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LOCAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE TERROR THREAT IN NEW YORK CITY: A RETROSPECTIVE AND A ROADMAP

FIELD HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 6, 2019

Serial No. 116–16

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37–473 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

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CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Max Rose, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement 1
Prepared Statement 2
The Honorable Mark Walker, a Representative in Congress From the State of North Carolina, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement 3
Prepared Statement 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement 5

WITNESSES

Mr. John J. Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, New York Police Department:
Oral Statement 6
Prepared Statement 9
Mr. Thomas Currao, Chief of Counterterrorism, Fire Department of the City of New York:
Oral Statement 13
Prepared Statement 17
Mr. Louis P. Klock, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey:
Oral Statement 20
Prepared Statement 23

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Max Rose for John J. Miller 41
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Thomas Currao 41
Questions From Chairman Max Rose for Louis P. Klock 42

LOCAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE TERROR THREAT IN NEW YORK CITY: A RETROSPECTIVE AND A ROADMAP

Monday, May 6, 2019

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM,
Staten Island, NY.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:07 p.m., in Staten Island Borough Hall, 10 Richmond Terrace, Staten Island, NY, Hon. Max Rose [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Rose [presiding], Walker, and King.

Also present: Representatives Pascrell and Clarke.

Mr. ROSE. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism will come to order.

Good afternoon, everybody. It is good to be home here on Staten Island, New York City. I am really proud to be convening my first subcommittee field hearing, and no better place to be doing it than here; and, of course, no more important issue, in my book, than that of New York City's security.

As many of you know, this is the first time in the history of this subcommittee or this committee that a representative from New York City has served as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. I am honored to be joined by the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Mark Walker of North Carolina, as well as 3 Members from the New York and New Jersey delegation: Ms. Yvette Clarke from Brooklyn, who is en route; Mr. King from Long Island; and Mr. Pascrell from Paterson, New Jersey.

Today's hearing, "Local Efforts to Counter the Terror Threat in New York City: A Retrospective and a Roadmap," could not be more important, especially as we approach the 20th anniversary of 9/11.

The NYPD and our law enforcement agencies continue to make huge strides in keeping New York City safe. We are now the safest big city in the country, and for that I do want to acknowledge the gentlemen in front of us for everything you have done to help make that the case. I know that does not just happen by osmosis.

I am looking forward to hearing about your progress over the last 2 decades, and hearing about your concerns so we can make sure that Congress continues to support your work.

New York City continues to face terrorist threats. Since 9/11, New York has been targeted over and over by terrorists seeking to

do us harm. The men and women of law enforcement in this city continue to thwart these attempted attacks.

In recent years, the threat from domestic terrorism has risen dramatically. Across the country, we have seen a rise in terrorist attacks on our holiest and most sacred places, houses of worship. Just 2 weeks ago, Jewish worshipers in the Chabad of Poway Synagogue in California were brutally attacked by a domestic terrorist. One woman, Lori Kaye, was murdered. That attack happened 6 months to the day after another murderous rampage in the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh.

Here in New York City, in March 2017, we saw another domestic terrorist murder an African-American man, Timothy Caughman, with a sword, as the first in a planned rampage targeting black men. Of course, we continue to face threats from jihadist-inspired terrorists. In October 2017, we saw an extremist ram a pickup truck into pedestrians and cyclists in Lower Manhattan, killing 8 people and wounding 11 others within eyeshot of Ground Zero.

It goes without saying that the job of keeping New York City safe is an incredibly complex and rapidly-evolving challenge. Thankfully, we have the best men and women on the job in the country.

As for us, Congress should be there to provide assistance where it is needed, and provide oversight where things are not working quite as well as they should, especially when it comes to information sharing with the Federal Government to counter terrorist attacks. We need to make sure that you are not just sending us information but that the Federal agencies are shooting it right back to you. That is why we are holding this hearing today.

After the Ranking Member delivers his opening statement, I will introduce these three distinguished gentlemen, representing the men and women working to keep this city safe.

Just on a closing note, there is a tremendous amount of media focus on a myriad of different public safety issues, from the global to the domestic. But it seems as if the issue of counterterrorism is no longer in the limelight. Well, today we are doing a hearing centered around that, centered around New York City, which has a bulls-eye on it, and might always will, to ensure that this remains an issue that we focus on.

[The statement of Chairman Rose follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE

MAY 6, 2019

As many of you know, this is the first time in the history of this committee that a representative from New York City has served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. I'm honored to be joined by the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Mark Walker of North Carolina, as well as 3 Members from the New York and New Jersey delegation—Ms. Yvette Clarke from Brooklyn, Mr. King from Long Island, and Mr. Pascrell from Paterson, New Jersey.

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I'm looking forward to hearing about your progress over the last 2 decades, and hearing about your concerns, so I can ensure Congress continues to support your work.

New York City continues to face terrorist threats. Since 9/11, New York has been targeted over and over by terrorists seeking to do us harm. And the men and women of law enforcement in this city continue to thwart these attempted attacks.

In recent years, the threat from domestic terrorism has risen dramatically. Across the country, we've seen a rise in terrorist attacks on our holiest and most sacred places—houses of worship. Just 2 weeks ago, Jewish worshipers in the Chabad of Poway synagogue in California were brutally attacked by a domestic terrorist. One woman, Lori Kaye, was murdered. That attack happened 6 months—to the day—after a white supremacist's murderous rampage in the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Here in New York City, in March 2017, a domestic terrorist murdered an African-American man, Timothy Caughman, with a sword—as the first in a planned rampage targeting Black men. And of course we continue to face threats from jihadist-inspired terrorists. In October 2017, an Islamist extremist rammed a pickup truck into pedestrians and cyclists in Lower Manhattan, killing 8 people and wounding 11 others.

It goes without saying that the job of keeping New York City safe is an incredibly complex and rapidly-evolving challenge. Thankfully, we have the best women and men on the job.

As for us, Congress should be there to provide assistance where it's needed, and provide oversight where things aren't working quite as well as they should—especially when it comes to information sharing with the Federal Government to counter terrorist attacks. We need to make sure that you're not just sending information to Federal agencies without them sharing information with you. That's why we're holding this hearing today.

Mr. ROSE. Again, with that, I thank all of our witnesses for joining us this morning, and I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Walker, for an opening statement.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, as well as the staff for their hard work in setting it up and certainly inviting me to this district here on Staten Island.

Before we get started, I want to just take a moment to remember Officer Jordan Harris Sheldon's family, a young police department gentleman from North Carolina who was killed in the line of duty this past Saturday evening.

I would also just like to take a point of privilege to thank Mr. Peter King for his years of work in representing New York and being really one of the lead people, past Chairman of this committee, and all the great work that he has done over the years.

There is no question that New York City is a major terror target. The city's law enforcement and first responder community have worked tirelessly to identify, prevent, deter, and mitigate threats in the region.

Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the threat landscape has shifted. We once principally faced threats planned and directed by al-Qaeda senior leaders. However, the last few years have seen a rise in lone-wolf actors radicalized by ISIS on-line propaganda.

ISIS has exploited social media to inspire these individuals to use knives and vehicles to carry out attacks on soft targets anywhere and at any time they can. The territorial defeat of ISIS does not leave us immune to their continued attempts to coordinate and inspire attacks on our soil. The attacks on Easter targeting Christians in Sri Lanka and the recent release of a new video of ISIS leader al-Baghdadi demonstrate that the group still remains a threat.

Additionally, we cannot forget that al-Qaeda and other Islamist terror groups remain intent on targeting the West, as the Chair-

man clearly identified. It is clear that domestic extremists are following in the footsteps of foreign terrorists by using social media platforms to spread propaganda and create echo chambers of hate. Religious institutions from all faith groups are being targeted by both domestic and internationally-inspired groups.

Targeting innocent people in their place of worship is one of the vilest acts of terrorism, and we must do a better job of identifying plots and stopping these attacks. Close coordination between Federal, State, and local entities is vital to counterterrorism defense both on the international and domestic fronts.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on whether they are receiving the necessary information and sharing support, training, and coordination from Federal partners. It is an honor to be here today to receive testimony from this distinguished panel, who all 3 I had been able to get a chance to meet earlier. I want to thank them for their service and for advising this subcommittee on terrorism threats facing the homeland, lessons learned, and emerging threats.

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The statement of Ranking Member Walker follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER MARK WALKER

MAY 6, 2019

I want to thank Chairman Rose for holding this hearing and inviting me to his District. There is no question that New York City is a major terror target. The city's law enforcement and first responder community have worked tirelessly to identify, prevent, deter, and mitigate threats in the region.

Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the threat landscape has shifted. We once principally faced threats planned and directed by al-Qaeda senior leaders.

The last few years have seen a rise in lone-wolf actors radicalized by ISIS on-line propaganda.

ISIS has exploited social media to inspire these individuals to use knives and vehicles to carry out attacks on soft targets.

The territorial defeat of ISIS does not leave us immune to their continued attempts to coordinate and inspire attacks on our soil.

The horrible attacks on Easter targeting Christians in Sri Lanka and the recent release of a new video of ISIS-leader al Baghdadi demonstrate that the group remains a threat.

Additionally, we cannot forget that al-Qaeda and other Islamist terror groups remain intent on targeting the West.

It is clear that domestic extremists are following in the footsteps of foreign terrorists by using social media platforms to spread propaganda and create echo chambers of hate.

Religious institutions from all faith groups are being targeted by both domestic and internationally-inspired groups.

Targeting innocent people in their place of worship is one of the vilest acts of terrorism and we must do a better job of identifying plots and stopping these attacks.

Close coordination between Federal, State, and local entities is vital to counterterrorism defenses—both international and domestic.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on whether or not they are receiving the necessary information sharing support, training, and coordination from Federal partners.

It is an honor to be here today to receive testimony from this distinguished panel. I want to thank them for their service and for advising this subcommittee on terrorism threats facing the homeland, lessons learned, and emerging threats.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, Ranking Member.

I also want to sincerely thank you for acknowledging the importance of New York City security for the entire country, as well as

the lessons learned for the entire country as to what our wonderful agencies are doing here on the ground.

Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 6, 2019

Since his first day in Congress, the Chairman has been a fierce advocate for the men and women of the city of New York Police Department, the Fire Department of the city of New York, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. [Chairman Rose's] decision to hold today's field hearing underscores his commitment to law enforcement and first responders serving in and around Staten Island.

Nearly 18 years after the September 11 attacks, we must continue to do all we can at the Federal, State, and local levels to prevent future attacks. The Federal Government needs to support State and local partners in their efforts. For example, the Federal Government provides vital funding through grant programs for State and locals to secure their communities.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration again proposed significant cuts to these programs. This is unacceptable. When it comes to securing communities from current and emerging threats, we should not be asking our State and local partners to do more with less.

Instead, we need to give them the resources they need to work alongside their Federal partners on behalf of their communities and the American people.

The Federal Government also spearheads critical information-sharing practices. We must ensure those channels remain open and that jurisdictional barriers do not inhibit the Federal Government and its partners from safeguarding those we serve. I hope that we hear about the influence the greater New York City community's resilience plays in their counterterrorism policies.

Time and time again, this city has refused to back down in the face of terror. The agencies represented here today are on the front line of defending our Nation from both domestic and international threats. That is why it is so important to hear their testimony and take it back to Washington to use in the committee's work.

Mr. ROSE. Additionally, I ask unanimous consent that the Members not serving on the subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the witnesses, as appropriate.

Without objection, so ordered.

I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. John J. Miller, deputy commissioner for intelligence and counterterrorism at the New York Police Department. Prior to this position, Mr. Miller served as the deputy director of the Intelligence Analysis Division at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Next we are joined by Mr. Thomas J. Currao, who currently serves as the chief of counterterrorism at the Fire Department of the city of New York. Prior to joining the FDNY, Mr. Currao was employed by the Rockland County Board of Cooperative Education Services as a health and safety technician.

Finally, we have Mr. Louis P. Klock, who serves as the deputy superintendent of police at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

For both Mr. Thomas Currao and Mr. Klock, we recognize you for this being the first time that you are testifying before Congress.

