    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

              THE STATE OF PIPELINE SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 1, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-28

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                       govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                            energycommerce.house.gov

                                ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    39-891 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2020

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                         FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                     Chairman
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             FRED UPTON, Michigan
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           PETE OLSON, Texas
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice     BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
        Chair                            BILLY LONG, Missouri
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILL FLORES, Texas
    JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
        Massachusetts                    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    TONY CARDENAS, California            RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
    RAUL RUIZ, California                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
    DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
    ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    DARREN SOTO, Florida
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
                                     ------

                               Professional Staff

                       JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
                    TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
                    MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
                             Subcommittee on Energy

                            BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
                                     Chairman
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California          FRED UPTON, Michigan
    MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania               Ranking Member
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    JERRY McNERNEY, California, Vice     CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
        Chair                            PETE OLSON, Texas
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               BILL FLORES, Texas
        Massachusetts                    RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
    ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
        officio)

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Illinois, opening statement.................................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     2
    Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Michigan, opening statement....................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Oregon, opening statement......................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................     9

                                   Witnesses

    Howard ``Skip'' Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
      Materials Safety Administration................................    11
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   155
    William Russell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
      Government Accountability Office...............................    23
        Prepared statement...........................................    25
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   161
    Lawrence Friedeman, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of
      Ohio...........................................................    40
        Prepared statement...........................................    42
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   162
    Carl Weimer, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust...........    77
        Prepared statement...........................................    80
    Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer,
      Association of Oil Pipelines...................................   102
        Prepared statement...........................................   104
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   164
    Christina Sames, Vice President, Operations and Engineering
      Services, American Gas Association.............................   111
        Prepared statement...........................................   113
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   166

                               Submitted Material

    Letter of May 1, 2019, from American Public Gas Association to
      Mr. Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush..................   137
    Letter of April 29, 2019, from Donald F. Santa, President and
      Chief Executive Officer, Interstate Natural Gas Association of
      America, to Mr. Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush......   140
    Letter of April 30, 2019, from Nick Wagner, President, National
      Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, to Mr. Rush
      and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush...........................   150
    Letter of May 1, 2019, from Brigham A. McCown, Founder and
      Chairman, Alliance for Innovation and Infrastructure, to Mr.
      Rush and Mr. Upton, submitted by Mr. Rush......................   152

              THE STATE OF PIPELINE SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA

                                  ----------

                             WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019

                      House of Representatives,
                                Subcommittee on Energy,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
    the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
    Hon. Bobby L. Rush (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Rush, Peters, Doyle,
    McNerney, Loebsack, Butterfield, Welch, Schrader, Kennedy,
    Veasey, Kuster, Kelly, Barragan, O'Halleran, Blunt Rochester,
    Pallone (ex officio), Upton (subcommittee ranking member),
    Latta, Rodgers, Olson, McKinley, Griffith, Johnson, Bucshon,
    Flores, Hudson, Walberg, Duncan, and Walden (ex officio).
        Staff present: Omar Guzman-Toro, Policy Analyst; Zach
    Kahan, Outreach and Member Service Coordinator; Rick Kessler,
    Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment; John
    Marshall, Policy Coordinator; Lisa Olson, FERC Detailee; Tuley
    Wright, Energy and Environment Policy Advisor; Mike Bloomquist,
    Minority Staff Director; Jordan Davis, Minority Senior Advisor;
    Peter Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Mary Martin, Minority
    Chief Counsel, Energy and Environment; Brandon Mooney, Minority
    Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; Brannon Rains, Minority Staff
    Assistant; and Peter Spencer, Minority Senior Professional
    Staff Member, Environment and Climate Change.
        Mr. Rush. The subcommittee will now come to order.
        The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the
    purposes of an opening statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        I want to thank all the witnesses who are attending this
    very important hearing today on pipeline safety and security.
    And I want to welcome all of our distinguished panelists that
    will be appearing before us today on two separate panels.
        I also want to express my disappointment and my deep-seated
    concern that we will not be hearing from one of the agencies
    responsible for oversight of pipeline safety, TSA, who actually
    presides over some of the most disturbing outstanding issues
    that need to be addressed by the members of this subcommittee.
        While we did invite TSA to appear before us today, so that
    the members of this subcommittee could address many of the
    issues that were spelled out in a December 2018 GAO report, TSA
    declined to send a witness. And frankly, I find it to be
    unacceptable and it will be addressed as we move forward. TSA
    needs to answer the questions that we have, that members of
    this subcommittee have and want to get answers to.
        In the meantime, I look forward to engaging with the
    panelists that are present with us today, examining the state
    of pipeline safety and security as it currently stands before
    the Nation.
        I have the pleasure of representing portions of Will
    County, Illinois, as part of the First Congressional District
    of Illinois. And Will County has the dubious distinction of
    accounting for 8 percent of all the pipelines in my State, and
    officials there were able to provide my office with critical
    insight into how pipeline safety and security protocols play
    out on the local level.
        As we all know, local communities are always the ones most
    directly impacted when something goes wrong with America's
    pipeline, as we have, unfortunately, witnessed far too often in
    areas extending from the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts to
    Aliso Canyon and San Bruno in California.
        From county first responders, who are usually the initial
    actors on the scene, to local emergency management agencies,
    who are required to participate and carry out emergency
    preparedness exercises to plan and prepare for disasters, local
    agencies play a huge role in helping to mitigate disasters, and
    they are not always provided with the adequate funding or
    resources to do the job which we require of them.
        Many times when private companies are mandated by Federal
    law to comply with consent decrees, they pull in local
    resources, such was the case with a recent spill in Romeoville,
    Illinois. Will County officials were required to contribute
    many hours of manpower and staff in order to help Enbridge meet
    its court-ordered decree, but they were not compensated any
    money for this huge responsibility that they had to accept.
        While there is the Hazardous Materials Emergency
    Preparedness, HMEP, grant program, it appears that there are
    some severe limitations upon this program. The HMEP or TAG
    program operates with limited and unpredictable levels of
    funding and has burdensome restrictions on how that money may
    be utilized.
        I look forward to today's hearing and to a robust
    discussion on both sides of the issue of this outstanding
    priority issue that is before us.
        And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. And
    now, I recognize my friend and colleague, my friend from
    Michigan, Ranking Member Upton.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rush follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Bobby L. Rush

        I want to thank you all for attending this very important
    hearing today on pipeline safety and security, and I want to
    welcome all of our distinguished witnesses that will be
    appearing before us on two separate panels.
        I also want to express my disappointment and concern that
    we will not be hearing from one of the major agencies
    responsible for the oversight of pipeline security, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) who actually
    preside over some the most disturbing outstanding issues that
    need to be addressed.
        While we did invite TSA to appear before us today, so
    Members could address many of the issues that were spelled out
    in a December 2018 GAO report, they declined to send a witness,
    which I find to be unacceptable and must be addressed moving
    forward.
        In the meantime, I look forward to engaging with the
    panelists that are here, to examine the state of pipeline
    safety and security as it currently stands.
        I have the pleasure of representing portions of Will County
    as part of the First Congressional District of Illinois.
        Will County accounts for 8-percent of all pipelines in my
    State, and officials there were able to provide my office with
    critical insight into how pipeline safety and security
    protocols play out on the local level.
        As we all know, local communities are always the ones most
    directly impacted when something goes wrong, as we've
    unfortunately witnessed far too often in areas extending from
    the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts to Aliso Canyon and San
    Bruno in California.
        From county first responders who are usually the initial
    actors on the scene, to local Emergency Management Agencies
    (EMA) who are required to participate and carry out emergency
    preparedness exercises to plan and prepare for disasters, local
    agencies play a large role in helping to mitigate disasters and
    they are not always provided the adequate funding or resources
    to do so.
        Many times, when private companies are mandated to comply
    with Consent Decrees, they pull in local resources such as was
    the case with a recent spill in Romeoville, Illinois.
        Will County officials were required to contribute many
    hours of manpower and staff in order to help Enbridge meet its
    court-ordered decree but were not compensated any money for the
    role they played.
        While there is the Hazardous Materials Emergency
    Preparedness (HMEP) grant program, it appears that there are
    some severe limitations with this program.
        The HMEP, like the Technical Assistance Grants, or TAG
    program operates with limited and unpredictable levels of
    funding and has burdensome restrictions on how the funding may
    be used.
        So I look forward to working together with my colleagues on
    both sides of the aisle, as we have done in the past, to
    examine the different types of grant programs available.
        It is important that we look at all of the different
    funding mechanisms at our disposal in order to make sure that
    we are providing our first responders, emergency management
    agencies, and all of the other critical State and local
    stakeholders with the resources they need to effectively do
    their jobs and keep all of the Nation's pipelines, and the
    communities they traverse, safe and secure.
        With that I yield the balance of my time, and now I would
    like to recognize my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Upton
    for his opening statement.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also my friend for
    sure.
        This is an important hearing as we begin our work to
    reauthorize the Nation's pipeline safety laws. I want to thank
    you for making this a bipartisan effort, for working with us to
    select the witnesses and prepare for the hearing. We have a
    great track record when we work together from the very start,
    especially when it involves public safety.
        Throughout my time in Congress, I have especially
    prioritized pipeline safety. It is personal, as we had to deal
    with a bad pipeline accident in my home State. I recall the
    2010 oil spill in the Kalamazoo River, not too far from my
    district, which led to the passage of the Upton-Dingell
    pipeline safety bill in 2012. And in response to the Kalamazoo
    spill specifically, we cut down on the incident reporting time,
    24 hours now, and we upped the financial penalty for
    violations.
        In 2016, we came together again to pass another bipartisan
    pipeline safety bill, which is now set to expire in October. I
    am proud of the work that we accomplished with that bill,
    particularly the language that I was able to include requiring
    mandatory annual inspections for certain pipeline crossings,
    such as the Enbridge Line 5, which crosses the Straits of
    Mackinac at a depth of more than 250 feet below the surface of
    the water, that was built some 60 years ago.
        Mr. Chairman, as we turn to this upcoming reauthorization,
    I am grateful for the commitment from you to adopt the same
    bipartisan formula that worked so well the last two times as we
    did pipeline safety.
        I am confident that today's hearing will provide us with a
    good start. We have two panels offering a diverse range of
    views, including the Administrator of PHMSA, the Commissioner
    from the Ohio Public Utility Commission, and a representative
    from the GAO, representatives of oil and gas pipeline
    operators, and pipeline safety advocates. As one can tell from
    the witness lineup, an effective pipeline safety and security
    program requires communication and cooperation among a wide
    array of stakeholders.
        Today's hearing will also allow Members to examine GAO's
    recommendations to address significant weaknesses in TSA's
    Pipeline Security Program management. I will confess that I was
    most disappointed to learn that, while TSA was invited to
    participate in today's hearing, they officially declined to
    appear. And I guess you could say, like the Alamo, we are going
    to remember that.
        We know from the committee's oversight that TSA staffing
    issues are a major limitation. TSA has some 50,000 employees.
    Only a handful--actually, it is a handful plus one, six--are
    assigned to pipeline safety. That is not very good.
        Strengthening cybersecurity for pipelines is an issue that
    I care deeply about, and I believe that Congress does need to
    act in both the House and the Senate. I have introduced a bill,
    H.R. 370, the Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity
    Preparedness Act, that would help address some of the
    vulnerabilities outlined in the GAO report. And although my
    bill is more focused on DOE's role, as the sector-specific
    agency for energy, I am committed to getting it over the finish
    line, and I am open-minded about ways to strengthen
    cybersecurity through our pipeline safety reauthorization bill.
    And I know that we can make it bipartisan.
        So, at the end of the day, we cannot separate pipeline
    safety from pipeline security, and we cannot allow agencies to
    carry out a turf war over jurisdiction, especially if they are
    going to refuse to come before this important committee.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding the
    hearing, and I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing to begin
    our work to reauthorize the Nation's pipeline safety laws. I
    would also like to thank you for making this a bipartisan
    effort, and for working with us to select the witnesses and
    prepare for this hearing. We have a great track record when we
    work together from the very beginning, especially when it
    involves public safety.
        Throughout my time in Congress, I have especially
    prioritized pipeline safety. It's personal for me, as it is for
    those of us who have had to deal with a pipeline accident in
    our home State. I often recall the 2010 oil spill in the
    Kalamazoo River, near my district, which lead to the passage of
    our pipeline safety bill in 2012. In response to the Kalamazoo
    spill specifically, we cut down on the incident reporting time
    and upped the financial penalties for violations.
        In 2016, we came together again to pass another bipartisan
    pipeline safety bill, which is set to expire at the end of this
    fiscal year. I am proud of the work we accomplished with that
    bill, particularly the language that I was able to include to
    require mandatory annual inspections for certain pipeline
    crossings, such as Enbridge's Line 5, which crosses the Straits
    of Mackinac at a depth of more than 250 below the surface of
    the water.
        Mr. Chairman, as we turn to this upcoming reauthorization,
    I hope that we can receive a commitment from you to adopt the
    same bipartisan formula that worked so well the last two times
    we did pipeline safety reauthorization.
        I am confident that today's hearing will provide us with a
    good start. We have two panels offering a diverse range of
    views, including the Administrator of PHMSA, a Commissioner
    from the Ohio Public Utility Commission, a representative from
    the Government Accountability Office, representatives of oil
    and gas pipeline operators, and pipeline safety advocates.
        As one can tell from the witness lineup, an effective
    pipeline safety and security program requires communication and
    cooperation among a wide array of stakeholders.
        Today's hearing will also allow Members to examine GAO's
    recommendations to address significant weaknesses in TSA's
    pipeline security program management. I was disappointed to
    learn that while TSA was invited to participate in today's
    hearing, the agency declined to appear. Going forward, I
    encourage the administration and TSA to take this matter
    seriously and cooperate with the committee.
        We know from the committee's oversight that TSA staffing
    issues are a major limitation. Even though TSA has over 50,000
    employees, only a handful are assigned to pipeline security. I
    understand that TSA only had 6 full time equivalent staff
    assigned to pipeline security in 2018. Only 6 out of 50,000
    employees!
        Strengthening cybersecurity for pipelines is an issue I
    care deeply about, and I believe Congress needs to act. I have
    a bill, H.R. 370--the Pipeline and LNG facility Cybersecurity
    Preparedness Act, that would help address some of the
    vulnerabilities outlined in the GAO report.
        Although my bill is more focused on DOE's role as the
    sector-specific agency for energy, I am committed to getting it
    over the finish line, and I am open-minded about ways to
    strengthen cybersecurity through our pipeline safety
    reauthorization bill.
        At the end of the day, we cannot separate pipeline safety
    from pipeline security, and we cannot allow agencies to carry
    out a turf war over jurisdiction. Especially if they are going
    to refuse to testify before the Energy and Commerce Committee.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing
    and I will yield back.

        Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
    committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for his opening
    statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
                IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        There are millions of miles of pipeline transporting
    natural gas, oil, and other commodities across the country. And
    when a pipeline fails, it can be destructive, and even deadly.
    Late last year, a failure in Massachusetts' Merrimack Valley
    caused one death, 21 injuries, and damaged over 130 homes. In
    February, a gas field explosion at a residence in Dallas,
    Texas, killed a 12-year-old and injured his family. And these
    tragic events underscore the need for a strong Federal safety
    pipeline program.
        And I want to welcome Skip Elliott, Administrator of the
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
    pronounced PHMSA, to the committee. Administrator Elliott, I
    wish you success in your effort to manage an agency notorious
    for its inability to meet congressionally mandated deadlines
    and carry out its mission in an efficient and effective way.
    And certainly, there are dedicated career staff at PHMSA who
    work hard to make our pipelines safer, but there are too many
    outstanding mandates from the 2011 and 2016 pipeline safety
    reauthorizations that PHMSA has failed to finalize, and that is
    unacceptable.
        As part of the 2011 reauthorization, Congress required the
    use of automatic or remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly
    constructed transmission pipelines to limit damage when a
    rupture occurred. The National Transportation Safety Board
    recommended use of this technology 25 years ago, after a
    pipeline explosion in my congressional district in Edison, New
    Jersey. I was in Congress then, and yet, here we are still
    discussing the same issue.
        The 2011 law also required operators to install leak
    detection systems on hazardous liquid pipelines, but 8 years
    later PHMSA still has not finalized the rule. And in what I
    consider to be the most important provision of the 2016
    reauthorization, Congress gave PHMSA emergency order authority
    to address imminent industrywide safety hazards that pose a
    threat to life or significant harm to property or the
    environment. Yet, PHMSA has failed to implement this, too.
        And it is not all PHMSA's fault. The prescriptive cost-
    benefit analysis required by the '96 reauthorization hamstrung
    the agency. If we want PHMSA to finalize more rulemakings, we
    must remove or adjust this overly burdensome requirement.
        We also need to restore the mechanisms for citizens to
    pursue legal action to compel PHMSA to fulfill its statutory
    duties. If the Federal Government can't or will not carry out
    its mandated responsibilities, citizens should have the right
    to take legal action.
        In the aftermath of the 2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion
    that killed eight people, San Francisco sued the Federal
    Government for having abjectly failed to enforce safety
    standards. Unfortunately, the court dismissed that suit because
    it found that the law did not permit mandamus-type citizen
    suits against the Government, and that was never Congress'
    intent and it must change.
        I am also extremely disappointed, as my colleague from
    Michigan said, that the Transportation Security Administration
    Administrator David Pekoske refused to testify or even send a
    witness today. And on a bipartisan basis, we invited TSA to
    testify on its pipeline security program, which the Government
    Accounting Office has criticized for having significant
    weaknesses. I am concerned that TSA lacks the resources,
    expertise in energy delivery systems, and, frankly, the
    commitment to keep up its obligations under the law. And so,
    Fred, I want to thank you for pointing that out, too.
        There was a serious security breach last week when someone
    shot at the Magellan pipeline in Minnesota, causing a release
    of over 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel. If TSA can't be bothered
    to be here to discuss this security breach and justify its
    performance to Congress, then perhaps it is time we look for
    another Federal agency other than TSA to handle this critical
    responsibility.
        And finally, I would like to thank Carl Weimer for all of
    his help over the years to this committee and Congress because
    I am told he will soon step down as the Executive Director of
    the Pipeline Safety Trust. Twenty years ago next month, the
    Olympic Gasoline Pipeline exploded in Bellingham, Washington,
    and that killed 18-year-old Liam Wood and two 10-year-olds,
    Wade King and Steven Tsiorvas. And I say their names because it
    is critical that we not forget these kids. Since then, Carl and
    the Trust have taken the outrage of that event and used it to
    improve the pipeline safety landscape, to the benefit of all of
    us.
        You know, again, the role of citizens, the role of
    individuals in drawing attention to what needs to be done here
    is very important, and I certainly want to highlight that.
        The Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization has typically been
    a bipartisan effort, and we look forward to continue working
    with colleagues on both sides of the aisle to update and
    improve this critical Federal program.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

        There are millions of miles of pipeline transporting
    natural gas, oil and other commodities across the country. When
    a pipeline fails, it can be destructive and even deadly. Late
    last year, a failure in Massachusetts' Merrimack Valley caused
    one death, 21 injuries and damage to over 130 homes. In
    February, a gas-fueled explosion at a residence in Dallas,
    Texas killed a 12-year old and injured his family. These tragic
    events underscore the need for a strong Federal safety pipeline
    program.
        I want to welcome Skip Elliott, Administrator of the
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
    to the committee. Administrator Elliott, I wish you success in
    your effort to manage an agency notorious for its inability to
    meet congressionally mandated deadlines and carry out its
    mission in an efficient and effective way. Certainly, there are
    dedicated career staff at PHMSA who work hard to make our
    pipelines safer, but there are too many outstanding mandates
    from the 2011 and 2016 Pipeline Safety reauthorizations that
    PHMSA has failed to finalize and that's unacceptable.
        As part of the 2011 reauthorization, Congress required the
    use of automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves on newly
    constructed transmission pipelines to limit damage when a
    rupture occurs. The National Transportation Safety Board
    recommended use of this technology 25 years ago after a
    pipeline explosion in my Congressional District in Edison, New
    Jersey. Yet, here we are, still discussing this issue.
        The 2011 law also required operators to install leak
    detection systems on hazardous liquid pipelines--but 8 years
    later, PHMSA still has not finalized a rule. And in what I
    considered to be the most important provision of the 2016
    reauthorization, Congress gave PHMSA emergency order authority
    to address imminent, industrywide safety hazards that pose a
    threat to life or significant harm to property or the
    environment. Yet PHMSA has failed to implement this, too.
        It's not all PHMSA's fault. The prescriptive cost-benefit
    analysis required by the 1996 reauthorization hamstrings the
    agency. If we want PHMSA to finalize more rulemakings, we must
    remove or adjust this overly burdensome requirement.
        We also need to restore the mechanism for citizens to
    pursue legal action to compel PHMSA to fulfill its statutory
    duties. If the Federal Government cannot or will not carry out
    its mandated responsibilities, citizens should have the right
    to take legal action.
        In the aftermath of the 2010 San Bruno pipeline explosion
    that killed eight people, San Francisco sued the Federal
    Government for having abjectly failed to enforce safety
    standards. Unfortunately, the court dismissed that suit because
    it found that the law did not permit mandamus-type citizen
    suits against the Government. That was never Congress' intent
    and it must change.
        I am also extremely disappointed that Transportation
    Security Administration Administrator David Pekoske refused to
    testify or even send a witness today. On a bipartisan basis, we
    invited TSA to testify on its Pipeline Security Program, which
    the Government Accountability Office has criticized for having
    ``significant weaknesses.'' I'm concerned that TSA lacks the
    resources, expertise in energy delivery systems and, frankly,
    commitment, to keep up its obligations under the law.
        There was a serious security breach last week when someone
    shot at the Magellan pipeline in Minnesota causing a release of
    over 8,000 gallons of diesel fuel. If TSA can't be bothered to
    be here to discuss this security breach and justify its
    performance to Congress, then perhaps it's time we looked for
    another Federal agency to handle this critical responsibility.
        Finally, I'd like thank Carl Weimer for his all of his help
    over the years to this committee and Congress because, I am
    told, he will soon step down as Executive Director of the
    Pipeline Safety Trust. Twenty years ago next month, the Olympic
    Gasoline Pipeline exploded in Bellingham, Washington killing
    18-year-old Liam Wood and two 10-year-olds: Wade King and
    Stephen Tsiorvas. I say their names because it is critical we
    not forget these children. Since then, Carl and the Trust have
    taken the outrage of that event and used it to improve the
    pipeline safety landscape to the benefit of all of us.
        Pipeline Safety Act reauthorization has typically been a
    bipartisan effort, and I look forward to continuing to work
    with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to update and
    improve this critical Federal program this year.

        Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, Mr. Walden, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.
        Mr. Walden. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rush. Good morning.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                   CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

        Mr. Walden. Thanks for having this hearing. I think it is
    really important that we work together to reauthorize and
    modernize the Nation's pipeline safety program.
        This is really an important hearing, and I am pleased that
    we are beginning this process on a bipartisan basis, Mr.
    Chairman, which is the tradition of the Energy and Commerce
    Committee on matters relating to pipeline safety and security.
        The Federal Government, acting through the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, known as PHMSA, has
    an important responsibility to develop and enforce regulations
    for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of
    the Nation's 2.7 million miles of pipelines.
        Pipelines are among the safest and most efficient ways to
    transport critical fuels and feedstocks, such as natural gas
    and petroleum, to our homes and businesses. And simply put, the
    safe operation of our Nation's pipeline and safety system is
    essential to help keep prices low for consumers and drive our
    economy forward in a positive direction.
        PHMSA cannot do this important job by itself. It must
    coordinate effectively with other Federal agencies, such as the
    Department of Energy, FERC, and TSA, and especially with the
    States. In fact, it is important to recognize that much of the
    responsibility for pipeline safety falls on the States. It is
    often State pipeline safety workers who are on the front lines
    inspecting and enforcing safety requirements. And in many
    cases, it is also the States' responsibilities to regulate
    rates and ensure the adequate investments are made in pipeline
    maintenance and modernization.
        As Members of Congress, it is our responsibility to ensure
    that PHMSA and the States have enough resources and the
    appropriate tools to get the job done. With PHMSA's
    authorization expiring at the end of this fiscal year, it is
    time for us to get our work done.
        As we turn to reauthorization, I will remain focused on
    protecting public safety and consumers. These are not mutually
    exclusive goals, and I am optimistic we can find bipartisan
    agreement, as we always have when it comes to pipeline safety.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope we can get a commitment to work
    together on the drafting process from the very beginning. That
    would really be consistent with our practice from the last
    round of reauthorization, and I think it would contribute
    toward a better quality work product. So, I hope we can do
    that.
        There are many areas where I believe we can update and
    strengthen the law to drive innovation and lower the barrier of
    entry for new technologies. New technologies for pipeline
    construction and integrity management can help improve
    efficiency and safety at the same time.
        I also believe we should examine recent pipeline safety
    incidents and incorporate lessons learned in our work. We
    should also make sure to provide PHMSA with clear directions,
    recognizing they already have a backlog of congressional
    mandates. They are working on two high-priority rules for both
    gas and liquid pipelines.
        PHMSA must also finish its work on other important safety
    rules relating to pipelines valves and rupture detection,
    integrity management, class location, and public education and
    awareness. I believe PHMSA is on the right track, and I look
    forward to the agency completing this important work.
        At this point, I will close by thanking our witnesses for
    appearing before us today. We are going to hear a range of
    perspectives to help inform our work, including PHMSA, the
    State of Ohio, pipeline operators, and safety advocates.
        We are also going to examine the findings of a recent GAO
    report which raises numerous serious concerns about the
    effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration's
    Pipeline Cybersecurity Program. As the committee of
    jurisdiction for energy and interstate commerce--and let me say
    this very clearly--I am very disappointed that TSA refused to
    provide a witness for today's hearing, and I would urge this
    administration in the strongest terms possible to cooperate
    with our committee and respond to what I believe are legitimate
    oversight requests relating to pipeline safety and security.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, thanks again for holding the
    hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing to begin
    our work to reauthorize and modernize the Nation's pipeline
    safety program. This is an important hearing, and I am pleased
    that we are beginning this process on a bipartisan basis, which
    is the tradition of the Energy and Commerce Committee on
    matters relating to pipeline safety and security.
        The Federal Government, acting through the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, known as PHMSA has
    an important responsibility to develop and enforce regulations
    for the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of
    the Nation's 2.7 million miles of pipelines. Pipelines are
    among the safest and most efficient ways to transport critical
    fuels and feedstocks such as natural gas and petroleum to our
    homes and businesses. Simply put, the safe operation of our
    Nation's pipeline system is essential to help keep prices low
    for consumers and drive our economy forward.
        PHMSA cannot do this important job by itself. It must
    coordinate effectively with other Federal agencies, such as
    DOE, FERC and TSA, and especially with States. In fact, it is
    important to recognize that much of the responsibility for
    pipeline safety falls on the States. It is often State pipeline
    safety workers who are on the front lines inspecting and
    enforcing safety requirements. In many cases, it is also the
    States' responsibility to regulate rates and ensure that
    adequate investments are made in pipeline maintenance and
    modernization.
        As Members of Congress, it is our responsibility to ensure
    that PHSMA and the States have enough resources and the
    appropriate tools to get the job done. With PHMSA's
    authorization expiring at the end of this fiscal year, it's
    time for us to get to work.
        As we turn to reauthorization, I will remain focused on
    protecting public safety and consumers. These are not mutually
    exclusive goals, and I am optimistic that we can find
    bipartisan agreement as we always have when it comes to
    pipeline safety.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope we can get a commitment to work
    together on the drafting process from the very beginning. That
    would be consistent with our practice from the last round of
    reauthorization, and I think it would contribute toward a
    better-quality work product.
        There are many areas where I believe we can update and
    strengthen the law to drive innovation and lower the barrier of
    entry for new technologies. New technologies for pipeline
    construction and integrity management can help improve
    efficiency and safety at the same time. I also believe we
    should examine recent pipeline safety incidents and incorporate
    lessons-learned.
        We should also make sure to provide PHMSA with clear
    directions, recognizing that they already have a backlog of
    Congressional mandates and they are working on two high
    priority rules for both gas and liquid pipelines.
        PHMSA must also finish its work on other important safety
    rules relating to pipeline valves and rupture detection,
    integrity management, class location, and public education and
    awareness.
        I believe PHMSA is on the right track, and I look forward
    to the agency completing this important work.At this point, I
    will close by thanking our witnesses for appearing before us
    today. We are going to hear a range of perspectives to help
    inform our work, including PHMSA, the State of Ohio, pipeline
    operators, and safety advocates.
        We are also going to examine the findings of a recent GAO
    report, which raises numerous, serious concerns about the
    effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration's
    pipeline cyber security program.
        As the committee of jurisdiction for energy and interstate
    commerce, I am very disappointed that TSA refused to provide a
    witness for today's hearing. I would urge the administration--
    in the strongest terms--to cooperate with our committee and
    respond to what I believe are legitimate oversight requests
    relating to pipeline safety and security.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
    hearing. I yield back the balance of my time.

        Mr. Rush. The Chair wants to thank the gentleman for his
    opening statement and reassure him that our side is eager to
    work with him on a bipartisan basis to address all of the
    issues which we are recently concerned about. I want to thank
    you.
        The Chair would like to remind Members that, pursuant to
    committee rules, all Members' written opening statements shall
    be made part of the record.
        And now, we will proceed to the witnesses' opening
    statements, beginning with panel one. I would now like to
    introduce our first panel of witnesses for today's hearing.
         The individual to my left is the distinguished Honorable
    Howard R. Elliott, Administrator for the Pipeline and Hazardous
    Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA. And next to Mr. Elliott
    is Mr. W. William Russell, the Acting Director of GAO. And next
    to him is Commissioner Lawrence Friedeman, the Public Utilities
    Commissioner for the great State, the Buckeye State, the State
    of Ohio.
        And I want to say that we thank all of our witnesses for
    being with us today, and we look forward to your testimony.
        Let me take a moment just to let you know that I will
    recognize you for 5 minutes to provide an opening statement.
    Before we begin, I would like to explain the lighting system
    that is before you. In front of you is a series of lights. The
    light will initially be green at the start of your opening
    statement. The light will turn yellow when you have 1 minute
    remaining. Please begin to wrap up your testimony at that
    point. The light will turn red when your time expires.
        And so, with that said, Mr. Elliott, welcome, and we
    recognize you for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening
    statement.

    STATEMENTS OF HOWARD ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT, ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE
    AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM RUSSELL,
      ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT
     ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND LAWRENCE FRIEDEMAN, COMMISSIONER,
                  PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

                  STATEMENT OF HOWARD ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT

        Mr. Elliott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ranking Member Walden, Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton,
    and esteemed members of this subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify here today. I look forward to updating
    this subcommittee on the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration's progress in closing open congressional
    mandates and in executing our broader safety mission.
        Let me first say that I understand the frustrations that
    have been expressed regarding the outstanding congressional
    mandates on pipelines and hazardous materials safety. We are
    working hard to ensure our Nation's pipeline system remains
    safe and finalizing the mandates remains a top priority for
    PHMSA.
        Of the 11 remaining mandates from the 2011 and 2016
    Pipeline Safety Act--there were 61 in total--three are tied to
    reports and other actions, and the remaining eight are tied to
    in-progress rulemaking efforts. Those mandates from the 2011
    Act, the ones that have been opened the longest, are being
    addressed by three of PHMSA's current rulemakings for gas
    transmission pipelines, hazardous liquid pipes, and rupture
    detection in valves.
        PHMSA continues to make progress on these rules. The liquid
    pipeline safety rule moved out of DOT for final review several
    months ago. We have also completed our work on the gas
    transmission pipeline final rule and the valve and rupture
    detection rule. And these rules are both undergoing internal
    review at DOT.
        I understand that many of you and many of our stakeholders
    may feel like we are not moving fast enough on our rulemakings.
    As a safety practitioner, I appreciate and I fully share those
    comments. As PHMSA Administrator, it is my responsibility to
    prioritize and pursue those rulemakings that will provide the
    greatest safety impact and have the highest likelihood of
    preventing events that could negatively impact people and the
    environment.
        To that end, I refer the members of this subcommittee to my
    written testimony regarding details of two completed safety
    congressional mandates dealing with comprehensive oil spill
    response plans for railroads and the transport of lithium ion
    batteries by air. In addition, we issued a final rule to
    modernize technologies for plastic pipelines that we hope will
    further accelerate aging distribution gas line replacements,
    which is one of the greatest concerns we have at PHMSA. In
    addition to congressional mandates, many of PHMSA's rules must
    also address recommendations from the National Transportation
    Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office, and our own
    safety concerns.
        PHMSA is working to meet the needs of our expanding
    domestic energy production as well. In August of 2018, PHMSA
    established a new Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal
    Energy Regulatory Commission that eliminates unnecessary and
    duplicative regulatory reviews by both agencies.
        Going forward, PHMSA will operate as the Federal
    Government's LNG safety authority. To date, PHMSA has issued
    approximately letters of determination for new LNG facilities.
    PHMSA has also established a team of cross-agency experts that
    are updating the LNG facilities safety standards that date back
    to 1980.
        In addition, PHMSA continues to work to ensure that the
    agency has a full complement of field inspectors and
    headquarters staff to meet the demands of our safety mission.
    Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of
    Transportation and for all of us at PHMSA. I am pleased to say
    that, while making progress on mandates, PHMSA's oversight role
    is to continuing to have a positive impact on safety. Our
    integrity management requirements have led pipeline operators
    to conduct over 90,000 repairs in high-consequence areas.
        Our field efforts are having an impact, too. Last year,
    PHMSA conducted over 12,000 days of inspections and
    investigations of pipeline systems. These field activities are
    helping to improve safety, as evidenced in the number of
    reported pipeline incidents which for 2018 was below the 5-year
    average, even with PHMSA's expanded regulatory oversight of
    underground natural gas storage facilities.
        Additionally, both pipeline-related fatalities and the net
    volume spilled from hazardous liquid pipelines was also below
    the 5-year average, down 33 percent and 20 percent,
    respectively, although we know that even one pipeline casualty
    is one too many.
        These facts, while notable, do not give me reason to pause
    during our ongoing safety mission at PHMSA. And even though we
    use statistics to help us measure improvements in safety, it is
    the vivid reminder in places like Bellingham, Marshall, San
    Bruno, Aliso Canyon, Merrimack Valley, and most recently,
    Durham, North Carolina, that serve as our motivation and
    commitment for working even harder to improve pipeline safety.
        Thank you again for inviting me to today's hearing, and I
    look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Administrator Elliott.
        And now, the committee will recognize Mr. Russell for 5
    minutes for purposes of an opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF WILLIAM RUSSELL

        Mr. Russell. Good morning, Chairman Rush, Ranking Member
    Upton, Ranking Member Walden, and members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the state
    of pipeline safety and security in America and TSA's pipeline
    security program. My statement is based primarily on our recent
    December 2018 report.
        As you know, more than 2.7 million miles of pipelines
    transport oil, natural gas, and other hazardous liquids that we
    all depend on to heat homes, generate electricity, and
    manufacture products. Pipelines serve as the veins of our
    economy and run through both remote and highly populated urban
    areas. As a result, our pipeline network is a prime target for
    terrorists, foreign nations, and others with malicious intent
    to do physical and cyberattacks. A successful pipeline attack
    could have dire consequences on public health and safety as
    well as the U.S. economy.
        The Transportation Security Administration, TSA, is the
    lead agency to ensure the security of our pipeline network. And
    in our recent report, we found that TSA provided pipeline
    operators with voluntary guidelines to enhance the security of
    their facilities. Pipeline operators and industry associations
    also reported they effectively coordinate and exchange security
    information with TSA.
        That said, we identified a number of weaknesses in TSA's
    management of its pipeline security program, and I would like
    to highlight four key areas for improvement.
        First, pipeline security guidance itself. It is important
    for TSA to ensure that its security guidelines, which were
    updated in 2018, March of 2018, that they clearly define how to
    determine the criticality of a pipeline facility. As a result,
    pipeline operators may not be fully reporting all of their
    critical facilities, so that TSA can apply appropriate
    oversight and ensure that any vulnerabilities have been
    addressed.
        Second, workforce planning. TSA also needs to better
    evaluate the number of staff and resources that it devotes to
    pipeline security. For example, in our review we found the
    staffing was as low as one person in 2014 and has since
    increased to a total of six FTEs.
        Establishing a strategic workforce plan could help TSA
    ensure that it has identified the necessary skills,
    competencies, and staffing allocations that the Pipeline
    Security Branch needs to carry out its full responsibilities,
    including conducting necessary reviews of pipeline companies
    and facilities.
        Third, assessing risk. TSA uses throughput and risk to
    identify the top 100 most critical pipeline operators for
    review, but has not updated the assessment methodologies since
    2014 to account for changes in the threat environment. For
    example, threats to cybersecurity were not specifically
    accounted for, making it unclear if cybersecurity threats were
    considered.
        Last, effective monitoring. While we found that TSA does
    conduct pipeline operator and facilities security oversight
    reviews and makes recommendations to address issues found, it
    has not tracked and documented the implementation of those
    recommendations for over 5 years. Until TSA monitors and
    records the status of pipeline operator progress to implement
    needed changes, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine
    whether its reviews are, in fact, leading to a significant
    reduction in risk.
        We made a total of 10 recommendations to address these
    issues. I am happy to report that TSA agreed with all of them
    and has actions underway to address them, largely in this
    fiscal year.
        In conclusion, robust security of our pipeline system is
    vital to our economic interests and to mitigate the risks of a
    malicious attack. TSA has an important role in this process,
    and by implementing the changes, can more effectively carry out
    this mission.
        Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton, and Ranking Member
    Walden, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I look forward
    to any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rush. I thank the witness for his opening statement.
        And now, the Chair recognizes Commissioner Friedeman for 5
    minutes for the purposes of an opening statement.

