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DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEFENSE: REBALANCING U.S.-AFRICA POLICY
Thursday, May 16, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ENGEL. The committee will come to order.

Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

This morning, the committee will hear from officials from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Defense Department about American efforts to promote democracy, sustainable development, and regional stability in Africa and how the Administration is working across agencies to achieve our goals.

Welcome to our witnesses. I thank you all for your time and your service, and welcome to members of the public and press as well. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

One of our biggest policy challenges in sub-Saharan Africa is figuring out how to help stabilize fragile States and reduce violence. Over the past 20 years, we have learned a lot about what works and what does not. We know that it requires strategic vision, it takes adequate long-term funding, and it takes coordination across the U.S. Government.

Mr. McCaul and I recently reintroduced the Global Fragility Act to promote this approach. Our bill would make sure relevant agencies are working closely together over the long term to address State fragility and to prevent violence and extremism in priority countries and regions around the world. This would be the top American goal in these countries, not a second or third tier objective.

My concern is that the Administration is taking an unbalanced approach favoring security-focused responses instead of getting to the root causes of instability which would prevent the need for military involvement down the road. We have seen a number of cases in where lip service has been paid to good governance and respect for human rights. But, in practice, we have shared an approach based on our values and instead gone after long-term solutions.

Take Uganda for example, one of the country’s main security partners in sub-Saharan Africa, a country where we should have
leverage. Yet, authorities there have ramped up repression and violence against opposition politicians and civil society. After three decades in power, Museveni is tightening his grip as the United States' response is reduced to reiterating requests to stop arresting and torturing anyone who dares to oppose the government. And we have yet to see a change in Uganda's trajectory.

Or the DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo. In January, the United States endorsed clearly fraudulent election results simply because the Administration did not believe the opposition leader, who actually won, could ever take office. What message does it send when the United States refuses to stand up for democracy, and the United States refuses to call out this sort of corruption?

Ironically, making regional security a top priority above all else ultimately undermines long-term stability on the continent. It is a failure of leadership, and compounded by the Administration's attempts to gut diplomacy and development.

We have talked about that here. We cannot conduct good diplomacy and good development if you are gutting these programs and gutting money to the State Department, and looking at it as a second or third tier priority. It sends a message. It sends a bad message. It sends a message to the agencies best poised to grapple with these challenges that they are not a priority. It sends a message to the rest of the world that the United States is ceding ground to any other power that wants to put down roots.

And you can bet that message is being heard loudly and clearly in Moscow and Beijing.

In Sudan and South Africa, Russia is already using the same playbook they used to attack the United States in 2016 to spread disinformation. Kremlin-aligned private military corporations are getting a foothold in the Central African Republic, Chad, which may be a precursor to similar Russian military involvement across the continent. China now has a military base in Djibouti, making it the only country in the world that hosts both a Chinese and an American military base—talk about hedging your bets. China also has been actively exporting surveillance technology to African governments as a threat to open civic and political spaces already quite fragile in some countries.

And there are a number of hotspots across sub-Saharan Africa that deserve our immediate focus. At the top of the list is Sudan. Since December, Sudanese citizens have peacefully protested against the government's repression and mismanagement of the economy. In mid-September, Sudanese security forces seized power from Omar al-Bashir, ending three blood-soaked decades in power. But despite calls from the African Union and other partners, including the United States, the Transitional Military Council has not been responsible to protesters' demands for an immediate transition to a civilian government.

Earlier this week at least eight protesters were killed by government security forces. And the longer the stand-off between the military and the protesters lasts, the greater the threat for widespread violence and great destabilization. I urge the Administration to keep working with other diplomatic partners to encourage and incentivize an immediate transition to a civilian-led government in Sudan.
I am also deeply concerned about the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has now surpassed 1,600 cases. The United States has supported the Congolese Government’s response, but poor access, distrust of the government, and attacks against healthcare workers have hindered efforts to identify and treat cases.

I have to mention, when we invest strongly in global health we are better able to mount a response and help both DRC and surrounding countries, like South Sudan and Rwanda, build their capacity to prepare for future outbreaks. That is why it is so baffling when the Administration sends up budgets requesting deep cuts to these efforts and uses bad tactics to delay and deny funding against congressional intent.

So, I would like to hear our witnesses’ answers on this range of issues. I look forward to a frank discussion. I am going to introduce our witnesses. But first I will yield to our ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any opening remarks he may have.

Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States has been a long and consistent partner with many African nations. Successful initiatives such as PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation have already saved millions of lives, created jobs, and spurred economic growth. Just last month I traveled to Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Tunisia with Senator Lindsey Graham where we helped launch the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative.

This initiative will provide work force development and skilled training, expand access to capital for entrepreneurs, and remove barriers to women’s participation in the economy through micro-financing.

Some of the fastest growing economies in the world are in Africa, and it is the fastest growing population as well, with a growing number of middle class consumers. This means new markets for U.S. companies, and new opportunities to partner with the United States. However, countries must have a clear-eyed approach on how this growth is being achieved and who they are partnering with.

Between 2000 and 2017, China loaned African countries $143 billion for infrastructure projects. China has used Africa’s growth as an opportunity for geographic and ideological expansion through their Belt and Road Initiative, which preys on developing nations, leaving them largely in debt traps.

The United States must provide a better alternative to China’s exploitation. I have met with African governments, and Ambassadors, and business leaders, and they all tell me the same thing, that the U.S. is their preferred partner but we are just simply not there. Ambassador Nagy, you and I just discussed that prior to the hearing.

The United States brings quality, transparency, and partnership, but we must show up to the game to compete. And that is why in my bill, the Championing Business Through Diplomacy Act, American business is so important. I think it helps ensure that the State better supports American companies of all sizes looking to invest
in Africa and elsewhere, bringing prosperity and, most importantly, stability.

The chairman and I introduced the Global Fragility Act, which I think is a very important bill, to help stabilize a destabilized continent, particularly when you look at the Sahel, which the Department of Defense, as Ms. Lenihan knows very well, the Sahel is going to be the next hotspot, I think, for if we cannot do the prevention piece right, then we have to send in the military.

And I think the Global Fragility Act is a good playbook for the Department of Defense to look at how we can prevent extremism so we do not have to go in and kill.

Now, the BUILD Act that Mr. Yoho introduced is a profound, significant piece of legislation that will put OPIC on steroids, and I think economic investment and opportunity from the private sector.

In line with my legislation, I applaud the Administration for their work on Prosper Africa to increase two-way trade with African countries. The United States also plays an important role supporting good governance and democratic values on the continent. We must continue working with countries to combat corruption and respect human rights.

In Ethiopia we have seen an historic transition. And I commend the bold reforms by Prime Minister Abiy.

In Sudan the people have risked their lives to call for a civilian-led government, an end to Omar al-Bashir’s brutal regime. The U.S. must stand by the people of Sudan during this critical moment in their history.

I know very well from my time as chairman of Homeland Security that ungoverned and unstable places become safe havens for terrorists to regroup and plan attacks and external operations. I am deeply disturbed by the number of increasing attacks targeting innocent civilians, including women and children.

The United States must continue to stand with our African partners in the fight against radical Islamist terrorism. And that is why proactive investments in security and development now will make the United States far safer in the long run.

I am also concerned that the proposed reduction in U.S. Special Forces and advisors in the Sahel is premature. My bill, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act, calls for an interagency approach to address these threats.

I think these witnesses today have valuable insight into these challenges facing Africa. It brings together, you know, State, USAID, and Defense, which is what our Global Fragility Act bill actually does, in an interagency, whole government approach to address this challenge that we have.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

Our witnesses this morning are Tibor P. Nagy, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs; Ramsey Day, USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa; and Michelle Lenihan, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Affairs.

Once again let me welcome you all and convey the thanks of the committee. I will now recognize you each for 5 minutes to summarize your testimony. Let’s start with Assistant Secretary Nagy.
Mr. Nagy. Thank you very much.

Good morning, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee. I am pleased to be joined here today by my colleagues from USAID and the Department of Defense. Our engagement across Africa is truly a team effort. I would also like to recognize the men, women, and families currently serving the American people across our missions in Africa and within our offices in Washington. I am grateful to represent such a dedicated and talented group of public servants.

When speaking to audiences, be they Americans or Africans, I often tell them that the best way to view Africa is through the windshield, not the rearview mirror. It is certainly a time of challenges and opportunities in Africa, and I look forward to sharing with you what we at the State Department are doing to advance U.S.-Africa foreign policy priorities.

I spent the vast majority of my 32-year diplomatic career in Africa, with posting in seven different countries, and I fell in love with the continent and its people. Since I assumed my current role last September, I have visited Africa three times, with another trip planned next month. During my trips, I have engaged with government officials, business leaders, civil society, and average citizens, in order to better understand each country and subregion through a broad range of people and perspectives.

As I said before this committee last December, the potential for increased engagement with Africa economically, culturally, and diplomatically is truly limitless. I am a firm believer that with every challenge there is opportunity, and we must capitalize on our successes.

We have seen significant, positive signs in numerous areas that are important to recognize. Prime Minister Abiy in Ethiopia continues to impress and inspire with his leadership, and we have seen progress in our relationship with Eritrea. President Lourenco of Angola has demonstrated a commitment to fight corruption and to foster citizen-responsive governance and dialog that can, and should be, replicated elsewhere.

Just 6 months ago, discussions about the Democratic Republic of Congo revolved around how to promote the will of the Congolese people in the face of a government trying to cling to power through unconstitutional means. By contrast, when Secretary Pompeo recently met with President Tshisekedi of the DRC following the historic transfer of power, the new president's priorities were fighting corruption, strengthening governance, advancing human rights, and combating trafficking in persons. And we continue to watch the dramatic events unfold in Sudan where, for the first time in 30 years, a transition led by civilians representing the diversity of Sudanese society seems possible.

To underscore the U.S. commitment to Africa, the Administration announced a new Africa Strategy in December 2018 to re-calibrate our engagement with the continent. This strategy seeks to promote trade and commercial ties to increase prosperity in the United States and in African countries, counter radical Islamic terrorism
and violent conflict, strengthen efforts to advance peace and secu-

rity by prioritizing resources and promoting effective and efficient
peacekeeping operations; and by supporting stability, democracy,
good governance, and self-reliance. Ultimately, the success of this
strategy would build on our strong relationships with individual
countries, effective regional organizations and, most importantly,
the people of Africa.

One enduring issue that I believe will be most significant in set-

ting the course for a more prosperous and secure Africa is har-

nessing the potential of Africa’s potential youth bulge as a force for
economic ingenuity and prosperity. Their education, training, and
successful integration into the economic futures of their countries
will create viable alternatives to the poverty that leads to violent
extremism and despair.

Looking ahead, the population of Africa is expected to double in
just a few short decades to 2.2 billion people, of which over 60 per-
cent will be under 25 years. The enormous potential of these young
people creates a wealth of economic opportunities that will deter-
mine the continent’s future.

We are not the only international actor that is interested in Afri-
ca. And we are justifiably concerned about certain countries that
seek to exploit the resources of African nations and subvert Afri-
cans’ desire for democracy for their own economic or geopolitical
advantage.

As you will hear today, no other nation matches the breadth and
depth of the United States’ engagement on the continent, or our
earnest promotion of partnerships, sustainability, and self-suffi-
ciency. We go beyond simply investing in Africa to investing in Af-
cicans. Africa is the dynamic continent of the future, and the direc-
tion it takes will have a major impact—for good or ill—not only in
the Africa but the rest of the world.

As the subject of today’s hearing suggests, this is not a role for
the State Department alone. We must constantly evaluate our ap-
proach and ensure a proper balance between the three D’s. Proper-
ly aligning our diplomatic, development, and defense tools and
resources is critical. Successful engagement and true partnership
with the people and governments of Africa comes from this coordi-
nated and fully integrated approach.

I would like to thank the committee for your bipartisan support
and engagement on issues in Africa. I look forward to your ques-
tions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nagy follows:]
Tibor P. Nagy, Jr.
Assistant Secretary – Bureau of African Affairs
United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S. – Africa Policy
May 16, 2019
2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Good morning, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be joined here today by my colleagues from USAID and the Department of Defense. Our engagement across Africa is truly a team effort. I would also like to recognize the men, women, and families currently serving the American people across our missions in Africa and within our offices in Washington. I am grateful to represent such a dedicated and talented group of public servants.

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As I said before this Committee last December, the potential for increased engagement with Africa economically, culturally and diplomatically is truly limitless. I am a firm believer that with every challenge there is opportunity, and we must capitalize on our successes.

We have seen significant, positive signs in numerous areas that are important to recognize. Prime Minister Abiy in Ethiopia continues to impress and inspire with his leadership, and we have seen progress in our relationship with Eritrea. President Lourenço of Angola has demonstrated a commitment to fight corruption and to foster citizen-responsive governance and dialogue that can - and should be - replicated elsewhere. Just six months ago, discussions about the Democratic Republic of the Congo revolved around how to promote the will of the Congolese people in the face of a government trying to cling to power through unconstitutional means. By contrast, when Secretary Pompeo recently met with President Tshisekedi of the DRC following the historic transfer of power, the new President’s priorities were fighting corruption, strengthening governance, advancing human rights and combating human trafficking. And we continue to watch the dramatic events unfold in Sudan, where for the first time in 30 years a transition led by civilians representing the diversity of Sudanese society seems possible.
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One enduring issue that I believe will be most significant in setting the course for a more prosperous and secure Africa, is harnessing the potential of Africa’s tremendous youth bulge as a force for economic ingenuity and prosperity. Their education, training and successful integration into the economic futures of their countries will create viable alternatives to the poverty that leads to violent extremism and despair. Looking ahead, the population in Africa is expected to double in just a few short decades to 2.2 billion people, of which over 60% will be under 25 years old. The enormous potential of these young people creates a wealth of economic opportunities that will determine the continent’s future.

We are not the only international actor that is interested in Africa, and we are justifiably concerned about certain countries that seek to exploit the resources of African nations and subvert Africans’ desire for democracy for their own economic or geopolitical advantage. As you will hear today, no other nation matches the breadth and depth of the United States’ engagement on the continent, or our earnest promotion of partnerships, sustainability and self-sufficiency. We go beyond simply investing in Africa, to investing in Africans. Africa is the dynamic continent of the future, and the direction it takes will have a major impact – for good or ill – not only in Africa but the rest of the world.

As the subject of today’s hearing suggests, this is not a role for the State Department alone. We must constantly evaluate our approach and ensure a proper balance between “the three D’s.” Properly aligning our diplomatic, development, and defense tools and resources is critical. Successful engagement – and true partnership – with the people and governments of Africa comes from this coordinated and fully integrated approach.

I would like to thank the Committee for your bipartisan support and engagement on issues in Africa. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. DAY.

STATEMENT OF MR. RAMSEY DAY, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. DAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate the commitment this committee has demonstrated to the continent of Africa.

As USAID Administrator Mark Green always says, the purpose of foreign assistance should be to end the need for its existence.

USAID supports the President’s Africa Strategy, and is modernizing the way we do business. Our foreign assistance will help our friends on the continent achieve sustained economic growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats. Given time limitations, I cannot touch upon all of our work in every country, so I will focus on some of the themes and situations at the forefront of our attention.

On March 4th, 2019, Cyclone Idai brought devastation to Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Torrential rains covered nearly 900 square miles in water, an area roughly the size of New York City and Houston combined. More than 1,000 people lost their lives, and 3.5 million people are in desperate need of assistance.

USAID quickly deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART Team, which includes experts in health, food security, shelter, water, sanitation, and hygiene. To reach communities cut-off by the storm, we requested the unique capabilities of the Department of Defense. The U.S. African Command, or AFRICOM, provided airlift and logistics support with 73 flights, and transported more than 782 metric tons of relief supplies.

Just 5 weeks later, Cyclone Kenneth struck Mozambique. And USAID deployed a team to determine additional needs.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, declared an Ebola outbreak in August 2018. Health officials have recorded at least 1,700 cases, including over 1,100 deaths. The U.S. Government deployed a DART team which is coordinating with the DRC Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization, and key actors to support a unified response to the outbreaks. The Ebola response remains a very high priority of the U.S. Government.

We also see threats to democracy. Rarely these days do authoritarian leaders oppose elections outright. Instead, they use sophisticated tools to bend elections to maintain their grip on power. We know that good governance, peace, and security can help unlock the vast potential of Africa. And across the continent, 34 countries have improved their governance performance over the last 10 years, and elections in Nigeria and Senegal earlier this year were largely free of violence.

There are, however, threats to these positive trends. Some governments have worked to close space for independent civil society, media, and opposition parties. The last few years in Uganda and Tanzania have been marked by a closing of political space, which is likely to continue as both nations head toward elections.
At the same time, there has been an unprecedented wave of social and political protests across Africa. In places like Sudan, citizens are standing up and voicing their demands. Learning from our experience in countries such as the DRC, Nigeria, and Kenya, we know that when it comes to democracy, development, and security, the approach must be holistic and balanced. This is why our resources focus on areas critical to advancing countries on their journey to self-reliance. And we will continue to support electoral processes and peaceful political transitions.

We also work with major political parties on issue-based campaigns, the inclusion of women and youth, and provide training for media on election coverage. Through the Trump administration’s Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative, WGDP, landed in February, USAID is working to promote women’s economic empowerment in Africa. We know that supporting women, from improving their land tenure rights to unlocking access to credit and employment, can unleash their full economic potential.

USAID is also embracing partnerships with the private sector like never before, reducing barriers to trade and investment, and fostering linkages between American and African firms. The U.S. Government’s Prosper Africa initiative will enhance our efforts in these areas. Prosper Africa mobilizes the full U.S. Government toolkit of approaches, capabilities, and influence across 15 government agencies to double trade and investment between the U.S. and Africa.

And USAID deeply values the leadership of Chairman Engel and Ranking Member McCaul for their sponsorship of House Resolution 1704, the Championing American Business through Diplomacy Act of 2019. This resolution, which aims to promote American business abroad, is in direct support of the goals of Prosper Africa.

Countering violent extremism is also a critical part of USAID’s work in Africa. We engage government and the civil society partners in their efforts to reduce radicalization, recruitment, and support to violent extremist organizations. For more than a decade the U.S. Government has pursued a coordinated 3D approach to the evolving terrorism threat on the continent. Regular coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, including AFRICOM, creates a space where we can determine how to use the U.S. Government’s diplomatic, defense, and development tools to their greatest effect.

As we reflect on the challenges facing individual countries, it is important not to lose sight of the long-term positive shifts across Africa. The overall trends point toward democratization, economic growth, and development. And USAID remains deeply committed to the role we play with the Departments of State and Defense in advancing U.S. policy and national security objectives.

Thank you for your continued support of USAID’s work in Africa. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]
Good morning, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate the commitment that this Committee and your colleagues have to the African continent.

Today, we’ve come together, along with colleagues from the State Department, and Department of Defense, to discuss joint efforts to promote democracy, sustainable development, and regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa. As USAID Administrator Mark Green always says - the goal of foreign assistance should be to end the need for its existence.

USAID supports the President’s Africa Strategy, and we will not continue with “business as usual.” Instead, our foreign assistance will help our friends on the continent achieve sustained economic growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats. I know that I cannot touch upon our work in each country given time limitations, so I will focus on some of the themes and situations at the forefront of our attention.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

The world’s gaze has turned toward Africa these last few months with natural disasters and disease outbreaks.

On March 4, 2019, Tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall in Mozambique and devastated Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. In the aftermath, torrential rains covered nearly 900 square miles of land with water—that’s an area larger than New York City and Los Angeles combined. Sadly, more than 1,000 people lost their lives, and 3 million people are in desperate need of assistance.

USAID mobilized quickly in response and deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), which includes experts in health, food security, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene to provide technical advice and make assessments in real time. To prevent the spread of cholera and other waterborne diseases, USAID delivered relief supplies, including water-treatment units, water-storage containers, and latrines, and is working with partners to provide medication and oral rehydration salts. To reach the communities cut off by the storm, we also requested the unique capabilities of the U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to provide airlift and logistics support for our humanitarian response. Over the course of their mission, the U.S. military flew 73 flights, and transported more than 782 metric
tons of relief supplies, including food, medical supplies, and vehicles, as well as USAID disaster experts and aid workers.

Just five weeks after Cyclone Idai, Cyclone Kenneth struck Mozambique in April, a total of 41 people were killed, more than 90 injured, and up to 300,000 people were impacted. USAID has deployed a team to the affected area to determine additional food, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene needs.

In a different region of the continent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) declared an Ebola outbreak on August 1, 2018. Since then, health officials have recorded at least 1,680 confirmed and probable cases, including 1,117 deaths, in DRC’s North Kivu and Ituri Provinces as of May 12, 2019. The U.S. Government deployed a DART to the DRC to augment the ongoing Ebola response efforts. These disaster and health experts from USAID and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), are working with partners to provide robust life-saving assistance and support to the affected populations. The DART is coordinating with the DRC government, the World Health Organization, other donors, and key actors to support a unified effort, encourage sustained resourcing and fair burden-sharing, and ultimately end the outbreak. USAID assistance works to break the chain of transmission, including through preventing and controlling infections, surveillance and case-finding, contact-tracing, case-management, and raising awareness in communities about how the virus is transmitted.

We remain concerned that the Ebola outbreak is still not contained. As Administrator Green, stated when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 8, 2019, the current outbreak is more than merely a health concern. The Administrator noted that the lack of citizen-centered responsive government in the affected areas represents a failure of institutions and a failure of democracy. Community distrust remains high and there has been a deeply disturbing uptick in violence targeting outsiders, including healthcare facilities. The Ebola response is a priority for the U.S. Government, not only because we are committed to supporting those affected, but also because effective efforts to contain and end the outbreak will prevent it from spreading throughout the broader region and beyond, including the United States. We are working with colleagues in the interagency to advocate for a more effective global response.

