

RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: EXTENDING NEW START OR STARTING OVER?

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: EXTENDING NEW START OR STARTING OVER?

Thursday, July 25, 2019

**House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and the Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,**

Washington, DC

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. KEATING [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the future of the U.S.-Russia arms control, and specifically the extension of New START.

Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I will now make an opening statement, and then, turn it over to the ranking member for his opening statement.

I would like to start off this afternoon with a reminder of how we got here. Even as a very young child, I clearly remember the Cuban Missile Crisis, as do many of my colleagues. I imagine when the United States and the USSR were in a 13-day standoff, and then, the presence of the Soviet nuclear armed missiles in Cuba was in the air, on the television, and many of us suffered, I think, even at early ages the trauma of knowing something was going on in our households and knowing how concerned our parents were and the whole country was. Many of us, including the then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, believed we were on the brink of a nuclear war.

In the aftermath, the United States and the USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and in the decades that followed, negotiated numerous other agreements, including SALT I and II, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and INF Treaty, and START.

While none of these agreements were perfect, and both sides have continued to develop new and more powerful weapons, our arms control regimes have kept us on the brink of mutually assured destruction. Today, it is important to take stock of how far we have come from the tension and the rampant worry about nuclear annihilation that shaped much of the second half of the 20th century.

The United States and Russia are in compliance with New START, as multiple administration officials have stated and testified previously. And the agreement has effectively reduced nuclear arsenals in both countries. Through New START, we have also had

unprecedented access to transparency around Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the agreement entered into force in 2011, the United States and Russia have carried out nearly 300 inspections and more than 18,000 notifications.

This has meant our military has been better informed about the threats we face and how we could prioritize investments in defense and readiness. General John Hyten, Commander of the United States Strategic Command, told Congress earlier this year that he is a, quote/unquote, "big supporter" of the treaty, and that he saw no reason to withdraw from it, unless Russia stops complying. Other leaders, including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, have specifically called for extension of New START.

So, in calling the hearing today, I hope to answer one question: why would we ever let this agreement lapse? I have heard criticism about New START, that it does not go far enough or it does not include countries like China. I have heard concern about Russia's compliance generally with other international agreements and treaty obligations. And I have heard concerns about weapon systems that are not covered by New START, which would be in our national security interest to bring under an arms control regime. These are all valid issues to raise in the context of the discussion about the arms control and Russia. However, none of them leads to a good reason to let New START lapse, and all of them can be addressed while still extending the agreement.

I have been in a lot of briefings and conversations about this agreement, and in none of them—many of them led by esteemed current and former national security officials—have I heard anyone mention a single thing we gain by letting the limitations and transparent measures enshrined in New START lapse, nor have I heard a single legitimate cost to staying in the agreement.

I would like to think there is broad consensus that the United States should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, and nothing in New START restricts our ability to extend it and, also, negotiate in parallel with Russia, China, and others about additional concerns or nuclear weapons.

It is also my understanding that it is the United States policy to support nonproliferation efforts and, in fact, that we benefit greatly from them. We entered into all these agreements because arms control serves our interests. Without it, we face greater risks of miscalculation, destruction, and loss of human life.

An arms race is also incredibly costly. At a time when we are debating the need for broad investments in infrastructure and in education, and areas to address very real safety concerns across the country, and to remain globally competitive, how exactly we are planning to pay for the inevitable arms race that comes from losing the limits to START will create real problems.

The relative peace and stability we feel right now that a nuclear attack from Russia is not imminent is due to the fact that we have these type of agreements; that we know more about what Russia is doing; that they know more about what we are doing. It is because of this that our nightly news does not speculate as to whether or not we will soon be in a war.

Why would we ever seek to go back to an era of uncertainty about Russia's next move, things we inevitably fear, and preparing for the worst? Because that is really what I am waiting for, to hear any good reason why we would take on all the risks and costs of losing New START for no clear gain.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here and being willing to provide their expert testimony on this issue.

I now turn it to the ranking member for his opening statement.

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here. I really appreciate it.

And it is getting toward the end of our time out here, so we are all excited, too. So, I just want to be brief today.

I think this is a really important hearing and I want to ensure that our questions are answered. And there are no easy answers to this.

Let me start off by saying that I believe in arms control agreements. President Reagan once said that it was his "fervent goal and hope that we will some day no longer have to rely on nuclear weapons to deter aggression and assure world peace". Maybe that will be in heaven someday; maybe it will be here on earth. We would love to get there, but arms control agreements help to achieve that goal.

Limiting the American and Russian nuclear arsenals is a good thing. These weapons are more than enough to deter any nation from considering an attack on American soil. A carefully crafted deal makes the world a safer place, not only on the day that it is signed, but for the foreseeable future.

I agreed with the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, not because it was not a good treaty, but because Russia was clearly violating it. With the end of the INF Treaty, the New START Treaty is the only game in town. And while it appears that Russia is complying with the New START agreement, it still has flaws.

In 2010, when it was ratified, there were concerns over the scope of the agreement, important issues that were left out. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin has taken advantage of these flaws to aggressively develop new forms of nuclear weapons that fall outside of the scope of this arms control agreement, while the United States sat idly by on the sidelines.

Additionally, the treaty does not limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons, otherwise known as tactical nukes. When it comes to these kinds of weapons, Russia has at least a 10-to-1 advantage. Last, Russia is close to fielding two new delivery vehicles, a nuclear-capable air-launch ballistic missile and a sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile, that would not fall under the New START's limitations.

Since 2010, I believe the strategic environment has changed significantly. Given Russia's increased stockpile in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it is important to find a way to reduce the disparity between the U.S. and Russia on these types of weapons. While we agree it is important to reduce Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile, the great power competition we find ourselves in shows that cold war-style bilateral agreements may not be the best approach anymore. New START only restricts two nuclear powers: Russia and

America. Nowhere in this agreement would it be possible to include China, which is rapidly developing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal.

The DIA Director, Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, has pointed out that China will likely double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the next decade, and that over the last year the Chinese have launched more ballistic missile tests than the rest of the world combined. If we are to achieve successful global nuclear arms control, we must find a way to complete a broader, multilateral nuclear arms control agreement that includes Russia and China.

I want to end on this note, given the coinciding timelines of the 2020 Presidential election and the expiration of the New START. Any hope of extending New START lies solely on the shoulders of President Trump's administration because Russia's Ambassador to the United States has already stated that they will not negotiate in the 16 days that New START remains in effect following the 2021 inauguration.

All this being said, I believe that our priority should be to support broader multilateral negotiations with Russia and China that bring some of these new systems into an arms control agreement while supporting the administration's efforts to negotiate on an extension of New START. President Reagan had the vision to see a world without the threat of nuclear weapons, and I think there is a way that we can get there. And I stand ready to help in that effort, even if that takes some time.

Again, there is no easy answer to all this. I look forward to hearing from all of you.

And I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the ranking member.

We are very privileged to have an outstanding panel of witnesses here today, individuals who are rich in experience in the academic area, in the NGO areas, and serving very related positions for our country. I want to thank these members for their service to our country. I want to thank them for being here.

Mr. Thomas Countryman is the chair of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors and former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

Ms. Madelyn Creedon is the president of the Green Marble Group and a former Principal Deputy Administrator of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration.

Mr. Brian McKeon is senior director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a former Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

And Dr. Thomas Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

I want to thank all of you for being here. We appreciate the time you have committed to this. We ask you to limit your testimony to 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared written statements will be made part of the record.

I will now go to Mr. Countryman for his statement.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, BOARD CHAIRMAN,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION**

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I thank Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Kinzinger for this opportunity, but especially for your interest in this topic. If we are to arrest the decline in American global leadership, this Congress must reassert itself.

For more than 50 years, every U.S. President has proposed and pursued negotiations with Moscow to regulate destabilizing nuclear competition and reduce the risk of U.S. and allies being destroyed in a nuclear war. They sought and concluded a series of treaties with strong bipartisan support that have made America and the world much safer. They knew that treaties require compromise with rivals who do not share our values; that treaties are not concessions made to adversaries, but an essential component of national security.

The U.S. used to take pride in leading the world in promoting agreements that prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reduced the risk of their use. Our leaders knew that numerical or technological superiority could not prevent the United States from destruction in the case of nuclear war. Ronald Reagan put this inescapable fact most succinctly: "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought."

The current administration veers away from this tradition, to detriment of our national security. Its hostility toward international agreements, particularly in arms control; its "go big or go home" approach, which requires agreements to address all possible problems, instead of one big one; its increasing use of the rhetoric of nuclear dominance and invulnerability; its belief that enhancing American security requires diminishing others' security, all have increased the risk of unintended nuclear war.

In November, the administration announced, without a coherent military or diplomatic plan B, its decision to terminate the INF Treaty. Russia's violation made withdrawal justifiable, but justifiable is not the same thing as smart. The administration has no viable plan to persuade Russia to remove its missiles and, instead, pursues development of new missiles which are not militarily necessary and would, if deployed, likely divide NATO and lead Russia to increase the number and type of missiles aimed at NATO targets. Congress would be wise to withhold support for a new Euromissile race.

Worse, the administration has dithered for more than a year on extending New START before it expires in 2021. In one of my final meetings in 2017 before I left government, I said to the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister that the new administration and Russia should sign an extension of New START at an early point, before some genius in either capital got the idea that extension could be used as leverage. He agreed. But what we both feared has come to pass, a dangerous fantasy that Moscow needs this treaty more than we do, a futile search for leverage, and a risk of ending up with no constraints on Russia's arsenal.

The President wants to bring China into trilateral talks on a new agreement to limit weapons not covered by New START. Now, pursuing talks with other nuclear-armed States and trying to limit all types of nuclear weapons is a noble objective, one I support in prin-

ciple, but there is no realistic chance such an agreement could be reached, certainly not before New START expires. And that leads to the conclusion that this is a deliberate poison pill, a pretext for running out the clock in order to kill New START.

It would be national security malpractice to discard New START, to leave Russian nuclear forces unconstrained, our intelligence into their capabilities drastically curtailed, and the incentives for costly nuclear competition multiplied. Without INF, without New START, there would be no binding limits on the two biggest arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Our difficult nuclear relationship with Russia would be more complicated; the risks of renewed nuclear competition would grow, and our efforts to mitigate nuclear risks in other parts of the world would be more difficult. The conditions for an expensive, destabilizing, and dangerous arms race would emerge.

As the chairman and the ranking member of the committee have suggested, the immediate step should be a 5-year extension of New START to provide a foundation for a more ambitious successor agreement. Extension is the only major step the President can take with Russia that would simultaneously improve our security, open the possibility of addressing other difficult issues we have with Russia, and draw bipartisan, if not unanimous, approval.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:]

Russia, China, Arms Control, and the Value of New START

Testimony of the Honorable Thomas Countryman,
Board Chairman, Arms Control Association,
Former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment
“Russia and Arms Control: Extending New Start or Starting Over?”

July 25, 2019

For more than fifty years, every U.S. President has proposed and pursued negotiations with Moscow as a means to regulate destabilizing nuclear arms competition and reduce the risk of the United States and its allies being destroyed in a nuclear war. They sought and concluded a series of treaties, with strong bipartisan support, that have made America and the world much safer.

The current Administration appears to be veering away from this tradition, to the detriment of our national security.

In November, the Trump administration announced, without a coherent military or diplomatic “plan B,” to terminate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in response to Russia’s testing and deployment of the non-compliant, ground-launched 9M729 missile.

The administration has not presented a viable diplomatic plan that might persuade Russia to remove its 9M729s and instead it is pursuing development and testing of U.S. ground-launched, INF-range missiles, which are not militarily necessary to counter the 9M729 and would if deployed, likely divide NATO, and lead Russia to increase the number and type of intermediate-range missiles aimed against NATO targets. Congress would be wise to withhold its support for a new Euromissile race.

Worse yet, Trump’s national security team has dithered for more than a year on beginning talks with Russia to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) before it expires in February 2021. In an interview published June 18, National Security Advisor John Bolton said of New START extension, “[T]here’s no decision, but I think it’s unlikely.”

Instead, Bolton has suggested the President wants to bring China into trilateral negotiations with Russia on a new agreement to limit nuclear weapons not covered by New START.

Pursuing talks with other nuclear-armed states and trying to limit all types of nuclear weapons is an admirable objective, which I support in principle. But such a negotiation would be complex and time-consuming. There is no realistic chance a new agreement along these lines could be finalized before New START expires.

It would be national security malpractice to discard New START in the hopes of negotiating a more comprehensive, ambitious nuclear arms control agreement with Russia and China to say nothing about getting it ratified and into force.

As the Chairman and the ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs have suggested, the first step should be a five-year extension of New START, which would provide a foundation for a more ambitious successor agreement.

Without the INF Treaty and without New START, there would be no legally binding, verifiable limits on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in nearly half a century.

New START verifiably caps the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons at 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems for each side; if those ceilings expires, Russia and the United States could upload hundreds of additional nuclear warheads to their long-range delivery systems. In fact, Russia, with its heavy missiles and several open missile production lines, could rapidly upload more additional warheads than the United States could). Each side would also have far less insight into the other's nuclear deployment and modernization plans. As a result, our already difficult and uneasy nuclear relationship with Russia would become even more complicated, the risks of renewed nuclear competition would grow, and our efforts to mitigate nuclear risks in other corners of the globe would become more difficult.

The Value of Nuclear Arms Control

Previous Presidents, since Dwight Eisenhower, have recognized the value of effective nuclear arms control. They understood that:

- Talking to an adversary, whether a superpower like the Soviet Union or a lesser challenger such as Iran, is not a sign of weakness, but a hardheaded and realistic means to reduce threats posed to the United States.
- Treaties provide rules of the road that enable the United States to pursue more effectively its economic and security interests. They constrain other nations' ability to act against our interests more than they constrain U.S. freedom of action.
- Arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, or a favor done to another nation, but an essential component of, and contribution to, our national security.
- In a world in which the U.S. claims global leadership, Washington must take the lead bilaterally and multilaterally, proposing initiatives that greatly reduce the risk that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) spread or are used.
- The pursuit of reductions of nuclear stockpiles and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is both a moral obligation, and since approval by the U.S. Senate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1969, it is a legal obligation as well, one that can and must be pursued regardless of the ups and downs of great-power relations.
- There can be no winners in a nuclear war. Mutual assured destruction is not a theory, or a philosophy; it is a reality. Since the time the Soviet Union achieved reliable intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1960s, neither the United States nor Russia can launch a nuclear attack on the other's homeland without the near-certain destruction of its own homeland. Arms control agreements, and associated stability mechanisms, serve to reduce the risk that a cycle of assured destruction will begin.

