    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 116-22]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                          FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES

                  FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 28, 2019

                    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ___________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    36-883                     WASHINGTON : 2020

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROB BISHOP, Utah
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          MO BROOKS, Alabama
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma, Vice
        Chair
                   Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
                    Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
                               Zach Taylor, Clerk

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     0
    Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................1 deg.

                                   WITNESSES

    Clark, Lt Gen Richard M., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic
      Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Air
      Force; accompanied by Lt Gen Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., USAF,
      Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
      Force for Acquisition..........................................     6
    Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
      Command........................................................     4
    Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
      for Policy, Department of Defense..............................     1
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs.......................................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Clark, Lt Gen Richard M......................................    75
        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    27
        Hyten, Gen John E............................................    37
        Trachtenberg, Hon. David J...................................    28
        Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    63

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Bishop...................................................    89
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................    89

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mrs. Davis...................................................    93
        Mr. Garamendi................................................    94
        Mr. Keating..................................................    96
        Mr. Larsen...................................................    94
        Ms. Speier...................................................    95
        Mr. Wilson...................................................    93

         FISCAL YEAR 2020 PRIORITIES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR
                                   ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                              Washington, DC, Thursday, March 28, 2019.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in
    Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Cooper. The subcommittee will come to order. First, I
    would like to ask unanimous consent that opening statements be
    inserted for the record. Hearing no objection, that will be
    done.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 27.]
        Mr. Cooper. And second, I would like to ask our unusual
    unanimous consent so that members of the full committee, like
    Mr. Lamborn, are also able to participate in the subcommittee
    questioning, after subcommittee members have had a chance to
    ask their questions.
        Hearing no objection--is the gentlemen asking for a
    recorded vote?
        [Laughter.]
        The gentleman withdraws his questionable objection.
        I would like to welcome the distinguished witnesses before
    us today. I apologize on behalf of the House of Representatives
    that this is getting such a late start, but you know that is
    business as usual here. So since there are no opening
    statements, why don't we go ahead and hear from the witnesses.
        We are lucky to have such a distinguished panel today, and
    I appreciate all the witnesses coming, but why don't we start
    with Secretary Trachtenberg.

    STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
              OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Trachtenberg. Chairman Cooper, distinguished members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
    President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for nuclear forces.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes today's
    increasingly complex global security environment, characterized
    by overt challenges to the free and open international order
    and the reemergence of strategic competition between nations.
        For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to
    reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately,
    Russia and China have chosen a different path and have
    increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies,
    along with the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.
        For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent
    is necessary to ensure that the reemergence of strategic
    competition does not lead to conflict or escalate to large-
    scale war.
        Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense
    spending to upgrade its nuclear forces and pursue advanced
    weapons specifically designed to counter U.S. military
    capability. Russia's nuclear modernization program covers every
    leg of its strategic triad and includes modern intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, submarine launch ballistic missiles, and
    long-range strategic bombers.
        Russia's minister of defense has stated that by 2020, 90
    percent of the country's strategic nuclear forces will be armed
    with modern weaponry. In March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced
    that Russia is developing even more new nuclear weapons
    capabilities. In addition, Russia is modernizing and expanding
    an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 non-strategic
    nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships, bombers,
    aircraft, and with ground forces.
        China continues its expansive military modernization and
    remains focused on establishing regional dominance and
    expanding its ability to coerce U.S. allies and partners.
    Modernization of its nuclear missile forces include deploying
    advanced sea-based weapons, developing more modern road-mobile
    and silo-based missiles and testing hypersonic glide vehicles.
    The Chinese are also developing a new nuclear-capable strategic
    bomber.
        And although we remain hopeful that negotiations with North
    Korea may produce a pathway to peace and denuclearization,
    North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a potential threat to
    our allies and our homeland and add to an already complex
    strategic picture.
        The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of
    Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure,
    survivable, and effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear forces are
    the ultimate foundation of our Nation's security. Our deterrent
    forces must be modernized to remain credible. Delay is not an
    option.
        The highest U.S. nuclear policy and strategy priority is to
    deter potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale
    against the United States or its allies. However, deterring a
    nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons. U.S.
    nuclear forces are also intended to deter non-nuclear strategic
    attacks, assure allies and partners, achieve U.S. objectives if
    deterrence fails, and hedge against an uncertain future.
        Effective deterrence of nuclear attack and non-nuclear
    strategic attack requires ensuring that potential adversaries
    do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first
    use, either regionally or against the United States. They must
    understand that the costs far outweigh any perceived benefits
    from non-nuclear aggression or limited nuclear escalation.
        U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is consistent with
    longstanding precepts that the United States would employ
    nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend our
    vital interests and those of our allies. Our policy also
    maintains the longstanding approach of constructive ambiguity
    regarding U.S. nuclear employment that has helped deter
    potential adversaries from nuclear coercion or aggression.
        A policy of no first use would undermine U.S. extended
    deterrence and damage the health of our alliances because it
    would call into question the assurance that the United States
    would come to defense of allies in extreme circumstances. A no
    first use policy might embolden adversaries who may perceive it
    as a weakened U.S. resolve to defend our allies and vital
    interests with every means at our disposal. It may also
    undermine U.S. non-proliferation objectives if allies felt the
    need to develop or possess their own nuclear weapons for
    deterrence.
        The 2018 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] reaffirmed the
    conclusions of previous Republican and Democratic
    administrations that the diverse capabilities of the nuclear
    triad provide the flexibility and resilience needed for
    deterrence in the most cost-effective manner. Each leg is
    essential, complementary, and critical to ensuring no adversary
    believes it can employ nuclear weapons for any reason under any
    circumstances.
        Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far
    beyond its originally planned service life. Most of the
    Nation's nuclear delivery systems will reach their end of
    service life in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe and cannot be
    sustained further. If not recapitalized, these forces will age
    into obsolescence. Consequently, we must not delay the
    recapitalization of the triad initiated by the previous
    administration.
        The fiscal year 2020 budget request funds all critical DOD
    [Department of Defense] modernization requirements. The request
    for nuclear forces is roughly $25 billion, or roughly 3.5
    percent of the overall DOD budget. This includes $16.5 billion
    to sustain and operate our nuclear forces and $8.4 billion for
    recapitalization programs. The Department's request to
    recapitalize the nuclear enterprise is about 1.2 percent of the
    total DOD budget request.
        Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to discuss arms control at
    length, including the administration's position on both the INF
    [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty and developments
    with respect to the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction]
    Treaty.
        But in the interest of time, let me conclude by stating
    that nuclear deterrence is the bedrock of U.S. national
    security. Our nuclear deterrent underwrites all U.S. military
    operations and diplomacy across the globe. It is the backstop
    and foundation of our national defense.
        A strong nuclear deterrent also contributes to U.S. non-
    proliferation goals by eliminating the incentive for allies to
    have their own nuclear weapons. I urge the committee to support
    the important nuclear programs and funding contained in the
    President's fiscal year 2020 budget request.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg can be found in
    the Appendix on page 28.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Secretary Trachtenberg.
        Now we will hear from General John Hyten.

    STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                           STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Hyten. Thank you very much, Chairman Cooper,
    Ranking Member Turner, distinguished committee members.
        It is an honor to be here today alongside my fellow
    Department of Defense leaders. It is also a continuing
    privilege to represent the 162,000 Americans that accomplish
    the mission of my command, U.S. Strategic Command, each and
    every day.
        I want to begin by thanking the committee for your enduring
    support to our national defense. The stability afforded through
    this year's on-time budget came at a critical time for us, and
    I cannot overstate the enormous impact that it had on
    modernization efforts and our overall force readiness.
        I would also like to express my gratitude to the Armed
    Services Committee for broadening our strategic deterrence and
    space discussions over the last few years and bringing them to
    the forefront of our national dialogue. Protecting Americans
    from harm is the single most important job of our government.
        The methods we use must be the result of a robust debate
    and analytic rigor. Experts on all sides of the issue should be
    able to answer the tough questions that steer us to the best
    possible security solutions for our Nation.
        But the most important message I want to deliver today is
    that I am fully confident in my command's ability to preserve
    the peace and decisively respond in any conflict. We are ready,
    postured, and partnered for all the threats that exist today,
    and no one should doubt this.
        Our forces, our capabilities, and the strategic deterrence
    they help provide underpin and enable all joint force
    operations. They are the ultimate guarantors of our national
    and allied security.
        STRATCOM's [U.S. Strategic Command's] first priority
    mission, strategic deterrence, is not a passive mission; it is
    an active mission, it is dynamic. Our capabilities and posture
    must continue to evolve as the global threat changes. And the
    threat is changing, as Secretary Trachtenberg just described.
        Today, we are challenged by multiple adversaries, with an
    expanding range of capabilities that we must adapt to overcome
    these new threats.
        To effectively deter--and, if necessary, respond--we must
    outthink, outmaneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate our
    adversaries. Deterrence in the 21st century is an active
    mission that requires integration of all our capabilities
    across all domains.
        For over two decades, China and Russia have studied our way
    of warfare. They understand and seek to counter our long-held
    advantages. They are actively exploring new methods to exploit
    perceived vulnerabilities, and they are directly challenging us
    in areas of long-held strength.
        My focus this year is to advance operations and
    modernization of the foundation of our national strategic
    deterrent, our nuclear triad. Our ICBMs [intercontinental
    ballistic missiles], submarines, bombers, and the weapons they
    carry are unique and complementary. The triad complicates our
    adversaries' decision calculus and has been a proven deterrent
    for over 60 years.
        I will also intensify implementation as my new
    responsibility as the Department's nuclear command and control
    and communications, NC3, enterprise lead, meanwhile supporting
    a seamless transition as the Department stands up a new space
    force organization, as well.
        A strong, continuing deterrent is critical to our Nation's
    security. Nuclear war cannot be won, and therefore it must
    never be fought, and so to preserve the peace, we must be ready
    for war. Today, we are ready.
        I look forward to an on-time budget for fiscal year 2020,
    so we can sustain the momentum invigorating this Department
    right now. So thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in
    the Appendix on page 37.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General, and now we will
    hear from Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe.

        STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
                       STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the budget priorities for nuclear
    forces and for your continued support of the Navy's deterrent
    mission.
        I am honored to be here today and I respectfully request my
    written statement be submitted for the record.
        Nuclear deterrence is the number one priority mission of
    the Department of Defense. The Navy Strategic Systems
    Program's, or SSP's, fiscal year 2020 budget supports the
    continued sustainment of that deterrent as well as the
    modernization efforts directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review.
        Additionally, although not part of the strategic nuclear
    portfolio that I manage, the SSP budget request supports the
    hypersonic conventional prompt strike program, an effort that
    leverages SSP's unique and critical non-nuclear skill set that
    the workforce has refined over the last 60 years.
        The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have
    provided unwavering and single mission-focused support to the
    sea-based leg of the triad for over six decades. Now with a bow
    wave of development activities on the horizon, the organization
    must be prepared not only to support to today's deterrent but
    to ensure it remains a credible and effective strategic weapon
    system into the future.
        As the 14th director, it my highest honor to represent the
    men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 1,700 sailors;
    1,000 Marines; 300 coastguardsmen; 1,200 civilians; and over
    2,000 contractor personnel;
        It is my most critical goal, as the director of SSP, to
    ensure that they are poised to execute the mission with the
    same level of success, passion, and rigor, both today and
    tomorrow, as they have since our program's inception in 1955.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
    behalf of those who make deterrence their life's work. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in
    the Appendix on page 63.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral, and now we will hear from
    Lieutenant General Richard Clark.

      STATEMENT OF LT GEN RICHARD M. CLARK, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
         STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION,
     HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT GEN ARNOLD W.
    BUNCH, JR., MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
                    OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION

        General Clark. Good morning, Chairman Cooper, Ranking
    Member Turner, distinguished members of the committee, on
    behalf of my wingmen, Lieutenant General Arnie Bunch, and
    myself, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force
    nuclear programs and policies.
        The return of great power competition is increasing the
    significance of nuclear weapons in our ever-changing strategic
    environment. Our primary strategic adversaries are modernizing
    existing nuclear and conventional systems, while pursuing new
    disruptive technology such as hypersonics, artificial
    intelligence, and cyber capabilities.
        And despite the efforts of multiple administrations to
    negotiate nuclear stockpile reductions and the role of nuclear
    weapons, neither of our competitors have followed our lead.
        In light of this, the U.S. must maintain a credible nuclear
    deterrent to promote strategic stability, protect the Nation,
    our allies, and our partners. Since the 1960s, every
    administration has recognized the critical role of the nuclear
    triad. The synergy of its three complementary legs ensures that
    we can deter strategic attack, assure our partners and allies,
    achieve strategic objectives, and hedge against future
    uncertainties.
        Modernization and recapitalization are paramount if we are
    to maintain a credible deterrent in the evolving strategic
    environment. ICBMs deny the adversary the ability to
    preemptively destroy the U.S. arsenal with a small-scale
    strike. Replacing the Minuteman III with the Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent will provide a responsive, safe, secure,
    and accurate weapons system capable of holding adversary
    targets at risk.
        Nuclear capable bombers are the most flexible and visible
    leg of the triad. Modernizing the B-52 and fielding the B-21
    ensures stand-off and penetrating capability far into the
    future.
        Cruise missiles such as the Long Range Standoff weapon can
    penetrate advanced air defense systems, execute multi-access
    attacks, and saturate enemy defenses. This weapon effectively
    extends the range of our bomber force, greatly complicating
    enemy defense requirements and costs.
        Nuclear command and control communications is the central
    nervous system of our nuclear deterrent. Like the triad, legacy
    NC3 systems are aging and require persistent resourcing to
    sustain and modernize. It must link the President and the
    national leaders to the force all day, every day, under all
    conditions, and without fail.
        The U.S. requires the tools necessary to prevent the most
    existential threat to our survival as a Nation. The flexible
    capabilities and complementary nature of the nuclear triad
    ensures the credibility of the U.S. deterrent while
    complicating the adversary's decision calculus.
        It is the backstop of U.S. national security. It is both
    necessary and affordable, and we must continue to support the
    critical role of the triad in defending our country and our way
    of life.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in
    the Appendix on page 75.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General Clark, and as you
    pointed out, we also are welcoming Lieutenant General Arnold
    Bunch, Jr., with us today. Appreciate your being at the witness
    table, as well.
        As I was walking into the hearing earlier, one of the
    attendees in the audience said you have today in this hearing
    four of the most important people in the world. That might be a
    little bit of an exaggeration, but it is probably not far from
    the truth, because when it comes to determining the future of
    the planet, the degree to which you bear your heavy
    responsibilities, it makes a difference.
        So thank you for joining us today.
        I want to be as considerate as possible to my colleagues
    who have joined us instead of taking an immediate flight home,
    so I will be very short in my questioning, but I thought that
    in many ways the most important sentence in all the testimony
    was what Secretary Trachtenberg said.
        Top of page 5, and he also said this orally, we must not
    delay the recapitalization of the triad and our nuclear
    command, control, and communications system initiated by the
    previous administration.
        Now, on behalf of the previous administration, I would like
    to take that as a compliment that American nuclear policy has
    generally been characterized by continuity, regardless of
    partisanship, regardless of politics, regardless of anything,
    and that continuity is, in many ways, our greatest strength. So
    I am hoping that even in this contentious political environment
    that continuity can be preserved.
        Now, we don't want to just mouth the old boilerplate, and
    we have a heavy obligation on all of us to teach new
    generations why the boilerplate was crafted to begin with and,
    on occasion, to improve the boilerplate, but continuity is a
    great strength. So I am hopeful that in this subcommittee's
    deliberations and in full committee deliberations we can bear
    those important principles in mind.
        For some of my fellow subcommittee members who haven't had
    a chance to see the testimony, there is a lot of information in
    here, and the written testimony, which has of course been
    already accepted by unanimous consent for the record, but
    appreciate the brevity of some of the presenters' statements,
    but the details in the testimony are sometimes awesomely
    important.
        So I appreciate the hard work that was put into crafting
    the testimony.
        I would like to now turn to my ranking member, Mr. Turner.
    Thank you for joining us, looking forward to your questions.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
    statement and dedication to this issue being bipartisan,
    because it has, as you and I have said in Congress, since your
    second time in coming to Congress.
        Is that right? When the chair was re-elected back to
    Congress after taking a period where he was not here, we were
    in the same class, so we have the same perspective of time
    period and we have been here during Republican and Democrat
    administrations, Republican and Democrat gavels with the
    speakership.
        And I join him in saying that this has been a bipartisan
    commitment to deterrence, because this is about keeping us safe
    and it has kept us safe for years. And I think as long as we
    continue to be committed to a nuclear policy that is focused on
    deterrence, that we will continue to deter our adversaries, or
    as we have heard from our presenters, the great power conflict.
        I want to welcome General Bunch. You soon will be going to
    Wright-Patterson Air Force Base as the head of Air Force
    Materiel Command. I look forward to you returning to Wright-
    Patterson Air Force Base and your leadership there.
        Mr. Trachtenberg, I want to start with you. I have got two
    areas of questions and I am going to ask your opinion and
    General Hyten. Two concepts that we are struggling with in this
    committee are the issues of low-yield nuclear weapons and no
    first use policy.
        And I would like--there are concerns, obviously, that if
    the United States does not have and deploy low-yield nuclear
    weapons, that our adversaries would believe that if they had
    undertaken an attack with low-yield nuclear weapons against us,
    that we might not retaliate because of all of our weapons being
    of such a large size that we would be deterred because we would
    be seen as escalating to their escalate.
        We have a policy in war of trying to limit collateral
    damage, so I have two parts to my question. One, does it affect
    the calculus of our adversaries in a negative way that could
    put us at risk?
        And secondly, are there targets in which we might want to
    use a low-yield nuclear weapon for which a high-yield nuclear
    weapon would be completely inappropriate, understanding that
    obviously that it is the most destructive force to unleash by
    man and the collateral damage that would occur?
        And then, General Hyten, if you would answer the same.
        Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Congressmen, thank you. I couldn't
    agree more with you in terms of the emphasis on deterrence
    being key. The whole objective behind our policy of course is
    to prevent conflict and certainly to prevent nuclear war. So
    what we are doing and what we are proposing is entirely
    designed to reduce the risk of conflict by enhancing our
    deterrent through creating uncertainty in the mind of any
    potential adversary, whether it be Russia or China or anyone
    else.
        I happen to believe that the supplemental programs that we
    announced in the Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 to include a
    low-yield ballistic missile warhead is certainly designed to
    help ensure that no adversary believes that they would have, at
    any point, any kind of advantage that they believe might be
    exploitable in a way where they felt that they could either
    initiate conflict or escalate conflict to the point where the
    United States might have to think twice about responding at
    all.
        So indeed, the purpose of moving forward with those
    programs is ultimately designed to improve our deterrent and to
    enhance stability.
        General Hyten. So, Congressman Turner, I think the most
    important element of deterrence is not our view, but it is what
    the adversary is thinking. We always have to try to put
    ourselves in the position of our adversaries and we have to
    listen very closely to what they say and watch very closely
    what they do.
        And when we see statements, as well as when we see them
    operate in the ways that you described where they have stated
    they believe that employment of a low-yield nuclear weapon
    would not be responded to by NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] or the United States, that causes a concern, and
    so the most important role of the low-yield nuclear weapon is
    to make sure that the adversary doesn't think that would
    happen. So the first role of that weapon is a deterrent weapon
    to make sure they don't cross that line.
        And in order for that to happen, we have to be able to use
    that weapon in an appropriate way. We can't talk about what
    those would be here, but the second part of your question was,
    are there targets that we would employ them against? And I will
    just say for the record that, yes, there is, but we would have
    to discuss specifics in a classified session.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you. So secondly would be the no first