                    STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE FRIEDEMAN

        Mr. Friedeman. Good morning. Chairman Rush, Chairman
    Pallone, Vice Chair McNerney, Republican Leader Upton,
    Republican Leader Walden, thank you. I appreciate the
    opportunity to be here this morning, as well as thanks to the
    other members of the subcommittee.
        My name is Larry Friedeman. I am a commissioner at the
    Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, known as the PUCO. Each
    day as I pass through the PUCO's lobby, I am reminded of our
    mission statement. And that is, to provide adequate, safe,
    fairly priced, and reliable utility services to the Ohio
    citizens. In short, we are to promote the general welfare by
    assuring the provision of essential services to all Ohioans.
        Implicit in the mandates is not only the need to establish
    service, but, just as importantly, to maintain the provision of
    safe utility services over time. Pipeline safety integrity is a
    foundational element of utility service upon which all Ohio
    citizens rely, and there is no higher consideration within the
    context of pipeline transmission and distribution than that of
    public safety.
        Ohio has a robust pipeline safety program dedicated to
    ensuring the safety and reliability of natural gas service to
    Ohioans. We have 113 natural gas pipeline operators and more
    than 71,000 miles of transmission, distribution, and gathering
    lines. Ohio is one of eight States that act as interstate
    agents for the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Administration, PHMSA, and has done so since 1973. We have 12
    interstate pipeline operators with over 8,500 miles of
    regulated interstate transmission lines.
        While these pipelines are located within the boundaries of
    the State of Ohio, the PUCO does not exercise jurisdiction over
    them. But, pursuant to an agency agreement with PHMSA, the PUCO
    inspects interstate natural gas pipeline systems based on an
    inspection plan agreed to with PHMSA. It investigates incidents
    and refers any rules of enforcement identified to PHMSA for
    disposition.
        Ohio also receives funding from PHMSA pursuant to the State
    Pipeline Safety Program Base Grant. This is a reimbursement-
    based grant authorized to support up to 80 percent of a State's
    cost to administer a gas pipeline safety program. In order to
    qualify, each State's program must comply with PHMSA
    requirements.
        We are proud to say that for the last 2 years Ohio's
    program has received the maximum score available on those
    annual audits conducted by PHMSA. Yet, in 2018, notwithstanding
    the maximum score, Ohio received not 80 percent, but 72.16
    percent of expenses incurred.
        The Ohio program has 10 inspectors, performs over 150
    audits annually, and they are primarily focused on pipeline
    distribution facilities. Ohio has built and maintained its
    pipeline safety program in no small measure because of the
    assistance received pursuant to the PHMSA Pipeline Safety
    Program Base Grant. Through the years, the program has enabled
    the PUCO to hire, retain, and train properly its staff. The
    training occurs at a PHMSA training center in Oklahoma City,
    Oklahoma.
        Now, complementary to the PHMSA-related activities, the
    State of Ohio has undertaken some independent initiatives that
    I think worth mentioning. More than a decade ago, the PUCO, in
    cooperation with Ohio's major natural gas utilities, embarked
    on a capital investment program to replace bare steel and cast
    iron distribution pipes. The purpose of the program is replace
    the pipes with upgraded materials which not only enhance the
    structural integrity of the system, but prolong the useful life
    of the system. It is not only remedial, but preventative in
    nature.
        Since the inception of the program, Ohio's four largest
    investor-owned natural gas utilities have invested over $3.6
    billion in replacement and have replaced over 5,000 miles of
    distribution main line and more than 1 million service lines.
    The progress and value of the program is perhaps best
    manifested by the fact that, at the end of 2010, about 20
    percent of the total pipeline fell within categories targeted
    for replacement; at the end of 2018, that percentage has been
    reduced to 12. It is an inescapably long program in duration,
    but the PUCO has ordered accelerated cost recovery to
    incentivize accelerated replacement rather than authorizing
    recovery at more typical regulatory paradigm structures.
        In conclusion, I recount the Ohio State's specific
    activities. In addition to the PHMSA-related activities, to
    help demonstrate the sheer magnitude of the compelling
    importance and desirability of Federal-State cooperation and
    coordination, and enhancing the structural integrity of the
    natural gas transmission and distribution system,
    deliverability, reliability, and, most importantly, safety are
    wholly dependent on effective pipeline safety measures. I would
    strongly urge the subcommittee's continuing support for safety
    reauthorization. And more specifically, I would urge your
    consideration of increasing the total reimbursement to the full
    80 percent, as authorized by Congress.
        Thank you so very much for your time. I would be happy to
    answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Friedeman follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks all the witnesses for their
    opening statements, and we have now concluded the opening
    statements.
        We will now move to Members' question. And each Member will
    have 5 minutes to ask questions of our witnesses. We will start
    by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
        Administrator Elliott, there are quite a few issues that I
    would like to discuss with you, but, as I say, I only have 5
    minutes to do so. And therefore, I will send additional
    questions in writing to you regarding the timeline for when
    PHMSA expects to complete its congressionally mandated
    rulemaking. That letter, that transmittal will be coming to you
    soon.
        And I would also like to hear back from your agency on some
    of its workforce issues. Specifically, I would like to hear
    whether or not PHMSA does, indeed, have all the sufficient
    number of professional staff with the right expertise to handle
    all those responsibilities that fall under the agency's
    jurisdiction, including conducting timely pipeline inspections
    and finalizing its rulemaking.
        One timely matter that I would like to discuss with you at
    this time is the issue I spoke about in my opening statement.
    How do we get more funding and assistance to the State and
    local level in order to help emergency management agencies and
    first responders with the resources they need desperately to
    fully and effectively carry out their duties? Also, is there a
    defined obligation on the part of pipeline operators to work
    with county-level emergency managers to develop and maintain an
    emergency preparedness plan before an event or an exercise
    occurs?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for those
    questions, and I will try to answer them in the order they were
    given.
        Let me first start by addressing, if you don't mind, the
    issue of mandates. I am the Administrator. I am responsible for
    ensuring that we work quickly to complete the mandates. I can't
    attest to actions by previous Administrators. I am the
    Administrator now; it is my responsibility. I understand that.
        But I think we have made good progress. The three rules
    that we have heard, going back to a Railroads, Pipelines, and
    HAZMAT Subcommittee meeting last June, really made it clear
    from both sides of the aisle that we need to move these
    mandates.
        As I indicated in my comments, I went back to the staff and
    I said, ``We need to do better than we are doing now.'' And I
    looked at the oil spill plan for railroads because that was
    close to being done and was a very, very important rule, as
    well as the prohibition of lithium batteries in passenger
    aircraft, which was another great concern.
        But the pipeline bills were equally important. We finished
    our work on the liquid pipeline rule. And again, as I had
    mentioned, that has been over at OMB now for about 50 days, and
    we are hoping to get a response back fairly soon.
        The two other rules that were of greatest concern, the gas
    transmission pipeline, we have completed our work there. It has
    been done for a while and it is going through the internal
    review process at DOT. We have been very responsive to
    questions that are coming back from the Office of the
    Secretary. So, we are being as responsive as we can to respond.
        The one bill that I think seems to have obtained the most,
    and probably rightfully so, the most focus is the rupture and
    automatic valve rule. And that wasn't in a final rule stage.
    That one was in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. So that one,
    agreeably, has languished the most. Our team has finished the
    writing of that Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. That, too, is
    also being reviewed by the Secretary's Office.
        So, all three of those we really hope to see two final
    rules completed and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking moving
    forward. We have several other mandates behind that that we are
    working equally hard on.
        To address the question about staffing, we have 581
    employees at PHMSA. About 310 are assigned to the pipeline
    side. I have mentioned before it is tough for us to compete
    with industry to hire good, qualified, as you said, pipeline
    engineers.
        Interesting, I was in Atlanta yesterday, and my Director of
    Human Resources was over at Virginia Tech trying to figure out
    how we can create a better recruiting bed at colleges and
    universities that put out good engineers. I think part of the
    problem is we need to make people more aware of the important
    safety mission of PHMSA, because I think once they understand
    that, we are going to be more attractive to be in a place to
    hire. But, right now, we have done a great job in filling the
    gaps, the voids that we had in our hiring, and it has given me
    a better position to see how effective are we with the current
    staff.
        I especially appreciate your comments about emergency
    responders. In my 40 years in the railroad, I was responsible
    for emergency response. And during that time, I lived in New
    Jersey and was actually the part-time emergency management
    coordinator for the town that I lived in in south Jersey. So, I
    fully appreciate the fact that we need to do more to help
    emergency responders. And you are absolutely correct, it is a
    responsibility of the oil and gas industry to make sure that
    they work with emergency responders, especially on drills and
    exercises.
        Mr. Rush. I want to thank you. And I want to just remind
    you that we will be submitting additional questions for the
    record.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Upton for 5 minutes for the
    purposes of asking questions.
        Mr. Upton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And again, I want to appreciate the testimony that you all
    provided us today. I know that we have a good number of
    questions.
        I particularly want to thank Mr. Elliott, the
    Administrator, for his personal review of the Nation's
    pipelines. I know you have been to Michigan a number of times.
    You have met with Republicans and Democrats, as we all care
    about these issues. And I just really appreciate your hands-on
    experience and your willingness to come and help us here.
        It is been clear for a long time that pipelines are really
    the safest way to transport oil and gas as it relates to
    incidents. But, of course, as you said in your testimony, it
    just takes one bad issue to really blow up and make a mess, a
    big mess of things in a major way.
        As you heard in my opening statement, yes, we are
    disappointed that TSA is not here. And I guess some could
    suggest that TSA has really increased by sixfold their
    inspectors, because it has gone from one to what I thought was
    six, but I am now told that it is now less than a handful; it
    is actually four. Is that correct?
        Mr. Russell. That is correct.
        Mr. Upton. So, there I was giving them the benefit of the
    doubt that it was a handful plus one, but it is actually less
    than a handful of folks around the country, which I don't think
    is a very good trend.
        This committee has worked a long time on cyber protections.
    God help us if somebody gets into one of these systems and does
    something bad, that would really pose a problem. We are all
    aware of public events the FBI and others have talked about.
    But I guess I want to refer this to Mr. Russell, as the GAO.
        In your report, what type of emphasis has TSA, knowing that
    they have these massive resources to look at the potential for
    a cyberattack on any of our pipelines, what have they done to
    address that, knowing that, in fact, there are published
    incidents of collusion? Let me put it that way. State-
    sponsored.
        Mr. Russell. That is correct. So, as DNI Coats recently
    acknowledged in the last intelligence assessment, you have
    nation states with the full capability to do harm to our
    pipeline network. And as you mentioned, with TSA's resources,
    it was six when we concluded our report in December. So, if it
    is down to four, that is, as you mentioned, less than a
    handful.
        And one of the concerns that we found in our review was the
    pipeline security officials did not necessarily have the
    requisite expertise and skills when it came to cybersecurity.
    And that is one of the things that we recommended that TSA try
    to account for when it does its workforce plan, as part of one
    of our recommendations.
        Mr. Upton. On page 6 of the GAO report, it says, and I will
    quote this to you, ``Our analysis of TSA's data found that at
    least 34 of the top 100 critical pipeline systems TSA deemed
    highest risk indicated that they had no critical facilities.''
    Can you dive a little deeper into that? What are they missing?
    Where should they be?
        Mr. Russell. Sure. So, the way it works now is it is a
    voluntary process. So, the pipeline operators----
        Mr. Upton. Should it be mandatory?
        Mr. Russell. One of the first steps, I think, and where we
    went with the recommendation, was for TSA to clarify their
    guidelines first, to make it more clear what is the definition
    of a critical facility. And that is what we found, is that
    there is some confusion around that, such that a full third of
    the top 100 most critical pipeline operators had not identified
    any critical facilities, which, then, affects which reviews
    that you do.
        Mr. Upton. I am sorry to interrupt, but what wouldn't be
    critical? I mean, we had this Kalamazoo Enbridge line that went
    in the Kalamazoo River. It was a billion dollars for Enbridge
    to clean that up. They didn't report it for what turned out to
    be a couple of days, and it was a pretty major--in Michigan,
    so, you know, it crosses your hand here. But a billion dollars,
    just a small--I mean, what is not critical that they would look
    at?
        Mr. Russell. Well, these are self-reported, so it is up to
    each of the pipeline operators to self-identify what is their
    critical facility. And that brings it around, I think, to one
    of the other points in the opening statement, around the
    recommendation followup. So, as TSA does their corporate
    security reviews, they may ask questions of the pipeline
    operators, hey, it looks like you may have a critical facility
    here. That may even be a recommendation. But if they don't go
    back to follow up to see if it is implemented, then you are
    continuing to have that risk.
        Mr. Upton. Knowing that my time is expired, let me just
    make a quick comment, not a question. And that is, for that
    particular pipeline, good news, it was completely replaced,
    replaced at the new standards that this committee pushed
    through. I want to say it was about $4.5 million per mile as it
    crossed the State. But we took care of it the right way.
        Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Mr. Russell. Sure.
        Mr. Upton. I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peters from the
    great State of California for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
    this hearing today.
        I had a couple of questions, maybe to follow up on the
    issue of resource constraints. I heard requests over the years
    for the increased use of technology to expedite gas pipeline
    inspections and safety monitoring. It might be a little bit of
    a double-edged sword with respect to cyber, but I will get to
    that with Mr. Russell.
        But, Mr. Elliott, are there technologies that you think
    need to be incorporated so that industry and regulators can
    better evaluate pipeline safety, particularly given the
    resource restraints we see at TSA?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. The
    short answer is yes. If I can elaborate, I will tell you that
    in my year and a half as the Administrator of PHMSA, but backed
    by many years in the rail industry, where we saw technology
    move in leaps and bounds, I have seen the same thing in the use
    of technology to help quickly expand the capabilities of in-
    line pipeline inspection technology.
        One concern that I have with that is, even as good as it
    is, it is still not perfect. And much of the in-line inspection
    tools that are in place today--and again, the level of
    sophistication is amazing--really focus on three purposes. One
    is to extend the usable life of the infrastructure. The second
    actually is to help reduce the amount of actual physical
    inspections that have to be done, thereby reducing cost. And
    the third is an absolute tangible improvement in safety.
        At PHMSA, we focus on trying to encourage the research and
    development both with the dollars that we have that go into R&D
    and what we encourage industry to do, to really focus, first
    and foremost, on the absolute safety value there. One of the
    criticisms we get is PHMSA's inability to move quickly to get
    out of the way of industry to implement this new safety
    technology. And I would agree with that. I think our special
    permitting process is a bit slow. Part of the language that we
    are trying to look at in reauthorization will help speed that
    up. But I do think that technology will continue to expand at a
    rapid pace and will continue to improve pipeline safety.
        Mr. Peters. And you think that is something that is being
    taken care of by industry? Or do you think that Congress needs
    to take action?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, I do believe that is something
    that industry is taking care of themselves, because it benefits
    the ability to, as I have mentioned, to extend the life of the
    infrastructure and help reduce inspection cost. I will tell you
    that, as PHMSA, we spend our R&D dollars more on what we
    consider to be step-change R&D, maybe not the safe R&D. For
    example, one of the R&D efforts that recently has been
    successful in dollars that we put is the ability to locate
    plastic pipe. Distribution lines are going more to plastic
    pipes. You can't use the same technology to locate the pipes.
    So, we would like to see more industry dollars go to some of
    that more step-change safety that is not really being focused
    on as much.
        Mr. Peters. I didn't hear you mention, explicitly mention,
    leak detection as one of the purposes, the objects of the
    technology, but I assume that would be covered as well?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes, I do think--and again, in my time I have
    been relatively impressed, at least in the leak detection
    capabilities that exist in control rooms. But probably more to
    your point, there is more that I think that can be done to
    identify smaller, some of those imperceptible leaks which tend
    to plague the industry. I think the larger releases, the
    systems seem to do a very good job. But you are probably
    correct, both with the in-line inspection capabilities that
    might identify issues before they ever turn into a leak--all of
    that I think with time will continue to reduce the likelihood
    of both large-scale leaks and small leaks.
        Mr. Peters. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Russell, in terms of lethality and cost of recovery,
    are pipelines in America more at risk from a cyberattack or a
    physical attack?
        Mr. Russell. I think there are definitely physical security
    concerns, as we have seen with environmental groups and others
    that cause damage. But the cyber threat is one that is ever
    emerging and ever evolving. And I think that is one where we
    thought there is more that could be done.
        Mr. Peters. Let me ask you this, because I have a minute
    left.
        Mr. Russell. Yes.
        Mr. Peters. As industry continues to deploy technology, how
    should the Government make sure that, from a cyber perspective,
    our citizens are protected? Because, I mean, technology is the
    point where bad actors tend to try to make those inroads. What
    do you think is the role for the Government, either
    administrative or the Congress, to make sure that we protect
    our citizens from a cyberattack?
        Mr. Russell. Sure. I think it boils down to robust
    oversight. So, do pipeline operators understand what their
    operating systems are, their control systems----
        Mr. Peters. Right.
        Mr. Russell [continuing]. Data systems, the industrial
    control systems that would be the point of attack? And have you
    adequately protected those? Anything that Government can do to
    put out a framework--so, for example----
        Mr. Peters. I have got 4 seconds left. So, I appreciate the
    answer. I would say let's continue to work on that together.
    Thank you for showing up. And when you say ``oversight,'' and
    we have the TSA not showing up, obviously, that frustrates the
    purpose, the ability of us to do oversight. So, I just note
    that for the record as well.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio,
    Mr. Latta, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Latta. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks very much for
    holding today's hearing. It is very, very important that we
    have this hearing.
        And I want to thank our panelists for being with us today.
        I would also like to, again, welcome Commissioner Friedeman
    for being with us today. He comes from northwest Ohio, not too
    far from where I am from. And so, we appreciate you being here,
    making the effort.
        If I could start my question with you, if I may,
    Commissioner Friedeman, as you mentioned in your testimony,
    Ohio is only one of eight States that acts as an interstate
    agent for PHMSA, which comes with considerable additional
    responsibility. Will you inform the subcommittee about Ohio's
    working relationship with PHMSA?
        Mr. Friedeman. Yes. Thank you for the question,
    Representative Latta.
        I think if you were to ask the commission staff
    anecdotally, they would characterize the relationship as
    professional, mutually respectful, cooperative, as well as
    productive. I mean, there is an acknowledgment of a shared
    accountability, I believe, in terms of the interstate pipeline
    and the assumption of responsibilities associated with the
    inspection. It enables the commission staff, frankly, to
    leverage in terms of funding in a way, again, to train,
    retrain, and retain good, qualified individuals, which then
    serves to benefit Ohio, and exemplary in terms of the
    compelling need to address these same situations nationally.
    So, it is a very positive relationship.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
        Administrator Elliott, what could Congress do to help drive
    innovation and foster an environment where operators can
    incorporate new technologies and best practices?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question.
        I think perhaps the best way is just continued support, and
    perhaps even a greater thirst for understanding how the oil and
    gas pipeline industry applies technology and innovation. Again,
    as I had mentioned earlier, it is a fairly constant drumbeat
    for us at PHMSA to encourage the pace at which that gets put
    into place. But I do believe that the more that people
    understand what is in place, and what more can be done, there
    might be some additional encouragements that can be brought to
    bear.
        Mr. Latta. Let me followup. Would more data and information
    demonstrating the capabilities of new technologies operating in
    real-world situations be helpful to PHMSA as it pursues updates
    to inspection and maintenance/repair critical in these
    regulations?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes, I think we have a large thirst for good,
    reliable data. We maintain a lot of that already, but I think,
    Congressman, the only way we are going to continue to get
    better is to continue to seek information/data that is going to
    allow us to continue to improve our safety mission.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you.
        Commissioner Friedeman, I understand that Ohio has a good,
    accelerated pipeline replacement program. Would you talk a
    little bit about the commission's role to ensure that pipeline
    rates are adequate to allow for pipeline replacement and
    modernization?
        Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir. Thanks again for the question.
        The commission needs to remain cognizant of the fact that
    the costs associated with the capital investment concomitant to
    the implementation of the program are essentially allocated
    socially across rate base. So, as I alluded to in my opening
    statement, there is a means by which we, the commission, not
    only incentivized accelerated replacement, but accelerated
    recovery. Now associated with that accelerated recovery is an
    annual audit where the commission could revisit the expenses
    and the prudence, and the various criteria by which we can
    appropriately balance the costs associated with the investment
    against the benefits derived from the investment.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you.
        Mr. Russell, if I could go to your testimony when you
    found--you said, on page 5, ``We found that TSA's Pipeline
    Security Branch had issued revised Pipeline Security Guidelines
    back in March of 2018, but TSA had not established a documented
    process to ensure that revisions occur and fully capture
    updates to supporting standards''. But you go down, you get
    right into ``reflect the dynamic threat environment and to
    incorporate cybersecurity principles''.
        I am concerned because in this subcommittee and this full
    committee we hear a lot about the attacks that occur out there.
    And how much is TSA taking these threats on the cyberattacks