**Democratic Backsliding**

Another significant challenge we face in the region is democratic backsliding. Rarely these days do authoritarian leaders oppose elections outright. Instead, they use sophisticated tools and methods to bend elections to ensure they can maintain their grip on power. Subverting civil society and independent media, manipulating vote tabulations, and other anti-democratic pluys are all too often undermining hope for everyday citizens to be able to shape their future through the ballot box.
During the past year, we have seen elections in Nigeria, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Africa, as well as the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, following four months of peaceful protests by citizens fed up with decades of oppression, corruption, and miracle. We know that good governance, peace, and security can help unlock the vast potential of Africa. And across the continent, 34 African countries have improved their overall governance performance over the last ten-year period, according to the latest Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Elections in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Senegal were largely free of violence. In April, USAID Administrator Green traveled to Senegal to lead the U.S. Delegation to the second inauguration ceremonies for President Macky Sall. Senegal represents what is possible in Africa through a commitment to democracy and inclusive economic growth. Over the past five years, many countries have shown improvements in transparency and accountability.

There are, however, threats to these positive trends. Elections are sometimes marred by corruption and fraud, and improvements in some dimensions of governance have stalled or declined in recent years, or have not reached all countries. Some governments have actively worked to close political space for independent civil society, media, and opposition parties. The last few years in Uganda and Tanzania have been marked by a closing of political space, which will likely continue as both nations head toward elections in 2020 and 2021. As a result of public frustration with flawed elections, an increasing closure of political space, rising instability due to conflicts and disasters, and the spread of extremism, fewer African citizens feel they are free to say what they truly think and feel. The need for USAID and other donors to address these challenges to democracy on the continent is clear.

At the same time, there has been an unprecedented wave of social and political protest across Africa. In places such as Sudan, citizens are standing up and voicing their demands for services and accountability.

Learning from our extensive experience in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Kenya, we know that when it comes to democracy, development, and security, our approach must be holistic, and balanced. Working in partnership with African governments, we strengthen governance institutions and protect the democratic gains that have been made across the continent.

We deeply appreciate your support for our work. USAID will continue to fund programming that aims to counter authoritarian impulses, nurture the capacity of civil society to advocate for an agenda of liberty, and advance fundamental freedoms worldwide. Our resources will be focused on areas that we know are critical to advancing countries on their journey to self-reliance. We will continue to support electoral processes and political transitions, such as elections in Ghana and Somalia that will take place next year. Our support takes individual country contexts and needs into careful consideration. It includes advisory services on required
legal reforms, technical assistance and training to electoral management bodies, and support to local organizations for civic and voter education campaigns and domestic election observation. We also work with major political parties on issue-based campaigns and inclusion of women and youth, provide training for media on responsible election coverage, and support efforts to mitigate conflicts and promote peaceful participation in political processes. At a time of historic transition in Ethiopia, we are focused on tangible and targeted interventions that will maximize the impact of U.S. engagement and support the critical political and economic reforms being undertaken.

Sustainable Development

Women are a critical part of advancing sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. As USAID Administrator Mark Green, said, “When women do better, countries do better, communities do better, and families do better.” The economic potential of women in sub-Saharan Africa is enormous. Closing the gender labor gap in the workforce could add $721 billion to the region’s GDP. And when women earn a competitive income, they invest heavily in their households – in food, healthcare, and education. From improving land tenure rights for women in places like Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Tanzania to unlocking access to credit, assets and employment across East Africa, USAID is already deeply engaged in, and committed to, women’s economic empowerment in Africa. Through the Trump Administration’s Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative, launched in February of this year, USAID will continue to promote women’s economic empowerment in the developing world. Administrator Green recently returned from a trip to Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivoire with Advisor to the President Ivanka Trump where they met with women leaders and small business owners to discuss ways to improve the enabling environment for women entrepreneurs, and advance issues like access to credit for all women innovators.

USAID looks to the opportunities presented by trade and international investments – they are among the fastest ways for Africa to boost its economic growth, which is in the interest of the U.S. We advance enterprise-driven solutions to unlock the continent’s growing markets. We are embracing true partnerships with the private sector like never before, working to reduce barriers to trade and investment, and foster linkages between U.S. and African firms. The U.S. Government’s Prosper Africa initiative will enhance our efforts in these areas.

The initiative will advance African and American prosperity and security, fuel mutual economic growth and job creation, and demonstrate the superior value proposition of transparent markets and private enterprise for driving growth. Prosper Africa will mobilize and coordinate the full U.S. government toolkit of approaches, capabilities, influence, and assistance to double two-way trade and investment between the United States and partner countries in Africa while creating permanent jobs at home and abroad. Fifteen U.S. government agencies will work together to
facilitate transactions and foster fair and accessible business climates and robust financial markets.

We believe that by leveling the playing field for free, fair, transparent investment, African nations can increasingly tap the trillions of dollars in private-sector resources needed to advance the continent’s development and ultimately eliminate the need for unsustainable foreign-backed loans.

One area where we are using a market approach -- or private sector engagement -- is the power sector. Power Africa, a whole-of-government effort led by USAID in partnership with the Departments of State, Commerce, Energy, and others, employs an approach to engage U.S. government agencies, international donors and finance institutions, host-country counterparts, and the private sector, to level the playing field and encourage investments in electricity infrastructure. “Power Africa 2.0” increases the program’s focus on transmission and distribution, a strong enabling environment, and the U.S. private sector’s competitiveness.

U.S. government funding has unlocked more than 20 billion dollars' worth of investment from the private and public sector in generation projects alone. To date, Power Africa has helped 129 projects, comprising over 10,000 megawatts, reach financial close. Since 2014, USAID and its partners in Power Africa have helped an estimated 58 million Africans gain access to electricity.

We will continue to deliver on the goals of the Electrify Africa Act by working with African governments to create and strengthen the policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks needed to increase transparency and competitiveness and attract continued private sector investment over the long-term on their countries' journey to self-reliance.

In addition to expanding trade and infrastructure in Africa, USAID remains committed to helping save lives across the continent. We are one of the U.S. implementing agencies for the State Department’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR has provided nearly 15 million men, women and children in sub-Saharan Africa with antiretroviral medicine, meaning they can now live long, healthy lives with HIV. Through the President’s Malaria Initiative, seven million malaria deaths have been averted and over one billion cases have been prevented globally since 2000, primarily among children under the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional Stability

Countering violent extremism is also a critical part of USAID’s work in Africa. We engage government and civil society partners in their efforts to reduce radicalization, recruitment, and support to violent extremist organizations. For more than a decade, we’ve pursued a coordinated
3D approach to the evolving terrorism threat on the continent through the Trans-Sahara Counterrorism Partnership and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterrorism. Regular coordination with the State Department and the Department of Defense, including AFRICOM, creates a space where we can determine how to use the U.S. Government’s diplomatic, defense, and development tools to their greatest effect.

During the Senate Appropriations Committee State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee hearing on April 29, 2019, Administrator Green emphasized the Sahel region as a priority. USAID is aggressively co-programming its various streams of assistance to focus on building the capacity of governments and local communities, promoting resilience and self-reliance, and eventually diminishing the need for long-term assistance. This is the development component of a broader national security partnership with the governments of Burkina Faso and Niger. USAID will implement the program in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense, and other U.S. Government agencies.

For example, in West Africa, an element of USAID’s support for the Trans-Sahara Counterrorism Partnership is the Voices for Peace Project, which counters violent extremism by leveraging both traditional and new media at the community level. The project builds partnerships with respected leaders, institutions, and networks to address drivers and root causes of violent extremism such as marginalization, exclusion, and poor governance. It supports a culturally effective communications environment to empower locally influential voices, establish interactive media platforms, and engage at-risk youth, women, and communities.

In the Horn of Africa, we provide robust assistance to meet emergency humanitarian needs as well as education, economic growth, governance and stabilization programming to shore up gains in Somalia. Given that marginalization and isolation drives extremism in Somalia, USAID’s programming engages with vulnerable communities and nascent local government to reduce opportunities for extremists to manipulate grievances. In line with the Stabilization Assistance Review, USAID is closely coordinating with DOD counterparts to determine early recovery assistance to areas cleared of al-Shabaab. USAID programs expand the presence of local government and identify shared public goods and services that incentivize cooperation through community driven development approaches. These USAID interventions implemented with local government and communities break the cycle of isolation and economic blockades imposed on areas by terrorists.

Along Kenya’s coast, USAID supports the Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism program. The program enhances the capacity of key civil society organizations to counter violent extremist influence and respond rapidly to prevent emergent incidents of violence related to extremism. USAID’s work along the coast complements efforts by State’s Bureau of
Counterterrorism to improve relationships between communities, government, and the security sector in order to address the threat and impacts of violent extremism.

USAID also combats wildlife crime, as extremist groups have been known to profit from the illicit wildlife trade as well as organized criminal networks, further compromising the security and stability of the region.

The Stabilization Assistance Review also paves the way for improved interagency collaboration in areas where the U.S. Government is integrating civilian-military processes to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

USAID’s stabilization programming supports host-nation initiatives to reduce insecurity and address the underlying drivers of armed conflict. In Mali, USAID supports the Peace, Stabilization and Reconciliation Project to improve prospects for long-term peace and security in northern and central regions. By building trust between conflict-affected communities and their government, strengthening the ability of communities to mitigate and manage conflict and prioritize and implement their community’s most pressing development needs, we are empowering marginalized youth as change agents.

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives supports the Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin program, which focuses on denying the space for Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa terrorists to operate by reducing recruitment and support for their ideology. The program includes small-scale, strategically targeted assistance to local partners to engage vulnerable youth to be more resilient to violent extremist influence. It also promotes confidence in the responsiveness of local authorities, thereby undermining the extremists’ ability to leverage governance-related grievances for radicalization and recruitment.

With 70 percent of its population under the age of 30, sub-Saharan Africa is the youngest region of the world, and it is these youth who will be the engines of Africa’s future. Programs like the Department of State’s Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) invests in the capacity of youth leaders to ensure that the current generation is equipped with the skills to lead stable democratic societies and to improve development outcomes and sustainability. Four years after the launch of YALI’s keystone programs—the Mandela Washington Fellowship and the Regional Leadership Centers—the initiative has graduated more than 17,000 participants from 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Conclusion
So as we reflect on the challenges facing individual countries at any given moment, it’s important not to lose sight of the longer-term positive shifts across Africa. Despite challenges, the overall trends in sub-Saharan Africa point to accelerated democratization, continued economic growth, and development. We know that investments in democratic institutions,
citizen-centered processes, and fundamental freedoms are key drivers of strengthening the commitment and capacity of governments, civil society, and the private sector in partner countries to take on their own development challenges. Again, USAID strongly believes that the purpose of foreign aid should be to end the need for its existence.

I remain deeply committed to USAID’s goals and the integrated role that we play with the Department of State and the Department of Defense in advancing U.S. policy and national security objectives. Thank you for your continued support of USAID’s work in Africa. I welcome any questions you may have.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Ms. Lenihan.

STATEMENT OF MS. MICHELLE LENIHAN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. Lenihan. Good morning, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and esteemed members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today on “Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S. Foreign Policy with Africa” alongside my colleagues from State and USAID.

I would also like to thank the women and men of the U.S. Department of Defense whose talent, commitment, and sacrifice enable us to execute our policies and achieve our objectives in Africa and elsewhere. It is an honor to represent them.

Africa is important to our national interests and will become increasingly so in the future. It is a complex security environment marked by great-power competition advancements, and threats from terrorist groups, violent extremist organizations, illicit traffickers, and transnational criminal organizations. Major trends, to include population explosion, have the possibility of compounding these issues.

Today’s forum provides a key opportunity for us to highlight the U.S. Government approach to advancing our foreign policy goals and addressing threats, which we do together.

DoD activities often seize the spotlight, but we are part of an integrated effort with State, USAID, and others contributing mightily with depth and breadth to effect objectives laid out in the 2018 U.S. Strategy for Africa.

One, promoting prosperity;
Two, strengthening security;
And, three, striving for stability.

Guided also by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, DoD strives to advance U.S. interests in Africa and deny others the ability to harm the United States and our partners. We do so primarily through partnership. First and foremost, that includes other U.S. departments and agencies, as a primary mission of ours is to provide military support to diplomacy and development.

The U.S. response to Cyclone Idai, as Mr. Day noted devastated Mozambique and heavily impacted Malawi and Zimbabwe, it is a powerful example of DoD providing unique capability, via airlift and logistics support, to enable the delivery of critical aid in support of USAID’s broader efforts.

We also contribute DoD medical expertise. In East Africa and Nigeria, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research supports the PEPFAR initiative through advancement of HIV/AIDS research and treatment of 340,000 patients. DoD is also poised to provide critical support to U.S. Government personnel stationed across the continent to ensure their safety in times of crisis. And we apply pressure on terrorist networks to create time and space for development and diplomacy efforts to take hold.

Additionally, we focus on our African partners and help build their capacity with the goal of developing professional forces who
respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and more effectively contribute to stability in Africa. Through engagement we have a greater chance of affecting behavior and ensuring forces are accountable.

Further, we work through international partners and organizations, such as the African Union and United Nations, and we support African-led initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel or the Multinational Joint Task Force, to maximize our impact and collectively address our shared threats. We employ a variety of tools to achieve our security objectives, from Defense Institution building to force professionalism, training, equipping, assisting, advising and more. Our efforts cover a broad spectrum.

The Department also champions the advancement and inclusion of women in security by changing the gender dynamics at the table, in the field, and within communities, we can help break the cycle of violence and raise societies through the elevation of women.

DoD is committed to implementing the 2017 Women, Peace, and Security Act, and helping prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict by increasing women’s participation. For example, since 2017, our Special Operations Exercise Flintlock in the Sahel has included a Women, Peace, and Security seminar to highlight the importance of women’s leadership and women’s civil society organizations encountering violent extremist organizations.

DoD maintains a dynamic episodic engagement with an enduring impact and light footprint. And we contribute to a whole-of-government effort to advance prosperity, security, and stability in Africa in support of our national security interests.

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, and honorable members, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss U.S.-Africa foreign policy and our integrated U.S. Government approach.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lenihan follows:]
Michelle Lenihan
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs – Office of the Secretary of Defense
United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S. – Africa Policy
May 16, 2019
2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on defense policy matters relating to "Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S.-Africa Policy," alongside Assistant Secretary Nagy and Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator Day. I am pleased to be here with colleagues with whom I work closely, speaking with you on the important issue of U.S.-Africa policy. I would also like to thank the women and men of the Department of Defense, whose dedication, talent, and sacrifice enable us to execute our policies and achieve our objectives in Africa and elsewhere.

As this is my first appearance before this Committee, I would also like to recognize and thank you for the strong collaboration and bipartisan support you provide to our security missions, and the vital contribution this Committee makes to our national security dialogue and decisions. Though brief, my experience as a Legislative Fellow in the U.S. Senate instilled in me a deep respect for the role of the foreign affairs committees in serving the American people and our national interests.

Vast, complex, diverse, and dynamic, Africa is a continent of opportunities and challenges with the possibility of surging either positively or negatively. Home to more than a billion people, the population of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to double by 2050, with the majority under 25 years of age. This growth, coupled with burgeoning economies, can lead to increased market potential, a dynamic new workforce, and innovative change. But it may also strain resources and services and exacerbate security threats. It is imperative that the Department of Defense helps partners foster positive trends and arrest the negative ones, as Africa is an enduring national security interest for the United States.

The Department of Defense’s approach to Africa policy is nested within the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 U.S. Strategy for Africa — and detailed in the 2018 Department of Defense Strategy for Africa. The overall goals of the National Security Strategy are to protect the American people, defend the Homeland, and promote prosperity and peace from a position of strength. The National Defense Strategy supports the National Security Strategy and focuses on three key pillars: (1) increasing lethality; (2) strengthening existing partnerships and attracting new ones; and (3) reforming practices to improve performance and affordability. The National Defense Strategy also gives clear guidance and priorities to the Department that, though we must continue to address terrorist threats, interstate strategic competition is our top national security priority. The U.S. Strategy for Africa also focuses on three pillars: (1) promoting prosperity; (2) strengthening security; and (3) striving for
stability. DoD plays a primary role in pillar two, and we work with our interagency colleagues to support pillars one and three.

As outlined in the 2018 DoD Strategy for Africa, the Department will continue to pursue African-led security solutions while maintaining the ability to act unilaterally to protect U.S. citizens and interests. As such, DoD will: (1) support the U.S. whole-of-government effort to address African security challenges; (2) leverage international partnership to support security objectives; (3) maintain strategic access and influence; and (4) seek low-cost, resource-sustainable, innovative security solutions. We strive to deny adversaries the ability to harm the United States and our partners while strengthening security to advance U.S. and partner interests. In this effort, we face a complex and volatile security environment marked by competition and aggressive behavior from other great powers as well as ongoing threats from terrorist groups and violent extremist organizations, illicit traffickers, and transnational criminal organizations.

The Department of Defense achieves these goals through partnership, both within the U.S. Government and with international partners. Department of Defense activities in Africa primarily serve to support diplomacy and development, as military solutions alone cannot address the challenges in Africa. Thus, our interagency counterparts are our core partners as we work together to achieve our long-term strategic goals. Additionally, we work closely with African partners and organizations, as well as other international actors, such as the African Union, regional African economic and social communities, the United Nations, and the European Union to achieve our shared objectives. We maximize our partnerships via a by, with, and through approach, with U.S. military capabilities employed in a supporting role. Security operations are executed almost exclusively by the partner forces; we work with partnered security forces on their operational needs; and we achieve U.S. and partner objectives through cooperative relationships. Together, we cooperate to contain and degrade transnational threats, protect U.S. personnel and facilities, prevent and mitigate conflict, and build partnership capacity to achieve our strategic goals. We will focus our engagement where our most significant defense and security interests are at stake, our partners demonstrate political will and a commitment to address security challenges, and targeted efforts are likely to have positive impact.

With your support, we will continue our approach, conveying demonstrated commitment and resolve while keeping our adversaries off-balance. Additionally, we will continue to work closely with Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. Government department and agency colleagues to ensure an integrated, balanced approach to address complex challenges and encourage opportunities to promote prosperity, strengthen security, and support stabilization in Africa.

Thank you for holding today’s hearing and highlighting U.S.-Africa policy. I appreciate the opportunity to represent the Department of Defense in this important forum.
Chairman ENGEL. Thank you all very much. I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. All time yielded is for the purposes of questioning our witnesses. And I will start by recognizing myself.

I want to ask a question about Sudan. The Administration's endorsement of fraudulent election results in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in January sent a strong message that in Africa the United States values regional stability over adherence to democratic processes and principles. Looking at recent events in Sudan, it is clear that the Transitional Military Council, which seized power in mid-April, is trying to determine how much power the international community will let them retain. This is arguably why negotiations between the military and the protestors have stalled.

Let me ask Ambassador Nagy, can you tell me why civil society actors across the continent should believe the United States' commitment to the consolidation of democracy after what happened in the DRC?

And can you promise this committee and the people of Sudan that the Administration will not undermine a true democratic transition in order to cut a deal with the very institutions that are responsible for Sudan's current political and economic malaise?

Ambassador.

Mr. NAGY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, the events in Sudan are extremely dynamic. As a matter of fact, they are going almost moment by moment as our charge just a little while ago was convoked to the foreign ministry along with others by the TMC, probably to hear about the state of negotiations between the TMC and the umbrella group of the opposition. There has been considerable progress in the last couple of days. We are very encouraged.

Tomorrow afternoon we are hosting right here at the State Department a Friends of Sudan Conference with delegates coming from around the world, including the Africa Union, Ethiopians as their chairmanship of IGAD, to make sure that the international community keeps pressing for forward momentum on this.

We are very encouraged with the events there. Our charge is extremely engaged. The deputy secretary had a phone call with the leader of the TMC, General Burhan, a few days ago.

A few weeks ago, right after the events really unfolded I sent our deputy assistant secretary to the region to have discussions.

So, actually, as of right now things are looking up. Horrible of the deaths. There appears to be a split within the armed forces. So, we are fully engaged. We are engaging with our allies and friends. We are also holding discussions, obviously, with our Gulf friends to make sure that there is a commonality of purpose in moving forward in Sudan.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman ENGEL. Let me ask a question and, Mr. Day, I think I will ask it to you about Russia and Africa. There is a growing risk that Russia could seize upon the successes of disinformation campaigns in the West and redeploy them to other parts of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, in recent months news has leaked that Russia or Russian-aligned entities have attempted to assist the governments of certain African countries, mainly Sudan
and South Africa, to try to spread disinformation or discredit political opposition parties.

So, Mr. Day, let me ask you this. How is Russia’s increasing use of disinformation a threat to U.S. interests on the continent met? Across the U.S. Government what is being done to push back against a growing trend of Russian aggression, actually, in sub-Saharan Africa?

Mr. DAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is certainly an element and a trend that we are seeing across the continent, both Russia and China. We are watching it very closely.

Now, Russia’s engagement on the African continent I think pales in comparison to China. So, a lot of our thinking has focused on ensuring that our African partners are aware of the risks of engagement with China, given the debt structure and the deals that had been done. But we are certainly concerned with disinformation, whether it be in South Africa, or Sudan, or anywhere. And so we continue with our African partners to ensure that there is a certain level of awareness of the risks of those engagements.

