

GLOBAL TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND, PART I

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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GLOBAL TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE HOMELAND, PART I

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Thompson, Langevin, Richmond, Payne, Rice, Correa, Small, Rose, Underwood, Slotkin, Clarke, Titus, Barragán; Rogers, King, McCaul, Katko, Ratchliffe, Walker, Higgins, Lesko, Taylor, and Guest.

Chairman THOMPSON. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order.

The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on “Global Terrorism Threats to the Homeland, Part One.”

To begin I want to note that tomorrow marks the 18th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We remember those who were lost that terrible day in New York, at the Pentagon, and at Shanksville, Pennsylvania. They and their loved ones are on Americans’ minds and our hearts at this time, especially.

Today I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, and appreciate their testimony before the committee. That said, I want to say for the record it is unacceptable that the Secretary of Homeland Security, FBI director, and acting director of National Counterterrorism Center refused a bipartisan invitation to testify at this hearing.

This committee has a long-standing practice of holding an annual hearing to examine threats to the homeland. We continue to face threats from foreign terrorist organization and home-grown violent extremists. Communities like El Paso have suffered unspeakable tragedy from domestic terrorist attacks recently. Agreeing to come before the committee at the end of October, over 3 months after our request was made, is not sufficient.

We will continue to engage the administration and ensure this committee has the information necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities. As another year passes Members of Congress, especially on this committee, are reminded of the duty we have to counter the terrorism threats of today and tomorrow.

Despite organizational setbacks and loss of physical territory, foreign terrorist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda remain capable and committed, conducting external attacks and influencing like-minded groups and individuals outside of Iraq and Syria, perpe-

trating a circle of violence and extremist rhetoric. One such attack took place on Easter Sunday this year, when a terrorist group inspired by ISIS killed over 250 people during coordinated attacks on 3 churches and a hotel in Sri Lanka.

Alarmingly, a recent Pentagon inspector general's report stated that ISIS was resurging in Syria after the administration's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from the country, refuting President Trump's own statements about ISIS being defeated. The United States must find ways to responsibly and adequately support partners on the ground, and advance efforts to keep ISIS from re-establishing itself.

Additionally, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are still active across parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, and the instability in some of these regions is ripe for jihadism to flourish. In fact, just last month the State Department's counter-terrorism coordinator, Ambassador Nathan Sales, stated al-Qaeda is as strong as it has ever been, and has let ISIS absorb the brunt of the world's counter-terrorism efforts, while patently reconstituting itself. In Somalia the al-Qaeda-linked group al-Shabaab conducted an attack on a hotel, killing 26 people, including 2 American citizens, this past July.

While we can't lose focus on terrorist groups like these, we are also facing a growing domestic terrorist—and particularly white nationalist—threat to our homeland. Addressing this threat, which is often transnational in nature, has long been—taken a back seat to other threats faced by the United States. Earlier this year the mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand, which left 51 dead, exemplify the growing transnational connections between white nationalist terrorists who inspire and communicate with each other across the world.

Just last month in El Paso, Texas 22 people were killed when a 21-year-old white nationalist terrorist opened fire on a WalMart, using an AK-47-style assault rifle. The shooter drove 10 hours from his home in Allen, Texas to El Paso, specifically to target Hispanics. In April a 19-year-old white nationalist terrorist opened fire using an AR-15-style assault rifle inside the Chabad of Poway synagogue on the last day of Passover in Poway, California, killing a 60-year-old woman. These attacks did not originate in a vacuum, but of—these white nationalist terrorists who killed people in Poway, California and El Paso, Texas, cited Brandon, the terrorist who carried out the Christchurch mosque attacks in New Zealand as an inspiration.

Sadly, these are just a few of the deadly domestic terrorism attacks linked to white supremacy extremism from this year. Over the last decade over 70 percent of extremist-related killings in the United States were committed by right-wing extremists, many of whom flock to social media and on-line platforms to espouse their hateful and violent rhetoric.

Like other terrorists and terrorist groups, white supremacist extremists take advantage of social media and on-line platforms to promulgate their ideology and promote violence. On June 26 I held a hearing examining social media companies' efforts to counter on-line terror content and misinformation. Just last week the committee deposed the owner of 8chan, an on-line platform that has

been linked to at least 3 acts of deadly white supremacist extremist violence.

While we cannot lose focus on the foreign terrorist threat to the United States, we have to simultaneously address the real and persistent threat of domestic terrorism. Certainly we can do both.

Last month, I met with acting DHS Secretary, Kevin McAleenan, in Jackson, Mississippi to discuss domestic terrorism at the public launching of the Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee for the Prevention of Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities.

Additionally, my legislation, the Domestic and International Terrorism Data Act, was reported by the committee by voice vote. The bill would require the Government to publish an annual public report outlining domestic terrorist incidents and exactly what the Government is doing to address these incidents. It would also require DHS to research how domestic terrorists are linked with transnational terrorist movements, including white supremacist movement.

I look forward to the committee taking up additional domestic terrorism legislation later this month.

Again, I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and expect a productive discussion on this important matter.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

To begin, I want to note that tomorrow marks the 18th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We remember those that were lost that terrible day in New York, at the Pentagon, and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. They and their loved ones are on Americans' minds and in our hearts at this time especially.

Today, I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses and appreciate their testimony before the committee. That said, I want to say for the record it is unacceptable the Secretary of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director, and acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) refused a bipartisan invitation to testify at this hearing. This committee has a long-standing practice of holding an annual hearing to examine threats to the homeland. We continue to face threats from foreign terrorist organizations and home-grown violent extremists, and communities like El Paso have suffered unspeakable tragedy from domestic terrorist attacks recently. Agreeing to come before the committee at the end of October, over 3 months after our request was made, is not sufficient. We will continue to engage the administration and ensure this committee has the information necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities.

As another year passes, Members of Congress—especially on this committee—are reminded of the duty we have to counter the terrorism threats of today and tomorrow. Despite organizational setbacks and loss of physical territory, foreign terrorist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda remain capable and committed of conducting external attacks and influencing like-minded groups and individuals outside of Iraq and Syria, perpetuating a circle of violence and extremist rhetoric. One such attack took place on Easter Sunday this year, when a terrorist group, inspired by ISIS, killed over 250 people during coordinated attacks on 3 churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. Alarmingly, a recent Pentagon inspector general report stated that ISIS was resurging in Syria after the administration's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from the country, refuting President Trump's own statements about ISIS being defeated.

The United States must find ways to responsibly and adequately support partners on the ground and advance efforts to keep ISIS from reestablishing itself. Additionally, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are still active across parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. And the instability some of these regions is ripe for Jihadism to flourish. In fact, just last month, the State Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Nathan Sales stated "al-Qaeda is as strong as it has ever been" and has "let ISIS absorb the brunt of the world's counterterrorism efforts while pa-

tiently reconstituting itself.” In Somalia, the al-Qaeda linked group “al-Shabaab” conducted an attack on a hotel, killing 26 people, including two American citizens, this past July. While we can’t lose focus on terrorist groups like these, we are also facing a growing domestic terrorist—and particularly white nationalist—threat to our homeland. Addressing this threat, which is often transnational in nature, has long been taken a back seat to other threats faced by the United States.

Earlier this year, the mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand, which left 51 dead, exemplified the growing transnational connections between white nationalist terrorists who inspire and communicate with each other across the world. Just last month in El Paso, Texas, 22 people were killed when a 21-year-old white nationalist terrorist opened fire on a Walmart using an AK-47-style assault rifle. The shooter drove 10 hours from his home in Allen, Texas, to El Paso specifically to target Hispanics. And in April, a 19-year-old white nationalist terrorist opened fire using an AR-15-style assault rifle inside the Chabad of Poway synagogue on the last day of Passover, in Poway, California, killing a 60-year-old woman. These attacks did not originate in a vacuum. Both of these white nationalist terrorists who killed people in Poway, California and El Paso, Texas cited Brenton Tarrant, the terrorist that carried out the Christchurch mosque attacks in New Zealand as an inspiration. And sadly, these are just a few of the deadly domestic terrorism attacks linked to white supremacy extremism from this year. Over the last decade, over 70 percent of extremist-related killings in the United States were committed by right-wing extremists, many of whom flock to social media and on-line platforms to espouse their hateful and violent rhetoric.

Like other terrorists and terrorist groups, white supremacist extremists take advantage of social media and on-line platforms to promulgate their ideology and promote violence. On June 26, I held a hearing examining social media companies’ efforts to counter on-line terror content and misinformation. Just last week, the committee deposed the owner of 8chan, an on-line platform that has been linked to at least 3 acts of deadly white supremacist extremist violence. While we cannot lose focus on the foreign terrorist threat to the United States, we have to simultaneously address the real and persistent threat of domestic terrorism. And we can certainly do both.

Last month, I met with Acting DHS Secretary Kevin McAleenan in Jackson, Mississippi to discuss domestic terrorism at the public launching of the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Subcommittee for the Prevention of Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities. Additionally, my legislation, the Domestic and International Terrorism DATA Act, was reported by the committee by voice vote. The bill would require the Government to publish an annual public report outlining domestic terrorist incidents and exactly what the Government is doing to address these incidents. It would also require DHS to research how domestic terrorists are linked with transnational terrorist movements, including white supremacist movements. I look forward to the committee taking up additional domestic terrorism legislation later this month.

Chairman THOMPSON. With that I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 5 minutes for the purpose of an opening statement.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are once again at the anniversary of September 11, 2001. Thousands of innocent Americans lost their lives that morning. Our Nation has not been the same since.

Those horrible acts were carried out by an organized, trained, and determined terrorist network. Thousands of brave men and women have given their lives to eliminate this threat to our homeland and our way of life. This anniversary is a somber reminder of those sacrifices.

During the past 18 years the United States and our allies dealt a decisive blow to al-Qaeda. Most recently, we have broken the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS. However, we cannot lose sight of the continued danger posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Al-Qaeda is rebuilding, expanding its ranks and safe havens, and remains intent on attacking the United States.

Since the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have grown to approximately 40,000 members. Their ranks now include battle-hardened specialists and bomb makers. This new generation of experts has honed their skills in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Northern Africa. Al-Qaeda participation in battles throughout the Middle East and Africa have also rebuilt the credibility of a once shattered organization.

The group's propaganda operation is also learning, as well. They watched ISIS recruit thousands, including young men from al-Qaeda's own ranks, using the latest social media tools. They have—now they are exploiting the same tools. Public statements from al-Qaeda senior leaders on social media platforms have increased by 67 percent over the last several years.

The terror organization is reintroducing its movement, and targeting a new generation of fighters. Their message is clear: A continued commitment to target the United States homeland, and a call for unity across jihadist factions.

Recent U.S. airstrikes targeting al-Qaeda fighters hiding and plotting external attacks in Syria prove the group remains a serious threat. The FBI told us in May that they are actively investigating over 1,000 cases of individuals in the United States inspired by al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organization.

This committee exists because of the horrific attack carried out by al-Qaeda. Though oversight and legislation—through oversight and legislation, it is our job to ensure DHS can prevent another attack. Unfortunately, since Democrats took the Majority, we haven't had a single full committee oversight hearing focused on the threat from foreign terrorists, nor have we moved to a—moved a comprehensive DHS authorization bill to strengthen the Department's ability to prevent attacks. Our recent focus on domestic terrorism is important, but we cannot let the Department or this committee lose sight of the serious and on-going threat from foreign terrorists.

I hope our witnesses today will articulate the challenges facing DHS, and provide recommendations to enhance our ability to defeat those—these and other emerging threats to our homeland.

Finally, I share the Chairman's frustration that DHS, FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center could not be here today. Our committee has a long-standing tradition of hearing from these witnesses each fall. Like Chairman Thompson, I expect them to appear before this committee as soon as possible.

With that I yield back my time.

[The statement of Ranking Member Rogers follows:]

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER MIKE ROGERS

We are once again at the anniversary of September 11, 2001. Thousands of innocent Americans lost their lives that morning. Our Nation has not been the same since.

Those horrible acts were carried out by an organized, trained, and determined terrorist network. Thousands of brave men and women have given their lives to eliminate this threat to our homeland and our way of life.

This anniversary is a somber reminder of their sacrifices. During the past 18 years, the United States and our allies dealt a decisive blow to al-Qaeda.

More recently we've broken the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

However, we cannot lose sight of the continued danger posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Al-Qaeda is rebuilding, expanding its ranks and safe havens, and remains intent on attacking the United States.

Since the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have grown to approximately 40,000 members. Their ranks now include battle-hardened specialists and bomb makers.

This new generation of experts has honed their skills in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Northern Africa.

Al-Qaeda's participation in battles throughout the Middle East and Africa have also rebuilt the credibility of a once shattered organization. The group's propaganda operation has been learning as well.

They watched ISIS recruit thousands, including young men from al-Qaeda's own ranks, using the latest social media tools.

Now they're exploiting the same tools. Public statements from al-Qaeda senior leaders on social media platforms have increased by 67 percent over the past several years.

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Our committee has a long-standing tradition of hearing from these witnesses each fall.

Like Chairman Thompson, I expect them to appear before the committee as soon as possible.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. Other Members of the committee are reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Rogers, thank you for this opportunity to receive testimony on "Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland."

I thank today's witnesses for coming before the committee to offer testimony on this important topic.

Witnesses:

- Mr. Peter Bergen, vice president, Global Studies & Fellows, New America;
- Mr. Ali Soufan, founder, The Soufan Center;
- Mr. Brian Levin, director, Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism, California State University, San Bernardino; and
- Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (Republican witness).

I will never forget September 11, 2001.

Tomorrow marks the 18th anniversary of the attacks that killed 2,977 men, women, and children.

I stood on the East Front steps of the Capitol on September 11, along with 150 Members of the House of Representatives and sang "God Bless America."

As a Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security since its establishment today's hearing is of importance to me.

I am supportive of efforts to employ effective approaches to interdicting, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist networks.

The previous administration focused on how best to use our Nation's soft power and military power for minimizing, eliminating, and containing terrorists' threats in the region, with a full understanding that over-aggressive actions militarily can pull our country into a precipitous military struggle that would be open-ended.

Unfortunately, this administration has diminished the role and the capacity of the State Department to keep manageable threats in check, while doing the hard work of coalition building so that there would be effective burden sharing for actions taken.

Regrettably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) declined to participate in the hearing, citing scheduling conflicts, despite a bipartisan request from the committee well in advance.

How can the United States provide a credible bulwark against terrorists threats abroad if we cannot get this administration to get over its reticence to speaking before committees in this Congress.

Incredible as it is, the President was planning to meet this weekend with the Taliban at Camp David, an organization directly linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks on our Nation, while at the same time he discourages his political appointees and acting department heads to participate in this hearing to assess the threats posed by international terror groups, which include the Taliban.

The benefits of the collaborative work done by all levels of law enforcement was evidenced by the work done by local, State, and Federal law enforcement during Hurricane Harvey and the resulting flood.

Homeland security and National defense are not and should not be made into political issues.

Our Nation needs our best efforts on the behalf of peace and security abroad to assure that we have peace and security at home.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

September 11, 2001 remains a tragedy that defines our Nation's history since that faithful day for many reasons, but the final chapter will be written by those who are charged with keeping our Nation and its people safe while preserving the way of life that terrorists seek to change.

One of the enduring challenges for Members of this committee is how we guide the work of the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that September 11 never happens again.

I offer my thanks and gratitude to the 9/11 Commission Chaired by New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chair Former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton Vice for their work in investigating the events of September 11, 2001 and making recommendations to the Nation and the Congress on what we need to do to avoid another September 11.

The 9/11 Commission report provided the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and identified lessons learned.

The report chronicled the activities of al-Qaeda which revealed the sophistication, patience, discipline, and deadliness of the organization to carry out the attacks of September 11.

From the Commission's work, we learned of the lack of imagination among our law enforcement and National intelligence community in understanding how dangerous al-Qaeda was to the security of the United States and the safety of our citizens.

We were aware of the threat al-Qaeda posed from attacks carried out against Americans and American interests in the 1990's through the year 2001.

On February 26, 1993, a truck bomb was detonated below the North Tower of the World Trade Center—killing 6 people.

It was intended to cause both the North and South Towers to collapse and if it had been successful thousands would have died on that day.

On August 7, 1998, 224 people were killed and more than 5,000 injured by bombs exploding almost simultaneously at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

On October 12, 2000, 17 sailors aboard the USS Cole were killed by an al-Qaeda attack using a small boat packed with explosives.

On September 11, 2001, 2,977, which included 2,504 civilians, were killed when al-Qaeda operatives hijacked 3 planes and used them as guided missiles to attack both World Trade Towers and the Pentagon.

VICTIMS OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACK

At the World Trade Center site in Lower Manhattan, 2,753 people were killed when hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were intentionally crashed in the north and south towers.

Of those who perished during the initial attacks and the subsequent collapses of the towers, 343 were New York City firefighters, another 23 were New York City police officers and 37 others were officers at the Port Authority.

The victims ranged in age from 2 to 85 years.

At the Pentagon in Washington, 184 people were killed when hijacked American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the building.

Near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, 40 passengers and crew members aboard United Airlines Flight 93 died when the plane crashed into a field.

It is believed that the hijackers crashed the plane in that location, rather than the target of the U.S. Capitol, after the passengers and crew attempted to retake control of the flight.

The act of those passengers to stop the hijackers likely saved the lives of thousands of their fellow Americans that day.

The heroic work done by the first responders who rushed into the burning Twin Towers and the Pentagon saved lives.

We will forever remember the law enforcement and firefighters lost their lives in the line of duty on September 11.

This Nation shall forever be grateful for their selfless sacrifice.

I visited the site of the World Trade Center Towers in the aftermath of the attacks and grieved over the deaths of so many of our men, women, and children.

I watched as thousands of first responders, construction workers, and volunteers worked to recover the remains of the dead, and removed the tons of debris, while placing their own lives and health at risk.

The men and women who worked at “Ground Zero” were called by a sense of duty to help in our Nation’s greatest time of need since the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

Under the leadership of President Obama, Osama bin Laden was found and killed and the prosecution of al-Qaeda has left them without the capacity to launch major operations within the United States.

Congress in response to the new challenges that our first responders would face created the Homeland Security Grant Program.

The grant program would address the challenges that were undermining first responder efforts at Ground Zero and the Pentagon.

Over time Congress has modified the program to provide for more targeted investments. First responders and emergency managers across the country have testified before our committee that without these much-needed grant funds, preparedness, planning, and training activities would not be what they are today.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Preparedness Report shows States have high confidence in the capability areas that have benefited from Homeland Security investments—such as operational coordination, situational assessment, and public alerts and warnings—and low confidence in capability areas that have received less funding.

Unfortunately, the last year the Homeland Security Grant program was fully funded was fiscal year 2010 when Congress appropriated \$2.75 billion for this program.

In fiscal year 2012—1 year later the funding level was only \$1.35 billion, although the funding level in 2013 had increased to \$1.5 billion—sequestration further reduced the amount available to be awarded to States.

In both fiscal years 2014 and 2015 the Homeland Security Grant program was \$1.5 billion.

We know that the funding provided by the Homeland Security Grant program has had a significant impact on the ability of first responders to react to terrorist events.

The Boston attacks resulted in the tragic killing of 3 and the injuring of more than 260 men, women, and children awaiting the arrival of runners in the Boston Marathon.

This low number of fatalities came as a direct result of the training of first responders to meet the security, rescue, and recovery needs of those directly impacted by the attack.

NEW TERRORIST THREATS

Today, this Nation faces new threats from terrorists.

Domestic Terrorism, Extremism, Homegrown Violent Extremism, and International Terrorism are all threats that our Nation must access and address.

Groups and individuals inspired to commit terrorist acts are motivated by a range of personal, religious, political, or other ideological beliefs—there is no magic formula for defining how a person may become a terrorist.

Further, the complexity of adding social media as a new source of recruitment for violent extremists is complicating the efforts of law enforcement, domestic security and National defense.

The most difficult challenges our Nation has faced since the attacks of September 11, 2001, is the prevention of terrorist's acts planned by "Lone Wolves."

Domestic terrorist incidents, particularly from far-right extremists, are on the rise, including recent mass shootings in Poway, California and El Paso, Texas.

This week will mark the 18th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, this hearing allows committee Members to gather information about the state of terrorism around the world and how policy makers can support those charged with securing the Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I welcome our panel of witnesses for today. Our first witness, Mr. Peter Bergen, is a vice president of Global Studies and Fellows, and the director of the International Security and Future of War Programs for New America. In addition to being a journalist and documentary producer, Mr. Bergen held teaching positions at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Next we are joined by Mr. Ali Soufan, the chief executive officer of the Soufan Group, and founder of the Soufan Center. The Soufan Center—Mr. Soufan is a former FBI supervisory special agent who investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa Embassy bombing, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events surrounding the attacks on September 11.

Our third witness is Mr. Brian Levin. Mr. Levin is a criminologist and civil rights attorney, and professor of criminal justice, and director of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University, San Bernardino, where he specializes in analysis of hate crime, terrorism, and legal issues.

Finally, we welcome Mr. Thomas Joscelyn. Mr. Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and is senior editor of FDD's *Long War Journal*. Much of his research focuses on how al-Qaeda and ISIS operate around the globe.

Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record.

I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Bergen.

STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL STUDIES & FELLOWS, NEW AMERICA

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Rogers and the distinguished Members of the committee.

I wanted to briefly address what happened over the weekend at Camp David, because I think it has some relevance to what we are discussing today.

I think President Trump made the right decision, mostly because this wasn't really a peace agreement, but a withdrawal agreement.

We have seen from our own past history that withdrawing from these countries can actually impact the United States and our allies in ways that are not beneficial to our National security.

Secondarily, this agreement was being conducted without the Afghan Government. After all, they are the elected representatives of the Afghan people. The Taliban are unelected theocrats, and we are treating them as a potential government-in-waiting, rather than an insurgent group.

Third, we have an Afghan election coming up on September 28. President Ghani is going to run. He almost certainly will win. It is the fourth election we have had in Afghanistan. We in the United States, and the U.S. Government, has for some reason treated negotiations with the Taliban as a priority, rather than shoring up the election system in Afghanistan, and the legitimately-elected government.

So I am glad that we have had this outcome. President Ghani will have a lot more leverage to say, "We need a seat at the table in the next round of negotiations with the Taliban."

By the way, President Obama reduced the troops in Afghanistan from 100,000 to the 8,500 level that we are about to get to very soon. He didn't do that with any permission from the Taliban or any negotiation with the Taliban. He just did it. We don't need their permission to get to the right troop level. I think 8,500 or something around that is a reasonable level to carry out the counter-terrorism mission that we need to do for the foreseeable future.

So, turning now to kind-of the question of where we are today, 18 years after 9/11. If I had come before your committee in 2002 and said, "In the next 18 years, 104 Americans are going to be killed by jihadi terrorists," that would have seemed—in the United States, that would have seemed an absolutely absurd prediction. But that is what has happened.

Why has that happened? There is, I think, three big reasons.

First of all, the actions of people like Ali Soufan, to my left, the actions of people on this committee, the actions of so many hundreds of thousands of other Americans, we—our offensive capabilities have, as Ranking Member Rogers mentioned, have inflicted a great deal of damage on al-Qaeda.

I mean al-Qaeda, the organization that attacked us on 9/11, is essentially a local jihadist group in Pakistan with no ability to attack us here in the United States. That could change if we, for instance, left Afghanistan tomorrow, because over time these groups can regroup.

So our offensive capabilities, the drone program, and our defensive capability—just think about the activities of this committee, which didn't exist on 9/11, or DHS didn't exist, TSA didn't exist, the National Counterterrorism Center didn't exist. Our intelligence budget was \$20 billion. Now it is \$80 billion a year. I can go on and on with all the things that we have done to make the country safer.

So, therefore, it is not surprising that we haven't been attacked by foreign terrorist organizations successfully in the United States since 9/11. Again, if I came before you in 2002 and made that prediction, it would have seemed absurd. But the fact is our offensive

capabilities, our defensive capabilities, and also public knowledge have reduced and managed this threat.

Now, “manage” is a useful verb, I think, in this context, because we are never going to win in any conventional sense. What we need to do is manage this threat to a level that, basically, is not going to interfere with our way of life in a meaningful way, as 9/11 did.

Now, turning to the domestic terrorism threat, which Ranking Member Rogers also mentioned, the white right-wing threat, the fact is that that is as important a threat to United States today as the jihadi threat. New America, where I work, and my colleague, Melissa Salyk-Yirk, here is here with me, and David Sterman, who also prepared some of this testimony, we have been tracking the question of right-wing terrorism for a long time.

Now, I mentioned the figure of 104 jihadi terrorists who have been killed, who—104 victims of jihadist terrorism in the United States since 9/11. Well, in the mean time, 109 Americans have been killed by right-wing terrorists. Then—and I don’t want to leave those 2 ideologies by themselves, because people motivated by black nationalist ideology have killed 8 people in the last 2 years. People motivated by a kind of ideological misogyny have killed 8 people in the last several years. So we face a range of threats from a range of ideologies, and prioritizing any one ideology in this context is mistaken.

Finally, I would like to say, in terms of the ISIS issue, obviously it is very good that we defeated them territorially. But ISIS wasn’t really the problem. ISIS was a symptom of some very deep problems in the Middle East, which are not going away: Sectarianism; collapse of governance; terrible economies; massive immigration into Europe; the rise of European ultra-nationalist parties, which fuels this in Europe. Unfortunately, those underlying conditions continue to exist.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

WHAT ARE THE TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES?¹

Since the 9/11 attacks, no foreign terrorist organization has successfully directed or carried out a deadly attack in the United States. With ISIS’s territorial collapse, the threat posed by the group has receded. It has been more than a year since the last lethal jihadist terrorist attack in the United States, and the number of jihadist terrorism cases in the United States has declined substantially since its peak in 2015. However, “home-grown” jihadist terrorism, including that inspired by ISIS, is likely to remain a threat. While ISIS’s inspirational power has lessened in recent years, white supremacist extremism is increasingly inspiring deadly violence.* The most likely threat to the United States comes from “home-grown” terrorists inspired by a mixture of ideologies including jihadist, far right, and idiosyncratic strains, who are radicalized via the internet and take advantage of the availability of semi-automatic firearms in the United States. The “travel ban” is not an effective response to any of these threats.

The threat to the United States from jihadist terrorism is relatively limited. New America’s “Terrorism in America After 9/11” project tracks the 479 cases of individ-

¹Thanks to David Sterman and Melissa Salyk-Yirk of New America for their inputs to this testimony.

*This number includes a small number of people who died before being charged but were widely reported to have engaged in jihadist terrorism-related criminal activity.

uals who have been charged with jihadist terrorism-related activity in the United States since September 11, 2001.² In the 18 years since 9/11, individuals motivated by jihadist ideology have killed 104 people in the United States. Every one of those deaths is a tragedy, but they are not national catastrophes as 9/11 was. The death toll from jihadist terrorism over the past 18 years is far lower than what even the most optimistic of analysts projected in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda and its breakaway faction, ISIS, have failed to direct a successful attack in the United States since the 9/11 attacks and none of the perpetrators of the 13 lethal jihadist attacks in the United States since those attacks received training from a foreign terrorist group.

ISIS did manage to inspire an unprecedented number of Americans to conduct attacks and otherwise engage in jihadist activity. In 2015, 80 people were charged³ in the United States with jihadist terrorism activity, the highest number in the post-9/11 era. More than three-quarters of all deaths caused by jihadists in the United States since the 9/11 attacks occurred in 2014 or later, the period when ISIS came to prominence.

However, there has not been a deadly jihadist terrorist attack in the United States in more than a year. The last lethal attack was a March 2018 stabbing in Florida that killed 1 person. The perpetrator was a 17-year-old who admitted being inspired in part by ISIS.⁴ Even in this case, the perpetrator appears to have been influenced by a range of extremist ideologies, including white supremacy.⁴

ISIS's ability to inspire violence in the United States has suffered in the wake of its territorial losses, but policy makers should not expect ISIS's territorial collapse to remove the threat of ISIS-inspired terrorism in the United States. Sayfullo Saipov's truck ramming attack that killed 8 people in Manhattan in October 2017 happened the same month that ISIS lost control of its capital in Raqqa, Syria.

While the number of terrorism cases isn't an exact proxy for levels of threat, it certainly says something about the scale of the threat. The number of cases of individuals charged with jihadist terrorism-related crimes has dramatically decreased since 2015 when it was at its peak with 80 cases. There have been 19 such cases as of the end of September 6, 2019.

The relatively limited jihadist terrorist threat to the United States is in large part the result of the enormous investment the country has made in strengthening its defenses against terrorism in the post-9/11 era. The United States spent \$2.8 trillion on counterterrorism efforts from 2002 to 2017, constituting almost 15 percent of discretionary spending during that time frame.⁵ That effort has made the United States a hard target.⁶ On 9/11, there were 16 people on the U.S. "No Fly" list.⁷ In 2016, there were 81,000 people on the list.⁸ Before 9/11, there was no Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, or Transportation Security Administration. As a result, in January 2019, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats testified that the United States is a "generally inhospitable operating environment" for home-grown violent extremists compared to most Western countries.⁹

By the beginning of the Trump administration, the jihadist threat inside the United States was overwhelmingly lone-actor, ISIS-inspired attacks such as Sayfullo Saipov's 2017 vehicular ramming in Manhattan. This threat has stressed law en-

²Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Albert Ford, and Alyssa Sims, "Terrorism in America After 9/11," *New America*, Accessed July 3, 2018, <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/>.

³"Incident/Investigation Report Case No. 17-000176" (Jupiter Police Department, January 12, 2017), <https://hvt-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/juvenile-report-deadly-stabbing-suspect-1520986286.pdf>.

⁴Paul Mueller, "Former Homeland Security Official Says Better Communication Needed in Wake of Stabbing," *CBS 12*, March 14, 2018, <https://cbs12.com/news/local/former-homeland-security-official-says-better-communication-needed-in-wake-of-stabbing>.

⁵"Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability," *Stimson Center*, May 2018, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf.

⁶This draws on: Peter Bergen, Emily Schneider, David Sterman, Bailey Cahall, and Tim Maurer, 2014: *Jihadist Terrorism and Other Unconventional Threats* (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2014), <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/2014-jihadist-terrorism-and-other-unconventional-threats/>.

⁷Steve Kroft, "Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List," *CBS News*, October 5, 2006, www.cbsnews.com/news/unlikely-terrorists-on-no-fly-list/.

⁸"Feinstein Statement on Collins Amendment," Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein, June 23, 2016, <https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=F02871C5-A023-4DEF-AEC3-EDAF34BEA2BF>.

⁹Daniel R. Coats, "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR_SSCI.pdf?utm_source=Gov%20Delivery%20Email&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Media%20Contacts%20Email.

forcement, given the diversity of the perpetrators and the lack of organization needed to conduct such attacks. However, it is still a far cry from the type of attack that al-Qaeda carried out on 9/11.

Law enforcement and intelligence services will still need to combat and monitor the threat to the homeland from foreign terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's attempt to bring down a U.S.-bound passenger jet in 2009 with a bomb hidden in a terrorist's underwear and the case the same year in which 3 Americans trained with al-Qaeda and returned with a plan to bomb the New York City subway, and the 2010 failed Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad, who trained with the Pakistani Taliban, are reminders of this. But the fact is that these failed attempts by Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) occurred a decade ago indicating that these FTOs were having quite a difficult time launching successful attacks in the United States whatever their goals might be to do so.

