive and capable collectors
of sensitive U.S. economic information and technologies, particularly
in cyber space.'' Strategic competitors such as China, Russia, and Iran
are developing and using advanced cyber capabilities in attempts to
undermine critical infrastructure, target our livelihoods and
innovation, steal our National security secrets, and threaten our
democratic institutions.
Vulnerabilities in supply chains--either developed intentionally
for malicious intent or unintentionally through poor security
practices--can enable data and intellectual property theft, loss of
confidence in the integrity of the system, or exploitation to cause
system and network failure. Increasingly, these vulnerabilities can be
viewed as a principal route into our most critical systems and
technologies, and we are increasingly concerned with aggressive actions
by potential foreign adversaries.
5G Technology
Ultimately, 5G technology may enable significant advances in our
society and the prosperity of the United States, but will also usher in
an age of significantly greater cyber vulnerability. Advances in 5G
technology, the internet of things (IoT), and other emerging
technologies are driving significant transformation in how we
communicate, operate our critical infrastructure, and conduct economic
activity. This represents the next generation of networks that will
enhance the bandwidth, capacity, and reliability of mobile
communications. The United States and South Korea launched 5G on a
limited basis at the end of 2018, and more countries are rolling it out
this year. According to the Global System for Mobile Alliance (GSMA),
5.1 billion people, or 67 percent of the global population, are
subscribed to mobile services. It is expected that 5G networks will
cover 2.7 billion people, or 40 percent of the global population, by
2025.
The first generation of wireless telecommunications networks in the
United States was deployed in 1982, and its capabilities were limited
to basic voice communications. Later generations added capabilities
like: Text, picture, and multimedia messaging; Global Positioning
System (GPS) location; video conferencing; and multi-media streaming.
5G networks will support greater capacity for tens of billions of
sensor and IoT smart devices, and ultra-low latency necessary for
highly reliable, critical communications. According to GSMA, between
2018 and 2025, the number of global IoT connections will triple to 25
billion. Autonomous vehicles, critical manufacturing, medical doctors
practicing remote surgery, and a smart electric grid represent only a
small fraction of the critical technologies and economic activity that
5G will support. These dramatic advancements in telecommunications and
technologies associated with them come with increased risk to the
Nation's critical infrastructure.
Risks to mobile communications generally include such activities as
call interception and monitoring, user location tracking, cyber actors
seeking financial gain through banking fraud, social engineering,
ransomware, identity theft, or theft of the device, services, or any
sensitive data. Integrating 5G into current wireless networks may
convey existing vulnerabilities and impact 5G network security.
Capabilities of 5G will allow for exponentially more data transmission
across networks. Data on 5G networks will flow through interconnected
cellular towers, small cells, and mobile devices and may provide
malicious actors additional vectors to intercept, manipulate, or
destroy critical data. Due to the nature of 5G network architecture,
many more pieces of cellular equipment will be present in the physical
world.
The National Cyber Strategy, released later that year, also
reiterates the need to acquire U.S. technology and capture U.S. data,
communications, and intelligence property to support its goal of
collaboration being the world leader in technology development and
strengthens the Government's commitment to work in partnership with
industry to combat cyber threats and secure our critical
infrastructure. Together, the National Cyber Strategy and DHS
Cybersecurity Strategy guide DHS's cybersecurity efforts to prioritize
the development of secure and reliable advanced information technology
risks posed by supply chain vulnerabilities and the adoption of 5G
technologies. To manage and address the risks posed by 5G, the U.S.
Government is taking an interagency approach, led by the White House.
National Security Council (NSC) Cybersecurity Directorate and the
National Economic Council co-lead a regular 5G interagency Policy
Coordination Committee (PCC) through the National Security Presidential
Memoranda (NSPM)--4 process. DHS participates in these meetings and
they provide an excellent opportunity to discuss and come to decisions
on key G5 issues.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Criminal entities and terrorist organizations continue to promote
and use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for illicit activity in order
to support surveillance, smuggling, and harassment and, at times, use
as weapons. The UAS threat to critical infrastructure and security
activities will likely increase soon as the number of UAS introduced
into the National airspace continues to increase, and the use of
technical means to detect, track, and disrupt malicious UAS operations
will likely remain limited. In order to combat the rising threat of
UAS, DHS conducts counter aircraft system (CUAS) operations authorized
by law, to disrupt malicious use of UAS at facilities or DHS supported
activities within the United States, and as designated by the Secretary
of DHS.
supporting election security
Leading up to the 2018 midterms, DHS worked together with Federal
partners, State and local election officials, and private-sector
vendors to provide information and capabilities to enable them to
better defend their election infrastructure. This partnership led to a
successful model that we aim to continue and improve upon in the 2020
election cycle.
To date, because of our holistic USG-wide response to this threat,
there is no evidence that any identified activities of a foreign
government or foreign agent had a material impact on the integrity or
security of election infrastructure or political or campaign
infrastructure used in the 2018 midterm elections for the U.S.
Congress. We must be uniform and clear in our communication of this
fact to the American Public.
We must make the important distinction between malign foreign
attempts to influence U.S. public opinion and actual incidents attacks
on activities targeting/against our election infrastructure. While we
see many examples of the first each every day--Russia and other foreign
countries, including China and Iran, conduct malign influence
activities and messaging campaigns targeting the United States to
advance their strategic interests--there is no evidence of successful
exploitation of our election or political campaign infrastructure. We
must combat both election infrastructure threats and malign foreign
influence campaigns holistically as a U.S. Government and U.S. society,
building resistance and resilience to attempts by foreign nation-state
adversaries to pull at the seams of our diverse social fabric and sow
discord in our political process.
DHS is holistically dedicated to the security of our electoral
process as it is a vital National interest. We regularly coordinate
with the intelligence community and law enforcement partners, as well
as relevant private-sector entities, to assess the scale and scope of
malicious cyber activity potentially targeting the U.S. election
infrastructure. It is our goal to ensure the American people enter the
voting booth with the confidence that their vote counts and is counted
correctly.
In advance of the 2020 Federal Election, DHS's Countering Foreign
Influence Task Force (CFITF) is expanding on both operational support
activities and public awareness and engagement. DHS established the
CFITF to facilitate public awareness, partner engagement, and
information sharing as it relates to malign foreign influence threats,
including those targeting United States elections. These efforts are
done in close coordination with and support to the FBI and its malign
influence efforts. The CFITF is growing the number of participants,
subsequently increasing lines of communication between the platforms
being exploited and the victims of that exploitation.
CISA, in coordination with our interagency partners, is also
helping Americans recognize and avoid foreign disinformation operations
impacting our elections through innovative efforts like the
#WarOnPineapple campaign. The #WarOnPineapple is aimed at educating
Americans on the use of malign foreign influence campaign tactics by
highlighting a topic that citizens can easily relate to: The
divisiveness of pineapples on pizza. Through this work, CISA is helping
Americans recognize and avoid foreign disinformation operations
impacting homeland security, including our elections.
counterintelligence
The foreign intelligence threat faced by DHS in today's global
environment has quickly evolved into one of the most significant
threats to our country in decades. Although the leading state
intelligence threats to U.S. interests will likely continue to be
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea--based on their capabilities,
intent, and broad operational scope, other Foreign Intelligence
Entities (FIE) in Latin America, South Asia, the Middle East, and East
Asia pose local and regional intelligence threats to U.S. interests
which cannot be ignored. Additionally, non-state actors, including
international terrorist organizations, transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs), drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and
foreign cyber actors will likely continue to employ and improve their
intelligence collection capabilities using human, technical, and cyber
means in efforts to obtain and exploit sensitive DHS information and
National security programs.
As China's intelligence services continue to grow, they utilize and
imbed into America's academic and scientific communities and pose a
significant risk to economic and National security through technology
transfer via foreign direct investment, venture capital investments,
joint ventures, licensing agreements, cyber espionage, traditional
espionage, and Talent Programs. The Chinese Government's Talent
Programs are aimed at targeting and recruiting overseas Chinese and
foreign experts, among them academics and business entrepreneurs, in
strategic sectors to teach and work in China. Through its various
Talent Programs, China has targeted foreign experts in the United
States in order to acquire technology and know-how that is directly
aligned with China's Five-Year Plans, science and technology, economic,
and military modernization efforts. U.S. academic institutions are at
particularly risk of exploitation due to their openness and
collaborative research approaches.
Chinese citizens who come to the United States to study or teach at
U.S. academic institutions also present a significant risk of
technology transfer. While they competitively develop their science and
technology workforce, we must continue to lead and out-produce China in
this area. The most immediate threats have far-reaching and enduring
implications to U.S. National security: Influence operations, critical
infrastructure, supply chain, as well as traditional and economic
espionage. Developing technologies and artificial intelligence (AI)
systems will influence the way we engage in National security in the
future. It is essential that we lead the global AI race to ensure that
we are ready for National security threats of the future.
illegal cross-border movements of people and goods: illegal
immigration, human trafficking, human smuggling, and the global illicit
drug trade
Illegal Immigration
This year, our Nation has experienced an unprecedented and
unsustainable humanitarian and National security crisis at the
Southwest Border. This crisis has presented unique challenges that our
Department has never seen. Nevertheless, this administration has taken
extraordinary and successful steps to secure our borders and restore
integrity to our immigration system.
As you all know, the scale of illegal immigration encountered by
DHS this year, including the number of families and children crossing
the border, has been unparalleled in recent history. The increased
shift to more families and children and the overwhelming numbers
profoundly affect our ability to patrol the border, ensure strong
interior enforcement, and diminishes our ability to prevent deadly
illicit drugs and dangerous people from entering our country. It also
detracts from our ability to facilitate lawful trade and travel.
Every day, DHS employees from CBP and ICE work to reduce the
illegal crossings into our country. CBP focuses primarily on enforcing
U.S. immigration laws at and between the ports of entry while ICE is
charged with enforcing immigration laws in the interior of the country.
DHS is receiving international cooperation. Mexico and our Central
American partners are also stepping up to help stop the flow of illegal
migrants. Further, with the help of the U.S. military, CBP is on track
to build 450-500 new miles of border wall by the end of 2020.
In the case of the foreign terrorist threat, border security is a
zero-sum challenge. Similarly, with an on-going opioid epidemic in our
country that has led to staggering numbers of casualties through
overdose and violence, each drug shipment that illegally crosses our
border is, in effect, responsible for the loss of American lives.
Consequently, the challenge of illegal immigration--which diverts our
resources along the border from our critical counterterrorism and
counter narcotics missions--represents a critical National security
concern.
We must continue to recognize the zero-sum nature of border
security and address the significant increases in mass migration. This
involves not just building the border wall that will conserve
overstretched law enforcement resources, but also fixing our
immigration laws that serve as ``pull factors'' for illegal immigration
and working with our foreign partners to alleviate the ``push factors''
in Latin American countries, particularly within El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, that cause mass departures in the first place.
Global Illicit Drug Trade
The United States is in the midst of an opioid epidemic that is
being fueled by the smuggling and trafficking of heroin, illicit
fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other synthetic opioids. Based on
investigative efforts, United States law enforcement has identified
China and Mexico as primary sources of the U.S. illicit fentanyl
threat.
Due to President Trump's engagement with Chinese President Xi,
China added fentanyl to the country's list of controlled substances,
effective May 1, 2019. Chinese fentanyl being shipped directly to the
United States decreased significantly. Illicit fentanyl, fentanyl
analogues, and their immediate precursors are most often produced in
China. From China, these substances are shipped primarily through
international mail or express consignment carriers (such as DHL, FedEx,
or UPS) directly to the United States or, alternatively, shipped
directly to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in Mexico.
Since May 1, 2019 it appears opioid traffickers have started
altering their methods by either trafficking non-fentanyl opioids such
as U-48800 to the United States as it is not scheduled in China, which
is illegally shipped directly to the United States through the
international mail or consignment carriers. Criminals and criminal
organizations are also sending pre-precursor chemicals such as 4-AP to
Mexico where Mexican cartels are synthesizing their own fentanyl from
these chemicals. While the direct shipment of Chinese fentanyl to the
United States has dramatically dropped, China is still ultimately
responsible for most of the fentanyl reaching the United States due to
its supply of pre-precursors to transnational criminal organizations in
Mexico.
Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl or fentanyl analogues are
prepared and mixed with other narcotics and fillers and/or pressed into
pill form, and then moved to the illicit U.S. market where demand for
prescription opioids and heroin remain at epidemic levels. In some
cases, regional distributors smuggle industrial pill presses and
components into the United States to operate illicit fentanyl tableting
operations domestically.
Mexican cartels have seized upon the profit potential of illicit
synthetic opioids and intend to grow their share of this illicit
market. Given its low cost coupled with high potency, one kilogram of
fentanyl can generate almost $10 million in revenue on the illicit
market. We are now seeing instances in which precursors originating in
China and smuggled into the United States have traveled through the
United States, destined for the U.S. Southwest Border locations.
The Mexican cartels have then smuggled the precursors out of the
country, synthesized them into illicit fentanyl, and imported the
finished product back into the United States for distribution and
consumption. The final product may be advertised as heroin, and the
end-user may not be aware of the presence of fentanyl.
Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking
Alongside illegal immigration and human smuggling, human
trafficking continues to pose a humanitarian and law enforcement
challenge. Migrant smuggling and human trafficking are often used
interchangeably in error when they are two distinct crimes. Migrant
smuggling is a crime committed against the sovereignty of a state,
while human trafficking is a crime of exploitation against an
individual. Migrant smuggling involves the provision of a service--
typically, transportation or fraudulent documents--to an individual who
voluntarily seeks to enter a foreign country illegally. Human
trafficking on the other hand, is a crime compelling an individual to
perform forced labor or a commercial sex act through force, fraud, or
coercion; or compelling a minor to perform a commercial sex act,
regardless of force, fraud, or coercion. Immigration status or country
of citizenship is not an element of human trafficking, nor is movement
across an international border. Human trafficking is also an
underreported crime because victims rarely come forward to seek help.
This may be because they are unable to do so or because their
vulnerabilities are being exploited, preventing them from seeking
assistance. Proper identification, assistance, and protection of
victims is essential to successfully combating this crime.
Transnational Crime Organizations
Based on the collection of intelligence and investigatory evidence
from USCG, CBP, and ICE, we observe that human smuggling enterprises
and the drug cartels maintain a symbiotic relationship. Certain members
of these criminal enterprises control the major United States and
foreign illicit drug markets, and others control the ``smuggling
flow,'' otherwise known as the ``illicit pathways.'' It is critical to
both our values as a Nation and the long-term stability of our Western
Hemisphere--including the health and prosperity of our Latin American
partners--that we work to disrupt these smuggling and trafficking
organizations, protect the vulnerable populations they exploit, and
help to build and strengthen our foreign partners' domestic
institutions and societies to protect their citizenries.
As we all know, cartels and other transnational organized crime
(TOC) networks serve as organizing forces behind the illicit mass
migration and migrant smuggling and human trafficking I discussed just
a moment ago. These TOC networks threaten the homeland, support hostile
foreign powers, and drive regional instability, crime, corruption, and
violence. TOC networks maintain a diverse portfolio of crimes,
including fraud, human trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. They are
also heavily involved in human, weapon, bulk cash, and drug smuggling
through their sophisticated criminal networks.
TOC networks are motivated by money and power and have little
regard for human life. These networks are commodity-agnostic--a human
being is moved along with no more care than a gun or a bundle of drugs.
When desperate aliens enter these networks, they may find themselves
beaten, assaulted, raped, and even killed by network members.
TOC networks continually adjust their operations to avoid detection
and interdiction by law enforcement, and--like legitimate businesses--
are quick to take advantage of improved technology, cheaper
transportation, and better distribution methods.
DHS uses a multi-layered threat-based strategy--conducts overseas
operations and capacity building, at-sea interdictions, border
interdictions, and interior enforcement activities--to leverage its
unique criminal, civil, military, and administrative authorities to
achieve mission objectives and counter TOC.
conclusion
Every day, the 240,000 men and women of the Department of Homeland
Security work to ensure the safety and security of all Americans and
are dedicated to building a brighter future. They deserve our support
and thanks.
I want to thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers,
distinguished Members, and staff for the support you have shown the
Department and the work undertaken by this committee to ensure DHS has
the tools it needs to adapt to the changing threat environment.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Director Wray to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Rogers, Members of the committee. I am honored to be here today
representing the roughly 37,000 men and women of the FBI.
It has now been just over 2 years since I became FBI
director in which time I have visited all 56 of our field
offices, meeting with State and local partners from every State
represented on this committee. I have met with every
headquarters division, scores of our foreign law enforcement
partners, business and community leaders, and crime victims and
their families.
Those interactions have given me a much better sense of
what we are up against. Quite frankly, the threats out there
are not the same from a decade ago. They are evolving in scale,
in impact, in complexity, in agility, and the FBI is moving
forward to meet those threats head-on.
In fact, over just the past 6 or 7 months, the FBI has
thwarted or disrupted terrorism-related plots, both domestic
terrorism and international terrorism. Our Joint Terrorism Task
Forces have made arrests in at least two-thirds of the States
represented on this committee just since April, and that is not
including all of our hate crime arrests and all the other kinds
of important work that we do.
So preventing terrorist attacks continues to be the FBI's
top priority. Even as we recognize our country's important
recent achievements with the death of al-Baghdadi and our fight
against ISIS in the Middle East, we know that we have to stay
vigilant against the threat both overseas and here at home.
We are also laser-focused on preventing attacks on those
already in the United States, people inspired by foreign
terrorists, what we call the home-grown violent extremists.
Often lone actors, these are folks inspired by foreign
ideologies, but who are self-radicalized largely on-line
through websites and encrypted messaging platforms rather than
in some remote training camp or cave.
We are also keenly focused in today's world on threat of
domestic terrorism, attacks carried out by people inspired by a
variety of violent extremist ideologies. I am talking about
everything from anarchist groups to racially-motivated violent
extremist groups.
Again, these are threats that began mostly on-line.
Terrorism today moves at the speed of social media. To confront
these threats, we are working closely with our Federal, State,
and local law enforcement partners and reaching out to the
communities we serve.
Our efforts are paying off. But these cases present unique
challenges in part because in this country, we do not
investigate a person just because of his or her beliefs, and
these people, like the home-grown violent extremists I was
referring to a minute ago, can also move very quickly with
little warning from espousing radical views to attack.
I can tell you after having personally walked through the
crime scene at the Tree of Life Synagogue and having visited
the teams from the mass shootings both in El Paso and in Dayton
that this threat is never far from our minds and is a focus
across the FBI.
The major threats we are focused on today are too numerous
to mention in my opening, but I look forward to answering
questions about a number of them as I respond to your
questions.
In particular on the cyber front, we see a wider-than-ever
range of actors, attack methods, and targets, including things
like sophisticated ransomware attacks on municipalities and
critical infrastructure. It is a threat that we are meeting by
partnering with the victims, with State and local authorities
and in particular, with our Federal partners, especially DHS
and other agencies.
On the counterintelligence front, we are especially focused
on China. They are using an expanding set of nontraditional
methods, blending both lawful and unlawful techniques.
So on the one hand, to come after the United States, on the
one hand, you have got things like corporate acquisitions,
funding of research, but then woven into those you have cyber
intrusions, stealing trade secrets, and a whole variety of
supply chain threats.
Even as I sit here today testifying before this committee,
the FBI has over 1,000 investigations involving attempted theft
of U.S.-based technology that lead back to China, involving
nearly all 56 of our field offices and almost every industry
and sector.
So this is not just a big city problem. It hits the
heartland. The men and women of the FBI dedicate themselves
every day to keeping the American people safe. I want to thank
this committee for your support for our FBI workforce. I can
tell you it makes all the difference in the world to our
hardworking agents, analysts, and professional staff both all
over this country, but also around the world.
So thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Wray
October 30, 2019
Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the current threats to the United States homeland. Our
Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving threats
ranging from home-grown violent extremists (``HVEs'') to cyber
criminals to hostile foreign intelligence services and operatives.
Keeping pace with these threats is a significant challenge for the FBI.
Our adversaries--terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and
criminals--take advantage of modern technology to hide their
communications; recruit followers; and plan, conduct, and encourage
espionage, cyber attacks, or terrorism to disperse information on
different methods to attack the U.S. homeland, and to facilitate other
illegal activities.
Just as our adversaries evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a
time of acute and persistent terrorist and criminal threats to our
National security, our economy, and indeed our communities. These
diverse threats underscore the complexity and breadth of the FBI's
mission: To protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of
the United States.
counterterrorism
Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority.
However, the threat posed by terrorism--both international terrorism
(``IT'') and domestic violent extremism--has evolved significantly
since 9/11.
The most persistent threats to the Nation and to U.S. interests
abroad are home-grown violent extremists (``HVEs''), domestic violent
extremists, and foreign terrorist organizations (``FTOs''). The IT
threat to the United States has expanded from sophisticated,
externally-directed FTO plots to include individual attacks carried out
by HVEs who are inspired by designated terrorist organizations. We
remain concerned that groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-
Sham (``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda have the intent to carry out large-scale
attacks in the United States.
The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest, most immediate terrorism
threat to the homeland. These individuals are FTO-inspired individuals
who are in the United States, have been radicalized primarily in the
United States, and are not receiving individualized direction from
FTOs. We, along with our law enforcement partners, face significant
challenges in identifying and disrupting HVEs. This is due, in part, to
their lack of a direct connection with an FTO, an ability to rapidly
mobilize, and the use of encrypted communications.
In recent years, prolific use of social media by FTOs has greatly
enhanced their ability to disseminate messages. We have also been
confronting a surge in terrorist propaganda and training available via
the internet and social media. Due to on-line recruitment,
indoctrination, and instruction, FTOs are no longer dependent on
finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the United States to
recruit and carry out acts of terrorism. Terrorists in ungoverned
spaces--both physical and virtual--readily disseminate propaganda and
training materials to attract easily-influenced individuals around the
world to their cause. They motivate these individuals to act at home or
encourage them to travel. This is a significant transformation from the
terrorist threat our Nation faced a decade ago.