As a consequence of American diplomatic leadership and the support of Congress, a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia verifiably capped, and later, helped lead to significant cuts in the two superpowers arsenals by more than 85% from their Cold War peaks. The total destructive power of those weapons has been reduced from the equivalent of over a million Hiroshima-size bombs to the somewhat less insane equivalent of 80,000 such weapons. One of those agreements, the INF Treaty, verifiably eliminated an entire class of destabilizing missiles that threatened European security and increased the risk of superpower miscalculation.

The United States helped lead the way to the negotiation and conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits any nuclear test explosion, no matter what the yield. Although the CTBT has not formally entered into force due to the failure of eight key states to ratify, the treaty has been signed by 184 nations including all of the P-5 states, has established a global monitoring network that is operating 24/7 to help detect and deter clandestine testing, and created a global norm against nuclear testing. Today no state is actively engaged in nuclear testing.

U.S.-led efforts to reduce the role and the number of nuclear weapons, to end nuclear testing, combined with political pledges from the United States and the other nuclear-armed states to take further disarmament steps, have helped to solidify international support for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and paved the way for its indefinite extension in 1995.

Many of these positive trends have been reversed and others are at risk. This is due in part of a deficit of American leadership and the growing body of thought in the Administration and Congress today, which believes

- The U.S. should not discuss vital national security issues, or consider compromise, with adversaries such as Russia and Iran until they have fully met U.S. demands in all fields.
- International treaties are inherently disadvantageous to the United States, as they constrain the freedom of action of the world's leading military and economic power.
- That because arms control agreements involve a degree of compromise, they grant unwarranted concessions to opponents.
- Such agreements are of no value if they do not solve EVERY problem between the parties, an all-or-nothing approach exemplified by the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- In the Cold War fallacy that there is a way to win a nuclear war, that a numerical or technical advantage can give the United States a dominance of power that would spare our country from destruction in a nuclear exchange. Sadly, no U.S. official today is able to repeat the obvious fact that motivated Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to declare: "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought."

Over the last two years, this line of thinking is evident in the Administration's retreat from global leadership, its embrace of authoritarian leaders, its weakening partnership with democratic allies, its withdrawal from international agreements, and its inability to make any new and meaningful agreements. The Administration has weakened restraints on Iran's ability to enrich uranium. It has refused to reconsider ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or otherwise reinforce the *de facto* nuclear testing moratorium, which has preserved America's important technical advantage in the nuclear field.

Now, as the termination date for the INF Treaty approaches and the expiration date for New START looms on the near horizon, the administration has failed to put forward a serious plan for constraining Russia's nuclear arsenal. There is a serious risk that without extension of New START and without mutual restraints on INF missile systems after the end of the treaty, the conditions for an expensive, risky and destabilizing nuclear weapons race will emerge, similar to - but riskier and more expensive than - the arms race we ran in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the absence of responsible steps to prevent a dangerous new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race, Congress can and should be ready to point the way forward.

The INF Treaty

The INF Treaty was a signature foreign policy achievement of President Reagan. It was unprecedented in requiring the destruction of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, resulting in the elimination of 2692 Soviet and U.S. missiles. It established the principle of on-site inspection, a concept still central today to effective agreements and to our understanding of Russian systems. It resolved a dangerous split within the NATO Alliance and reduced a genuine threat to our Allies and to peace in Europe. It was central to establishing the opportunity for genuine cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

The Russian military was never happy about Gorbachev's 'surrender' in signing the INF Treaty, and has developed a cruise missile in violation of the range prescribed by the treaty. I think it unlikely that the Russian Defense Ministry consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the legality of this action. Deployment of the 9M729 has proven to be of double benefit to Russia, apart from the marginal utility of a new means to threaten NATO territory.

Moscow is pleased to continue a long-running debate about the actual range of the 9M729, because it distracts from a less comfortable topic: the several dozen European cities and

sites now within range of the new system. The U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will free the Russian military to plan new generations of missiles aimed at Russia's neighbors, (both NATO and non-NATO), all while plausibly blaming the United States for the treaty's demise.

Barring a diplomatic miracle, U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty will become effective August 2, and it is 'justifiable' as a response

to Russia's violation. But 'justifiable' is not the same as 'smart,' or even well-considered.

The President's decision was taken without the benefit of senior-level interagency discussion, and without any plan to counter effectively the slight military advantage that Russia might gain by its deployment. That meant that the U.S. diplomatic strategy on the INF Treaty essentially amounted to the expression of "hope" that Russia will "change course" and return to compliance, which is of course not serious strategy.

The decision to terminate the treaty, combined with the possibility of new U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, is risky and unwise. It opens the door to a new phase of destabilizing INF-range missile competition with Russia.

The Administration has yet to answer repeated Congressional calls for information on its decision to withdraw from the treaty or a strategy for a post-treaty world. The Pentagon's FY 2020 budget request for new INF-range missiles lacks key details about the types of missiles DoD plans to develop or justification of the need for such missiles.

The United States should ensure that Russia gains no military advantage from its violation of the INF Treaty. Given that the United States and NATO forces currently can hold hundreds of key Russian military targets at risk using their existing array of sea-, land-, and air-based conventional strike weapons and missiles, new U.S. intermediate-range missiles are militarily unnecessary. If additional military measures are required, such as air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and cruise missile defenses, these can be pursued without the provocative and escalatory deployment of new ground-based missiles.

In addition, new missiles would have to be deployed on the territory of allies neighboring Russia or China to have military value. No ally has yet said it would be willing to serve this function. Any such deployment in Europe would require unanimous approval by NATO members, which cannot be assumed.

These missiles, whether nuclear- or conventionally-armed, American or Russian, would be able to strike targets deep inside Russia and in western Europe. Their short time-to-target capability

increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis. Any nuclear attack on Russia involving U.S. intermediate-range, nuclear-armed missiles based in Europe could provoke a massive Russian nuclear counterstrike on Europe and on the U.S. homeland.

This leaves open the question: what happens next and what can be done to mitigate the risks?

The Trump administration is clearly seeking to deploy new, intermediate-range missiles in Europe, to counter Russia's nuclear-capable, but very likely conventionally-armed, 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles that have been deployed so far.

Rather than spur Russia to deploy more 9M729s that put our allies at risk, a new and more serious NATO commitment to arms control is needed to protect Europe and the United States.

One option would be for NATO to declare as a bloc that no alliance members will field any INF Treaty-prohibited missiles or any equivalent new nuclear capabilities in Europe so long as Russia does not deploy treaty-prohibited systems where they could hit NATO territory.

This would require Russia to dismantle or move at least some currently deployed 9M929 missiles. As the United States and Russia dispute the range of that missile, they could simply agree to bar deployments west of the Ural Mountains, or beyond. The U.S. and Russian presidents could agree to this “no-first INF missile deployment plan” through an executive agreement that would be verified through national technical means of intelligence, monitoring mechanisms available through the Open Skies Treaty and Vienna Document, and as necessary, new on-site inspection arrangements.

Another possible approach would be to negotiate a new agreement, perhaps as part of a New START follow-on, that verifiably prohibits ground-launched, intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads. As a recent United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research study explains, the sophisticated verification procedures and technologies already in place under New START can be applied with almost no modification to verify the absence of nuclear warheads deployed on shorter-range missiles.

Such an approach would require additional declarations and inspections of any ground-launched INF Treaty-range systems. To be of lasting value, such a framework would require that Moscow and Washington agree to extend New START

The Future of New START

The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty brought the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russian Federation to their lowest level since the 1960s. It built upon previously agreed systems of notification, verification and inspection. To date, the two sides have exchanged over 10,000 notifications of movement of delivery systems and have conducted dozens of on-site verification inspections on each other's territory.

As a result, the United States has a significantly clearer picture of Russian strategic capabilities than it could attain by national intelligence means alone. There have been no credible allegations of Russian violations of the agreement and, despite some questionable Russian concerns about verifying the conversion of U.S. strategic nuclear systems to conventional roles, the United States also continues to fully implement the treaty.

In one of my last meetings before leaving the State Department in 2017, I suggested to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov that Russia should seek early in the new Administration to extend the treaty, before any big thinkers in either Washington or Moscow got the brilliant idea that extension could become a bargaining chip. Although he agreed with that concern, what we both feared has occurred: a myth has taken hold in this city that Russia 'needs' New START more than the United States needs it, and that it can be "leveraged" to gain something more from Moscow.

Taking all these factors into account, the most important step that the two sides could take would be to take advantage of the option, as described in Article XIV, to extend the Treaty by five years to 2026.

To do so, it is important that the two sides promptly begin consultations on key issues raised by each side. Russia has raised concerns about the verification of the permitted procedures to convert some U.S. nuclear weapons delivery systems to conventional roles. The United States has understandably suggested that new Russian strategic nuclear weapons systems, including the Status-6 nuclear-armed, long-range torpedo and the proposed nuclear-propelled, long-range cruise missile, should be accounted for under New START. If both sides are willing to engage in a professional dialogue relatively soon, using the mechanism contained in the treaty, the Bilateral Consultative Commission, these issues can be addressed in a mutually agreed manner either before or soon after a decision to extend New START is taken.

New START extension is the most significant step this President could take with Russia that would improve national security, lay the basis for progress in other areas of Russian misbehavior, and draw bipartisan (though not unanimous) support.

I want to welcome the initiative of Chairman Engel and ranking member McCaul, the “Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces” (H.R. 2529), which would express the Sense of Congress that the United States should seek to extend New START so long as Russia remains in compliance. The bill would also require an intelligence assessment of how the expiration of New START would affect the size and posture of Russian nuclear forces and the additional intelligence capabilities the United States would need to compensate for the loss of the treaty’s extensive transparency and on-site monitoring provisions.

We don’t need and cannot afford a new Cold War-style nuclear arms race. Nor do we need to give China a cynical excuse to expand its arsenal, as it will likely do if the United States and Russia discard New START without a replacement agreement and pursue expanded deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the wake of the INF Treaty collapse.

As an insurance policy against increased Russian and U.S. strategic warhead deployments in the absence of New START, Congress could prohibit the use of funds for the purpose of increasing U.S. strategic warhead and delivery vehicles above New START limits, so long as the U.S. intelligence community assesses that Russia remains under the New START limits

During Senate consideration of the Treaty in 2010, the White House made a strong commitment to sustain the funding necessary to replace and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons delivery systems and for warhead life extensions. Since then, the cost estimates for those programs have grown significantly, and the Trump administration has added a number of new requests that would add new nuclear capabilities to the arsenal.

If this administration – whether through inaction or proactively – forces the end of New START, Congress should not supinely go along with the administration’s plan for spending on new nuclear weapons, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates to be \$1.7 trillion over the next 30 years. Instead, Congress should seek more cost-effective program alternatives that can save hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars while still allowing for the deployment of a nuclear force more than sufficient to deter any and all nuclear adversaries.

A Broader Arms Control Agreement?

The Administration has delayed any action on extension of New START and has proposed instead expanding New START to include China as a treaty party, and to set new limits on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which are not covered by New START. When described this way, such an approach may seem to make sense. Involving other nuclear-armed states and all types of nuclear weapons in the disarmament process should be a medium-term goal of any Administration

However, given the antipathy expressed toward New START (and all other treaties) by President Trump's National Security Advisor, John Bolton, it strikes me and many others as a poison pill, a pretext for withdrawing from or allowing New START to expire, rather than to sustain meaningful limits on Russia's most dangerous nuclear weapons – their strategic arsenal – which is an essential foundation for any new, broader and more ambitious follow-on agreement.

There are several obstacles in the way of a more ambitious trilateral nuclear arms control deal with China and Russia:

- First, China has very little incentive to participate. With a nuclear arsenal less than one-tenth the size of America and Russia, it argues that these two sides need to reduce before including China in their discussions. Nor has the United States defined what agreement it would want China to embrace: would it be to commit to the limitations New START imposed on Moscow and Washington? This would mean giving our blessing to a five-fold increase in China's weapon stockpile, which is hardly in our interest. Or would we agree to reduce American and Russian deployments to the level of China (300+)? That would be a real contribution to reducing the risk of nuclear war, but it is not currently achievable, for both political and security reasons.
- Second, Russia counts the French and British nuclear deterrents like the American arsenal, as belonging to a potential adversary. It has suggested that multilateral discussions should include not only Beijing, but also Paris and London. Further, Moscow is not ready at this time to discuss its non-strategic arsenal, particularly if the US is not prepared to discuss issues of greatest concern to Moscow, such as US plans for ballistic missile defense.

- Third, the United States would not be ready to discuss reducing its own non-strategic nuclear stockpile before completing consultations with NATO partners, which would inevitably be complex and time-consuming.
- Finally, even under ideal conditions, a bilateral negotiation on a single topic takes years. Even if Russia and China were willing to discuss the proposed American agenda, a trilateral discussion of multiple topics would inevitably take considerably longer, even if it were pursued by an Administration committed to the topic and with successful experience in negotiations. This is not such an Administration. Between Mr. Bolton's long-standing opposition to New START, and the nearly complete absence of experienced officials in the State Department, it is utterly unrealistic to expect such an agreement could be achieved before the scheduled expiration of New START in 19 months.

Beyond New START: Strategic Stability

If New START is not extended, we will find ourselves in 2021 - for the first time in nearly 50 years - with no legal restraints on the American and Russian arsenals. This absence would be a foreboding political signal: if the two main nuclear powers cannot even agree on the urgency of reducing the nuclear threat hanging over them both, what chances will there be for reducing other areas of tension?

As our intelligence leaders have testified, our national technical means alone - even if upgraded at great expense - could not fully substitute for the insight into the Russian arsenal we gain from New START's notification requirements. In the absence of confidence about the other side's capabilities, both U.S. and Russian planners will have greater incentive to engage in worst-case scenario planning, driving a spiral of increased spending on destabilizing systems.