Mr. Miller, this may be your 100th. We also recognize you for that.

[Laughter.]

Mr. ROSE. Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record.

I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Miller.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. MILLER. Good afternoon, Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the subcommittee. I am John Miller, deputy commissioner of intelligence and counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department. On behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O'Neill and Mayor Bill de Blasio, I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee today to discuss the NYPD's efforts to fight modern terrorism and the evolution of threats to New York City.

Since September 11, 2001, we have seen New York City become the safest big city in America. That is in terms of crime reduction. We have achieved numbers that we have not seen since the early 1950's. But that said, the threat of terrorism since September 11, 2001 has not abated. That tragic day forever changed how the NYPD views its mission and forced us to recognize that we must be proactive as a police department in our efforts to prevent both home-grown and international terrorism in our city. Soon after 9/11, the NYPD became the first major city police department to develop its own significant in-house counterterrorism infrastructure, operating throughout the city, throughout the United States, and even the world to share intelligence and develop techniques to combat this continually evolving threat.

The one thing that undergirds all of those counterterrorism efforts, all that intelligence gathering, is what drives our neighborhood policing philosophy overall, and that is collaboration and collective problem solving. That is collaboration with our Federal, State, local, and private partners. It is too vital, the threat of terrorism, which recognizes no borders and often does not distinguish between Government and civilian targets. In fact, this collaboration, which includes my fellow panel members, both the Port Authority, the Fire Department, the MTA, as well as many others, serves as the backbone of the NYPD's counterterrorism philosophy.

While my submitted testimony provides significantly greater detail and numbers about our counterterrorism efforts, I would be remiss if I did not briefly outline our Government and private-sector partnerships, our counterterrorism initiatives, and our portfolio of protective equipment, which are extensive and always leveraged in a way that ensures maximum protection for both the public safety as well as civil liberties.

The NYPD is a significant participant in the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We have over 120 detectives assigned to the New York JTTF. It is the Nation's oldest. It started in 1980. We have operations like Operation Sentry, which coalesces 275 different law enforcement partners from around the country; Operation Nexus, where the NYPD assists businesses Nation-wide, with a focus on New York City, in identifying suspicious transactions that might be linked to terrorist plots; and, of course, NYPD Shield, which established a vital communications network between the NYPD and approximately 20,000 Shield members in the private sector. Those are

from businesses large and small, and organizations throughout the country now. The Shield program is being replicated Nationally by other police departments, where we have sent teams to help them learn the way to set it up, to operate, and manage it.

As part of the Securing the Cities initiative, we have created a security infrastructure which includes the placement of radiation detection equipment in neighboring jurisdictions at key points of entry to the five boroughs so that the city is virtually ringed with a radiological alarm system.

The Department also participates in multi-agency super searches that are joint operations to focus manpower at sensitive transit locations such as bridges, ferries, and tunnels, and that is conducted in partnership with the Port Authority Police, the Amtrak Police, the MTA Police, New Jersey Transit Police, as well as the FBI, TSA, and in large part with the National Guard Shield Group, which is part of the protection package for all of those locations.

We deploy a critical response command. That is over 525 specially-trained, specially-armed police officers as one of our first lines of defense against any threat, with a particular focus on the active shooter.

We deploy our trained vapor wake dogs that are able to sense mobile threats and explosive particles. That means if you think of a Boston Marathon type of scenario, not just using an explosive detection canine to examine a package that is left in a doorway, but a scenario where someone is carrying explosives through a crowd at a major event, these dogs can put you on the trail of that individual, and there is a tactical plan that goes with that.

We employ expert civilian analysts who study terrorist groups, trends, and methods of attack.

Through our International Liaison Program, detectives are embedded with fellow law enforcement agencies in 13 foreign countries, including France, Spain, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Singapore, and Israel.

Across the city, we have distributed approximately 3,000 radiation pagers and nearly 4,000 radiological dosimeters, in addition to the installation of highly sensitive detection equipment on the boats, helicopters, and a fixed-wing aircraft we use to patrol New York Harbor. We use vehicles that patrol our streets with other detectors. Our Federally-funded Domain Awareness System, or DAS, receives data from real-time sensors, including radiological and chemical sensors, shot spotter information to detect gunfire in the streets, information from 9–1–1 calls, hundreds of license plate readers, and live feeds from thousands of CCTV cameras around the city.

The DAS system makes it possible to scan footage for specific objects, such as an unattended bag, a car driving against the flow of traffic or in a restricted area, suspicious behavior such as a person walking through a restricted area. The DAS' advanced graphical interface and mapping capability allows us to monitor arising threats and to guide our response if an attack should occur.

We also design and implement large-scale counterterrorism projects, including counterterrorism training for the entire patrol force and other law enforcement agencies; identifying critical infrastructure sites and developing protective strategies for those sites;

researching, testing, and developing plans for the use of emerging technologies used to detect and combat chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons; developing systems and programs to increase harbor security, which includes proactive deployment and mapping of background radiation in the Port of New York and New Jersey; and interfacing with the New York Office of Emergency Management.

The NYPD's Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureaus utilize equipment and deploy programs and initiatives which, without continued and increased Federal funding, would not exist in their current forms, or even at all. Federal funding is critical to our efforts, and it is a serious cause for concern when we see such Nation-wide funding decrease by $26.2 million from 2008 levels, and hear about proposals to cut funding even further. The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New York against terrorist attacks and to strengthen homeland preparedness, including the security of critical transportation and port infrastructure.

Notwithstanding our extensive efforts, violent extremists of all stripes, both foreign and home-grown, count New York City as their No. 1 target. What makes our unenviable position on this list even more concerning is the evolution of the terror framework in the modern day. What we once saw as threats to our homeland coming in large part from well-funded state and non-state actors who established training camps, attracted recruits to these camps, trained these recruits and planned attacks from these centralized locations, and dispatched individuals to carry out these attacks, we now see the primary threat as one that is decentralized and carried out by so-called "lone wolves." Traditional brick-and-mortar terror camps and infrastructures have been replaced with websites, chat rooms, and on-line manuals. This is the difference between a directed terrorist and an inspired terrorist. Largely gone are the days when groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda provide us with the opportunity to locate, surveil, and infiltrate a training camp, or gather intelligence and identify bad actors, learn of the group's methods and techniques and future plans and targets. Instead, tech-savvy extremists have teamed with terror masterminds with the goal of virtual recruitment, training, and the provision of an on-line tutorial on how to plan an effective attack to susceptible individuals who do not even need to leave their home. These modern-day terrorists are increasingly more difficult to identify, as are their targets.

We have prevented 30 plots targeting New York City, but we have also had 3 plots, including the truck attack that you referenced, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, which injured 12 people, killing 8; the attempted suicide bombing on the Times Square subway station; as well as the Chelsea bombing. Each one of these was inspired by a designated foreign terrorist organization largely through the use of internet propaganda.

So to close and to sum up, as Police Commissioner O'Neill has said, in some areas the NYPD is very good. In other areas, we are the best. But in all areas, we can do better. Our ability to get better in the realm of counterterrorism is directly tied to continuing and increased levels of Federal funding and Federal partnerships, and the foresight of Federal legislators to ensure laws that are

aimed at protecting our liberties cannot be used as a pathway to design a more effective attack by our enemies.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to answer questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MILLER

MAY 6, 2019

Good afternoon Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the subcommittee. I am John Miller, deputy commissioner of intelligence and counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department (NYPD). On behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O'Neill and Mayor Bill de Blasio, I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee today to discuss the NYPD's efforts to fight modern terrorism and the evolution of threats to New York City.

Since September 11, 2001, we've seen New York City become the safest big city in the Nation. That tragic day forever changed how the NYPD views its mission and forced us to recognize that we must be proactive in our efforts to prevent both homegrown and international terror threats to our city. Soon after, the NYPD became the first police department in the country to develop its own significant counterterrorism infrastructure, operating throughout the city, country, and the world to gather intelligence and develop techniques to combat this continually evolving threat. The one thing that undergirds all of our counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering efforts, and what drives our neighborhood policing philosophy overall, is collaboration and collective problem-solving. Collaboration with our Federal, State, local, and private partners is vital to combat the threat of terrorism which recognizes no borders and often does not distinguish between public and civilian targets. In fact, this collaboration, which includes my fellow panel members, the Port Authority, Fire Department, and the Metropolitan Transit Authority, as well as many others, serves as the backbone of the NYPD's counterterrorism philosophy.

The NYPD's Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureau utilizes equipment and employs programs and initiatives which, without continued Federal funding, would not exist in their current forms, or even at all. Federal funding is critical to our efforts and it is a serious cause for concern when we see such Nation-wide funding decreased by $26.2 million from 2008 levels and hear about proposals to cut this funding even further. Over the last 5 years, the NYPD has received an average of $162 million a year in Federal funding, of which on average $116.4 million of that comes from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants. The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New Yorkers against terrorist attacks and to strengthen homeland preparedness, including the security of critical transportation and port infrastructure.

We frequently work with other Government agencies to help protect our city. Most notably, the NYPD is a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, led by the FBI, which combines the resources of multiple law enforcement agencies to investigate and prevent terrorist attacks. Additional initiatives include Operation SENTRY, which consists of regular contact with law enforcement agencies from around the country in order to share information and training techniques, and to pursue joint investigative avenues. At last count, there are 275 participating law enforcement partners. Law enforcement in this country can no longer be content with merely focusing on activity in their own jurisdictions. Information silos can be deadly and Operation SENTRY is designed to break down walls between jurisdictions.

The NYPD's Critical Response Command (CRC) is one of our first lines of defense against any threat. An elite squad, with officers trained in special weapons, long guns, explosive trace detection, and radiological and nuclear awareness, who respond quickly to any potential attack on the city, including active-shooter incidents. This team, which is central to the Counterterrorism Bureau's proactive counterterrorism mission, conducts daily deployments, saturating high-probability targets with a uniformed presence aimed at disrupting terrorist planning operations and deterring and preventing attacks. But the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bureau has a mandate broader than the CRC's operations. The Bureau has wide-ranging responsibilities that include designing and implementing large-scale counterterrorism projects; conducting counterterrorism training for the entire patrol force and other law enforcement agencies; identifying critical infrastructure sites and developing protective strategies for such sites; researching, testing, and developing plans for the use of emerging technologies used to detect and combat chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons; developing systems and programs to in-

crease harbor security, which includes the pro-active deployment and mapping of background radiation in the Port of New York and New Jersey; and interfacing with the NYC Office of Emergency Management, which coordinates the city's response to mass-scale events.

Over the years, the caliber of people we have been able to attract has played a major role in our ability to protect New York City. We have hired civilian analysts who are experts in intelligence and foreign affairs. They study terrorist groups, trends, and methods of attacks. One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable diversity in our ranks. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of foreign-speaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign linguist program with more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85 different languages—Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Mandarin, Pashto, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu, to name just a few.

Our personnel also includes our trained vapor wake dogs. Our vapor wake dogs are often deployed at large-scale events in the city. They are able to sense mobile threats and explosive particles, and they are trained to avoid the distractions of large crowds and loud noises. They are an invaluable component to our counter-terror strategy which has been made possible by Federal appropriations.

The NYPD also provides comprehensive training to our officers to respond to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. There are many possible forms a terror attack could take, and the Department has to be ready for any scenario. Federal funds are vital to training officers to respond to active-shooter scenarios, allowing them to engage and end a coordinated terrorist attack like the attack in Mumbai. It also provides critical instruction to officers in life-saving techniques that can be implemented before it is safe enough for medical personnel to enter an active crime scene.

In addition to supporting the staffing levels of our counterterrorism and intelligence bureaus and training our officers, this funding has helped the NYPD create the security infrastructure that has prevented potential attacks. For instance, in an initiative supported by DHS, we have installed radiation detection equipment in neighboring jurisdictions and at key points of entry into the five boroughs so that the city is virtually ringed with a radiological alarm system. This program, called Securing the Cities, includes 150 law enforcement agencies in dozens of nearby cities and towns.

