    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
                                OF INVESTIGATION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2020

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-73

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    40-245 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022

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                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                        JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chair
                   MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania, Vice-Chair

    ZOE LOFGREN, California              DOUG COLLINS, Georgia, Ranking
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas                Member
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
    HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,          Wisconsin
        Georgia                          STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
    KAREN BASS, California               JIM JORDAN, Ohio
    CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana        KEN BUCK, Colorado
    HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES, New York         JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas
    DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island     MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
    ERIC SWALWELL, California            MATT GAETZ, Florida
    TED LIEU, California                 MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
    JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland               ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington          TOM McCLINTOCK, California
    VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida          DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona
    J. LUIS CORREA, California           GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas              BEN CLINE, Virginia
    JOE NEGUSE, Colorado                 KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
    LUCY McBATH, Georgia                 W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida
    GREG STANTON, Arizona
    MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas

            PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director & Chief Counsel
                    BRENDAN BELAIR, Minority Staff Director

                                   ------

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, February 5, 2020

                                                                       Page

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the Committee on the
      Judiciary from the State of New York...........................     1
    The Honorable Doug Collins, Ranking Member of the Committee on
      the Judiciary from the State of Georgia........................     4

                                    WITNESS

    Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
      Oral Testimony.................................................     8
      Written Testimony..............................................    11

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    An article entitled, ``The Plot to Subvert an Election:
      Unraveling the Russia Story So Far,'' New York Times, submitted
      by the Honorable Mary Gay Scanlon, Vice-Chair of the Committee
      on the Judiciary from the State of Pennsylvania for the record.    74
    An article entitled, ``Justice Department Investigating Migrant
      Shelter Provider,'' New York Times, submitted by the Honorable
      Sylvia Garcia, a Member of the Committee on the Judiciary from
      the State of Texas for the record..............................   112
    An article entitled, `` `Chaos Is the Point': Russian Hackers and
      Trolls Grow Stealthier in 2020,'' New York Times, submitted by
      the Honorable Joe Neguse, a Member of the Committee on the
      Judiciary from the State of Colorado for the record............   122

                                    APPENDIX

    A statement from the Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC,
      submitted by the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of New York for the
      record.........................................................   146
    A letter from Brian O'Hare, President, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation Agents Association submitted by the Honorable
      Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary from
      the State of New York for the record...........................   160
    Articles submitted by the Honorable Doug Collins, Ranking Member
      of the Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Georgia for
      the record
      An article entitled, ``Radical feminists vandalize 2 churches,
        burn prolife journalist's car,'' The Christian Post..........   164
      An article entitled, ``Exclusive: `I Will F**in' Slit Your
        Throat': Protester Threatened Girl At March For Life, Student
        Says,'' Daily Caller.........................................   169
      An article entitled, ``WATCH: New video documents abortion
        activists' attacks on peaceful pro-lifers,'' LifeSite........   175
      An article entitled, ``Louisville woman charged with assaulting
        elderly anti-abortion activist outside clinic,'' Louisville
        Courier Journal..............................................   178
      An article entitled, ``Jordan Hunt: Man Arrested For Kicking
        Anti-abortion Protestor Has History of Alleged Attacks,''
        Newsweek.....................................................   181
      An article entitled, ``Video shows assault, vandalism against
        campus pro-lifers,'' The College Fix.........................   183
      An article entitled, ``Woman who was roundhouse kicked at anti-
        abortion rally speaks out,'' Toronto Sun.....................   185

                     QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

    Questions from the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of New York for the
      record.........................................................   192
    Questions from the Honorable Theodore Deutch, a Member of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Florida for the
      record.........................................................   199
    Questions from the Honorable Sylvia Garcia, a Member of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Texas for the
      record.........................................................   201
    Questions from the Honorable Ted Lieu, a Member of the Committee
      on the Judiciary from the State of California for the record...   202
    Questions from the Honorable Joe Neguse, a Member of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Colorado for the
      record.........................................................   203
    Questions from the Honorable Eric Swalwell, a Member of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of California for the
      record.........................................................   205
    Questions from the Honorable Ken Buck, a Member of the Committee
      on the Judiciary from the State of Colorado for the record.....   206
    Questions from the Honorable Mike Johnson, a Member of the
      Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Louisiana for the
      record.........................................................   207

                OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, February 5, 2020

                         U.S. House of Representatives

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room
    2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerrold Nadler [Chair
    of the Committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Nadler, Lofgren, Jackson Lee,
    Cohen, Johnson of Georgia, Deutch, Bass, Richmond, Jeffries,
    Cicilline, Swalwell, Lieu, Raskin, Jayapal, Demings, Correa,
    Scanlon, Garcia, Neguse, McBath, Stanton, Dean, Mucarsel-
    Powell, Collins, Chabot, Gohmert, Jordan, Buck, Ratcliffe,
    Roby, Gaetz, Johnson of Louisiana, Biggs, McClintock, Lesko,
    Reschenthaler, Cline, Armstrong, and Steube.
        Staff Present: Aaron Hiller, Deputy Chief Counsel; Amy
    Rutkin, Chief of Staff; Arya Hariharan, Deputy Chief Oversight
    Counsel; David Greengrass, Senior Counsel; Madeline Strasser,
    Chief Clerk; Moh Sharma, Member Services and Outreach Adviser;
    Sarah Istel, Oversight Counsel; Kerry Tirrell, Oversight
    Counsel; Priyanka Mara, Professional Staff Member/Legislative
    Aide; Anthony Valdez, Staff Assistant; John Williams,
    Parliamentarian; Ben Hernandez, Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime;
    Ebise Bayisa, Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime; Brendan Belair,
    Minority Staff Director; Bobby Parmiter, Minority Staff
    Director/Chief Counsel; Jon Ferro, Minority Parliamentarian/
    General Counsel; Erica Barker, Minority Deputy Parliamentarian;
    and Ryan Breitenbach, Minority Chief Counsel, National
    Security.
        Chair Nadler. The House Committee on the Judiciary will
    come to order.
        Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
    recesses of the Committee at any time.
        We welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on Oversight
    of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I will now recognize
    myself for an opening statement.
        Thank you, Director Wray, for being here. Although we have
    a great deal of ground to cover today, nearly every topic we
    discuss will be linked to two questions. How is the FBI working
    to address some of the most serious threats to our Nation? When
    it falls short, how is the Bureau working to correct its course
    and live up to our ideals?
        The FBI is filled with brave, devoted public servants who
    work hard to keep us safe from threats both domestic and
    foreign, but it is clear that more work needs to be done to
    shore up public confidence in the Bureau. The FBI's
    jurisdiction is broad. Among other critical matters, the FBI is
    responsible for election security, criminal and
    counterterrorism investigations, our fight against domestic
    terrorism, and oversight of our public servants. I would like
    to talk about each of these in a bit more detail.
        First, we are heading toward the 2020 elections. There is
    nothing more important than ensuring that each and every
    American has confidence in the integrity of his or her vote. As
    you have warned us, foreign attacks on our elections continue
    to this day. You recently stated, ``Russia represents the most
    significant threat to the election cycle itself.''
        Other nation-states, including China and Iran, may have
    interest in interfering in our next election, too. We must be
    unified in our fight against anyone who tries to undermine the
    very foundations of our democracy. Our priorities should be
    preventing and deterring any of our adversaries from attacking
    us ever again, and when attacks do happen, we must respond
    swiftly. Our democracy depends on it.
        Now, some have tried to deflect the attention from the
    clear evidence of Russia's attack in 2016 because it does not
    suit them politically. In a recent interview, Director Wray,
    you confirmed that these alternative theories have no
    evidentiary support. For example, there is no evidence
    whatsoever to suggest that Ukraine, not Russia, hacked into the
    Democratic National Committee's computer networks.
        We know the evidence. We know who our allies are and we
    know who our adversaries are. Now, we must work with our allies
    and come together as a Nation to protect our voting systems
    from our enemies. As you testify today, I will be listening to
    how the FBI plans to counter these threats and secure our
    elections.
        I will also be listening for your plans to counter attempts
    to undermine the integrity of our elections from within. I am
    deeply concerned that every time the interagency team tasked
    with securing our elections takes a significant step forward,
    President Trump undercuts that progress with a statement or a
    tweet that spreads misinformation or directly invites our
    adversaries, other nations, to meddle in our elections.
        You may not be able to control the content of the
    President's Twitter account, but our Government has an
    obligation to be unified in protecting every American's right
    to vote from anyone who threatens to undermine that right.
        Second, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is a tool
    entrusted to the Government to protect our country. This
    Committee's job is to make certain that the use of that tool
    complies with the law and with our commitment to privacy and
    civil liberties.
        On December 9th of last year, the Department of Justice
    Office of the Inspector General released a report entitled
    ``Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the
    FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation.'' The Inspector
    General found deep and systemic problems with how the FBI has
    used the FISA Act to target United States citizens. I will
    remind you that this Committee expressed concerns along those
    lines for the last 3 or 4 years.
        The report found ``basic fundamental and serious errors in
    the process designed to ensure the factual accuracy of
    information presented to the court.'' In so doing, the Bureau
    ``fell short of what is rightfully expected from a premier law
    enforcement agency entrusted with such an intrusive
    surveillance tool.''
        Simply put, the FBI failed in its responsibilities with
    respect to FISA, and that requires action. Congress must
    address these systemic failures if we are to leave such a
    powerful tool in the hands of the FBI.
        I am encouraged, Director Wray, that you have volunteered
    to make dozens of important changes to address the findings of
    the Inspector General, but a recent submission by a court-
    appointed Amicus suggests that new procedures, new checklists,
    and new training modules may not be enough to address the
    problem.
        The Committee has a responsibility to renew certain aspects
    of FISA in the coming weeks. Having read the report, I feel
    strongly that we must address these problems in that
    legislation without delay.
        I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
    Sensenbrenner, among others, for encouraging us to wait until
    after the Inspector General released his report to take up this
    matter. Now, of course, some have suggested that the report
    provides evidence of a far-reaching conspiracy to remove the
    President. As you know, that is utter nonsense.
        The Inspector General, and I am quoting, ``did not find
    documentary or testimonial evidence that political bias or
    improper motivation influenced the decisions to open the
    individual investigations.'' At bottom, the report documents
    important issues that affect the sacred liberties of American
    citizens. I hope that we can focus on those substantive issues
    where we are bound to find common ground and not derail our
    conversation with long-debunked conspiracy theories by the
    President or any of his minions.
        Third, we must address the sad and frightening resurgence
    of White supremacy and other forms of nativist extremism that
    plagues our country. The FBI's most recent hate crime
    statistics are a testament to the rise of antisemitic violence.
    The year 2018 marked the deadliest year of antisemitic attacks
    in American history. Hate crimes attacks against LGBT
    individuals and Latinos were also markedly up in 2018. These
    grave statistics demand a swift and immediate response,
    starting with the FBI's making concerted efforts to improve
    hate crime statistics reporting.
        Recent State and Federal prosecutions have shown that White
    supremacist groups are increasingly coordinating their
    messaging beyond our borders. Through social media, White
    supremacists are spreading their hate, their message of hate,
    inspiring attacks both at home and abroad.
        This growing problem hits close to home. The Anti-
    Defamation League's ``Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents''
    reported more than 1,800 acts in 2018, one of the highest
    totals since it began tracking such incidents 40 years ago. In
    New York City alone, the NYPD--the New York Police Department
    reported more anti-Jewish, antisemitic incidents in 2019 than
    all other hate crimes put together.
        So, as you testify today, Director Wray, I will be
    listening for how the FBI is working to address this threat,
    and, in particular, whether the Bureau has properly prioritized
    White supremacy and similar forms of domestic terrorism over
    other threats that pose far less immediate risk to our Nation.
    Concrete steps are needed now to address the rising tide of
    hate.
        Finally, the FBI's investigations are meant to be
    independent from political influence. That is critical,
    especially as it relates to your investigations of public
    servants. To that end, Director Wray, I expect that you will
    take a moment to provide the American public with an
    explanation of the Bureau's role in Justice Kavanaugh's
    confirmation to the Supreme Court last year.
        To be clear, I have no intention of relitigating the
    confirmation process here, but there remains a great deal of
    mistrust and uncertainty around the FBI's supplemental
    background check of Justice Kavanaugh during the last few days
    of that confirmation. The country needs a better understanding
    of that process.
        For example, I hope to hear what it means for the Bureau to
    take direction from a client agency--in this case, the White
    House--when it conducts a background check of this nature. If
    that process is as strictly curtailed as I believe it to be,
    then the country can, at the very least, approach the next
    high-profile confirmation with its eyes open.
        As you are about to see, Director Wray, many of our Members
    on both sides of the aisle feel quite passionately about these
    and other issues. My hope is that we will enter these
    discussions with the same goals, fulfilling our mandate,
    fulfilling our duty to uphold our country's values, providing
    oversight of this agency, ensuring increased transparency for
    the American people, and working toward solutions that are best
    for all of us as a nation.
        We have great respect for the manner in which you have led
    the FBI these past years and even greater respect for the men
    and women of the Bureau. I look forward to your testimony.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Judiciary
    Committee, the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for his
    opening statement.
        Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it. It is
    good to be back in this room. It has been a while.
        It is also good to see a Former Chair here. Mr. Goodlatte
    is here with us, who has actually been a part of many of these
    investigations before, and it is good to see him.
        It does appear, though, we have a new year. We have the
    first time back in this room, but it seems things have never
    changed in this committee. One of the things that I have
    noticed here is it is interesting that we like to talk about
    the Inspector General's report, but my Chair could have
    actually called the Inspector General to sit where you are, Mr.
    Wray, but we chose not to. We would rather talk about that
    process. We would rather talk about his report.
        It is interesting to me, though, the one thing the Chair
    didn't say was, is the Inspector General said no one should
    feel vindicated by this report. I think it is interesting that
    we, again, like to gloss over problems and discuss that without
    actually bringing witnesses here to do that. As our Committee
    showed in December, we are not about Witnesses. We are about
    rubberstamps. That is exactly what happened here.
        So, the problem I have is, so we are not going to
    relitigate issues. I love what was said here in this issue of
    that we are not going to relitigate the hearings of the Supreme
    Court Justice. It is okay to not relitigate it by actually
    talking about it, but actually to take a shot at it in the
    opening statement seems to be okay. Again, we have not changed
    a whole lot here.
        It is also interesting that we will bring up voting systems
    and election stuff, which we have talked about a little bit in
    this Committee, but when it comes to the foreign side of it, we
    have ignored that. We have talked about moving more toward a
    federalizing of our elections. This is what we have done in
    this hearing. This is what we have done here.
        That is just from the opening statement. I will get to you
    now, Mr. Wray, and I appreciate it, for you being here.
        You have led the FBI during turbulent times, unparalleled
    really by any other Director. You have stepped in at a time
    probably as difficult as has been a part.
        Your agency is respected for its tireless efforts to keep
    Americans safe from all manners of threats. As you know, I have
    a great deal of affection for the men and women of law
    enforcement.
        As outlined in the Inspector General's report, which,
    again, as I shared with you earlier, it would have been nice to
    have had him here. This is the first opportunity to discuss
    that. So, it will be a lot of this discussion today.
        The Bureau engaged in some of the most shocking
    surveillance abuse in history. Specifically, the FBI improperly
    surveilled a U.S. citizen who had been affiliated with then
    presidential candidate Trump. The basis for this electronic
    surveillance, which is among the most intrusive investigations
    the FBI employs, was predicated on opposition research paid for
    by Hillary Clinton and the Democratic National Committee and
    procured by foreign--former foreign intelligence officer using
    Russian sources as his basis for reporting.
        To make matters worse, Republicans investigating events
    surrounding the 2016 election learned an FBI attorney falsified
    evidence to renew a surveillance against Carter Page, a law-
    abiding U.S. citizen and Naval Academy graduate. This was
    confirmed by the Horowitz report.
        In fact, I had hoped we would have had him here before you.
    We did not. We wrote to the Chair to have this happen. It never
    happened.
        Mr. Director, I understand perfectly well that this abuse
    did not occur on your watch, and I want to make that fully
    clear to every question that is made today. However, I think
    you would agree that it is on your shoulders to take
    responsibility and address it vigorously.
        The flaws in this surveillance are too voluminous to break
    down in one opening statement, but the bottom line is that the
    FBI failed as an institution to adequately protect the American
    civil liberties, and the system itself exhibited glaring
    deficiencies that must be corrected to regain confidence of the
    American people.
        I want to argue an even larger point, though. Whether one
    supports or does not support this President, it is undeniable
    that an unfair, unfounded cloud was cast upon President Trump's
    Administration for the past 3 years, largely stemming from the
    abuses committed in some of the intelligence community. Sadly,
    we have seen this before.
        In the 1970s, the Church and Pike Committees were formed to
    safeguard American citizens against the overwhelming powers of
    the Government. For example, Robert Kennedy spying on Martin
    Luther King Jr. and the unconstitutional surveillance of anti-
    war and other political protesters. These actions sparked the
    advent of a law intended to protect U.S. citizens, the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as the creation of the
    special court to oversee implementation of the new legal
    restrictions on surveillance.
        We have lived with this surveillance regime since the
    1970s, and it has undoubtedly prevented attacks on the
    homeland. I am confident it has saved American lives. However,
    recent events show that there are also substantial holes in the
    law that need patching or possibly wholesale change.
        Prior to March 15th, our Committee and this Congress must
    take critical decisions about reauthorization of specific
    provisions of FISA. This is a matter of vital importance
    because this law is primarily about fighting terrorists, but it
    is also a tall order.
        Make no mistake. While I believe that we must reauthorize
    several provisions, such as collection of business records,
    roving wiretaps, lone wolf authority, the reauthorization of
    these specific provisions in no way addresses the abuses. In
    the matter of the 2016 election, the FBI fell short of what is
    expected and demanded from our law enforcement and intelligence
    institutions. Plainly, the improper spying of an American
    citizen can never happen again.
        That is the great irony. This law was passed to address
    abuses and protect American civil liberties and was abused for
    political purpose, for those violations of those liberties.
        Director Wray, you have proposed solutions, and I am glad
    to see that. I am proud of the work that you have done, though
    I worry about some of those are going to fall short. That is
    why we are here today.
        In substance, you have hit on necessary reforms to training
    and documentation, but there also must be a change, a
    corresponding change to cultural attitude and the threat of
    swift and certain disciplinary measures. I am concerned words
    like ``omission'' and ``misstatements'' downplay the
    intentional conduct and bias exhibited by central players
    involved in the Carter Page surveillance and the conduct of the
    investigative measures taken against others affiliated with
    President Trump.
        From my vantage point, this is not a time to parse words or
    attempt to sugarcoat the fact that public servants abused their
    positions in our intelligence agencies for political purpose.
    Of course, the FBI keeps us safe, and you have personally and
    admirably served the American people for many years in law
    enforcement. I appreciate your Georgia connection and Georgia
    family roots. You have served us well in my district of the
    Northern District of Georgia as a prosecutor, and the men and
    women of the FBI have dedicated their lives to protecting the
    American people from external and internal threats.
        As the son of a trooper and one who also serves, I have
    grown to respect the institutions and been a part of those
    whose goal is protecting our common defense. Your leadership
    over the FBI is a hefty responsibility. These times call for
    leadership which reignites the discipline required to operate
    fairly and effectively. I hope you bring that to the forefront
    of your mind as you consider the efforts to prevent future
    abuses by our intelligence community.
        Now, there are a lot of things I would love to talk about
    today, and I think both sides would. Unfortunately, we are
    going to be clouded by the fact that you are the first real
    oversight of the Department of Justice that we have had under
    this majority. We have not had the Horowitz report here. We
    have not had other things here because the majority chose not
    to.
        When we look at this, though, the men and women of the FBI
    are some of the most valuable assets we have, and their
    dedication should never be questioned. There are some bad
    actors, and bad actors need to be called out. Bad actors need
    to be removed. Those vast majority of good actors need to be
    applauded, and their families need to be thanked for what they
    do.
        I want to thank you, Director Wray, for this. I look
    forward to this hearing, as we continue to do our proper job of
    oversight as we move forward with this. I thank you for being
    here and look forward to talking to you more.
        I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. I thank the gentleman.
        Before we continue, I want to note the presence of the
    former Chair of this Committee, my good friend Bob Goodlatte.
    It is good to see you in this room again.
        I just want to remind the Ranking Member that this is not
    our first attempt at oversight of the Justice Department. In
    fact, we invited the Attorney General, Mr. Barr, here last
    year. He refused to come. We subpoenaed him. He refused to obey
    our subpoena.
        So, we have gone to considerable lengths for oversight of
    the Justice Department. I am glad Mr. Wray is here today.
        I will now introduce today's witness. Christopher Wray
    became the eighth Director of the FBI in August 2017. Before
    becoming Director, Mr. Wray served in various roles at the
    Department of Justice, including Assistant U.S. Attorney for
    the Northern District of Georgia and Principal Associate Deputy
    Attorney General. In 2003, Mr. Wray was nominated by President
    George Bush to be the Assistant Attorney General for the
    Department of Justice's Criminal Division.
        Before working in law enforcement, Mr. Wray clerked for
    Judge Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Fourth Circuit and worked at the international law firm of King
    & Spalding.
        Mr. Wray received his B.A. from Yale University and his
    J.D. from Yale Law School. We thank Director Wray for
    participating in today's hearing.
        Will you please rise? I will begin by swearing you in.
        Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the
    testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the best
    of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you God?
        [Response.]
        Chair Nadler. Thank you. Let the record show the witness
    has answered in the affirmative.
        Please note that your written testimony will be entered
    into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, I ask that you
    summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. To help you stay within
    that time, there is a timing light on your table. When the
    light switches from green to yellow, you have 1 minute to
    conclude your testimony. When the light turns red, it signals
    your 5 minutes have expired.
        Director Wray, you may begin.

