    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
           THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               November 19, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-81

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     38-448 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2020

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California                 FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland                MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

       Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
                                   Terrorism

                     THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman

    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island            Ranking Member
    TED LIEU, California                 STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           LEE ZELDIN, New York
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland                BRIAN MAST, Florida
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    JUAN VARGAS, California              STEVE WATKINS, Kansas

                          Casey Kustin, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Humud, Ms. Carla E., Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs,
      Congressional Research Service.................................     8
    Yacoubian, Ms. Mona, Senior Advisor for Syria, Middle East and
      North Africa, United States Institute of Peace.................    20
    Feltman, Amb. Jeffrey, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in
      International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings
      Institution....................................................    28
    Ghaddar, Ms. Hanin, Friedmann Visiting Fellow, Geduld Program on
      Arab Politics, The Washington Institute........................    39

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    63
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    64
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    65

                           INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

    Information submitted for the record from Representative Chabot..    66

    WHAT'S NEXT FOR LEBANON? EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT PROTESTS

                           Tuesday, November 19, 2019

                           House of Representatives,

                        Subcommittee on the Middle East,

                        North Africa, and International

                                   Terrorism,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                         Washington, DC

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
    Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Deutch [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.
        Welcome, everyone.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
    political, economic, and security environment in Lebanon in
    light of the ongoing public protests and calls for reform.
        I thank our witnesses for appearing here today.
        I note we are expecting further votes this afternoon. We
    are going to do our best to have as robust a hearing as we can,
    get to as many member questions as possible.
        I will now recognize myself for purposes of making an
    opening statement before turning it over to the ranking member
    for the same purpose.
        Since mid-October, massive protests have spread throughout
    Lebanon and brought more than a million people into the
    streets. Although triggered by a proposed tax on the messaging
    service WhatsApp, the demonstrations rapidly expanded to
    criticize government corruption and to question the pillars of
    the Lebanese political system.
        In the last few months, major protests have also developed
    in Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and Iran. Although driven by country-
    specific and local issues, these demonstrations share a common
    theme--frustration with unemployment, corruption, and a lack of
    political and economic opportunity.
        In Iran, the regime has responded with violence, reportedly
    killing at least a dozen people and injuring approximately a
    thousand and by shutting down the internet. This repression is
    shameful, and Congress stands with all of those peacefully
    protesting in Iran and throughout the region and condemns
    violent crackdowns on peaceful free expression.
        The peaceful leaderless protests in Lebanon are largely
    driven by youth and women. Unlike the 2005 demonstrations that
    launched the Cedar Revolution, the current demonstrations
    transcend sectarian divisions and are animated by unifying
    national themes. They are larger and more comprehensive than
    the 2015 protests that focused on the Lebanese government's
    inability to provide basic services, like trash collection.
        Amid these protests, Lebanon faces a dire economic crisis
    which prompted government officials to declare an economic
    State of emergency in September. Lebanon's debt-to-GDP ratio is
    more than 150 percent, one of the highest in the world.
    Lebanese banks have been intermittently closed for weeks and
    place limits on customer withdrawals.
        The government has been unable to implement reforms that
    would allow it to access the nearly $11 billion in economic
    assistance promised by the international community in 2018.
    Economic stagnation in Lebanon helped spark the protests last
    month, and the deteriorating economy could compound public
    frustrations in the coming weeks.
        Faced with this fluid situation, the United States should
    refrain from any actions that could destabilize Lebanon. Yet,
    on October 31st, the National Security Council and the Office
    of Management and Budget placed an indefinite and unexplained
    hold on $105 million in critical security assistance to the
    Lebanese Armed Forces. They did so against the recommendations
    of both the State Department and the Defense Department, and in
    opposition to the explicit direction of Congress.
        I share serious concerns about Hezbollah's massive rocket
    and missile arsenal in Lebanon and the LAF's inability to
    prevent Hezbollah's military buildup and dangerous activities
    on Lebanon's borders that threaten our partners. Rather than
    protect Lebanon, Hezbollah, with Iranian support and direction,
    and its advanced weapons, make the Lebanese people less safe.
        But I am also concerned when wholesale generalizations of
    LAF collaboration with Hezbollah are made. Pentagon officials
    claimed, and I quote, ``The Lebanese Armed Forces have
    consistently had the best end-use monitoring reporting of any
    military that we work with, meaning that the equipment that we
    provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we can account for it at
    any given time.'' Closed quote.
        Former CENTCOM Commander, General Joseph Votel, testified
    before Congress in February 2018 that, ``Since our security
    assistance began, Lebanon has maintained an exemplary track
    record for adhering to regular and enhanced end-use monitoring
    protocols. We are confident the LAF has not transferred
    equipment to Hezbollah.''
        The United States must continue to vigorously enforce
    mechanisms to ensure that no equipment provided to the LAF
    winds up in Hezbollah hands. U.S. training to help
    professionalize the Lebanese Armed Forces provides a bulwark
    against rogue individuals who might be persuaded to turn a
    blind eye to Hezbollah.
        On November 8th, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Engel
    and I sent a letter to the administration raising concerns
    about the pause in assistance and requesting details by
    November 15th. The administration has not provided a response.
    A continued freeze on assistance threatens to undermine the
    LAF, a non-sectarian, national institution that is strongly
    supported by the Lebanese public. It also weakens the LAF's
    ability to counter threats to Lebanon's security, including
    extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.
        It also sends the wrong message at a time when many of our
    partners are questioning our commitment to the region after
    President Trump's reckless withdrawal from Syria. Slowing the
    delivery of assistance allows adversaries, like Hezbollah and
    Iran and Syria and Russia, to make inroads in Lebanon by
    raising doubts about U.S. credibility. The administration
    should release its hold and resume assistance to the Lebanese
    Armed Forces, ensuring accountability and a continuation of
    comprehensive end-use monitoring protocols which will prevent
    our rivals from establishing a foothold in Lebanon.
        Looking ahead, the demonstrators in Lebanon are demanding
    wholesale political reform, a technocratic and non-sectarian
    cabinet, a new electoral law, and early elections. The United
    States should support these goals and discourage any violence
    against the protesters.
        However, we must refrain from intervening directly.
    Protesters have broadly rejected outside support, and given
    Lebanon's history, remain skeptical of external intervention.
    We should be clear that these are Lebanese protests driven by a
    wide array of Lebanese people who want transparent governance,
    accountable institutions, and a peaceful, prosperous future.
        I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, their
    assessment of the protests, and suggestions for the way forward
    in Lebanon.
        And with that, I will yield to Mr. Wilson for his opening
    statement.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch, for calling
    this important and timely hearing.
        For over a month now, the courageous people of Lebanon have
    taken to the streets demanding an end to the endemic corruption
    and sectarianism that have paralyzed their country for far too
    long. In a country like Lebanon, which has been divided, sadly,
    socially and politically along strict sectarian lines, these
    recent protests are historic. It is not just a protest of one
    community against another or one political interest over
    another. Citizens from all sects, from every corner of the
    country, have joined in these protests. They are a rejection of
    the entire political establishment and class. These protests
    are, in effect, a popular vote of no confidence, not just in
    the current government, but in the entire Lebanese political
    system writ large.
        These unprecedented, countrywide protests ultimately led to
    the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri last month, but
    this announcement did not quell the protesters. In line with
    their now famous slogan of, quote, ``All of them means all of
    them,'' end of quote, the people of Lebanon have continued
    their demands that all of the country's sectarian party leaders
    resign. What they want is an overhaul of the entire political
    structure, not the resignation of a single individual.
        The ongoing protests in Lebanon present both challenges and
    opportunities for U.S. policy. On the one hand, it is difficult
    to assess exactly what kind of Lebanese government will emerge
    out of these largely leaderless, grassroots protests. What
    political solution will be acceptable to the people in the
    streets? How will that affect the U.S.-Lebanon bilateral
    relationship? How can we guarantee that the malign actors,
    including Hezbollah, will not exploit a potential political
    transition to come?
        On the other hand, these protests offer a major potential
    opportunity for the United States. The energy behind these
    protests signals a real desire among Lebanese of all ages to
    see a Lebanon free of many of the burdens of sectarianism that
    have held it back so long. They offer a momentum for change in
    Lebanon that has not been seen since its establishment.
        These protests also are very troubling for the Iranian