Chairman ENGEL. Anyone else care to comment? Ambassador.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We are weaponizing our embassies to confront the Russians. I mean, we all know that for the Russians this is nothing new. This is the same type of disinformation the Soviet Union conducted back in the 1960’s, 1970’s, 1980’s. We have to confront them at their source. We have to engage with our local interlocutors. Our embassy public diplomacy sections have to be aggressive. And we are using the Young African Leaders Initiative network, which is several hundred thousand bright young Africans, to help us fight this disinformation, sir.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Let me call on Mr. McCaul. But let me also say that next week the House is going to vote on the Global Fragility Act, which both Mr. McCaul and I are sponsoring, establishing an overreaching policy framework for long-term inter-agency planning.

And I hope that in your answering some of the other questions you can sort of work that in. Thank you.

Mr. McCaul.

Mr. McCaul. No, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great segue. I was going to ask you just that question. And I, you know, when I talk to, when I get the threat briefings, whether it be DoD or State, intelligence community, the Sahel seems to be the new, to be the new hotspot. In Iraq and Syria we have, I think we have tamped down the threat there. It is still alive but it has certainly been crushed to a large extent. And it seems that the Sahel is the hotspot.

That is why the Global Fragility Act I think is so important. And I just wanted—and I know the national strategies you have mentioned, Ms. Lenihan, sort of outlines what our bill authorizes. The Relief and Recovery Fund will authorize $1 billion over 5 years.

So, with the three of you here, you are really the three principals of the Global Fragility Act, how, how would this actually work in action? And I will start with you, Ambassador.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir, Ranking Member.
I have to say that from our point of view we are absolutely delighted with the cooperation that we have between the three of us. We work very closely together. We meet constantly discussing policies. Of course, at times we see things differently, but overall we always have the same goal.

There are some examples of this. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership where we are having meetings next week amongst all agencies involved is an ideal. And that is exactly how we need to work in situations like the Sahel because it is, it is multi-threat, it is historical, it is cultural, there are so many players involved, including Europeans and the United Nations, so the United States of America has to have a single force.

And as has been evident, situation after situation in Africa we can fight hard, eradicate terrorism, but if there is nothing to fill that space, all you end up with then is after a few years even a worse group of terrorists.

Mr. McCaul. Uh-huh.

Mr. Nagy. Another partnership which is absolutely essential in that situation are the countries involved. And that is where also our diplomacy really matters, because out of the five, six, seven countries you can have six countries very strongly together. All it takes is one, which is not heavily involved and responsible, to keep spreading what I call a cancer.

So, from our point of view, bravo and thank you, sir.

Mr. McCaul. Right. And the Chairman and I introduced the Trans-Sahara Partnership Act. It will be on the floor next week, I believe. So that is very good.

Mr. Day?

Mr. Day. I could not agree more with the assistant secretary. You know, from USAID’s perspective we need space to operate. And when we can gain access to certain areas it has been proven that our programs can be effective, whether it is food security or education, some of our resilience programming in health, good governance, all of those are incredibly important to building kind of a holistic approach to this. But if we do not have access to it then it makes it a lot more difficult. Means our programs are going to be a lot more limited.

We can do a tremendous amount with our Office of Transition Initiatives, which we are working in northern Burkina Faso and Mali, and some areas in Niger, in Tillaberi area. But it is incredibly important that we have great coordination amongst the various agencies because that gives us the space to operate. Because these programs will work, but we just need to have the space to operate. Similar in Somalia and several other places as well.

Mr. McCaul. Ms. Lenihan.

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you, Ranking Member.

I agree with my colleagues on the panel, fragility is a serious concern within Africa. From a defense standpoint you need to get at the underlying issues rather than just address the security effects. And for that matter, you have to work on development, you have to work on diplomacy. We take steps in order to create time and space in order to do that and work in support of our interagency partners in order to do so.
So, any attempts to address underlying issues and causes certainly will have spillover effects on improving security and reducing the need for it.

Mr. McCaul. Thank you. My time is kind of limited but I do want to address China real quickly.

The chairman mentioned in his opening statement Djibouti. The idea that they have a military base right next to ours in Djibouti is just, to me, unacceptable. In this One Belt, One Road they are literally, they are taking over African nations without a shot fired, in my judgment, over-leveraging them, bringing in their workers, extracting natural resources.

I met with the Conservation Group yesterday. The Chinese are coming in with AK-47s and harvesting, you know, rhinos.

So, it just seems to me we are not com—we are not there and we are not competing in Africa. And if we are not there and we are not competing, you know, American businesses are not competing, we lose.

Ambassador, you seem to want to respond to that.

Mr. Nagy. Up to now maybe not, but oh my gosh, we are getting ready to fire back at full force. Because we are going to do this strategically. We, again, I would hate to use the word “weaponize” but we are weaponizing our embassies to confront the Chinese across a whole range of issues, and most prominently the commercial one. Because, as you said, sir, the Africans tell us over and over and over again they would much rather deal with U.S. businesses than the Chinese. But they have been dealing with the Chinese because the Americans have not been at the door.

But we are going to change that. I mean, I could go on forever on this. But I just promise you that we are seized, the secretary is seized, and you are going to see a very aggressive posture in so many different fields. Every time I go to Africa I get in trouble with the Chinese for my speeches to where the Chinese Ambassador in Uganda had to do a full page op-ed in response to the things I said because I, I say the truth about what we are doing and what they are doing.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. McCaul. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, it has been a very slow creep and very deceptive, but I think people are waking up to what is happening now.

And I yield back.

Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

It is now my pleasure to call on the chair of the Africa Subcommittee of this committee, Ms. Bass.

Ms. Bass. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I appreciate the ranking member in saying that people are beginning to wake up because, you know, whenever I hear about the Chinese or the Russians in Africa, you know, my thought is “Where are we?” And, you know, it is time for us to step up. And so I appreciate the assistant secretary saying that you are going to come full force. I would love to hear the details as to what that means.

And then, of course, what concerns me about it is is that, and I know you are genuine because I know you, but then, you know, we have a 66 percent decrease in the budget. So, I do not know
how you go full force and have your budget, you know, decrease so much. So, perhaps you can clue me in on the secret as to how you are going to do that.

And I appreciate Ms. Lenihan talking about addressing the root causes because I am concerned about our imbalance in that we put a lot more emphasis. Obviously, we put emphasis on security but we all recognize that if you address the root causes you are addressing, you know, the security situation as well.

So, perhaps if you would not mind, maybe Assistant Secretary, you could give me some top lines as to how it will be full force.

I also want to ask about Cameroon and Ethiopia. So, I do not want to run out of time. Go ahead.

Mr. Nagy. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Very quickly, I have worked for seven different administrations, different levels of budgets. I have had some fat ones and thin ones. All I can promise you that I will do the absolute best I can with whatever funds are made available.

On China specifically, we are having individual embassy and country strategies. We are putting deal teams together, from the largest embassies to the smallest ones, to do both sides of this: support U.S. businesses, work with the countries to improve their business environment which will attract U.S. businesses. Because all my discussions with U.S. business they say, we want to go to Africa but this is what is stopping us.

So, again, that is a full force press.

And also to make clear to people, you know, every time China builds a 50,000-seat stadium they get full page coverage, front page. What is not said, that there would not be people to be in that stadium if not for U.S. Government’s billions of dollars saving millions of Africans from HIV/AIDS. So, so we need to make sure that both sides of the story is told on this.

And I will stop there for you.

Ms. Bass. Sure. And I know with my ranking member over there that we would love for you to come to the subcommittee, and perhaps we could drill down because we want to figure out how to be, how to be supportive.

Ms. Lenihan, would you like to respond to what you were saying in terms of addressing root causes but yet our focus is on security?

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you, Representative. I do believe that we need to address root causes. But I also know from Defense we——

Chairman Engel. Ms. Lenihan, can you pull the microphone just a little closer to your mouth.

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you. Yes, I do believe that we need to address root causes in Africa, which my colleagues here from USAID and State do a heroic job of doing so, along with the many people out in the field and within the department in order to do so.

Additionally, at the State Department—I am sorry, additionally at the Department of Defense we work on institution building, which I also believe addresses some of the root causes in order to create those critical foundations and promote governance across the Sahel. Of note, there is the Security Governance Initiative which is focused on addressing cross-cutting security sector improvements
to develop governance and build institutions. Two countries, Mali and Niger are part of that.

Ms. Bass. Thank you. And I am sorry to cut you off but I know I am going to run out of time.

So, I wanted to ask in terms of the crisis in the Cameroon in the Anglophone region, we know it has been worsening over the last 18 months. And so I wanted to know what we are doing along with our diplomatic partners to encourage negotiation?

Mr. Nagy. Thank you very much.

Very quickly, Cameroon continues to be one of three countries that grieves my heart every night. I sat with President Biya a couple of months——

Ms. Bass. What are the other two?

Mr. Nagy. Somalia and South Sudan.

Ms. Bass. Oh, OK.

Mr. Nagy. I sat with President Biya a couple of months ago in Cameroon and we told—he told me, you know, yes, we are interested in dialog. And, but the government has done nothing to show for it. They have set up some Potemkin Institutions which have not done anything.

We continue to press forward with our, our allies. We had an Arrias at the United Nations——

Ms. Bass. I am sorry, I am going to run out. This is just terrible, 5 minutes. But I have to get to Ethiopia.

Mr. Nagy. OK.

Ms. Bass. So, you know, give me——

Mr. Nagy. One best news on Ethiopia, yesterday if you had been at the State Department for our Partnership Forum on Ethiopia and seen the hundreds and hundreds of peoples there from the diaspora, from U.S. business,——

Ms. Bass. Oh.

Mr. Nagy [continuing]. And from the Ethiopian Government, your heart would have melted.

I kicked it off and I was just delighted because I knew we would get to this point. Going forward we are finding ways to support Ethiopia. But what they need now is jobs, jobs, jobs. And that will be brought by the business investment. So, we will do our best to promote that.

Thank you very much.


Are you going to let me continue on, Mr. Chair?

Chairman Engel. Thank you.


Chairman Engel. Ms. Bass, yes, I will give you one extra minute. See that, I offered it and she did not take it. So I have got the, I have the best of both worlds.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our distinguished panelists. Thank you for your work.

You know, I have been here since 1981. Every single Presidential budget that has come up here is dead on arrival. President Obama cut tuberculosis by 20 percent; we put it back.

He cut, neglected tropical diseases by 20 percent; we put it back, and then some.
So, when I see a budget come up that has draconian cuts, it is in a way not worth the paper it is printed on. But I am not sure why OMB insists on doing that each and every year. But every president has done that. Thankfully, Congress is a check and we do, I think, get it right most of the time.

Let me just say a couple of things. I think that we are balanced in many ways. Of course, there is always room for improvement. Much of what started with President Bush, PEPFAR for example, I was the prime author of the reauthorization for 5 years. That was signed by President Trump.

We are talking about $30 billion approximately over 5 years for tuberculosis, for HIV/AIDS, and look at the progress that has been made through successive administrations. Beginning with Bush, his idea, one of his greatest legacies ever, 17 million Africans saved because of it. Mother to child transmission saved about 2 million or so, and maybe more.

And then you have the situation of about, what is it. 13 high-HIV burden countries who are on pace to control their HIV/AIDS pandemic by 2020 according to Ambassador Deborah Birx.

So, there is real progress being made. And as you said, Mr. Ambassador, they may build the stadium—they being the Chinese—which is high gloss and highly visible, but we are saving lives, and you are walking point saving those lives. And I do not think that should be in any way trivialized or in any way denigrated. It is fantastic what you are doing.

So, there has been continuity from administration to administration, and it continues. I cannot think of a better person to be running our USAID than Mark Green. I got along great, worked great with Dr. Shah, who I thought was a great USAID administrator, and the two that followed, including the interim. And now that baton has been given to a very—so I do hope that, you know, the press and others when they walk away, so much is happening on the ground.

Ebola if you would elaborate quickly on what is happening in D.R. Congo on Ebola, as the situation is very, very discouraging. But you can fill us in on that.

Karen Bass and I visited Ethiopia last year and met with President Abiy. And we are very encouraged by his release of political prisoners. You might want to elaborate very quickly on that.

And then Turkey. You know, we talk about China. I chaired several hearings on China’s influence on what is happening in Africa, their fleecing of their minerals, their wood, their other, oil, and their debt now, which is a huge problem. You may want to speak to that quickly.

Trafficking, we are doing wonderful work. I think, at the trafficking office and in our embassies on combating that hideous scourge of modern day slavery. Thank you for that. I do not think that gets enough focus or coverage.

And I would respectfully ask that this committee mark up a bill that I have been trying to get passed for some time, the End Neglected Tropical Disease Act, which Karen Bass and I co-authored, and Gregory Meeks, bipartisan bill. A billion people plus walking around with worms and parasites. Very low cost interventions. We are spending $100 million to combat that. We need to get a men-
tality like PEPFAR to fight that as never before. Because co-infections and opportunistic infections obviously thrive on the weakness when somebody is walking around with worms in their intestines, over a billion people.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we could bring that up as soon as possible, respectfully.

Mr. DAY. Perhaps I will just speak very quickly on, on Ebola. We are deeply concerned. We should all be concerned about the Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC. It is not contained and it is not under control. This is no longer a public health crisis, it is a political challenge as well as a development challenge.

There are layers of complexity that are occurring simultaneously. We have extremist organizations that are working within the areas, there are community militias, there is deep community distrust. A whole range of complexities in terms of the operating balance.

So, our priorities are to, first, contain the outbreak, control the outbreak and, ultimately, end the outbreak. Now, we are working in kind of four primary areas of approach:

One is to ensure we have the most effective vaccine strategy possible;

Two is to address the community distrust issues via community engagement programs, but then also making sure that we are coordinated with the DRC political structure, including President Tshisekedi;

Working with the international organizations, including the World Health Organization including, as well as the U.S. Government coordination, which is our primary partner is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC.

And then, of course, we have got to work on preparedness of the ring countries, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and Uganda.

So, we need a reset on this, and we are working on a reset plan because we have seen a real increase in the number of cases over the last month. So, it is a concerning issue.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Nagy?

Mr. NAGY. In Ethiopia, sir, yes, Prime Minister Abiy continues to make dramatic, dramatic reforms, very focused on the elections, working with the opposition to make sure that the election timetable is right.

There are fissures, as we all know, in Ethiopia which have been under the surface for decades which are going to be coming out. And it is a troubling situation for him. So far everything is well under control.

And, of course, there are serious opposition to his reforms within certain segments of the Ethiopian Government. He needs support because he is doing one of the most dramatic things possible is converting Ethiopia into a country that will be based on institutions, which I think is very, very dramatic. And we are doing our best to help him with that. We are sending technocrats at the institutional level. But more than anything, as I mentioned, he really needs jobs, jobs, jobs for his young people, sir.

Mr. SMITH. You do talk about China a lot. I know my time is up, but if you could, for the record especially, speak to what Turkey is
doing vis-a-vis the Horn of Africa, because it is a very serious problem?

Mr. Nagy. Yes, sir.

Chairman Engel. If I could ask you to keep the answer short because we have to call on other people. Thank you.

Mr. Nagy. Very quickly. Yes, the Turks are very involved. For business purposes they are also involved in the airport on Mogadishu, and in doing some, some training of the Somali National Army. And we would like to see what the effectiveness is. And we would like to cooperate and coordinate closer.

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Engel. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Keating.

Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have touched on a lot of important issues: the empowerment of women; effects from China, Russia. But I want to touch on another one. We did talk about the Sahel. We talked about the complex challenges that are there. But there is a threat multiplier that concerns me, and that is the effect of climate change as a threat multiplier.

They really intensify a lot of those problems, the instability that is there, the effect of land degradation, food, food insecurity, and resource distribution. They are a source of—they are incubators, it is an incubator of conflict as well from a stability and security standpoint. So, I want to know what we have been doing on that to try and deal with adaptation to the climate change, what resources have, how we would prioritize this important issue.

Mr. Day. Thank you, Congressman.

I agree it is absolutely a critical issue. USAID’s approach primarily is to focus on the consequences of a changing climate and extreme weather events. So, if we can build more resistant local communities, then they are going to be much more capable of addressing many of those challenges. So, that is everything from food security to resilience programming, which we have done all across, all across the continent, particularly on the Horn of Africa and Sahel.

So, a lot of our programming is engaging the local community to ensure that there is local governance engagement but also working with everything from local farmers to educational institutions to ensure that food security and their ability to be resilient in new types of environments is increased and maintained.

Mr. Keating. Ms. Lenihan, could you comment more on the security and military side of that from your perspective, too? Because climate change really impacts that as well.

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you, Representative.

There are certainly some environmental effects occurring in the Sahel with the increased tension between, say, farmers and herdsmen over absences of water and just concern for resources.

But I would also like to highlight that our AFRICOM is doing primarily in the logistics shop, in the J4, in order to work with partners to improve their abilities. For instance, in Burkina Faso there is a program in order to work on water sanitation and hygiene to make the most of what they are doing. Also, through some of their efforts they are helping bring the military and that mili-
tary expertise into a larger whole government effort in order to address some of those climate issues.

Mr. Keating. Yes. I was struck recently, I was in part of the Munich Security Conference hearings and I was struck by how much discussion was going on about EU’s partnership in Africa. Can you comment on that?

And one of my beliefs is we could multiply our efforts, too, by working closer with those European efforts since we share so many of the same values and concerns. Can’t we do a better job of working together? Can you comment on what they are doing, how we can work with them in a concerted way to really be more effective, particularly when we are dealing with the Chinese and the Russians trying to deal with that area?

Mr. Nagy. I will be happy to talk on the political side because we have very close coordination with the G7 which is Europeans plus Japan. We meet on a regular basis to compare, coordinate our policies across Africa.

At the country level, most of our Ambassadors belong to what are called local donor groups where they sit locally, again, mostly with EU and other major donors, to make sure that there is as least as possible duplication of effort on their programs. Having sat in donor groups myself, it is astounding what you can find out at the local level because the capitals often do not talk to each other. So, you can really use your resources in a much wiser way.

Mr. Keating. Yes, yes. But also, you know, avoiding duplication.

What about policy of consolidating those efforts and concentrating those efforts more? Is there discussions on that? I just think there is a tremendous opportunity for us.

Mr. Nagy. There, I do know there is in certain circumstances. For example, with the dramatic changes in Ethiopia that is one of the things that our like-minded missions did was to get together to see how quickly each could respond to the various needs of the Ethiopian Government.

One big example is one thing they needed was direct budget support. The United States of America does not write checks in most instances and just gives them to, to governments. The Europeans were able to do that to a certain extent.

Mr. Keating. Is part of this, though, also inoculating some of the countries, you mentioned Ethiopia, about what China is doing with these type of loans, these, you know——

Mr. Nagy. At the last G7 meeting, sir, I can assure that China was a very hot topic of discussion.

Mr. Keating. All right.

Ms. Lenihan. And, Representative, I would add from the security standpoint that we work quite closely with our European counterparts and colleagues. One, the European Union has training missions in multiple areas of Africa which complement our efforts.

Additionally, we provide support to the French for CT operations in the Sahel under the authorities granted by Congress which has a force multiplying effect.

Further, in Somalia one of DoD’s primary roles in actually as a coordination facilitator. So, we have something called a Mogadishu Coordination Cell headed by a one-star which serves to actually co-
ordinate all of the international defense capabilities in order to reduce duplication and ensure greater effectiveness.

Chairman ENGEL. The gentleman——

Mr. KEATING. Thank you very much. I think we could do the same type of thing in the economics here that we are in the security and defense field in that respect, you know, working together as a multiplier.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Keating.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here.

I do not know where to start, there is so much going on. But I hear the same thing we have heard over for the last 3 years. And I am glad China has come to the forefront of what they are doing around the world and that people are paying attention to that. And you know what, China is going to continue to do what they have been doing. You know why? Because they can. They have the cash to do what they are doing.

We have a space program in the 1960's when we had a mandatory spending was about 30 percent, discretionary was 70. We could do a space program. We could do inter-State programs because we had the cash. China can do that.

And this is a call-out to this body, not just the Foreign Affairs Committee but to Congress in general, the House and the Senate. If we do not get our fiscal house in order this is going to continue and China is going to eat our lunch about it.

And the other thing that China does is China provides no string financing, unlike western countries, with no conditions on fine points such as human rights, clean governance, the things that we believe in as we try to promote democracies.

I have not been a big fan of promoting democracies. I think our focus should be on stable governments. If you have stable governments you have better governance, and then you can start bringing an economy this way. And I think we just really need to have an honest conversation in here about our fiscal irresponsibility as a body. And it is tragic that we are not doing that.

Moving on, Africa still faces tremendous electricity access challenges. China is heavily engaged in the African power sector with investments of 13 billion between 2010 and 2015. Do you believe that the U.S-based programs like Power Africa are competitive enough against China increasing engagement on the continent specifically in energy and development, the development sphere?

Mr. DAY. Thank you, Congressman.

You know, I think Power Africa really has been a successful model. And I think we have learned a lot from our experience in Power Africa.

Power Africa has facilitated over 120 transactions, almost $20 billion. And there are 58 million people on the African continent now who have electricity who did not have that before the initiative started.

I think if you wrap that into a larger package, as we roll out the more details about the Prosper Africa initiative, which will be kind of multi-sectoral, an effort to really coordinate all of the U.S. Gov-
ernment toolkit to support private sector engagement on the African continent, then I think we can get to the scales I think you are talking about there.

Yes, we have had some real success on the power side with Power Africa, but Prosper Africa is an umbrella effort to really support American businesses on the African continent. And this is us coming to the table.

Mr. YOHO. And I appreciate your bringing that up.