               TESTIMONY OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY

        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member Collins, and
    the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
    be here today to discuss how the men and women of the FBI are
    keeping us all safe from an ever-growing array of threats.
        In the 2 years since I became the FBI Director, I've
    visited all 56 of our field offices around the country and met
    with State and local law enforcement, partners from all 50
    States, every State represented by this committee. I have met
    with all of our headquarters' divisions, with scores of our
    foreign law enforcement partners and intelligence community
    partners, leaders of small businesses, big businesses,
    community leaders, prosecutors, judges, and with crime victims
    and their families. I know up close that the threats are real
    and challenging and that the 37,000 men and women of the FBI
    are working around the clock to combat them.
        As this Committee is well aware, we face a diverse and
    increasingly dangerous terrorism threat. We continue to worry
    about international terrorism by groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS,
    but now the threat from lone actors already here in the U.S.
    and inspired by those groups, the homegrown violent extremists,
    that threat is even more acute. At the same time, we are
    particularly focused on domestic terrorism, especially racially
    or ethnically motivated violent extremists.
        Not only is the terror threat diverse, but it is also
    unrelenting. In the last several months alone, just to name a
    few important examples, our joint terrorism task forces have
    foiled synagogue bombings in Colorado and Nevada, arrested
    eight Members of the violent extremist group called the Base
    across four different States, arrested a guy down in Miami for
    planning ISIS-associated acts of violence. I could go on.
        We are also facing the growing and increasingly blended
    threats of cyber intrusions and state-sponsored economic
    espionage, and we're worried about the threat of malign foreign
    influence, including the security of our elections, a topic, of
    course, on everyone's mind this year. We know that our
    adversaries are actively trying to influence national policy,
    public opinion, and our elections. So, together with our close
    partners in the intelligence community, at DHS, State
    governments, and elsewhere, the FBI remains laser focused on
    protecting our democracy as we move through this election year.
        As if that weren't enough, we face ruthless gangs
    threatening our neighborhoods and our schools, the scourges of
    opioid trafficking and abuse, human trafficking, crimes against
    children. The list of threats that we face is not getting any
    shorter, and each of those threats is evolving in scale, in
    impact, in complexity and agility.
        What's more, hanging over all them are broader challenges,
    like maintaining lawful access to increasingly encrypted
    electronic evidence that we actually need to find, stop, and
    prosecute criminals. To tackle these threats, we're relying on
    our deep well of expertise, intelligence, and partnerships. At
    the same time, we're making some important changes to the way
    we operate at the FBI.
        As both you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member Collins have
    noted, in December the Inspector General's office released its
    report on the 2016 Crossfire Hurricane investigation on certain
    related FISA applications. The failures highlighted in that
    report are unacceptable, period. They don't reflect who the FBI
    is as an institution, and they cannot be repeated.
        The FBI has embraced every last one of the Inspector
    General's recommendations, but we're also making a number of
    improvements above and beyond those recommended by the
    Inspector General. I've already ordered more than 40 corrective
    actions, including significant modifications to our FISA
    policies and procedures.
        We're training every employee with FISA responsibilities on
    those new processes, and I will tell this Committee that I see
    every day how indispensable our FISA authorities are to
    protecting the American people.
        I also recognize that these tools are powerful and
    intrusive. So, it is our responsibility as public servants to
    honor our duty of candor to the FISA court when seeking to use
    our authorities and to exercise those powers, when approved by
    the court, in trust, carefully and responsibly.
        Since taking on the leadership of the FBI in August 2017, I
    have spoken to every FBI field office and every headquarters
    component in the Bureau about the importance of getting our
    processes right, about operating at all times by the book. I've
    installed a new leadership team, helping me drive home that
    insistence on doing the right thing the right way every time,
    and the need to hold ourselves accountable when we fall short
    of that mark. That's what I think the American people expect.
    That's what I think the American people deserve.
        Now, I may not have been in this job during the problems
    described in the IG's report, but I'm here now, and my
    leadership team and I are fiercely focused on preventing these
    kinds of failures from happening again. At the end of the day,
    while this kind of scrutiny can be difficult and even painful,
    I am confident that the FBI will emerge an even better and
    stronger organization.
        I also want to note, as Ranking Member Collins pointed out,
    that our crucial USA FREEDOM Act authorities are expiring in
    March, including in particular I would call out the roving
    wiretap, business records, and lone wolf provisions. None of
    those authorities were in any way at issue in the IG's report,
    and I would urge Congress to permanently reauthorize them. They
    are vital to our relentless efforts to keep something like 325
    million American people safe.
        The American people can be confident that the FBI will
    never stop working to safeguard our country against a wider
    than ever range of criminal and national security threats and
    confident that we're going to be doing the right thing in the
    right way.
        So, I want to thank this Committee for your continued
    support of the Bureau. I'm happy to take your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chair Nadler. Thank you. I will now begin the questions by
    recognizing myself.
        Director, you referred to the IG report--and Mr. Collins
    and I both referred to it--and that report found considerable
    mistakes and considerable bad practices in the incident
    reviewed in those FISA warrant applications. Correct?
        Mr. Wray. Correct.
        Chair Nadler. Okay. You understand that, and you are going
    to do everything you can to correct that. I think we all know
    that.
        Is it correct that the report also found that there was no
    evidence whatsoever that the mistakes that the FBI made or that
    the people in the FBI made had any political motive against the
    President or anyone else?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Chair, I would just refer you to the
    report itself. Obviously, the Inspector General put a lot of
    hard work into that investigation. I think a million-something
    documents, 170 interviews, very thorough, very independent 500-
    pages report.
        Chair Nadler. Isn't it correct?
        Mr. Wray. So, I would prefer to rely on his description of
    what he found. He made some very specific findings on that,
    both about what he found and, Mr. Chair, as to what he did not
    find.
        Chair Nadler. Okay. Now, recent reporting suggests that the
    President plans to seek payback against those individuals he
    believes crossed him during the impeachment proceedings. I am
    sorry to have to ask. Has the President, the Attorney General,
    or any other Administration official asked the FBI to open an
    investigation into Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, John Bolton, or any
    Member of Congress?
        Mr. Wray. Mr. Chair, I have assured the Congress and I can
    assure the Congress today that the FBI will only open
    investigations based on the facts, law, and proper predication.
        Chair Nadler. I understand that, and I assume that it is
    correct that neither the President, the Attorney General, or
    any other Administration official has asked the FBI to open
    improper political investigations?
        Mr. Wray. No one has asked me to open an investigation
    based on anything other than the facts, law, and proper
    predication.
        Chair Nadler. Thank you. What reporting mechanisms are
    available for FBI officials and employees to report concerns if
    they believe the agency or they are being asked to pursue
    politically motivated investigations?
        Mr. Wray. Well, there are a number of avenues that an
    employee who is troubled by any number of things. There are
    whistleblower provisions. They have the ability to go up to
    their supervisory chain. We have a number of mechanisms
    independent of the supervisory chain inside the organization,
    and under certain circumstances, there are, of course,
    reporting mechanisms I think even to Congress.
        Chair Nadler. Okay. Of course, there are provisions
    designed to protect the anonymity of whistleblowers so that
    they can't be retaliated against?
        Mr. Wray. Again, it depends on the specific vehicle, but
    there are a number of provisions that deal with protecting
    whistleblowers, which I think is important.
        Chair Nadler. Now, to switch topics. The FBI's position on
    encryption is well known. For example, last October when
    speaking on Facebook's plans to encrypt its messaging services,
    you said this would be a ``dream come true for predators and
    child pornogra-phers.''
        That is if they were able to totally encrypt without a
    backdoor, this would be a terrible thing. That is what you
    said.
        Mr. Wray. We don't think we're asking for a backdoor.
        Chair Nadler. No, no.
        Mr. Wray. The first part of what you said is correct, yes.
        Chair Nadler. Okay, fine. Now, there are a lot of people in
    the Federal Government who share these views and argue that
    encryption represents a risk to public safety. An October 15,
    2019, letter from the Department of Defense highlights DOD's
    reliance on encryption. The letter goes on to state, ``It is
    imperative that innovative security techniques, such as
    advanced encryption algorithms, are constantly maintained and
    improved to protect DOD information and resources. The
    Department believes maintaining a domestic climate for state-
    of-the-art security and encryption is critical to the
    protection of our national security.''
        I am curious to understand how the FBI squares its position
    on encryption and the need to make sure that there are means
    that will arguably weaken encrypted systems everywhere, how
    they square that with the effect it will have beyond the
    Bureau's investigations. In this case, an apparent impact on
    the Pentagon's ability to protect our national security.
        In other words, it seems from the various statements we
    have seen that the FBI is taking one position, and the
    Department of Defense totally opposite position. Could you
    comment?
        Mr. Wray. Well, first off, I would say that I don't think
    the Department of Defense, having read the specific report
    you're talking about, is taking a position on what Facebook
    should be doing about its messaging platform. I would tell this
    Committee that the FBI believes strongly in encryption. We,
    after all, have a cybersecurity mission, which is one of our
    top priorities.
        I think we also have to have mechanisms that allow lawful
    access to protect flesh and blood Americans. Right now, even as
    we speak, NCMEC, the National Center for Missing and Exploited
    Children, gets about 18 million tips--and I think it's
    important for Americans to understand this--get about 18
    million tips a year related to child exploitation, 18 million.
    Some vast swath of those come from Facebook.
        Now, if Facebook moved forward with the plans that they
    have at the moment, we will be blinded. They will blind
    themselves and law enforcement. No matter what lawful process
    this Committee ever comes up with to allow us access to that
    content, those children and those predators will still be out
    there. That will not have changed. What will have changed is
    that no matter what lawful authority we've been given, that
    will disappear.
        I don't think that's a decision that one company--in that
    instance, Facebook, but it could be any number of other
    companies--should be making on behalf of the American people.
        Chair Nadler. That is a very well-stated summary of the
    FBI's well-known position, but the DOD seems to have exactly
    the opposite position. You may not know the DOD, but I am
    asking if you do know. These positions seem completely at odds
    with each other, and the DOD is not commenting only on
    Facebook, and you are not commenting only on Facebook.
        So, if you know, if you are familiar with the contradiction
    here, would you comment on it?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think there's a contradiction
    between the steps we take to protect the country's most
    sensitive national security and defense information and having
    individual manufacturers design their systems in a way
    knowingly to blind law enforcement all over this country from
    content.
        Chair Nadler. I have one more topic. There has been a lot
    of confusion in the public about the Bureau's role in
    conducting background checks for Senate-confirmed appointments,
    including judicial nominees. My understanding is that when
    conducting these background checks, the FBI is restricted to
    the scope and subject matter requested by the client agency.
        In the case of Justice Kavanaugh's appointment, I
    understand that the client agency was the White House,
    specifically the White House counsel's office. So, yes or no,
    if the White House had directed the FBI to interview some
    witnesses, but not others, or if they had told you to complete
    the process by a certain date, would the FBI have followed that
    request?
        Mr. Wray. The process that exists for background
    investigations, including supplemental updates to background
    investigations, is very different from a criminal investigation
    or a national security investigation. As you've noted, Mr.
    Chair, by longstanding practice and process under background
    investigations, the FBI is what's called the investigative
    service provider, or the ISP. We do whatever we do in a
    background investigation, much less an update to that
    background investigation, only at the direction or request of
    the adjudicating agency which, in this case, would be the White
    House.
        Chair Nadler. That is what I am.
        Mr. Wray. They set the scope for what we investigate.
        Chair Nadler. That is what I am seeking to get at. They set
    the scope. In other words, if the White House or the Senate or
    whoever is requesting the investigation says tell us everything
    you know about this fellow, you would do that, and if they say
    only look at this or that, you will only look at this or that?
        Mr. Wray. Right. We follow the request of the adjudicating
    agency. I would say that it is not unique to the Justice
    Kavanaugh situation or anything else. That's longstanding
    process, and I've consulted with our background investigation
    specialist, as I did back at the time, to ensure that this
    process, as it was in that instance, was done by the book.
        Now, the book for background investigations is different.
        Chair Nadler. So, I understand that. So, if there is
    criticism, if there is criticism of the limited scope of the
    FBI investigation, the criticism would be properly directed not
    at the FBI, but at whoever issued the instructions delineating
    the scope of the investigation?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I can't speak to whether there should be
    criticism, but as I said, yeah.
        Chair Nadler. I didn't say whether there should be. I said
    if there is to be criticism, the criticism would be directed,
    validly or invalidly, at whoever gave you the instructions as
    to the scope of the investigation, not at the FBI.
        Mr. Wray. I think if the Senate or the Congress wants the
    scope to be broader, then they should direct that request to
    the adjudicating agency.
        Chair Nadler. Very good. Thank you very much.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Collins, for his
    questioning.
        Mr. Collins. I appreciate it, Mr. Chair, and are we, I am
    assuming, operating under--this is going to be a long hearing
    if we are operating under basically a 10-minute question time.
    It is an interesting timeframe here for today, but it is also
    interesting to me is that we have come back now to something
    that I have been waiting for a while because I heard this and I
    am before my question time, and I am going to have plenty of
    time.
        So, I had heard this before we actually started this
    majority's Chairmanship that we were going to reinvestigate the
    Kavanaugh hearing. It took almost 12 months, 13 months to get
    there, but we have started that process this morning. It is
    interesting that the Chair couldn't let it go. Don't want to
    have a hearing about it, but he will get it in right now.
    Again, just the drive-bys of this Committee still just amaze
    me.
        Let us go back to something that is actually here for you
    to discuss. Under the criminal wiretap statute, an agent must
    exhaust other feasible options before seeking a wiretap to a
    subject. Meaning the agent must attempt to seek evidence in a
    less intrusive manner first, assuming it is safe to do so. FISA
    also requires, albeit not as stringently, that the information
    sought cannot be obtained through normal investigative
    techniques.
        Are you aware whether agents sought to interview Carter
    Page before seeking a FISA on him?
        Mr. Wray. Congressman, I would just--as to the facts of the
    Inspector General's report, I would refer to the report itself.
    I'm very sensitive about not trying to characterize or
    summarize his findings, just like I don't like it when people
    do it to my investigations.
        Mr. Collins. I appreciate it. Let us take it from just a
    step away from the investigation itself. Should they have tried
    any other means before seeking a FISA against Carter Page? This
    would be--or Joe Smith, whatever you want to call it. Proper
    procedure here should be that they have to go through less
    intrusive means other than going straight to a FISA issue.
    Would that not be proper procedure?
        Mr. Wray. I think every investigative decision, including
    the decision about when to seek a FISA wiretap, has to follow
    specific procedures and safeguards, and its fact dependent and
    fact specific, based on a whole slew of circumstances. So, it's
    hard for me to answer one hypothetic in that regard.
        Mr. Collins. So, fact dependent is also--the facts in
    different cases also don't give you a carte blanche to just
    bypass rules that are set in place for specific stuff like
    that?
        Mr. Wray. Absolutely right. I do not think anyone has carte
    blanche to bypass rules, and I intend to make it painfully
    clear that that would not be acceptable in the FBI today.
        Mr. Collins. I appreciate that, and I think that is one of
    the things that in discussing this, I do believe that you have
    set forth and attempted to find ways to reassume trust in the
    agencies involved here. I appreciate that.
        In fact, I spoke about it in my opening statement. I talked
    about how we come to this part. Most people forget the reason
    that we have a FISA court now was because of the abuses when
    left uncontrolled outside of FISA.
        I understand on my side, and possibly on the Democratic
    side as well, there is a lot of concern about the FISA process,
    the FISA court. There is a lot of us who have concerns about
    it, in the secretness of it and the way it goes about. We also
    must remember where it came from to start with. It came out of
    a time in which these agencies had problems. They came together
    with this, the Pike and Church Committees, to actually find a
    solution because left unregulated, we also see what happens
    there as well.
        The problem is now that we have found it at least to be
    abused or had problems under a regulated system. So, the
    question is, is not necessarily could we do a new Committee to
    say, okay, let us look at this from a wholesale perspective,
    but more specific questions from your perspective. If you are
    looking at changing FISA, not the issues that you have talked
    about and I have agreed upon that need to be reupped, but in
    macro level, how can we restore--and you and I have talked
    about this--how do we macro-level restore trust in the American
    people in the agencies and in the intelligence agencies?
        Are there things that you--should we believe top-level
    officials in the intelligence community can now be trusted to
    self-police?
        Mr. Wray. I believe the American people can have confidence
    in the intelligence community, as I sit here today. I think
    there are a number of things that the Inspector General's
    report identified that should be changed and can be changed and
    need to be improved, and we've accepted and agreed with every
    single one of those.
        I've gone above and beyond. So, I can't go through my
    entire list of 40 corrective--40-plus corrective actions here,
    but they're all designed to improve the process, to improve
    accountability internally, improve the rigor, the discipline,
    the safeguards that exist for that very, very important tool
    that we rely on every day to keep people all over this country
    safe.
        Mr. Collins. I appreciate that, and I think sometimes that
    is missing in the rhetoric and the discussion here that you and
    the Attorney General both have taken corrective action. Now,
    some of us may not agree they went far enough. We don't believe
    that maybe some were not held accountable to a different
    standard, the euphemistic ways it was discussed in the Horowitz
    report of mistakes. I think most Americans don't understand
    that concept, especially when you are dealing with their civil
    liberties.
        One of the issues that has been coming up in this is I am
    concerned that many of the FISC--and we will go to the FISA
    court here--Amicus Attorneys appear either conflicted or have
    taken active positions hostile to, frankly, Republican
    positions. Why should we trust--again, there is some discussion
    here? Why should we trust Amicus Attorneys to impartially
    present a case to the court in favor of civil liberties
    interests while ignoring affiliations of the surveillance
    target, a political affiliation, or even the affiliation with
    the Administration seeking the warrant?
        This is a question for you. Do you trust the Amicus
    Attorneys to fairly present cases to court? Because that is a
    big discussion here on is civil liberties actually being
    protected in a way now under the court system, in the FISA
    court?
        Mr. Wray. Well, the whole Amicus process is the purview of
    the FISA court itself, and I think it's a mechanism that can in
    the right circumstances be useful, as the law was changed, I
    think in 2010 to clarify, for novel issues of law. We do lots
    and lots of FISAs that don't raise any remotely controversial
    issues for any Member of this Committee all the time, and
    they're incredibly important. So, I would be very leery of
    entertaining any kind of change that would have all kinds of
    unintended consequences.
        We do a lot with FISA to protect this country from the
    terrorist threat. As somebody who lived through 9/11 in the FBI
    building itself, and in my prior DOJ tenure worked very closely
    on the 9/11-related investigations, met with the families and
    everything else, I can assure the Members of this Committee
    that we need those FISA authorities. We need the agility to
    stay ahead of the threat, or we're all going to regret it.
        Mr. Collins. I think you are right on that. The question
    comes in the bigger scope of what this Committee is having to
    deal with--and other parts of this Committee will have to deal
    with as well, because the priority of that court comes under
    this jurisdiction the perception is now that it become a
    problematic process.
        You can have 100 very proper or 99 very proper, none as you
    said unique, but that one or two, especially when they have the
    emphasis that it has had in the last 3-4 years, does cause a
    perception issue. That perception issue, is it was a
    politically motivated end? There was a bias in the process.
    That no matter how euphemistically the Horowitz report wanted
    to describe it, there was a problem.
        I do want to come back to something, though. Did the FBI
    conduct a Woods review on the Carter Page FISA application?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I would refer you to the Inspector
    General's report. I don't want to try to characterize exactly
    what he said about the Woods process in the Carter Page
    application.
        Mr. Collins. In all due respect, from your agency, you
    would have seen and have access to these records. So, I'm
    asking as more of a direct question here. Did the FBI conduct a
    Woods review on the Carter Page FISA application? I'm not
    asking for the Horowitz report. I'm asking a specific question
    about this issue.
        Mr. Wray. We have done significant reviews of the materials
    underlying the Carter Page FISA applications, including a
    number of steps that we've taken lately to, in effect, claw
    back the information that was collected under those
    applications.
        Mr. Collins. So, I am not to push it, but so is that a yes?
    Was a Woods review done on the Carter Page FISA application?
        Mr. Wray. We've reviewed the Woods file underlying the
    Carter Page applications.
        Mr. Collins. Okay. So, there was a review of it. So, what
    are the findings that you can share?
        Mr. Wray. Again, I don't think there's any findings that I
    can share here today beyond the findings that are in the
    Inspector General's report.
        Mr. Collins. Okay. So, we are past this. So, you have
    looked at this. You are now saying that you have looked at the
    Woods review process on this FISA application. Is there
    concerns that have brought out? What would be your concern as
    the Director of the FBI that this would not happen again,
    especially finding the issues that were found, or the lack of
    issues in the Woods review that goes before this FISA
    application under Carter Page?
        This is becoming--so if you have looked at it, how is that
    compatible with what should have happened, and why more
    processes or changes not taken place?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think a number of the 40-plus corrective
    actions that I've already directed go to ensuring the rigor and
    discipline of the Woods process.
        Mr. Collins. Knowing exactly what you said there, let me
    ask you this directly--the final and direct question on two
    points here. Number one, knowing what you know because you have
    looked over the Woods reviews process for the Carter Page, do
    you think that it was a properly done investigation, especially
    given the Woods review of this application to the FISA court?
    This is you. I am not talking about the Horowitz report.
        Mr. Wray. I think the report describes conduct that is
    unacceptable and unrepresentative of the FBI as an institution,
    and that includes in a number of respects ways in which those
    particular applications were handled.
        Mr. Collins. So, you are saying that you agree on that. One
    last question. Have there been any determinations who leaked
    the Page FISA to the press?
        Mr. Wray. I'm sorry. I couldn't hear that.
        Mr. Collins. Has there been any determination, or have you
    determined who leaked the Page FISA to the press?
        Mr. Wray. I don't have anything I can share on that.
        Mr. Collins. Could you share it in a classified setting?
        Mr. Wray. No, I don't think so.
        Mr. Collins. So, we have not determined it. Have we looked?
        Mr. Wray. Again, I can't speak to specific leak
    investigations or anything of that sort, Bureau or otherwise.
        Mr. Collins. So, are we saying there is an ongoing
    investigation into that?
        Mr. Wray. No, I'm not saying that.
        Mr. Collins. I yield back. Thank you. Thank you for being
    here, and I appreciate it.
        Mr. Chabot. Point of order, Mr. Chair.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chair, since the Chair and the Ranking
    Member have each consumed about 10 minutes, is it safe to
    assume we are going back to the 5-minute Rule for everybody
    else?
        Chair Nadler. We are always under the 5-minute rule,
    subject to my lenient interpretation of it.
        Mr. Chabot. How lenient will the Chair be with all the rest
    of the Members?
        Chair Nadler. I try to be as lenient as possible.
        Mr. Chabot. I don't know that we necessarily want leniency
    because we have got a 5-minute Rule for a good reason, and I
    think we ought to stick to it.
        I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. Ms. Jackson Lee?
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray, I would like leniency, but
    let me welcome you and thank you for your service, and as well
    make a point on the record that the IG report did point to
    unsavory behavior, but it did not condemn the entire agency of
    men and women who have served. The G-men stereotype, I hope,
    has expired, and these are men and women who serve the Nation.
    Is that correct?
        Mr. Wray. I think the Inspector General's report, as you're
    saying, describes conduct that is, in my view, unacceptable and
    unrepresentative of who the FBI is today. I don't think it is a
    referendum on the 37,000 men and women of the FBI and the
    thousands and thousands of investigations they do all the time
    to keep Americans safe.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to take that for the record.
    Thank you so very much.
        Let me acknowledge, of course, our Former Chair, Chair
    Goodlatte. Let me also associate myself with Chair Nadler that
    we attempted many times to have oversight with Attorney General
    Barr, and as well we did oversight with the Mueller report and
    a number of individuals who had relevancy to that. So, we have
    been doing our job. We have had a difficult time. So, we are
    glad that you are here.
        Let me state on the record as well that I would like a
    letter directed to me about the individual ASACs, Special
    Agent-in-Charge, and their ability to participate in
    nonpolitical events dealing with gun violence or human
    trafficking. I want an actual letter on the procedures because
    when one has requested it, you get a yes, and then someone
    says, ``I have got to call Washington.''
        I have said this to you over and over again, and I just
    don't want to have this. So, I need a letter directed to me on
    that policy.
        I want to ask a question, I have to ask very quickly on
    hate crimes. There is a rage of hate crimes by White
    nationalists and White racists. You have indicated a number of
    cases, but specifically, by one sentence or two, can you give
    me what the FBI is doing proactively to deal with the rise in
    the hate crimes against religious groups and certainly against
    racial groups, minorities, and immigrants?
        Mr. Wray. Thank you for the question.
        We have domestic terrorism and hate crimes, as a close
    cousin of domestic terrorism, at the top of the priority list.
    There are a few things that I've done recently to further
    intensify our efforts.
        One, I created a few months ago a domestic terrorism and
    hate crimes fusion cell in the FBI to bring together the
    expertise of both our domestic terrorism folks and our hate
    crimes folks so that they're working together to not just focus
    on the threats that have already happened, but to look ahead
    around the corner and anticipate where else we need to be.
        We have also ensured that all our 200-plus joint terrorism
    task forces have domestic terrorism squarely in their sights as
    another example. Last, but not least, I would add that I have
    elevated racially motivated violent extremism as a national
    threat priority for fiscal year 2020, which puts it on the same
    footing as ISIS and our homegrown violent extremists.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to be able to have a briefing
    on that, whether classified or appropriately in a briefing. I
    would like to understand better what they do, and I would like
    to make sure that it is broad based. I would also like a
    classified briefing on the FISA and the response going forward.
        In the IG's report, it specifically talked about
    discrimination against women. I would add to that
    discrimination against African Americans, in particular. In
    terms of the hierarchy of the FBI, what are you doing about
    that? Again, I am going to officially ask for a letter
    detailing what you are doing because I have just a short period
    of time, and I have two more questions.
        So, if you can just give me just a moment of what you are
    doing so I can ask my other questions, please.
        Mr. Wray. On the issue of diversity, that's very important
    to us. It's one of our core values, and I've made significant
    efforts to energize our diversity agent recruiting, including
    speaking at some of those events myself around the country.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any Directors, African
    Americans, in that top leadership?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I've appointed a number of African
    Americans to lead some of our biggest field offices, for
    example, and I just recently--
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I know you made progress, Director, but
    let me--my apologies for cutting you off. I, too, want an
    official letter of where they are placed and other minorities
    and what you are specifically doing regarding women and gender
    discrimination.
        Let me move quickly. I hope that the Iowa Democrats will
    ask for an FBI investigation on the app. I believe that Russia
    has been engaged in interfering with a number of our elections
    dealing with the '21 elections--I am sorry, the 2016 election.
    Would you answer these two questions about voter suppression
    and about your work to end racial profiling?
        I have introduced legislation on that, and there is
    extensive racial profiling, specifically in groups that may be
    considered Black identity groups that are really nonviolent,
    the New Black Panther Party and other groups that may be on
    labels. I am going to end so that you can answer those two
    questions, voter suppression and the as it relates to Russian
    involvement and the work on end racial profiling at the Federal
    level.
        I thank the Director for his service. You can answer those
    two questions.
        Mr. Wray. Maybe it'd be better for me to answer both of
    those with a follow-up communication to you because neither of
    them is a short answer.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. If you can give just a brief and then an
    answer, I would appreciate it. Then a letter, rather, I would
    appreciate it. On the record, thank you.
        Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we are also concerned about
    potential Russian interference with our elections, and that's
    why I created the Foreign Influence Task Force, which is
    acutely focused on that topic, among other nations--states that
    are attempting to influence our elections.
        On the question of the so-called Black identity
    extremists--
        Ms. Jackson Lee. The end racial profiling, yes. Thank you.
        Mr. Wray. Well, racial profiling, that would be a longer
    answer than I can try to address here in this setting. On the
    Black identity extremism issue, as you may know, we no longer
    use that term, and I've taken to heart a lot of the feedback
    that I got from a number of people, have met, worked very
    closely with NOBLE, for example, among others. So, I think
    we're moving in the right direction on those topics.
        We don't investigate ideology or rhetoric or anything of
    that sort, no matter whether it's in that context or anything
    else. We investigate when there are three things--credible
    evidence of a criminal violation, credible evidence of violence
    or threat of violence, all in support of some ideology. If we
    don't have those three things, we don't investigate in the
    domestic context.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The lady yields back.
        Mr. Chabot?
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for being here
    today.
        Director Wray, we appreciate you testifying before this
    Committee again. You have, of course, already referred to the
    review of a so-called Crossfire Hurricane investigation by
    Inspector General Michael Horowitz.
        As you know, the Inspector General reported serious flaws
    and overreach by the FBI in the application process to
    surveille Carter Page who, at the time, was a foreign policy
    advisor to the Trump campaign.
        While the review did not conclude that your predecessor or
    any of his agents were politically motivated, the way that they
    went about obtaining these FISA warrants was, at the time, and
    continues to be deeply concerning to many people.
        Given that there is an election less than a year away, it
    seems to me that significant changes need to occur to address
    past FISA application abuses by the FBI, and you have referred
    to them to some degree already.
        What are some of the changes that you are implementing that
    will help to ensure that politically motivated agencies and
    attorneys are unable to pursue FISA applications with
    unverified, uncorroborated, or even downright false
    information?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
        I, too, was deeply concerned by what I read in the
    Inspector General's report and, as I have said, I consider it
    to have described conduct that I consider unacceptable and
    unrepresentative of the FBI that I know.
        Now, there are a number of things that I think go to
    addressing those concerns, and I will just name a few of them
    here. I will say it starts with the one at the top.
        I have been communicating unambiguously in field office
    after field office, headquarters division after headquarters
    division, that how we do what we do matters--that the American
    people expect the FBI not just to get to the right result but
    to go about it in the right way.
        So, I have been pounding process, process, process
    everywhere I go, and I have put in place a whole new leadership
    team that is helping me amplify that message.
        Second, we have put in place a whole number of--and they
    get kind of technical, but a whole number of process and policy
    changes that go both to our use of FISA, but also to our use of
    things like confidential human sources and those kind of things
    and how those get incorporated into the FISA process.
        We have put in place new training. I put in place last
    summer, actually, over 18 months ago, a training that did not
    exist before, all focused on not just avoiding bias but
    avoiding even the appearance of bias, and I started--this is