THE MOST LIKELY TERRORIST THREAT: INDIVIDUALS INSPIRED BY A RANGE OF IDEOLOGIES AND WHITE SUPREMACY

Today, the terrorist threat to the United States is emerging from across the political spectrum, as ubiquitous firearms, political polarization, images of the apocalyptic violence tearing apart societies across the Middle East and North Africa, racism, and the rise of populism have combined with the power of on-line communication and social media. This mixture has generated a complex and varied terrorist threat that crosses ideologies and is largely disconnected from traditional understandings of terrorist organizations.¹⁰

Since the 9/11 attacks, individuals inspired by jihadist ideology have killed 104 people in the United States. However, individuals inspired by far-right ideology (including white supremacist, anti-Government, and anti-abortion views) have killed 109 people. On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius, a 21-year-old white man, allegedly shot and killed 22 people at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas after posting a manifesto that described his motive as a purported "Hispanic invasion."¹¹ The attack was the deadliest far-right attack in the post-9/11 era.

Individuals inspired in part by black nationalist ideology have killed 8 people since 9/11, and individuals inspired by forms of ideological misogyny also killed 8 people during this period, for instance, a shooter killed 6 in Isla Vista, California, in 2014 in attacks he framed in terms of his hatred for women.¹² And last year, a gunman killed 2 women at a yoga studio in Tallahassee, Florida, using the same rationale.¹³ The diversity of terrorists' political motivations warns against overly focusing on any single ideology.

Though there are many ideological strands, and attackers' ideological reference points are often in flux or complex, one particular ideological strand—white supremacy—stands out as a particular danger. Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the United States has seen a spate of deadly white supremacist terrorist attacks. Every deadly far right attack in this period identified by New America had a nexus to white supremacy—together killing 43 people; 4 times the number of people killed by jihadist terrorists in the same period. There were also more than 3 times as many deadly far-right attacks with connections to white supremacy in the same period as lethal jihadist attacks.

According to Michael McGarrity, assistant director of the FBI's counterterrorism division, and Calvin Shivers, deputy assistant director of the criminal investigative division, "individuals adhering to racially motivated violent extremism ideology have been responsible for the most lethal incidents among domestic terrorists in recent years, and the FBI assesses the threat of violence and lethality posed by racially-motivated violent extremists will continue." In July 2019 the FBI Director Christopher Wray, testified that there have been about 100 domestic terrorism-related arrests during the past 9 months.

White supremacist terrorist attacks and violence more generally, appears to be increasingly interlinked and internationalized. A study by *The New York Times* determined that "at least a third of white extremist killers since 2011 were inspired by others who perpetrated similar attacks" and that the connections crossed inter-

¹⁰Peter Bergen and David Sterman, "The Real Terrorist Threat in America," *Foreign Affairs*, October 30, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-10-30/real-terrorist-threat-america>.

¹¹Peter Bergen and David Sterman, "The Huge Threat to America That Trump Ignores," *CNN*, August 4, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/04/opinions/el-paso-dayton-far-right-threat-bergen-sterman/index.html>.

¹²<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43892189>.

¹³<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/local/yoga-shooting-incel-attack-fueled-by-male-supremacy/>.

national borders. Crusius who carried out the attack at the Walmart in El Paso in August had posted a manifesto on 8chan, an on-line message board often featuring racist postings, about his support for the terrorist who had killed 50 worshippers at 2 mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand 6 months earlier.

Just as school shooters learn from other school shooters, terrorists learn from other terrorists. Notably, the terrorist who carried out the Christchurch attack had posted a manifesto to 8chan just before he carried out the attacks at the mosques. Crusius's on-line manifesto referred to a "Hispanic invasion" of Texas as the rationale for his imminent terrorist attack in El Paso. Trump has also described migrants coming across the Southern Border as an "invasion." However, Crusius said his views about immigrants predated Trump becoming President.

THE TERRITORIAL DEFEAT OF ISIS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

Over the past year, the United States and its partners have successfully eliminated all of ISIS's territory in Iraq and Syria. In March, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated ISIS's last piece of territory in Syria in Baghuz. The loss of its territory in Iraq and Syria dramatically undercut ISIS's claim that it is the caliphate, because the caliphate has historically been a substantial geographic entity, such as the Ottoman Empire, as well as a theological construct.¹⁴ The so-called caliphate also allowed the organization to have a constant influx of money through the taxation and extortion of millions of subjects, oil sales, ransoms and antiquities sales.¹⁵

As ISIS's territorial caliphate collapsed, there was a noticeable decline in its propaganda capability. Key propaganda outputs including ISIS's English-language magazine *Rumiyah* ceased publication.¹⁶ According to Europol's 2019 report, ISIS's losses "had a significant impact on its digital capabilities," leaving its weekly Arabic *Al-Naba* newsletter as its only regular output.¹⁷ The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team's January 2019 assessment said that "the propaganda machinery of the ISIL core is further decentralizing, and the quality of its material continues to decline."¹⁸

LIMITS TO ISIS'S DEFEAT IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

While ISIS's territorial collapse represents a major success for the counter-ISIS coalition, the group remains capable of exploiting current and potential future instability in Iraq and Syria to improve its position. The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Committee in February 2019 assessed that in Iraq, the group's transition "into a covert network is well advanced" and that ISIS poses a "major threat" in the form of assassinations of officials and "frequent attacks" on civilians.¹⁹ Indeed, precursors of ISIS previously demonstrated their ability to continue operations in areas where it has lost territory during the "surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq in 2008.²⁰ A particular concern is the Al Hol refugee camp in Kurdish-controlled Syria where 70,000 mostly women and children from countries around the world are warehoused. ISIS's ideology is alive and well in the camp according to multiple government and media reports.

However, there are other factors that may limit the group's ability to achieve a resurgence in the near-term. Iraq has exited the ISIS crisis in far better shape than conventional wisdom expected at the outset of the counter-ISIS campaign, providing a stronger basis for preventing an ISIS resurgence having faced it once already.²¹ In addition, the presence in the region of U.S. forces as well as the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the well-trained Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service makes

¹⁴Peter Bergen, "Is the Fall of Mosul the Fall of ISIS?," CNN, July 11, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/opinions/isis-loss-of-mosul-and-its-future-bergen/index.html>.

¹⁵Callimachi, "ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls."

¹⁶"Twenty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

¹⁷"Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 (TE-SAT)" (EUROPOL, 2019), <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>.

¹⁸"Twenty-First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

¹⁹"Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

²⁰Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-Ubaydi, "The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State's Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities" (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, June 2017), <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/07/The-Fight-Goes-On.pdf>; Brian Fishman, "Redefining the Islamic State" (New America, August 18, 2011), <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/policy-papers/redefining-the-islamic-state/>.

²¹Douglas Ollivant and Bartle Bull, "Iraq After ISIS: What To Do Now" (New America, April 24, 2018), <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/iraq-after-isis-what-do-now/introduction>; *After ISIS: What Is Next in the Middle East* (Future of War Conference: New America, 2018), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2KitBX24Bc>.

an ISIS resurgence less likely. However, the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq does not mean the defeat of the organization as a whole, let alone the larger jihadist movement.

ISIS BEYOND SYRIA AND IRAQ

On Easter Sunday, April 21, 2019, terrorists killed more than 250 people in coordinated bombings of 3 churches and 3 hotels in Sri Lanka.²² The 2 groups tied to the attacks are ISIS²³ and National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ).²⁴ ISIS claimed the attack 2 days after it took place, and later reporting indicated that multiple family networks coordinated the bombings. According to the United Nations Secretary General's July 2019 report on the threat posed by ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS's leader, was not aware of the attack before it happened.²⁵ However, the attackers were sufficiently connected to ISIS's network that ISIS was able to release video of the attack via its official platforms.²⁶

The Sri Lanka attack illustrates ISIS's ability to inspire attacks outside of Syria and Iraq. And it is not a stand-alone case. Since 2017 ISIS, and its supporters, have conducted attacks in more than 25 countries.²⁷ Even so, there is reason for optimism. The United Nations Sanctions Monitoring Team reported a "substantial reduction in global external attacks" associated with ISIS in 2018.²⁸

ISIS's ability to conduct such attacks is bolstered by two overlapping sources of international strength. One is its on-line networks—or what some have termed a "Virtual Caliphate"—which produce and spread propaganda but also provide advice for attacks while helping ISIS's central organization claim ties to attacks carried out by militants thousands of miles away. The second factor is ISIS's more official structure of wilayat (provinces) and affiliates. In January 2019, the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team reported that a centralized ISIS leadership remains that "communicates and provides resources to its affiliates, albeit at a reduced level."²⁹ Al-Qaeda's continued existence and maintenance of its own affiliate network after Osama Bin Laden's death warns against dismissing the ability of the group to maintain a coherent albeit reduced network after territorial or leadership losses.

ISIS has shown some evidence of its ability to build or sustain its brand and affiliate structure in the wake of the territorial collapse in Syria and Iraq. In April 2019, it claimed its first attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo, announcing a Central African "province."³⁰

On the other hand, the strength of ISIS's affiliates should not be overestimated. Giving ISIS too much credit for its control over affiliates with pre-existing constituencies or exaggerating its affiliates' strength can aid ISIS's media strategy of portraying itself as in control of a highly centralized, globalized Caliphate even in the wake of its territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria.³¹ Many of ISIS's affiliates and prov-

²² Roshni Kapur, "Sri Lanka's Easter Sunday Bombings: Moving Forward," *Middle East Institute* (blog), May 7, 2019, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/sri-lanka-easter-sunday-bombings-moving-forward>; Amarnath Amarasingam, "Terrorism on the Teardrop Island: Understanding the Easter 2019 Attacks in Sri Lanka," *CTC Sentinel* 12, no. 5 (June 2019), <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2019/05/CTC-SENTINEL-052019.pdf>.

²³ Jeffrey Gettleman, Dharisha Bastians, and Mujib Mashal, "ISIS Claims Sri Lanka Attacks, and President Vows Shakeup," *The New York Times*, April 23, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/asia/isis-sri-lanka-blasts.html>.

²⁴ Ethirajan, Anbarasan. "Sri Lanka Attacks: The Family Networks behind the Bombings." *BBC News*, May 11, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48218907>.

²⁵ "Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat" (United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2019), <https://undocs.org/S/2019/612>.

²⁶ Amarasingam, "Terrorism on the Teardrop Island: Understanding the Easter 2019 Attacks in Sri Lanka."

²⁷ Jin Wu, Derej Watkins, and Rukmini Callimachi, "ISIS Lost Its Last Territory in Syria. But the Attacks Continue," *New York Times*, March 23, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/23/world/middleeast/isis-syria-defeated.html>.

²⁸ "Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

²⁹ "Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

³⁰ Steve Wembi and Joseph Goldstein, "ISIS Claims First Attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *New York Times*, April 19, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/world/africa/isis-congo-attack.html>; Rukmini Callimachi, "ISIS, After Laying Groundwork, Gains Toehold in Congo," *New York Times*, April 20, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/world/africa/isis-attack-congo.html>.

³¹ For a discussion of these risks see, for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, "Neither Remaining Nor Expanding: The Islamic State's Global Expansion Struggles," *War on the Rocks*, February 23, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/neither-remaining-nor-expanding-the-islamic-states-global-expansion-struggles/>.

inces are either struggling or are under substantial military pressure. In Libya, once viewed as a potential fallback for the group, ISIS lost its hold of the city of Sirte in late 2016.³² Yet the group appears to continue to pose a resilient terrorist threat.³³

In other areas, where ISIS held less power, affiliates are facing even tougher environments. In January 2019, the U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Committee reported that ISIS “in Yemen now has only a few mobile training camps and a dwindling number of fighters,” that the group is not economically self-sufficient, that it recruits few foreign fighters, and that its activities in Al-Bayda “now consist mainly of protecting the group’s leaders and their family members.”³⁴ Some affiliates have also seen the deaths of important leaders. For example, Abdulhakim Dhuqub, ISIS’s second in command in Somalia, was killed by a U.S. airstrike in April 2019 in Xiriro, Somalia.³⁵ Abu Sayed Orakzai, also known as Sad Arhab and the leader of ISIS in Afghanistan, was killed by an airstrike by Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan in August 2018.³⁶

The ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, however, continues to mount large-scale attacks as it did last month when an ISIS suicide bomber killed 63 people attending a wedding in the Afghan capital, Kabul. This attack underlined how careful the United States must be as it negotiates a withdrawal of forces with the Taliban. The United States must continue to maintain sufficient counterterrorism capacity to ensure that ISIS, al-Qaeda, and elements of the Taliban that reject any kind of peace agreement with the Afghan government do not threaten the Afghan State or regroup sufficiently to plot attacks in the West.

THE RESILIENCY OF AL-QAEDA

Even as ISIS suffers repeated setbacks, al-Qaeda has shown resiliency in the face of the counterterrorism campaigns directed against it and the challenge from within the jihadist movement posed by the rise of ISIS. In August, al-Qaeda marked the 31st anniversary of its founding, making the group one of the longest-lasting terrorist groups in history.³⁷

Eighteen years after 9/11, al-Qaeda continues to operate across North Africa and South Asia despite the heavy losses it has sustained, including the death of its founder, Osama bin Laden, and of dozens of other al-Qaeda leaders who have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb all retain capacity for sustained local attacks.

In Syria, al-Qaeda’s fortunes are far from clear, though any accounting must acknowledge a substantial al-Qaeda presence in the country. Al-Qaeda in Syria has undergone changes to its naming and organizational design. Initially known as the Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda in Syria adopted the name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in July 2016 to distance itself from al-Qaeda core, though then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper labeled it a “PR move . . . to create the image of being more moderate.”³⁸ In January 2017 another rebranding occurred, with the group taking the name Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).³⁹

Despite its presence in a number of countries, al-Qaeda has not demonstrated a capability to strike the West in a decade and a half. The last deadly attack in the

³² Lachlan Wilson and Jason Pack, “The Islamic State’s Revitalization in Libya and Its Post-2016 War of Attrition,” *CTC Sentinel* 12, no. 3 (March 2019), <https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-states-revitalization-libya-post-2016-war-attrition/>.

³³ Wilson and Pack; “Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.”

³⁴ “Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.”

³⁵ Kyle Rempfer, “US Killed No. 2 Leader of ISIS-Somalia, Officials Say,” *Air Force Times*, April 15, 2019, <https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/04/15/us-killed-number-two-leader-of-isis-somalia-officials-say/>.

³⁶ Ehsan Popalzai, Ryan Browne, and Eric Levenson, “ISIS Leader in Afghanistan Killed in Airstrike, US Says,” *CNN*, August 26, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/26/world/isis-leader-afghanistan-strike/index.html>.

³⁷ For one discussion of terrorist group longevity, see: Jodi Vittori, “All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (December 2009): 444–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903326602>.

³⁸ Bryony Jones, Clarissa Ward, and Salma Abdelaziz, “Al-Nusra Rebranding: New Name, Same Aim? What You Need to Know,” *CNN*, August 7, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/01/middleeast/al-nusra-rebranding-what-you-need-to-know/index.html>.

³⁹ “Tahrir Al-Sham: Al-Qaeda’s Latest Incarnation in Syria,” *BBC*, February 28, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38934206>.

West directed by al-Qaeda was the July 7, 2005 bombing of London's transportation system, which killed 52 commuters.⁴⁰

It is possible that al-Qaeda could feed off of ISIS's setbacks to regain leadership of the global jihadist movement.⁴¹ The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team notes that al-Qaeda remains stronger than ISIS in some regions, and that its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released more statements than ISIS's leader in 2018.⁴² On the other hand, al-Qaeda has its own troubles with the death of Hamza bin Laden, who was widely believed to have been being groomed for leadership.⁴³ Hamza had appeared in al-Qaeda propaganda videos since he was a child. In recent years, he also had started releasing statements that positioned himself as one of al-Qaeda's ideologues—for instance, Hamza released a statement in 2016 calling for unity among the jihadist militants fighting in Syria. Earlier this year the U.S. State Department announced \$1 million reward for information about Hamza. Despite Hamza's increasing public profile there was no evidence to suggest that he played a successful operational role in al-Qaeda organizing terrorist attacks around the world.

The possibility of parts of ISIS and al-Qaeda merging also cannot be ruled out. At the very least, al-Qaeda's ability to remain resilient after decades of counterterrorism efforts suggests that ISIS remnants may similarly be able to continue on long after losing its hold on Syria and Iraq.

THE RESILIENCY OF JIHADISM

Beyond the fates of particular organizations, the jihadist movement has proven resilient in the Middle East, parts of the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as South Asia. This is in large part because of continuing instability across these regions.⁴⁴ Underlying stressors include the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict that overlaps with the Saudi-Iran regional proxy war playing out in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; state collapse across the Middle East and North Africa, most extensively in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen; high unemployment and economic strain in much of the region; and an on-going youth bulge.⁴⁵ This combination of factors, along with trends that reduce the barriers to entry to jihadist organizing including the sustained use of social media, make it likely that instability will continue in the Middle East and North Africa and that this instability will enable jihadist activity for the foreseeable future.

Further escalations in either the U.S.-Iran or the Saudi-Iran conflicts could provide fresh fuel for jihadists. A major escalation or war would likely fuel apocalypticism in the region and do so in a way that aligns with the jihadist ideology that has framed Iran and Shia Muslims as enemies; the consequences could be similar to the regional catastrophe triggered by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.⁴⁶

KEY TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Low-Tech Attacks: Firearms, Knives, and Vehicles

The United States should expect low-tech forms of violence (reliant on firearms, knives, and vehicular rammings) to remain the most common type of terrorist vio-

⁴⁰ Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, trained 2 brothers in Yemen in 2011 who, more than 3 years later, attacked the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine. It is far from clear if AQAP had any real role in directing this attack beyond providing training years before the attack took place. For more on this attack see: Maria Abi-Habib, Margaret Coker, and Hakim Al Masmari, "Al Qaeda in Yemen Claims Responsibility for Charlie Hebdo Attack," *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/yemens-al-qaeda-branch-claims-responsibility-for-charlie-hebdo-attack-1421231389>.

⁴¹ Bruce Hoffman, "The Coming ISIS-al Qaeda Merger," *Foreign Affairs*, March 29, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03p-29/coming-isis-al-qaeda-merger>.

⁴² "Twenty-Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team."

⁴³ "Twenty-Fourth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017) Concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities" (United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, July 15, 2019), <https://undocs.org/S/2019/570>; Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman, and Eric Schmitt, "Son of Qaeda Founder Is Dead," *New York Times*, July 31, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/hamza-bin-laden-al-qaeda.html>.

⁴⁴ Examining the Global Terrorism Landscape, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and International Terrorism (Committee on Foreign Affairs) Cong., 1–12 (2019) (testimony of Ali Soufan).

⁴⁵ This draws on: Peter Bergen, "Normandy, Istanbul, Dhaka, Nice, Baghdad, Orlando: WHY?" *CNN*, July 26, 2016, <https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/26/opinions/why-terrorist-attacks-opinion-peter-bergen/index.html>.

⁴⁶ Jesse Morton and Amarnath Amarasingam, "How Jihadist Groups See Western Aggression Toward Iran," *Just Security*, April 16, 2018, <https://www.justsecurity.org/54946/jihadist-groups-western-aggression-iran/>.

lence in the West.⁴⁷ Of the 8 jihadist attacks in the West in 2019 identified by New America, only 1 involved explosives. In 6 of the 8 attacks, a knife or other bladed weapon was used. In one attack, the perpetrator attempted but failed to carry out a vehicular ramming. Of the 108 jihadist attacks in the West since 2014 identified by New America, only 18 have involved explosives. Of the 14 deadly jihadist attacks in the United States since 9/11, only 2 involved explosives. In contrast, 10 involved firearms.

*Explosives and TATP*⁴⁸

The attacks involving explosives in the West since 2014 can be divided into two categories: (1) Those involving TATP, triacetone triperoxide, which has long been the bomb of choice for jihadists in the West due to the ease of acquiring the components to make it, as compared to military-grade explosives; and (2) those involving improvised explosives. Seven of the 18 attacks in the West involving explosives since 2014 involved TATP. Eleven involved other improvised explosives.

TATP can be built using the common household ingredient hydrogen peroxide, which is used to bleach hair. Though generally more accessible than military-grade explosives in the West, making a TATP bomb is tricky because the ingredients are highly unstable and can explode if improperly handled. The danger of building TATP bombs without training can be seen in the case of Matthew Rugo and Curtis Jetton, 21-year-old roommates in Texas City, Texas.⁴⁹ They didn't have any bomb-making training and were manufacturing explosives in 2006 from concentrated bleach when their concoction blew up, killing Rugo and injuring Jetton. The pair had no political motives: They had just wanted to blow up vehicles for fun.

TATP therefore can indicate that a perpetrator received training or direction from a foreign terrorist group. Indeed, 3 of the 7 attacks involving TATP since 2014—the 2015 Paris bombings, the 2016 bombings of the Brussels metro and airport by the same ISIS cell, and the 2017 bombing of an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, England—were directed by ISIS.

The 4 other attacks since 2014 involving TATP—the September 2017 bombing at the Parsons Green tube station in London in which the bomb failed to fully explode; the August 2017 attacks in Barcelona where traces of TATP were found at a suspected bomb factory tied to the plot; a June 2017 failed bombing of the Brussels metro that killed only the perpetrator; and a May 2019 attack in which a 24-year-old Algerian man exploded a bomb that included TATP in Lyon, France, injuring 14 people—had no known operational link to ISIS.⁵⁰ These attacks account for less than 5 percent of all inspired or enabled attacks and only a third of inspired or enabled attacks involving explosives.

All of the attacks involving TATP occurred in Europe and none occurred in the United States, and is a sign of the greater development of and diffusion of expertise and technology in jihadist networks in Europe compared to the United States.

Eight ISIS-inspired attacks and 3 ISIS-enabled attack in the West since 2014 used other explosives. For example, Tashfeen Malik and Syed Rizwan Farook, who killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California, had built pipe bombs using Christmas lights and smokeless powder.⁵¹ They learned the bomb recipe they used from *Inspire*, the English-language propaganda magazine of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pe-

⁴⁷For the purposes of New America's database, the West is defined as consisting of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. While we recognize that there is substantial variation in the threat among these locations, we believe that the countries making up this region share similar patterns with regard to the jihadist threat that are distinct from other regions and worthy of examination.

⁴⁸This draws on: Peter Bergen, "Paris Explosives are a Key Clue to Plot," *CNN*, November 17, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/17/opinions/bergen-explosives-paris-attacks/index.html>.

⁴⁹Cindy George, "Man Going to Prison for 1906 Texas City Apartment Blast," *Houston Chronicle*, June 17, 2008, <http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Man-going-to-prison-for-06-Texas-City-apartment-1658835.php>.

⁵⁰Aurelien Breeden, "Lyon Bomb Suspect Told Police He Pledged Allegiance to ISIS," *New York Times*, May 30, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/world/europe/lyon-france-bombing.html>; Ian Cobain, "Parsons Green Bomb Trial: Teenager 'Trained to Kill by ISIS,'" *Guardian*, March 7, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/07/parsons-green-tube-bombing-ahmed-hassan-on-trial>; Laura Smith-Spark, Erin McLaughlin, and Pauline Armandet, "Explosive TATP Used in Brussels Central Station Attack, Initial Exam Shows," *CNN*, June 21, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/21/europe/brussels-train-station-attack/index.html>; Paul Cruickshank, "Source: Early Assessment Finds TATP at Barcelona Attackers' Bomb Factory," *CNN*, August 19, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/18/europe/spain-terror-attacks-tatp/index.html>.

⁵¹Richard Esposito, "San Bernardino Attackers Had Bomb Factory in Garage," *NBC News*, December 4, 2015, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/san-bernardino-attackers-had-bomb-factory-garage-n474321>.

ninsula, whose article “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” was also used by the Boston Marathon bombers.⁵²

The Use of Armed Drones by Terrorist Groups

The United States should expect the use of armed drones by terrorist groups and other non-state actors to expand. In August 2018, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was the target of a bungled assassination attempt utilizing 2 quadcopter drones rigged with explosives during a speech in Caracas.⁵³ He blamed far-right political opponents for what he called an assassination attempt.⁵⁴ This imaginative, yet forbidding, attack has not only raised concerns over the possibility of taking out a head of state with drones, but the possibility of attacks at public events, parades, sporting events, etc. Already, groups such as ISIS, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas, among others, have all used drones in varying capacities, such as for surveillance and for armed attacks.⁵⁵

ISIS has deployed drones extensively. In January 2017, ISIS announced in its newsletter “al-Naba” the establishment of the “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen,” an operational unit organized to engineer and deploy drones in combat.⁵⁶ The terror network has been experimenting with drone technology since at least 2015, when Kurdish fighters in Syria shot down two small commercial drones reportedly belonging to the group—both of which were armed with explosives.⁵⁷

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have also been actively using drones. In the first half of 2019, they attacked the Jizan and Abha airports⁵⁸ in southern Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi oil pipelines.⁵⁹ The multiple airport attacks have led to significant civilian injuries. This escalation does not show signs of stopping in the near future.

Though ISIS and the Houthis are the clearest cases of sustained armed drone campaigns by non-state actors, numerous other groups have used drones in combat or maintain the capability to do so. Non-state actor UAV use has been seen in as many as 20 countries or territories, but only a fraction are used as weapons.⁶⁰ In most cases, UAV use has been for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, or logistics, and often used for criminal activities such as trafficking or smuggling.⁶¹ In November 2018, Nigeria’s president announced that Boko Haram had acquired and begun using drones.⁶² In July 2018, Russia claimed that one of

⁵² Adam Nagourney, Richard Perez-Pena, and Ian Lovett, “Neighbor of San Bernardino Attackers Faces Terrorism Charges,” *New York Times*, December 17, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/san-bernardino-enrique-marquez-charges-justice-department.html>; Scott Malone, “DIY bomb instructions, device remains shown at Boston trial,” *Reuters*, March 19, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-boston-bombings-trial-idUSKBN0MF14F20150319>.

⁵³ Peter Bergen and Melissa Salyk-Virk, “Attack of the Assassin Drones,” *CNN*, August 07, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/opinions/attack-of-the-assassin-drones-bergen-salyk-virk/index.html>.

⁵⁴ “Apparent Drone Attack in Venezuela Highlights Growing Concern for U.S.,” *CBS News*, August 6, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maduro-venezuela-apparent-drone-attack-highlights-growing-concern-in-us/>.

⁵⁵ “Drone Wars: The Next Generation Report,” May 2018, accessed June 26, 2019, <https://drone warsuk.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/dw-nextgeneration-web.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Joby Warrick, “Use of Weaponized Drones by ISIS Spurs Terrorism Fears,” *Washington Post*, February 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470-bf0401_story.html?utm_term=.11aab1591ca9.

⁵⁷ David Hambling, “ISIS is Reportedly Packing Drones with Explosives Now,” *Popular Mechanics*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18577/isis-packing-drones-with-explosives/>.

⁵⁸ “Yemen’s Houthis Attack Saudi’s Abha Airport, Injuring Civilians,” *Saudi Arabia News, Al Jazeera*, July 02, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/yemen-houthis-claim-attack-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-190702005421808.html>.

⁵⁹ Marwa Rashad, “Yemen’s Houthis Target Two Saudi Airports with Multiple Drone Attacks,” *Reuters*, June 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-drone/yemens-houthis-target-two-saudi-airports-with-multiple-drone-attacks-idUSKCN1TG0M3>.

⁶⁰ Michael Kameras, Bethany McGann, and Jenny Sue Ross, “U-AV TO ACT NOW: A Pilot-Less Study of Trends in Non-State Actor UAV Use and Related U.S. Government Policy Recommendations” (Washington, DC: George Washington University, April 2019).

⁶¹ Kameras, McGann, and Ross.

⁶² “Nigeria Says Boko Haram Now Uses Drones, Mercenaries Against Military,” November 30, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/30/c_137642456.htm.

its military bases in Syria was again attacked by drones,⁶³ though the responsible group is unknown. The PKK used drones against Turkish soldiers in August 2017.⁶⁴ Hezbollah and Hamas were early adopters of drone technology and maintain an armed drone capability. In 2004, Hezbollah flew a military-grade drone, reportedly acquired from Iran, over Israeli airspace.⁶⁵ The Lebanese militant group also conducted strikes in Syria in 2014 with an armed drone and in 2016 with over-the-counter drones armed with small explosives.⁶⁶

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Soufan to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ALI H. SOUFAN, FOUNDER, THE SOUFAN CENTER

Mr. SOUFAN. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished Members. Thank you for hearing my statement today.

Tomorrow marks 18 years since al-Qaeda murdered nearly 3,000 people on American soil. As we honor the dead, we remember too the importance of remaining vigilant.

Today I draw 4 main conclusions: First, both al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State remain potent threats; second, in addition to the jihadi challenge, we now face clear danger from white supremacist extremism; third, there are important similarities between these two groups of extremists; but fourth, under its current approach, the U.S. Government is at a clear disadvantage when it comes to combating white supremacy.

The Islamic State is still today one of the richest jihadi groups in history, with access to hundreds of millions of dollars looted from Iraq and Syria. Its figurehead, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has survived. It presides over global affiliates, so-called provinces, all the way from the Sahel to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda continues to mutate and grow, with tens of thousands of members across the world, more than 100 times as many as the group had on September 11, 2001.

Both the groups are more than capable of inspiring home-grown extremists inside the United States. The radicalization is reinforced now by images of detention camps like Al Hol in Syria, where thousands of children from ISIS members are being kept.

But it is not only jihadi terrorism that threatens our homeland. In Charleston, Pittsburgh, Poway, El Paso, Charlottesville, and elsewhere across this Nation Americans have suffered violence on the hands of white supremacist extremists. According to a study by the ADL, in 2018 white supremacists killed 3 times as many Americans as the Islamists. In May of this year a senior FBI official testified that the Bureau is pursuing about 850 domestic terrorism investigations, a significant majority of them targeting white supremacists.

⁶³ "Unidentified Drones Attack Russian Khmeimim Airbase in Syria," *Uawire.org*, July 17, 2018, accessed July 3, 2019. <https://uawire.org/unidentified-drones-attack-russian-khmeimim-airbase-in-syria#>.

⁶⁴ Gurcan Metin, "Turkey-PKK 'drone-wars' escalate," *Al-Monitor*, September 18, 2017, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/turkey-pkk-drone-conflict-escalates.html>.

⁶⁵ David Axe, "Hezbollah Drone Is a Warning to the U.S.," *Daily Beast*, August 17, 2016, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/hezbollah-drone-is-a-warning-to-the-us>.

⁶⁶ Ibid; Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, "Hezbollah Armed Drone? Militants' New Weapon," *CNN.com*, September 22, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergen-schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/index.html>.

The threat bears a striking resemblance to what we saw with jihadism. White supremacists from around the world are increasingly forming global networks, much as jihadis did in the years leading to 9/11. Supremacists make a propaganda warning of an alleged great replacement of whites in the same way jihadis talk about supposed war against Islam. White supremacists promote violence as an appropriate way to defend the purity of the race, just as jihadis use violence to protect the purity of their religion. Both groups recruit followers and reinforce their messages through social media. While jihadis make martyrdom videos, supremacists post on-line manifestos. Where jihadis travel to fight in places like Syria and Afghanistan, white supremacists now have their own theater in which they learn to combat: Eastern Ukraine.