    use policy. I was just at the congressional dialogue at the
    Library of Congress that included author Michael--I am going to
    slaughter this I am sure--Beschloss? Thank you. It is
    Beschloss? Ah, I have it right. Author of Presidents at War.
    And he actually said something and I thought we should probably
    look at it at this committee.
        He said that in the Korean conflict that there was a period
    of time which North Korea and China perceived that we might use
    nuclear weapons in that conflict and that because of their
    concern that it affected the outcome and the behavior of North
    Korea and China. And that at some point in the conflict they
    learned that we had decided not to--thank God, because
    obviously that would be an inappropriate use--but they had
    learned that we had dismissed that nuclear weapons would not be
    used and it affected the conflict negatively for us. Our
    adversaries became more involved.
        So my concern with no first use is again, back to as you
    were saying General Hyten, what is in the minds of our
    adversaries. Mr. Trachtenberg, General Hyten, could you tell us
    as Michael has, what effect that might have on our adversaries?
    Thank you.
        Mr. Trachtenberg. I would agree with you, Congressman
    Turner, and I would also agree with General Hyten in terms of
    what matters most is what is in the mind of our adversary.
    Further, I would agree with Chairman Cooper when he spoke about
    the continuity in U.S. nuclear policy.
        One of the continuities in our policy has been that the
    United States has not adopted a no first use policy, regardless
    of administrations, because among other reasons we extend our
    nuclear security guarantees, the so-called nuclear umbrella or
    the extended deterrent, to allies.
        We do that in order to assure our allies that the United
    States is willing and able to defend their security under the
    most stressing of conditions, that we will be able to do that.
    As I said in my prepared statement, the concern I have with a
    no first use policy is that it may cause others to believe that
    we are backing away from some of our assurances to allies and
    partners and may reduce the level of uncertainty in the minds
    of potential adversaries and cause concern in the minds of some
    of our allies. And so for those reasons, I think a no first use
    policy would be destabilizing rather than stabilizing.
        Mr. Turner. General, you need to turn your microphone on.
        General Hyten. I think Chairman Dunford said it well on
    Tuesday, when he said that anything that simplifies an enemy's
    decision-making calculus would be a mistake. And that is
    exactly what this would do. That would create an environment
    where an adversary could think that crossing the line would be
    okay and that the United States would not respond to whatever
    the situation was.
        I think the current policy is exactly right. It has been
    that way through multiple administrations. I think it is
    important to continue that policy. It improves our strategic
    deterrent. It improves the support that we give to our allies.
        When I travel overseas, the extended deterrent message I
    bring from the United States is hugely powerful to our allies
    that have chosen not to build their own nuclear weapons and to
    trust that the United States nuclear umbrella will cover them.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank the gentleman.
        Now we will hear from Ms. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to all of you for your dedicated service and
    the way in which you have conducted yourself over the years. We
    greatly appreciate it.
        I wanted to follow up on that discussion, because maybe I
    am here as a little bit of a doubter, and probably represent a
    good number of people who are really quite sophisticated enough
    to enter into this discussion and see that from their vantage
    point, as well. So I would be--you know, continue to be
    unconvinced of the value of low-yield nuclear weapons as part
    of our arsenal.
        I would like to ask you,--and you have certainly addressed
    this, Mr. Trachtenberg and General Hyten, particularly--but can
    you tell us on a personal level, how did you arrive at that
    position?
        And if you have someone who, you know, looks at you in the
    eye and says, okay, so what is next? How does that what is
    next--how is that addressed by our current stockpile? You know,
    it calls into question use after that. And what is next?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, if I might, Congresswoman, first of
    all, let me say, I appreciate the opportunity to engage in this
    discussion. It is very important, and I understand there are
    differing views among people who have followed this issue for
    many years.
        I do have to come back, however, to the view--it is my
    personal view that when we are talking about such serious
    matters of nuclear deterrence, it really is very critical for
    us to try to assess as best we can how an adversary or how a
    potential adversary views the issue.
        We have tried to look at, for example, Russian military
    doctrine, statements, military deployments, capabilities,
    investments, exercises. And I have to say that what we have
    seen--what I have seen certainly in recent years has given me
    significant pause and concern in terms of how I think the
    Russian Federation actually views these issues of deterrence.
        And therefore, I look at the issue of, say, a low-yield
    ballistic missile warhead as something that I believe would be
    useful in trying to at least close a gap in capabilities that I
    think Russia may be looking at as affording them some kind of
    advantage that they could use to either engage in nuclear
    coercion or some type of aggression.
        And so I am looking at it from the standpoint of how I
    think the other side may be approaching this and what we might
    be able to do in order to best make them think twice about the
    course that they may be on as a result.
        Mrs. Davis. What comes next, and maybe for all of you too,
    what?
        General Hyten. So ma'am, when I looked at it--I looked at
    it just from a threat perspective. As a commander of--the
    nuclear commander for our country, I have to look at the threat
    and then I have to make sure that my command is best postured
    to respond to that threat as I could.
        And as we looked at it in the Nuclear Posture Review, we
    saw a threat that was out there that we didn't have all the
    capabilities that we thought we needed to respond to that. We
    already have some low-yield nuclear weapons in our arsenal.
    They are in the air leg of the triad. They are not in the
    submarine leg and they are not in the ICBM leg. We felt like we
    needed a small number of immediate response capabilities to do
    that.
        But it is also interesting to note that our low-yield
    nuclear weapons will all be inside of the New START agreements.
    Almost all the Russian nuclear weapons are outside the New
    START agreement, building under platforms that aren't
    accountable.
        Actually, when we remove the weapons, the big weapons from
    the submarine and put small weapons in, we are going to have
    still the same number of weapons, they will just be a smaller
    yield. But we think that smaller yield actually gives us a
    better chance to deter our primary adversary.
        And I think what comes next is that this puts us in a very
    good place that we can deter for the coming--if this was the
    Cold War, we would be going back and we would build all the
    things that the Russians are building now, nuclear-powered
    torpedoes, nuclear-armed torpedoes----
        Mrs. Davis. If we had them in the past and more
    capabilities that you are speaking of, would we have used them?
    At what time?
        General Hyten. If they worked, we wouldn't have used them.
    The whole goal of these weapons is to not use them. That is a
    dichotomy that is hard for many of our fellow countrymen to
    understand. But the key is, by being ready, by being obviously
    ready and communicating that to the adversary, they will not
    cross the line and we will not have to use them. If we are not
    ready someday, that is when I get concerned that somebody will
    cross that line.
        Mrs. Davis. I think my time is up. So I can't go to the
    rest of you, but thank you very much for being here.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank the gentlelady.
        Mr. Bishop.
        Mr. Bishop. Yes, thank you.
        And I thank our witnesses here, it is--you are basically
    all saying the same thing, I guess. One of our tasks is to tell
    the 427 members who aren't here exactly what you guys are
    saying.
        I do have a couple of questions, General Clark, if I could
    start with you, almost a parochial one. Has the Air Force ever
    considered directing the two GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent] prime contractors to utilize both suppliers of the
    solid rocket motors for the program development and production?
    And if so, would there be a benefit or a programmatic challenge
    of doing that approach?
        General Clark. Sir, thank you for the question. And that is
    under consideration right now. I would have to defer, however,
    to my wingman, General Bunch, who is our acquisition expert and
    he is involved heavily in this process. So, General Bunch?
        Mr. Bishop. I thought we were the only ones that deflect.
    But go ahead, General Bunch, please.
        General Clark. Yes, sir, I am learning.
        General Bunch. So sir, we are in those discussions right
    now.
        We are weighing out the cost, and the schedule, and the
    performance, technical risks associated to the programs if it
    were to go to and direct, that we had to use each of the solid
    rocket motor producers. We are also weighing that against the
    risk to the industrial base. We are having those ongoing
    dialogues within the Department of Defense.
        And then once we look at that equation and where those
    risks are, as the acquisition part of this team, we have to go
    back to the requirer part of this team, General Hyten, and
    explain what those risks are both from a performance, and a
    schedule, and cost and how that plays out on a timeline, so
    that we can determine if we can meet his requirements. So that
    debate and discussion is ongoing right now.
        Mr. Bishop. You are still in the process.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir, we are.
        Mr. Bishop. When you get done with that, I would like to