Despite their territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains
relentless and ruthless in its campaign of violence against the West
and has aggressively promoted its hateful message, attracting like-
minded violent extremists. The message is not tailored solely to those
who overtly express signs of radicalization. It is seen by many who
enter messaging apps and participate in social networks. Ultimately,
many of the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging.
Echoing other terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated for lone-offender
attacks in Western countries. Recent ISIS videos and propaganda have
specifically advocated for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement,
and intelligence community personnel.
Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be
susceptible and sympathetic to violent terrorist messages. However, no
group has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse
ideology as ISIS, which has proven dangerously competent at employing
such tools. ISIS uses traditional media platforms as well as wide-
spread social media campaigns to propagate its ideology. With the broad
distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and
radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in the United States either
to travel to foreign lands or to conduct an attack on the homeland.
Through the internet, terrorists anywhere overseas now have direct
access to our local communities to target and recruit our citizens and
spread their message faster than was imagined just a few years ago.
The threats posed by foreign fighters, including those recruited
from the United States, are very dynamic. We will continue working to
identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters
traveling in support of ISIS, those foreign fighters who may attempt to
return to the United States, and HVEs who may aspire to attack the
United States from within.
ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al-Qaeda maintains
its desire for large-scale, spectacular attacks. While continued
counterterrorism pressure has degraded the group's Afghanistan-Pakistan
senior leadership in the near-term, al-Qaeda is more likely to focus on
building its international affiliates and supporting small-scale,
readily-achievable attacks in key regions such as east and west Africa.
Simultaneously, over the last year, propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders
seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United
States and the West.
In addition to FTOs, domestic violent extremists collectively pose
a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the United States.
Trends may shift, but the underlying drivers for domestic violent
extremism--such as perceptions of Government or law enforcement
overreach, socio-political conditions, racism, anti-Semitism,
Islamophobia, and reactions to legislative actions--remain constant.
The FBI is most concerned about lone-offender attacks, primarily
shootings, as they have served as the dominant lethal mode for domestic
violent extremist attacks. More deaths were caused by domestic violent
extremists than international terrorists in recent years.
The recent attacks in Texas and California underscore the continued
threat posed by domestic violent extremists and perpetrators of hate
crimes. Such crimes are not limited to the United States and, with the
aid of internet like-minded hate groups, can reach across borders. To
combat the threat at home, the FBI established the Domestic Terrorism-
Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, in spring 2019. Composed of subject-matter
experts from both the Criminal Investigative and Counterterrorism
Divisions, the fusion cell offers program coordination from FBI
Headquarters, helps ensure seamless information sharing across
divisions, and augments investigative resources.
As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves,
we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the
strength of our Federal, State, local, and international partnerships.
The FBI uses all lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat
these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our domestic
and foreign partners, we are collecting and analyzing intelligence
concerning the on-going threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations
and home-grown violent extremists. We continue to encourage information
sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task
Forces around the country. Be assured, the FBI continues to strive to
work and share information more efficiently, and to pursue a variety of
lawful methods to help stay ahead of these threats.
counterintelligence
The Nation faces a continuing threat, both traditional and
asymmetric, from hostile foreign intelligence agencies. Traditional
espionage, often characterized by career foreign intelligence officers
acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and asymmetric espionage,
typically carried out by students, researchers, or businesspeople
operating front companies, is prevalent. Foreign intelligence services
not only seek our Nation's state and military secrets, but they also
target commercial trade secrets, research and development, and
intellectual property, as well as insider information from the Federal
Government, U.S. corporations, and American universities. Foreign
intelligence services continue to employ more creative and more
sophisticated methods to steal innovative technology, critical research
and development data, and intellectual property, in an effort to erode
America's economic leading edge. These illicit activities pose a
significant threat to National security and continue to be a priority
and focus of the FBI.
Foreign influence operations--which may include covert actions by
foreign governments to influence U.S. policy decisions, political
sentiment or public discourse--are not a new problem. But the
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and
its partners must address it. The goal of these foreign influence
operations directed against the United States is to spread
disinformation, sow discord, push foreign nations' policy agendas, and
ultimately undermine confidence in our democratic institutions and
values. Foreign influence operations have taken many forms and used
many tactics over the years. Most widely reported these days are
attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide swath of Americans
covertly from outside the United States--to use false personas and
fabricated stories on social media platforms to discredit U.S.
individuals and institutions. However, other influence operations may
include targeting U.S. officials and other U.S. persons through
traditional intelligence tradecraft; criminal efforts to suppress
voting and provide illegal campaign financing; concealing efforts to
influence U.S. Government activities, cyber attacks against voting
infrastructure, along with computer intrusions targeting elected
officials and others; and a whole slew of other kinds of influence,
like both overtly and covertly manipulating news stories, spreading
disinformation, leveraging economic resources, and escalating divisive
issues.
Almost 2 years ago, I established the Foreign Influence Task Force
(``FITF'') to identify and counteract malign foreign influence
operations targeting the United States. The FITF is uniquely positioned
to combat this threat. The task force now brings together the FBI's
expertise across the waterfront--counterintelligence, cyber, criminal,
and even counterterrorism--to root out and respond to foreign influence
operations. Task force personnel work closely with other U.S.
Government agencies and international partners concerned about foreign
influence efforts aimed at their countries, using 3 key pillars.
Currently there are open investigations with a foreign influence
nexus spanning FBI field offices across the country. Second, we are
focused on information and intelligence sharing. The FBI is working
closely with partners in the intelligence community and in the Federal
Government, as well as with State and local partners, to establish a
common operating picture. The FITF is also working with international
partners to exchange intelligence and strategies for combating what is
a shared threat. The third pillar of our approach is based on strong
relationships with the private sector. Technology companies have a
front-line responsibility to secure their own networks, products, and
platforms. But the FBI is doing its part by providing actionable
intelligence to better enable the private sector to address abuse of
their platforms by foreign actors. Over the last year, the FBI has met
with top social media and technology companies several times, provided
them with Classified briefings, and shared specific threat indicators
and account information, so they can better monitor their own
platforms.
But this is not just an election-cycle threat. Our adversaries are
continuously trying to undermine our country, whether it is election
season or not. As a result, the FBI must remain vigilant.
In addition to the threat posed by foreign influence, the FBI is
also concerned about foreign investment by hostile nation-states. Over
the course of the last 7 years, foreign investment in the United States
has more than doubled. Concurrent with this growth, foreign direct
investment (``FDI'') in the United States has increasingly become a
National security concern, as hostile nations leverage FDI to buy U.S.
assets that will advance their intelligence, military, technology, and
economic goals at the expense of U.S. National security. The Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (``CFIUS''), an Executive
branch committee chaired by the Department of Treasury, was statutorily
created to address potential risks to U.S. National security resulting
from foreign acquisitions or mergers with U.S. companies. As part of
this process, the FBI provides input and analysis to the National
Intelligence Council within 8 days of a CFIUS filing and a risk
assessment to the Department of Justice within 30 days of a CFIUS
filing. As a result of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act (``FIRRMA''), which was enacted last year, the FBI anticipates its
workload to increase dramatically.
cyber threats
Virtually every National security threat and crime problem the FBI
faces is cyber-based or facilitated. We face threats from state-
sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized cyber syndicates, and
terrorists. On a daily basis, these actors seek to steal our state
secrets, our trade secrets, our technology, and the most intimate data
about our citizens--things of incredible value to all of us and of
great importance to the conduct of our Government business and our
National security. They seek to hold our critical infrastructure at
risk, to harm our economy and to constrain our free speech.
As the committee is well aware, the frequency and severity of
malicious cyber activity on our Nation's private-sector and Government
networks have increased dramatically in the past decade when measured
by the amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, the volume of
personally identifiable information compromised, or the remediation
costs incurred by U.S. victims. We expect this trend to continue.
Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber
activity: High-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers, global
organized crime syndicates, and other technically sophisticated and
dangerous actors. FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are
using technical capabilities and traditional investigative techniques--
such as sources, court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical
surveillance, and forensics--to counter these threats. We continue to
actively coordinate with our private and public partners to pierce the
veil of anonymity surrounding cyber-based crimes.
Botnets used by cyber criminals have been responsible for billions
of dollars in damages over the past several years. The wide-spread
availability of malicious software (malware) that can create botnets
allows individuals to leverage the combined bandwidth of thousands, if
not millions, of compromised computers, servers, or network-ready
devices to disrupt the day-to-day activities of governments,
businesses, and individual Americans. Cyber threat actors have also
increasingly conducted ransomware attacks against U.S. systems,
encrypting data and rendering systems unusable--thereby victimizing
individuals, businesses, and even emergency service and public health
providers.
Cyber threats are not only increasing in size and scope, but are
also becoming increasingly difficult and resource-intensive to
investigate. Cyber criminals often operate through on-line forums,
selling illicit goods and services, including tools that lower the
barrier to entry for aspiring criminals and that can be used to
facilitate malicious cyber activity. These criminals have also
increased the sophistication of their schemes, which are more difficult
to detect and more resilient to disruption than ever. In addition,
whether located at home or abroad, many cyber actors are obfuscating
their identities and obscuring their activity by using combinations of
leased and compromised infrastructure in domestic and foreign
jurisdictions. Such tactics make coordination with all of our partners,
including international law enforcement partners, essential.
The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats,
from improving threat identification and information sharing inside and
outside of the Government to developing and retaining new talent, to
examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We
take all potential threats to public- and private-sector systems
seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those
who pose a threat in cyber space.
conclusion
In closing, the work being done by the FBI is immeasurable;
however, we cannot afford to be complacent. We must seek out new
technologies and solutions for the problems that exist today as well as
those that are on the horizon. We must build toward the future so that
we are prepared to deal with the threats we will face at home and
abroad and understand how those threats may be connected.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of the
committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the FBI's
efforts to combat the myriad of threats it faces. I appreciate your
continued support and look forward to answering any questions you might
have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Acting Director Travers to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RUSSELL TRAVERS, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Travers. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers,
Members of the committee, it is a privilege to be here to
represent the men and women of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
In the years since 9/11, the U.S. counterterrorism
community and its many partners have achieved significant
successes against terrorist groups around the globe. Perhaps
most importantly, coalition operations against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria deprived a group of its so-called caliphate.
But in addition, on-going CT efforts across Africa, the
Middle East, and South Asia continue to diminish the ranks of
al-Qaeda and ISIS, removing dozens of experienced leaders and
operatives every year.
Interagency efforts at home to enhance our defenses here
have resulted in continued progress in safeguarding the
homeland from terrorist attacks. There is, indeed, a lot of
good news.
But we need to be cautious because challenges remain. I am
going to focus on just 3.
First, military operations have bought us time and space as
we address the terrorist global threat, but the diverse,
diffuse, expanding nature of that threat remains a significant
concern.
After 9/11, we were primarily focused on the threat
emanating from a single piece of real estate along the Apian-
PAC border. Eighteen years later, as Director Wray, has
indicated, we have a very diffuse threat. We have a home-grown
violent extremist threat.
We have 20 ISIS branches and networks ranging from hundreds
to thousands of individuals. We have al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and branches' affiliates. We have foreign fighters
that flock to Iraq and Syria from over 100 countries. We have
Iran and its proxies, and there is a growing terrorist threat
from racially- and ethnically-motivated extremists around the
globe.
By any calculation, there are far more radicalized
individuals now than there were at the time of 9/11. This
highlights the importance of terrorism prevention. While some
aspects of the threat can be dealt with through kinetic
operations, the residents of the ideology will not be dealt
with by military or law enforcement operations alone.
The world has a lot of work to do in the non-kinetic realm
to deal with radicalization and underlying causes.
The second challenge I would highlight stems from the
terrorist's ability to exploit technology and the attributes of
globalization. They are good at it, and they are very
innovative.
We have seen the use of encrypted communications for
operational planning and the use of social media to spread
propaganda and transfer knowledge between and amongst
individuals and networks. We see the use of drones and UASes
for swarm attacks, explosive deliveries, and even assassination
attempts.
High-quality, fraudulent travel documents will increasingly
undermine a named space screening and vetting system and
thereby threaten border security.
We will see greater use of cryptocurrencies to fund
operations, and the potential terrorist use of chemical and
biological weapons has moved from a low-probability eventuality
to something we consider to be much more likely.
In many cases, terrorist exploitation of technology has
outpaced the associated legal and policy framework needed to
deal with the threat.
Looking out 5 years, we are particularly concerned with the
growing adverse impact encryption will have on our
counterterrorism effort.
The third challenge I would highlight relates to a concern
about complacency. Our whole-Government approach to
counterterrorism over the past 18 years has kept the country
pretty safe. In our view, the near-term potential for larger-
scale, externally-directed attacks against the homeland has at
least temporarily declined as a result of U.S. and allied
actions around the globe.
But as noted earlier, the threat itself continues to
metastasize and will require very close attention in the years
ahead. In a crowded National security environment, it is
completely understandable that terrorism may no longer be
viewed as the No. 1 threat to the country, but that begs a host
of questions.
What does the National risk equation look like as the
country confronts a very complex international security
environment?
How do we optimize our CT resources in the best interest of
the country?
If we're going to reduce efforts against terrorism, how do
we do so in a manner that does not inadvertently reverse the
gains of the past 18 years?
These are all complicated questions that will require
serious discussion both within the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Travers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Russell Travers
October 30, 2019
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of
the committee, for the opportunity to be with you today. I will begin
with a brief overview of the terrorism threat before discussing
homeland and overseas threats in more detail. I will close my opening
remarks with a discussion of global trends impacting counterterrorism
efforts, along with comments on the way forward, from NCTC's
perspective.
terrorism threat overview
The United States and its allies continue to pursue an aggressive
global campaign against a complex array of terrorist actors. Operating
across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, U.S. and partner forces have
killed or captured thousands of terrorist leaders and operatives since
September 11, exemplified this past weekend in the heroic removal of
the brutal ISIS in Iraq and Syria leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. These
removals degrade the ability of terrorists to organize, communicate,
and strike the United States. Working unilaterally or with partner
nations, the United States has disrupted numerous attack plots, saving
the lives of countless potential victims. At home, Federal, State, and
local intelligence and law enforcement agencies--working in close
cooperation--continue to counter terrorist activity. Enhanced border
security efforts have constrained groups' ability to infiltrate the
United States, and we now assess the most predominant terrorist threat
to the homeland to emanate from U.S.-based lone actors. Additionally,
the U.S. Government and private-sector allies have made significant
strides curtailing terrorists' on-line presence.
While these efforts have diminished the terrorist threat to the
United States, we have enjoyed less success staunching terrorist growth
overseas. Over a year ago, NCTC warned that the terrorist threat was
becoming more diverse, dispersed, and unpredictable; unfortunately,
these trends have only continued, posing an increasingly complex
challenge for the United States and its allies. In several regions, we
continue to observe the expansion or revival of familiar threats, as
well as the emergence of new ones.
First, the overall threat from radical Islamic terrorists
has not abated and, in some regions, is growing. Prominent
groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda are expanding into new areas
and reinforcing their networks' cohesion, bolstering the
overall movement's reach, resiliency, and threat to U.S.
interests.
At the same time, the United States is confronting an
aggressive Iran and its network of terrorist proxies, who are
employing violence to undermine U.S. pressure and influence
throughout the Middle East. Tehran, including the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), and its
formidable allies like Lebanese Hizballah are strengthening
their relationships with a wide array of militants and
exporting advanced tactics and weaponry--capabilities that can
be turned against U.S. personnel with little warning.
Finally, high-profile attacks in the United States and
abroad--most notably the March attacks against mosques in
Christchurch, New Zealand and the August attack in El Paso,
TX--highlight that the United States is facing threats from a
broader range of terrorist actors, to include violent
extremists motivated by racial and ethnic hatred. While
primarily a lone actor threat, these violent extremists in the
United States and abroad are deftly using technology to recruit
others to their extreme ideology.
Several broader global trends are adding to the complexity of the
terrorist threat landscape including the availability of disruptive
technologies, enduring conflicts and instability, the drift of focus
and resources away from CT, and the rising global influence of U.S.
competitors. These concurrent and interrelated dynamics are
increasingly affecting--at times negatively--our ability to mobilize or
sustain effective pressure against terrorists. In this environment,
staying ahead of terrorist adaptation requires an increasingly nimble
U.S. response that better leverages foreign allies, private-sector
partners, and whole-of-Government resources.
the terrorist threat to the homeland
Throughout 2019, persistent United States and allied CT pressure
against key al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders and operatives have continued to
degrade these groups' ability to launch terrorist attacks against the
United States. Radical Islamist terrorists' external plotting
capabilities may have been further hampered by the demands of
sustaining large-scale insurgent campaigns, combatting capable local
U.S. allies, or fighting other militant competitors.
Despite our successes, leaders of both al-Qaeda and ISIS retain the
intent to strike the United States and have proven resourceful in
finding ways to evade U.S. defenses. I would refer to the example of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which, while fighting an
insurgency in Yemen, nevertheless attempted 3 external operations
against U.S. aviation between 2009 and 2012 using novel explosive
designs. Currently, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and several of their local
affiliates and branches retain key competencies and resources--
including explosives expertise and foreign operatives--that could
support attacks in the United States or the West. Further declines in
CT pressure could enable them to quickly reinvigorate or expand
external plotting. This could include additional attacks against
aviation, which remains of great interest to terrorists because of the
potential economic and psychological impacts.
As we sustain pressure against radical Islamic terrorists' external
operations capabilities, we will likely continue to face a more
persistent threat from U.S.-based home-grown violent extremists, which
we assess represent the preeminent Sunni terrorist threat to the United
States. While there has only been one such attack in the United States
this year, it remains a serious threat and poses an enduring detection
challenge because of these attackers' lack of direct connections to
known violent extremists or terrorist groups, their use of easy-to-
acquire weapons and tactics and tendency to operate alone or in small
groups. In addition, radical Islamist terrorist groups overseas
continue to promote lone actor attacks through their media outlets,
viewing them as an efficient tactic to terrorize the United States and
other opponents.
The threat from terrorists motivated by ideologies unconnected to
the radical Islamist terrorism are also a concern. Since the beginning
of 2018, these terrorists have conducted the vast majority of lethal
homeland terrorist attacks. Most of these attacks were perpetrated by
lone actors adhering to a racially- or ethnically-motivated violent
extremist ideology who have been radicalized, in part on-line, and
motivated by a range of grievances associated with political and/or
social agendas. While most of these actors have used readily-available
firearms and edged weapons against soft targets, 2019 has been the most
lethal year for these attacks since 1995.
Finally, Iran and Hizballah's on-going efforts to expand their
already robust global networks also threaten the homeland. The arrests
last year of Iranian operatives and diplomats in the United States and
Europe linked to attack plotting underscore Tehran's determination to
use violence against its adversaries around the world, potentially
including within the United States. Additionally, the arrest in July of
a Hizballah-trained operative in New Jersey who conducted surveillance
of U.S. landmarks on behalf of the group is emblematic of the reach of
its sophisticated global network, which has been active in Europe,
South America, and Africa.
the terrorist threat overseas
While our CT campaign has diminished terrorists' external attack
capabilities, our efforts to curtail radical Islamic terrorist growth
and the threat to U.S. interests overseas have proven less successful.
Radical Islamic terrorist groups are now operating in more countries
around the world than ever before, threatening a widening circle of
U.S. interests and allies.
I will begin with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, where United States and
coalition efforts have eliminated the physical caliphate and removed
the group's long-time leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, demoralizing ISIS
fighters and demonstrating the persistence of U.S. and coalition forces
to eliminate terrorist threats wherever they are. However, the
terrorism threat persists as ISIS has successfully transitioned to a
clandestine insurgency consisting of thousands of committed operatives
across the 2 countries. ISIS cells continue to conduct a diminished but
steady rate of IED attacks, raids, and ambushes against local security
forces and other opponents. ISIS fighters are attempting to evade local
counterterrorism pressure by using safe havens in rural, under-governed
areas of northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. Senior leaders
have publically encouraged adherents to be patient and persevere,
pointing to the group's previous successes rebounding from setbacks.
In an effort to enable its revival and attract new recruits, the
group continues to stoke and exploit Sunni fears of sectarian violence
and economic and political marginalization while targeting populations
vulnerable to ISIS's appeals, including refugees. ISIS leaders since at
least mid-September have also prioritized the freeing of thousands of
detained members in prison and IDP camps across Iraq and Syria. The
release and reintegration of these veteran operatives would greatly
augment the group's operations, mirroring the dynamic we saw play out
in 2013. Finally, ISIS leaders will likely move to exploit the recent
instability and the attrition and co-option of CT forces in
northeastern Syria to reinvigorate their insurgent and external
operations efforts.
Outside of Iraq and Syria, ISIS's global network remains robust
and--in some areas--is expanding, thanks to its approximately 20 global
branches and networks. This year, the group publically announced new
branches in Mozambique, Pakistan, and Turkey, underscoring leaders'
determination to sustain their global reach amidst setbacks in Iraq and
Syria. The capabilities of these branches and networks vary, but ISIS
groups in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Sinai Peninsula, and West
Africa have the capacity to conduct sophisticated attacks against local
security forces and target U.S. interests and personnel. Even networks
lacking direct connection to ISIS core can be deadly--the attacks in
April in Sri Lanka that killed over 290 people--including 4 Americans--
serves as a salient reminder of ISIS's reach and threat to U.S.
citizens. Additionally, the far-flung ISIS enterprise retains a degree
of cohesion: ISIS this year launched several synchronized attack and
propaganda campaigns in which numerous branches and networks
participated, which is an indicator of enhanced connectivity.
Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to target U.S.
interests, expand their regional insurgencies, and strengthen their
connectivity. Senior leaders, including several based in Iran, oversee
these global efforts, sustaining the network's cohesion. In September,
group leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised the 9-11 attacks, reiterated his
call for attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets, and urged extremists
to travel to radical Islamist terrorist battlefields, highlighting al-
Qaeda's multi-pronged strategy. In addition, the group leaders'
announcement in January of a ``Jerusalem Will Never Be Jewish''
campaign in response to the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem
underscores their efforts to tie the group's regional efforts to al-
Qaeda's overall global agenda campaigns. Two attacks in Kenya and Mali,
conducted by al-Shabaab and the al-Qaeda-aligned, West Africa-based
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), have since been included
under this campaign.
