[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                   ESCALATION WITH IRAN: OUTCOMES AND
         IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS AND REGIONAL STABILITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
       THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            JANUARY 28, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-92

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
        
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
39-453PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada                   ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California                 FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland                MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

 
                                     

               Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

   Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International 
                               Terrorism

                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOE WILSON, South Carolina, 
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island            Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California                 STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland                BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California              STEVE WATKINS, Kansas

   
                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Karlin, Mara, Director of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins School 
  of Advanced International Studies..............................     8
Tabatabai, Ariane, Associate Political Scientist, Rand 
  Corporation and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, Columbia 
  University School of International and Public Affairs..........    14
Pletka, Danielle, Senior Fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy 
  Studies, American Enterprise InstituteAndrew H. Siegel 
  Professor on American Middle Eastern Foreign Policy, Georgetown 
  University Walsh School of Foreign Service27...................

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    50
Hearing Minutes..................................................    51
Hearing Attendance...............................................    52


                  ESCALATION WITH IRAN: OUTCOMES AND 
         IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS AND REGIONAL STABILITY

                       Tuesday, January 28, 2020

                        House of Representatives

  Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and International

                               Terrorism

                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

                                     Washington, DC

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in 
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E. 
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Trone. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. 
Welcome, everyone.
    The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the 
impact of rising tensions between the United States and Iran, 
and on U.S. policy and interests in the Middle East, and on 
regional stability.
    May I ask for unanimous consent for Representative Perry, 
who is a full member of the Foreign Affairs Committee to join 
us this morning?
    Without objection.
    I want to note that Chairman Deutch will be joining us late 
this morning.
    I thank our witnesses for appearing today.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.
    There are a number of significant questions before us. 
First: Are the American people more safe or less safe after the 
killing of Qasem Soleimani? How will the Trump Administration's 
escalation and program of maximum pressure impact the U.S. 
interests and stability in the region? What are the explicit 
benchmarks and goals of the Trump Administration's policies 
toward Iran and Iraq?
    As a member of this subcommittee, I have significant 
concerns about the administration's inability to answer these 
questions and communicate a coherent strategy to confront the 
Iranian challenge while avoiding war and keeping us safe. I 
have to say that we had hoped to hear from Secretary Pompeo 
about this in the Foreign Affairs Committee 2 weeks ago but he 
refused to testify. The Committee has invited him again to a 
hearing tomorrow and I sincerely hope he attends because our 
questions about U.S. actions against Iran get at some of the 
most fundamental issues of war and peace that come before 
Congress.
    We are exercising our constitutional duty and I would 
imagine that, as a former Member of Congress, the Secretary 
understands that.
    Soleimani was responsible for the attacks that killed 
hundreds of Americans and thousands of Iraqis, Syrians, and 
others. The careful plotting and planning he put into sowing 
death, destruction and chaos is absolutely reprehensible. There 
is no doubt that under his command, the Quds Forces' efforts to 
expand terror pose a direct threat to U.S. interest and 
American lives. However, the Trump Administration has failed to 
provide a coherent rationale for the strike that killed him. It 
remains an open question whether eliminating one threat is 
worth the consequences of this action.
    The fact remains the American people have seen no evidence 
that killing Soleimani prevented an imminent attack against 
American facilities or personnel and no evidence of a 
discernable political plan for our policy toward Iran moving 
forward.
    I do not want to ignore the implications for Iraq either. 
Before this situation escalated so dramatically at the end of 
December, Iraqis were taking to the streets to protest 
pervasive Iranian influence in their country. These protesters 
forced Iraq's leaders to take action, resulting in new 
electoral law and the resignation of Prime Minister Abdul 
Mahdi. The Iraqi protest struck me as a very real and 
passionate expression of a people who want to be free of undue 
Iranian influence. Instead, Iraq now seems to be the site of a 
proxy battle.
    The administration's escalation has jeopardized our 
interest in Iraq, now that U.S. Military personnel are focused 
almost entirely on force protection against threats posed by 
Iran and its militia partners. Almost all of our counter-ISIS 
efforts in Iraq are paused. Iran would like nothing more than 
to force American civilian and military personnel out of Iraq.
    Following the strike on Soleimani, the Iraqi Council 
representatives voted to end U.S. Military presence there. Last 
Friday, tens of thousands protested in the streets of Baghdad, 
calling for the expulsion of American troops and the largest 
protest movement appears to be splintering. I cannot stress 
this enough. This is exactly what Iran has wanted all along. It 
serves no one's best interest if our actions lead to a dramatic 
reduction in reasonable diplomacy, a resurgence of ISIS, and 
free reign for Iran and its proxies.
    Finally, I would like to make the point, because I think 
this administration needs to be reminded, Congress has not 
authorized war with Iran. What we need now is a clear strategy. 
We should use this occasion to develop one that is based on 
collaboration between equal branches of our government and 
enjoys bipartisan support. In the long-run, this is more likely 
to make us safe, and strong, than the escalatory action that 
seemed to have taken over the last month.
    I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and thank them 
for helping us understand the consequences of recent events in 
U.S.-Iran relations, their implications for the Middle East, 
and how the United States can best navigate this difficult path 
forward.
    I now recognize the ranking member for the purpose of 
making an opening statement.
    Mr. Wilson. Ladies and gentlemen, I am honored to be here 
today and thank you, Chairman David Trone, for standing in for 
Chairman Deutch. Thank you for calling this important hearing 
to examine what comes next for U.S. policies and interests in 
the Middle East after President Donald Trump's courageous game-
changing decision to protect Americans be eliminating Qasem 
Soleimani, a merciless terrorist, who was directly responsible 
for the deaths of at least 700 Americans in the conflict that 
we have in the Global War on Terrorism.
    Iran has been threatening the United States since taking 
the American diplomats hostage during the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. This is not a secret. The regime chants death to America, 
death to Israel. These chants are not empty words. These are 
the followers of the Ayatollah announcing their intentions to 
the world and it is our responsibility, as protectors of the 
American people, to recognize that and respond, as needed, to 
defend American families.
    I firmly believe that the attacks that Iran and its proxies 
have engaged in in the past year, and as recently with the 
missile attack yesterday, beginning with the bombing of the 
Marine barracks in Beirut, and on to ballistic missile attacks 
of U.S. Forces in Iraq, attacks against the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad, shooting down an American drone, and attacking oil 
tankers and oil fields, an attempted assassination in 
Washington all are hallmarks of the rogue Iranian regime's 
murderous conduct. These attacks will not stop, if they are 
left unaddressed.
    President Trump's strike on Soleimani was a needed step to 
achieve peace through strength. Today, we will discuss what 
other steps are needed to bring stability to the Middle East. 
Even as Iran works to sow discord and chaos, we must continue 
the maximum pressure campaign. The sanctions against the 
Iranian rulers are working. The despots in Iran are desperate. 
Now is not the time to restore resources for tyrants to 
continue aggression in the region. Sanctions relief did not 
lead the authoritarians to moderate behavior before and it will 
not have that effect now.
    Turning to Iraq, the United States must make it a priority 
to stand up for human rights accountability and meaningful 
government reform. For months, the Iraqi people have been 
expressing their democratic rights as guaranteed to them by the 
Iraqi constitution, protesting corruption in their government 
and Iran's interference in their country.
    Gruesomely, these protesters have been slaughtered. Amnesty 
International says that over 600 people have been killed. It is 
our responsibility to stand with these protesters and defend 
their rights. That is why my colleague, Representative Tom 
Malinowski, and I have introduced H.R. 5376, the Iraq Human 
Rights and Accountability Act of 2019, which requires a State 
Department review to determine if certain popular mobilization 
forces and interior ministry leaders meet the criteria for 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Act 
Human Rights and Accountability Act.
    The Trump Administration has courageously imposed sanctions 
on the PMF tyrants and made corruption designations. I know the 
administration will continue to take a strong stance on this 
issue and I hope this committee will take up the Iraq Human 
Rights and Accountability Act.
    Similarly, we must remain steadfast in our right--in 
support of the rights of the people of Iran, who have also 
engaged in peaceful protests against the Islamic Republic's 
tyrannical policies.
    Later today, the full House will vote on a resolution Mr. 
Joyce and I authored to support the right of the Iranian people 
to protest.