Across the city, we have distributed approximately 3,000 radiation pagers to units throughout the Department and nearly 4,000 radiological dosimeters to each Patrol Borough's counterterrorism post. We continue to invest heavily to acquire and maintain state-of-the-art equipment to identify, prevent, or disrupt threats. We have installed highly-sensitive detection equipment on the boats and helicopters we use to patrol New York Harbor, as well as vehicles we use to patrol our streets.

Mass transit and the many entry points into New York are always among our highest priorities. The NYPD and our partners in the MTA place particular emphasis on the subway system, in light of its attractiveness as a target and because it is a vital artery that keeps this city running. In excess of 5 million New Yorkers use the subways every day and the strength of the system, open 24 hours a day every day of the year, makes it an appealing target for attackers. We perform random screening of bags and packages of subway passengers and we maintain a presence at each of the 14 underwater subway tunnels. We have expanded uniformed patrols underground and regularly conduct security sweeps in subway cars. The department also participates in Multi-Agency Super Surges which are joint operations to focus manpower at sensitive transit locations such as bridges, ferries, and tunnels, conducted in partnership with the Port Authority Police, Amtrak Police, MTA Police, New Jersey Transit Police, the FBI, TSA, and the National Guard SHIELD Group.

Federal funding also helps ensure that each officer responding to a terror incident has the proper equipment so that they can effectively respond to events such as active shooters or radiological attacks. The support we receive from the Federal Government, whether it be in the form of funding and our collaborative relationships with our Federal law enforcement partners has been and continues to be invaluable. However, we continue to seek greater funding levels that are commensurate with the severity of the ever-present threat to our city, which unfortunately consistently finds itself atop the terror target list. With additional funding above and beyond the current levels, the NYPD could, among other things, further increase deployments in critical areas of the city, continue to expand our Domain Awareness System (DAS) in order to retrieve and analyze critical information and elevate situational awareness, as well as expand our public, private, and international partnerships.

As part of our information-sharing efforts, I would like to note that the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) certified a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at NYPD Headquarters which

supports Classified information sharing integral to the NYPD mission. We also have three I&A personnel assigned to New York City to support NYPD in addition to a DHS Special Security Officer (SSO) assigned full-time to manage SCIF operations. The DHS Intelligence Analyst assigned to the NYPD is co-located with our Intelligence Division and proactively shares DHS and intelligence community information with us. This partnership alone has resulted in leads for existing investigations, new investigations being opened, and two recent joint finished intelligence products.

In addition to the NYPD's public sector and international Government partnerships, we have increasingly teamed up with the private sector. These partnerships are instrumental and are always leveraged in a way that ensures maximum protection for both the public's safety and civil liberties. Our public-private initiatives, interconnected yet distinct, begin with our Federally-funded Domain Awareness System, which receives data from real-time sensors, including radiological and chemical sensors, ShotSpotter, information from 9–1–1 calls, hundreds of license-plate readers, and live feeds from thousands of CCTV cameras around the city. Not all of these cameras are city-owned or -operated. In fact, most of them are not. They belong to private entities that have chosen to partner with us in the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative, providing encrypted access to their cameras as well as other information, in our collective effort to keep the city's millions of inhabitants safe. This information, including camera feeds, can also be accessed by NYPD officers on their Department-issued mobile devices in real time. DAS makes it possible to scan footage for specific objects, such as an unattended bag, a car driving against the flow of traffic, or suspicious behavior, such as a person walking through a restricted area. DAS's advanced graphical interface and mapping capability allows us to monitor arising threats and to guide our response if an attack should occur.

Our collaborative efforts also include initiatives known as Operation Nexus, where the NYPD works with businesses throughout the Nation to provide them with information to help them identify suspicious transactions that may be linked to terrorist plots, and NYPD SHIELD, which established a 2-way line of communication and information sharing between the NYPD and approximately 20,000 private-sector members from businesses and organizations throughout the country, representing almost every sector of industry and Government. The information we share enables us to better secure our city and allows businesses, both individually and collectively as industries, to enhance their own security.

However, in spite of our extensive efforts, violent extremists of all stripes, both foreign and home-grown, count New York City as their No. 1 target. What makes our unenviable position on this list even more concerning is the evolution of the terror framework in the modern day. Where we once saw the threats to our homeland coming in large part from well-funded state and non-state actors who established training camps, attracted recruits to these camps, trained these recruits, planned attacks from these centralized locations, and dispatched individuals to carry out these attacks, we now see the primary threat as one that is decentralized, carried out by so-called "lone wolves". Traditional brick-and-mortar terror infrastructures have been replaced with websites, chat rooms, and on-line manuals. This is the difference between a directed terrorist and an inspired terrorist. Gone are the days where groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda provide us with the opportunity to locate, surveil, and infiltrate a training camp, gather intelligence and identify bad actors, learn of the group's methods, techniques, future plans, and targets. Instead, tech-savvy extremists have teamed with terror masterminds with the goal of virtual recruitment, training, and the provision of an on-line tutorial on how to plan an effective attack to susceptible individuals that don't even need to leave their home. These modern-day terrorists are increasingly more difficult to identify, as are their targets.

Although the primary threats now come from "lone wolves", and the danger from centralized terror groups has recently moved to the margins, it has not disappeared. With the fall of the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq a major blow was struck to the international terrorist infrastructure but we do not expect the threat to abate any time soon. As we saw this Easter in Sri Lanka, the threat from these well-funded and organized terrorist groups remains very real. The State Department currently lists North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism, and politically influential groups such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Importantly, the State Department recently for the first time designated a government military organization as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What began as an ideologically-driven militia after the Iranian Revolution, has become a largely autonomous authoritarian military security force numbering over 100,000 which has inserted itself into virtually every aspect of Ira-

nian society and the Middle East generally, suppressing dissent domestically, and arming, training, and funding fighters in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Whether the ever-looming specter of an attack against our city stems from an individual or group that is inspired or directed, we will continue to work in collaboration with our Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners to continuously improve our investigative and emergency response infrastructure, while protecting and upholding the freedoms and liberties afforded to those who live, work, and visit New York City. In the almost 18 years after the worst attack our country has ever experienced, the NYPD and our partners have uncovered approximately 30 terrorist plots against our city. In most cases, they have been thwarted by the efforts of the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Tragically, we could not stop all of them. In September 2016, a man inspired by al-Qaeda set off home-made pressure cooker bombs in the Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan and in Seaside Park, New Jersey, injuring 30 people, and 7 additional unexploded devices were subsequently discovered. This case highlights that although our proactive efforts could not prevent this attack, our reactive preparedness resulted in the immediate activation of partnerships and plans that not only quickly located the perpetrator, but also other devices before more damage could be done. Collaboration between the FBI, ATF, our New Jersey partners, and the NYPD, among others, led to this individual's speedy capture and he is currently serving multiple life sentences.

In November 2017, an ISIS-inspired extremist used a rented truck to mow down innocent cyclists and pedestrians on the West Side Highway running path near Ground Zero in Manhattan, killing 8. Collaboration between the NYPD and the FBI led to Federal charges of lending support to a terrorist organization, in addition to murder charges, on which he will be tried later this year.

More recently, in December 2017, an ISIS-inspired extremist attempted a suicide bombing when he set off a homemade explosive device at the Port Authority Bus Terminal subway station in Manhattan, injuring 3 people and himself. Once again, collaboration between the NYPD and our State and Federal partners resulted in a successful investigation and a guilty verdict on terrorism charges. These attacks, while tragic, serve to strengthen our resolve to protect New Yorkers from terrorist violence in all forms and from all quarters.

The future of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy must necessarily seek to adapt to emerging tactics we see nationally and internationally, which if successful can inevitably be used against this city. We must be vigilant and constantly strive to anticipate and protect against threats before they materialize into deadly acts.

To this end, since September 11 the NYPD's reach has extended overseas. Through our International Liaison Program, detectives are embedded with law enforcement agencies in 13 foreign countries, including France, Spain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Singapore, and Israel. This program has been vital in establishing and maintaining contacts and information sharing with local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as INTERPOL, and has proven to be effective not only in counterterrorism efforts, but in solving crimes where a perpetrator has fled New York to escape justice. The NYPD has been given unprecedented access to the scenes of terror attacks and intelligence by our foreign partners, enabling us to immediately make threat assessments and adapt our security posture in the city.

Right now, one of the most prominent and thankfully unrealized threats comes in the form of unmanned aircraft systems, or drones. Though bad actors have yet to deploy drones for terroristic purposes in the United States, terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda have incorporated drones in battle overseas to devastating effect. And, as we saw last December in London where illegal drone flights brought an entire airport to a standstill for 17 hours, when we are unable to disable or disrupt a drone posing a threat, we are at its mercy. This is where we need your help.

Currently, Federal law prohibits anyone except the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice from using technology that could be used to jam a drone's signal, and there exists no pathway for State or local governments to apply to the FCC for an exception from this prohibition. The NYPD recommends amending the Federal Code to allow State and local governments to use jamming technology against unmanned aircraft systems in select circumstances. We would ensure those members of the service would be properly-trained and would establish meaningful oversight protocols. Despite the best efforts of our DHS and DOJ partners, which we do not question, they simply do not have the resources to ensure the level of geographic coverage New York City requires against this threat. The difficulty that DHS and DOJ will have responding to threats in New York City is magnified in places where they do not have permanent field offices. The NYPD is ready, willing and able to deploy this option if given the authority. Select trained members

of the NYPD could be ready to respond swiftly anywhere in the five boroughs. Even a short delay could mean the difference between successfully stopping such an attack and catastrophe.

Last, given the low cost and minimal expertise needed to carry out vehicle or truck attacks like we've seen in Nice, France and Manhattan's West Side Highway, we expect this tactic to remain popular among people looking to do us harm. However, with the advent and inevitable proliferation of driverless vehicles we must not find ourselves playing catch-up as we are currently doing with drones. Lawmakers must preemptively, before these vehicles become as wide-spread as drones are now, require that these vehicles incorporate a mechanism to allow law enforcement to interdict or otherwise disrupt a driverless vehicle suspected of being used as a weapon.

Almost 18 years after 9/11, New York City enjoys the distinction of being the safest big city in America. However, complacency serves as a welcome mat for tragedy. The state-of-the-art technology I have outlined requires on-going modernization to be effective, as is the nature with all technology. The partnerships I have lauded cannot remain static, we must expand our public, private, and international networks so that we can tap into and learn from ever-evolving and diverse intelligence, methods, approaches, and strategies. The equipment we employ must be upgraded in order for it to have maximum value in protecting the public and our officers. The training we administer must be updated to ensure our tactics keep up with the evolving threat against our city. Finally, relevant laws must continuously be reviewed and amended to guarantee the legal framework designed to protect our freedoms is not used to compromise our safety.

As Commissioner O'Neill has said, in some areas the NYPD is very good, in other areas, we are the best, but in all areas we can do better. Our ability to get better in the realm of counterterrorism is directly tied to a continuing and increased level of Federal funding, Federal partnerships and the foresight of Federal legislators to ensure laws aimed at protecting our liberties cannot be used as a pathway to design a more effective attack by our enemies.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Currao to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

Thank you again for being here.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CURRAO, CHIEF OF COUNTERTERRORISM, FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. CURRAO. Good afternoon, Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. My name is Tom Currao, and I am the chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness for the New York City Fire Department. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the importance of the FDNY's continuing preparedness efforts in a dynamic threat environment.

The primary mission of the New York City Fire Department is to protect life and property. We execute this mission through firefighting, search and rescue, pre-hospital patient care, and hazardous materials mitigation. However, as a professional fire service agency, our protection of life and property, particularly after September 11, is increasingly in the homeland security realm via threat and risk analysis, developing and sharing intelligence at all levels of classification, as well as working within the first responder community to mitigate and recover from the effects of natural disasters.

In a post-9/11 environment, we operate in a constant state of evolution, seeking the latest innovations to keep up with emerging threats. We maximize our cooperation and coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies, working together to prepare for, re-

spond to, and mitigate the effects of security and disaster threats. All of this is made possible by the Federal Homeland Security funding that we receive.