Al-Qaeda's regional insurgencies continue to achieve varying levels
of success. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has ramped up its campaign against
African Union forces, the local government, and U.S. and Western
personnel. In September, the group launched a large-scale assault on a
base in Baledogle that houses U.S. military personnel. In Mali and
other parts of West Africa, JNIM and allied fighters have ramped up
their attacks against international peacekeepers and local security
forces, exacerbating instability and humanitarian conditions. In North
Africa, local CT operations in Libya and Tunisia have probably stunted
the growth of al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but
the group continues to pose a threat to government and Western targets
throughout the region.
In Yemen, AQAP has sustained its insurgent campaign and may expand
their efforts as continuing political instability threatens to diminish
CT pressure against the group. In Syria, Hurras al-Din--an al-Qaeda
aligned group consisting of veteran extremists--is working to advance
the group's global agenda, although the deaths of at least 1 senior
operative and the tenuous status of its safehaven in northwest Syria
could impede their efforts. In Afghanistan, the death in September of
the leader of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) may disrupt
their regional operations. Finally, al-Qaeda retains its long-standing
ties to the Haqqani Network and other militant networks active in
Afghanistan and Pakistan that frequently target U.S. personnel.
In Iran, the regime continues to use terrorism to threaten the
United States, our allies, and other opponents, as well as to cement
its long-term political influence throughout the Middle East. As we
have observed in recent months from Tehran's attacks on international
shipping and Saudi oil facilities, the regime is intent on escalating
its efforts to intimidate and impose costs on its opponents, posing a
growing direct and indirect threat to U.S. interests and personnel.
Iran, through the IRGC-QF and other malign elements like the Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) maintains links to terrorist
operatives and networks in Europe, Asia, and Africa that could be
called upon to target U.S. or allied personnel.
Iran can also call upon a wide range of proxy groups to support its
terrorist and regional influence operations. Tehran is poised to use
these entities to target U.S. personnel in the event that the regime is
threatened. Iranian leaders also nurture these alliances in pursuit of
long-term political advantage, similar to its decades-long partnership
with Hizballah, which wields significant political influence within
Lebanon and possesses a formidable military force including thousands
of rockets. In Iraq, Iran has provided weapons and funding to a wide
variety of powerful militia groups, whose influence and advanced
terrorist capabilities threaten the U.S. presence there. Iran is also
supporting Huthi forces in Yemen, whose increasingly bold attacks
against Saudi Arabia could indirectly endanger U.S. personnel. Finally,
Iran maintains ties to several Palestinian military groups including
Palestine Islamic Jihad, which has killed numerous civilians in Israel.
global trends increasingly impacting the ct fight
Our ability to combat the diverse range of terrorist threats
continues to be influenced, at times negatively, by broader military
and political trends. Navigating these challenges will likely require
leveraging a broad range of Government resources and capabilities
across the interagency, given their scope and scale.
Emerging Technologies.--Terrorists continue to exploit rapid
technological advances in fields like encrypted communications,
social media, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The speed at
which industry responds to consumer demands for newer, more
capable technologies also fuels terrorist innovation and, at
times, limits our ability to disrupt their operations.
Specifically, terrorists are continuing to explore the use of
increasingly ubiquitous, more secure modes of communications in
order to evade detection. While the amount of terrorist content
on mainstream platforms like Facebook has been curtailed,
terrorists have responded by using less-accessible platforms to
communicate and disseminate propaganda. Finally, commercially-
available unmanned systems--like aircraft (UAS) and surface
vehicles (USV)--are enabling some groups to conduct tactical
surveillance, smuggling operations, and attacks against key
critical infrastructure targets like oil refineries or airports
that can result in significant economic damage.
Conflict and Instability.--Enduring conflicts in several
countries including Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen continue to serve as incubators for terrorist presence.
The intractable nature of these conflicts, their spillover into
neighboring countries, and the long-term impacts on
humanitarian conditions continue to provide terrorist groups
with new opportunities to carve out safe havens, bolster
operations, derive resources, and recruit the next generation
of fighters. As an example, several on-going conflicts and
insurgencies across Africa have enabled terrorists aligned with
al-Qaeda and ISIS to expand their influence and embed with
local militant groups, fueling an unprecedented rate of
jihadist growth across the continent.
Partner Complacency and Distraction.--Some partners'
perception that the terrorist threat has been sufficiently
reduced or eclipsed by other political or security concerns may
increasingly prompt them to allocate resources away from CT
efforts, potentially diminishing pressure on some networks.
Influence by Strategic Competitors.--The growing influence
and footprint of U.S. competitors--particularly China and
Russia--in key CT theaters could constrain our ability to
mobilize and direct local CT operations. Both Beijing and
Moscow have increased their security, military, and CT
assistance programs as part of their campaign to undermine and
supplant U.S. influence in parts of Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East--regions that also host preeminent terrorist
groups. In addition, our competitors often promote punitive and
anti-democratic CT strategies that could fuel further
radicalization to violence.
the way forward
These challenges require a nimble, aggressive U.S. response that
makes greater use of foreign partners and resources resident in both
the interagency and private industry. An over-reliance on ``business as
usual'' practices or kinetic efforts will increase the risks of being
outpaced by our terrorist adversaries and marginalized by our
competitors, particularly as competing demands on U.S. National
security resources mount.
Bolstering Foreign Allies.--As the scale of the global
terrorism challenge grows, foreign partners will play an
increasingly central role in fighting it. Sustained U.S.
leadership, advisory, and capacity-building efforts in both the
military and non-military areas remain instrumental in ensuring
that partners implement effective, comprehensive, and balanced
CT measures, sufficiently resource them, and cooperate with
neighbors and other allies. As noted in the 2018 National
Strategy for Counterterrorism, proactively identifying and
focusing on those allies that are best positioned and able to
advance U.S. CT efforts will prove key in countering the
terrorist threat; this includes working with allies and
partners on preventing and countering terrorist radicalization
and recruitment in the first place--through not only strategic
communications but community engagement and other ``countering
violent extremism'' approaches.
Mobilizing Tech Sector Partners.--As noted previously,
terrorist actors continue to move aggressively to exploit new
technologies to communicate, appeal to new audiences, and
recruit adherents. Establishing and supporting relationships
with those companies that are driving these technological
changes remains critically important in countering such
efforts. These partnerships have already borne fruit: For
instance, private-sector action--enabled by Government
assistance--has greatly curtailed the accessibility of violent
extremist content from ISIS on the internet. However,
subsequent terrorist adaptations, including the increased use
of closed social media forums, only highlight the need to
sustain and build on these partnerships. U.S. Government
engagement with entities like the industry-led Global Internet
Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) could help combat a broader
spectrum of violent extremist content by using lessons learned
in countering ISIS's on-line presence, while also helping these
companies navigate free speech issues. This should be
complemented by support for local alternative narratives and
counter-messaging in key countries around the world.
Exploiting Data.--I have previously testified about the
growing data challenge the CT community faces. We continue to
see an ever-expanding corpus of pertinent data, an explosion in
social media information, and competing equities and
authorities, non-standardized data, and challenges with
incorporating biometrically-based screening systems. To
overcome these challenges, we must increase our focus on
expanding information sharing and improving our use of data-
driven techniques to counter terrorists' attempts to evade CT
pressure. Given the wide range of U.S. stakeholders with
interests in data, broad reforms of our disclosure and
information-sharing processes will require a whole-of-
Government approach that works to broadly reorient mindsets and
cultures. In addition, we will continue to move toward
standardizing our existing systems and developing common
guidelines for use in order to facilitate greater access for
relevant authorities.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to present NCTC's
views and assessments this morning. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Under Secretary Glawe to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. GLAWE, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Glawe. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Rogers, and distinguished Members of the committee.
It is my honor to testify on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security and to address today's emerging world-wide
threats.
First, let me briefly touch on my role. I currently serve
as the chief intelligence officer and under secretary at the
Department of Homeland Security. I am responsible for ensuring
the Secretary, our 22 DHS components and offices and our
homeland security partners have access to intelligence they
need to keep the country safe.
My focus is to ensure the unique tactical intelligence from
the DHA intelligence enterprise is shared with operators and
decision makers across all levels of Government so they can
more effectively identify and mitigate threats to the homeland.
My office, as well as the rest of the U.S. intelligence
community and our law enforcement partners, generate
intelligence that is unbiased based on sound analytic judgments
and tradecraft that meet the U.S. intelligence community
standards. Regarding the threat landscape, I will speak today
about the major shifts in the threat landscape.
Specifically, I would like to speak about the threats we
face from foreign terrorist organizations, domestic terrorism,
cyber threats, foreign influence, and transnational organized
crime.
Underpinning these threats is increasing adversarial
engagement from nation-states, such as China, Russia, and Iran.
Regarding domestic terrorism and targeted violence, I want
to address one of the most pervasive threats we face in the
homeland, which is the threat from targeted violent and mass
attack. Regardless whether it is considered domestic terrorism
or a hate crime, there is no moral ambiguity on this issue.
The extremists are often motivated by violent ideologies or
perceived grievances, often targeting race, ethnicity, National
origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender, and gender
identity.
We are focused on identifying the behaviors and indicators
that are indicative of an individual at risk of carrying out
targeted violence or mass attacks so that we can appropriately
identify and mitigate any violent act before it occurs.
My past experience of 24 years as a policy officer and
special agent and part of the first responder metropolitan
police department to the Columbine attack has made me uniquely
postured to be a witness for you today. My first-hand
experience has shaped my approach to dealing with this type of
violence.
Foreign terrorist organizations remain a core priority of
DHS's counterterrorism efforts, and we continue to make
substantial progress in our ability to detect and mitigate the
threats that these groups pose. ISIS, al-Qaeda, and returning
foreign fighters represent significant, persistent, and long-
term National security threats.
Cyber threats and emerging technologies. Cyber threats
remain a significant strategic risk for the United States,
threatening our National security, economic prosperity, and
safety.
Nation-states and cyber criminals are increasing the
frequency and sophistication of their attacks and other
malicious cyber activity.
Regarding foreign influence, the foreign influence has
quickly evolved into one of our most significant threats to our
country in decades. U.S. adversaries, including Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea, and other strategic competitors will use
off-line influence operations to try to weaken democratic
institutions, undermine U.S. alliances, threaten our economic
security, and shape our policy outcome.
Regarding transnational organized crime, transnational
criminal organizations have a destabilizing effect on the
Western Hemisphere by corrupting Government officials, eroding
institutions, and perpetuating violence. They profit from a
range of illicit activity, including human smuggling and
trafficking, narcotics, extortion, and kidnapping.
Transnational criminal organizations are motivated by power
and money and have little regard for human life. They
continually adjust their operations and supply chains to avoid
detection and interdiction by law enforcement and, like
legitimate businesses, are quick to take advantage of improved
technology, cheaper transportation, and better distribution
methods. In many ways, they are operating like a sophisticated
intelligence organization.
With that, I want to close, and I want to thank you for the
opportunity, and also on behalf of the men and women of the
Department of Homeland Security, and the honor to testify
before you today.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. I thank all of the witnesses for their
testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Secretary, during your tenure here with the committee,
were you provided all the resources you needed to do your job?
Secretary McAleenan. I think the Department of Homeland
Security has received strong support from Congress in a
bipartisan fashion across multiple budget years and multiple
administrations.
We have used that funding and those resources to increase
our security effectively across programs from the IT side, the
intelligence side, the operational side in both our border
security and our international partnerships.
Are there more resources we could use? Certainly. There
always are. I do not think you will ever meet a law enforcement
leader who will say they have all the resources they need. But
I do think we have been able to communicate our requirements
and receive broad bipartisan support over my career.
Chairman Thompson. So if you had what resources you do not
have, that could give us a greater grasp on the terrorist
threat to the homeland?
Secretary McAleenan. On the counterterrorism side, one of
the things that we have requested in this budget cycle and
actually called you, Mr. Chairman, and other leaders on the
appropriations side back in May to look at a resubmission of
our grant capability so that we could focus on supporting
efforts against domestic terrorism and targeted violence and
readiness around the country so we could identify opportunities
to move people off a pathway to violence and address, you know,
their concerns and their disaffection early in that process.
That is $17.5 million we requested. It is in the Senate
mark-up for our appropriations, and we have also asked for
investment in our Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention
Office at the DHS headquarters. I created that my first week as
Acting Secretary.
We are looking for that office to help coordinate and
galvanize efforts across multiple DHS components to support
prevention and that whole-community effort we are looking for.
So that is one specific investment, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
One of the issues in light of what you have talked about is
this whole issue of domestic terrorism. Director Wray, can you
share with the committee the challenges you have with your
agency in addressing domestic terrorism?
For there are some definitional issues from what I
understand that continue to be a challenge.
Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think what you are
referring to, which we have talked about a little bit, I think,
in the past, is that there is not currently a domestic
terrorism offense, as such, in the same way there is, for
example, on the international terrorism side a material support
to foreign terrorist organization.
Having said that, we tackle the domestic terrorism threat
through a wide variety of tools, explosive charges, gun
charges, State and local charges, hate crimes charges. So we
use a lot of different tools to go after it, and our folks have
been pretty resourceful with our partners in making sure that
we do not let anybody get away with it.
We had, I think, 107 domestic terrorism arrests in fiscal
year 2019, which is about the same number, a little less, but
about the same number as our IT or international terrorism
arrests.
Chairman Thompson. So of your issues that you are
addressing here, have you put a percentage on, of the cases you
investigate, how many of them are strictly addressing domestic
terrorism?
Do you see it on the rise?
Mr. Wray. Well, we see a couple things. We see domestic
terrorism as a persistent, evolving threat. We have typically
had about 1,000, and it fluctuates from time to time, but it
tends to be about 1,000, sometimes closer to 900, sometimes a
little over on the domestic terrorism side.
The number has not dramatically changed, but it is made
very troubling consistent. Certainly the most lethality in
terms of terrorist attacks over recent years here in the
homeland has been on the domestic terrorism side.
One of the things we have started doing recently is I
created a Domestic Terrorism and Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, which
brings together both our efforts targeting a lot of the same
conduct through our counterterrorism resources, you know, our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, et cetera, but also on the hate
crimes side, through our criminal programs we are able to pick
that up there.
So we are starting to have less of a left hand/right hand
issue internally, and I think that will make us even more
effective as we go forward.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to ask any of the panel that want
to take a swing at this. When we look at the deaths of al-
Baghdadi and Muhajir, what does that mean for the rest of the
senior leadership?
Do you see anybody in particular emerging to fill that
void?
Because that was the No. 1 and No. 2 ISIS leaders. How big
of a leadership organization is below that tier of leadership?
Director Travers. There is no question that the losses over
the weekend were significant to ISIS. At the same time, it has
a deep bench. Muhajir was one of the individuals that could
have ascended to the top. Haji Abdullah is another one.
We need to remember that the United States and the
Coalition overall have had tremendous success in eliminating
leadership over the years of both al-Qaeda and ISIS, and yet
the bench tends to rise to the top.
My guess is that we will, if history is any judge over the
next somewhere between a couple of days and a couple of weeks,
we will see a new leader caliph announced. There will be
eulogies. Those eulogies will come even from al-Qaeda. I
suspect Zawahiri will play elder statesman and issue his own.
We will see calls for attacks against Western interests.
Typically that does not amount to a great deal in the near
term, and then we will see requests for the branches and the
affiliates to swear allegiance to the new leader.
That is what we will be watching very carefully to see how
this individual consolidates control going forward.
Mr. Rogers. During this period of time before that happens,
how effective do you think ISIS will be at carrying out attacks
or do you think they will be kind-of in a pause period?
Director Travers. I actually do not think it will have much
impact. If there were significant attacks that were in the
planning, that planning will continue. It will not have that
much effect.
Mr. Rogers. Can you give the committee an idea about how
large a number of fighters comprise ISIS and how many of those
are in prisons?
Director Travers. As I mentioned, there are 20-odd ISIS
branches and affiliates around the globe. They may be as few as
hundreds. They may have as many as thousands in the case of
Khorasan.
We believe that within Syria and Iraq, there are at least
14,000 ISIS fighters, and that is an important number because 5
or 6 years ago when ISIS was at its low point, they were down
under 1,000.
So to us this tells us that the insurgency has a lot of
options.
Within the prisons, the SDF had roughly 10,000 prisoners
in, oh, 15, 20 prisons in Syria. Roughly 2,000 of those were
foreign fighters.
Mr. Rogers. OK. There was some faulty reporting recently
about ISIS fighters being released from prisons and/or escaped.
Can you tell us what is true and what is not true?
Director Travers. Well, we know of no instance where ISIS
fighters were released from prisons. There have been some
prison breaks, not so much in the last few days. I think we
were something over 100 individuals broke out of prisons.
There is a lot of fog of war as individuals are being
relocated. We think the SDF has been incredibly professional
about this, trying to relocate prisoners, and they are trying
to keep control of the prisons.
It is going to be very interesting to watch over the coming
weeks with the Turkish-Russian accord and the Syrian move into
east of the river, how those prisons are being managed going
forward.
Mr. Rogers. Outside of al-Qaeda and ISIS, what affiliate
organizations are you most concerned about?
Director Travers. I am sorry, sir?
Mr. Rogers. Outside of ISIS and al-Qaeda, what affiliate
organization are you most concerned about?
Director Travers. Well, the entire Shia side of the house,
so certainly Iranian-backed Shia militia groups and Hezbollah
and so forth.
As I mentioned and as my colleagues have mentioned, the
homeland violent extremist individual threat is amongst the
greatest that we worry about.
Mr. Rogers. Good. I will use my closing seconds to welcome
our newest Member to the committee. Representative Bishop, Dan
Bishop, won an election last month to represent North
Carolina's 9th District. He will serve on the Emergency
Preparedness and Transportation Security Committees.
I know he is going to be a fine addition to the committee
membership.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To you and the Ranking Member, this is a very crucial
hearing. I appreciate the time given, although the time is
short.
Mr. Secretary, let me thank you very much for both your
dedication and commitment to this Nation, as your fellow
witnesses are likewise public servants, and we thank them for
their service.
Let me start with you, and my time is short. So I note in
your testimony on page 4 of your testimony you state, ``Perhaps
one of the most significant evolutions over the past 3 years
has been domestic actors' adoption of FTO techniques to inspire
individuals via the internet to carry out acts of terrorism.''
Can you briefly explain that and what Homeland Security is
doing about that briefly?
Secretary McAleenan. Very briefly, if you go back a few
years to look at what al-Qaeda and its affiliates were doing
with Zarqawi in Yemen, for instance, really using the internet
to appeal to disaffected youth and to try to radicalize from
afar, that was the home-grown violent extremist phenomenon.
We are seeing that unfortunately with other ideologies, and
the ability to communicate with like-minded individuals and get
validation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. So what is Homeland Security doing
about that?
Secretary McAleenan. We are doing several different things.
First, the strategic framework outlines the whole-of-community
efforts to build awareness, to identify opportunities to see
risks being presented by individuals on a pathway to violence.
But in terms of monitoring that internet space, especially
if on the Dark Web, that is one of the serious challenges we
face going forward. We want to work with private-sector
entities to ensure they have good policies, to monitor content,
and to address it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Secretary McAleenan. If it is inciting violence, but the
FBI----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McAleenan [continuing]. Do not police ideology.
We are trying to look at individuals who are on a pathway to
violence.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
This chart represents, I think, a dangerous phenomenon. The
red indicates that these are vacant. They are acting persons.
Do you find it difficult to secure the Nation when you have
most of the positions held by temporary persons?
Is that something that should be corrected?
Secretary McAleenan. So it is very good to have confirmed
leadership. That helps with interactions with Congress. It
ensures the alignment with administration policy.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Secretary McAleenan. What I can tell you though is that our
career leaders, our senior executives throughout the
organization are tremendous and are men and women on the front
lines----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I need
to go on to my other question.
It has been reported that there are close to 3,000 children
that were separated from their parents, and by the way, I
appreciate your extensive answer. I just have a very short
period of time.
So my question is on the burden that it puts on your men
and women at the border. Do you now view that as a failed
policy and did not hold the deterrence that it should have
held?
Children as young as 9 months, I held Roger in my arms. He
was 9 months old separated from his family.
Can you give me a quick answer on that please? I have a
question for Director Wray.
Secretary McAleenan. Respectfully, Congresswoman, I have
testified several times on this. I have spoken publicly and to
media and press on this issue. It was an effort to prosecute
people violating the law.
We lost the public trust for that effort, and the President
was right to end it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, Director Wray--I take that as it
was a failed policy, but I thank you very much for your
service.
Director Wray, let me quickly. I was at a meeting last
evening dealing with biologic threats, threats of smallpox or
Ebola being used by terrorists. Can you tell me what work the
FBI is doing on this very difficult act of terrorism that might
impact the American people, No. 1?
No. 2, a specific question dealing with 2 individuals that
are unidentified being sought by police for the assault of an
unarmed black man in Charlottesville. These individuals are
still at large.
I am wondering if you are aware of them and whether the FBI
is engaged with trying to find these individuals involved in
Charlottesville.
Would you please answer those questions, please?
Mr. Wray. Just taking your second question first, I am not
at least sitting here right now familiar with the specifics of
that matter, but I am happy to take the information from----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate it. I will give it to
you. Thank you.
Mr. Wray. On the first question related to the biological
weapons, as I think Mr. Travers mentioned, that is something
that we are increasingly concerned about. We are trying to go
about it through a number of different lenses working with our
partners.
No. 1, we are, of course, working with the rest of the
intelligence community to try to gain more information about
the capabilities, plans, and intentions of different
adversaries in terms of their designs on different kinds of
biological weapons.
Second, we are working more and more closely with what you
might consider non-traditional partners, whether it is labs,
people in the medical industry, you know, research and
development people to better understand what the capabilities
are.