    In Lebanon, following months of popular protest of 
government corruption and inefficiency, a pro-Hezbollah 
government has taken over. This development is concerning for 
obvious reasons and I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses how the United States should tailor our responses--
our policies and response.
    I thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look forward 
to their analysis and recommendations.
    Thank you again, Chairman Trone, and I yield back.
    Mr. Trone. I will now recognize members of the subcommittee 
for 1 minute opening statements, should they wish to make one.
    Representative Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
having this hearing.
    I just want to say that I think we have heard a lot of red 
herrings and false intelligence justifying the assassination of 
a foreign leader. However maligned an actor he was, and he was, 
is it going to be the policy of the United States to take out, 
by assassination, every maligned leader in the Middle East? Of 
course not.
    Is it going to be the policy of the United States to take a 
unilateral action without consultation with Congress or allies 
and worry about the consequences subsequently? Are we going to 
lie about the justification for such actions, while we are at 
it?
    That cannot be the policy of the United States in this 
region. It is not the proper action of a great power and, 
frankly, it has weakened the United States, not strengthened 
us. And unlike what Secretary Pompeo says, today is not a safer 
world. It is a more dangerous world after that action.
    There should have been proper consultation, careful 
vetting, and a clear understanding of the import of this 
action. None of that happened and all of that flows from the 
disastrous decision by this President to walk away from our own 
nuclear agreement with Iran that was working. I know we will 
explore that in the hearing.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Trone. Any other members?
    Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. Well, I sure thank the chairman and the ranking 
member for their indulgence of the U.C. of my time here.
    I reject categorically the assertion that there is no 
strategic or tactical plan regarding the elimination of 
Soleimani from the battlefield.
    The fact that the administration does not come out and tell 
Members of Congress or the world at large what the strategic or 
tactical plan is, it is appropriate that they do not. We do not 
tell our enemies what the plan is. And unfortunately, Congress 
and even some in the President's own administration cannot be 
trusted with that information not to give it to the world or 
our enemies.
    This was not an assassination. And this individual was not 
a foreign leader. This individual was a terrorist wearing the 
uniform of a nation state that uses terrorism as statecraft.
    I heard nothing from my colleagues on the other side when 
their President eliminated almost 4,000 people from areas 
outside the battlefield, terrorists that should have been 
eliminated. And the world is a safer place because they were 
and that is why we did not hear anything from either side.
    And with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Trone. Without objection, all members may have up to 5 
days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for 
the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
    I will now introduce our witnesses: Dr. Mara Karlin is the 
Director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies. She is also an associate 
professor at SAIS and a non-resident senior fellow at the 
Brookings Institution.
    Dr. Karlin served the national security roles for five U.S. 
Secretaries of Defense, advising on policies, spanning 
strategic planning, defense budgeting, future wars, and the 
evolving security environment in regional affairs. Most 
recently, she served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy and Force Development.
    Welcome back to the subcommittee.
    Dr. Ariane Tabatabai is an associate political scientist at 
the RAND Corporation and an adjunct senior research scholar at 
Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. 
She is also a Truman National Security Fellow and a Council of 
Foreign Relations member.
    Previously, she served as a visiting assistant professor of 
security studies Georgetown University, Edmund A. Walsh School 
of Foreign Service, was international consultant for NATO, and 
held several positions for the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs.
    We also welcome back Ms. Danielle Pletka, a senior fellow 
in foreign and defense policy studies at the American 
Enterprise Institute. Until January 2020, Ms. Pletka was the 
senior vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at 
AEI. Ms. Pletka holds the Andrew H. Siegel professorship on 
American Middle Eastern Foreign Policy at Georgetown University 
Walsh School of Foreign Service.
    Previously, Ms. Pletka was a senior professional staff 
member for Middle East and South Asia Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
    Thank you all for being here today. Let us remind witnesses 
to please limit your testimony to 5 minutes.
    And, without objection, your prepared witness statements 
will be made a part of the hearing record.
    Thank you for being here today.
    Dr. Karlin, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF MARA KARLIN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS 
        HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Ms. Karlin. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members 
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear 
before you today. This morning, I will be summarizing my 
written remarks, which I submit for the record.
    As U.S.-Iran dynamics grow sportier in the wake of Qasem 
Soleimani's killing, there are three insights I would like to 
convey. First, U.S. strategy vis-a-vis Iran is convoluted and 
clunky. This administration has outlined its vision of a 
fundamentally different Iranian regime through its maximum 
pressure campaign. Yet, it has attempted this policy while 
simultaneously pursuing contradictory efforts. It has a 
national security strategy and a national defense strategy 
focused on great power competition. It pulled out of the 
nuclear agreement without any effort to lay the groundwork for 
a new deal. It promulgated vague, and contradictory, and ad hoc 
responses to Iranian aggression, from skipping tens of rungs on 
the escalation ladder by killing Soleimani, while confusingly 
lurching in the aborted response last summer, when Iran shot 
down a U.S. drone.
    This confusing approach is read by the Iranians as 
feckless, by regional partners as fickle, and by other U.S. 
adversaries like North Korea, as presenting opportunities for 
mischief.
    The latest escalation raises considerations like how and in 
what ways Congress should financially support adventurism 
absent strategy and how Congress can compel a coherent 
strategic approach to policymaking on the Middle East.
    For those who question whether missile salvos by the 
Iranian military constituted the sum total of Iran's 
retaliation for the Soleimani killing, let me be clear. Though 
the timing and the target of future action are uncertain, there 
should be no doubt that further Iranian response is sure to 
follow. That response could look like attacks by Iranian 
clients, such as Hezbollah, against soft targets frequented by 
U.S. Military personnel or directly against U.S. diplomats or 
civilians.
    Simply put, we have reached the end of the beginning of 
this escalatory cycle.
    My second insight: The Middle East is moving along a 
trajectory that increasingly favors Tehran. In Syria, Iran is 
managed with support from Russia and Hezbollah to keep Bashar 
al-Assad in power. In Lebanon, the new government further 
empowers Hezbollah in Damascus. In Iraq, key constituencies are 
seriously reconsidering the U.S. Military presence. In Yemen, 
the Saudis and the Emiratis spent years battling the Houthis 
with little to show for it, besides horrific Yemeni losses and 
Iranian delight.
    Across the region, Iran's clients are not only growing in 
capacity but also in capability. Furthermore, the Russians, not 
the Americans, have committed to consistent diplomatic 
offensives across the region. Not only do the Russians have a 
seat at the table in the Middle East, they increasingly are 
setting the table as well.
    There are steps the United States can take to adjust this 
trajectory. Hezbollah and Iran would be overjoyed if the United 
States gave up on Lebanon. It is essential to watch, as the 
military and the government sniff around for a new 
rapprochement, to ensure the military continues to tackle 
threats of mutual concern and to increase force protection for 
Americans in Lebanon. The United States should excoriate 
Lebanese leaders who further undermine Lebanese sovereignty.
    In the Gulf, ratcheting down tensions is a shrewd move. Key 
Gulf States, like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are seeking 
accommodation with the Iranians. We should also encourage an 
end to the Saudi spat with Qatar and urge the Saudis to find a 
path out of the Yemen war.
    And above all, we should find a way to normalize the U.S.-
Saudi relationship, rather than prioritize it.
    My third insight: The United States must find a way to 
meaningfully deprioritize the Middle East. The key geopolitical 
challenge, going forward, is posed by China and yet, we remain 
trapped in Middle East purgatory. The overmilitarized approach 
to the region continues. At least 20,000 new U.S. Military 
Forces have been sent to the region in recent months, bringing 
the total estimate of U.S. Military personnel to 80,000, which 
comes at a time as our diplomatic presence is plummeting.
    The administration's maximum pressure campaign is resulting 
in maximum focus on Iran and there are opportunity costs for 
doing so.
    Going forward, I urge you to look at the following areas of 
concern: On strategy and execution, given that U.S. strategy 
toward Iran and the Middle East is convoluted, the 
administration should clarify what it is trying to achieve, why 
is it trying to do so, and, above all, how it will do so.
    On the counter-ISIS campaign and coalition, given that the 
conflagration between the United States and Iran has imperiled 
the fight against ISIS and fueled discontent among some Iraqis, 
the administration should explain how it plans to rehabilitate 
the fight and Congress should deepen its consultation with key 
coalition members, especially the Iraqis.
    A deal in disarray. Given that U.S. participation in the 
nuclear agreement, rather than considering ways to improve it, 
has resulted in the United States dividing itself from its 
fellow signatories, while Iran pursues its own agenda, Congress 
should help formulate pathways with partners to limit Iran's 
nuclear program.
    And our regional presence and purpose: Given that for two 
decades the United States has overwhelmingly relied on a 
military approach to the region, Congress should consider how 
the United States can right-size its military posture and grow 
a more robust diplomatic presence.
    As outlined today, there are no simple solutions. However, 
some steps are overdue in leading Middle East strategy in a 
more coherent and sustainable direction.
    Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Karlin follows:
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    Mr. Trone. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Tabatabai.