A deep strategic stability dialogue between Washington and Moscow is necessary today to reduce the risk of unintended escalation and will be even more essential tomorrow if New START is allowed to expire. Central to this effort is the intensification of U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts. The "no-contact" policy dating back to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was meant to show Moscow there can be no business as usual, but it now works against American security interests, as it prevents the kind of information exchange and relationships that could help prevent an incident from becoming a conflict.

Beyond military channels, it is to be hoped that last week's meeting between American and Russian diplomats will lead directly to a continuing, intensive strategic stability dialogue that will focus on enhanced understanding of each other's doctrines and capabilities, less name-calling and more problem-solving.

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Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Countryman.
Ms. Creedon.

**STATEMENT OF MADELYN CREEDON, NONRESIDENT SENIOR
FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Ms. CREEDON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and members of the subcommittee. It is, indeed, a pleasure to be here today to discuss the much-needed 5-year extension to New START and U.S. nuclear policy and forces.

First, I would like to make clear that I do not represent any organization today and that my remarks are strictly my own. But I would like to make five brief points.

First, New START should be extended. No further action is needed by the Senate. Both Presidents Trump and Putin just have to say yes. Extension of New START is in the national security interests of the U.S. because it would continue the limits on both Russian and U.S. strategic systems, continue to provide transparency and assurance through onsite inspections, information exchanges and declarations, insight not readily obtained by national technical means.

The U.S. and Russia, previously the Soviet Union, have a history and a tradition of strategic arms limitation agreements and the transparency, verification, and compliance mechanisms they provide. Without a treaty, we will enter a period of uncertainty and risk the possibility of a new strategic arms race.

Second, modernizing the nuclear triad of delivery systems and platforms, and life-extending the U.S. nuclear warheads is essential to maintaining the safe, secure, and reliable stockpile we have today. It is important to note that the central limits of New START are the basis for the modernization effort that was kicked into high gear by the Obama Administration and continued by the Trump administration. This modernization is a long-term effort that will extend well into the 2050's. The New START central limits are extremely flexible, so that each side can ascertain what mix of delivery systems and warheads are needed to ensure its own security.

Third, there is another piece of modernization that is often overlooked, but also needs sustained support, and that is the National Nuclear Security Administration's nuclear complex. This complex provides the manufacturing capability to support the nuclear warhead life-extension programs, which, in turn, obviates the need to hold large quantities of weapons in reserve.

In addition, the science complex ensures that the stockpile can be maintained and adapted without a return to explosive, underground nuclear testing. It is a truly amazing fact that the advances made in the science of nuclear weapons over the last 25 years allow the NNSA labs to now know and understand more about the function and performance of nuclear weapons than they did in the days of testing. The NNSA complex is old. Much of it dates back to the Manhattan Project and the early days of the cold war, and it needs to be replaced or refurbished.

Fourth, we should never forget that, ultimately, it is people who sustain our deterrent. Military and civilians of DoD and NNSA work to maintain the continuum of deterrence, beginning with threat prevention and nonproliferation. They need support and we

need to ensure that the entire nuclear enterprise always has the best and the brightest.

And fifth, our allies and partners also rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of their security against nuclear attack, however remote the possibility. As much as they want the U.S. deterrent to be safe, secure, and reliable, they do not want a new arms race and a return to the days of mutual assured destruction.

As of September 2017, the U.S. has 3,822 warheads in its stockpile, more than enough, with another 2,000-plus warheads awaiting dismantlement. This is down from the mid-sixties peak of 31,255 warheads. We surely do not want a return to those days and increase the risk of nuclear war, rather than reduce it.

In conclusion, in my prepared testimony I referenced a 2010 op-ed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Jake Garn, a former Republican Senator from Utah, supporting New START. In that piece, they cautioned against seeking a silver bullet that solves all problems. New START was under consideration at the time that they wrote the op-ed and was being criticized for not covering the full range of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In many respects, that is what the Trump administration is doing again with respect to extending New START, criticizing it for what it is not and was never intended to be, a silver bullet treaty. The treaty should be extended and time provided to take the next step toward stability.

Thank you for holding this hearing on a very important topic that is not discussed enough, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]

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Statement of
Madelyn R. Creedon

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
and
Former Principal Deputy Administration for the
National Nuclear Security Administration

Before the

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment

Russia and Arms Control: Extending New START or Starting Over?

July 25, 2019

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear today before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to discuss New START, nuclear modernization, arms control and nuclear policy.

To start off the discussion, I would like to make five points.

First, one of the most important things that the Trump Administration could do is extend the New START Treaty from its current February 2021 expiration date to 2026. The treaty allows a 5-year extension by mutual agreement. It is a simple matter of saying yes. The Senate, because it provided its consent to the treaty in 2010, has no further role in the actual extension but it would be very helpful if congress, on a bipartisan basis, could indicate not only broad support for the treaty but actually urge the five-year extension.

Extension of New START is in the national security interests of the United States, as the treaty provides strategic stability, certainty and transparency in the relationship between the United States and Russia at least as far as strategic nuclear arms are concerned. Moreover, a 5-year extension would allow an opportunity for discussions of what comes next in the broader US-Russian relationship and in arms control. This could include non-strategic nuclear weapons and some of the more novel systems that Russia has recently unveiled, as well as a new approach to intermediate range missiles to replace the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which will cease to exist on August 2, per the US notice of withdrawal, and absent a dramatic and unexpected change of course by Russia.

New START has been criticized from the outset because it covers only strategic nuclear warheads and systems and it did not address non-strategic systems. As former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Jake Garn, a former Republican senator from Utah, said in a September 22, 2010 op-ed in the Washington Times in support of New START "No single treaty provides a 'silver bullet' to mitigate all of the threats we face, and New START is no exception. To condemn it because it fails to accomplish tasks it was not meant to address is to misunderstand the history of arms control and of international relations. And, if we fail to have New START enter into force, we will have significantly reduced our chances of obtaining in the future a treaty that regulates short-range systems."

This idea still holds true today—there are no silver bullet treaties that solve all problems, incremental steps are still important.

Many also forget that the START Treaty had expired in December 2009 and that New START was replacing the START Treaty, which also only covered strategic warheads and systems. More importantly, however, without the START Treaty there were no inspections, no information exchanges, no transparency and no limitations on strategic forces between December 2009 and February 2011 when New START entered into

force. Without an extension of New START now the US situation will repeat that period of the unknown.

Point two is support the Triad. The current multi-decade program to replace the Triad of US delivery systems, a new ballistic missile submarine, a new ICBM – the Ground-based strategic deterrence program, a new bomber—the B-21 are all important to US national security and that of our allies and partners.

Similarly, the warhead life extension programs undertaken by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will allow the smaller active nuclear weapons stockpile (3822 at the end of 2017) to be maintained safely and securely, while increasing its reliability. This is important as there is correlation between the size of the stockpile and its reliability, security and safety—the smaller the stockpile the greater the need for confidence.

President Obama, in seeking a world without nuclear weapons, said clearly in his 2009 Prague speech that "as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies."

In the period after 9/11, as a nation we dropped the ball on replacing these systems; the US fought the long war in the middle east and elsewhere and nuclear deterrence was not a priority.

As a result, President Obama laid out a program of delivery system and platform modernization, and warhead life extensions in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. For the most part this effort was continued in President's Trump's 2018 NPR, although with significantly less emphasis on threat reduction.

Third is replacing the infrastructure at the NNSA and supporting the science that underpins the warhead life extension programs. Over the last 25 years, NNSA has made a significant investment in the science of nuclear weapons, allowing the weapons to be maintained, and now life extended, without the need for underground explosive nuclear testing.

The scientific achievements are remarkable and were thought not to be achievable when the program started in the mid-1990s. The naysayers were certain a return to underground explosive nuclear weapons testing would be needed but have clearly been proven wrong. While the science has excelled, and still needs to be supported, the manufacturing side of the NNSA complex was largely ignored.

Many of the manufacturing buildings date back to the era of the Manhattan project and the early Cold War; and even with the inclusion of the new science facilities, 54% of the NNSA facilities are inadequate or substandard. The NNSA complex is roughly the size of Delaware, has over 2000 miles of roads and has about 6 pentagon equivalents of active space under roof.

Replacing and upgrading the NNSA complex will be difficult and expensive, but in the end, it will be the smaller, more modern, safer and more secure complex that the nation needs.

We hear much about the cost of the nuclear enterprise. A Congressional Budget Office report in October 2017 assessed the cost of the enterprise to be \$1.2 trillion over 30 years in 2017 dollars. This estimate was based on a New START force structure. Maintaining a nuclear deterrent is costly, although a small percentage of the overall defense budget, estimates range from 3% to 7%. Without the constraints of New START on both Russia and the US the cost could certainly be more.

Fourth is people. DOD, the Services and NNSA don't have enough people for the modernization. Getting the right people is very difficult in the current competitive environment. Developing and adopting more creative ways to attract, train, hire and retain employees is critical. This could include scholarships, on the job training, and retention pay for example, but whatever is the correct answer hiring has to be easier and faster. And of course, the back log in getting new security clearances, updated security clearances and even getting security clearances transferred from one agency to another has an enormous impact on the nuclear and national security enterprise and the morale of the workforce.

The fifth and final point is that the US nuclear capabilities are not only the ultimate deterrent for the United States but also many of our allies and partners. Their belief that the United States maintains a credible deterrent is critical to sustaining these alliances and avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One of America's great strengths is its structure of alliances. The Department of Defense's National Defense Strategy, supports these important alliances, by dedicating one of its three lines of effort to "strengthen alliances as we build new partners."

Both the 2018 and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) also emphasize the commitment to our allies and partners. The 2018 NPR specifically states that "No country should doubt the strength of our extended deterrence commitments nor the strength of the U.S. and allied capabilities to deter, or if necessary, defeat, any potential adversary's nuclear or non-nuclear aggression." The 2018 NPR also makes clear that extended deterrence and our allies' and partners' confidence in the nuclear umbrella is "essential to their security, enabling most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons and thereby contributing to U.S. non-proliferation goals."

Assurance and deterrence are just part of our commitment to allies and partners. Our allies and partners also want to ensure that the United States does not support, start, or participate in another arms race similar to that of the Cold War. As a result, our allies continue to support arms control. In the July 11, 2018, NATO Brussels Summit Declaration, the heads of state and government of the 29 member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance set forth their support for both arms control and New START. "Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an

essential contribution to achieving the Alliance's security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security."

The Summit Declaration also praised the US and Russia for meeting the central limits of New START and set out NATO's continuing support for the Treaty. "We acknowledge the United States' and Russia's reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and applaud their meeting the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as of 5 February 2018. The new START Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies express their strong support for its continued implementation and for early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic stability."

In closing, I would like to highlight the need for a national discussion on nuclear policy, including nuclear deterrence.

Part of the national discussion is finding the right balance between reductions and modernization and building the consensus to support both. Achieving the balance and starting a consensus was a major achievement of the Obama Administration. Sustaining that consensus will be difficult, as it is already showing signs of fraying.

Ensuring a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent for the US and our allies can help to prevent nuclear use until the time when there is an opportunity to reduce the threat and resume work to set the conditions that will, ultimately, eliminate nuclear weapons. In the meantime, while the nuclear deterrent programs will vary and evolve over time, consistency in support and funding is necessary to ensure a safe, secure and reliable deterrent for the US and our allies and partners.

President Obama tried to lead the way down the road that would lead to a world without nuclear weapons. Sadly, the world didn't pick that path and the threat of nuclear use is increasing. On the other hand, the increasing nuclear threat makes discussions with others, Russia, China, and even North Korea and Iran all the more important. Withdrawing from agreements and hoping the problem goes away is certainly not the answer. Engagement at all levels is necessary to avoid a new nuclear arms race, and new conflicts, particularly those with a potential nuclear dimension.

Dialogue is also important to address the more probable threats of terrorist use of a nuclear device and the accidental or misinformed intentional use of a nuclear weapon by a nation.

Arms Control in its broadest context isn't something we do for fun. Agreements and treaties to limit numbers, types, capabilities or kinds of systems and provide transparency in research, development, and deployments, bring certainty and stability and should improve mutual understanding and trust.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Ms. Creedon.
Mr. McKeon.

**STATEMENT OF BRIAN McKEON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, PENN
BIDEN CENTER FOR DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT**

Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the importance of arms control agreements with Russia. I agree with much of what was said, if not all of it, by my two colleagues. I will try very hard not to duplicate what they said. I will focus primarily on New START.

An extension of New START, which we have discussed already, would bring significant benefits to American security, for the same reasons the treaty was a good idea in the first place: the transparency and predictability that it provides. New START contains an inspection and verification regime that includes regular exchanges of data; regular notifications, including advance notification of launches, and intrusive onsite inspections of the military bases on the territory of the other party where nuclear forces are based.

General Hyten, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified last winter that the insight provides by the verification measures are “unbelievably important,” quote/unquote, to his understanding of Russian force posture. Without a treaty, our confidence levels about the size, location, and nature of Russian forces would decrease, and the intelligence resources required to monitor such forces would increase, but they would not yield information equivalent to that which can be obtained through the onsite inspections.

The treaty limits the number of strategic launchers and warheads that each party may deploy as well as a combined limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers. This structure provides several advantages to the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.

First, the Commander of the Strategic Command can devise the war plans secure in the knowledge about the size and location of Russian nuclear forces. Without the treaty, he would be required to engage in worst-case planning assumptions, which eventually could result in decisions to increase the size of deployed forces.

Second, the Departments of Defense and Energy can plan for the recapitalization of the nuclear triad and the DOE production facilities with certainty about the requirements for U.S. forces well into the next decade. The flexibility in the treaty is particularly important at a time when all three legs of the triad are aging out and scheduled for replacement at the same time. In the event that DoD encounters reliability issues with the current force or technical issues in the recapitalization program that affects one leg of the triad, we can respond by adjusting other legs of the triad to ensure that we maintain an adequate deployed deterrent.

Third, the upper limits prevent the two sides from engaging in an unproductive and unnecessary arms race in order to seek an advantage against the other. An arms race is not foreordained, but it cannot be ruled out, and at times the President has threatened it.

The Trump administration, as has been stated, has not committed to an extension and appears focused now on the new goal of a trilateral agreement involving the United States, Russia, and China. The President's ambition is admirable; the only problem is there is almost zero chance of it happening during his first term.