And you said something in the beginning that I feel with: you should work yourself out of a job.

Mr. DAY. That is right.

Mr. YOHO. If we are successful in our foreign aid policies, you know, you have passed the baton off to that country because they have become self-sufficient.

The bulk of the money that we put in there, sub-Saharan Africa has generally seen between 25 percent of the total U.S. bilateral aid, the bulk of which supports health programs.

We were in the Congo with Chairman Royce and Chairman Engel a couple years ago and we were at the cabinet meeting with President Kabila who could not find the time to meet with America, but his cabinet did. And this was a rhetorical question I asked, but it was shocking on how rapid the response was. I asked them, What are you doing for social programs? And he goes, What do you mean? I said, Health, education, you know, housing, you know, hunger. He goes, We have you.

You know, that is not sustainable. We have got to work with the countries like the Sudan and Ethiopia. How do you find countries willing to come along? And the ones that are, do we really run and push a lot of effort with these people to build their countries and government?

Mr. DAY. Sure. Thank you for the question.

This is something that we are having many, many discussions about. And the administrator has laid out a vision which we call a Journey to Self-Reliance, which is really looking at the level of commitment and the level of capacity in our host country, host country partners.

And those countries that have not demonstrated a significant level of commitment, our relationship will ultimately, from a development perspective will ultimately shift.

Mr. YOHO. I have got to add one more question in here.

Mr. DAY. Yes.

Mr. YOHO. If Congress, meaning the House and the Senate, fails to fund the BUILD Act or the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as intended by Congress, and the administrators cannot prepare—allowing the administrators not to prepare for the massive roll-out that everybody is anticipating for October 2019, how detrimental will it be to our foreign policies in the future?

Mr. DAY. It will be significant. We are very excited about the DFC coming operational on October 1. From a USAID perspective this is an incredibly important tool to engage the private sector on the African continent.

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador Nagy?
Mr. Nagy. Absolutely essential. That is one tool that I have been pointing out in all my visits around the continent and in speeches to U.S. business is they are so excited about that. Because I cannot order U.S. business people to go to Africa. That is why I tell African governments put in place a business environment that will welcome U.S. business because they are eager to go. But the BUILD Act will be very important.

Mr. Yoho. Chairman.

Ms. Bass [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Bera.

Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

I am glad my colleague from Florida, Mr. Yoho, brought up implementation of the bill. Back in as chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight we want to make sure it is implemented and rolled out in the most effective way. So, we will be looking at that and making sure that implementation gives you the full tools necessary.

You know, I was in west Africa last summer. I actually wanted—I am a doctor by training, with a public health background—I actually wanted to go to the western part of the DRC when that outbreak is going on. But through risk tolerance they would not let me go there, so we went to Sierra Leone instead to kind of get a sense of, you know, what we learned from the 2014 outbreak.

And on that category of risk tolerance, you know, the one thing I worry about—and again I am thinking about this as a doctor and public health specialist—Mr. Day, you absolutely pointed out what is happening in the eastern Congo is getting worse, and it is rapidly getting worse. And, you know, talking to health workers who, and our workers from CDC, who have been in country recently or currently are in country, it is difficult to address this without actually being at the epicenter and providing supervision.

And, you know, I guess my question maybe to Ambassador Nagy would be what is that risk? I do not want to put our personnel in harm’s way but I also understand if we cannot get close enough to the epicenter, maybe going in and out, this rapidly can get out of control.

And maybe for Ms. Lenihan, is there a role for our, you know, outside of diplomatic security, additional DoD security, et cetera? I do not know, maybe Ambassador Nagy?

Mr. Nagy. Yes, sir. The risk is something we have looked at very, very carefully and had our experts look at it to see where effectively we can be stationed, for example, to do the most that we can. Some NGO’s have a much higher risk tolerance than we do.

Our Ambassador, if we let him, would have a much, much, much higher risk tolerance. He is that kind of a person. So we have to literally hold him back. Because everybody is so keenly, keenly just intent to put a stop to this because the dangers are immense, you know, going off in different directions, crossing borders of countries that could not be able to deal with it.

So, we are extremely seized with this. But the risk for American personnel definitely takes priority.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bera. Mr. Day?

Mr. Day. Sure. And I would just that I am glad you mentioned kind of the short-term capabilities of being able to get into some
of the more hotspots. The primary population centers have been Beni, Butembo, and Katwa. Our head of the Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Admiral Ziemer, was just there last week. So, we are able to kind of get in on short term and to do quick assessments.

But the WHO is actively working in many of those areas, so they have roughly 400 or so personnel that are there. But I agree with the assistant secretary, the operating environment right now is not conducive for long-term USG.

Mr. BERA. And I appreciate that. And, you know, from the folks that have been in country that we have been interacting with they do think there is that possibility of sending some of our folks in for a day or two at a time and pulling them out so they can oversee, you know, how the workers that are in these hotspots are actually doing, give them advice, et cetera. But, you know, and maybe it is that in and out darting of, you know, providing supervision, not, not idea but maybe what we have to do.

Ambassador Nagy, you touched on something that I hear increasingly from our foreign service officers and our Ambassadors around the world. Kind of in this post-Benghazi environment of diplomatic security and embassy security we have put a lot of our personnel behind walls and so forth. And these men and women, who are truly patriotic out there, understanding that there is risk, you know, I almost feel like we have overcorrected. Because where we used to be out with the people, interacting on a daily basis, now you see the Chinese and others.

And I hate to see us building these embassies with big walls. And our men and women want to be out there. And, again, I do not know the right answer of risk tolerance, but I want to make sure we have not overcorrected and hurt our diplomats and our development workers' ability to be most effective. And maybe if you can comment on that.

Mr. NAGY. Sir, having a son who is in diplomatic security, he and I have argued about this a lot. Because I am the kind that wants to be out there. When I was an ambassador, you know, going to church there was only one road, so that was the only choice I had. But each of our Ambassadors takes a look at this very carefully.

They are very competent, very professional, they adapt circumstances sometimes based on the day of the week. I, personally, am very comfortable that we have found that compromise.

Mr. BERA. Yes.

Mr. NAGY. And from an oversight perspective that is certainly something that we are going to be looking into working with our diplomatic security personnel, but also making sure that our men and women that are out there representing our values and our country on a daily basis——

Mr. BERA. Yes.

Mr. NAGY [continuing]. You know, can do their jobs as well.
Mr. BERA. Thank you.

Ms. BASS. Before I go to Mr. Kinzinger, I did want to ask Ms. Lenihan a followup question from Mr. Yoho, which is the same question he posed to the other witnesses.

If the BUILD Act is not funded completely what will the impact be from your perspective of DoD?
Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you for your question.
I defer to my colleagues here who are focused, more closely fo-
cused on the BUILD Act.
Ms. BASS. Thank you.
Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank the Chairman for yielding. And thank you all for being here. I very much appreciate it.
You know, post-conflict stabilization spans years. Democracy building takes longer. And sometimes in our society we like to kind of see it all done immediately and we forget our own history that, you know, we had a revolution, and then a civil war, and a lot of division. And some people think that we are divided today. But compared to the past, it is nothing.
And so the deteriorating situation in Libya I think is proof of the time it takes. While the international community had high hopes for the 2011 transition plan, we have seen anti-government militias gain control of key resources and suffocate the U.N.-backed govern-
ment. And I am concerned with the current stability of Libya, as well as the country’s long-term health.
As a result of the ongoing hostilities between the LNA and the U.N.-backed government of national accord, we have seen the cre-
ation of the perfect environment where terrorists groups can flourish.
So, Ms. Lenihan, how has the fighting impacted U.S. operations in combating the threat of ISIS and other terror groups in the region? And, also, have we seen an uptick of ISIS fighters fleeing Syria and Iraq to regions in Libya?
Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you, sir.
We agree the situation in Libya is grave. We have concerns about the ongoing——
Ms. BASS. Speak up just a little.
Ms. LENIHAN. Of course. We agree with the concerns about the situation in Libya and ongoing instability as far as the impacts, as well as the impacts on other areas.
We are in support from the Department of Defense on a political solution that is truly the way forward in order to have long-term stability in Libya. We currently do not have forces in Libya con-
ducting CT operations.
And as far as foreign terrorist fighters, we have not seen a seri-
ous uptick in return based on advances in the Middle East, but cer-
tainly that is something that we will continue to follow closely out of concerns that that could occur.
Mr. KINZINGER. And could you talk about Egypt’s role in com-
bating terror on that shared border?
Ms. LENIHAN. Sir, Egypt falls outside of my portfolio. So, with all due respect, I will defer.
Mr. KINZINGER. Any of you guys? Ambassador, same?
So, let me transition then. Through the Belt and Road Initiative China made the geo-strategically significant country of Djibouti one of their first major initiatives. Through their debt trap diplomacy, a Chinese-owned company has taken control of the container ter-
minal and the adjoining multi-purpose cargo facility.
What concerns me is that six miles away is America’s largest military base in Africa which is supplied through the now Chinese-
operated port. Additionally, the PLA base in Djibouti located adja-
cent to the port has used military grade lasers to interfere with American C–130’s flying into the base.

Ms. Lenihan, how does the presence of a Chinese military base affect American operations across Africa and the Middle East?

Ms. LENIHAN. Yes, sir. Thankful for raising the question.

In alignment with our national defense strategy China is a strategic concern for the Department of Defense. Certainly with the advent of the Chinese base in close proximity to our own base at Camp Lemonnier it raised some certain complications. We have to be concerned about safety and de-confliction and create mechanisms in order to manage that.

As we have noted before, China is an integral concern on the continent, and so what we continue to do is promote our model to ensure that we remain the preferred partner with our African partners and then also continue to eliminate some of the concerns about working with China overall.

Mr. KINZINGER. And let’s say we reduce our role in there in Africa in general, or in that region, how would the Chinese react to that? And I will ask that also of the Ambassador.

Ms. LENIHAN. Sir, we maintain engagement from a DoD standpoint. We have a robust activity of specific cooperation across the region to include within the Horn of Africa and in Djibouti. So——

Mr. KINZINGER. OK. I will——

Ms. LENIHAN [continuing]. We will continue that.

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you.

Ambassador, if you could.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir. Thankfully, we are not reducing our role in Africa because the Chinese would be delighted if we reduced our role in Africa. I want to dramatically increase our role, especially on the business side. I want U.S. business people to be running over the Chinese business people instead of the other way around.

Mr. KINZINGER. And with the 50 seconds left do you want to more generally kind of address China in Africa as a presence?

Mr. NAGY. Absolutely. It is they are a strategic competitor. For decades U.S. business people have not been at the door. And when the door was opened that is why the African governments have been doing deals with the Chinese.

You know, we went through a debt restructuring back in the 1980’s and we forgave a lot of debt. And, hopefully, we do not have to get to that again where African governments will be looking to see how they can get out from under Chinese debt. You know, to trade one debt trap for another would be devastating for our African friends.

And getting U.S. businesses you do not—you reduce corruption, you increase good governance, you have greater rights for women, you care more about the environment, and on and on and on. So, there are so many pluses. And there would be so many minuses with the U.S. ceding that territory, sir.

Mr. KINZINGER. And I was pleased with getting the Eximbank up and running. So, I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Representative Castro.

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairwoman. And thank you all for your testimony today. It is great to see that we are having a full committee hearing on Africa in the Foreign Affairs Committee.
For the longest time, certain parts of the world, including Africa, have gotten the out of sigh, out of mind treatment. There are things that happen in Africa that if they happened in other parts of the world would get much more attention.

We see once in a while cases where 50 people or 100 people are killed or are victims of a natural disaster, and that is a blip on American news media.

And so let me ask you, there was some conversation here about making sure some of the countries, after we have infused development moneys into them for years, are able to get back on their feet or get on their feet and establish their own economic strength. What are we doing to help those economies and their businesses? I know what we are doing to help U.S. businesses, what are we doing to help African businesses build their own capacity and export and become successful?

Mr. DAY. Thank you, Congressman.

You know, USAID has been active on the African continent for six decades. And this has been a big part of our area of focus for pretty much that entire time. Many of these countries have been able to take advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. And so, USAID has worked with a lot of African firms to prepare them and to build capacity so that they can actually export their goods via AGOA.

Now, we, USAID, works through our Trade and Investment Hubs. And we have three Trade and Investment Hubs on the continent. And so a lot of firms will come to those Trade and Investment Hubs. We will work with them, build those capacities and then make business linkages back to the U.S. if there is export opportunities for them.

Mr. CASTRO. Sure.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir. I think AGOA is one of those examples of multi-political projects that have ben supported by both parties. Now the United States is strongly supporting the continent-wide Free Trade Agreement which the AU has been sponsoring. It looks like it will be coming into force.

And on the side of that we would very much like to have a very first Free Trade Agreement with an African country. We only have one Free Trade Agreement with Africa, and that is with Morocco. We would very much like to have a sub-Saharan one exactly to meet those interests, sir.

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. And I would hope that we would do something to help them export to the United States and export to other countries.

Again, we want our American businesses to be successful. But if it is truly, if our development is truly about having countries get up on their own feet, you have also got to help their own economic infrastructure.

Let me ask you, Mr. Day, what has happened to the USAID budget with respect to Africa in the last few years?

Mr. DAY. The budget——

Mr. CASTRO. Has it gone up, or down, or flatlined?

Mr. DAY. I think there has been a fluctuation, as always.
Mr. CASTRO. I know the proposal was to take USAID down dramatically. But I am trying to remember specifically for Africa what happened?

Mr. DAY. In 2018 the non-security outside of the international disaster assistance was roughly 8 billion.

Mr. CASTRO. But how does that compare to 2017, 2016, 2015?

Mr. DAY. I do not have those numbers in front of me right now, but it has fluctuated back and forth over the last several years.

Mr. CASTRO. OK. And then the second part of it is what are we doing to develop democracies on the continent?

Mr. DAY. So, you know, the work that USAID, USAID does all across the continent is centered on the core value of democracy because that is a reflection of American values and principles. So, democratic principles are woven into essentially every program that we have on the continent, which is hundreds of programs across 40 countries. And so, democratic principles, whether it is electoral support or good governance, we work with governments when we can. In some cases we cannot. But we work on electoral principles, we work with civil society, we work with media all across the, all across the continent. We work with political parties. And so it is woven through all of our programs in all of our countries.

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. Well, and again I want to thank you for you all’s work and everything that you are doing. I know that you are doing it sincerely and earnestly.

I just think that we have to avoid the temptation to see these nations as only charity cases because I think that it undermines, I think, their humanity and who they are. And we have to be, we have to be concerned not just with our own success and American businesses’ success, which of course we all agree with, and we want to beat China out. I do not want China to have stronger relationships on the continent than we do, but I think the way that we do that is by affirming Africa and their nations and affirming their own capacity and building their own capacity.

So, thank you again for being here. Thank you for everything you guys are doing. We appreciate it.

Ms. BASS. Representative Wagner.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank, thank our witnesses for their time and for their service to our country.

Ms. Lenihan, I understand that Russia has been expanding its footprint in Sudan and is considering establishing a naval base near Port Sudan. But after months of protests against the autocratic regime, Russian-backed Omar al-Bashir has been deposed on a peaceful coup. Will regime change in Sudan increase or diminish the likelihood of an enhanced Russian presence in Sudan? And how would this affect U.S. interests?

Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question.

Russia also is of strategic concern for the United States, as outlined within the national defense strategy. And we do see an increasing interest on the continent. In the context of Sudan, there certainly is a relationship. The situation is obviously very dynamic at present as far as what will occur within that country with the transitional military——
Mrs. Wagner. Will the regime change do you think increase or diminish the likelihood of their enhanced Russian presence?

Ms. Lenihan. I would say it would be difficult to tell. But certainly once there is an established relationship, that could be affected once that leader is gone.

Mrs. Wagner. Ambassador Nagy, Russia’s actions in Sudan look a lot like its activities in Venezuela and Syria to me. What do you think Russia’s intentions are, and what lessons should the U.S. draw from Syria and Venezuela scenarios?

Mr. Nagy. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.

I believe that Russia is very opportunistic in Africa. They do not have the resources of China. They certainly do not have the resources of the United States. They look for places where they can cause trouble, basically, and poke us in the eye. Or, as in the Central African Republic specifically, poke the French in the eye.

We just have to be very careful and block wherever we can. With, you asked about Sudan, I am hoping that if the transition in Sudan goes in the direction it does go in, we end up with a civilian-controlled government, then they will have a totally different view of Russia than the government that they will be replacing.

Mrs. Wagner. We absolutely are all hoping for that.

Mr. Day, I am so glad that you highlighted the centrality of women’s empowerment in achieving sustainable development goals. Education and economic empowerment for women have positive, positive ripple effects in developing countries all across the globe.

I am particularly interested in efforts to reduce the gender gap in property ownership in sub-Saharan Africa where the World Bank found that men are almost three times more likely than women to own property by themselves. This disparity has wide-ranging economic consequences and their, their daughters.

Can you tell me how USAID is working to reduce gender gaps in property ownership in sub-Saharan Africa?

Mr. Day. Thank you, Congresswoman.

This is absolutely vitally important to Africa’s development, so thank you for raising it. And it is also vitally important to many of the countries that I have worked in in my——

Mrs. Wagner. Yes.

Mr. Day [continuing]. In my career, including the Middle East. But it is probably even more so in Africa in that I sometimes say that these economies are not going to succeed if they only use half their brain. And I think that is never more true than in, than in Africa.

And so, women need access to not only land rights but also education. And they need access to finance so that they can access markets. They need to have access to networks. But then also there is a regulatory, and a policy, and a legal, and a cultural environment that needs to also be, that needs to be changed. And that is exactly what USAID is doing in the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiative, WGDIP.

Mrs. Wagner. Right.

Mr. Day. So, we are really looking forward to digging in our heels in the program.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, let me know how we can be helpful because I see it as really the only way forward. And the property ownership gap is outrageous at the moment.

I have a little bit of time left. So, Mr. Day, Tanzania has long been considered a democratic success story. However, current President John Magufuli, I believe, has begun to violate democratic norms in the name of eradicating corruption. Can you tell me how USAID is working to prevent democratic backsliding in Tanzania?

Mr. Day. Thank you again for the question. And the assistant secretary and I have had numerous conversations about this, lamenting about——

Mrs. Wagner. Yes.

Mr. Day [continuing]. The developments in Tanzania. We are, we are deeply concerned about the rhetoric coming out of Tanzania, not only from a human rights perspective but from a democracy perspective as well, and a business perspective. Because there are a lot of American businesses who are waning their interest in Tanzania because of the developments there.

Now, we have continued to work on our health programming, particularly PEPFAR, which is vitally important in Tanzania. But a lot of our programming has really had to shift away from support and partnership directly with the government as a result of these developments. And we are now really focused more on civil society and independent media. And that’s where we’ve shifted a lot of our programs.

Mrs. Wagner. Well, I would really hate to see backsliding.

And, Ambassador Nagy, I know I am out of time, but I would be very much interested in your perspective on this, too, and certainly I think our committee would. So, either in writing or perhaps would be——

Mr. Nagy. Sure.

Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Would be best.

Mr. Nagy. Very quickly. Tanzania is especially sad because that was one of the beacons——

Mrs. Wagner. Right. Yes.

Mr. Nagy [continuing]. Of democracy through Africa’s history and decolonization. So it is, it is hurtful to the entire continent and the friends of Africa. And our embassy, believe me, is extremely engaged across a whole spectrum of interlocutors of making the point trying to promote democracy, and also trying to help those organizations that are Tanzanian——

Mrs. Wagner. Right.

Mr. Nagy [continuing]. And are trying to hold onto democracy. Because there is a danger of it evolving into what we would call a Potemkin democracy where you have the structures of democracy but without anything really behind it.

Mrs. Wagner. Well, the backslide is just terrible. And I appreciate the chair’s indulgence, and for your tremendous service in the area.

Ms. Bass. And, Representative Wagner, in the subcommittee we are probably going to take up some of these subjects again. And you are welcome to come.

Mrs. Wagner. I look forward to it. You bet. This is something that is near and dear to my heart.
Ms. BASS. Good.

Mrs. WAGNER. And I would be very pleased. So I appreciate my friend Ms. Bass' invitation.

Ms. BASS. Absolutely.

Representative LIEU.

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. I would like to thank the panel for being here. Thank you, Ms. Lenihan, for your public service, including your service in our Naval Reserves.

I would like to ask you first some questions about Libya. So, Acting Secretary of Defense Pat Shanahan has said that he believes that a military solution is not what Libya needs. Would you agree with that statement?

Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you, sir.

I would say we need a political solution in Libya for long-term stability.

Mr. LIEU. OK. On April 7th, Secretary of State Pompeo said, “We have made clear that we oppose a military offensive by Khalifa Haftar’s forces and urge an immediate halt to these military operations against the Libyan capital.”

Would you agree with that statement?

Ms. LENIHAN. Sir, I would note that we do agree a political solution is required in Libya.

Mr. LIEU. Right.

On Friday, April 19th, there was a story that ran in the media. I will just pick one of them. This happens to be from CNN. The title is, “Trump praises Libyan General Haftar as his troops march on U.S.-backed government in Tripoli.”

So, my question is what is the current U.S. position with regards to Libya, are we supporting General Haftar or are we supporting the current government of Libya?

Ms. LENIHAN. We continue to support a political solution led by the U.N. Ghassan Salame has been working to bring all sides of the parties to the table in order to find a way forward in Libya.

As far as Haftar, over time we have engaged with multiple parties in discussions recognizing how complex the situation is in Libya and how all parties need to be onboard for a solution forward.

Mr. LIEU. Is the United States supporting General Haftar?