Recent research shows that around 17,000 foreigners from 50 countries, including the United States, have gone to fight in that conflict. In describing their mission, some white supremacists have used the term “white jihad.” One neo-Nazi group recently adopted the name “The Base.” Translated into Arabic, “The Base” is al-Qaeda.

These similarities should inform our strategy. Terrorism, after all, is terrorism, regardless of race, faith, ideology, or creed.

Our current framework allows for the designation of transnational groups as foreign terrorist entities. This gives the U.S. authorities 3 main advantages: First, they can monitor communications between people connected to the designated groups, even among U.S. citizens operating on U.S. soil; second, they can share intelligence on the designated groups with our allies; third, they can bring charges for providing material support to their designated groups, charges that carry severe penalties.

These are important tools. Allies such as the United Kingdom and Canada already designated violent supremacist entities as terrorist organizations. But so far no white supremacist groups have been designated by the United States, despite the threat they pose. We need to recognize the international nature of this threat, and start treating white supremacist terrorists the way we treat other global terrorists. Only then can we give our law enforcement the tool they need to meet the challenge.

Eighteen years ago we grossly underestimated the rising threat of jihadi terrorism. That inattention cost us dearly on September 11, 2001. I cannot say what form the jihadi supremacist equivalent of 9/11 might take, but we should not wait to find out before we act.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Soufan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALI H. SOUFAN

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished Members: Thank you for hearing my testimony today.

During this session on global terrorism and threats to the homeland, my aim is to provide a brief overview of the threat landscape while focusing in particular on the challenges facing the United States in protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks. We are reminded of the importance of remaining vigilant, particularly given

tomorrow's somber 18-year anniversary of the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. But even after untold trillions of dollars¹ spent and thousands of lives lost in the name of counter-terrorism, the threat landscape is arguably more complex today than it was nearly 2 decades ago. The threat from al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist groups like the so-called Islamic State remain, joined by the challenges posed by violent white supremacist extremism (WSE), an ideology with a foothold in the United States and with tentacles stretching across the globe, from Ukraine to New Zealand and beyond.

Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony.

In my years of tracking, analyzing, and ultimately trying to disrupt terrorist organizations, I draw 4 main conclusions about the current state of global terrorism and threats to the U.S. homeland. First, both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State remain a threat to the United States homeland, even as both organizations look different than they did just a year ago at this same time, given important geopolitical developments. Second, in addition to the challenges posed by combating Salafi-jihadist organizations, there is a clear and present threat posed by violent white supremacy extremism (WSE) and violent white supremacy. Third, there are important similarities between Salafi-jihadist organizations and violent white supremacist extremists, especially in areas such as the use of violence, operating on the internet, recruitment, propaganda, financing, and the transnational nature of the networks. Fourth, the U.S. Government is at a disadvantage, largely due to the lack of comprehensive legislation and available tools, when it comes to combating the threat posed by violent white supremacist extremists, but there are still important lessons that can be gleaned from studying the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

THE CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL JIHAD

Months after the collapse of the territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State remains a viable threat to the United States and the international community writ large. The organization's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is alive and on the lam, while in the group's former strongholds, it is reconstituting its networks and waging a low-level campaign of political assassinations, ambushes, and guerilla warfare-style attacks.² IS will be able to continue making money, even without a stranglehold on territory, and still has access to hundreds of millions of dollars that will aid its efforts to rebuild its organization.³ A United Nations report recently warned that IS "could launch international terrorist attacks before the end of the year" in Europe.⁴ The United States remains vulnerable from home-grown violent extremists inspired by Islamic State propaganda, reinforced in the eyes of would-be jihadists by the daily images coming from detention camps like al-Hol, in Syria.⁵ Over the past several months, there have been several arrests of American citizens seeking to plan attacks on U.S. soil on behalf of the Islamic State.⁶

¹No official number exists for the combined cost of the "Global War on Terror," but estimates range between \$3 trillion and \$6 trillion (National Defense Budget Estimates for fiscal year 2019; the Costs of War project at Brown University's Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs).

²Eric Schmitt, Alissa J. Rubin, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. "ISIS Is Regaining Strength in Iraq and Syria." *The New York Times*, August 19, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/us/politics/isis-iraq-syria.html>; Louisa Loveluck and Mustafa Salim. "Hundreds of Islamic State Militants Are Slipping Back into Iraq. Their Fight Isn't Over." *Washington Post*, July 21, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/hundreds-of-islamic-state-militants-are-slipping-back-into-iraq-their-fight-isnt-over/2019/07/21/1f6e4262-a259-11e9-a767-d7ab84aef3e9_story.html.

³Patrick Johnston, Mona Alami, Colin P. Clarke, and Howard J. Shatz. "Return and Expand? The Finances and Prospects of the Islamic State After the Caliphate." *RAND Corporation*, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3046.html.

⁴Nick Cumming-Bruce, "ISIS, Eyeing Europe, Could Launch Attacks This Year, U.N. Warns." *The New York Times*, August 3, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/middleeast/islamic-state-attacks-europe.html>.

⁵Bethan McKernan, "Inside Al-Hawl Camp, the Incubator for Islamic State's Resurgence." *The Guardian*, August 31, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/31/inside-al-hawl-camp-the-incubator-for-islamic-states-resurgence>; Vivian Yee, "Guns, Filth and ISIS: Syrian Camp Is 'Disaster in the Making.'" *The New York Times*, September 3, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/world/middleeast/isis-alhol-camp-syria.html>; Loveluck, Louisa, and Souad Mekhennet. "At a Sprawling Tent Camp in Syria, ISIS Women Impose a Brutal Rule." *Washington Post*, September 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-a-sprawling-tent-camp-in-syria-isis-women-impose-a-brutal-rule/2019/09/03/3fcd14-c4ea-11e9-8bf7-cde2d9e09055_story.html.

⁶Madeleine Carlisle, "19-Year-Old Queens Man Arrested for Intending to Commit an Attack on Behalf of ISIS." *Time*, August 30, 2019, <https://time.com/5665735/queens-teen-isis-attack/>; Michael Kunzelman, "Man Indicted on Terror Charge in Alleged ISIS-Inspired Plot." *NBC4*

Al-Qaeda, for its part, also seems determined to strike the United States. In a message from April 2017, Zawahiri reiterated the importance of al-Qaeda's global struggle.⁷ The next month, messages from both Osama bin Laden's son Hamza (now allegedly deceased) and AQAP emir Qassim al-Raimi both released videos urging al-Qaeda's followers to launch attacks in the West.⁸ Yet another speech from Zawahiri, this one titled "America is the First Enemy of the Muslims" and released in March 2018, incited al-Qaeda's followers to strike the United States.⁹ A recent United Nations assessment of al-Qaeda's links to groups in Syria observed the following in reference to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Tanzim Huras al-Din (HAD): "HTS and HAD are assessed to share a history and an ideology but to differ on policy. HTS centered its agenda on [Syria], with no interest in conducting attacks abroad. HAD, by contrast, was said to have a more international outlook."¹⁰ None of this should be surprising, as al-Qaeda's overarching narrative has always been that the West is at war with Islam.¹¹

THE RISING THREAT OF VIOLENT WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM

But it is not only jihadi terrorism that threatens the U.S. homeland. As the Anti-Defamation League reports, in 2018 violent white supremacist extremists were responsible for 3 times as many deaths in the United States as were Islamists.¹² Moreover, in May of this year, a senior FBI official testified to Congress that the bureau is pursuing about 850 domestic terrorism investigations, a "significant majority" of which are related to white supremacist extremists.¹³ Out of necessity, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well aware of the threat posed to the U.S. homeland from domestic terrorism. From Pittsburgh to Poway and El Paso to Charlottesville, violent white supremacist extremism plagues the United States on a regular basis, but this threat is not just local in nature.

The attacks in Norway and New Zealand invited closer scrutiny on WSE, and revealed that similar to the global jihadist movement, violent white supremacists and other elements of the radical ideology maintain international linkages and continue to forge global networks with ideologues¹⁴ radicalizing individuals across the globe. Both Breivik and Tarrant drew inspiration from grievances from other countries and causes, while each presented himself as a defender of global European white civilization.¹⁵ And while the attacks at Utoya and Christchurch are among the most prominent of those perpetrated by WSEs, there have also been linkages between WSE ideologies and attacks in the United States (California, Florida, Kansas, New

Washington, August 29, 2019, <http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Maryland-Man-Indicted-on-Terror-Charge-in-Alleged-ISIS-Inspired-Plot-558764191.html>.

⁷ Charles Lister, "How al-Qaeda Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 11, Iss. 12, February 2018, p. 6, <https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaeda-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/>.

⁸ Aaron Y. Zelin, "Introduction," in Aaron Y. Zelin, ed., *How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Threat*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 153, June 2017, p. 6, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-al-qaeda-survived-drones-uprisings-and-the-islamic-state>.

⁹ Tore Refslund Hamming and Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "The True Story of al-Qaeda's Demise and Resurgence in Syria," *Lawfare*, April 8, 2018, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/true-story-al-qaedas-demise-and-resurgence-syria>; see also, Thomas Joscelyn, "Al Qaeda Chief Says America is the 'First Enemy' of Muslims," *Long War Journal*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/03/al-qaeda-chief-says-america-is-the-first-enemy-of-muslims.php>.

¹⁰ Letter dated 15 July 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), al-Qaeda and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council. <https://undocs.org/S/2019/570>.

¹¹ Colin P. Clarke and Charles Lister, "Al-Qaeda is Ready to Attack You Again," *Foreign Policy*, September 4, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/04/al-qaeda-is-ready-to-attack-you-again/>.

¹² "Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018," Anti-Defamation League, <https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018>.

¹³ David Shortell, "FBI is Investigating More than 850 Domestic Terrorism Cases," *CNN.com*, May 8, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/politics/fbi-domestic-terrorism-cases/index.html>.

¹⁴ Some prominent ideologues in the WSE movement include: James Mason, Greg Johnson, Martin Lichtmesz, Frodi Midjord, and Kevin MacDonald, among others.

¹⁵ Daniel Byman, "Right-Wingers Are America's Deadliest Terrorists," *Slate*, August 5, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/right-wing-terrorist-killings-government-focus-jihadis-islamic-radicalism.html>; see also, Daniel Byman, "Right-Wing Terrorism Has Gone Global," *Slate*, March 15, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/new-zealand-mosque-attacks-global-right-wing-terrorism.html>.

Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Wisconsin) Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.¹⁶

Yet the emerging epicenter of WSE seems to be located in Russia and Ukraine. There are extensive ties between the Russian government and far-right groups in Europe.¹⁷ Russian disinformation efforts on-line have fueled anti-immigrant sentiment in countries like Sweden, fueling resentment among native-born Swedes and newly-arrived immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. In 2015, Sweden accepted 163,000 asylum seekers, primarily from Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria.¹⁸

In Ukraine, the aforementioned Azov Battalion has actively recruited foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs, including many from the West, to join its ranks and receive training, indoctrination, and instruction in irregular warfare.¹⁹ The group has cultivated a relationship with members of the Atomwaffen Division²⁰ as well as with U.S.-based militants from the Rise Above Movement,²¹ or RAM, which the FBI has labeled a “white supremacy extremist group” based in Southern California. The Azov Battalion also maintains a political wing, offering ideological education, and ties to a growing vigilante street movement which can be counted on for violence, intimidation, and coercion.²² On the other side of the conflict in Ukraine, Russian groups like the Russian Imperial Movement and its paramilitary unit, the Imperial Legion volunteer unit, also attract and train foreign fighters motivated by white supremacy and neo-Nazi beliefs.²³ Just as jihadists have used conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Balkans, Iraq, and Syria to swap tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and solidify transnational networks, so too are WSEs using Ukraine as a hub or battlefield laboratory, where an estimated 17,000 people from over 50 countries has traveled to actively participate in the ongoing conflict.²⁴

COMPARING JIHADISTS & WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISTS

Although the threat of WSE violence has been omnipresent, as outlined in earlier sections discussing the history and evolution of the movement, the lion’s share of studies and analysis has focused on jihadi violence. The impact of the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 was so significant that for the past 2 decades, al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State garner far more media attention than terrorist groups not motivated by Salafi jihadism.²⁵ And while there are obviously important dif-

¹⁶ Weiwei Cai and Simone Landon, “Attacks by White Extremists are Growing. So Are Their Connections,” *New York Times*, April 3, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html>.

¹⁷ Robert Levinson, “The Fight in the Right: It is Time to Tackle White Supremacist Terrorism Globally,” *War on the Rocks*, August 22, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/the-fight-in-the-right-it-is-time-to-tackle-white-supremacist-terrorism-globally/>.

¹⁸ Jo Becker, “The Global Machine Behind the Rise of Far-Right Nationalism,” *New York Times*, August 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/europe/sweden-immigration-nationalism.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fjoebecker&action=click&contentCollection=undefined®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection.

¹⁹ IntelBrief: The Transnational Network That Nobody is Talking About,” Soufan Center 22 March 2019, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-transnational-network-that-nobody-is-talking-about/>; Oren Dorell, “Volunteer Ukrainian Unit Includes Nazis,” *USA Today*, March 10, 2015, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/10/ukraine-azov-brigade-nazis-abuses-separatists/24664937/>.

²⁰ Oleksiy Kuzmenko, “Defend the White Race: American Extremists Being Co-opted by Ukraine’s Far-Right,” *Bellingcat*, February 15, 2019, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>.

²¹ Criminal Complaint, *United States of America v. Robert Paul Rundo, Robert Boman, Tyler Laube, and Aaron Eason*, United States District Court, Central District of California, <https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/421-robert-rundo-complaint/0f1e76cdeef814133f24/optimized/full.pdf>.

²² Tim Hume, “Far-Right Extremists Have Been Using Ukraine’s War as a Training Ground. They’re Returning Home,” *Vice News*, July 31, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vb95ma/far-right-extremists-have-been-using-ukraines-civil-war-as-a-training-ground-theyre-returning-home.

²³ Michael Carpenter, “Russia Is Co-Opting Angry Young Men,” *The Atlantic*, August 29, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/russia-is-co-opting-angry-young-men/568741/>; Josephine Huetlin, “Russian Extremists Are Training Right-Wing Terrorists From Western Europe,” *The Daily Beast*, August 2, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-extremists-are-training-right-wing-terrorists-from-western-europe>.

²⁴ Kacper Rekawak, *Not Only Syria? The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in Comparative Perspective*, GLOBSEC, 2017.

²⁵ Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 357% more coverage than other attacks. See Erin M. Kearns et al., “Why

ferences between jihadis and white supremacist extremists, there are also important similarities that can help inform best practices and lessons learned in how these organizations can be successfully countered. Writing in the *New York Times*, Max Fisher recently observed, “The ideological tracts, recruiting pitches and radicalization tales of the Islamic State during its rise echo, almost word-for-word, those of the white nationalist terrorists of today.”²⁶ John R. Allen and Brett McGurk agree, assessing that while WSE attacks “may differ from Islamic State attacks in degree,” they are also “similar in kind: driven by hateful narratives, dehumanization, the rationalization of violence and the glorification of murder, combined with ready access to recruits and weapons of war.”²⁷

Utility of Violence

Like jihadis, white supremacist extremists justify the use of extreme violence, in some cases bordering on anomie, by citing self-defense, inherently necessary because of the violence used by their adversaries. Both groups often deploy metaphors in their writings and propaganda that reflect a firm belief that their societies are under siege and that only violence can halt the “invaders.”²⁸ For jihadis, this means an assault on Muslims by the West, which seeks to destroy Islam and humiliate the ummah. Conversely, white supremacist extremists fear encroachment from multiculturalism, immigration, and the so-called “Islamization” of society. White supremacist extremists propaganda relies on themes related to so-called “replacement theory,” or “the great replacement,” which is the idea that Western culture is under assault from demographic shifts favoring non-white immigrants, something WSEs believe is the deliberate strategy of a shadowy cabal of (mostly) Jewish elites.²⁹ The conspiracy theory claims an “intellectual” basis in the work of French philosopher Albert Camus and American eugenicist Madison Grant.³⁰ The exemplification of this violent ideology was captured in the motivation of Robert Bowers, the terrorist who attacked the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA in October 2018. Bowers appeared to target the Tree of Life because of what he perceived as the synagogue’s assistance for immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.³¹

Violence is viewed by both groups as something that is both utilitarian, but at times theatrical, intended to inspire followers while terrorizing others. Only through extreme violence can these groups achieve their goals, which requires inducing a climate of fear that can in turn be used to reshape society in the image they seek to create.³²

Cycle of Violence

In addition to serving as both the means and the end for both jihadists and WSEs, violence is also intended to beget further violence, contributing to a tit-for-tat cycle that inspires followers and provokes a reaction from those not considered within the terrorists’ in-group. Extreme violence serves as a complement to identity politics and the two are inextricably linked in ways that do not always appear obvious. The perceived threat to the identity of these groups is the “exact mirror image” of each

Do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others? *Justice Quarterly*, 36: 6, 2019, pp. 985–1022.

²⁶ Max Fisher, “White Terrorism Shows ‘Stunning’ Parallels to Islamic State’s Rise,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/terrorism-white-nationalist-supremacy-isis.html>.

²⁷ John R. Allen and Brett McGurk, “We Worked to Defeat the Islamic State. White Nationalist Terrorism is an Equal Threat,” *Washington Post*, August 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-worked-to-defeat-the-islamic-state-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-an-equal-threat/2019/08/06/e50c90e8-b87d-11e9-bad6-609f75bfd97f_story.html.

²⁸ Sulome Anderson, “The Twin Hatreds,” *Washington Post*, March 22, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2019/03/22/feature/how-white-supremacy-and-islamist-terrorism-strengthen-each-other-online/>.

²⁹ Rosa Schwartzburg, “The ‘White Replacement Theory’ Motivates Alt-Right Killers The World Over,” *The Guardian*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/05/great-replacement-theory-alt-right-killers-el-paso>; see also, Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, “The Great Replacement: The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2019, <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-great-replacement-the-violent-consequences-of-mainstreamed-extremism/>.

³⁰ John Eligon, “The El Paso Screed, and the Racist Doctrine Behind It,” *New York Times*, August 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/el-paso-shooting-racism.html>.

³¹ Masha Gessen, “Why The Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,” *New Yorker*, October 27, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/why-the-tree-of-life-shooter-was-fixated-on-the-hebrew-immigrant-aid-society>.

³² Ali Soufan, “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>.

other.³³ The comparison even extends to the naming of groups within these movement, as neo-Nazis recently adopted the name “The Base” for a new social networking platform connecting various elements of the extreme right.³⁴ “The Base” was the name selected by Osama bin Laden for his group, which when translated into Arabic means “al-Qaeda.” In terms of organizational structure, white supremacists adopted the leaderless resistance model of terrorism before jihadists ever did, relying on attacks by lone actors as a means of minimizing infiltration of the movement by Federal law enforcement agents in the 1980’s.³⁵

Jihadi violence in the Middle East and North Africa has contributed to civil war and state failure, which in turn has driven migration of predominantly Muslim societies to Europe. As European countries receive ever-increasing applications for asylum—in 2015, the European Union received more than 1.3 million applications for asylum—segments of domestic populations in countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout the continent have perceived the demographic shift as threatening to their traditional values.³⁶ In some cases, this has led to the growth of movements like PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West.³⁷

To extremists on both sides, the current state of world affairs is presented as an existential threat to their way of life, and exclusionist ideologies fuel a pushback against societal change.³⁸ Extremists also feel emboldened, convinced that violence will lead to revolutionary change. “Murderous Muslim militants, like America’s most dangerous young men, feel destiny if not righteous wrath behind them.”³⁹ Both movements also see attacks contributing to an “inspirational contagion” which will strengthen their respective organizations while encouraging further plots.⁴⁰ Each attack builds on the last and can have a cumulative effect, reinforcing the validity of propaganda that both jihadists and violent white supremacist extremists promote.⁴¹ As Simon Cottee notes, “jihadists and far-right violent extremists feed off each other, cynically exploiting the outrages of their enemies as a spur and justification for further retaliatory bloodshed.”⁴²

Virtual Laboratories / Use of Internet

The use of the internet itself is not new for terrorist groups, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico successfully harnessed power of the internet as early as 1994.⁴³ WSE groups have also long been adept to operating in the on-line space.⁴⁴ The internet helps perpetuate a “feedback loop of radicalization and violence” that is intended to accelerate the time table toward an apocalyptic end of times.⁴⁵ There are legitimate concerns that the internet has “accelerated the

³³ Kathy Gilsinan, “How White-Supremacist Violence Echoes Other Forms of Terrorism,” *The Atlantic*, March 15, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/violence-new-zealand-echoes-past-terrorist-patterns/585043/>.

³⁴ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, “Neo-Nazis Are Organizing Secretive Paramilitary Training Across America,” *Vice News*, November 20, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3mexp/neo-nazis-are-organizing-secretive-paramilitary-training-across-america.

³⁵ Bruce Hoffman, “Back to the Future: The Return of Violent Far-Right Terrorism in the Age of Lone Wolves,” *War on the Rocks*, April 2, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/back-to-the-future-the-return-of-violent-far-right-terrorism-in-the-age-of-lone-wolves/>.

³⁶ Julia Ebner, *The Rage*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2017, p. 79.

³⁷ Katrin Bennhold, “One Legacy of Merkel? Angry East German Men Fueling the Far Right,” *New York Times*, November 5, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/merkel-east-germany-nationalists-populism.html>.

³⁸ Melissa Etehad, “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits>.

³⁹ Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Violent Young Men, Here and Abroad,” *The Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/violent-young-men-here-and-abroad-11565737090>.

⁴⁰ Clint Watts, “America Has a White Nationalist Terrorism Problem. What Should We Do?” *Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)*, May 1, 2019, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/05/america-has-a-white-nationalist-terrorism-problem-what-should-we-do/>.

⁴¹ Rita Katz, “New Zealand Shooting: White Supremacists and Jihadists Feed Off Each Other,” *Daily Beast*, March 20, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-zealand-shooting-white-supremacists-and-jihadists-feed-off-each-other?ref=author>.

⁴² Simon Cottee, “What Right-Wing Violent Extremists and Jihadists Have in Common,” *National Post*, April 5, 2019, <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/what-right-wing-violent-extremists-and-jihadists-have-in-common>.

⁴³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 3d ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, p. 210.

⁴⁴ Kathleen Belew, “The Right Way To Understand White Nationalist Terrorism,” *New York Times*, August 4, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/el-paso-terrorism.html>.

⁴⁵ Max Fisher, “White Terrorism Shows ‘Stunning’ Parallels to Islamic State’s Rise,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/americas/terrorism-white-nationalist-supremacy-isis.html>.

radicalization process,” although research demonstrates that there also remains a significant off-line, or in-person component to how individuals radicalize.⁴⁶

In many ways, social media has exacerbated the issue by helping connect transnational nodes of like-minded individuals and groups. In the current environment, jihadis have flocked to sites like Telegram while WSEs and their supporters operate on Gab and 8chan. It serves as a medium for both radicalization and recruitment, as well as terrorist learning. WSEs have curated an on-line library of terrorist manuals and manifestos, while jihadists have created magazines like *Inspire* and *Dabiq* that have taught others how to conduct attacks.⁴⁷ It is also now well-documented that WSEs have used the internet to study terrorist tactics used by jihadists to improve their own capabilities.⁴⁸

Propaganda

Propaganda, media and public relations, and information operations of both jihadis and WSEs describe an existential battle between good and evil that form the cornerstone of these movements’ ideological beliefs. For jihadis, this eternal struggle is often framed in terms of the battle against the Zionist-Crusader alliance, while for violent white supremacist extremists, it is the call of racial holy war, or RAHOWA, that most resonates with its adherents. Both movements are also dualistic in nature, offering binary choices to potential followers to become part of the ideological in-group or risk being labeled as an enemy, apostate, or outsider.⁴⁹ The propaganda of jihadis and WSEs each portray members as defenders of a unique culture and bulwarks against cultural elites deemed unworthy of legitimacy.⁵⁰ And both jihadis and white supremacist extremists promote anti-Semitism, aspects of austere social conservatism, and variations of obscure and antiquated eschatology.⁵¹

Each group also seeks to actively undermine the foundations of liberal democratic societies, which should be destroyed through violence and remade by a small vanguard of true believers.⁵² Both movements have also recognized the importance of key figures who have become an inspiration for the fringes of their respective movements. Jihadists revered the sermons of the American-born preacher and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula figurehead Anwar al-Awlaki, whose radical views inspired numerous jihadi terrorists to launch attacks.⁵³ White supremacist extremists also have their own martyrdom figures, the most famous of which is Anders Breivik, the terrorist responsible for the attacks in Norway that killed 77 people at a summer camp for children back in 2011.⁵⁴ Breivik has been lauded as a “Saint” and “Commander” and whose beliefs were cited as inspiration by the Christchurch attacker Brenton Tarrant.⁵⁵

Recruitment

Terrorist propaganda serves as a key avenue for exposing potential supporters to radical ideologies and helping to recruit new members into extremist movements. While jihadis have long circulated martyrdom tapes and beheading videos, WSEs

⁴⁶ Melissa Etehad, “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits>. See also, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/stop-isis-recruitment-focus-offline>.

⁴⁷ Ali Soufan, “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>.

⁴⁸ Frank Gardner, “The Unlikely Similarities Between the Far Right and IS,” *BBC*, March 30, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47746271>.

⁴⁹ Scott Stewart, “What White Supremacism and Jihadism Have in Common,” *Stratfor*, March 26, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-white-supremacism-and-jihadism-have-common>.

⁵⁰ Jim Sciutto, “The Striking Similarities Between the KKK and Islamist Jihadis,” *CNN.com*, August 17, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/opinions/striking-similarities-between-jihadis-and-kkk-sciutto/index.html>.

⁵¹ Imogen Richards, “Right-Wing Extremism, Salafi Jihadism, and The War on Terror,” *ADI*, April 2019, <https://adi.deakin.edu.au/news/right-wing-extremism-salafi-jihadism-and-the-war-on-terror>.

⁵² Daniel Byman, “Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy,” *Brookings Policy Brief*, February 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/terrorism-and-the-threat-to-democracy/>.

⁵³ Alexander Melagrou-Hitchens, “Why Awlaki Mattered,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204612504576606522230694328>.

⁵⁴ Colin P. Clarke, “The Cult of Breivik,” *Slate*, March 18, 2019, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/anders-breivik-new-zealand-right-wing-terrorism-inspiration.html>.

⁵⁵ Lizzie Dearden, “Revered as a Saint by Online Extremists, How Christchurch Shooter Inspired Copycat Terrorists Around the World,” *Independent*, August 25, 2019, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/brenton-tarrant-christchurch-shooter-attack-el-paso-norway-poway-a9076926.html>.

have livestreamed their attacks, as occurred in Christchurch, and published long manifestos that often reference previous high-profile attacks. By spreading these types of videos, extremists on both sides are attempting to reach individuals, primarily young men (though not exclusively) who may be alienated from broader society, feel marginalized or discriminated against, and who are disconnected from their communities.⁵⁶

Victimization forms a commonality across both movements, as does a distrust of political leaders and public institutions and a feeling of helplessness or ineptitude about how to find success and fulfillment in modern society.⁵⁷ Self-empowerment is a key element of the recruiting pitch, while both jihadis and WSEs focus on themes of “purity,” militancy, and physical fitness.⁵⁸ The martial aspects of recruitment appealed to generations of al-Qaeda militants who answered the call of holy war, traveling to training camps to learn guerilla warfare tactics and bombmaking techniques. In Ukraine, violent white supremacy extremist groups have bonded over shared interest in mixed martial arts and so-called “ultimate fighting” competitions. The Azov Battalion has used this venue as a method for growing its network, including with Neo-Nazis from the United States and the West who have traveled to Ukraine to forge bonds with white supremacist extremists from Europe and elsewhere.⁵⁹

Financing

Financing is another area where similarities exist between how jihadists raise money and how white supremacist extremists seek to fund their organizations. Like jihadis, U.S. and overseas violent white supremacy organizations and individuals have leveraged both licit and illicit forms of finance, including a range of criminal activities, to sustain operations. In the post-9/11 era it has become much more difficult for jihadist groups to operate in the licit financial system, but as the Islamic State proved, it is possible to raise and spend money locally through a range of activities, from oil trafficking to extortion, and still remain a financially viable terrorist organization capable of governing large swaths of territory while simultaneously planning external operations.

Both crowdfunding and cryptocurrencies are a popular method of funding for white supremacist extremists, who have leveraged content creation social media platforms, such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to seek funding. The intersection and overlap between social media, crowdfunding websites, and payment systems facilitate peer-to-peer (P2P) financial transactions in a manner that has served as an accelerant for violent white supremacy extremism fundraising. While it is impossible to precisely quantify the scope of the WSE's financial power it is, without question, very significant. Advances in technology and the power of social media and crowdfunding has allowed for both violent and non-violent radical right actors to avail themselves of a large number of like-minded donors who share similar fears. Playing on these fears in order to monetize hatred and discord is big business.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMBATING GLOBAL TERRORISM

Our current counterterrorism framework was set up in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to deal exclusively with foreign terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. For example, the law allows for the monitoring of communications between people connected with foreign terrorist groups—even if they are United States citizens operating on American soil—and the sharing of the resulting intelligence among American agencies and with our allies. But those monitoring and intelligence-sharing tools cannot be used against those connected with terrorist groups based in the United States—no matter how dangerous—or even when these individuals have connections with WSE transnational groups that have been designated as terrorist organizations by our allies. This is today's reality because domestic terror supporters are protected by free speech laws in ways that jihadis (including those who are United States citizens) are not, and we have yet to designate transnational WSE organizations.

⁵⁶ Melissa Etehad, “White Supremacists and Islamic State Recruits Have More in Common Than You Might Think,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 7, 2019, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-08-07/domestic-terrorism-white-supremacists-islamic-state-recruits>.

⁵⁷ Jim Sciutto, “The Striking Similarities Between the KKK and Islamist Jihadis,” *CNN.com*, August 17, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/opinions/striking-similarities-between-jihadis-and-kkk-sciutto/index.html>.

⁵⁸ Ali Soufan, “I Spent 25 Years Fighting Jihadis. White Supremacists Aren’t So Different,” *New York Times*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/white-supremacy-terrorism.html>.

⁵⁹ Michael Colborne, “Friday Night Fights With Ukraine’s Far Right,” *New Republic*, July 9, 2019, <https://newrepublic.com/article/154434/friday-night-fights-ukraines-far-right>.

Since 2001, a long list of people have been indicted on a charge of providing material support to designated foreign terrorist entities like al-Qaeda. But for domestic terrorist organizations, material support charges are impossible because there is no mechanism for designating domestic terrorist groups as such. Moreover, domestic terror charges are harder to prove and carry penalties inadequate to the gravity of the offense. Even the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh, the worst domestic terrorist in the Nation's history, was not charged with any terrorism offense for precisely this reason.