    oppressors. Taken together with the ongoing protests in
    neighboring Iraq, and also in Iran, it appears the people of
    the Middle East are beginning to chafe under the yoke of their
    Iranian oppressors. For the first time ever, we see Shiites in
    southern Lebanon openly protesting Hezbollah and criticizing
    its political leaders and allies. Hezbollah is always trying to
    paint itself as separate from the political class over which it
    has maintained a stranglehold in recent years. Its leaders and
    propaganda have, instead, made efforts to identify the
    terrorist group with the Lebanese people, not the defunct
    political establishment. But these protests have put a wrench
    in the Iranian proxy's designs.
        Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, played the wrong hand--
    dismissing protests as a hostile plot by Western and Israeli
    governments, instead of supporting the public outcry. This
    confirmed to many that Hezbollah is, in fact, part and parcel
    of the Lebanese political establishment that cannot be trusted.
    We can only hope that as this movement progresses more and more
    support for Hezbollah diminishes in Lebanon.
        I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses
    today about how the United States can facilitate a positive
    outcome for the people of Lebanon, and specifically, what
    Congress can do in a bipartisan manner.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        I will now recognize members of the subcommittee for 1-
    minute opening statements, should they choose to make one.
        Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.
        Mr. Sherman. We stand with the people of Lebanon. We stand
    with the people of Iran.
        I look forward to working with members of the subcommittee
    on legislation I am working on, which I have tentatively
    titled, ``the Hezbollah Leadership Corruption Disclosure Act,''
    which would use the intelligence community's capacities to
    determine what assets are owned around the world by Hezbollah
    leadership and disclose that. Because every villa disclosed,
    every French chalet disclosed is a nail in the coffin of a
    violent and corrupt terrorist organization.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Chabot is recognized for 1 minute.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As a former chairman of this committee myself, I have
    followed Lebanon very closely for some time now. The protests
    over the last several weeks show that the Lebanese people are
    fed up with the systematic corruption by the Lebanese
    government, to the point that protests have transcended
    sectarian differences.
        To date, Lebanon has been unable to enact necessary, and
    now urgent, if politically difficult, economic reforms, even
    with the generous international aid package waiting. Now is an
    excellent opportunity for Lebanon to actually make those
    reforms and get its fiscal house finally in order.
        The protests referred to by our chairman are also a sign
    that the Lebanese people have had enough of Hezbollah, a
    completely corrupt organization, which, hopefully, 1 day will
    be cast out by the Lebanese people. They deserve so much
    better.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
        Mr. Pence, you are recognized for 1 minute, should you
    wish. Should you wish, or we can go to the witnesses.
        All right. Without objection, all members may have 5 days
    to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for
    the record, subject to the length limitations of the rules.
        And I will now introduce the witnesses.
        Ms. Carla Humud is an analyst in Middle Eastern affairs at
    the Congressional Research Service. She covers Syria, Lebanon,
    and the Islamic State for the Middle East-Africa section of
    CRS's Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
        Ms. Mona Yacoubian is the senior advisor for Syria, Middle
    East, and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace.
    Prior to joining USIP, she served as Deputy Assistant
    Administrator in the Middle East Bureau at the United States
    Agency for International Development, from 2014 to 2017, where
    she had responsibility for Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.
    She previously worked on Middle East and North Africa issues at
    the Stimson Center at USIP and at the State Department's Bureau
    of Intelligence and Research. Her current research focuses on
    conflict analysis and prevention in the Middle East. Ms.
    Yacoubian earned an MPA from Harvard's Kennedy School of
    Government and a BA from Duke University.
        Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman is the John C. Whitehead
    Distinguished Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the
    foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution and a
    senior fellow at the U.N. Foundation. From July 2012 until his
    April 2018 retirement, Ambassador Feltman has served as United
    Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Before
    joining the United Nations, Mr. Feltman was a U.S. Foreign
    Service Officer focusing largely on the Middle East and North
    Africa. Ambassador Feltman served as Assistant Secretary of
    State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, and
    a variety of posts across the Middle East. He is the recipient
    of two Presidential Service Awards and several State Department
    Superior Honor Awards.
        And finally, Ms. Hanin Ghaddar is the Inaugural Friedmann
    Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
    Policies, Geduld Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on
    Shia politics throughout the Levant. She is the long-time
    managing editor of Lebanon's NOW News website, and has also
    contributed to a number of U.S.-based magazines and newspapers,
    including The New York Times, on foreign policy. Prior to
    joining NOW, Ms. Ghaddar wrote for several Lebanese newspapers.
        Thanks to our really esteemed panel for being here today.
        And let me remind the witnesses to please limit your
    testimony to 5 minutes. Without objection, your prepared
    written statements will be made part of the hearing record in
    their entirety.
        We are really grateful for all of you taking the time to
    join us.
        Ms. Humud, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF CARLA E. HUMUD, ANALYST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS,
                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Ms. Humud. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member
    Wilson, members of the committee, for inviting me to testify
    today about the situation in Lebanon on behalf of the
    Congressional Research Service. I will summarize my written
    statement by speaking briefly about the domestic issues that
    have sparked the protests, the challenges faced by the main
    actors in Lebanon, and policy questions for the United States.
        The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri on
    October 29th followed nearly 2 weeks of nationwide mass
    protests, described as potentially the largest in Lebanese
    history. The movement reflects broad dissatisfaction with what
    protestors describe as government corruption, ineptitude, and
    economic mismanagement.
        Protestors have cited the State's failure to consistently
    provide basic goods and services, including water, electricity,
    garbage collection, as well as fair access to jobs and
    educational opportunities. Protestor demands include the
    appointment of a new government of independent technocrats,
    early elections, a new electoral law, the return of what they
    describe as looted public funds, and a fundamental change to
    Lebanon's sectarian-based political system.
        The outcome of the protest movement will be shaped by
    decisions made by four players, including the protestors, the
    political elite, the army, and Hezbollah. The protestors face
    the challenge of sustaining momentum as government formation is
    delayed potentially for weeks or months. While the movement has
    been leaderless thus far, protestors must decide whether to
    risk fragmentation, but potentially gain greater influence by
    selecting representatives that can negotiate with the
    government on specific policy issues.
        Lebanese political elites face the task of appearing
    responsive to widely held political grievances while avoiding
    concessions that could significantly undermine their hold on
    power. They may consider the possibility of co-opting or
    waiting out the movement. They could also attempt to divide it
    by using loyalist groups to cause disruption and introduce a
    sectarian element, some of which we have already seen.
        The Lebanese army must balance pressure from political
    elites to clear protestors from key roadways and infrastructure
    against its longstanding reputation as a neutral body and its
    policy of non-interference in political disputes.
        Hezbollah has expressed support for some protestor demands
    while also working to preserve the political status quo from
    which it benefits. Hezbollah, like other key players, is not
    necessarily a unitary actor in this conflict. Some Hezbollah
    supporters have participated in protests while others have
    deployed to the streets and targeted demonstrators. Hezbollah
    seeks to focus the debate around issues such as State
    corruption and away from core issues such as whether Hezbollah
    should preserve weapons outside of State control.
        These actors are operating against the backdrop of a major
    economic crisis and the risk of the government defaulting on
    its debt, adding additional urgency to the cabinet-formation
    process. All of this raises questions for the United States
    regarding how the U.S. should prioritize different, potentially
    competing policy goals, at a time of domestic uncertainty in
    Lebanon.
        Successive U.S. administrations have identified several
    core policy goals for Lebanon. These have included:
        One, reducing the influence of Hezbollah and Iran via
    efforts to strengthen Lebanese State institutions. This
    includes supporting the LAF's ability to extend State control
    throughout the country, especially in Hezbollah strongholds in
    southern Lebanon.
        Two, strengthening Lebanon's border security and
    counterterrorism capabilities, in light of spillover from the
    conflict in neighboring Syria and the movement of fighters
    linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic state.
        Finally, preserving stability in Lebanon and, in
    particular, alleviating the impact of the more than 1 million
    Syrian refugees currently residing in the country.
        Congress has appropriated funds aimed at the policy
    objectives outlined above while also placing certification
    requirements on U.S. assistance funds to prevent their misuse
    or transfer to Hezbollah or other designated terrorist groups.
        Until now, Hezbollah operations targeting Israel, the
    infiltration of Sunni extremist groups from neighboring Syria,
    and social tensions between refugees and host communities had
    been the primary potential sources of instability in Lebanon.
    The domestic protest movement which calls for a fundamental
    shift in Lebanon's political system adds a new element.
        In light of the fluid situation in Lebanon, U.S.
    policymakers may debate how to best strike a balance between
    encouraging broad reform, preserving stability, and countering
    Hezbollah, and how to prioritize these objectives, if and when
    necessary.
        This concludes my brief remarks, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Humud follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Humud.
        Ms. Yacoubian, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR SYRIA, MIDDLE
        EAST, AND NORTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