Ms. LENIHAN. The United States supports a political solution in Libya.

Mr. LIEU. Is it your understanding that Russia is supporting General Haftar?

Ms. LENIHAN. I would say General Haftar has supporters from the international community.

Mr. LIEU. Do those supporters also include United Arab Emirates?

Ms. LENIHAN. We have engaged with United Emirates in order to talk about a political solution, recognizing the way forward is through a coordinated effort in Libya.

Mr. LIEU. Is it your understanding that Russia and UAE have provided weapons to General Haftar?

Mr. DAY. Sir, I cannot speak to that.

Mr. LIEU. OK. And are you aware or not if Saudi Arabia is supporting General Haftar?
Mr. DAY. Again, sir, I cannot speak to that.

Mr. LIEU. OK. After General Haftar’s attack on the Libyan capital the U.S. pulled some military forces out of Libya. Do we have any more U.S. forces in Libya?

Mr. DAY. DoD removed its forces and has not returned them.

Mr. LIEU. I am sorry, say that again?

Mr. DAY. DoD removed its forces and has not returned them.

Mr. LIEU. OK, thank you.

I would like to end just this thing on Libya by saying I think it would be good if Donald Trump and his State Department friends got on the same page on Libya because I am just reading the same facts you are and there are being conflicting signals sent by the President versus the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State.

So, I would like to ask now about civilian casualties. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act required an annual report on civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. Congress has also directed DoD to develop a strategy for reducing casualties. At the same time, we are seeing a number of reports from non-governmental agencies that contradict the numbers from the Department of Defense.

So, my first question is, what methodology does DoD use to track and investigate civilian casualties, particularly in Africa?

Ms. LENIHAN. At the Department of Defense we take civilian casualties extremely seriously. We take extraordinary measures in order to ensure that we avoid any harm to civilians in our operations.

In the case of Somalia we work closely with the partners as well as under the consent of the Federal Government of Somalia and all attacks occur in Al-Shabaab areas which are normally secluded, with low civilian populations. And anything as far as our practices I would say I would be more comfortable talking about in a classified environment.

Mr. LIEU. So, if we could either get a classified briefing or a letter that sort of lays out the methodology that DoD uses, would that be OK?

Ms. LENIHAN. Sir, I will followup with you on that.

Mr. LIEU. OK. What methods does DoD use to measure whether your efforts to reduce civilian casualties are successful?

Ms. LENIHAN. We undergo extensive analysis within our planning before we undertake any kind of operation. And then afterwards we continue to do a review of what occurred. We also welcome any reports from others as far as any allegations or concerns with civilian casualties. Then we run those through for thorough reviews.

We also continue to review practices to ensure that we are appropriately dealing with this in the best manner. We hold ourselves to a very high standard. And continue to——

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. If I could ask one last quick question.

In the last 2 years have civilian casualties in Africa from U.S. forces have they gone up, or gone down, or stayed the same?

Ms. LENIHAN. Sir, in the last year we published our 2018 CIVCAS report. Within that we noted those two civilian casualties which occurred in Somalia.

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. BASS. Mr. Fitzpatrick.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for being here.

I want to spend a little time focusing on the current human rights situation in Zimbabwe. As I am sure you know, Zimbabwe is a country that has experienced multiple challenges to democracy and human development over the past two decades. And our government, as well as international human rights organizations have documented disappearances, torture, killing, rape, and other acts of violence committed by government agents against its own citizens in Zimbabwe.

And since the recent elections, live ammunition has been used against civilians on two separate occasions, resulting in multiple deaths.

Our government has consistently maintained the need for fundamental changes to occur. Targeted economic measures will be lifted from individuals in positions of power in Zimbabwe. And I would encourage my colleagues to join me in a letter that I am putting together reiterating the changes we would like to see to allow for Zimbabwe to head to a place that embraces human rights.

So, I have two questions for the panel.

No. 1, Zimbabwe continues to experience repressive violence targeted at stifling freedom of assembly. Just this week, government actors targeted street vendors. Across the continent we have seen continued seemingly harsh measures employed by government agents to discourage citizens from protesting. And my questions is, what is the State Department doing to encourage tolerance of freedom of assembly across the continent, but specific to Zimbabwe?

And second is, during the January protests in Zimbabwe internet was suppressed for many days, raising tensions of citizens both within and outside the country who were unable to confirm the safety of their loved ones. What measures is the department engaging in to encourage citizens that they are able to maintain communication, in particular as the U.N. has declared access a basic human right to aid in access and freedom of opinion and expression?

Mr. NAGY. Thank you very much, Congressman.

Zimbabwe is another one of those tragic needless cases which is where the tragedies are purely manmade. For me it is very special because my kids were born in Zimbabwe.

I had this same conversation with President Mnangagwa at the United Nations in September. And I told him exactly what we were looking for if we want to start opening the door to better relations.

I will be going to Zimbabwe in a couple of weeks, and I look forward to having my next conversation with President Mnangagwa because nothing much has happened since then. They keep coming to us saying that, well, Zimbabwe is open for business. We want to engage. We want to have better relations.

Our point is there are two odious pieces of legislation which have been on the books:

One, specifically prevent public assembly, freedom of assembly;

The other one is on freedom of expression.

And before we can talk about anything else, those two pieces of legislation need to be either withdrawn or replaced by much more
positive ones. Because until then, we are really not interested, despite so many people wanting to get back to doing trades and things like that. We just cannot.

We appreciate the ZIDARA legislation because we can point to that. As you mentioned, sir, we have had a number of specific sanctions. We hold that in reserve going into the future.

So, the United States of America is not going to warm relations with Zimbabwe until they have been talking a good game, let’s actually see something that start improving the environment.

Recently, in the most recent demonstrations where there was violence a couple of months ago, for the first time we had evidence of Zimbabwe security forces using rape as a weapon of war. That is a road that we cannot allow the country to go down on. So, we will maintain a very strong pressure on there until there are actual concrete acts on their part.

Mr. Fitzpatrick. No question, sir. And the situations that we are being apprised of are horrific, including rape being used as a tool of war; false imprisonment of people who are just advocating for freedom of assembly, freedom of speech. There was one gentleman who had the privilege of meeting Pastor Iban who is going to be detailed, the details of that case in my letter. I would really encourage you, sir, to look into that circumstance, look into those situations. If there is anything we can do on this committee to advocate, please let us know.

I yield back.

Mr. Engel [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Day, hello. We provide a fair amount of aid to Africa. One thing that occurs to me is that we should be providing textbooks, electronic of paper, everywhere. First, it is pretty hard to steal a textbook. If you do steal textbooks, it is pretty hard to sell them if the United States is providing them in that country for free to the students. And they, of course, could be electronic. I am talking about teaching materials.

But in that way, while I am not saying that the textbooks need to be written so that Berkeley, California’s School Board would approve them, they can reflect our values of democracy, freedom, openness, transparency. I hope you will take that under consideration.

Mr. Day. Thank you. We absolutely will. Education programs are at the core of what we do. So——

Mr. Sherman. And I know in some countries parents are required to pay for the textbooks. And that is one reason to either not send your kid to school or to send your kid to a madrasa if you happen to be in one of the countries where the Wahhabis are funding madrasas.

The President referred to the region we are talking about as a group of blank line-hole countries. Ambassador Nagy, I am sure that was not helpful to our outreach to the peoples of Africa. And so, the question is what do we do to counterbalance that, erase it, by demonstrating to the people of Africa that America regards their countries as important, vibrant, progressing, an important part of human kind’s future?
One possibility is that the President goes to Africa. I know his relatives have gone. That has not been entirely successful. I am not—I cannot guarantee that the President would do everything he should, should he go to Africa, but his mere appearance there might demonstrate that his administration values the continent. Would that or anything else you can identify help remove the taste in the mouth in Africa of the unfortunate comments?

Mr. Nagy. Congressman, in my visits to Africa—I have now visited I think 15 countries, I am going to visit five more—I have come across only genuine good feelings toward the United States of America. What I keep telling Africans, look at America. By thy deeds thou shall be known. I have had nothing but positive interactions.

I agree with you, high level visits to Africa are so welcome by our African friends and partners. For the White House travel schedule, sir, I would refer you to the White House.

Mr. Sherman. Let me move on to another question.

We see the debt trap system that China is using. Of particular concern is their possible control of the Doraleh container terminal in Djibouti or their efforts to acquire same. And I am working on legislation that would declare that certain debt trap instruments the country would just be free not to pay. And they would not lose their credit rating. They would not lose their access to U.S. capital. It would be the “If It Is A Phony Debt, Just Tear It Up” Act.

Ambassador Nagy, what do you think?

Mr. Nagy. Not being an economist, I have to beg off. But I agree with you totally about the concern of the debt. What I mentioned before was we went through a whole decades of Africans owning incredible debt that had to be forgiven. And why do through that cycle again?

Being sovereign countries, of course——

Mr. Sherman. Well, the Chinese do not forgive the debt, they take the port. We have seen that in Sri Lanka.

Mr. Nagy. We did.

Mr. Sherman. We will see that in Africa.

Mr. Nagy. We did. Up to now, the Chinese have not seized any piece of State-owned property in Africa. But that is not to say anything about the future.

Mr. Sherman. Well, discovered this technique.

Mr. Nagy. So, it is of concern, equal concern to us.

Mr. Sherman. And I will point out, I mean, the question arises for any African country, why repay the debt? The answer is because western financial institutions will not loan you any more money if you default on debt. And if it is legitimate debt, fair debt, it is probably a good idea.

Mr. Nagy. Can I?

Mr. Sherman. But, but to have the Chinese debt, if you do not pay it, if you do not pay a bad Chinese instrument we would have to define that. That should not hurt, affect your credit rating.

Mr. Nagy. Can I give you a piece of good news?

Mr. Sherman. Yes.

Mr. Nagy. An American company actually won a contract from the Chinese in Uganda for a $3 billion refinery. They are doing it as equity. And it took a while to convince Ugandans of the advan-
tage of that. But once they did they said, wow, that is not incurring more debt.

Mr. SHERMAN. You are saying the Chinese are involved in this, too?

Mr. NAGY. Americans——

Mr. SHERMAN. OK. I think you misspoke.

Mr. NAGY. The Americans won it from the Chinese.

Mr. SHERMAN. OK. We prevailed and got the contract?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, we prevailed, so.

Mr. SHERMAN. We did not get it from the Chinese, we prevailed over the Chinese.

Mr. NAGY. We prevailed.

Mr. SHERMAN. Got you.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHERMAN. I believe my time has expired. Thank you.

Chairman. ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. WRIGHT.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, first, thank you for your distinguished service for our country and to Texas in particular.

I want to go back to Cameroon. I share Chairwoman Bass' interests there. I have a number of Cameroon nationals in my district. Both of you ran out of time.

You mentioned that the government have established some Potemkin Institutions. They were not really doing anything to bring the two sides together. Could you elaborate on that, because you ran out of time before?

Mr. NAGY. Sure. Yes, sir.

I understand the Cameroonian Government established several commissions. And I am sorry, I do not know the exact name of it, whether it is the Multi-cultural Institution for National Reconciliation or something, which on the face of it sounds good. But the institution—and there have been a couple of these—but they have not been provided adequate budget, and they have not really done anything.

Because what the country needs more than anything else is a genuine open dialog probably to include the diasporas of the Cameroonians because they have a great deal of interest in this. Because, sir, what is happening, both sides are becoming further and further radicalized.

Unfortunately, I believe that the President of Cameroon is being told by his hard liners that he can win this thing militarily. There is no way that they are going to win this militarily. The violence is going to get worse in the northwest and the southwest. The arm for an arm, literally an eye for an eye, and the whole world will be blind there. The violence will spread to the west province. It may even spread to the litoral province which is the large city of Douala, so there has to be something.

We are very, very energetically speaking with our allies. That is why I said that we just had in the Security Council this Monday a what the United Nations called an Arrias where it is an open debate. And it is so clear that everybody wants to move forward on this.
Are sanctions on the table? Everything is on the table moving forward. But we have to bring this situation to an end, else there is a possibility of what happened in Nigeria with Boko Haram. It started as a small movement and now look at it. And it would be disastrous for the region if the Cameroon Government turned this thing into yet another type of Boko Haram.

Mr. WRIGHT. Or Boko Haram came back into Cameroon.

Well, you mentioned, you know, it appears to be spiraling out of control because the more the security forces clamp down, the more resistance there is on the Anglophone region. So, what can we do that we are not already doing?

Mr. Nagy. Well, like I said, the best we can do for right now is just work for our allies to really make the Cameroonian Government understand the need for a real dialog. And if that does not happen relatively quickly, then we have to look at the array of other tools we have in our toolkit. Because, frankly, the possibility of sanctions is always there. But it is always better to work in concern with our friends before we go in that direction.

Because it is, the frustrating thing is that it is in the interests of everybody to have a national dialog. The situation will not end militarily. Each day the atrocities will get worse and worse.

Mr. WRIGHT. Is permanent separation of the two regions a possibility?

Mr. Nagy. Sir, I do not believe so because I think both Cameroonians, including in the southwest and northwest, have a sense of Cameroonianness, and the concept of a separated what they call Ambazonia in my view is not realistic.

Mr. WRIGHT. OK.

Mr. Nagy. It is the view of the United States of America to recognize the integrity of the country of Cameroon.

Mr. WRIGHT. Right. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Chairman ENGEL. Thank you very much.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today.

I am troubled, as I think a number of people are, about China's expanding business interests in Africa, especially the manner in which they are expanding their business interests, including predatory lending and obtaining substantial collateral and leverage over African governments. And specifically, this question has to do with access to minerals and natural resources.

And the one I am particularly interested in is cobalt, which of course is important for electric cars. And we know that the DRC has an abundance of cobalt. I have heard reports that China has infrastructure agreements that essentially give it, China, monopolistic mining rights in the DRC. And I have also, I also have come to understand that China has taken on an imperialistic approach through labor abuses and displacement of local workers in favor of Chinese nationals.

So, before I go any further, I see a couple of nodding heads. Am I generally correct about what I have just said? There seems to be consensus. Mr. Lenihan, do you agree?

Ms. LENIHAN. [Nonverbal response.]
Ms. WILD. And it is not a trick question; I just, you know, wanted to make sure that this was something that I understood correctly.

What I would like to explore is how we make inroads in those markets and at the same time preserve, as somebody who is very labor oriented and very—I am the Education and Labor Committee in addition to this—I am not interested in only working on education and labor rights here in the United States but making sure that we are not taking advantage of workers abroad, or that our employers, our United States employers are not doing so.

So, for any one of you I am interested to hear what your thoughts are on what we can do to at least compete with China. And let’s focus on the DRC right now.

Mr. NAGY. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, especially for focusing on the DRC because there I think we have a real opportunity with new President Tshisekedi, who since his inauguration has been doing a lot of the right things and saying the right things, and we remain very engaged with him. And he has said that he would prefer the United States of America to be his partner of choice.

So, if he pursues the right moves in fighting corruption, in leveling the business playing field, I know the U.S. business sector will be wildly enthusiastic to get back in there.

I met with our business community when I was there. I met with business people here who are eager to get into China and specifically deal in some of those commodities you are talking about, cobalt, including the rare earths, because that is another whole field.

And this is, again, the thing with U.S. business investment: U.S. companies have so any positive practices, not just toward the environment but toward labor, toward women's rights, not paying bribes, and things like that. This fits in squarely with President Tshisekedi's goals. We have to trust and verify and work hand-in-hand with him. But I am more optimistic about the Congo than I ever have been before in my life because this is a, this is a huge deal.

Again, U.S. businesses bring jobs. It is not the condition that everybody above turning a shovel is brought from another country.

Ms. WILD. Right.

Mr. NAGY. And the Africans appreciate that. Even the dictators can look outside their doors and see the millions of young Africans without jobs who are angry. So they are just as eager to bring American companies that bring the jobs. So——

Ms. WILD. So, what can we do to encourage that? What can we do to help that practice along and facilitate it? Mr. Day, you seem to want——

Mr. DAY. Go ahead.

Mr. NAGY. No, go ahead, Ramsey.

Mr. DAY. I was just going to quickly add that we are active in this space, in the DRC. We have been supporting the Responsible Minerals Trade Program for quite some time. And we have been able to validate over 450 mines in the DRC as conflict free, which increases the level of transparency throughout the entire process. And so, these are important programs to focus on.

But I would also defer to the assistant secretary?
Mr. Nagy. So, exactly. With the BUILD Act, for example, the support that we can give to U.S. businesses, having our embassies weaponized to aggressively support U.S. business, to set up the field teams, to work with the host governments to tell them specifically what they can do to improve their business environment, this all works together. It requires a tremendous amount of energy but it is well worth it.

And I can assure you the U.S. business community is beyond interested and excited about the possibilities that Africa offers.

Ms. Wild. That is the sense that I have also.

Thank you so much. I yield back.

Chairman Engel. Thank you.

Mr. Watkins.

Mr. Watkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the panel for being here.

Islamic extremist groups in Africa, including al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, have caused problems of course for a long time. Which group do you feel poses the greatest threat?

Ms. Lenihan. There are a significant number of terrorist groups operating in Africa on multiple parts of the continent. We have a priority operating in Somalia where we have seen Al-Shabaab have a significant impact on the country. Although, I would note that there is some progress that we are seeing in Somalia in a heartening way.

We have seen the Federal Government of Somalia work with the Federal member States, which is critical for political progress.

We have seen the return of our embassy back to Mogadishu for the first time since the 1990's.

So, although progress is slow in Somalia, we are in fact seeing it.

But there are also other groups of concern across the continent. We have talked about the Sahel where today you have both al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates operating there with increasing gains, and other nodes throughout.

Mr. Watkins. Yes. Somalia has been fragile and violent for more than 25 years. What more should the U.S. be doing? Any comments? Please, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Nagy. Sure. Exactly right, Congressman. That has been one of my biggest frustrations. In 2002, when I left as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Somalia was a mess. There was an Islamic radical group called al-Ittihad. I come back 20-some years later, Somalia is still a mess. The Islamic radical group is called Al-Shabaab. Billions of dollars spent since then.

Luckily, now for the first time I think we have the opportunities to make real progress. We have an extremely talented Ambassador on the ground in Mogadishu, Ambassador Don Yamamoto, who engages constantly, continuously with the Somali Government.

We have what I feel like is a three, a real 3D approach there to where we are working very closely together, and with the Somali Government. Very dynamic prime minister. Maybe, maybe this time it really will happen. I do not want somebody else to come back here in 20 years and face the same situation.
Mr. Watkins. Does it concern you, I believe the DoD is planning a 10 percent reduction in Special Forces deployed to the—to Africa? Is that a problem?

Mr. Nagy. Honest to goodness, Congressman, I do not believe so because to me part of that, and of course I will turn it over to my colleague to address it more clearly, I think part of that is actually based on some successes. For example, in northern Cameroon, working with the Cameroonians. And if I looked at the total number of exercises and DoD activities in Africa last year, they were actually larger in number then than the year before.

We will obviously work together with whatever resources we are given to make sure that they are optimally used and to effectiveness. So, from my point of view that is a decision for DoD. And we will work with our partners the best way possible.

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you. I can add to that to say that the majority of our activities in Africa are not affected. We are engaged in a robust level through multiple tools which I referenced in my opening comment. Some adjustments that we have made are CT-focused specifically, as Ambassador Nagy mentioned, oftentimes they are in areas where we have already seen success and our partners have matured through those programs and so they are coming to a natural end.

But we will continue to review whatever decision to make. We constantly review our activities and our posture in order to react to conditions on the ground. And I am sure we have got the best way forward working in conjunction with State and our other partners in the U.S. Government.

Mr. Watkins. To the best of your knowledge is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is that AQIM organization affiliated and interconnected with al-Qaeda in Iraq or in the Middle East?

Ms. Lenihan. AQIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate, so it is part of a larger organization. We also have seen some consolidation of al-Qaeda groups into something called Janam which is operating within the Sahel.

Mr. Watkins. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. I yield my time.

Ms. Bass [presiding]. Representative Allred.

Mr. Allred. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing today and you all for coming up here.

I think it is critical that we not ignore Africa and that we counter Chinese and Russian influence in Africa. And I want to commend many of our efforts through USAID and the State Department to stabilize and support institutions in Africa, in particular of course, the PEPFAR program which was created by my constituent, President George W. Bush.

However, I do have some concerns with the Administration’s approaches, including the recognition of the fraudulent election outcome in the DRC, a watering down of the U.N. sexual violence resolution, and of course, the budget cuts that were, this committee had a hearing on not long ago that were rejected, of course, out of hand.

And I wanted to turn to some comments on the Administration’s national security strategy which portrays Chinese influence as un-
dermining African development by “corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments.” I agree with that assessment. But the Administration’s intention to counter that appears to be through bilateral actions.

I think one of our strengths that is unique to the United States is our ability to engage multilateral allies to engage in whatever the issue is. I just want Ambassador, Mr. Ambassador, and Ms. Lenihan if you could, to address why we are approaching this through bilateral communications and actions instead of the U.N. and some of our allies in the region?

Mr. Nagy. Congressman, as I said earlier, I have worked through seven different administrations. And each administration has its own unique priorities and their approaches to how to do business. Not that one is, you know, any better than the other, they are different. The priorities for this Administration is doing things bilaterally. And that can work just as well as doing things multilaterally. Some efforts are more effective one way, other efforts are more effective the other way. We maintain a very robust engagement with the African Union. For example, this conference that we have organized for tomorrow afternoon on Sudan, the African Union is both sending a representative from Addis and they will be teleconferencing from Khartoum where their expert is engaged directly.