Many of our allies have already changed their own laws to allow more robust investigations of domestic terrorists. Britain's domestic intelligence agency, MI5, for example, can now use many of the same methods against domestic extremism that they have long deployed against al-Qaeda, thanks to laws passed following 9/11.

The FBI should also be able to use many of the same counter-terrorism tools against domestic extremism as they currently have available for countering the Salafi-jihadist threat, with appropriate safeguards for our Constitutional freedoms. But this can happen only if Congress updates our post-9/11 legislation to allow domestic terror groups to be designated in the same way as foreign ones. Our allies—including Germany, Canada, and the UK—have designated domestic terrorist organizations, and we must consider doing the same or at least designate the groups designated by our allies as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). This will allow our law-enforcement agencies access to the full suite of monitoring tools and our prosecutors the ability to bring meaningful charges for aiding domestic terrorism.

Twenty years ago, we grossly underestimated the rising threat of Islamist terrorism. That inattention cost us dearly on Sept. 11, 2001. We cannot afford to wait for the white-supremacist equivalent.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Levin to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN LEVIN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HATE & EXTREMISM, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN BERNARDINO

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of the committee, my name is Professor Brian Levin, and you have heard the introduction of my background.

I also wanted to add, and I wanted to thank everyone on this committee. I am former NYPD. We are celebrating an anniversary tomorrow. We have to take all threats seriously. I want to give a heartfelt thank you to everybody on this committee, everyone, irrespective of party.

I am here on behalf of our university's two-decade-strong independent research and policy institution, the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism. I want to thank you for another opportunity to come here to discuss our latest findings, most of which are coming from our latest Report to the Nation 2019. The conclusions are both fascinating and cautionary.

I also would be remiss if I didn't thank all the scholars that helped with this report: Nakashima, Thompson, Nolan, Reitzel, Grisham, and Landon.

But let me go right to the report. This is what came out before the latest spate of mass shootings. This is what we said: "While white supremacists and ultra nationalists will remain—will maintain their position at the top of the threat matrix, the risk is also diversifying. Splintered free speech platforms, where hate speech is more prolific, have enabled organizationally unaffiliated extremist and loners with a tool to congregate, radicalize, and broadcast not only bigotry, but, disturbingly, lone acts of mass violence that reference prior attacks." Let me note this was before El Paso.

The report also noted recently terrorists used 8chan, Telegram, Gab, and Facebook around the time of their attacks. 8chan, now temporarily non-operational, is a free speech platform whose “Embrace Infamy” home page slogan is a gift wrap on a noxious bazaar of deeply bigoted, misogynistic, and violent bombasts in their political section. White supremacist, far-right extremists are now the most ascendant transnational terror threat facing the homeland in a fluid and somewhat diversifying risk matrix.

Let me say this. I am very glad that we are hearing that we are seeing a confluence from across the ideological spectrum. We need to—my son—just a point of personal privilege, my son played soccer, and he plays defense. You have to look where the kicks are coming. You can’t just look at one side of the field. I think we need that alacrity, and that is why I appreciate the committee noting that.

But we also have to look at where these shots are coming from: White supremacist, far-right-extremist-motivated homicides. This is our curated data. We are a little different from the ADL. We look at those that are motivated by the ideology.

White supremacist, far-right extremists—and I do not mean conservative people of goodwill—have killed at least 26 people so far this year. We had 16 service members killed in Afghanistan so far this year. More people were murdered domestically so far in 2019 by just a handful of white supremacists than all of those killed in the whole of calendar year 2018 in every extremist homicide event.

This is coming at a time where, disturbingly, mass shootings overall, including those with mixed or no discernible ideological motives, were also rising. Through September 1 the Gun Violence Archive has enumerated 283 mass shootings, nationally. That is more than 1 a day, and the first time that we have seen this since 2016.

One of the things that our research has shown is for the data, which I think is really interesting. There is a pattern of spikes in both violent internet chatter and actual terrorist incidents, as well as hate crime. I put a little chart by one of our colleagues from our center in there that shows when these spikes in hate crime go up. I can show you, whether it is here, whether it is in Europe, we see also terror attacks around that.

Similarly, the month of the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally and the associated political controversy around it was tied for the second-worst month, according to FBI, for hate crime for this whole decade.

If we want to look at another time, around the election of President Obama we saw this spike. What did we see around that time, as well? Terror plots and terror attacks. In England we saw a member of parliament assassinated at a time when these hate crimes went up, as well.

So what we are seeing is a convergence of many things. What I would say to you is that we have to have a holistic approach.

One of our—my guests here today lost her father—this is Tina Meins—lost her father in the San Bernardino terrorist attack. We have to have a coordinated approach, and that includes data. It also includes looking at the weapons of war, which are being used now increasingly by terrorists of all stripes, but in particular white

supremacists and the far right. We have to have a coordinated National approach to this.

I appreciate you having me here to discuss this, and I welcome any questions that the Members of the committee have.

I want to once again, though, thank you for the work. The Homeland Security Committee does important work. I think it is important that other Governmental agencies come here and speak with you so that we are getting a holistic picture for what needs to be done. Thank you so much, Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN LEVIN

SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of the committee, my name is Prof. Brian Levin. Thank you so very much for your service to our country and for another opportunity to present some of the latest findings, on extremism, primarily derived from our *Report To The Nation: 2019 Factbook On Hate & Extremism In The U.S. & Internationally*, which are both fascinating and cautionary.

I am a professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, who is also on faculty at our National Security Studies program at California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB). I am here, however, on behalf of CSUSB's two-decade strong independent research and policy institution, the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism ("CSHE"). Our quantitative and qualitative trend analysis on violent manifestations of political conflict and prejudice across both borders and the ideological spectrum, has been used by scholars, journalists, and policy makers around the world.

As the best analysis is often a coordinated team effort, I want to take this brief opportunity to thank all the scholars who enabled CSHE to conduct this important research: Our study co-author Legal Fellow Lisa Nakashima, as well as our Cal State-based crew of Drs. Kevin Grisham and John Reitzel and our Research Fellow William Lambdin; along with Dr. James Nolan of West Virginia University and data analyst Andrew Thompson.

WHITE SUPREMACIST-MOTIVATED FATALITIES RISE ALONG WITH MASS SHOOTING EVENTS

White supremacist/far right extremists are now, the most ascendant transnational terror threat facing the homeland, in a fluid and somewhat diversifying risk matrix. According to CSHE's preliminary data, white supremacist/far right extremist-motivated homicides have killed at least 26 people so far this year. More people were murdered domestically so far in 2019 by just a handful of white supremacists, than all of those killed in the whole of calendar year 2018 in every extremist/hate homicide event. The fatalities per incident are also trending up as semi-automatic rifles continue to be their weapon of choice.

This is coming at a time where, disturbingly, mass shootings overall, including those with mixed or no discernable ideological motives are also rising. The three main categories of violent mass offenders are listed below, and usually one element is primary, with at least one other often playing a more minor supporting role:

1. The Ideologically Motivated (Religious, Political, or Hybrid)
2. The Psychologically Dangerous (Sociopath or Unstable)
3. Revenge, Validation, or Personal Benefit

Through September 1, the Gun Violence Archive has enumerated 283 mass shootings (where at least 4 are shot) nationally in 2019, the first time since 2016 that there were more than an average of 1 per day. Moreover, fatalities by rifle (of which semi-automatics are a subset), at 403, reached their highest level in a decade in 2017 according to the FBI.

VIOLENCE INCREASES AROUND POLITICAL DIVISIONS

Interestingly, our 2018 data showed the majority of white supremacist homicides clustered roughly before election time when polls indicated a possible party shift in a highly contested mid-term election. We also saw an increase in hate crime reports from major U.S. cities during that time as well. 2018 was the fifth consecutive annual increase in police enumerated hate crime in our multi-city study, and the steepest increase since 2015, with nearly half the cities hitting decade highs—despite a drop in the first half of the year.

Similarly, the month of the fatal Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally and the associated political controversy around it, was tied for the second-worst month this decade for FBI reported hate crime. Except for election month 2016, the last months with higher totals than August 2017, were around the election of Barack Obama, when escalating anti-Black hate crime hit levels not seen since.

Election month, November 2016, was the worst month in 14 years with 758 FBI reported hate crimes. Interestingly, other data showed a corresponding increase in the volume of both bigoted speech on 4chan, as well as an increase in manipulative racially divisive ad buys by the Russians on Facebook around that time. The *Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (Mueller Report)*, March 2019 concluded:

“Collectively, the IRA’s social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers . . . According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S. persons and ‘may have reached an estimated 126 million people.’”

The day after the elections—November 9, 2016—with 44 reported hate crimes, was the worst day in 13 years. It was also the day 3 interdicted militia extremists planned to truck bomb a Garden City, Kansas apartment complex populated by Somali-American Muslims. This pattern of bursts in hate crime, vile internet chatter, and terror around conflictual political events has been repeated elsewhere, as in the United Kingdom. There hate crimes not only rose around the Brexit vote, a sitting member of parliament was assassinated around that time as well. More recently, we have seen an increase in threats against American public officials, as well as an escalation in precursor extremist activity or violence by other ideological movements as we embark on yet another highly-conflicted election season.

2019 will reverse an overall downward trend in American extremist/hate homicides that we’ve seen over the last couple of years, due to the rising number of mass white supremacist killings. Out of last year’s total of 22 extremist motivated homicides, 17 were white supremacist/far right motivated, one was violent Salafist Jihadist, and there were none by the hard left or Antifa, though some of their localized splinters certainly have committed a steady string of crimes. Jews (for the first time) and African-Americans were the most common victims in fatal white supremacist attacks in 2018, while Latinos and Asians are this year.

A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

When I testified before this committee just 4 years ago, only weeks before the Paris and San Bernardino terror attacks, the landscape was different. Then, I warned that the most urgent transnational terror threat facing the American homeland came from violent Salafist Jihadists who were often inspired or orchestrated by more organized groups.

D’aesh in particular expanded not only its “caliphate” territory—to nearly the size of Michigan, but also its terrestrial and on-line communal presence, recruitment, and revenues. The reach of its fatal extremism, left an escalating violent string of fatalities in its wake on America, and elsewhere.

By the following summer of 2016, they inspired more horror, with another semi-automatic rifle rampage, this time at Orlando’s Pulse night club, killing 49 mostly LGBT victims, and supplanting the San Bernardino massacre as the most fatal post-9/11 terror foreign influenced attack.

That year our center enumerated just 3 white supremacist/far right homicides. White supremacists, had changed their tactics in an attempt to openly enter the mainstream in the prejudice tinged fissures over debates on issues of public concern like terrorism and immigration. Neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and alt-right adherents engaged in more large public demonstrations in the 2½ years leading just into and after Charlottesville, than in the whole of the previous decade. Nazis and Holocaust deniers even ran for Congressional and Senate seats in California and Illinois. Since Charlottesville, however, public organized groups have splintered amidst legal, financial issues and internecine squabbles, leaving a fragmented extremist landscape.

WHITE NATIONALISM IS AN INTERCONNECTED TRANSNATIONAL THREAT TO THE HOMELAND

Earlier, in May I cautioned the committee that: “For today’s digital, often loner white nationalist terrorist, internet platforms are force multipliers that record and disseminate not only graphic violence, but narcissistic manifestos as well, in a

scripted on-line folkloric chain of violence. These extreme views are disturbingly common in the general population.”

Our aforementioned 137-page “Report to the Nation: 2019” released in July further elaborated on this threat in its summary:

“While white supremacists and ultra-nationalists will maintain their position at the top of the threat matrix, the risk is also diversifying well beyond the far right, to include those with antagonistic ideologies, those inspired by zealots and conflicts abroad, and those with more personal grievances in an increasingly coarse and fragmented socio-political landscape . . .

“[H]atemongers have increasingly migrated to splintered free speech, encrypted and affinity-based platforms, and messaging services, where hate speech is more prolific . . . The internet has enabled . . . organizationally unaffiliated extremists and loners with a tool to congregate, radicalize, and broadcast not only bigotry, but disturbingly, lone acts of mass violence that reference prior attacks.”

The report further noted, “recently, terrorists used 8chan, Telegram, GAB, and Facebook around the time of their attacks.” 8chan, now temporarily non-operational, is a free speech platform whose “embrace infamy” homepage slogan was gift wrap on a noxious bazaar of deeply bigoted, misogynistic, and violent bombast in their political speech section.

THE GREAT REPLACEMENT

Within days of our latest report release, another link in this transnational horrific “chain of violence” that I discussed in May was forged. On the morning of August 3, a 21-year-old white male from Allen, Texas posted a methodical 4-page diatribe on 8chan after driving across the State. It opened with praise for both the Christ-church terrorist who killed 49 at two mosques, and his lengthy manifesto entitled “The Great Replacement,” which was itself lifted off a 2012 French book by Renaud Camus, with the same title, about European “white genocide.” The New Zealand terrorist, in turn was also inspired by, yet another manifesto writing white supremacist terrorist who murdered 77 in Norway in 2011.

The young Texan further explained the influence that the French book had on him:

“This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas . . . I am simply defending my country from cultural and ethnic replacement brought on by an invasion . . . Actually, the Hispanic community was not my target before I read the Great Replacement.” Le grand remplacement is a 2012 dystopian book lamenting the coming extinction of white Europeans on the continent by Muslim immigrants and other people of color, that has become a recent staple in an international chain. The killer concluded by warning, “This is just the beginning of the fight for America and Europe.”

Less than 20 minutes after uploading his hateful exhortation, its author opened fire on mostly older shoppers in a crowded El Paso Walmart with a legally purchased semi-automatic military style rifle killing 22—the worst white supremacist/far right terrorist attack since 168 perished in the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing of April 19, 1995.

LEADERLESS RESISTANCE AND PROPAGANDA OF THE DEED

That same year, Stormfront, the first white Supremacist website was launched by Don Black, a neo-Nazi white supremacist felon, whose vision of an international racist network was succinctly stated in its moniker “White Pride World Wide.” In 1995, I testified before another Congressional committee about the central role that the “Leaderless Resistance” tactic plays regarding scripted violence by autonomous loners or small cells against those perceived as enemies of whites. News reports of random “propaganda of the deed” violent attacks against minorities alone was supposed to inspire other extremists. In today’s fragmented social media landscape, the white supremacist embrace of leaderless resistance has produced a “propaganda of the deed 2.0” effect. The violence is not only inspired by racist folklore, but through an accompanying text or video, the terrorist seeks to write the next chapter of it. Most of these young terrorists have no direct operational connection to, or affiliation with terror groups. However, the internet has also apparently enabled newer small violent groups, with short half-lives, like the Kansas plotters, Atomwaffen Division, the Rise Above Movement and the Base to not only recruit individually, but to also assemble, across borders when necessary, for violent activities or training.

The spread of white nationalist and, to a lesser extent, other extremist viewpoints into an increasingly fragmented and sometimes violent mainstream socio-political

landscape provides an overflowing elastic reservoir for intergroup conflict around the globe, where offenders are also co-influenced by a variety of factor ranging from conspiracy theories to misogyny. At its most jagged and unstable digital edges, it has resulted in political violence, intimidation, and threats with transnational reach. As then DNI director Coates stated to the Senate in January, “In the past 2 years, individuals with ties to violent ethno-supremacist groups in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have either carried out attacks on minorities and politicians or had their plots disrupted by authorities.” Britain’s intelligence agencies explained recently “Increasingly, the vital piece of information that might stop an attack is unlikely to be held by MI5, but buried somewhere else in the mountain of data generated each day, often scattered across the world.” And just last month the Swedish Security service observed “a development in the violent right-wing extremist scene that could increase the risk of certain individuals being inspired to carry out attacks or violent crime . . . [as] violent right-wing extremist ideology might be going from something considered extreme to something considered normal, could prompt certain individuals to become radicalized.”

As one can see, violent extremism is evolving and while currently dominated by white nationalists/far right ideologues, they do not exert a monopoly. Still, with 43 percent of American respondents to a 2018 Reuters poll saying whites are under attack, there is a wide bench from which these extremists can try to draw recruits.

CAUTION RESPECTING MAJOR STATUTORY OVERHAULS

With dozens of statutes available to combat domestic terrorists and the unknown impact on civil liberties from major changes, I hold the same basic position today that I did when I testified almost 25 years ago regarding a broad overhaul of domestic Federal statutes.

CSHE does however, support the following:

Enacting H.R. 3106, the Domestic Terrorism DATA Act to improve the availability and production of timely government data on terrorism and the Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act;

Enhancing both statutory and administrative provisions to counter the growing threat against public officials and elected office holders;

Amending 18 USC § 231 to punish not only trainers, but trainees in violent methods designed to foment civil disorder;

Improving background checks and closing loopholes on firearms purchases, as well as the placement of restrictions on semi-automatic rifles, and extended magazines inter alia;


Providing greater funding and resources to enhance interagency coordination to combat the threat that white supremacist/far right extremism poses to the homeland.

As I noted in May, the domestic terror threat is a fluid one, with increasingly transnational and internet dimensions. The societal and international divisions that fuel extremism will likely be further exacerbated by a highly-charged political season and increasing international instability.

Thank you.

Appendix: FBI Designations

► The FBI currently classifies domestic terrorism into four categories: [racially motivated violent extremism](#), [anti-government/anti-authority extremism](#), [animal rights/environmental extremism](#), and [abortion extremism](#) ([source](#)). Previously, the agency had tracked a broad array of categories of racially motivated crime, including the controversial



“[Black Identity Extremism](#).” While the agency has since stopped using that term, it has also [stopped tracking](#) “[White Supremacist Extremism](#).”

Though international terror threats have remained stable, the FBI has seen a significant rise in the number of [white supremacy domestic terrorism cases](#) in recent months ([source](#)). Since November 2018, the FBI has recorded approximately 100 international terrorism arrests and 90 domestic terrorism arrests ([source](#)). In 2017, there were approximately 150 arrests that the FBI classified as domestic terror, and about 120 in 2018. According to one FBI official who spoke to CNN, the agency is on course to match or exceed those numbers in Fiscal Year 2019 ([source](#)).

The FBI currently has about 5,000 terrorism-related investigations open, including 850 related to domestic terrorism, 1,000 related to ISIS and affiliated groups, and 1,000 for homegrown violent extremists ([source](#)). Of the 850 domestic terrorism investigations open, approximately [half are related to Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Extremism](#), and approximately [40 percent are related to Racially Motivated Violent Extremism](#). A “[significant majority](#)” of the Racially Motivated Violent Extremist cases currently open are related to [White Extremism](#), according to testimony given by Michael McGarrity, FBI Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division at a May 2019 hearing in front of the House Committee on Homeland Security ([source](#)).

APPENDIX TABLES Hate-Motivated Homicides from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018

DATE	PERPETRATOR NAME	IDEOLOGY OF PERPETRATOR	CITY, STATE	INSTRUMENTALITY	NUMBER OF FATALITIES	NAME OF FATALITY VICTIMS (IF 3 OR LESS)
11/2/2018	Scott Paul Beierle	Extreme Misogyny	Tallahassee, FL	Firearm	2	Nancy Van Vessem, Maura Binkley
10/27/2018	Robert Gregory Bowers	White Supremacy	Pittsburgh, PA	Firearm	11	Multiple
10/24/2018	Gregory Bush	White Supremacy	Jeffersontown, KY	Firearm	2	Maurice E. Stallard, Vickie Lee Jones
8/20/2018	Daniel Martinez	Hispanic Supremacy	Cerritos, CA	Firearm	2	Sam Ferguson, Alhmond Davis
8/19/2018	Joden Rocco	White Supremacy	Pittsburgh, PA	Knife	1	Dulane Cameron Jr.
7/2/2018	Ronald Lee Tidwell	White Supremacy	Shawnee, KS	Knife	1	MeShon Cooper
3/17/2018	John Daniel Carothers	White Supremacy	Murfreesboro, TN	Arson	1	Robert Miller
3/12/2018	Corey Johnson	Salafist-Jihad	Palm Beach Gardens, FL	Knife	1	Jovanni Brand
1/2/2018	Samuel Woodward	White Supremacy	Lake Forest, CA	Knife	1	Blaze Bernstein



Hate-Motivated Homicides from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017

DATE	PERPETRATOR NAME	IDEOLOGY OF PERPETRATOR	CITY, STATE	INSTRUMENTALITY	NUMBER OF FATALITIES	NAME OF FATALITY VICTIMS (IF 3 OR LESS)
12/31/2017	Matthew Riehl	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Highland Ranch, CO	Firearm	1	Zach Parrish
12/23/2017	Nicholas Giampa	White Supremacy	Reston, VA	Firearm	2	Scott Fricker, Buckley Kuhn-Fricker
12/7/2017	William Atchison	White Supremacy	Aztec, NM	Firearm	2	Paco Fernandez, Casey Jordan-Marquez
11/2/2017	Wendell Melton	Anti-LGBTQ	Henderson, NV	Firearm	1	Giovanni Melton
10/31/2017	Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov	Salafist-Jihad	New York City, NY	Vehicle	8	Multiple
9/14/2017	Kenneth James Gleason	White Supremacy	Baton Rouge, LA	Firearm	2	Donald Smart, Bruce Cofield
8/12/2017	James Alex Fields Jr	White Supremacy	Charlottesville, VA	Vehicle	1	Heather D. Heyer
7/5/2017	Alexander Bonds	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Bronx, NY	Firearm	1	Miosotis Familia
6/19/2017	Robert Hunt	White Supremacy	Century Correctional Institution, FL	Knife	1	Jorge Slaughter
5/26/2017	Jeremy Joseph Christian	White Supremacy	Portland, OR	Knife	2	Ricky John Best, Taliesin Myrddin Namkai-Meche
5/20/2017	Sean Urbanski	White Supremacy	College Park, MD	Knife	1	Richard Collins III
5/19/2017	Devon Arthurs	Salafist-Jihad/ Fmr. Atomwaffen	Tampa, FL	Firearm	2	Jeremy Himmelman, Andrew Oneschuk

5/16/2017	Lloyd Montier Barrus, Marshall Barrus	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Missoula, MT	Firearm	1	Mason Moore
4/18/2017	Kori Ali Muhammad	Black Supremacy	Fresno, CA	Firearm	3	Zackary Randalls, Mark Gassett, David Jackson
3/30/2017	James Harris Jackson	White Supremacy	New York, NY	Knife	1	Timothy Caughman
2/22/2017	Adam W. Purinton	White Supremacy	Olathe, KS	Firearm	1	Srinivas Kuchibhotla
1/31/2017	Joshua Cummings	Salafist-Jihad	Denver, CO	Firearm	1	Scott Von Lanen
1/6/2017	Esteban Santiago	Salafist-Jihad	Fort Lauderdale, FL	Firearm	5	Multiple

Hate-Motivated Homicides from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016

DATE	PERPETRATOR NAME	IDEOLOGY OF PERPETRATOR	CITY, STATE	INSTRUMENTALITY	NUMBER OF FATALITIES	NAME OF FATALITY VICTIMS (IF 3 OR LESS)
9/16/2016	Nicholas Glenn	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Philadelphia, PA	Firearm	1	Unidentified Female Victim
8/23/2016	Stanley Vernon Majors	White Supremacy	Tulsa, OK	Firearm	1	Khalid Jabara
8/21/2016	Aaryn Snider	White Supremacy	Fort Wayne, IN	Knife	1	Samuel Hardrix
8/10/2016	Russell Courtier	White Supremacy	Gresham, OR	Vehicle	1	Larnell Malik Bruce Jr.
7/17/2016	Gavin Long	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Baton Rouge, LA	Firearm	3	Brad Garafola, Matthew Gerald, Montrell Jackson
7/7/2016	Micah Xavier Johnson	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Dallas, TX	Firearm	5	Multiple
7/7/2016	Lakeem Keon Scott	Anti-Police/Anti-Government	Bristol, TN	Firearm	1	Jennifer Rooney
7/4/2016	Monte Tyree Johnson, Lolanta Little	Anti-LGBTQ	Washington, D.C.	Firearm	1	Deeniquia Dodds
6/12/2016	Omar Mateen	Salafist-Jihad	Orlando, FL	Firearm	49	Multiple
3/29/2016	Shehada Khalil Issa	Anti-LGBTQ	North Hills, CA	Firearm	2	Amir Issa, Rabiah Issa



APPENDIX TABLE: FBI Hate Crime by Month and Year

CSHE-WVU EXCLUSIVE: FBI Reported Hate Crime Varies by Month, 1992-2017

► Over the last decade, the worst months for reported hate crimes were around presidential elections in **November 2016** (758, the worst in fourteen years) and **October 2008** (722). **August 2017**, the month of the violent **Charlottesville rally**, at **663 incidents**, was tied for the second worst month since **November 2008**, even though the homicide and assaults there were **not** reported as hate crimes.

The worst months overall for hate crime were **September and October 2001**, with almost 3,000 after the 9/11 attacks.

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1992	495	514	615	608	829	546	492	559	478	569	524	433
1993	634	596	568	686	689	651	718	680	623	662	617	479
1994	406	455	612	541	502	461	509	533	552	585	418	379
1995	584	573	709	671	564	715	719	691	757	855	586	522
1996	686	679	756	783	757	790	812	760	776	761	651	548
1997	561	598	740	715	788	712	712	673	695	758	584	512
1998	595	597	651	662	707	688	736	655	663	763	549	485
1999	566	642	636	777	738	638	704	711	684	710	581	488
2000	561	629	751	743	702	653	663	685	740	879	596	461
2001	624	552	735	809	741	762	684	711	1942	1043	616	511
2002	544	519	701	708	673	666	651	633	767	643	537	420
2003	528	488	683	673	697	649	641	678	681	681	615	475
2004	523	630	685	701	741	654	670	633	646	718	585	463
2005	542	541	622	678	680	600	612	625	612	677	548	426
2006	559	535	637	735	700	690	742	641	682	695	611	499
2007	553	479	632	675	717	686	688	658	744	743	574	475
2008	561	591	674	683	721	669	684	673	680	722	667	458
2009	478	491	565	549	615	591	557	639	594	628	500	405
2010	474	437	600	663	613	538	558	619	657	634	473	362
2011	440	387	516	539	589	553	548	572	552	571	470	485
2012	560	544	589	577	629	571	611	568	590	518	465	371
2013	395	394	476	524	566	561	594	560	510	507	440	387
2014	324	383	434	483	512	504	505	550	490	548	366	380
2015	412	364	437	512	558	562	592	544	481	469	462	457
2016	382	385	496	489	492	538	612	521	536	568	758	491
2017	544	576	632	560	648	641	580	663	631	642	579	479

1991 Hate Crime data obtained from [National Archive of Criminal Justice Data](#).

Color distribution of cells conditioned on the tenth, fifteenth, and nineteenth percentiles.

Solid bar around cells indicates five most frequent months for hate crimes and two additionally significant months.

1) Dec. 20, 1992 Rodney King Verdict; May 1992; 2) Gay, Lesbian, Bisex, Oct. 1994; 3) *Yellow Peril* Debate, Spring-Summer 1996;


4) U.S. Civil Liberties/Free Speech Institute, Oct. 2000; 5) September 11; 6) *Threats Against*, April-Oct. 2001;

6) 2016 U.S. Presidential Election; Nov. 8, 2016; 7) Heather Heyer's murder during the Unite the Right Rally, Aug. 12, 2017

FBI: Hate Crime, Last 10 Years

Year	Number	Number Change	Percentage Change
2017	7,175	+1,054	+17.2%
2016	6,121	+271	+4.6%
2015	5,850	+371	+6.8%
2014	5,479	-449	-7.6%
2013	5,928	-645	-9.8%
2012	6,573	+351	+5.6%
2011	6,222	-406	-6.1%
2010	6,628	+24	+0.4%
2009	6,604	-1179	-15.1%
2008	7,783	+159	+2.1%

APPENDIX: Hate Speech on 4chan (Andrew Thompson) and U.S. Hate Crime & 4chan Hate Speech



Appendix: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THREATS

► According to Capitol Police Chief Steven A. Sund, [threats against members of Congress continue to grow in 2019](#). In Fiscal Year 2018, the department opened approximately [4,894 cases](#), whereas in 2019, the department has already opened [2,502 cases](#). Testifying before the House Administration Committee, Chief Sund told members threats against members of Congress in fiscal year 2019 are [on par to surpass the number made in fiscal year 2018](#) ([source](#)).