    STATEMENT OF DR. ARIANE TABATABAI, ASSOCIATE POLITICAL 
    SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION AND ADJUNCT SENIOR RESEARCH 
SCHOLAR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC 
                            AFFAIRS

    Dr. Tabatabai. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wilson, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    My testimony will proceed in three parts. First, I will 
begin by looking at the internal dynamics in Iran today, before 
examining what we might expect from the regime next, and I will 
end by discussing U.S. policy options.
    Repression has been a consistent feature of the Islamic 
Republic since its inception in 1979 but 2019 marked new 
trends. It revealed the regime's heightened perception of 
threats both at home and abroad, a new boldness in operations, 
and a new capability, the ability to completely shut down the 
internet. So far, Tehran's actions in 2020 indicate the 
regime's willingness to continue to attempt to sideline not 
only those outside of the regime space but also groups and 
individuals typically associated with the pragmatic segments of 
the system.
    The regime is currently primarily engaged in two type of 
efforts to limit the scent. One, it is preventing and stopping 
popular opposition by hindering the flow of information and 
through the use of lethal force. And two, it is limiting the 
scent within the ranks of the regime, which includes 
restricting certain factions' involvement in the political 
process, such as the ongoing efforts to disqualify candidates 
belonging to certain camps by taking--from taking part in the 
elections.
    Nevertheless, unrest continues in Iran as the maximum 
pressure campaign, coupled with the regime's own in competence 
and corruption, continues to take their toll on Iran's economy. 
Despite continued popular unrest, the regime appears unlikely 
to fundamentally change its domestic or foreign policy 
behavior. And although Iran appears to have made a symbolic 
response to Soleimani's death, the regime probably does not 
feel that it has achieved full justice for Soleimani's killing.
    The United States should be prepared for further action 
from Iran, likely a more subtle response that is intended to 
limit our ability to react.
    Though limited, Iran's toolbox allows the regime to 
overcome its conventional inferiority, vis-a-vis the United 
States, enabling it to pose a challenge to us and our partners. 
It includes the following: disinformation to sway public 
opinion; attempts to interfere in our elections; cyber attacks 
and efforts to target U.S. persons, organizations, agencies, 
and infrastructure; a network of proxies, including tens of 
thousands of fighters across several theaters and countries; 
direct IRGC attacks on U.S. personnel, assets, and interests; 
resumption of attacks on oil infrastructure; and the resumption 
of nuclear activities that were previously halted under the 
JCPOA.
    Clearly, the United States should be prepared for all 
scenarios, including a potential collapse of the regime. 
However, for the foreseeable future, the United States should 
be crafting policies that advance U.S. interest, even if the 
Islamic Republic remains in place because that is currently the 
most likely scenario.
    In the event of further escalation from Iran, the United 
States may very well have to consider a kinetic response but it 
should do so when its own strategic gains are clear. Deploying 
more forces whose mission and operational status is unclear to 
the region might not actually deter Iran and a deployment 
arguably offers more targets for asymmetric Iranian 
retaliation. Merely moving troops is not sufficient to deter an 
adversary when redlines and objectives are not clearly and 
credibly communicated.
    The United States can identify and discretely target 
Iranian proxy capabilities, as it has in the past. This could 
be effective if deployed surgically and accompanied by clear 
messaging to Tehran.
    Given recent developments, appetite for negotiations in 
Iran is likely limited. Nevertheless, the United States can 
prepare the groundwork for engagement by sending clear signals 
to Tehran that it is serious about seeking a diplomatic 
solution and avoiding conflict, as the President has done on a 
number of occasions.
    Currently U.S. policy toward Iran is heavily reliant on 
sanctions. Sanctions are a critical means of achieving U.S. 
objectives but they are only fully effective if they are 
coupled with other U.S. instruments of power. The 
administration should consider offering a cohesive message to 
Iran that clearly lays out U.S. objectives, what the United 
States is willing to offer to Iran, and what Iran would have to 
do in return. This would need to be done within the framework 
of a realistic plan that does not rely on maximalist positions. 
Absent this, Tehran may interpret the administration's ultimate 
goal as its complete surrender and such capitulation is a non-
starter for Iran and has, historically, led nations to go to 
war.
    Congress could request more clarity in this messaging and 
decisionmaking process, as well as encourage coordination with 
allies.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Tabatabai follows: ]
    
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

       
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Ms. Pletka.

   STATEMENT OF DANIELLE PLETKA SENIOR FELLOW IN FOREIGN AND 
   DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND 
 ANDREW H. SIEGEL PROFESSOR ON AMERICAN MIDDLE EASTERN FOREIGN 
 POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE

    Ms. Pletka. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Wilson, good morning. 
Thank you so much for having me back. It is always an honor to 
testify before this committee.
    The title of this hearing, I believe, misplaces a bit what 
should be the appropriate focus on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Without overstating the case, I believe this is not 
actually a moment of escalation with Iran, at least not in 
terms of direct conflict. We are likely to see, as my 
colleagues have pointed out, some proxy escalation but even 
that, I think, will be careful for fear of provoking the 
unpredictable President Trump.
    More important, I believe, is that notwithstanding 
victories, in Syria, Iran really is in a period of flux and 
stress, unlike many we have seen in recent years. Internally, 
next door, and in--next door in Iraq and in Lebanon, home to 
Iran's most important proxy, Hezbollah, the regime is under 
enormous pressure.
    In connection with Qasem Soleimani's death and the likely 
transition ahead of the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei, those pressures create an opportunity for the United 
States. The key questions are what are we going to do with that 
opportunity, what the actual policy of the United States is 
toward the Islamic Republic, and how the maximum pressure 
campaign will impact those aims.
    On the direct question of the impact of the Soleimani 
strike, let's start with Iran itself and the Quds Force that 
the late general led for the last two decades. Those who have 
suggested that the IRGC and the Quds Force will revert to 
business as usual after the passing of their leaders I think 
are confused about the role that Soleimani played. He was not 
simply the leader of Iran's expeditionary forces and 
coordinator of its proxies, he was a man of great strategic 
intelligence and cunning, with charisma that made his 
leadership all the more effective. His successor, Esmail Qaani, 
is, to paraphrase an American politician, no Qasem Soleimani. 
What does that mean? That will be guesswork for us.
    But Qaani's power to control Iran's major proxies may 
portend increased independent action on their part. We have 
already seen threats against U.S. officials and a call for 
personal jihad, which is highly unusual in the Shia faith by 
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
    The Hashd al-Shaabi, the popular mobilization units in 
Iraq, have also escalated attacks on the U.S. on U.S. targets 
in Iraq. This is all happening at a moment of uncertainty in 
Iran itself, which recently suffered the worst demonstrations 
it has experienced since the revolution.
    Protests in Iran reemerged on a large scale last November 
and hundreds, if not thousands, have died at the hands of 
security forces, and it took weeks to crush the protests. With 
elections ahead and Ayatollah Khamenei's succession due sooner, 
rather than later, no wonder those deeply invested in the 
system of the Islamic Republic are worried.
    Things have been similarly unstable in neighboring Iraq, 
where popular demonstrations forced the resignation of Iraqi 
Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi. Those demonstrations have been 
ongoing also since the beginning of October.
    It is important to understand just how much of a slap in 
the face these demonstrations in Iraq are to Iran. They have 
been dominated by Iraqi Shiites. They have focused on 
governance failures, corruption, and on Iranian influence. And 
neither efforts by regular police nor the Hashd were capable of 
stifling that popular anger. The Iranian Consulate in Najaf was 
attacked and burned down.
    Ironically, demonstrations that began around the same time 
in Lebanon have focused exactly--on exactly the same thing--
governance failures, corruption, and sectarianism. Those also 
resulted in the collapse of the government with Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri stepping down. A new Hezbollah-only government has 
since been appointed with Hezbollah's chosen candidate, Hassan 
Diab, at its helm.
    Circling back to Tehran and looking at its major satellites 
in Iraq and Lebanon, it is fair to say Ayatollah Khamenei has 
had a bad month. Remember, he celebrated the beginning of 2020 
thinking he had quelled protests at home, that the United 
States was weak, disengaged. 2019 saw the disastrous Trump 
decision to quit Northeaster Syria and betray our Kurdish 
allies, as well as the administration's low-key responses to 
the downing of an American drone, attacks on Gulf shipping, and 
the direct attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq and Khurais 
facilities.
    While the U.S. did in fact retaliate in all instances with 
substantial cyber attacks on Iran, according to my 
understanding, the failure to respond overtly only served to 
reinforce the signal that the Syria withdrawal had sent: that 
the U.S. is turning its back on the Middle East.
    But then the Soleimani strike and the U.S. dismissal of 
efforts to toss U.S. Forces out of Iraq put paid to that notion 
that the U.S. was ceding the region. The question this hearing 
raises is: What is next? What is the message the United States 
is trying to send? That is a question not only on our minds 
here, but on the minds of policymakers and leaders in 
Jerusalem, and in Riyadh, and elsewhere in the Middle East who 
wonder what the U.S. strategic posture really is. Are we 
committed to staying in Iraq? Are we committed to Saudi 
Arabia's defense to staying in Syria, to competing with the 
Russians, to keeping the plus up of troops in the Gulf or not? 
Is the maximum pressure campaign about a new JCPOA or is it 
really about regime collapse?
    The right course is to ramp up pressure on Iran 
politically, militarily, and diplomatically--I have just 
another moment, if you won't mind--and for the Congress, if I 
may, to embrace some consistency on the question if Iran 
policy. It is incoherent to denounce the Soleimani killing and 
the abandonment of the Kurds in much the same breath. Either we 
want a robust posture in the region or we do not want a robust 
posture in the region.
    The right course is to begin to work more seriously with 
Iranian dissidents and opponents of the regime with a view to a 
better future to further isolate Iran supporters within Lebanon 
and Iraq, and empower protesters against Iranian domination. We 
know the regime is under pressure. We know they will seek to 
regain their footing. We know their economic resources are 
stretched. We know the Iraqi people and the Lebanese people do 
not actually wish to be ruled from Tehran.
    What we do not know is what U.S. policy actually will be 
going forward. That is a much needed clarity.
    Thank you for your time.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows: ]
    