    actually know the response of that one also.
        General Bunch. Yes, sir, we will.
        Mr. Bishop. General Hyten, either you or the Secretary, let
    me ask the same thing. CBO [Congressional Budget Office], bless
    their hearts, have put a 30-year score on GBSD, or our nuclear
    policy, and it has been described as eye bleeding. Any time
    there is a 30-year score, whoever is doing that uses an eight
    ball and a Ouija board, but what I would like to ask you is
    obviously I have questions on the methodology of CBO.
        But they have both tried to conduct the modernization and
    operations in the same number. So if I could have you kind of
    divest those, tell me, what would the operation number simply
    be--or I am sorry, the modernization number simply be? And
    perhaps even as a percentage of our overall defense budget?
        General Hyten. So I will start, Secretary, if that is okay?
    So the specific numbers are in my prepared statement, and we
    will get to the exact numbers if you would like for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 89.]
        General Hyten. But broadly speaking, at the height of the
    build-out of our nuclear capabilities, it would add up to
    about--our numbers say 6.4 percent--the CBO said 7 percent of
    the entire defense budget, which means 93-plus percent of
    defense budget would be available for other things.
        And this is the most important item in our defense budget,
    I think that is a reasonable thing. Now are you talking about
    operations----
        Mr. Bishop. Wait, I think you just said the next question
    which is--if it is 6 percent or 7 percent, is that worth the
    cost?
        General Hyten. I think former Secretary Mattis said it
    right, America can afford survival and this is about our
    Nation's survival. We have to look at it that way and go down
    that path. Now, inside that roughly 6 percent that we get to at
    the height of it a little over 3 percent would be in
    modernization and a little under 3 percent would be operations
    sustainment. And I have the specific numbers in my prepared
    statement.
        Mr. Bishop. We will get them from there. I thank you. And
    let's suppose just for a second that we do something really
    silly around here, and we postpone funding of this--we push it
    to the right. Can you tell me quickly what would be either mid-
    or long-term financial or programmatic significance of any kind
    of delay in that funding?
        General Hyten. As Chairman Cooper pointed out, and so did
    Secretary Trachtenberg, this modernization program started in
    the last administration, but it started late. We should have
    started a decade ago. My biggest long-term concern as
    STRATCOM--I am not concerned about anything today actually. I
    am ready to respond to any threat anywhere.
        But I am concerned 10 years from now unless all of these
    stay on track, that a future STRATCOM commander will sit in
    front of you and say I am concerned about the readiness of my
    force, because the submarines will deliver just in time; when
    Ohio goes off, Columbia comes on; when GBSD comes on, Minuteman
    goes off.
        Mr. Bishop. So 2035 would be out of the question, if we
    keep pushing to the right.
        General Hyten. 2030 is the date where we have to have these
    come online, and everything right now delivers just in time.
        Mr. Bishop. Can I ask just one last favor? GBSD is a
    terrible name, it has no beauty--it sounds like one of those
    medical diseases you try and eliminate; Minuteman, that is
    cute. Come up with a better name. And the other problem I have
    is, is simply if we are going to argue first use, we already
    used it, we have done that historically. Get over it. Let's get
    on with that issue.
        General Hyten. So I concur with the name. It is just
    horrible. And I----
        Mr. Bishop. I keep getting----
        General Hyten [continuing]. And I would encourage my Air
    Force to come up with a name for that program.
        Mr. Bishop. Get that before the numbers.
        General Hyten. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank the gentleman. The next questioner will
    be Mr. Brooks--he is gone. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hyten, in the
    past, outside advocates have argued that LRSO [Long Range
    Standoff weapon] is destabilizing. What is your thought?
        General Hyten. Well, we have had nuclear-powered cruise
    missiles, or nuclear cruise missiles for a long time--not
    nuclear-powered cruise missiles, but nuclear-tipped cruise
    missiles for a long time. We have also had conventional cruise
    missiles for a long time. We have had them for years, decades.
    It has never been destabilizing before. I don't know how it is
    destabilizing now.
        It is interesting to note that the Russians employed cruise
    missiles in Syria. Somehow we weren't concerned that they were
    deploying nuclear weapons into Syria and we didn't respond like
    they were deploying nuclear weapons into Syria.
        Cruise missiles have been dual-use capabilities for a long,
    long time and nothing changes in 2019 that wasn't the same in
    the last century. It is the same structure. I don't believe
    they are destabilizing.
        Mr. Rogers. Excellent. General Clark, in the beginning of
    the GBSD program, my buddy's favorite name, did the Air Force
    do an assessment on the service life extending of the Minuteman
    III versus a GBSD? And which is the most cost-efficient way?
        General Clark. Yes, sir, thank you for that question. We
    did do an analysis of alternatives on GBSD and considering the
    continued sustainment of Minuteman III was one of those
    alternatives that was analyzed, and it is less cost effective
    to try to extend the life of Minuteman III. We have several of
    the components that are becoming obsolete--the propulsion
    system, the guidance system, even the ability to provide the
    solid rocket motor fuel--we only have one more opportunity to
    do that for these weapons. After that we have to--we will have
    to buy a new weapon.
        And as General Hyten stated, if we continue to push this
    decision down the road, these systems that are part of the
    overall system start to come off, the missile comes offline,
    and then it costs us even more money to recapitalize and
    modernize.
        So our best alternative as General Hyten stated is to
    recapitalize now. We will sustain Minuteman III until GBSD
    comes online, but we are right at the point of being able to
    make that happen now, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. When is it supposed to come online?
        General Clark. It--we start coming online in the early
    2030s and by the mid 2030s we are complete, and I will----
        Mr. Rogers. We are going to pass the date of the end of
    service life before those are online----
        General Bunch. Congressman Rogers, can I add just one item
    into that? I am sorry, sir, I didn't mean to interrupt you, I
    apologize. It is a great question. Our IOC [initial operating
    capability] right now for GBSD is 2029. That is when we have
    reached the initial operational capability and our full
    operational capability is 2036.
        So we are tracking, exactly as General Hyten said, we need
    these by 2030, we are right on the timeline. That is why it is
    so critical that we continue to execute these programs the way
    we are.
        Then one other item I would add to what my wingman said
    here is, even if we did the SLEP [service life extension
    program] on the Minuteman III, there are requirements that
    General Hyten has that we do not believe we would be able to
    meet. So it is not just about the cost, it is about the ability
    to meet the warfighter requirement that were also weighed in to
    that decision when we did the analysis of alternatives.
        Mr. Rogers. Admiral Wolfe, can you talk about the--what the
    Navy is doing with the PEO [program executive office] Columbia
    class to better integrate the work you were doing in SSP with
    the overall program? What is your assessment of the pace of the
    Columbia replacement?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So Columbia, although not in my
    direct portfolio, we stay very, very close on the development
    on the Columbia-class submarine. That is still on plan. As a
    matter of fact, if you look at what CNO [Chief of Naval
    Operations] has just published in his design for superior
    2.0, it actually--he challenges that program to pull
    the Columbia left and get it out sooner, per General Hyten's
    point of, you know, we are line on line right now.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Referring to the document ``A Design for Maintaining
    Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0'' released December 17, 2018.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        So that program is moving forward. Obviously, I know
    Secretary Geurts has briefed you on--they have stood up a
    separate program executive officer specifically for Columbia
    because this is the Navy's number one acquisition program. And
    so, that is for the submarine.
        From our perspective, what we are doing on the weapons
    system, we are on track for both modernizing the Ohio weapons
    system, which will then go on the Columbia, so we will not have
    two populations. So all of those efforts are on track right
    now, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Thank you all for being here and
    thank you for your service to our country. I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Horn.
        Ms. Horn. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. And I
    want to echo Mr. Cooper's comments and everyone's comments
    about the importance of making sure that we are creating
    consistency and prioritizing. So I want to continue along that
    line of questioning, and I hope you can help me understand a
    few things.
        Given that we don't have unlimited funds to do all that we
    need to do--and I am sure we could continue to invest in more
    things and making our choices--can you help me understand a
    little bit more on the--I know we have been talking along the
    lines of the current low-yield weapons and the modernization
    and transitioning to the new ones, that distinction of if there
    any pathway to draw down one or transition to--between the two.
    And that--General Hyten and Mr. Trachtenberg.
        General Hyten. Ma'am, one of the good things about the low-
    yield nuclear weapon, its nomenclature is the W76-2. It is
    actually just a modification of the W76-1 that has been going
    through a production line in the Department of Energy for the