Chairman Bennie Thompson of the House Homeland Security Committee sent a letter to Michael Stenger, U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms, requesting an emergency meeting to examine the U.S. Capitol Police Board's approach for protecting members of Congress in the face of increased threats to their lives. [Source: Twitter](#)

CSHE: Crimes and Threats Against Civilian Public Officials, 2018-2019

Date	State	Target	Details of Crime	Source
7/26/19	OK	University of Tulsa, Professor Susan Barnett, and then-Senior Vice Provost Wilma Tanaka	Christopher Barnett, a Republican candidate for Oklahoma governor in 2018, was charged with threatening an act of violence against the University of Tulsa and members of its administration and faculty, after stating he would shoot fans exiting the University's football stadium.	Tulsa World
7/18/19	MD	Congresswoman Frederica Wilson	Darryl A. Yarnum, a Pentagon cybersecurity contractor, called the congresswoman's district office in late June and left a voice message threatening to kill her if she introduced a vaccination bill. He has been charged with threatening to kill a member of Congress.	The Daily Beat
7/9/19	TX	Congresswoman Veronica Escobar	Rep. Escobar, along with those surrounding her, have received death threats because of a report that claims that her aides have improperly detained asylum seekers in Mexico.	Politico
7/8/19	NY	President Trump	Resident of Highlands, NY was arrested following threats made against President Trump and law enforcement.	Mid Hudson News
7/2/19	PA	Chester County Judge and sheriff's deputy	Michael McNugh was arrested for threatening to shoot a judge and sheriff's deputy.	Daily Local News
7/2/19	OR	Portland City Hall	Bomb threat reported against Portland City Hall. However, no device was found.	Oregon Live
7/1/19	AZ	Phoenix Police dispatcher	Multiple threats made against Phoenix Police staff after a video of an altercation between police and a family went viral.	Fox 10 Phoenix
6/20/19	NC	VA Senate Candidate Quinn Raabold	Joseph Carl Vandeviere threatened Candidate Raabold with lynching via Twitter.	The Daily Beast
6/7/19	SD	Mayor Paul Torkelson and Sioux Falls City Council	Christopher Bruce made threats against Sioux Falls mayor and city council members and was arrested for a stalking charge.	ABC 4 SDNY
6/4/19	UT	Unnamed members of Congress	Scott Hovan arrested for making threats against lawmakers opposed to or critical of the Trump administration in more than 3,000 calls over 2 years.	The Hill
6/1/19	FL	Congressman Matt Gaetz	Amanda Leigh Kondratyev charged with battery for throwing drink at Rep. Gaetz.	Huffington Post
5/29/19	WA	President Trump and family, and unspecified synagogues	Chase Elia Calacurcio pleaded guilty for making interstate threats through online posts against President Trump's family and threatening to bomb synagogues.	Seattle Times
5/17/19	PA	RCC Commissioner Ali Pal and his family	Marica Wan was sentenced to a year and a half in federal prison for threatening to kill RCC Commissioner Ali Pal over railroad of rail neutrality regulations.	Fox News
4/26/19	CA	Congressman Devin Nunes	Multiple threats against Representative Nunes.	Washington Examiner
4/1/19	FL	Senator Cory Booker, Congressman Eric Swalwell, and Congressman Raulo Trias	John Kiss pleaded guilty to transmitting threats through interstate communication Sen. Booker, Rep. Trias and Rep. Swalwell.	The New York Times
3/27/19	WV	President Trump	Brit Leonardo Charren, an armed man accused of threatening President Trump, pleaded guilty to reckless driving and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.	WVQAY
3/23/19	NY	Congresswoman Ileana Omar	Patrick W. Cortina, Jr. was charged with threatening to assault and murder Rep. Omar.	NBC News
3/21/19	FL	Congresswoman Mashe Waters and other members of Congress	Richard Mel Phillips was sentenced to 18 months for threatening to kill members of Congress.	Daily Command
3/3/19	OR	Senator Ron Wyden	James Arthur Solder was sentenced to two years of federal supervision after threatening Sen. Ron Wyden.	The Hill
3/1/19	NY	President Barack Obama and Congresswoman Mashe Waters	Stephen J. Taubert sentenced to four years in prison for making racist threats to kill President Obama and Rep. Mashe Waters.	Roll Call
2/1/19	MD	Protestant cable news journalists and Democratic politicians	U. Christopher P. Mason took 11411 rifles and stockpiled weapons to carry out terror attacks.	The New York Times
12/13/18	NY	Unidentified U.S. Senator	Michael Brogan charged with making threats of violence against an unidentified U.S. senator.	Roll Call

11/18/18	OK	President Trump and members of law enforcement	Harold Vandenburg was arrested for threatening law enforcement and President Trump	Fox2Now
10/26/18	PA	President Trump and Sarah Palin and family	In 2008, suspect Shawn Christy started a long journey of making obscene threats against Sarah Palin and her family, but was eventually arrested on June 12, 2019 for threatening to "put a bullet" in President Trump's head	The Morning Call
10/26/18	FL	Variety of public officials, including Presidents Obama and Clinton, Sens. Cory Booker and Kamala Harris, and major Democratic donors, including George Soros and Tom Steyer	Cesar Sayoc mailed 16 explosive devices to a variety of public officials	Orlando
10/19/18	NY	Two unnamed U.S. Senators	Ronald DeRita was arrested for allegedly threatening to murder and assault two U.S. senators over their support for the successful nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court	CBS2
10/17/18	MIN	Republican Party members	Democrat-Former-Labor Party staffer was suspended for posting on social media that Democrats would execute Republicans	Free Beacon
10/15/18	VT	Vermont House of Representative candidate Debrae Martin	Candidate Martin received a letter threatening her with rape and murder	Hartford
10/15/18	MIN	Minnesota House candidate Shane Muehlend	Candidate Muehlend reportedly suffered an attack, resulting in a concussion, while at a restaurant in St. George Township	Star Tribune
10/9/18	MIN	Justice Kavanaugh	Teacher tweeted out a suggestion that someone should kill Justice Kavanaugh	Star Tribune
10/7/18	CO	Wife of Senator Corey Gardner	Senator Corey Gardner's wife received a text message containing a video of a beheading	9 News - NBC
10/3/18	KY	Family of Senator Rand Paul	After having the home address and phone number of Senator Rand Paul released to the public, threats of violence have been made against him and his family	Orlando
10/2/18	DC	Unknown	Deadly poison rich sent in envelopes to Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson	New York Post
10/2/18	TX	Unknown	Powder mailed to campaign headquarters of Senator Ted Cruz	News Week
10/1/18	MD	Kellyanne Conway	Mary Elizabeth Inabnetti shook Kellyanne Conway at a restaurant in Bethesda, MD before being escorted out of the establishment	CBS News
9/9/18	CA	Congressional candidate Rudy Peters	Forrest Vincent Powell attempted to stab Congressional candidate Peters with a switchblade	San Francisco Chronicle
9/1/18	CT	President Trump	Gary Joseph Gravette, also known as Roland Frejson, threatened to kill President Trump, mentioning use of explosives and bio-weapons	New Haven Register
8/3/18	NY	Congressman Steve Scalise and Congresswoman Cathy McMorris-Rodgers	Carlos Sayon left threatening voicemail messages against Reps. Scalise and McMorris-Rodgers	Life News
7/26/18	TN	Congresswoman Diane Black	Clifton Ward was arrested for threatening to assault and murder Congresswoman Diane Black	WKRN
7/7/18	NY	Aide to Representative Lee Zeldin	Martin Astral threatened Lee Zeldin and "Trump supporters" before nearly striking a campaign worker with his car	Post News
7/2/18	CA	Unnamed Oregon elected official	Nathaniel Blake Huffman wrote emails and sent voicemails to an unnamed Oregon elected official	East Bay Times
Total: 41				


Criminal Prosecutions for Presidential Threats



*Prosecutions counted in chart were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 871 – Threats against President and successors to the Presidency, under which anyone who “knowingly and willfully... [threatens] to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm” upon the president, vice president, ex-presidents and ex-vice presidents, members of their families, presidential and vice presidential candidates, or members of their families (within 120 days of the general election) faces up to five years in prison for each count, and a \$250,000 fine. (Sources: [Quartz](#), [TRAC](#), [Legal Information Institute](#)).

Appendix: American Young People in Most Diversified Demographic Pool

**U.S. Census:
of Race and
Origin by**



**Distribution
Hispanic
Age Group**

Appendix: Terrorism in Federal Law

Source: [FBI](#)

Term	Statute Number	Statute Text	FBI Working Definition
International Terrorism	18 U.S. Code § 2331(1)	"The term "international terrorism" means activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State. . . appear to be intended. . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and. . . occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum."	According to the FBI, <u>International Terrorism</u> constitutes terrorism perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), a list of groups maintained by the U.S. Department of State, or nations, i.e. state-sponsored terrorism.
International Terrorism Charging Statute	18 U.S.C. § 2332b – Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries	"Whoever, involving conduct transcending national boundaries and in a circumstance described in subsection (b), . . . kills, kidnaps, maims, commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon any person within the United States; or . . . creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States; in violation of the laws of any State, or the United States, shall be punished as proscribed in subsection (c)."	
Domestic Terrorism	18 U.S. Code § 2331(5)	"(T)he term "domestic terrorism" means activities that. . . involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and. . . occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. . . ."	<u>Domestic Terrorism</u> constitutes terrorism perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based groups or movements, espousing extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature.

In April 2019, the FBI established the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell to achieve the closely-related goals of combating domestic terrorism and providing justice to those who are victims of hate crimes ([source](#)).

Appendix: INTERNATIONAL Hate Crime Data/ United Kingdom


► In Europe, many countries have hate crime laws that also punish hate speech, but prohibitions vary by nation. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) tracks and documents hate incidents and hate crimes by country. The OSCE's criteria for hate crimes is two-fold: 1) the act must constitute an offense under criminal law, and 2) the act must be motivated by bias ([source](#)).

Hate Crime by Nation in 2017

COUNTRY RANK BY SIZE	COUNTRY POP.	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
Austria #16	8.71 million	302	425	395	186	130	91	59	101	62
		29%	8%	122%	89%	23%	34%	-42%	63%	
Canada #18	35.68 million	2973	1408	1352	1295	1340	1404	1322	1402	1478
		42%	2%	3%	34%	30%	7%	-6%	5%	
France #21	62.81 million	1506	1535	1780	1662	1765	2357	dnr	2	dnr
		-18%	3%	8%	-6%	-25%	na	na	na	
Germany #23	82.46 million	7933	3538	3546	3059	4947	4514	4040	3770	4053
		120%	18%	<1%	-34%	3%	12%	7%	-18%	
Greece #34	11.78 million	138	40	60	71	109	1	dnr	2	2
		220%	-83%	-15%	-85%	38800%	na	na	nc	
Hungary #12	9.83 million	733	33	dnr	75	40	36	37	19	15
		538%	na	na	36%	33%	3%	28%	37%	
Italy #25	62.25 million	3540	756	565	536	432	71	68	54	134
		42%	33%	-7%	24%	365%	4%	21%	-54%	
Poland #17	38.62 million	838	874	263	778	757	366	222	251	194
		4%	232%	64%	3%	385%	20%	-12%	139%	
Sweden #15	10.04 million	dnr	4862	4839	4258	3943	5513	5483	5139	5797
		na	<1%	34%	8%	-29%	<1%	7%	-13%	
United Kingdom #10	65.11 million	9555.2	85769	62518	52863	47886	47626	50648	53946	58812
		38%	23%	135%	135%	1%	-6%	-6%	-6%	

Source: [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe \(OSCE\)](#)
Source: [Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18](#)

Number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police by month, April 2013 to March 2018




Appendix: Hate Crimes in U.S. Cities: 2018

Hate Crimes in 30 Major U.S. Cities: 2010-2018, 38 Million Total Population, 11.5% of U.S. Population

► In contrast to a 3.5 percent decline in crime overall in major U.S. cities in 2018 ([source](#)), these latest hate crime data mirror a multi-year rise across myriad other representative crime, social science, and digital datasets on prejudice and fragmented intergroup cohesion, also presented here. While this incremental rise occurred globally across many surveys, there is variation regarding targeting, timeframes, and localities. distinct spikes occurred across data sets around conflictual, violent or political catalytic events, and during times of increased Russian social media manipulation.

The 2018 total marked a 42 percent increase over 2010's total of 1,417 and a 51 percent increase over 2013's decade low of 1,324. Moreover, full year increases reversed steep first half declines. In several cities with large percentage increases derived from very low numbers of reports, much of the rise is likely from improved efficiencies known as "reporting effect."




Not all data sets were up as hate crime in the ten largest American cities fell under one percent in 2018, after four increases, to 1,030, on a large anomalous drop in Phoenix. Still, totals exceeded one thousand for only the second time this decade, with seven of the cities rising, and half hitting decade highs: Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, and Philadelphia. The 2018 total is 32 percent above 2010's total, and fifty percent above 2013's decade low of 684.

So far in 2019, major cities like New York, Los Angeles and Chicago are also up.

Appendix: Reuters Poll

► The Percent of Americans who say white people are under attack in the U.S. has risen to 43 percent in 2018, up from 39 percent in 2017. The number who say racial minorities are under attack in the U.S. has also risen, to 57 percent in 2018, up from 54 percent in 2017. While 23 percent said they didn't know whether they supported the alt-right in 2017, a greater number (28 percent) in 2018 said the same. The number of people who said they strongly or somewhat support neo-Nazism went up by one percentage point in 2018, to 5 percent, while the number who strongly or somewhat support white nationalism has also gone up one percentage point in 2018, to 8 percent.



Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Joscelyn to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and other Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify here today. This is actually the nineteenth time I have testified before Congress, many of those times before this committee. I find this committee in particular to have a pretty bipartisan air about it, and that is great for—especially when addressing issues that really are a threat to all of us across the ideological spectrum, as the other guests here have said.

You know, I deal a lot with ISIS and al-Qaeda, and there is a lot of sentiment in the United States right now that people just want to move on. I get that. You know, if you were telling me 18 years after 9/11 I would still be talking about al-Qaeda I would probably be surprised at the time. Unfortunately, however, I am always reminded of a simple, pithy phrase, which is “The enemy gets a vote.” Both ISIS and al-Qaeda are continuing to fight. I think that was recognized in the opening statements both from you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Mr. Ranking Member.

I would say I had some—a preamble dedicated to the called-off discussions at Camp David. But if we could just copy and paste Peter’s opening remarks as my critique, as well, that—I agree with every one of his points there.

I wanted to add one additional point of critique on that, in terms of negotiations with the Taliban, which is that in July the Taliban released a very disturbing video. My colleagues and I are nerds who troll through all the Taliban propaganda. We troll through all al-Qaeda and ISIS propaganda.

In this video, about 10 minutes in, they were justifying the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 bombings in London. They said that it was a slap on—a very hard slap on our dark faces—“our,” meaning Americans. They said that we deserved it, that it wasn’t their fault or the jihadis fault, it was Americans’ fault for their policies overseas. This has been a consistent Taliban message for the past 18 years. It is very disturbing to me that that sort of detail would be whitewashed while we are negotiating with them, and that people aren’t taking that into account.

I will add one other fact on that. In my testimony you will see I quote from 4 very recent U.N. Security Council reports dealing with al-Qaeda and ISIS. You can find the links are all given in my testimony for this. But one other fact that doesn’t get enough attention is what the U.N. Security Council says about al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. What the U.N. Security Council says is that al-Qaeda continues to see Afghanistan as a safe haven for its leadership, based on its long-standing strong ties with the Taliban.

In addition, these reports from the U.N. Security Council say things like al-Qaeda members act as instructors and religious teachers for Taliban personnel and their family members.

I won’t bore you with the additional details, but there are ample facts like that recounted in these U.N. Security Council reports that show that al-Qaeda is very much interested in resurrecting the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. The idea that the Taliban is going to somehow restrain or renounce al-Qaeda right now today I find fanciful. Yet that was the whole exchange in this deal that was sort-of proffered, was that we were going to withdraw our troops in exchange for this sort of promise. I—if you go back to the 9/11 Commission Report and many other details, you know there is no reason to believe that.

I used more of my time on that than I thought I would. But I will just say this very quickly. You know, ISIS in particular, you know, as we have been warning—and there is, I think, uniform agreement across the expert community on this—ISIS is not close to dead. Despite losing its physical caliphate, obviously, ISIS is very much alive.

There is—there are real challenges there, in terms of making sure that they are not able to reconstitute certain threats to the West. In particular, you know, I still find it fascinating that we know of guys who have been fighting for ISIS or its predecessor organizations for over a decade who are still in the game, and are still fighting that haven’t been taken out.

As I think Ali pointed out, they are in—they have a number of so-called provinces, everywhere from West Africa all the way to South Asia. They are fighting. By the way, those provinces were set up to compete with al-Qaeda’s presence in each one of those regions, because al-Qaeda is the deep, entrenched insurgency in most

of those areas, including Shabaab in Somalia, or in West Africa, or, as I mentioned, Afghanistan or elsewhere.

I would just say this. I echo—if you look at my testimony, even though it is not the main thing I focus on, I echo the alarm over the rise of far-right terrorism and extremism. I think it is an obvious growing threat.

One of the paragraphs in my testimony deals with how individuals responsible for attacks everywhere from New Zealand to El Paso were sort-of feeding off of each other and trying to one-up each other in trying to kill more people in the name of this sort-of twisted ideology. That, to me, makes it a global threat right off the get-go, just being able to see the ideas transit all the way from New Zealand all the way to El Paso and various other areas.

I will say this, too. Well, there is—there are a lot of points to argue, or to sort-of go into about the comparisons between jihadism and far-right terrorism. One point of similarity that I think comes across is after the New Zealand terrorist attack I was very struck by the fact how many jihadis were sharing the video of the massacre in the mosques in New Zealand. In fact, I got the video by—from al-Qaeda channels. They were sharing it and commenting on it. You could see this twisted sort-of feedback loop, this cycle of violence between the two feeding off of each other as they are talking about this.

In my written testimony—I won't read it here—I produced a quote from a Shabaab spokesman—this is al-Qaeda in Somalia and East Africa—and he used the New Zealand terrorist attack to argue, yes, basically that terrorist was right, Muslims don't belong in the West. You need to come fight for us against the West. Come back to your homelands.

So that is exactly how—and one of the areas that I am doing research on right now—these twin threats are sort-of feeding off each other. I am very worried, in particular, about both growing in the near future. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Rogers, and other Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.

It is hard to believe that 18 years have passed since the September 11, 2001, hijackings. The world has changed dramatically during that time. Many in the United States want to move on from the fight against jihadism, including from the wars unleashed by 9/11 and America's response. I cannot say I entirely blame them. But the enemy gets a vote, and our enemies have not given up.

Many in Washington argue that "great power competition" is America's main concern, and that the United States needs to pivot away from protracted conflicts against the jihadists. Some argue that we can no longer afford to have our limited resources tied up in the fight against the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, because we need to focus on near-peer competitors such as China, or on spoilers like Russia. Rising challengers, and especially China, do demand more of the U.S. Government's attention. But I think the resource allocation argument misses a key point: By and large, the U.S. military's pivot has already occurred. The last "surge" of American forces ended in 2011. Today, there are far fewer American troops deployed to war-time theaters than at the height of the U.S. commitment.

The United States has also already shifted much of the burden to its allies, as they have carried out the bulk of the on-the-ground fighting against Sunni jihadists for years. For example, Kurdish, Iraqi, and other forces played a leading role in the ground campaign against the Islamic State, ending its territorial claims in Iraq and Syria. Those same allied forces sustained the overwhelming majority of casualties in the war against the so-called caliphate. The same is true in jihadist hotspots such

as Afghanistan and Somalia. Unfortunately, 16 Americans have perished as a result of the conflict in Afghanistan this year. Still, Afghan military and security forces, as well as civilians, have sustained far higher casualties.

Going forward, as the United States presumably draws down further, a key question is: How will America's allies continue to keep the jihadists at bay with even less external assistance? We see in Afghanistan, for instance, that the government is barely holding the Taliban and other jihadists back throughout the country. This has been the case even though approximately 14,000 American troops, along with thousands of NATO partners, have been assisting the Afghans. America's airpower and Special Forces have been essential for preventing the Taliban from capturing more ground, especially several provincial capitals. This means it is extremely unlikely that the situation will improve with less Western assistance. This does not mean that we should paper over the problems with the war effort or ignore wasteful spending. The wide-spread frustration with these issues is well-placed. However, there are also legitimate concerns about the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan in the future.

Even though the U.S. military's footprint has been significantly reduced, America's armed forces continue to strike terrorist targets in several countries. Law enforcement and intelligence officials also continue to face a wide spectrum of threats. These include threats from the Islamic State and its global arms, al-Qaeda and its international network, as well as other foreign terrorist organizations. The Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and allied groups are fighting or operating across an enormous amount of ground, stretching from the remote regions of West Africa, through North and East Africa, into the heart of the Middle East, and all the way into Central and South Asia. The jihadists' war is far from over. Most of the jihadists are fighting for territory over there, but new threats to American security could emerge from within their ranks at any time.

There are also ample reasons to be concerned about the rise of far-right extremism, including terrorist attacks by white supremacists or other anti-government actors. To date, most of the far-right attacks inside the United States have been carried out by individuals. It is far too easy for a lone terrorist to wreak havoc. And we have already witnessed how an attack in one part of the world can inspire or influence another, even half a world away.

Consider that Brenton Tarrant, the accused terrorist who massacred 51 innocent civilians at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March, claimed to be inspired by Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people in Oslo in 2011, as well as by Dylan Roof, who murdered 9 churchgoers in a 2015 mass shooting in Charleston.¹ Even if the Christchurch terrorist exaggerated his ties to Breivik—he claimed to be in “brief contact” with the jailed mass murderer²—the evidence shows how one far-right terrorist's words and deeds can influence the actions of another living far away. In fact, Patrick Crusius, who has been charged with killing 22 people in August at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, reportedly wrote: “In general, I support the Christchurch shooter and his manifesto. This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.”³ In addition to their hatred for immigrants, the gunmen in New Zealand and El Paso have also been described as “eco-fascists.”⁴ This demonstrates how different extremist ideas can be combined in the minds of would-be terrorists to produce an even more toxic hatred. Also in August, another terrorist opened fire on a mosque in Norway, injuring 1. The man named as the main suspect in that attack, Philip Manshaus, reportedly drew inspiration from the killings in New Zealand and El Paso as well as from a shooting at a synagogue in California in April.⁵

I have studied jihadists for years. There are differences between the current far-right threat and that posed by groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But

¹Adam Taylor, “New Zealand suspect allegedly claimed ‘brief contact’ with Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik,” *The Washington Post*, March 15, 2019. (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/15/new-zealand-suspect-allegedly-claimed-brief-contact-with-norwegian-mass-murderer-anders-breivik/>).

²Ibid.

³Tim Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, and Katie Benner, “Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online,” *The New York Times*, August 3, 2019. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html>).

⁴Joel Achenbach, “Two mass killings a world apart share a common theme: ‘ecofascism,’” *The Washington Post*, August 18, 2019. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/two-mass-murders-a-world-apart-share-a-common-theme-ecofascism/2019/08/18/0079a676-bec4-11e9-b873-63ace636af08_story.html).

⁵Jason Burke, “Norway mosque attack suspect ‘inspired by Christchurch and El Paso shootings,’” *The Guardian* (UK), August 11, 2019. (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/norway-mosque-attack-suspect-may-have-been-inspired-by-christchurch-and-el-paso-shootings>).

I am struck by one similarity. The jihadists portray themselves as the guardians of Islam and its glorious past. They rely on a heavily mythologized view of history, justifying their violence by arguing that it is necessary to restore lost glory. This was a large part of the Islamic State's caliphate claim. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his henchmen wanted people to believe that an Islamic empire had been resurrected for Muslims, even though most of their victims are in fact Muslims.

There is a similarity with far-right extremism in this regard. The terrorist in Christchurch covered his weapons with historical symbols and names, portraying his wanton violence as a defense of the West against Muslims. Of course, his shootings were no such thing. But not only far-right believers were emboldened by Tarrant's historically illiterate narrative; so were some jihadists. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership and their loyalists around the globe called for revenge in the wake of the massacre in New Zealand. We collected messages from Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, West Africa, and elsewhere.

One message, from Shabaab's spokesman, the appropriately-named Ali Mahmoud Rage, was especially noteworthy. Rage agreed with Tarrant that Muslims have no place in the West. "We say to the Muslims in the West, wake up from your slumber, and know that you are in the den of wolves who surround you from every direction and lie around you," Rage claimed. "You are not safe from their gaze, even when you are inside the mosques." Rage continued: "O Muslims, you must realize that there is no future for you in the West, and that you must return to your countries, to participate in liberating them from the enemies and to live afterwards as Muslims, free under the shade of the Shariah and the governance of Islam."

In other words, both Tarrant and Rage portrayed themselves as the guardians of whole civilizations. Neither man is any such thing. But their hate is not all that different.

My other key points today are as follows:

1. While the Islamic State has lost its territorial caliphate and suffered other significant blows, the group lives on as a global terrorist and insurgent organization. The organization has highlighted the continued loyalty of more than a dozen of its so-called "provinces" outside of Iraq and Syria this year. Some of these are smaller operations. But its "provinces" in West Africa and the Khorasan (a region covering Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as parts of several other neighboring countries) are especially active. As was the case at the height of its power, the Islamic State's violence is focused primarily overseas.
2. To date, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's men have had far more success orchestrating professional plots in Europe than inside the United States. This has to do with ease of travel and other logistical issues. But officials will have to continue monitoring this threat stream for some time, as Baghdadi's surviving goons would like to orchestrate a large-scale attack inside the United States or against American interests elsewhere. Fortunately, a number of hurdles stand in their way. But continued pressure is necessary to ensure they do not exploit any holes in America's defenses.
3. The Islamic State's threat inside the United States has come primarily from its remote planners or through inspiration. Many of the group's "remote-controlled" plots—that is, attacks guided by on-line handlers working overseas—have been thwarted, but some inspired attacks have succeeded. With the proliferation of encrypted messaging capabilities, it may become easier for the jihadists to remotely guide larger-scale plots in the future, providing bomb-making or other tactical advice to people living in the United States. There is evidence that the Islamic State has done this elsewhere and that others, including al-Qaeda or far-right terrorists, could employ the same methods.
4. Eighteen years after 9/11, Americans have the right to wonder how much of a threat al-Qaeda is to them. The organization has failed to conduct another high-profile attack inside the United States. Some early plots were thwarted, while others failed on their own. However, al-Qaeda is far from dead. Despite triumphalist claims about the organization's supposed demise, al-Qaeda is a global terrorist and insurgent organization. Indeed, al-Qaeda's loyalists are probably fighting in more countries today than ever before. Although this is not widely understood, al-Qaeda has devoted most of its resources to various insurgencies, seeking to build Islamic emirates that could one day join together and resurrect an Islamic caliphate. Of course, this vision is far from becoming a reality. But it does motivate much of the al-Qaeda network's violence. This central idea also explains al-Qaeda's global structure. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (also known as the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims"), and al-Shabaab in Somalia are all openly loyal to al-Qaeda's senior leadership and serve as regional branches of the group. In

addition, there are several al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria, though the organization's structure in the Levant is now a bit murky due to various bouts of infighting and disagreements over strategy. There are other al-Qaeda-linked groups elsewhere as well.

5. Al-Qaeda has not attempted a large-scale attack in the West in years, but this does not mean the threat has been entirely eliminated. Al-Qaeda deliberately chose to prioritize fighting in various theaters over spectacular, 9/11-style terrorism. There is always a possibility that al-Qaeda will decide to take a big shot at the United States or Europe once again. The last al-Qaeda attack in the West came in January 2015, when two brothers carried out a precisely planned assault on Charlie Hebdo's offices in Paris. That attack, facilitated by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, was part of al-Qaeda's targeted global campaign against supposed blasphemers. Al-Qaeda's men wanted to portray themselves as the avengers of Islam after Charlie Hebdo and other publications printed allegedly offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed. Al-Qaeda has also sought to inspire individuals to lash out on their own, and has had limited success in this regard.

6. There are a variety of ways al-Qaeda could attempt a major, mass casualty attack in the West in the future. Part of the story that is often overlooked is the U.S. Government's role in suppressing various emerging threats. For example, the U.S. military struck alleged al-Qaeda leaders in Syria twice this year, claiming that these unnamed individuals are "responsible for attacks threatening U.S. citizens, our partners, and innocent civilians."⁶ Previous American airstrikes in Syria have targeted al-Qaeda figures suspected of plotting against the United States and the West as well. In recent years, the United States has also taken out al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and Yemen after intelligence officials learned they had a hand in anti-American and transregional plans.⁷ This counterterrorism campaign demonstrates how al-Qaeda's external operations planning has become more geographically dispersed over time, a direct result of the group's role in various insurgencies.

7. The Trump administration has been pursuing a deal with the Taliban as part of its effort to extricate American forces from Afghanistan, but this will not lead to peace. As the Taliban's recent actions have demonstrated—including its large-scale assaults on the cities of Kunduz and Farah, suicide bombings throughout the country, kidnapping and murder of a human rights official, and release of a video justifying the 9/11 attacks—there is no good reason to think the organization is interested in peace. The Taliban currently contests or controls more ground than at any time since 9/11. Americans' frustration with the war effort is well-placed. In my view, however, a deal with the Taliban is not necessary to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan, nor will it advance American interests. A number of regional or international terrorist organizations fight under the Taliban's banner today, and there is no indication that the Taliban will truly break with them.

8. The Taliban remains closely allied with al-Qaeda, and this is not likely to change as a result of any agreement between the United States and the Taliban. At FDD's *Long War Journal*, we've documented this relationship for years. In addition, 4 reports submitted to the United Nations Security Council since last year have warned that: Al-Qaeda is "closely allied" with the Taliban, and the group's "alliance with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan remains firm";⁸ al-Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban is "long-standing"

⁶U.S. Central Command, "Statement from U.S. Central Command on strike against al-Qaida in Syria," June 30, 2019. (<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/statements-View/Article/1891697/statement-from-us-central-command-on-strike-against-al-qaida-in-syria/>); see also: U.S. Central Command, "Statement from U.S. Central Command on U.S. Forces strike against al-Qaida in Syria leadership in Idlib, Syria," August 31, 2019. (<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/1949406/statement-from-us-central-command-on-us-forces-strike-against-al-qaida-in-syria/>). These airstrikes targeted Ansar al-Tawhid and Hurras al-Din (or possibly former members of the group). Both are al-Qaeda-affiliated groups operating in Idlib as well as elsewhere in Syria.

⁷Cheryl Pellerin, "Transregional Strikes Hit al-Qaida Leaders in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan," U.S. Department of Defense, November 2, 2016. (<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/994180/transregional-strikes-hit-al-qaida-leaders-in-syria-yemen-afghanistan/>).

⁸United Nations Security Council, "Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," June 27, 2018, pages 3 and 15. (<https://undocs.org/S/2018/705>).

and “strong”;⁹ al-Qaeda “has grown stronger operating under the Taliban umbrella across Afghanistan and is more active than in recent years”;¹⁰ the Taliban is the “primary partner for all foreign terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, with the exception of” the Islamic State’s Khorasan branch;¹¹ al-Qaeda “members continue to function routinely as military and religious instructors for the Taliban”;¹² and al-Qaeda “considers Afghanistan a continuing safe haven for its leadership, relying on its long-standing and strong relationship with the Taliban leadership.”¹³

9. Far-right terrorism is a global phenomenon. To date, high-profile attacks have been carried out primarily by individuals or very small cells. As the brief summary above makes clear, however, violent provocations are traveling around the world at an alarming rate. Individual terrorists are not only inspired online, but can also engage in one-upmanship, with aspiring terrorists attempting to outdo one another. Racially-motivated extremist beliefs do not have to be focused exclusively on cultural or ethnic identity, but can also incorporate other radical ideas, sometimes making it difficult to distill the beliefs of a perpetrator down to a single issue. Several recent terrorist attacks have been conducted by individuals who combined far-right, anti-immigrant views with other beliefs. However, their targets—whether they are Hispanic, African-American, Muslim, Jewish, members of the LGBT community, or other civilians—indicate their primary motivations.

10. Going forward, we must be vigilant regarding the possible development of more sophisticated far-right terrorist organizations and networks with capable leaders, both inside the United States and abroad. There are already indications that neo-Nazis and others are organizing their on-line presence to make it easier for aspiring terrorists to get their hands on evil knowhow such as bomb-making techniques. As we have seen, a single shooter can terrorize a community and kill dozens. A small team of dedicated individuals could hypothetically do even more damage, especially if they combine small arms with explosives. Paramilitary or other organized training could greatly increase the threat even further. Coordination across national boundaries is also a very real concern.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. This is kind-of the broad brush question for the Members.

As we look at this global threat, what is your suggestion to this committee for us to focus on for the next year, both internationally and domestically, in your learned opinion?

Mr. BERGEN. Can I remind the committee that Representative King introduced legislation a long time ago? No fly, no buy. If you are too dangerous to be on a no-fly list, why is it OK for you to buy semi-automatic weapons?

There was a moment after the Florida attack where it seemed like Congress actually might vote for this. This is astonishing. The NRA have produced a huge smokescreen, saying there is some Americans on that list who shouldn’t be on there. Well, we know that only 800 Americans are on that list. My guess is all but 2 of them should be on that list, and that the civil rights of the 2 people that are being infringed are less important than the civil rights of every American who might be killed in a mass shooting because

⁹United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” December 27, 2018, page 16. (https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/N1846950_EN.pdf).

¹⁰United Nations Security Council, “Tenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan,” April 30, 2019, page 9. (<https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/481>).

¹¹Ibid.

¹²United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” June 27, 2019, page 16. (<https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/570>).

¹³Ibid., page 15.

somebody legally purchased semi-automatic weapons, as Omar Mateen did, the guy who killed 49 people down in Florida, as did the terrorists who killed this lady's father in San Bernardino.

This is the simplest thing we could actually do to reduce the threat.

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Soufan.

Mr. SOUFAN. I think, when it comes to terrorism—I agree with what Peter said about mass shootings. But also, when it comes to terrorism, I think we need to be sure that the Islamic State won't rise again. We need to figure out a strategy that goes beyond just the military and the intelligence. We need to start focusing on targeting the ideology and targeting the incubating factors that is making these groups recruit all over the place.