        Ms. Yacoubian. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and
    members of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify on the implications of the
    current protests in Lebanon. The timing for this hearing is
    especially important, given the dramatic nature of the protests
    and the challenges and potential opportunities they pose to
    U.S. interests.
        I have followed developments in Lebanon over many years,
    and currently, I am a senior advisor at the United States
    Institute of Peace. Please note that the views expressed here
    are my own and not necessarily those of USIP.
        Since October 17, Lebanon has witnessed historic mass
    protests bringing more than 1 million people to the streets
    across the country. The largest peaceful uprising comes amidst
    the mounting financial crisis that could bring about a total
    collapse of the economy. The economy's warning lights have been
    blinking red for some time. Stagnant growth has prompted
    mounting unemployment, especially among youth. Lebanon's debt-
    to-GDP ratio is among the highest in the world. Its fiscal
    deficit is ballooning, and the country has a severe foreign
    exchange shortage. Limits on bank withdrawals and concerns over
    fuel and even food shortages have contributed to a growing
    sense of panic. In short, Lebanon is on the verge of a
    catastrophic economic meltdown.
        The current protests are different from past demonstrations
    in precedent-setting ways. The protests are decidedly anti-
    sectarian. Previously, protest movements have been captured by
    sectarian interests, leading to their demise or provoking
    greater polarization. Thus far, demonstrators have resolutely
    rejected efforts to inject sectarian demands or rhetoric into
    the protests.
        They are geographically diverse. Marches and demonstrations
    continue to occur across Lebanon from the north to the south,
    from the Beqaa Valley to the coast. Women and youth are at the
    forefront, playing an outsized role. Themes of civic engagement
    resonate across the protests. Discussion circles and debates on
    a broad range of issues occur daily across the country.
        However, the early optimism of the protest has given way to
    fears about darker scenarios unfolding. Two looming, dangerous
    dynamics, if unchecked, can quickly engulf Lebanon in
    widespread chaos and violence--an impending financial collapse
    or agitators turning the protests violent.
        Lebanon's revolutionary moment holds important implications
    for U.S. national security interests which are predicated on
    maintaining Lebanon's security and stability. Should the
    current protests be overwhelmed by financial collapse, a turn
    to violence, or both, U.S. national security interests would,
    likewise, come under significant threat.
        Given the stakes, it is critical that the United States
    proceed wisely and cautiously at this sensitive and potentially
    dangerous juncture for Lebanon. U.S. engagement should be
    guided by two key principles. One, engage where the U.S. has a
    comparative advantage, cultivating institutions that serve as a
    foundation for vibrant democracy. And two, refrain where the
    U.S. presence does more harm than good, in particular,
    resisting the temptation to support the protestors directly or
    transform the protests into a cudgel to use against Hezbollah
    and Iran.
        Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah has been unnerved by the
    demonstrations which have occurred in Hezbollah strongholds,
    signaling its constituency's deep discontent over socioeconomic
    issues. The Shiite militant group has expertly navigated
    Lebanon's sectarian system to accrue more power with little
    accountability, raising the slogans of resistance while
    engineering and manipulating the Lebanese governing system
    behind the scenes.
        As a prime beneficiary of the current status quo, Hezbollah
    would lose significantly, should the protestors' demands be
    fulfilled. A new governance system in Lebanon based on strong
    civic ideals and responsive, accountable, and inclusive
    institutions would dramatically undercut Hezbollah's influence.
        To conclude, I would like to highlight four key U.S. policy
    recommendations.
        One, work with key countries to pressure Lebanon's
    sectarian power brokers for the urgent appointment of a cabinet
    of independent technocrats to address the impending financial
    collapse.
        Two, engage international financial institutions to develop
    an emergency financing package conditioned on appropriate and
    necessary reforms.
        Three, maintain U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon.
    Lebanon hosts the highest number of per capita refugees in the
    world, and U.S. economic assistance has played an important
    role in supporting local communities.
        And four, unfreeze the $105 million in U.S. security
    assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the most respected
    State institution in Lebanon with strong popular support.
        Thank you, and I am happy to take your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Yacoubian.
        There is one vote on the floor, and there is about 10
    minutes left on the vote. So, I think we are going to, if the
    witnesses can sit tight, we are going to break for a moment,
    head off to the floor, cast our one vote, and come back for the
    rest of your testimony and questions.
        And with that, we will temporarily adjourn.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Deutch. The hearing will come back to order.
        Thanks so much to the witnesses for indulging us as we do
    our other important work, casting votes on the House floor.
        And with that, Ambassador Feltman, you are recognized for 5
    minutes.

    STATEMENT OF JEFFREY FELTMAN, JOHN C. WHITEHEAD VISITING FELLOW
     IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS
                              INSTITUTION

        Ambassador Feltman Thank you for inviting me.
        I will summarize my written testimony submitted for the
    record. I note that I represent only myself; the Brookings
    Institution does not take any institutional position on policy
    positions.
        Lebanon's current protests are not about the United States,
    but the protests can affect our interests. Congressional
    attention at this pivotal moment, therefore, is most welcome.
    In my view, a realistic U.S. policy for Lebanon has three
    elements.
        First, undermine Hezbollah's resistance, clean and anti-
    establishment narrative, most importantly among the Shia.
        Second, support the capability, credibility, and
    transparency of national institutions like the Lebanese Armed
    Force vis the sectarian ones represented by Hezbollah.
        Three, prevent Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, or Russia from
    filling the space, from controlling strategic Mediterranean
    ports and hydrocarbons.
        Successful implementation of these elements would help
    discredit the nonsense that Hezbollah's rockets defend Lebanon,
    when Hezbollah's rockets are what put Lebanon at risk of war.
        The current demonstrations by Lebanese disgusted with the
    status quo politics are more significant, as the other speakers
    have noted, than the 2005 protest movement against the Syrian
    occupation. This time, the Shia have joined.
        Hassan Nasrallah's red line against the resignation of
    President Aoun or early parliamentary elections ties Hezbollah
    tightly to the corruption and the cronyism that enrages the
    protestors. The demonstrators will not forget that Hezbollah
    deployed thugs on motorcycles to break up the protests by
    force.
        Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who enabled the expansion
    of Hezbollah's power by handing the terrorist organization a
    veneer of Christian cover, is now discredited as the symbol of
    everything that ails Lebanon. In other words, the Lebanese
    themselves are now undermining Hezbollah's once untouchable
    status.
        Regarding support for national institutions, my second
    point, U.S. support has contributed to the Lebanese Armed
    Forces mostly, but not entirely, restrained professional
    reaction to these demonstrations. Compare this with how
    Egyptian or Iraqi or Syrian or Iranian armed forces deal with
    protests. Among the Lebanese, confidence in the LAF, in
    general, is rising, and our assistance made this possible. It
    is in our interest that this continues.
        Does this mean that the Lebanese Armed Forces should try to
    disarm Hezbollah by force? That would spell civil war. And as
    we have seen in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Syria, and Yemen, Iran
    uses civil wars to implant terrorist proxy organizations, and
    Al-Qaeda and ISIS and their affiliates also exploit the chaos
    of civil war. Civil war is not in our interest.
        The U.S. has some legitimate concerns about the Lebanese
    Arm Forces' performance, but the FMF should resume quickly and
    publicly, both because of the program's merit in terms of
    improving the LAF's counterterrorism performance, but also to
    undermine the Hezbollah, Iranian, Syrian, Russia narrative that
    the U.S. is unreliable.
        Mr. Chairman, the Lebanese face choices regarding
    government formation and policies, and it is happening, as my
    fellow panelists noted, in the middle of a financial crisis, a
    severe financial crisis. The United States cannot make
    decisions for the Lebanese. But, given how our interests will
    be affected by how this evolves, we can clarify the
    implications of the directions that the Lebanese might be
    considering.
        Our message, in my view, should be twofold: that, first,
    the United States can help mobilize the international support
    that Lebanon needs, but that, second, we could only do so if a
    credible, incoming government adopts the effective reforms and
    anti-corruption measures that are demanded by the protestors;
    and to attract the investment and the financial deposits that
    Lebanon needs to prosper and to avoid economic collapse,
    Lebanese officials will have to at last satisfactorily resolve
    the longstanding contradiction between a citizenry that largely
    identifies with the West with policies that tolerate harboring
    an Iranian terrorist organization and that lean toward an
    Iranian-Syrian axis.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ambassador Feltman.
        Ms. Ghaddar, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF HANIN GHADDAR, FRIEDMANN VISITING FELLOW, GEDULD
           PROGRAM ON ARAB POLITICS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