    that are occurring on the pipelines out there to make sure that
    these guidelines get in place?
        Mr. Russell. Right. So, they were able to update them in
    March 2018, as you mentioned. Part of that update was to
    include more guidance for the pipeline operators on
    cybersecurity issues. Why we think it is very timely and needed
    for them to have a process to continue to update that is, about
    a month after the guidelines came out, there was a new set of
    an updated framework from NIST that included some additional
    provisions around supply chain risks and some other things that
    are important to also incorporate. So, our concern is that we
    want TSA to have a process, so you don't wait another 6 or 7
    years to, then, incorporate those standards into the Security
    Guidelines.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, my time is expired and I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee,
    Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Obviously, we are beginning the process of developing
    legislation to reauthorize the Pipeline Safety Act. And first,
    we have to understand the current state of affairs and what
    work remains incomplete from previous reauthorizations. But,
    unfortunately, as I noted in my opening statement, numerous
    congressional mandates from the 2011 and 2016 reauthorizations
    have not been finalized by PHMSA.
        So, I wanted to start with Administrator Elliott. I would
    like to ask you for updates on some of these outstanding
    mandates. First, what is the status of the rulemaking on
    emergency order authority that was included in the 2016 Pipes
    Act?
        Mr. Elliott. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. As
    you may recall, we submitted an Interim Final Rule for the
    emergency order authority, which we believe gives us the
    intended authority that Congress was looking for. We have
    since, after further public review and comment, have made some
    modifications to that specifically about the timelines that
    industry may have to do an appeal to that process. We have
    completed our final rule language, and it is currently over at
    OMB.
        Mr. Pallone. OK. Now what is the status of the rulemaking
    mandated in the 2011 Act to expand integrity management beyond
    high-consequence areas?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, really, that falls into two rules that
    we are working on, the liquid safety rule, which I had
    mentioned in my comment there are some integrity management
    aspects there. We have finished our work there, and that also
    is at OMB.
        The other component is in the gas transmission rule. When I
    first came to PHMSA about a year and a half ago, that gas
    transmission rule was affectionately referred to as the ``mega
    rule''. It had gotten so big, I don't know how it could have
    ever moved. So, we split it into three parts, the mandate
    section, another section of the bill that deals with integrity
    management, some damage prevention, and the third part is
    gathering lines. We have completed our work on the mandate
    section, and we are actively working on the second section of
    that that deals with some additional integrity management work.
        Mr. Pallone. And then, lastly, what is the status of the
    rulemaking mandated in the 2016 Act to regulate underground
    natural gas storage facilities?
        Mr. Elliott. Right. We have completed our work with that,
    and that is also being reviewed by the Office of the Secretary.
        Mr. Pallone. Now I know, Administrator Elliott, that you
    inherited many of these delayed mandates, but the fact remains
    that your agency is behind schedule, obviously. So, we hope we
    will begin to see major progress this year.
        And I wanted to shift briefly to Bill Russell from GAO.
    Your December 2018 report highlighted troubling weaknesses in
    the Transportation Security Administration's pipeline security
    program. And in your report, you found that the TSA Pipeline
    Security Branch had not calculated relative risk among the top
    100 critical pipeline systems using its risk-ranking tool since
    2014, and that the risk-ranking tool did not include current
    data. So, my question is, can you please elaborate on these
    findings and how GAO's recommendations address the shortfalls
    you identified in TSA's risk-ranking tool?
        Mr. Russell. Right. So, the risk-ranking tool is critical
    because that really shapes which companies, which pipeline
    operators TSA is going to review with the limited resources
    that they have. So, what we saw is some shortcomings in how
    they thought about the threats that were encountered.
    Obviously, from 2014 to now, there have been evolving threats.
    One of the questions we had was the extent to which some of the
    cybersecurity issues had been factored into that initial risk
    assessment. Another one had to do with just the safety of the
    pipeline system. So, for example, a pipeline network may be
    more vulnerable if, for example, PHMSA has identified some age
    and safety issues. Was that factored into the risk ranking in
    order to prioritize reviews? So, we had four different
    recommendations to try to get at some of these issues.
        Mr. Pallone. I mean, you know I am very concerned,
    obviously, as many of us are here, that TSA is working with
    outdated information, which can have dire consequences for a
    program focused on the security of the country's pipeline
    network. And again, it is unacceptable that TSA refused to
    testify at this hearing or explain how it is responding and
    reacting to the troubling findings in GAO's report. But I
    certainly appreciate what GAO is doing and your ongoing efforts
    to do oversight of this.
        So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKinley, my friend
    from West Virginia, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will go back, the title of this hearing says it is the
    ``State of Pipeline Safety and Security in America''. The state
    of pipeline safety and security in America. So, I am just
    curious, if we look back--I have got a chart here that says
    that, in the last 10 years, we are now transporting nearly 40
    percent more material through our pipelines, gas and fuel oil,
    and whatever, a 40 percent increase on that.
        Also, we have seen that, since 1999 to today, last year,
    the number of incidents have not varied much. I guess back to
    an earlier comment, someone said, if there is just one, it is a
    problem. And I don't think anyone would disagree with that. But
    I think the reality is, when you are transporting 614 million
    cubic feet of material, that there is a chance, just like in an
    airplane, with 737 Max and others, there is going to be a
    chance of something going wrong. But, over nearly 20 years, we
    virtually had no increase in incidents. We were 275; we dropped
    to 233, 258, 264, 278, 303. There were 286 last year. So, it is
    essentially the same, and we are transporting tremendously
    increase in product.
        So, I am curious on this. How would you grade, Mr. Elliott,
    how would you grade your performance? Is it the fact that there
    are any, this is a ``C'' or a ``D''? Or how would you give it a
    grade in overall safety and security of America with our
    pipeline system?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for that very important
    question. Before I assign a grade, I will tell you we can never
    ever do enough. We will constantly strive every day, at least
    while I am in the Administrator's chair, to improve the safety,
    not only of pipeline safety. And a lot of people forget we also
    have the responsibility of surface transportation safety, which
    is 1.2 million shipments of hazardous materials a day, in
    addition to the 2.7 million miles of pipeline that we have.
        But if I were to give a grade, I would give us a ``C,''
    because I think we are doing well, but we are never doing good
    enough. I think some of the comments that we had earlier, I do
    think that we will continue to see great advancements in safety
    through technology, innovation, research and development. But,
    from my perspective, I think it is going to be constantly
    working with the highly professional team at PHMSA to make sure
    that each and every day that we are out working with operators
    and members of the public to make the transportation of energy
    products by pipeline as practical and safe as possible.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
        Mr. Russell, how would you grade it? Because you have got
    an outside view of it. Given the increased traffic, virtually
    no increase in number of incidents, but there are incidents.
    And as I said before, I don't like that, either. But how would
    you grade it?
        Mr. Russell. I think, overall, based on our most recent
    report, it is clearly needs improvement, whether it is taking
    care of some elements in the Pipeline Security Guidelines that
    the pipeline operators rely on to help manage their processes,
    being a little bit more diligent on just following up on the
    common-sense recommendations that the pipeline security folks
    at TSA make to those operators.
         Mr. McKinley. Well, if I could, let me follow up with that
    a little bit.
        Mr. Russell. Sure.
        Mr. McKinley. Because I interpret what you are saying is
    maybe more regulations. So, I am curious, because I have got
    the Atlantic Coast Pipeline. I think we have heard about that.
    There are 67 permits that had to be granted, 67, for FERC, FAA,
    the Federal Communications Director, and NOAA, the National
    Park Service, the Corps of Engineers in Huntington, Pittsburgh,
    Norfolk, Wilmington. I could go on and on. Sixty-seven
    different permits to be able to--do you think the increased
    regulations--I am not talking about doing away with any of
    them--but increasing the number of regulations, is that going
    to give us more safety and security of our pipeline?
        Mr. Russell. Well, I will say, for the TSA role, there
    isn't a regulation. It is a voluntary-based system. So, I think
    our point is just making sure that that process works as
    effectively as possible, in the absence of a regulation.
        Mr. McKinley. I will think about that a little bit. Thank
    you.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Russell. Sure.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Doyle for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    holding this hearing today.
        This conversation is particularly important to my district
    of Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania's energy mix has rapidly
    transformed in recent years due to the Marcellus Shale. And as
    a result of the natural gas boom, Pennsylvania is experiencing
    a buildout of infrastructure from pipelines to the Shell
    cracker plant in Beaver County, just outside my district. This
    can be a great resource, but only if we ensure that the
    pipelines meet stringent safety and environmental standards, so
    that we are protecting the health and safety of the people of
    Pittsburgh as well as the country.
        Mr. Elliott, Carnegie Mellon University in my district is a
    world-class center for robotics, which can play a vital role
    for monitoring the safety and security of pipelines and
    protecting the environment. How does PHMSA take into account
    new and emerging technology, and how do you ensure the
    performance standards reflect the most effective technology
    available?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you, and I
    appreciated visiting the gas transmission work going on in your
    district last week.
        As I mentioned, PHMSA provides R&D dollars to help ensure
    that we are staying current with the most cutting-edge. One of
    the ways that we do that is on a biennial basis--and we are
    actually thinking now to do it more often--we hold an R&D forum
    where we allow colleges and universities, and others that are
    involved in pipeline research and development, to come in, and
    we kind of spell out what we are looking for, where we think we
    need to see research and development progress in the pipeline,
    especially the pipeline safety area. And then, from that forum,
    we receive applications for R&D, some of it actually including
    robotics that you mentioned about. And then, based on the best
    applications, we will provide the funds that we have to pursue
    that R&D. I wish we could do more, but we do the best we can.
        Mr. Doyle. Let me ask you, several pipelines are under
    construction in Pennsylvania right now. Late last year, it was
    reported that energy transfer in Sunoco had amassed more than
    800 State and Federal permit violations while building two
    pipelines, the Rover and Mariner East 2, across Pennsylvania
    and Ohio. I have concerns that the two pipelines, despite being
    under construction, have polluted waterways with gallons of
    drilling fluid and created sinkholes in backyards. Can you
    please describe some of these violations?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question,
    and we continue to work very closely with our State partners in
    Pennsylvania that have been doing most of the oversight there.
    And I will tell you, yes, I think we have at PHMSA a concern,
    based on our dialog with the State pipeline office, about
    perhaps a lack of professional construction methods that are
    being used. So, I think we wholly support the actions that are
    being taken at the State level to enforce perhaps a more rigid
    construction standard.
        The work that I did for many years in the railroad
    industry--and Pennsylvania was one of the big States that we
    worked in--I also oversaw all of the environmental aspects of
    the railroad. And I will tell you that I have a great concern
    anytime there is any kind of impact to the environment, whether
    or not it is hazardous substance or whether or not it is
    material that basically is a byproduct of directional boring,
    which was some of the case we had here.
        Mr. Doyle. Right.
        Mr. Elliott. So, I agree with the aggressiveness that the
    State oversight is providing here.
        Mr. Doyle. Studies have shown, since 2010, at least two
    critical detection systems designed to help operators avoid
    costly accidents only were detecting right away spills roughly
    12 percent of the time. In fact, random observations from the
    public were nearly four times more effective in detecting
    leaks. Given that PHMSA studies have shown that industry leak
    detection can be unreliable, what is PHMSA doing to incorporate
    modern leak detection standards into its rulemaking, and when
    can we expect action on that?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, again, thank you for the
    question. And we have incorporated some additional leak
    detection language within both our liquid and gas rulemakings.
    But I will also say that it is our intent, I think, to continue
    to see progression in the technology and the actions by the
    operators that will identify the potential for any kind of
    small leak. The larger leaks, typically, are the ones that the
    industry will quickly identify through their control rooms. It
    is those small leaks that propagate and may go unnoticed for
    many days. I think that is where technology is going to be most
    useful, to find areas of likely release and get in and correct
    that long before it can ever harm the environment.
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding back.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Griffith, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I am going to pick up with Mr. Doyle's questions. But,
    first, I want to thank you for mentioning Virginia Tech, which
    is in my district, and I hope that you all were successful in
    finding some folks there who are willing to work for you. There
    are a lot of good people. So, I know that it was a worthwhile
    trip.
        Mr. Doyle was already picking up on it, and there are a lot
    of new technologies coming out. One that I have looked at that
    I think has some real potential is fiberoptic, you know,
    placing that out there to track leaks.
        We have a couple of pipelines coming through Virginia, one
    of which comes through my district and comes very close to
    Virginia Tech. And a lot of people are concerned about the
    safety, and the small leaks, as you said, are where the new
    technologies can go. But what is PHMSA doing to remove any
    regulatory barriers--and let me know if you think there are
    some--and incentivize the adoption of new technologies? Because
    we have got this big gas pipeline coming through, and it
    appears to me that FERC is not requiring that they use some of
    these new technologies to make sure that these facilities are
    completely safe. And even if it is just a small gas leak, what
    is small today, as you know, can be big tomorrow and can cause
    a problem not only to the environment, but to the people who
    live near that pipeline.
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
    think one of the items that I have been most impressed with is
    we have seen advancements in technology. And I do believe that,
    as we see new construction and complete replacement of
    pipelines, I do think that you are going to see--and some is
    available today and some will continue to be available--that
    the pipeline installation process will include systems that
    will self-report the health of the pipeline above and beyond
    what happens today with in-line inspection technology.
        So, I think the combination of several things, continuing
    use of integrity management systems by the operators, the
    continued expansion of technology and in-line inspection
    technology, and then, the continued use of self-diagnostic
    capabilities with new and totally replaced pipeline. I do think
    that in the not-too-distant future we will probably see new
    constructed pipeline that will be able to self-report on a
    regular basis its real-time health.
        Mr. Griffith. So, here is my concern and the concern my
    constituents have. And I know they were trying to sell product,
    but some folks came in with their fiber optics and they were
    able to show how they can detect based on the temperature
    change. If you just lay that fiberoptic on top of the pipeline,
    you can tell if there is a small leak. You can also tell if
    somebody is trying to do physical harm to the pipeline, for
    whatever reasons, because they in real time can see if somebody
    is driving up or walking up to the pipeline, if somebody starts
    digging near the pipeline. They can see all of that.
        And yet, the pipe is not in the ground yet. The technology
    appears to be ready. And FERC doesn't seem to be requiring it.
    Do you all work with FERC to say, hey, this is new technology?
    It is not that expensive, and when you are talking about a
    pipeline that is going to be in the ground for decades and near
    a lot of communities, I think people would sleep a lot better
    in my district if they knew that that was there. And it is not.
    There is no plan for it. The pipe is not in the ground yet in a
    large part of my district. What can we do to encourage the
    operators to do that? And what can you all do to work with FERC
    to say, hey, this is something that really ought to be done?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, we will continue to have dialog with
    FERC on a regular basis, and we will discuss that. But I think
    one of the other things that we can do in the regular dialog
    that we have with the oil and gas operators is to continue to
    push the use of new technologies that will minimize leaks and
    releases of pipelines. We can have that conversation with them.
        Mr. Griffith. I certainly hope that you will. And there are
    some new people in FERC. So, I don't want to say that they are
    all like this, but I will tell you, at one point a few years
    back, we had three Congressmen from our region who asked for
    additional hearings and we got nothing. And that is very
    discouraging. It doesn't seem like they are very open to input.
    I hope you have a different experience.
        That being said, I have got a few more seconds. What is
    your favorite new technology on pipeline safety? You have got
    to have one that you are just like, hey, that is pretty neat.
        Mr. Elliott. To me, I actually think it is the ability to
    locate nonmetallic pipeline that is becoming so prevalent in
    natural gas distribution systems in major metropolitan areas,
    because I think that has the greatest opportunity to create
    safety. I know in the incident that occurred in Durham, North
    Carolina, where a directional boring machine tapped into a
    distribution line--I just think that the ability to be able to
    more accurately identify nonmetallic pipeline is probably my
    thing.
        Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Mr. McNerney from
    California for 5 minutes.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, I thank the chairman for that.
        And I thank the witnesses this morning.
        Administrator Elliott, on September 9th of 2010, I was on
    the San Mateo Bridge when the San Bruno explosion occurred. Two
    of my three children live in peninsula just south of San
    Francisco. Also, the Aliso Canyon leak, which was incredibly
    dangerous, and we were very lucky that there were no explosions
    with that, occurred in California. Near my district we have
    three large natural gas storage facilities, including the
    MacDonald Island, which is 82 billion cubic feet.
        So, are the inspections by the California Public Utility
    Commission and the Federal authorities for these facilities,
    and the high-pressure transmission pipelines, doing enough to
    keep our communities safe? Are they doing enough?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, I do believe that the work being
    performed is adequate. I, first, want to say, when I first came
    to PHMSA, it was the discussion of San Bruno and the eight
    fatalities that occurred there, and that Aliso Canyon was the
    worst natural gas release we have ever had in this country. So,
    those resonate very much.
        We are so dependent upon the use of our State partners to
    oversee certain operations. And 80 percent of the pipeline
    system in the U.S. today falls to the oversight of our State
    partners. I think, as I said earlier, there is always more we
    can do. We always need to strive to get better. We need to work
    more closely with our State partners to make sure that we are
    being as forward-thinking as possible. But I would have to say
    that, at this point in time, I do think the work is adequate.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, we clearly have our complaints about
    the pace of PHMSA's rulemaking, but are we being too demanding
    about the safety of our constituents? Is that part of the
    problem?
        Mr. Elliott. No, I mean, you can never not take into
    account the absolute importance of the safety of your
    constituents. And as I had mentioned earlier, we have every
    reason to continue to focus on improving and completing those
    mandates, so the safety value of those rules can get out and be
    in place.
        Mr. McNerney. What is the holdup in these rulemakings? I
    mean, is industry dragging its feet or you don't have enough
    personnel? Do you need more resources from Congress? I mean,
    what is the holdup here?
        Mr. Elliott. As I had mentioned before, I understand it is
    my responsibility, as the Administrator today, to complete
    these mandates, going back to 2011 and 2016, and we work on
    that every day. For most of the mandates that have been brought
    to our attention as being most important, the liquid, the gas,
    the rupture detection valve rule, we have completed our work on
    those, and they are going through the necessary review before
    they can be published as a final rule, except for the rupture
    and automatic valve rule, which is a Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking. So, granted, we have got a ways to go on that, but
    it has got the greatest attention at PHMSA, sir.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
        Mr. Russell, I have introduced some good cybersecurity
    bills in Congress and in a number of others in previous
    Congresses. Your example of the TSA's criteria for determining
    pipeline facility criticality as a potential for mass
    casualties or significant health effects, it is very concerning
    that the pipeline operators interpret this differently. What
    more can the TSA do to provide more clarity to operators of
    whether the facilities qualify and the additional steps that
    are necessary to make the infrastructure more secure?
        Mr. Russell. Thank you for the question. Certainly, TSA did
    update the guidelines in 2018. So, that is a good thing, to
    make them more current. But it is really some of those key
    terms. What does mass casualty mean? How does that translate to
    the area you are operating in? Again, issues around the
    criticality, what exactly does that mean? So, I think either a
    glossary or more specificity around some of those key terms is
    what we are proposing that TSA try to do.
        Mr. McNerney. Good. Thank you.
        Commissioner Friedeman, how do you deal PHMSA's shortage of
    personnel? Is that a factor affecting your capability to do
    your job?
        Mr. Friedeman. Not that I have been informed from our
    staff, recognizing, however, that there is an assessment on
    basically an operator's proportionate throughput that offsets
    any shortfall relative to funding. So, there is a budgetary
    opportunity on the part of the commission to address some of
    the issues inferentially that you are talking about.
        Mr. McNerney. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Johnson of Ohio for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Friedeman, welcome today from the great State of Ohio.
    We may have covered some of this ground already, but I want to
    dig in a little deeper. I really appreciate you being here to
    discuss how the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio best keeps
    our pipeline systems functioning and safe. Ohio's safety
    program has received the maximum score available, as you know,
    on PHMSA's audits over the last 2 years, which I think
    demonstrates how seriously PUCO takes pipeline safety.
        Now I appreciated that in your testimony you reiterated
    PUCO's mission Statement, which focuses on reliability and
    safety, but also affordability. And I am sure each of these
    issues were taken into consideration when Ohio developed its
    accelerated pipeline replacement program.
        So, I know Congressman Latta got into this a little bit,
    but can you talk a little bit deeper about the program's
    importance and your commission's replacement program and your
    commission's role to ensure that pipeline rates are adequate
    and just to allow for pipeline replacement and modernization?
        Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Thank
    you for the comments relative to the PUCO.
        As I had indicated previously, the costs associated with
    the investments are obviously socialized across ratepayers. So,
    there is a need to balance, once again, to attempt to achieve