A lot of that work happens through our Weapons of Mass
Destruction Division, which is really single-mindedly focused
on this kind of stuff.
Then, of course, we have our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
which have investigated a number of attacks, and they are
always on the lookout for information there, where we see any
indication that a particular subject is looking into that kind
of weapon.
We do think it is something that is going to become
increasingly hard to chase just because the internet, again,
makes the recipes for these things more and more widely
available to less and less sophisticated actors.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York--oh, I am
sorry--from----
Mr. King. How could you forget?
Chairman Thompson. Yes. Well, you appeared to be off----
Mr. King. I appear to be forgotten. I know.
Chairman Thompson. Yes, well, I recognize the gentleman
from New York for 5 minutes. Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
First of all, Secretary McAleenan, thank you for your
service. It has been truly outstanding in some very difficult
times. I really admire and appreciate that.
Also, in my direct dealings with you, I have always found
you to be totally straightforward. I want to again express my
appreciation.
Director Wray, let me say especially from a parochial point
of view of the very close relationship between the FBI and the
NYPD and local police. It was not always that way in New York,
but the JTTF is really functioning very well right now, and as
far as I am concerned, the level of cooperation has never been
better. So I want to thank you for that.
On some of these specific questions, Mr. Travers, you
mentioned about the fog of war and we are not certain exactly
how many ISIS prisoners may have escaped. Once that fog of war
clears, and hopefully soon, what are our plans to get a reading
on those 100, the chances of them going to Europe and coming to
the United States or any attempt for them to become part of any
coordinated effort against the United States?
Again, how soon do you think we will know how many escaped
and where they are?
Are we working with our foreign partners, European partners
especially, to track them going back into Europe?
Director Travers. So we spent a great deal of time trying
to work with the SDF over the past couple of years on
biometrically enrolling individuals so that we can, as Acting
Secretary McAleenan indicated, ensure that our vetting
processes are such that individuals cannot come to the United
States.
I am actually feeling pretty confident certainly on the
foreign fighter issue. That one has been worked very hard
because over the last couple of years there was a concern about
trying to get European countries to repatriate. We have not had
a lot of success, and so we got somewhat fatalistic that we
would eventually be seeing some of these individuals long
before the Turkish incursion.
As a result, the ability to catalogue who they are and get
them into the appropriate databases is, I think, a good thing.
The Europeans may have somewhat greater difficulty. They do
not screen in the same way we do. The European Union processes,
while they have improved dramatically since Paris and Brussels,
they are still trying to deal with 28 countries, and so the
Schengen system, I think it is fair to say, is somewhat more
porous than ours.
So for us, I think we are in pretty good shape, at least on
the foreign fighter problem. For the Europeans, I think they
still have some challenges.
Mr. King. Again, I would tie those 100 or whatever number
it is escapees into that foreign fighter category.
How does that shape then? How does that change the picture?
Director Travers. Well, our expectation is that the vast
majority of the individuals that escaped more likely than not
were Syrian and Iraqi and will be looking to stay in the
region. They will be incorporated into the ISIS insurgency in
all likelihood.
We could still see them serve as suicide bombers, and so
forth. I think it is fair to say that where we had the SDF
locking down these prisons for a couple of years, the
expectation is that we will probably see more releases.
Just 3, 4 weeks ago, we had Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi indicate
in a radio that he wanted to attack both prisons and IDP camps
to get people out. I assume that we will see some of that.
Those prisons are vulnerable.
Mr. King. Director Wray, Secretary McAleenan, do you have
any comment on that?
Mr. Wray. I would just add in that, of course, the FBI has
had our folks over there doing a lot of these biometric
enrollments, and I do think that is an important part of the
defense, and so I agree with Mr. Travers on that.
We are concerned that some of these folks may exploit the
visa waiver program ultimately and may not be an immediate term
threat to us, but over time could find their way in in ways
that we have to be vigilant about.
I would also say that we know that ISIS has started to take
advantage of using women in operational planning and trying to
recruit youth more and more, some of them in these displacement
camps that were in Syria. So it is a little bit hard to gauge.
I know our European partners are very worried about this,
part of the plan by ISIS to try to launch kind-of a
multigenerational conflict, and that is going to present all
kinds of challenges for us and our partners.
Mr. King. Secretary McAleenan.
Secretary McAleenan. I agree with both Director Wray and
Acting Director Travers.
Just 2 notes. We are working this on the multilateral level
with the European Union and Europol, both providing our
capabilities and reach-back to identify threats.
I agree with Acting Director Travers on the work in the
region. We have been there alongside the FBI and DOD helping
identify people on the battlefield so that we can prevent them
from accessing the homeland in the future.
But also, we have on a bilateral basis, we have extended
our capabilities, an automated target system, global, some of
the techniques to identify watch-listed individuals or even
those that present risky travel patterns. We have given that
capability to our European partners, to our Southeast Asian
partners, and extensively in the Western Hemisphere.
So if individuals do try to travel toward us, we do have
layers of international partner capability that will help
identify and stop that movement.
Mr. King. Thank you all. Again, Secretary, thank you for
your service.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5
minutes, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our guest speakers for being here today.
You know, an American life is an American life, whether it
is in America or outside the U.S. Soldier, an American soldier
is an American. An American front-liner, whether it is a
firefighter or a police officer, is an American.
So we talk a lot about foreign terrorists and domestic
terrorists, and my concern is: Are we separating these into
silos and treating them independently?
I am hearing stories that we may have domestic terrorists
going overseas to the Ukraine, getting trained on ISIS tactics,
coming back to the United States prepared to do God knows what.
Are we having enough coordination between domestic
terrorist operations and international terrorist operations in
terms of your defensive capabilities to make sure that we are
not missing anything?
Mr. Wray.
Mr. Wray. I think you are onto a trend that we are watching
very carefully. I know we have had conversations with NCTC
quite a bit on this topic.
We are starting to see racially-motivated violent
extremists connecting with like-minded individuals overseas on-
line certainly. In some instances, we have seen some folks
travel overseas to train and----
Mr. Correa. Where?
Mr. Wray. It varies. Different parts of Eastern Europe.
Mr. Correa. OK.
Mr. Wray. We have seen some connections between U.S.-based
neo-Nazis and overseas analogues, and certainly a more
prevalent phenomenon that we see right now is racially-
motivated violent extremists here who are inspired by what they
see overseas.
So, for example, the Christchurch attack in New Zealand, we
have had, you know, folks that we have arrested here who were
motivated by what they saw happening over there. So they are
not working together, but they are just fueled by each other.
Just to be clear on the silos point that you made, on the
FBI end, our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which bring together
something like 50 different Federal agencies and like 500 State
and local agencies, we tackle domestic terrorism and
international terrorism both through the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces.
So I think that ensures less risk of that silo issue that
we are talking about.
Mr. Correa. So if I call my local Orange County Sheriff and
ask him if his Fusion Center is coordinating with your Fusion
Centers, the answer from him would be yes?
The answer from him would also be yes if I asked him is
there a two-way line of communication or is there only
information on a need to know basis that he gets from your
agency?
Mr. Wray. Well, I do not want to speak for the Orange
County Sheriff, but as I said in my opening, I have traveled
out to California, to every field office, met with partners,
including Orange County, LAPD, et cetera, and the feedback I
get from our partners is that the chemistry and the information
flow between the FBI and our State and local partners is better
than it has ever been.
In fact, just a few days ago I brought together, which was
not happening before, all of the major city chiefs with our
SACs in charge of all of our field offices in one room for a
whole afternoon, Classified briefings, working together.
So there is a lot going on on that front, and I would hope
you would----
Mr. Correa. It is very delicate when it comes to talking
about Americans or privacy, and when you start to begin to talk
about domestic versus international terrorism, you may run into
some legal constraints in terms of what you do without a
warrant when it comes to American citizens.
Do you have any thoughts of how to address that issue?
You are talking about somebody overseas. Then you are
talking about an American citizen. How do you gather the proper
intelligence to address those issues?
Do you have the legal framework there to protect privacy
and at the same time let you do your job?
Is there anything we can do to help you do your job better?
Director Travers. Well, we are very sensitive to the
privacy concerns, especially when it comes to U.S. persons. We
say all the time, every day, throughout the FBI our job is to
protect the American people and uphold the U.S. Constitution.
I will say in terms of things that we are concerned about,
and you have heard it referenced, I think, by every member of
this panel, the encryption issue is a real problem. I think a
lot of people do not fully understand the impact that is
already having on our joint efforts and, more importantly, what
it is going to be another year or 2 years from now.
More and more terrorists, domestic terrorists and
international terrorists, are resorting to putting their
communications on encrypted messaging platforms.
Mr. Correa. If I may, Mr. Chair, just a couple more seconds
here.
I just wanted to emphasize to all of you gentlemen here
that in my district, I think, and other districts across this
country, the El Paso shooting brought us to a new level of
consciousness in terms of our safety locally.
So what I am trying to say is domestic terrorism on my list
is No. 1 now.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5
minutes, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McAleenan, thank you for your service and your
tenure. You shall be missed. You have testified many, many
times. You will be missed by this committee. None of us shall
miss attempting to pronounce your last name.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Higgins. So thank you for your service. I think you
reflect the very highest standards of commitment to service to
we, the people, and the law enforcement community, myself
included, certainly recognize your professionalism in very
difficult times.
Now, regarding border security and the humanitarian crisis
at the border, just to follow up on what my esteemed colleague
stated earlier, in my opinion and the opinion of many
Americans, the responsibility for failure primarily lies with
Congress, not with the boots on the ground and not with the
Executive.
On June 27, after many months of delay, the Emergency
Border supplemental to address the humanitarian crisis at the
border was finally passed by this Congress. Important missions
like providing Health and Human Services funds to carry out
programs for unaccompanied alien children, many other very
worthwhile investments, those funds specifically were meant to
ensure for unaccompanied alien children, that minors received
adequate care and services to address the humanitarian crisis
at the border.
I witnessed this, and my colleagues, first-hand. So I ask
you, sir: Since funding was passed, have you seen improved
conditions at the border with regard to the humanitarian aid?
Secretary McAleenan. We have seen dramatic improvements,
Congressman. We were able to apply that funding immediately to
increase available bed space for unaccompanied children with
Health and Human Services. That resulted in a dramatic drop
from a peak of 2,700 unaccompanied children in border stations
down to now on an average day, it is between 85 and 150.
Those children are moving very quickly to a better setting
for their care, usually in less than 24 hours.
Mr. Higgins. Would you concur that this, of course, is a
priority not just for the Department of Homeland Security, but
for us as a Nation, as a compassionate and loving nation?
Secretary McAleenan. There is no question, and the
opportunity to provide a better situation for families arriving
with the new facilities, the 6,000 additional temporary beds
that we have provided that are not in border patrol, not in
police stations, if you will, also----
Mr. Higgins. Thank you for clarifying that.
I bring that up because this committee has a responsibility
to move forward the people's business in a bipartisan manner,
and I ask you, Mr. Secretary, do you believe regardless of what
party controls Congress, who is in the Majority or Minority, or
who sits in the White House, that focus and funding from
Congress on the continuing issues at our Southern Border,
security and humanitarian; would you concur that regardless of
politics in this bizarre realm of Washington, DC, that we
should as a Nation focus on improving the conditions at our
Southern Border?
Secretary McAleenan. I would agree.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir.
May I ask in my remaining time regarding cartel activity,
there have been reports of increased cartel-to-cartel violence.
How has that impacted Customs and Border Patrol at the border?
What level of cooperation is DHS receiving from Mexican law
enforcement?
Has that cross-border cooperation been impacted greatly by
the increased conflict among Mexican criminal cartels?
In my remaining minute, if you will address those questions
regarding the cartel activity in Mexico.
Secretary McAleenan. So the extreme violence that the
cartels or TCOs are mounting are really over control of
territory, control of access to the border, the very valuable
routes to conduct drug smuggling activities or human smuggling
activities remains very intense, especially in Tamaulipas,
which is the easternmost northern border state in Mexico.
That creates challenges in our security environment at the
border, but also for our Mexican counterparts. They have
stepped up. They have identified 25,000 troops, if you will,
that are----
Mr. Higgins. You say ``they.'' Just to clarify, you mean
Mexican law enforcement?
Secretary McAleenan. The Mexican government. They have
taken elements of their military, elements of their navy, and
elements of their federal police and combined them into a
national guard that is now helping patrol both their southern
border between Chiapas and Guatemala, for all types of
smuggling, especially human smuggling, and states in transit
routes toward their northern border.
Where we still want to collaborate further and try to gain
control is working with them on joint patrols on our shared
border so we can prevent access to those routes for any type of
smuggling to these violent organizations, and that is an area
we need to continue to partner and develop.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for your
answer, your service.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the young lady from New Mexico, Ms.
Torres Small for 5 minutes.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Ranking Member.
Thank you all for being here today, and particularly,
Secretary McAleenan, thank you for your presence here on the
eve of your departure. Thank you for your years of service to
the Department of Homeland Security and to our country.
On the eve of your departure, we are looking now at our
fifth Secretary of Homeland Security, and I would like to hear
how you think that lack of continuity in leadership might
impact the ability for the Department to fulfill its mission of
protecting National security.
Secretary McAleenan. One of the things that has been very
gratifying for me the last 6\1/2\ months serving as Acting
Secretary. It was really getting exposed to parts of the
Department that I knew about but had not had a chance to work
directly with.
You know, areas where we had partnered on counter-narcotics
or, say, a response to a natural disaster like with the Coast
Guard, but now it is kind of imbedding with them. I spent the
night on a Coast Guard cutter 2 weeks ago off the coast of El
Salvador, really understanding their mission, their
capabilities.
I mean, talking with our CISA professionals on how they are
looking at the cyber landscape and working with the private
sector, working with State and local, these 8,800
jurisdictions, counties, and townships that are managing
elections, thinking about the similarities between how at
Customs we worked with the supply chain side, how they are
working with State and locals.
I am just very confident with the quality and caliber of
leadership and front-line people across this entire Department.
I have seen how effective they are. I have seen how clear they
are on their mission, and I see how dedicated they are.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Secretary.
Secretary McAleenan. Senior leadership is key. I am not
going to disagree with you there, but I am not worried about
continuity in our efforts to protect the American people across
a whole range of threats.
Ms. Torres Small. I think we both can agree that there are
good folks working and that senior leadership is key.
One of the concerns that I think you hit on that I share is
when it comes to our cyber assets, when it comes to protecting
our election infrastructure and when it comes to combatting
transnational criminal organizations, all of those require
careful relationships with private partners, with foreign
partners, with our public sector. It requires careful
coordination and leadership is key in that.
Do you see how lack of leadership, especially when you have
identified the need to bring Government, private sector, and
international parties as well as the public together to combat,
for example, or to protect our cyber assets?
Do you see how having to go through another Secretary could
impact our ability to do that?
Secretary McAleenan. So I focused on 3 things during my
tenure: The border security and immigration crisis, election
and cybersecurity, and counterterrorism and domestic terrorism.
One of the things I am very pleased with is we have very
clear strategic intent and strategic framework on----
Ms. Torres Small. I understand that. In terms of cyber
assets, do you see the change in leadership, again, could
impact our ability to maintain those essential partnerships?
Secretary McAleenan. The main connection point on cyber
with the communities, both interagency and the private sector,
is the director of CISA. Chris Krebs is in place. He is well-
respected and regarded and has a tremendous relationship that I
have seen in action across those areas.
I do not think a different Secretary or Acting Secretary is
going to affect that progress.
Ms. Torres Small. OK. So when it comes to election
security, again, one of the main focuses is making sure that
you are working with foreign partners as well as with local
election officials, State officials.
Given that on the eve of Secretary Nielsen's departure she
sought to warn the President about continuing Russian
involvement, do you see a change in leadership impacting the
potential for protecting our election security?
Secretary McAleenan. I do not. In fact, with Director Wray,
with the DNI, with Chris Krebs from CISA, with Paul Nakasone,
General Nakasone from NSA, we briefed the House in July and the
Senate on our joint efforts as a team to address election
security from the foreign to the counties and townships, and I
think we have a team effort, and very clear lanes that we are
all working in concert against.
Ms. Torres Small. Secretary McAleenan, I do not want to
downplay the work that you have done. I just have a fear that
some of it will be lost with continuing efforts to protect our
election infrastructure, and that is my concern.
You have expressed a need for this to continue into the
work of 2020 for that election cycle. So do you see that
impacting with now having to change leadership, given the steep
learning curve that the next person will have?
Secretary McAleenan. I do not think so because of the
strength of Director Krebs and our partners across the cyber
and election security efforts.
Ms. Torres Small. Last, with transnational criminal
organizations and the need to coordinate with Federal partners
as well as foreign partners to alleviate some of the push
factors that we are seeing in the Northern Triangle, do you see
that the change in leadership, the lack of continuity will
impact those relationships to help stem those push factors?
Secretary McAleenan. That has been the entire focus of my
tenure. Really, I mean, we have over a dozen agreements with
Mexico and Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, respectively. We
are now executing against those agreements, and I have high
confidence with our international affairs team and our
operators that we will be able to maintain that momentum.
Ms. Torres Small. So it has been the main focus with you as
Secretary to do that work, and how you are having to leave and
someone else will have to face that learning curve.
Secretary McAleenan. Well, the agreements are in place, and
we are actually executing and operating against those
agreements. So we do not have to do that front-line diplomatic
effort again.
So I do think we have momentum in place and the layers that
we need to continue to make progress.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Secretary.
I yield my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Taylor,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I appreciate this hearing. I think this is important.
I just wanted to start toward the Department of Homeland
Security. I appreciate your leadership there, and in some ways
in my short time here in Washington, it seems like an agency
that is embattled. We are watching different groups advocating
for different things.
One of the things I have been most surprised by is the
advocacy for disbanding Department of Homeland Security. It
certainly almost goes without saying that that is bad for
morale when Members of Congress are advocating to get rid of
the entire Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Secretary, how would you respond to someone who says
that we do not need a Department of Homeland Security?
Secretary McAleenan. I guess fundamentally I would say they
do not understand how the Department has matured and evolved to
work in a cohesive manner to address the threats we face.
I think it is an essential part of our homeland security
fabric and enterprise. The synergy that we have developed
across operating components with our Intelligence Analysis
Directorate, with State and local partners, with international
partners, that is because of the multi-mission capabilities
that we bring, the authorities that are unique, the opportunity
to have both civilian and military service with the Coast Guard
under our umbrella.
All of that is integral to protecting the homeland across
the variety of threats that I outlined in my opening statement.
Mr. Taylor. In addition to threats, you also have FEMA,
which is the ability to respond. You have Coast Guard, which
now deals with threats but also response to National disasters.
I will say that I have not heard a Member of this committee
who seem to have more expertise and understanding of what it is
that goes into what you do and appreciation that we may
disagree on how you are doing it or the complexity of how you
do it; we can all agree that certain things need to be done,
whether it is a disaster response or securing the border or
having an immigration system that is orderly.
So I just want to let you know that I do not think that we
should be getting rid of the Department of Homeland Security,
and I am somewhat taken aback with the suggestions from some of
my colleagues that that is an idea.
But, again, I have not heard that on this committee.
Just I know that during your questioning, you were cut off
a couple of times. Is there anything you wanted to add or you
felt like you had not had a chance to express at this point,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary McAleenan. Nothing to add right now. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor. All right. Director Wray, just shifting over to
your job, it seems like you are able to police into people that
are inspired by international terrorist organizations; that
that is easier to do because there is some web of ideology that
you are able to integrate into, whereas home-grown violence
seems to be a little bit more difficult to police.
Can you talk about is that a correct perception?
That is my perception from sitting on this committee, but I
just wanted to hear from someone who is doing it on the ground.
Mr. Wray. I think you are correct, Congressman. In
particular, on the international terrorism side, because of the
nexus to foreign persons and foreign threats and foreign
terrorist organizations, we have the ability to use
intelligence tools, counterintelligence tools, counterterrorism
tools, FISA, in particular, which is absolutely indispensable
to our effectiveness in protecting this country.
We, of course, do not have that in a domestic, a purely
domestic terrorist context. So that is one particular way in
which we have less transparency sometimes.
But I will say in general the domestic terrorism threat is
increasingly, as I think Mr. Travers used the term ``diffuse,''
and I think that is why this issue of complacency becomes so
important.
You know, the post-9/11 era of sleeper cells, well-
structured, very disciplined, massive, large-scale attacks,
that is still out there, but we have moved into this world
where you have terrorists including domestic terrorists, who
are not really that organized who are and some people use these
terms ``lone actors.'' I do sometimes, but a lot of times they
are communicating with each other in a more informal way, on-
line or in some other way, inspiring each other.
The lack of a structure makes it more challenging for us,
for example, to get human sources or undercovers inserted. If
there is no organization to insert somebody into, that is a
challenge. So that is part of the different nature of the
threat.
Mr. Taylor. Sure. I guess in my closing seconds, I would
just like to thank the men and women of the FBI for what they
do for our country. I am incredibly grateful, particularly for
your counter-corruption efforts and what you have done to keep
this country on the level in terms of Government.
It has been depressing to me to watch how states are so
unable to police themselves in terms of corruption, and I am
very grateful for the people at the FBI that really provide
that level of policing. They are really just a mission-critical
thing for this for our democracy.
So I am grateful for your service and the service of the
men and women that you serve.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. I thank the gentleman. The time has
expired.
For everybody concerned, we are trying to get the
temperature adjusted a little bit. I just kind-of look at
everybody, and they are kind-of drawn up.
We understand.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York for 5
minutes, Mr. Rose.
Mr. Rose. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member and to
the gentlemen of the day, thank you all for your extraordinary
service.
I want to first just put out a few questions regarding our
current efforts against the Jihadist threat and make sure we
are on the same page.
My understanding is today we have the correct levels of
authority and resources at hand to tack foreign Jihadist
fighters moving to ISIS or al-Qaeda and its affiliates and
their efforts to come to the United States.
That is correct?
[No response.]