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    Mr. Trone. Thank you for your testimony.
    We will now move to member questions under the 5-minute 
rule. I will begin, followed by Ranking Member Wilson. We will 
then alternate between the parties.
    Let me begin by asking Dr. Karlin, with respect to the 
Soleimani strike there is concern that the Trump Administration 
did not consider the fallout or implications for the U.S. 
interest in the region, Hezbollah, arguably Iran's strongest 
proxy, in addition to its ongoing military activities.
    How and where could Iran deploy Hezbollah to threaten the 
U.S. or our partners? And what advanced capabilities has Iran 
provided Hezbollah that are most concerning to the U.S.?
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. I 
think there is very real concern that is warranted that the 
administration did not think about the second-and third-order 
effects to this strike, a strike that had been pondered by 
previous U.S. administrations and also by the Israelis and then 
not taken. Had there been some serious consideration, I think 
we would have seen enhanced force protection, for example, and 
a plethora of embassy notifications, particularly across the 
Middle East, and perhaps flowing troops ahead of time.
    So I think there is a lot of evidence that one should be 
concerned that these attendant effects were not considered.
    How the Iranians might respond, there is not a shortage of 
options, to be frank. They have done the official military 
response and it ended up being relatively superficial and, 
luckily, the injuries were not catastrophic, although very real 
on the U.S. Military personnel side.
    What we should expect now is going to be some sort of 
effort by their various clients, quite possibly by Hezbollah. 
There are soft targets across the Gulf. For example, if you 
look at Bahrain, places where U.S. sailors hang out, you could 
see them hitting U.S. troops in places like Jordan, also no 
shortage of soft targets there, or even potentially going 
directly against U.S. diplomats around the region.
    So they have a lot of options and I guess what I would say 
is you know stay tuned. When we have looked at the Iranians, 
historically, they have not necessarily felt this need to 
respond automatic
    Mr. Trone. What do you see next for Syria on 
Hezbollah?ally. We have seen this when folks like Iman 
Mughniyah and Abbas Musawi were killed. So we now really need 
to be, I think, in an eyes wide open and as prepared as 
possible posture.
    Ms. Karlin. On Syria, I think the Iranians, and Hezbollah, 
and the Russians have gotten what they wanted. Bashar al-Assad 
is not going anywhere. Granted, he has this sporty insurgency 
to continue tackling and that will continue but a year from 
now, 2 years from now, when we are in future hearings, I 
suspect Bashar al-Assad will still be around. And as he 
increasingly takes control, Hezbollah will be able to now focus 
less on Syria and more on other things that the Iranians need 
them to do, in particular, what is happening domestically in 
Lebanon.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Dr. Tabatabai, the downing of the Ukrainian airliner 
sparked the resurgence of demonstrations in Iran. How will 
these protests affect near-term Iranian decisionmaking, 
specifically, potential retaliation for the killing of 
Soleimani? And how are the protests impacting the parliamentary 
elections scheduled in February in Iran?
    Dr. Tabatabai. Thank you, sir.
    Yes, as you mentioned, the downing of the airliner has led 
to protests in Iran. What is important to note, though, is that 
protests are an inherent feature of Iranian public life. They 
have been happening for 40 years.
    So I would be careful to kind of chase what is happening in 
Iran domestically and put too much weight in terms of what 
impact it may have on the regime. That said, it is quite clear 
now, I think, that the next parliament in Iran is going to be 
fairly hardline, that most of the so-called reformists and 
moderates have been sidelined in an attempt to undermine 
President Rouhani and his efforts going into the Iranian 
Presidential election year.
    Mr. Trone. Ms. Pletka, Iran has long sought the withdrawal 
of U.S. Forces from Iraq. In what ways is Tehran likely to 
exert pressure on the Iraqi political system to push for the 
expulsion of our troops, how should we respond, and do you 
believe the reduced diplomatic presence in Iraq is hindering 
our ability to counter Iranian influence in Baghdad?
    Ms. Pletka. Thank you, sir. That is a great question.
    I think that is going to be Iran's No. 1 priority is to use 
its proxies, whether they are in terrorist groups around the 
region or in governments that they support to try to push U.S. 
troops out of the region and to try to extend Iranian influence 
even further than it has extended in recent years. They are 
going to do that through--they are going to do that using the 
popular mobilization units. They are going to do that using the 
turmoil that we see on the ground right now in the formation of 
a new government. They are going to do that using Hezbollah. 
They are going to use that using strategic attacks against U.S. 
targets that they believe go up to but do not push past what 
they believe or assess to be the President's red line.
    The challenge for them, of course, is not knowing exactly 
where that is and going too far because going too far will 
clearly provoke a response, as the President has proven earlier 
this year.
    I am sorry. What was the second part of your question? Oh, 
the diplomatic part.
    Look, are we going to be harmed by that? Absolutely. We 
have been harmed over the last three and a half years by our 
failure to have people in positions of authority at mid-levels 
in government and in senior positions in our embassies. We need 
people in Baghdad. We need people in Beirut. We need people--we 
did not have an ambassador in Saudi Arabia for the first 2 
years of this administration. I believe that that harms not 
only our ability to conduct diplomacy but our ability to manage 
the challenge that Iran presents to us. Though some of those 
challenges have been remediated, we have an ambassador now in 
both places, and we have an Assistant Secretary for Near East 
Affairs, at the same time, there is no question that what you 
want is not a militarized answer to every challenge. What you 
want is militarized diplomacy backed up by that military.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Trone, and thank you, too, 
for being here today.
    Ms. Pletka, how would you assess the effectiveness of the 
United States sanctions on Iran, which have been courageously 
placed by President Donald Trump? Have you detected any changes 
in Iran's behavior since the maximum pressure campaign has 
begun? And how best can we help the people of Iran, who are the 
heirs of the extraordinary person culture?
    Ms. Pletka. Thank you for asking that question.
    On the issue of sanctions, I think many of us who believed 
that an effort to reconstitute sanctions after the JCPOA would 
be very difficult, if not impossible, have been--the word I 
like to use is gob-smacked by how effective they have been.
    The President and his team have done, I think by all 
accounts, an impressive job in putting together the most 
serious, the most biting campaign of sanctions that have been 
in place. Iran's foreign currency assets are diminished 
extraordinarily. Iran's currency has dropped precipitously. 
Iran's oil exports are below a quarter of a million barrels per 
day, which is their main source of income.
    The only question there is, again, to what end. And you 
rightly followup with the question of how we can best help the 
people of Iran because these sanctions, while they impact the 
people of Iran, are, of course, focused on the regime of the 
Islamic Republic, not on the people of Iran. They are the 
victims of this regime and they will suffer alongside. How can 
we best help them?
    You know we have never been terribly successful at 
answering that question, not since the end of the cold war. And 
I believe that if you, this committee, were to turn to that 
question, it would be hugely helpful to our policy because no 
matter what, even if these demonstrations that we are seeing in 
Iran are unlikely to lead to regime collapse, and I believe 
they are unlikely to lead to that, at the same time, we should 
know what it is that we hope will be there instead of the 
ayatollahs and the mullahs that are running the country right 
now.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. It is also encouraging to 
see our E.U. allies now adjusting to openly embracing 
sanctions.
    And Ms. Pletka, how should the U.S. alter its Lebanon 
policy in response to the new pro-Hezbollah Government? How 
does this change in our strategic posture toward Lebanon?
    Ms. Pletka. Lebanon is really a modern day tragedy and our 
failure to do more to limit Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon. 
Over successive administrations, nonpartisan criticism or 
bipartisan criticism is in place. Right now, what we are 
looking at is the replacement of a government that was a fig 
leaf for Hezbollah to a government that is plain Hezbollah. The 
implications for Israel, the implications for us, the 
implications for terrorism, and the implications for the 
Lebanese people are very serious.
    What we need to do, again, is we need to work to isolate 
those inside Lebanon who have robbed the country blind with 
their corruption, who support terrorism, and who seek to drag 
Lebanon, as a victim, into war with Israel, at some point in 
the future. How we do that is partly the way we have so far, 
through sanctions but sanctions are a very blunt tool. We also 
need to empower and help the people who are willing to stand up 
to Hezbollah. And there, I feel we have really fallen down on 
the job.
    We have supported only the Lebanese military, believing 
that the Lebanese military is a key tool in fighting Sunna 
extremism. Well, it is but it is also a key tool in helping 
Hezbollah. We need a much more refined, much more directed 
policy that looks to empower good guys and to isolate and harm 
bad guys.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
    And Dr. Tabatabai, what more can we do to support the 
popular protesters in Iraq?
    Dr. Tabatabai. So I think that you know the U.S. role in 
supporting protesters should actually be fairly limited 
because, even though it is useful to help the flow of 
information, it is helpful to make statements encouraging and 
standing with people across the region. Ultimately, the 
decision for who should govern those countries is theirs and we 
should be fairly limited in how much we--how many statements we 
make in that direction.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you, as we conclude, again, I am just 
so proud of the President's courage to go and eliminate 
Soleimani. He killed, directly, hundreds of Americans with the 
IEDs. Thousands of Americans today have lost arms and legs. And 
so I appreciate so much the leadership of President Trump. 
Peace through strength.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you. Mr. Malinowski.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am actually not going to talk about the main issue of 