So, we engage with African States bilaterally. We also engage at the sub-regional level. In all of my visit to the continent I have visited ECOWAS. I visited EGAD during my trip to East Africa. So it is a dual-track approach.

We, as I have said, we have also supported very strongly the continent-wide Fred Trade Agreement. So it is a bit of both. We will do whatever is the most effective, sir.

Mr. Allred. OK. I want to move on and talk about the Belt and Road Initiative that is now putting a digital silk road through which some countries in Africa have been emboldened, I am particularly thinking of Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Uganda, to increase surveillance on their citizens, including into the political opposition.

So, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Day, what are the implications of the expansion of this digital Chinese influence in Africa? And what plans do we have to protect civic and political space in Africa from being eroded by the surveillance culture that China is attempting to export?

Mr. Nagy. Sir, it is obviously very negative, the impacts of that activity. We at the embassy level, at the Ambassador level definitely engage with the governments, tell them of the disadvantages and the vulnerabilities that they will have. In some cases we have had to ask the government to take the cameras down that face our embassies. And other embassies have done the same thing.

Some governments are receptive. Unfortunately, other governments are not. At the end of the day it is a sovereign decision on their part. We regret very much what is going on and, hopefully, people will realize the vulnerabilities that they are opening up to themselves.
Mr. DAY. Congressman, I would just add that we are also working with our partners at our level to ensure that there is a level of awareness of the risks, particularly to American investment on the continent, and sure that there is an understanding that American companies are going to be very reluctant to engage in trade and investment with a particular country if they have built their infrastructure on—the digital infrastructure in this way.

And it seems to resonate. But in many cases they may not have many options. And we are certainly sensitive to that. But we are certainly trying to raise awareness of some of the risks to this.

Mr. ALLRED. OK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Representative LEVIN.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you for your leadership in this area.

You know, I feel like the U.S. pays much less attention to sub-Saharan Africa than it should. And this is a problem of long standing. So, it was great to hear all of your passion and commitment and knowledge this morning.

I want to start with a question on Somalia for Ms. Lenihan. The U.S. has dramatically increased air strikes to counter Al-Shabaab in Somalia since April 2017. We carried out more air strikes in Somalia in the last 9 months of 2017 than in the 5-years from 2012 to 2016. Then there were 47 in 2018, and almost 30 just in the first quarter of 2019 as far as I can find out.

Until recently, the Administration claimed that U.S. strikes had not caused any civilian deaths in Somalia during this period. However, last month AFRICOM acknowledged two, that two civilians had in fact been killed by a U.S. strike in 2018. And Amnesty International and other third parties have provided credible evidence of additional civilian casualties that are not accounted for in the U.S. Government’s assessment.

So, Ms. Lenihan, my question is why are AFRICOM’S official assessment, assessments of civilian casualties, so much lower than the assessments provided by credible third parties?

Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you, Representative for your question.

Our strikes are one component of our broader approach that we take within Somalia. Civilian casualty is something that we consider a very grave situation. It is something that has significant senior leadership attention in the Department of Defense. Any time——

Mr. L EVIN. So, I have very little time. So, can you answer my question, why are they different?

Ms. LENIHAN. Of course. So, we welcome any information that we find from other groups. Amnesty International is actually engaged with them. My team has met with them, as well as in AFRICOM. We take that information under review. We do our own analysis and so forth, and based on our own information and what they have provided, we have a different perspective on the numbers.

Mr. LEVIN. Well, but is it not true that AFRICOM launched an internal review in part because of Amnesty’s report, and you found that 2018 air strikes targeting Al-Shabaab did kill two civilians. That was, that was acknowledge; right?

Ms. LENIHAN. There were two civilian——
Mr. Levin. And that is a fact that had not been previously disclosed?

Ms. Lenihan. Our combatant commands are constantly reviewing our best practices as well as their information. AFRICOM did undergo an additional review. It did find out information regarding two civilian casualties.

Mr. Levin. All right, so it is true, yes.

Ms. Lenihan. Yes. And——

Mr. Levin. All right. Well, I would just encourage you to be transparent. And I am very concerned about civilian casualties.

I also want to ask a question about a very different subject to Mr. Day, and that is climate change.

In the span of less than 2 months we saw Cyclones Idai and Kenneth hit southeastern Africa, and with them hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of people displaced. The New York Times reported that this was the first time that two cyclones had struck Mozambique in the same season ever.

What is the U.S. Government doing to improve the Mozambique, Mozambican Government’s response to such incidents and increase the resilience of the local population to extreme weather events, which seem like they will happen more and more frequently?

Mr. Day. Thank you for the question. These, of course, were devastating events, particularly Cyclone Idai in Beira. We have had a longstanding and good relationship with the Government of Mozambique, but a lot of our programs, particularly in Beira and as you go further north, have really been focused on HIV and AIDS work. So PEPFAR and PMI, the President’s Malaria Initiative have been active up there.

Mr. Levin. Right.

Mr. Day. We have not had many programs in that area of the country. A lot of our programs have been in the south where more of the population centers have been. So, we have not had programs up to date when it comes to kind of disaster response. But we have had a lot of programs that are related toward food security and stabilization and resilience type work, which does kind of impact some of those issues.

Mr. Levin. Well, I am afraid you are going to need to have more there and elsewhere.

Let me just ask you a broader question. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have spotty electricity grids and coverage, and other energy coverage. There is a huge opportunity here to help the countries of sub-Saharan Africa leapfrog ahead and use renewable energy technologies like solar, and wind, and geothermal to provide power to their people. And it could play a huge role in combating climate change.

So, I am curious. My time has expired, but I will let you answer and then I will turn it back over, Madam Chairwoman.

Mr. Day. I would just quickly say that Power Africa has an all-of-the-above approach. So, they work on solar, they work in wind, they work in a variety of different sectors in the power sector. Couldn’t agree more. And so it is an area that I think will transform many of these areas.

The Power Africa 2.0 we are transitioning that strategy to not just in generation but also in transmission. We have learned that
if you just focus on generation but you do not have the trans-
m ission infrastructure then it is not going to work. So, we are fo-
cusing more on the transmission side as well. But all of the above.

Mr. LEVIN. All right. Thank you very much.
I appreciate your patience, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. BASS. Absolutely.
Representative HOULAHAN.
Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. This question is for
Ambassador Nagy.
I was wondering if you might happen to recognize the name
Christopher Allen?

Mr. NAGY. [Nonverbal response.]
Ms. HOULAHAN. So, Christopher Allen is the name of an Amer-
ican citizen and freelance journalist who was killed by South Suda-
nese forces reporting on the conflict in South Sudan less than 2
years ago. And he is from around my community just outside of
Philadelphia. He was 26 at the time of his death. And his parents,
as you can imagine, continue to be heartbroken and frustrated by
the fact that there really does not appear to be any accountability
at this point in time for his tragic murder.

And I was hoping if you, since you are not familiar with him,
would please for the record be able to prepare and update a state-
ment for us of what has transpired regarding his case so that the
State Department can be helpful in working to obtain justice for
Mr. Allen?

Mr. NAGY. Absolutely, Congresswoman. I promise you that I will
look into it. Now that I know the name, which happened of course
before I came here, absolutely. The loss of American citizens, trag-
ey beyond words. And I will look into it and get that back to you.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. I appreciate it. His family really is
quite heartbroken and I think they very much feel unheard. And
I think it would be really helpful in this new world order if you
have the opportunity to look into that for us.

My next question is for Mr. Day and Ms. Lenihan. And, as you
are aware, we talked about this a little bit earlier just up the dais,
the Women, Peace, and Security Act became law in 2017, and we
are expected the required strategy to be released any day now from
Congress. As we know, it was due in October 2018. And given the
current youth bulge in many African countries, I think it is more
important than ever, as we talked about, to increase the efforts to
support girls and girls' education, to eliminate child marriage, and
to provide women comprehensive reproductive health services.

Can you tell me a little bit about how you are using the 2011
Women's Peace and Security Act and what you were doing in an-
ticipation in release of this other act? Thank you.

Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you. I noted this is a topic I believe strongly
in and the Department of Defense strongly supports as well. In my
opening remarks I noted one example which is Operation Flintlock
which is the CT—I am sorry, Special Operations Force exercise
where we have a women, peace, and security seminar, which we
have done since 2017.

Other examples, in Tunisia we actually have training, all-female
training for intel. And then another example I can cite is certain
times with our education programs in order to provide incentives
for greater female participation. A country may get an additional slot if a women is offered.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Mr. Day?

Mr. DAY. Thank you for the question.

Again, this is something that USAID has really woven into many, if not all, of our programs. We call it a cross-cutting issue, this engaging women into, into our program, women and girls, as well as youth.

I think one example would be in Kenya where the Musoni Microfinance Organization partnered with DowDuPont to create a microfinance facility in which over 5,300 microfinance loans were issued through agricultural producers throughout the country. 83 percent of them went to women.

And so this is something that is near and dear, I think, to the heart of USAID because, as I said earlier, Africa is not going to progress in its development progress without the participation of women at all levels, through the economy, through the political system, and certainly through the educational system as well. So, this is part and parcel of what we do.

Ms. HOULAHAN. And I serve on the Africa Subcommittee as well and really have a deep passion for women and girls in particular. I really think that 51 percent our population on the planet really deserves a better shake. And I think that we have a responsibility as a nation who leads to make sure that we are doing that.

I am pretty disappointed that we, that we struggle with this particular situation and that things are consistently late in this area. I really appreciate your passion for it as well.

I have only 45 seconds left. And I just was wondering for me, Mr. Day, if you could give me a little bit of an update. I know you spoke a bit about the DRC and you talked a bit about the Ebola outbreak and that it was not under control. But are there any lessons that we have learned that could be further institutionalized in order to improve this issue in the international community?

I am sorry, I only have about a half a minute.

Mr. DAY. We are continuing to learn lessons as we go. We certainly learned a lot of lessons in the 2014 West Africa outbreak. And we have been applying a lot of those lessons in this particular outbreak.

There is a huge difference between the two in that the operating environment is just so difficult, it is so complex. But we are certainly learning that community engagement just absolutely must be at the core of what we are doing because the community distress that we are seeing, which has nothing to do really from this particular outbreak, this is longstanding traumatic issues, marginalization, predatory behavior by the previous government. So these are major, major issues. But the community engagement element of this is absolutely critical.

So, we will certainly take that with us if and when there is another outbreak as well.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And I have run out of time.

I also would like to acknowledge and thank Representative Abigail Spanberger for yielding her time to me. I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Representative Spanberger.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you to our witnesses today.

Ms. Lenihan, I would like to start with a question for you.

Earlier this year General Waldhauser testified that AFRICOM has not been granted “offensive strike capabilities or authorities” outside of Libya and Somalia. However, the Administration reported to Congress in 2018 that it considered two Islamic State affiliates in Western Africa to be legal targets under the 2001 AUMF.

My question is, in which countries does DoD assess it has the authority to use military force, whether currently engaged in hostilities or not, and under which authorities is it operating?

Ms. Lenihan. As General Waldhauser noted, our two areas where we have direct strike actions are in Libya and Somalia. Under both of those accounts it is under the AUMF.

Ms. Spanberger. And are there other engagements in other portions of Africa that are falling outside of those two named locations?

Ms. Lenihan. No. We only conduct direct strike in Libya and Somalia.

Ms. Spanberger. Thank you. And pivoting and further discussing Somalia, we have dramatically increased our air strikes in Somalia. We have hundreds of troops on the grounds. And according to DoD reports, we have forces that regularly use self defense. We have seen this escalation over the last three Presidential administrations. It is not limited to party or anything else. But I do find these shifts something that we within this committee should be talking about.

Do you assess that we are seeing a slippery slope of engagement or mission creep in Somalia? And do you expect U.S. military presence and the use of force to increase further as time continues?

Ms. Lenihan. We have seen some successes and some gains in Somalia. So I would say although it is a long slog there, we have definitely seen some notes of optimism. We recently hosted Prime Minister Khayre at the Pentagon where he talked about some of the economic reforms in order to pursue debt relief and so forth. Also noting how the security efforts are helping create that time and space in order for development and diplomacy efforts to take hold and to grow.

So, I would say although Somalia is a difficult environment we are on a positive trajectory there, and that our defense activities are just one part of a much broader USG effort. As we have noted, for the first time our U.S. embassy has returned there. USAID is heavily engaged with a high degree of activity. We have also seen some other areas of improvements: the direct payments to his soldiers in order to reduce corruption, as well as biometric registration of weapons in order to increase accountability.

So, the Somalis are taking some really tough steps in order to build out their institutions, build out that infrastructure and, ultimately, take responsibility for their own security.

Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Ms. Lenihan.

As a former CIA officer, I believe very deeply in the counterterrorism efforts of our country and the nature of that as a really multifaceted approach. I also now, as a Member of Congress, re-
main deeply concerned that we are continuing to operate under the 2001 AUMF that has been expanded and broadened over time.
Initially it was focused on, on those who, who perpetrated the September 11th attack. So, I do note that for the record because it is something that I am very focused on.
But I would like to continue a bit. Ambassador Nagy, given the 2018 stabilization assistance review placed the State Department squarely in the lead, are you being consulted when the military does broaden the scope of military targets, or does endeavor to escalate the force in Somalia or Libya?
Mr. Nagy. On Libya I cannot address that. That is out of my area of operations.
Ms. Spanberger. Yes.
Mr. Nagy. But in Somalia what we are doing with this, our embassies have to give us their individual analysis in July so that we can look at it comment-wide and see where we stand. And it will become an annex, a strategy that we will look at together.
Ms. Spanberger. OK.
Mr. Nagy. Just to further our working relationship. So, I am encouraged by this process going forward. We very much needed this.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Ms. Lenihan. And if I could add to that, we work in close cooperation with the State Department on our overarching approach in how the security element fits in our broader U.S. objective.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you. And one quick question for Mr. Day.
It seems that we are all in agreement that the counterterrorism efforts need to united defense, diplomatic, and development efforts. Are there any other comments that you would make regarding how the United States can improve the capacity of African countries to prevent, mitigate—to prevent and mitigate radicalization and violence so that we can get ahead of military engagement?
You probably need another 20 minutes for that, sir.
Mr. Day. Maybe so. We look at it from both bottom-up and top-down.
So, we certainly need good partners. And we have some good partners on the African continent. In some cases we do not have as good partners. So, in those cases we really have to work from the bottom up. And that really starts with local communities.
So, just like it does in any country it starts with local leaders, local politicians, local chiefs and tribal leaders. And so, having that grounding is absolutely critical.
Now, in an ideal world you can do both. But in some cases we do not have that environment.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much.
Madam Chair, thank you for letting us run over. To the witnesses, thank you.
Representative Phillips, I think you might be closing this out. Proceed.
Mr. Phillips. It sure would look like that. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I echo my now-departed colleagues’ gratitude to our witnesses for appearing today, had the collective sentiment about elevating Africa amongst our priorities here on this committee.
I think we would all agree that foreign assistance is a pillar of our national security strategy. It should be, especially as it relates to addressing the root causes of extremism and instability around the world.

As I am sure you all know, Section 385 of the 2017 NDAA empowers the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $75 million to agencies such as USAID and the Department of State to implement foreign assistance programs, including conflict mitigation, good governance, and peacebuilding to address the root causes of violence and instability.

My question is for you, Ms. Lenihan. And can you tell me if the Secretary of Defense has used that authority?

Ms. Lenihan. Thank you. One, for the Section 385 authority, it gives us greater flexibility in order to address the issues on the continent. We certainly explored possibilities and considered programs, and we would like to implement that at some point. But at present we do not have a 385 program ongoing.

Mr. Phillips. OK. So, so nothing has been transferred.

Can you share something about the programs that you are considering or ways that it could be deployed?

Ms. Lenihan. We have looked at it in the maritime concept. We have also looked at it within the Sahel. And there are some legal complications and so forth that we have to work through, but we are intent on creating a program in order to exercise that authority.

Mr. Phillips. OK. I speak for myself, and I am sure other committee members, too, in that, you know, it was allocated for a reason, and we would sure like to see it deployed, especially considering the challenges that we face and the good uses for it.

Mr. Day. I would like to turn my next question to in my district Cargill is based in my district, the Third District in Minnesota. Another number of other countries that help feed the world. Wondering how the private sector and companies can better engage with USAID, perhaps with help of Congress, to do better by more people, especially in Africa?

Mr. Day. Thank you, Congressman.

You know, the private sector is absolutely critical to the administrator’s vision for the future of USAID. We have a private sector engagement approach policy that we are now implementing.

We are looking at this through the lens of we will never have enough resources to meet the need on the African continent. But if we can leverage what we are doing and if we can partner with the private sector, then I think we can mobilize so much more capital, move so much more capital onto the continent for the benefit of both African but also American companies such as Cargill, and others.

We have done this already with programs like Feed the Future. But we want to take that even, we want to take that to scale, which is why we are rolling the Prosper Africa Initiative. So, agriculture, because the African continent is still very much an agrarian economy, agriculture, and of course health, digital commerce is still going to be, these are going to be, I think, pillars of the Prosper Africa approach. But that engagement and that leveraging of American, the American private sector we think is a superior value
proposition on the continent which, of course, counters the influences of China. It helps African development. It creates American jobs.

And so, this is why this is such a priority for us.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Wonderful.

Why do not we close. I would like each of you maybe to take 20, 30 seconds and just express to us how this committee might support efforts in Africa, if you could wave a magic wand and implore that we do something. Maybe starting with you, Mr. Ambassador, what might we do expeditiously and helpfully?

Mr. NAGY. I greatly appreciate these kinds of opportunities to just publicize for the larger public as to what is going on in Africa and the importance of Africa so that we can articulate that. And also to show that the partnerships that we have together that there really is a whole of government approach there.

And then the tremendous things that, for example, we talked earlier about the BUILD Act, ZIDERA, you know, these types of other acts which are coming out which make our jobs much, much easier. Because, like, for example, in Zimbabwe I can point directly to the ZIDER—to ZIDERA and say, no, we cannot, you know, open up greater relations until you do X, Y, and Z.

So, your support in that regard is just phenomenal. Thank you very much.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. DAY?

Mr. DAY. I could not agree more with the assistant secretary. This, this relationship is absolutely critical to our success on the continent, whether it is AGOA or the chairman and the ranking member’s legislation on championing American business through the Diplomacy Act, or the Electrify Africa Act. I mean, these are all in support of direct goals of USAID and transcend any administration.

So, we certainly appreciate the tremendous support.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Day.

Your final comment, Ms. Lenihan?

Ms. LENIHAN. Well, as a testament to the synchronization of our efforts, I will agree with my colleague. And just note highlighting the importance of Africa, highlighting the great work that USAID and the State Department are doing on the ground, continuing to maintain a focus on it certainly is helpful. And I appreciate the opportunity from this committee in order to discuss it today and into the future.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, thank you all, and I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Well, let me just conclude by thanking our three witnesses for enduring the hearing today. It was—Oh.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I did just get a message to sprint from the Transportation Committee.

Ms. BASS. Representative Malinowski.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. Thank you for fitting me in in the last second.

So, a lot of things I could ask you guys about, but I wanted to focus on a country that I visited I think four times in my last few years as assistant secretary of State, and that is Ethiopia. And I know it is a country near and dear to your heart, Ambassador.
In 2016 this was an authoritarian State that was going through turmoil, potential transition. And we worked incredibly hard to try to promote the democratic transition that the country sorely needed. And now, here we are looking at perhaps the most promising democratic transition of any country in the world I would say.

And I am glad that you agree. But my question really to all of you is what are we doing to seize the moment? Because, and I know that there are engagements, and just this week you guys are, at least at your level, talking to a wide range of Ethiopian officials. But this seems to me to be a case that calls for a much more dramatic increase in U.S. engagement at all levels. I know it is above your pay grade, but I mean, this, I would much rather see the Ethiopian prime minister in the Oval Office than Viktor Orban of Hungary, given the values of this country.

So, I just want to challenge you all on this, to tell us what are we doing to significantly step up our engagement and support for Ethiopia? And how are we marrying that what I hope will be a significant increase with continued encouragement to move down this path?

Mr. Nagy. Can I start on this one, guys, and I will turn it?

Thank you very much, Congressman, for that question. I do not know if you had a chance to see what is happening this week at the State Department, but we have the Ethiopia Partnership Forum going on with a high level delegation from Ethiopia. And line around the block of U.S. business people in the Ethiopian diaspora to get in to engage with these high level officials as to what they can do for Ethiopia, how they can invest in Ethiopia, what are the sectors of investment.

Because Ethiopia has come to the point where there are a couple of things that they desperately need. One is the prime minister's grand vision to transform Ethiopia into a true State of institutions. With that goes they are, they are working on everything. It is like everything is a priority. And, unfortunately, in one of those situations where everything is a priority it is very difficult for us to fill all the gaps.

But then what they need more than everything else, and very quickly, are jobs. And the prime minister himself has articulated that. In that regard, I do not think anybody can bring more money into the picture than U.S. businesses and other responsible businesses because they are the ones that create jobs, not the, not the Chinese infrastructure projects.

Right after the change started I remember coming over and sitting down with Ramsey and Administrator Green to ask exactly what can the United States do to very quickly respond to their needs? And it has to be triaged because our resources, frankly, are not limited. So many of them are tied up that we cannot just all of a sudden put tremendous funds together. We are working continuously comparing notes with Ambassador Mike Raynor. We are so fortunate to have one of our best Ambassadors in the world in Ethiopia to see where we can go quickly, whether it is sending a technical expert to the Ethiopian Bank or to this ministry or that ministry. They have created brand new ministries. They want to have relationships across the board. They want to open up all sectors of the economy.
It is an incredible opportunity but it is also an incredible challenge to figure out where the United States can bring its best value added.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Let me actually, because I only have 46 seconds, so one quick question for you and one for you, Ms. Lenihan.