For starters, the architect of this "go big or go home" strategy is Mr. Bolton, the National Security Advisor, who has never seen an arms control agreement that he liked. He shepherded one in the Bush 43 administration that limited nuclear-deployed arms for exactly 1 day and, then, it expired. So, there are reasons to be skeptical about this gambit.

Second, arms control treaties negotiated between the United States and Russia usually took months or years to negotiate, and then, the Senate's consideration and review would also take months or even longer. A trilateral agreement involving the United States, Russia, and China would be vastly more complicated.

Third, there is the simple and practical fact that China is not interested. Given the significant disparity in its nuclear forces compared to the United States and Russia, even with the expansion that China is going through that the ranking member identified, the idea that Beijing would negotiate a treaty of this sort is fanciful.

Finally, I am skeptical about this, given the current state of bilateral relations between the United States and Russia, which I think we would all concede is poor. In an ideal world, we would pursue an arms control agenda with Russia that includes negotiations on non-strategic weapons, on further reductions in strategic systems, and discussions about Russia's novel systems. We must have those discussions about the novel systems in the context of New START and the New Start extension.

But we also have to recognize we live in a world where distrust between the United States and Russia is high, where Russia has violated the INF Treaty, illegally occupied Crimea, intervened in Eastern Ukraine, and sought to interfere in our elections. We have to be realistic about what can be achieved in this environment.

It is realistic to extend New START and, as has been stated, doing so is not inconsistent with the pursuit of a more ambitious agreement. In fact, it seems illogical to pursue more expansive limits on nuclear weapons while contemplating a world in which there are no limits between the United States and Russia. That would be the classic case of letting the perfect get in the way of the very good. The New START agreement is a very good agreement, and the United States and Russia should pursue an extension.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]



Statement of Brian P. McKeon

Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for
Diplomacy & Public Engagement
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Before the

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment

**Russia and Arms Control: Extending
New START or Starting Over?**

July 25, 2019

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the importance of arms control agreements with Russia. This hearing is timely, given the imminent demise of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the looming expiration of the New START Treaty.

For nearly five decades, dating back to the Nixon Administration, the United States and the Soviet Union, and its successor state the Russian Federation, have engaged in negotiations and concluded agreements to limit the size and scope of our respective strategic nuclear arsenals, which have the potential to destroy the planet many times over. We engaged in such discussions not only when bilateral relations were improving -- such as during the era of détente in the 1970s -- but even during the height of the Cold War in the early to mid-1980s. Forged by both Democratic and Republican presidents, and with bipartisan support from the U.S. Congress, these agreements have led to sizable reductions in the nuclear forces of both countries, enhanced strategic stability, and measurably advanced our security.

Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who could hardly be accused of being naïve about Russia, stated the issue as a binary choice nearly a decade ago in presenting the New START Treaty to the Senate: “the key question [during this period] has always been the same: Is the United States better off with a strategic arms agreement with Russia, or without it?” The answer, he said then, has always been the same: “with an agreement.”¹

That is a question the United States again confronts, as the United States and Russia consider whether to extend the New START Treaty, which expires in 18 months. In practical terms, this would be a simple undertaking: the treaty can be extended for another five years if both parties agree to it. The President can take this step without obtaining the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.

An extension would bring significant benefits to American security, for the same reasons that the treaty was a good idea in the first place: the transparency and predictability that the treaty provides -- which thereby contribute to strategic stability between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Let me briefly address these elements:

Transparency: the New START Treaty contains several provisions that allow each party to assure itself that the obligations are being met by the other party, and, as important, visibility into the nuclear posture of the other party. These include twice-yearly exchanges of data regarding our respective forces, regular notifications related to a range of activities -- including advance notification of launches -- and intrusive, on-site inspections of the military bases on the territory of the other party where nuclear forces

¹ “The New START Treaty, Hearings before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 111-738, at 45-46 (2010).

are based. Since the treaty entered into force in 2011, the two parties have exchanged over 18,000 notifications² and conducted over 300 on-site inspections.³ The treaty also provides for regular meetings in a bilateral commission to discuss issues of concern about the operation of the treaty.

These data exchanges, and the ability to verify Russian reporting through 18 annual inspections – which involve American personnel on the ground inside Russian military facilities – provide invaluable information that our national technical means alone cannot duplicate. General Hyten, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told your Senate colleagues in February that the insight provided by the verification measures is “unbelievably important” to his understanding of Russian force posture.⁴

Consider for a moment a world without such transparency. Over time, in the absence of a treaty, our confidence levels about the size, location and nature of the Russian forces would decrease.⁵ Of necessity, the intelligence resources required to monitor such forces would increase, but they would not yield information equivalent to that which can be obtained through the treaty’s inspection regime.⁶ The increased collection on Russian nuclear forces would inevitably result in reduced focus by the intelligence community on other priorities. You should not take my word for it. I would urge the subcommittee to solicit the opinion of the Director of National Intelligence about what would be lost if the treaty expires, the costs and resources required to monitor Russian nuclear forces in that circumstance, and the tradeoffs required. The National Intelligence Estimate prepared in 2010 in connection with New START would also provide information in this regard.

This transparency even extends to certain information being made public, thereby providing not only the U.S. public but also other countries evidence that the treaty limits are being honored. The most recent data made public by the United States indicate that

² “New START Treaty,” Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/new-start/> (data as of July 11, 2019) (accessed July 16, 2019).

³ “New START Treaty Inspection Activities,” Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-inspection-activities/> (data as of June 27, 2019) (accessed July 16, 2019).

⁴ “Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Feb. 26, 2019, at 56-57 (preliminary transcript), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-14_02-26-19.pdf (accessed July 18, 2019).

⁵ A recent State Department report to Congress confirms: “Without the data exchanges and the access through on-site inspections to Russian facilities subject to the Treaty, the overall effect would be a decrease in our knowledge of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. “Report on the Reasons that Continued Implementation of the New START Treaty is in the National Security Interests of the United States,” at 2 (prepared in response to Section 1237 of the National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2016), Department of State (Dec. 2018), <https://www.state.gov/report-on-the-reasons-that-continued-implementation-of-the-new-start-treaty-is-in-the-national-security-interests-of-the-united-states/> (accessed July 19, 2019).

⁶ *Supra* note 4, at 83 (Gen. Hyten states that “[T]here is really nothing that can replace the eyes-on/hands-on ability to look at something.”)

both parties are below the limits on deployed launchers and warheads.⁷ According to all publicly available information, the Russian Federation remains in compliance with the Treaty.

Predictability: the New START Treaty limits the number of strategic launchers and warheads that each party can deploy, as well as a combined limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers. The limits, and the way they are structured, provide several advantages:

First, the Commander at U.S. Strategic Command can devise war plans involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons secure in the knowledge about the size and location about Russian nuclear forces. Without the treaty's limits and its verification provisions, the Command would be required to engage in worst-case planning assumptions, which could eventually result in decisions to increase the size of the U.S. deployed forces. Strategic Command would also have to consider whether China would respond to that circumstance by expanding its nuclear forces, although I would note that a modernization of its nuclear missile force and expansion of its stockpile is underway, according to public statements by the U.S. intelligence community.⁸

Second, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) can plan and budget for the recapitalization of the nuclear triad and the DOE production facilities with certainty about the requirements for U.S. forces well into the next decade.

The flexibility contained in the New START Treaty is of significance to the DoD, at a time when all three legs of the triad are aging out – and scheduled for replacement -- simultaneously. The treaty limits the total numbers of launchers and deployed warheads, and permits each party to determine for itself the mix of launchers it deploys at any one time, and also provides a combined limit of deployed and non-deployed launchers. This structure will be important as the Department pursues recapitalization programs that will extend into the 2030s. In the event the DoD encounters reliability issues with the current force, or technical issues in the recapitalization program that affect one leg of the triad, DoD can respond by adjusting the other legs of the triad to ensure that we maintain an adequate deterrent.

⁷ "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," Fact Sheet, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Department of State, July 1, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-10/> (data as of March 1, 2019) (accessed July 15, 2019).

⁸ Director of National Intelligence, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Statement for the Record, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, at 9 (January 29, 2019), <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCL.pdf> (accessed July 18, 2019); Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends," Remarks at the Hudson Institute (May 29, 2019), <https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/> (accessed July 18, 2019).

Third, the upper limits on our respective forces prevent the two sides from engaging in an unproductive and unnecessary arms race in order to seek an advantage against the other country. That not only advances stability but saves resources that the Department of Defense can devote to other priorities. An arms race is not foreordained, but it cannot be ruled out, and at times President Trump has threatened it. The recapitalization of the triad is already expensive enough: during the peak years of the modernization program, costs are projected to double over current expenditures for operating and sustaining the nuclear forces.⁹ Increasing the size of the force would obviously add to the budget burden.

Maintaining these ceilings is especially important given that Russia commenced its nuclear modernization effort over a decade ago, is about 80 percent complete, and will most likely be completed next year, according to a statement made by the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command just a few months ago.¹⁰ Thus, in the absence of caps on strategic systems, Russia would be in a position to deploy a larger and more modern force just as the United States is working to replace systems that are nearing obsolescence.

For these reasons, as well as the transparency benefits that I discussed earlier, the U.S. military has generally been in favor of the New START Treaty, as evidenced by the support of the treaty by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2010, and more recently in testimony to the Congress by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

To date, the Trump Administration has not committed to extend New START. When questioned in congressional testimony, Administration officials have stated that the matter is under review. The National Security Advisor was more forthcoming about his policy preference in an interview last month, when he said “There’s no decision [on extension], but I think it’s unlikely.” Mr. Bolton added his own critique of New START, calling out its lack of limits on so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as on the novel weapons being developed by the Russian Federation.¹¹

Administration officials, including the President, now appear focused on moving beyond New START, with an ambitious goal of a trilateral agreement to involve the United States, Russia and China. At the G-20 summit last month, President Trump and Russian President Putin agreed that the two countries “will continue discussion on a 21st century

⁹ Congressional Budget Office, “Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046, at 1 (Oct. 2017), <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53211-nuclearforces.pdf> (accessed July 18, 2019).

¹⁰ David Vergun, “Stratcom Commander: Modernizing Nuclear Triad Critical to Defense,” <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1767844/stratcom-commander-modernizing-nuclear-triad-critical-to-defense/>, Feb. 27, 2019 (accessed July 15, 2019).

¹¹ Bill Gertz, “Bolton: China Continuing Cyberattacks on Government, Private Networks,” *Washington Free Beacon*, June 18, 2019.

model of arms control, which President Trump stated as needing to including China.”¹² What this means is undefined.

The President’s ambition is admirable. The only problem is that there is almost zero chance that a trilateral agreement will be realized in the near term, and almost certainly will not be prior to the expiration of New START in February 2021.

For starters, the architect of this “go big or go home” strategy is National Security Adviser John Bolton, who never saw an arms control agreement that he liked. Under his watch, over the course of two administrations, the United States has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the nuclear agreement with Iran, and started the process of withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The only arms control treaty he ever endorsed while in government was the 2002 Moscow Treaty with Russia – a treaty that did little to control any armaments, given that its obligations would have lasted for just one day.¹³ So there are reasons for skepticism that this gambit is sincere, at least with regard to Mr. Bolton.

Second, arms control treaties negotiated between the United States and Russia during and after the Cold War often took months or years to negotiate, given the complexity and detail required of an agreement with rigorous inspection regimes. A trilateral agreement involving the U.S., Russia and China would be vastly more complicated, and is highly unlikely to be concluded during the remainder of the President’s term.

Third, China isn’t interested. For years, China – believed to have just a few hundred nuclear weapons¹⁴ compared to thousands of weapons in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia – has rebuffed U.S. requests for even general discussions on strategic stability. Given the significant disparity in nuclear forces among the three countries, the idea that Beijing would agree to negotiate a treaty with the U.S. and Russia is fanciful. And while Chinese messaging is sometimes decipherable only by those with long experience on China, in this case Beijing’s line has been clear and consistent, essentially a version of: “let us know when you get down to our levels (of nuclear forces), and we’ll talk.”

¹² Readout of President Trump’s meeting with President Putin, White House pool report, June 28, 2019, https://publicpool.kinja.com/subject-pool-report-18-wh-putin-readout-1835931840?_ga=2.198019622.88652660.1563468874-1712271804.1563468874 (accessed July 18, 2019).

¹³ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Treaty Doc. 107-8 (2002), <https://www.congress.gov/107/edoc/tdoc8/CDOC-107tdoc8.pdf> (accessed July 18, 2019). Article I of the Moscow Treaty required each party to “reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads,” so that by December 31, 2012, the “aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party.” Article IV(2) provided that the treaty would expire that same day, unless extended by agreement of the parties. The Moscow Treaty was terminated on February 5, 2011, pursuant to Article XIV(4) of the New START Treaty.

¹⁴ Public estimates by respected research organizations indicate that China has just under 300 nuclear weapons. E.g., Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 75:4, at 171-78 (estimating that China has 290 weapons), <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511> (accessed July 18, 2019).

Finally, I am skeptical because of the state of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia, which is at a low ebb.

In an ideal world, we would pursue a longer agenda with Russia to further advance our arms control objectives. We would seek negotiations on so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, where the Russian arsenal significantly exceeds that of the United States. We would also seek further reductions in strategic systems.¹⁵ We would try to preserve the INF Treaty, now almost certain to terminate next week. And we would seek discussions about Russia's novel systems, under development for several years now, which President Putin has periodically boasted about.

Unfortunately, we live in a world where distrust between the United States and Russia is high. We live a world where Russia has violated the INF Treaty, illegally occupied Crimea and intervened in Eastern Ukraine. We live in a world where Russia sought to interfere in the U.S. presidential elections as well as various European elections, and will likely try to interfere in our elections next year. And we live in a world where, as my former boss Secretary of Defense Carter said in a speech in 2015, "Moscow's nuclear saber rattling raises questions about Russia's commitment to strategic stability" and causes us to wonder "whether they continue to respect the profound caution that world leaders in the nuclear age have shown to the brandishing of nuclear weapons."¹⁶

As a supporter of sound arms control agreements, I hope the President's core objective – of seeking mutual restraint of nuclear forces among the leading powers – is sincere. At the same time, we must be realistic about what can be achieved in the current environment.

It is realistic to extend New START – and it must be emphasized that doing so is not inconsistent with the pursuit of a more ambitious agreement. In fact, it seems illogical to pursue more expansive limits on nuclear weapons while contemplating a situation in which there are *no limits* between the two countries that possess the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Adopting such a position would be a classic case of letting the perfect get in the way of the very good.