Soleimani today. I want to--I just want to focus on one thing 
that we all say we agree on, we all like to think we agree on, 
and that is our support for the people of Iran who are 
struggling against this dictatorship, struggling for freedom, 
the people of Iran who are saying that they want to be part of 
the world, particularly the younger people, the people of Iran 
who show their sentiments by refusing to walk over an American 
flag because they realize that that is just dumb propaganda 
from their regime and, again, they want to be part of the world 
and they want to be connected to us.
    So we all say that we stand by them, and we congratulate 
ourselves for saying this, and we feel good about saying this. 
But here is what we are actually doing: The people of Iran, 
anyone who was born in Iran, is presumptively denied entry into 
the United States right now under a travel ban that makes zero 
sense from a national security point of view. Unless they get a 
waiver, they cannot come here.
    On top of that, in the last several weeks, we have had 
incident, after incident, after incident of Iranians, 
particularly students, coming to the United States with visas, 
which means that they have been vetted thoroughly by the State 
Department, by DHS, passed every test. They arrive at an 
airport and some Border Patrol officer looks at them for 20 
minutes and sends them back, without any consultation with 
other parts of the U.S. Government, destroys their lives 
because many of them have spent thousands of dollars making the 
journey to come to the United States. Some of them have been to 
the United States, studied here, and have just left for a 
conference and are told, often degraded, often humiliated at 
airports, we do not want you here because you are Iranian.
    Today, we are going to be passing a resolution in the House 
that says we stand by the people of Iran and their struggle for 
human rights. I am going to vote for that resolution because I 
agree with every word in it. It is sponsored by my friend, the 
chairman of this subcommittee. But I also think this resolution 
is, in some ways, shameful. We are going to be pretending today 
to stand by the people of Iran, even as this House, even as 
this Congress does not a damn thing about what the U.S. 
Government is actually doing.
    Our actual policy right now is to hurt the people of Iran 
and that is what we need to be speaking about.
    So I want to ask everybody here, our witnesses, whether you 
agree or disagree with what I just said. Is our current 
approach consistent with the lessons that we learned during the 
cold war, for example, when we took on the Soviet Union, when 
we took on their leaders, their regimes, while welcoming the 
freedom-loving people who lived behind the Iron Curtain who 
wanted to come to the United States, study here, learn from us? 
Are we doing the right thing and are we really standing by the 
people of Iran, as we conduct this policy?
    Whoever wants to start but I would like to hear from all 
three of you.
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you, Congressman Malinowski.
    I am in violent agreement with you and everything you just 
highlighted. If this were a priority, we would be emphasizing 
every day how corrupt the regime is. We would be facilitating 
internal communication. We would be bringing Iranians here. We 
would be finding ways to engage the Iranian people and we would 
have clarity on our messaging.
    I think what you have heard from all three of us witnesses 
is that we are really confused about what the U.S. is trying to 
do. And if we are confused, that is particularly problematic.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Sir, yes, thank you. I am also completely in 
agreement with you and my colleague.
    In addition to the travel ban and, of course, all the 
issues you highlighted at the border, there is also the 
humanitarian impact of sanctions that we should be thinking 
about. Yes, sanctions are designed, hopefully, to impose a cost 
on the regime but there are reports about issues pertaining to 
the shortage of medicine, and medical equipment, and goods in 
Iran.
    So the average Iranian is also paying the price for the 
regime's maligned activities and policies. And that is 
something else that we should also be thinking about.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
    Ms. Pletka. Well, you know what I think about this. I do 
agree with you. I think restrictions on cultural visits and on 
educational visits by Iranian students and others is self-
defeating.
    I do hope that, in supporting things like this, that we are 
mindful that the Iranian Government does not control who gets 
to come here and who does not get to come here. What we want is 
an opportunity for the young people that we all keep talking 
about to actually have a chance to see what a democratic 
country looks like, and see what a better life looks like, and 
take that back home with them when they go. So I could not 
agree with you more.
    I do think that this administration has done more than is 
appreciated on the question of supporting internal 
communications inside Iran. I think they have done more than I 
know we have done previously, in either Republican or 
Democratic Administrations, to stand by people who have been 
imprisoned by the Iranian regime, have done more to try to help 
get them out of prison.
    On the other hand, there is much more that can be done. 
There are no sanctions on food and medicine, as you know. We 
should not allow them to exploit this. What I would love for us 
to do is what we did during the Soviet era, which is to elevate 
this as a matter that we discuss in every single meeting--I 
have said it before at this committee--when we talk about the 
human rights and human freedom of the Iranian people and about 
the predations of their government.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
    Mr. Trone. Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Karlin, I will begin with you, if I can. How would you 
expect the IRGC's regional operations to change without 
Soleimani at the helm?
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you for that question, Mr. Congressman.
    Qasem Soleimani was important but he was not irreplaceable. 
The IRGC has been a tremendously effective organization, 
unfortunately, over decades and, also, despite financial 
pressures over the years, as well.
    So I suspect there will be an effort to facilitate and 
deepen relationships with various groups. In particular, we saw 
Qasem Soleimani really oversaw this magnificent kind of 
knitting together of various clients in places like Syria. So 
his replacement will have to work on facilitating new and 
deeper relationships as well. That said, I do not expect any 
meaningful change whatsoever.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Tabatabai--I hope I pronounced that right--I will go to 
you next. How do you expect Iran's relationship with the PMF, 
the so-called popular mobilization forces, to change without 
Muhandis in the picture?
    Dr. Tabatabai. Yes, thank you. I have a similar answer. I 
think that the relationship is very strategic right now. As 
both the United States and Iran start to enter a new era of 
competition in Iraq, the PMF is going to be critical--a 
critical asset for Iran.
    We have seen how closely Kataib Hezbollah has been 
following the Iranian lead over the past year, especially, and 
I suspect that that will continue to happen and Kataib 
Hezbollah, specifically, will continue to remain a tool by 
which Iran exercises pressure on the United States.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Pletka, I will go to you next. First of all, I used to 
periodically, about once a year for a number of years, go and 
teach, lecture to students at the University of Dayton, just 
north of my district, which is Cincinnati. And the professor 
there was a Father Pletka. And I was just curious if there is 
any relationship.
    Ms. Pletka. Nope, absolutely, none. The word Father is the 
dead giveaway for me, since that is not my religion.
    Mr. Chabot. Okay. Well, he was a great priest and a great 
guy.
    But in any event, with the Soleimani strike, President 
Trump made clear that killing Americans was a very red line. 
Nevertheless, over the weekend you know we saw Iranian proxies 
hit our embassy in Baghdad with rockets. I think we assume that 
Iran was involved with this.
    What, if any, adjustments would you recommend to the 
administration relative to deterrence and Iran?
    Ms. Pletka. Well, after the Soleimani strike, people said 
that the United States had restored deterrence in the region. I 
think that what is missing here is a sense of clarity about 
what those red lines actually are.
    And you know what had happened in the runup to this was 
that the Iranians have been testing us over the last year or 
two, like your little brother--am I bugging you now? Am I 
bugging you now with successive escalations in strikes? And 
they finally went too far. That is not a really great way to 
run a relationship. It is better to have that clarity up front.
    And so what we are looking at now, you know in the 
aftermath of the strike, is the Iranians, once again, trying to 
figure out what it is they can do.
    Iranian proxies are now involved in this. The attacks on 
the Green Zone and on our facility in Baghdad are most likely 
coming from Iranian proxies. We should make no mistake, their 
ultimate instructions come from Tehran. But, at the same time, 
it is Iraqi forces that are doing this and I think they do not 
know exactly what we are going to do in response.
    I would very much welcome the idea of the President 
standing up and being very clear about what it is that the 
United States is willing to tolerate and what it is not willing 
to tolerate and that he would not fall into the trap of saying 
and if you keep at this, we are going to withdraw troops, 
because, of course, that is the aim of the attacks in the first 
place.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And with the little bit of 
time I have left, I will followup, if I can, with another 
question.
    In the past few months, we have seen popular frustration 
with Iran's influence and its proxies in Lebanon. How should we 
respond to these protests and the demands of the protesters? 
How can we be sympathetic and helpful without having it turned 
against us?
    Ms. Pletka. It is a good question because, obviously, you 
do not want people labeled as puppets but that is part of the 
risk that comes with the game. If we remember, during the cold 
war, all of the Soviet refuseniks and dissidents were labeled 
as American puppets because that is what dictatorships do to 
their opponents.
    Inside Lebanon I think we have done a lamentable job in 
trying to fight against the corruption that has, frankly, not 
just ripped off money from the Lebanese people but ripped off 
money from the World Bank, ripped off money from USAID, and the 
American taxpayer. This is a systemic corruption that has taken 
place in the Government of Lebanon that is--and make no 
mistake, this is not just Hezbollah involved in systemic 
corruption. That is why people are out in the streets. It is 
not for some political reason. It is because they are sick and 