        Ms. Ghaddar. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
    me today to speak about my country, Lebanon. This is a summary
    of a longer statement that I submitted.
        The core of the protests are the failing economic
    conditions and the persistent corruption of the ruling class,
    but they evolved to target the fundamental issues such as the
    sectarian system. The bleak economic situation is evident in
    the fact that Lebanon's readily available foreign reserves are
    now valued at less than $10 billion, which are not expected to
    last more than three or 4 months. And economic collapse is
    likely. Only a government made up of independent technocrats
    can gain the confidence of the Lebanese people and allow the
    international financial assistance.
        However, the current parliament with the pro-Hezbollah
    majority and the current President are not allowing it.
    Hezbollah is worried that a new, independent government would
    be the first step in isolating the party. Successful protests
    mean that Hezbollah will lose state entities through which they
    control the country's main security and financial decisions.
        As Hezbollah is going through its own financial crisis,
    thanks to the U.S. sanctions on Iran, Hezbollah's reaction has
    been intimidation of the protestors. But to avoid an Iraqi
    scenario, Hezbollah is using its influence within State
    institutions, mainly certain units within the Lebanese army, to
    quell the protests.
        The United States has so far provided the Lebanese army
    with $2 billion since 2006 in military equipment and
    international military education and training. This aid is the
    most significant leverage the U.S. has in Lebanon. However, it
    is not the equipment that Hezbollah needs. It is the LAF
    security decisions. Today, the LAF stands at a critical
    juncture, and three main issues are troubling.
        First, the LAF withdrew from portions of the south and the
    Beqaa, known to be Hezbollah's core areas. It is important to
    note that the Shia community that is Hezbollah's main
    constituency has joined the protests, which makes Hezbollah
    extra-anxious about losing its support base. As they intimidate
    the Shia protestors, the army was asked to leave.
        Second, the LAF started unblocking roads using excessive
    force under enormous pressure by the authorities.
        Three, factions within the LAF known to be affiliated with
    Hezbollah started a wave of unlawful arrests of activists. Some
    are still detained while others were released with clear signs
    of torture on their bodies. One has died.
        You can clearly see the contradicting affiliations within
    the LAF units. For example, parts of the military intelligence
    and the Republican Guards that are close to the President are
    acting to fulfill Hezbollah's agenda. However, there are many
    army units that are not. These elements will be much needed if
    violence escalates and the economic crisis deepens.
        So, what can the U.S. do?
        On the aid for the LAF, continue urging the LAF to protect
    non-violent protestors.
        The United States should reiterate that continued U.S.
    assistance to the LAF is contingent on safeguarding the
    protestors.
        Urge the LAF to protect all Lebanese citizens, including
    the Shia.
        Condition military aid to the LAF to ensure that the units
    within the army which are using excessive force do not benefit
    from it. It is vital that the U.S. aid to the army does not
    help units that are violating basic human rights.
        Eventually, maybe redesign the aid package itself. My
    reading of the FMF authority is that it is for purchase by
    foreign governments of defense material, training, and related
    services. However, the most serious challenge facing the LAF
    will be salary payments. As the State goes bankrupt very soon,
    implications of absentee LAF members include security and
    ensuring integrity of U.S.-origin equipment, making sure
    equipment does not fall into the wrong hands. Therefore, I
    would recommend that the committee explore with the State and
    Defense Departments a short-term program to cover salary
    payments for certain units in the case of economic collapse.
        Domestically, exert pressure on President Michel Aoun to
    call for immediate parliamentary deliberations and early
    elections. This current parliament cannot and will not lead
    required reforms.
        Sanction Hezbollah's allies. President Aoun, Speaker Nabih
    Berri, and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil are not only
    Hezbollah's main allies, they are also the most corrupt
    political figures in Lebanon. They need to be held responsible
    for the country's dire economy and instability.
        Internationally, work closely with the Europeans to ensure
    that any stability-related financial aid to Lebanon is not
    provided unless early elections are called and reforms begin.
        Finally, address Iran's regional operations. From Iran to
    Iraq and Lebanon, it has become very clear that Iran is not a
    factor of stability. Accordingly, any future negotiations with
    Iran need to address its regional presence and influence.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Ghaddar follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Ghaddar.
        Thanks to all the witnesses.
        We will turn to questioning by the members, and I will
    actually defer to Mr. Wilson to start us off.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank each of you. Each one of you were very perceptive
    and show a deep concern for the people of Lebanon, with which
    many of us associate because Lebanese-Americans are so
    enterprising and well-thought-of in our local communities. And
    so, it is particularly distressing to see what should be such a
    vibrant country have such a dire economic future.
        With that in mind, Ms. Ghaddar, there have been attempts to
    reform the economy and address Lebanon's phenomenal financial
    distress of a debt service equal to half of the government's
    revenues. Why have these efforts failed? What reforms should be
    promoted?
        Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you very much for this is a very
    important question.
        The CEDRE aid which was dedicated to Lebanon in 2018
    addresses many of these reforms, especially reforms of the
    electricity sector which takes a huge number of Lebanon's
    budget and, also, the augmented public sector. It is very clear
    what reforms should be implemented. It is all listed in the
    aid.
        I think the problem is that, because the political class
    are so corrupt, they are benefiting from the electricity sector
    and the augmented public sector. For example, they use the
    public sector to employ their own supporters who do not do
    anything. So, this is a big deal.
        These are some of the reforms that can be done. However,
    the current authorities failed since the CEDRE aid in Paris was
    announced to implement these reforms because they will not
    benefit from them. On the contrary, they will lose. So, that is
    why they, themselves, cannot implement these reforms. And CEDRE
    aid is there. It is $11 billion US dollars that are ready to be
    given to the Lebanese State on condition of these reforms.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        And, Ms. Yacoubian, what do the current protests mean for
    Iran's primary proxy Hezbollah? Is there a way that the U.S.
    can leverage the momentum of these protests to drive a further
    wedge between Hezbollah and the people of Lebanon?
        Ms. Yacoubian. Thank you.
        Clearly, as I noted in my oral satement and as well in my
    written testimony, Hezbollah has also been impacted by these
    protests. Shia communities have taken part in the protests.
    There have been demonstrations in areas that are considered
    Hezbollah strongholds. As I note in my written testimony, what
    was once called ``the wall of fear'' surrounding any sort of
    open criticism of Hezbollah, of Hassan Nasrallah, there are
    cracks in that. So, that is significant.
        I would argue that this movement is powerful because it is
    Lebanese, because it is organic. And as I note in my testimony,
    I think the most important thing the United States can do with
    respect to the protests themselves is step back, is continue to
    provide the sort of very important assistance we provide and
    have provided, whether to the Lebanese Armed Forces or our
    economic assistance to Lebanon, which is also significant. But
    I think the extent to which the United States attempts to put
    itself frontally into these protests will only backfire, will
    serve to discredit the protests. And, in fact, the protestors
    themselves have been quite clear that they are not interested
    in support from any foreign power, from any sort of foreign
    interference.
        At the same time, as I noted, I think if we see the
    protests, if we can allow for an environment that enables not
    only the protests to continue, but, more importantly, their
    demands to be fulfilled for responsive governance, for an end
    to corruption, for strong State institutions, that, to my mind,
    is the most important counterweight to Hezbollah. That kind of
    transition in Lebanon will do more, in my view, to undermine
    Hezbollah than an attempt to, sort of in a ham-handed way,
    manipulate the current protests as a cudgel against Hezbollah
    and, by extension, Iran.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Humud, with the current protests
    underway in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran--and there were reports
    today of deaths across Iran in the past couple of days--is this