The New START Treaty is a very good agreement. It's not perfect; no international treaty is. But it provides important constraints that make the United States safer, predictability for the U.S. military as it recapitalizes our nuclear forces, and a foundation

¹⁵ President Obama proposed to negotiate on both these issues in June 2013. Negotiations never got off the ground, due the Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea in early 2014. Remarks of President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany, June 19, 2013, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany> (accessed July 15, 2019)

¹⁶ Remarks of Secretary of Defense Carter, Berlin, Germany, June 22, 2015. <https://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1953> (accessed July 22, 2019).

for strategic stability between the United States and Russia at a time when there are significant challenges in the bilateral relationship. Assuming that Russia remains in compliance with New START, it would be foolishness of the first order to let the treaty lapse.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.
Dr. Karako.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS KARAKO, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. KARAKO. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, thank you for the opportunity to comment today on nuclear arms control. It is a very timely issue. U.S. and Russian officials were just meeting about this last week, and, of course, we are probably just eight or 9 days away from the potential termination of the INF Treaty.

Now, in 18 months, the United States will face the question of whether or not to extend New START, but that decision need not be made today. Instead, it is worth considering how this moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, this decision point, can best be used to advance some longer-term U.S. goals for arms control and defense more broadly.

With today's hearing, the committee usefully connects the question of New START extension to Russia's violation of INF. A lot has changed since 2010. Indeed, contempt for agreements seems to now have become a defining feature of Russia's international identity. And that identity and track record should be central to our thinking about future agreements with them, including whether and under what circumstances an extension should be made.

Now much commentary on this issue has treated the prospect of extension as self-evident, as urgent and necessary to forestall an arms race. And Washington has gradually come to grips with the reality of renewed, long-term geopolitical competition. Many of Russia's violations have also become more widely acknowledged. But I wonder, have the implications of Russian behavior really sunk in?

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review warned that, quote, "Concluding further agreements with a State in violation of multiple existing agreements would indicate a lack of consequences for its non-compliance and thereby undermine arms control broadly." End quote. Chairman Dunford has expressed doubt about New START extension on similar grounds.

It is also debatable how a lack of extension would necessarily lead to further buildup. Rather than occurring in response to some sort of U.S. action, Russia's nuclear renaissance was initiated separately and prior to more recent U.S. modernization efforts. Apart from further uploading ICBMs, it is hard to imagine Russia affording much more than they are doing already.

To be sure, there are benefits in the treaty's degree of certainty with respect to the category of nuclear weapons called strategic, even if the line between strategic and non-strategic systems grows more artificial by the day. Given that Russia seems uninhibited from just about every other form of bad behavior, it is worth dwelling on the apparent anomaly that they comply with New START while violating just about everything else. Moscow may simply not feel the need to violate a treaty structured around so-called strategic weapons when they can do so much with non-strategics, and with which they have, reportedly, a 10-to-1 advantage. These non-

strategic Russian systems include the INF-violating missile, other sea-and air-launched missiles, and the transoceanic torpedo.

Russia appears to value the treaty extension, and we should at least try to get some leverage of this value in the service of broader defense goals. And one path is to earnestly renew negotiations for a comprehensive approach to all nuclear weapons. That was urged by the Senate in its 2010 resolution of ratification and it was pursued by the Obama Administration. Russia showed little interest then, but it was the right goal and we should pursue it again.

Another important goal is that multilateral arrangement that includes China, which is, after all—this has changed since 2010—now the pacing threat for United States national security. Such a move was endorsed by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister mentioned before in 2013. Getting China to that table will not be easy. It is not obvious why it would be in China's interest to do so, at least not as the table is now set. It may require resetting the table, perhaps even working with Russia in a post-INF context to field significant forces around China.

In sum, it may be beneficial to extend New START on conditional terms, a condition that Russia immediately enter into and sustain good-faith negotiations for that more comprehensive accord. These negotiations could also advance a joint effort to coach China into some kind of regime.

There are 18 months for these options to be explored. Those talks should be given time to proceed, but talking about the urgency of unconditional extension I worry could have the unintended consequence of undermining the U.S. negotiating position and setting back these larger, longer-term goals.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I look forward to questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Karako follows:]

**Statement before the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
Energy, and the Environment**

***“Russia and Arms Control: Extending New
START or Starting Over?”***

A Testimony by:

Thomas Karako

Senior Fellow, International Security Program
Director, Missile Defense Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

July 25, 2019

2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, members of the subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to present my perspective on arms control with Russia, especially in light of the INF Treaty's likely termination next week and the question of a five-year extension of New START. It is a timely matter, as press reports indicate that U.S. and Russian officials were in Geneva last week to explore the concept of a new nuclear arms accord.¹

Given our longer-term goals with respect to strategic competitions with Russia and China, such an extension could be made conditional on the immediate start of negotiations for a comprehensive approach to controlling all Russian nuclear weapons, and a joint effort to incorporate China into some future arms control agreement.

The United States may, in the end, decide to extend the New START treaty pursuant to its terms. But the decision need not be made immediately. The New START treaty is set to expire in February 2021, a year and a half from now.

It does, nonetheless, seem worth considering how this moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship can best be used to shape the future. Extension appears to be something that the Russians value, even if they have concerns about the U.S. approach to launcher conversion.² Perhaps that value could be leveraged in some way to advance two long-standing U.S. arms control goals: a more comprehensive approach and multilateralization.

A Pattern of Contempt

The committee's hearing today usefully connects the question of New START extension with the question of the INF Treaty, from which the United States may soon withdraw, according to the treaty's terms. Disregard for international agreements and international law is a central feature of Russia's behavior and place in the international order. It should therefore be central to our thinking about future arms control with them, including whether, how, when, and under what circumstances an extension of New START should be made.

In addition to violating the INF Treaty, Russia is either rejecting or avoiding obligations and commitments under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki Accords, and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Russia has also violated the Open Skies Treaty and is selectively implementing the politically binding Vienna Document to avoid transparency of its major military exercises.³ They have also carried out a chemical weapons attack on the territory of a NATO ally, contrary to the Chemical Weapons Convention. These are not isolated incidents, but a pattern.

The pattern is compounded not merely by Cold War-style nuclear rhetoric, but also by a willingness to manipulate the good faith upon which international agreements depend. In 2007, Russia messaged their discontent with the INF Treaty, and their interest in jointly withdrawing. In retrospect, one cannot read

¹ Roberta Rampton, "U.S., Russia to Discuss Nuclear Arms Limits in Geneva on Wednesday: Officials," *Reuters*, July 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia/us-russia-to-discuss-nuclear-arms-limits-in-geneva-on-wednesday-officials-idUSKCN1UA268>.

² Pavel Podvig, "Is New START Extension Really that Easy?" *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, May 20, 2019, http://russianforces.org/blog/2019/05/is_new_start_extension_really.shtml.

³ Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, DC: DOD, 2018), 73-4.

Putin's 2007 Munich remarks without recognizing the military logic by which Russia wanted intermediate-range missiles, given the capacity of their other neighbors. But instead of giving notice of its intent to withdraw for reasons of supreme national interests, as the United States did with the ABM Treaty, Russia instead took a more cynical path: violating its terms while remaining within the treaty, thereby putting the onus upon the United States to make the case about Russian violation, and then withdraw.

In the words of Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, Jr. director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, "Russia's actions have strained key pillars of [the] arms control architecture."⁴ Many of Russia's arms control violations have been widely acknowledged, as has the sense of renewed geopolitical competition. But have the implications of this contempt sunk in? What does it mean for how future arms control will have to adapt? At what level of strain will the edifice fall?

Over the last five years, Washington has awakened to the reality of renewed competition with Russia and China. The invasion of Ukraine, the violation of numerous arms control treaties, various activities in the East and South China Seas, and a host of other activities have contributed to the sense that history has indeed returned, and that our approach to deterrence and defense policies must change accordingly.⁵

This new period of great power competition will not be brief. In describing the strategic competitions with Russia and China, the National Defense Strategy refers to them as "long-term." Approaches to arms control must be adapted to this new reality. Their content and form may also need to be different than in the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period up to around 2010.

Weighing the Question

Much of the public commentary has treated the prospect of a five-year extension as self-evidently the right thing to do under any circumstances, as an urgent step that needs to be taken immediately, and as necessary to forestall an arms race between the United States and Russia. Few things in life are truly self-evident.

To be sure, there is some benefit in the degree of certainty with respect to the category of delivery systems and warheads called "strategic," even if the line between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons grows more artificial all the time. There is also value in the apparent confidence it instills about Russian intentions, force structure transparency, and perhaps intelligence gathering.⁶

It is, however, debatable that the expiration of the New START treaty would automatically lead to some kind of arms buildup over and above that which Russia is already undertaking. In the first place, Russia's current nuclear renaissance seems to have been initiated years ago, quite separately and prior to more recent U.S. nuclear modernization investments or force structure decisions. Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has previously commented on assertions that planned U.S. nuclear modernization in the 2020s would spur an arms race: "Despite decades of American and allied reserve—for 25 years our

⁴ Robert P. Ashley Jr., "The Arms Control Landscape ft. DIA Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley Jr.," (speech, Hudson Institute, Washington DC, May 29, 2019), <http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Hudson%20Transcript%20-%20The%20Arms%20Control%20Landscape.pdf>

⁵ A similar point has been made by former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Frank Rose. See Frank A. Rose, "The Future of Global Strategic Stability" (speech, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, July 19, 2019).

⁶ *Hearing on Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements: Hearing Before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (March 8, 2017) (testimony of Gen. John Hyten).*

nations have refrained from building anything new—many countries, including Russia, North Korea, and more, have been doing just that. And some of these nations are even building some new types of weapons.”⁷

Although the United States government has found that Russia has complied with New START, Russia has been modernizing its nuclear forces at a considerable rate over the past decade. An increase in Russian spending on strategic systems upon the expiration of the treaty would depend upon several factors, including the ability of Russia’s faltering economy to support even greater military spending.

There is also a question whether deciding now to renew New START in the face of Russia’s near-complete record of arms control violation would undermine our negotiating position and resolve about responding to their pattern of non-compliance. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “Concluding further agreements with a state in violation of multiple existing agreements would indicate a lack of consequences for its non-compliance and thereby undermine arms control broadly.”⁸ In December 2018 General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “It’s very difficult for me to envision progress in extending [New START] ... if the foundation of that is non-compliance with the INF Treaty.”⁹

Any decision about a five-year extension should be made with a long-term view, and specifically what sort of follow-on treaty might be pursued or achieved in or before the 2026 timeframe. As much as one would like to segregate New START off into its own separate lane, these matters are linked. The Russia that has complied with New START is the same Russia that has violated INF and a host of other arms control agreements. And the Russia that violated INF is the same Russia with whom the United States would be negotiating a START follow-on treaty. Such linkages of distrust would likely carry over to those that would be called upon to advise and consent to a future treaty. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was briefed in November 2012 about Russia’s INF-violating missile, then-Senator John Kerry remarked that, “We’re not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our colleagues are sitting up there knowing somebody is cheating.”¹⁰

The apparent anomaly whereby Russia complies with New START while violating nearly everything else merits further consideration. The Russians have demonstrated that they seem uninhibited from almost any form of bad behavior and international norm, so it may not be out of obligation to the sanctity of international treaties. Nor do they seem to be placing less reliance upon nuclear weapons, since they are modernizing their entire strategic and expanding their non-strategic nuclear forces.¹¹ So why does Russia comply with New START? It may be that Moscow does not feel the need to do so because they can gain comparative advantage by developing and fielding a wide variety of non-strategic systems. Apart from

⁷ Ashton Carter, “Nuclear Deterrence: Still the Bedrock of US Security,” *The American Interest*, April 6, 2017, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/04/06/nuclear-deterrence-still-the-bedrock-of-us-security/>.

⁸ *Nuclear Posture Review*, 74.

⁹ Gen. Joseph Dunford quoted in Jonathan Landay and Arshad Mohammed, “Russia Must Scrap or Alter Missile U.S. Says Violate Arms Treaty,” *Reuters*, December 6, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-russia-missiles/russia-must-scrap-or-alter-missiles-u-s-says-violate-arms-treaty-idUKKBN1O52BA>.

¹⁰ Quoted in Thomas Karako, “Putin’s Treaty Problem: The Lessons of Russia’s INF Treaty Violations,” *CSIS Commentary*, July 29, 2014, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/putin%E2%80%99s-treaty-problem-lessons-russia%E2%80%99s-inf-treaty-violations>.

¹¹ Tony Wesolowsky, “Here’s What We Know: Russia’s New Generation Of Nuclear-Capable Weapons,” *Radio Free Europe*, February 19, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/here-s-what-we-know-russia-s-new-generation-of-nuclear-capable-weapons/29778663.html>.

further uploading intercontinental ballistic missiles with additional warheads from their stockpile, it is hard to imagine Russia affording or doing much more than what they are doing already.

Paths Forward

Since a decision about the short-term extension of New START need not be made immediately, the decision ought to be informed with respect to what we want and are willing to accept in a follow-on treaty, and how best to create the conditions for realizing our longer-term goals.

There are several major options for the post-New START era.

Status Quo

One is to essentially pursue the status quo—call it START IV—a bilateral arrangement between Russia and the United States that includes caps on both launchers and warheads, and perhaps improved methods of verification. If the status quo is good enough for the longer-term, then a five-year extension would make sense, as might indeed a hypothetical 10- or 15-year extension. Merely renewing the one arms control treaty with which Russia is interested in complying would not address the increasing imbalance of non-strategic systems, nor would it address China's growing nuclear forces. An unconditional extension also runs the risk of kicking the can on further reductions as well as failing to make a statement about Russia's pattern of noncompliance.

Comprehensive Bilateral Approach

Another option is to enter negotiations to include a comprehensive approach to all Russian nuclear weapons, specifically including those non-strategic weapons for which Moscow reportedly has a 10:1 advantage relative to the United States. Like several predecessor treaties, New START failed to capture the so-called "non-strategic" nuclear systems, including the INF-violating cruise missiles, a nuclear-powered and nuclear capable cruise missile, and a nuclear-powered, nuclear capable transoceanic torpedo. It is a cliché these days to say that all nuclear weapons are strategic weapons, and yet so many of them are not "strategic" for the purposes of arms control. As Russia doubles down on unregulated non-strategic forces, the definition of what nuclear forces are in and out of the "strategic" category (or the category's elimination) may be the most important criterion for a subsequent treaty.