Following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire Department has used Federal funding to invest in several core areas. We expanded the Department's incident management capabilities by building a state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center at FDNY headquarters to manage complex emergencies. We developed a 300-member Incident Management Team to manage and coordinate emergencies. This team has activated for a variety of emergencies, including at explosion incidents, during extreme weather such as Super Storm Sandy, and at major fires. The IMT operates as a regional and National resource, serving the people of the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area as well as our fellow citizens around the country and the world when deployed in the wake of hurricanes and severe storms.

The Department created the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness to develop emergency response plans and create drills and exercises. We built advanced training facilities at the Fire Academy, including a Subway Simulator, a Shipboard Firefighting Simulator, and a marine-based Damage Control Simulator. We have also developed specialized units and preparedness capabilities within our Special Operations Command such as HazMat, HazTac Ambulances, and Technical Decontamination Engines. The Department built advanced technical rescue capabilities across Rescue Operations and the FDNY's Special Operations Command. Members are trained to respond in various tech rescue environments for search and rescue and patient extrication, including building collapses, incidents in the New York City subway system, and high-angle rescues. We also created tactical water rescue teams to rescue people impacted by floods and hurricanes.

Following the Paris attacks of 2015, the Commissioner tasked Department leadership with designing a response mechanism that would be ready for quick deployment to such incidents. Using Federal funding, the Department created the Counterterrorism Rescue Task Force, in which specially-trained EMS personnel operate in conjunction with NYPD force protection in warm zones during active-shooter events to triage and provide life-saving care, such as bleeding control, in those moments where every second counts.

We have also enhanced our urban search-and-rescue teams and Special Operations Command Task Force, and we have built a formidable marine fleet to patrol and protect New York Harbor. Marine assets include a tiered system of response boats, ranging from 140-foot boats for large-scale disasters, mid-sized boats with more maneuverability, to smaller medical response boats. These are also a regional asset, responding primarily within the Port of New York and New Jersey but with the ability to respond to emergencies throughout the Northeast.

The FDNY cannot operate at our highest capacity without working hand-in-glove with our partners at the NYPD, New York City Emergency Management, the Port Authority of New York New Jersey, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the United States Coast Guard, the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Joint

Terrorism Task Force, and many departments and first-responder agencies here in New York and across the country.

Only a short while after its formation, the Rescue Task Force was deployed in response to the 2016 Chelsea bombing. In June 2017, when a disgruntled doctor killed 1 person and wounded 6 others at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, the Rescue Task Force entered the hospital to treat seriously wounded patients even as the gunman was still being sought. It was also deployed in response to a pipe bomb that was detonated during a morning rush hour at the Port Authority. Each deployment involves FDNY and NYPD members working in concert, operating as a single unit.

The cooperation exhibited by the agencies during live emergencies does not just happen on its own. Rather, it is the product of intense training and preparation so when a call comes in, the teams work together seamlessly. The Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness, FDNY's in-house planning and preparedness group, works with local and regional partners to develop emergency response plans and carry out joint exercises and drills. On average, the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness runs 40 preparedness exercises a year. Recent examples include active-shooter drills with the NYPD, Ebola pathogen drills with New York City and Long Island area hospitals, and a cybersecurity drill with West Point Cadets. We also conduct joint trainings with the Metropolitan Transit Authority, including a recent full-scale shooter exercise in the Park Avenue Tunnel.

The Counterterrorism Task Force works extensively with NYPD counterparts, including an annual 3-day training involving communications and movement of Rescue Task Force members, medical care and patient movement in the warm zone, self and buddy aide for injured members, improvised explosive device awareness, and drills around a variety of scenarios such as a classroom shooter with a secondary device. In 2018, we had 120 days of joint training. In 2019, approximately 100 Fire and EMS members and 60 NYPD members will receive the training each week. Last year, the FDNY/NYPD Rescue Task Force deployed for pre-staged events 69 times, including a 2-hour joint training session at each deployment. FDNY also conducts large-scale joint agency trainings, such as a 3-day New York State homeland security training in Oriskany, New York. The FDNY also has a liaison to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Cooperation and communication between the Fire Department and the Police Department is as strong as it has ever been. This extends beyond response to planning and developing interagency standard operating procedures. In fact, there is a draft procedure that was recently developed by both of our agencies to address fire and smoke as a weapon in the high-rise environment. In addition, we regularly share intelligence analysis with the NYPD Intelligence and Counterterrorism Divisions.

In 2004, the Department created the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. Serving as the focal point of the Department's strategic preparedness, the Center creates dynamic and practical approaches to counterterrorism, disaster response, and consequence management. Core competencies of the Center include: Intelligence sharing; weapons of mass destruction and secu-

rity preparedness; designing drills and exercises; and emergency response planning, education, and technology.

We want to briefly share with the committee some of the emerging threats that we have been focusing on at the Center. One trend that we are tracking that appears to be on the rise is violence perpetrated by domestic extremists. This includes violence carried out by domestic individuals motivated by political, social, environmental, and religious movements. In the United States, and indeed on a global basis, this includes the white supremacist movement and its various subgroupings, anti-Government extremist movements, and single-issue movements including anti-abortion, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim extremists, among others. These attacks often involve firearms and improvised explosive devices. These weapons may be easy to obtain and construct using common materials and supported by digital instructional resources. Recent examples of attacks of this nature include the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting and an individual who sent pipe bombs to prominent political and media figures.

Another threat that we have been studying closely for years is the concept of complex coordinated attacks. These are attacks that are characterized by multiple teams of attackers, multiple attack locations, and perhaps multiple types of weapons. Examples include attacks in Mumbai, Paris, Brussels, and the Easter Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka. Their complex and dynamic nature present operating challenges for first responders. An attack involving multiple forms of violence at disperse locations elevates the importance of communication and coordination among responders. Responses may require simultaneous action and sustained operations over a long period of time involving personnel from a wider response area than in a single isolated response, as well as a deliberate method of communicating with and providing warnings to the public. The Fire Department's Incident Management Team and operators train frequently with other first-responder agencies and jurisdictions to be prepared for just such an event. One specific example will take place on June 4 when the Fire Department will be taking part in an exercise with the U.S. Coast Guard responding to a hypothetical situation of active shooters on multiple ferries in different areas of the city's waterways.

We also devote resources to planning and preparation around the threat of vertical terrorism, which is a terrorist incident in a high-rise building using automatic weapons, explosives, and potentially fire as a weapon. The most striking example of this is the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. This is a particularly complex problem and involves coordinated planning and development of interagency standard operating procedures to support further research, training, and exercises. Attacks of this nature present challenges both in reaching the perpetrator as well as reaching, caring for, and transporting patients. In many ways, the success of the law enforcement and fire service missions are intertwined and co-dependent.

The Fire Department relies on Federal funding to make smart investments in terrorism and disaster preparedness. The grant funds that we obtain has allowed us to create and maintain the capabilities that I have described to you here today and has enabled

the Department to continue looking forward, proactively planning for the next wave of threats. In addition to the large equipment, we use Federal resources for critical equipment such as personal protective equipment. This gear is critical to the safety of our members when responding to and mitigating potential chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, such as when the Ebola patient that was discovered in Hamilton Heights was exhibiting signs of Ebola. FDNY Haz-Tac paramedics donned their TyChem-F suits and their Powered Air Purifying Respirators and relied on their training to successfully respond to, transport, and hand off the patient to an isolation section within Bellevue Hospital.

Proposed cuts under the current administration would significantly erode the progress that we have made in the years since 9/11. Cuts to our funding would result in the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness or the Fire Department Operations Center not having the resources available to adequately run. These cuts would severely impact the operation of our Incident Management Team, our Rescue Task Force, and other specialized teams.

It has been an honor today for the Fire Department to appear before you. We appreciate your support and we look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this committee and the Congress so that we are able to sustain existing capabilities and continue to adapt to new threats in order to protect the people of the New York City urban area.

I would be happy to take your questions at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Currao follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS CURRAO

MAY 6, 2019

Good afternoon Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism. My name is Tom Currao and I am the chief of counterterrorism and emergency preparedness for the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the importance of the FDNY's continuing preparedness efforts in a dynamic threat environment.

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In a post-9/11 environment, we operate in a constant state of evolution, seeking the latest innovations to keep up with emerging threats. We maximize our cooperation and coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies, working together to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the effects of security and disaster threats. All of this is made possible by the Federal Homeland Security funding that we receive.

POST-9/11 INNOVATIONS

Following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire Department has used Federal funding to invest in several core areas. We expanded the Department's incident management capabilities by building a state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center at FDNY headquarters to manage complex emergencies. We developed a 300-member Incident Management Team (IMT) to manage and coordinate emergencies. This team has activated for a variety of emergencies, including at explosion incidents, during extreme weather such as Superstorm Sandy, and at major fires. The IMT operates as a regional and National resource, serving the people of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area as well as our fellow citizens

around the country and the world when deployed in the wake of hurricanes and severe storms.

The department created the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP) to develop emergency response plans and create drills and exercises. We built advanced training facilities at the Fire Academy, including a Subway Simulator, a Shipboard Firefighting Simulator, and a marine-based Damage Control Simulator. We've also developed specialized units and preparedness capabilities within our Special Operations Command such as HazMat, HazTac Ambulances, and Technical Decontamination Engines. The department built advanced Technical Rescue capabilities across Rescue Operations and the FDNY's Special Operations Command. Members are trained to respond in various tech Rescue environments (for Search and Rescue and Patient Extrication), including: Building collapses, incidents in the NYC Subway, and high-angle rescues. We also created tactical water rescue teams to rescue people impacted by floods and hurricanes.

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COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

The FDNY cannot operate at our highest capacity without working hand-in-glove with our partners at the NYPD, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), the Port Authority of New York New Jersey (PANYNJ), the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and many departments and first responder agencies here in New York and across the country.

Only a short while after its formation, the Rescue Task Force was deployed in response to the 2016 Chelsea Bombing. In June 2017, when a disgruntled doctor killed 1 person and wounded 6 others at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, the Rescue Task Force entered the hospital to treat seriously wounded patients even as the gunman was still being sought. It was also deployed in response to a pipe bomb that was detonated during a morning rush hour at the Port Authority. Each deployment involves FDNY and NYPD members working in concert, operating as a single unit.

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EMERGING THREATS

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We also devote resources to planning and preparation around the threat of vertical terrorism, which is a terrorist incident in a high-rise building using automatic weapons, explosives, and potentially fire as a weapon. The most striking example of this is the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. This is a particularly complex problem and involves coordinated planning and development of interagency standard operating procedures, to support further research, training, and exercises. Attacks of this nature present challenges both in reaching the perpetrator as well as reaching, caring for, and transporting patients. In many ways, the success of the law enforcement and fire service missions are intertwined and codependent. To prepare for this type of attack, the FDNY has conducted drills tailored to this scenario, including hosting a Vertical Terrorism Preparedness Workshop at 1 World Trade Center with our partners at NYPD, NYCEM, PANYNJ, the FBI, DHS, FEMA, and others.

IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL FUNDING

The Fire Department relies on Federal funding to make smart investments in terrorism and disaster preparedness. The grants funds that we obtain has allowed us to create and maintain the capabilities that I've described here today and has enabled the Department to continue looking forward, proactively planning for the next wave of threats. In addition to the large equipment, we use Federal resources for critical equipment such as Personal Protective Equipment for our first responders. This gear is critical to the safety of our members when responding to and mitigate potential chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. When we received a call in

2014 that a patient in Hamilton Heights was exhibiting signs that he very likely had Ebola, FDNY Haz-Tac paramedics donned their TyChem-F suits and their Powered Air Purifying Respirators and relied on their training to successfully respond to, transport, and hand off the patient to an isolated section at Bellevue Hospital Center.

Proposed cuts under the current administration would significantly erode the progress that we have made in the years since 9/11. Cuts to our funding would result in the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness or the Fire Department Operations Center not having the resources available to adequately run. These cuts would severely impact the operation of our Incident Management Team, our Rescue Task Force, and other specialized teams.