    the equilibrium between benefit and cost. And that is really
    something that is, I think, inherit in the nature of the
    recovery mechanism that we use relative to using a rider,
    rather than waiting for a rate case. So, that enables the
    commission to review on an annual basis.
        Mr. Johnson. What are some of the balancing factors? I
    mean, when you talk about your philosophy of balancing quality
    and safety with cost and acceleration, what are some of the
    factors that you use to balance all of that out?
        Mr. Friedeman. Well, obviously, one of the key
    considerations is bill impact, recognizing again that
    affordability is a function--affordability across all
    ratepayers. That is, from the highest perspective, the
    consideration relative to the social costs associated.
        In terms of the implementation of the program itself, there
    is a recognition that bare steel cast iron noncathodically
    protected infrastructure is subject to deterioration over time.
    So, basically, the staff, in conjunction with, in cooperation
    with the utilities in the State, identified pipelines that fall
    within the bucket targeted for replacement. And it was a very
    methodical approach that was started over a decade ago, and I
    believe that the various utilities are at various stages of
    completion, but that all four of the major investor-owned
    utilities are intending to complete their programs by 2033. And
    to the credit of other utilities, not those of the big four,
    they are beginning to adopt the same process, or at least
    express an interest in doing so, recognizing, I think, the
    benefits to be derived.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. Well, thank you.
        Administrator Elliott, as you know, PHMSA's State partners
    oversee more than 80 percent of the Nation's pipeline
    infrastructure, especially the gas distribution pipelines that
    connect our homes and businesses to the main transmission
    system. Can you talk a little bit about State programs and the
    methodology that PHMSA uses to distribute pipeline safety
    grants?
        Mr. Elliott. And, Congressman, thank you for the question.
    There are all but two States that participate in the State
    program with PHMSA. Alaska and Hawaii are the two. So, on an
    annual basis, PHMSA will work with the State to receive
    information about their current inspection program, about the
    goals that they have achieved, about the staffing that they
    have. We take that information, and then, we will conduct a
    review of the State program, looking very much at the same
    information, the adequacy of the program. Is staff adequately
    trained? Are they meeting their goals?
        And then, with the dollars that are allocated to PHMSA as
    part of our State-based grant, we look at the dollars that the
    State has projected that they have for the State program. Then,
    we add those dollars, and then, factor in the score. And that
    ultimately provides the funding to the State.
        It has been mentioned before that, while PHMSA can fund up
    to 80 percent, over the last few years it has hovered more
    closely to about 70 percent. And actually, one of the things
    that we have done--we recognize the importance of funding the
    State programs. Occasionally, we will get a question about,
    well, what do you do for poor-performing States? And one of the
    answers is we can reduce the amount of funding, but, to me,
    that is counterproductive. Why would you reduce the amount of
    funding? So, we try to keep the funding as robust as possible.
    But, in the last few years, we have actually taken some unused
    funds at PHMSA and moved it over to the State-based program to
    put in as much dollars as we can for the program.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, thank you.
        And I apologize for going over, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
    the indulgence. I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kuster from New
    Hampshire for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to all of you for being with us today.
        I want to dive right into an accident that was very close
    to home in the neighboring community. In September of 2018, an
    accidental release of high-pressure gas caused an explosion
    just across the border from my district in Lawrence, Andover,
    and North Andover, Massachusetts, referred to as the Merrimack
    Valley incident. Over 130 structures were damaged as a result
    of the accident. More than 20 individuals were injured and,
    very sadly, one person lost their life.
        So, what we have learned is that the tragic accident could
    have been completely avoided. And it is imperative, in my view,
    that Congress work to identify additional safety measures that
    can help prevent these types of accidents. So, I want to
    address Mr. Elliott. My understanding is, in 2011, the Pipeline
    Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act required the
    use of automatic or remote-controlled shutoff valves on
    transmission pipelines, but, to date, PHMSA has not implemented
    this mandate, despite the NTSB finding that the use of the
    automatic shutoff valves is effective in preventing and
    reducing the severity of pipeline explosions. So, my question
    is, why has PHMSA not implemented this mandate over 8 years
    since this bill was signed into law?
        Mr. Elliott. Thank you for your question, and we continue
    to feel for the Rondon family and the loss of their loved one
    in the incident up in Massachusetts.
        You are correct that the requirement for automatic shutoff
    on transmission lines is part of the rupture detection and
    valve rule. In this case, we were dealing with a gas
    distribution line. And so, the rules didn't necessarily apply
    there.
        But let me just expand what I think needs to be done or
    what we can do there. And I think it is important to say----
        Ms. Kuster. And is there any sense of urgency?
        Mr. Elliott. Congresswoman, I think there is a significant
    sense of urgency. I think this is a case, too, where the
    importance between PHMSA and the State partners actually works
    as intended. This was, in every sense of the word, a monumental
    failure on the part of the operator. We set the minimum
    standards, Federal standards, for pipeline safety. States can,
    and have for many years--and it has been over 50 years that
    States have been allowed to oversee their intrastate process--
    but the States had the ability where, if it is not in conflict
    with the minimum Federal regulations, to apply their own
    regulations to strengthen what the Federal Government has in
    place. And that is exactly what happened in Massachusetts. If
    you recall, the State legislature included specific language
    that now requires a professional engineer to sign off on the
    plan, in the belief that doing that would have prevented this
    incident.
        The minimum Federal requirements are very clear. They
    require qualified individuals and a qualification process at
    every step of the process. So, we believe that the Federal
    standards, if they had been adhered to in the Merrimack Valley
    incident, would have prevented this. But this is a good case
    where the State felt they needed to go above and beyond the
    Federal standards.
        I think, going back to your original question, I think
    there will be a lot further discussion about the importance of
    automatic shutoff valves not just on transmission lines, but on
    gas distribution lines.
        Ms. Kuster. So, what is the holdup from instituting this
    requirement?
        Mr. Elliott. Right. Well, as I had mentioned before, the
    rupture detection and automatic valve rule is probably one that
    has languished the longest at PHMSA. It is in a Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking stage. We have finished our work on it. And
    I have committed that we will move that not only into the
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, so we can get it out to get
    public comment, but, then, move it to the final rule as quickly
    as possible. It is still on schedule to become a final rule
    before the end of the year.
        Ms. Kuster. Can I ask you, do you know what percentage of
    new pipeline infrastructure has automatic shutoff valves? Is
    this accepted technology now and it is being installed?
        Mr. Elliott. I do not know specifically, but I can
    determine that, and I will as quickly as possible get back to
    you with that information. But I don't have the specifics of
    that.
        Ms. Kuster. And what is your sense of the timeline for when
    Congress can expect, and the public, the American public, for
    the mandate for the automatic shutoff valve to be implemented?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, again, that rule, even though it is in a
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage, we still have it on the
    books to be completed in this year. That may be a bit
    aggressive, but we are going to work as hard as we can at PHMSA
    to move that bill forward.
        Ms. Kuster. I appreciate that, and I urge you, the urgency
    of now to protect our constituents. So, thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Elliott. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
    Bucshon, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think you can see the bipartisan frustration with delays
    in action from Federal agencies. This is, not blaming anyone
    here, but this is kind of a frustration not only in this area,
    but across the board where congressional intent, determined and
    passed into law sometimes decades before, has not been carried
    out. And it is a frustrating problem, and it sounds like you
    are doing the best, Mr. Elliott, at least at PHMSA to resolve
    some of those frustrations.
        I also want to say that, just as technology evolves in our
    own personal lives--you know, no one would go out and buy a
    computer with 20-year-old technology--we shouldn't be putting
    pipelines in the ground with 20-year-old technology. As Mr.
    Griffith pointed out, there is new technology, including fiber
    optics, that, in my view, if we are putting new pipeline in the
    ground and technology exists, we should find a way to utilize
    that, because we wouldn't buy a computer for ourselves with 20-
    year-old technology. It makes no sense. This happens across the
    Government, and it is very frustrating. I understand that there
    are stakeholders and there are costs involved in new
    technology, but we need to be more nimble in this process,
    especially as it relates to something as critical as pipeline
    safety,
        So, with those opening comments, Mr. Friedeman, I have a
    question. This has been addressed a little bit. But I
    understand over the last several years States have implemented
    mechanisms to accelerate the replacement of pipelines. That is
    a positive thing. In your testimony, you explain how these
    campaigns have helped rapidly modernize Ohio's aging
    infrastructure with over 5,000 miles of distribution main lines
    and more than 1 million service lines being replaced since the
    inception of the program nearly a decade ago.
        How do you at the State level balance the need for these
    investments with, ultimately, the cost that is borne by the
    ratepayers? It is a difficult balance, I understand.
        Mr. Friedeman. Yes, sir, it is a difficult balance. I think
    it is a qualitative as much as it is a quantitative assessment.
        Mr. Bucshon. Yes.
        Mr. Friedeman. As I indicated previously, there is a
    sensitivity relative to affordability, an acknowledgment that
    affordability is not a constant across all ratepayers. And
    then, it is very difficult, as you suggest, to assign a
    quantitative value to that. It is a consideration. It is a
    variable that goes into the decisionmaking process. I can't be
    more specific than that. I am sorry, I hope that is
    responsive----
        Mr. Bucshon. No, that is. I mean, it is a difficult process
    as it is in southern Indiana, you know, and the State of
    Indiana, where we have the need for updating pipelines and
    other infrastructure. And then, of course, people like me hear
    back from our constituents about that, and I think sometimes
    maybe we don't, as a society, give as much information about
    the process to everyone, so that people understand. I think
    most people understand, if you have more safe and updated
    pipelines, that may necessitate in the short run, or even in
    the long run, higher rates to cover the capital improvements
    that have been made. And I think sometimes the frustration that
    I hear is that that understanding of that is not projected as
    well as it could be maybe to the ratepayers. And I am sure you
    guys do a great job of trying, doing your best to do that. But
    I would encourage everyone to try to project that to the
    ratepayers, because we hear about it.
        We also hear about unfunded mandates from the Federal
    Government, and specifically, EPA and a number of other
    agencies that are blamed for that. But, many times, again, it
    is just a frustration.
        Mr. Russell--and I have about a minute--as you know, risk-
    based decisionmaking is the best way to approach complex
    problems like cybersecurity, especially when you are dealing
    with 2.7 million miles of pipelines. Is it true that TSA is not
    attempted to understand the relative risk of a safety instant
    among the Nation's most critical pipelines? Would you say that
    that is true or not true?
        Mr. Russell. I think, for their older risk assessment, the
    one that was done in 2014, one of the observations was not
    factoring in maybe some of the PHMSA safety data that would get
    at the age of a system and how that might affect the system's
    vulnerability. And that is one of the things we would like to
    see them take on.
        Mr. Bucshon. OK, great. And then, the last thing I will say
    is I am still struggling, me personally, to understand why the
    TSA, as the agency of record on some of these things--and I
    suspect that has happened over time--but I think someone
    mentioned that maybe we should revisit the jurisdictional
    issues related to pipeline safety as part of our
    reauthorization. I just want to throw that out there.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Doyle [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. O'Halleran for 5 minutes.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, and
    to all our witnesses before us today for joining our
    conversation on how Congress can ensure the pipelines of today
    do not harm our citizens, our economy, and environment of
    tomorrow.
        I believe Congress has a duty to legislate; the agencies
    have a duty to carry out the laws and implement regulations in
    the spirit of the statute. In this vein, Mr. Chairman, it is my
    hope that we, as a committee, can continue working in a
    bipartisan fashion, as we have in the past, to reauthorize the
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's
    pipeline safety program.
        Administrator Elliott, I thank you for appearing before our
    committee today to provide perspective regarding pipeline
    safety issues. However, given TSA's role overseeing their
    pipeline security program, and with the growing threat of
    cyberattacks facing our Nation, I find it troubling that TSA
    neglected to send a representative to appear before us in this
    vein. Hiding from the GAO report's negative findings is not the
    way to do this. Sooner or later, the TSA will have to let the
    American people know why they have not met their duty. And I
    just, having been involved in public safety in the past, I just
    can't imagine why this type of process is not addressed in an
    appropriate way.
        Administrator Elliott, I appreciate the diligent, behind-
    the-scenes consultation you described in your testimony before
    our agency issues a rulemaking. However, since you became
    Administrator, which specific new actions and processes have
    you put into place to ensure these rulemakings are done in a
    timely fashion?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question,
    and especially with regards to security. I think Ranking Member
    Upton said it best. At PHMSA, we understand you can't separate
    safety and security, and even though we have the safety
    function, the professional men and women of PHMSA that are out
    doing the inspections, I think it is worth mentioning, also are
    trying to, where they can, identify security concerns and
    convey that back to the industry and our colleagues at TSA.
        With regards to what we are doing to try and expedite the
    rulemaking process, besides focusing on the sheer importance of
    moving the mandates, which I can guarantee we focus on every
    day, one of the things we have done that may have had, or will
    have, the best outcome is, you know, PHMSA really is two modal
    administrations in one. And we have actually just started to
    complete the work of basically bringing all the rulemaking
    activities into one single entity within PHMSA. And that's
    going to allow us to be more agile, more responsive to
    rulemakings, both on the pipeline and the hazardous material
    surface transportation side. It basically gives us the same
    ability to bring new resources together to form a single entity
    that is going to allow us to do work quicker and more
    efficiently, and again, as we say, flex more, depending on
    where the regulatory need is going to be. So, that is probably
    the most important thing we have done, other than focusing on
    mandates each and every day, sir.
        Mr. O'Halleran. I thank you.
        Section 30, Mr. Elliott, of the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act
    requires development of protocols to consult with Indian tribes
    that have hazardous material pipelines within their
    jurisdiction, and we know many of them do. How would you
    describe the agency's protocols to work with tribes on a
    pipeline near a reservation boundary and with the spill
    response zone entirely within the reservation?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    Actually, I think it is good, and I will explain why. It was
    last year, in 2018, that one of the senior field members of the
    pipeline team actually prepared a protocol that sets out how we
    are going to communicate with tribal authorities before we go
    in to do inspections, typically, with oil and gas operators.
    That is kind of independent of what the operators do, but we
    feel that it is absolutely necessary to make sure that we
    provide the communications, and more importantly, the respect
    to the tribal leadership about the pipelines that operate
    underground within their territories. But I think, more
    importantly, to also create a stronger link between the tribal
    leadership and the PHMSA representatives, so they know who to
    call.
        Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Elliott.
        Mr. Chairman, as a citizen--forget the fact that we are
    here in Congress--but, just as a citizen, it really perturbs me
    that an agency of Government does not appear before the
    oversight committee.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Doyle. The gentleman yields back.
        I think both sides of the aisle and this entire committee
    shares your thoughts on that.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Walberg for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thanks to the panel for being here.
        Administrator Elliott, thank you for being here, and thank
    you wearing that amazing blue tie. With a Buckeye at the other
    end of the table, we appreciate a Wolverine representation
    there.
        [Laughter.]
        I don't know if anybody else noticed, but I did. And after
    the 10 years football drought we have had, we will take
    anything.
        Mr. Elliott, as you know, one of the challenges for States
    in colder climates like Michigan is inspecting pipelines for
    potential cracks, leaks, and not having to shut off or disrupt
    gas flow, especially in winters like last winter with the polar
    vortex that we experienced. That is why I am excited about the
    development of new technologies like robotic smart pigs for in-
    line inspections that could be used to help make pipelines
    safer. Other developments in recent years include drones for
    mapping and detecting leaks, software solutions to help analyze
    pipelines, and, as Mr. Griffith mentioned, fiberoptic cable
    technologies.
        My question is, how does PHMSA work with operators or other
    technology innovators to develop and identify potential
    technologies for further attention in its regulatory processes?
    And secondly, what could Congress do to help drive innovation
    and foster an environment where operators can incorporate new
    technologies and best practices?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
    With regards to my tie, while it is not the beloved cream and
    crimson of my Hoosiers, at least it is Big 10 colors.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
        Mr. Elliott. You are welcome.
        With regards to how we can continue to foster accelerated
    growth in technologies, especially technologies that provide
    greater safety, as I mentioned earlier, I think there are two
    important ways to do that. One is the absolute responsibility
    of PHMSA, and not only me, but the staff--I get the opportunity
    to talk to a lot of oil and gas executives, and it is probably
    one of the first points that I always make about the importance
    of safety technology and how we need to continue to invest,
    again, not so much in safe R&D, but, basically, some of the
    step-change safety that will help, I think, get us this next
    level of safety.
        But I think the second part is from the congressional point
    of view. I think, again, have this great thirst to understand,
    I mean to ask industry to come in and be very specific about
    their paths to more aggressive implementation of this safety
    technology.
        I came from the railroad industry where we have seen
    tremendous improvements in technology and R&D, all designed to
    eliminate causes of incidents that will create catastrophic
    incidents, rail incidents. And I have seen the same thing in
    the pipeline incident.
        But I think the one thing that is missing is the ability to
    communicate that effectively to those people, both on the
    regulatory side as well as the congressional side, to fully
    understand what is going on, and then, to provide good
    recommendations about how all that good work can be----
        Mr. Walberg. How the program is helpful?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
        Mr. Friedeman, as we have heard today, while PHMSA still
    has mandates for the 2011 reauthorization unfinished, they have
    made the most of the resources they have to bring these complex
    technical rulemakings close to the finish line. However, as you
    noted in your testimony, States can play an important role in
    taking some of the burden off of PHMSA by assuming safety
    authority over interstate gas pipelines. Like Ohio, Michigan is
    one of only eight States that act as interstate agents and
    perform inspections. Can you describe how your relationship
    with PHMSA has impacted the overall safety and integrity of
    Ohio's pipeline system?
        Mr. Friedeman. In my discussions with the safety team at
    the commission, once again, anecdotally, that relationship I
    think is perceived by staff to be very productive, to be
    mutually respectful. And I believe there is, in becoming an
    interstate agent, an assumption of responsibility and an
    acknowledgment of the responsibility to promote the welfare of
    the citizens of Ohio. I would commend the State of Michigan for
    doing the same. I would believe that there is that same
    assumption of responsibility and acknowledgment at play there.
        I think, given the activities within the State of Ohio that
    I, hopefully, described today, you can appreciate the sheer
    magnitude of pipeline activity nationally. I mean, it is
    absolutely remarkable. There are in excess of 2 million miles
    of distribution, transmission, and gathering lines.
        In order to accept the charge of a regulator or
    responsibility of a regulatory to promote general welfare and
    the delivery of adequate and reliable service, and safe
    service, I think the magnitude underscores the compelling need
    of the parties to act in a cooperative and coordinated fashion.
    Again, I believe that the relationship between PUCO and PHMSA
    is a clear demonstration of what can be accomplished through
    that coordination.
        Mr. Walberg. OK. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rush [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes the
    gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Chairman Rush. Thank
    you for holding today's hearing.
        This topic is a very timely one for my district, as two
    people tragically lost their lives, and others were seriously
    injured, as a result of an explosion originating from a natural
    gas line in Durham, North Carolina, that occurred on the
    morning of April 10th of this year. I just received a news
    break just a few moments ago that there is yet another gas leak
    in the 500 block of Duke Street there in Durham. We don't know
    the extent of it. The news reports are that no one has been
    injured, and that is a good report.
        But, Mr. Chairman, the explosion in Durham demonstrates
    just how important the safety and security of our pipelines are
    and how the work of this subcommittee to reauthorize the
    Federal pipeline safety program is critically important.
        And let me thank the three witnesses. But I will first
    address this question to the Administrator. Do you have any
    knowledge of the Durham explosion that I made reference to a
    moment ago?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, yes, I do.
        Mr. Butterfield. Can you elaborate on it for me, if you
    could?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, we were saddened to learn of the
    second loss of life from this incident.
        When incidents occur--and we are very thankful that in the
    State of North of Carolina we have a very good pipeline
    partner--but what we typically do anytime that there is a
    fatality, serious injury, or significant evacuations, we will
    dispatch members of our Pipeline Accident Investigation
    Division to go in and assist the State. And I need to
    underscore that, assist the State, because they have the
    predominant oversight.
        We know that, when we arrived, it was still kind of being
    treated as a fire scene and that other agencies were there as
    well. We worked with our State partners, and I do know that one
    of the problems in helping, that has prohibited us from
    basically understanding the specific point of damage with the
    distribution line is the damage to the building and the
    asbestos-containing material and the debris. So, they have
    actually had to do an asbestos cleanup.
        We know that they are getting close to being able to do the
    excavation of the actual distribution line that was hit by the
    boring machine. Our accident investigation team will be there