This option was the one urged by the U.S. Senate in its resolution of ratification for New START, requiring that the president certify that the United States would, following consultation with NATO allies, initiate negotiations with Russia to address the disparity of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States.¹²

The Obama administration pursued these negotiations in good faith. In April 2010, President Obama called for an additional round of bilateral negotiations that should address tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed strategic weapons. And in June 2013, Obama called for deployed strategic weapons to be reduced by a third and for "bold reductions" in U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.¹³ Russia

¹² *Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, 111th Cong., December 22, 2010, S. Res. 111-5.

¹³ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate -- Berlin, Germany," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 19, 2013, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany>.

showed little interest in these ideas. It seems to me that the extension of New START might be used as a means to help reopen these issues.

Even while pursuing this grander deal, the United States should not widen the aperture to include negotiated restraints on its missile defenses, whether in terms of number, types, location, or capabilities. The Trump administration's 2019 Missile Defense Review stated that "the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats."¹⁴ In doing so, it continues the approach endorsed by the Obama administration, that "the United States will not negotiate restraints on U.S. [ballistic missile defense] capabilities."¹⁵ As then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller noted in 2014, the number of U.S. long-range interceptors is fewer than the 68 nuclear-armed interceptors around Moscow, and "our limited numbers of defensive systems cannot even come close to upsetting the strategic balance."¹⁶ In terms of both numbers and capability, U.S. ballistic missile defenses will not come close to upsetting the strategic balance anytime in the foreseeable future, so limits on them should not be included in strategic arms negotiations.

Multilateralization

A third option is scrapping the bilateral approach to pursue in earnest a multilateral treaty that includes China. This would indeed be a worthy goal. China is, after all, the long-term pacing threat for the United States. China has up until now entered into no agreements related to transparency, limitation, or reduction of its nuclear forces. Although some commentators would like to believe China has a minimum deterrence policy, it is hard to square such a conclusion with what appears to their pursuit of a robust triad of delivery systems.

Such a move to move beyond the bilateral structure was endorsed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, in 2013: "We cannot endlessly negotiate with the United States the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms while some other countries are strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities." He added that "Making nuclear disarmament a multilateral process is becoming a priority."¹⁷

This approach is not without risk and would not be easy. Assuming that all parties would be permitted parity in numbers, a trilateral or multilateral approach could result in substantial reductions on the part of Russia and the United States to come down to China's level, or conversely green light China to build up to Russian and U.S. levels.

Such a goal is worth pursuing, and the Trump administration should be commended for entering into discussions with Russia about possibly pursuing such a goal. Apart from the prestige that it might bring to raise China to the level of a great power in a nuclear arms control context, however, it is not obvious why it would be in China's interest to do so, or what the United States and Russia could do, exactly, to get China to that table—at least not as the table is currently set.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Missile Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), ix.

¹⁵ Department of Defense, *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 35.

¹⁶ Rose Gottemoeller, "America's Commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach" (speech, Missile Defense Agency site, Bucharest, Romania, November 18, 2014), <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/2014/234157.htm>.

¹⁷ Sergci Ryabkov quoted in "Russia Insists on Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control Talks," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, May 28, 2013, <https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-insists-next-round-uke-cuts-be-multilateral/>.

To get China there may require resetting the table. To do so, it will be necessary to first persuade China it is in its interest to join it. That may require the robust pursuit of intermediate-range capabilities. That pursuit could be in concert with Russia. Vladimir Putin noted in 2007 the Russian desire to have intermediate-range missiles, given the presence of such capabilities on their periphery. Perhaps the United States should have listened to Putin when he said that in Munich, or perhaps Russia should have exited the INF treaty in an orderly and legal manner in order to meet the need for such capability relative to China and others. At any rate, the demand signal by Russia for such forces seems to be a real one, as is that of the United States.

It may therefore be worth exploring with Russia an arrangement to both limit the numbers and capability of intermediate-range missiles in the European area, and encourage their location by both parties closer to China.¹⁸ Just as it took the fielding of Pershing missiles in Europe to bring Russia to the table for INF, getting China to the arms control table may require fielding a number of new capabilities, perhaps in coordination with Russia, as well as the cooperation of our allies.

A Less Formal Approach

Should none of this happen, there is another path forward: a less formal approach. The United States could simply allow New START to expire with unilateral or joint declarations to abide by the existing limitations, as has been done in the past. Some four decades ago, in the wake of Russia's invasion of another one of its neighbors, Afghanistan, it became clear that SALT II would not be ratified, and there was a period of time with a presidential declaration of adhering to SALT II limits even without a binding treaty governing strategic systems. There was likewise a period after the expiration of START I and the entry into force of New START in 2011, when no legally binding verification mechanisms were in place.

In 1961, Thomas Schelling and Mort Halperin wrote that "a more variegated and flexible concept of arms control is necessary—one that recognizes that the degree of formality may range from a formal treaty with detailed specifications, at one end of the scale, through executive agreements, explicit but informal understandings, tacit understandings, to self-restraint that is consciously contingent on each other's behavior."¹⁹ Moving away from a more formal approach might have the added benefit of withholding the prestige and ceremony that accompany treaty signing and conclusion.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the future of arms control with Russia could look different than its Cold War-era forms. It might not be defined by formal treaties with numbers of delivery systems or warheads. Other elements such as transparency, alert levels, and confidence building measures might be more important. The two more ambitious tracks discussed above are preferable, but a less formal approach is not unthinkable. As the world order takes a new form, arms control may also take new forms.

¹⁸ Elbridge Colby, "The INF Treaty Hamstrings the U.S., Trump is Right to Leave It," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/23/the-inf-treaty-hamstrings-the-u-s-trump-is-right-to-leave-it/?utm_term=.b8091d67dbb9.

¹⁹ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 77.

Concrete Conditions for Extension

The question of a short-term extension of New START should be informed by the longer-term strategic goals, as well as by Russia's troubling record of arms control compliance. To that end, it might be beneficial for the U.S. to pursue a conditional rather than unconditional extension of New START.²⁰

The condition should be that Russia immediately enter into negotiations for the New START-follow-on agreement, one encompassing all nuclear weapons including so-called non-strategic weapons. Such an approach would also have to be informed by Russia's troubling history of contempt for arms control, and by the prospect that a nominal commitment to such negotiations could become nothing more than a means of delay. This would require an annual assessment of negotiations over the course of the next five years, lest Russia merely use this as a means to delay or prolong genuine negotiations. A second condition or perhaps topic of negotiations during that period should be how the United States and Russia can bring China to the table for a multilateral agreement—just as Rybakov urged in 2013.

We should all hope that the concrete conditions are present in which a New START extension can be made. There are eighteen months to shape those conditions. These options should be explored, and talks should be given time to proceed. At this moment, however, it is probably premature to make a firm decision about extension.

Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. I look forward to your questions.

²⁰ Franklin Miller, "Deterrence, Modernization, and Arms Control" (speech, Mitchell Institute Breakfast Series, Washington DC, May 24, 2019).

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Dr. Karako.

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.

This is the committee with European-Eurasian jurisdiction. So, I want to focus, first, on the relationship we have with our NATO allies as it relates to this issue.

In trips I have had already to Europe talking to our allies and discussions I have had back here at home with our NATO allies, there was great concern about the way that the U.S. approached the INF Treaty and backing away from it. Their concerns were more than private. They were public. They were concerned they were not consulted ahead of time and brought into those discussions with an INF Treaty that affected them directly. They were concerned, too, that as we proceeded to do that, that we did not take that 6-month period—this is about the last—and concentrate at least and demonstrate efforts to renegotiate some of that. And that is important, I think, because how we deal with these allies is critical to our strength in the future and our global security as a whole.

So, with that in mind, what would it look like in terms of our NATO allies if we made a decision not to proceed to this agreement and extend it in the first round? Now I noticed that was addressed by Mr. Countryman and Ms. Crendon. If you would like to comment on that, since you brought up this in your testimony?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Briefly, the NATO alliance is one in which the United States should not only be a leader, but a listener. And all of the NATO allies have spoken of the importance of extension of New START. They all support it.

On the INF, I think they were disappointed by the degree of consultation. There was no interagency process, as it has been pursued for many years in Washington, before the President made this announcement. While the announcement was not a surprise, what you have just said is correct, that there was zero effort on the part of the United States to pursue alternatives to the disappearance of INF other than building new missiles. So, I think the Europeans have a valid criticism there.

Finally, non-strategic nuclear weapons, of which the United States has more than a thousand by the last information I had, are an important issue for the NATO alliance as well. And one of the things that makes negotiating a new agreement to include non-strategic weapons impractical is we have not begun any kind of process of consultation with our NATO allies, whose interests are directly affected, about what we would put on the table with regard to non-strategic weapons.

Mr. KEATING. Ms. Crendon?

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you.

NATO has consistently, over the course of the last series of summits, reiterated that NATO is a nuclear alliance and remains such as long as nuclear weapons exist. That said, NATO has substantially reduced the number of strategic warheads placed on its soil and certainly is not interested in increasing those.

In order to avoid more increases in nuclear arms, maintaining the New START Treaty is extraordinarily important for NATO. Just recently, the NATO Secretary General has reiterated this in

a press conference that he held shortly after the most recent NATO Russia Council meeting, which NATO is still continuing to hold.

And I would add, it is not just our NATO allies that are very interested in ensuring that we continue with New START. It is the whole range of our allies in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Mr. KEATING. We talked about leverage briefly, and Dr. Karako mentioned that, too. But, given our relationship now with Russia, and given the fact that New START could be extended just with the Presidents' initiatives to do that, I just think it creates more leverage for the U.S. to just move forward and demonstrate we are prepared to do this.

China is now engaged more than ever in training exercises with Russia together. Trying to deal with that could, indeed, make our initial leverage more difficult. Does anyone want to comment on that?

Ms. CREEDON. Well, it might make it more difficult, but I think there is also something important to consider. And that is the significant disparity currently between the number of nuclear warheads and systems that Russia and the U.S. have compared to China. So, right now, between the U.S. and Russia, they have 90 percent of the world's nuclear delivery systems. There is room, there is opportunity, there is need for further reductions on the part of those two nations before we can bring in China, at least on the strategic arms.

Mr. KEATING. I now recognize the ranking member.

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And again, to all of you, thank you for being here.

And by the way, Mr. Countryman, you were born to be in public service with a last name like that.

[Laughter.]

And I know everybody tells you that, but I am like, it is like when you meet somebody whose last name is "Butcher" and they are a butcher, or something.

But thank you all for your service.

A couple of quick points. Mr. McKeon, I appreciate your testimony. I just wanted to make a point. I think just bringing up that Ambassador Bolton is involved is not a reason. I actually have a great deal of respect for the guy, and I know he takes a lot of hits in the media and people use him as a foil, but I think he knows foreign policy really well. And so, I think that is important to note.

But let me ask a question to Mr. Karako or Dr. Karako. So, let's say we extend New START for infinity, forever, and we abide by the current limits forever into the foreseeable future. What limits does China have under that?

Dr. KARAKO. Oh, of course, the answer is none. And up until now, they have managed, China has managed to get away without any binding limitation on transparency or anything—and so, again, fully stipulating the challenges of getting them to that table.

Mr. KINZINGER. And let me ask you on that, too. So, let's say we get them to the table. Let's say we negotiate directly with China and we have a China-U.S. treaty, and that freezes us under the current limits we are already under under New START, for instance. What is the motivation for China to be involved if, in fact, we are under the same limits we are already under, under another

treaty, for them to get into that treaty and limit themselves? Would you agree that there is no motivation whatsoever, then, at that point?

Dr. KARAKO. I would say, in a vacuum with no other context, not necessarily. But there are other things going on, including, for instance, in the post-INF world, things that the United States can and will likely be doing in the region with our allies.

Mr. KINZINGER. So, it looks like, I think the best thing we can hope for—and I think we all agree on this, and we probably all agree on 90 percent of the issue, anyway, with some nuances—but we would obviously like to see a treaty between the U.S., Russia, and China, where we are all, in essence, living by the same kind of rules. Because if any one of those three are out, then, obviously, that is an advantage for them. They do not have to abide by that agreement and you have two others that are.

But let me ask you, so we have an agreement with Russia and nothing with China. In the next 10 or 20 years, who do you see as the biggest threat to the United States from a national security perspective, Russia or China?

Dr. KARAKO. Well, the typical formulation is Russia may be urgent, maybe more provocative, but, of course, the pacing threat for the National Defense Strategy in the Pentagon right now is China. And so, that is why I tried to emphasize that we need to look beyond the 5-years, and as we think about the 5-year extension, include that long-term perspective in there. It is worth making the effort for that longer-term push.

Mr. KINZINGER. And I think, too, one of the things, if we enter a multilateral treaty, which I think we would all love to see, but you can begin to put a lot of new things in there as far as we are opening up a front; we are concerned about a front opening up in space right now. We know some of the capabilities that the Chinese and Russians have in space. There are cyber issues. There are any number of things that may be able to be wrapped into some broader situation. Because, right now, when it comes to space, it is kind of like the laws of the old pirates of the sea, right? There really is no law. There are no rules. And that is something that I think is of as great a concern to the United States and national security even as nuclear weapons. They are both very intense, but this one is not getting enough attention.

Let me ask you another question. What could we use if we want to get China to the table in this, which is all of our goal—I think we would all agree—what could we use as leverage to get the Chinese to the table? And also, do you think we could expect Russia's help in doing so?

Dr. KARAKO. It is hard to say we can expect anything from Russia, but what I would suggest is that, in the absence of the INF Treaty, the United States, through long-range precision fires and other things, should be pursuing longer-range strike fires from multiple domains. That is the sort of thing that will get China's attention.

Now the administration has said we are only going to be pursuing conventional intermediate-range missile forces, and that is a good thing. But we can begin the process of holding lots of different things at risk in China through that means.

Mr. KINZINGER. And right now, we know Russia is developing new strategic systems to get around our missile defenses. I guess my question in my limited seconds here, if you want to talk a little about that? But also, do you believe Russia would agree to discuss the inclusion of these weapons in any New START extension?