    part of a bigger movement? Or how do you contextualize this?
        Ms. Humud. I think in some ways this is part of a broader
    trend of societies and populations demanding fundamental
    reforms and dissatisfaction with corruption. That being said,
    there are specific elements that are particular to Lebanon. The
    sectarian element is one that is particular to Lebanon, and
    that has really been a unique factor of this movement.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you. My time is up, and I appreciate the
    chairman being so magnanimous to let me go first. Thank you.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        Before going to Mr. Watkins, can I just ask--Ms. Humud, we
    have heard throughout the day, throughout this hearing, that
    one of the key demands is an end to a sectarian political
    system. Can you just give us some perspective on what that
    system is now that they are protesting against?
        And then, we will go to you, Mr. Watkins.
        Ms. Humud. Sure. The Taif Accords that ended Lebanon's
    civil war mandated a sectarian system that divides or
    distributes political power based on religious or sectarian
    identity. So, Lebanon's parliament is evenly divided between
    Muslims and Christians, and that division filters its way down
    to the cabinet and into other State institutions. And so, what
    this means is that Lebanese citizens in some ways organize and
    are mobilized based on their religious or sectarian identity
    rather than on an issues-driven basis. And that is primarily
    what the protestors are seeking to address, rather than a
    system whereby politicians are able to divide citizens based on
    identity, that they can identify these sort of cross-sectarian
    issues that really are common to all citizens, primarily the
    economy at this point.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Ultimately, the desire to be viewed as
    Lebanese citizens rather than Sunni and Shia or----
        Ms. Humud. Yes.
        Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Hezbollah?
        Ms. Humud. Yes.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
        Mr. Watkins, you are recognized.
        Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to the panel for being here.
        I would like to ask about the international response. And I
    am going to throw these questions to anybody. Particularly
    European, Russian, Iranian response to the protests, what have
    those been like?
        Ms. Ghaddar. On the Iranian part, I have been following
    very closely the Iranian responses. Obviously, it was exactly
    as Hezbollah's responses, that these protests are rightful in
    their demands. But that they have been penetrated by the Mossad
    and CIA and all the Western intelligence to direct them. That
    it is not about reforms anymore. It is about fighting the axis
    of resistance, et cetera, et cetera; discrediting the protests,
    and siding with the authority.
        At the beginning of the protest, the Iranians and Hezbollah
    together, at the very beginning they said that this government
    is not going to fall. And for the first time, Hezbollah was
    wrong; the government resigned. The first speech of Hassan
    Nasrallah was siding with the authorities against the protests.
    In his second speech Hassan Nasrallah was becoming the
    authority against the protests. He now is the authority. The
    people in the streets see him as the authority. They all see an
    Iranian influence in Lebanon. And that is why, for the first
    time, you see people turning against Hassan Nasrallah himself.
        Now it is very obvious; Hezbollah is blocking the formation
    of a new, independent government. The Iranians and Hezbollah's
    position has been, with the authority, against the people.
        Mr. Watkins. Let me actually jump over to the economy and
    corruption, please. What can the U.S. do to help the people of
    Lebanon counter corruption? Anybody?
        Ms. Ghaddar. As I mentioned in my recommendations, it is to
    stress on the early elections and independence.
        Mr. Watkins. Thank you.
        Go ahead, sir.
        Ambassador Feltman Thanks for the question.
        I think, in general, many of the Lebanese status quo
    leaders, the ones that the protestors are demanding be ousted,
    probably believe they can wait out the protests, that the
    protests cannot go on forever. And then, they can go back to
    their normal way, business as usual, and avoid any kind of
    accountability or scrutiny of what has happened.
        But what is different this time is the financial crisis
    that people have mentioned. The financial crisis is basically a
    ticking bomb. And that gives the protestors and the outside
    supporters of the idea of an independent, sovereign Lebanon
    some leverage.
        The United States showed leadership back in 2006 after the
    war between Hezbollah and Israel in helping to shore up
    Lebanese finances at that time, helping to persuade Gulf Arab
    States to put money into the central bank, deposits to shore up
    the currency, come up with the international assistance
    package, bring in investors. All these things can be done
    again.
        But I think it should be clear to the Lebanese that we are
    not going to exercise our leadership or our political
    investment in these types of initiatives unless they make the
    fundamental changes, that this will have a long-term impact.
    Those privatization ideas dealing with the telecom, with the
    electricity, with offshore hydrocarbons, right now no one on
    the street would trust those as actually benefiting the people
    or providing various services over the long term.
        So, I think you could put together a package, but the
    package needs to be linked with fundamental changes inside
    Lebanon about how Lebanon is going to be governing going
    forward and how do you resolve that contradiction between a
    Western ally of Lebanon and the fact that they are harboring an
    Iranian terrorist organization?
        Mr. Watkins. Understood.
        One last question. The Lebanese institution, the military,
    how is the army viewed by the Lebanese people?
        Ms. Yacoubian. I will take an initial stab. I think the
    army is the institution that is most respected by the Lebanese
    public. It is a cross-sectarian institution. I think my
    colleagues have rightly pointed out ways and areas in which
    there are elements of the Lebanese army that have not behaved
    properly. For the most part, the Lebanese army has, in fact,
    conducted itself professionally. It is very well regarded by
    the Lebanese in polling and other types of instruments to
    indicate popular support, or lack thereof.
        Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you.
        Ms. Ghaddar. Can I just add one little thing?
        Mr. Watkins. Yes, sure.
        Ms. Ghaddar. It is really the army intelligence. There is a
    huge difference between the army intelligence and the rest of
    the army units. The people today see the difference and the
    Lebanese still respect the army, but they do not respect the
    army intelligence.
        Mr. Watkins. Understood. Thank you.
        I yield.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Watkins.
        I would just like to followup on much of this discussion
    about reforms to the corruption in the political system. There
    have been calls from the international community which have
    offered assistance to national reforms of Lebanon's government.
    Are these protests sufficient to bring about the reforms? And
    how much does it matter that the perception is that these
    protests are essentially leaderless? How can we get to make it
    stick?
        I guess, Ms. Ghaddar, we will start with you.
        Ms. Ghaddar. The protests are leaderless for a very good
    reason. The authorities have been looking for leaders to
    discredited them. They have been looking for leaders to arrest.
    They have been looking for leaders to intimidate. And that is
    why the protests are leaderless. One, for people to be safe, to
    protect themselves. And two, because it is really not about
    leadership this time. This is a real movement. It is not like
    the 2015 Uprising that started with civil society. It is not
    like the 2005 Cedar Revolution which was led by the March 14
    political camp. This is organic. This is pure Lebanese.
        And a lot of people try to represent themselves as
    representatives of the protests, the representatives of the
    revolution. They were all shunned. It is very important that we
    need to keep it leaderless because the objective is not to
    negotiate with authorities. The objective is to bring down the
    authorities.
        The next step, I think for the protestors themselves, and
    for a lot of people following Lebanon, is the following: the
    protest itself cannot change anything in terms of avoiding the
    economic collapse. The protests can push for change. The first
    achievement is that the government resigned.
        The second step is the small sample of elections that we
    had, which is the syndicates of the lawyers, the independent
    candidate won. For the first time ever, an independent
    candidate won. This tells you that elections can change things.
    It made people realize that the next step is actually beyond
    the government formation. It is really about early elections,
    based on a non-sectarian electoral law that would produce a new
    parliament, a new government, and a new President. And this is
    how we can actually move things forward.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
        Ambassador Feltman, what can the United States and the
    international community do to help with both the call for early
    elections and the anti-corruption efforts?