    again to assist the State. And then, once that area is
    uncovered, then that piece of pipe will go to, typically, go to
    a laboratory for analysis. So, we will continue to work with
    the State to assist in the investigation in any way we can.
        Mr. Butterfield. But, based on you investigation thus far,
    do you believe that there could have been anything done to
    avoid this explosion?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, you know, this was a case where the
    excavation putting in the fiber optics had done the one call.
    The lines had been marked. But I think one of the
    determinations we are going to have to make is whether or not
    this was an area where the operator would have been required to
    do an excavation, to hand dig, and look to make sure that the
    directional boring didn't strike the distribution line. So, I
    think we will know more after the investigation is complete,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend from Iowa, if he wants
    to consume some of my time. If not, I will yield back.
        Mr. Loebsack. Go ahead.
        Mr. Butterfield. I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes Mr. Olson for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair for holding this very
    important hearing to Texas 22.
        And welcome, to our three panelists, to the first panel.
        My first question is for Administrator Elliott. As you
    might know, I represent one of the fastest-growing communities
    in the country. Our pop base in Texas 22 is booming. In some
    areas, we have thousands and thousands of families who are
    living on a land that used to be rice, sugarcane farms, and
    cattle operations. That has made big changes for flood control,
    like Hurricane Harvey, but it has also put a challenge on
    pipeline safety. Clearly, there are pipelines all across Texas
    that used to be under wide-open spaces that are now under
    families' feet and schools. My district has that problem, that
    situation, over and over and over.
        I would like to ask you about how inspections and, quote/
    unquote, ``class location rules'' change as land above
    pipelines changes. Am I correct that there has been a rule in
    the works since 2013? And will you work closely with Congress
    to make sure you all are taking it seriously?
        Mr. Elliott. So, Congressman, thank you for the question.
    With regards to how class location evolves with the increase of
    population, as you know, there are several class locations. And
    as new growth occurs near a pipeline, then there are certain
    restrictions, and it is the responsibility of the operator to
    determine that growth. Are there now buildings and populations?
    And then, they have the responsibility to do several things.
    One of them is to reduce the pressure of the pipeline that is
    now going through this high-consequence area, part of the class
    location.
        Mr. Olson. One question for you on your workforce. At
    breakfast this morning with a lead in the energy operations,
    somebody in touch with the pipeline industry. And they are
    concerned because they admitted they poach your people. Your
    people, our best and brightest, they can pay them a lot more
    than you can pay them.
        Mr. Doyle and I have a bill that addresses this for FERC by
    addressing them to have higher pay than the normal Federal
    level. Would that be something you would like to have? Have a
    little weapon to keep them? Because, again, they admitted these
    are great people; we want them in our employ; and so, we are
    poaching off of PHMSA.
        Mr. Elliott. Well, certainly we are in competition with
    industry. And when we do hire pipeline inspectors who typically
    have engineering degrees, and after we put them through some of
    the best possible training, they even become more marketable to
    industry folks. So, we are always looking at ways, Congressman,
    to find new sources of recruiting. I mentioned a little
    earlier, our HR Director has actually been tasked to go into
    colleges and universities that have engineering programs and,
    basically, do a better job of selling the safety mission of
    PHMSA, because I think that is attractive to a lot of folks.
        We continue to look at ways to incentivize individuals that
    want to come to work for PHMSA. One of the most alarming things
    to me, for example, we had 10 job offers out for pipeline
    engineers. Sixty percent turned that offer down for various
    reasons. Many of those are actually because they had better
    offers elsewhere.
        So, I guess that is a long way of saying we probably would
    encourage any help we could get to better incentivize
    pipeline----
        Mr. Olson. So, it would be OK with more money, not the
    restrictions that are placed right now, something like the SEC
    has to regulate securities and exchange. Would you be OK with
    more money to pay these people?
        Mr. Elliott. I would be happy to see that, but I will work
    with whatever tools I have.
        Mr. Olson. Yes, sir, that is our toolbox to give you.
        The last questions is, Commissioner Friedeman of Ohio, as
    Texas 22 grows, we know that a lot of new pipe is being built,
    especially for local distribution lines. You described in your
    testimony how one phase is replacing older existing lines. Can
    you talk about how pipeline technology has changed in recent
    years and what this means for safety and spill prevention?
        Mr. Friedeman. I think inherent in the replacement program
    is that, first of all, it is an inevitably long duration
    because of the scope of the activity required. And the natural
    consequence of that is technological advancement as the program
    evolves. An illustration of that would be the composite
    material in plastic. So, there is a certain remedial nature
    when you have an accelerated main replacement program that
    identifies pockets and susceptibility. When you replace old
    infrastructure with new infrastructure, not only are you
    mitigating the risk associated with leakage, but what you are
    doing is replacing it with technologically improved composite
    material at the time, which should, then, extend the useful
    life beyond that which was historical. So, there is just an
    inherent benefit to a well-coordinated program.
        Mr. Veasey [presiding]. I thank you.
        I yield myself 5 minutes.
        Mr. Elliott, I wanted to ask you, in your testimony you
    reiterated that, ``The mission of PHMSA is to protect people
    and the environment by advancing the safe transportation of
    energy products and other hazardous materials that are
    essential to our daily lives.'' And most of the time, we do
    pretty well at achieving this mission, but incidents are too
    frequent, and everybody knows that we have to do better.
        Last year, February the 23rd, Linda Rogers was just 12
    years old when she was killed by a natural gas leak and an
    explosion in her family's home in the district that I represent
    in Dallas. And we know the difference between transmission and
    distribution of natural gas, and the different approaches to
    safety that are obviously required for each of those. But,
    after this explosion, more than 300 nearby homes were evacuated
    due to the quantity and severity of the natural gas leaks
    discovered in the residential neighborhood, and reports show
    that more than 2 dozen homes across the north Texas and central
    Texas area have blown up since 2006 because of leaking from
    natural gas pipelines. And tragically, nine people have died
    and at least 22 others have been injured badly.
        I appreciate you making clear in your testimony that
    completing the hazardous liquid rule, which includes installing
    a leak detection system, is one of your highest priorities. Do
    I have your commitment on making leak detection systems a
    priority in this rule?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes.
        Mr. Veasey. Beyond a rulemaking effort, there are recent
    pipeline industry-recommended practices addressing pipeline
    safety systems, leak detection, and integrity management
    systems that have been developed by the American Petroleum
    Institute in response to recent disasters. What are you doing
    to incorporate industry-recommended practices into your regular
    scheme?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for the question. And
    we are very aware of the tragic incident in Dallas with Atmos
    Energy. And, similarly, we had sent inspectors and
    investigators to work with the Texas Railroad Commission. We
    continue to work with them on some of the ongoing concerns.
        But we will, with regards to the mandates, we will continue
    to work to complete those that will bring the greatest safety
    value to not only protecting people, as you said, as well as
    the environment.
        Mr. Veasey. Do you have any programs or efforts to collect
    and promote industry best practices?
        Mr. Elliott. And again, yes, and to that, we regularly will
    look at industry standards that have been in practice for a
    while that have shown tangible safety benefits. And we will,
    then, through incorporation, make those regulations. We have
    several of those that we are working on now, working on the
    language, and several of those deal with pipeline safety.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
        And just kind of switching gears, I wanted to ask, as you
    know, in today's pipeline technology, we have a lot of
    technology that is being used for leak detection, different
    things like that, to make sure that the transmission of natural
    gas is being done safely. What is being done, because we have
    talked a lot about it on the grid, but you don't hear it a lot
    as it relates to pipelines, like hacking, the technology
    actually being compromised as it relates to transmission of
    natural gas through pipelines?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, I think, as some of the discussion today
    has pointed out, you cannot separate safety and security. And
    while we work every day to improve safety, we understand we
    also have a responsibility, where we can, to help improve
    security. And one of those areas, actually, that is ongoing now
    is we are trying to understand, Congressman, how we can go into
    major pipeline control rooms that control these operations,
    some of them many thousands of miles in length, and perhaps be
    a little better armed to ask the pipeline control room
    operators questions about their SCADA security systems. Are
    they adhering to best practices within the cybersecurity realm?
    Again, we don't profess to be the security organization, but I
    think we can probably do a better job of ensuring that we ask
    the right questions to help understand that they are, in fact,
    doing that.
        Mr. Veasey. Do you feel that the people that are actually
    providing the technology, the technology that is being provided
    to the pipelines, that those companies are being vetted enough
    and that whatever they are providing to these pipelines is
    secure enough to make sure that any sort of hacking isn't
    taking place, and that those companies aren't somehow complicit
    with that?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes, it is certainly outside of my real area
    of expertise, but I can tell you, again, I fall back on my
    railroad experience, because we had the same issue with
    dispatching of trains and the concerns about cybersecurity and
    positive train control.
        And I will tell you, I have every reason to believe that
    the vetting of companies that are involved in providing that
    kind of SCADA system, cybersecurity link--I have no reason to
    believe that the oil and gas industry do not adequately vet
    those companies.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much. I appreciate you.
        Now I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina,
    Mr. Hudson.
        Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Elliott, good to see you again. Thank you for being
    here with us today to examine ways to increase the safety of
    our constituents and all Americans.
        While pipelines are the safest means of energy
    transportation, unfortunately, there are from time to time
    instances of failure. In these moments, it is critical our
    first responders are trained and prepared to handle these
    dangerous situations. Back home in North Carolina, some local
    and small fire stations don't have the budget to send their
    first responders to specific emergency pipeline safety. Last
    year, we had over 70 emergency responders take free online
    classes to receive pipeline emergency response training.
        By using technology, we are creating safer communities. In
    recent years, technology has been developed to internally scan
    pipelines to find issues and detect leaks before they become a
    problem. I know a lot of the questions today have surrounded
    technology, but do you want to just, more generally, add more
    detail to what PHMSA is doing to encourage pipeline operators
    to continue innovating and incorporating the most cutting-edge
    technologies and best practices?
        Mr. Elliott. Congressman, thank you for your question. And
    the first part of the discussion, I don't think we can ever do
    enough, especially in rural areas with volunteer fire service
    companies, to do enough in industry, whatever it may be, to
    train our emergency responders enough. We did that religiously
    in the rail industry, and I know the pipeline industry has
    similar practices. But that is something I totally support.
        Again, I go back to the topic about technology and
    innovation, I guess my one area--and I don't necessarily
    consider it a concern, but I think it is where we have to focus
    more--that is through the oil and gas pipeline industry. It is,
    again, to move away from what I consider to be safe R&D and to
    move into some of the more research and development work that
    will deliver further safety enhancements.
        You know, we have talked about, and I very rarely anymore
    talk about the fact that the pipeline industry has a rate of
    99.997 percent safety. Having come from a heavily regulated
    industry, I am of the belief that we are not necessarily going
    to be able to regulate that last little bit of safety. It is
    going to come through adherence to certain regulatory items
    like integrity management, I think adherence to very
    comprehensive safety management systems that are less driven by
    regulations, but more by the safety culture of the company. And
    I think continuing to drive and invest more in technology and
    R&D, again, that is more step change than some of the
    traditional in-line inspection R&D that is going on today. I
    think that is where we can have some of the best investments
    and advancements in safety.
        Mr. Hudson. I agree with you on that. Would you support a
    pilot program or an alternative process that would allow PHMSA
    to work more closely with pipeline operators on some of this
    newer, safer technology?
        Mr. Elliott. Absolutely. I mean, one of the criticisms that
    we have heard, rightfully so, from industry is we are too slow
    in allowing new safety technology to come to pass. As I have
    mentioned, we have to be absolutely sure that this new
    technology does, in fact, deliver not only the ability to
    extend the life of the infrastructure and to be a surrogate for
    physical inspection, but it has to deliver safety value. And
    sometimes it takes us a little longer to understand that. I
    think our special permit process is good, but I think there are
    ways we can improve the ability to move good technology into
    the application process faster than we are able to do it today.
        Mr. Hudson. Appreciate that.
        Do you have any recommendations for Congress on ways to
    encourage more early-stage R&D to supplement the work that
    PHMSA is doing today?
         Mr. Elliott. I mean, I do the best I can, so I will take
    whatever encouragement Congress can offer to provide greater
    investment and focus on R&D.
        Mr. Hudson. Well, I would just ask that maybe take that
    back and think about it. We would appreciate any advice that
    you have for ways we can partner with you, because I think we
    all agree, both sides of the aisle, we want these innovative
    technologies. We want to continue to move in the direction that
    you are describing where we continue to be on the cutting edge
    of safety and move as quickly as possible to keep our
    communities safe. So, if you would take that back as homework,
    and we would love to have any feedback you might bring back to
    us.
        Mr. Elliott. That is the kind of homework I appreciate.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Hudson. OK. Thank you.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Hudson.
        And now, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from
    California, Ms. Barragan.
        Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
        Thank you for being here today, gentlemen.
        Are any of you familiar with the 2015 oil spill in Santa
    Barbara? Yes, Mr. Elliott?
        Mr. Elliott. Yes.
        Ms. Barragan. This was the Refugio State Beach spill.
        Mr. Elliott. Yes, the Plains issue?
        Ms. Barragan. All American Plains. Can you tell me how
    something like this happens and where the pipeline safety
    program that PHMSA, where do they fall into the picture of this
    spill?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question.
    And undeniably, this was a significant impact. Matter of fact,
    I just sat through a briefing that NOAA provided last week that
    actually showed kind of the impact from the point of origin,
    where the oil came underneath the highway and down the
    embankment, and then, out into the coast.
        I do have to preface my remarks by saying, as you know, it
    is currently being litigated in the Department of Justice and
    involved in others. But I will tell you this: that from the
    PHMSA point of view, we really see this as a case where our
    integrity management rules and the responsibilities of this
    operator were not adhered to, and were not adhered to in a
    pretty significant way.
        Ms. Barragan. Well, there were multiple violations, right?
    And they weren't fixing what had to be fixed, isn't that right?
        Mr. Elliott. That is generally correct, yes.
        Ms. Barragan. How are the American people supposed to trust
    pipeline companies who can't do the right thing, and then, end
    up having a spill where you have the California coastline, just
    marine life, people, economy, and a huge impact? How are the
    American people supposed to trust when a company tells us day
    in and day out, ``Hey, we are going to come in; we are going to
    put this in; it is going to be safe; nothing is going to
    happen''?
        We hear the statistics on how safe it is. And then, you see
    these examples where there are constant violations and they are
    not doing the right thing. People start asking, Where is the
    oversight on this? I think it is hard for the American people
    to trust these pipeline companies. And it is hard as well when
    you hear that, since that time, there hasn't been a lot done,
    and there have been all these delays that are happening.
        And so, when you think about the President trying to open
    up new California coastline, and the coastline in general, to
    drilling, it is a huge concern, rightfully speaking, after you
    take a look at what has happened.
        Let me ask, the Trump administration's requested budget for
    PHMSA is roughly 8 percent less in 2020 than it was in 2019.
    How will that impact the pipeline safety program, and does it
    open us up to have more incidences of what happened in Santa
    Barbara, if we are putting less money into it than more?
        Mr. Elliott. Well, thank you for that question, very
    important points. I want to comment about what needs to be done
    for operators that don't follow the requirements. I think it is
    true in any case, and at least from my experience in a year and
    a half at PHMSA, that there is a spectrum. There are some
    extremely good, conscientious operators, and we are very
    thankful that they are there. And I understand the issue of
    public trust. All it takes is one operator to kind of dispel
    that trust.
        I think here, anyway, the process is working probably as it
    should, in that there were a number of parties to the
    investigation against Plains, and even criminal investigation
    and penalty. And again, I can't really get into it, but some
    discussion is ongoing about what the impact will be to Plains
    with regards to a settlement.
        But in regards to----
        Ms. Barragan. The budget cuts. Is the 8 percent budget cut
    going to make it more likely, less likely--I mean, how is it
    going to impact the pipeline safety program?
        Mr. Elliott. You know, I worked in my prior career to make
    sure that every dollar we have is effective in allowing us to
    conduct our safety mission. And I really see that we are able
    to do that at PHMSA. It is----
        Ms. Barragan. Mr. Elliott, I only have 10 seconds left. Is
    an 8 percent cut in the budget going to help safety and the
    pipeline safety program, yes or no? Is it going to help it?
        Mr. Elliott. So, I will make sure that there is no
    degradation in PHMSA's ability to conduct its safety mission
    with the dollars that are provided to us, whatever that may be.
        Ms. Barragan. Well, I don't have a lot of confidence in
    that, but thank you for responding.
        Mr. Elliott. I understand.
        Ms. Barragan. I yield back.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
        And now, I would yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from
    Washington, Ms. McMorris Rodgers.
        Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. I thank the chairman for the time.
        And I appreciate all the witnesses being here. I think it
    has been a really important discussion, a discussion both on
    current standards and regulations and how we are doing as far
    as meeting those standards, but also looking at how do we do
    this in a smarter way, and embracing innovation and technology
    and the solutions that are before us. Because we all want to
    make sure that we are keeping our communities safe and our
    shorelines safe from these kinds of situations.
        I wanted to ask, Mr. Elliott, I just wanted to ask, coming
    from a rural area, I wanted to dig a little deeper into how do
    you approach pipelines in highly populated areas versus the
    rural areas, where there are less people and development. And
    we have class location requirements for pipelines located in
    areas where we have seen recent population growth. I just
    wanted to hear a little bit more about how do you go about the
    rural versus the more populated. And my colleague here from
    Texas talked about his growing area, too.
        Mr. Elliott. Well, thank you for the question. And
    certainly, there is an important dichotomy between oil and gas
    pipelines in populated versus rural areas. I really believe
    that it falls back to the absolute importance of adherence to
    the pipeline and safety, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration's integrity management rules that require
    pipeline operators to have an absolute adequate understanding
    of all the operations within their network, whether or not it
    is a high-consequence area or a rural area, to make sure that
    that line is operating in as safe a fashion as possible, and
    that they are doing the appropriate inspections to ensure that
    any concerns that might be due to weld issues or lack of
    cathodic protection or corrosion are found and addressed long
    before they are ever an impact. And I think that our integrity
    management rules have been extremely effective over the years
    in making sure in holding operators accountable for
    understanding the health of their pipeline throughout their
    network, regardless of whether or not it is rural or high
    populated.
        Mrs. Rodgers. And would you also speak just to, what are
    the procedures that you have in place to determine the risk?
    Because whether it is rural or a growing area, or what happened
    on the California coast, what are the procedures that are in
    place to address the----
        Mr. Elliott. Again, that all, for the most part, falls back
    to the operator and the application of their integrity
    management system. But one of the items that we do at PHMSA, I
    mean, we do our own risk assessment to make sure that we
    adequately work with operators to do inspections of gas and oil
    pipeline systems, both in rural and high-density areas. Again,
    with limited resources, we use kind of a risk analysis. We look
    at the past history of the operator. We look at past incidents
    of problems with that pipeline. That helps us set our
    inspection process to look at these lines.
        Mrs. Rodgers. Would you update me on the review? I
    understand there has been a review underway since 2013 on the
    class location requirements.
        Mr. Elliott. So, the class location rulemaking that we are
    working on, we put out an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    to seek comment about whether or not industry could use certain
    integrity management tools in lieu of having to take additional
    steps in the higher-level class locations, the high-density
    areas. In other words, can some of this technology and
    sophisticated in-line inspection capability replace the ability
    to have to reduce certain pipeline pressures?
        And I think it was mentioned earlier, and rightfully so, I
    mean, some of the growth is basically expanding so rapidly that
    it is difficult to basically take some of the steps that are
    currently part of the class location program. So, we are
    working through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that will help
    us understand more fully can we somehow apply additional
    integrity management inspection process to higher class
    locations as we see population growth.
        Mrs. Rodgers. OK. I had one more question, and this was to
    Mr. Russell, but I, too, am frustrated that TSA is not here.
    And I guess I will ask this final question on the record.
        Thank you very much. I have run out of time. I yield back.
        Mr. Veasey. Are there any more questions?
        If not, that concludes our first panel. I would like to
    thank our witnesses for joining us today to testify on this
    very important issue.
        And at this time, I ask staff to prepare the witness table
    such that we may begin our second panel shortly.
        Thank you. Thank you, participants.
        Mr. Veasey. We will now hear from a second panel of
    private-sector stakeholders. Those witnesses include Mr. Carl
    Weimer, executive director for Pipeline Safety Trust; Mr.
    Andrew Black, president and CEO of Association of Pipelines;
    and Ms. Christina Sames, vice president, operations and
    engineering services, American Gas Association.
        We want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. We
    look forward to your testimony, and at this time the Chair will
    recognize Mr. Weimer for 5 minutes to provide his opening
    statement.