tired of not having--do you realize that in Beirut, which is 
considered by some to be the prowess or the Switzerland of the 
Middle East, they do not have electricity 24 hours a day in 
some parts? That is because this government has been incapable 
of not lining its own pockets and doing the right thing in 
providing services.
    The United States is not very good in helping fight against 
corruption. That goes for Iraq. That goes for Lebanon. And 
frankly, it goes for a lot of other places. We could really 
step it up in that area.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am sorry our friend from Pennsylvania is still not here 
to deny that the killing of Soleimani was not an assassination 
really brings you know George Orwell to tears. What was it, a 
mercy killing, euthanasia by drone? It was an assassination. It 
was the targeting and killing of a foreign leader. Now, we can 
debate whether that is appropriate or warranted but it is what 
it is. And unfortunately, it is that kind of Orwellian behavior 
that characterizes all too much of what passes for a foreign 
policy in the Middle East.
    We heard that it was, quote, incoherent to denounce the 
Soleimani strike and the abandonment of the Kurds in the same 
breath but, both have the same thing and character. And I will 
ask you, Dr. Karlin, to comment. No consultation with Congress. 
No coordination with allies. Absence of any kind of larger 
context for strategy. Damaging counter-ISIS operations and 
increasing threats to Americans. So both actions, though 
different in nature, had similar characteristics and 
consequences.
    Your comment, Dr. Karlin.
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you for that question, Mr. Congressman. I 
could not agree with you more.
    Look, we can all agree that Qasem Soleimani was a horrific 
human being who was detrimental to U.S. national security 
interests, period, full stop. There is no debate about that. 
Responsible for the deaths and at least the maiming of 
thousands of American Servicemen and women.
    That said, it is still not clear why he was killed, when he 
was killed, and where he was killed. That is profoundly 
worrisome. So I think it makes sense to question why did that 
happen. What were we expecting? What do we expect to happen 
after that?
    And also to note, as you do, sir, the confusion surrounding 
our relationship with the Kurds and our partners around the 
region. Any successes we have in this region are due to our 
partners in the region and also outside of the region, like the 
counter-ISIS coalition members, like our allies in Europe. When 
they are not sure what we are trying to do, then we cannot all 
work in lockstep in support of a coherent and sustainable 
policy.
    Mr. Connolly. Would you say that the unilateral 
renouncement of our own agreement, JCPOA, that was working all 
respects, might fit in that category?
    Ms. Karlin. I think it was profoundly unhelpful. I would 
have rather that we had worked with our close allies to try to 
get a pathway to another agreement.
    Mr. Connolly. Would you say that by abandoning JCPOA, 
nonetheless, it achieved the objectives of curbing bad Iranian 
behavior in the region?
    Ms. Karlin. I do not think we see much evidence of that.
    Mr. Connolly. Right.
    Ms. Karlin. And we see the U.S. standing alone.
    Mr. Connolly. Do you think sanctions have curbed their 
behavior in the region in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq, and 
Lebanon?
    Ms. Karlin. I think sanctions have been unhelpful to them 
domestically but, at the end of the day, as we saw during the 
Iran-Iraq War, they will find a way to fund what they need to 
fund.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes.
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you.
    Mr. Connolly. Dr. Tabatabai, have we seen evidence of the 
curbing of bad Iranian behavior, from our point of view, bad, 
in the region, based on either sanctions or the withdrawal of 
the United States from JCPOA?
    Dr. Tabatabai. Not in terms--not strategically, no. There 
may have been some tactical changes here and there. For 
example, they may have less money to send to various groups. 
But in terms of their activities and Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
et cetera, we continue to see a level of involvement, support 
for various groups.
    Mr. Connolly. I have a lot of respect for the ranking 
member, Mr. Wilson, who is also my friend, but when he talks 
about praising the President's peace with strength strategy, I 
would argue the opposite. There is plenty of evidence in front 
of us. There is no peace and, frankly, there is no strength. 
There is nothing but weakness and withdrawal of the United 
States from some strategic positioning in the region.
    I want to give you an opportunity, and you as well, Dr. 
Karlin, if you want to comment on it. You mentioned the 
possible collapse of the regime. We need to get ready for that. 
I know Dr. Pletka also referenced that and said, and I agree 
with her, it is probably unlikely, at least in the near-term, 
but I want to give you an opportunity.
    Why should we think the regime could actually collapse, 
given its staying power since 1979?
    Dr. Tabatabai. Sir, I fully agree that it is the least 
likely scenario. However, I think that the United States should 
be prepared for all scenarios and that is one possible----
    Mr. Connolly. All right. Forgive me for interrupting. You 
were not suggesting that is something that could be imminent or 
in the near future.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Absolutely not. No, absolutely not.
    Mr. Connolly. Right.
    Dr. Tabatabai. I think it is the least likely scenario 
right now.
    I should also add that it is not clear what would happen 
next, even if the regime were to collapse.
    Mr. Connolly. Right.
    Dr. Tabatabai. There is a world in which there is a liberal 
democracy that replaces the Islamic Republic but there is also 
the possibility that we will see something like Syria, you know 
a civil war, or even a similar regime with different ideology 
to replace the current one.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes. This is a monumental subject and, of 
course, there is not a single person at the press table, on the 
subject of Iran, which is amazing, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 
Member, but thank you both for holding this hearing.
    And thank you all for being here.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Watkins.
    Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think that General Soleimani was a righteous and 
justified kill. He, when looking for why, how about the 600 
some-odd soldiers that he killed, our brothers and our sisters?
    And also, the strategy is a credible deterrent. It is a far 
cry from the appeasement strategy that was proven to not work. 
It is a maximum pressure campaign. And having spent years at 
the tactical level, I assure you that, when you go out on 
missions, the ideas that, should anything happen to you, you 
want the enemy combatants knowing that hell fire will rain down 
upon them, should anything happen to you. And that is a 
credible deterrent and I assure you that it is far more 
effective than the hope that your Commander in Chief giving 
them money will somehow make them not want to kill you. That is 
ridiculous. It never works and it never will.
    A credible deterrent and a maximum pressure campaign is far 
more effective, particularly in this part of the globe. So when 
I hear our guests ask, well, why kill him, because he was a 
combatant, as evident by the title that he preferred going by, 
which was general. So he was a high-ranking enemy combatant, 
probably overseeing the violent attacks on the embassy, which 
he probably helped to orchestrate. So that is your why.
    And the mere fact that he got paid in part by a government 
paycheck from Iran, which is the leading State-sponsor of 
terror, is a moot point. He was an enemy combatant in Iraq, 
outside of his country. So, I relish in the fact that he does 
not live to kill any more Americans.
    Which when you ask well, what happens next? Well, how about 
the fact that they try and continue to kill us? That is what 
happens next. And the mere fact now that they have got one less 
operative, a very powerful and influential one at that, makes 
our job safer and easier.
    Ms. Pletka, do you--what do you think the administration's 
strike on Soleimani will deter--do you think that the 
administration's strike on Soleimani will deter Iran's future 
operations in any way?
    Ms. Pletka. Sir, I think it has the capacity to do that. 
You know I do not think you are seeing anybody lament that the 
parting of Qasem Soleimani, although there are political 
disagreements about whether it was wise or not, I certainly do 
not, and believe the President was justified in this choice.
    The question really for us is followup. And what we need 
from the administration is clarity. Because if you look at the 
run-up last year, you saw a number of attacks by Iran or by 
Iranian proxies on both American assets, the drone, but also on 
global oil supplies.
    The United States has, through the last decades, no matter 
the President, had a doctrine of opposition to interference in 
the continuity of global energy supplies. The perceived failure 
of the President to respond to the attacks on Abqaiq and on 
Khurais in Saudi Arabia gave Iran the idea that he was not 
going to stand up to them.
    Soleimani turned that around but we do not know what is 
next and I do think it is really important for the 
administration to clarify and to capitalize on the deterrence 
that was restored with that strike to tell the Iranians what it 
is we will and we will not tolerate because, otherwise, as you 
have seen over the last week, they will either directly, 
although much more likely through proxies, continue to test and 
see. And when they test us, we are likely to see Americans 
injured but, frankly, while Americans are my top priority, I do 
not want the Iranians killing anybody. They ought to stop.
    Mr. Watkins. Understood but you can see the escalation 
going from a drone to oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, to 
an oil field attack in Saudi Arabia, to the killing of 
Americans. You would agree that there is some model of 
escalation there that represents this one, right? And so would 
you--what would your recommendation then be?
    Ms. Pletka. Well as I said, I mean I think that, again, I 
think that the Soleimani strike has managed to let's say halt 
momentarily that direct escalation. In other words, Iran using 
Iranian territory and Iranian forces to actually attack. What 
it has not done, unfortunately, is made clear to the Iranians 
that they cannot use their proxies to do the same thing and 
that is where I think we need to be wary.
    Yesterday, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad was hit by several 
missiles. You know that is not a lesson learned and they need 
to learn that lesson. Otherwise, somebody else is going to get 
killed.
    Mr. Watkins. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Several years ago, I dined with some of our troops in Iraq, 
our soldiers. And just hours after we had dinner, several of 