    important--I started by requiring all the top people--it is not
    the way government usually works.
        I started by requiring everybody at the top of the house,
    all 200-plus SES folks in the Bureau to come into Quantico for
    a full day to get coached on that by judges, the Inspector
    General, and others, trying to set, again, the tone--the idea
    that it starts at the top.
        I put in place training that didn't exist before, policies
    that didn't exist before, processes that didn't exist before,
    oversight that didn't exist before, and where there are people
    who are still left, most of whom are effectively at the line
    level or at least were at the time of the Inspector General
    report, they have been referred to our Office of Professional
    Responsibility, which is our disciplinary arm.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Director. I would like to get
    one more question in and, hopefully, get you time to answer it.
        Mr. Director, the President signed into law the Fix NICS
    Act--and I think you mentioned that earlier--in March 2018 to
    help close reporting gaps in the National Instant Criminal
    Background Check System, commonly referred to as NICS.
        Having access to accurate records is critical to ensure
    that missing records or access to those records doesn't put the
    lives of innocent men, women, and children at risk.
        Just a few months ago in November the Attorney General
    released a report detailing improvements in the NICS system
    since the enactment of this important legislation based on
    preliminary data.
        Instead of highlighting and building upon the improvements
    detailed in that report, unfortunately, this Committee spent a
    considerable amount of time trying to impeach the President.
        In light of the reported results, what can Congress do to
    help build upon those efforts to keep individuals who should
    not possess firearms from obtaining them?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think the Fix NICS Act was a very
    important step forward and, at the end of the day, we all share
    the goal of trying to keep guns out of the hands of those
    prohibited by law from possessing them, and that is what our
    NICS examiners do every day.
        We have thousands and thousands of NICS checks that we have
    to do all the time, and making sure that we have accurate and
    complete records in the NICS system is critical to making that
    happen and that is why I think the statute was such a step in
    the right direction.
        So, we continue to march forward on that effort. Obviously,
    resources to our folks out at the NICS shop would be very much
    appreciated.
        I have actually gone out there myself and put on the
    headset and listened so that I can actually experience
    firsthand what those calls look like so that I can actually
    feel and experience it and not just observe it from some
    conference room in DC.
        So, they do very, very important work and, again, I thank
    the Congress for the Fix NICS Act.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chair, my time has expired.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Cohen?
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Director,
    for your service. You have brought distinction to the FBI and
    to the State of Georgia. Congressman Johnson hasn't done that
    as well, but you have certainly done it in a spectacular
    fashion.
        Hate crimes is something that concerns me, as it does the
    Chair, and collecting data on hate crimes is important and that
    is something the FBI does.
        Eighty-five local law enforcement agencies with populations
    of 100,000 and more either did not report to the FBI or
    affirmatively reported zero incidents.
        That is hard to fathom. What can we do to improve
    participation in collecting that hate crimes data? Should there
    be a link to funding for agencies and communities to report?
        Should the FBI field offices, which there are in 26 of
    those cities, have some effort to see that there is information
    sent in? Do you have any suggestions on how we can get better
    reporting?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I would say that I share your
    desire to make sure that we have as complete and accurate
    information reported about hate crimes as possible. We know
    that hate crimes are historically underreported.
        We also know that hate crimes reporting has increased
    significantly over the years and part of that is through
    outreach efforts that we have made with our State and local
    partners to encourage them to collect and report that
    information.
        The point that I always try to make to departments
    everywhere is that it is far better to have these issues
    evaluated based on the facts and the actual data rather than
    based on rumors or conventional wisdom or potentially
    inaccurate news reporting.
        So, they should all share the same goal that we have of
    making sure that it is the facts and the facts will speak for
    themselves.
        So, anything that can be done appropriately to encourage
    more of that is something that I think we are always interested
    in.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, if you could--whatever you can do to see
    that they are reported. Hate crimes have risen in this country
    and it has been the Klan, which used to use Stone Mountain as a
    place to assemble, and neo-Nazis, which we all saw in
    Charlottesville and we knew there were not fine people on both
    sides.
        That has been really harmful to a lot of people in this
    country who saw that and have seen the harm that the communists
    and the Nazis and Klan have done over the years to Jews,
    African Americans, and others.
        So, things like that go on forever and people are reminded
    of them. One of my early memories from my childhood going to
    Atlanta, driving through, was knowing about the bombing of the
    temple there in about 1960 and that is an image that is hard to
    forget. So, we need to work on that.
        Emmett Till is one that the country suffers from, and I
    know there is still an investigation going on and I believe the
    Department of Justice has reopened that investigation.
        Can you tell me anything about that and where that
    investigation stands?
        Mr. Wray. I am sorry. I couldn't quite hear the question.
        Mr. Cohen. The Emmett Till investigation. Has the FBI
    opened, or the Department of Justice reopened and investigation
    into that?
        Mr. Wray. I can't comment or discuss any investigation in
    this setting.
        Mr. Cohen. Are you conducting some old hate crimes and
    civil rights violation laws or civil rights violations? Are you
    going to civil cold cases?
        Mr. Wray. We are doing a lot of investigations in the hate
    crimes arena, both racially motivated and religiously
    motivated. It is one of the more active areas that we have
    right now.
        Mr. Cohen. In cold cases as well to try and open them up?
        Mr. Wray. In some instances there are cold cases that are
    being looked at as well.
        Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you just a general question. What we
    do is legislation, do you have any suggestions of legislation
    you would like to see us consider to help the FBI in its
    mission?
        Mr. Wray. I don't have any legislative proposals for the
    Committee as I sit here right now.
        Mr. Cohen. Okay. You have made clear that Mr. Trump himself
    was not under investigation by the FBI prior to his election
    and taking office, is that correct?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I was minding my own business in private
    practice when all of that happened. So, I didn't advise the
    President of anything related to--
        Mr. Cohen. In your historical reflections on it and looking
    at what the FBI did, the FBI did--I don't want to get you in
    any more trouble than you are already in.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Cohen. Let me pass on that and withdraw that question
    for you and just say that you should have considered all those
    histories in your family of going to Vanderbilt.
        Yale is an okay school, but Vanderbilt is an even better
    school, and I saw Taylor Malone in your bio and I knew the
    Malone family and helping get Malone & Hyde started, which was
    a great company in Memphis, and thank you for that.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you.
        Chair Nadler. Mr. Gohmert?
        Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
        Director Wray, thank you for being here. I wish I had
    enough time to address some of the things that the Chair said
    that needed correcting. Questioning you is too important.
        First, have you ever signed an application for a warrant or
    an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant
    yourself?
        Mr. Wray. I have signed--right now as FBI director I sign
    the certifications for FISA applications for FISA warrants, if
    that is what you are talking about. I am not sure if that is--
        Mr. Gohmert. Do you ever read them before you sign them?
        Mr. Wray. Of course.
        Mr. Gohmert. All right. Well, Mr. Rosenstein would not
    admit ever reading any of the things he signed, especially with
    regard to a FISA application. So that concerned me greatly. I
    am glad to hear you do.
        Now, there is a report that Mr. Clinesmith did that altered
    information that was supplied to the FISA court--that he was
    allowed to resign. Is that accurate?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Clinesmith is no longer with the FBI,
    and I don't think I can comment on a specific personnel matter
    beyond that.
        Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Well, let me tell you--
        Mr. Wray. --as we sit here right now.
        Mr. Gohmert. --when you have an FBI agent, and you don't
    need to defend the 37,000 employees. They are not being
    questioned here. I can tell you as a former Felony Judge I had
    FBI agents come to me.
        They would never have dreamed of lying in an affidavit or
    changing information to misrepresent the facts to me or any
    other judge.
        There are people across the country whose reputations have
    been sullied by the improper or, I believe you said,
    unacceptable and unrepresentative actions at the FBI here in
    Washington, DC.
        They are not under attack. The reputation of the FBI has
    been so sullied, and we all hoped that when you became director
    you were going to help fix that.
        I can tell you, I know that you wouldn't be in this
    position if you didn't believe that there was deterrent effect
    in punishment. That is what law enforcement is engaged in, at
    least part of the job.
        So, when you have somebody that violates Americans' civil
    rights and commits a fraud upon the FISA court and the court
    doesn't do anything but appoint somebody that is friendly to
    the position of the fraud as an Amicus, then we continue to
    have questions not only about what needs to be done to fix
    FISA, but if we ought to go back to the way it was before the
    '70s.
        So, this is serious. So, when you have an FBI agent and,
    surely, you are aware, to commit a fraud upon a FISA court or
    any court or to misrepresent facts in something that is sworn,
    those can involve crimes and this guy is not even fired and
    there is no indication he is going to be prosecuted.
        I know you are saying it is a personnel matter, so I can't
    get into it. I am telling you, the FBI reputation here in
    Washington cannot be cleaned up until there are people that are
    held to account for the unacceptable actions here in Washington
    and letting somebody resign sends a message to anybody else
    that wants to get politically active and use their job at the
    FBI to further a political will.
        The message to them is, well, if I get caught, I will be
    asked to go take a better paying job somewhere else. Great
    punishment. No deterrence, and business goes on as usual.
        We needed an FBI director that would clean this mess up so
    America could feel good about it, and I can tell you when you
    come in and say it is a personnel matter--I can't really deal
    with it or talk about it, you are not helping improve the
    reputation.
        I want to bring up another matter. You know about 302s. The
    FBI is about the last law enforcement agency or department in
    the country that doesn't video or audiotape statements that are
    made and that is--they have been allowed to do that because
    they have such a great reputation or did.
        Now that we have seen 302s get changed, different opinions,
    what did he say, what did he not say, especially with General
    Flynn, many of us are wondering if it isn't time if not
    bringing the FBI into the 21st century at least into the last
    half of the 20th century and start having FBI agents record
    statements by people that are being questioned by FBI agents to
    help the FBI get their reputation back.
        I mean, some justices of the peace will look for that.
    Would you consider supporting the recording of statement to FBI
    agents rather than just a written summary that can be changed
    later by an FBI agent?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, there are certain
    circumstances under which statements are currently recorded
    already at the FBI and that is a change.
        I think this is a subject that requires longer discussion.
    I would be happy to have my staff follow back up with you.
        As to the question of the FBI's reputation and candor to
    the court, I don't want to let this time expire without telling
    you how strongly I feel about candor to the court.
        I have been a prosecutor. I have been a Defense Attorney. I
    have been an Assistant Attorney General. I have been an FBI
    Director.
        To me, candor to the court is sacrosanct, and I don't think
    there is anybody in the FBI that is belaboring under the
    misimpression that I think it is okay to mislead a court.
        Now, the vast majority of the senior people involved in the
    investigation at issue here are gone from the FBI. Of those who
    are left--
        Mr. Gohmert. The vast majority.
        Mr. Wray. And the--
        Mr. Gohmert. There are people there still.
        Chair Nadler. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. Wray. If I could just finish my answer.
        Mr. Gohmert. No, we are now up to 9 minutes--
        Mr. Wray. None in the National--
        Mr. Gohmert. At least let him answer the question.
        Mr. Wray. None in the National Security Branch.
        Chair Nadler. The witness may answer the question.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The people who are left were, largely, line-level people at
    the time of the matter in question. Those people have all been
    referred to our disciplinary arm.
        The reason I am not engaging with you on a specific
    personnel matter is because my commitment to ensuring proper
    accountability ensures that even that is done by the book, and
    by the book, to me, does not include discussing a pending
    personnel issue in this hearing.
        So, I respect the reason for your question. I share your
    passion both about the reputation of the FBI and about the
    importance of candor to the court.
        Chair Nadler. Mr. Johnson?
        Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I want to commend the FBI director. You came out of a very
    lucrative private practice of law. You were at the pinnacle of
    your career as a lawyer after having served in government for a
    number of years at a very high level.
        So, after 10 years of being out in the practice of law,
    both as a defense lawyer and handling other matters, you were
    called upon to return to government service and you accepted
    the call at a considerable financial disadvantage. You still
    accepted the call to come back and head up the FBI.
        In your confirmation proceeding you were asked a question
    in the Senate if you believed that the investigation into the
    Russian 2016 election interference was a witch hunt and under
    what many would have felt would be pressure to equivocate in
    some way, you came right out and you said that no, you did not
    believe that it was a witch hunt.
        Ever since then, you have conducted yourself as FBI
    Director in that same honest and forthright way and that is a
    refreshing conduct that you have exemplified in the midst of an
    anti-institutionalist Trump Administration which has applied
    pressure to you to conform just like most others have conformed
    to its anti-institutionalism.
        You have protected the FBI, and isn't it a fact that there
    was no finding in the IG report that the FBI committed a fraud
    upon the FISA court? Isn't that true?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, as I want to be consistent in
    the way I am answering everyone's questions.
        As to the Inspector General's report he put an enormous
    amount of work--over a million documents, 170 interviews--and I
    just really don't want to be characterizing his findings.
        He made very specific findings both about what he found and
    about what he did not find in that report.
        Mr. Johnson of Georgia. He say that it was a fraud. He said
    that the FBI committed a fraud on the FISA court and I just
    don't read the report to say that.
        Now, he did identify some deficiencies in the warrant
    reauthorization application process, and I think you will
    probably find those kinds of shortcomings in every law
    enforcement agency in America. If you look carefully enough you
    will find some of that going on.
        I am convinced that you have made it clear that no cutting
    of corners, no taking the easy way out, do it the hard way, and
    I expect that from the FBI.
        So, I want to thank you for your conduct in protecting the
    FBI as an institution. It is not a rogue agency out there
    hurting people.
        I will say this about encryption. When it comes to domestic
    terrorism and hate crimes and right-wing extremists,
    nationalist groups, antisemitic groups out here, using
    encryption to organize, to plan, and then to conduct operations
    that actually result in people being killed and injured and our
    government being destabilized and you are doing it in a way
    that you cannot be surveilled, you cannot be held to account in
    any way after the fact for what you did, I think that is a
    danger to our society.
        On the other hand, when it comes to the government of, by,
    and for the people, to provide for the common defense and
    promote the general welfare, if we can't rely on our government
    to have the ability to protect its own secrets while at the
    same time getting at wrongdoing that wrongdoers try to keep
    secret, then we are in dangerous territory.
        So, I think we need to honestly take a look at these
    things. Now, I had some questions I wanted to ask. I am running
    out of time and I am going to abide by the five-minute period.
        Once again, I will say thanks. Last, I will say I look
    forward to the day when I can look at the front row of folks
    behind the FBI director who comes to present with staff and I
    look forward to the day when I can look forward to the day when
    I can see some diversity on that row.
        I look forward to the day when I can see somebody who looks
    like me on that row. I know that there is a lot of young Black
    kids out here who aspire to go into law enforcement and, as far
    as I am concerned, the FBI is the pinnacle of law enforcement
    and I want them to feel like they have a chance to reach the
    top.
        So, I thank you for your service to the nation.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Jordan?
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director, thank you for being here. Thank you for your
    leadership of those 37,000 people you talked about who are
    busting their tail every day to help protect all of us in this
    country.
        We do appreciate that, and I appreciate your comments about
    Mr. Horowitz's report, saying it was unacceptable. I am a
    little concerned because it didn't seem to me that you had
    quite the same outrage in your response letter to Inspector
    General Horowitz.
        December 6th, 2019, you wrote a letter. It is the last few
    pages of Mr. Horowitz's report. In the third sentence of that
    letter, you said this, ``The report's findings and
    recommendations represent constructive criticism that will make
    us stronger as an organization.'' Constructive criticism that
    will make us stronger.
        Director, you know what we all know. On July 31st, 2016,
    the FBI opened an investigation, spied on four American
    citizens associated with the Presidential campaign.
        The FBI went to the FISA court and lied to the court 17
    times. The FBI took the dossier, the now-famous dossier, to the
    FISA court and didn't tell the court--you just talked about
    candor to the court--they didn't tell the court the guy who
    wrote it was desperate, had communicated to the Justice
    Department that he was desperate to stop Trump.
        Didn't tell the guy who wrote it, Mr. Steele, was paid by
    the Clinton campaign to put the document together. when all
    that is pointed out to you in a 400-page report, you say,
    thanks for the constructive criticism.
        Four-hundred-page report that says there were 51 assertions
    that top people at the FBI made to the court that weren't
    backed up, that weren't supported at all, and it is called
    constructive criticism.
        Constructive criticism is when your grade-school teacher
    tells you to study more for the spelling test. Constructive
    criticism is one of my colleagues says, hey, Jim, you should
    have asked your questions different last week in a hearing.
    That is constructive criticism.
        Here is what Mr. Horowitz said. Here is what the Inspector
    General said. So, many basic and fundamental errors were made
    by three separate handpicked teams on one of the most sensitive
    FBI investigations that was briefed to the highest levels in
    the FBI.
        Maybe more importantly, here is what--here is what Judge
    Collyer wrote. She said this in her public order, ``The
    frequency with which representations made by FBI personnel
    turned out to be unsupported or contradicted by information in
    their possession and with which they withheld information
    detrimental to their case calls into question whether
    information contained in other FBI applications is reliable.''
        Put that in plain English that is they gave so much wrong
    information here how are we supposed to trust any other
    representations made to the court.
        Even Jim Comey, on December 17th, said something I never
    thought I would hear Jim Comey say. He said, ``I was wrong. We
    were overconfident.''
        So, I am a little concerned. I appreciate what you are
    saying today but this is unacceptable. I appreciate what you
    said just to Mr. Gohmert's questions about candor to the court.
        That is not how--that is not what took place in this
    report, is way past constructive criticism.
        This was a major royal screw up. This is way past
    constructive criticism.
        Mr. Wray. I am sorry. Is there a question?
        Mr. Jordan. There is.
        Mr. Wray. What is the question?
        Mr. Jordan. I am concerned you are not taking this serious
    enough. Are you taking it seriously enough, Director Wray?
        Mr. Wray. I think I have demonstrated unambiguously that I
    take this very seriously. At the same time that the letter that
    you read occurred, I communicated in no uncertain terms to my
    leadership team and to the entire FBI workforce that I consider
    the Inspector General's report to have described conduct that I
    consider unacceptable.
        Mr. Jordan. So, it was more than--
        Mr. Wray. Unacceptable and unrepresentative of who we are
    as an institution.
        Mr. Jordan. Why didn't write that in the initial--this is
    the first--it is the last 10 pages of this report.
        Mr. Wray. I addressed the letter because I think--
        Mr. Jordan. Let me just--
        Mr. Wray. The letter, I think, to me, describes the--
        Mr. Jordan. Let me point out one--
        Mr. Wray. I am sorry. Go ahead.
        Mr. Jordan. Let me just point out one of the things you
    said. One of the recommendations that Mr. Horowitz says is if
    you are going to do a headquarters special--if you are going to
    pull this from the field offices, run an investigation out of
    the headquarters on a sensitive investigative matter, he said
    you should have some proper protocols in place and some checks
    and balances.
        You said, we accept this recommendation. We got to be
    careful about doing these headquarters specials, which is what
    the mid-year exam was, what Crossfire Hurricane was. It was run
    by the top people at the FBI.
        As you rightly say, they are all gone. Well, one of the
    recommendations that you say you are going to do to deal with
    this concern, you said we are going to require FBI Deputy
    Director approval prior to opening any FBI headquarters
    sensitive investigative matter.
        Well, shazam, you know what that means? That means Andy
    McCabe had to sign off on it. Well, isn't that how we got here
    to begin with?
        Andy McCabe has to sign off on it, so now, the Deputy
    Director has to sign off if you are going to run an
    investigation out of headquarters and pull it from the field
    office. Is that really going to solve this problem?
        Mr. Wray. That is not the complete recommendation for
    corrective action.
        Mr. Jordan. I am reading it right here.
        Mr. Wray. No. No. Let me--if I may--sorry, go ahead.
        Mr. Jordan. I am reading it. I am just reading what you
    wrote. Requiring the FBI Deputy Director approval prior to
    opening any FBI headquarters sensitive investigative matter.
        Mr. Wray. The corrective action that we put in place on
    that particular issue involved a number of things.
        One, to communicate to the field that only in the rarest of
    circumstances, which was not communicated before, should any
    investigation--sensitive investigation be conducted out of
    headquarters.
        Two, that, in addition, to requiring the Deputy Director
    sign-off for those rare circumstances where that strong
    presumption would be rebutted that it not only required sign-
    off by the Deputy Director, but also by the affected field
    offices and that is a difference.
        That is what is different. So, you couldn't have some small
    group of people at headquarters making the determination that
    this is an exception.
        Now, the field offices that would otherwise be the
    presumptive offices to run those investigations, their
    leadership have to be involved in the discussion, so that
    people can make sure that any decision to do this--
        Mr. Jordan. Who makes the call? Who makes the final--
        Chair Nadler. Gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Deutch?
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director, first, I want to add my voice to those who thank
    you and the 37,000 men and women of the FBI who work every day
    to keep us safe.
        I also want to thank the FBI for its work in trying to
    bring Bob Levinson home. As you know, Bob's the longest-held
    American hostage in history.
        He went missing off around Kish Island in March of 2007 as
    he served in the FBI for 25 years and the Levinson family, its
    community of Coral Springs, all of Florida and America, are
    desperate for him to return.
        As one of the Bureau's own, I, again, ask that you
    prioritize his case in the Bureau and in your interactions with
    your interagency counterparts.
        I want to talk a bit about gun violence, and I want to
    start just by making an observation, and I mean this not as a
    slight against the Ranking Member.
        Every time there is a reference to actions by this
    Committee as drive-bys a number of us cringe. I just want to
    point out that over the past 24 hours there were drive-by
    shootings in Connecticut, Texas, Michigan, Illinois,
    Washington, Nebraska, Florida, and Wisconsin.
        We are very sensitive. I am glad you are here to be able to
    talk about the issue of gun violence. In your testimony, you
    said the FBI is most concerned about lone offender attacks,
    primarily shootings, as they have served as the dominant lethal
    mode for domestic violent extremist attacks.
        You spoke earlier in your exchange with Mr. Chabot about
    the role that Fix NICS has played in helping to keep guns out
    of the hands of dangerous people.
        So, I would ask you whether you believe that Congress
    should strengthen gun laws to further prevent the types of
    attacks that you reference.
        Mr. Wray. Well, the FBI won't be taking positions on
    specific pieces of legislation but would be happy to provide
    operational input in the way we normally do on any specific
    proposal.
        I will say that we all share the goal of keeping guns out
    of the hands of those who are prohibited from having them and
    things that take steps in that direction, and I think are
    things we should encourage.
        We share deeply the concerns about violence committed with
    guns around this country and I think we have demonstrated that
    through our investigations, through our NICS examiners, and
    through a variety of other means.
        Mr. Deutch. Director, I would just like to follow up on a
    question that Senator Blumenthal asked you at your confirmation
    hearing.
        He asked about support--whether you would support
    strengthening gun laws and specifically mentioned background
    checks.
        You said at the time, and I quote, ``I would want to take a
    look at any specific legislative proposal and get back to you
    once I had evaluated a specific piece of legislation. But, I do
    support efforts to deal with gun violence aggressively and
    effectively and I think my record both as a line prosecutor and
    in leadership with the department is consistent with that,''
    closed quote.
        Director Wray, it has been 343 days since the House passed
    H.R. 8 and H.R. 1112. The first, as you know, requires
    background checks on private sales.
        The second would increase the minimum waiting period from
    three to 10 business days if an initial check is inconclusive,
    and if an additional 10 days lapsed without confirmation of
    eligibility, then the dealer could sell the firearm to that
    buyer.
        Have you had the opportunity over these past 343 days to
    review those specific proposals?
        Mr. Wray. I have not.
        Mr. Deutch. I will be honest. That is the answer I expected
    and, yet it is shocking. I understand that the role of the FBI
    is not to advocate.
        I also know that for those 37,000 men and women who are out
    there every day trying to keep us safe that we share the same
    commitment to do everything we can to keep them safe while they
    are doing their job.
        You told Senator Blumenthal that you just needed an
    opportunity to review before making a determination about
    whether it could help.
        You talked today with my colleague, Mr. Chabot, about how
    Fix NICS does the job to help keep guns out of the hands of
    dangerous people.
        There is a piece of legislation that the House passed that
    would help to do exactly that, and you sit there, Director
    Wray, and tell us that you haven't really had a chance in 343
    days to even consider whether this is the type of thing that
    can help protect the lives of the public and the lives of those
    37,000 men and women who put themselves out there every day to
    keep us safe.
        It is beyond discouraging. We need to work together on
    this. We can't be silent on this. I hope that when the Senate
    ultimately is forced to take up a piece of legislation that 90
    percent of the American people believe is the right thing to
    do, that will help keep us safe and your agents safe, that we
    will be able to celebrate that together.
        Until then, I hope that you will have the opportunity to
    dig in to understand that what we did here will help to save
    the lives of the men and women who work for you.
        I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Buck?
        Mr. Buck. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director Wray, for 25 years I was a prosecutor. I worked
    closely with FBI agents. They are bright, hardworking,
    dedicated professionals and it was an honor to work with them.
        I am deeply concerned about revelations concerning
    corruption in the past leadership of the FBI. I am particularly
    troubled with the FBI's treatment of investigative journalists
    like Sharyl Attkisson.
        When the FBI spies on journalists, it undermines the
    integrity of our government, and it tarnishes the badge. In
    early 2011, Sharyl Attkisson began reporting on Fast and
    Furious, where the Obama ATF recklessly allowed illegal gun
    sales and watched as straw purchasers walked guns across the
    Mexican border straight into the hands of drug cartels.
        Attkisson exposed the scandal and the fact that the illegal
    guns were found at several crime scenes, including where U.S.
    Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was murdered.
        For her work on Fast and Furious, Attkisson received an
    Edward R. Murrow award, an Emmy award, and an investigative
    reporting award.
        Another Attkisson story involves Solyndra, a solar company
    involving an Obama donor. Obama Energy Secretary Chu approved
    more than half a billion dollars in taxpayer loans to Solyndra.
        Chu ignored Treasury's legal guidance and put the rights of
    private investors above taxpayer interests. When Solyndra when
    bankrupt, taxpayers lost $528 million. The Administration
    sought to delay Solyndra's layoff announcement until after the
    2010 election.
        Ms. Attkisson also covered Obama's Benghazi cover-up.
    Thanks to her, we know Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
    ignored the warning signs. As allies were withdrawing from
    Libya, we did not.
        We know four Americans died waiting in vain for our
    government to send help. We know Susan Rice, Hillary Clinton,
    and Ben Rhodes then lied, blaming the attack on a video.
        Attkisson was nominated for an Emmy for her Benghazi
    reporting.
        Director Wray, you and I are public officials. Media
    criticism comes with the job. Some criticism may be unfair. In
    fact, much of the criticism may be unfair.
        A free press is indispensable to our republic. America is
    better because of Sharyl Attkisson and investigative
    journalists. The American people deserve to know the truth
    about their government, including with respect to Fast and
    Furious, Solyndra, and Benghazi.
        So, did the Obama Administration thank Sharyl Attkisson for
    her work? Did the White House recognize her for keeping the
    public informed and holding government accountable?
        Did President Obama present her with a Presidential Medal
    of Freedom?
        No. Using a highly politicized FBI, the Administration
    spied on her, and that is what small-minded people do.
    Government emails show the Obama White House plotted to silence
    her stories.
        After suspicious incidents involving her home Internet,
    computers, and phones, Attkisson hired a forensic computer
    expert who determined she was hacked by an IP address used by
    the FBI to conduct domestic surveillance, and that spyware,
    proprietary to the Federal government, and several classified
    files had been inserted on her computer.
        CBS News, Ms. Attkisson's employer, undertook a second
    forensic exam confirming those conclusions. Former government
    officials, including one from the FBI, later admitted that they
    took part in this illegal surveillance.
        When confronted with the facts, Attkisson did what a good
    investigative journalist does. She sought the truth. As a last
    resort, she sued DOJ and the FBI in search of justice.
        Did the FBI come clean and admit what happened? No. They
    engaged in delay tactics, prompting Federal Judge James Wynn,
    an Obama appointee, to write a scathing rebuke of the
    government's conduct.
        I am short on time, so I will forward your office several
    written questions for a response. Basically, I am interested in
    knowing whether the FBI was ever directed to obtain information
    about investigative journalists by the Obama White House
    including for purposes of creating or maintaining an enemies
    list.
        Has the FBI ever attempted to retrieve data from any
    electronic device used by Sharyl Attkisson, James Rosen, or any
    journalist with the Associated Press?
        In each instance where that occurred, I would like it if
    the FBI would identify what legal authority such actions took
    place.
        Director Wray, the FBI must put restrictions in place to
    prevent an Administration regardless of party from using the
    FBI for political purposes.
        If you do not Act to expose past abuses by the FBI--
    expose--I believe it will be very difficult to receive
    congressional support for your priorities like FISA or
    preventing online platforms from blocking information from law
    enforcement.
        I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Jeffries?
        Mr. Jeffries. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Director
    Wray, for your presence here today and for your continuing
    service to the country.
        According to the FBI's website and your testimony earlier
    today, one of the highest priorities of the FBI is to deal with
    the impact that hate crimes have on the people of America. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Wray. Yes. Counterterrorism is the number-one priority
    of the FBI.
        Mr. Jeffries. Within that counterterrorism priority,
    domestic terrorism, which leads to some of the hate crime
    incidents that we have seen, falls within that scope. Is that
    right?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Jeffries. I think each year the FBI releases a hate
    crime statistics report. Is that true?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Jeffries. In the context of that report, I think you
    identify single-bias incidents as an incident in which one or
    more criminal offenses are motivated by a particular bias. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I haven't--I don't have the report in front
    of me. That sounds consistent with my recollection.
        Mr. Jeffries. Is it fair to say that since 2017 there has
    been a significant increase in hate crime incidents here in
    America?
        Mr. Wray. Between 2016 and 2018 there was definitely an
    increase in hate crimes reported, and I think we have reflected
    that in our report.
        Mr. Jeffries. So, a significant amount of those incidents
    are directed at individuals as a result of racial bias. Is that
    true?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Jeffries. So, we have seen an increase in hate crimes
    directed at communities of color, correct?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Jeffries. An increase in hate crimes directed at
    immigrant communities. Is that right?
        Mr. Wray. Less so of that, but yes.
        Mr. Jeffries. Have we seen an increase in hate crimes
    directed at members of the Jewish faith as well?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know that we have reliable data on that.
    Certainly, we are deeply concerned about the antisemitic
    violence that we have been seeing in this country and there
    have been a number of attacks just over the last 18 months that
    we have observed.
        So, I don't know that we have reliable data on that one.