    last few years. And as they are approaching the end of that,
    the only thing we had to do to build the W76-2, the low-yield
    nuclear weapon, was make what--you know, they are nuclear
    weapons, so there is nothing minor about a nuclear weapon.
        But in the realm of the work that is done at the nuclear
    weapons lab, it is a fairly minor adjustment to that weapon to
    make it a low-yield nuclear weapon. That work has begun this
    year; that work is underway right now.
        That budget is a very small amount of the overall budget to
    get to that. And then the employment on the submarines is
    actually a straightforward process. As we build out the
    submarine, as we go through--we can talk about how we do that
    in a classified world--but as we go through that, we will just
    take this weapon, put it into the missile--and we still have to
    load the missile, just like you always do. So there is really
    no cost delta there. In the overall scheme, it is a very small
    number.
        Mr. Trachtenberg. Congresswoman, I would agree with you, in
    terms of the necessity of prioritization. And obviously, this
    is something that the Department looks at very carefully. But I
    would echo General Hyten's comments, as well, in terms of
    looking at the low-yield ballistic missile warhead, the
    program, as relatively inexpensive vis-a-vis other programs.
        We have asked in the fiscal year 2020 budget for about
    $19.6 million to pursue that program. We do think it is a
    reasonable investment to make for the ultimate objective of
    enhancing our deterrent against what is the most destructive
    potential possibility that we can think of.
        Ms. Horn. Thank you. And following on with that, that line
    of prioritization, with our current challenges, this is clearly
    an incredibly critical area, but with our current challenges in
    the--in the rest of our strategic space, missile defense, new
    technology development space, and the growing numbers of
    adversaries and the attention and the money and the development
    that they are putting into this, I would just like to hear from
    both of you, and then if there is time, anyone else, about what
    you see as the right balance between investments in those
    critical areas so that we don't lose our strategic advantage
    there and here in the nuclear arena, please?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. Certainly, Congresswoman. I do think that
    we have certainly intended to strike the right balance in our
    investments going forward, and I think the budget request that
    has been submitted to Congress reflects our prioritization
    based on our assessment of what the right balance is.
        We have, of course, focused on readiness, but also on
    modernization in this budget. You are exactly right to note
    that adversaries and potential adversaries have been moving
    forward with advanced technologies quite at a rapid pace. We
    all know that technology advances quite substantially, very
    rapidly.
        We believe the investment priorities we have set out, at
    least in terms of our recapitalization of the nuclear force,
    some of the supplemental capabilities that we have been
    speaking about that were reflected in the Nuclear Posture
    Review, as well as in the missile defense review and some of
    our missile defense priorities, reflect not only an
    appreciation but an understanding that we need to invest more
    in terms of the advanced technologies, not only for ourselves,
    but also to counter the investments that potential adversaries
    are making on those technologies, as well.
        Ms. Horn. I think my time has expired, so I will defer to
    the chair.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
    gentlelady from Wyoming.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you to all of our witnesses for being here today. General
    Hyten, thank you very much for hosting me at STRATCOM recently.
    It was a very useful and informative day spent there, so I
    appreciate very much your taking the time to do that.
        I wanted to ask you first, General Hyten, about pit
    production, and if you could talk a little bit about sort of
    where we stand and specifically what is driving the requirement
    for the 80 pits per year that we are seeing now.
        General Hyten. So thank you. It was good to have you at
    Offutt. Thank you very much for coming and spending time at
    STRATCOM. We have had a little water there since you were
    there, but STRATCOM is doing fine. The base has got some
    serious damage, but STRATCOM is a pretty amazing command. We
    are doing just fine.
        When you look at pit production, I think it is important to
    realize the United States really hasn't been producing
    plutonium pits for quite a while. We have been using old
    plutonium pits to refurbish and build. Even the new weapons are
    using old plutonium pits.
        What I am concerned about, from a STRATCOM perspective, as
    we look in the out-years and we get into future, we could be
    dealing with 100-year-old plutonium pits sometime. And we don't
    really know what a 100-year-old plutonium pit looks like. Now,
    plutonium has a very long half-life.
        But I have looked at the plutonium pits. I have looked at
    that structure. And I am concerned about building new weapons
    that will have 100-year-old plutonium pits. I think that is
    just a risk that the United States should not take.
        We need to reinvigorate that process. And so we have gone
    through a detailed analysis with the Department of Energy and
    the Department of Defense, but STRATCOM has been in the middle
    of it, to look at exactly what we need and we have some very
    specific numbers. The minimum requirement is by 2030 we need a
    plutonium pit production capacity up to 80 across the
    enterprise. The first step to getting that is 2026 we need 30 a
    year, by 2026.
        Those first 30 will happen at Los Alamos. We have a plan
    with the Department of Energy that we support that will get to
    80 at both Los Alamos and Savannah River in South Carolina to
    get to what we need for the future, but that will put us on a
    sustainable path through this century to make sure we have the
    right infrastructure for our future nuclear stockpile.
        Ms. Cheney. And I am hopeful that--it is too bad we weren't
    able to get NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]
    here today to talk to us about this. We will follow up with
    them. When you look at what we are doing right now to get to
    the 30 by 2026, what is your sense of the progress we are
    making? Are you comfortable that it is sufficient? What is your
    feel about that?
        General Hyten. So I am comfortable that all energy is being
    put on that. I still worry about that because it is going from
    zero to 30. And 30 doesn't sound like a big number probably to
    many of the committee, but going from zero to 30 is a huge step
    because plutonium is a very difficult material to work with.
    And so we watch that very closely and I have a stockpile
    assessment team that I send to Los Alamos, I have my staff go
    to Los Alamos.
        Because I have to certify the nuclear stockpile every year,
    I probably spend a lot more time down deep in the technical
    weeds than most combatant commanders do, but that is one of the
    most important things I do is certify the nuclear stockpile and
    I have to understand where that is.
        So Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty and I have a very,
    very close relationship, and we are working hand-in-hand to
    make sure that we can deliver that capability the Nation needs.
    But it is going to take a lot of work to get there.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And then turning to our space sensor
    layer, Missile Defense Agency [MDA]--we have talked in this
    committee and certainly we have provided an increase of $73
    million last year for that. But now this has appeared as the
    top issue on the unfunded priorities list for MDA.
        Could you give us a little bit of enlightenment in terms of
    what is happening there and what exactly the Department is
    doing in response to the hypersonic and ballistic defense space
    spending?
        General Hyten. So, Congresswoman, in my letter to Congress
    this week I also noticed that I am watching closely the space
    layer of our missile defense capabilities, as well.
        I watch it from a STRATCOM perspective though, because the
    thing that enables our deterrence is the fact that we can see
    any threat from wherever and we can characterize it, attribute
    it, and then respond to it if we have to. That enables our
    deterrent. We need that in the space sensor layer, and we
    appreciate very much the $73 million that Congress appropriated
    last year.
        That is now transitioning into the Space Development
    Agency. Dr. Mike Griffin has that responsibility. We are
    pushing hard to make sure there is $15 million in the budget
    this year for sensor technology. There is a DARPA [Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency] program that is looking at
    that.
        Dr. Griffin has got to integrate all those things together.
    We certainly were hoping for increased funding this year, but
    the Department has to make difficult decisions as we go
    through. But Dr. Griffin has got his job this year putting all
    those pieces together and having a good plan for this Congress
    next year.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. My time has expired.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman from Colorado.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for all
    the witnesses for being here and for your service to our
    country. Admiral Wolfe, regarding our hypersonic weapons
    programs, I have got several questions. I hope these haven't
    already been asked. I was out of the room at another committee
    hearing, but I am back now, so I would like to pursue this line
    of reasoning a little bit.
        Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have
    worried about the potential for a miscalculation. They worry
    that the Russians or Chinese won't be able to tell the
    difference between a sub-launched hypersonic and a sub-launched
    nuclear weapon. So you as someone who has worked on both types
    of systems, can you help clarify key observable differences
    that would help put our minds at ease?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir, thanks for the question. So at the
    unclassified level what I will tell you is that there is no
    doubt when a weapon initially comes out of a submarine
    launched--a submarine, they look very much the same when they