Mr. Rose. OK. Currently we have the correct resources and
authority at hand to track and use the tools of law enforcement
to prevent or punish those American citizens who send resources
to ISIS, al-Qaeda or its affiliates; is that correct?
[No response.]
Mr. Rose. Last, currently we have the correct resources----
Chairman Thompson. Hold on just a minute.
Say yes or no. That helps everybody for the record.
Mr. Wray. I am answering the last question. My answer to
the last question is yes.
Mr. Rose. Thank you.
Currently we have the authorities and the resources at hand
should someone use the tools of social media to translate ISIS
texts, al-Qaeda texts, disseminate that information, recruit
people whether at home or abroad. The tools of law enforcement
are available to us to punish those individuals; is that
correct?
What I am specifically referring to is providing material
support to a foreign terrorist organization.
Mr. Wray. Right. Certainly legally material support is a
very valuable tool for the kinds of things you are talking
about.
You get into the technological dimension of it which is
becoming increasingly challenged, which is that encryption
issue I was talking about before, and that is a real phenomenon
that is going to become a bigger and bigger legal issue.
Mr. Rose. Of course. I just mean, sir, if we can identify
what we are doing, there are charges associated with that.
Now, you all described each in your own separate way this
domestic terrorism threat that we are facing today, white
nationalism, white supremacist threat that we are facing as
transnational in nature and mirroring many of the tools of
ideological persuasion that the Jihadist threat has used for
the last 25, 30 years or more.
So I just want to ask you the same exact questions as it
pertains to some of these global white nationalist, white
supremacist, neo-Nazi organizations that we currently see
today, the Azov Battalion in Ukraine, which over 17,000 foreign
fighters have streamed to; National Action in the United
Kingdom; Nordic Resistance in Sweden, all entities that the
Federal Government has already identified as hostile in nature.
Do we currently have the authority and resources in place
to track who has gone to these entities to train and work with
them, and to make sure that they are tracked when they came to
the United States?
For you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McAleenan. So that is one of the things we
emphasize in our strategic framework, that for DHS our
operational effectiveness and our authorities really apply to
that border and cross-border movement of people, goods, money.
Mr. Rose. It is a simple question, Secretary, and again,
with respect to your service, someone goes and trains with the
Azov Battalion.
Secretary McAleenan. Right.
Mr. Rose. Do we have them on the list in the same way that
we would have someone on the list if they went to go train and
fight with ISIS?
Secretary McAleenan. So between our National Targeting
Center under CDP, our Homeland Security Investigations, we have
had multiple efforts, Hammerskins, Rise Above Movement, just in
the last year where we have used that international cross-
border collaboration and movement to address and make arrests,
take away visas, prevent that collaboration.
So, yes, we have been focused on that.
Mr. Rose. Good. Sir. Mr. Director.
Mr. Wray. I think we use different tools than we do on the
international terrorism side, but I think we have been
effective much as Secretary McAleenan said. We just use
different offenses and work with our foreign partners on it.
Mr. Rose. Mr. Travers.
Director Travers. I have probably talked to 15 of my
counterparts around particularly Europe and Southeast Asia on
this particular problem. Everyone is grappling with the same
thing.
There are experiments in terms of naming these
organizations. In many cases our European colleagues find that
these organizations are very close to political parties, and
that confronts the free speech issue, and so this is something
we are all grappling with as this question of designations
comes up.
Mr. Rose. Well, so is Hamas and Hezbollah, and that has not
stopped us.
My larger question here is that do we need to consider
designating some of these entities as foreign terrorist
organizations or is the current policy of the United States of
America that we only designate Muslim organizations as FTOs?
If white nationalist organization fits the criteria of an
FTO, as I believe these do, should we consider designating them
as such?
You have the broad-based authorities. You currently do to
fight ISIS and al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Director Travers. Designations is not an intelligence
community function. It belongs to the State Department.
Mr. Rose. Is that all of your answers here, that this is
the State Department's purview?
Mr. Wray. Designations is the purview of the State
Department, yes.
Mr. Rose. I understand. My time is running out. My question
is that would this assist you because I am sure that if we took
away the FTO designation for other terrorist organizations, you
would protest. You would object to that.
Mr. Wray. We would find that very operationally
problematic, yes.
I will say that as Secretary McAleenan said in response to
a different question, we can always use more tools, right? You
are never going to find a law enforcement or intelligence
professional that would not like more tools, and I can imagine
situations where what you are describing would be very helpful
for us to have as a tool.
I will also say though that more and more--and I referenced
this in my opening statement--more and more the biggest threat
we face here in the United States is these, whether it is
domestic terrorists, like white supremacists, or international
terrorism, people who are inspired by Jihadist movements, we
have these self-radicalized actors here, and so the whole
concept of going after organizations, which was a construct
which was created about things like al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, et
cetera, is still valid, but the threat that we face right now
is not so much about organizations.
That is why the approach that you are describing might be
useful, but I do not think that it is going to necessarily hit
what we consider the biggest threat that we are facing here,
and that is why what Mr. Travers said is so important.
Mr. Rose. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Katko.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset I want to thank Mr. McAleenan for his career
in public service and all he has done to help keep our country
safe. We very much appreciate what you have done, and you have
done an extraordinarily good job, and thank you for that.
I wish I had an hour or 2 hours with all of you because
there are so many questions I want to ask, but you know,
Director Wray, something you said really struck me, and that
was that on the cyber front we have a wider range of threats
now than ever before.
I could not agree with you more, and as the Ranking Member
on Cybersecurity Subcommittee, I am constantly amazed at the
complexity of the threats and the permutations of the threats.
So I want to talk about that a little bit if I can.
You mentioned a few of them, ransomware, supply chain,
trade secrets, China. What else can we be doing as a committee
to give you the tools to address this issue?
I am going to ask some of the others the same thing.
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, we need to work more and more
closely with the private sector, and so things that help
facilitate that are always useful. You know, in this country,
something like 90 percent of the critical infrastructure is in
the hands of the private sector, and so the cyber threats, in
particular, for the United States, unlike, say, a very
centralized country like China where over half of the companies
are state-owned enterprises, requires this partnership with the
private sector.
So this is a place that for me we need to see more and more
resources, quite frankly, devoted because we are going to have
to engage more and more with the private sector on that issue.
I will also say that data analytics are an increasingly big
problem. It is not a sexy topic, but it is incredibly
significant in the cyber arena, particularly. In any one case,
if you just stop and think about it for a minute, the volumes
and volumes of them coming up with new kinds of bytes. You
know, but your own prefix in front of it to capture the sheer
volume of what we are getting in every case.
The ability to exploit that fast enough is a real
challenge, and so helping DHS and FBI and others with kind-of
the tools to exploit that information is going to be a real
step forward.
Mr. Katko. Yes, and I do want to talk about that a little
bit. You are right, and it is a different dynamic.
I was a Federal prosecutor for 20 years, organized crime,
and so we had different agencies. You worked together with
them, and you go after the bad guys, and you are protecting the
public.
But here we have to work so closely with the private
sector. I do not think we do a good enough job, and from a
resource standpoint.
So could you expound just a little bit on the resource
standpoint, what specifically you think you would need in order
to get this done?
Mr. Wray. Well, we need more agents, computer scientists,
data analysts, and tools, technological tools to be able to
engage on more and more cases.
We find that one of the biggest frustrations that we have
from the private sector is how quickly we can engage on a lot
of these things, and part of that is because of the point that
you made, right, just the sheer volume. The attack surface is
so broad now.
We are trying to use our cyber task forces that we have all
over the country that have a whole bunch of different agencies
on them as well, and we are trying to look for ways to partner
with the private sector.
But, again, a lot of it comes down to people and tools and
very specific kinds of people.
Mr. Katko. Yes, I would like to follow up with you off-line
about this and just try and get a better handle on what it is
we need and so then we can maybe try and fulfill your requests.
Mr. McAleenan, I know you want to add to this, but the
centerpiece of the cybersecurity mission for Homeland is in
CISA, and that has been stood up over the last year. How is it
going? What else can we do better with them?
Secretary McAleenan. I think it is going very well, and I
just want to echo the director's point about people and tools.
We do need more. The attack surface is very broad, and private-
sector engagement is obviously one of CISA's core
responsibilities.
But I would like to add at the State level, State and local
government levels. We really do need to think about the right
resourcing to support our States.
We are going to have an election in 2020 with well over 90
percent of voters casting ballots with good, auditable paper
backups, but not every State is there where we need them. That
is a resourcing issue.
When we engage these counties, we are talking about
updating their Windows software to eliminate vulnerabilities
that have existed for years, and that is usually a funding
problem, not necessarily a will problem, although we do have
awareness challenges.
So that kind of engagement is critical. The public utility
side of this equation, I mentioned industrial control systems
in my opener, you know, everything from pipelines to power.
This is a critical area where we need those quasi-governmental
and private-sector entities to take the cybersecurity measures
they need to be successful, and that is what CISA is doing
across the board.
Mr. Katko. I am out of time, but, Mr. Glawe, is there
anything else you want to add to that?
Mr. Glawe. Just to follow what Director Wray said and
Secretary McAleenan. Our engagement with the private sector is
critical, and we have conducted since I took over in 2017 a
real heavy emphasis on engagements through the corporate
security symposiums, which I host with Director Wray's folks in
the Bureau.
But getting the collection requirements, show the private
sector how to protect the brand, how to protect their
customers, how to protect their clients is critical. We are not
going to be able to win this fight on the foreign adversary to
try to influence business on the homeland without a hand-in-
glove relationship, and it is a new dynamic.
How we are using the State Fusion Centers and partner with
the FBI is critical to have that hand-in-glove information
sharing on what is their biggest risk.
It is not about a competitive advantage. It is about an
equal advantage with those foreign adversaries that are
attacking our country through economics.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, I yield back, but I just want to
note and respectfully suggest this is an area that I think we
should have a subject of a hearing and really try and figure
out what the manpower requirements might be. Then maybe we
could formulate something to try and assist them because it is
a critically important area.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair agrees with you. We have
already had some discussions along that line.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank all of you. A thank you to Mr.
McAleenan for your appearance before the committee and the fact
that as far as I know, you have been a very straight shooter
with us. So thank you very much.
Are any of you concerned about what could happen and may be
already happening as a result of the cryptocurrency issue?
The thing that is frightening to me in looking at this is
that the software is available to just about anybody, including
people who would like to do some harm to us, and you know, you
could do a transaction, you know, just like that.
Unless we have some really low-IQ bad guys, in the future
we are going to have to deal with people moving arguably
millions of dollars, millions of invisible dollars going here
and there.
Is there a division? I know FinCEN is working under
Treasury, but is there a division anywhere else that is
focusing on this problem that is only going to grow?
Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Congressman, I think you have put your finger on
a very, very vexing issue for everyone in law enforcement and
National security more broadly. At the FBI, we have an Office
of Technology Division that is keenly focused on
cryptocurrency, and we have a number of tools that we use with
different forms of cryptocurrency to try to break past or get
around the anonymization that occurs there.
But every time we come up with a new tool, you know, there
is a new type of cryptocurrency coming right behind it, and it
is not just as you mentioned the low-IQ bad guys.
Unfortunately, one of the phenomena that we are seeing
increasingly is in effect crime is a service.
So in other words, there are sophisticated forms of
cryptocurrency out there, and on the Dark Web there are
basically organizations that are now marketing it to the low-IQ
bad guys. So it is now available to those people, too.
So this is absolutely going to be a phenomenon going
forward that we need to be concerned about.
Secretary McAleenan. Can I just add quickly, Congressman, I
agree with you 100 percent that traceability of financial
transactions is a huge vulnerability as we emerge into
different cryptocurrencies?
For DHS, U.S. Secret Service has unique capability on both
financial investigations and cyber, and this is kind-of the
nexus of all Homeland Security investigations have this
capability and is working these problems as well.
I do not know if Under Secretary Glawe wants to add
anything from the intel side.
Mr. Glawe. Just to echo what the Secretary just said, the
vulnerabilities we have for how we identify illicit activity
with finance is critical, and how we have the infrastructure to
track and identify the individuals in the United States and
global is critical.
We also have the policies and authorities in place to do
that.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you.
I wish we could probably have a whole hearing on this
issue. I have spent a little time dealing with it.
FinCEN, we probably need somebody from Treasury to talk to
us about FinCEN, but there is also this proposal being kind-of
floated around now by Treasury that the Secret Service should
be transferred out of DHS into Treasury.
I guess I am not sure if they want to connect it with
FinCEN or what, but do any of you have a position on that,
especially you, Secretary McAleenan?
Secretary McAleenan. So I have talked about why and I
certainly understand why Treasury would want to be associated
with one of the finest law enforcement organizations in the
world, the U.S. Secret Service, and they do have a nexus with
the financial responsibilities, financial investigations of
Treasury.
They are also well-ensconced in DHS on National security
special events and threats. Obviously, we will look at that
with the administration and with Congress in the months ahead.
Mr. Cleaver. OK. Since you are leaving, do you think that
that should remain with Homeland Security?
Secretary McAleenan. I think there are strong arguments on
the placement for Secret Service in both departments, and I
support the dialog that the administration is having with
Congress at this time.
Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Cleaver. You are a good man, Mr. Director.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Being a fellow Mississippian, I agree it is kind-of chilly
in here.
Mr. Secretary McAleenan, thank you for your service.
As I understand your story, you were watching the towers
fall at 9/11 and ran to the sound of the guns. So I appreciate
that, and for those of us who were in service at the time those
towers fell, we look at that degree of patriotism with great
admiration. Thank you.
To all of the witnesses here today, thank for your service
to our great country. I really appreciate your being here today
and for your candor.
My question is really to all of you or whomever you think
is best to answer it. I would still like to kind-of dig into
this cooperation between ISIS and AQ and what you think their
capacities are if they combine and how that impacts the
homeland.
Director Travers. I will start. There are places around the
globe where ISIS and AQ definitely cooperate, West Africa, I
think, being a classic case where JNIM, an AQ affiliate, and
ISIS West Africa certainly cooperate on the ground.
I think the general view is that we are very unlikely to
see a strategic alliance between the two. There are issues
associated. Al-Qaeda thought the caliphate itself was a
mistake. The very issue of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being a caliph
grated at AQ, to be sure.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. Oh, sure.
Director Travers. So my guess is that we are going to
continue to see much like we do today, ISIS and AQ battle in
places, Yemen, in East Africa, whereas in the homeland, and
Director Wray can talk to this, we do see a bit of an
idiosyncratic adoption of sometimes individuals will cite ISIS.
Sometimes they will cite AQ ideology. We have certainly seen
that in Europe, but in general, I do not think we are going to
see a strategic alliance.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. Switching gears a little bit to
cyber, what are your thoughts on Blockchain and its impact on
cybersecurity, and is there an increased vulnerability with
Blockchain or is it decreased?
Is that protective in any way, I guess?
Secretary McAleenan. I think it has potential to decrease
vulnerability by creating a distributed ledger where you can
verify transactions across multiple entities. I think there are
some really interesting applications being explored, supply
chain being one of the critical ones, and I am speaking of the
traditional cargo supply chain from a Customs and Border
Protection background, being able to verify that shipment from
stuffing in a manufacturer's facility all the way to unloading
it at a Walmart in the United States.
That is a very promising type of capability. So I think
ultimately Blockchain will be a help as it is applied in
various sectors.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. How well do you think Government as
a whole is accepting that?
I mean, I agree with you. Are we moving toward Blockchain
across the infrastructure?
Secretary McAleenan. So I think the private sector is going
to drive it as it usually does in adoption of new technology.
What we are trying to do at CHS is play a productive role where
we can partner in the financial sector, for instance, in
movement of cargo in supply chains and in cybersecurity
applications as well, to basically provide a platform and
support standard-setting for Blockchain applications in
different areas.
I think there is a lot of work to be done, and frankly that
is a dialog that needs to happen with Congress as well.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. Agreed. Again, changing the
subject, and this is for Under Secretary Glawe. I am
pronouncing your name correctly, Glawe?
Can you elaborate a little bit on the National Vetting
Center, where we are, the memorandum that was recently issued,
and kind-of give us an update on that?
Mr. Glawe. Sure. Myself and the Secretary for many years in
our prior capacity have been working on this, and I am happy to
say the National Vetting Center is right on track with where we
want to be, and that is really taking U.S. intelligence
community data, law enforcement data, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection data, and other data sources to find nefarious
actors, criminal entities, work expanding it to looking at
transnational crime, foreign intelligence operatives, and it is
really a model that the Secretary led in his prior capacities
in developing the business model to find bad things that are
trying to come into the United States.
This will be expanded to cargo, and it really is a model
that is really important for the Department of Homeland
Security. We are the last line of defense before bad things
come in the country, and I would defer to the Secretary because
he was really the architect behind this for many years, and he
saw it to fruition before he left.
Secretary McAleenan. I think you summarized it very well.
This is a collaboration with the intelligence community and
interagency parties that has expanded, that has been done from
the beginning with inclusion of privacy from across the
interagency to make sure we are doing this right with every
additional data set with every comparison that we have the
right safeguards in place.
It is already identifying individuals that could pose a
threat to the United States that we would not have seen before
this capability was brought on-line.
So I think it is absolutely headed in the right direction,
building off the National Targeting Center framework.
Mr. Green of Tennessee. I just want to thank you for that
work. Thank you both.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from Mississippi and
Tennessee yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for appearing.
I would like to juxtapose, if I may, 2 children. We have
seen the photographs of the babies coming from south of the
border, but I have also seen as of late a photograph of a child
3 years of age born in Ukraine, came to this country with his
father after his mother died, grew up in Brooklyn, Master's
degree from Harvard, serves in the military, Purple Heart
recipient.
There was no way to prognosticate at the time this child
sought to enter the United States that he would become the
person he is today. No way. One can but only imagine the number
of children we have turned away who may have been of great
benefit to our country.
Immigrants have made America great, not by themselves, but
they have been a part of the greatness of this country.
When I see the photograph of this baby being separated from
a parent crying, there is just no way to know what we have done
when a person is seeking lawful asylum.
In my research, I do not find any place where the colonel,
whom I have great respect for, by the way, do not believe he is
being treated fairly, but I have not found in my research any
indication that he was required to wait in a third country for
some period of time before he could enter this country.
My research does not indicate that at that time persons who
were coming from Europe or Ukraine in this case, any of them
had to wait in cages. I just have to ask myself why are we
treating persons coming from south of the border so
differently, wait in a third country, working out agreements
such that if they do not do certain things in other countries,
they are going to be denied the opportunity to traverse to this
country.
Why are we treating them so differently, if you would,
Honorable Mr. McAleenan?
Secretary McAleenan. Congressman, under the U.S. refugee
programs, people do apply and wait in third countries while
they go through the process with, first of all, the United
Nations, the International Organization of Migration, with the
State Department Population Refugees and Migration, and then
DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
So it is a multi-agency process that happens abroad for
refugees that come to the country today, to the most welcoming
country in the world.
Mr. Green of Texas. Is it your indication to me for the
record that this is what occurred with the colonel?
Secretary McAleenan. I do not know the colonel's individual
case, Congressman. I am sorry.
Mr. Green of Texas. All right. Well, I do not know it in
totality, but I know enough about it to suggest that it appears
to me that we are not being even-handed in terms of our
approach.
At the turn of the century, we had many people to come to
this country, not into the 21st Century but the 20th Century,
from Europe. They came here on boats. They went through Ellis
Island, and they did not have the requirements that we have for
the people coming from south of the border.
A lot of these changes are changes that were made on your
watch. This happened on your watch. You have some
responsibility for what is happening.
This is not to disrespect you, dear friend, but it is to
say that some of this could have been abated. You did comment
and indicate that it was terminated because of the way it was
impacting people. I hope I said that correctly. I am not trying
to demean you or the President.
But it should not have started. It should not have started.
Why? What made us decide that these people should be treated
the way they were treated?
Secretary McAleenan. I do not think we have the time today
to have a fulsome conversation on this, but let me try to
answer your question.
The laws have changed dramatically since the turn of the
century and the prior arrival of mass migrations. We are trying
to apply those laws.
We are also trying to ensure that individuals who need
protections, protections for asylum, and these categories are
political, racial, religious, membership in a social group,
they are able to receive those protections as close to home as
possible without entering in a dangerous smuggling cycle.
We cannot have an immigration system that is based on a
Darwinian principle, of anyone who arrives at the U.S. border
should be allowed to enter. We have to have more integrity in
the international system. We have got 70 million in vulnerable
populations of----
Mr. Green of Texas. My time has expired.
I must state and say this, dear sir. Nowhere in the law do
we have language such as what you just used. That was done to
inflame.
If you were in court and being questioned, you would be
taken to task for trying to use that type of inflammatory
language.
Darwinian? There is nothing in the law that says Darwinian,
and you know this. That was done intentionally to inflame.
Secretary McAleenan. I am not inflaming anything,
Congressman.
Mr. Green of Texas. But that is what that language does.
Secretary McAleenan. I am explaining that under----
Mr. Green of Texas. But you are using inflammatory
language. I was very careful to try as best as I could to be
fair to you and the President, but the truth is this.
They are people of color, and with people of color, we have
a different standard. If these were babies coming from the
north, we would not have treated them the way we treated these
children.
Secretary McAleenan. I disagree. We apply the law equally
to people, refugees of all colors.
Mr. Green of Texas. Well, it does not evidence itself in
what we see.
Secretary McAleenan. Migrants from all colors----
Mr. Green of Texas. It does not evidence itself in what we
see.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The time has
expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want thank Secretary McAleenan for your service to our
Nation and to the American people and protecting the American
people in I think very difficult times.
When I was Chairman of this committee, I saw the rise and
fall of ISIS and the so-called caliphate. We just had recently
the killing, the death of Abu Bark al-Baghdadi.
I would like to know just from the Secretary and the two
Directors, FBI and NCTC, what impact that has on the morale of
ISIS. How much of a threat are they today?
Secretary McAleenan. So I believe just starting quickly,
and passing to my colleagues, I believe they do continue to
present a threat, and as Russ Travers noted, the inspiration of
their ideology persists.