    Certainly, there is plenty of reason to be deeply concerned.
        Mr. Jeffries. I think based on your report--I believe this
    is the 2018 report--in 20 percent of the incidents that fall
    within the hate crime category are crimes directed at
    individuals as a result of racial bias. Is that right?
        Mr. Wray. I don't have the percentages in front of me.
        Mr. Jeffries. Think in that category of antireligious hate
    approximately 55 percent of those antireligious hate incidents
    are actually directed at Members of the Jewish community. Is
    that fair to say?
        Mr. Wray. That sounds quite possible. Again, I don't have
    the report in front of me. As I said, we are extremely focused
    right now on antisemitic attacks, of which there have been an
    alarming number over the last 18 months alone.
        Mr. Jeffries. In terms of this troubling increase that we
    have seen since 2017 directed at African Americans, Latinos,
    people of color, immigrants, certainly Members of the Jewish
    community, what are some of the steps that you are taking in
    this climate of hatred that has festered over the last few
    years to address this alarming rise?
        Mr. Wray. Well, we will not tolerate hate-fueled violence
    in our communities, and we are addressing them investigatively.
    I have mentioned a couple, but I will just recap a few and then
    add a few.
        Number one, we are using every tool in the toolbox. We are
    trying to be creative. So that is not just traditional gun
    charges, explosives charges, things like that but, for example,
    rising out of the Charlottesville incident we used the federal
    rioting statute to charge some people there, which was a fairly
    novel statute to rely on.
        I have created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion
    Cell, which didn't exist before, to bring together those two
    disciplines to ensure we are maximizing our effectiveness.
        I have elevated racially-motivated violent extremists'
    threat on the same level as a national threat priority along
    with ISIS and homegrown violent extremists.
        Mr. Jeffries. Mr. Wray, can I just stop you right there
    because I am running out of time, and I appreciate you
    articulating that.
        Mr. Wray. Yeah.
        Mr. Jeffries. You mentioned Charlottesville, and one of the
    troubling things that came out of Charlottesville beyond the
    death of a young woman who was there, which is incredibly
    tragic, is that some of the White nationalists, the White
    supremacists, the neo-Nazis were heard to have chanted, ``Jews
    will not replace us.'' Is that right?
        Mr. Wray. I believe I remember hearing that was said.
        Mr. Jeffries. Is that connected to a theory amongst White
    nationalists called replacement theory where, apparently, there
    is this view that Jews are genetically programmed to undermine
    Christian civilization and seek to replace White Christians
    with a more ethnically diverse population. That is replacement
    theory. Is that right?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I am not an expert on the different strands
    of White supremacist ideology.
        Mr. Jeffries. Why were they chanting ``Jews will not
    replace us'' in a context where there is all of this xenophobic
    activity, anti-immigrant activity, and then we see a rise in
    antisemitic incidents?
        I mean, is the FBI actually looking into the connectivity
    between a theory that exists and the xenophobic attacks that
    have come from the highest office in the land, and then a
    troubling increase for a variety of reasons and we need to deal
    with all of those reasons--but a troubling increase in
    antisemitic incidents?
        Mr. Wray. We are investigating antisemitic violence. So, we
    don't investigate ideology or rhetoric no matter how abhorrent
    it is.
        What we do is investigate violence, and when it is violence
    that is fueled by some despicable ideology then that is part of
    the investigation.
        Mr. Jeffries. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. [Presiding.] Thank you.
        The gentleman from Texas is recognized.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Director Wray, good to see you. Thanks for
    being here.
        I originally intended to talk to you about the encryption
    issue today. Given where this hearing started and where I think
    it is going as it relates to the issue of FISA abuse, I am
    going to ask you about this.
        I want to give you an opportunity to hopefully answer these
    questions once and for all so that the rest of your testimony
    can be properly directed.
        It seems like some of my Democratic colleagues, because
    this FISA process was initiated during the Obama
    Administration, that they want to focus on the fact that there
    was no abuse of the FISA process or that the abuse was not
    politically motivated.
        It started with Chair Nadler. The very first question to
    you was trying to establish that the Inspector General found no
    evidence of political motive or bias against the President, and
    you responded that the Inspector General's report speaks for
    itself.
        So, does the Inspector General, and Inspector General
    Horowitz, on December 11th before the Senate Judiciary
    Committee, said this quote, ``On the FISA side, we found, as
    you noted, a lack of documentary or testimonial evidence about
    intentionality. But, we also noted the lack of satisfactory
    explanations and, in fact, we have opened the possibility that
    for the reasons you indicated it is unclear what the
    motivations were. On the one hand, gross incompetence,
    negligence. On the other hand, intentionality and everywhere in
    between,'' end quote.
        Just because no FBI agent tells the Inspector General, I
    admit, I am biased and politically motivated against President
    Trump, doesn't mean there isn't overwhelming evidence of bias
    and political motivation in the record.
        To use just one example, an FBI lawyer involved intimately
    in this FISA process against a Trump campaign associate, Carter
    Page, sent a number of texts in and around the election of
    President Trump. Here are a few of them.
        ``The crazies finally won.'' Another one. ``This is the Tea
    Party on steroids.'' Another one. ``Pence is stupid.'' Another
    text that he sent, ``I just can't imagine the systematic
    disassembly of the progress we have made over the last eight
    years.'' Finally, when asked whether he intended to keep
    working during the Trump Administration, he said, quote, ``Viva
    la resistance.''
        Regardless of what that FBI lawyer admitted, do you see
    evidence of political bias or motivation against President
    Trump in those text messages?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I would just say, Congressman, as I have
    said before that I consider the report to have described
    conduct that I consider unacceptable and unrepresentative of
    who we are as an institution.
        I am not going to comment on specific people's conduct for
    a variety of reasons. I will say that political bias has no
    place in today's FBI.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I appreciate that. I am going to ask
    you to comment on someone's specific conduct because that very
    same FBI agent is the one the Inspector General found in his
    report was the one that tampered with evidence by
    counterfeiting an email from an intelligence agency to
    illegally continue surveillance of a Trump campaign associate.
    That is what happened, right, Director?
        Mr. Wray. Again, I would just refer you to the report.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, the report acknowledges that. So, does
    the Department of Justice and the FISA court. They acknowledge
    that this was illegal surveillance with respect to at least
    several of these FISA applications because there was not
    probable cause or proper predication, correct?
        Mr. Wray. Right.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. So, to the point of one of my Democratic
    colleagues that there was no fraud on the court, illegal
    surveillance, and changing evidence to conduct illegal
    surveillance is the very definition of fraud on the court, is
    it not?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I certainly think it describes conduct that
    is utterly unacceptable.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. It is what took place here.
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I refer to the report. We have
    accepted, and I have been very clear about this--we have
    accepted every finding in the Inspector General's report,
    including some that are extremely painful to us as an
    institution.
        Mr. Ratcliffe. I appreciate it, Director Wray. I love the
    FBI. You know my background. I know what you are trying to do.
    I know the difficult position that you are in.
        I think the record is clear. I remain convinced that the
    prior Administration weaponized the FBI for political
    motivation and purposes.
        I just wonder whether or not you are going to be able to
    put the genie back in the bottle. I truly know that your
    motivations are to do that.
        I wish you the best of luck.
        I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. Thank you.
        The gentleman from California is recognized.
        Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, and thank you, Director, for
    appearing today and thank the agents that you oversee every
    day. Please extend to them our thanks for what they do for our
    country.
        Mr. Deutch talked about our hope that the bipartisan
    background checks bill will receive a vote in the Senate. I
    hope that is the case, too.
        I am the brother of two police officers, and while my
    brothers and I don't agree on every gun safety proposal that I
    have, I tell them every day they are all rooted in wanting to
    protect them and the people in our communities, including FBI
    agents.
        I know here today are young people who are marching for our
    lives and even a father who was asked to leave the State of the
    Union last night because the passion he brings to this issue--
    Fred Guttenberg, who lost his daughter, Jamie, at Parkland, who
    does not seek to take anyone's weapons who possesses them
    legally but just wants to make sure we are all safer in our
    communities.
        So, I look forward to working with the Bureau to make sure
    that we can keep our pistols, keep our rifles, keep our
    shotguns to protect ourselves, but also make sure the most
    dangerous weapons don't end up in the hands of the most
    dangerous people.
        Shifting to election interference, Director, are the
    Russians interfering in our election right now?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think we have seen any ongoing
    efforts to target election infrastructure like we did in 2016.
    We, certainly, are seeing and have never stopped seeing,
    really, since 2016 efforts to engage in malign foreign
    influence by the Russians.
        So, that is the use of false personas, fake media accounts,
    social media stuff, the trolls, the bots--all that stuff that
    is described at great length both in the ICA and in some of the
    indictments that have been returned since then.
        So, that kind of effort is still very much ongoing. That is
    not just an election cycle issue but, of course, now that we
    are in an election year it is an effort to influence our public
    in that regard.
        Mr. Swalwell. Does the FBI see the Russians amplifying
    content of certain campaigns in the 2020 election, meaning,
    creating accounts, trying to create discord, or not just in
    general political discord but does the Bureau see an effort to
    try and help or hurt any particular campaign through social
    media amplification?
        Mr. Wray. I would have to think about whether or not I
    could say anything in an open setting on that. Certainly, I
    would say in general that the efforts to sow divisiveness and
    discord on both sides of an issue and to generate controversy
    and to generate distrust in our democratic institutions and our
    electoral process, that is very much ongoing.
        Mr. Swalwell. Are other countries also capable of doing
    that or are doing that right now?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know that we have seen other countries
    trying to do exactly that. Certainly, other countries like
    China, for example, have very active malign foreign influence
    efforts in this country. Theirs is a little bit different than
    the efforts that I was just describing.
        It is still very, very active and very serious. It is more
    geared--in their instance, it is more geared towards trying to
    shift our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on
    a variety of issues.
        We do know that other adversaries besides Russia are
    looking very closely at what the Russians have done and taking
    note of it and giving active consideration as to whether that
    is a playbook they should adopt.
        Mr. Swalwell. Director, you are sitting in the same Chair
    that Director Mueller testified to this Committee from. He laid
    out a number of instances of obstruction of justice in his
    report, but also cited a DOJ policy that prevents a sitting
    President from being indicted, and it has raised the question
    for me and many on this Committee--and we have introduced
    legislation that would toll the statute of limitations for a
    sitting President to have them start running again once they
    leave office.
        As far as the Bureau goes, as far as I know, the Bureau has
    procedures to open an investigation, and there is different
    phases of an investigation before presenting it to the
    Department of Justice for prosecution.
        So, if the DOJ policy prevents a sitting President from
    being indicted, is the Bureau even able to investigate
    allegations of wrongdoing?
        I just want to take this President out, and just any
    President in the future as long as that policy is in place. Are
    you able to even start an investigation or would you have to
    wait until the President left office?
        Do you understand the question?
        Mr. Wray. I think I do, and I am not sure I have an answer
    sitting here right now about a specific hypothetical.
        Obviously, the FBI investigates not just crimes but
    national security threats, and I think something that a lot of
    people don't understand is that we have counterintelligence
    investigations that often aren't geared towards crimes or
    charging anybody at all.
        They are geared towards identifying and understanding
    national security threats and mitigating or neutralizing those
    threats.
        So, there might be some difference there.
        Mr. Swalwell. If you had an allegation--if you had an
    allegation of wrongdoing, do you see that DOJ policy as
    limiting you from even conducting an investigation while the
    person is in office?
        Mr. Wray. I would have to give that more thought. I don't
    have an answer sitting here right now.
        Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. The gentleman from Florida is recognized.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Director Wray, it is often the case that it is in a
    community's worst moment or toughest day that they interact
    with the FBI. That was certainly the case for my community in
    Pensacola following the terrorist attack at NAS Pensacola.
        I wanted to begin by thanking the FBI and the very talented
    professionals who brought comfort and competence and a very
    thorough investigation into that fact pattern.
        I am confident, based on the work of the FBI in concert
    with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
    Security, that on a going forward basis will be able to work
    with our allies more closely so that there is ongoing robust
    review of communications and social media content.
        I know that investigation is concluded with the press
    conference that Attorney General Barr had.
        I wanted to give you the opportunity to reflect on any
    lessons learned and any strategies that we might use to ensure
    that our military communities are safe as we host some of our
    foreign partners.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you for the
    question and thank you also for the kind words about our folks
    who work very hard on that investigation, also with their
    military partners, especially NCIS, among others.
        Certainly, that tragic event highlighted a number of
    things. One, the importance of making sure that we get adequate
    information from our foreign partners and that they do the
    diligence that often they are in the best position to do on the
    people before they come our way, and I think the kingdom has
    indicated an interest in being more engaged on that and I think
    that is a healthy and positive sign.
        Another different lesson learned, though, from that
    investigation, which ties into a topic that has come up a few
    times already here this morning and, as the Attorney General
    commented, I think, very forcefully on, one of the things that
    the shooter in Pensacola did in the heat of the moment while
    people were coming at him and he was coming at them, took the
    time to shoot one of his own phones to destroy it so that,
    presumably, we, in law enforcement, wouldn't have access to
    what is in it.
        Now, remarkably, the men and women of the FBI in our Office
    of Technology Division (OTD) were able to reconstruct that
    phone as an engineering matter so that we could have access to
    it for a technical perspective.
        Because of the way the encryption is on the phone, we don't
    have meaningful access to the content of that phone. So,
    whatever it is he was trying to prevent us all from seeing, we
    don't know, and we are currently engaged with Apple hoping to
    try to see if we can get better help from them to try to get
    access to the contents of that phone.
        It illustrates why this lawful access issue is such an
    important one. I appreciate the question.
        Mr. Gaetz. Given the fact that recently al-Qaida Yemen has
    taken responsibility for the terrorist attack in my community,
    it would seem to elevate our need to have access to those
    communication devices and tools.
        Apple responds that the government should not be forced to
    compel them to make a key for a lock that exists. Do you
    believe that there is meaningful legislation that the Congress
    should consider so that technology partners have a yellow brick
    road to work with the government to not put burdens on them
    that could be used by our adversaries but that, in fact, could
    help the FBI with these important investigations that involve
    these complex issues of international criminal and terrorist
    organizations?
        Mr. Wray. Well, whether it is done by legislation or done
    by the companies doing it voluntarily, I think we have to find
    a solution. This problem is real. It is now. I hear about it
    from law enforcement from every State in the country all the
    time.
        It affects every threat we are contending with. We believe
    strongly in encryption, as I said to the Chair earlier. We also
    believe that law enforcement has to have lawful access to the
    content of where the information is or we are not going to be
    able to protect people.
        There are some countries that have already passed
    legislation of the sort that you are referring to--Australia,
    for example.
        One way or another, we have got to figure out a way to
    solve this problem or we are all going to wake up one day and
    realize that law enforcement--the hardworking men and women of
    law enforcement in Pensacola and everywhere else are blind.
        If you were a criminal and you had a choice between doing
    all your information and communications in a device that was
    utterly beyond reach of law enforcement and doing it in one
    where law enforcement with a warrant could have access, which
    one would you pick?
        Of course, you would pick the first one. I think these are
    decisions that should be made by the American people through
    their elected representatives, not through one company making a
    business decision on behalf of all us.
        Mr. Gaetz. Well, I hope as we unpack these difficult and
    complex questions that the FBI will work with my office because
    my community is deeply vested in these questions now, because
    we have seen the impact and as we see the involvement of
    international terrorist organizations claiming credit, we are
    even more interested to ensure that those who are killing and
    maiming my constituents are held accountable.
        I thank the Chair and I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. Thank you.
        The gentleman from California is recognized.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Madam Vice-Chair.
        Thank you, Director Wray, for your service. I would like to
    first ask about election security. There are various components
    of election security. I would like to focus on two.
        The first is the actual hacking of voting machines and
    databases containing voter files--what steps are the FBI taking
    to make sure that it doesn't happen?
        Mr. Wray. So, on the cyber side, if you will--the hacking
    side--we are taking a three-prong approach. We have
    investigations, intelligence sharing, and engagement.
        So, on the investigation side we have investigations that
    we will conduct into potential cyber intrusions into election
    infrastructure. A lot of times it is not clear when there is an
    intrusion who is behind it, right.
        It could be somebody for a financial motive or just
    mischief, or it could ultimately trace back to a Nation State
    and foreign adversary, and that is one of the things we try to
    do on the cyber side.
        On the intelligence-sharing side, we have tried to push out
    to State and local election officials and campaigns indicators
    to be on the lookout for so that they are more likely to, if
    they spot something, think, wait a minute--this might be
    something I should contact FBI or law enforcement about.
        Then on the engagement side, we have tried to do things
    including we have created a protected voices website that puts
    out information to campaigns all over the country about cyber
    hygiene to better protect their not necessarily election
    infrastructure but the campaign infrastructure, if you will,
    from cyber-attacks.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
        So, the second component, which I think could have even
    more of an influence on elections, is disinformation--spy op
    operations--and as you know, the Mueller investigation the
    special counsel indicted a Russian troll farm.
        So, what steps are FBI doing to try to mitigate
    disinformation in the upcoming election?
        Mr. Wray. So, I think you are right, that in some ways that
    is an even more challenging area, not the least because it
    never stopped, right. It happened in 2016 and it has been
    continuing ever since then.
        It may have uptick during an election cycle, but it is a
    24/7 365 days a year threat.
        Second reason it is challenging is that, unlike a cyber-
    attack on an election infrastructure, that kind of effort
    disinformation in a world where we have a First amendment and
    believe strongly in freedom of expression, the FBI is not going
    to be in the business of being the truth police and monitoring
    disinformation online.
        So, it requires not just the investigations when we do get
    leads that we can pursue but also engagement with the social
    media companies in particular, and that is one of the places
    where there have been great strides since 2016 where we have
    made--and we saw it in the midterms with a lot better
    engagement with the social media companies where there are
    things that they can do as private companies voluntarily, based
    on their own terms of use or terms of service, where they can
    use the resources they have to find and shut down accounts and
    sort of nip some of these things in the bud.
        So, I think this is going to require not just a government
    solution, but a sort of private industry solution as part of
    dealing with that threat.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
        I would like to shift subjects to the Department of Justice
    bias training. As a Member of the Congressional Asian and
    Pacific American Caucus, I want to follow up on a question I
    submitted for the record the last time you had come in and
    testified regarding the DOJ's department wide implicit bias
    training.
        Do you know what the status of that training is, and if you
    don't, could you submit us information of the status of the
    training?
        Mr. Wray. I would be happy to provide you more information
    as a follow-up.
        Mr. Lieu. Okay. All right.
        There is always an issue of folks in the United States who
    are engaging in spying. There are also folks who may be
    intimately caught up in that. So, I think it is better if we
    had a classified briefing on this.
        In terms of Asian Americans who are surveilled or targeted
    by the FBI or Asian nationals who are, would you be willing to
    give a briefing to the Members of the Congressional Asian and
    Pacific American Caucus in a classified setting what the scope
    of that program is and the status of it?
        Mr. Wray. We would be happy to arrange some kind of closed
    session briefing on the counterintelligence efforts in the
    space that you are talking about.
        Exactly what would be in the briefing we would have to sort
    of think through. Certainly, I am sure there is helpful
    information we could share and it would probably be
    constructive.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. The gentleman from Arizona is recognized.
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thanks, Director Wray, for being here today. We have talked
    a bit about this order from Judge Collyer from December 17th of
    2019, in particular, a couple of references she makes that FBI
    personnel provided information which was unsupported or
    contradicted by information in their possession and also
    several instances in which FBI personnel withheld from the
    National Security Division of DOJ information in their
    possession, which was detrimental to their case and their
    presentations to the FISA court.
        In particular, she expands specifically on what some of
    those were. The fact that there were allegations that Carter
    Page had met with two different Russians in July in Russia--in
    July of 2016, even though Page said he had never met them.
        That was never included--this kind of exculpatory
    information. Nor did they talk about the actual origins of the
    information that they were relying on.
        You have said repeatedly today that the conduct was
    unacceptable, and I am trying to determine in my mind whether
    you find some distinction between unacceptable and whether
    there was any kind of criminal conduct on the part of these
    people who were giving sworn--effectively, sworn testimony by
    signing these sworn affidavits to the court, neither altering
    evidence or failing to disclose evidence that was exculpatory
    as required.
        Do you find anything criminal in their conduct?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think each case depends on the facts of
    the specific individual, right. So, when you start talking
    about criminal liability, there is always a question of the
    level of intent--the mens rea, right.
        So, whether or not the particular individual knowingly
    misled somebody that might be different from somebody who made
    a mistake and omitted some information.
        Either way, the reason I use the word unacceptable is not--
    I am not trying to sort of split hairs or engage in semantics.
    What I am saying is I hold the men and women of the FBI to a
    heck of a lot higher standard than not violating the criminal
    law.
        I expect the men and women of the FBI to be the best of the
    best and to do everything by the book, which is why in speech
    after speech, in every field office and every headquarters
    division, the first topic I raise is the importance of not just
    getting to the right result but, rather, letting the process be
    followed and ensure that the way we do what we do defines the
    FBI's brand way more than whether or not we are successful in a
    particular investigation.
        I specifically have been raising, and this goes all the way
    back to my first few months as director, the importance of
    making sure that the judges who sign our warrants can trust our
    work.
        That is not something that I started saying in response to
    this report. I have been hitting that theme since the outset
    because it is so important to me, having been not just a
    prosecutor but a defense attorney.
        To me, it is at the very heart of who I am as a
    professional and what I expect of our people--the candor to the
    court.
        Mr. Biggs. I get that. So, what you are talking about is
    ethical actions regardless of what the criminal liability may--
    or exposure may be because of a culpable mental state.
        I get that, and I think we could have a philosophical
    debate of whether criminal law is reflective of the morality of
    our culture and our society.
        That is not why we are here today. What happened here was
    so systemic or systematic that the judge said it was so
    questionable I don't know if we can even rely on other FBI
    affidavits.
        That indicates that there might have been some kind of
    imputation of some kind of criminal mens rea requirement. I
    don't want to get into that right now, because I want to ask
    another question.
        I think that maybe you--I would hope that you have really
    considered whether there was criminal culpability on the part
    of these people who misled the court and spied--and resulted in
    spying on American citizens without, in my opinion, real
    probable cause to do so.
        So, one of the things that you talked about as your reforms
    is to have the field office involved when you are bringing
    something into the home office to investigate.
        The problem that I see with that is that you are asking,
    effectively, a subordinate to go to have input that might be
    counter to their superior, somebody who actually has,
    basically, some impact on their career even.
        So, this becomes problematic. I would like you to address
    that in a second. I would just give you my example. I was a
    trial lawyer myself on both sides, prosecuting and defending.
        I did international law for a while. When I went back to
    get a graduate degree, I could tell you this. Even with my
    experience, I was wary to cross the professor because I knew
    they had control over my grades. They had control over whether
    I would be able to finish my degree in the time I wanted to get
    my degree finished.
        So, I would suggest to you that maybe that might not be a
    reform that actually is more than cosmetic in nature and I
    would like you to address that, please.
        Mr. Wray. So, I certainly understand the concern and the
    dynamic that you are describing. What I would say is this. The
    changes that I put in place there have a few different
    dimensions.
        One, and this was not made clear before so this is
    something that we did, my leadership team and I, that differs
    from the past, we made it explicit that other than in the
    rarest of circumstances all investigations should be conducted
    in the field.
        You might think that should be obvious. That wasn't
    articulated clearly. We articulate it clearly.
        Second, we built in place the check and balance concept
    that I described in response to some of the earlier questions.
        I get your point about subordinate/superior. I think what
    we were trying to do was ensure that in that case, the Deputy
    Director would have the input of the field office leadership.
        What I did not want to do, since this would be a policy
    that would govern us, going forward in every possible situation
    is prevent ever under any circumstances whatsoever
    investigations being conducted out of headquarters.
        I don't think something that absolute is wise for me to tie
    the FBI director's hands in that regard. I will give you an
    example.
        One of the Black eyes of the FBI in the past was, of
    course, the Hanssen matter. Now, that kind of investigation was
    conducted out of headquarters. It was an unusual situation,
    incredibly important, incredibly delicate for reasons that I am
    sure you can imagine.
        That was appropriate that it be conducted out of
    headquarters. In many ways the pipe bomb investigation--the 9/
    11-related investigation--that was, in many ways, run out of
    headquarters, and I had a front row seat to that as I was in
    the department's leadership under President Bush and Attorney
    General Ashcroft at the time.
        So, there are rare, rare circumstances where it does make
    sense to have an investigation run out of headquarters. What
    needed to be clear was everybody needs to understand that had
    to be kind of the Black swan, the unusual situation.
        The steps that we put in place and the corrective action
    that you are referring to be our effort to try to make sure
    that people understood it couldn't just become a practice--that
    you had to jump through those hoops, and hopefully we will
    accomplish that.
        Mr. Biggs. Director, I would hope that you would--
        Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Biggs. I would hope that you would go on with regard to
    the reform--the superior/subordinate issue that we talked
    about.
        Thanks, Director.
        Ms. Scanlon. Okay. The time has expired.
        The gentleman from Maryland is recognized.
        Mr. Raskin. Welcome, Director Wray. Thank you for your hard
    work.
        Does the FBI publish the Uniform Crime Report?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Raskin. So, the 2018 report found that there were 24
    hate-related murders in our country that year. That didn't
    include 11 people who were murdered by a neo-Nazi White
    supremacist at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh.
        Why were they not included?
        Mr. Wray. I don't--sitting here right now, I haven't
    drilled into the methodology behind the report. I will tell you
    that when it comes to the Tree of Life Synagogue that I not
    only have been personally monitoring it, but I actually went to
    the Tree of Life crime scene, walked through it with the team,
    et cetera.
        Mr. Raskin. So, you saw it. You knew that--
        Mr. Wray. So, I am deeply invested and got a full play-by-
    play as to the horror that occurred there.
        Mr. Raskin. You knew--
        Mr. Wray. I will say that one of the things that a lot of
    people don't realize is that, but for a few fluke
    coincidences--really completely fluke coincidences--there would
    have been a whole bunch of kids going to, in effect, class at
    the top floor of that synagogue and the death toll from that
    attack could have been exponentially worse, as horrifying and
    tragic as what actually happened was.
        Mr. Raskin. Yeah. So, it was the most violent antisemitic
    attack in the history of the United States, but it wasn't
    recorded in the 2018 hate crimes compilation that the FBI
    publishes, just as Heather Heyer's murder by a crazed White
    supremacist in Charlottesville was not recorded in the 2017
    Uniform Crime Report.
        Are you aware of this problem in the methodology that the
    FBI is using?
        Mr. Wray. I am not aware of the specific methodological
    problem.
        Mr. Raskin. Do you know why this is happening?
        Mr. Wray. I do not. I am happy to take a closer look at it.
        Mr. Raskin. Well, as I understand it, because I looked into
    this, the FBI relies on State and local governments to turn in
    statistics related to hate crimes. So, if they fail to do it,
    if they are overwhelmed, negligent, or whatever, it doesn't
    happen.
        So, you were there at the Tree of Life scene of the
    massacre. You knew about it. It never appeared in the FBI's
    statistics.
        The FBI reports an average of 7,500 hate crimes a year, if
    you look at 2013-2017. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
    National Crime Victimization Survey estimated an average of
    200,000 hate crimes a year, right.
        So, that is a pretty dramatic difference between what your
    larger department is saying exist in hate crimes and what the
    FBI is saying.
        Do you think this is a problem in terms of us just getting
    a hold on what the problem of violent White supremacy is
    presenting to America today?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think it is unique to White
    supremacy. I do think, and I think I may have said this in
    response to one of your colleagues, we do know that hate crimes
    are historically underreported.
        Of course, the challenge of underreporting is you never
    know for sure just how badly underreported they are. We also
    know that reporting has increased significantly over the last
    couple of years.
        That may be because the violence is on the rise, or it
    could be because more departments are doing what you are
    rightly suggesting we need them to do. We are trying to do a
    lot on our end to encourage State and local law enforcement to
    provide better reporting.
        Mr. Raskin. What are you doing?
        Mr. Wray. So, we do presentations on it. We do outreach
    about it. In speeches when I am meeting with law enforcement, I
    will talk about it. Things like that.
        Mr. Raskin. Let me shift to a related subject. Between 2009
    and 2018, domestic extremists killed in our country 427 people,
    which equates to about three-quarters of all the extremist
    murders. Most of them were conducted by White supremacists and
    other far right extremists.
        Yet, we have had testimony--we have heard testimony that
    most of the Department of Justice's and FBI's resources are
    still channeled at Islamic or Islamist fundamentalist terror.
        What have you done to try to reallocate resources towards
    what has been the major threat in terms of domestic terror
    since 2001?
        Certainly, over the last decade it has been White extremist
    groups that have presented the biggest threat. So, what have
    you done to channel the resources in the right direction?
        Mr. Wray. Well, we have directed all our joint terrorism
    task forces to have domestic terrorism squarely within their
    sites.
        We have created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion
    Cell to ensure that we are bringing not just the
    counterterrorism resources but on the criminal investigative
    division side our civil rights enforcement folks lashed up with
    the domestic terrorism folks.
        I have elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to a
    national threat priority at the same band with homegrown
    violent extremism and ISIS.
        We had about the same number of arrests in the last fiscal
    year on both fronts. In either case, I would say that for us,
    we assess that the greatest threat to the homeland as certain
    things that cross between both the jihadist-inspired and the
    racially-motivated violent extremist side, which is you have
    lone actors, typically, who are, largely, radicalized online
    and choose, sometimes very quickly go from despicable rhetoric
    to violence, choose easily accessible weapons--a car, knife,
    gun, and maybe an IED they can build crudely off of the
    Internet--and they choose soft targets. That threat, that is