        Ambassador Feltman I do think that the U.S. needs to
    release the FMF right away to show that we are supporting the
    national institution that, as Dr. Yacoubian said, is most
    respected in Lebanon. So, the FMF needs to go.
        But, beyond that, the fact that there is a financial
    crisis, the fact that everyone knows there is a financial
    crisis that needs to be avoided because of the risk that chaos
    just enables Iran and Al-Qaeda-type things, gives us some
    leverage.
        We have talked about the 2005 demonstrations and how these
    are different, but there is a lesson in the 2005 demonstrations
    that I think we need to keep in mind. Had the Lebanese
    themselves gone out, and the international community was paying
    no attention, and called for the Syrian occupation to end,
    those Lebanese protests would have been broken up brutally by
    the combination of the Syrian army and intelligence services.
    Had the international community been calling for the Syrian
    occupation to end, but the Lebanese were home and not paying
    any attention, nothing would have happened. It was the
    combination of the street protests in 2005 and the attention by
    the international community working in tandem that forced the
    Syrians out.
        We could have the same formula now. We do not know who the
    protest leaders are. They do not want us to know who their
    leaders are. There are not any leaders. But we know what their
    basic demands are. Those would be the same demands we would
    have, as the international supporters of Lebanon, for
    transparency and end to corruption, new electoral law. If we
    make it clear that the only escape from the financial crisis is
    implementing what the protestors are demanding, we have bottom-
    up pressure from the street, outside pressure, multiplied by
    that financial crisis. I think we could make a difference.
        Mr. Deutch. Ms. Yacoubian, we hope that this hearing will
    help make a difference. How else can we contribute to this?
    What is your sense of how to strengthen the movement that is
    trying to accomplish these goals?
        Ms. Yacoubian. Again, first, I would underscore I think the
    movement, in and of itself, demonstrates the creativity, the
    ingenuity, sort of the talent, quite frankly, of the Lebanese.
    If you go online and watch Twitter and look at some of the
    things that they are doing, it is quite impressive. So, I do
    not know that they need help from us in that regard.
        I would sort of underscore Ambassador Feltman's point. I
    think this impending economic meltdown--and that is really what
    we are looking at--is a real forcing mechanism for action. The
    protestors have been quite clear about what they want. And
    again, it is very much, I think, about early elections, in
    particular.
        The U.S. has a lot that we can contribute in that regard.
    In my written testimony, I underscore the need to provide, for
    example, and to renew our assistance with regard to elections,
    observations, et cetera. I think that this is a moment where
    the international community quietly--France, the United States,
    other key powers--can really push and pressure the need to
    fulfill the demands of the protestors, and then, ideally,
    follow in with appropriate assistance to help Lebanon pursue
    free and fair elections going forward.
        Mr. Deutch. And finally, Ms. Humud, can you just give us a
    bit of historical perspective here on what these demands are
    and why, given Lebanon's history, the demands are not only not
    unreasonable, they are consistent with what we have seen
    before?
        Ms. Humud. The demands are definitely consistent with what
    we have seen before. As my colleagues have mentioned, the U.S.
    could respond in some ways by supporting protestor demands for
    change and conditioning U.S. assistance on reform; potentially
    targeting corrupt leaders, regardless of sect. There would be
    tradeoffs to this approach, of course. It could require
    severing ties with some of our traditional political allies in
    Lebanon. That, in turn, could push them toward external power
    brokers such as Iran, who share their goal of preserving the
    status quo. So, regardless of the approach the U.S. chooses to
    take, there will always be a tradeoff.
        In terms of Congress' role specifically, Congress could
    always pass legislation directing U.S. representatives at
    multilateral banks, development banks, to advocate for specific
    economic policies vis-a-vis Lebanon.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
        We do not want to push them toward outside actors like
    Iran. And I will circle back to that, Ambassador Feltman.
        But, Mr. Vargas, I would like to recognize you for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Ranking
    Member, and, of course, the witnesses here.
        Back in April 2017, I was able to take a codel with Darrel
    Issa to Beirut and other parts of Lebanon and got a chance to
    meet with a number of people while we were there. Of course,
    there was great concern about Hezbollah in the southern part of
    Lebanon. And I continue to have, of course, that great concern
    of what is going to happen there.
        I apologize, I had to miss part of the meeting earlier. So,
    I apologize for that. That is what happens when you have two
    meetings at the same time, two hearings.
        But I have great concern about that and the military
    buildup. And I would like to hear from you what you think is
    going to happen in the next few years because of that military
    buildup. Who would like to take that? Ambassador, why don't you
    handle that first?
        Ambassador Feltman I think that, as we saw in 2006, the
    risk of unanticipated war between Lebanon and Israel, between
    Hezbollah and Israel, is always there. It was a devastating war
    in 2006. At least on the Lebanese side--I was Ambassador at the
    time--it was not anticipated, and that risk is always there.
        I think that my view is that, because of its exposure in
    Syria right now, because of the exposure to domestic criticism,
    Hezbollah is not interested in a war with Israel at the moment.
    But that does not mean that a war with Israel will not happen.
    There could always be a miscalculation.
        But what I do think is encouraging, though, is the
    increased capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. When I was
    Ambassador in Lebanon in 2007, the Lebanese army struggled for
    5 months, from May to September, to take out a Sunni terrorist
    organization, Al-Qaeda affiliate called Fatah al-Islam. It took
    5 months and there were 158 LAF soldiers killed, along with 50
    civilians and an entire Palestinian refugee camp. Nahral-Bared
    was completely destroyed, the home of 30,000 civilians.
        Fast forward to 2017. The Lebanese Armed Forces had an
    anti-terrorist operation on the eastern border with Syria where
    they were able to capture over 700 ISIS fighters with only
    seven LAF officers killed in only 10 combat days. That is in
    our interest, to see the Lebanese Armed Forces be combating
    terrorism. And the capabilities have improved because of the
    assistance, mentoring, FMF that we have provided.
        Mr. Vargas. I appreciate it. But one of the concerns from
    some of the people that we spoke to was that the LAF, in fact,
    was not going to be too involved in things that happened in the
    southern part of the country when it came to questions of
    Hezbollah and the fact that they would not be involved in that.
    I mean, I do not know if that is common thinking for everybody,
    but that certainly was the case with a number of people.
        Ambassador Feltman I mean the Lebanese Armed Forces does
    reflect the Lebanese society.
        Mr. Vargas. Right.
        Ambassador Feltman Every family has relatives at some level
    in the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces
    basically operates, tries to stay apolitical in a country where
    there is very little political consensus about how to move
    forward.
        I would argue that, if our benchmark for success with the
    Lebanese Armed Forces military assistance is that they take on
    Hezbollah frontally, that that is a mistaken benchmark; that
    that causes civil war. And Lebanon civil war is what gave
    Hezbollah the opening to begin with.
        Mr. Vargas. Right.
        Ambassador Feltman Hezbollah civil war----
        Mr. Vargas. You are right. That was my question. Because it
    seems like, when you are talking about the LAF, and I am
    asking, what do you think is going to happen in the south,
    well, the LAF. I thought, well, the LAF is kind of non-
    existent; they are a non-issue in the south.
        Yes, go ahead.
        Ambassador Feltman I will turn it over to Dr. Ghaddar.
        Mr. Vargas. Doctor, go ahead.
        Ms. Ghaddar. I do not think Hezbollah would want the LAF to
    be involved in the south in case of any war with Israel or
    others. They do not need the LAF. Hezbollah does not need the
    LAF fighting capacities. They do not need their equipment. They
    do not need their training. They have more than that. So, this
    is not the issue for Hezbollah.
        What they need from the LAF, actually, is the security and
    military decisions. Their access to certain units and
    commanders is what they need. It is not the LAF itself. So,
    looking forward, we need to think about Hezbollah's access to
    these decisions.
        What I am worried about, looking forward, is that there is
    a potential split between the units because, as the crisis
    deepens and the economy crisis deepens, we will see more units
    moving in different directions, some closer to Hezbollah's