One of the things we have done recently with DHS, with the
FBI, we put out a joint intelligence bulletin just ensuring
there is awareness of the potential even though it has not
happened in the past after the death of a senior leader, the
potential for someone to be inspired and to commit an attack in
the immediate aftermath.
We do think it is going to affect their ability to
reorganize and to direct, but we maintain our concern about the
diffuse and dispersed ISIS affiliates and their ability to
continue to mount threats to U.S. interests world-wide.
Mr. McCaul. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. I would agree with Secretary McAleenan. Certainly
it is an important blow, a successful blow for which we are all
grateful, but it is also clearly the case that they anticipated
at some point that they would need to have successors, and to a
large extent what we are most worried about here on the
homeland is what I would call the virtual caliphate, which is
people who are inspired on-line, which is a lot easier to do
and not just all tracing back to one leader.
Mr. McCaul. Director Travers.
Director Travers. I would just add that they have been
thinking about the demise of the caliphate for a couple of
years. Adnani talked about it and the need to prepare for an
insurgency.
They have lost a lot of leaders. This is a bureaucracy that
is pretty good at doing succession planning. I think it is
absolutely fair to say that it will be a morale hit. I think
you can largely attribute many of the decline in attacks in
Europe over the last couple of years to the demise of the
caliphate.
But nevertheless, the ideology continues. The resonance
continues, and that is a strategic concern for us.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is all accurate, and I do think
the threat level has gone down a little bit. I mean, 2015, 2016
was like one external operational plot per month it seemed
like.
Domestic terrorism seems to be on the rise, but, Director
Wray, I just want to ask you about in terms of just numbers and
arrests.
How many domestic terrorism arrests were effectuated in
2019?
Mr. Wray. Sir, in 2019, we had 107 domestic terrorism
arrests, and we had, I think, 121, give or take, international
terrorism arrests.
Mr. McCaul. So in terms of international terrorism, there
were more international terrorism arrests than domestic
terrorism?
Mr. Wray. Yes. Pretty close in number, but yes.
Mr. McCaul. Pretty close. How does that compare to the
previous year?
Mr. Wray. The previous year was both hovering around 100
arrests, both of the prior years as well.
I will say on the international terrorism side in terms of
number of investigations that we have on-going, we have both
the home-grown violent extremists, which are these people here
inspired by various parts of the jihadist movement. We have
about 1,000 give or take investigations of that sort.
But then that is not counting the foreign terrorist
organizations or directed, structured international terrorist
organizations which, you know, probably have about another
1,000 or so of those.
So while domestic terrorism is absolutely something that is
very much top of mind and we at the FBI recently elevated to be
a National threat priority along with HVEs and ISIS,
international terrorism is very much alive and well and
something we need to stay focused on, too.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is correct. You know, we talk a
lot about domestic terrorism being on the rise, but I do not
think we can let our eyes off the ball with foreign terrorist
organizations and international terrorism.
I introduced a bill with some colleagues. You know, you
have a domestic terrorism definition that was created after 9/
11. Congress passed, you know, laws pertaining terrorism and
both the international terrorism and domestic terrorism.
International terrorism had charges associated with it.
Domestic terrorism did not. The FBI opens cases of domestic
terrorism and international terrorism. However, the U.S.
Attorneys, and I was one of them, cannot charge a domestic
terrorism case. There is no specific charge related to that.
I introduced that bill working with the FBI, and it was
endorsed by the FBI association. Do you have any comments on
that bill and what value that would give to the FBI and U.S.
Attorneys?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think as I had mentioned in response to a
different question, certainly we can always use more tools. As
you say and as you experienced first-hand in the U.S.
Attorney's Office, we do not have a domestic terrorism crime as
such.
What you probably also saw and probably practiced while you
were in the U.S. Attorney's office is our folks at the FBI,
just like the AUSAs they work with, do not give up, and so they
find work-arounds.
We have been very good at using everything else in Title
18, including creative things like most recently we used the
Federal rioting statute to go after some of the terrorism that
occurred in connection with Charlottesville, for example, and
the Rise Above Movement there.
We also work with our State and local authorities, and
especially in places like Texas. We have had some very
successful work with State and local law enforcement, and you
can get some pretty good hits at some State and local charges.
Mr. McCaul. Yes, the State charge has the death penalty.
But I think, Mr. Chairman, in closing, you know, whether it
was the Austin bomber, which is clearly terrorism, to El Paso,
to Odessa, I think this is something we should take a look at.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs.
Watson Coleman.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for coming today, and good luck
to you, Mr. McAleenan. Good luck to you with whatever it is you
are going to do next.
I have got a number of questions. I would be here, like Mr.
Katko said, forever. I want to start with either Mr. Glawe or
Mr. Travers said that there are 15,000 ISIS members in Syria
and other places and Iraq, versus 1,000.
Who said that?
Director Travers. I did, ma'am.
Ms. Watson Coleman. OK. So what is the time frame that you
are talking about? From when to when?
Director Travers. This is 5 years ago, before the build-up
of ISIS and the caliphate was formed. ISIS was down to about
1,000 people. Even after the demise of the caliphate, the low
end of the estimate is 14,000 ISIS members in Syria and Iraq,
mostly in Iraq, which for us suggests that there is a great
fertile ground for a long-term insurgency.
Ms. Watson Coleman. OK. Do you think that given the recent
betrayal of our Kurdish allies and uproar and chaos that is
taking place over there now become fertile ground for ISIS to
grow there as well?
Mr. Wray. Ma'am, I did not get the question.
Ms. Watson Coleman. The President of the United States
pulled away the troops that were supporting the Kurds and
fighting with the Kurds against ISIS. Now, we have Turkey has
infiltrated. There have been alliances now with Russia, our
other really trusted friend. ISIS, some of their prisoners are
escaping. There seems to be really chaos and fear and
elimination happening over there.
I am wondering does that make it more fertile territory for
ISIS to grow as well? That is just yes or no.
Mr. Wray. It is a very fluid situation. Sure. We do not
know exactly what the Syrian military is going to do east of
the river. I believe both the President and the Secretary of
Defense have indicated that we remain committed with our forces
there to a counter-ISIS campaign.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Really? I thought we were just going to
protect the oil.
Do we have any idea how many members of al-Qaeda exist?
Director Travers. Numbers are difficult to come by. Again,
we are looking at a command-and-control structure that exists,
and then there are a half-dozen or so affiliates, and they have
thousands of individuals each.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So are we talking about another 15,000,
20,000? I am trying to figure out how safe I feel.
Director Travers. I would say that numbers themselves are
not a particularly good indicator of capability.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So this is what I heard, and you can
tell me if I am wrong. I am hearing that we are doing pretty
good at keeping bad people, really bad people, out of the
United States of America. Even in cybersecurity, we are doing a
decent job with trying to protect our infrastructure and those
things that are important to us, whether it is China for
monetary reasons or Russia for disruption of our
infrastructure.
I am hearing that, right? That is basically what I am
hearing. Just anybody just tell me.
Director Travers. I can only speak to terrorism, but I
think this country has done a great job pushing borders out and
establishing a comprehensive vetting system.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So I kind-of want to go into for a
minute, real fast, this whole issue of domestic terrorism, and
I want to direct my questions to Mr. Wray.
Mr. Wray, first of all, I am sorry. Honorable Mr. Wray.
You had collapsed. You have taken away this horrible
category of black extremity, extremists, whatever it was
called, and the report that went with it.
You have now collapsed what is white supremacism,
replacement supremacism, and black separatism into a racially-
motivated category of terrorism.
Do you then make a distinction as to who commits what
infractions, and do you have any indication are we having a
greater percentage of those incidents happening with white
supremacists, white replacementists, or black extremist; and if
so, can you tell me your breakdown?
Mr. Wray. Well, I cannot give you exact numbers sitting
here right now, but what I can tell you is that the
reorganization of our categories, our nomenclature was based on
a lot of I think very helpful dialog that I had with
Congressional Black Caucus, with Noble, with lots of other
people, and was part of a much broader reorganization of the
way we counted.
Within the racially-motivated violent extremist category, I
think it is fair to say from what we see internally that a huge
chunk, the majority of the racially-motivated violent
extremists, domestic terrorism, the majority of that is at the
hands of what I would call white supremacists.
Ms. Watson Coleman. Are we aware of the linkages that may
take place internationally, the inspiration that comes from
things we saw in Christchurch and things of that nature?
Mr. Wray. We are very actively looking at that. We spend a
lot of time trying to discern trends and leads on that front.
Ms. Watson Coleman. If we identify those connections, would
we then be able to identify the groups as terrorist groups?
Mr. Wray. Where there are groups, as such, I think we have
been pretty effective at identifying them, but I will say, as I
think I may have mentioned to one of your colleagues, more and
more on the domestic terrorism side, including this white
supremacist violence category, it is not really about groups in
the same way we used to think of groups with al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah. It is more diffuse, more unstructured and
undisciplined.
Ms. Watson Coleman. So I think you have a really huge task.
All of you have a huge task to keep us safe, and I thank you
for the work that you do.
I am concerned about the FBI having its resources taken
away from doing some of this really important stuff and put
into a position to have to investigate itself as to whether or
not there was a treasonous investigation done as it related to
the 2016 involvement of Russia in our election, and I pray that
your resources are not taken away so that you can continue to
focus on that which is really a threat to us and the safety and
security, and Congress can concentrate on the other.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Crenshaw, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
What a great discussion today, and I will try to hit some
different topics. This question regarding Hezbollah and the
recent decision of the Lebanese president to step down, I will
direct this to you, Mr. Travers.
How do you think that affects the Iranian threat, the
Hezbollah threat, globally?
Then maybe you can expand upon what the nexus is between
Hezbollah and some of the groups south of the border in South
America and Mexican drug cartels, if any.
Director Travers. Well, the unrest in Lebanon and Hariri's
decision largely is a local issue having to do with a WhatsApp
tax, I think, and so it has been fascinating to watch. I am not
sure that it has a great deal to do with the Hezbollah threat
itself.
My guess is that Hezbollah was a fan of Hariri and would
like him to stay put. So we will have to see how that plays
out.
Hezbollah itself, you are quite right, is an extraordinary
organization, and it does have global connections. It is a very
mature organization. It is very careful in its decision-making
process.
We are watching very carefully its activities in the Middle
East right now, how if it would respond to Iran. In our view it
has no interest in going to war with Israel, for instance. It
has a high bar for any attacks against the United States.
Nasrallah is a pro. He has been doing this for a very long
time.
Mr. Crenshaw. There is a high bar for attacks, but what is
its capability?
Have you seen any nexus between them and groups south of
the border?
I mean, there was long thought to be a relationship between
them and the tri-border areas in South America. What about
closer to our border? Is there any potential for that kind of
relationship?
Director Travers. In this session, sir, I just do not think
we can get into that. I need to go into closed session.
Mr. Crenshaw. Fair enough. But let's talk directly about
the Mexican drug cartels that we do see south of our border. I
will direct this to you, Mr. Secretary.
One thing that stands out to me especially from a tactical
perspective is how capable the Mexican drug cartels are, with
their weaponry, with their training, with their brutality, and
with their endless amount of funding.
I mean, if you look around the world as far as threats at a
very tactical level, they are probably one of the most capable
groups, and right now they have no interest in conducting
attacks against the United States, right? Their interests are
more business-related.
But how can we do better working with the Mexican
government to quell this threat, and what should we be worried
about in the future?
Secretary McAleenan. It is a really challenging one. I
outlined it in my opening as one of the major threat vectors we
see affecting the homeland, and not necessarily a direct act of
violence, as you alluded to. They focus that on each other
primarily and, unfortunately, on the government of Mexico and
other allies' police forces in the region.
But really their ability to smuggle hard narcotics into the
United States, we have seen the impact of the fentanyl and
synthetic opioid epidemic. Methamphetamine is really the main
concern in scale if you talk to our State and local law
enforcement partners right now.
But there are 4 or 5 very violent, very capable
organizations that impact the safety of Mexican citizens in a
number of states.
Mr. Crenshaw. Is there more we can be doing with the
Mexican government?
Is there a better relationship that could be had or is that
at a good place right now?
Secretary McAleenan. So I think both the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Justice and other IC
partners are really supporting the government of Mexico law
enforcement. I do think we need to continue to work on the
weapons flowing south, on the money flowing south that is
helping support cartel activities in Mexico and in the region
more broadly.
That has got to be a concerted effort across the USG.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
Director Wray, I will point this last one to you.
You mentioned before thwarting various attacks, domestic
and foreign terrorist attacks, over the last few years. You did
not give any numbers. Maybe those are Classified. That is fine.
I do not need the numbers right now.
I want to know if we have been more successful than we were
20, 30 years ago and why. Is it because stovepiping has ceased
to be such a problem?
The interagency relationships, are those working better?
Do we have better tools?
Is our presence overseas helpful? Is it hurting?
The eyes and ears on the ground, is the intelligence
collection, is our view of the networks helping us out there?
Are we keeping them busy so that they are not planning
attacks here?
What is it?
I am out of time after that question. So I will let you
take it.
Thank you.
Mr. Wray. Well, in the interest of time, what I would say
most of the reasons for the success boils down to one word,
which is partnerships, partnerships between Federal agencies,
partnerships, in particular, between Federal agencies and State
and local law enforcement, partnerships within the intelligence
community, partnerships with our foreign partners.
All of those things have led to a greater flow of
information, greater connecting of the dots, greater ability to
get ahead of the threat, and a greater recognition that there
is no one disruption strategy. There are a lot of different
ways in which you can disrupt a terrorist attack.
It could be a kinetic strike. It could be criminal law
enforcement action. It could be some, you know, visa action. It
could be some foreign government taking action. There are a lot
of different ways, a lot of different tools in the toolbox if
everybody is talking to each other.
I will say, having been in the FBI building on 9/11 and
been intimately involved in the War on Terror during those
years and then coming back into this role now, the difference
between how closely everybody is working together, I know this
sounds a little Pollyannaish. It is like night and day, and it
could not come a moment too soon.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Barragan, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
So, Mr. Secretary, under your tenure we have seen an
expansion of human rights abuses under this administration
specifically named ``migrant protection protocols,'' or the
``remain in Mexico policy.''
The name almost assumes that this program will actually
protect migrants when it does the complete opposite. Instead of
allowing asylum seekers to remain safely in the United States
as they wait for their cases to be heard, as has been done by
law under the U.S. Refugee Act, you have forced nearly 50,000
asylum seekers, including vulnerable individuals like those
with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, LGBTQ people
to wait in areas plagued by violence, like the state of
Tamaulipas, Mexico, which is a Level 4 threat.
This is the same warning that countries like Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, and North Korea have.
I am going to say this again. We are sending people,
pregnant women, back to dangerous places in Mexico that have a
Level 4 threat that is the equivalent of Afghanistan, Iraq,
Syria, and North Korea.
Before you decided to return families with children and
other asylum seekers to wait in these very dangerous places in
Mexico, did you conduct any type of an analysis, any type, to
assess the potential harms that these asylum seekers might
suffer?
Secretary McAleenan. So the migrant protection protocols is
a program in partnership with the government of Mexico.
Ms. Barragan. I am asking if you have any kind of an
assessment on the potential harm of where they are being sent.
Did we do that?
Secretary McAleenan. There was a month-long dialog with the
government of Mexico on the----
Ms. Barragan. I am asking the United States. It is a yes or
no. Did you assess the threat level before you sent them there?
Secretary McAleenan. Between the Department of Homeland
Security, Department of State which jointly negotiated this
program with the government of Mexico, assessments were done on
Mexican's ability to manage this program jointly with the
United States, yes.
Ms. Barragan. OK. So you did assess this, and you thought
it was perfectly fine.
Do you know that there are public reports of kidnappings,
assaults, and other attacks on families and other asylum
seekers that are returned to Mexico?
Are you reading these reports? Are you hearing about them?
Secretary McAleenan. Certainly we carefully monitor reports
of violence in the northern border states of Mexico for lots of
reasons.
Ms. Barragan. So have you heard about people being
kidnapped? Yes or no?
Secretary McAleenan. Yes, we have heard----
Ms. Barragan. Have you heard about people being assaulted?
Yes or no?
Secretary McAleenan. Please let me finish the answer.
Ms. Barragan. I do not have that much time, and I want to
know what you are aware of.
Secretary McAleenan. But sometimes it is not a yes or no
question.
Ms. Barragan. Because my colleagues over here are talking
about how we are a compassionate and loving Nation, but sending
a deaf child back to Mexico and to a Level 4 area is not
compassionate to me.
Sending pregnant women back to these areas to be raped,
killed, and abused is not a compassionate Nation.
So I am trying to assess whether you----
Secretary McAleenan [continuing]. Families to pay smugglers
and put themselves at risk on a dangerous journey is not
compassionate either.
Ms. Barragan. Correct, and let's talk about those.
Chairman Thompson. Just a minute, Mr. Secretary. She is
still talking. Let her finish, and you will get your chance to
respond.
Ms. Barragan. So, Mr. Secretary, let's talk about those
cartels. In the press conference yesterday, Acting CBP
Commissioner Mark Morgan remarked that the Mexican cartels
could really teach a business class at Harvard. These are the
same cartels that dominate the several areas of the border
where your agency is currently sending tens of thousands of
vulnerable asylum seekers to wait for weeks and maybe months
under this so-called protection program.
In August, cartel members came to a shelter in Nuevo
Laredo, a city where your agency has returned 10,000 asylum
seekers. They demanded that the minister in charge of the
shelter hand over Cubans who were sheltered there for ransom.
When he refused, do you know what happened? The cartels
kidnapped him. That pastor has not been seen or heard of since
then.
Have you heard of this incident with the pastor?
Secretary McAleenan. I have not heard of that incident.
Ms. Barragan. OK. Well, in September, Vice News reported
how many numerous people who are subjected to MPP have been
delivered to the hands of these very dangerous cartels--we at
least can all agree are just very dangerous--just miles away
from their being forcibly returned by CBP officers.
One migrant described how the Mexican immigration officers
who were transporting them turned them directly over to the
cartels.
Are you aware that Mexican officials are turning these
people directly over to these very dangerous cartels? Are you
aware of this?
Secretary McAleenan. I am not aware of any verified
incident where that occurred.
Ms. Barragan. Well, it is clear to me that the MPP program
is creating a business opportunity for cartels who now have
tens of thousands of vulnerable people and desperate people who
are being exploited. It is unbelievable to me that we believe
that this is OK, that because it is not happening on U.S. soil,
that it is just OK.
But as my colleague said, it is on us, and one day we will
have to go to heaven and go face those who judge us, and we
will have to live with the decision on what we did and whether
we stood up for human rights or whether we let them happen
under our watch.
I have to tell you it is heartbreaking that this country is
closing the door on people who are fleeing violence and sending
them back to dangerous places that have a Level 4 threat where
even U.S. citizens are told not to go.
With that I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Miss
Rice, for 5 minutes.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McAleenan, I, too, want to join my colleagues in
thanking you for your service and wish you luck on your future
endeavors.
There have been several reports that President Trump is
considering appointing Acting U.S. CIS Director Ken Cuccinelli
or Acting CBP Commissioner Mark Morgan, even though the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel has determined that they
are ineligible under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. Are you
aware of that?
Secretary McAleenan. So I am not going to discuss any pre-
decisional personnel efforts, but I will note that the
administration will follow the law in naming a successor for
the Department of Homeland Security.
Miss Rice. OK. I am glad to hear that.
In your final hours as Acting Secretary, do you have any
plans to change the current line of succession at DHS?
Secretary McAleenan. Again, I am not going to discuss any
pre-decisional personnel actions.
Miss Rice. Well, I am just asking if you are planning on
doing that. I mean, there is only 24 hours left.
Secretary McAleenan. I have no present plans to do that.
Miss Rice. Have you discussed nominating someone to be the
assistant secretary of the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office with the President?
Secretary McAleenan. I have not.
Miss Rice. Have you spoken to anyone in the administration
about that?
Secretary McAleenan. Again, I am not going to discuss pre-
decisional personnel matters.
Miss Rice. I was just asking you. You said you did not
discuss it with the President. Have you discussed that specific
thing with anyone in the administration?
Secretary McAleenan. I am not going to discuss pre-
decisional personnel matters.
Miss Rice. OK. Last week Facebook announced that it had
removed a network of Russian-backed accounts that posed as
local citizens to support President Trump and attack former
Vice President Joe Biden.
Multiple reports, including the 2017 intelligence community
assessment, Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation, and
a bipartisan report released earlier this month from the Senate
Intelligence Committee, have all confirmed that Russia
attempted to interfere in the 2016 election and will do so
again in 2020.
Do you accept that conclusion, Mr. McAleenan?
Secretary McAleenan. Yes, our entities, CISA is leading
that effort along with our Intelligence and Analysis
Directorate and others, are focused on threats posed to our
elections, including from Russia.
Miss Rice. Mr. Wray, do you agree with those conclusions?
Mr. Wray. We believe that Russia--we assess that Russia
continues to have designs on interfering and influencing our
electoral system.
Miss Rice. Have either of you spoken with President Trump
or anyone in the administration about Russia and what they are
planning on doing in the 2020 election?
Mr. Wray. Well, I have had, along with others, numerous
meetings with folks in the White House, including the
President, on election security and on the threats they face.
Miss Rice. Do you conclude that they appreciate Russia's
interference in 2016 and the likelihood that they are doing it
now to affect the 2020 election?
Yes or no. You do not have to tell me who you spoke to.
Just do you have confidence that someone, that there is someone
in the administration that appreciates that?
Mr. Wray. Let me say it is crystal clear, I think, to all
of us involved in protecting our elections, FBI--and I do not
want to speak for the other agencies, but from all my
interactions with our partners, it has been the same--crystal
clear that this is a top priority that we intend to take very
seriously and throw every tool in the toolbox against.
Miss Rice. OK. Thank you.
So I just want to make reference to an article that
literally just posted on the New York Times, and I understand
some people's feelings about the New York Times, but let's just
accept for a fact that what I am going to talk about is
actually fact.