    what we assess is the biggest threat to the homeland right now.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Scanlon. Okay.
        Before I recognize the gentleman from California, after
    your questions we will take a 10-15-minute break.
        The gentleman from California is recognized.
        Mr. McClintock. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Wray, I am still not clear of your response to
    questions asked by both Mr. Nadler and Mr. Ratcliffe.
        Is it your testimony that there was no political bias in
    the decisions and actions that affected the so-called Crossfire
    Hurricane investigation?
        Mr. Wray. My testimony is that the Inspector General made a
    number of very specific findings on the question of political
    bias both about what he found and what he didn't find, and we
    accept that in full.
        Mr. McClintock. I am not asking what the Inspector General
    found. I am asking after 2\1/2\ years heading the FBI what is
    your judgment? Was there political bias involved with this
    investigation?
        Mr. Wray. My judgment is the same as the Inspector
    General's.
        Mr. McClintock. Same answer to the mid-term exam
    investigation?
        Mr. Wray. Oh, about the prior investigation?
        Mr. McClintock. Yeah.
        Mr. Wray. I haven't gone back and rereviewed that one. So,
    but again, we accepted all the findings of the Inspector
    General, so yeah.
        Mr. McClintock. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Wray.
        Gregg Jarrett, the journalist, wrote a book--actually, a
    series of books--on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation--and
    in his latest book he describes it as, ``The story of ambitious
    and unscrupulous people in high positions of government who
    abused their authority.
        They sought to subvert the Rule of law and undermine the
    democratic process. They weaponized their powers to influence
    the Presidential election, undo the result they did not like,
    and extrude the elected President from office.
        Our intelligence community and the FBI were at the heart of
    this illicit and unprecedented scheme.''
        As director of the FBI, what is your response to that
    observation?
        Mr. Wray. My response is that the conduct described in the
    Inspector General's report is unacceptable.
        Mr. McClintock. You say unacceptable--
        Mr. Wray. That it is unrepresentative of the FBI that I see
    every day working there, as Director.
        Mr. McClintock. Then let me ask you, who has been fired as
    a result of the Inspector General's report?
        Mr. Wray. Well, most of the people involved in the
    investigation that is featured in the Inspector General
    report--
        Mr. McClintock. Who has been fired?
        Mr. Wray. Well, there are a few people who are no longer
    with the FBI. Some of them have been terminated. Some of them
    left on their own. Some of them have sued me.
        Mr. McClintock. Let me ask you this. Who has been
    disciplined? Who has been disciplined?
        Mr. Wray. Like I said, there have been a number of people
    who have been terminated from the FBI. Some of them have sued
    me.
        Mr. McClintock. Terminated or allowed to resign?
        Mr. Wray. Well, in some cases, terminated.
        Mr. McClintock. You know, you use the word unacceptable. I
    would think you would find a stronger word for that over what
    has happened by the actions of people who sullied the
    reputations of every decent person at the FBI and disgraced the
    agency that you now head.
        The FBI is entrusted with the most terrifying powers that
    we can give our government--the power to ruin people's lives,
    to invade their privacy, to launch pre-dawn raids on their
    homes, to bankrupt them with legal costs, to deprive them of
    their liberty.
        We entrust you and your agency with these powers to protect
    our liberty and to protect our safety, and when those powers
    are abused in the manner that we saw in this whole Russian
    collusion hoax, that is a direct threat to our freedom and to
    the credibility of your agency.
        I am terribly disappointed that you cannot summon the
    outrage to put it in stronger words than just this is
    unacceptable and doesn't represent the FBI.
        Unfortunately, at the moment, it does represent the FBI or
    at least the leadership of the FBI that committed these abuses.
        You were appointed to clean things up and I am just--after
    reading the IG's report and the Strzok and Page emails and the
    actions of Bruce and Nellie Orr, McCabe, and Comey, frankly,
    Mr. Director, I don't trust your agency anymore.
        That is a profound thing for me to say because I was raised
    to revere the FBI. I sat glued to the television every week
    when Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., came on and exemplified everything
    that was great and holy about our government.
        I think that you have lost the trust of an awful lot of
    Americans and that is a dangerous, dangerous thing for an
    agency that (a) is entrusted with these powers, (b) is
    entrusted with these powers to specifically protect our lives
    and liberty.
        I don't see how you can restore public trust without a
    thorough and complete and public housecleaning and without at
    least a clear and unambiguous expression of moral outrage,
    unacceptable actions against those in our agency, or I should
    say, unmistakable actions against those in the agency that
    abuse these powers.
        Let me just ask you one final question. Looking at the
    treatment of Michael Flynn by your agency, why would anyone in
    his right mind want to talk to an FBI agent knowing that there
    could be a hidden agenda to catch them up on a factual detail
    and then prosecute them for lying?
        Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Flynn's case is the subject of ongoing
    litigation. So, I am not going to talk about his particular
    case.
        I will tell you that I am sorry to hear the views that you
    express. I will also tell you that having been to--I have been
    to--
        Mr. McClintock. Those views have--include me.
        Mr. Wray. I am sorry. May I answer?
        Mr. McClintock. Yeah.
        Mr. Wray. May I answer?
        Having been to every field office of the FBI, having talked
    to law enforcement in every State in the country, having
    engaged with every headquarters division, having engaged with
    partners, private sector, public sector, foreign, State, local,
    and intelligence community, I can tell you that the FBI that I
    see every day is the kind of FBI that you describe having
    reverence for and I hope that we can restore your confidence in
    that FBI.
        I would say to you also that I am not somebody, as is quite
    clear by now to lots of people, who expresses himself with
    hyperbole and loud rhetoric.
        I am somebody who reflects his views through action, and we
    have taken--I implemented the day the Inspector General's
    report came out over 40 deep corrective actions that deal with
    that series of failures and problems.
        I have communicated over and over and over again my
    expectation of what the FBI employees should do and that,
    frankly, is what I do see from the FBI employees day in and day
    out, all over the country and, frankly, all over the world.
        Now, where there are people who need to be held
    accountable, we have a disciplinary process for that, for the
    current employees.
        The vast majority of the people involved in the conduct
    that you are describing are no longer with the FBI, so they are
    not subject to our disciplinary process in the first place.
        There is, of course, as you know, the ongoing John Durham
    investigation, which we have been cooperating with fully, as
    the Attorney General himself has said.
        So, I look forward to, hopefully, having another hearing
    with you at some point where we can have a very different kind
    of exchange about the FBI.
        Mr. McClintock. I would very much look forward to that.
        Ms. Scanlon. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The Committee will stand in recess until 12:45. We would
    ask that people stay seated until the director is able to make
    his way out of the room.
        [Recess.]
        Chair Nadler. The Committee will come to order.
        Mr. Cicilline?
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Director.
        I have to say for me it is sad to see in an ongoing and
    desperate attempt to please the impeached President that some
    are continuing to malign the extraordinary men and women of the
    FBI who serve the American people with honor. So, I want to
    begin my comments by saying thank you for your extraordinary
    service to our country and to the brave men and women of the
    FBI.
        On that score, the survival of our democracy is directly
    dependent on our ability to protect the integrity of our
    elections, particularly from foreign interference, and so that
    it's clear that the American people get to decide who will lead
    this country, not some foreign power. So, I hear from my
    constituents regularly about what is being done to secure the
    2020 election.
        You said, Director, back in December that Russia represents
    the most significant threat to the election cycle itself. My
    first question, is that still your assessment?
        Mr. Wray. Yes, it is.
        Mr. Cicilline. Would you just describe what steps the
    Bureau has taken to investigate, deter, and counter Russian and
    other foreign governments' attempts to interfere in our
    elections, and particularly what lessons we might have learned
    or the FBI might have learned from the 2016 and 2018 elections
    that hopefully give you confidence that we're in a better
    position to combat the Russian threat?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. Needless to say,
    this is something that it's at the top of our list as a
    priority because it goes right to the heart of who we are as a
    country. One of the things that I did shortly after taking over
    as Director was to create the Foreign Influence Task Force in
    the FBI that brings together not just our counterintelligence
    resources, but our Cyber Division resources, our criminal
    investigative resources, and even our counterterrorism
    resources, which might sound a little counterintuitive at
    first.
        One of the things that we know the Russians have attempted
    to do, in addition to some of the more publicized things, is to
    try to spin up some of the domestic terrorism-type activity
    that occurs in this country. So, there was value of bringing
    that discipline to it as well.
        We have a three-prong strategy to deal with this effort--
    investigations, intelligence sharing, and engagement. The
    investigation side is pretty much what you would imagine. It's
    everything from public corruption investigations, voter
    suppression investigations, counterintelligence investigations,
    and cyber investigations.
        There, of course, have been indictments, many of which
    you're familiar with--the IRA's Chief Accountant, the Russian
    intelligence officers coming out of the special counsel
    investigation, Maria Butina, et cetera.
        On the intelligence sharing side, one of the things we've
    tried to do is really leverage the resources of State and local
    law enforcement because some of these efforts may get detected
    in the first instance by them. So, we've pushed out
    intelligence products pretty broadly for people to know what to
    be on the look-out for, which will help us get in front of it
    earlier.
        Then the last, but really in some ways the most important
    part of it is the engagement piece. One of the lessons--you
    asked about lessons learned. One of the key lessons learned
    from 2016, which we put into action with the midterms and we're
    continuing to put into action every day, is the need to engage
    not just the State and local election officials, but with the
    social media companies because so much of the Russians' effort
    is driven through social media. Fake news, propaganda, all that
    stuff, that's not new. What's new is the social media vehicle
    to do it because it's scalable. It's cheap. It's a bullhorn.
        So, one of the things we're doing a lot better--not just
    the FBI, but the whole Government--is working with Silicon
    Valley to try to leverage what they can bring to the fight as
    well, and we're going to continue to do more and more of that.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Director, do you believe now that the Bureau has the tools
    in place and the resources necessary to effectively fight these
    types of foreign influence operations in our elections?
        Mr. Wray. We're well postured for the fight, but I will
    also tell you, you've probably never met an FBI Director who
    couldn't use more resources. Any resources that Congress would
    see fit to send our way, I can assure you they will be put to
    good use.
        Mr. Cicilline. Well, I'd ask you, Director, in writing if
    you could identify where you would best use additional
    resources, I promise you I will advocate for them.
        My final question is, as you are aware, when someone goes
    in for a criminal background check to buy a gun, if the
    background check is not completed within 3 days, the gun seller
    is authorized to sell the gun. Then if the background check
    comes back 2 weeks later and the person is a disqualified
    purchaser, the ATF goes and tries to retrieve the gun, et
    cetera.
        This has happened a significant number of times, and I have
    a piece of legislation that would require that if it comes back
    that the person is a disqualified purchaser, that the local law
    enforcement community as well as the field office of the FBI be
    notified. Because that means someone bought a gun who is not
    legally allowed to buy one.
        Would that be useful for the FBI to know that?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I'd have to look at the specific
    legislation to be able to have a view on that. I will tell you
    that in the kinds of fact patterns that you're describing,
    certainly I see that happen anecdotally, but not infrequently.
    Certainly, it's important to us.
        Mr. Cicilline. So, I'll provide a copy of H.R. 3552 to your
    staff, and I would certainly like your support for it because I
    think it would make a real difference.
        With that, I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Armstrong?
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you for being here, Director.
        I have had the opportunity over the years to work with lots
    of your agents doing Federal public defense on a lot of
    historical methamphetamine conspiracies. I think one thing that
    most people don't always recognize is when you do those types
    of cases, they oftentimes have no actual physical drugs
    involved.
        What they end up having is co-conspirator testimony, other
    investigators doing years' long of investigations through
    interrogations, statements, affidavits, and sworn testimony.
    They are dealing with people who aren't necessarily predisposed
    to tell law enforcement the truth. They use various different
    things, such as knocking years off their sentence and
    obstruction of justice charges, perjury charges, and all of the
    tools that are available to them.
        What I think comes down to and as somebody who has worked
    on these cases, there are two different ways you can lie to an
    agent. Neither one of them usually works out for the criminal
    defendant, and that is either by an affirmative lie or an
    omission lie. There are real serious consequences to that,
    whether it is an obstruction charge or perjury charge, or
    oftentimes, it is as simple as adding another 6 or 7 years on
    to your sentence. The FBI is very, very good at those things.
        I have heard you talk today. I mean, we have read the
    Inspector General's report, and I think it is important to take
    both of those reports that were given, both the midterm report
    and the final report, and some of those things are concerning
    enough, like the gross negligence, incompetence, and the things
    that have been said. I am appreciative of the 40 corrective
    measures, and we have talked about improving the process,
    rigor, accountability, tone at the top.
        You have said the conduct was unacceptable. How we do what
    we do matters. Process matters. Process and policy changes. I
    have a little--one of the things that I have a little concern
    with--actually, a significant concern with, is when you take
    all those institutional mistakes, or however you want to frame
    them in those two reports. Typically, when you have that kind
    of systemic breakdown or those types of issues, mistakes fall
    randomly across a process, and that didn't happen here.
        You will be hard-pressed for you to point out a mistake
    that was made that wasn't either against President Trump or in
    some cases that benefits Candidate Clinton. Throughout the
    entire report, there is not a real randomization of those
    mistakes. That is what I am concerned about.
        What I am concerned about is this wasn't just a failure of
    process. This was a failure of people. I am not going to ask
    you to go back because I would like to, but I know what my
    answers are going to be. So, when we are talking about these 40
    corrective actions and the things that we are doing, moving
    forward, in any case as we continue to go forward, how are the
    penalties being imposed?
        Because you can have 250 institutional safeguards, but if
    there isn't real consequences to those safeguards, then we
    don't have a real solution to the problem. I don't want to talk
    about political bias. I would prefer to have a hearing for 3
    days on it. For the purposes of this question, I don't care
    what the motivations were. I just know that people, either by
    omission or by intention, lied to a court on a sworn document,
    that if that would happen to any other citizen, they would be
    charged with a crime.
        While there are plenty of reasons to allow people to resign
    quietly, there are reasons to have people have internal
    disciplinary actions in their files. When you are dealing with
    a secret court and secret warrants in probably the most
    politically charged case that court has ever happened, it is
    important that those institutional safeguards exist. Important
    for a guy like me to think because if they didn't exist there,
    I don't know what is happening in the other cases as well.
        So, I am glad you are putting these resources in place. I
    am glad you are putting all these procedural safeguards in
    place. I would like to have a conversation about what are the
    consequences for those not happening.
        Mr. Wray. So, we have a fairly robust disciplinary arm, our
    Office of Professional Responsibility, which I think in general
    is viewed within the Government, the broader U.S. Government,
    as one of the premier independent disciplinary arms in any
    Executive Agency. That is the arm through which we apply
    discipline in response to misconduct or, in some cases, for
    just poor job performance even.
        The penalties range across--
        Mr. Armstrong. I want to stop there.
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Mr. Armstrong. Poor job performance, I am not getting into
    that. Quite frankly, I can't imagine managing 37,000 people.
    When I am talking about misconduct is that I just hope we are
    holding ourselves accountable to the same thing we are holding
    other people accountable for.
        Mr. Wray. Well, I can assure you, without getting into
    specific examples, that I can think of just during my time as
    Director, where I have seen conduct that our people have been
    disciplined for that no one else in the Government would have
    been disciplined for. So, I think we hold ourselves to an even
    higher standard, and there's no one who deplores falling short
    of that standard more than I do.
        Mr. Armstrong. I will just end with this quickly, and I
    hope that is the case. Because it sure seems like when we get
    into these situations, somebody looking at it from the other
    side, that we allow people to resign quietly or move into
    different areas, and then we come to hearings, and we say we
    can't talk about internal disciplinary proceedings.
        I think you are going to ask us a lot of things coming up.
    We have the FISA reauthor coming. We are going to continue to
    have conversations about facial recognition. We are talking
    about encryption as it goes. One of the things we have to do is
    not only know that we have the procedural safeguards, but that
    the people who are doing this will be held accountable, whether
    that is internally, externally, or even in a court of law.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Ms. Jayapal?
        Ms. Jayapal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Director Wray, for being here, for your service,
    and for your work. For being one of the few agency Directors
    that actually understands that Congress has at least a
    coequal--is at least a coequal branch of Government, and we do
    have accountability and oversight.
        I wanted to talk about something that was actually just
    mentioned, and that is face recognition technology. This is an
    area that is actually bipartisan in terms of the concerns that
    some of us have and the way in which face recognition
    technology brings unprecedented power to the FBI that, in my
    opinion, runs a severe risk of infringing on civil liberties of
    Americans and employing technology that has been shown over and
    over again to be flawed, specifically in terms of identifying
    people of color.
        The FBI now has the power to use this face recognition
    technology, often without the consent of Americans across this
    country, to match or request matches with 640 million photos of
    Americans, sometimes taken at the DMV as we are getting our
    driver's license, but with no idea that it is going to be used
    in other ways.
        A December 2019 National Institute of Standards and
    Technology report found that false positives are up to 100
    times more likely for Asian and Black faces, with Native
    Americans having the highest rates of being falsely identified.
    Is the FBI re-evaluating its use of face recognition technology
    in light of this report?
        Mr. Wray. So, I can't speak specifically to the report.
    What I can tell you is that--and I hope this is comforting to
    you, and a lot of people I find don't realize this. We, at the
    FBI, don't use facial recognition for anything other than lead
    value, right? So, in other words, there is no one under FBI
    policy who is arrested, much less convicted, based on facial
    recognition technology.
        We use it to advance an investigation to then be used with
    other information, figure if we're going in the right place.
    So, let me start with that.
        Second thing, we scrupulously train all the examiners under
    various constitutional protections, and then as to the DMV
    searches that you're talking about, again, we the FBI don't do
    those searches. The only way those searches can happen is under
    strict MOUs that have all kinds of constitutional backing. Even
    when we get the results, it then has to be reviewed carefully
    by a trained examiner.
        The last point I would make to you or which, again, may be
    helpful to you is that you mentioned NIST.
        Ms. Jayapal. Yes.
        Mr. Wray. We have changed our algorithms so that under NIST
    testing and NIST standards, we now have over 99 percent--that's
    not my judgment, that's NIST's standards--over 99 percent
    accuracy with what we do. Again, even there, even with over 99
    percent accuracy, we don't use it for anything other than lead
    value.
        Ms. Jayapal. So, that is really important to hear, and I
    appreciate the clarification. So, just to be clear, under
    current FBI policy, can face recognition technology be used
    without a warrant or probable cause in any circumstance?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Ms. Jayapal. Okay. So that, I mean that is a concern for
    me, continues to be a concern for me. The ACLU reports that
    between October 2017 and April 2019, the FBI ran over 152,000
    facial recognition searches with its law enforcement database.
    However, the Syracuse TRAC database finds that there were
    10,541 new convictions in fiscal year 2019. Can you explain the
    large gap between the number of face recognition searches and
    the number of convictions? Is it not a sign of overuse without
    evidence of the technology's effectiveness?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I try to be very careful only to opine or
    comment when I have the access to the underlying information.
    So, I'd have to look at the underlying reports to really have a
    view on that.
        I will tell you that when you asked before about warrants
    and so forth, I'm quite confident that the way we use facial
    recognition technology is fully compliant with the Bill of
    Rights and the Constitution.
        Ms. Jayapal. Okay. I would love to talk some more about
    that. I wanted to know if you know about in June of 2019, Axon,
    the largest domestic provider of police body cameras, announced
    that it would not be using face recognition technology on body
    cameras--this is the former taser folks--or on any technology
    and encouraged the Government to do the same.
        It came after the company established an independent ethics
    review board to advise the company on ethical issues. Is that
    something that the FBI would consider doing, to establish some
    sort of an independent ethnic's review board on some of these
    technologies before they come out of the box, before they do
    damage, to kind of look at how these technologies affect the
    civil liberties and privacy of millions of Americans across the
    country?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, we only use facial recognition for
    lead value. I'm not familiar with the specific report that you
    described. So, I would have to take a closer look at it to be
    able to answer that question, to have a view.
        I think we take very seriously our need to have appropriate
    safeguards internally, and I'm pretty satisfied that the way
    we're doing it has those. Where there have been adjustments
    that were appropriate, we've made those adjustments. Which is
    why, for example, when I mentioned the algorithm, the algorithm
    that the FBI had before that was a significantly lower
    percentage accuracy than the one we now have. That was done in
    close consultation with the NIST standards and NIST testing.
        Ms. Jayapal. Well, I appreciate that, Director, and I will
    send over some of these things I have mentioned and would love
    to continue the conversation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
        Ms. Lesko?
        Ms. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Director,
    for being here.
        First, I am going to say a short statement, and then I am
    going to ask a question about leaks. I guess the statement is I
    remember watching the media and they were talking about the
    Deep State and everything. I thought, well, certainly they are
    exaggerating. People back in my district would talk about the
    Deep State. Again, I listened, but I thought, well, it must be
    a bit of an exaggeration.
        Then I remember President Trump talking about how he
    thought he was being spied on, and a lot of the media was like,
    he is just full of it, basically, paraphrasing. Then we get
    this Inspector General report, and boy, I am starting to think
    some of these people are on to something. There was abuses, as
    you have said. It was inappropriate. You don't want that to
    happen.
        I just want you to know that the people in my district, a
    lot of people just have totally lost confidence, unfortunately,
    in the process. They are afraid that they are going to be
    targeted or political people. When you combine that with the
    IRS going after Tea Party groups, people are really questioning
    this whole thing.
        So, I hope that as you investigate what exactly happened or
    you discipline people if they had FISA court abuse cases, that
    maybe you make it public so people really believe that you are
    doing something about this.
        Next, my question is about leaks. This place seems like a
    sieve. I mean leaks all the time. So, I wanted to know what
    role the FBI has in people leaking classified information and
    what you are doing about it?
        Mr. Wray. So, first, let me say I despise leaks, and I have
    a long list, which will use up all your time and mine to go
    through about why they're so harmful. What I will say is that
    some of the things that I've done since becoming Director are
    the following.
        One, I put in place a new media policy for all our
    employees, and then everybody was required to be trained on it,
    which makes for anything that might come out of the FBI at
    least, to make it excruciatingly clear what people's
    obligations are and what the prohibitions are about engaging
    with the news media.
        The reason that having that kind of strict, clear policy is
    so important is because then if somebody slips up or worse,
    there's no ambiguity about what the rules were. That's why we
    trained them on them.
        Second, I created a dedicated leak investigation unit
    within the Counterintelligence Division because a lot of the
    leak investigations that are conducted Government-wide we do on
    behalf of the Government. So, if somebody leaks, and we've had
    a number of significant investigations that led to indictments
    of people in other agencies, where they specifically leaks of
    classified information. There are other violations that could
    occur. Grand jury information, title III information, things
    like that. When it comes to leaking classified information, for
    example, we really have to be aggressive with it, and we've
    tried to be.
        Then, last but not least, where there have been provable
    leak violations by any of our own people, we've imposed
    discipline. There have been some people who have been
    terminated for violating the media policy.
        Ms. Lesko. Thank you, and I yield back my time.
        Oh, yes, I will yield to Mr. Jordan the balance of my time.
        Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentlelady.
        Director, was the dossier Russian disinformation?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know that I would try to characterize the
    dossier sitting here right now. I would refer back to the
    Inspector General's report and the Special Counsel's report.
        Mr. Jordan. When Dr. Fiona Hill testified as part of the
    impeachment proceedings, she indicated that she thought
    Christopher Steele was played by the Russians.
        Mr. Wray. I haven't looked closely at the testimony you're
    describing.
        Mr. Jordan. It sort of raises an important issue. If that
    took place, which Dr. Hill at the NSC seemed to think did, then
    the FBI used Russian disinformation as a basis to get a warrant
    to then spy on American citizens. That is a big concern.
        Mr. Wray. Russian disinformation is a major concern for us
    24/7.
        Mr. Jordan. That is why I brought it up. You brought that
    up earlier in the hearing.
        Mr. Wray. We investigated it aggressively.
        Mr. Jordan. Yes, but we talk about election interference,
    Russian disinformation. It may have been used in that way. That
    is the one thing that seems like a lot of people don't want to
    talk about it. Certainly, folks on the other side don't want to
    talk about it.
        That may have been the biggest Russian disinformation used
    in the 2016 election was when Christopher Steele got played by
    the Russians, and the document he produced was taken to the
    court to get the warrant to spy on a person associated with the
    Presidential campaign.
        Mr. Wray. I understand your concerns. I'm just not going to
    add anything beyond what's in the Inspector General's report
    and the special counsel's report on the question of the
    dossier.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Ms. Demings?
        Ms. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
        Director Wray, thank you so much for being with us today.
        We have heard a lot of discussion suggesting that there is
    something wrong with the culture at the FBI. Well, I can tell
    you, I am not hearing that in my community and in my district
    and the many, many people that I speak with. Having served 27
    years in law enforcement, I did not see that.
        I want you to know that I really appreciate your leadership
    and the dedicated men and women who serve and go places that
    others would not dare to go. I also thank you for taking the
    steps. We have individuals that make mistakes, and I appreciate
    you taking the steps to address those mistakes as it pertains
    to the FISA warrant or application process.
        I am also very glad to hear my colleagues on the other side
    express concern about civil liberties and civil rights. I have
    heard that more today, and I am glad to hear it because it lets
    me know that perhaps we can work together on some of those
    issues.
        I prefer to talk to you, Director Wray, I heard your
    comments when you were asked questions specifically about
    legislation that might address gun violence. I would like to
    know, what do you believe the FBI could do to help, or to be
    more proactive in helping to address gun violence throughout
    the Nation, even as it may pertain to--I know you get thousands
    or maybe millions of phone calls that maybe should not go to
    the FBI. Maybe they should go to law enforcement, and you have
    to redirect those calls to the proper--I can imagine how
    burdensome that may be. Could you speak a little bit to that
    for me?
        Mr. Wray. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        I think you've actually put your finger on it, in some ways
    I hesitate to list any challenge as the biggest challenge we
    have because, boy, we've got a lot of challenges. The question
    of tips and threats to life, in particular, about potential
    active shooter events, it's hard to overstate what a big
    phenomenon that it is in law enforcement.
        We get thousands of tips a day at our national call
    operating center, which is up in West Virginia. Of those
    thousands of tips, something like 50 or 60 of those a day are
    threats to life. About 80 percent of those 50 or 60 a day don't
    have any Federal nexus whatsoever, but they're coming into the
    FBI. So, it's a challenge for us, when time could really be of
    the essence, to get that information to State and local law
    enforcement quickly enough for them to be able to act.
        Happily, we've built on something called eGuardian, which
    we've had in place for a while, but we've taken it to a whole
    new level. We did a pilot program over the last year, which now
    dual tracks--and there's systems, IT systems dimensions to
    this. The dual tracks, when we get the tip, the lead not just
    to the local field office, say, in your home district, but also
    to the State fusion center at the same time. That enables
    quicker action by, say, local law enforcement.
        We've had a number of success stories, including in your
    home State, where there have been tips that came into the call
    center and that were fed out and with very little information.
    You don't know who the person is. You don't know where they
    are. You just maybe know what State it is. You don't know
    whether it's just rhetoric, and yet there have been arrests
    where it turned out the person actually had guns and ammunition
    in their apartment and arrests that were made within hours of
    that tip coming in.
        Now, I wish we were that successful all the time, but it
    tells me that I think we're on the right track. The volume is
    just overwhelming. We want people if they see something to say
    something, and boy, are they saying something. So, it's coming
    in like in droves.
        I've been out there, just like I was saying before, with
    the NICS examiners who listen on their headset. I've actually
    gone to the Call Center. Twice now I've been out there and put
    on the headset with the operators and kind of listened to how
    it goes and seen how they handle the calls. These are very,
    very hard-working, dedicated people who have just a hellishly
    difficult job to do with everything on the line.
        For every tip that turns out to be real where there is a
    life saved as a result, there are thousands of tips that turn
    out to be nonsense, but we have to sift through them. So, we're
    doing everything we can, but I just want to make sure that the
    American people understand just how challenging this is.
        Ms. Demings. Thank you. I know one of the other challenges,
    if I could, Mr. Chair? Thank you. Are the violent homegrown
    extremists, and I know that is another major challenge for the
    FBI. What can you tell me about what you are doing to better
    address that challenge?
        Mr. Wray. So, we use the term ``homegrown violent
    extremist'' to refer to people already here in the United
    States, largely radicalized online by different parts of the
    global jihadist movement. So, these are people who are largely
    lone actors who will go from radicalization to mobilization and
    attack sometimes in weeks or days, and they'll choose as a
    method of attack something that's crude and readily available--
    a knife, gun, or car.
        They'll choose to attack so-called ``soft targets,'' which
    is just intelligence community speak for everyday people living
    their everyday lives, as opposed to like a Government facility.
    So, that's a restaurant, mall, or school.
        Ms. Demings. A nightclub in Orlando.
        Mr. Wray. A nightclub. Right, exactly. Which means
    everything is a target. So, the challenge for law enforcement--
    Federal, State, and local--is how are we going to act? The
    time, as the professionals say, between flash to bang is
    compressed, and the amount of information for a lone actor with
    that kind of attack is very, very, very limited.
        So, it's a real challenge. It's different from the sort of
    sleeper cells of the immediate post-9/11 era. We have about
    1,000, probably over 1,000 homegrown violent extremist
    investigations as I sit here today testifying before this
    Committee, and it's in all 50 States and in all 56 of our field
    offices. So, this threat is real, it's now, and it affects
    communities big and small.
        Ms. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
        Ms. Scanlon?
        Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony here
    today. It has been really, really interesting and helpful.
        As a representative from Pennsylvania, a State that was
    targeted by Russian efforts to subvert the 2016 election, I
    wanted to follow up some questions from my colleagues about the
    FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force and the threat by foreign
    governments to our elections. There has been extensive
    reporting by the Department of Justice that attempts to sow
    discord in the 2016 elections in Pennsylvania that included
    social media efforts, organizing rallies to support one
    candidate who happens to be President Trump, and weaponizing
    social media with what has been termed a sweeping and
    systematic attempt to undermine the election.
        Before I get into that, Mr. Chair, I would ask unanimous
    consent that this article, ``The Plot to Subvert an Election,''
    which reports on efforts by Russia to undermine our election,
    be placed in the record.
        Chair Nadler. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