    agenda, some not. And eventually, when the economy collapses,
    who is going to pay salaries? The military equipment and
    training provided by the U.S. is going to be useless when they
    do not have salaries. So, this is something to think about.
        Mr. Vargas. My time has expired. Could I take 30 seconds?
        Thank you very much for that answer.
        And the last thing I would say is this, though: the issue
    of sectarian identity and the notion that there could be free
    and fair elections without taking into account sectarian
    identity, that certainly would go against what I saw while I
    was there. And again, I do not pretend to be an expert. I did
    get a chance to meet with different groups, and there is a
    very, very strong sectarian identity. And I do not know that
    having an election where some of those groups did not hold onto
    some sort of power would actually be beneficial. It probably
    would cut the other way, I would assume, but I do not know.
    Again, I am not an expert, but that did concern me when I
    heard, you know, to have early elections and have one group win
    and sort of dominate the politics, I thought, well, that is the
    old civil war that they had from 1975 to 1990, and we certainly
    do not want to go back to that.
        Ms. Ghaddar. Just one thing I should say. Since then, much
    has changed. I do not think the issue today is the sectarian
    identity. When you see the Lebanese protestors today, how
    united they are, and how the small elections that we had 2 days
    ago at the syndicates of the lawyers, what it means, I am not
    worried about that.
        Mr. Vargas. OK.
        Ms. Ghaddar. I think things have changed, and it also
    depends on the nature of the electoral law.
        Mr. Vargas. Yes. OK. Thank you very much.
        And, Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Ranking Member, thank
    you.
        Thank you, witnesses.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
        We have got just a few more questions if the witnesses will
    indulge us.
        Mr. Wilson, you are recognized.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Indeed, I appreciate the point of view of providing for
    economic reforms. And then, in terms of reforms to the
    government, technocrats, how do you identify corruption? What
    would be the definition of corruption? And we will begin with
    Ms. Humud and proceed all over. But how do you identify what
    the definition is of corruption? What are some examples of
    corruption? And who would you report the corruption to? And is
    there any independent judiciary or body to which corruption can
    be reported?
        Ms. Humud. Sure. Prime Minister Hariri, before his
    resignation, did float the idea of an anti-corruption
    committee. That is something that has been floated before, and
    we have not seen a lot of progress on there.
        One thing that various government officials before their
    resignation tried to do is this issue of financial disclosure
    and of lifting banking secrecy on their accounts to show
    greater transparency on the funding that they have, where it
    goes. I think there is also an additional issue of the budget,
    oversight of the budget, and budget auditing that has not been
    fully transparent in the past.
        Ms. Yacoubian. I would just add, very briefly, I think
    identifying corruption will not be difficult. It is pervasive;
    it is endemic. It is interesting to note that, in a recent
    Gallup poll, 93 percent of Lebanese believe that there is
    corruption around them. The country ranks 138th in the
    Transparency International poll.
        So, I think the issues really have to do with the ways in
    which this sectarian system that undergrids things_the
    families_and the ways in which, for example, contracts are
    guided toward particular families. This is why the garbage
    crisis came to what it came to with literally rivers of trash
    flowing in Lebanon.
        There has been some interesting research done on the extent
    to which, even down to the municipalities--that is where the
    rubber meets the road in terms of addressing everyday
    problems--that the corruption is so pervasive that it impedes
    effective solutions, because, again, it is about contracts and
    business and other things being steered toward favorites. So,
    there is quite a bit of cronyism.
        And I think, from my perspective, we have to be clear. This
    is an issue and a challenge in Lebanon that we are not going to
    be able to solve, that the Lebanese will not be able to solve,
    even despite the immediacy of the current problem. This is a
    generational challenge that is going to take quite some time to
    address.
        Mr. Wilson. Ambassador.
        Ambassador Feltman I think our interest is to prevent a
    collapse in Lebanon that would enable Iran to deepen its roots,
    Al-Qaeda affiliates to rise up again in the chaos of civil war
    or financial economic collapse. That is our interest. And that
    is linked to the anti-corruption, because the only way you are
    going to be able to prevent the crisis is to be seen by the
    population, by investors, by those would be supporting Lebanon
    from outside, that you are starting to address the corruption.
    But our interest is to prevent that collapse in order to
    prevent the chaos that benefits others.
        If there is an economic collapse in Lebanon, everybody
    hurts, but I think Hezbollah probably hurts a little bit less
    because of their own independent resources and things, and that
    is not in our interest. So, our interest is in anti-corruption
    more generally, but it is specifically linked to that desire
    not to see Lebanon collapse. And that is where I think that the
    financial crisis gives us the opportunity to reinforce and
    amplify the voices on the street calling for the type of
    government that would have the credibility and confidence to
    start to tackle this.
        As my colleague said, it is not going to be able to be
    rooted out overnight. But if you have a government that is seen
    as credible, competent, independent, you can start to attract
    the type of investment, the type of return of tourism and
    businesses that will buy time to allow those reforms to take
    place.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        Ms. Ghaddar.
        Ms. Ghaddar. Thank you.
        The general definition of corruption is, when political
    figures abuse the State's institutions and resources, and
    create followers instead of citizens. So, what the protests are
    about today is regaining citizenship and national identities
    rather than sectarian identities. And that is what the Lebanese
    are actually trying to do.
        The moment they become citizens, they are no longer
    followers, then the corrupt system will be shaken. For example,
    that is how Iran took over the State institutions, because
    Hezbollah protected the cronies and, in return, they got their
    allegiance. So, the President today is Hezbollah's ally and his
    son-in-law, the Foreign Minister, is also Hezbollah's main
    ally, in addition to the Speaker. And it is not a coincidence
    that the three of them are actually the most corrupt
    politicians in Lebanon. So, basically, when you target corrupt
    politicians, you automatically and indirectly contain
    Hezbollah.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much to each of you.
        Ms. Yacoubian. Could I add one point?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes.
        Ms. Yacoubian. I think one other issue that we have not
    discussed is the need for oversight and the fact that this is a
    system in Lebanon that is without any sort of oversight and any
    sort of accountability to citizens. So, even things as basic as
    demanding transparency with respect to government spending and
    ensuring that parliamentary votes are public and known, there
    are a number of practices that can be undertaken to begin to
    shine light, to begin to open up, to begin to allow for more
    transparency, which is the best antidote to corruption.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        Mr. Deutch. Again, thanks to all the witnesses.
        Ambassador Feltman, public support for the Lebanese Armed
    Forces is soaring. Why is that the case? How are they perceived
    by the public? And what would be the consequences if our
    assistance to the LAF is significantly delayed or terminated?
        Ambassador Feltman Thank you.
        I think I probably would use a different term today than I
    used in that piece I wrote a few weeks ago because the army's
    records since the initial days is a little bit more mixed. But
    I believe strongly that the FMF, the assistance that we have
    given to the Lebanese Armed Forces over the years, particularly
    in the increases after the 2006 war, is in our interest. This
    is not a gift to the Lebanese. This is something that is in our
    mutual interest, the partnership.
        And it is also not unconditional. The improvements that I
    cited on their counterterrorism measures is directly related to
    the assistance, the training, the mentoring that we have given
    them.
        As my colleague to my right said, the Lebanese Armed Forces
    is probably the No. 1 most respected institution in the
    country. That does not mean that it is above criticism. It does
    not mean it is a perfect institution. We have seen evidence, we
    have seen units in these protests that have performed very well
    protecting protestors in Beirut. We have seen them stand away/
    withdraw as thugs beat up protestors in Nabatieh in the south,
    as Ms. Ghaddar mentioned.
        But the FMF gives us the ability to build the type of
    partnership, to continue to cultivate the type of partnership