    come out.
        But what I will tell you is because of the difference in a
    hypersonic and a ballistic missile, that quickly for anybody
    that can see it can quickly tell that they are not the same.
    That is the first issue.
        If you look at the size of the boosters that we are talking
    about, the signature is much different. When you look at the
    flight profile, they quickly diverge between the two. That is
    the first key issue from a technology perspective.
        Second is, if you look at where we believe a conventional
    hypersonic would actually be deployed, it would be in a much
    different area than where our SSBNs [ballistic missile
    submarines] deploy, so that would be an indicator.
        And, thirdly, which is also key to that, is there is no
    plan to put a conventional weapon onto one of our strategically
    loaded SSBNs. So again, you will have separation from those
    two.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And, Admiral Wolfe and Mr.
    Trachtenberg, what are the operational advantages of a land-
    based versus a sub-based hypersonic weapon?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. The operational advantages of a land-
    based device, a sub-based hypersonic weapon--I think in terms
    of the operational details I will defer to Admiral Wolfe on
    that. But obviously much depends on the basic mode of the
    weapon itself and where the weapon is based. So depending upon
    where we would look to base a hypersonic weapon against a
    particular threat, I think that would factor into the
    operational characteristics----
        Mr. Lamborn. So geography.
        Mr. Trachtenberg. That would be one factor, yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir, I would agree. And of course, it
    is all about access and it is all about the target set that you
    need to go after. I will tell you, there are advantages to
    both, which is why as part of what we are doing with our
    memorandum of agreement in the Department of Defense, we are
    commonly developing this technology between us, the Army, the
    Air Force, and even the Missile Defense Agency for just the
    basic technology. So I think, again, it gives you a portfolio
    of options with that weapon.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And lastly, Admiral Wolfe, we
    just had a closed briefing with you on hypersonic weapons but
    the organization and budgetary lines are still unclear. How
    much are we--how much is the DOD asking for hypersonic weapon
    development in this year's budget? And how much of that are you
    responsible for? And what are the specific milestones you want
    to reach, for what you can say in this setting?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So from a DOD perspective, I don't
    have the overall DOD number, so I would ask that we take that
    for the record and get back----
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
        Admiral Wolfe [continuing]. To you with the DOD line.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 89.]
        Admiral Wolfe From a Navy perspective, my budget request in
    2020 is for $593 million, and what that does is it continues
    the effort that we started in fiscal year 2019 for both getting
    to additional flight testing of the actual hypersonic body
    itself to continue to prove the technology.
        It continues the development effort for the booster, which
    the services will use for that weapon. And then it also
    continues the integration onto the platforms--the studies for
    which platforms it will be deployed in the Navy, and to then
    start that integration into those platforms.
        Mr. Lamborn. And do you have any particular milestones that
    you would like to reach or is that still to be determined?
        Admiral Wolfe. So obviously getting to key flight test is
    critical, and that is about all I can say in this forum, sir.
    In a classified forum, we could talk about what--what we are
    planning and when we are planning on doing it. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Certainly. Okay, thank you. And once again
    thank you all five of you for your service. Mr. Chairman, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank the gentleman. I think all members of the
    committee have had a chance to ask a question. If anyone has a
    pressing question they would like to follow up on, I would be
    happy to yield to you. Otherwise, I will conclude the hearing
    with an opportunity--Ms. Davis?
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just very briefly,
    could you just clarify for me that the Pentagon had proposed
    funding in the 2020 budget for the low-yield SLBM [submarine-
    launched ballistic missile]. Is that in the OCO [overseas
    contingency operations] budget?
        Admiral Wolfe. Ma'am, I would have to go check. I don't
    believe it is in the OCO budget. If I look at my line, it is
    rolled up into other efforts that we are doing for RDT&E
    [research, development, test, and evaluation]. But I would have
    to take that for the record to actually verify that. That is
    for the low yield. There are other parts of my budget which are
    in the OCO line, yes, ma'am.
        Mrs. Davis. Mr. Trachtenberg, where is it?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. No, I believe that is correct. I believe
    that is correct, Congresswoman. But I would want to confirm
    that for the record.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mrs. Davis. Correct that it is not in the OCO budget?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. That is my understanding. But I would
    like to confirm that.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay, apparently somebody saw it there.
        General Hyten. And then the actual weapon itself is in the
    Department of Energy budget.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay, okay. All right, because obviously there
    are concerns about its use, where the OCO budget is used for.
    Okay, thank you very much.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the subcommittee members for their
    questions. I think the only major topic that hasn't been
    touched on is the space force. And I would like to give General
    Hyten a few minutes here to summarize his ideas for the space
    force.
        General Hyten. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the
    opportunity. I think there is a couple things I would like to
    share with the committee. I think first and foremost, I
    appreciate this committee taking on space as a warfighting
    challenge a couple years ago.
        And I very much appreciate the President weighing in and
    talking about space as a warfighting domain. It is a place now
    that we conduct military operations. It is a place that our
    adversaries are building capabilities and deploying
    capabilities to threaten us in space, and we have to deal with
    it seriously.
        I think the most important thing we can do in the near term
    is stand up a new unified command moving space out from under
    my command, out from under U.S. Strategic Command, and creating
    a new U.S. Space Command focused 100 percent of the time on the
    space problem.
        Because I have been in the space business my whole life,
    and I love the space business. But I am the STRATCOM commander.
    And space at best will never be higher than my third priority.
    It has to be nuclear first, nuclear command and control second.
    Space will never be higher than my third priority.
        I get to spend so little time on space because I have to
    focus on nuclear. We need a commander focused on space all the
    time. And that commander was nominated this week, General Jay
    Raymond. And I hope the Senate takes up that nomination
    quickly.
        The second piece is the space force. The President said we
    need a structure inside the Pentagon focused on space all the
    time. And I support that structure.
        I have to admit, I had some concerns when we were talking
    about a separate service, separate and distinct from the Air
    Force. But when the President made the decision and said it has
    got to be under the Air Force, I am all in.
        I think the Vice President said it exactly right. He said,
    so creating the space force within the Air Force is the best
    way to minimize duplication of effort and eliminate
    bureaucratic inefficiencies. That is what the President and the
    Vice President told us to do.
        Now, I understand in meeting with many of you over the last
    24 hours that there are some concerns about that. But I just
    want you to know from my perspective, if you see any
    bureaucratic inefficiencies in there, if you see any
    duplication of effort, I would support just taking that stuff
    out. We need a streamlined focus.
        The problem we are trying to solve there is there are so
    many people in the Pentagon that are in charge of space. We
    need one person in charge of space that will then organize,
    train, and equip forces for the new U.S. Space Command. That is
    the structure that has to be out there.
        I think the President's vision is right, and it is also
    very similar to where this committee was starting as long as 2
    years ago. I think somewhere we can come to agreement on what
    that is and create that structure that will allow us to deal
    with the space problems we need in the future. So thank you
    very much for letting me talk about that.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman from Ohio.
        Mr. Turner. I just want to thank the chairman for asking
    that question. That was a great answer, General Hyten. I
    greatly appreciate it. I think that really is going to help our
    debate here.
        And obviously, we look to your expertise because--you know,
    it is real application of what is happening. So, thank you for
    that answer. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking that
    question.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. If we could get your
    answer on a YouTube video and require all of our colleagues in
    the other body to watch that, I wouldn't even mind if it was
    set to music or something like that, anything to induce them to
    watch it.
        Mr. Turner. Just think----
        Mr. Cooper. It would be helpful.
        Mr. Turner. Can we put an emoji in the background of you
    dancing?
        Mr. Cooper. No, no, no. Perhaps John Lewis, he has a very
    good dance. But there are few more important topics than this
    for this Congress, so I appreciate your weighing in. I would
    like to thank all of the witnesses for their excellent
    testimony.
        The subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 28, 2019