FIRST RESPONDER USE OF T-BAND SPECTRUM

Finally, I would like to address T-Band spectrum, which is a portion of spectrum that is used for public safety communications in 11 heavily-populated metropolitan areas. Currently, the Federal Communications Commissioner is required to reallocate and auction the T-Band spectrum by 2021. Since September 11, the FDNY has systematically improved radio communications for our firefighters and EMS personnel responding to fires and medical emergencies because those transmissions can so often mean the difference between life and death. Losing the T-Band spectrum would require billions of dollars to replace existing radios and infrastructure, devastate FDNY's operations at thousands of emergencies each day, and unnecessarily endanger the safety of New Yorkers. We appreciate the bi-partisan Congressional effort to preserve the T-Band spectrum before it is reallocated for good.

It is an honor for the Fire Department to appear before you today. We appreciate your support and we look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this committee and the Congress so that we are able to sustain existing capabilities and continue to adapt to new threats in order to protect the people of the New York City Urban Area.

I would be happy to take your questions at this time.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Klock to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF LOUIS P. KLOCK, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

Mr. KLOCK. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of Chief Security Officer John Bilich and the Superintendent of Police Ed Cetnar, I want to thank you for allowing the Port Authority to represent here.

I am humbled to be sitting next to two fine gentlemen here who have personified the mission that we go through day in and day out.

I would like to just ping off a couple of quick words before I go through my statement, such words as teamwork, training, preparedness. Those words truly define the relationship that we have here, not just in training but exercise preparedness but when the bell rings, like what happened on December 11, 2017 when, just at the doorsteps of our bus terminal, both gentlemen explained how someone came in and detonated themselves. At that moment there, it personified teamwork in a way that, frankly, I have not seen in years. Regardless of what uniform you wore, what rank you were, everyone just jumped in and did what they had to do. Briefings occurred, intelligence was shared, and at the end of the day it was a proud day for New York City, the way everybody responded.

I just would like to let you know that what we have here is truly a winning team and something that we are all, frankly, very proud of what we have here, but we cannot do it alone. We thank you for

what you are doing here because, frankly, from where I sit, it energizes me and I cannot wait to go back to the Port Authority to let everyone know about the support that we have from all of you. So thank you very much.

I will jump into my remarks. You can tell I am a first-timer because I typed it in size 12 font, and I look over at Mr. Miller and he had like a 20 font, so you can tell he has done this 100 times.

Mr. ROSE. They have had the opportunity to testify as many times as Mr. Miller has.

Mr. KLOCK. I will live and learn. Thank you.

I will take a few minutes just to talk about our mission and how we operate within our various facilities.

Since our inception in 1928, the Port Authority Police Department has emerged as the Nation's largest transportation police department, with over 2,200 members. The Port Authority's unique operational landscape of airports, seaports, trains, bridges, tunnels, and real estate include some of the busiest and most iconic structures in the world. The Port Authority Police Department is divided into four divisions: Air Transportation, Ground Transportation, Counterterrorism and Investigations. I would just like to take a moment to break down each one of those different branches.

The Air Transportation Branch includes Newark Liberty International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Teterboro Airport, and John F. Kennedy International Airport. In 2018, over 138 million passengers traveled through Port Authority airports, which was a 4.5 percent increase over 2017 travel. The Port Authority Police Department has significantly increased its presence in recent years, adding additional posts and implementing cutting-edge counterterrorism technology. The department continually invests in security enhancements, adding drone equipment that helps detect drones that venture into our air space, automated license plate readers, and the newest radiological detection through a partnership with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as DARPA. Additionally, the Port Authority Police provide aircraft rescue firefighting services at all 4 airports.

Our next branch is the Ground Transportation Branch, encompassing the George Washington Bridge, Lincoln Tunnel, Holland Tunnel, Goethals Bridge, Outer Bridge, Bayonne Bridge, PATH system, Port Authority Bus Terminal, World Trade Center, and the New Jersey Marine Terminals. Port Authority bridges and tunnels serve as the interstate gateway between New York and New Jersey. Over 100 million vehicles travel across the George Washington Bridge each year, making it the busiest bridge in the world. Port Authority Police continue to keep the region moving by conducting high-visibility patrols, accident mitigation, and traffic enforcement.

The PATH system, which is our train system, provides rail service on 44.8 miles of track between New York and New Jersey, with an average ridership of approximately 280,860 passengers per day who pass through our 13 stations. The PATH system was the first commuter rail line to fully implement positive train control in the United States. Port Authority Police at PATH have a robust daily deployment consisting of heavy weapon patrols, counterterrorism initiatives, plainclothes operations, and radiological detection.

The Port Authority Bus Terminal is the largest bus transportation facility in the United States and the busiest by volume in the entire world. The bus terminal serves as the major hub for buses in midtown Manhattan and services commuter lines as well as interstate bus operations. In 2017, the Port Authority Police, along with our partners here at the table, valiantly apprehended Akayed Ullah, who detonated an improvised explosive device in an underground corridor leading to the bus terminal.

Last, the New Jersey Marine Terminals, consisting of our Port Elizabeth, Port Newark, and Port Jersey branches, comprise the busiest container terminal on the East Coast and the third-largest in the country. In 2018, the port moved over 38 million metric tons of cargo, which has consistently grown over the last 10 years. The Port Authority CVI, which is our commercial vehicle inspection unit, specializes in commercial vehicle safety inspections and helps ensure the safe transportation of cargo and hazardous materials through the port and through other facilities. Police patrols are highly trained in anti-terror, radiological detection, and heavy weapons.

The Port Authority Police have the distinct responsibility to protect the approximately 15 acres of the World Trade Center campus, where over 3,000 people lost their lives in the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Port Authority Police suffered the largest 1-day loss of law enforcement when 37 police officers were killed on 9/11 during the attempted rescue of thousands of people from the World Trade Center site. Today, the campus is home to a variety of Government and corporate entities and is one of the most visited locations in Manhattan. The World Trade Center campus contains the National 9/11 Memorial. The Port Authority Police aggressively patrol the campus, utilizing state-of-the-art counterterrorism patrol tactics and equipment.

The department has made significant investments in counterterrorism investigations as we look to emerge with greater Emergency Services Unit, our K–9 Unit, CVI Unit, and the Counterterrorism Unit. These units work closely with our partners sitting here today, as well as other local, State, and Federal mutual aid partners to enhance advanced response and mitigation capabilities. Furthermore, members of the Port Authority Criminal Investigations Bureau are embedded in Federal and State task forces, including the Joint Terrorism Task Force in both New York and New Jersey, as well as the DEA Task Force in both New York and New Jersey. This collaboration provides critical intelligence and helps drive our mission. Our Department has one of the largest K–9 deployments in the country, with 24-hour coverage at all of our facilities. Additionally, our K–9 assets are attached to Federal task forces and are often requested by our mutual aid partners for patrol-related assistance.

In closing, the evolution of the Port Authority Police Department over the last year has led to the Department being on the forefront of counterterrorism policing. Investments in staffing, training, equipment, and technology are just part of the Department's aspiration to become the greatest counterterrorism police department in the country. For over 91 years, the Port Authority Police Depart-

ment has proudly served the region with pride, service, and distinction, and will continue that tradition.

I thank you for allowing me to represent the fine ladies and gentlemen of the Port Authority Police Department. I will now take any questions of you if you have any at this time. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LOUIS P. KLOCK

MAY 6, 2019

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The New Jersey Marine Terminals (Port Elizabeth, Port Newark, Port Jersey) comprise the busiest container terminal on the East Coast and third-largest in the country. In 2018 the port moved over 35 million metric tons of cargo, which has consistently grown over the last 10 years. The Port Authority Police CVI Unit specializes in commercial vehicle safety inspections and helps ensure the safe transportation of cargo and hazardous materials throughout the port and through other facilities. Police patrols are trained in anti-terror, radiological detection, and heavy weapons.

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Authority Police aggressively patrol the campus utilizing state-of-the-art counterterrorism patrol tactics and equipment.

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Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the Port Authority Police Department. I will now take any questions.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, Mr. Klock.

I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.

To reiterate something that you just said, this is indeed a great team, and we are honored again to have you all here.

I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the panel.

I will now recognize myself for the questions, for the first series of questions.

Mr. Currao, you made an interesting point about outlining some of the cuts you would have to make should Federal funding decrease. I would ask you just to elaborate on that, if necessary, and then I will present the same question to each of you. If you could just paint us a picture, $25 million down in the last 10 years, what are the consequences if Federal funding continues to decline, Federal support, and how would that support affect New York City's public safety and that of the country?

Mr. CURRAO. So, I would answer that in really two main ways. One is preparedness. As I mentioned, the Center for Terrorism Disaster Preparedness puts together 40 exercises a year, and those exercises touch on local level, State, and regional level. We work across with many, many agencies, across a full suite, a full spectrum of threats. So our ability to be able to put together those exercises, not only the quantity but the depth of those exercises, would be more challenged because we would not have the funding to support that.

On the other end, from the response mode, the rescue task forces, the training that we are on day 3 right now, our continual training with our partners in the New York City Police Department, would be severely hampered. As I said, we train 100 members a week from the FDNY, we train 16 members a week from the NYPD, and that is all predicated on the funding that we get, and that has a direct impact. We have already used these skills, particularly in the West Side ramming. The skills we learned in this training helped save lives.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

Mr. Klock. With the understanding that Uncle Sam only gives me 5 minutes.

Mr. KLOCK. Very good. I will make it 5 minutes' worth. Thank you.

Very similar to what the Chief had mentioned earlier, preparedness would definitely be something that we would feel a pinch. We have full-scale exercises, not just on the front of a disaster or something along those lines, like an aircraft disaster or something like that, but we also conduct active-shooter drills at every one of our facilities throughout the year, and they are very realistic. We do them with our partners that are seated here, so it is not in a silo. On the Jersey side we bring Elizabeth, as well as Jersey City, as well as New Jersey State Police and Transit. So it is a shared function.

We believe that you are only as good as you train. If you train hard, you are going to do well on game day. So training would definitely be something that we would experience a setback. The training that we do is real. They spend a tremendous amount of effort and labor on making it as realistic as possible, and you would not want to lose that when it comes to training because that is really how you are going to respond when the bell rings.

The other portion is strictly putting cops out in the field and in operations. Day-to-day, your funding puts a lot of our heavy weapons and our tactical people out there in harm's way and right on the front. When things begin to have an uptick, not just around the city but around the world, we will respond in kind when both agencies here ramp things up as a result of what is going on around the world. Frankly, we cannot do that without your assistance. We put people out not just at airports but you heard about all the different facilities. Frankly, that comes into hundreds and hundreds of people around the clock, and it adds up.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Without repeating what my colleagues said in the interest of time, I think when you look at the contribution we make, 85 percent of the cost of running anything in Government is personnel costs. We pay that, with the exception of reimbursement for the salaries of a few intelligence analysts. So it is not as if we do not bear our own brunt here or contribute in kind.

But when you look at the programs I discussed in my testimony, the domain awareness system has an operations and maintenance cost of $52 million a year. That is primarily a counterterrorism system that serves other functions, but it was built to protect New York City from National security threats.

The radiation pagers, the dosimeters, things that were supported by Securing the Cities money, which has been diverted to other places, would be a concern.

So UASI money has maintained a relatively steady pace. But when we see the port funding, the transit funding, the infrastructure protection funding that comes from other places decreased by $26.2 million since 2008, the threat is not getting smaller, and none of what we do is getting cheaper, and when we turn to the city to say we may have to pay for more of this, I think you are aware that the city is facing its own budget concerns.

So this is a real concern for us. There was discussion in the last administration of cuts up to 40 percent, which was foolish and irre-

sponsible. There have been discussions about reductions in this administration. We are just saying we are trying to maintain safety here, and it has not gotten any cheaper.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

I now recognize Mr. Walker, North Carolina, Ranking Member.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you all. Thanks to the panel again for the very detailed testimony.

I would like to jump right into it with a question for each witness, and I would like you to keep your responses to about 20 seconds, if possible, to provide an overview of how you coordinate and share information with other jurisdictions to improve Nation-wide counterterrorism efforts, of course to the extent that you can. Could you just give us a brief overview?

We will start with Mr. Miller, Mr. Currao, and Mr. Klock.