When I talk about ISIS, I also talk about al-Qaeda. Shabaab has been recruiting based on local reasons in Somalia. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb is recruiting based on tribal and ethnic and resources conditions in the Sahel region. The same thing in what is happening in Syria with al-Qaeda and ISIS, and what is happening in Afghanistan.

After 18 years of this so-called war on terrorism, we spend more than—I don't know. It is reported \$5–6 trillion, and now we have more terrorists than when we started on 9/11. What we are doing is—internationally, globally—is not working. What we are doing domestically is working very well. I think the intelligence community, the law enforcement community have been doing an amazing job in containing that threat and preventing that threat from coming to the United States.

Joint terrorism task forces around the Nation, intelligence folks and military personnel on the front lines are doing an amazing job, and they are keeping us safe. But we are actually putting a Band-Aid on the wound. We need to cure it. By curing it, I think we need to go beyond the military and the intelligence.

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. I think there are 3 major things that we need to look at.

One are socio-political divisions, which are getting very hot throughout North America and Europe. If you want to look at where a threat comes from, look at where you have the bench with the most players. Forty-three percent of Americans, according to a Reuters Ipsos poll, said whites are under attack. That is up 4 percent from 2017.

That being said, I think we also have to look at unstable states, displaced persons internationally, and—as well as civil war.

Two other quick things. One, the internet. Thank you very much for calling in the head of that toxic waste dump, 8chan, which not only says—not only has bigoted things on there, it is really a place for rallying other extremists to commit acts of mass violence.

Last, I have the daughter of someone whose father—who painted murals of Jesus at children's hospitals—shot dead in our community. We just had some—we just had a California highway patrolman shot dead. At the time, San Bernardino was the worst post-9/11 violent Salafist Jihadist attack by way of fatalities. That has been eclipsed since.

We have to do something about the weapons of war. I am former NYPD. I am a gun owner. But you know what? I don't want unstable lunatics or ideological extremists having access to these weapons of war. We have seen, for instance, FBI—rifle deaths have hit a 10—a decade high. That is the subset of where semiautomatic comes from. So I think, with regard to magazines, all that kind of stuff, we have to look at magazine size. We have to look at types of these semiautomatic rifles, which are now the weapons of choice.

Also, I would say for my friends who also look at these jihadist messages, they say, "Go get a gun. It is easy in the United States."

So I think, you know, we can dance around the circle, but the bottom line is that these kinds of weapons are wreaking havoc in our country, and 89 percent of Americans, just in a poll that came out just over this past week, said that they favor things like background checks, restrictions on magazines, and also perhaps even hiking the age of purchasers who have not served in the military. So there are a variety of things. I want to thank the committee for the holistic approaches.

Last, though—I think it is really important—the threat is really diversifying. While white nationalist, white supremacists are on the—on top, these other groups that we are talking about internationally, they have a remarkable ability, like hitting mercury with a hammer, to come back and coalesce. So I think we have to keep a broad spectrum approach. But right now, white nationalists, white supremacists represent the biggest threat. I think, if you look at what the U.K. services have said, what Sweden said just in the last month, this is something that is hitting all over the world.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Joscelyn.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Two quick points. One on al-Qaeda. I think it is fitting, since we are 18 years after 9/11, we can ask why we haven't been attacked again. There are many reasons, I would say, one of which is, of course, the U.S. Government suppressed a number of threats, one of which is that they were incompetent on several occasions, thank goodness, and the third of which is very misunderstood, and is not something that you hear often, but I think this committee should explore, which is that over last several years al-Qaeda has absolutely de-prioritized attacks in the West, in particular, and certainly in terms of mass casualty attacks, or attempting one.

The last al-Qaeda attack in the West was actually January 2015 against the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris. That was a very precise, well-planned, military-style assault that they designed to try and send a message across the Islamic world to pretend that they are avenging Islam for the cartoons that were published or re-published by Charlie Hebdo. That is a very different sort-of style of attack than just sort-of blanket trying to bring down planes, or to bomb buildings, or go after random civilians.

The fact of the matter is we have evidence, which I can share with you later, that al-Qaeda has had a stand-down order, and has not tried sort-of a 9/11-style attack in some time. It doesn't mean they will be successful if they push that button again. There are a lot of tripwires they could, you know, come across that would stop them. But I would ask the question of why. Why is it they really

haven't tried that recently? They have been growing their insurgency footprint, and I think they have more assets to try that in the future.

Very quickly, on the far-right threat—or I am terming the “far-right threat,” this committee, I think, should spend time, in my opinion, looking at the increasing indications of organizational capacity, which I think Ali Soufan had addressed in his testimony. I think that that is where I think this may be going.

I am worried that, when you look at the recent big attacks we talked about in El Paso or New Zealand, or the attack on the mosque in Norway, or some of these other ones, these were carried out by individuals. If you have a team, a small team of individuals who are well armed, who have procured weapons, they could be even more deadly, and they could be training for something along those lines, and training along those lines they can get inspiration from a number of different sources.

I wouldn't—I am not going to share all my thoughts on that in an open setting, because I don't want to accidentally inspire somebody, but I would be happy off the record to provide more thoughts along those lines.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. I think you will probably get a chance to do an off-the-record conversation about it, too.

The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee for questions.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Joscelyn, what steps can the United States and its allies take to keep pressure on terrorist networks and their safe havens?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think the No. 1 thing is transparency, talking about what is going on. I am a little worried that our leaders are not articulating what is going on, or what we see overseas, and explaining to the American people the threats that are developing.

I will give you an example. Just days before President Trump was elected, a very senior al-Qaeda leader was killed in Kunar Province in Afghanistan. He was planning attacks against us from Afghanistan. He was laying the groundwork for long-term planning. That made barely a ripple in the news cycle. Nobody even knew that that occurred. Yet we see stuff like that all the time. You can see in Syria, where the U.S. military has bombed al-Qaeda locations twice this year, there has been no real explanation of why, or what the threat was, or what they were doing.

So I think there is a basic level of education that is not being met right now. But I think we have to keep pressure on these networks, the leadership structures, and, most importantly, work with allies and partners around the world to keep the jihadi insurgencies at bay, because, as those jihadi insurgencies spread and have spread, the threats can multiply to global security. And that is not something that we are going to at this point have the U.S. military taking the lead in large coin-style operations around the globe.

But we have to be very careful about identifying partner forces on the ground to back. The big threat in Afghanistan, as Peter outlined, and I agree with, is that we have been negotiating with the Taliban, while throwing the legitimate government of Afghanistan

under the bus. That is our best hope of keeping the Taliban and al-Qaeda at bay is propping them up. I know it is costly. I know people are frustrated with the war. Believe me, I get it. But that is the best hope in the long run for not allowing these threats to multiply out of Central and South Asia.

Mr. ROGERS. Can I point out, Mr. Levin, you said we should go beyond what we are doing to combat global terrorism. Mr. Soufan talked about how, after 18 years, we have many more of these global terrorists than we had when we were attacked in 2001.

So I would ask the whole panel, what do you think we should be doing differently from what we have been doing to combat this global terrorist threat? Start with Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. First, don't take your eye off of the violent Salafist Jihadists. Also, don't take your eye off of a variety of different places that are becoming hot. FDD was just threatened by Iran. I mean we now have an American think tank basically being threatened by a foreign power, and they have proxies that do bad things—

Mr. ROGERS. What should we do about it, though? That is what I am asking all of you. What should we be doing differently from what we have been doing as a Nation? You said don't take our eye off of them, but then what other action?

Mr. Soufan.

Mr. LEVIN. Oh, could I just—

Mr. ROGERS. Sure, sure.

Mr. LEVIN. I don't think we should just get out of Afghanistan as if we are—you know, we are heading to a football game that we are late for because we are impatient. So I just wanted to make sure I made that point.

Mr. ROGERS. Right.

Mr. LEVIN. Ali.

Mr. SOUFAN. So, sir, first you correctly said that al-Qaeda has more than 40,000 members today. We are not even including the so-called Islamic State and all the members that they have.

I mean, at one point they had 45,000 foreign fighters from 110 different countries that joined them in Iraq and Syria. Remember, after the war in Afghanistan, after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, we had about 10,000 foreign fighters. ISIS alone had more than 45,000 foreign fighters from 110 different countries, and you see what those 10,000 did on 9/11, almost created a path that led us to 9/11.

What made this ideology, the Salafist Jihadi movement? What made it stay after all the trillions of dollars that we spent?

First, resiliency of the ideology. Frankly, wouldn't even attempt to counter the ideology. We are not comfortable in dealing about countering the ideology under many administrations.

Two, sectarianism. That started with the Iraq war. The sectarianism created opportunities for regional countries to fight each other using the sectarian elements which fed into groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, and gave a new blood for al-Qaeda, the Iraq war.

Third, I think it is the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring changed the calculus of Osama bin Laden. This is when he ordered his organization not to focus on the far jihad, not to focus on the United States, but to focus regionally, create chaos, prevent anyone from

filling the vacuum, and then they can create an alliance between all these groups and create their own caliphate.

So now they are doing exactly what bin Laden told them with al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb. Then it goes to the Horn of Africa with the Shabaab. Then it goes to AQAP in Yemen. Then it goes to the different names that al-Qaeda uses in Syria, from Ansar al-Deen to the Tahrir al-Sham. You can put a lipstick on a pig, it is still a pig. They are all al-Qaeda members.

So if you look at that, the Arab Spring changed the calculus of the global jihad. The Syria war that gave them another opportunity that Afghanistan—you know, that we took away from them in Afghanistan. We need to engage in countering the sectarian elements by cohesive diplomatic initiative, and solving a lot of these problems there. We need to counter the ideology using people from the region, tribal leaders, governments, scholars—preventing our allies from using religion in order to fight Iran, for example, and this way it is feeding into al-Qaeda.

We need to find solutions for a lot of these incubating factories that is feeding these groups and make them recruit. We need to diminish their ability to recruit. You know, al-Qaeda and ISIS should not be the answer for the grievances of Muslims in the Middle East. When we do that, we will be on the first path of success.

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you. I yield back.

Mr. BERGEN. I mean I think it is very simple. Just learn from our own history. We closed our embassy in Afghanistan in 1989. Into the vacuum came the Taliban and then al-Qaeda. We withdrew completely from Iraq at the end of 2011. By the way, this is a bipartisan failure, because it was George W. Bush's plan, it was implemented by the Obama administration. Let's not make the same mistake in Afghanistan.

Let's also learn from our successes. You know how many people have died in the operation against ISIS, how many American servicemen have died in the Iraq and Syrian war? It is 16. Now, each one of those deaths is an individual tragedy. But tens of thousands of Iraqis and Syrians died on our behalf. We trained up one of the world's worst military, the Iraqi military, to become the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, one of the most effective counter-terrorism groups in the region, and they did a great job in defeating ISIS. We did the same thing with Syrian Democratic Forces. Its—those forces are still there, and they make it much less likely that either ISIS—that ISIS could come back in the same way that it did in the summer of 2014.

So I think just learn from our history. We know how to do this. The Trump administration's approach to this and the Obama administration's approach to this have, broadly, been very similar. No big footprint. Use special forces, use drones, use cyber operations, keep the number of Americans that are actually fighting on the ground pretty—to a very small group. That is a tried-and-true kind of approach.

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Rice.

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bergen, has the announcement of the death of Osama bin Laden's son had an effect on al-Qaeda's ability to recruit newer, younger members? Are you concerned that the leadership void, such as there is one, leaves opportunities for more extreme spin-off groups to rise?

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you, Miss Rice, Representative Rice. You know, bin Laden's son, the State Department put a million dollars on his head. I think that is actually kind-of—if you think \$25 million for Ayman al-Zawahiri, the actual leader—Hamza was a, you know, 30-year-old. He wasn't—there is no evidence he was carrying out operations. It is not good for them that they lost him, because he could have become a next generation leader. Ali Soufan has written about this extensively. I don't think it is really that big a deal, either way. Al-Qaeda's leadership is mostly dead, and that is because of the drone program.

We don't know how Hamza died. I wouldn't be surprised if it was on the wrong end of an American drone, but it has been very effective. The best witness for that is bin Laden. If you look at the Abbottabad documents, he was extremely concerned about the drone program because it was killing his entire organization, the leadership of it.

Miss RICE. How close do you think Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Mr. BERGEN. I have no idea.

Miss RICE. Does anyone on the panel have any thoughts about that?

Mr. BERGEN. I mean, look, the International Association for Atomic Energy has said at least 9 times that the Iranians are not enriching uranium to the point where it is really an issue. Right now the agreement was 3.67 percent. It is now—they have been enriched to 4.5 percent. Well, they need to get to 90 percent for a weapon. So, look, I am not a nuclear weapons expert, but, I mean, they are a very long way from it.

But they are kind-of fiddling around the edges, and we are kind-of in this kind-of ironic situation, where the thing the Trump administration is supposedly trying to prevent is actually beginning to happen, which is they are trying to inch up to getting this capacity. But they are being very careful. They don't want a conflict with us in the same way that we apparently don't really want a conflict with them.

Miss RICE. Peter, I think that you actually mentioned before, you know, that a lot of how we address the issues that we are talking about here today requires a level of cooperation with our international partners. A big concern that I have—and I am sure many people on this panel have—is our ability to actually build those kind of international—or continue those kind of international relationships that are so important, not just to intelligence gathering, but to a collective response to whatever threat it is that we are talking about.

So, Peter, your thoughts on that, and anyone else on the panel?

Mr. BERGEN. No, I mean, our allies are still with us in Afghanistan. If we—but if we withdrew, they are not going to stay. I mean, they are advising and assisting the Afghan army. So, I mean, they

are looking to us for leadership, obviously. Yes, I think that is about it.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I have one thing.

Miss RICE. Yes.

Mr. JOSCELYN. You know, we—I hear a lot in this town about great power competition. I am sure you guys hear quite a bit about it. You know, especially with China, and homeland security, and different threats and issues. My own view, as you see in my written testimony, is that the resource allocation argument is a little bit misplaced.

I am sure there is still fat on the bone to be cut in terms of what we are spending on counterterrorism, maybe, actually. But the pivot away from making that the centerpiece of what the U.S. military does, in particular, happened years ago. If you look at Defense Department budgets, you look at how our forces are deployed around the world, it is just simply not the case that they are sort-of tied up resources fighting al-Qaeda or ISIS that need to be freed up to worry about China or worry about Russia. I just don't buy that argument, as a whole.

You can argue about different—what you think we should be doing in Afghanistan, or you can argue we should be doing things differently. Fine. But I don't think that there is sort-of this meme that has grown about how we just have to worry about China and great power competition now, and don't worry about this stuff.

The bottom line is that the best cost management way to deal with this jihadism going forward is to make sure that our allies are properly supported in the fights, since they are the ones who are incurring the on-the-ground casualties, by and large, since they are the ones that are expending the resources, and since, by and large, it is their societies and their homes that are in jeopardy.

You know, if we pull back from that and we take—pull the rug out from under them, then guess what? We are going to have to spend more resources to deal with it in the long run, and then it is going to become an even bigger resource allocation problem.

Miss RICE. Yes. Mr. Soufan, what more should be done to combat the use of crowdfunding and crypto currencies to fund white supremacist extremists?

Mr. SOUFAN. Well, first we need to recognize the threats. I bet our intelligence and law enforcement folks will do a great job in dismantling it.

Our allies, for example, the Canadians and the British, already designated some white supremacist groups as terrorist organizations. Guess what? These groups have contacts with white supremacist groups in the United States. Now you have an ally like the Brits or the Canadians saying, "Those are terrorists, America. What are you going to do about it?"

So this is really interesting. We need to recognize the threat. We need to start looking into designation of foreign entities that is involved in promoting this hateful narrative. Then the next will come.

Unfortunately, with 9/11 we were screaming and crying, "Hey, pay attention to this al-Qaeda. Pay attention to Osama bin Laden." I remember when the USS Cole happened and we were in Yemen. Nobody cared. When we finally convicted Osama bin Laden and his

operatives who were blowing up two embassies in East Africa, in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998, the day after the conviction the cover pages in the New York papers were a fight that took place between Jennifer Lopez and P. Diddy in a club. Nobody cares about what we are doing.

People cared and woke up after 9/11. We were in that battle for a long time. We have been asking people, "Please pay attention." I think we need to recognize that. Other allies started recognizing that threat. We need to pay attention before it is too late. Thank you.

Miss RICE. Thank you all very much. Thank you, Mr.—

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for 5 minutes.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all the witnesses for their testimony.

Mr. Levin, thank you for your service with the NYPD. In your testimony you mentioned about the social and political divisions here in the country which edge the violence. Let me just say at the outset white nationalism is evil. Whatever has to be done to stamp it out, we have to do, whether it is cooperation internationally, nationwide among local police. Coordination that we put in against al-Qaeda and ISIS has to all be also used against white nationalism.

I would say, though, that—so we don't take our eye off the ball all together, even domestically, there have been attacks from the left. For instance, the attack on Steve Scalise and the Republican baseball team. It was motivated by somebody from the left. We had El Paso. We also had Dayton, which appears the person was motivated from the left.

Now, not to ascribe any of this to people on the left, but we do have people who can be driven off the edge. So I think, while white nationalism is most organized right now, also we should keep an eye on, again, groups like Antifa on the left, because there is a, I think, a violence in our society. It is more pronounced on the right right now, but it is also there on the left. We should keep that in mind.

Also, the attacks on police officers have increased dramatically in the last several years. So all of that, I think, should be part of the holistic approach we are talking about.

Also, I can't agree more with all of you who say that we can't take our eye off the ball, as far as overseas, as far as the Islamist threat, the terror threat. Just go back to 2009 with Najibullah Zazi. If he had been successful, we would have had hundreds, if not thousands, of people killed with that one attack. There was going to be an attack on the—a liquid explosive attack on the New York City subway system, which almost succeeded. I was actually with Commissioner Kelly the night they were waiting for that to happen. They didn't know if they had gotten everybody or not. So with one mistake, or one taking our eye off the ball, we could have another 9/11, or we could have had someone like Zazi getting through.

So I think it is a temptation on both sides to, you know, sort of live in your own silo. I think that those of us on the right have to realize there is a definite threat coming from white nationalism.

It is there. It is evil. But also, as a country, we can't let battle fatigue cause us to make decisions which may seem pleasant at the time—we are finally bringing our troops home, we are finally easing some of the restrictions—and then find out we get attacked the next day.

As you said, otherwise it will be a Jennifer Lopez replay. We will be—I remember in 2001 also the big issue that summer had been the attacks by sharks and people at the beach. That was the headlines every day. We never heard from it again after 9/11.

So with that, if I could just, again, ask each of you if you can just comment. Do you think that significantly the reach between overseas Islamist terrorism, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the offshoots, that reach they have into the United States as far as actual interconnection has been reduced, and where it stands right now since 9/11?

Mr. BERGEN. Well, let me make an observation. Every lethal terrorist attack carried out by jihadi terrorists since 9/11 has been carried out by a U.S. citizen or a U.S. legal permanent resident. None of them are foreign terrorists. None of them came from overseas. So the reach is entirely electronic.

I mean—so the travel ban was kind-of a solution in search of a problem that didn't really exist. You can't ban the internet, and the people involved aren't—they are here, they are Americans.

So the question is one of domestic radicalization, whether it is right-wing terrorists, or whether it is jihadists, or whether it is black nationalist terrorists, or ideological misogynists, or other groups.

So the real issue is what is happening on the internet, and what is radicalizing people here, notwithstanding the fact that, as everybody has said, we have to be cognizant of the overseas threat. But the kind of proximate threat is the local threat here in the United States.

Mr. KING. Mr. Bergen, if I could just add, though, to that, though, for instance, Zazi was an American citizen.

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. KING. But he was—also had been over in—I guess it was Afghanistan, where the attack was coordinated from. So he was an American of Afghan ancestry, and he was over there. So that was, yes, an American carrying it out, but with direct coordination from Afghanistan.

Mr. BERGEN. That is correct, sir. So, you know, Faisal Shahzad, trained by the Pakistani Taliban in 2010, tried to blow up an SUV—

Mr. KING. Times Square.

Mr. BERGEN [continuing]. In Times Square, and the Underwear Bomber was a Nigerian who was trained in Yemen who tried to bring down a flight. So—but these are all a decade ago. I'm not saying it can't happen again, but the things that are happening all the time are these domestic terrorists.

Mr. LEVIN. Could I just respond to something you said, Congressman?

Mr. KING. Yes, sure.

Mr. LEVIN. Nobody knows the Antifa threat like I do, since the last death threat I got was either from the hard left or Antifa. We don't know who it was.

But now, Dayton is in a little bit of a holding pattern. FBI apparently still is looking at it as domestic terrorism. It could be a hard left thing. However, over the last couple of years we have not seen any homicides committed by Antifa or the hard left. Not saying it couldn't happen—1970's, a different picture. When I testified before the committee just 4 years ago I said the biggest threat facing the United States homeland are violent Salafist Jihadists. Then, within weeks, we had Paris and our community was hit.

But I think we also have to look at a little bit of operational effectiveness. What we have seen is this pattern around the world of these white nationalist, far right—we just had a Nazi elected in Germany. So yes, could the hard left do things different?

One of the things that we see is when one goes up, another goes up. If you remember, after the Oklahoma City bombing, who came out of the shadows? The Unabomber.

So what we are seeing is a lot of convergence. We even see, like, mixed messages and mixed motives. But bottom line is, at this point, we have not seen the kind of organized threat—Antifa, I think, is more concerned, frankly, with shouting loud at a lot of these places, and minor physical assaults. But we did see in Tacoma an Antifa partisan commit an attack with firearms and an IED, just in the last few months.

But bottom line is we have counted—we—so the year after I testified, 3 homicides by white supremacists. Now, this year alone, 26.

Mr. KING. Yes, I am not disputing anything you said. I would say that, right now, the main threat is white nationalism. We should also keep an eye, since there is, as you said, violence going throughout our society, and some of the recent attacks have also been coming from the left.

But again, I—let's make it clear. White nationalism right now is the main domestic threat. I am not getting away from that.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Can I make a very quick point? Just to answer your question about the issue of infiltrating a terrorist team, which is what this gets to the heart of, the—one of the big reasons why they haven't been able to do another 9/11-style attack is because there are a number of trip wires for infiltrating into the United States a team of trained terrorists from abroad. That doesn't mean it has been perfect; some of them have gotten through on an individual basis, that sort of thing.

My main concern with the spread of a jihadist insurgency is it gives them more jumping-off points to try and get a team into the United States. That is my main concern. I don't think—although the United States is definitely tracking that threat in places like Syria and Yemen and elsewhere, I think there are probably holes developing in our vision of the enemy, which may be a concern, going forward.

There are some indications of what they are trying to do, in terms of basically finding a side way in to try and do something along those lines. But again, that is sort-of the—that is, obviously, not the bulk of what we have seen since 9/11, but it is still a possibility that can't be ruled out.

Mr. KING. OK, thank you. I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Torres Small for 5 minutes.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being here today.

I am concerned about the rise of white nationalism abroad, and their connection to domestic terrorism in the United States. As you know, authorities believe that the shooter of the El Paso massacre last month, just a few miles from the district I serve, wrote a anti-Hispanic manifesto, referencing white supremacist ideologies, and support for the Christchurch shooting in New Zealand.

Mr. Soufan and Mr. Levin, can you please talk about the nexus between global white supremacist extremism and its impact on domestic terrorism in the United States?

Mr. LEVIN. Sure. From time to time we see, like, different flavors of the year. So the Turner Diaries back in the 1980's was a book that inspired a group that committed the largest armored car heist and had a list of people to kill. Now there are others. I don't even want to mention these other books, by the way, so I am not going to.

But if you look at the words of the actual terrorist in El Paso, he said exactly why he was doing this. It wasn't until he read a book, and that book was this "The Great Replacement." What "The Great Replacement" started out—is a book by a fellow named Camus, not the one that you all studied in high school, another Camus. What it talked about was Muslims in Europe, and how they were taking over, this whole concept of white genocide. What has happened is this has become a world-wide template.

In the United States it is now, with this terrorist, Latinos. But we have also seen them talk about conspiracies and Soros. The killer that murdered congregants at the Tree of Life Synagogue spoke about immigration, because Jews were supporting immigrants.

So the bottom line is, just like the violent Salafist Jihadists, there is a template of grievance and this fear, as America changes. We have ceased to be a white majority Christian nation, and there is going to be some tension, not only with that kind of thing, but also political changes.

Interestingly enough, the young people who have been committing this—look at this. We have seen Poway. We have—we haven't put Gilroy as ideological white supremacist at this point. But bottom line is those counties, if you look at those counties, they are all counties that have had their demographic change. The young people who are committing these attacks—we are talking, like, teenagers and young 20's—they are in the most diversified group of any age cohort.

So I think we have to do a lot with regard to education, weaponry, but also we need—

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Sir, I just—I have got 2 more minutes, I want to get to a few more—

Mr. LEVIN. Sure.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Just one more question. The other thing I appreciate is Mr. Bergen and Mr. Soufan both talked about the range of terrorism threats, and that terrorism is terrorism. So un-

derstanding ideology is one key piece of how we address that; the other is understanding platforms.

So I wanted to just get a sense of—because the shooters of El Paso and Christchurch massacres both used on-line platforms to spread their xenophobic ideologies. So, Mr. Soufan, if you can, speak to how—what on-line platforms are doing to better detect and mitigate terrorist groups and individuals from promulgating violent extremist context and galvanizing support.

Mr. SOUFAN. We always hear Facebook and Twitter putting down accounts and closing accounts. But you know what? You put out something, and they open 3 or 4 more.

You heard about the ideology, but there is actually an organizational transnational network that goes beyond the ideology. We have groups—and I don't want to name any of them here, because I don't want to give them the PR of their names being mentioned in the U.S. Congress, but I will be very happy to share all the names and the organizations with you. These organizations operate in so many different places in the Western world, all the way from Australia through Ukraine to Western Europe to the United States.

We have groups in the United States, they actually go on a trip all together to Europe every year to celebrate Hitler's birthday, where people from all over the white supremacist movement get together and they party and they coordinate and they work together. We have people training exactly like the jihadi—

Ms. TORRES SMALL. What can on-line platforms do to better mitigate those convenings?

Mr. SOUFAN. Well, from that perspective, what the on-line—this is a problem that we have witnessed with them with the jihadis, and we still—we see it with the white supremacists. They have to monitor their websites, and they claim, when they are selling ads on their websites, that—or on their platforms, that they can monitor everything. That is why they can—you know, you can make money out of it. Well—

Ms. TORRES SMALL. What can Congress do, and the Department of Homeland Security, to improve coordination with the on-line platforms?

Mr. SOUFAN. Well, I think you need to hold the on-line platforms accountable. We need to work—you hold them accountable for what is on their platforms. Unfortunately, this is something that hits with the First Amendment. I think Congress—and I think I believe people in this committee had dialogs with the platforms on this.

Ms. TORRES SMALL. Thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first say at the outset—express, Mr. Chairman, my disappointment that the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FBI director, and the director of NCTC is not here today. It has been a long-standing tradition of this committee when I was Chairman, and Mr. King. They annually have testified before this committee. I regret that, and I hope that we can follow up in a bipartisan manner on that.

Let me also say, Peter, your experience—been one of the only journalists who have interviewed Osama bin Laden; Ali, your tre-

mendous work at the FBI, both pre-9/11 and post, is to be commended. I thank the other witnesses, as well.

But I want to talk also about Afghanistan. I think we need a residual force, as we need one in Syria, if anything, for homeland security response. We can't nation-build, but I think, to have that residual force to protect the homeland, is extremely important.

On the—I want to ask one question on the international terrorism and one on domestic terrorism.

I would say that we—in 2015 and 2016 our threat briefings were terrifying. I think that there is one operational external operation per month to kill Americans in the United States. That has greatly diminished, and I attribute a lot of that to the crushing of the so-called caliphate.

Having said that, I think they have retreated, and they are embedded. They are on the rise in the Sahel in Africa. So maybe Mr. Bergen and Mr.—Ali, if you could, comment on where is al-Qaeda today, and how big of a threat are they as they were, say, pre-9/11?

Mr. BERGEN. Yes, I mean I think al-Qaeda, you know, for some of the reasons Ali laid out, has, you know—they have kind-of moved to a local insurgency model in places like Syria and other places. Their capacity to attack the United States has really diminished. So, you know, that can change, but right now they are—you know, the last time al-Qaeda carried out an attack in the West was the 7/7 attacks in London on July 7, 2005. You know, that was 15 years ago, almost.

So—but, you know, why did ISIS—there were 80 ISIS cases in the United States in 2015. The number has gone down to 18 in 2019. The fact that ISIS had this geographical caliphate was very inspirational. So the model is a little bit different. If a jihadi group has large amounts of territory, is able to recruit, as Ali's group has documented, you know, tens of thousands of people from around the Muslim world, you know, we have a strong interest in making sure these geographical safe havens disappear, because they are very inspirational to people that may not even travel there.

Mr. SOUFAN. I think, sir, there was a reason al-Qaeda was focusing locally, because the Arab Spring gave them the opportunity to do so.

Al-Qaeda's strategy is basically based on the management of savagery, 3 different stages: First, you do attacks in order to have the system that you are fighting collapse; and then you fill the vacuum and prevent anyone else from filling that vacuum but you; and then you establish a state. That is exactly what al-Qaeda is trying or attempting to do in each of these areas that experience the vacuum after the Arab Spring, all the way from Sahel to Yemen to Syria to Iraq. Remember, ISIS was al-Qaeda in Iraq before.

So, basically, al-Qaeda, when it started—I spoke about the resiliency of the group. Al-Qaeda, when it started, they didn't focus against the United States, they were focusing in Sudan about trying to help the Somalis against the United States, and then went to Afghanistan after the Sudan government kicked out Osama bin Laden.

But then, after that, they started their global jihad. There is a big possibility that, at one point, when they feel that they already

established a network, they already have the operatives, they already have the expertise, they already have a network, globally, to go back to the global jihad—because global jihad is what al-Qaeda is all about, and—

Mr. McCAUL. Right. My last question—and from my position as the lead Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I do think the Sahel is a new hotspot to look at with the jihadists.

But on domestic terrorism, you know, my father was a bombardier, he bombed the Nazis. I have no tolerance for white supremacists, you know, for Nazi doctrine. It disturbs me greatly. When I talked to the FBI in 2015, 2016, it was all about—every shooting that took place was by—it was traditionally a jihadist. Now it seems to shift, and we are talking more about white supremacy, domestic terrorism groups.

My question is this: We have a National counter-terrorism center. Does it make any sense to have a domestic counter-terrorism center under the FBI that would have this same discipline of fusion intelligence?

But also, as Ms. Torres Small mentioned, the role that Twitter and Facebook played—and I worked with them greatly to bring down the sermons of Awlaki, all this stuff that was out there, jihadist material, off the internet, does it make any sense to have a similar discipline, domestically, to take down this—you know, when a manifesto is published on the public internet, to take that down?

Mr. BERGEN. I think, sir, on the first, I mean, yes. I think a domestic analog of the NCTC I think is an interesting idea.