Dr. KARAKO. In terms of hypersonic glide vehicle kind of things?

Mr. KINZINGER. Yes.

Dr. KARAKO. Possibly, but I would not count on it. That is the sort of thing that is an emerging threat and it is an emerging advantage. At least a couple of years ago, we were a little bit behind the curve on that. So, it is something we are scrambling to catch up on, both on the strike and defensive side, but we are not there yet.

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, again, I want to thank the chairman and thank you all for being here. It is a really important issue, and we could stand to learn a lot from all of you. So, thank you for being here.

I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to our witnesses.

I want to begin by asking you, Mr. Countryman, what you think is the likely both short-term and long-term outcome if we do not extend New START in terms of American national security interests?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. In the short term, we would immediately lose valuable eyes on Russian nuclear capabilities. Also, in the short term, and something that does make this urgent, there is an important international meeting in the spring of 2020, the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference that is held every 5 years. Traditionally, it has been important for the U.S. and Russia to demonstrate that they are reducing their arsenals and reducing the nuclear threat to the world in order to gain consensus at the review of a treaty that has been strongly in our national security interests.

Neither the U.S. nor Russia at this point can go to that conference next year and say with a straight face, "We have done our best to fulfill our legal obligation to keep reducing our arsenals." That will be a loss for our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to still more countries beyond the nine that hold them now.

In the medium term, you should also expect that Russia will be able, because of open production lines, because of its possession of heavy missiles, to be able to upload more nuclear warheads more rapidly than the United States can with no visibility whatsoever from our side.

And in the long run, I think we are setting the conditions for a very expensive and destabilizing nuclear arms race that two Presidents have expressed their readiness to conduct.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you.

Ms. Creedon, National Security Advisor Bolton has long opposed New START extension. In a 2010 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, he argued that New START would cripple the United States' "long-

range conventional warhead delivery capabilities and severely constrain our nuclear flexibility,” and we would, I quote, “pay for this mistake in future conflicts entirely unrelated to Russia”. End quote. Did his predictions turn out to be true?

Ms. CREEDON. So, I do not think so at all. One of the things that is very clear is that the New START Treaty does not limit either conventional systems nor does it limit missile defense systems. And at the time, there was a lot of, I would say pulling of hair and gnashing of teeth, that the New START Treaty was going to limit these things, and they do not. It does not.

The other thing is, one of the beauties, if you will, of the New START Treaty is that it is an infinitively flexible treaty. So, it sets top-line numbers for delivery systems and platforms and top-line numbers for operationally deployed warheads. And within those top lines, the U.S. has infinite flexibility to be able to shape its systems based on what is most important to its national security interest at the time. So, I think it is an extraordinarily flexible treaty.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you.

My final question is, there has been a lot of discussion about a trilateral agreement and including Russia in this conversation. It is important to note that China’s nuclear arsenal numbers about 300 weapons while the United States and Russia have more than 1300 and 1400, respectively. And I think there have been a number of people who have argued, and I think Senator Markey actually, on May 15th, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, “I think it’s pretty clear that the attempt to move this to multilateral arms control talks with Russia and, then, adding in China is really a poison pill to provide an excuse for not extending New START.” Do you agree with that assessment, Mr. Countryman?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, and the point about getting China into the negotiations, nobody has explained what we would like China to sign up to and what we would put on the table. Broadly speaking, three options. We could ask China to agree to the same limit of strategic warheads as the U.S. and Russia, thereby giving a U.S. blessing to China quadrupling its nuclear forces. We could propose that the U.S. and Russia go down to China’s level of about 300 warheads, give or take. I think that is a great idea, but not achievable anytime in the near future. Or we could tell the Chinese, “Let’s lock in forever a 5-to-1 numerical advantage for the United States over China.” It is impossible to explain why the Chinese would go for that. No coherent negotiating strategy that would draw on the Chinese has been put forward.

Mr. CICILLINE. And in the few seconds I have left, Mr. Countryman, if the United States and Russia began increasing their nuclear arsenal, in the absence of an extension of New START, what is China’s likely response to be?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. The main thing is they will keep doing what they are doing, which is building up forces anyway. But the incentive to accelerate that growth will be even greater, as not only the U.S. and Russia lose transparency about each other, the rest of the world, including China, will have no clue as to the actual size of the two arsenals.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEATING. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett.

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I had a couple of questions, and I will just throw them out to the committee. And you all just jump in when you want to—even if you do not want to. I would appreciate it.

What can we use as leverage to get the Chinese to the table on the arms control issue? Not everybody at once.

Dr. KARAKO. I guess I would again say, agreeing with what has been said just a moment ago, that is not going to be easy. Right now, China possesses a considerable advantage on the conventional strike in the region. That is their home game. That is our away game. And they have got a lot of advantages to push around their neighbors.

I think that what was formerly called the “pivot” or the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, and now, with the Trump administration, it is the Indo-Pacific, more and more strike assets and different operations in that region, making it harder for China to push its neighbors around, that would be a good thing.

Ms. CREEDON. I think we are going about this a bit wrong. So, in the context of nuclear weapons and warheads and delivery systems, there is zero incentive for China, given the significant disparity between the U.S. and China, and then, also, Russia and China. What we really need to think about, since we have no history of bilateral-type arrangements with China, how do we look at building a relationship initially? And so, there are some things that we might do to start to build this relationship.

So, one of the things that we might consider, which would also be extraordinarily important to the U.S. Navy, is ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, for example. China has ratified this. They operate under it, and the U.S. has not ratified and is at a significant disadvantage in the region. So, that would be something that we might do to begin relationships under a treaty umbrella.

The second thing—and this is a little bit out there—but, on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Russia has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; China has not, nor has the U.S. Basically, China has been waiting to see what we do. OK. Both the U.S. and China would like to see North Korea not resume testing and freeze its nuclear weapons program.

Another idea, for instance, might be the U.S. and China agreeing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in exchange for DPRK to also sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

So, I think we need to think about this in much more creative ways to build that relationship with China.

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I agree with everything that Madelyn Crendon has just said. I will also point out that a trilateral negotiation in which Russia and China are in the same room with a U.S. negotiator does not increase our leverage vis-a-vis Russia to have China in the same room. And it does not increase our leverage vis-a-vis China to have the Russians in the same room.

It is extremely difficult to immediately jump to the level of familiarity with concepts, particularly the crucial concept of transparency which U.S. and Russian negotiations have built up over

decades, extremely difficult to jump to that level with the Chinese, for whom transparency is an extremely alien concept. We do need to work hard on military-to-military channels and honest, closed, secret, strategic discussions between United States and Chinese officials about military and strategy issues as a first step.

Mr. BURCHETT. You said, "closed". Do you mean, you are talking closed-door meetings?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. I mean getting to understand the way each other thinks in a frank way. Yes, closed door.

Mr. BURCHETT. I got you.

What would be the impact on allied national security if we failed to extend the New START? Would the U.S. nuclear umbrella be stretched way too thin?

Mr. McKEON. At the current time, Congressman, we have more than enough for our deterrent purposes in the war plans. Under New START, I would point you to an unclassified report to the Congress in 2013, when new deployment guidance was issued by President Obama where a statement to that effect was made, that we had more-than-adequate forces under the New START limits.

If there is a buildup in response to the absence of a treaty by the Russians and we decide to respond, I do not think that would stretch our forces. We can adequately cover our deterrence requirements by a buildup. The question it poses to STRATCOM and DoD is, if we reduce forces, then, as you adjust the war plans to meet our deterrent requirements, that is where the harder calculations come in.

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important subcommittee hearing.

I would like to drill down a little bit more about whether we should move forward or not with regards to the New START. I do not know, Mr. McKeon, following your comment, the New START covers Russian weapon systems. What do you think, as we see their modernization program, what systems we should be most concerned about here in the United States?

Mr. McKEON. Well, there are several issues going on in the Russian modernization program. They have been modernizing their triad and they are ahead of us in that respect. They are doing some work on nuclear weapons, which we really can't talk about in this forum.

Mr. COSTA. How rapidly is that taking place?

Mr. McKEON. Well, the overall modernization, I have a quotation from General Hyten in my prepared statement, sir, that he anticipates that their overall modernization will be completed next year and they are about, I think, 80 percent of the way there.

Mr. COSTA. And to what extent does the New START limit those efforts?

Mr. McKEON. New START only has two core limits. It limits launchers, the number you can have deployed and non-deployed, and strategically deployed warheads. Other than that, there are no limits.

The issues of concern to the United States and our Western allies are also the so-called novel systems that President Putin has boasted about from time to time—the hypersonic glide weapon, it is under development, the so-called doomsday underwater torpedo that he has talked about.

Mr. COSTA. How real are those?

Mr. MCKEON. I am two and a half years out-of-date on the intelligence, sir, so I do not know the current state of those programs. But when I left government, I would say that they were not as far along as you might infer from his public statements. And in any event, we have never had defenses against Russia's strategic systems. Our national missile defense has never been designed to stop a Russian system.

Mr. COSTA. Notwithstanding discussions with—

Mr. MCKEON. So, we are already vulnerable to Russian strategic weapons, whether they have—

Mr. COSTA. Well, and we have been for some time.

Mr. MCKEON. Correct.

Mr. COSTA. So, are we pretty confident about our intelligence, notwithstanding what we can and cannot talk about in this hearing, in terms of what new systems they are developing?

Mr. MCKEON. I would really hesitate to opine on how confident the intelligence community is today. We, obviously, have very good satellites and other technological capabilities. I think our intelligence about leadership—

Mr. COSTA. Would any other witness like to opine?

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. Intentions are not that great.

Mr. COSTA. Any of the other witnesses like to opine?

Ms. CREEDON. Well, to that end, I think the thing that we also have to remember is that our intelligence is greatly enhanced by extending New START because it provides for those on-the-ground inspections. It provides for the notifications. It provides for displays. It provides, in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, an opportunity to discuss whether or not new systems are, in fact, covered or not by the New START Treaty. So, there is a lot in the context of the New START Treaty in the intelligence arena that we would lose if it were not extended for the additional 5 years.

Mr. COSTA. I have read that our cost to update our own modernization program could extend \$50 billion-plus per year for a number of years. What are the financial costs if we do not, if New START does expire, do you think?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. There is immediately greater spending on intelligence, and then, no matter how much we spend on intelligence and national technical means, we would not be able to substitute for the information we get from notification and inspections.

Mr. COSTA. So, what is your view in terms of the cost of our own efforts to modernize?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. It is huge, I mean huge. It is probably \$1.7 trillion over the next 30 years. And I expect that, if the demise of New START leads to nuclear planners in both capitals, in the absence of solid information, working off of worst-case scenarios, they would propose ever greater levels of expenditure and armament. That is where we were throughout the arms race of the sixties, and

I think that is the more expensive, riskier status, riskier race we would go back to.

Mr. COSTA. I do not know who feels most confident to talk about the Chinese, but what are the odds that we should be concerned about China's nuclear arsenal? I mean, they handle it differently than we and the Russians do in terms of how they store and how they maintain alert status, as I understand it.

Ms. CREEDON. The Chinese arsenal is actually quite small.

Mr. COSTA. Yes, that is what I understand.

Ms. CREEDON. And so, the Chinese advantage is really in the area right now of conventional systems, and that is the——

Mr. COSTA. And that is expanding greatly?

Ms. CREEDON. Yes.

Mr. COSTA. We have watched their buildup. It is a dramatic increase.

My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Wright.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you.

I want to thank all of you for being here today. Let me stress that I have great respect for you, your intelligence, your experience. And like everyone up here, I think we should pursue an arms control treaty.

But I remember very vividly a previous U.S. President who set conventional wisdom on its head with his approach to adversaries and arms control and foreign policy generally, who was thoroughly vilified in the press, vilified by the left as a reckless cowboy who was going to lead us into nuclear war. But what his policies did do is help bring down the Soviet Union, which resulted in genuine arms control.

If I were a betting man, I would bet that none of you 2 years ago would have predicted that Donald Trump would set foot in North Korea, but he did. And no President has set conventional wisdom on its head like this one has since Ronald Reagan. So, I would caution against utilizing conventional wisdom to predict what this President might or might not achieve.

The second thing is—and, Dr. Karako, I want to get your thoughts on this for just a second—it seems to me only prudent that we would periodically review every treaty we have, whether it is an arms control treaty or a trade agreement, whatever it might be, to see if they are still working for the American people, because no treaty is sacrosanct. Would you agree with that?

Dr. KARAKO. Sure, in principle. The NATO treaty might come close to that, but, in principle, that is right. That is one of the reasons that something like New START had a 10-year period and with the option of a 5-year extension. It was not indefinite.

Mr. WRIGHT. The purpose of an arms control treaty is not to make us feel good; it is to actually control arms. And any of you can answer this. Given that we know Russia is developing new weapons, and given, as Dr. Karako mentioned, their disdain for even respecting agreements, if they do not agree to limit new weapons, are not we setting ourselves up for a future violation in the future, if we go through with this one? There is nothing in their recent behavior that would give us confidence that they would treat

another agreement any differently. Would you all comment, all of you?

Dr. KARAKO. I would say, again, that there is that anomaly, that Russia has seemingly complied with New START while being willing to violate just about everything else. And so, I have not suggested that extension of New START would mean that they would violate it. On the contrary, because so many things have changed since 2010, that disparity that everyone has referred to and alluded to, it has a different significance today. It is salient. It matters more that they are doing all these things that are not covered by the treaty.

Mr. WRIGHT. I still have a little time. Mr. Countryman, did you want to—

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. First, I have the greatest respect for Ronald Reagan, who came into office not knowing much about nuclear weapons and made it a priority to study up from day one. And as a consequence, you are absolutely right, he took radical, world-changing steps in that direction. When the Soviets violated the ABM Treaty by building a radar, he did not pull out of the treaty; he did not stop negotiating other treaties. He pressed ahead until that violation was corrected, and that treaty was preserved. And most importantly, he made that sentence, together with Mr. Gorbachev, that no one in the current administration is prepared to repeat, that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

I wish that Russia were the only country in the world that took such a cavalier attitude toward international agreements. It is important to distinguish between the verification mechanisms of INF and New START. Because the INF Treaty succeeded in its goal of eliminating all known intermediate-range missiles, the onsite inspection provisions were allowed to lapse. And if we get to some kind of extended agreement that addresses the question of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, we should find a way to address that problem.