Mr. MILLER. Sure. We have the Shield Program, which has 20,000 members. That is the private-sector outreach. We have the Sentry Program, which is designed specifically for other law enforcement agencies. That has 275 members. It used to be the doughnut around New York City, but now it extends all the way up and down both coasts and as far west as Texas and California. We have our foreign liaisons, which, of course, brings it out to the world.

We are in a constant cycle of exchange of information.

Mr. WALKER. OK, good enough.

Mr. Currao.

Mr. CURRAO. I would have to give as our primary example our watch line. It is a weekly intelligence product. It is 1 page. It is developed for the fire service and emergency medical and first responder community. It goes across the Nation. It has an estimated readership of tens of thousands. It also goes to 9 countries. We have a lot of particular partners like the London Fire Brigade, Australia. So that is one of our primary methods of sharing intelligence, one of many.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Klock.

Mr. KLOCK. Thank you. I will be brief.

We have our Criminal Investigation Bureau personnel that scour intelligence from around the world to look for certain commonalities that have to do with aviation, rail, ports, and what they will then do is look for certain trends, and this really comes with the help of everyone here at the table. They will take that information, disseminate it out to every single rank in the department so that they are aware when they go out on patrol.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Miller, if we go back and think about the West Side bike attack in October 2017, would you spend about 20 or 30 seconds and talk about lessons learned about preventing and also responding to these types of attacks?

Mr. MILLER. One of the key lessons of the bicycle attack was the pre-operational surveillance done by the offender there. We had had an incident in Times Square involving a non-terrorist incident where a number of people were run over on the street. We did a renewed program of putting bollards, Jersey barriers, and other things to block key sidewalks at symbolic targets all over the city. The bicycle path was one of those places that had not been consid-

ered for that. So if you look at that today, it is locked down so that a car cannot enter, as are many places since.

Mr. WALKER. Some of my closest friends back in Greensboro are Rabbi Fred Gitman and Rabbi Andy Corrin, wonderful people. I remember in 2017 when there were hundreds of bomb threats directed to the Jewish community. They were later, thank goodness, determined to be hoaxes.

In the midst of this situation, however, obviously there is a real need to share information and coordinate—I was a pastor for 16 years—to coordinate with religious communities. A lot of these churches and synagogues and temples and mosques, they never really put together a security team. I was at two mega-churches. They had a little bit of a service.

Mr. Klock, would you mind taking that? I may come back to Mr. Miller as well. How do we communicate? How do we set up something to make sure that, from your perspective, these religious institutions are better protected?

Mr. KLOCK. Sir, I am going to have to defer to my partners here because our operating environment has very little to do with religious communities. What we do is take the information that we learned from lessons from around the world and truly apply them to our facilities. But with respect to reaching out and touching the various religious facilities, we do not have much interaction.

Mr. WALKER. With 45 seconds, let's split it between the two gentlemen here, if we could, please.

Mr. CURRAO. So one of the things that we do is we employ a red team analysis, and we have been doing this at sensitive locations throughout the city. My team, my intelligence division from the Center for Terrorism, will go out and actually look at an occupancy through the eyes of the perpetrator. We will develop a scenario, and we will exercise that scenario.

Mr. WALKER. Are you getting that information to the religious institution at some point?

Mr. CURRAO. Well, we have not done a religious institution yet. We just recently did the Atlantic Terminal. But we do work with our private-sector partners the whole way. They are actually in the exercise, and the lessons learned are immediately applicable to any changes.

Mr. WALKER. With a few seconds left, Mr. Miller, would you wrap it up?

Mr. MILLER. Sure. We did three important things. One, we looked at the threats and determined that myriad calls saying that there was a bomb there, that it was going to go off in an hour and there were threats and demands, was clearly not a real threat. It was designed to scare, to cause disruption and panic.

So we did conference calls with religious institutions and said the threat here is not really of a bomb. The threat here is to disrupt your daily activities. Here are the procedures to go look, and we recommended that they stop doing full-on evacuations and closures where there was not additional information except threats that fit into this fake pattern.

The other thing we did was a very competent investigation with the JTTF, which led to the identification of one of the people mak-

ing the threats, and ultimately a person in a foreign country who was arrested and charged.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our committee rules, I will recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on the committee, alternating between Majority and Minority. Those Members coming in later will be recognized in order of their arrival.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me to today's field hearing.

We truly have three patriots—and I am not blowing smoke, I mean it—in front of us today who are witnesses. We know the background and we know what they have contributed.

I have had the honor to work in this field for a long time with my good brother Peter King. We worked together on homeland security. As an original and founding Member of the Homeland Security Committee and co-chair of the Congressional Law Enforcement, Congressional Fire Services caucus, I am glad the committee remains focused on local efforts to counter this enduring threat.

We will support our first responders because they are on the front lines every day keeping us safe. That is clear. That is a given. There is no equivocation whatsoever.

But, you know, I strongly oppose efforts in Washington—let's get down to the nitty-gritty here—of this administration to cut over $600 million in Federal funds for counterterrorism programs, equipment, and training at the State and local level.

For the second year in a row, they have tried to cut nearly $200 million from the State homeland security grant program, over $200 million from the Urban Area Security Initiative, the center part of what we do; over $100 million from transportation and port security grants. These cuts are outrageous.

We are pretty good in the Congress at talking out of both sides of our mouths, I know. We train for it. But this is absurd, unacceptable, and I think that the Chairman of this subcommittee within Homeland Security is doing all of us a great favor by letting some fresh air in and some light.

I had a question, Mr. Miller, for you. Domestic terrorism in the United States, motivated by right-wing ideologies, has grown precipitously in the last decade. According to a recent analysis which I read, between 2010 and 2017 right-wing terrorists committed a third of all acts of terrorism in the United States—that is 92 out of 263—more even than Islamist terrorists, 38 out of 263.

Given this information, has the New York City Police Department included domestic terrorism, and has this shift been both at the analytical as well as the operational end of what we deal with day in and day out? Can I have your response to that, sir?

Mr. MILLER. We too have seen the increase in the pitch and tone of the vitriol on-line, as well as the attacks across the Nation. We are ideologically agnostic, meaning the team, a significant team that includes Bill Sweeney, the assistant director of the New York

Office of the FBI; Brian Parman, the Special Agent in Charge of the JTTF—that is over 500 people that do this day and night. Add to that 2,000 people from the NYPD. So we have no shortage of people to focus on this. But we focus on the act, the actions, the plots, and the plans regardless of what the cause is.

So as we have seen the increase around the country, we have intensified our gaze in terms of the analysis, the people looking at it and searching for any right-wing terrorism here. As was discussed in testimony earlier today, we had an individual come up from Baltimore and commit a homicide with a racial motive purely because New York is the media capital of the world. We get that. We have not seen the giant uptick in activity here in New York, but we are watching for it. We obviously had the spate of pipe bombs in October. We had an individual who walked into St. Patrick's Cathedral 2 weeks ago with 5 gallons of gasoline.

So we are keenly aware of this, and our resources shift with the threat. With the pipe bomb case that went on in Manhattan, which brought the city almost into a crisis as it unfolded over the course of a week, there was no counterterrorism resource that was spared or not focused on that, again regardless of ideology. It was not about the ideology, it was about the terrorism.

Mr. PASCRELL. As you know, that part of Homeland Security has basically been shut down by this administration in terms of domestic terrorism. It does not make any sense to me. Perhaps I am missing something.

Mr. MILLER. We asked about that specifically, and what we were told is that the same people are doing the same jobs but they were shifted around in a reorganization. Regardless of that, though, our effort remains laser focused on any plot or any threat to the safety of New Yorkers based on any kind of terrorism.

One thing I would put forward to this committee in terms of that is there are designated foreign terrorist organizations. We live in a country with a Constitution and a First Amendment, and it would be very difficult to figure out what is a designated domestic terrorist organization, what does that look like here. However, I do believe it would be helpful to have a domestic terrorism statute where no matter what the cause was or what the organization was, or whether it was made up or real, that the individual who went to carry out something that would be designated or defined under that statute as a terrorist act, regardless of cause, could be charged with terrorist enhancements that went beyond the simple gun charge or the simple conspiracy charge. Remember, if an individual has a machine gun and plans to do something for ISIS as a designated foreign terrorist organization, they are facing telephone-book-level sentencing in Federal court. If the same person for a domestic terrorist agenda does the same thing, it may be a conspiracy to commit a crime that did not happen with a legally registered weapon. We need help there.

Mr. PASCRELL. One quick last question if I may, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ROSE. Yes, you are the boss.

[Laughter.]

Mr. PASCRELL. Let me ask you this question. Did you get a chance to read—it was made public in 2009—the domestic terrorism report that was provided to the Congress of the United

States in the Obama administration? With a great amount of pressure from certain organizations, they deep-sixed it under Secretary Napolitano. Are you familiar with that document?

Mr. MILLER. As I sit here, I am not familiar with that specific document. In 2009, I was somewhere between the FBI and the DNI.

Mr. PASCRELL. It was started under the Bush administration, and they deep-sixed it in 2009.

Mr. MILLER. I could not respond to that specifically.

Mr. PASCRELL. I recommend that we all read that because it has pertinence today.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, our neighbor here on Staten Island, Peter King. Also, on behalf of the committee, I thank you for your long-time service to this committee and your support for New York.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate that very much.

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here. In my district we lost over 150 friends, neighbors, constituents on 9/11, and along with Staten Island it is probably the largest number of victims. So this is a very close personal issue to me.

I would just say to my good friend Mr. Pascrell, one of the reasons we have been successful is this has not been a partisan issue. The fact is the biggest cuts of all were made by the Obama administration, and we restored them. Last year the Trump administration made indefensible cuts; they were restored. This year if there are more indefensible cuts, they will also be restored. So to me, there have been good guys and bad guys on both sides. There was a 40 percent cut under the Obama administration, which would have decimated. Last year's cuts by the President would have been devastating, and this year's will as well. So I think it is important that Congress work together in a bipartisan way and stand together, not as Republicans and Democrats but as Americans, to make sure that this works.

I would ask Mr. Miller—again, we are running low on time here—can you tell us the significance if we did not have a T-Band?

Mr. MILLER. In the communications realm?

Mr. KING. Yes, yes.

Mr. MILLER. This is the bandwidth we are using to transmit video and data. It would be extraordinarily, extraordinarily damaging. Right now, the radio frequency band is full, but the way the data transmits, particularly stuff that is essential today—video, photographs, and things that take up a lot of bandwidth—without T-Band, there is no way to move it efficiently in the public safety realm. It is essential.

Mr. KING. Chief, I know the Fire Department has a real anxiety over this.

Mr. CURRAO. Absolutely. Our radio infrastructure, our innovations, are really built on that, and to lose that band would be detrimental. It would be very, very difficult and would have a severe impact on our operations.

Mr. KING. Superintendent Klock.

Mr. KLOCK. Sir, the same would hold true with the Port Authority. Thank you.

Mr. KING. John Miller, obviously there is tremendous cooperation at this table. I think all of that has improved since 9/11. Between the NYPD and the FBI, what is the status now of that cooperation?

Mr. MILLER. I was around when they formed the Joint Terrorism Task Force in 1980, and I have seen the levels of cooperation between the FBI and the NYPD ebb and flow over the years. I can say with extraordinary confidence that the relationship between the FBI and the NYPD, all the way from FBI headquarters to the JTTF in New York, has never been closer or literally more seamless. We talk multiple times every day on the phone back and forth between the leadership, and given the number of our people embedded there, 120, we are literally, the NYPD, part of the fabric of the JTTF, not just a participant.

Mr. KING. So you and Bill Sweeney get along very well?

Mr. MILLER. Bill Sweeney and I, Brian Parman and I, the ASACs, it has never been closer. That is not to say that there is not some disagreement that comes up twice a month over some strategy or some case. The difference is at the end of the meeting or the end of the phone call, that is settled amicably. We choose a way to go together and we go that way, and you do not read about it in the newspaper.