The former draconian charities proclamation is, has been, my understanding, replaced with a new more liberal structure.

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Are we taking advantage of this to do what we could not have done before and to begin to work more directly with Ethiopian civil society organizations? Are we testing that space?

And then to you, Ms. Lenihan, can you assure me that DoD in its mil-to-mil engagements is making it crystal clear there can be no going back, given that the, you know, the security institutions in Ethiopia I must imagine were not entirely friendly to this transition. Some of them had to be removed from the intelligence apparatus. And there is always this risk of dual messaging. Can you assure me of that?

Mr. NAGY. Very quickly. Yes, both at the embassy level and here. Tomorrow I am meeting with a group of U.N. NGO’s who are very interested in Ethiopia. So, we will promote that to the best of our ability.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Including assistance?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Including assistance?

Ms. LENIHAN. And I note on the defense front, we are thrilled by the changes that are occurring in Ethiopia and any opportunities that that proposes. I was able to be at our bilateral engagement with the minister of defense. We had 16 lines of effort in order to try to embrace them, and through engagement really ensure those positive practices that you have noted and that there would be no backsliding. To the point where, actually, I think we were saturating what they can absorb. So, we are trying to manage that.

But Ethiopia is also stepping up. They are leading justified—Exercise Justified Accord this summer, taking a leadership role within the region. And so, we are certainly working with them on institution building all the way through things like exercises.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, so much.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Representative OMAR.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass.

So, I just wanted to really get into this horrific reign of terror and its spread in Africa. And, you know, we oftentimes are really dealing with this issue. And it seems like we are attempting to drone it to death. And I am just wondering what the particular assessment has been because we know that in Somalia, particularly in dealing with Al-Shabaab, since President Trump has gotten elected the number of drones has increased, but the number of attacks that Al-Shabaab has been able to carry out has also tripled.

We also know the same to be true for Boko Haram.

And I am just wondering what, where do we go from here and what the solution will be, should be?

Ms. LENIHAN. Thank you for your question.
As I said, the Department of Defense employs a broad spectrum of activities and engagements across the continent. Our direct strikes is actually a very small component of what we do. I noted earlier in my discussion, my testimony, we work on building partnership capacity. We do security cooperation, draining and clipping, but also working to employ medical expertise, as well as security and so forth. So it is really a broad spectrum of what we do.

In the case of Somalia, we also have a broad approach which we have building the Danab, which is an Advanced Infantry Brigade in order to provide security for people in Somalia, high level of protection. We have seen great results from that.

We also work as a coordinating function in order to ensure international donors’ contributions are being used as effectively without duplication as they can.

In the case of our strikes, I would say that we take ultimate extraordinary efforts to ensure that we reduce any kind of civilian harm and that we are working in coordination with our partners to include the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure that it is in line with what their broader approach is on a full spectrum of economic, political, and so forth.

We are trying to maintain pressure on the network in order that we can create that time and space. And we have seen some improvements in Somalia, as we have noted before, you know, just some of the economic reforms that are ongoing. We have seen the Somalis take greater responsibility as far as joint operations in lower Shabelle in order to expand the safety zone within, within outside of Mogadishu.

And, additionally I would just note that you see increased air flights coming in, commercial flights coming into Mogadishu. You see Maersk using the port. So, there are some real gains that have been made.

Ms. OMAR. In that breadth, do you see sentiments within the Somali community changing against Al-Shabaab? Or should we reassess the way that we are dealing with Al-Shabaab? I mean, maybe the Ambassador can take that one.

Mr. NAGY. That I wish I could answer, Congresswoman.

Ms. OMAR. And if you could be brief, I have a few more questions.

Mr. NAGY. Sure. I wish, I wish I could answer that. I honestly do not know.

The crux of the matter is, the three of us can work together perfectly well but we need that fourth partner, which is a willing and capable government in place. The first day on the job I talked about Somalia and I asked, how many forces to Al-Shabaab have? How many forces does the Somali National Army, and AMISOM, and the Federal member States have?

Based on the numbers alone it should be no contest. But you need to have that willingness and that capability in the partner. Hopefully, now we are getting to the point we have it.

I just spoke with Ambassador Yamamoto last week, so.

Ms. OMAR. So, let me ask you this followup question. It seems like that there is a direct sort of correlation between our droning and the increase of their assaults. And their recruitment seems to
increase because of some of the civilian casualties that might take place.

And so, how do we mitigate that? What is our strategy to make sure that the people are on our side and that they are partners in helping us fight terror?

Ms. Lениhan. And, again I would note that we have a broad approach and that strikes are just one minor component of it. I think one of the greatest issues in Somalia is just people, governance, people feeling as if the government is taking care of them, they are providing services, and so forth.

So as the Federal Government of Somalia expands its own capabilities and its reach, then you are going to have the greatest impact on eliminating the attractiveness of Al-Shabaab. In addition to the security efforts that we are employing in alignment with our partners, both AMISOM as well as other partners in order to try to create that Somali national security architecture so that the Somalis again can expand the sense of control that they have over the government—or over the country.

Mr. Nagy. I would just like to. And one thing I would really like to do, I am looking forward to doing, I am eager to do my next domestic outreach up to Minnesota to do outreach with the Somali diaspora because I have found in my experience that it is extremely useful to engage directly with the diasporas to see if there are any other ideas or other reflections on how things can be done.

Ms. Omar. I think that that probably would be very much welcomed. You know, in your earlier testimony, testimonies all of you talked about the partnership that needs to happen in order for us to have a greater influence in Africa. And I would be remiss if I did not say that as an African on this committee, when you have a president who uses language like “shithole countries” it makes it really hard for people in Africa to sort of think themselves as being in partnership with the United States.

And so I hope that we are in the business of developing better relationships, we are in the business of really looking at the language that we use to describe these nations that have a great potential, that are just looking for a partnership. And that is where America really can shine.

So, thank you. I yield back.

Ms. Bass. Wonderful. I want to close us out on that note. And also reference that in our Subcommittee on Africa we would like to followup and have you come back.

This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Elliot L. Engel (D-NY), Chairman

May 16, 2019

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2127 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/).

DATE: Thursday, May 16, 2019

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S.-Africa Policy

WITNESSES:

The Honorable Tibor P. Nagy, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Ramsey Day
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

Ms. Michelle Nteme
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-3022 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general, including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices, may be directed to the Committee.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day    Thursday    Date    05/16/19    Room    2172 RHOB
Starting Time    10:12 a.m.    Ending Time    12:50 p.m.

Recesses
(____ to ____)   (____ to ____)   (____ to ____)   (____ to ____)   (____ to ____)   (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Check all of the following that apply:
Open Session [x]    Electrornically Recorded (taped) [x]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]    Stenographic Record [x]
Televized [x]

TITLE OF HEARING:
Democracy, Development, and Defense: Rebalancing U.S.-Africa Policy

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
N/A

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [x] No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)
IFR - Omar
QFR - Engel, McCaul

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE    or    TIME ADJOURNED 12:50 p.m.

Evan Buzey
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
### HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**FULL COMMITTEE HEARING**

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When I worked in Somalia from 2016 to 2018 supporting provision of military assistance to forces combating al-Shabaab, most discussions with international partners acknowledged that our efforts could not ultimately defeat the jihadist group. As part of the plan for transitioning security responsibilities, the job of defeating al-Shabaab fell to the fledgling Somali government, although we never clearly defined how the government would achieve that end.
As we completed planning for the security transition, al-Shabaab conducted more attacks in 2018 than the previous year – even after confronting an international coalition for over a decade. This basic fact should cause concern in spite of the dramatic increase in U.S. drone strikes and tentative signals of reform from Somalia’s federal government. Even after punishing strikes, al-Shabaab has been able to execute major operations in Kenya and Mogadishu in recent months. The eventual departure of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and continued weakness of the Somali National Army leave grim prospects for a decisive government victory over al-Shabaab. In light of diminishing returns from an escalated military campaign, the United States needs to rethink its approach.

The U.S. intervention in Somalia has focused on the tactics of the conflict – insurgency and terrorism – at the expense of viewing the political violence in Somalia holistically. Faced with a weak Somali army and overstretched partner in AMISOM, U.S. policymakers turned to the counter-terrorism toolkit to arrest al-Shabaab’s gains in the past two years. But this approach fails to see the conflict in Somalia for what it is: another chapter in a civil war fought at varying intensities since the end of the 1980s. As in many civil wars, rebel groups will resort to terrorism based on a clear, if cruel, strategic logic.

If we accept that al-Shabaab’s terrorist tactics are a symptom of the broader Somali civil war, the most important security question for Somalia is not how to defeat al-Shabaab, but rather, how to end a civil war. Through this lens, the most appropriate policy for the U.S. government is to pursue a negotiated settlement ending the civil war driving al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities. To support negotiations, the United States should reduce its military footprint in Somalia and overall levels of military assistance as a signal that a counter-terrorism campaign cannot end the conflict. An amended approach that recognizes the importance of political settlement between the federal government and al-Shabaab should condition security assistance on political accommodations by the Somali government, increase U.S. diplomatic presence to facilitate negotiation, and ensure a sustainable presence of international forces to provide credible security.
guarantees in a negotiated settlement.

**Stalemate on the Battlefield**

Since 2011, the combination of a surge to 22,000 AMISOM troops, U.S. drone strikes, and hundreds of millions of dollars invested into the Somali National Army has successfully ejected al-Shabaab from most major population centers. Yet these forces have been unable to recover the group’s remaining strongholds in the south and central regions of Somalia, as outlined in the Somali Transition Plan.

The Trump administration’s escalation of drone strikes has done little to alter the basic stalemate that has existed since the last major AMISOM victories in Operation Indian Ocean and recovery of the towns of Dinsoor and Badheere in 2015. Since then, al-Shabaab has recaptured a number of towns abandoned during the withdrawal of Ethiopian bilateral forces and severed the road connecting Mogadishu to the major inland city of Baidoa. The group retains control of the town of Leego, which AMISOM and the Somali government identified for recapture as part of the initial phase of transition almost a year ago.

AMISOM’s transition of security responsibilities to the Somali government has largely stalled. Prominent troop-contributing countries are threatening to leave the mission in the face of reductions of E.U. funding. Despite the mission’s recent declarations that it had completed plans to initiate targeted offensive operations to support the transition process, the long drought of offensive action does not spur confidence. Part of the decline in offensive operations can be attributed to stinging battlefield defeats of key troop-contributing countries at Koliyow, El Adde, Golweyn, and Burhakaaba. Additional casualties carry domestic political costs as Kenyan politicians have called for bringing their troops home, while the Ugandan government swiftly investigated its operations in Somalia in the aftermath of their losses. In light of these realities, caution will likely to continue to carry the day, despite public statements to the contrary.

The Somali National Army remains a long way from presenting a long-term
security solution in Somalia. Efforts to build the national army offer a litany of cautionary tales about international efforts to shape effective, responsible security institutions. Endemic corruption in Somalia is most salient in the security sector, leading the U.S. State Department to suspend military assistance to non-mentored Somali forces in December 2017. The army has proven incapable of holding positions vacated by AMISOM, allowing al-Shabaab to recapture abandoned AMISOM bases, as it did recently following Kenyan withdrawals.

**When Ending a Civil War is More Effective than Counter-Terror**

Civil wars leave policymakers with three potential outcomes—decisive victory, negotiated settlement, or ongoing violence. Since Sept. 11, the prevalence of negotiated settlements has decreased over an unwillingness to negotiate with organizations designated as terrorists. The expansive language and vision of the War on Terror led the U.S. government to perceive any insurgent group that used terrorist tactics as a terrorist organization equivalent to al-Qaeda. This dynamic was exacerbated as groups like al-Shabaab, which had only conducted attacks inside Somalia prior to its designation as a terrorist group, sought alliance with the trans-national terrorist organization.

This has placed the United States in the difficult position of attempting to reverse battlefield victories won by Islamist insurgencies like al-Shabaab and its predecessor, the Islamic Courts Union. These groups have been successful not only because of greater military prowess than government forces and warlord militias, but also because of their more predictable and legitimate forms of justice. Having lost large swaths of territory, al-Shabaab stitched itself within the fabric of Somali society, often lending the organization far more legitimacy and credibility than the alternative presented by the Somali government.

Al-Shabaab is well situated to continue fighting in Somalia indefinitely. It enjoys robust and sustainable domestic financing through effective taxation. Further, my own research shows that rebel organizations capable of employing conventional
and irregular forms of warfare decisively win civil wars far more often than they lose. Al-Shabaab is a remarkably resilient organization that has sustained worse losses than those it is incurring as a result of escalated U.S. drone strikes. Indeed, leading experts see little evidence of the group’s imminent defeat. The inability to decisively defeat al-Shabaab leaves only negotiated settlement or prolonged fighting and the certainty of continued terrorist activity as plausible near-term outcomes to the ongoing conflict.

**Correcting Course to Align Means with Realistic Ends**

I am hardly the first to propose negotiation with al-Shabaab. Limited research has found support for such an approach among the Somali populace and the idea has been discussed within political circles in Mogadishu and by scholars. What has been missing from these discussions is a pathway to bring al-Shabaab and the government to the negotiating table. Al-Shabaab maintains a position of some strength and may be willing to bet that its opponents will eventually tire of the conflict, offering it an opportunity to achieve a decisive victory. Although the organization has experienced some notable defections, it has not openly sought negotiations and may entirely refuse a negotiated approach. However, a credible long-term AMISOM presence along with select U.S. military pressure could change al-Shabaab’s calculus if it becomes clear it cannot wait out international support to the Somali government. Al-Shabaab has never been offered an off-ramp from the conflict granting it a role in government. If faced with an ongoing stalemate and continued loss of senior leaders, the group could be receptive to negotiation as the best available outcome.

The Somali government, which has aggressively asserted its sovereignty, must take the lead in a negotiated settlement with the United States and international community playing a supporting role. To encourage negotiations, the United States must be clear that it will not support the Somali government in the unattainable goal of decisively defeating al-Shabaab. Negotiations would require a multi-step process of initial talks guided by clan elders between the government and al-
Shabaab, followed by broader negotiations including the international community with U.N. facilitation. The United States would need to take the lead in conducting regional diplomacy and in the Security Council to build international support for a negotiated settlement. The transnational nature of al-Shabaab's threat will require African Union and regional participation in final negotiations to assure that a negotiated settlement provides security to Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

BECOME A MEMBER

The Somali government and Somali society must decide how to reconcile with al-Shabaab's past atrocities. An end to the conflict will need to be settled through negotiation by equal parties that gives al-Shabaab a future role in governance. This approach must not repeat the experience of previous high-level al-Shabaab defectors. The Somali government arrested popular former al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar "Abu Mansur" Robow last December for violating the conditions of his surrender after he entered a regional election. This reaction offered a poor precedent for future accommodations with al-Shabaab. Following Robow's arrest, al-Shabaab leaders considering disarming now have every reason to distrust the Somali government, while the government has signaled that former al-Shabaab leaders will not be allowed a role in politics. The Somali government could reverse this misstep by releasing Robow and offering a clear path for his reintegration into society.

From America's perspective, a strategic approach to pursue a negotiated settlement would tie diplomatic, military, and programmatic means to an achievable strategic end. Initially, the U.S. government should rethink how it engages with insurgent organizations that use terrorist tactics and have been defined as foreign terrorist organizations. Current legal restrictions could prevent effective negotiation with the group and would certainly limit programming available to incentivize
negotiation. Until de-listed, leaders of al-Shabaab would remain sanctioned by the United States if elected to office and would be ineligible to receive U.S. government support if they integrated into security institutions like the army or police. Former al-Shabaab commander Ahmed Madobe currently occupies a regional government post, signifying that the United States has been willing to overlook al-Shabaab affiliations in the past. Obviously, any U.S. action to remove al-Shabaab’s listing as a foreign terrorist organization should only follow the group’s unconditioned agreement to a negotiated settlement and pledge to reject terrorism.

Ultimately, if the United States is serious about reducing military commitments left as vestiges from the War on Terror, it will need to accept that political accommodations in civil wars involving al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations that do not pose significant threats to the homeland can be an effective means of reducing terrorism. To be sure, Al-Shabaab has conducted regional attacks, but those attacks targeted troop-contributing countries participating in combat operations in Somalia. Moreover, they occurred as al-Shabaab lost territory, which is often associated with a resort to terrorist attacks. Given the clear connection between al-Shabaab’s regional terrorist activity and the civil war in Somalia, it is not unreasonable to think such attacks would end through a negotiated settlement.

Rather than an increased military presence, the United States must present an overt diplomatic presence in Somalia, which can help facilitate negotiations between al-Shabaab and the government. Increasing diplomatic security spending for the U.S. Mission to Somalia and allowing the ambassador and diplomatic staff to travel off their compound on Mogadishu International Airport, as every other major diplomatic mission currently does, is an important first step.

Denying al-Shabaab the ability to decisively defeat the Somali government is critical to bringing the group to the table. Military support to Somalia must be scaled in such a manner that incentivizes al-Shabaab to negotiate by credibly demonstrating it cannot wait out external intervention. This support includes external funding for AMISOM, conditional security-sector assistance to the
Somali government, and limited U.S. military support. AMISOM requires sustainable funding for a force of at least 10,000 troops to secure key population centers and potentially provide troops in a peace-keeping role to support localized negotiated settlements. This number would be a dramatic reduction from the current authorized force level of 20,624, but offers a middle ground of providing sufficient force to guarantee the security of the federal government and maintaining low enough numbers to ensure sustainable funding. The European Union’s appetite for bearing the ongoing costs of maintaining AMISOM has diminished, presenting a challenge to funding. But asking European allies to continue bearing this security cost is precisely the type of burden-sharing the Trump administration should be pursuing, rather than demanding payment for U.S. bases in Europe. Setting a significantly lower troop level meets E.U. requests for reduced funding and provides predictability to troop-contributing countries and European funders. If necessary, the U.S. government should deploy points of leverage where it currently supports European priorities in Africa, such as assistance to European forces in the Sahel, as a tool to incentivize the European Union to continue this mutually beneficial burden-sharing agreement. Although Somalia undoubtedly requires security assistance, the United States should reduce spending that helps drive the war economy and instead find a balance that moves away from the typical largesse of U.S. military assistance while meeting the minimum requirements to forestall al-Shabaab victory. Bloated security assistance spending perpetuates conflict in Somalia as political-military elites traffic insecurity for personal enrichment. The U.S. government alone has spent over $2 billion combatting al-Shabaab in the past decade through security assistance. The December 2017 pause in assistance to large portions of the Somali army was an important step toward adopting a responsible approach to security assistance. Resumption of large-scale U.S. military assistance should be tied to strict conditions based on the federal government achieving key political accommodations with its member states and between major clans, while reducing
corruption levels. Conditioning assistance on reduced corruption levels and maintaining lower levels of assistance to prevent future corruption also gets at one of the primary factors that de-legitimizes the government.

U.S. drone strikes have been extremely effective in supporting the Somali government and AMISOM and preventing al-Shabaab from massing to overrun key bases. During a recent review of AMISOM bases that I participated in, multiple officers attributed the survival and security of their bases to the presence of American drones. But while it is important to provide a military backstop for the government, the United States should reduce external military support to the fight against al-Shabaab. To support a sustainable force posture and demilitarize the American approach to Somalia, the U.S. military presence should be limited only to the ability to strike massing al-Shabaab forces and senior leaders. This approach would make strikes rare occurrences rather than the norm and would entirely remove advise and accompany missions.

Conclusion

Reduced military commitments privileges an approach to the conflict that respects the primacy of politics in ending Somalia’s civil war. Reduced military support to Somalia forces the issue of mobilizing the country to secure itself, while removing an enabler of political elites pursuing internecine political warfare as foreign militaries guarantee their security.

Ultimately, the decision to pursue a negotiated outcome to the civil war in Somalia rests with its Somali belligerents. Nonetheless, the United States and its partners can offer a firm nudge by removing some of the implements of war and adopting a strategic framework that recognizes politics as the arbiter of peace in Somalia.
BECOME A MEMBER

Jason Hartwig is a security sector reform professional. Most recently, he worked for the U.S. Mission to Somalia as a military assistance coordinator. Jason previously served in the U.S. Army as an armor officer, deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Image: AU-UN IST Photo by Stuart Price
Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Tibor P. Nagy, Jr. by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#1)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

USAID responded separately.

1. This Administration’s approach to the foreign assistance budget has been to call on other donors to ‘do more’ and to mobilize resources from the private sector and from partner nations’ domestic resources towards our common goals. In sub-Saharan Africa, can the State Department provide concrete evidence that this approach has achieved its intended result since the release of this Administration’s first foreign assistance budget in the spring of 2017?
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Tibor P. Nagy, Jr. by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#2)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

Question 2:

Several key U.S. security partners in Africa rank “Not Free” on Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” Index, including Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Uganda. Moreover, the State Department’s annual human rights reports regularly raise concerns with security force abuses in these and other African security partners. As a result, it appears that the United States prioritizes stability over the promotion of good governance or respect for human rights. Why does the U.S. government perpetuate a situation in which our frontline security partners have a flawed track record with regard to respecting human rights and consolidating democratic institutions? Does this approach ultimately make the United States safer? Beyond raising human rights and good governance issues with our security partners, what concrete measures is the United States doing to address this problem?