                           MS. SCANLON FOR THE RECORD

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    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Scanlon. You said before that the FBI is seeing efforts
    to make these kinds of efforts again with respect to social
    media and divisive messaging campaigns. Can you tell us a
    little more about that? What is going on now?
        Mr. Wray. So, we see very active use of sort of fictitious
    accounts, false personas, if you will, that then are used in
    combination with amplification of existing stories. So, it's
    both fake news, if I can use that term, as well as
    disinformation of a different sort, where it's pushing kind of
    propaganda. The two things work in concert, have always been
    part of our national security threats from overseas.
        What's changed, certainly with 2016 and continues to this
    day, is the use of social media. All the things we love about
    social media, if you apply it to this context, it's like
    injecting steroids into disinformation efforts that have
    existed for many, many, many years. That has now taken the form
    of sowing divisiveness and discord.
        So, we see the Russians, for example, taking opposite sides
    of the same issue. They identify an issue that they know that
    the American people feel passionately about on both sides, and
    then they take both sides and spin them up. So, they pit us
    against each other.
        Then they combine that with an effort to weaken our
    confidence in our elections and in our democratic institutions,
    which is a pernicious and asymmetric way of engaging, in
    effect, information warfare.
        Ms. Scanlon. Right. I think many of us are disturbed about
    both the efforts to undermine our elections, undermining law
    enforcement, the courts, free press, et cetera, and the impact
    that has on our country. Other than asking people to be
    hyperaware of this and asking that they really use common sense
    when they see outrageous stories, what can the FBI do? What can
    we do?
        Mr. Wray. So, I think it's multiple layers of defense,
    right? You just put your finger on probably the first line of
    defense, which is the American people themselves, the voters.
    People need to be thoughtful consumers of information, get
    their news from multiple sources, think carefully about what
    sources they're relying on.
        Do they really know where this information came from? What
    else have they seen independently that corroborates it? That
    kind of thing. Media literacy builds a level of resilience in
    an informed electorate.
        Then you move up a notch from that, and you've got the
    social media companies. They can play a role. We're working
    much more closely with them because they have all kinds of
    tools at their disposal that law enforcement certainly couldn't
    use. They have terms of use, terms of service, and they have--
    these are very profitable companies. So, they have a lot of
    resources that they can bring to identify accounts, especially
    when we work in collaboration with them.
        They've gotten a lot better and a lot more sophisticated
    about that, which you think about the nature of disinformation.
    It only works if people believe you're somebody you're not. To
    do that in a sophisticated way, you have to build up the
    reservoir of credibility. Well, if we can keep knocking them
    back and knocking them off through these social media companies
    doing that, it makes it harder for them to build that reservoir
    of credibility and mislead the American public.
        Ms. Scanlon. Just turning to one other thing, I have had
    constituents express concerns about Election Day interference,
    whether it is hacking voter rolls, or machines is not such a
    big deal in Pennsylvania because we have so many different
    machines. What kind of steps is the FBI taking with respect to
    that, and how rapid a response can folks expect?
        Mr. Wray. Well, both we and the Department of Homeland
    Security have plans--and we did this in the midterms--to stand
    up in effect command centers on the Election Day itself. The
    FBI also has, together with all the U.S. Attorney's Offices,
    designated individuals who are kind of on standby in every
    State and every district, every Federal district to be
    available for whether it's voter suppression or voter fraud
    because we have to worry about both.
        So, those are some of the things that happen.
        Ms. Scanlon. Okay, thank you. I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
        Ms. Garcia?
        Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Director Wray, thank you.
        [Discussion off the record.]
        Ms. Garcia. Are you sure? I will start again. Thank you for
    being here, and I, too, want to express my thanks to you and
    all the Members of your team and your department.
        I can tell you that I am a proud graduate of the Citizens
    FBI Academy in the Houston region, and I not only have seen
    some of the nuts and bolts of the organization, but I have also
    toured the FBI data center in West Virginia. I have a deep
    appreciation for the work that you are doing. So, please give
    my regards to everyone from the top to the bottom and tell them
    that they are doing a good job for us.
        I want to start with an article that appeared in the New
    York Times in December of 2018, in which they reported that the
    FBI had opened an investigation into Southwest Key, one of the
    largest recipients of HHS contracts for housing unaccompanied
    migrant children. According to the report, in 2017, at least
    eight of Southwest Key's executives earned more than the
    Federal salary cap of $187,000. In fact, the founder made $1.5
    million a year. His wife earned $500,000 a year as Vice
    President. His Chief Financial Officer earned $1 million a
    year.
        Additionally, both the owner and the CFO for years
    collected Government money in rent as landlords for some of the
    facilities that the children were being housed. Which, of
    course, raises the question of using Government dollars for
    private financial gain, potential conflict of interest, and
    potential self-dealing.
        Can you tell me if that investigation has ended up its
    inquiry?
        Mr. Wray. I'm not familiar, at least off the top of my
    head, with the article and, therefore, the investigation you're
    describing. So, I'd have to take a closer look to know whether
    there's information we could share on that. Certainly, as
    somebody who has both as a line Prosecutor and then as
    Assistant Attorney General and now as the FBI Director, and
    then as a Defense Attorney in between, on the issues of White
    collar crime and procurement fraud, those are subjects that are
    very important to me and that I think we pursue very
    aggressively.
        Ms. Garcia. Are you aware of any investigation on any of
    these? This was a nonprofit shelter. Are you aware of any
    investigations, either the nonprofit shelter arena or any of
    the privatized facilities where they were holding either
    unaccompanied minors or older immigrants?
        Mr. Wray. There's nothing that I can think off the top of
    my head that I could comment on in the Hearing certainly.
        Ms. Garcia. All right. Well, we will move to another topic.
        Mr. Chair, I would like to submit for the record the New
    York Times article dated December 20, 2018.
        Chair Nadler. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

                           MS. GARCIA FOR THE RECORD

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    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Garcia. Thank you.
        Now, one of the things that fascinated me at the data
    center when we did that tour was just all the different tools,
    if you will, in the toolbox that you have in collecting data
    and helping find good leads, as you said, or try to identify
    any potential bad actors.
        Can you tell me which of the crimes, or do you have a list
    of crimes where the FBI uses facial recognition to investigate,
    including requests from State and local police?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know that I have a list of crimes that we
    use it for. Certainly, from an FBI perspective, our focus is on
    using it, as I said in response to one of your colleagues, for
    lead value. I think, for what we do, we would do it with every
    program that we have, I would assume, but--
        Ms. Garcia. If my colleague Val Demings was still the
    sheriff in Orlando and she called you for some help on a
    robbery, would you do that? Or do you prioritize the crimes to
    make sure that you are looking at the more heinous crimes?
        Mr. Wray. Well, as with every technology and tool that we
    have, for example, in our lab in Quantico, we prioritize based
    on a variety of circumstances, and some of it goes to the
    nature of the crime can make something a higher priority.
    Sitting here right now, I can't tell you that I know exactly
    what the protocol is for prioritization within our facial
    recognition.
        Ms. Garcia. So, you do prioritize them?
        Mr. Wray. Absolutely. Some of that is prioritized based on
    speed with which an answer is needed. Some of that's based on
    the nature of the offense. Some of that's based on the quality
    of the information that's given to us.
        Ms. Garcia. So, can you tell me which crimes you prioritize
    the most, if you don't have a list or--
        Mr. Wray. I don't have an answer for you in terms of what I
    can prioritize in terms of particular offenses.
        Ms. Garcia. So, who decides that then?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I'm more familiar with it in the context of
    our lab, because obviously they're getting all kinds of
    information that requires testing. Usually, the people fairly
    far up the supervisory chain in the lab can make decisions.
    There's some kind of protocol when information comes in.
        Sometimes things can be moved up in the queue if there is
    some real exigency. So, for example, in the Cesar Sayoc package
    bombing investigation that was such a phenomenon for a while we
    obviously moved that to a higher priority within the variety of
    parts of our lab in terms of their testing. While I'm not
    sitting here right now familiar with exactly how they handled
    it on the facial recognition side in terms of the queue, my
    assumption is it would be a similar kind of approach.
        Ms. Garcia. What about fingerprints? How long do you keep
    them, and are they date stamped?
        Mr. Wray. I'm sorry. Fingerprints?
        Ms. Garcia. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wray. How long do we keep them?
        Ms. Garcia. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wray. I don't know off the top of my head. We can try
    to see if there is information we could get to you as a follow-
    up on that.
        Ms. Garcia. Are they date stamped when they are received or
    when they are actually fingerprinted, so that if I were to say,
    ``can you find my fingerprint from when I became a U.S. Customs
    Inspector working my way through law school?'' you could find
    my fingerprints?
        Mr. Wray. That's a detail question that I'm pretty
    confident we have dates on all our fingerprint cards. I can't
    tell you exactly the specifics of that.
        Ms. Garcia. It is likely you still have my fingerprints
    somewhere?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know the answer to that.
        Ms. Garcia. Thank you. If you could follow up with me.
    Thank you.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Mr. Steube?
        Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Director, for being here today.
        The Chair started out the hearing by talking about Russian
    influence in the 2016 election. When we had Bob Mueller before
    this Committee, I asked him specifically when he was sitting in
    that chair before this Committee, did they have any evidence
    that a single person actually changed their vote due to Russian
    interference in the 2016 election? He testified under oath that
    wasn't under his purview and that somebody else, another group
    or other investigators were investigating that.
        Can you confirm that this is being investigated or that is
    not being investigated within the FBI? Whether somebody
    actually changed their vote due to Russian interference in the
    2016 election.
        Mr. Mueller had stated that this wasn't within his purview,
    but somebody else was investigating that.
        Mr. Wray. Right. Well, I think to the extent that we have
    ongoing investigations into Russian malign foreign influence
    efforts, it is conceivable that this kind of investigation
    would detect if somebody had changed their vote. I don't know
    that I would describe us as conducting an investigation into
    individual voters' decisions.
        Mr. Steube. So, there is no evidence then before this
    Committee or the American people that a single American voter
    changed their vote due to ads that Russia was putting on
    Facebook or Russian interference in the 2016 election?
        Mr. Wray. I'm not aware of any intelligence community
    assessment or investigation specifically into--beyond what's
    already been done and reported on about the 2016 presidential
    election.
        Mr. Steube. Okay. Let us move to the Horowitz report. The
    FBI's decision to defensively brief then-Candidate Hillary
    Clinton, but failure to brief then-Candidate Donald Trump is a
    blatant example of the FBI's disparate treatment of the two
    campaigns and clear bias. There is a reason the IG stated the
    FBI ``fell far short of the scrupulous accuracy that is
    required.''
        On that note, there were clear issue with the Carter Page
    FISA application. Fifty-one factual assertions related to the
    application and renewals either did not have supporting
    documentation, or the supporting document didn't State the
    fact, or the supporting document showed the factual assertion
    is inaccurate.
        There were 17 separate inaccuracies or wrongful omissions
    in the 4 FISA applications, including 7 repeated in all and 10
    that did not occur in the original application, but occurred in
    3 renewal applications. The FBI omitted evidence cutting
    against probable cause. For example, Carter Page stating that
    he had nothing to do with Paul Manafort, and George
    Papadopoulos' denial that the Trump campaign was collaborating
    with Russia or WikiLeaks or otherwise involved in the DNC
    server hack.
        Additionally, the FBI failed to disclose Bruce Ohr's
    information that Steele's reporting was going directly to the
    Clinton campaign. The FBI overstated Christopher Steele's
    previous work with the FBI. The FBI was less than fully candid
    about Christopher Steele sharing information leading to Yahoo's
    September 2016 article. The FBI did not disclose the lack of
    reliability of Steele's subsource.
        FBI personnel apparently avoided using the Woods file
    reveri-
    fication system for FISA applications. The FBI knew Carter Page
    was a U.S. intelligence asset who had assisted in cases
    involving Russian intelligence but hid that fact from DOJ
    during development of the FISA application.
        So, my question to you is--and I think a lot of the
    American people would like to know the answer to this
    question--are all the individuals, agents, and supervisors that
    were involved in all these abuses that I just annotated that
    were in this Horowitz report, are all of them no longer working
    at the FBI? Have they resigned, fired, or been removed from
    their position?
        Mr. Wray. At the more senior levels of the FBI, the people
    involved, I think in every respect that I can think of, are
    gone from the FBI. Of course, there is an ongoing investigation
    by Mr. Durham, with which we're actively cooperating and fully
    cooperating, I might add.
        As to the current employees, there are more, what I would
    call more line-level employees who were involved in some of the
    events in the report. All those employees, anybody who still
    remains at the FBI--again, they tend to be more line-level
    people, were referred to our Office of Professional
    Responsibility, which is our disciplinary arm, which is the
    standard process.
        After there's been fact finding by the Inspector General,
    the facts go to our disciplinary arm. By longstanding process,
    that's how we handle discipline about those people. We have
    erred on the side of inclusion when we did that.
        So, what I mean by that is there are some people in the
    report who were literally named like once or twice, and it's
    not really clear they're even named in a way that's
    problematic. We've gone ahead and just figured better safe than
    sorry, and we've sent all those names to the Office of
    Professional Responsibility.
        We will follow that process, and I have made very clear
    that if that process results in recommendations of discipline,
    then we're going to impose discipline. We're going to hold
    people accountable.
        Mr. Steube. Just a quick follow-up, if I could, Mr. Chair?
    What is the timeframe on that?
        Mr. Wray. I can't give you a projected timeframe exactly.
    It may depend. It's probably not all going to happen at one
    time. Some people will take longer than others.
        Mr. Steube. Thank you.
        Chair Nadler. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. Neguse?
        Mr. Neguse. Thank you, Director Wray, for your service.
    Thank you for being here today. Also, thank you to the 37,000
    public servants that work in your agency, for the work that
    they do every day.
        I represent the great State of Colorado, and, in
    particular, I am appreciative of the work that you have done to
    thwart a number of attacks, including the synagogue in Pueblo,
    Colorado, that you mentioned.
        I want to give you an opportunity to clarify earlier part
    of your testimony. The Chair had asked a question, and I think
    there was some confusion around your answer. So, with respect
    to a recent article that alleges that the Administration may be
    attempting to initiate political investigations or politically
    motivated investigations, rather, into their political
    opponents, has the President, the Attorney General, or any
    Member of the Administration asked you to initiate an
    investigation into John Bolton?
        I am not asking whether or not that request would be
    improper or proper or whether or not if such a request was
    made, if you have initiated such an investigation. I am simply
    asking if they have asked you to do so.
        Mr. Wray. I understand why you're asking the question, and
    I would just tell you my commitment to doing things by the book
    includes not talking about whether any particular investigation
    does or does not exist. You shouldn't read anything into that.
    That's not a hint that anything is happening. It's just I don't
    think that's a question that I can responsibly answer if I'm
    going to be faithful to my commitment to doing things by the
    book.
        Mr. Neguse. Well, we appreciate--
        Mr. Wray. I will tell you, as I said to the Chair--I will
    tell you, as I said to the Chair, that no one has asked me to
    open any investigation on anything that's not consistent with
    the facts, the law, and proper predication.
        Mr. Neguse. I would just say, Director Wray, with all
    respect, as you could probably imagine, these questions, both
    the question the Chair posed and the question that I posed, are
    not academic or esoteric for us. Seven months ago, Special
    Counsel Mueller sat in the same chair that you are in, and we
    all know now, that the very next day, the President had his
    infamous call with the President of Ukraine, in which he sought
    foreign interference in our elections. Of course, as you know,
    in just a few hours, the Senate will render judgment in the
    impeachment trial of the President.
        So, one can ask reasonable questions as we read these
    reports that we just over the course of the last few days as to
    potentially what other actions this Administration might take.
    So, again, I appreciate your earlier answer, and I want to move
    on to a different topic, which is election interference.
        There was an article just a few weeks ago in the New York
    Times, and I would ask for unanimous consent to enter it into
    the record. `` `Chaos Is the Point': Russian Hackers and Trolls
    Grow Stealthier in 2020,'' by Matthew Rosenberg, Nicole
    Perlroth, and David Sanger of the New York Times.
        [The information follows:]