Mr. KING. Chief, I was going to ask you about fire as a weapon, Mumbai being an example. Before that, just to let you know, this Saturday they are naming a street after John Vigiano in Deer Park. For those of you who may not know, he was a hero firefighter. He lost two sons in 9/11, one a cop, one a firefighter. Anyway, that will be, I think, 11 o'clock Saturday morning. Saturday? Sunday morning—Saturday morning.

In any event, can you tell what kind of training is done using Mumbai as a base and that type of thing, using fire as a weapon? Your coordination with the police and the other forces.

Mr. CURRAO. Absolutely. Fire and smoke as a weapon, it is one of our most challenging coordination pieces. We have a draft document that we co-wrote with the NYPD. It is a draft right now. It is a very complicated issue because in order to deal with something like fire and smoke as a weapon as part of a complex attack, our missions are intertwined, so we have to answer a lot of questions about how do we do that effectively and safely for our personnel. So we have to control the fire, we have to get our emergency medical personnel up into those areas, rapidly triage and treat. That is a direct take-off from what we are doing right now with our rescue task forces and what we call tactical emergency casualty care. We learned a lot from the military, and it has helped both our agencies to be able to save lives.

In terms of fire protection, we are looking at different ways to be able to apply water from different locations in order to be able to, if we can, use the fire protection systems within the building. We have actually done extensive testing if they attack our fire prevention systems with explosives, how to seal those systems so they still work, and we are still looking at research at how we can do it with an integrated, coordinated team.

Mr. KING. If they are firing weapons at you, you can work with the NYPD on this?

Mr. CURRAO. That is what we are——

Mr. KING. It is fire and guns, is what we are basically talking about.

Mr. MILLER. It is very complicated. We took one of the tallest skyscrapers in New York City, and we did a 2-day drill that kind of tested the theory of what is firefighting by remote control, what is firefighting up close, what does force protection look like where you have firefighters in a place where there may be terrorists or active shooters or explosives and you have police officers who are not used to working in a fire environment. This is something we worked on for a long time since that day, and I think we are fairly advanced at it. It is not complete because of the layers, but we have taken enormous strides.

Mr. KING. Thank you all for your testimony.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from Brooklyn, my friend, Ms. Clarke.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our Ranking Member Walker for convening today's field hearing.

In Congress, I am proud to represent New York's 9th Congressional District, otherwise known as Brooklyn, and I could not be more excited to be here on Staten Island with my colleague, Congressman Max Rose.

I would like to thank you, our witnesses, for your testimony here today and for your years of dedicated public service to New York and New Jersey and, of course, to our Nation.

New York City embodies the innovation, dynamism, and diversity that make our country special, and that is why it is the No. 1 terrorist target in the world. A strike on our city is an attack on the values we hold dear as Americans.

I can remember both the 1993 terrorist attack as well as 9/11 as though it was yesterday, my father being a Port Authority retiree, not only the horror of watching the Towers fall but the bravery of our first responders who risked it all in service to others. We each owe a debt of gratitude to these heroes, and I am honored to have witnesses from the NYPD, the FDNY, and the Port Authority Police here with us today.

Sadly, terrorism has become a multi-headed demon and remains an all-too-real threat for our communities. I believe that Donald Trump's approach to foreign policy is deeply concerning, particularly the recklessness with which we have gone about seeking our policy positions, and I believe it has also generated a new generation of ISIS fighters, while here at home I believe his rhetoric has sparked a deadly wave of white supremacist attacks.

Every day, New Yorkers go about their lives riding our subways, visiting houses of worship, not knowing when or where terror will strike next.

We cannot give in to fear; we must confront it. Today's hearing is about giving our local first responders the tools and Federal assistance they need to keep our city and our region safe. We have made great strides since 9/11, but we still have much work to do, from improving information sharing to enhancing security of our

transportation networks. Meanwhile, we must also prepare for emerging threats such as cyber terrorism, which require new approaches and increased vigilance.

The Statue of Liberty is not just a symbol of our city. It is an embodiment of the values that terrorists despise so deeply. For those who seek to destroy and traffic in hate, our city, filled with immigrants and entrepreneurs, represents a perfect enemy.

I look forward to working with each of you to protect New York, to defend our values, at minimum continuing a maintenance of effort, at most trying to make sure you have all of the resources you need to be an example for this Nation and to keep us all safe.

So I want to start with you, Mr. Miller. You spoke in your testimony about the traditional brick-and-mortar terror infrastructures that have been replaced with websites, chat rooms, and on-line manuals. So much of what is fueling terrorist activity is web-based these days. Increasingly nefarious activities are fueled by chatter on the web and foreshadowed via social media.

In addition, we know that malicious actors are seeking to tamper with our critical infrastructure, and ransomware has begun to proliferate in the private sector. Likewise is the threat of election tampering through our electronic voting machines.

How equipped is the city of New York to defend us in the cyber realm?

Mr. MILLER. So, we have taken, Representative Clarke, giant steps in the past—literally in the past 2 or 3 years that had not existed before. One critical step was setting up the New York City Cyber Command. That is different from DOIT, which is the Department of Internet Technology. It is literally a protection element within the city's government that looks across all the city's networks. We traveled to Los Angeles, where they had developed a similar although slightly different structure, and we have confronted in a very new way, through a task force approach, cyber threats where we have seen cyber attacks, cyber infiltrations, cyber incidents, malware, where the Cyber Command has been able to bring in the FBI, the NYPD cyber people, DOIT and its experts.

Our cyber people, who are not on the law enforcement side, they are on the 1's and 0's side, that has been a big step, because we have seen it coming. We saw what happened in places like Newark, where they suffered a ransomware attack that was disabling. We saw what happened in Atlanta, where they lost hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of equipment and information, and we have changed our footing significantly. That is in the cyber realm.

In the terrorism realm, we are constantly scanning across the darkest corners of the internet, whether it is right-wing, left-wing, Islamist. It has become a choose your own adventure or, as one of my British colleagues at the Leadership and Counterterrorism Conference called it last week, a terror salad bar, where you can go from cause to cause and pick and choose, but the weaponization of social media has been significant.

Ms. CLARKE. Very well.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

We have time should any of the Members of the committee like another round of questions.

I will just jump in very quickly.

Mr. Miller, I want to talk about a supremely local issue but something that is incredibly important for the security of New York City, and that is the relationship between the NYPD and the National Park Service as it pertains to Floyd Bennett Field. If you could just give us an update on how critical this site is, what you are doing there, and what are the latest aspects of your interactions with the National Park Service.

Mr. MILLER. We have a long history at Floyd Bennett Field. There was a time in the 1970's when the Federal Government wanted to turn Floyd Bennett Field over to the city, and the city was in dire economic straits at that point, trying to avoid bankruptcy, and could not take the property on, which looking back is a shame. It went to the National Park Service as part of the Gateway National Area, and the NYPD maintains its aviation bureau there. That is critical in a city of 8.6 million people over hundreds of square miles for the police helicopter function.

It is more critical considering that the Coast Guard air wing is now located up in Cape May in New Jersey and up in Cape Cod, without much in between.

So the NYPD is the primary air/sea rescue element that is going to get there first. Their facility is at Floyd Bennett Field, the Special Operations Division of the NYPD. That is emergency service, the strategic response command. It is the people that we have that are medically trained. It is our active-shooter people, they are at Floyd Bennett Field. The driver training program is at Floyd Bennett Field operating on what used to be runways. It is a piece of the NYPD's critical infrastructure.

Our history with the U.S. Park Service there has been friendly and cordial. We have always had open discussions. But where we have asked to maintain facilities that are falling down, legacy facilities that we moved into and occupy, where we have asked to make improvements to create other structures, like an active-shooter simulation training place, a shoot house, if you will, where we have asked to repair things that are falling down or rusting, we have gotten very cordial discussions but ultimately, in every case, been mired in bureaucracy that has not allowed us to go forward.

So we have an aging, borrowed, and failing infrastructure there that we would like to make improvements on because it is essential to the most important operations of the NYPD.

Mr. ROSE. So, let me get this straight, though. The principal threat that we face in New York City today most likely is that of a self-radicalized gunman of some type. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MILLER. I would agree with that. I would caveat that with the idea that the lone wolf is our primary threat. We have said that in our own assessment, which I can share with this committee on a law enforcement-sensitive basis. But we also see al-Qaeda in the shadows trying to rebound. I think if you look at the Sri Lanka attacks from last week, what we saw was a watershed moment for ISIS, which had been declared out of business as a caliphate, as an infantry, and as a terrorist group beyond propaganda the week before, and they managed to launch a multi-layer, complex attack that killed hundreds of people in targets that involved large

amounts of explosives, weapons, even a training camp that was uncovered in the last few days.

So we face a multi-level threat, and SOD, the people who occupy Floyd Bennett Field, are the very pointy edge of our spear on that threat.

Mr. ROSE. So this is a threat that is greater now than ever, and the National Park Service will not allow you to build a complex to suitably respond to a myriad of different threats.

Mr. MILLER. They never say no, and we never get to yes. I worked in Washington for 7 years. It could use some help. It needs some fixing.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you. I think I speak for the committee when I say that that is horrifying, and we are going to work our hardest—and please, anyone, disagree with me, if you like. We are going to work our hardest to fix that and make sure that New York City is prepared to defend itself.

Mr. MILLER. On behalf of the Police Commissioner of the city of New York, we appreciate it. We find it very frustrating.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

We now recognize again Mr. Walker, the Ranking Member from North Carolina, and we thank you so much again for supporting New York.

Mr. WALKER. Well, New York sets the example as far as security, counterintelligence, and I am happy to be here again today.

One of the areas that we have not talked about at all is cyber terrorism. Without making a mistake again as far as which one of you—I think maybe Mr. Miller is the one I would think would want to address this.

Obviously, we get hit thousands of times per day by foreign entities. We do not always know how much of that is state-sponsored versus privately. What are you guys doing? What are you worrying about a long-term attack from that perspective? Would you mind giving us your thoughts in that area?

Mr. MILLER. Our concerns—and these would be the concerns of everybody across this table—are two things. One, that we face the threat of terrorism and that we have systems and plans and kind of a push-button effect of when the bell rings, we are all ready to go and we know exactly what we are going to do. The threat behind the threat is if a state actor—and remember, the U.S. Government just recently designated an Iranian military entity, the IRGC, as a designated foreign terrorist organization. It shows a state-funded and state-level military capability aimed at attacking cities like New York. Hezbollah is a client terrorist organization of Iran.

We have seen a dramatic uptick in our ability to uncover Hezbollah activity in New York City examining targets that include the airport, the Federal buildings, critical infrastructure, transit, and to document those. The only reason that these Hezbollah operatives have been given to document those is to develop target folders for future attacks. We have seen that in Hezbollah's habits in the past, going back to 1995.

But if you had that attack that occurred on that day, whether it was the lone wolf, multiple lone wolves, an ISIS cell as we saw in Sri Lanka, a state actor like Iran, and the systems that you use to support the response to that, your 9–1–1 system, your radio sys-

tems, your digital systems that are connected to the internet, were attacked either prior to that or simultaneously, as we have seen hospital systems go down, communications systems go down, Government record systems go down, that would be a devastating scenario.

That is why we have begun in the past 2 or 3 years to invest so much more in cyber protection of not the banks—they have their own protection. It is about losing millions and millions and millions of dollars. We get that. But our focus has been on protecting what protects us, and that has been the cyber element of critical infrastructure. That is reservoirs, hospitals, emergency response systems.

Mr. WALKER. I have often thought if you cannot communicate in a crisis like that, you are opening yourselves up for mass chaos, and I think that is why we also, with some of the hard assets—and we have done a great job of hearing this today. Cyber terrorism is something that I am glad to hear that you guys continue to be focused on that.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

We now recognize for a second round, Ms. Clarke from New York.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

This question is for Mr. Klock. The Port Authority is responsible for some of our region's most important and critical infrastructure such as the Hudson River, tunnels and bridges, as well as each of our city's major airports. These are not only among the most significant terrorist targets in our Nation, if not the world, but the screening that occurs at these sites determines whether hazardous materials will make their way into the rest of our city.