    STATEMENTS OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
    TRUST; ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
        ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPELINES; AND CHRISTINA SAMES, VICE
     PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND ENGINEERING SERVICES, AMERICAN GAS
                              ASSOCIATION

                        STATEMENT OF CARL WEIMER

        Mr. Weimer. Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman
    Rush and Ranking Member Upton for inviting me to speak today on
    pipeline safety and for--I would also like to thank this
    committee for continuing this bipartisan effort to protect
    people and the safety of America, as you always do.
        Before we get into various pipeline safety issues, let me
    give you a brief overview of where we stand today regarding the
    safety of pipelines in this country.
        While everyone testifying today supports the goal of zero
    incidents, we still have a long way to go to reach that goal.
    According to PHMSA data, since the PIPES Act was signed less
    than 3 years ago, there has been over 1,700 reportable pipeline
    failures.
        Over those failures, nearly 800 are considered significant
    incidents under PHMSA's definitions and the number of
    significant incidents had been increasing over the past decade.
        For the past 15 years, the emphasis in reducing pipeline
    incidents has been focused on performance-based integrity
    management programs in high consequence areas.
        Unfortunately, it would appear that these integrity
    management programs have not yet lived up to their promise as
    significant incident rates within high consequence areas
    continue to climb for hazardous liquid and gas transmission
    pipelines.
        The pipeline safety system that Congress has created also
    plays a part in PHMSA's inability to get things done. One large
    barrier to getting better regulations in place is the cost
    versus benefit analysis that Congress has uniquely created for
    PHMSA.
        With a large pipeline system where the probability of a
    failure is low but the consequences can be huge, it is nearly
    impossible to pass regulations under the current cost benefit
    rules.
        If you are really interested in longstanding issues such as
    effective leak detection, automated shutoff valves, regulation
    of over 400,000 miles of totally unregulated gathering lines,
    then the cost benefit language in the statute needs to be
    fixed.
        PHMSA's penalty authority also results in civil penalties
    that are economically insignificant to many operators and are
    much smaller than those imposed by some States.
        The wording in the statute for criminal penalties also does
    not align with the better wording for PHMSA's hazmat operations
    and creates a very high bar to prove. We have provided
    suggested changes to the statute that can give PHMSA more
    flexibility and penalty assessment in the ability to bring
    criminal charges on companies in the rare cases where that is
    warranted.
        As currently written, the pipeline safety statutes do not
    prohibit the release of gas or hazardous liquid from a
    pipeline.
        Under current PHMSA rules as determined by recent court
    rulings, an operator can cause a significant incident without
    necessarily having violated a safety regulation.
        In other words, under PHMSA's rules, an operator has to
    have a plan for operating and testing their pipeline but they
    don't necessarily have to have a plan that works.
        To close that loophole, we ask that you add language to
    make clear that the intent of the statute is to avoid releases
    of gas or hazardous liquids.
        In the PIPES Act, Congress asks GAO to produce important
    reports on the integrity management program for both natural
    gas and hazardous liquid pipelines after the new PHMSA rules,
    which they have been working on since 2010, are published.
        Since those rules have yet to be published and may be
    delayed further, these important reports are not yet due. The
    current integrity management rules have been in place for over
    a decade, are well understood, and NTSB has done a study on its
    effectiveness. So we ask that Congress direct GAO to produce
    these important reports as soon as possible instead of waiting
    for the proposed rules.
        Congress should also ignore industry calls for a relaxation
    of class location rules because of integrity management is in
    place until the GAO reports are done and the number of
    incidents under integrity management show a downward trend.
        Also in the PIPES Act Congress directed PHMSA to make it
    clear that the Great Lakes, coastal beaches, and marine coastal
    waters are considered unusually sensitive areas.
        This mandate has yet to be accomplished. The need to do
    this came as a surprise to us since, clearly, these are
    unusually sensitive.
        We were also surprised to learn that PHMSA does not
    currently have a way to define and map all such areas. Congress
    should also ask GAO to do a study of whether PHMSA's
    definitions and identification of such areas along with
    commercially navigable waterways are consistent with other
    environmental regulations and whether PHMSA currently has GIS
    data layers that allow the agency and the industry to know
    where such boundaries are. Users of this data are to ensure
    that pipeline operators are accurately identifying these areas.
        Congress should also mandate that such areas be made public
    so State and local governments, along with the public, can
    ensure that PHMSA and pipeline companies are considering these
    important areas.
        I see that my time is about up so I want to thank you again
    for asking me to testify today and I stand ready to help answer
    any questions and work on reauthorization.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Weimer follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Weimer.
        Mr. Black, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BLACK

        Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
        I am Andy Black, president and CEO of the Association of
    Oil Pipelines. AOPL represents liquid pipeline owners and
    operators transporting crude oil, refined products like
    gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and home heating oil, and
    industrial products like propane and methane.
        We have over 55 member companies which deliver over 21
    billion barrels annually over a 215,000-mile network of
    pipelines. I am also testifying on behalf of the American
    Petroleum Institute, which represents all facets of the oil and
    natural gas industry including exploration and production,
    refining, marketing, and pipeline and marine transportation.
        Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the liquid energy
    we all need and use every day. No other mode of transportation
    is as safe for the American people or the environment as
    pipelines.
        And pipelines are getting safer. Over the last 5 years,
    pipeline operators have reduced the number of liquid pipeline
    incidents impacting people and the environment by 20 percent.
        This is Government data publicly available from PHMSA.
    PHMSA data also shows pipeline incidents caused by incorrect
    operation impacting people and the environment are down 38
    percent over the last 5 years and pipeline incidents caused by
    corrosion, cracking, or weld failures impact people and the
    environment are down 35 percent over that period.
        Member companies of AOPL and API work hard to improve
    pipeline safety. We are transparent about where we are doing
    well and where we can do better.
        The statistics I just shared come from the performance
    report we develop jointly each year analyzing pipeline safety
    data. We use this analysis to guide our industry wide pipeline
    safety programs focusing on key safety issues as we strive
    towards the goal of zero incidents.
        Through this strategic effort, the pipeline industry has
    addressed key safety recommendations from Congress, PHMSA, the
    NTSB, and issues identified through analysis of safety data.
        Recent safety accomplishments include developing new best
    practices for finding and fixing cracking in pipelines,
    managing leak detection programs, responding to pipeline
    emergencies, and applying safety management systems to
    pipelines.
        API also just released an updated best practice for
    inspecting and performing maintenance on pipelines using the
    latest inspection technologies and analytical techniques.
        Harnessing technology to advance pipeline safety is a theme
    we are pursuing across industry and we recommend Congress adopt
    as well. For example, high-tech tools can travel inside a
    pipeline scanning it like an MRI or an ultrasound at the
    doctor's office.
        Pipeline operators have the opportunity to find issues
    early, perform preventative maintenance, and keep pipelines
    operating safely.
        The problem is Federal regulations can't keep pace with
    fast-moving technology innovations. Outdated PHMSA regulations
    sometimes conflict with the latest knowledge and techniques.
        Congress can do more to allow PHMSA and pipeline operators
    to improve safety by harnessing technology and innovation such
    as creating a pilot program to test pipeline safety
    technologies and approaches. We were thrilled to hear
    Administrator Elliott say ``Absolutely'' when asked if he was
    interested in authorizing a voluntary information-sharing
    program encouraging joint stakeholder problem solving,
    requiring regular PHMSA and stakeholder review of pipeline
    safety research and development advances, improving the
    approval process for alternative safety technologies, and
    encouraging voluntary discovery, disclosure, correction, and
    prevention of pipeline safety violations.
        Next, protecting public safety and the environment from
    attacks on pipelines is a top reauthorization priority for us.
    Pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy American
    families and consumers use every day at their industrial
    facilities. Recent attacks on pipelines by turning valves or
    attempting to damage the pipeline itself are dangerous.
        Members of the public, surrounding communities, and the
    environment are put in danger by attacks on pipeline facilities
    that could easily result in a spill.
        Congress should deter future attacks against pipeline
    facility by closing the loopholes in the scope of criminal
    Federal liability and in Federal pipeline safety law put by
    previous Congresses on a bipartisan basis.
        AOPL and API also recommend improving PHMSA programs and
    regulations by easing hiring and retention of PHMSA inspectors,
    which we discussed on the first panel, improving due process in
    enforcement proceedings, tailoring requirements to pipeline
    operating status, adjusting incident reporting requirements for
    inflation, and incorporating the latest best practice on
    inspection repair and tank maintenance.
        I look forward to answering any of your questions on these
    proposals, our pipeline safety performance record, or the
    action operators are taking to improve pipeline safety further.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rush [presiding]. And now the Chair would like to
    recognize Ms. Sames for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF CHRISTINA SAMES