    where we can have influence on how the Lebanese Armed Forces
    develops over the longer term. And we have seen that in
    counterterrorism already. Our message now should be we expect
    professional, equivalent treatment by the Lebanese Armed Forces
    of the protestors across the entire country.
        But the most important thing is we are undermining
    Hezbollah's argument that only Hezbollah can protect Lebanon by
    helping the Lebanese build a credible national institution in
    which all Lebanese can be proud. It is undermining Hezbollah's
    narrative.
        Hezbollah's rockets, as I said earlier, do not defend
    Lebanon. They put Lebanon at risk of war. The Lebanese Armed
    Forces is the long-term defense for Lebanon, and I think it is
    in our interest that we remain partners with them.
        The other thing is, the Russians want to be there. The
    Russians will move into a vacuum if we aren't there. The
    Russians are already supporting General Haftar in Libya. The
    Russians are already deeply embedded in Syria. Do we really
    want the Russians to take over the entire Eastern
    Mediterranean? I would say no.
        And that reinforces my point, let the FMF flow now, but
    flow with a message. Flow with a message about what we expect
    of the LAF performance during this tense time.
        Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that, Ambassador Feltman, and I
    appreciate the impassioned plea. As we await response from the
    administration, I hope they are listening to you. The answer to
    your question is a resounding, no, we do not want Russia to
    have full control of yet another country in the region. And I
    hope that we will hear from the administration soon.
        Let me finish with something that we have alluded to, the
    witnesses have alluded to, but I just want to address straight
    on. And, Ambassador Feltman, I am going to direct this to you,
    given your experience as a high-level official at the United
    Nations. And I wanted to just refer to a letter that was led by
    Congresswoman Luria, Congressman Zeldin, Congresswoman Stevens,
    and Congressman Waltz to the Secretary General about U.N.
    Security Council Resolution 1701.
        The point, it has been 13 years now, and 1701 called upon
    the Lebanese government to extend its sovereignty over all of
    Lebanon and disarm all armed groups in Lebanon, so there will
    be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese
    State. UNIFIL was called upon to enforce this. And 13 years
    later there are 150,000 rockets pointed at Israel and
    construction of massive terror tunnels recently discovered as
    well.
        By any definition, this has been a failure. So, the
    question is, does it need to be reformed? Does the Lebanese
    government need more tools? How do you respond? This has been
    such a productive hearing about the need for us to support the
    protestors and strengthen the Lebanese government. And then, in
    southern Lebanon we have house after house after house housing
    rocket after rocket after rocket, 150,000, when there should be
    zero, when the Security Council spoke clearly that there should
    be zero. Do you have thoughts, Ambassador Feltman, on what can
    be done?
        Ambassador Feltman I apologize if I sound cynical after my
    6 years at the United Nations. But when I look at Security
    Council resolutions, I realize that the resolutions may have
    some value into establishing what is a theoretical objective.
    But if there is no political will for implementation, they
    count for little.
        Look at the Libya arms embargo. The Libyan arms embargo was
    renewed unanimously in June. All 15 Security Council members
    supported it. And now, many Security Council members are
    actually shipping arms to warring parties.
        Resolution 1701, and earlier 1559, which was a few years
    earlier, which called for the dismantlement of all Lebanese and
    non-Lebanese militias, also has not been implemented. There has
    been no political will demonstrated not only by the Lebanese,
    but by others on the Council to hold the Lebanese's feet to the
    fire.
        There is a briefing on Monday at the Security Council. I
    thanks Ms. Ghaddar for telling me that this is on Monday. And I
    am sure that there will be lots of members that will ask the
    U.N. Special Coordinator about 1701. But it requires political
    will from the outside that this is not just important on the
    days when the Security Council is meeting; it is important
    every day. And it requires the Lebanese themselves to start
    understanding the risks that their country is under because of
    Hezbollah's weaponry.
        And I think that that is something these protests have
    started to underscore. When you have the Shia starting to
    criticize Hezbollah, you have a whole new situation and a
    better opportunity to get this message across.
        Mr. Deutch. I acknowledge, and I am not surprised by, your
    cynicism. I would just finish by pointing out, I mean, UNIFIl,
    it is important to remember is the United Nations Interim Force
    in Lebanon. This is not just a question of pass a resolution
    and hope things happen. There is a process put in place to do
    it. The process has failed. And as you point out, Ambassador
    Feltman--and you have now pointed out twice, and I appreciate
    it--Hezbollah's rockets do not defend Lebanon; they put Lebanon
    at risk of war. They put the entire country at risk of war. It
    is a really important point.
        And you would like to make one more?
        Ambassador Feltman Yes, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
    Member, make one more point on UNIFIL. I was Ambassador in
    Lebanon during old UNIFIL, pre-2006 UNIFIL, little UNIFIL. I
    was, then, Ambassador and Assistant Under-Secretary-General at
    the United Nations watching big UNIFIL.
        And certainly, just like with the LAF, we could have a lot
    of questions on performance, on is UNIFIL or the LAF being
    aggressive enough in implementing its mandate. But there is
    something I want to point out. The type of operation that
    Hezbollah launched in 2006, a very sophisticated operation
    where they used the Israeli military communications channels,
    they had what sounded like native Hebrew speakers sounding as
    though that they were Israeli soldiers talking. They went
    across the border into Israel and kidnapped and killed Israeli
    soldiers. That would be very difficult to pull off today
    because of larger UNIFIL.
        UNIFIL is not perfect, but UNIFIL, by being in the south,
    has changed the rules of the game that I think reduce the risks
    of the accidental war. Before 2006, there was this regular
    back-and-forth between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, to show
    its resistance credentials, would have these ridiculous firing
    of mortars into unoccupied parts of Shebaa Farms, part of Syria
    that Israel occupied after the 1967 war. And Israel would
    respond by launching something into Lebanon, or vice versa. But
    there was always a risk that any of these could go haywire,
    that any of these could lead to a devastating war.
        Because UNIFIL is so big and so present, even if they are
    not doing what you and I think they should be doing, they are
    preventing that type of accidental war.
        Ms. Ghaddar. Can I say something about this?
        Mr. Deutch. Yes, Ms. Ghaddar.
        Ms. Ghaddar. I am from the south of Lebanon. I have lived
    there until I was 18. And things have changed drastically since
    then.
        The Shia today joining the Lebanese and starting to
    criticize Hezbollah is not new. It has been going on since
    2006, actually, and Hezbollah has been challenged by the Shia
    community for a very long time. This is new in terms of
    becoming public, and that is the main issue.
        And one of my main arguments since then is that the
    rhetoric of the resistance is gone. The people do not want a
    war anymore. The Shia mainly do not want a war anymore. What
    they want is actually alternative economic plans.
        Therefore, I always feel that one of the best ways to
    counter Hezbollah is to work with the Shia, not work with
    municipalities governed by Hezbollah. Today, the Shia are
    coming out and saying, ``We are Lebanese citizens,'' and we
    need to hear that. We need to know that they really want to
    join the rest of Lebanon. Working with local municipalities is
    ineffective because these are governed by Hezbollah. Work with
    the Shia, the business community, the civil society. And that
    is what will challenge Hezbollah the most.
        Mr. Deutch. And I appreciate it. I appreciate your insight
    very much. The fact that there has been so much discussion
    about the frustration with Hezbollah, the concern by Nasrallah
    about what is happening, is very hopeful.
        This last point I raised because, even as we go through all
    the rest of this, standing with the people of Lebanon as they
    make these peaceful demands, there are still 150,000 rockets
    that I think it is fair for us to continue to worry about,
    whether in the context of a Security Council resolution or
    these broader conversations.
        This has been an extraordinary hearing. I am grateful to
    all four of you for appearing with us today.
        The members may have some additional questions which they
    will submit for the record. And I ask they submit any questions
    within five business days.
        Mr. Deutch. And with that, and without objection, the
    meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                    APPENDIX

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                           INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]