For many years, we have understood the risk of a bomb detonating in a tunnel or on a bridge, or even on an airplane or on a PATH subway car that you operate. However, terrorists are increasingly turning to technology to further their aims, and we must be prepared for the day that terrorists attempt to hack a PATH train, commandeer it, derail it, turn it into some sort of moving missile.

Can you discuss your efforts to bolster cybersecurity at the Port Authority?

Mr. KLOCK. Yes, ma'am. That is a very dynamic question, and I would have to, in all likelihood, defer to some of our experts in the department when it comes to that. Not to skirt the issue or the question, but I know Mr. Miller would have a much better answer than myself.

It is a concern. It is something we live with every day. From the patrol perspective, every single officer that is out there has their eyes on a swivel, and they are looking for any anomalies that go on out there that would possibly springboard into this type of activity.

But with respect to the cyber component, I am going to have to defer, if you do not mind, Mr. Miller, if you could touch on that on our behalf, please.

Mr. MILLER. Representative Clarke, the key for us has been developing the Critical Infrastructure Working Group. This had never

been done before, only because the need was nascent and we had not figured each other out. But that is chaired by the NYPD's cyber people and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office where you get Con Ed, Department of Environmental Protection, Port Authority, Verizon, AT&T. It is a big table, but it is everything you do not want to break when the city needs it—communications, water, health, emergency responders. The Port Authority is a piece of that, and what we do is we put all the threat information on the table, we talk about our shared experiences and what fixes we have in place, and we try to make sure that the system is not dependent on the weakest link in the chain, and that has been an incredibly important community, not just to exchange threat information but also best practices, and also to do drills. This has been done at the IBM lab, where you can do a tabletop, where you can actually make computer systems fail and have other systems break and then have to make critical decisions, where all of the players have seen what would happen if multiple systems failed.

Ms. CLARKE. Mr. Miller, let me ask you, with the proposed budgetary cuts, do you see there being some challenge to continuing to maintain that type of a task force working group and maintaining a robust, forward-leaning set-up so that you can continue to look at these threats as they evolve? Because as soon as we practice on one means of being able to address a threat, there is someone else working on a threat we have not thought about.

Mr. MILLER. The cyber realm, the terrorism realm, is a most dynamic threat realm——

Ms. CLARKE. Absolutely.

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. In that it is adaptive and it is resilient. The cyber realm moves at the speed of technology. Nothing is faster than that. So if you have a completely effective meeting on cyber threats, 2 weeks later those threats may all be different. So the structured funding we get in significant amounts is for counterterrorism. In the cyber realm we have not seen the significant funding that it would take to build out these efforts, which we have done on our own on a shoestring. We have been using forfeiture money from the District Attorney's Office, as well as the NYPD's own funds, and some of our partners, but this is not a fully-funded effort. So when they are talking about cuts, we are going in the wrong direction for something that is a burgeoning threat if you look at the ransomware numbers or the latest cyber numbers which talk about exponential increases in crime, in victims, and in monetary losses.

Ms. CLARKE. Very well.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take this opportunity to suggest that we drill down on this even further and look at ways in which we can alert the administration and perhaps legislate in this space. I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Agreed. I could not agree more.

The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from Long Island, Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just discuss the mass transit. There are probably millions of passengers every day in New York City, I guess over 1,000 entrances and exits to the stations, another 300,000 on PATH, hun-

dreds of thousands more on Long Island Railroad, Metro North, Amtrak.

So I guess I would ask John and Superintendent Klock, Mr. Miller and Superintendent Klock, how is the level of cooperation on this? I am not looking for any details. I do not want to let the enemy know what you are doing, but as far as cooperation with yourself, the MTA Police, Port Authority Police, and Amtrak Police too, for that matter.

Mr. MILLER. We have a very coordinated cooperation with the MTA, with the Transit Authority. As you know, within the NYPD we have a transit bureau of thousands of police officers who are focused on just that. We have 5.6 million people who come through the subway system and who use the buses every day. From a crime standpoint, we have roughly 1, 1.5 index crimes a day. If it were a city of 5.6 million people with a single serious crime a day, it would be a miracle. So it remains a very safe system.

However, terrorists have shown—and I think all we have to do is look back to the December 11 attack by Ullah in the Times Square Station beneath the Port Authority, where the Port Authority officers reached the scene very quickly and knew exactly what to do. Some of them had been deployed in theater and dealt with suicide bombers in the past with the National Guard and the Reserves. Transit remains a fixation on the part of terrorists because it is a multiple casualty target and it is an economic target.

We stay focused with random deployments, and they are random for a reason. We try to keep a level of unpredictability of the people who do the explosive swabs, the explosive detection dogs, the long-gun teams, that you see them here, then you see them there, and we see them all over the system to try and keep people who would be doing pre-operational surveillance or assessment off balance.

MTA Police, great cooperation. Our transit bureau works with them closely. Amtrak, great cooperation. New Jersey Transit, which you would not assume we would be that close with, we have one of their analysts who sits in our intelligence bureau going over the threat material every day and communicating back and forth. Port Authority, we talk all the time between the Port Authority, the State Police, the National Guard, about the threat picture at the airport. It is a big focus.

Mr. KING. What it reminded me of was the story about Zazi's sentencing the other day. It reminded me of how close we came to mass murder just 10 years ago.

Superintendent.

Mr. KLOCK. Sir, thank you again. If I can just echo what Mr. Miller said, it is rock solid. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the team speaks, communicates, trains, operates, and when the bell rings, everybody is together.

With respect to our sensitivity to transportation, we know how vital it is to the region, and we know what would happen if something cataclysmic occurred. Our world as we know it, not just locally but around the world, would change dramatically. That being said, everyone at the table here, as well as all the other agencies that Mr. Miller mentioned, we are all hooked hand-in-glove, and we get it. We share the intel, and it gets all the way—I have said this before—it gets all the way down to the cop on the beat because

that is the one you want to have a vested interest in this and know what is going on so that they can spot this and take action immediately, like what happened on 12/11 back in 2017.

So we are all together. We are. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KING. Just on a personal note, if I can conclude, I want to thank the Chairman, and also thank the Ranking Member, who braved the language barrier and came here from North Carolina.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KING. You are doing pretty well, I have to say.

Mr. WALKER. Thanks. I am getting translations.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KING. I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, sir.

Gentlemen, last call. Anything else that we can do to support?

Mr. MILLER. I think it would be very important most particularly for this committee, if any, to spend a couple of minutes talking about the threat from drones.

So, when we were last here on Staten Island talking to this committee, and I know Representative King will remember this, we talked about the need for a change in the law to have a law enforcement carve-out to interfere with unmanned aircraft, because prior to that, doing anything to interdict a drone, no matter what it was carrying, would have been a Federal crime of interfering with aviation.

Thankfully, and I thank this committee for listening and bringing forth that message, we had legislation that came up in the fall that gave authority and power to the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security to come to major events and be able to detect and interdict any drone that could pose a threat.

Since that time, of course, you know we go through a very rapid season here. I know Yvette Clarke knows this better than anybody, where we leap from the New York City Marathon that goes right through your district over to the Thanksgiving Day Parade and all the ancillary events that happen in the boroughs, to the lighting of the Christmas Tree, to——

Mr. KING. And hopefully the World Series.

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. To the World Series, of course. Those are very difficult events to police. You could throw in the U.S. Tennis Open game. But these are things where you have unmanned aircraft flying over heavy crowds, Times Square on New Year's Eve.

The context is this. ISIS has used these drones in theater to drop bombs, to attack U.S. forces, to attack U.S. targets. Their propaganda that came up in their magazines over the fall and Christmas season featured photographs of drones carrying packages over New York City, saying "We have a present coming for you," over Paris and the Eiffel Tower, over other American targets.

So I am not suggesting an idea that the terrorists have not already figured out in theater or thought about for U.S. soil. The FBI, which has the authority to detect and interfere with drones, is not going to be able to be at every event across this country. It is just not within their bandwidth, and they have said no to us zero times when we have asked them for a major event. But there are many smaller events where we need this kind of protection.

We need to talk about taking the next step from the fine legislation that was passed, which is a step in the right direction but requires the approval of the Attorney General of the United States to act against a weaponized drone and the presence of Federal agencies. This is going to have to end up in a place where the Congress finds a way, with the FAA and the FCC, because we are talking about aircraft and we are talking about radio signal, to grant authority to trained, specially-trained and certified, let's say by the Federal Government, specially-designated State and local law enforcement officers who then will have access to the equipment to be able to go over an event where they say there is going to be no drone flights allowed over this event, New Year's Eve, Christmas, what have you. The Super Bowl is a great example. And to be able to interdict those.

Right now, if the FBI is not sitting there with us, and there is no particular piece of equipment that works effectively on its own—you need a suite of tools here—that would require the help of DHS Science and Technology, organizations like DARPA from Defense, to develop those tools. Right now, we are not much further than we were before. We have the advantage in New York of being the 800-pound gorilla who can get the FBI Operational Technology Division to come up from Quantico for a big event, but there are going to be plenty of times when we need that coverage and it is not there.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for that. That is a scary prospect, and it is something we have to seriously consider and figure out how to fix this.

To conclude, I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.

Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be open for 10 days.

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE FOR JOHN J. MILLER

Question 1. The homeland security threat posed by ghost guns—unregistered, untraceable firearms sold or assembled without a serial number—presents a growing and metastasizing challenge for law enforcement.

What is your agency doing to address the threat posed by ghost guns?

Answer. Fortunately. New York City has not seen the numbers of these untraceable guns that other jurisdictions such as California and Nevada have but, as we often see in law enforcement, the epidemic seems to be moving west to east. We began tracking the recovery of ghost guns in the city as a separate category in 2017. We recovered 32 ghost guns in 2017, 14 in 2018, and 21 so far this year. The sellers of unfinished "80%" receivers have effectively gamed the system. These receivers can be easily machined into fully-functioning, untraceable weapons, and you can find instructional videos right on YouTube. The only purpose I can see for these guns to exist is to evade law enforcement. There is legislation currently before the New York City Council, as well as the New York State Assembly and Senate to ban ghost guns, which are net positives, but this is a Nation-wide issue. Congress must act to stop the supply of these guns.

Question 2. I have introduced a bill, the Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists' Use of Ghost Guns Act, to require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct annual terrorism threat assessments regarding the availability of ghost guns in furtherance of an act of terrorism. This bill will require DHS to disseminate these annual threat assessments to State, local, and Tribal law enforcement.

Will additional information from the Department of Homeland Security regarding the threat posed by ghost guns assist your agency's work in combating this growing homeland security threat?

Answer. Information is power in law enforcement. Any additional intelligence would be invaluable to our mission of keeping dangerous weapons out of criminals' hands. Our collaboration with DHS is on-going and one of our most valuable assets. The work already being done by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to track the proliferation of these weapons Nation-wide is a valuable tool for the NYPD to anticipate the inevitable influx of these weapons into our city. And as I previously testified, the NYPD's involvement in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Federally-funded Domain Awareness System, and the embedded DHS Intelligence Analyst at NYPD headquarters enable us to share information in real time.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE FOR THOMAS CURRAO

Question 1. The homeland security threat posed by ghost guns—unregistered, untraceable firearms sold or assembled without a serial number—presents a growing and metastasizing challenge for law enforcement.

What is your agency doing to address the threat posed by ghost guns?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. I have introduced a bill, the Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists' Use of Ghost Guns Act, to require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct annual terrorism threat assessments regarding the availability of ghost guns in furtherance of an act of terrorism. This bill will require DHS to disseminate these annual threat assessments to State, local, and Tribal law enforcement.

Will additional information from the Department of Homeland Security regarding the threat posed by ghost guns assist your agency's work in combating this growing homeland security threat?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE FOR LOUIS P. KLOCK

Question 1. The homeland security threat posed by ghost guns—unregistered, untraceable firearms sold or assembled without a serial number—presents a growing and metastasizing challenge for law enforcement.

What is your agency doing to address the threat posed by ghost guns?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. I have introduced a bill, the Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists' Use of Ghost Guns Act, to require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct annual terrorism threat assessments regarding the availability of ghost guns in furtherance of an act of terrorism. This bill will require DHS to disseminate these annual threat assessments to State, local, and Tribal law enforcement.

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