Russia has been testing new disinformation tactics in an
enormous Facebook campaign in parts of Africa as part of an
evolution of its manipulation techniques ahead of the 2020
American Presidential election. The campaign underlined how
Russia is continuing to aggressively try different
disinformation techniques, even as it has come under scrutiny
for its on-line interference methods, by spreading the use of
its tactics to a region that is less closely monitored than the
United States and Europe.
It is said that it was highly likely that Russian groups
were already using the same model of working. What they did in
Africa was actually work with local people so that it was not
immediately detectible that these were Russian-backed accounts.
So the Russian groups have already started using that model
of working with locals right here in the United States to post
inflammatory messages on Facebook, and by employing those
local, the Russians did not need to set up the fake accounts as
they had done in the past or create accounts that originated in
Russia, which is making it easier to sidestep being noticed.
This is just an enormous, enormous problem. Director Wray,
were you aware of this, using local people, not just in Africa,
and its disinformation about being critical of various American
and French policies?
But they are doing that now in anticipation of the 2020
election. Can you tell me are you able to address this?
Are you finding Facebook and other social media platforms
helpful?
If you could just expound on that.
Mr. Wray. Sure. So obviously, I have not read the article
that you mentioned, and I have to be a little bit careful about
what I can say that I know through other sources.
But I am generally aware of the phenomenon or the tactic,
if you will, that you are describing. I would say that we
expect that the Russians will and already have continued to up
their game from, you know, what they did in 2016.
Of course, we have upped our game, too, and in particular,
you mentioned Facebook. We've worked very closely with a lot of
the social media companies. That is one of the big steps
forward that happened in the midterms and that has continued
right on up to this day, is a lot of engagement with those
companies to underscore to them that they bear, that they bear
a significant responsibility in this area.
There are a lot of things that they can do under their
terms of use, terms of service that would be harder for anybody
in the government to do in a country like ours.
So we have made a lot of progress. There is a lot more
sharing of information back and forth and getting synergies
from working together.
There is still progress to be made, and we are going to
need to keep the pressure on because, as I think I said, the
bar is just going to keep going up, and you pointed to a good
example of that.
Miss Rice. I would like to continue this conversation with
you off-line, if that would be possible.
I want to thank you all for being here, and I hope that we
can all agree that this issue of election security is not a
political issue. We are talking about saving democracy as we
know it, and I know all of you gentlemen, I think I can speak
for you in saying that I know and I am grateful that you
appreciate that fact, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Guest, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Guest. I want to thank you and your staff for visiting
Mississippi in August. I had a chance to visit with you as you
all were conducting some field hearings there, meeting with
members of the community about working together, the private
sector/public sector, to see that we are making and creating a
great place to live and worship and raise a family, and I want
to thank you for that visit, and more importantly, thank you
for your service to our country.
Earlier this month, President Trump signed into law House
Resolution 1590, a bill that was authored by my office, the
Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Act. This law would
require your successor to develop and exercise and evaluate the
effectiveness of our Nation's ability to identify and deter
terrorists before they travel through our State, into our
States and into our Nation.
My question is: Do you believe that bills such as 1590,
bills that create exercises are helpful for the Department of
Homeland Security so that we are able to identify, close gaps,
and so that Congress is better able to determine the necessary
weaknesses within our system?
Secretary McAleenan. Certainly, I think it is the kind of
activity we undertake really every day to make sure that there
are no vulnerabilities or gaps in our information sharing
between agencies, between foreign partners, and that we are
applying that at every opportunity to identify a potential
threat trying to enter the United States or even head toward us
through our foreign partner nation's borders.
So I do think being very focused on it and highlighting the
effort to exercise it and test those capabilities is a valuable
approach.
Mr. Guest. You have testified several times before this
committee and before other committees in Congress. We have
talked a great deal about Southwest Border apprehensions. I
believe that in fiscal year 2019, it has reached nearly 1
million apprehensions.
Do you believe that illegal immigrants are encouraged by
loopholes in our immigration laws to make the dangerous journey
and to try to cross the border illegally?
Secretary McAleenan. I do not think there is any question
about that. We had 977,000 crossings. We are in our fifth month
now here in October of a 15 to 20 percent reduction month-over-
month, and that is because we have been able through our
National partnerships to address some of the vulnerabilities
presented by those loopholes, the No. 1 being that if you bring
a child with you, you could have been released into the United
States.
That is why we had that crisis in the spring. We have asked
Congress to address that in November 2017, in January 2018, and
throughout my tenure as CBP commissioner and Acting Secretary,
Congress has not acted on those vulnerabilities.
We have been in partnership with international partners and
using existing legal frameworks, including 235(b)(2)(C) of the
Immigration Nationality Act, which is the migrant protection
protocol program, to try to create the ability to get
immigration results elsewhere in the system since we cannot do
it here in the United States.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Secretary, what do we need to do as Congress
to close these loopholes?
Secretary McAleenan. We have asked for 3 very specific
legislative changes that would have addressed the drivers of
this crisis before it occurred.
One is the ability to keep families together in an
appropriate setting through an immigration proceeding. That is
what the prior administration was able to do at the end of 2014
crisis. A district court in the Ninth Circuit took that away
from us in 2015, and we have not had that authority.
We have asked for Congress to reestablish it, and we are
now trying to pursue it by regulation, also held up in the
courts.
Second, we have asked for the ability to treat
unaccompanied children coming from non-contiguous countries the
same way we do with Canada and Mexico and provide them access
to protections from their home countries so they do not make
these dangerous journey, but if they do, have the ability to
repatriate them so they are not incentivized to try.
Then third, we have asked for Congress to address the
vulnerabilities in our asylum system and the huge gap between
the ultimate rulings by immigration judges where only 10 to 20
percent are giving an affirmative asylum recognition, but at
the credible fear stage, which happens at the border, 80
percent-plus have been allowed to proceed with their cases that
could take 5 to 7 years while they are released in the United
States.
Those are the 3 changes in law that we have asked for
consistently for over 2 years.
Mr. Guest. If Congress were to act and implement the
requests that you have made, what impact do you believe that it
would have upon what we are seeing as far as the humanitarian
crisis along our Southwest Border?
Secretary McAleenan. I think it would provide us the
ability to have integrity in the system here in the United
States and not rely solely on foreign partnerships to address
the loopholes in our law that caused the crisis over the last
year.
Mr. Guest. Mr. McAleenan, this may be your last time as
Acting Secretary to address this committee in this setting. Is
there anything that you would like to leave with us as a
Committee of Homeland Security? Anything that you see moving
forward that we need to address and prioritize as Members of
Congress that would be able to keep the American public safe?
Secretary McAleenan. So I think we have seen a lot of
evidence of nonpartisan, bipartisan discussion on critical
threats facing our country. You heard all 4 panelists outline
really the same 3 to 5 top concerns that we are facing.
But we have had really important dialog, I think, on some
of the emerging aspects that are going to be challenging in the
future, things like foreign influence, things like
cryptocurrency. Those are conversations that we need to have
with Congress in a bipartisan basis and come up with solutions,
and this committee is properly placed to support those dialogs.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms.
Underwood, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by thanking the departments and agencies
represented here today and our entire intelligence community.
In addition to protecting us from underseen threats, your
continued work contributed to the successful operation this
weekend that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. I am
really grateful for your diligence, your commitment to the
mission, and service to our country.
Thank you.
Director Wray, you said that when it comes to foreign
interference in American elections, 2018 midterm elections were
a, ``dress rehearsal for the big show in 2020.'' In the 2019
Worldwide Threats Assessment report, we expect our adversaries
and strategic competitors to refine their capabilities and add
new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences,
suggesting the threat landscape looks very different in 2020
and in future elections.
So, sir, as much as you can share in this public setting,
can you detail what those new tactics might be and increasingly
sophisticated capabilities that our adversaries are developing?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think you anticipated part of what I am
going to say, which is most of what I would say in response to
that question really cannot be done in an open setting.
I will say that as I have mentioned in response to
Congresswoman Rice, some of the things that the Russians have
tried in other countries we expect them to try to do here as
well. You know, it is pretty common to test it out in other
jurisdictions.
Thankfully, we do not have elections every year. So that
gives us a little bit of time to plan ahead.
Certainly technological tools keep evolving. So their
ability to come up with different kinds of false personas, the
trolls, the bots, all those things become more vexing and more
challenging, which puts the premium on the point that I was
making before about our working, on the foreign influence side,
working with the social media companies, in particular, to
really get them to keep upping their game as part of the
defense.
Ms. Underwood. OK. The 2019 Worldwide Threats Assessment
also reports that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran
currently have the ability to carry out a sophisticated cyber
attack on our elections. We know that they have the capability.
In addition to that, would you say that these countries have
the motivation or the intent to attack our election?
Mr. Wray. Again, I want to be a little bit careful what I
can say in this setting, but I do not think we have seen an
intention by those other three countries to attack election
infrastructure. That does not mean they are not looking
carefully at what the Russians attempted to do and trying to
learn lessons from that.
But all of those countries in different ways are clearly
interested in engaging in maligned foreign influence.
Ms. Underwood. Right.
Mr. Wray. The difference from interference in election
infrastructure, and they all have different ways of going about
it, but they are all kind of taking pages out of each other's
playbooks. As we project forward, it is something that we have
to be vigilant about.
Ms. Underwood. Now, are you worried about copycats from
smaller actors, non-state actors, on our elections?
Mr. Wray. Absolutely. Cyber actors, and where that becomes
particularly challenging is one of the phenomena that we see in
the cyber crime arena these days is what we call the blended
threat, which I where nation-state actors essentially hire
cyber mercenaries.
So you used to be able to separate the world into the cyber
criminals and the nation-states. Well, now if you see what
might be a cyber criminal actor, he could be acting on his own
for a financial benefit or for his own----
Ms. Underwood. For hire.
Mr. Wray. Or he could be hired by some nation-state.
Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
Mr. McAleenan, earlier this morning this committee had a
field hearing on election security in my district in Northern
Illinois, and during the hearings, State and local election
officials spoke so highly of their work with CISA senior
cybersecurity advisor Matthew Masterson. These officials
coordinate with Mr. Masterson and his team to prepare and
respond to emerging threats to our election infrastructure, and
they testified that this coordination was incredibly helpful
and valuable.
So what can Congress do to support and expand CISA's
resources in this area as we prepare for growing threats in
2020 and beyond?
Secretary McAleenan. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that
feedback. Mr. Masterson is a tremendous professional and well-
regarded in the field.
I had the opportunity to speak with State and local
election officials in Illinois when I was in Chicago a few
months ago, and I had that same sense of partnership with CISA.
What can we do to expand it? We do want to increase our
presence, our protected security advisor presence, conveying
the capabilities of CISA to support counties, townships that
are running elections Nation-wide. We would like to be out and
present in more places because it is that direct interaction
when you have a partner that you know that has that expertise
that can really change your capabilities and your readiness.
So that is a key area that CISA is looking for additional
reach and resources.
Ms. Underwood. Awesome. So I am about out of time. I wanted
to talk about domestic terrorism a little bit. So we are going
to send over some questions. I know it is your last day, sir,
but I would hope that the Department would respond.
Our committee is continuing to explore how we can protect
our country from these emerging threats of the violent
extremists and appreciate your on-going work in that area.
Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Would the gentlelady want to mention a report that you were
trying to find?
Ms. Underwood. Thank you so much, sir.
So we had the opportunity to get a briefing from an FBI
briefer over the last couple of weeks. He came in last week on
Wednesday, in the Classified setting came in this week, and in
response, they mentioned that on CapNet that there would be
weekly reports about social media findings taken from the IC
and distributed to State and local partners, and that it would
be available to us each week.
We attempted to log in and access that report to track what
the Russians are doing in real time. It is my understanding
that that report is being developed somewhere between your
agencies, but we do not have access to that currently.
I am a little bit concerned, sir, to be honest, Mr. Wray,
because if that report is developed, we would like to see it,
and if it is not, you know, worried that perhaps the briefer
was not completely truthful in his update to us.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I think we were promised access to
what we thought was a report that had been generally produced
on a regular basis, and we will get to you in writing what that
is because the Vice Chairwoman went down to look for it, and it
was not there.
Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Wray. If I can get the information from your staff, I
will be happy to have my staff drill into it and figure out
what is going on there.
Chairman Thompson. Sure. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5
minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will start with you, Mr. McAleenan.
Let me ask you about the parole directive. Is it still in
effect and in force?
Secretary McAleenan. I am sorry. Which one, the significant
public benefit parole directive?
Mr. Richmond. Well, no, the one with ICE detainees about
parole or holding them, and my specific concern is the New
Orleans ICE office, the field office that has released I think
last year not 1 person. This year they still keep about 98
percent of the people.
So I am asking you is that parole directive still in force.
Secretary McAleenan. So I am not aware of any policy
changes at the National level for ICE making determinations on
parole, variety of different categories, whether people arrive
at a port of entry, between ports of entry, whether it is an
interior enforcement action, whether it is a mandatory
detention context under Congressional statute.
Mr. Richmond. Well, let's just go to a specific part where
they determine whether the person is a flight risk, whether
they have substantial connection to the community, whether they
have family that are U.S. citizens.
It is just amazing to me that no one in a particular field
office in a whole year had any substantial ties to the
community that they were not determined to be not a risk factor
and released pending their hearing.
So does that stand out to you, 100 or 98 percent of people
being held?
Secretary McAleenan. I would have to follow up with ICE and
the acting director on that question. I am not aware of a
different approach by field office because it is a National
policy, and you have listed some of the factors that are
considered in a case-by-case manner.
Mr. Richmond. Well, then let me just make this as a formal
request, and you can pass it off to whoever you deem necessary
that I would like an analysis of the New Orleans field office,
how many people were granted parole over the last 3 years and
the different categories of why they were not granted.
Also, do you remember the case of Yoel Leal? He was in New
Orleans. He was very sick. He was housed in Louisiana and in
Mississippi, and we were discussing, No. 1, his medical
treatment, and we realized that there is a language barrier
many times for the people that we are holding in our custody
and care, and that he refused treatment, but he did not
understand what he was doing. So that was a big question for
us.
Then we also asked to have a specific conversation with
you, the Chairman and I, and in the mean time you all deported
him. My question would be: No. 1, did you know about it?
No. 2, if you did, why would you all deport him when the
Chairman and I were requesting a specific meeting about his
status and whereabouts?
Secretary McAleenan. So I am personally not aware of the
details of this case or a decision to remove him while the
Chairman was asking about the case. I will be happy to go back
over the time line and get you any information we can about
that decision making process.
Mr. Richmond. Would you please do that?
Then let me just on a different note, and I would really
appreciate just a candid answer if you could, our TSA officers
play an incredible part in securing our country and our
airports, and especially in New Orleans where they stopped a
guy trying to board a plane. One officer was shot. One was
stabbed, I believe.
Do you think we are paying them what they are worth?
Secretary McAleenan. So I do think the pay structure for
our TSOs has to be looked at. They are incredible
professionals. We want to maintain that cadre, that expertise
as much as we can. They do a tremendous job.
I had a chance to meet some of the team in New Orleans who
was involved in that incident, and we are extraordinarily proud
of the work they do.
Mr. Richmond. Do you have a suggestion on what it should
look like?
Secretary McAleenan. I do have a referral because our
acting deputy secretary to TSA Administrator Dave Pekoske is
working intimately on this issue, and we can get you the exact
details on our recommended path forward for TSO pay.
Mr. Richmond. If you could get that to the Chairman and I,
I know the Chairman has a bill, but if you can get us that,
that would be very helpful.
Then with the last remaining seconds, Director Wray, you
and I talked several times about the term ``black identity
extremists.'' Over the last couple of weeks, we were alerted
about something called ``Iron Fist.'' Is that on-going?
Does it exist, No. 1?
No. 2, is it still on-going?
Our information tells us it was to target individuals it
classified as black identity extremists.
Mr. Wray. Well, I am not familiar with the name that you
just used. So I cannot engage specifically on that question.
I will say, as I think we have discussed before, we have
moved away from that categorization, and I will add, as I think
I mentioned to you in one of our earlier conversation--and this
is very important to me personally--we do not open
investigations into anyone on the domestic terrorism side
unless we have, No. 1, credible evidence of a Federal crime;
No. 2, credible evidence of a threat of violence; and, No. 3,
in furtherance of an ideology.
If we do not have those 3 things, there is no
investigation. So we do not investigate ideology, rhetoric,
peaceful protests, anything like that.
Mr. Richmond. Well, let me just ask unanimous consent to
enter into the record an October 6, 2017, article from Foreign
Policy entitled ``FBI's New U.S. Terrorist Threat, Black
Identity Extremists''; an October 13, 2017, letter from the CBC
to Director Wray asking for a briefing; an August 8, 2019,
article by the Young Turks entitled ``Leaked FBI Documents
Reveal Bureau's Priorities under President Trump.''
But I will just conclude by asking your commitment to meet
with us again to give us an update of where we are, what it
looks like, if, in fact, there have been arrests, surveillance,
investigations on anybody under the old black identity
extremists and now what it is consumed in.
So I would just ask that you commit to briefing us again on
that particular issue.
Mr. Wray. We would be happy to keep the dialog going.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Without objection we will enter those into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Article Submitted by Honorable Cedric L. Richmond
the fbi's new u.s. terrorist threat: `black identity extremists'
Law enforcement calls it a violent movement. Critics call it racist.
By Jana Winter, Sharon Weinberger/October 6, 2017, 11:42 AM
As white supremacists prepared to descend on Charlottesville,
Virginia, in August, the FBI warned about a new movement that was
violent, growing, and racially motivated. Only it wasn't white
supremacists; it was ``black identity extremists.''
Amid a rancorous debate over whether the Trump administration has
downplayed the threat posed by white supremacist groups, the FBI's
counterterrorism division has declared that black identity extremists
pose a growing threat of premeditated violence against law enforcement.
``The FBI assesses it is very likely Black Identity Extremist (BIE)
perceptions of police brutality against African Americans spurred an
increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law
enforcement and will very likely serve as justification for such
violence,'' reads the report, marked for official use only and obtained
by Foreign Policy.
The August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,
was the catalyst for widespread anger and violence, the FBI report
says, concluding that continued ``alleged'' police abuses have fueled
more violence.
``The FBI assesses it is very likely incidents of alleged police
abuse against African Americans since then have continued to feed the
resurgence in ideologically motivated, violent criminal activity within
the BIE movement,'' the report states.
Some 748 people have been shot and killed by police so far in 2017,
including at least 168 African-Americans.
The report, dated Aug. 3--just 9 days before the white supremacist
rally in Charlottesville turned deadly--appears to be the first known
reference to ``black identity extremists'' as a movement. But former
government officials and legal experts said no such movement exists,
and some expressed concern that the term is part of a politically
motivated effort to find an equivalent threat to white supremacists.
A former senior counterterrorism and intelligence official from the
Department of Homeland Security who reviewed the document at FP's
request expressed shock at the language.
``This is a new umbrella designation that has no basis,'' the
former official said. ``There are civil rights and privacy issues all
over this.''
The concept of ``black identity extremists'' appears to be entirely
new. FP found only five references to the term in a Google search; all
were to law enforcement documents about domestic terrorism from the
last 2 months. One of those on-line references is to law enforcement
training on identifying ``domestic terror groups and criminally
subversive subcultures which are encountered by law enforcement
professionals on a daily basis.''
Among the six acts of premeditated violence linked to black
identity extremists--it excludes violence toward police carried out in
the normal course of their duties--the reports cites the July 2016
shooting of 11 police officers in Dallas. The shooter, Micah Johnson,
was reportedly angry at police violence.
``Based on Johnson's journal writings and statements to police, he
appeared to have been influenced by BIE ideology,'' the FBI report
states. The attack took place during a Black Lives Matter protest of
police shootings, though the BLM movement is not mentioned by name in
the report.
Yet those involved in the Black Lives Matter movement have voiced
concerns about FBI surveillance.
DeRay McKesson, an activist involved in the Black Lives Matter
movement, told FP that the FBI visited his house in the run-up to the
Republican National Convention. ``I spoke about the FBI visit to my
house and the houses of other activists in our final meeting with
[President Barack] Obama,'' he said.
``There is a long tradition of the FBI targeting black activists
and this is not surprising,'' McKesson said.
The FBI declined to comment on the report itself and did not
respond to specific questions, but in an emailed statement to FP, the
bureau defended its tracking of ``black identity extremists,'' saying
that ``the FBI cannot initiate an investigation based solely on an
individual's race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or the
exercise of First Amendment rights.''
In its August report, the FBI said it expects further attacks by
black identity extremists, driven by both the perception and the
reality of unfair treatment at the hands of police officers.
``The FBI further assesses it is very likely additional
controversial police shootings of African Americans and the associated
legal proceedings will continue to serve as drivers for violence
against law enforcement,'' the report says.
Some experts and former government officials said the FBI seemed to
be trying to paint disparate groups and individuals as sharing a
radical, defined ideology. And in the phrase ``black identity
extremist'' they hear echoes of the FBI's decades-long targeting of
black activists as potential radicals, a legacy that only recently
began to change.
``They are grouping together Black Panthers, black nationalists,
and Washitaw Nation,'' said the former homeland security official.
``Imagine lumping together white nationals, white supremacists,
militias, neo-Nazis, and calling it `white identity extremists.' ''
The FBI is linking the people discussed in the report based only on
them being black, rather than on any sort of larger ideological
connection, the official said. ``The race card is being played here
deliberately.''
Michael German, a former FBI agent and now a fellow with the
Brennan Center for Justice's liberty and national security program,
said manufacturing this type of threat was not new. He has criticized
earlier FBI reports on ``black separatists,'' arguing that they
conflated radical groups operating in the 1970's with attacks in 2010
and later, even though there was no obvious connection.
The use of terms like ``black identity extremists'' is part of a
long-standing FBI attempt to define a movement where none exists.
``Basically, it's black people who scare them,'' German said.
Even former officials who view the government's concerns about
black separatists as legitimate balked at the term ``black identity
extremist,'' and point out that the threat from individuals or groups
who want to establish their own homeland is much less than from the far
right.