them were killed with a rocket attack. It was an Iranian-
powered rocket, almost certainly the handiwork of Soleimani. We 
do not mourn his death one iota.
    I think for the purpose of this hearing, we have got to 
expand the way we are looking at the issue or we would just be 
lost. And here is what I want, particularly in response to Dr. 
Karlin's opening remarks that the administration needs to 
create a clear strategy and rebuild diplomatic relations with 
Iraq and move toward nuclear.
    We have, right now, the administration saying they are 
going to continue maximum pressure strategy and today, even 
administration members saying to date that has not been 
successful.
    Yet, we are also saying well, we have to engage them in 
discussions for new nuclear agreement, since we pulled out of 
the JCPOA. Well, it is contradictory. I mean how do you 
accomplish that? You cannot use a carrot and a stick at the 
same time. There is no clarity with that--the clarity you spoke 
to, Dr. Karlin.
    So where do we go forward in the big picture here? We have 
a strategy to date that is not working. Meanwhile, Iran is 
moving forward and it is my belief, based upon what I can just 
estimate--I will leave it at that--that they are closer to a 
year, thanks to the JCPOA, than 6 months to a breakout but the 
clock is ticking.
    So what we have, maximum pressure not working to date. 
Discussions about why we should have discussions about a 
nuclear agreement. The clock is ticking and pretty soon, every 
day they are closer to being a nuclear power. And the problem 
we have dealing with them is just going to be that much more 
difficult. Just look at North Korea.
    So where do we go? Where is this clarity and how can you 
possibly move forward without making a decision?
    Now, who are the intermediaries? I mean the Sultan of Oman 
passed away and he was an intermediary in the past. Can you 
suggest, Dr. Karlin, you know you were saying Congress should 
have a greater role but, with the administration with its 
contradictory carrot and stick approach and no clarity 
whatsoever, how do we go forward?
    Ms. Karlin. Thank you for that question, Mr. Congressman. 
We do need to acknowledge that it just has not been working, 
that increasingly the United States is standing alone, and 
that, problematically, the conversation is increasingly about 
the United States rather than about the Iranians. That is 
distracting and profoundly unhelpful.
    So where we go is by starting to find some other allies. It 
is always better when more folks are on your team than not. So, 
I think----
    Mr. Keating. Yes, but our historic allies are in agreement 
with the JCPOA. They did not pull out.
    Ms. Karlin. Indeed.
    Mr. Keating. So that creates an enormous difficulty with 
them being intermediaries. They would be arguing against 
themselves.
    Ms. Karlin. Indeed and I think we probably need to make 
some sort of shift acknowledging that any discussions for a new 
nuclear agreement will be highly imperfect but it is a story 
where something is better than nothing. So working with the 
Germans, the Brits, the French, in particular, will be crucial.
    I should emphasize that the administration has not done 
much to build a pathway to a new agreement and, moreover, the 
Russians appear to be the ones all over the Middle East.
    Mr. Keating. By the way, if I could, that is not getting us 
any closer because if we continue with maximum pressure, Iran 
is not going to negotiate with continued maximum pressure. We 
put them in a spot where their option seems to be let's go 
ahead with the nuclear plan, let's let our proxies act and we 
do not have contingencies in place to deal with that. And you 
know we have the sanctions but the Revolutionary Guard, they 
are getting money from the black market with the sanctions 
even. And I think you addressed they manage to get their money 
somehow. Well, that is one of the ways they do it. So these 
contradictions are there.
    Don't you think the administration has to come to grips 
with selecting one avenue and pursuing it and not have these 
series of contradictions?
    Ms. Karlin. Well, maximum pressure increasingly sounds like 
regime change and it sounds like a test they just cannot pass. 
So, why try to even study for it?
    So, effectively, I do think one can have a policy that 
mixes carrots and sticks, as long as it is nuanced and 
thoughtful, but if the Iranians feel like there is absolutely 
nothing they can do to meaningfully get the U.S. to shift, I do 
not see why they would do so.
    Mr. Keating. That is a problem and we will work as a 
Congress and a committee to try and delve into those issues. 
Thank you for being here.
    But until we acknowledge the big picture here, we are going 
to continue to put ourselves perilously close to conflict and 
war.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Have any of you all been in a fight, physical, or combat, 
or otherwise? Have you been in a fight? Have any of you been in 
a fistfight or in combat?
    That is not rhetorical. I am asking.
    Ms. Pletka. I cannot speak for my colleagues but I 
certainly have been in a fight. Why do you ask?
    Mr. Mast. Have you been in a fight?
    Ms. Karlin. In a fistfight?
    Mr. Mast. Or combat?
    Ms. Karlin. Sure. Not in combat.
    Mr. Mast. But a fistfight?
    Dr. Tabatabai. Not that I recall.
    Mr. Mast. Okay. So it is hypothetical for you, Doctor.
    If somebody is fighting you and you hit them back, is that 
escalation or defense?
    I will take your silence as exactly.
    We were not escalating. We were defending ourselves against 
a terrorist who has gone out there and hit us time, and time, 
and time again.
    Let me ask you something maybe you all can answer. When was 
the last time that Soleimani hit us before he ended up in about 
five separate pieces on the side of a tarmac?
    Ms. Karlin. I do not know, Mr. Congressman, that anyone is 
debating how awful he was or how many Servicemen and women he 
has--whose deaths he may be responsible----
    Mr. Mast. People are but that is not my question.
    When was the last time he hit us?
    Ms. Karlin. He was consistently hitting us.
    Mr. Mast. No. When was the last time he hit us? When was 
the very last time that Soleimani hit us?
    Ms. Karlin. Consistently up until his death.
    Mr. Mast. So right up until his death, he was hitting us. 
You agree with that. His last actions, right before his death, 
was hitting the United States of America.
    Ms. Karlin. I think there is no debate that up until the 
end of his life, Qasem Soleimani was working against U.S. 
national security interests.
    Mr. Mast. But what about his last actions, literally? I 
mean you guys are Director of Strategic Studies, political 
scientists, foreign and defense policy studies. You guys study 
this. What was his last act of terrorism before we ended his 
life on the side of a tarmac?
    Ms. Pletka. None of us have security clearances. I think 
what we are all aware of is that he was coordinating the 
attacks on the American embassy.
    Mr. Mast. It is open source information. You do not need a 
security clearance to know that.
    Ms. Pletka. What I am aware of is that he was coordinating 
attacks on the American embassy, with the leadership of the 
popular mobilization forces, the Hashd al-Shaabi.
    That is what I know. I do not know whether my colleagues 
have better knowledge.
    Mr. Mast. So right up until his last moment, he was hitting 
us. He was attacking us. And you all are coming in here saying 
there is some kind of escalation that is going on. You do not 
think if somebody was hitting us right up until the last second 
that is defense? This academic approach to defense I find 
absolutely worthless.
    Let's go to some other questions here.
    What was the imminent threat that was posed by Osama bin 
Laden when we executed him? What was the imminent threat that 
was posed by him while he was hiding out in his compound in 
Pakistan? Was there an imminent threat? Was there any intel 
about he was planning something immediately?
    More crickets.
    Was he executed within borders that the U.S. had an 
authorized use of military force to go into?
    Ms. Karlin. If I may, I do not recall that the Obama 
Administration argued that Osama bin Laden was being killed due 
to an imminent threat. So it is really just a question of 
justification. And I think where we are a little confused is 
that the Trump Administration has given us about 17 different 
reasons why Qasem Soleimani has been killed. And all of them 
may be accurate. I am just not sure which.
    Mr. Malinowski. Who posed a greater threat at the time of 
their death, bin Laden or Soleimani?
    More crickets. I think it is because you all do not want to 
answer these questions. So, I am not going to----
    Ms. Pletka. No, it is not because we do not want to answer 
the questions. It is----
    Mr. Mast [continuing]. End with this statement right here 
right now.
    I think I find this whole conversation is just an exercise 
in you folks being trapped in a cold war policy purgatory, 
where you not recognizing that we have moved out of this ladder 
of escalation, as you all are talking about. Oh, you need to 
have this designated exactly. They know what we are going to do 
if we see them do this.
    That is not the way that it works. It is okay to have 
selective ambiguity. It is okay that they be surprised by the 
actions. And it is good for foreign policy for them to not know 
exactly the way the President is going to hit them. That is 
strength.
    And in that, I appreciate the fact that you all took the 
time to come here, although I found its worth to be minimal.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you.
    Mr. Vargas.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank the ranking 
member and the witnesses here today.
    I do want to ask a few more questions, if I could, with 
respect to the maximum pressure campaign. I think it was stated 
here today it was helpful domestically or unhelpful 
domestically, in the sense of us putting pressure domestically 
not on other operations internationally in the region.
    Could you talk a little bit more about that, whomever would 
like to? Yes, Doctor, to ahead.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Sure, yes. Thank you, sir.
    So I think in terms of creating grievances, deepening 
grievances that exist in Iran, it has certainly done that. 
There are people are upset with how things are going. A lot of 
the economic grievances are, of course, tied to the regime's 
own incompetence, mismanagement but the sanctions certainly 
have an impact.
    I think the key question that we should be asking 
ourselves, though, because hopefully we are not in the business 
of hurting countries for the sake of hurting countries, but in 
order to achieve our objectives, is what are the objectives we 
are trying to achieve and is maximum pressure helping us get to 
that point.
    And I certainly think that in terms of a strategic impact, 
we have not seen that yet.
    Mr. Vargas. Would you agree with that, Ms. Pletka?
    Ms. Pletka. I think we have seen a strategic impact. What 
we are not going to see is, from one strike, the Iranians 
changing what is, essentially, the gravamen of their foreign 
policy.
    Iranian foreign policy has, for the last at least three 