    =======================================================================

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 28, 2019

    =======================================================================

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 28, 2019

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP

        General Hyten. As outlined in the 2018 NPR, current estimates show
    that maintaining and operating the current nuclear forces requires
    between 2% and 3% of the DOD budget. To recapitalize/modernize the
    nuclear enterprise it is projected to be another 4%. At its highest
    peak in 2029, it is estimated to be 6.4% of the overall DOD budget.
        Below chart provided from the Nuclear Posture Review to show
    nuclear enterprise funding to 2040.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
        Admiral Wolfe. The FY 2020 Department of Navy Conventional Prompt
    Strike request is $593 million and supports the following: 1) Flight
    Experiment 2, 2) booster development, and 3) platform integration
    studies. The Navy defers to OSD to provide the overarching DOD
    hypersonics FY 2020 budget request.   [See page 20.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 28, 2019

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

        Mrs. Davis. Why do you believe Russia possesses a large NSNW force?
    How does this force affect U.S. national security? Has DOD considered
    utilizing negotiations to reduce this force; have you approached Russia
    about lowering its NSNW numbers?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. After the Cold War, Russia retained, and is now
    modernizing, its large NSNW force because it provides Russia a
    strategic advantage vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. The 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review identified this as a potential vulnerability in
    deterrence as it indicates Russia's mistaken belief that it could use
    NSNW forces to achieve its objectives in a conflict with the United
    States and our NATO Allies. The tremendous disparity in NSNW forces
    between the United States and Russia makes it very difficult to
    negotiate reductions and Russia has shown little interest in doing so.
        Mrs. Davis. Have you ever had a discussion with Russia about their
    nuclear posture, and in particular an escalate-to-de-escalate (E2D)
    strategy, which the Nuclear Posture Review claims is part of Russia's
    nuclear doctrine? How did they respond? Do you view this doctrine as
    offensive or defensive in nature?
        General Hyten. I would like to have such a discussion, but I have
    never had a conversation with Russia about their nuclear posture.
        ``Escalate to deescalate'' is an outdated term from Russian
    academic writings dating back to the 1990's. What we know from these
    same academic and military journals, is Russian thought has evolved
    into ``escalation dominance'' or, more aptly, ``escalate to win.'' This
    doctrine is offensive in nature and possibly encourages preemptive
    nuclear use.
        Mrs. Davis. During your testimony you noted that funding for the
    W76-2 low yield warhead was not requested in OCO-for-Base. Would you
    confirm that this is the case and describe, in detail, where funding
    for W76-2 deployment is requested? If it was requested in OCO-for-Base,
    why would the administration do so?
        Admiral Wolfe. The PB20 Budget Request for the Department of the
    Navy includes funding for the deployment of the W76-2 warhead. The Navy
    has requested $19.6 million for this effort. All of this money is
    included under the line item for TRIDENT II Mods. The entire line item
    (net total of $1,177.251 million) is part of the OCO-for-Base request.
    The Budget requests OCO for base requirements in support of the
    National Defense Strategy. The Budget requests these funds in OCO to
    comply with the budget base defense caps included in the Budget Control
    Act of 2011.
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
        Mr. Wilson. The Nuclear Posture Review provides a framework for
    modernizing the nuclear triad. Can you discuss the role and importance
    of developing plutonium pits in nuclear modernization and how it
    impacts deterrence?
        General Hyten. Plutonium pits are the nuclear triggers, which allow
    our weapons to function.
        The current pits have been in the stockpile for decades and are
    approaching their end-of life. Although we still have confidence in
    these complex material systems, it is essential the pits be replaced
    before we have used all available margin. We are approaching that
    point; however it is difficult to know exactly when it might occur. And
    while plutonium does have a long half-life, it is part an exquisitely
    engineered pit, with many other materials.
        Assessments on plutonium pit production requirements are based upon
    the age of the stockpile and an understanding of plutonium pit/primary
    aging at the time of the assessment. We are now over a decade later
    from the 50-80 ppy assessment. During this time period the stockpile
    continued to age and our understanding of the effects of aging on
    plutonium pits/Primary assemblies improved. The net result is the
    requirement for at least 80 pits per year by 2030, synchronized with
    planned warhead modernization programs.
        Past decisions to delay, defer, or cancel programs to recapitalize
    plutonium pit manufacturing have forced us into this ``just in time''
    replacement scenario and increased the rate at which we must replace
    the aging plutonium components in the stockpile. Continuing to delay
    progress on recapitalizing pit manufacturing will only further increase
    and require us to produce even more plutonium pits annually for the
    stockpile in order to ensure the continued safety, security and
    effectiveness of our fielded systems.
        ``At least 80 pits per year'' means the National Nuclear Security
    Administration must be able to produce a minimum of 80 pits per year
    for the stockpile to meet nuclear modernization requirements. The U.S.
    requires this sustained plutonium manufacturing capability of at least
    80 pits per year by 2030 to address known aging concerns, support
    projected stockpile modernization programs, and maintain a minimal
    capability to respond in a timely manner to future uncertainty. Failure
    to achieve this level of production will introduce additional risk to
    sustaining an effective nuclear deterrent. It is not a matter of if,
    but when we will exceed the point where we are no longer confident the
    weapon will operate reliably as designed.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
        Mr. Larsen. What is the State Department's contribution to OSD-P's
    thinking on arms control issues in the interagency process, and in how
    you view treaty effectiveness, compliance, and implementation
    activities?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. We work very closely with the State Department on
    arms control, verification, and compliance issues, both directly and
    through the interagency process. The State Department is a valued
    partner. It leads a number of interagency working groups that
    continually assess the compliance of our arms control partners and
    oversee interagency coordination of U.S. implementation policy,
    culminating in coordination and publication of its annual Arms Control
    Compliance Report. State Department further coordinates the
    interagency's collective efforts to keep our allies informed of our
    current and future arms control efforts. In particular, it was key to
    helping build diplomatic support both for NATO's declaration of
    Russia's material breach of the INF Treaty, and for the U.S. suspension
    of its obligations under the INF Treaty.
        Mr. Larsen. Do you view China as a more important strategic
    competitor than Russia in the long run? How would China react
    politically and in nuclear doctrine to New START expiring, and the U.S.
    and Russian nuclear forces being completely unconstrained? Is this more
    or less likely to lead to China expanding its nuclear force? Would New
    START keeping constraints on and insights into Russia's nuclear forces
    make your deterrence mission for China easier or harder?
        General Hyten. Long term strategic competitions with both China and
    Russia are the principal priorities for the Department. That said,
    China's pursuit of regional dominance is the major challenge to U.S.
    interests in Asia.
        China may place some value on New START as it limits the strategic
    offensive arsenals of both the U.S. and Russia.
        However regardless of New START, China is advancing a comprehensive
    modernization program which includes the continued development and
    deployment of a nuclear triad combined with anti-access/area denial
    (A2/AD) and power projection operations--and it is expected to remain
    on this path well into the future.
        China continues to increase the number and capabilities of its
    nuclear forces and its lack of transparency regarding the scope and
    scale of its nuclear modernization makes predictions of its future
    intent problematic.
        The Nuclear Posture Review provides a tailored U.S. strategy for
    China which is not predicated upon insights into Russia's nuclear
    forces. Hence, I would not expect our deterrence mission for China to
    be affected by the New START Treaty with Russia.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. Recently, the requirements for plutonium pit
    production have led to an increase in planned production from up to 50-
    80 pits, to ``at least 80 pits'' per year. Can you give the Congress
    clarity on why the number of pits per year has increased, and what
    exactly the administration means by ``at least 80 pits per year''?
        General Hyten. Assessments on plutonium pit production requirements
    are based upon the age of the stockpile and an understanding of
    plutonium pit/primary aging at the time of the assessment. We are now
    over a decade later from the 50-80 ppy assessment. During this time
    period the stockpile continued to age and our understanding of the
    effects of aging on plutonium pits/Primary assemblies improved. The net
    result is the requirement for at least 80 pits per year by 2030.
        Past decisions to delay, defer, or cancel programs to recapitalize
    plutonium pit manufacturing have forced us into this ``already late-to-
    need'' replacement scenario and increased the rate at which we must
    replace the aging plutonium components in the stockpile. Continuing to
    delay progress on recapitalizing pit manufacturing will only further
    increase and require us to produce even more plutonium pits annually
    for the stockpile in order to ensure the continued safety, security and
    effectiveness of our fielded systems.
        ``At least 80 pits per year'' means the National Nuclear Security
    Administration must be able to produce a minimum of 80 pits per year
    for the stockpile to meet nuclear modernization requirements. The U.S.
    requires this sustained plutonium manufacturing capability of at least
    80 pits per year by 2030 to address known aging concerns, support
    projected stockpile modernization programs, and maintain a minimal
    capability to respond in a timely manner to future uncertainty. Failure
    to achieve this level of production will introduce additional risk to
    sustaining an effective nuclear deterrent. It is not a matter of if,
    but when we will exceed the point where we are no longer confident the
    weapon will operate reliably as designed.
        Mr. Garamendi. Absent Russia materially breaching the New START
    Treaty, do you see any reason for the United States to withdraw from
    the treaty before it expires in 2021?
        General Hyten. No. The New START Treaty's verification regime
    (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) provides
    transparency into Russian strategic offensive capabilities,
    contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force structure and
    pace of modernization.
        However, New START does not cover the weapons Russia is developing
    outside of the treaty and my desire is to have all nuclear weapons as
    part of a future strategic arms treaty.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
        Ms. Speier. Absent Russia materially breaching the New START
    Treaty, do you see any reason for the United States to withdraw from
    the treaty before it expires in 2021?
        General Hyten. No. The New START Treaty's verification regime
    (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) provides
    transparency into Russian strategic offensive capabilities,
    contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force structure and
    pace of modernization.
        However, New START does not cover the weapons Russia is developing
    outside of the treaty and my desire is to have all nuclear weapons as
    part of a future strategic arms treaty.
        Ms. Speier. If New START were to expire, how would your advice to
    the President change regarding the current U.S. nuclear force posture?
    How would your military planning change, including your responses to
    Russia potentially increasing the number of nuclear weapons pointed at
    the United States, after 2021?
        General Hyten. Regardless if New START were to expire or not, my
    advice to the President would not materially change.
        New START is beneficial to STRATCOM. The New START Treaty's
    verification regime (i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges,
    notifications) provides transparency into Russian strategic offensive
    capabilities, contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force
    structure and pace of modernization. I believe in any situation I can
    foresee in the next 10 years I can provide an effective defense as long
    as I have a capable triad with the weapons that we've defined. Beyond
    ten years I have concerns regarding weapon development outside of New
    START. Without a verifiable and comprehensive arms control treaty it is
    difficult to understand where Russia is going in developing torpedoes,
    cruise missiles, and hypersonics. Likewise, if Russia goes in a
    different direction it would be harder to identify this shift.
        While it is difficult to predict with any certainty whether Russia
    would increase their strategic nuclear weapon stockpile outside of a
    New START agreement, I think the impacts would probably be more
    geopolitical in nature and unlikely to drive significant changes in
    U.S. force structure.
        Our comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the NPR
    includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against prospective
    and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad, including
    requisite NC3 and supplemental capabilities, provide the diversity and
    flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for effective deterrence as the
    geopolitical landscape evolves.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
        Mr. Keating. At the Munich Security conference in mid-February,
    Polish foreign minister Jacek Czaputowicz stated the following: ``We
    are not very much in favor-we are definitely even against--deployment
    of [INF Treaty prohibited] missiles on our soil. But we will work out
    the solution with our allies in NATO because it must be united response
    to Russian threat in that case. . . If we do it maybe [host new
    missiles] it will be a decision of all the alliance.''
        Do you agree that any decision to base U.S. ground-launched
    intermediate-range missiles should only be considered if it is
    supported by ``all of the alliance''? Has the Pentagon begun
    conversations with any alliance members about hosting INF-range
    missiles on their territory? Will the administration commit to briefing
    Congress on plans for the potential basing of INF range missiles
    outside the United States?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. We expect to work closely with allies in
    determining the appropriate response to Russia's evolving military
    posture, including its deployment of the INF Treaty-prohibited, dual-
    capable SSC-8 missile. This response could very well entail deployment
    of conventional ground-launched intermediate range systems, when such
    systems are ready, if we believe they contribute to NATO's deterrence
    and defense posture. We will keep Congress informed as we proceed with
    development.
        Mr. Keating. General Hyten's testimony before the committee noted
    that:
        ``Russia is also developing and intends to deploy novel strategic
    nuclear weapons, like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater
    unmanned vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile, which
    Russia seeks to keep outside of existing arms control agreements.''
        Given the administration's stated commitment to verifiable and
    enforceable arms control efforts that advance U.S. and allied security,
    please describe in detail the administration's efforts to constrain
    Russia's new nuclear systems systems. Does the administration have a
    plan to address these new systems through negotiations with Russia? Has
    the administration made any progress in constraining these systems?
    Please provide dates of all discussions, including interagency
    discussions, with Russia where such systems were discussed, and at what
    level they were held, since the beginning of the administration.
        Mr. Trachtenberg. We are very concerned about the enormous
    investments Russia is making in nuclear forces that are not captured by
    existing arms control agreements, including its increasingly capable
    NSNW arsenal and several of the ``novel'' systems General Hyten
    referred to in his testimony. We have raised our concerns with Russia
    regarding its new novel systems through diplomatic channels, including
    during three sessions of the New START Treaty's Bilateral Consultative
    Commission. Going forward, any future arms control regime must account
    for these systems in some manner.
        Mr. Keating. In NATO's statement after the administration's
    announcement to suspend implementation of the INF Treaty, the Alliance
    reiterated its commitment to ``committed to the preservation of
    effective international arms control, disarmament, and non-
    proliferation.'' How would the absence of any strategic arms control
    limitations and an unconstrained Russia complicate Alliance cohesion,
    and in particular NATO nuclear planning?
        Mr. Trachtenberg. The consensus 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration
    makes clear that allies remain open to arms control, with the aim of
    improving the security of the Alliance, taking into account the
    prevailing international security environment, but that the conditions
    for achieving further disarmament goals have not become more favorable
    in the last several years. Although this situation is regrettable, the
    Alliance has maintained cohesion in the face of Russian behavior that
    has impeded progress on arms control (e.g., Russia's suspension of the
    Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Russia's effective termination
    of the INF Treaty). In the presence of such uncertainty, the Brussels
    Summit Declaration also points out that NATO continues to adapt in
    order to ensure that its deterrence and defense posture remains
    credible, coherent, resilient and adaptable to a changing security
    environment, and that it has taken steps to ensure its nuclear
    deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.

                                      [all]