In 2009, Daryl Johnson, then a Department of Homeland Security
intelligence analyst, warned of the rise of right-wing extremism,
setting off a firestorm among Congressional critics. Johnson, who left
the department in 2010, said he could think of no reason why the FBI
would create a new category for so-called black identity extremists.
``I'm at a loss,'' he replied, when asked about the term.
``I have no idea of why they would come up with a new term.''
There have been concerns about rising violence among black
separatist groups in recent years, he said, but it does not approach
the threat of right-wing extremism. ``When talking about white
supremacists versus black supremacists, there are way more white
supremacists,'' Johnson said.
For historians and academics who have looked at the history of FBI
surveillance of black Americans, the report also smacks of the sort of
blatant racism the bureau has worked hard to leave behind. From the
time J. Edgar Hoover took over the anti-radical division in the FBI at
the height of the first ``red scare'' in 1919, the bureau began
systematically surveilling black activists.
``Black protests get conflated for the bureau [with communism], and
it begins there,'' said William Maxwell, a professor at Washington
University in St. Louis, who has researched the FBI's monitoring of
black writers in the 20th century.
What followed, according to Maxwell, was decades of FBI pursuit of
black radicals in the belief, often mistaken, that they were part of a
larger subversive movement. ``It's deep in the bureau's DNA,'' he said.
Lately, that seemed to be changing. As FBI director, James Comey
famously kept a copy of the Martin Luther King Jr. wiretap order on his
desk as a reminder of the bureau's past abuses and made new agents
learn the history of the FBI's pursuit of the civil rights leader.
The FBI also appeared to be focusing more attention on the threat
of white supremacists. In May, the FBI warned that white supremacist
violence was growing, according to a report obtained and published by
FP. That same report noted that white supremacists were responsible for
more attacks in the United States than any other extremist group,
including Islamic extremists.
Critics, however, accuse President Donald Trump of shifting
attention away from right-wing violence. This year, the Trump
administration decided to focus the Department of Homeland Security's
``countering violent extremism'' program on Islamic terrorism and
deprioritized funding to counter white supremacist groups.
``To hear there is a new initiative targeting black identity
extremists is surprising given that shift,'' said Alvaro Bedoya, the
executive director of the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown
Law.
Maxwell, the Washington University professor, had an even darker
view. ``It's classic Hoover-style labeling with little bit of
maliciousness and euphemism wrapped up together,'' he said. ``The
language--black identity extremist--strikes me as weird and really a
continuation of the worst of Hoover's past.''
In a sense, the FBI's desire to identify a unifying ideological
underpinning to what are often individual violent acts is not
surprising, said David Garrow, a historian who wrote a Pulitzer Prize-
winning biography of MLK. ``Security agencies want to perceive a threat
that is political, a threat that ideological,'' Garrow said, ``but what
we're actually witnessing is men, almost entirely men, acting out in
violent criminal ways and grasping at some chimera of political
justification.''
But the document itself smacks of incompetence more than
conspiracy, according to Garrow, who reviewed a copy of the report
provided by FP. ``The immediate instinct is to think [the FBI] are a
threat,'' he said. ``My immediate instinct is to wonder whether they
are minimally competent.''
Garrow, who has reviewed decades' worth of FBI documents for his
work, warned against seeing this report as proof that the FBI is
illegally targeting black Americans.
``They are often so clueless,'' he said of the FBI. ``I don't find
them a threat.''
But the former homeland security official said the report's
tendency to lump together different groups that have no obvious
connection will make it harder for law enforcement to identify real
threats. ``It's so convoluted--it's compromising officer safety,'' the
former official said.
And even though the report mentions in a footnote that ``political
activism'' and ``strong rhetoric'' by themselves don't amount to
extremism and ``may be constitutionally protected,'' it identifies
anger with police or ``anti-white rhetoric'' as indicators of a
potential ``violent threat.''
``Just the term `black identity extremist' is protected,'' the
former official said. ``You can identify all you want.''
The FBI, however, defended the classification in its statement to
FP.
``Domestic terrorism groups differ from traditional criminal groups
in that they take action for a different purpose, to bring attention to
a social or political cause,'' the FBI wrote.
``Therefore, their existence as a group has a legitimate purpose,
at least in part. Their legitimate activity may include acts of
protest, advocacy, and civil disobedience.''
The FBI says there are ``nine persistent extremist movements'' in
the United States at present. Those include ``white supremacy, black
identities, militia, sovereign citizens, anarchists, abortion, animal
rights, environmental rights, and Puerto Rican nationalism.''
Jana Winter is an investigative reporter based in Washington, DC.
Twitter: @janawinter Twitter: @weinbergersa
______
Letter From the Congressional Black Caucus Submitted by Honorable
Cedric L. Richmond
October 13, 2017.
Director Christopher Wray,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20535-0001.
Dear Director Wray: We write to express our concern over the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) recent ``Intelligence
Assessment'' dated August 3, 2017, entitled ``Black Identity Extremists
Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement Officers.'' We also request
a briefing on the origins of this research and the FBI's intended next
steps now that this assessment has been performed and disseminated.
As you are no doubt aware, the FBI has a troubling history of
utilizing its broad investigatory powers to target black citizens.
During the 1960's, Director J. Edgar Hoover used the Counter
Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) to surveil and discredit civil rights
activists and members of the Black Panther Party, For example, the FBI
falsified letters in an effort to blackmail Martin Luther King, Jr.
into silence. Given this history, and given several concerning actions
this Administration has taken on racial issues, Members of the
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) are justifiably concerned about this
FBI Assessment.
Unfortunately, this Administration has developed a pattern of
statements and actions that are hostile to African Americans. The
President and his advisors have at times failed to condemn Neo-Nazis
and white supremacists. The President encouraged law enforcement
personnel to use less restraint in dealing with individuals suspected
of crimes. Last, the Attorney General has rolled back criminal justice
reforms--a move that will disproportionately harm African Americans.
Against this backdrop, the Members of the CBC cannot help but be
concerned about the aforementioned intelligence assessment. The FBI is
responsible for investigating criminal activity and referring its
findings to Department of Justice attorneys for prosecution. The
intelligence assessment, citing only a handful of incidents since 2013,
has concluded with ``high confidence'' that ``Black Identity
Extremists'' are likely to target law enforcement based on
``perceptions of police brutality against African Americans.''
The assessment and the analyses upon which it is based are flawed
because it conflates black political activists with dangerous domestic
terrorist organizations that pose actual threats to law enforcement. It
relies on a handful of obviously terrible incidents to paint black
Americans who exercise free speech against witnessed police brutality
as possible violent extremists. These broad characterizations can only
serve to further erode trust between law enforcement officials and many
of the black communities they serve, further inflaming an already tense
and complicated dynamic. Local law enforcement may erroneously target
non-violent but politically-engaged persons or groups because of this
assessment. Our constituents continue to express their frustration
about being ignored and being attacked for exercising their
constitutionally-protected right to free speech to protest inequities
across American institutions.
We are concerned that this assessment could lead the FBI to target
black communities, and it is imperative that you come to meet with the
49 Members of the CBC to address our concerns. Please respond to this
letter in wtiting by October 23, 2017, as many of our Members and
constituents will interpret a lack of response as confirmation that the
FBI intends to unfairly target African Americans. Thank you for your
personal attention to this critical matter, and we look forward to your
response.
Sincerely,
Cedric L. Richmond,
Chair, Congressional Black Caucus.
John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Member, House Committee on the Judiciary.
Bennie G. Thompson,
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security.
Elijah E. Cummings,
Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
______
Article Submitted by Honorable Cedric L. Richmond
leaked fbi documents reveal bureau's priorities under trump
By: Ken Klippenstein, Aug 8, 2019.
Under President Trump, the FBl's official counterterrorism
priorities have included ``Black Identity Extremists,'' ``anti-
authority'' extremists, and ``animal rights/environmental extremists,''
according to leaked Bureau documents obtained exclusively by The Young
Turks. The documents, many of which are marked ``Law Enforcement
Sensitive'' and ``For Official Use Only,'' also reference a mysterious
plan to mitigate the threat of ``Black Identity Extremists'' with a
program code named ``IRON FIST'' involving the use of undercover
agents.
Each fiscal year, the FBI headquarters updates its Consolidated
Strategy Guide, which lists the Bureau's priorities in numerous domains
such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. When an
August 2017 internal FBI report referencing the counterterrorism threat
posed by ``Black Identity Extremists'' was published by Foreign Policy,
the FBI became the subject of intense criticism for adopting what
critics alleged was a racially loaded term.
What was not publicly known, however, was that not only had the FBI
adopted the term; it specifically listed it as a top counterterrorism
priority in its 2018 strategy guide, referring to the group as a
``priority domestic terrorism target,'' and even established a program
to counteract the supposed threat.
While the documents depict concerns about violent black extremist
attacks, they do not cite a single specific attack--unlike white
supremacist attacks, of which several prominent examples are provided.
Furthermore, although the FBI last month reportedly assured Senate
Democrats that it had dropped the term ``Black Identity Extremist'' in
favor of one that isn't race-specific, the documents suggest that this
was misleading. Despite changing the name, the Bureau retained much of
the original definition and still targeted black people.
So grave did the Bureau consider the threat of black extremists
that from 2019 to 2020, using new designations, it listed the threat at
the very top of its counterterrorism priorities--above even terror
groups like al-Qaeda.
``Black Identity Extremists'': What's in a Name?
By 2019, the FBI had indeed replaced its 2018 counterterrorism
priority ``Black Identity Extremists'' with the vaguer designation
``Racially Motivated Extremism,'' according to the Bureau's fiscal year
2018-20 counterterrorism strategy guides obtained by TYT.
In addition to the strategy guides, TYT also obtained FBI threat
guidances associated with many of the counterterrorism priorities.
These guidances detail the nature of the threats as well as how the
Bureau plans to counteract them.
Despite the new term, ``Racially Motivated Extremism,'' a 2019
threat guidance defines the new priority as including ``Black Racially
Motivated Extremism,'' a term that appears repeatedly in the document
and includes much of the same definition of the 2018 ``Black Identity
Extremist.''
``Racially Motivated Extremism . . . generally includes White
Racially Motivated Extremism, previously referred to as White Supremacy
Extremism, and Black Racially Motivated Extremism, previously referred
to as Black Identity Extremism,'' the FBI document states.
The FBI's new 2020 counterterrorism priorities changed the
designation yet again, this time to ``Racially Motivated Violent
Extremism.''
However, the new term also includes much of the same definition of
the 2018 ``Black Identity Extremist.''
The 2020 threat guidance states, ``RMVEs [Racially Motivated
Violent Extremists] use force or violence in violation of criminal law
in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society, or
in an effort to establish a separate black homeland or autonomous black
social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the
United States.''
The 2018 threat guidance defines Black Identity Extremists in
nearly identical fashion, saying members ``use force or violence in
violation of criminal law in response to perceived racism and injustice
in American society; some do so in furtherance of establishing a
separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions,
communities, or governing organizations.''
``The FBI judges some RMVE perceptions of police brutality against
African Americans served as justification for premeditated, retaliatory
violence against law enforcement in 2016,'' the document states.
Origins of the `Threat'
The 2018 threat guidance strongly suggests that the ``Black
Identity Extremist'' term emerged from the Black Lives Matter
movement--specifically, the 2014 shooting of black teen Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri, and its aftermath.
``The FBI judges BIE perceptions of police brutality against
African Americans have likely motivated acts of pre-meditated,
retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement,'' the document
states. ``The FBI first observed this activity following the August
2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the
subsequent acquittal of police officers involved in that incident.''
The threat guidance goes on to attribute the threat in part to
violent rhetoric on social media as well as media attention generally.
``The threat to law enforcement from BIE . . . is likely to remain
elevated, and may continue to expand, driven in part by continued calls
for violent action on social media,'' the document says. ``The FBI
assesses racially charged events, coupled with the wide-spread media
attention of the events . . . remain contributing factors to the
emergence of violent lone offenders within the BIE movement.''
Countering the `Threat'
The documents also shed light on the FBI's plans to counter the
perceived threat of black extremists. Methods alluded to include
undercover employees, confidential informants and, cryptically, IRON
FIST.
The 2018 threat guidance states, ``It is challenging to get sources
into BIE groups, due to security measures these groups employ. The
vetting process and time investment to gain access to leadership in BIE
groups is very lengthy. The use of undercover employees and on-line
covert employees in BIE investigations would provide valuable
intelligence to assist in mitigating the threat.
``Field offices will evaluate their need for an open Type 3
assessment file in regards to BIE. An open assessment file allows for
greater proactive collection techniques should the BIE threat emerge in
the wake of a police-involved incident that sparks potential BIE
activity.''
The Bureau appears particularly interested in ascertaining BIE
groups' organizational structure as well as their alleged ties to
criminal organizations.
``The FBI needs a better understanding of the hierarchy and
structure of BIE groups, and how these groups train/work with one
another, and criminal organizations,'' the guidance states.
Although the document says that ``many recent lethal BIE incidents
have been conducted by BIE lone offenders,'' it does not cite any
specific cases.
The guidance also references legal and seemingly innocuous
activities as ``key threat indicators,'' including attempts to identify
the names or vehicles of law enforcement officers.
Threat Mitigation Strategy `IRON FIST'
IRON FIST, an FBI program not known to the public prior to the
publication of these documents, was a strategy implemented by FBI
headquarters to ``mitigate'' what it considered to be a ``threat''
posed by the ``BIE movement.''
``IRON FIST is designed to evolve and adapt to the ever-changing
threat posed by BIEs, to proactively address this priority domestic
terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced intelligence
collection efforts,'' a 2018 FBI threat guidance document states. (At
the same time, the Bureau also considered white supremacist extremists
a priority domestic terrorism target.)
``IRON FIST will accomplish this by identifying actionable
intelligence to directly support the initiation of FBI investigations
and augment current efforts directed against BIEs . . . In addition,
FBIHQ works to develop potential CHS [Confidential Human Sources] and
conduct assessments on the current BIE CHS base.''
IRON FIST also includes a tactic by which the FBI would use the
felony status of many Black Identity Extremists against them.
``Many BIEs are convicted felons who are prohibited possessors,
therefore the FBI will continue to use their prohibited possessor
status as a tactic to assist in mitigating the threat for potential
violence,'' the document states.
Little else is revealed about IRON FIST in the documents.
`White Supremacy Extremists'
The same documents show that the FBI also defines racially
motivated extremists as inclusive of white supremacist groups, which it
describes as a ``medium threat.''
Until 2019, ``White Supremacy Extremists'' was a term listed on the
FBl's counterterrorism priorities before it was categorized under
racially motivated extremists, the documents also reveal.
``Some RMVEs are driven by a belief in the superiority of the white
race and a perception that the U.S. Government is conspiring with Jews
and minority populations to bring about the race's demise,'' the 2020
threat guidance states.
While the 2020 threat guidance alludes to violent black extremist
attacks, each of the specific attacks referenced were carried out by
white supremacists: The October 2018 attack on a synagogue in
Pittsburgh, which killed 11, the March 2019 attack on two mosques in
Christchurch, New Zealand, which killed 51, and the April 2019 attack
on a synagogue in Poway, California, which killed one.
In July, FBI Director Chris Wray told Congress that the majority of
terrorism cases the Bureau has investigated in 2019 ``are motivated by
some version of what you might call white supremacist violence.''
The head of the FBI's counterterrorism division testified that 40
percent of domestic terrorism cases were racially motivated extremists
and that most of them were white supremacists.
Despite the apparent rise in attacks, the documents show that, in
2018, the FBI anticipated a decline in national white supremacist
groups.
``The FBI further judges ongoing attrition of national organized
white supremacy extremist groups will continue over the next year,
yielding a white supremacy extremist movement primarily characterized
by locally organized groups, small cells, and lone offenders,'' the
2018 threat guidance states.
``Infighting and lack of leadership have made it difficult for
groups to organize nationally and to sustain their memberships and
influence. The internet and the emergence of social media have also
enabled individuals to engage the WSE movement without joining
organized groups,'' the 2019 threat guidance says.
A PDF of the FBI documents obtained by TYT can be viewed here.
Ken Klippenstein is a senior investigative reporter for TYT. He can be
reached securely via Signal at 202-510-1268, on Twitter
@kenklippenstein or via email: [email protected].
Follow TYT Investigates on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to stay on
top of exclusive news stories from The Young Turks.
TYTNETWORK Copyright 2019 The Young Turks, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. McAleenan, let me join the chorus of
people who have thanked you for your service to this Department
for quite a long time. You have been a consummate professional.
I personally thank you for that.
Going forward, the question is if nobody is appointed by
tomorrow, are you prepared to stay on until somebody is
appointed?
Secretary McAleenan. It is an important question, and in my
letter of resignation, I did offer to the President to ensure a
smooth transition in that arranged my position and want to make
sure that happens to the Department.
Chairman Thompson. So you are, if asked to stay on,
prepared to do it until someone is nominated for your position?
Secretary McAleenan. I hope the plan for a successor is
imminent, but if necessary, I will absolutely ensure a smooth
transition.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions. Hearing no further business, the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Kevin McAleenan
CLIMATE CHANGE
Question 1. How can the United States strengthen our
counterterrorism approach to better link the impacts of climate
change with countering violent extremism and terrorist
recruitment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
WOMEN & ISIS
Question 2a. How should the United States address the
emerging threat of attempted radicalization of women by ISIS
and other terrorist organizations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2b. Are there U.S. programs or strategies
targeting this specific concern?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
SYRIA & ISIS
Question 3a. Recently, hundreds of ISIS affiliates escaped
from a Kurdish-run prison in northeast Syria after bombing by
Turkish military forced the Kurds to divert resources to
counter the Turkish threat.
Where are they now?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3b. Could conditions on the ground allow ISIS to
reconstitute and undermine 8 years of counterterrorism
operations by U.S. and allied forces?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3c. Which ISIS affiliates, if any, are capable of
conducting attacks beyond their borders? Which pose the
greatest threats to U.S. National security, and why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3d. What is the state of ISIS' cyber capabilities?
How sophisticated are they?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
TPS
Question 4a. In September 23, 2019, a Federal Register
announcement to extend Syria's TPS designation for 18 months to
March 31, 2021, the Department stated that, ``following the
defeat of the self-described Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) in March 2019, ISIS sleeper cells have stepped up
insurgency operations in cities controlled by the Syrian
Democratic Forces.'' However, the President has bragged
multiple times that his administration is responsible for
defeating ISIS ``100 percent.''
Please explain the discrepancy between the Department's
findings and the President's declarations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 4b. Do you believe that conditions will have
improved sufficiently in 18 months to safely return Syrian TPS
recipients to Syria? What effect will the President's recent
decision to turn his back on the Syrian Kurds have on the
conditions supporting Syria's TPS designation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question From Ranking Member Mike Rogers for Kevin McAleenan
Question. Acting Secretary McAleenan testified before the
House Appropriations Committee in April that the Department
would like to quickly establish a permanent central processing
center in El Paso. Can you please give the committee insight
into the status of that project? What concrete steps have you
taken to establish this facility and when do you expect it to
be completed?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Christopher Wray
WOMEN & ISIS
Question 1a. How should the United States address the
emerging threat of attempted radicalization of women by ISIS
and other terrorist organizations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 1b. Are there U.S. programs or strategies
targeting this specific concern?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
SYRIA & ISIS
Question 2a. Recently, hundreds of ISIS affiliates escaped
from a Kurdish-run prison in northeast Syria after bombing by
Turkish military forced the Kurds to divert resources to
counter the Turkish threat.
Where are they now?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2b. Could conditions on the ground allow ISIS to
reconstitute and undermine 8 years of counterterrorism
operations by U.S. and allied forces?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2c. Which ISIS affiliates, if any, are capable of
conducting attacks beyond their borders? Which pose the
greatest threats to U.S. National security, and why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2d. What is the state of ISIS' cyber capabilities?
How sophisticated are they?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for Russell Travers
CLIMATE CHANGE
Question 1. How can the United States strengthen our
counterterrorism approach to better link the impacts of climate
change with countering violent extremism and terrorist
recruitment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
RELATING TO WOMEN & ISIS
Question 2a. How should the United States address the
emerging threat of attempted radicalization of women by ISIS
and other terrorist organizations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2b. Are there U.S. programs or strategies
targeting this specific concern?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
SYRIA & ISIS
Question 3a. Recently, hundreds of ISIS affiliates escaped
from a Kurdish-run prison in northeast Syria after bombing by
Turkish military forced the Kurds to divert resources to
counter the Turkish threat.
Where are they now?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3b. Could conditions on the ground allow ISIS to
reconstitute and undermine 8 years of counterterrorism
operations by U.S. and allied forces?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3c. Which ISIS affiliates, if any, are capable of
conducting attacks beyond their borders? Which pose the
greatest threats to U.S. National security, and why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3d. What is the state of ISIS' cyber capabilities?
How sophisticated are they?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Questions From Honorable Dina Titus for David J. Glawe
CLIMATE CHANGE
Question 1. How can the United States strengthen our
counterterrorism approach to better link the impacts of climate
change with countering violent extremism and terrorist
recruitment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
WOMEN & ISIS
Question 2a. How should the United States address the
emerging threat of attempted radicalization of women by ISIS
and other terrorist organizations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 2b. Are there U.S. programs or strategies
targeting this specific concern?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
SYRIA & ISIS
Question 3a. Recently, hundreds of ISIS affiliates escaped
from a Kurdish-run prison in northeast Syria after bombing by
Turkish military forced the Kurds to divert resources to
counter the Turkish threat. Where are they now?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3b. Could conditions on the ground allow ISIS to
reconstitute and undermine 8 years of counterterrorism
operations by U.S. and allied forces?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3c. Which ISIS affiliates, if any, are capable of
conducting attacks beyond their borders? Which pose the
greatest threats to U.S. National security, and why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
Question 3d. What is the state of ISIS's cyber
capabilities? How sophisticated are they?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of
publication.
[all]