On the second, you know, the Germans criminalized—have made it a criminal matter for these companies not to immediately take things down.

Now, it is not really a First Amendment issue, it is really a terms of use issue, right? We are not criminalizing free speech, we are just saying, hey, being on these platforms is not a right. They are private property. You are allowed onto them. But if you incite violence, we can get you off. So it is really just about making social media companies enforce their own terms of use.

How do you do that? You don't necessarily do it through legislation. You do it through having hearings like this, and you do it through shaming and naming, and making it, like—you know, think about Facebook. Facebook was creating the Promised Land 10 years ago. Now it is a much more complicated picture.

You know, these companies need to face—they tend to have, first of all, denial and then, eventually, acceptance is the usual. I think they know they have a huge public relations problem, and—but it is based on some real problematic things that people are doing on their platforms. We need to just constantly keep the pressure on them to do the right thing, because it is not a First Amendment issue, it is a terms of use issue.

Mr. McCAUL. Thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Yes, and let me say that this committee, as you know, we have been looking into this, and our next speaker might talk about it. But shaming is part of it, but I think there is some responsibility that we, as Members of Congress, will have to

exert as we do our review. But we are trying to get it right, you know, and not a knee-jerk response, but try to get it right.

The gentleman from New York for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to just start out by saying, Mr. McCaul, I think this notion of a domestic NCTC is a brilliant concept, and would really love to work with you on that. I think there is a tremendous amount of potential for progress there.

Mr. Levin, thank you, as well, for your support to the NYPD.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you for your service to our country. One of the contributors to this is a student of ours who is an Afghan veteran. God bless you.

Mr. ROSE. All right. Well, that is—thank you. I needed to hear that today.

So here is the problem with social media right now, is that they are committed to getting foreign terrorist organization content off of their platforms. When they don't do it correctly, we call them out on that. We have to do a better job of establishing a system by which we can publicly hold them to a standard, a standard that we have helped establish, and an organization where they can solve that collective action problem.

But the issue, as we face domestic terrorism, is—and white nationalist terrorism—is that many of these entities are not established as FTOs.

So my question to you is simple. Which organizations should the State Department establish as FTOs, as it pertains to the white nationalist threat? We will start with Mr. Bergen.

Mr. BERGEN. I am going to defer to Mr. Levin and Mr. Soufan, but I think this is a very fruitful idea, because there are, obviously, huge First Amendment issues around this. But if you can designate a white nationalist organization overseas that somebody here domestically is communicating with, then you open yourself up to all sorts of material support charges. So I think it is a very fruitful potential idea.

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes, that is exactly what I mentioned in both my oral statement and my written statement. I think we already have a few organizations that has been designated as foreign terrorist organizations.

The Canadian—for example, when they designated one of their organizations, they designated it as a part of a foreign terrorist network. It was a white supremacist group, domestic white supremacist group. So we already have some groups that has been designated by our allies. I think we can work on our allies in trying to help them build material support cases inside the United States for these individuals that have been in contact with them.

Mr. LEVIN. Here is the problem. It is very similar to—I know the rest of the panel will remember this—when bin Laden was killed, there was a treasure trove of emails and documents. He was upset that it was being farmed out to do-it-yourselfers. It was—he was a little—you know, he was upset about the change with regard to that.

What we are seeing is a fragmentation, often times—not always—but with regard to groups which are splintered. They are splintered and very hard to identify, No. 1.

No. 2, in Europe they outlaw hate speech, which is legal here.

Mr. ROSE. But that is not going to change here. So I want to keep us focused here. Foreign terrorist organizations, white nationalist organizations, who should we identify as such?

Mr. LEVIN. We should look at some of these neo-Nazi groups that are in Britain, that are in Germany.

Mr. ROSE. OK.

Mr. LEVIN. I don't want to give them free publicity.

Mr. ROSE. That is all right. They get enough of it on Facebook already.

Mr. LEVIN. Right. But the security services in Sweden, in Germany, in Britain know who the ones that have the violent—

Mr. ROSE. OK.

Mr. LEVIN. I think we have to have the same kind of coordination with that that we had with regard to violent Salafist Jihadists.

One other quick point on this. There is a difference in threat. Europe, you have the return of foreign fighters that we don't have here, for instance, with regard to the violent Salafist Jihadist threat. Here we are looking at a lot of people who are disenfranchised folks who are almost self-radicalizing.

Mr. ROSE. Yes. But with all respect—and I want to get to the next witness—we see the same thing in the jihadist threat, too. So the—there are striking similarities between these two likely threats. Not the most dangerous threat, but the most likely threat we face is that of a self-radicalized gunman. But the ideologies are relevant.

So just—because I have limited time—

Mr. LEVIN. Sure, but we can't drone white supremacists in Germany.

Mr. ROSE. Right.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just very quickly, believe me, I monitor a lot of hateful content. If you could see my computer in the room in the back you would probably be shocked at how much stuff is still on-line. Every day, hundreds and hundreds of terrorist channels that I monitor on Telegram, in particular, that have been active for probably 2 years, some of them.

All I would say is this. In terms of removing content from on-line, I am generally sympathetic to that idea. The only thing I will tell you is if you talk to the real professionals, like at the FBI or elsewhere, they will tell you that there is a lot of material that goes on-line. It is very useful for figuring out who to be investigating—

Mr. ROSE. Sure.

Mr. JOSCELYN [continuing]. Because these guys interact. If you can designate certain terrorist organizations overseas, then that can be a trip wire to get more investigative work done, in terms of who is actually engaging with content from those organizations.

Mr. ROSE. Absolutely. Just to close things out, I believe that this is the epicenter of the problem, is that right now in the United States of America if someone says, "I declare allegiance to ISIS, and I want to hurt people," we have an amazing amount of law enforcement resources available to us to address that. When they say the exact same thing about a white nationalist organization, we do not. Terrorism is terrorism, and we have to fix that.

The first step, I believe, is to start establishing some of these organizations as true foreign terrorist organizations.

Mr. SOUFAN. Not only that. There are 17,000 people from across the Western world that went to fight in Ukraine. The great majority went to fight was white supremacist organizations. Some of them are from the United States.

We have another problem with foreign fighters, and it is white nationalist problem, not jihadi problem. These guys can travel to the Ukraine, can meet with other like-minded groups, come back to the United States, and no one is monitoring them. At least one of them got indicted by the L.A. office of the FBI as part of an organization that I won't name, and their job was to organize violence in Charlottesville.

This is a reality. We know these groups—

Mr. ROSE. But you would agree we have the infrastructure in place—

Mr. SOUFAN. Absolutely, absolutely.

Mr. ROSE. We have to identify them.

Mr. SOUFAN. Absolutely. Declare those guys in Ukraine as terrorists, and then we will monitor each and every one when they come back to the United States.

Mr. ROSE. Great. Thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko.

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset I want to echo the sentiments of my—some of my colleagues here about the FBI director, the Homeland Security Secretary, and the director of NCTC not being here. I don't think we should tolerate that conduct much longer, and I think that—our job is to provide oversight. I don't think the tail should wag the dog. I think that we should let them know in no uncertain terms that when we call them to testify, it is not an option, and that we should put our foot down and get them here.

Now, I want to turn to what we have discussed here today. It is pretty clear to me that we have had a very healthy discussion, and we got some direction, especially from Mr. Rose's questioning, about maybe labeling some of these foreign—some of these white supremacist groups as foreign terrorist organizations, and then using the model that we have used with the jihadist organizations to help go after them, which is a great idea.

I do want to understand the scope of it, the problem in the United States, a little bit better, and I am not sure I got it absolutely clear that white supremacists is the biggest problem, and we got to go after that, and we have to address it. I will talk more about that in a moment.

But Mr. Levin, you stated that the risk is diversified, and we need to look at the entire field in your testimony. Could you briefly tell us what you meant by that?

Mr. LEVIN. Sure. I mean the risk is diversifying in a variety of ways. One, organizational structure. We talk a lot about loners, but there have been recent cases—and again, I don't want to mention these groups—but they have included transnational. We now have a missing Canadian service member who was just booted out of the service, who is a member of a paramilitary group that trained here

in the United States. So we are also seeing this stuff bubble up, where we are not just talking loners, we are seeing that—the internet, and other ways of people to congregate, to train with military weapons.

I believe that 18 United States Code 231, which prohibits paramilitary training to foment civil disorders, should be amended to also punish trainees, not just trainers. That is something that is not ideological, it is not a First Amendment kind of issue.

I would also say that I am a bit concerned—and, gosh, I don't want to come up as being the white supremacist defense person here—but we must make sure that it relies on criminal predicates. What we have seen recently in Southern California, a group on the left that was actually peaceful that was investigated, and what I worry about is we—whatever we are going to do, we want to make sure that we have restrictions which make sure that people who—we might just disagree with are not being tracked because they are a terrorist—

Mr. KATKO. I understand that. There has got to be safeguards of that.

Mr. Bergen, you say—you testified words to the effect that prioritizing one domestic ideology is a mistake. What did you mean by that?

Mr. BERGEN. Well, I just mean that, you know, for—look, if we get—political violence has been a way of life in the United States—I mean, in the 1970's it was the underground black national—Black Panthers. Black—people motivated by black nationalist ideology have killed 8 people in the last 2 or 3 years in the United States. People motivated by ideological misogyny have killed 8 people in the United States in the last several years.

So all I am saying is that there are many different ideologies that young men who want to carry out violent acts might attach themselves to. Jihadism and white supremacy are the two most important ones, but there are others. Representative—you know, I mean, everybody knows the Steve Scalise case, and how lucky he was to survive that attack. So we are seeing a little bit of an uptick on leftists.

Despite what Representative King said, Antifa is not carrying out lethal attacks. They may not—

Mr. KATKO. Right, right. I understand what you are saying, and I guess that is my point, too, is we are so laser-focused on the jihadist movement that maybe we took our eye off the fact that this—we now have a burgeoning white supremacist movement. If we start focusing on the white supremacist movement, we should not take our eye off some of the other possible burgeoning things like you mentioned. Whatever we do, as a committee, and whatever we do, as a Congress, has to keep an eye on that fact.

So, with that in mind, is there any suggestions that any of you have as to things we should do to make sure that not only do we go after the white supremacists, and do what we have to do with that, but how we not take our eye off some of the other groups that are starting to develop and burgeon and become concerns?

Mr. SOUFAN. I think we have joint terrorism task forces, each one has a domestic terrorism squad or squads, and they are focusing on that. I think they work very closely with people—

Mr. KATKO. They do focus on—I don't mean to interrupt you, but I get the sense when talking—I have worked with them for 20—ever since 9/11. I get the sense sometimes that domestic terrorism is not as much of a priority, No. 1. No. 2 is they don't really have the guidelines for domestic terrorism that they do for international terrorism. You know what I mean?

Mr. SOUFAN. You are correct on both, sir. This is one of the problems that now they are facing because they see an increase with white supremacist activities, and they don't have the legal tools to counter it the same way they counter it when it is from a jihadi group.

Mr. KATKO. So what tools should we implement for them?

Mr. SOUFAN. Just to give you—you mentioned, you know, one of the tools is designation, absolutely. Another is to recognize a threat. A third to start looking into these groups and see how they are connecting with each other.

We have—look, the reason I am concerned about this, and the reason I am here today is because I saw that in the 1980's and 1990's evolving with the jihadis, and nobody was listening.

Mr. KATKO. Exactly, exactly.

Mr. SOUFAN. Now we see the same thing. I can sit with you, I can give you names, organizations, individuals here in the United States and Western countries. In other places they have their own Afghanistan, and they are doing the same thing. They are today where the jihadis were in the 1990's.

Mr. KATKO. We can't wait—

Mr. SOUFAN. We need to pay attention.

Mr. KATKO. We can't wait for the wake-up call that we had on 9/11.

Mr. SOUFAN. Exactly.

Mr. KATKO. Right? So whatever you—all of you—have as far as information—my time has passed—but suggestions, please submit them to us. Please talk to us and let us know. Because I think we all want to get this right. This isn't a Republican or Democratic thing, this is an American thing, and we want to get it right. So thank you very much.

Mr. SOUFAN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Underwood.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With the number of domestic terrorism arrests now approaching 100 this year, it is clear that domestic terrorism is a pervasive threat to our National security.

Recently, Acting Secretary McAleenan expressed the need for further investments at the Department of Homeland Security to bolster the agency's efforts to prevent, prepare, and respond to domestic terrorism. This issue was underscored when I was briefed by the Department's protective security advisors, or PSAs, who provided valuable assistance to critical infrastructure and community organizations in the region.

Unfortunately, in communities like mine that are more suburban and rural, the PSAs are significantly under-utilized. This year region 5 PSAs have conducted 151 assessments in the Chicago urban

area, yet have only conducted 13 assessments located in communities outside of the UASI-designated area.

As we allocate resources to the Department, I want to make sure that communities like mine are receiving their fair share, and are not left vulnerable to extremist threats. My team and I have been digging into this issue over the past months.

Beginning in fiscal year 2018, DHS began providing security grants to houses of worship and other community organizations located outside the urban areas for expenses like cameras and security personnel. However, in rural areas, where budgets are tight, and revenue sources are limited, we have learned that many organizations are not aware of these grants.

So, for the panel, as we work on legislative options to increase DHS's engagement with organizations in rural and suburban communities on domestic terrorism, I would be interested to hear specific recommendations that you all have to ensure that communities in northern Illinois, like Grayslake and Aurora, are connected to DHS's resources. Do you have any thoughts?

We can start with you, Mr. Joscelyn.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I would have to look into a whole mess of things you said there. I haven't investigated that in any detail, but I will. I will look into what you just said.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I haven't—I would like to get a copy of what you read off, because I didn't get all of it, but I—there is an issue there.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK, thanks.

Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. Here is the thing. It is similar, but it rhymes with regard to white supremacist versus violent Salafist Jihadists. What I think—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. I am sorry, we are asking about grants and the ability for these protective service officers to go into rural areas.

Mr. LEVIN. Right. And my point was going to be as follows—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK, great.

Mr. LEVIN. Because it is more dissipated, you have to have the local law enforcement involved. They know who the local neo-Nazi skinheads are, much more so—and God bless FBI, I work with them. But you have to include local law enforcement, and you have to put it—just one thing. You have to make it a priority. Law enforcement responds—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. My question is about community grants. Law enforcement grants are being provided by DoJ and DHS, and they are well-resourced, or at least going to communities rural, suburban, and urban. But there is a huge gap.

So I am going to go next to Mr. —

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. Well, off ramps—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. Off ramps for groups—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN [continuing]. That help people that are leaving the movement.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.

Mr. SOUFAN. I don't know much about that specific area, ma'am.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK.

Mr. SOUFAN. I am not—but the grant program was always great. It helped us tremendously in countering violent extremism. We had people in different communities, like, for example, in the Somali community, you know, doing a lot of good works to counter the propaganda of Shabaab. So the grant program was always a great program, and that is something definitely worth looking into.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK.

Mr. SOUFAN. Thank you.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Bergen, do you have any comments?

Mr. BERGEN. I don't.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK, thank you. Houses of worship have been increasingly under threat of white supremacist extremism, as seen by the horrific shootings in Pittsburgh, at the Tree of Life synagogue, and in Charleston, South Carolina, at the Emmanuel AME Church. Houses of worship are no stranger to these kinds of threats. But as extremists are emboldened to use more sophisticated tactics, we must strengthen protection for places of worship.

So, Mr. Levin and Mr. Soufan, I understand that you are former law enforcement professionals. Do you have specific recommendations for houses of worship seeking to protect their facilities and congregations from domestic terrorism threats?

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, they have to step it up. I think every department should have a blueprint of houses of worship in their area. They are now a target.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. We have to have all kinds of security that we don't have the time right now to talk about. But I could talk—I could send things—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Send it in writing?

Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Thank you.

Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUFAN. I think we have some great organizations doing amazing work with that—SCAN, for example—doing phenomenal work protecting houses of worship, especially Jewish synagogues and Jewish organizations. I think I believe they set up a sub-committee in DHS to focus on this threat, too.

So that is something we need to figure out, how to engage with community leaders and how to engage with local law enforcement and Federal law enforcement in order to ensure that these kind of places are better protected.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. OK.

Mr. SOUFAN. Because we have seen attacks against mosques, against churches—

Ms. UNDERWOOD. Right.

Mr. SOUFAN [continuing]. Against synagogues, and that needs to stop.

Ms. UNDERWOOD. So if you have specific recommendations that you would like to followup with in writing, we would welcome that.

I look forward to working with the Chairman and Members of this committee to advance meaningful legislation, ensuring that the Federal Government has the resources needed to combat and prevent the spread of all forms of violent extremism and domestic terrorism.

I yield back, thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Soufan, can you describe the similarities between those that have pledged allegiance to ISIS or al-Qaeda, and violent white supremacists, in terms of how they recruit, coordinate, or even plan their attacks?

Mr. SOUFAN. Sure. If you look in the United States, for example, most of the terrorism that took place, or that occurred by ISIS or al-Qaeda in the recent years were individuals that had self-radicalized on-line, people that never met al-Qaeda individual and an ISIS individual. They self-radicalized themselves, and they went from the radicalization process to the operational, you know, overnight. That is exactly what we see with the white supremacist. Usually, with the jihadis, they put a video about why they did what they did. With the white supremacist, they put a manifesto.

They advocate violence as the only way to reach their goals. One wanted a goal of pure racial society, one wanted a goal of pure religious society. The similarity goes on and on and on. But the kind of threats that we are experiencing today, attacks that—experiencing today, the United States from the jihadis—or from the white supremacist, very similar to the attacks that we experienced in the last 3 or 4 years by the jihadis.

Mr. WALKER. OK, and how do you recommend Federal agencies such as the FBI or the DoD address the broad range of these emerging threats?

Mr. SOUFAN. I think, first of all, we need to recognize this. Second, the FBI and DHS and other local law enforcement and Federal law enforcement need to be given the appropriate tools.

But we can start, as we mentioned earlier, by designations. A lot of these groups and individuals here are connected to other groups in Europe that is already considered terrorist organizations by our European allies, and this is a good—

Mr. WALKER. Let me go to Mr. Joscelyn just for a minute there. Do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Very quickly, I offered one similarity between the two in my written testimony, which I won't recount here. But in terms of portraying themselves as defenders of a civilization or an ethos, that is a very common sort of psychological phenomenon—

Mr. WALKER. Right.

Mr. JOSCELYN [continuing]. Across both sides. There are differences, as I mentioned—alluded to in my testimony, as well. We got to be careful.

I mean ISIS built a paramilitary army that conquered territory and declared itself to be a physical caliphate. We don't, fortunately, have anything like that on the white supremacy side yet right now. They are not, you know, developing so-called provinces around the world.

Al-Qaeda was primarily an insurgency organization since its founding, and I think its organization is much more robust than people give it credit for. I would just say, on that note, if you ask somebody who is really in the game for a list of all the veteran al-

Qaeda operatives who are still alive, who go back to bin Laden's day or beforehand, you would probably be surprised.

Mr. WALKER. Yes, and you have just hit a few—answered a few of the questions I had, so well done there.

We have been long aware of the law enforcement challenge of international terrorists using encrypted communication to recruit, coordinate, plan, et cetera. Is there evidence that domestic terrorists are using the same techniques and systems at this point, Mr. Soufan or Mr. Joscelyn?

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes, absolutely. They—you know, as time can tell you, they use, you know, the same—not the same platforms. Like, 8chan, for example, is used by the white supremacists. The jihadis use the Telegram, and so forth. But yes.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Levin—and I was—I arrived here a little bit late—I was invited to attend an event of the CBC in the Emancipation Hall. But I—as I was walking in, I believe you were saying something about the changing demographics of both political—but I think I heard you say the fact that we are no longer a majority Christian nation, that you were weighing that into some of the charges—in the increasing white supremacy. Is there data to back that up, or is that just a personal perspective that you have?

Mr. LEVIN. No, there is data, and it is in our report. It is white Christians are now a minority in the United States. I will—

Mr. WALKER. But to make that—but, yes, I understand that. But to say that, as far as—that could be weighing in on driving the white supremacy, do you have any data on that?

Mr. LEVIN. How it is driving white supremacy?

Mr. WALKER. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Well, what I can tell you is that a combination of changes appears to correspond to certain spikes that we are seeing around certain catalytic events like elections, and things like that, where this kind of change is being promoted by white supremacists.

I want to be careful here. White Christians are our friends and our neighbors. My neighbor runs a Christian school. However, the way it is being turned around is that society is not only becoming racially changed, but we are also losing our religious traditions, as well. That is amplified and perverted into another message.

Mr. WALKER. Fair enough. You have made your point there. I think—and I agree with my friend, Max Rose, who did an eloquent job, and with Representative John Katko—both are an issue, and certainly resources are a factor. I think we are big enough in Congress to look at the ability to be able to override both of these elements in our country.

With that I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Slotkin, for 5 minutes.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Hi, gentlemen. Thanks for being here. I want to echo and actually amplify some of the comments of my colleagues on the other side.

To both the Chairman and the Ranking Member, it is outrageous that the day before September 11 we cannot have an annual counter-terrorism brief from DHS, from the FBI, and from NCTC. I know you both tried. But I look forward to your plan of how this

committee can engage, because I am offended for the public, because, again, right up against an anniversary, to not be able to hear from the leadership of the Cabinet on where we are on counter-terrorism threats is just nuts.

Then, second, I am offended for all the people who work in those agencies who have been the ones who have helped prevent an additional attack like that. They don't get any credit, because it is hard to say what could have happened. But the fact that we have gone this many years without a similar style attack, I certainly wouldn't have bet on it when I was on New York on September 11, 2001.

So I just wanted to amplify that I think that is just beyond the pale.

We have talked a lot about the similarities between the way that people have become radicalized in foreign terrorist organizations and in domestic terrorism. I don't want to repeat it, but just the radicalization process seems very similar, particularly the use of the internet. That sort of quest for purity of religion or society or whatever, and feeling like you are a defender of that purity seems very similar. The tools of violence are very similar, right, the way that you—these groups perpetrate violence.

I think, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have a lot of agreement on our committee that this is just an area of interest that we haven't done as much work on as foreign terrorism. You know, this committee was stood up because of what happened on 9/11, and I think, while we have to remain vigilant, we have figured out how to at least minimize the threat from foreign terrorist organizations. But I don't think we are there on domestic terrorist organizations of all kinds.

So I think that we have enough interest in us setting up either some sort of task force, or some sort of concerted effort for this committee to take the lead on the things that our local law enforcement and FBI, National Counterterrorism Center would need in order to stem this threat. Because if we are getting this message that the noise in the system smells and feels like what happened before 9/11, where there wasn't a lot of attention, but things were happening, then I would argue this is the time for us to act, learn the lessons of history, and move out with some sort of task force, bipartisan task force. I think we need it.

Just in my remaining time—because folks have asked really great questions—can I get from one of you—maybe Mr. Bergen or Mr. Soufan—an example of how a specific case of someone radicalized to become a domestic terrorist, an example of someone over the past year, year-and-a-half, their story, to bring it home a little bit for people who may be watching and listening to this?

Of course, as short amount of time as you can manage.

Mr. BERGEN. Well, first of all, thank you for your service to the country. You know, Omar Mateen was born in Queens, New York, same place our President was born. He kind-of flirted with Hezbollah, al-Qaeda. Eventually, you know, many of these people are zeroes trying to be heroes, right? He was working as a kind-of security guard at a golf community retirement center. He had dreams of joining the NYPD, it failed.

For him, and I think for a lot of these guys—and they are almost universally guys—the ideology is something they attach themselves

to because they have grievances that are unresolved. This is the way they are going to be a hero in their own story. Then they legally acquire 4 semi-automatic weapons. Omar Mateen killed 49 people in a nightclub at 2 a.m. in the morning on a Saturday night, an excellent place to kill as many people as possible with 4 semi-automatic weapons.

So that is the story. That is an extreme version of it, but that is the story you see.

Ms. SLOTKIN. So I would just say we have listed a number of things that, you know, we feel like we don't have the same authorities to work externally outside the United States as we do internally. There is a lot of legal reasons.

Besides designation, what are the other tools, maybe Mr. Soufan or Mr. Joscelyn, that we think our law enforcement need in order to squelch the threat of domestic terrorism?

Mr. SOUFAN. Well, we need to give them the tools that we are giving them for international terrorism. Most of the successful terrorism cases are basically based on material support charges. We cannot charge domestic terrorists with material support. It is impossible to do it. You need to designate in order to do so.

So basically, we are going to look at every case as one individual. With the law that exists today, even when we stop—the FBI or law enforcement stops someone from going to conduct a terrorist attack, they have to let him go. Even when they charge them, they charge them on some stated charge or violation of the Telecommunication Act, because he is harassing, let's say, Jews or Muslims on-line. Then, toward the end, they have to let them go because there is nothing they can do to prosecute these people unless they kill.

So all our efforts, or the law enforcement effort, is not preventative as much as, you know, reactive in nature, after the fact. We need to be sure that these things won't happen. In order to do so, at least we need to start with making that international connection, because a lot of these guys are connected to entities overseas, and some of these entities are already declared as terrorist organizations by our allies.

Ms. SLOTKIN. I know my time is way past up, so thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOSCELYN. Mr. Chairman, can I give you one quick note, please, just 1 second? I have an idea for you, because you are interested in transparency and oversight, and I am a big advocate of both.

The Intelligence Committee has a yearly world-wide threat assessment hearing, where they have to prepare a written assessment, prepare it and testify in public about it. I think it would be a great idea to have a similar assessment for the Department of Homeland Security to talk about the threats and assessments inside the United States, and to testify about what those look like, and it basically gives you a mechanism for accountability and for inquiring about what is actually going on. That is it.

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, good suggestion. Just for the record, some of the Members have talked about their disappointment in not having certain members here. The Ranking Member and I made the request in July for their attendance here today, and we

have received notice that they will be available October 30. So it is not as high a priority as it should be, and I think we will share the sentiments of what we have heard here today as to their not being here is not in the—what we think—the best interest of this country.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the witnesses being here.

It will be 18 years tomorrow since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and, obviously, international terrorism, specifically radical Islamic terrorism, still poses a persistent threat to our Nation and to U.S. interests abroad. We have seen various spikes in intensity with respect to that.

To that point, recent Department of Defense and other reporting is showing that ISIS has reorganized and recovered to some significant degree in Iraq and Syria, specifically. While that same reporting does indicate that ISIS is facing some financial constraints, I think they still have the ability to fund significant operations. Other reporting also shows that al-Qaeda is re-introducing its movement and targeting a new generation of fighters.

So to that point, I guess, since its territorial defeat at the end of 2017, we know that ISIS still commands somewhere around 14,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. I serve on the—also serve on the House Intelligence Committee, and many in the intelligence community are raising concerns that ISIS is adapting and consolidating and creating conditions for resurgence in the Syrian and Iraqi heartlands, where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and most of the ISIS leadership is now based.

So I want to start, I think, with you, Mr. Joscelyn. With America's intelligence strategy focused so much and shifting to a lot of our adversaries, like China and Russia and Iran and North Korea, are we and can we ensure that we are devoting the appropriate resources to also address these emerging or re-emerging threats with radical Islamic terrorist groups?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, my big concern there is that the territorial caliphate was taken away largely by a proxy force that required, basically, a minimal amount of boots on the ground from the United States and our resources. There seems to be an impatience, even with that. That I find to be somewhat deplorable.

You know, if you look at the whole thing that is going on, you know, basically, very few—as Peter said, very few Americans have died taking away the physical caliphate. This is something that is clearly in our National interests, to basically make sure this organization does not re-constitute itself and grow once again.

You know, just recently, the State Department release rewards for information on 3 different ISIS leaders. All of them have pedigrees that go back a decade or more. You know, I mean, this is an organization that clearly still has talent that has been in the game for a long time, and hasn't been taken out of the game.

I think, going forward, that is why I have emphasized in my testimony I don't believe the resource allocation argument that we need—we have these vast resources being spent against the jihadis that need to be repositioned against China. I just don't buy that, when you look at how we are fighting ISIS, and we are looking—

how we are fighting other organizations. There is certainly fat that can be cut from the bone. But overall, it is something that is basically a outsourced fight, for the most part.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you.

Mr. Soufan, I see you nodding and wanting to weigh in, so I want you to do that. But I also—I am curious. One of the themes that we have seen in statements from Ayman al-Zawahiri is the need to reunite the jihadist factions.

So as you comment on my first question, my second one is do you see that happening, al-Qaeda and ISIS uniting under one banner? What is the prospect of that?

Mr. SOUFAN. First, I agree with everything Tom said. ISIS is not dead. Al-Qaeda was—never went away. Al-Qaeda just changed focus. Today they have 100 times more members than they had on 9/11.

ISIS today, you know, still have at least \$400 million. That makes them the richest terror organization in the world. Baghdadi is still alive. They are recruiting other already-existing terrorist groups in different places, provinces, as we see in the Sinai, and with Boko Haram in Nigeria. So the threat is there.

Also, ISIS have thousands of members in jail, usually in Kurdish authority—under—with the Kurds in Syria. What is going to happen to those guys if their countries are not taking them back? Are they going to be released? When they are released, what kind of threat they will pose on their countries? Actually, the United States and the West. A lot of them are from Western countries. So the threat is very there still. The threat is very dangerous.

Now, as for your second question, sir, I am sorry, what is the second one? I am—

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Reuniting—Zawahiri is saying—

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes.

Mr. RATCLIFFE [continuing]. Reuniting al-Qaeda and—

Mr. SOUFAN. I think now it is becoming increasingly difficult, especially after the death of Hamza bin Laden. The folks in ISIS really don't like Zawahiri. That is why they broke off from him. We have seen some ISIS members, at least in Syria and some in Yemen, rejoin al-Qaeda. But this is very limited. It hasn't been a wave.

I think Hamza bin Laden was to be the person who used his father's name. The plan, at least, of the senior members of al-Qaeda. Some of them are still alive, as Tom said, who established the organization with Osama bin Laden in 1988. Those guys are still alive, and they are still operational.

So, basically, their plan was to probably use bin Laden to unify the Salafist Jihadi movement again. That is why Hamza, in all of his statements, never attacked ISIS. It was a job left to Zawahiri. I think at this point, if they don't have a Hamza, if they don't have a bin Laden, I think it is going to be very difficult for them to reunify.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific.

Mr. JOSCELYN. If I may, just real quick, what we track every day is just a lot of infighting still between ISIS and al-Qaeda across the board in different theaters. What I would ask, especially because our policy in Afghanistan has become very confused, there is this

idea that we are going to count on the Taliban, basically, to take out ISIS. I would ask people in the U.S. intelligence community and Homeland Security who is leading the charge in eastern Afghanistan against ISIS for the Taliban. It is a guy named Bilal Faat, also known as Bilal Zadran. He is in the al-Qaeda fold.

So basically, you are counting on al-Qaeda to wipe out ISIS as part of our strategy, which makes zero sense. Thanks.

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank you all for your perspective, all the witnesses today, thank you.

I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California—

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—

Chairman THOMPSON [continuing]. Mr. Correa, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CORREA [continuing]. For holding this hearing, and I want to echo some of the comments made by Republican colleagues in this committee that not having the FBI or DHS show up is not only disrespectful, but we are talking about the safety of all Americans in this country.