        Ms. Sames. Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Upton, and
    esteemed members of the committee, thank you for the invitation
    to be here.
        I am Christina Sames, vice president of operations and
    engineering at the American Gas Association. Prior to AGA, I
    worked for the Pipeline Research Council International, which
    is a research consortium, and also spent 12 years within
    PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety where I worked on everything
    from regulations on damage prevention to unusually sensitive
    areas and initiative like, well, community assistance, the
    pipeline mapping program, and moving damage prevention forward.
        AGA represents more than 200 local energy companies that
    deliver natural gas to 74 million natural gas customers.
    Natural gas pipelines deliver gas through 2.5 million miles of
    pipeline including 2.2 million miles of local distribution
    pipe.
        The gas utilities distribution pipelines are the last
    critical link to the delivery chain that brings natural gas
    from the well head to the burner tip.
        AGA's members live in the communities they serve and
    interact daily with both customers and regulators to oversee
    pipeline safety locally. Our customers are our neighbors, our
    friends, and our family members.
        The industry uses a variety of tools to ensure the
    integrity of their distribution systems. This includes
    prescriptive and risk-based regulations along with voluntary
    actions.
        A key risk-based regulation used by operators is
    distribution integrity management, a regulatory process that
    allows an operator to develop a unique safety plan specific to
    that system's operating characteristics and risks to determine
    how best to mitigate those risks and to prioritize the work
    that needs to be done. The process strengthens the systems and
    improves safety. Upgrading distribution pipeline systems is
    important to safety and reliability. We currently have 43
    States and the District of Columbia that have expedited
    pipeline replacement programs and over the past 20 years the
    amount of cast iron and bare steel in use has declined
    dramatically, replaced by modern pipelines which increase
    system safety and reliability.
        The distribution industry has proven it can simultaneously
    increase delivery and improve safety. PHMSA data shows the
    distribution incidents have declined as the mileage and
    consumers have increased.
        But while we have come a long way, recent tragic incidents
    demonstrate more needs to be done. The April 10th incident in
    Durham, North Carolina was caused by third-party excavation
    damage, which continues to be the primary cause of distribution
    incidents.
        The tragic incident in Merrimack Valley was unprecedented.
    Why the NTSB is still investigating, they have stated the cause
    was over pressurization of a low-pressure gas distribution
    system.
        Post incident, AGA immediately brought together industry
    experts and published a shared InShare technical paper
    capturing leading practices to prevent over pressurization.
        AGA created a board-level task force to escalate our
    existing pipeline safety efforts and determine what more can be
    done. We hosted a crisis leadership and communications summit
    and developed a technical paper that covers the skills required
    to perform engineering work on a natural gas system.
        AGA's member safety efforts exceed expectation and
    regulations. The AGA board adopted a commitment to enhancing
    safety that lists specific activities above and beyond
    regulation. We participate in peer reviews, bench marking
    activities, safety summits, and other industry programs to
    enhance safety.
        Relative to reauthorization, AGA asks the subcommittee to
    consider three high-level principles. Preserve industry
    engagement and pipeline safety rulemaking by upholding the
    PHMSA regulatory process. Support flexibility in rulemaking by
    recognizing that the gas distribution system differs and avoid
    one-size-fits-all regulations. Don't obstruct pipeline safety
    replacement programs via new mandates that delay pipeline
    replacement or require a replacement faster than work can be
    accomplished safely, reliably, without compromising quality.
        Our full statement covers several pipeline safety
    reauthorization topics. We would like to highlight how integral
    PHMSA's gas pipeline advisory committee process is to the
    pipeline safety rule making.
        Providing stakeholders supporting vital roles which
    includes input from subject matter experts actually accelerates
    rulemaking and their implementation.
        We also support the GPAC cost benefit analysis process. To
    the best of AGA's knowledge, not one single rulemaking has been
    held up by this process.
        More importantly, cost benefit analysis protects the public
    as regulatory costs are ultimately borne by the customers.
        Thank you for the opportunity to participate. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Sames follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Rush. As chair, I want to thank all of the witnesses
    for their opening statements. This concludes our opening
    statements and we will move now to Member questions and I will
    start by recognizing my friend Mr. Doyle for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    courtesy.
        Pittsburgh has had a record amount of rain over the past
    year that has caused flooding and landslides throughout our
    region. As recently as September of 2018 a landslide in
    neighboring Beaver County caused a pipeline to explode and one
    house was completely destroyed and 30 more homes had to be
    evacuated.
        We know that extreme weather will continue because of
    climate change. Mr. Black and Ms. Sames, how does the industry
    take into account extreme weather events and earth movements
    and how does industry plan to adapt as we are seeing more and
    more of this severe weather?
        Mr. Black. Pipeline operators face requirements today to be
    aware of that operating environment. Earth movements, any
    change. So there is a current requirement right now for that
    pipeline operator to have understood what stress might be
    placed on a pipeline by land movement.
        We have a practice in information sharing among our
    industry and we'll bring pipeline operators together to tell
    stories about incidents or near misses or precautions that were
    taken based on that information.
        If the climate continues to change, pipeline operations
    right now continue--will continue to be faced with those
    requirements and ongoing practices to assess that operating
    environment.
        Mr. Doyle. Ms. Sames?
        Ms. Sames. Congressman Doyle, I am actually from the
    Pittsburgh area originally. I am very familiar with all the
    rain you have had along with other areas of the country.
        So we look at a variety of things. We are looking at new
    flood mapping that is coming out. We are monitoring the
    weather. We are putting sensors on our lines to look for ground
    movement.
        We have been doing this for a while in areas where we have
    seismic activity but we are looking at it now for other areas
    because we are seeing changes, and with changes you have to
    adapt.
        So operators are not including this more in their
    distribution integrity management plans.
        Mr. Doyle. Mr. Weimer, how about you? What should be done
    to properly address climate adaption and resiliency?
        Mr. Weimer. Yes, thanks for the question.
        Clearly, the pipeline operators are supposed to be--have
    control of their pipeline and under integrity management they
    are supposed to look at risks and find out how to mitigate
    those risks. I think as we have seen with changing weather,
    whether it is river scours that caused two releases into the
    Yellowstone River in your area in the Midwest, there has been a
    number of big failures because of ground movement flooding.
        In Texas, there has been failures because of wet soil. When
    the NTSB looked at integrity management they thought it was
    working pretty well for things like corrosion but it wasn't
    working very well for some of these other threats that are
    harder to find.
        So I think we need to get a better handle and the industry
    is working on some of that. We also need to think about it when
    we are siting pipelines. You know, it doesn't make much sense
    to put a pipeline on the side of a hill that can fail.
        So some of the routing of some of those pipelines needs to
    be considered, too.
        Mr. Doyle. How about--you know, Pennsylvania has a history
    of coal mines where we were a coal-producing State and we have
    many abandoned mines throughout our State.
        So subsidence is also a concern for energy infrastructure.
    How is subsidence and geological formations taken into account?
        Ms. Sames. Well, the one good thing with distribution lines
    is many of them are plastic, which means they have a little bit
    more flexibility to move with the ground. It only goes so far,
    which means that where you have a sudden change, a sudden drop,
    a sudden sink hole, which you do experience in Pennsylvania and
    a few other areas, you're focusing on emergency response--how
    do you quickly shut off the gas to that area when there is a
    subsidence that is so fast and so dramatic that it causes the
    pipeline to break.
        Mr. Black. Thinking about your question, Congressman, on
    rivers, the industry updated a recommended practice on waterway
    crossings to address the river scour issue. What once was a
    recommended practice just about calm coastal areas has now been
    upgraded to address the river scour issues.
        Pipeline operators have to take those responsibilities
    seriously and do.
        Mr. Doyle. OK.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I appreciate the courtesy
    you have shown me and I will yield back.
        Mr. Rush. I thank the gentleman for yielding the chair.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Upton for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Upton. Well, thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
    the panellists for waiting. Aren't you glad we don't have three
    panels, right?
        A couple of questions. Ms. Sames, to follow up on what you
    just said, and I was going to ask about new technologies as we
    look--you know, as we look at this next bill and there has been
    some questions raised about, you know, sort of like plastic and
    paper, plastic and steel. So you indicated that plastic is
    emerging volumewise, I guess you could say, in a lot of new
    pipelines.
        Can you talk a little bit about the advantage or
    disadvantage and where do you think plastic is as it relates to
    steel? What hurdles might be there and help us?
        Ms. Sames. In case it's not obvious, you start talking
    technology with by background I start getting really excited.
        So plastic now takes--accounts for more than 50 percent of
    the distribution pipe. That is increasing because we are
    replacing the cast iron and bare steel.
        Mr. Upton. And that is primarily in gas because oil really
    doesn't work, right?
        Mr. Black. Still coated steel. Yes, Congressman.
        Mr. Upton. I am sorry to interrupt. Go ahead.
        Ms. Sames. That's fine. So some of the benefits of plastic,
    and it only goes up to a certain size, which is why you see on
    the liquid lines and the interstate lines really coated steel.
        But on plastic--on distribution we use a lot of plastic
    because it is flexible, it is easier to insert, it is not
    subject to corrosion. So there's a lot of benefits that we see
    with it.
        And the product has come a long way since the initial--the
    initial products back in the '60s and '70s. So we are seeing a
    shelf life of--lifespan of these plastics--these newer
    plastics--they are predicting well over a hundred years. That
    is pretty darn good.
        The down side of plastic is----
        Mr. Upton. What's the cost difference between----
        Ms. Sames. Definitely cheaper.
        Mr. Upton. Substantial? Is it substantial?
        Ms. Sames. Mm-hmm. Right. Right. So the customers are
    bearing that cost benefit, which is why you see bills so low
    right now between the cost of natural gas and being able to use
    plastic. It is a lot cheaper.
        The one down side with plastic is an issue that we continue
    that struggle with, which is third-party damage. The Durham
    incident, third-party damage again.
        So if you all could find a way to stop the telecoms, the
    water, and sewer lines from hitting us, I would greatly
    appreciate it.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Black, do you want to comment on it at all
    or not?
        Mr. Black. We are excited about the technology advances.
    They're not in plastics and the liquids but they are about
    inline inspection technologies, leak detection technologies. We
    have encouraged Congress to direct PHMSA to implement a pilot
    program allowing for real-world testing of technology and
    applications. We think that will give them more information
    that they need so that they can update regulations to advance
    technology.
        Mr. Upton. In the last Congress, both Mr. Black's and Ms.
    Sames' organizations submitted letters of support for our
    action to strengthen DOE's cybersecurity program for pipelines.
    We appreciated that.
        This bill has now been introduced--reintroduced as H.R.
    370, Pipeline and LNG Facilities Cybersecurity Preparedness
    Act. Can you continue to support that? I don't know if you have
    taken another look at it. It really hasn't changed. But we
    would--let me just say we would welcome your written support
    for this a second time.
        Ms. Sames. We do support that bill. It gives DOE a great
    coordination role, which I think is very much needed. So yes,
    you continue to have our support.
        Mr. Black. We are glad to support that bill to help it get
    through the committee process. Cybersecurity is important. We
    encourage all of Congress to work on this--a holistic approach
    with energy, transportation, and intelligence-related
    committees.
        An important goal is not having duplication and conflicting
    sets of guidance that could set operators back.
        Mr. Upton. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. Thank you for yielding. The Chair recognizes
    himself for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Weimer, so good to see you again before the
    subcommittee. You have provided your expertise to the members
    of this subcommittee on pipeline safety, reauthorization
    efforts, and we certainly appreciate you being here once again
    with us.
        In your testimony, you stated that since the year 2010,
    despite all the high-profile pipelines incidents, congressional
    interest, NTSB and GAO recommendations, PHMSA is incapable of
    producing new safety rules mostly due to the unique and overly
    burdensome cost benefit requirements that the agency must
    adhere to.
        Why do you call the cost benefit requirement for PHMSA
    unique and how does it contribute to an agency's inability to
    implement significant new rulemaking even when they are
    directed to do so by law?
        Mr. Weimer. Thank you for the question, Chairman Rush. Yes,
    I am on the gas advisory committee for PHMSA and we have
    another board member who is a law professor at the University
    of Arkansas who is on the gas advisory committee. I am on the
    liquid advisory committee.
        Both of these committees often focus on the cost benefit.
    It was put into the statute in the mid-90s and PHMSA, just
    because of timing efforts, was one of the few places where the
    cost benefit requirements landed.
        We don't have a problem with cost benefit. We think it
    makes sense to consider the costs versus the benefits and that
    is already required under executive orders.
        We are not talking about that. We are talking about the
    uniqueness in the statute where the industry can, because of
    the Administrative Procedures Act, can legally challenge that
    and the cost benefit is--the only place we know of it is in the
    PHMSA statute.
        Other places like EPA and some other agencies have mention
    of cost benefit. But it is not--they don't have to justify the
    cost the way PHMSA does.
        Even a former Administrator, just two Administrators back,
    has recently said that one of her frustrations as Administrator
    was trying to get rules passed because of the cost benefit
    statute, and you see it slowing things down because PHMSA
    doesn't always have enough data to justify the cost because
    they have to get that data from the industry.
        So the industry comes forward with any rulemaking and says
    things are going to cost billions and billions of dollars and
    PHMSA really can't argue with that. Good information to know.
        The committee should certainly take that into
    consideration. But it shouldn't be the only way you can get a
    rule passed.
        Mr. Rush. What kind of corrective strategies would you
    recommend that the Congress take?
        Mr. Weimer. Well, I think in our testimony we provided some
    red line version of what cost benefit language got put into the
    statute in the '90s and we recommended that that be removed to
    make it more of an even playing field with just about every
    other statute we see.
        Mr. Rush. You feel very strongly about the need for
    enacting minimum standards for the 435,000 miles of natural gas
    gathering lines traversing our Nation.
        What are the dangers, in your opinion, of leaving those
    lines unregulated?
        Mr. Weimer. Thank you for that question. Yes, it is pretty
    amazing. As the shale plays have turned out in this country,
    especially in places like Pennsylvania, you know, rapidly there
    was hundreds of thousands of miles of new gathering lines put
    in.
        A lot of those shale plays have pressures coming out of the
    ground at much higher pressures. So the pipelines going in are
    larger and much higher pressure. They are basically the same as
    gas transmission pipelines that are already fairly well
    regulated.
        These pipelines run right past homes. Even in rural areas
    they run past clusters of homes. Were it failed, it would be
    the same as a failure of a gas transmission pipeline and in
    most places they are completely and totally unregulated.
        So, you know, to prevent failure so people don't show up in
    front of this committee again with the latest failure minimum
    standards for these gathering lines need to be enacted.
        Mr. Rush. My time is up. I certainly want to thank you very
    much.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Latta from Ohio for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our panel
    of witnesses today for appearing.
        Mr. Black, if I could start with you. You said something
    kind of interesting that we talk about in this committee a lot.
        Energy and Commerce is a great committee. We have very
    broad jurisdiction. We think it is the best committee in
    Congress--not only think, we believe it.
        But you said something that we really believe, because what
    we see in this committee are technologies and inventions that
    are really 5 to 10 years out and so one of the things we have
    to be careful when we are, you know, working on legislation is
    to make sure that we are not hindering the progress out there
    in the community.
        And you have mentioned that--on, you know, making sure that
    the Federal regulations, you know, keep pace in what you're all
    doing out there. But what I would like to do is--my first
    question I would like you to go, if you would further expand on
    your testimony and comments regarding a pilot program to test
    cutting-edge safety technologies.
        And would you tell us about what those new technologies are
    and are available out there and how they might offer the
    opportunity for further improvement for pipeline safety?
        Mr. Black. I will give you one example. Pipeline integrity
    management regulations are almost 20 years old. That is before
    the iPhone. We had smart pigs then but they weren't nearly as
    smart as they are now. Right now, there are improved
    technologies of travel inside the pipeline collecting data.
        At the same time that we now have terabytes of data on
    pipeline features whereas we didn't before, we also have better
    analytical techniques to know what that increased information
    tells us. Yet, the PHMSA regulations are almost 20 years old
    and are not up to date.
        So the latest know-how and techniques on prioritizing risks
    in pipelines is not what PHMSA is requiring operators to do.
    Repair criteria updates are not in what we understand would be
    the next hazards liquids rule that is moved.
        We can see PHMSA needing real-world experiences from a
    controlled environment by selecting pipeline operators to test
    any new technologies. It could be leak detection technologies.
    It could be scheduling repairs and maintenance under new
    analytical techniques.
        If they can gather information like that, they can have
    more confidence to update regulations in the manner that they
    should with equivalent or better level of safety, maybe they
    won't be so slow.
        Mr. Latta. Well, I assume you have discussions with PHMSA
    on a frequent basis. When you bring this up to them, what do
    they say about upgrading those regulations that bring this new
    technology out?
        Mr. Black. Well, they know that it's important to us that
    integrity management regulations be updated. You have heard
    Administrator Elliott say that he is open to pilots.
        We hope this would be an issue that they would work on.
    They also have the special permit process which has been
    cumbersome and slow and only allows one operator to get a
    waiver for an equivalent level of safety or better.
        It may be ill-suited to pipeline integrity management
    regulations. But it is something that we need to consider with
    them.
        The industry just released API-recommended practice 1160.
    That is all about performing maintenance and repairs on
    pipelines and as the Administrator said they have a goal--we
    all have a goal in avoiding spending resources on issues that
    aren't high priority and making sure that we are on high
    priority.
        Whatever it takes, whether it is congressional action or a
    pilot program or a repair permit or a rulemaking we need to
    update those regulations.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you.
        Just continuing on this topic, we know that the technology
    is ever changing and adapting. But, again, what do you--how do
    we get to that point of working with the agency to make sure we
    get those technologies out there?
        Mr. Black. Well, we found the model in the motor carrier
    statute at the Department of Transportation. They have the
    authority to do this pilot program, and if Congress directs
    them to do that and creates that authority, hopefully, that is
    something that they will create.
        We also have rich exchanges on research and development
    advances. They are funding research and development. We are
    funding research and development.
        The collaboration between the two is episodic and not as
    good as it should be. One of our proposals is that Congress
    direct PHMSA to review its research and development programs
    and have us do it within the entities that Mr. Weimer was
    describing--the liquid and gas pipeline advisory committees.
        If you put that in the statute that that is something that
    PHMSA should be doing, we believe that will maybe force more
    regular and frequent and fast discussions of R&D advances
    because we share the same goal--zero incidents, improving
    pipeline safety and technology.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired and I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding back.
        Mr. Walberg is--no, I am sorry. Mr. Olson is recognized for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair, and welcome to the second
    panel.
        I want to start by thanking each of your organizations for
    your performance--of pipeline performances during Hurricane
    Harvey.
        Hurricane Harvey hit southeast Texas in late August of
    2017. Parts of my home received 5 feet of rain over 2 days. The
    largest petrochemical complex in the world is along the Houston
    Ship Channel, which is 52 miles long.
        It is America's largest exporting port for the last 10
    years. All that product comes from Eagle Ford, Permian Basin,
    somewhere else. It got there without a major spill--major
    incident.
        So thank you, thank you, thank you. Hurricane Harvey shows
    how safe you guys are.
        Our first question is for you, Mr. Black and Ms. Sames. As
    they mentioned on the first panel, Texas 22 is booming. One
    example--our population, we think, will be over one million in
    the next Census. It has grown almost 30 percent in the last 10
    years.
        As the population keeps increasing, people are moving to
    areas that were rural before. There were pipelines there, and
    so with all that traffic flowing to the Port of Houston, the
    port of Freeport, coming from the west Permian Basin flows
    through Fort Bend County. Can't get there without Fort Bend
    County.
        So can you all please talk about how the industry works
    with new communities as they are built around existing
    pipelines? How to make sure that first responders and others
    know what the risks are?
        Mr. Black.
        Mr. Black. Well, you are certainly right, Congressman, that
    not only is the population of that area in your district
    growing but the benefits within Texas of increased oil and gas
    production are helping Houstonians and others have benefit from
    lower prices, more availability to U.S. and North American
    supplies.
        It is important for us to expand pipeline capacity to help
    feed those needs and to make sure that the public along the
    existing route is aware of pipelines that are there.
        We are ready to work with anybody that is constructing a
    pipeline to make sure that they are safely not threatening the
    pipeline. The ``call before you dig'' program and public
    awareness programs are very important.
        Mr. Olson. Ms. Sames, your comments, ma'am?
        Ms. Sames. Well, in addition to what Andy said, there is
    also the Pipeline Informed Planning Alliance document that
    helps to--helps communities as they are building around
    existing pipelines. There are a lot of great practices in
    there.
        It was a collaborative effort that included, you know, the
    Pipeline Safety Trust, the oil industry, the gas industry,
    emergency responders, Governors, cities. I lost count of how
    many. It is a good document and it really provides guidance
    around how communities can build safely around these existing
    pipelines--these larger existing pipelines.
        Simple things like if you're building a school near an
    existing pipeline put the parking lot near the pipeline, not
    the school, but also make sure that there is a good exit so
    that when people--if something happens in that small stretch
    that they have an escape route. It is things like that that are
    within the document. Hopefully, they will consider it.
        Mr. Olson. I thank you, too, because pipelines provide
    green space all over Fort Bend County and Brazoria County. A
    park right by my house, the biggest park my hometown of Sugar
    Land has, is built over an existing pipeline. The markers are
    all along the park. But it's a park and people are there.
    They're flying kites. They've got this little dirt bike trail.
    That is because a pipeline is there. That land is available. It
    would have been taken up but that pipeline gave us green space.
    So thank you for that.
        I want to get back to the staffing issues I talked about
    with PHMSA in the first panel. You know, they can't function
    without the right agents, the right people in place, and
    sometimes, I mentioned, they get poached because their people
    are so good.
        Mr. Doyle left, but he and I have a bill to give FERC a
    sort of waiver to keep employees, pay them higher than average
    Federal salary. That has happened for the SCC. Would you
    support that going through PHMSA, having that have more
    financial resources to keep the people they've got?
        Mr. Black. I will tell you about the proposal that we have
    made to the Congress on this and the committee. We understand
    that if PHMSA had Schedule A hiring authority for its
    inspectors, they would be able to better attract and retain
    pipeline operators.
        From what we have learned about the Federal personnel
    process, that would help. It is in all of our interests for
    PHMSA to be able to have quality inspectors on the job. I
    haven't studied your bill. I am happy to do that. But the
    spirit of being able to have PHMSA maintain quality inspectors
    is one we support.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you. One final comment, and this is a
    question for you, Mr. Black. Are the Horned Frogs going to beat
    the Sooners this year in football?
        Mr. Black. Well, as a TCU grad, they should every year.
    Yes, sir.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Olson. OK.
        Mr. Rush. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel.
        Mr. Black and Ms. Sames, I think you share some of the
    frustrations regarding PHMSA's inability to comply with
    congressional mandates relating to pipeline safety rulemakings.
        In your view, what is keeping PHMSA from complying with
    deadlines on their significant rulemakings?
        Mr. Black?
        Mr. Black. Congressman, we believe there was a strategic
    mistake by the last administration to lump many large complex
    issues into a few mega rulemakings. The rulemaking process is
    not build for that.
        We believe that they should have separated them out. The
    Administrator has acknowledged that and that is what they are
    doing. We don't believe cost benefit requirements are what
    delayed those rules.
        Now, certainly, if a proposal is overly broad it deserves
    to be reviewed further. We think the American people, who
    ultimately pay the cost of regulations, deserve to know that
    the benefits outweigh the costs and we think cost benefit
    analysis improves regulations.
        Lastly, some of the proposals that we have seen to remove
    cost benefit from the PHMSA statute risks, number one, later--
    longer delays because the Office of Management and Budget might
    return something to PHMSA that hasn't had cost benefit
    analysis.
        And, two, I would hate to end the requirement that a risk
    benefit analysis and a cost benefit go before the public
    advisory committee that Carl and our industry reps are on.
    Those are great discussions to improve regulations.
        We think, to answer your question, it has been mistakes of
    just lumping too many things in mega rules. That is why they
    were delayed. They are recovering now.
        Mr. Walberg. Ms. Sames, any additions there?
        Ms. Sames. I fully agree with Mr. Black. But in addition,
    just an observation. It is my opinion, my observation, that
    PHMSA's staff--technical staff--are pretty darn good at moving
    things forward after the advisory committee meets.
        It appears that something is occurring after it leaves
    their technical office to that rulemaking. I don't know exactly
    what it is but----
        Mr. Walberg. Does OMB add to the delays?
        Ms. Sames. I am sure that there are some with OMB. But it
    appears that there may be things beyond PHMSA within the
    department that may also be holding things back a little bit. I
    don't know where the obstacle is.
        But I can tell you that the industry is very frustrated. We
    like certainty. How often do you have the industry sending in
    letters to the secretary asking for them to move a rulemaking
    forward? And we have been doing that.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
        Ms. Sames, in your written testimony you highlight that
    every natural gas distribution system is different in terms of
    design, use, age, location, external risks, operating history,
    current operating conditions, et cetera, et cetera.
        Could you please talk about how, as a result of these
    differences, prescriptive regulations that take basically a
    one-size-fits-all approach might not be the best idea?
        Ms. Sames. Thank you for the question.
        Distribution lines are really different from the
    interstates and the liquid. You have--for example, on
    distribution you have plastic. You have steel. You have coated
    steel. You have bare steel. You have all of these different
    materials that were put in over the ages.
        You also have different pressures and different sizes. It's
    just very unique compared to everything else.
        So when you get a prescriptive regulation it doesn't take
    any of that into account and I will give you an example.
    Atmospheric corrosion surveys are done every 3 years. Now, if
    you are in a desert environment you may not need an atmospheric
    corrosion survey every 3 years.
        However, if you are along the ocean you probably need it
    more frequently, which is why it is important to have not only
    those prescriptive regulations but also the risk-based
    regulations that we get through integrity management. That kind
    of balances things out of it.
        Mr. Walberg. OK. On the first panel I asked about the role
    of States like Michigan, which have robust inspection programs
    themselves, play in pipeline safety--specifically, their
    coordination with PHMSA.
        Has this model helped your Michigan utilities meet higher
    safety standards at low regulatory burden as they invest in
    transitioning away from the old cast iron or steel distribution
    pipes?
        Ms. Sames. I think it has because the local inspectors know
    the environment. They know the operators. They're spending a
    lot of time with the distribution operators and that allows
    them to collectively move safety forward in a way that is the
    lowest cost to the customers.
        The members that I have, they are all publicly traded
    utilities for the most part, which means that their rates are
    going through the commissions and it really is a partnership--
    how do you improve safety, how do you do things the right way
    at the lowest cost to the customer and the least burden.
        Mr. Walberg. And they should have a better grasp on the
    situations?
        Ms. Sames. Correct, because they are there. They live and
    work in the same communities that we are serving.
        Mr. Walberg. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Sames. You are welcome.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Black, earlier you indicated that, you know, there were
    concerns about a tax on pipelines and I share that, and I
    understand you also have indicated in speaking with Mr. Latta
    that, you know, one of the things we can do is to have
    voluntary compliance and so forth.
        But one of my concerns is, as you heard me on the previous
    panel, is we got pipelines going in the ground, you know, as we
    speak or in the process. They are not in the grounds yet. Once
    we get them in the ground we are not going to put new
    technology--you know, we are not going to say ``Dig it up'' 5
    years from now and put in the new technology.
        And so the concern is why aren't the companies putting
    those pipelines in the ground now, putting in the technology?
    And, again, there may be others.
        But, you know, I had a demonstration of what could be used
    with the fiber optics and, of course, you'd have to have some
    broadband in the area so we'd have to work on that.
        But the fiber optics that will tell you if somebody is--if
    there is a leak that just occurs naturally or if somebody is
    making an attack on a pipeline that's underground they can see
    it, you know, live action and get out there and do something
    about it before the harm you indicated, which I agree with you,
    could be harm to the community.
        You know, it's not just about stopping the pipeline. There
    could be an environmental risk. There's a risk of explosion or
    fire or whatever. So if the industry is not already doing it,
    it seems to me that would be smart.
        In fact, as a recovering attorney, let me posit that
    because that technology is out there the gas companies might
    very well be at risk of having not used the best equipment and
    may have some liability damages in the future.
        So why aren't they doing it? And that makes me worry that
    voluntary doesn't work and that we may need to have, you know,
    regulatory that says, you know, if there's something out there
    that increases public safety we ought to do it.
        What say you?
        Mr. Black. We are excited about leak detection technology
    development. I know operators are talking with vendors about
    technologies to see, sniff, and hear signs of small leaks,
    which are the hardest ones to detect.
        That can include acoustic smart balls, fiber optic cables.
    I have heard of copper cables with conductors. PHMSA conducted
    a study on leak detection technologies as a result of a mandate
    from Congress.
        We heard what you alluded to on the first panel. Sometimes
    the claims of performance--we are not sure yet about how they
    will do road tested. So operators have having those
    conversations right now and hoping to be able to have
    confidence in those technologies.
        I am aware of several pilot programs, not in a DOT pilot
    but in a company sense, where they're testing some of those new
    technologies. We think the pilot program will help an operator
    work with PHMSA and try and implement, hey, this is how we want
    to do for leak detection--are you OK on that.
        Mr. Griffith. But here is the problem with my constituents,
    and there are two coming through Virginia. One comes directly
    through my district. Another one is a little bit further north.
        OK, great. You do a pilot project. Wouldn't it make more
    sense to go ahead and put that in the ground now? Because
    they're not--once the pilot project comes back and says yes, it
    works, they're not going to dig up the corridor over hundreds
    of miles and suddenly put down that technology that works.
        So aren't we--if we had something that already could do
    that and you said, well, the new stuff doesn't work any better
    than the old stuff, I would say, OK, let's wait and see or--but
    we don't have anything that will give us that detection and at
    least with the one technology, and again, I admit there are
    others that are probably out there, it changes the temperature
    of the gourd.
        They can tell immediately if there's a leak out there and
    it would seem to me that the companies would want to do this
    and put it down in advance and then if you needed the software
    upgrades down the road you might be able to do that a whole lot
    easier than--I mean, the ditches are dug right now and they are
    laying the pipe. Why aren't they doing it, and that is what
    calls into question for me voluntary versus us having some
    regulations.
        Now, if it's going to take us 20 years to get the
    regulations that isn't going to work either. I am not sure
    there is an answer to that, Mr. Black. Let me go to Ms. Sames
    for something different because you have referenced it, I
    think. But the finalizing of the rulemaking on the automatic
    shut off valves and remote controlled shut off valves which, to
    me, makes a lot of sense and I think that's the one you're
    asking them to hurry up and get it done.
        But can you explain for the public the difference between
    the transmission and distribution systems and what
    considerations need to be made on these auto shut offs for each
    of those?
        Ms. Sames. Sure. So automatic and remotely controlled
    valves we are putting them on our intrastate transmission. I
    can't speak to the interstates. But we are putting them on our
    intrastates where we have what I will call consistent pressure.
        The problem with automatic shut off valves is they sense a
    pressure drop, which means that if you have pressure
    fluctuations in the line, it is going to shut off and now you
    are shutting off customers, which is why they tend not to work
    as you get further downstream.
        You have too many pressure fluctuations because people are
    turning on their stoves. They are turning on their furnaces.
    They are using more natural gas, which is sucking the gas from
    the system which is dropping the pressure.
        We are very supportive of them in many instances where you
    don't have those pressure fluctuations.
        Mr. Griffith. Well, how about the--and I know you said it
    was--you were doing intra but how about that 42-inch pipe
    coming through my district? Wouldn't that work better there?
        Ms. Sames. I cannot speak to that one, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate it.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Rush. I thank the gentleman, and I want to thank all
    the witnesses for your patience and for your participation in
    today's hearing, and I want to also remind Members that,
    pursuant to committee rules, you have 10 business days to
    submit additional questions for the record, which will be
    answered by the witnesses who have appeared before the
    subcommittee, and I ask each witness to respond promptly to any
    such questions that you may receive.
        And this--we have a unanimous consent request to enter into
    the record the following information: a letter from the
    American Public Gas Association, a letter from the Interstate
    Natural Gas Association of America, a letter from the National
    Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, a letter from
    the Alliance for Innovation and Infrastructure.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. Rush. And the Chair now adjourns this committee.
        At this time, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 1:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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