decades, if not really since the inception of the Islamic 
Republic, been structured around indirect conflict, rather than 
direct, except for the Iran-Iraq War.
    Mr. Vargas. But----
    Ms. Pletka. So the notion that they would toss that by the 
wayside after the death of Qasem Soleimani is unlikely.
    Mr. Vargas. But no, I think you may have misunderstood----
    Ms. Pletka. I am sorry.
    Mr. Vargas [continuing]. Or misheard my question.
    Ms. Pletka. I apologize.
    Mr. Vargas. It was not the strike at all.
    Ms. Pletka. Oh.
    Mr. Vargas. No. My question was on the issue of maximum 
pressure campaign.
    So the maximum pressure campaign, it does seem to have done 
something internally in the country in that you do see more 
protests. You do see that there is some disruption, certainly 
by some. I mean I think it is----
    Ms. Pletka. My apologies.
    Mr. Vargas. That is okay. I know you were so focused but go 
ahead and try and answer it.
    Ms. Pletka. Still the same answer, which is that I think we 
have seen some impact in terms of Iran's ability to continue to 
fund its proxies. When Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah 
goes out and starts begging for money, that is probably good 
news for people who hate terrorism and that certainly has had 
an impact. We have seen that they have not been able to 
support, they have not been able to--they have not been able to 
meet payroll in certain instances.
    There is no question that when the Islamic Republic is 
forced to choose to spend money on these proxy forces and does 
not, that that is a good thing for us. Does that mean that they 
are going to abandon the entire raison d'etre of their foreign 
policy, which is the use and building up of these proxies? No, 
it does not but it has made it much harder. And it has, I 
think--I think there is persuasive evidence that it has made an 
issue of it internally because people do resent the notion that 
they are paying other guys to fight in Syria, which is not, by 
I think in the view of most Iranians, critical to their 
interests, that they are paying other people to fight for Assad 
when they are not spending at home.
    Mr. Vargas. Dr. Karlin, what do you think?
    Ms. Karlin. I think it has an effect, however, when I look 
at the two buckets of concern I have with Iranian policy, there 
is the nuclear file and there is the bad behavior regionally 
file, effectively, the Iranians are doing pretty well on both 
of those.
    So at the strategic level, I do not think we have seen the 
change that we need to.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Vargas. Yes, the concern I have always had, of course, 
is the nuclear side. And I, personally, did not think that the 
deal that we had with them was a great deal. I was one of the 
first people to come out against it on the Democratic side. 
However, there was, I think, some good that was for the 15 
years. It was the second 15 years and beyond I think was a 
disaster. But there is nothing in place now at all, which I 
think is even worse, obviously, but we have to do something.
    And last, I guess I would just throw this out. I certainly 
would always think of Iran and Iraq as counterbalances when 
Saddam Hussein was there. You even seen the Iran-Iraq War in 
1980 I think to 1988, where it was sort of a stalemate and huge 
losses on both sides but certainly, in my own opinion, two very 
rough, difficult, maybe tyrannical groups fighting against each 
other there, the political politicians and the armies.
    But there is no counterbalance yet that is proximate to 
that country. In fact just the opposite now, it seems that Iraq 
is cozying up to it and that is a real problem.
    Any quick comments? I know my time is about up.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Yes, I certainly would agree that since 
2003, Iran has had less of a challenge from Iraq and, in fact, 
it has been able to expand its influence in Iraq, largely 
thanks to us toppling Saddam.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Pletka. But we do not miss Saddam Hussein, we should 
underscore.
    Mr. Vargas. Excuse me?
    Ms. Pletka. We do not miss Saddam Hussein.
    Mr. Vargas. Don't miss Saddam Hussein?
    Ms. Pletka. No.
    Mr. Vargas. I do not miss him at all.
    Ms. Pletka. No, and neither do we. We should underscore 
that.
    Mr. Vargas. He was one of the bad guys. I just remember 
strategically there was a counterbalance but I do not miss any 
of those guys.
    Mr. Deutch [presiding]. All right, thank you, Mr. Vargas.
    I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. Welcome to the 
witnesses. I am sorry that I was delayed.
    Later today, Ranking Member Wilson and I will join our 
colleagues on the House floor to consider H. Res. 752, a 
resolution supporting the rights of the Iranian people to free 
expression and condemning the regime for its crackdown on 
legitimate protests, the violent crackdown, the crackdown on 
expression, the shutting down of the internet.
    I want to also take a moment to thank my friend, Mr. 
Malinowski, for his powerful comments about the abhorrent U.S. 
policy toward Iranians who want to come to this country. And I 
would like to just ask a question to you about that.
    Dr. Tabatabai, the United States recently barred Iranians 
from accessing E1 and E2 nonimmigrant visas that allow foreign 
nationals to enter the United States to engage in international 
trade or to invest capital. Of course, the administration 
barred all immigrant visas to Iranians in early 2017.
    What do--how do we make sense of what we are going to be 
doing on the House floor later, standing with the Iranian 
people and the bans that are in place? Can you just--they are, 
as Mr. Malinowski points out, they are so utterly inconsistent 
but I would love your insight.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think those two things are somewhat contradictory, to say 
the least. On the one hand, we are saying that we stand with 
the Iranian people in their fight against their own tyrannical 
regime. On the other hand, we are barring them from entering 
the country, I would agree, on very thin grounds, when it comes 
to national security concerns. And in fact, I think allowing 
that these students who have gone through the process to have 
been deemed as not posing a challenge, a threat to U.S. 
national security, allowing them to come to this country to 
study at top universities, as many of them have been accepted, 
is good for our image. It allows them to be exposed to 
different ways of thinking, to experience democracy firsthand. 
And ultimately, it allows them to contribute to our economy as 
well.
    So I think that it is a positive thing to allow them to 
come here and I think that it is very important, if we are 
saying that we are standing with the Iranian people, that we 
are also putting our money where our mouth is.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
    Ms. Pletka, isn't there some--isn't there a benefit, at the 
same time that we are expressing our support for the Iranian 
people and their desire for democracy to allow them to be 
exposed to democracy here?
    Ms. Pletka. Congressman Malinowski raised this with all 
three of us----
    Mr. Deutch. Yes.
    Ms. Pletka [continuing]. Before you were able to be here 
and I said exactly what I am about to say again, which is it is 
completely inconsistent. While we need to be mindful about both 
national security questions because Iranians have tried to 
conduct terrorism on our soil, and have tried to, and have 
looked to supply their nuclear and missile program with 
purchasers here in the United States, at the same time, if we 
are mindful, if we are not good enough to keep those guys out 
and let the right people in, then shame on us.
    Mr. Deutch. I could not agree more. Thank you.
    In my remaining time, I just want to spend a moment talking 
about what all of this means to our efforts to try to free 
Americans and other foreign nationals that the Iranians hold 
hostage and that includes my constituent, Bob Levinson, who was 
abducted nearly 13 years ago.
    The tensions that exist now obviously effect negotiations 
over American citizens who have been wrongly detained or held 
hostage. And I would open this to any of you, diplomatic 
channels that discuss hostages and a potential off-ramp or an 
opportunity to deescalate tensions is critical. Is it your 
sense, any of you, that that exists? How much harder is that 
now?
    Ms. Pletka, we will start with you.
    Ms. Pletka. There is a diplomatic channel to discuss 
hostages and it resulted in the release of a Princeton student 
who was being illegally held inside Iran. It resulted in the 
first information we have had, actually, about Bob Levinson in 
some time. It is one of the contradictions of this 
administration, perhaps, that it has been, I think, unusually 
successful and unusually diligent in trying to--in paying 
attention to both Americans and others imprisoned in regimes 
like Iran's.
    So actually, that is a hopeful sign.
    Mr. Deutch. Dr. Tabatabai.
    Dr. Tabatabai. Yes, if I may, just one more point to add to 
this, which is that we also have allies, the U.K., Australia, 
and other countries, France, who have dual nationals and their 
own nationals who are held in Iran.
    So this is one more avenue where we should be working with 
our allies because they share our interest there.
    Mr. Deutch. Dr. Karlin.
    Ms. Karlin. I have nothing to add, sir.
    Mr. Deutch. I think your assessment is exactly right. I 
would simply make the request of you, as I make everyone who 
appears here that every amount of credit that we give to the 
administration and others that the administration works with on 
being diligent and focusing on this issue, as we focus on those 
efforts, let's also acknowledge the fact that it will--none of 
those efforts will be deemed fully successful until everyone 
has the opportunity to return home, including my constituent, 
Bob Levinson. And it is a point I have made to the 
administration and continue to, just as I have to the prior 
administration, and everyone who has been involved in this.
    I thank you very much for being here and, again, I 
apologize for my delay.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Yes, thank you, Chairman Deutch. And as we 
conclude, certainly in a bipartisan manner, we can recognize 
that Nawres Hamid, an Iraqi American was killed by an Iranian 
rocket on December 27th. It was 5 days later that Soleimani was 
killed. And so the context needs to be placed and not to forget 
Nawres Hamid, who was buried in California, I would say an 
appreciated Iraqi American Muslim.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Deutch. Well again, thanks very much to the witnesses. 
I appreciate your being here. Thank you for your testimony.
    Members of the subcommittee, as you all know, may have some 
additional questions and we ask you to please respond to those 
questions in writing. And I would ask my colleagues that any 
questions for the hearing be submitted to the subcommittee 
clerk within five business days.
    And with that, this meeting is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
                                
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