During the break I had a meeting with some religious leaders in my community—synagogues, mosques, churches—to talk about safety in the community, lack thereof, to see what they needed to feel that they were securing more of their houses of worship.

I also had my local sheriff, Sheriff Barnes, attend. He made some interesting comments that I thought were disturbing, and that is that he still felt that we are still operating in silos. When it comes to terrorism, fighting terrorism, we are still operating in silos.

Let me be specific. He said to me in response to some of my questions that the FBI still gives him information on the need-to-know basis. He has what is called a fusion center in Orange County, where, essentially, he takes as many of the local organizations and Federal organizations to put information together to try to approximate when the next attack is being planned, or when it is going to take place. Many times he would essentially say—my words—we can't get that information from the FBI.

I am hearing the discussion here today, and we are still talking about a bigger silo, which is—we are talking domestic terrorism versus international terrorism. We are almost having a competition to see which terror, which threat is bigger, international or domestic. I think it is just one. We are talking about the safety of Americans, and when the next attack is going to happen, heaven forbid.

Eighteen years ago this country was attacked, brutally attacked. For the most part, we shifted our resources to international terrorism. We really took our eye off the ball of domestic terrorism. Whatever it is that inspires that domestic terrorism, we are not focusing on that right now. Is that what I am hearing from all of you here today?

[Pause.]

Mr. CORREA. Don't all of you answer at the same time, but—

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I will say this. I mean, certainly, if you look at the FBI's testimony to this committee and elsewhere, they have certainly, I think, testified to the fact that they had a lot of ongoing active cases involving domestic terrorism, including white supremacists.

I think the issue has to do with better coordination, and probably making sure they have all the capabilities they need to go after who I think you are hearing from this panel are potentially developing organizational capacity, which is, I think, going to be in the next level.

Mr. LEVIN. Could I just interject one quick thing on that?

Mr. CORREA. Go.

Mr. LEVIN. There are just 4 issues here. There are legal issues in dealing with international terror. We have FISA courts, we have ways of getting evidence overseas that are different than if we are dealing with domestic groups.

Also, domestic groups are smaller, and they can be violent, but they have a much shorter half-life. Therefore, it is really important to have local law enforcement up and in equal number. Some of the testimony here was that the local folks have a better handle on some of these hate groups. Totally.

Mr. CORREA. Yes?

Mr. LEVIN. Yes.

Mr. CORREA. So, shouldn't they be coordinating a whole lot better with DHS and the FBI?

Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely. And also—

Mr. CORREA. That, Mr. Chairman, is the reason I feel we are at a loss here today.

Chairman THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. CORREA. OK, so maybe some of the information should not be shared in public. We can go private, sir, and address these issues. Whatever tools the FBI or maybe my local sheriff need to address these issues, we need to give them those tools.

Please continue in the last minute that I have.

Mr. LEVIN. The last thing, how we get the evidence. We have intelligence, for instance, with regard to international. Certainly—when I say international, I am talking about violent Salafist Jihadists, for example.

With regard to the more localized folks that we have here who you call domestic terrorists, these groups are much smaller, and the people that are going to find the information first are going to be people in the local community. Friends, family members, local law enforcement. With that we want to make sure that there is reporting.

So how do we do that? Make sure there is an off-ramp, so that those who are neo-Nazis and white supremacists know that there is—that, if they want to give it up, there is a place that they can go, other than jail or death.

Mr. CORREA. Further comments?

Mr. BERGEN. The FBI did a very interesting study about who knows when something is going to happen. The people who know the most are peers, and the people who know the least are strangers. So strangers produce a lot of false positives.

Going—just picking up on Professor Levin's point, it is getting people, the peers, to come forward. In the case of the San Bernardino case, a peer knew exactly what was going to happen, provided the weapon.

How do you get that person to come forward? Off ramps are part of this. You can't offer the kind of binary choice of say nothing or

go to prison for 20 years. You have to sort-of—and this is where local law enforcement can help. I mean this is what cops do, right? They go out and they kind of talk to people, and they get information. So it is appealing to peers.

Family members know the second most. They are slightly more likely to come forward.

Then, of course, authority figures often know something. But—and are very likely to come forward, but they don't know the full dimension.

So when you are looking about, whether it is jihadism or right-wing, it is—getting peers to come forward is really—they are the people with the information.

Mr. CORREA. Mr. Chair, I yield.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. You bring a number of issues. Part of our challenge, as a committee, historically, has been this shared jurisdiction. That creates some structural impediments that we are just faced with. Some of us are going to make another swing at minimizing some of those impediments, as we go forward.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana for 5 minutes, Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I thank the panelists for appearing before us today.

Mr. Levin, thank you for your service to the Thin Blue Line, sir. I was a SWAT operator for 12 years. You appear to be a very well-read man. You are obviously of high intelligence. You are familiar with our Constitution, I am quite sure.

Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely.

Mr. HIGGINS. And our Federalist Papers?

Mr. LEVIN. I won the Civil Liberties Award at Stanford Law School.

Mr. HIGGINS. Our Federalist Papers?

[No response.]

Mr. HIGGINS. Federalist Papers, the Federalist letters?

Mr. LEVIN. Sure.

Mr. HIGGINS. Not to put you on the spot. In Federalist 10, Madison stated that liberty is to faction as air is to fire, an element without which it will instantly expire.

Now, I have heard you use—now that I have reminded you, you recall one of the most famous Federalist letters, I am sure.

Mr. LEVIN. Mm-hmm.

Mr. HIGGINS. What Madison was saying there is that, as we were constructing our representative republic, as the Constitution was being formed and debated, it was a great question of whether or not we could even do this thing, whether or not we could have a strong central government and still maintain the sovereignty of the States and the freedoms of the citizens therein. He clarified that there was an inherent danger within a society that allowed great liberties. Yet none would argue for the elimination of liberties in order to reduce the threat that could be borne of such liberties.

You have stated a couple of times—if I am quoting you correct—“weapons of war.” But you are not talking about tanks and grenades and shoulder-launched munitions, are you, sir?

Mr. LEVIN. No, I am talking about semi-automatic rifle access to people who shouldn't have them in a civilized society. If you look at the Constitution, the Preamble is "secure domestic tranquility."

Mr. HIGGINS. OK. With great pardon, reclaiming my time, so you—when you say "weapons of war," do you support the seizure of semi-automatic weapons that are legally owned?

Mr. LEVIN. No.

Mr. HIGGINS. Your colleagues mentioned the term "full semi-automatic weapon." I have heard this term used increasingly.

Mr. LEVIN. I am sorry, which colleague?

Mr. HIGGINS. A full semi—your colleague to your right. It is referring more to the term than the colleague.

A semi-automatic weapon, has—one pull of the trigger, there is a release of one round. And there are millions of Americans that follow the law and own these weapons. It has been suggested by some, as part of the National narrative—and we should have this conversation. But I find it reflective of Madison's warnings, that to restrict the liberties, or to infringe upon the Constitutional protections of law-abiding Americans in order to create some illusion of greater safety or security would be, in itself, a more significant threat to the future of our republic.

So it has been alarming to me to listen to gentlemen of distinguished accomplishment today seemingly leaning toward suggesting the serious infringement of Second Amendment rights, perhaps First Amendment rights. What about freedom of speech and assembly, peaceful assembly, red flag laws? These things are quite alarming to many Americans, myself included.

In my final minute I would like to ask you each to answer yes or no. Last Congress, under the leadership of Chairman McCaul and this committee, the House of Representatives passed the Department of Homeland Security Authorities Act. This was, essentially, the first full authorization of the Department of Homeland Security. It failed in the Senate. It was never brought to a vote.

My question to each of you—yes or no, given the restrictions of time—do you agree that it is in the Department of Homeland Security's best interest for Congress to provide it with full reauthorization.

Yes, sir?

Mr. BERGEN. I think so, yes. Just one minor point. My in-laws are from the great State of Louisiana. They don't go hunting with AR-15s. So I think what I am advocating is a very minimalist position, which is no fly, no buy. This is something Congress can do. This seems like a very basic thing. Anybody who is too dangerous to get on an American-bound or an American passenger jet is not the sort of person who should be acquiring, legally, semi-automatic weapons.

Mr. HIGGINS. That gets to be determined by whom, sir?

Mr. BERGEN. Well, by the people around this table sitting here, the legislature—

Mr. HIGGINS. The people around this table. So bureaucrats and career politicians in Washington, DC. shall determine what Constitutional protections shall just be—

Mr. BERGEN. You pass the laws, sir. You pass the laws.

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, I would say that our anointed documents shall protect our citizens' freedoms and rights.

Good sir, yes or no regarding full authorization of DHS?

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Yes.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think so, yes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Gentlemen, I respectfully thank you for your time.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this important hearing today.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Since we have conducted this hearing I have just been informed that the President has asked for the resignation of our National security advisor, John Bolton. In light of the conversation that we have been having at this hearing, I would like to get some comments from our witnesses on that.

Mr. BERGEN. We are about to get our fourth National security advisor of the United States. Interesting question who that will be. I think it is surprising, this level of turnover.

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Soufan.

Mr. SOUFAN. I am concerned that it is the fourth National security advisor in a period of less than 3 years, but I am not surprised, frankly, because I think the President has differing views regarding Iran that Mr. Bolton—and I think we have—we don't know what is going to happen between Iran and the United States over there.

So it seems that there is probably disagreement about that. I don't know. We just heard it from you, sir. But yes, I am not really surprised. Recently they haven't been seeing eye-to-eye.

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. When I spoke in Europe, one of the things that came up was the disorganization that is occurring with regard to issues of international security. This kind of rotation is troubling.

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Joscelyn.

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think it acts as a very strong impediment to any American who is loyal to their country and just wants to serve their country to have a constant turnover of personnel, and not have any stability there, in terms of what you are going to do. Whether you agree with the people's positions or not, you know, you need to have some sort of stability and stable hands on the steering wheel. It is a strong disincentive, I can tell you personally, for anybody who would think about trying to work for their country to have this type of turnover, constantly.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada for 5 minutes.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I just would like to disagree with that rather weird interpretation of Federalist 10 offered by Mr. Higgins as justification for not passing gun control.

Actually, Madison was looking at reconciling interests of factions of people who disagreed with each other, and he was opposed to direct democracy—in other words, rule by mob—and thought we needed a representative government to reconcile those factions. Certainly, that is what Congress is, and that is what our role should be. So it is absolutely appropriate that we should consider and pass those kinds of bills that deal with gun violence.

Second, we—you were talking about peers were the ones who know first. I think that brings up the role of women. Women in some societies are on the front lines, and maybe the best able to recognize radicalization, or see something happening in the home, and I don't think we are doing enough to talk to women, especially in other countries.

Then, third, as I look at the policies of this administration in addition to the turnover of our National security, they want to cut ICE funding, which is to help local governments deal with terrorism. You got a Muslim ban, which you said was a solution looking for a problem, it just keeps out the most vulnerable. It has deterred national tourism, it has hurt my business in Las Vegas. We have got a limit, and they are wanting to reduce that limit again this year on the number of refugees we will take.

Now we hear him using terrorism as an excuse for not allowing immigration, like terrorists are going to sneak across the border with the people who are coming from El Salvador. Or just recently, we can't let the people in from the Bahamas who have been devastated, because bad, bad people might come in with them.

Could you all address this? How is—is any of this effective, or even accurate?

Mr. BERGEN. OK, the short answer is it isn't helpful. Just a quick anecdote.

Ninety years ago a woman called Mary MacLeod left the Outer Hebrides, which was one of the poorest places in Europe, and she came to New York, and she married a guy called Fred Trump, and had 5 sons. One of them is named Donald Trump.

The United States has not been this cramped, you know, terrified place in the past. This banning refugees as a blanket matter is un-American. The travel ban wouldn't have reduced terrorism.

The whole burden of this discussion today has been we have a domestic problem. Sometimes it is jihadist, sometimes it is right-wing. Sometimes it has been black nationalists. Sometimes it is other forms of ideology. This is a problem that we have here, not coming from outside.

Mr. LEVIN. If I could just address one thing, I think that what we have to do is have a reasonable discussion. If you look at Antonin Scalia's opinion in the Heller case involving the District of Columbia in 2008, he specifically said not everyone is entitled to any gun anywhere at any time. What I think that we have to do is look at reasonable restrictions. Eighty-nine percent of Americans favor certain types of restrictions. Eighty percent on another issue, with regard to red flags.

The bottom line is—and I wish the Congressperson would have stayed, because our assistant director is from Louisiana, a former member of the military. We are not hostile with regard to conservative people of good will who are gun owners.

But the bottom line is my community keeps getting hit. We just had a CHP's officer murdered. We had the San Bernardino terrorist attack occur just weeks after I spoke. I promised the people in my community that I would bring this up, not as a cudgel or a political thing, but something that the Constitution, the Second Amendment—even if it is a fundamental right, which the Supreme Court has not yet interpreted it as—we put restrictions on fundamental

rights all the time, such as freedom of speech, freedom of interstate travel, and all those kinds of things.

Bottom line is we have to have some kind of reasonable agreement. In a representative democracy that we live in, yes, we have people from all different places. Frankly, we have heroes here, sitting on this committee. I think one of the things that we should look toward doing—and we heard this yesterday in New York at the Senate hearings—is perhaps giving this committee a bit more jurisdiction to cover these issues—of terrorism, that is.

Mr. JOSCELYN. If I could just—we don't have enough time for this, but I just wanted to applaud one point you were talking about with the role of women, in terms of addressing earlier signs of radicalization, and violence, and that sort of thing.

One of the issues that we see across the board when you are saying different types of extremism is misogyny is very prevalent across different types of extremist beliefs. You know, the jihadis that I spent most of my life studying are extremely misogynist, you know. You know, you study that in different forms of other extremism, as well. So that is—we are out of time, but that is a huge issue there.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing so close to September 11. We are going to bring it back on topic a little bit.

You know, September 11 changed the role of the United States, it changed the Middle East, it changed all of our lives, my life included. September 11 was possible because al-Qaeda had the time and the space to operate and plan. One thing I fear—and this is coming from rhetoric from the left and the right—what I fear is that we are no longer at war with them, but they are definitely at war with us.

This pertains to the resignation of our—of John Bolton, as well. He is in favor, generally speaking, of maintaining a presence in Syria and Afghanistan and Iraq. I also am in favor of that. I worry about what would happen if we had a premature withdrawal.

Maybe starting with Mr. Bergen, you could speak to the consequences of premature withdrawals from these places, and if any other panelists have something to add to what Mr. Bergen says, please do so.

Mr. BERGEN. First of all, thank you for your service, sir.

Secondarily, I am in violent agreement. I mean we have run this experiment before. I testified earlier that in 1989, because our embassy in Afghanistan—into the vacuum came Taliban and al-Qaeda. We got out of Iraq prematurely at the end of 2011. We have—it is, like, why repeat these mistakes? I mean these are recent mistakes.

We know what a withdrawal looks like, and what a vacuum looks like, and what these groups will do. It doesn't require a vast amount of American resources to stay in these places and maintain some kind of advise-and-assist mission.

Mr. JOSCELYN. May I say something real quick? Again, thank you for your service.

I would say this. I am actually deeply ambivalent about all war. Because, having covered it every day of my life, I see how horrible it is. I am very concerned, in particular, in Afghanistan, that we don't have a good grasp on what our mission is, and have sort-of lost focus of that along the way. I think this happens quite often, actually.

But that said, the counter-terrorism side of me sees the writing on the wall. When you see what groups are operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan right now and throughout the region, and they have regional and global aspirations, and you see these organizations elsewhere, I have no doubt in my mind that the main thing that is keeping our thumb on them is the American presence, and our ability to—

Mr. CRENSHAW. That is the key. They have global aspirations. So if we just left them alone, you don't think they would just leave us alone?

Mr. JOSCELYN. So your—earlier, before you got here, Congressman, just days before President Trump was elected President, a guy named Faruk al Katani, who we profiled based on bin Laden's files and other evidence, was killed in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan. He had a very strong hand in al-Qaeda's global operations to come after us, to come after the United States. This is just days before the Presidential election in 2016. It got almost no notice. Nobody even—very few people probably off of this panel even know about it.

Mr. SOUFAN. I think—again, thank you for your service, sir. I think al-Qaeda had the space and place to plan attacks. They also had the intention at the time. Now I think they are focusing locally, but the intention is still there. They are rebuilding their network. Any premature withdrawal from any place, to include Afghanistan, is a Saigon.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you. And—

Mr. LEVIN. I concur with that, by the way.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you. I want to move on in my limited time here to Hezbollah. Regardless of what anyone thinks about the Iran deal, whether it was good or bad, or whether it should have been withdrawn from, the reality is that when the JCPO was put into place it enriched the Iranian regime. They didn't use that money for—on social welfare programs and infrastructure, right? They used it to enrich the Quds Force, the IRGC, as well as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic jihad, Shia militias in Iraq, Houthis, et cetera.

Can—and maybe I will start with you, Mr. Soufan. Can you speak to the current capabilities of Hezbollah? Are they weakened? Are they strengthened? How has their global outlook changed?

Mr. SOUFAN. Hezbollah is today probably the most powerful group, terrorist group, in the world. I think their capabilities were shown in Syria, where, if it wasn't for their involvement, the Syrian regime will—could have been defeated early on.

Hezbollah today is not only an organization, it is not only a political party in Lebanon. Hezbollah is a regional force, a regional legion, Quds Force. We put the report on Iran and Iran's playbook, and Iran—they learned from what happened to Saddam. They know,

if they want to challenge the United States, they won't last a month.

However, I think they moved from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare, and they started to establish groups that can fight for Iran in case there is war. They copied the model of Hezbollah, Hashd Sha'abi in Iraq, with the Houthis in Yemen, and with so many different groups around. You mentioned some. That is something we haven't—we are not paying attention to. We are not paying attention to the rise of—some of these groups are considered terrorist organizations, but they have missiles that can go across continents.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you. I am out of time. I have got a lot more questions, but thank you for this, Chair.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. To the Ranking Member, thank you for this very important hearing. Let me, just for the record, indicate—because we are in Homeland Security—my prayers for the people in the Bahamas, and certainly on the south-east.

But we know the enormity of the devastation, which really ties into the question from my colleague from Las Vegas about precipitous policies that don't do us any good, and certainly don't reflect on the status of the most powerful nation in the world, and as well, developing allies: Rejection of devastating Bahamian citizens is just simply an outrage.

Let me also indicate, as some of my colleagues have said the day before 9/11, that I am one of those Members who was here 9/11—in fact, in the United States Capitol—when the naivete of the United States was obviously not breached, but imploded, if you will. But leadership in that midst decided not to stereotype, stigmatize, even though, as we were fleeing with no knowledge, I could see the building smoke from the Pentagon. It is seared in my heart and mind, as is Ground Zero. Weeks later I was able to go by train to New York, and actually be in the presence of first responders, who were still recovering, if you will—not rescuing, obviously. They were still there, seeking the remains of those who had been lost.

To put this in context, I have been in a lot of meetings. Since this is global terrorism, I will say that, as it relates domestically—which is part of the global world—that racism is now a National security threat, and all of its extensions of white supremacy, white nationalism. I know that there is thoughts about those who are in the Black Power movement, but we can document a recent vintage that we have not seen any incidences that could be characterized as terrorist from that community, from our community.

I am wearing a kente cloth, because this is the 400th year of return.

So let me just quickly, in the time left to Peter Bergen, who I know—and your work, and I appreciate it very much—tell me how terrorism globally, or the attitudes of the United States play into not being a breaker, or a blocker of this, but it fuels it if we don't take our rightful place of acknowledging alliances, fighting where we do fight with alliances, but condemning the dastardly actions of racism.

Mr. Levin, if you would do that, as well.

Then anyone who wants to speak to the toxicity of guns, as relates to those who wish to do evil and harm, and that we cannot separate the two. We have just had meetings at the Tree of Life. Obviously, a gun was used at the synagogue. A gun was used in Pulse Nightclub.

So, Mr. Bergen.

Mr. BERGEN. Well, let me just make an observation, because we—which isn't repetitive of things we have already said. You are 3,000 times more likely to be killed by a fellow American with a gun than you are to be killed by any terrorist of any description in this country. We have a—you know, you are 50 times more likely to be killed in the United States than, say, in the United Kingdom by somebody with a gun.

We have an endemic problem with gun violence. Whatever people's view of the Second Amendment, this is just a fact. We are trying to—so I will leave it at that.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Levin.

Can someone answer any value to meeting with the Taliban on the soil of the United States without a more detailed plan and a strategic plan for that meeting?

Mr. LEVIN. The answer to your last question is I am astounded by that, and incredibly disappointed.

With respect to white supremacy and white nationalism, again, what is so important, and what I think has been done, is before we had more of a curation. The Klan wouldn't associate with Nazis. Then, in the 1980's, they did. Then, in the 1990's, the Justice Department had a whole task force relating to skinhead violence.

What I think, some of the things we are missing today with respect to today's hearings, you cannot entirely approach this kind of surgery like you would another type of surgery, because the groups that will show up with respect to white supremacists are going to be smaller, they are going to have less of a half-life, and the folks that are going to be most likely to get them is not a CIA agent listening in on signals intelligence coming from overseas, but a teacher, a peer person, or someone who is on the internet with them.

We are seeing people getting self-radicalized very quickly. Years ago Congress looked at an assailant who was arrested on an airplane, leaving. He got self-radicalized quickly. Now he would be one of the ones who took the longest.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Just one question. Is racism and—racism and this posture of hatred—be considered a National security threat?

Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely, definitively.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEVIN. International, as well.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back, thank you.

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your testimony and your time being here, and I think this is an important hearing.

During the recess I had some very unfortunate news from my district. The white nationalist shooter in El Paso, Texas went to

high school in my district, grew up in my district, lived in my district.

Last year Plano, Texas was the safest city in America. I have an African-American mayor, I have two Asian-American women on city council. I have a very diverse community. I have the largest mosque in North Texas. I have the largest synagogue in North Texas. I have a very large Hindu community in my district.

A year ago a young man who went to Plano West High School, right, a few miles to the west of Plano Senior High, decided to radicalize to become an ISIS-inspired terrorist. He was arrested by the FBI before he could—he wanted to conduct attacks against Hindu temples in my district and against the Stonebriar Mall, which is where I have taken my daughter ice skating.

So what I am trying to understand is how people are radicalizing on-line. I don't think it is my community. I think I have a very—again, a very diverse, harmonious community. But I think that it is—on some level I think it—I am looking to the internet to understand that.

My question is to what extent is radicalization self-induced by content, and to what extent is there an active recruiter helping to radicalize? I have heard ISIS recruiters talk about recruiting, and that seemed like an active effort. It was difficult to radicalize someone, it wasn't something that just happened overnight. Is that the case, or is it—can it just happen with content? If the content is there, people could radicalize? Or does it require an active effort?

Mr. BERGEN. It is both. You know, what usually—you want to broadcast your message, your hateful message, with as many people as possible, because only 1 percent is going to respond. Then you communicate with them in an encrypted fashion.

We talk about—you are from Texas, so think about the attack on the Prophet Mohammed Cartoon Contest. Those guys, who were born in the United States, American citizens, radicalized on-line, started communicating via encrypted communications with an ISIS recruiter who directed them to do this attack. They had 100 communications. We still don't know the content.

So it is both.

Mr. TAYLOR. Right, and I think you are talking about the attack in Garland, Texas. Is that right?

Mr. BERGEN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I actually met that police officer who defended that attack. So—I mean, and that was, again, in Garland, Texas, which—you know, and it wasn't—it doesn't seem to be home-grown. I mean it is not happening at the local mosque in Collin County, it is happening on-line.

But you are saying it is both, it is both the recruiter and the content. Is that your experience, as well, Mr.—

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Soufan.

Mr. SOUFAN. Yes, absolutely, it is both. We have seen it both. We have individuals who self-radicalize themselves, never met with an ISIS guy, never communicated with an ISIS guy, and then they take their machine guns, go to a club in Orlando, and kill people.

You have folks that, no, they did exactly what Peter said. They watched a lot of these videos, they chatted with them on-line, and

then they moved into encrypted software to talk, and they were ordered or instructed to do specific acts. We have seen them both, and we have seen the same thing happening with the white supremacist movement, frankly, too.

Mr. TAYLOR. So is that sort-of a—is it a 50/50 or an 80/20? I know I am asking you to kind-of start——

Mr. SOUFAN. I——

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Making a generalization. You are saying both, but is it definitively one or the other?

Mr. Bergen.

Mr. BERGEN. It is mostly the former.

Mr. TAYLOR. Meaning?

Mr. BERGEN. Meaning it is mostly the people will just—as Ali said, it is like the people reading content, they get a semi-automatic weapon, they go and do something. But in some cases it is directed by ISIS.

Mr. TAYLOR. OK. Mr. Joscelyn, did you want to add something?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Actually, in my previous testimony before this committee I had a whole bunch of examples of guys in the United States who were contacted by ISIS recruiters in Iraq, and Syria, and elsewhere, and how the FBI intervened in those cases. That gives you a good guide for the sort of the pull aspect of it, people who are reaching out to sort-of get people in the fold.

But you were talking about shooting the—draw the Prophet Muhammad Contest. That was actually part of an organized idea campaign called the Cartoon Jihad started by al-Qaeda, all the way back in *Inspire Magazine*, where they were encouraging people to go out and shoot any kind of venue or publication that was drawing images of the prophet Muhammad. I think, in that case, there was clear evidence that that influenced their thinking on that.

So the—and I—and this—in that case you can see that these ideas are being pushed out by organized terrorist organizations to seep into the minds of people like that, and then they can act on them.

Mr. LEVIN. If I could just interject real quickly?

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure.

Mr. LEVIN. Over 20 years ago I testified before this committee about leaderless resistance. It was another committee, excuse me. This movement glorifies lone action or small autonomous cells, but they have—it is an ecosystem. They are not really loners. They are egged on by peers who not only help them operationalize, but amplify and direct where this aggression goes. They look at themselves in a chain.

So what we are seeing now is a perverse thing, where these people don't need immediate peers in their town, they can have a peer in New Zealand who is imprisoned, and they say, oh, I am going to inscribe the next chapter in this book of violence. By the way, I am going to put something on the internet, either text or video, and that is what is becoming more problematic.

What we are seeing is a dissipation, but also not only from loners, but also what we are worried about is duos and small cells, which are harder to detect.

Mr. TAYLOR. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Soufan referenced Orlando. Our next witness—actually, the questioner—is a former chief of police from Orlando, who is now a Member of Congress, Congresswoman Val Demings.

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and thank you to our witnesses.

Mr. Soufan, the Chairman is absolutely right. I am from Orlando. The Pulse Nightclub is in my district.

I walked in on what I thought was a very interesting conversation. I was going to say it was strange, but it was a conversation, Mr. Bergen, where you were reminding Congress of what our job is, and that our job is to write laws, to write legislation that will help to keep people in this country safe.

It is kind-of amazing to me how we have zero tolerance when mass numbers of Americans are killed by international terrorists, but we sit back and do little or nothing when mass numbers of Americans are killed by domestic terrorists.

You are absolutely right, we can do better. As we talk today about the disorganization of National security, surely this is one of those areas—in spite of all of the opposition that we hear, and the unfounded justifications to not do anything, surely this is one of the areas where we can come together and work hard to keep Americans safe. If we are not doing that, that is the foundation on which we do the rest of our work.

Very, very quickly, would you agree that programs aimed at countering home-grown extremism are most effective when they have the involvement of local community members and leaders? Do you feel that some of the current policies implemented by this administration have undermined those partnerships? Could either of you elaborate on that?

Mr. BERGEN. To your first, yes.

To your second, you know, I am not really sure. But the point is, you know, it is hard to measure success with these programs, because success is something not happening. On the other hand, these programs cost almost nothing. I mean your committee was instrumental in getting money to—for these programs. They are, like, \$50 million. I mean it is a drop in the bucket.

Try—you know, throw a few things at the wall, see what works, what doesn't work, and understand that this is not expensive.

Mrs. DEMINGS. Anyone else?

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just to echo that point about see what works and doesn't work, it is very easy to fund studies to figure out which types of programs, with a minimal amount of funding, are more effective than others. I mean, yes, it is difficult maybe to get the precise metrics you need to figure out which ones—because you are—as Peter said, you are stopping something from happening.

But you can also sort-of look at other metrics. I don't have the time to get into all that, but there are ways to design studies of efficacy for little money, overall.

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. SOUFAN. I don't think we can secure our communities without the community members and leaders being involved. So absolutely, that is, I believe, extremely important.

Then, hey, if something doesn't work, we will figure out a way to make it work. But yes, absolutely, it is a must.

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you. I heard a couple of reports about a rise in the attempted radicalization of women.

No. 1, have you seen that? Can you verify those reports?

And No. 2, are there any programs or strategies targeting that specific concern?

Mr. SOUFAN. We have seen that. We have seen that with both kinds of, you know, the threats that we are talking about today, the white supremacist threats, and also the jihadi threats. When it comes to ISIS, for example, women are not necessarily the victims. They are as involved, and they did as evil activities as the men.

You just look at what is happening now in camp, and how the women of ISIS are trying to bring back ISIS inside the detention facility in Syria. So we have seen examples where women were involved in recruiting members, women were involved in enslaving Yazidis, for example, in Syria and Iraq, and where women were involved in, you know, establishing the network.

The same thing in al-Qaeda. Not to the same level with ISIS. Osama bin Laden's wife, for example, was instrumental in directing him in so many different ways in his global jihad, the mother of Hamza.

So, yes, women can be victims, but we have seen more and more women taking a role of, you know, of a villain.

Mrs. DEMINGS. Are there any particular programs or strategies to address that rise or concern at this point?

Mr. SOUFAN. I am not familiar, I don't know if somebody—

Mr. BERGEN. I am not, either, but I will say domestic violence is often an indicator that you are going to carry out other forms of violence. Jihadist terrorists, we mentioned misogyny. Obviously, they are misogynists. But also, they are going to carry out acts of domestic violence.

A thing for the committee to look into is to look at the cases in the United States that have been preceded by acts of domestic violence.

Mr. LEVIN. Also, we recently had a violent Salafist Jihadist plotter in Arizona who went to a misogynistic videos done by far right. So misogyny not only stands alone, but it is also an undercurrent.

In the white supremacist world, generally women play a much different role. They are supposed to make white babies to prevent the overthrow of white society.

Mrs. DEMINGS. OK.

[Laughter.]

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, let me thank the witnesses for their very valuable testimony. I have been on the committee since it was a select committee, and I—let me say that you have far exceeded in your testimony today giving us, as a committee, I think, what we really need. Your passion, your intellect, with the subject matter, speaks volumes.

So I don't want to speak for the Ranking Member, but you know, we—you all have shared with us a lot of things we needed to hear, and your talent is beyond reproach.

Mr. ROGERS. I too have been on this committee since it was a select committee, and this is an outstanding panel. You have been

very valuable, and this has been a great hearing. Thank you very much.

Chairman THOMPSON. Rest assured we will follow up on a lot of things that came out of your testimony today. I don't know whether you are going to get credit for it, but it might come in a different form.

All of us supported Mr. King's bill, by the way. It just, you know—we just got to keep trying in that.

So Members may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing.

Without objection, the committee record will be kept open for 10 days.

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