Mr. WRIGHT. Ms. Creedon? No, you do not have a comment? If you do not, that is fine. We can go to Mr. McKeon.

Ms. CREEDON. I am conscious of your time, sir. But the only thing I really wanted to add on this is the New START Treaty was intentionally and specifically to continue the legacy of strategic arms control, and that is what it did. And it defines strategic arms within its treaty. If there are going to be new weapons that fit within the definition of what is a strategic arm, then the New START Treaty would cover it and limit it.

And that is a very different topic of conversation than what most of the conversations are, and most of those conversations are about those systems that are not covered by this treaty. And that was known at the time it was entered into, and it was known at the time all the other strategic arms control treaties were entered into. The idea was to have New START control the strategic arms, and then, have an opportunity to get after all those other things that were not included in New START. That is what we still need to do.

Mr. WRIGHT. And I am out of time unless the chairman wants to—

Mr. KEATING. No. The chair recognizes the vice chair of the committee, Ms. Spanberger from Virginia.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have talked a lot about the nuclear forces modernization cycle that began in the early 2000's, and that many of these modernization programs would be subject to limits under the New START Treaty. But Russia is also developing a number of new strategic weapon systems that are not currently subject to the treaty. These include nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles, globe-circling nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and long-range nuclear torpedoes. While these weapons are not currently included in the treaty, Article 2 allows for emerging offensive arms to be considered for inclusion through a bilateral consultative process.

Mr. Countryman, you were very clear that an extension of New START should not be contingent on the inclusion of these emerging weapon systems. And with that in mind, I am curious if you could share, what is the best way that we could address these new strategic nuclear weapon systems and capabilities into the future?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. The treaty itself contains the means for doing so. The Bilateral Consultative Commission can be used by both parties to address concerns they have, and specifically, Article 2 says that is where you address them. I would like to see both Washington and Moscow use the Bilateral Consultative Commission aggressively; that is, not just meet once every 4 months, but stay in session and work hard on these issues, because I believe both Russian and American issues can be resolved sufficiently to allow extension of New START without further problem.

Ms. SPANBERGER. And a bit of a broader question, Mr. McKeon, for you. When we are looking about emerging technologies and future technological capabilities, from your perspective, are there things we should be anticipating that we are not or are there things we should be anticipating when looking at our treaty efforts, be they bilateral or multilateral?

Mr. McKEON. I think the conversation about Russia and China and strategic systems needs to be broader than nuclear. And I think the ranking member spoke about this when he was still here. We have issues with the Chinese and Russians in space and in cyberspace, and we have seen reports about Russia mapping out where some of the underwater sea cables are. So, there are a lot of issues in the context of a broader strategic stability conversation that we need to have with both the Russians and Chinese.

Continuing New START, assuming Russian compliance, at least gives us some forum to have these conversations with the Russians. We have restrictions on mil-to-mil engagements with the United States and Russia because of the intervention in Ukraine. Those might be reconsidered. We have tried to have strategic stability conversations with the Chinese over many administrations. So far, they have not been interested. We need to take a broader lens, I think, not just on the nuclear question, as important as that is.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank each of you for being here.

And it certainly was positive to see the agreement with Congressman Wright and Mr. Countryman about the success that President Ronald Reagan achieved, the victory in the cold war and the liberation of dozens of countries, and the creation of dozens of new countries around the world because of successful policies. I appreciate the contributions of each of you, as we achieve new policies.

Dr. Karako, before the United States announced the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, they consulted with the allies in Europe. NATO issued a statement supporting the U.S. withdrawal and agreeing with the U.S. conclusion that Russia had violated the treaty. Has the United States consulted with its allies about potential extension of New START? Would you expect the allies to support a U.S. decision to allow the treaty to lapse?

Dr. KARAKO. I could not speak for what they would do, other than to speculate. But I think that what you just described there in terms of consulting with NATO, you are right, they did go through—it might not have been exactly when some of our allies wanted or as soon, but, eventually, they did speak with one voice. And I think it kind of depends on how well we communicate the seriousness of what we are trying to accomplish.

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, Dr. Karako, Russia is developing new strategic systems designed to get around the missile defenses of the United States. These systems do not appear to be limited by the New START. How many of these systems would Russia need to have an edge over our citizens? How useful is the U.S. missile defense system against Russia's existing nuclear weapons?

Dr. KARAKO. Well, of course, today, and as the Trump administration's missile defense review reaffirmed, U.S. missile defenses are not directed against or not capable, in terms of capability or number, of really dealing with the strategic threat from Russia. That has not changed, and we are not on a programmatic path to change that.

These new systems, however, you are right, they are more on a regional level and the so-called non-strategic level, designed to get at the gaps and seams of what we are relatively good at in terms of point or regional ballistic missile defense.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And for each of you, beginning with Mr. Countryman, again, who has a unique name, do you believe the United Kingdom and France should join the arms control process, as Russia has suggested? Do you believe they would be willing to limit their nuclear forces or provide transparency into their numbers and capabilities?

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. On the first part, I think that the British, in particular, also the French, have provided more transparency than China has, and unprecedented compared to their historical record. I do not believe that they would be willing to enter into a process right now. What I would like to see is increased use of the P5 mechanism in which those five countries you mentioned have consulted on nuclear issues with a view to increasing transparency, developing trust, exchanging views on doctrines. Getting to understand each other is, I think, a precondition for what I hope 1 day will be that kind of multilateral negotiation.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Ms. Creedon.

Ms. CREEDON. So, I certainly agree with Tom. France and the U.K. have been extraordinarily open. In fact, they have actually been more transparent than even has the U.S. But transparency would be a very good first step.

And I would expand this discussion because what we have not talked about Pakistan, India, or Israel, or the DPRK, all of whom have nuclear weapons and all of whom could benefit from some sort of a transparency process from the outset. Certainly, Pakistan, India, and Israel are not transparent, nor is China. Even Russia is not terribly transparent, except in the context of the New START Treaty. And if we did not have the New START Treaty, we would even lose that.

So, transparency is a very good way to start confidence-building measures, exchanges of information, so we did not get ourselves in some sort of a situation of an accidental nuclear war or a misunderstanding that started a nuclear war inadvertently.

Mr. WILSON. And, Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. The only thing I would add, sir, to what has been said is I would be skeptical the French would ever want to get into a multilateral conversation about limiting their deterrent, which they see as independent and vital to the defense of their country. The British might eventually be coaxed into such a process.

Mr. WILSON. And, Dr. Karako.

Dr. KARAKO. Yes, the independence of our allies, they have been very transparent, but at the same time they have their numbers. It is not that significant relative to Russia.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, each of you, for being here today.

I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. And thank you.

Today's hearing is one of the more important hearings that we can have, and it is important to have it at this juncture. We really worked hard as a committee to get this done before we broke, so that we can do all we can do to move the ball forward on an extension of New START, whatever form that may take.

There was a great deal of agreement on what the challenges we have and the goals that we should achieve, some differences on how we can get there, but that agreement is important. This is, indeed, an issue that is an existential threat, much as it was years ago. The human costs that are at stake are enormous.

And I think, indeed, the situation is even more dangerous than before. With the extension of artificial intelligence and the prospect of miscalculation greater, the threat is greater.

Also, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, it is extremely important, too, because we have great challenges ahead of us in that committee as well and great costs attendant to those challenges. The modernization effort that has been mentioned is one that will be expensive. We have to look at how we can curb the overall expenditures that we have, so that we can accomplish that. Because we have new threats, not just in modernization of current types of assets, but expansion in the cyber area, into space, and, as we have mentioned, in the ocean.

And the last point I would make is this: that extending New START is important. We can do other things that we discussed here while moving ahead and showing the U.S. is taking that initiative themselves. Our profile around the world right now, as we have moved away from the INF Treaty, although justified, yet something we could have executed in a better manner, casts a view of us around the world, as well as the moving away from, which we did not discuss, the JCPOA, a treaty, not a treaty, but an agreement that included Iran, which, indeed, was very transparent and actually a model of transparency compared to our other agreements.

It is important, in the wake of that, that we move ahead and be the leaders on a New START extension, so that the U.S. can be where it should be, in a position of global leadership in arms control.

So, I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Countryman, Ms. Creedon, Mr. McKeon, Dr. Karako, for your participation in this important agreement. We look forward to hearing from you in the future. Feel free to have any input you can on this important matter with this committee.

And with that, I will adjourn the committee.

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment

William R. Keating (D-MA), Chairman

July 25, 2019

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>):

DATE: Thursday, July 25, 2019

TIME: 2:00 pm

SUBJECT: Russia and Arms Control: Extending New START or Starting Over?

WITNESS: The Honorable Thomas Countryman
Board Chairman
Arms Control Association
(Former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security)

The Honorable Brian McKeon
Senior Director
Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement
(Former Acting Under Secretary and Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense)

The Honorable Madelyn Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
(Former Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy)

Thomas Karako, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow, International Security Program
Director, Missile Defense Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment HEARINGDay Thursday Date July 25th Room 2172Starting Time 2:07 Ending Time 3:24Recesses ☐ (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Mr. Keating

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒Executive (closed) Session ☐Televised ☒Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒Stenographic Record ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

Russia and Arms Control: Extending New START or Starting Over?

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See Attached

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

*Mr. Thomas Countryman's Testimony**Mr. Brian McKeon's Testimony**Ms. Madelyn Creedon's Testimony**Dr. Thomas Karako's Testimony**QFR's from Mrs. Wagner*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 3:24

 Subcommittee Staff Associate

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
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	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
X	Greg Pence, IN
X	Ron Wright, TX
	Michael Guest, MS
X	Tim Burchett, TN

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

**Questions for the Record from Representative Ann Wagner
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and Environment
Russia and Arms Control: Extending New START or Starting Over?
July 25, 2019**

Question:

New START has been rightly praised for its verification provisions. Ambassador Countryman, how would the expiration of New START affect potential or ongoing negotiations to secure verification provisions for Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons programs?

Answer:

Ambassador Countryman: The verification provisions for an existing nuclear arsenal, as in New Start, are quite different from the verification provisions for a nuclear research program, which were contained in the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and which were strictly implemented by Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Certainly some of the same technology and procedures we use to monitor Russia's arsenal could potentially be employed if we are able to reach agreement with North Korea, although we are still far from that point in bilateral negotiations. For example, New Start contains a provision that allows for remote monitoring technologies to detect the presence of nuclear warheads.

The greater effect of the expiration of New Start would be a further diminished American reputation for being a responsible partner. Our credibility has already been eroded by the US unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, despite there being no evidence of any Iranian violation. Negotiating partners - whether adversaries or allies - have already been given several good reasons to doubt the reliability and staying power of any agreement concluded with Washington.

Question:

Because New START limits and restrains the world's largest nuclear powers, it stabilizes competition among third party nuclear states like China. Mr. McKeon, can you explain the dynamics between China, the United States, and Russia under New START? What would trilateral nuclear competition between these powers look like in the absence of New START?

Answer:

Mr. McKeon: Under New START, the United States and Russia agreed to mutual restraints on deployed strategic launchers and warheads. The Treaty's central limits, in effect since February 2018, are complemented by its verification regime, which includes exchanges of data, notifications, and on-site inspections. This contributes to strategic stability between the two countries with the world's largest nuclear arsenals.

China has a significantly smaller nuclear force than the U.S. and Russia, with approximately 300 nuclear weapons and 250 or so launchers.¹ China claims that its force is designed to be a “minimum deterrent,” and it has remained small relative to the large arsenals of the United States and Russia over several decades. The U.S. intelligence community (IC) believes that China is currently modernizing its nuclear missile force and expanding its weapons stockpile.² The IC’s most recent public statement says that “these new capabilities are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent by providing a second-strike capability and a way to overcome missile defenses.”³ This suggests that China’s nuclear posture has not been significantly influenced by the existence of New START.

A world without New START – if not extended or replaced by a successor agreement -- is unpredictable. An arms race could ensue, though it is not foreordained. The loss of the verification regime would, over time, reduce our confidence levels about the size, location and nature of the Russian forces. Without the treaty’s limits and its verification provisions, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command would be required to engage in worst-case planning assumptions, which could eventually result in a decision to increase the size of the U.S. deployed forces. Russia would likely respond to such a development by expanding the deployment of its forces; it is less clear that China would do the same, beyond the current modernization program.

Both countries almost certainly factor our national missile defense system into account as they make force-sizing decisions, even though the United States has long made clear as a matter of policy that the system is not intended to counter their strategic deterrents, but is instead designed to counter rogue states such as North Korea. That system is expanding, from the current 44 ground-based interceptors to 64 over the next several years.

Finally, the demise of the INF Treaty and the poor state of U.S.-Russian relations since Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the U.S. and NATO policy responses thereto, have contributed to an erosion of strategic stability between our

¹ See, e.g., Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 75:4, at 171-78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511> (accessed Aug. 1, 2019). See also U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” Annual Report to Congress, at 66 https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf (accessed Aug. 2, 2019) (stating that China has approximately 90 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and four operational submarines equipped with 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles).

² Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Statement for the Record, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, at 9 (January 29, 2019), <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf> (accessed July 18, 2019); Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends,” Remarks at the Hudson Institute (May 29, 2019), <https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/> (accessed July 18, 2019).

³ Director of National Intelligence, *supra* note 2, at 9.

two countries. That contributes to the uncertainty about the dynamic that will result if New START is not extended.

The uncertainty is also rooted in part in our lack of recent experience with such a world. Since the START I Treaty entered into force in December 1994 -- with the exception of a 14 month period while New START was under negotiation and consideration by the Senate -- the United States and Russia have had in place mutual restraints, by treaty, on strategic weapons.

Question:

A trilateral arms control agreement between the United States, Russia, and China seems like a prudent national security goal. And Russia should be as eager as we are to pursue such an agreement, given its long border with China and difficult history. Dr. Karako, what leverage can the United States use to entice China to enter trilateral negotiations? Is this an area in which Russia can play a constructive role, or is Russia more likely to seek to cut the United States out of negotiations?

Answer:

Dr. Karako did not submit a response in time for printing.

Question:

Dr. Karako, if the United States and Russia choose to not to extend New START, how should U.S. planners seek to offset uncertainty resulting from reduced transparency, especially given that Russia has muddied the waters regarding its nuclear posture in recent years?

Answer:

Dr. Karako did not submit a response in time for printing.