                           MR. NEGUSE FOR THE RECORD

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    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Neguse. In the article, there are a couple of
    references to new developments in terms of the way in which
    Russian actors, the intelligence apparatus is engaging in
    disinformation in attempted interference in our elections. I
    wonder if you could comment about two in particular? I will
    just quote.

            ``One of the two Russian intelligence units that hacked
            into Democrats in 2016, `Fancy Bear,' has shifted some
            of its work to servers based in the United States in an
            apparent attempt to thwart the NSA, which is limited to
            operating abroad. Also, the trolls at the Internet
            Research Agency are trying to exploit a hole in
            Facebook's ban on foreigners buying political ads,
            paying American users to hand over personal pages and
            setting up offshore bank accounts to cover their
            financial tracks.''

        I wonder if you could expand in greater detail on both of
    those two issues and how the FBI, I guess, is addressing both
    of those developments.
        Mr. Wray. So, certainly, I appreciate the interest. I think
    I'd have to be pretty careful about how much detail I could
    provide in an open hearing. I would say that we believe--we
    assessed that the Russians continue to engage in malign foreign
    influence efforts of the sort that I was describing before--
    fake personas, trolls, bots, state-sponsored media, the whole
    gamut in the bag of tricks.
        We also assessed that just like any sophisticated actor,
    that they continue to refine their approach. We saw that from
    2016-2018. We've seen it from 2018 moving forward. Happily,
    we're refining our approach, too, and we're trying to stay
    ahead of it.
        Mr. Neguse. Thank you, Director Wray.
        I would just say, I think the Committee would very much
    benefit, to the extent you are willing to indulge us in a
    classified setting, a Hearing on the developments. I appreciate
    the fact that the FBI is very focused on this issue.
        If the Chair would indulge me, I would just make two final
    points. First, we will make sure that you are aware of a letter
    that we sent to the Inspector General a few months ago with
    regard to an issue on the NICS program. As you probably are
    familiar, there was a woman named Sol Pais, who purchased a
    weapon in Colorado unlawfully many months ago and, as a result,
    raised some serious questions about the POC and NICS program
    and whether there is sufficient auditing happening. So, I would
    look forward engaging with you and your team on that issue.
        Finally, I would just say I appreciate the fact that you
    are here. I have only been on the Judiciary Committee for about
    a year, but my understanding is that this Committee has
    oversight over the Department of Justice, and that means having
    folks like yourself come in and engage in a healthy exchange
    with Members of the Committee.
        It is unfortunate that the Attorney General has declined to
    do what you are doing today. In the last 30 years, 6 Attorney
    Generals: Jeff Sessions, Eric Holder, Michael Mukasey, Alberto
    Gonzales, John Ashcroft, and Janet Reno have come in front of
    this Committee to appear and exchange views with Members of the
    House Judiciary Committee, and I think it is shameful that the
    Attorney General has not done that.
        I am grateful that you have chosen to do so. Again, I
    appreciate your service.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Cline?
        Mr. Cline. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you for being here today.
        The IG report uncovered that the FBI fell far short of the
    scrupulous accuracy that is required for FISA applications
    while surveilling Carter Page. Ironically, FISA's original
    purpose was in large part intended to respond to unchecked
    surveillance abuses by the Federal Government.
        As the FBI moves forward with implementing the corrective
    actions that you have laid out in light of the IG report's
    findings, it is imperative that the Bureau continues to work
    towards regaining the full faith and trust of the American
    public. Now, three FISA amendments are scheduled to sunset in
    March, and as this Committee, which is the Committee with
    jurisdiction over these--over FISA, considers reauthorization,
    it is paramount that we ensure that American Civil Liberties
    and due process are in no way inhibited.
        So, I would ask you, it has been reported that the so-
    called lone wolf provision of FISA has never been used. Can you
    explain why it has never been used and why there is still a
    need for it, if it has never been used?
        Mr. Wray. So, I appreciate the question. We think of the
    lone wolf provision as something that we could have used in any
    number of instances. Because we had in those--under the
    particular facts of those circumstances other tools we were
    able to use, we went with those instead.
        I will tell you that the lone wolf provision, we assess--
    and this goes directly to some of the answers I've given to a
    variety of your colleagues about where the terrorist threat is
    moving. More and more, we are seeing al-Qaeda, for example, use
    so-called ``clean operatives'' here in the U.S. You've heard me
    talk about the homegrown violent extremists, these folks who
    are here in the U.S. inspired by ISIS, al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab,
    you name it. In those instances, we fully expect that the lone
    wolf provision will end up being our ``go to'' tool. So, we
    really need it.
        Mr. Cline. Okay. Would returning to the pre-PATRIOT Act
    standard for section 215 orders requiring specific and
    articulable facts that the person to whom the records pertain
    is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power threaten the
    FBI's intelligence gathering capability?
        Mr. Wray. My own view is that if we were to return to the
    pre-PATRIOT Act era, as somebody who saw the terrorist threat
    before 9/11, the day of 9/11, and the years after, including
    the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, that would be a sad day for
    America, and there would be a lot of people whose safety would
    be jeopardized.
        Mr. Cline. Now, what would be the effect if there were a
    legal requirement for an Amicus Attorney to be present for
    every single consideration of a traditional FISA application in
    front of the FISC?
        Mr. Wray. My own view is that that would grind the FISA
    process to a halt. As the vast majority of FISAs don't raise
    even remotely sensitive issues in the sense that the Committee
    or some Members of the Committee might be concerned, that would
    be a real tragedy.
        I will also say that part of the reason why FISA is so
    important is because it allows us to use classified information
    and present it to a court in a way that we would never
    otherwise be able to do in a traditional process. It also
    allows us to use foreign partner information, which those
    partners are very, very skittish, as you can imagine, about
    sharing with us and having it put into a court process.
        If we started adding an Amicus into every FISA application,
    let us set aside the practicality of it--
        Mr. Cline. Well, about what percent have Amicus Attorneys
    present at this point?
        Mr. Wray. I don't have that percentage. I know that the
    statute that provides for Amicus involvement speaks--and I
    think this is appropriate--speaks in terms of the court having
    the discretion to appoint an Amicus for novel issues of law. I
    think that's in those rare and unusual circumstances are the
    places where it makes sense to appoint an Amicus. That's really
    the court's decision, not ours.
        Mr. Cline. Do you think that some of the shortcomings found
    in the IG report would have been, could have been avoided or
    prevented if an Amicus Attorney may have been present?
        Mr. Wray. I actually don't think so. I think the problems
    that are found in the IG's report are best addressed through
    the 40-plus corrective actions that I've articulated. We're
    also considering additional ones in coordination with both the
    court and the Department. Bringing a level of rigor to the
    process and discipline to the process is at the heart of those
    40-plus corrective actions, and I don't think adding an Amicus
    by itself really would meaningfully change that.
        Mr. Cline. I would argue that some of your proposals, like
    giving subordinates in field offices the ability to agree as to
    whether a warrant is or a case is handled at the central
    office, does little to make the necessary reforms to actually
    address the problems in the IG report.
        Mr. Wray. Yes, that's not a--I'm sorry. I take your point.
    That's not geared towards FISA at all, that particular
    corrective action. The 40-plus corrective actions we have
    include things like that, but that goes more to some of the
    other deficiencies that were identified in the IG's report. A
    lot of the ones we have are much more geared toward the FISA
    process itself.
        Mr. Cline. Last question. Some agencies have Ombudsman
    Offices meant to address disputes. What if we had a sitting
    Ombudsman Office to review all FISA applications, rather than
    Amicus Attorneys who may be personally predisposed to political
    views or conflicted due to prior public statement?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I think the problems that are
    identified in the Inspector General's report, we spent a lot of
    time, my leadership team and I, looking very hard at the facts
    and trying to think about what the right ways to address those
    problems are. We took a really comprehensive approach to it,
    and that the approach that we've taken is the one best designed
    to address the issue.
        Mr. Cline. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Stanton?
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        Director Wray, thank you for being here. Please pass on
    appreciation to the women and men of the FBI. We appreciate
    their work. They are too often under attack, and we appreciate
    their professionalism.
        Today, I would like to bring attention to a crisis in
    desperate need of a solution. That is the pattern of violence
    that disproportionately affects American Indian and Alaska
    Native women. The U.S. Department of Justice has found that
    Native American women face murder rates more than 10 times the
    national average, and 4 out of 5 Native women are affected by
    violence today.
        The missing and murdered indigenous women epidemic is a
    tragic reality, and it is one we need to tackle with real
    solutions. The challenge we face today is that no one truly
    knows, not even the FBI, who has jurisdiction on Tribal lands,
    how many indigenous women go missing or are murdered every
    year.
        There is no dedicated Federal database designed to collect
    information on missing and murdered indigenous women. The
    numbers we do have come directly from State and Tribal law
    enforcement agencies, and often, neither are equipped with the
    training or tools necessary to support thorough investigations.
    As a result, understanding the true scope of this crisis is
    nearly impossible.
        Unfortunately, in my home State of Arizona, we are all too
    familiar with this tragic issue. The Murder Accountability
    Project, a nonprofit that examines available data on murders,
    found that Arizona has the third-highest number of missing and
    murdered indigenous women. One third of those murders go
    unreported to the FBI, and the National Institute of Justice
    system that tracks missing people shows that since the first of
    the year, there are 45 missing Native Americans in Arizona. Of
    course, those are the only ones that have been reported.
        These figures are gut-wrenching. That is 45 families, 45
    communities of friends and neighbors with no real information
    about their missing loved ones, and not enough law enforcement
    support to find answers, hoping to be an exception from the
    statistics. That is happening in Tribal communities across the
    United States of America.
        Last year, Arizona passed an important State law, led by
    State representative Jennifer Jermaine, to examine the issue of
    murdered and missing indigenous women and girls, making Arizona
    one of only seven States to establish its own task force to
    find answers. In November of 2019, the Trump Administration
    launched a task force to tackle this issue at the Federal
    level. You remember that task force.
        While this task force is an important step, we must do more
    to truly address this epidemic. It shouldn't take more women
    and girls dying to bring enough attention to the crisis to end
    it. So, I have several questions about this, and please keep
    your answers as brief as possible.
        We know that sound policy recommendations are created when
    directly impacted people are at the table sharing their
    experiences and giving their input. Director Wray, are Tribal
    leaders, indigenous survivors, and data collecting
    organizations going to be part of the task force where these
    protocols are being drafted and considered?
        Mr. Wray. Well, the details about the task force are ones
    that are better referred to the Department. I will tell you
    that I believe strongly, which I think is at the heart of your
    question, about the importance of hearing directly from Tribal
    leaders. In fact, as FBI Director, I went with our Phoenix
    special agent-in-charge to meet with the leaders of the Navajo
    Nation and to drive around on Indian country and hear firsthand
    about what the challenges are.
        I believe, from what the leaders of the Navajo Nation told
    me, including the President of the Navajo Nation, I think I'm
    the first FBI Director to ever go there and visit them myself.
    So, we are trying to engage directly and hear from them. It's,
    as you said, gut-wrenching to hear the fact patterns of these
    cases, and my heart goes out to the victims.
        Mr. Stanton. Public reporting indicates that the task force
    has only been allocated at this point $1.5 million. Is that
    enough resources to do the job for the very broad jurisdiction
    of the Federal task force?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, the nitty-gritty of the task force,
    I would refer you to the Department. I would tell you that
    we're going to make the best use of the resources we do have.
    As I said in a different context to one of your colleagues, if
    Congress gives us more resources, I can assure you we'll put
    them to good use.
        Mr. Stanton. It is clear that we are dealing with a crisis
    of missing and murdered indigenous people that are consistently
    undercounted and underrepresented. Thankfully, Director, you
    emphasized earlier in this very Hearing that very point by
    saying, ``The challenge of under reporting is you never know
    for sure just how badly under reported they are.'' That is a
    direct quote from yourself.
        I strongly believe that Congress plays a critical role in
    addressing this epidemic of violence. Legislation such as
    Representative Torres' Savanna's Act and Representative
    Haaland's Not Invisible Act should be considered by this
    Committee and signed into law if we truly want a comprehensive
    solution to this crisis.
        More immediately, we need the Senate to swiftly pass the
    Violence Against Women Act, which contains additional
    protections for Native American women. It has been stalled in
    the Senate for over 10 months.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
        Ms. Dean?
        Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Welcome, Director Wray. I am glad you are here, and we
    thank you for your time, testimony, and service.
        In the beginning of your testimony, you set out the mission
    of your 37,000 folks, and I just want to repeat it. To protect
    the American people and to uphold the Constitution of the
    United States. Such core values, I thank you and the Members of
    the FBI for your service.
        I have had a cousin in the FBI serve very nobly, a neighbor
    and friend just recently retire. I want to affirmatively
    distance myself from some of the disparaging comments that I
    heard right here today that I really do not understand. They
    are extraordinarily misplaced, and they are shameful.
        So, I would like to start with the issue of gun violence,
    go back to that issue, and I thank you for focusing on it. This
    past November, we saw yet another community devastated by a
    school shooting, the tragedy at Saugus High School in Los
    Angeles. It differed in one alarming way from the predecessors
    of gun violence, something I care about. The firearm used there
    was a ghost gun.
        So, I would love to get an update from you and the FBI on
    what your thoughts are on ghost guns. They are firearms that
    are assembled often from kits or by 3-D printers. They are
    often undetectable by metal detectors. Because the way they are
    assembled, they will end up without serial numbers and making
    them untraceable.
        My own State of Pennsylvania--I serve suburban
    Philadelphia--recently moved to recognize 80 percent of
    partially assembled guns to fall within the standard of the
    State's definition of a firearm while enforcing State laws on
    illegal firearm possession. Has the FBI seen an increase in the
    use of ghost guns, undetectable firearms in investigations you
    have participated in?
        Mr. Wray. I don't know that I can speak to whether
    statistically we've seen an increase, but I can certainly tell
    you anecdotally that this is a topic that's coming up more and
    more frequently. We're having people do sort of intelligence-
    type assessments of the use of it, and it illustrates, frankly,
    a problem that cuts across not just ghost guns, but other
    technologies as well, if I can use the word ``technology'' as
    kind of a crude shorthand there.
        You know, 3-D printing is something that my first reaction
    to is, wow, can you think of all the great things we can do
    with that at the FBI? Then my second reaction is, oh, no. Do
    you realize what other people can do with that technology?
    That's true of so many of the technological issues that we
    confront today.
        Ms. Dean. We feel that same paradoxical set of feelings. I
    introduced a bill this Congress. I want you to know of it. I
    know you are not here to advocate for any legislation. The
    Undetectable Firearms Modernization Act, which would prohibit
    the possession of any firearm that is undetectable by airport-
    level screening.
        Do you think this kind of legislation, not my bill
    specifically, but that kind of legislation is going to be an
    important partnership with making sure that we are secure at
    our airports?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, as you anticipated, without
    commenting on specific legislation, I would say that it
    behooves us as a country to be constantly thinking about where
    is the threat moving, and what are the technologies that
    different kinds of bad actors can use to circumvent the very
    careful security infrastructure that we have in this country?
    That's something that we struggle with all the time, and I
    worry at sometimes that government--and I don't mean Congress,
    the Executive Branch. I just mean government, writ large,
    doesn't move nearly as quickly as the bad guys do.
        Ms. Dean. Yes.
        Mr. Wray. By the time we come up with the recognition that
    some kind of technology is the subject of enhanced protection
    things are way downfield. So, I think trying to stay ahead of
    it is something that is always to be encouraged.
        Ms. Dean. I share that concern, and I hope that we will be
    able to move on that legislation, and I hope that the Senate
    would take it up.
        Following up on Representative Deutch's concern, I want to
    echo his urging of you to look at the two bills we passed
    nearly a year ago, H.R. 8, universal background checks, and
    H.R. 1112, closing of the Charleston loophole. I saw and read
    in your testimony on page 7 about the good work that the NICS
    system is doing, but there are holes within that system, and I
    believe FBI must be aware of them.
        The good news is that, as you report, in 2019 over 2
    million background checks were performed. By your own
    reporting, the FBI previously acknowledged that about 3,000
    people pass the NICS background check system each year despite
    there being this system in place. More reason why wouldn't
    want--why we should have universal background checks in place.
        The 3-day default to yes, which is the Charleston loophole
    bill, do you agree--does the FBI agree that we need to close or
    change the NICS system, so we no longer have the 3-day if you
    don't get clarity on the background check, you default to the
    licensed firearm dealer may sell the gun? Do you agree that we
    need to change that portion of the NICS system?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, as to any kind of legislative change
    to the existing gun laws, I would not be in a position where I
    could give you a position on that.
        Ms. Dean. I want to push back on a legislative change. This
    is a systematic change. It may take a legislative fix. It maybe
    would be something that FBI could recommend. It could be maybe
    an Executive Order. There are many ways to go about this.
        If you know there is a gaping hole, if you know that in the
    example of the Charleston shooting, they did not get clarity
    within 3 days. The man bought the gun, went in, and did the
    grievous harm that he did in the church, and 5 days out, it was
    determined he was a prohibited purchaser.
        Knowing that gaping hole is there, do you not want the NICS
    system to close that hole?
        Mr. Wray. We always want to make the NICS system more
    comprehensive, more complete, and more reliable. So, any holes
    that are in the NICS system are ones that we're interested in
    addressing.
        Ms. Dean. I hope you will urge this legislature and the
    President and the Senate to make sure that we close these
    holes, and we begin to save lives from gun violence.
        Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Ms. Mucarsel-Powell?
        Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you so much, Director Wray, for coming before us and
    sitting and listening to so many issues today.
        Last night, we all watched the President Address to Nation.
    While he was so proud of his work on protecting the Second
    Amendment, which we all agree--nobody here wants to change
    that--what he did not mention is that this week is National Gun
    Survivors Week. He didn't mention the thousands of lives that
    we have already lost to gun violence just this year alone.
        So, we are now approaching the 2-year anniversary of the
    Parkland shooting, and following the shooting of Marjory
    Stoneman Douglas, many families of the children that were
    killed that day noted that the FBI did not appropriately Act on
    the tips that the Parkland shooter was dangerous. You had
    received several tips. I am glad to hear that you are working
    on improving the system, but if you can give just one specific
    example on how you are changing that internal policy so that
    these types of mistakes don't happen again.
        Mr. Wray. So, certainly Parkland was an awful, awful
    tragedy, and my heart goes out, and all the FBI men and women's
    hearts go out to the victims and the families. We've made
    extensive changes there.
        I've personally, as you've heard a couple times, been out
    to visit. I saw it before Parkland, and I saw it after, after
    the changes that I directed were put in place. I sent
    immediately after Parkland a dedicated Inspection Division team
    to take a hard look at the way things were there. Since then,
    we have increased staffing, including at the supervisor level.
    We've enhanced training. We've enhanced the technology in any
    number of ways.
        We've added more oversight. We've put in place a whole new
    leadership team out there with people who have deep, deep, deep
    experience. In some instances, there are two particular
    individuals coming out of the inspection that we did out there.
    One individual was reassigned. Another is I'll just say no
    longer with the FBI.
        Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you, Dr. Wray. If you could
    provide my office with just a summary of some of those changes,
    I would greatly appreciate it.
        I want to turn now to election security. It is interesting
    how my colleagues, we have all been focusing on election
    security. I haven't really heard from the other side of the
    aisle our concern that what we heard in 2016 is that we got
    confirmation that Russia interfered in our elections. You
    actually stated just in an interview in December of 2019 that
    Russia represents the most significant threat to the election
    cycle itself.
        The Mueller report and our entire intelligence community
    also agree that Russia targeted to help then-Candidate
    President Trump now, and they also hacked into some election
    systems in Florida. They were successful in infiltrating some
    of the Florida counties. They alleged that no data was
    manipulated. They got into the garage. They didn't necessarily
    get into the house.
        So, we know now that they are trying to do it again in
    2020. The Florida Secretary of State Laurel Lee mentioned
    recently that the State's election system is under daily
    attack. The American people now need their assurances, as you
    can understand, that when our vote is cast, it is protected.
        So, I wanted to just point out a couple of examples of what
    we saw here in 2016. The post on the left was highlighted by
    the House Intelligence Committee. It is an ad paid by the
    Russians promoting then-Candidate Trump in Florida. The post to
    the right was outlined in the Mueller report. It shows then-
    Candidate Trump posting about rallies in Florida that were
    actually organized by Russian operatives.
        This is the type of propaganda that was spread in 2016 and
    that we are actually still seeing today. I am just very
    concerned that if we are not careful in managing the
    disinformation of campaigns on social media, it will once again
    be a powerful tool for Russia or any other actors in our
    elections.
        So, I wanted to ask you if you could give me just a couple
    of specific examples that the FBI is taking to prevent the
    exploitation of misinformation on social media to influence our
    2020 elections?
        Mr. Wray. Well, in some cases, we have investigations that
    result in charges, right? So, we have, for example, we charged
    the IRA's Chief Accountant--the Internet Research Agency's
    Chief Accountant, we charged a number of Russian military
    officers for their involvement. So, that's kind of on the
    enforcement side.
        I think one of the more important steps that has to be
    taken and that we have been taking quite robustly in the wake
    of 2016 is engaging with the social media companies because the
    scale of what we're talking about is far beyond something that
    law enforcement, even if everybody in the FBI did this, could
    investigate our way through the threat. It needs more than
    that.
        So, working with the social media companies, they have
    under their terms of use, terms of service, the ability to shut
    down accounts that are being manipulated by false personas, et
    cetera. So, we've been doing that a lot more actively, or I
    should say they have been doing that a lot more actively based
    on information we give them. In many instances, that then leads
    them to identify new accounts, and in the right circumstances
    with the right process, we get information back from them,
    which allows us to investigate more aggressively, which then
    allows us to give more back to them.
        So, you get a little bit of a virtuous cycle going, and
    that allows the Government to do what it's most effective at,
    but also allows the private sector to do what it really needs
    to do. So, that's probably the biggest thing, I would say.
        Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you. I ran out of time.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Mr. Reschenthaler?
        Mr. Reschenthaler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Chair, I would defer to my friend and colleague from
    Ohio, Mr. Jordan.
        Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Director, I want to go back to where my colleague from
    Florida, Democratic colleague, was just at, talking about
    Russian election interference. We had a brief exchange on this
    a few minutes ago. Again, Dr. Hill talked about the dossier.
    She said that it was a rabbit hole. During her testimony in the
    open hearing in front of the Intel Committee, she said it was a
    rabbit hole and that she thought Christopher Steele got played.
        Yet, that very document that Mr. Steele put together by
    talking to Russians was taken to the court to get a warrant to
    spy on a presidential campaign, specifically the Trump
    campaign. So, that means one of two things had to have
    happened. Either the FBI got played, or the people in charge of
    that investigation at the headquarters knew about the dossier
    and yet used it anyway, their bias was that strong.
        It seems to me in light of all that, the real question is--
    and you have referenced this in I think your opening statement,
    Director. The real question is what are we going to do now? We
    have got 5 weeks until a major reauthorization takes place. So,
    what are the specific things we can do now to address what took
    place?
        The FBI got a document that was from Russians that was not
    true and yet used that to go spy on a presidential campaign.
    So, what recommendation--let me run through, maybe run through
    a list, and you can tell me if you like some of these ideas.
        Should there be--would you recommend to the FISA court that
    there be a Citizen Advocate at the court when an American
    citizen's rights are going to be infringed on?
        Mr. Wray. I think that's a change that we would have to
    think very, very carefully about, lest it have all kinds of
    unintended consequences.
        Mr. Jordan. Would you be in favor of a transcript of every
    FISA hearing being kept by the court, and secondarily, that
    transcript then being sent to the House Intelligence Committee
    and the Senate Intelligence Committee for their review and only
    that Committee's review?
        Mr. Wray. That starts to involve the manner in which the
    court conducts its proceedings. So, I'd have to think about
    that a little bit more.
        Mr. Jordan. How about some type of appeal process? Any type
    of appeal process that you would favor?
        Mr. Wray. Well, there is under the current FISA system from
    the FISC, the FISA court, at the lower level, there is the so-
    called FISCR, or FISC Court of Review. So, there is an
    Appellate Court, and there have been in extraordinary
    circumstances appeals to the FISA Court of Review.
        Mr. Jordan. How about a hearing--whenever there is a
    renewal of a FISA warrant, that there actually be a hearing?
    You can't just look at the paper and say, okay, we are going to
    continue the FISA warrant. Of course, the example is Mr. Page,
    Carter Page. They got the initial warrant, and then it was
    renewed three times.
        So, how about during those renewal process or those
    renewals, that it is an actual hearing every single time?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I think the court has the discretion to
    have hearings whenever it thinks it's appropriate. The thing I
    would say whenever we talk about anything with FISA, when you
    use phrases like ``every single time,'' is that it's important
    for the American people to understand, for this Committee to
    understand that the vast majority of the FISAs that we do, both
    the initial applications and the renewals, are the kinds of
    applications that I am quite confident--we don't know each
    other, but I'm quite confident you wouldn't lose any sleep
    over. We really wouldn't want to grind things to a halt on that
    front.
        Mr. Jordan. I am not disputing that, Director. We have a
    400-page report, and we know what took place in the context of
    2016--2017 relative to Carter Page, who was part of the
    Presidential campaign. Some of the things that were spelled out
    in this report, my guess is probably have never happened in
    American history.
        So, that is our concern, and we hear so much about Russian
    interference in our election, which is true. It happened. We
    all know it did, and we want it to stop. Seems to me a big part
    of that Russian election interference was the idea that a
    document that Russians put information came from Russians that
    Christopher Steele put together, was used in this way I think
    is scary.
        Mr. Wray. Just on that point, because I think just to make
    sure we're not talking past each other unintentionally. When it
    comes to the origins of the investigation, the Crossfire
    Hurricane investigation, I think the Attorney General has said
    publicly--so I think that's why I'm on solid ground to say it
    here--that one of the things that Mr. Durham is looking very
    specifically at is the origination for the investigation.
        Mr. Jordan. Sure. We appreciate that.
        Mr. Wray. We have cooperating fully with that
    investigation, as the Attorney General himself has commented
    publicly on a number of occasions. So, there's that.
        The other thing I would say to you, which might go a little
    bit to the issue you're raising, is that as the Attorney
    General recently mentioned in a press conference, he and I are
    putting in place mechanisms where investigations of the sort
    that was at issue in the Crossfire Hurricane context would have
    to get approved both by the Director and by the Attorney
    General.
        Mr. Jordan. Important point.
        Ms. Bass. Time. Time.
        Chair Nadler. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Ms. McBath?
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chair, can I ask one quick question?
        Chair Nadler. Ms. McBath?
        Ms. McBath. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you, Director Wray, for being here today.
        This is National Gun Violence Survivors Week, and I am a
    survivor of gun violence. I just want to thank you and all the
    FBI agents that work so diligently on behalf of the United
    States of America, trying to keep us safe from unnecessary gun
    violence and keep our communities safe. I really appreciate
    that.
        I know that some of my colleagues before me have asked you
    today, they have asked you about hate crimes. I just want to
    kind of go back and start by returning to that serious issue.
    In November, the FBI released its hate crimes report, which
    found that there were more than 8,000 hate crimes offenses, and
    57.5 percent were motivated by race, ethnicity, or ancestry
    bias.
        Another 20 percent were motivated by religious bias. Of the
    incidents motivated by religious bias, about nearly 60 percent
    of them were antisemitic. So, taken together, antisemitism was
    the motivation behind about 11 percent, or 11.7 percent of all
    the hate crimes that were reported in the report.
        Now, I know that you have addressed this a little bit
    before, but I would like to ask you to kind of elaborate a
    little bit more on the steps that the Bureau is taking to train
    our local law enforcement to respond to antisemitic incidents
    and reports, including reporting, information sharing, and
    violence prevention.
        Mr. Wray. So, I appreciate the question. A number of things
    that we're doing. One, I created a domestic terrorism hate
    crimes fusion cell last year that's designed to ensure that
    we're maximizing our effectiveness, both bringing the domestic
    terrorism dimension of the kind of threat you're talking about,
    as well as the hate crimes dimension. There's a lot of overlap,
    and I wanted to make sure that we are leveraging every possible
    resource.
        Second, we elevated to the top-level priority racially
    motivated violent extremism, so it's on the same footing in
    terms of our national threat banding as ISIS and homegrown
    violent extremism. We have directed all our joint terrorism
    task forces, and there are 200-plus of those all over the
    country. We're talking about 4,500 something investigators--
    Federal, State, and local together--to make sure that domestic
    terrorism is squarely within their sights.
        We talked a little bit earlier about the threats to life,
    and a lot of those are in this category and making sure those
    get farmed out as a priority to our State and local partners. I
    have personally been engaged on this. I went to the Tree of
    Life synagogue myself and walked the crime scene with the team.
    We're doing a lot of outreach efforts.
        I've met with leaders of a number of the national Jewish
    organizations. We do presentations all over the country to help
    them help houses of worship better secure them. So, those are
    some of the things that I would mention.
        Ms. McBath. Thank you. Thank you for that.
        The statistics in the hate crimes report are made more
    chilling when we consider that many of those who harbor hate
    actually have access to weapons. Having lost a son to one of
    those weapons, I am proud to be a co-sponsor of my colleague
    Representative Cicilline's bill--he is not here--the Disarm
    Hate Act, which would actually prevent individuals from
    possessing a gun if they are convicted of a hate crime.
        My bill, the Federal Extremist Protection Order Act, could
    also be used by law enforcement to keep guns out of the hands
    of people that appear to be in crisis, emotional or behavioral
    crisis, and a danger to themselves and to others. Extremist
    laws like my bill can actually help prevent gun violence by
    actually responding to signs of danger before the tragedies
    actually occur.
        We know that the signs--we know what the signs are. An FBI
    study found that the average active shooter displayed 4-5
    observable and concerning behaviors over time, often related to
    the shooter's interpersonal interactions, verbal threats,
    apparent distress, physical aggression, and other signs of
    violent intentions.
        For every active shooter in the study, at least one person
    noticed that behavior or that concerning behavior. So, what
    recommendation does the FBI have for reducing the risk of
    active shooters?
        Mr. Wray. So, first, let me just say that I'm deeply sorry
    for your loss, and I can only imagine--I know there's no words
    that I can say that would help ease your pain, but I just want
    to make sure that you understand how much I feel for you.
        Second, when it comes to the phenomenon that you're
    describing, I think you put your finger on an important point.
    We know in situation after situation, whether it's the
    homegrown violent extremist or the racially motivated violent
    extremist or even just the sort of more classic school shooter,
    that in almost every instance when you go back and look, there
    was someone--a family member, neighbor, co-worker, or
    classmate, it could be anyone who saw or who knew the person
    well enough and saw a change in the behavior.
        We say all the time, you hear that expression, ``If you see
    something, say something.'' Well, most of us when we hear that,
    we picture the unattended backpack in the bus terminal or
    something, right? Of course, we want people to say something
    then, too. We're really trying to push out the message that if
    you see something about someone that doesn't seem right, we
    want you to say something.
        I think that, most of the studies show that if we could get
    more of the American public to do that, in some cases it
    requires a leap of faith in law enforcement because you may be
    talking about somebody that's very close to them. That's the
    way we can ensure that some of these people get the help they
    need, but also, more importantly, protect them from hurting
    other people.
        Ms. McBath. So, and last question. Do you believe that
    these red flag laws are advantageous in really curbing the tide
    of gun violence?
        Mr. Wray. Any sort of position on actual gun legislation is
    something that we would have to coordinate with the Department.
    Certainly, I know a number of States have passed laws like
    that, and we work with them when they have those laws and use
    whatever tools are in the toolbox.
        Ms. McBath. Thank you.
        Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
        Ms. Roby?
        Ms. Roby. Thank you, Director Wray, for being here and
    staying for this long for us to ask our questions.
        Being from Alabama, I first want to highlight the FBI's
    investment in their new facilities in Huntsville, projected to
    add over 4,000 jobs. So, we in Alabama are very pleased that
    the FBI is investing in our State.
        When you testified last year in front of the Appropriations
    Committee, I focused on human trafficking and child welfare,
    and I was pleased to see that you focused on human trafficking
    and child exploitation for two pages in your written testimony.
    On January 31st, of course, the President signed an Executive
    Order combatting human trafficking and online child
    exploitation in the United States. So, I want you to talk about
    that in a minute, about that Executive Order, how you plan to
    enforce that and work to combat child exploitation, continue to
    combat child exploitation and trafficking.
        Also, I serve here on Judiciary as the Ranking Member on
    the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
    Internet. One area that I, as a mom, am deeply concerned about
    is child safety on the Internet. I hope that my colleagues in
    the majority will hear this, as I have been very much trying to
    create some space here on this Committee for us to dive into
    that in a hearing specific to that.
        The Internet is being used to exploit and entrap children,
    and I think a big piece of this is education of parents, quite
    frankly, which is one of the reasons I want to have a hearing
    here to help draw attention. With the Executive Order and my
    concerns, I will give you an opportunity to talk about not just
    what the FBI is doing now, but any plans you have for the
    future, and quite frankly, how can we here in the Congress be
    more helpful?
        This is a very serious issue that needs a lot of attention.
        Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate both questions. This is a
    subject I remember well, your commitment and focus on this
    issue. It's a subject that's near and dear to my heart, not
    just now as FBI Director, but earlier in my law enforcement
    career when I was Assistant Attorney General. Frankly, even in
    private practice, one of the pro bono efforts that I was
    involved in was to try to push our firm to do pro bono work for
    victims of human trafficking. So, I have a long history of
    being interested in this topic.
        On the FBI's end, certainly I was there for the signing of
    the Executive Order that you mentioned that the President
    signed, and I appreciate his focus and his daughter's focus on
    this issue. It's a multi-agency effort that is extremely
    important.
        On the FBI's end, we recently had, for example, Operation
    Independence Day over the summer, where I think we ended up
    rescuing over 80 kids. That's just in about a month. You think
    about that. That's not counting the kids who we caught the
    predators, but the kid didn't happen to still be ongoingly
    victimized. Who knows what would have happened if we hadn't
    arrested all the perpetrators that were involved in that.
        We try very hard to have a victim-centric approach, so it
    doesn't end with just the prosecution of the offender, but to
    try to engage through our Victims Services Division with the
    victims and stay connected with them even beyond that as they
    engage in recovery.
        On the last point, on the child exploitation online point,
    that is a subject I'm deeply concerned about, and it goes--when
    you asked like what Congress can do? I would come back to the
    lawful access issue. That is the law enforcement's ability to
    maintain--this is not about gaining new authority. This is
    about not losing lawful access to the content, which is what
    allows us to rescue all those kids.
        Last year, there were about 18 million, 18 million tips
    provided to NCMEC, child exploitation tips. Something like 80
    percent of those tips came from Facebook. To Facebook's great
    credit, by the way. If Facebook goes forward with the plans
    that they have right now to go to end-to-end encryption across
    all their platforms, what that will mean is that those 18
    million tips will just disappear.
        No longer, it doesn't matter what laws Congress pass,
    doesn't matter what lawful access we've been given, we will not
    be able to see that content. So, the perpetrators will still be
    out there. The victims will still be out there. The only thing
    that will be gone is the evidence we need to stop them and
    rescue those kids.
        Ms. Roby. Right. I know my time has expired, but I really,
    really, really would like to take this opportunity to say to
    the majority please, please help us create some space, either
    on the Subcommittee or the Full Committee so that we can have--
        Ms. Bass. [Presiding] Ms. Roby, I just pulled someone aside
    and asked that they follow up with you, your staff
    specifically.
        Ms. Roby. Thank you. Really, honestly, it is more about
    having a public hearing where we can dive into the various--
        Ms. Bass. That is what I asked--I do understand that.
        Ms. Roby. Yes.
        Ms. Bass. We talked about it.
        Ms. Roby. Yes. Yes, you and I did.
        Ms. Bass. I did just raise it a minute ago.
        Ms. Roby. Okay, perfect. Thank you.
        Thank you, Director Wray. Appreciate it.
        Ms. Bass. Mr. Correa?
        Mr. Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Director Wray, I want to thank you very much for being here
    today. I want to thank your staff, the FBI, for the good work
    you do protecting our country, as well as our families.
        I want to turn a little bit and talk about facial
    recognition technology. Its use, its capabilities are
    exploding. That genie is out of the bottle, so to speak. I know
    other countries are using it extensively.
        So, my question to you is, in general, is the FBI using
    this technology, and to what extent?
        Mr. Wray. So, I appreciate the question. You're right that
    certainly other countries may use facial recognition
    differently than we do. We do use facial recognition, but--and
    this is the really important point--we use it for lead value.
    So, in other words, we don't use facial recognition as the
    basis to arrest or convict someone. We use it to figure out if
    we're going in the right direction and then put together with
    other information.
        Second, we only allow people who are subjected to very
    significant and rigorous training on the Constitution and on
    the appropriate scientific steps to use that technology. I
    would say that we recently upgraded and the last point I'll
    make on this is we recently changed our algorithms to fit the
    NIST testing standards, and we now have tested out at over 99
    percent accuracy under the NIST standards.
        Again, the key takeaway is we use it for lead value. So, an
    agent can submit information. They can run the facial
    recognition through the database, and they don't get a one-to-
    one match. They give them back a couple different options, and
    then they pursue it again for lead value, not as evidence to
    arrest or convict somebody.
        Mr. Correa. I sit on Homeland Security, and this has been a
    subject matter that we have delved into extensively. Airports
    and other areas where this technology is useful, very useful.
    Same time, there is a lot of false positives. So, what you are
    telling is that constitutionally, you are putting in some
    guardrails there to make sure this technology is not abused. Is
    that what I am hearing?
        Mr. Wray. Yes. We take rigorous obedience to the
    Constitution as one of our core values, and we're applying it
    very much to the way we use facial recognition.
        Mr. Correa. When you say you use it for leads, other
    countries, they put a camera at every corner, and all that
    technology, all that facial recognition information is stored
    somewhere for God knows what reasons. Here, you are saying it
    is only for leads.
        So, if you have got a camera somewhere in public and see a
    bank robbery, you see somebody running away from that area,
    that would be an instance where you would use it to try to
    identify a possible suspect in that situation?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I guess you could have a situation, right,
    where let's say we got a tip about a potential terrorist
    incident, and there's a video of somebody who's unidentified.
    The quality of the picture is such under the appropriate
    scientific standards we could take that picture and run it
    against the database and see if that matches with somebody in
    the database. Then we might know that we're going in the right
    direction.
        Mr. Correa. In that situation, if I may interrupt, do you
    have a database of suspected terrorists, terrorist watch list
    that you would be comparing that to? Is that what I am hearing
    you say?
        Mr. Wray. Well, I don't know how I would describe the FBI's
    own database.
        Mr. Correa. You have a database?
        Mr. Wray. We have a database of our own. We also have the
    ability with a number of States around the country where they
    have photos that under MOUs, very strict MOUs that are designed
    to ensure compliance with the Constitution, we can send them a
    picture and say can you run this and see if this hits with
    anybody you have in your system?
        There's a whole process for that. It can only be done by
    people who are trained appropriately. Again, even if we get
    back a positive match, it's then just for lead value. It's for
    investigative value, not--
        Mr. Correa. Director Wray if I may interrupt you? I am
    running out of time. Again, as I mentioned, this is a very
    powerful tool, very useful tool, but also one that could be
    subject to errors and abuse.
        I would ask your department to continue to periodically
    update us on your progress in terms of how you are using it and
    also on those guardrails you are putting in in terms of to
    assure that there isn't any misuse or abuse and that you are
    constitutionally doing the right thing. Again, want to make
    sure we work with you so there are no misunderstandings moving
    forward.
        Thank you for being here, sir.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you, Director Wray. Thank you for being
    with us today, and I know you have been here for a very long
    time.
        We have spoken many times about Black Identity Extremists,
    and I definitely want to ask you about that today. I understand
    that the Bureau no longer uses BIE and instead categorizes
    these cases under the broader label of racially motivated
    violent extremism. One, I wanted to know if you guys have
    really repudiated the whole BIE category? Because I know when
    we have talked about it in the past, it really didn't seem to
    be that there was much evidence that there were Black Identity
    Extremists.
        The title was a little longer than that, something about
    Black Identity Extremists that threaten police or attack
    police? So, tell me what is different.
        Mr. Wray. So, I found our conversations before to be very
    constructive and very valuable, and we also engaged not just
    with you and your colleagues, but also with NOBLE with whom we
    have a great relationship and are working more closely than
    ever.
        Ms. Bass. Great. Yes, that is great. Good.
        Mr. Wray. We have, as you mentioned, changed our
    terminology as part of a broader reorganization of the way in
    which we categorize our domestic terrorism efforts. So, we took
    a whole bunch of categories, not just the one that you
    mentioned, but a number of others and consolidated down to
    really four buckets. The reason for that is--
        Ms. Bass. What are the four buckets?
        Mr. Wray. What's that?
        Ms. Bass. What are the four buckets?
        Mr. Wray. There's racially motivated violent extremism,
    which is any kind of violent extremism that's driven with a
    kind of racial intent of one sort or another, no matter which
    direction.
        There is anarchism/government extremism. I may not have the
    label right. That covers kind of variety of everything sort
    of--certain kinds of militia stuff all the way over to kind of
    more the anarchist, maybe sort of Antifa-like kind of
    methodology.
        There is abortion violent extremism, people on either side
    of that issue who commit violence on behalf of different views
    on that topic.
        Ms. Bass. People on either side of that issue don't commit
    violence.
        Mr. Wray. Well, we've actually had a variety of kinds of
    violence under that, you believe it or not.
        Ms. Bass. Really? That go into the buildings and hurt the
    doctors--
        Mr. Wray. At the end of the day, and then the last one has
    to do with animal rights and environmental.
        Ms. Bass. Those are the four?
        Mr. Wray. What's that?
        Ms. Bass. Those are the four?
        Mr. Wray. Those are the four. The point is we wanted to
    underscore what I told you earlier, but we wanted to make it
    even more clear that at the end of the day, for us, it's not
    about the ideology. It's about the violence. That's where we
    weigh in.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Wray. It's not that the ideology isn't important--
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Wray. --for us as Americans, but we only investigate
    violence and the crimes that go with the violence. So, we
    wanted to make clear that.
        Ms. Bass. So, under the racially motivated violent
    extremism, how many African-American or Black groups are
    considered under there?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I want to be clear. We don't
    investigate groups, per se. We have properly predicated
    investigations into individuals, and in some cases, they may
    have co-conspirators. In each of those instances, it's where we
    have three things:

        (1) Credible evidence of a Federal crime;
        (2) credible evidence of violence or threat or use of
    violence; and
        (3) on behalf of some ideology.

        If we have those things and only if we have those things
    will we open an investigation.
        Ms. Bass. Right. So, are White supremacist groups under
    racially motivated violent extremism? Or do White supremacists
    have a whole separate category?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I want to stay away from the use of
    the word ``groups.'' We certainly investigate White supremacist
    motivated violent extremism in the same category that we're
    talking about.
        So, for example, we just last month arrested eight Members,
    I think, of a group known as the Base, and there were arrests
    that were made not just in my home State of Georgia, but also
    in Maryland.
        Ms. Bass. Oh, yes. That was getting ready to go to
    Virginia. Correct?
        Mr. Wray. What's that?
        Ms. Bass. That was the group that was on their way to
    Virginia?
        Mr. Wray. I think that's right. I can't remember that
    detail specifically.
        Ms. Bass. So, there are organizations, and I understand
    that when you say you just investigate individuals. You just
    gave an example of a group. So, I know that there are a lot of
    White supremacist groups, and so my question to you is about
    Black groups. So, I don't know, maybe they are Black
    individuals.
        Under the category of Black identity extremism formerly,
    there were organizations such as the one in Texas and the
    individual in Texas that was arrested. He was incarcerated for
    a while, and then after being incarcerated and going on trial,
    he was released. He had activity on a website, and he also had
    literature when he was arrested. Are you familiar with the case
    that I am talking about? We have talked about it before.
        Mr. Wray. I think so, yes.
        Ms. Bass. So, my question is, are there African Americans
    or Black groups or individuals that are currently a part of the
    racially motivated violent extremism category?
        Mr. Wray. Well, again, I don't know that I would speak in
    terms of investigating groups. We investigate individuals and,
    in some instances, individuals with co-conspirators. I would
    say certainly there are individuals who we categorize and track
    under the racially motivated violent extremism part of our
    program management who are African Americans targeting others.
        So, for example, you probably saw some of the reporting
    about the killing of the individuals in Jersey City.
        Ms. Bass. I did.
        Mr. Wray. Including the killing of the people in the kosher
    supermarket.
        Ms. Bass. I did.
        Mr. Wray. Those individuals associated themselves with
    something called the Black Hebrew Israelite.
        Ms. Bass. Oh, I am very familiar with them.
        Mr. Wray. So, we are--
        Ms. Bass. So, let us use that--
        Mr. Wray. That would be in that category.
        Ms. Bass. So, let us use that as an example, because I am
    very familiar with that group. That group is in several--what
    did you say?
        Mr. Collins. Your time has expired.
        Ms. Bass. Yes, well, excuse me, but I am taking the
    prerogative of the Chair.
        Mr. Collins. It has happened all day.
        Ms. Bass. Using that group as an example, is that a group?
    Because they open--I mean you see them on street corners and
    different groups. They are not a secret group at all. Is that
    group part of the racially motivated extremism, the group? I
    understand the Act that took place, and I understand the
    individuals, and it is not clear their level of association.
        Mr. Wray. What I would say to you on that is we have some
    investigations into individuals who associate themselves with
    that movement.
        Ms. Bass. Beyond those two people?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Ms. Bass. Okay. Director Wray, documents published in 2019
    in August suggest that the FBI still uses the designation. The
    documents show that the FBI's official consolidated strategy
    guide, which lists the Bureau's counterterrorism priorities,
    continues its focus on BIE. So, the same document, are you
    familiar with the document that I just mentioned?
        Mr. Wray. Not from your description of it. So, perhaps what
    I can do is if you want to have my staff take a look at that
    document--
        Ms. Bass. What about the ``iron fist?''
        Mr. Wray. The what, now?
        Ms. Bass. The iron fist? The documents identify an FBI
    threat mitigation strategy called the iron fist. Are you
    familiar with that?
        Mr. Wray. Not sitting here right now, but if you want to
    send me the document, you're looking at offline, I can have my
    staff follow up with you, and we can try to get back to you on
    it.
        Ms. Bass. Okay. All right. Thank you.
        The hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Wray. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                                   APPENDIX

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                     QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

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                         U.S. Congressman Mike Johnson

                     U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary

                            Questions for the Record

                               February 12, 2020

         Hearing--``Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation''

        Director Wray, as you are aware Former Special Counsel
    Mueller brought on members of the FBI onto the Special
    Counsel's team when Crossfire Hurricane was transferred from
    the FBI to the Special Counsel. In Mr. Mueller's subsequent
    appearance before this Committee he refused to answer any
    questions related to the Steele Dossier. With that in mind, I
    would like to ask you a few questions regarding this phase of
    the investigation:

        1. LTo your knowledge did Former Special Counsel Mueller
    ever question any of the Steele Dossier origins after or during
    the transition of Crossfire Hurricane from the FBI to the
    Special Counsel's team?
        2. LAre you aware of any FBI personnel that were not part
    of the Mueller team being asked by Former Director Mueller to
    carry out tasks during his tenure as Special Counsel?
        3. LIn addition to addressing the relevant deficiencies
    found in the IG report, are you internally examining FBI
    protocols surrounding the transfer of investigations to a
    Special Counsel, particularly in instances where FBI staff are
    used by the Special Counsel?
        4. LHave you considered updating any sections of relevant
    Policy Implementation Guides or the Domestic Investigations
    Operations Guide (DIOG) regarding FBI interactions, or the
    transfer of investigations, to a Special Counsel?

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