Answer:

There is a critical link between democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) and peace and security in Africa. In addition to promoting DRG principles through diplomatic engagement, we also continue to support core DRG programs and security sector professionalization programs that address human rights abuses. Continued institutional engagement with our security partners helps mitigate human rights abuses and security force overreach by emphasizing professional security forces that respect human rights and civilian control of the security sector. It also promotes dialogue, and frank conversations, about shared goals and objectives, including human rights, at high levels of government that are otherwise closed to international engagement. We also use the Leahy human rights vetting processes to strengthen accountability, fight impunity, and open up opportunities for further reform.
Question 3:

The Administration has announced plans to downsize the U.S. military’s presence in Africa by as much as 10 per cent. Can the State Department detail how this decision will impact its engagement on the continent, including its monitoring and evaluation of programs in non-permissive environments? What measures is the State Department taking, if any, to adapt to this development?

Answer:

The reduction of DoD troops in place to advise, assist, and/or accompany African security forces could impact the effectiveness of equipment support provided through Title 22 funds employed by our partners. We are actively developing programmatic plans to mitigate the reduction in the U.S. military footprint. Title-22 funded security assistance programs were designed to be complementary with DoD’s current and planned presence, along with other Title 10 security assistance programs, such as Title 333. With a reduced DoD military presence, we may have to accept more risk and/or rely on partner forces for safety and security, which may increase the cost to operate and the personal risk of our program implementers. In the areas where DoD is no longer present, State Monitoring and Evaluation teams may be impacted in being able to conduct site visits for required contract and program oversight in certain regions - the Department will work with the Defense Department on mitigation plans for site visits on a case by case basis.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Tibor P. Nagy, Jr. by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#4)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

Question 4:

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded to include a Digital Silk Road through which Chinese-made telecommunications, broadcasting, and surveillance technology are being sold to countries across the world. In Africa, such outreach has already emboldened governments in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Uganda to increase surveillance on their citizens, including members of the political opposition. What are the implications of the expansion of the Digital Silk Road for U.S. interests in Africa? What measures can the United States take to protect civic and political space in Africa from being eroded by the surveillance culture that China is attempting to export?

Answer:

China seeks to establish itself as a cyber-power and has been rapidly developing a legal framework to enhance its control over data, networks, and information in cyberspace. We have grave concerns about the risks posed by telecommunications suppliers subject to foreign government control or influence that poses risks of unauthorized surveillance or malicious cyber activity. We urge our allies to conduct careful evaluations of ICT and connectivity projects, whether for 5G or previous technology generations. They should always include national security and human rights considerations in their evaluation of ICT vendors. For earlier generations of wireless technology, there are several American, European, and Asian vendors with superior product offerings. For 5G technology, non-Chinese alternatives to Huawei include Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Tibor P. Nagy, Jr. by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#5)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

Question 5:

Despite a progressively worsening security situation in parts of Darfur, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has continued to withdraw military personnel from the region. In this context, and in light of the political upheaval in Khartoum and several other parts of Sudan, does the State Department think that the UNAMID drawdown should be placed on hold for some period of time?

Answer:

National political upheaval and local tensions have contributed to ongoing instability in Darfur. Recent examples include violence against protesters calling for a civilian-led government and protection of their rights, the destruction of United Nations property in Nyala and in Zalingei where one protestor was killed, and the looting on May 14 associated with the hand-over of the UNAMID Super Camp in El Geneina, West Darfur. During the forceful intrusion into the UNAMID camp, a reported combination of civilians and members of the Sudanese military and police stole UN property and contingent-owned-equipment, vandalized the premises, and threatened UN staff and personnel. The United States was instrumental in New York in getting the UN Security Council to issue a stern statement condemning the attack. We are urging the Sudanese authorities to take immediate steps to ensure the safety of all UNAMID sites in Darfur, swiftly investigate these incidents, and hold those responsible to account. We support the full implementation of UNAMID’s mandate and will preserve all options for future consideration in the lead up to the June 30 UNAMID mandate renewal.
Question 6:

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered a peace agreement between the government of South Sudan and the opposition in September 2018, under which a transitional government was meant to be formed within eight months. However, on May 3, South Sudan’s opposing parties agreed to extend their Pre-Transitional period by another six months due to complications in drawing the country’s states and boundaries and establishing a unified army. Both sides have been reluctant to make progress, and President Salva Kiir now says the parties will need more than six months to prepare for a transitional government. What is the Administration doing in coordination with the Troika (United States, United Kingdom, and Norway) and regional stakeholders to encourage implementation and ensure elections remain on track for March 2022? What is the Administration’s “Plan B” to resolve the conflict if it is determined that the revitalized peace deal is not being implemented?

Answer:

The United States and our Troika partners are focused on ensuring implementation of the September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). We are urging the parties and region to use the six-month extension to implement credible security arrangements and lay the groundwork for an inclusive transitional government, leading to free and fair elections. We have emphasized that regardless of a delay in the formation of the transitional government, elections should be held by March 13, 2022, as originally scheduled under the R-ARCSS. We are urging the region to appoint an empowered chairperson to head the R-ARCSS monitoring mechanism.

We are seeking to capitalize on the opportunities the peace agreement offers to reduce violence, protect civilians, and promote accountability. As for a “Plan B,” we will evaluate the existing process, make judgements as its implementation proceeds, and engage with the region
and parties when appropriate. Despite the flaws in the existing arrangement, we think the peace agreement has saved lives.
Question 7:
Due to the political transition in Ethiopia last March, the country now has the first potentially pro-Western leader, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in almost half a century. Yet U.S. government support for the transition has been lackluster, and we are now on the cusp of losing influence with a key African partner nation. How can the United States more effectively support ongoing political and economic reforms in Ethiopia, particularly as the country prepares for elections in 2020? If the United States is not able to support PM Abiy’s reforms how might this damage U.S. influence in Ethiopia and in the wider Horn of Africa?

Answer:
The United States is responding to this extraordinary moment in Ethiopian history. For decades, the United States government has invested in the people of Ethiopia, helping to improve public health, literacy, agricultural production, food security and standards of living. Now we are working with Ethiopia to promote civic and political discourse inside the country, and to help all Ethiopians take advantage of newfound political freedoms and the opening of their great nation to market economics.

Support for Ethiopia is central to our effort in the wider Horn of Africa, and we continue to work on a whole-of-government effort to address the most urgent needs to support the new reforms. In recent months, we have drawn up tailored plans of action in close cooperation with Ethiopian experts inside and outside of the new government. Over the past 6 months, we sent three high-level delegations focused on security and justice, economic growth, and democracy and governance to ensure that imminent U.S. government financial support will be as valuable as possible. Most recently, we held a unique and powerful “Ethiopia Partnerships Forum” at the
State Department on May 15 and 16, which linked more than 400 American companies, investors, and private-sector experts with senior Ethiopian and U.S. government officials to talk frankly and imaginatively about the “new” Ethiopian business climate and investment opportunities. At the same time, we have reached out to American companies operating in Ethiopia to hear about the challenges they are facing there, and to remind them of their responsibilities to be good corporate actors in the area of labor rights.
Question 8:

The crisis in the Anglophone region of Cameroon has been worsening over the course of the past 18 months, yet there appears to be a negligible willingness on the part of the Cameroonian government and Anglophone separatists to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. What is the United States doing, along with ‘likeminded’ diplomatic partners, to encourage warring parties to negotiate a way out of this conflict? Are we yet at the point at which travel bans and asset freezes need to be imposed on individuals on both sides of the conflict?

Answer:

The Department of State continues to urge respect human rights and accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and abuses in Cameroon. The United States has repeatedly urged government officials and armed groups to forswear further violence and commit to a broad-based dialogue without preconditions. On May 13, Department of State officials, along with our P3 partners, publicly raised concerns over the Anglophone conflict during an Arria meeting at the UN Security Council. We continue to explore all options that will encourage both sides to engage in a dialogue and bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon.
Question 9:

Recently, a senior Ugandan military officer threatened to send the military into parliament in a reprise of an incident in 2017 in which the Special Forces entered parliament to beat and intimidate members of parliament during a debate over removing an age limit on presidential candidates from the constitution. Beyond mere rhetoric on the need to respect human rights and civilian-control of the military, what are the State Department and Department of Defense doing to counteract the increasingly repressive behavior of the Ugandan security forces?

Answer:

Uganda remains a prominent security partner of the United States, principally through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Ugandan troops receive training on human rights and the law of war as a pre-deployment requirement for AMISOM. In addition, Ugandan participation in professional military education programs ensures that future Ugandan military leaders are exposed to U.S. values related to human rights and civilian control of the military. Finally, the U.S. government has raised serious concerns about human rights violations in Uganda on numerous occasions with the highest-level of Ugandan officials. In our conversations, we have underscored that U.S. law prohibits assistance to individuals and units credibly accused of gross human rights violations, including the Special Forces Command, whose abuses you cite.
Question 10:

In recent years, violent extremist organizations and inter-communal conflict have severely destabilized Burkina Faso, and this instability increasingly threatens to spread to coastal West Africa. During this time, Burkina Faso has increased its military spending from 3% of its budget to 30%. Aside from building the capacity of the Burkinabe security forces to address the symptoms of the problem, what is the State Department doing to address the root causes of instability in Burkina Faso so that the country does not become another failed state? (AF/W with AF/SA and Post input)

Answer:

Aside from security, the State Department, in cooperation with other agencies, is coordinating a broad range of efforts to address the root causes of instability in Burkina Faso, which include deepening interethnic tensions, lack of economic opportunities, and pressures from violent extremist organizations.

A USAID Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI) team joined the U.S. Embassy in Burkina Faso in August 2018 to provide short- and medium-term solutions to strengthen communities’ resilience against the rise of violent extremism in the North and Sahel regions of the country. OTI and embassy programming funded by the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and other sources addresses drivers of violent extremism and sensitizes at-risk communities on how to identify and respond to extremist trends; promotes interethnic and community-police dialogue; empowers youth in vulnerable regions, and amplifies moderate voices.

The State Department supports the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)’s efforts in developing a second compact which will focus on developing Burkina Faso’s energy sector.
Through a constraints analysis, the Government of Burkina Faso identified the high cost and poor quality of and low access to energy as binding constraints to economic growth. MCC’s focus on developing the energy sector will produce an environment that is conducive to business and economic growth.

The United States provided nearly $12 million in humanitarian assistance in FY 2018 for Burkina Faso, including for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The number of IDPs is expected to rise to at least 190,000 by the end of 2019.

Since 2011, USAID has dedicated more than $30 million per year to working with the poorest and most vulnerable Burkinabe to adapt to, absorb and recover from crises such as droughts, floods, crop/livestock infestations and diseases, and market changes. Much of that assistance goes directly to regions most affected by insecurity.
Question 1:

In sub-Saharan Africa, violent extremist groups are primarily concentrated in Somalia, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin. In the Department of Defense’s assessment, do the activities of these terrorist groups constitute a grave threat to U.S. national security interests? Why/why not? If they do not, is our current posture and engagement in the region commensurate with the threat to U.S. interests?

Answer:

Most violent extremist organizations in Africa represent a threat to U.S. forces, interests, and diplomatic facilities in the region. Many of these groups have local objectives; however, several are associated with or part of transnational terrorist groups like Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and have the objective of attacking U.S. and western targets. Left unchecked, these violent extremist organizations could threaten the U.S. homeland.

DoD seeks to deny safe havens to terrorists and disrupt their ability to direct or support external operations against the United States through a by-with-and-through approach with our African and international partners. Our current posture and engagement is adequate to disrupt the threats to U.S. interests; however, if extremist influences are left unchecked, these networks could evolve to more directly threaten U.S. interests outside of the continent. Persistent pressure on Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and other Al-Qaida-associated groups remains necessary to prevent the destabilization of African nations and the ability for terrorists to strike the U.S. and our interests in the future. Fragile and conflict-affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism, transnational terrorism and organized crime. Stabilization activities can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States, its allies, and partners.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ms. Michelle Lenihan by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#2)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

Question 2:

Despite long-running U.S. efforts to build the capacity of African militaries, we continue to see military coups, impunity for security force abuses, and a widespread inability to prevent and mitigate conflicts throughout Africa. Aside from the measures that the U.S. government already takes such as “Leaky vetting” and human rights training, how might U.S. security cooperation programs be improved or re-envisioned in light of these challenges?

Answer:

DoD approaches security cooperation through a whole-of-government framework that supports long-term U.S. strategic requirements throughout Africa. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) advances U.S. national security interests most effectively through focused, sustained engagement with partners in support of our shared security objectives. USAFRICOM’s security cooperation programs support U.S. Government foreign policy primarily through institution building, military-to-military activities, and engagements.

The consolidation and reorganization of security cooperation authorities enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA), will help USAFRICOM address new and emerging threats on the continent. In aggregate, the statutes enhance the flexibility, transparency, and oversight of security cooperation authorities and resources, professionalize the workforce, and improve alignment of security cooperation activities to defense strategy. The NDAA helped to streamline many of those authorities by consolidating many regional authorities into global authorities, making temporary authorities permanent, and providing greater flexibility within the Department for allocating budgets against those authorities. As an example of the Department’s implementation of the statutory reform of security cooperation authorities, the recent DoD Instruction on Assessment, Monitoring & Evaluation (AME) provides instruction for how the Department will conduct AME and implement related statutes. DoD believes the current reforms are sufficient at this time to address the current threats, but recognizes that the evolving environment requires continual updates and rethinking of how best to address challenges on tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We appreciate Congress’s continued support in ensuring that our security cooperation efforts match the changing threats.
Question 3:

In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, making it the only country in the world to have both a U.S. and Chinese military base. The U.S. base, Camp Lemonnier, and Djibouti’s port facilities are key enablers for logistics support to five combatant commands: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. In light of the support that the U.S. military’s only forward and enduring installation in Africa provides across several combatant commands, what operational and counterintelligence risks does the Chinese base pose to U.S. security interests and military personnel?

Answer:

The new Chinese base sits on highly strategic territory in the Horn of Africa. As is the case globally, DoD constantly assesses risk and works to mitigate it. For DoD, continued access to Camp Lemonnier and Chebelley Airfield, as well as overflight, port access and passage through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, are essential for ongoing operations. Any specific operational or counterintelligence risks are better discussed in a classified setting.
Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Ms. Michelle Lenihan by  
Chairman Eliot L. Engel (#4)  
House Foreign Affairs Committee  
May 16, 2019

Question 4:

As the United States recedes from the world stage, countries like China and Russia have rushed in to fill the gap, as we have seen in several African countries. For its part, Russia has been increasing its military engagement in the region through arms sales and security cooperation - some of which has been facilitated through Kremlin-aligned private military corporations. How does Russia’s growing military presence on the continent affect U.S. security interests?

Answer:

Russia is exploiting seams across Africa to increase its influence and undermine U.S./Western influence. DoD is monitoring Russian efforts to expand its influence in Africa through arms sales, military training, intelligence exchanges, and deals to gain access to rare minerals. We are working with the interagency to illuminate the hidden costs of doing business with Russia, provide a better alternative, and prepare to compete if necessary.
Question 5:

Despite several years of bilateral capacity-building with the Nigerian military, as well as with the militaries of other Lake Chad Basin countries (Chad, Cameroon, and Niger), both Boko Haram and the Islamic State-West Africa continue to operate in parts of northeastern Nigeria. What are the strategic, operational, and tactical impediments that Nigerian security forces face in their efforts to counter terrorism in the northeast? How would the Department of Defense assess the Nigerian military’s willingness to address these impediments?

Answer:

Nigeria has endured multiple setbacks in its volatile northeast region as it faces an increasing threat from ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA). In a series of high-profile attacks, ISIS-WA has seized military bases and materiel, including armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, placing further stress on Nigeria’s already strained military readiness and capabilities. At the same time, the Nigerian military faces instability emanating from herder-farmer conflicts in the Middle Belt region and considerable humanitarian challenges due to scarcity of resources and internal displacement.

Amidst these challenges, DoD is working to assist the Nigerian military through a variety of security cooperation efforts. We are currently working with the Nigerian Air Force to increase its effectiveness, and we assess that the Air Force, in particular, is a willing partner. Looking ahead, utilizing Title 10 and Title 22 authorities, USAFRICOM will execute tailored programs to expand Nigerian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); counter-IED; and air-ground integration capabilities. With Nigeria’s presidential election now concluded, DoD is continuing to assess additional partnership opportunities with Nigeria to help build important institutions and counter the significant extremist threats that exist in the country.
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Mr. Ramsey Day by
Chairman Eliot L. Engel
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 16, 2019

Question 1:

This Administration’s approach to the foreign assistance budget has been to call on other donors to ‘do more’ and to mobilize resources from the private sector and from partner nations’ domestic resources towards our common goals. In sub-Saharan Africa, can USAID provide concrete evidence that this approach has achieved its intended result since the release of this Administration’s first foreign assistance budget in the spring of 2017?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 2:

The Administration has announced plans to downsize the U.S. military’s presence in Africa by as much as 10 per cent. Can USAID detail how this decision will impact its engagement on the continent, including its monitoring and evaluation of programs in non-permissive environments? What measures is USAID taking, if any, to adapt to this development?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 3:

Global climate change shapes the environmental conditions of the Sahel, which in turn affects the ability to sustain livelihoods in the region. The overlapping conflicts in the Sahel region have complex roots, but climate change may nonetheless act as a “threat multiplier,” by intensifying some factors contributing to instability such as demographic pressures, land degradation, food insecurity, and resource competition. How has climate change interacted with state fragility in regions such as the Sahel, and how has this affected U.S. interests? What types of climate adaptation assistance can USAID offer that might be most effective in regions such as the Sahel?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 4:

One of the lessons learned from the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was that understanding the local cultural dynamics and building trust with local communities was a key enabler to contact tracing, administering vaccines, and eventually containing the spread of the epidemic. Yet, it appears that responders to the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have not been able to apply these lessons to build trust within the communities affected by the outbreak. **Why was this critical lesson from the 2014-2015 outbreak**
not applied earlier in the DRC? Knowing that this will not be the last Ebola outbreak, what lessons should be further institutionalized in order to improve the international community’s support to domestic health organizations and local communities?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 5:

Despite a progressively worsening security situation in parts of Darfur, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has continued to withdraw military personnel from the region. What does USAID anticipate as the humanitarian implications of UNAMID’s withdrawal, if any, amidst continuing insecurity?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 6:

In March and April, Mozambique was hit by two devastating, record-breaking cyclones. What is USAID doing to improve the Mozambican government’s response to such incidents and increase the resilience of the local population to extreme weather events? Is USAID concerned that these events could become the ‘new normal’ for coastal countries like Mozambique?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.

Question 7:

In recent years, violent extremist organizations and inter-communal conflict have severely destabilized Burkina Faso, and this instability increasingly threatens to spread to coastal West Africa. During this time, Burkina Faso has increased its military spending from 3% of its budget to 30%. What is USAID doing to address the root causes of instability in Burkina Faso so that the country does not become another failed state?

Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.
PEPFAR is one of the most successful U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Over 85 million people have received testing and counselling because of PEPFAR, and 14 million people receive lifesaving treatment. Part of our success in the PEPFAR program, and all our global health efforts is from our continued and sustained contributions to the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. The U.S. remains the largest supporter of the Global Fund, as it is an effective platform to pool donor funding, maximize impact, and encourage other countries to do more. I fully support continued robust support for the Global Fund, including following through on U.S. pledging commitments. Through years of sustained investment in health systems strengthening, we have the opportunity to work with the private sector, NGOs and leading medical institutions such as Texas Children’s Hospital to build on these successes. Our robust support for bilateral programs such as PEPFAR, and multilateral programs such as the Global Fund, has created a strong foundation where the U.S. can address other global health challenges such as cancer. That is why I am excited to work with the administration on an initiative to combat childhood cancer in Africa. Supporting global health is in the national interest of the United States.

Question 1:
Do you support maintaining robust U.S. support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund), including fulfilling our previous pledging commitment, and continued U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) allocations to defeat HIV/AIDS globally?

Answer 1:
The U.S. continues to be the single largest donor to global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria relief efforts. The FY 2020 budget includes $6.3 billion to support key global health efforts such as PEPFAR, the Global Fund, the President’s Malaria Initiative, Global Health Security, and other global health programs. Following the fulfillment of previous pledges, the FY 2020 budget, when combined with FY 2019 appropriations, provides up to $1.1 billion toward a new three-year pledge to the Global Fund that commits up to $3.3 billion to the fund through 2022, matching other donors with one U.S. dollar for every three from other donors. These resources allow PEPFAR to help control the HIV/AIDS epidemic globally by achieving goals

Question 2:
How can the U.S. leverage the success of PEPFAR to combat childhood cancer in Africa?

Answer 2:
In working to increase diagnosis and treatment for children living with HIV, PEPFAR developed systems and facilitated policy changes that could be leveraged to combat childhood cancer in Africa. Centers of excellence (COE’s) for pediatric treatment of HIV have been developed that serve as referral centers for complicated HIV cases. Specialists at COE’s could be trained in diagnosis and treatment of pediatric cancers. These COE’s also provide consultation to community providers, and task shifting of HIV care to nurses has extended the availability of care. These networks of providers could be trained on signs of pediatric cancer to allow earlier referral to specialized centers and on monitoring of children after treatment at referral centers. These providers are comfortable with complicated pediatric HIV clients with immunodeficiencies and pharmacists. These COE already have fully equipped laboratories and trained personnel required to monitor patients during chemotherapy.
Question 3:

What is the role for the private sector in U.S. supported health initiatives in Africa? How can we better leverage and support private sector engagement?

Answer 3:

PEPFAR’s partnerships with the private sector, which plays an increasingly prominent role in the growth of economies in Africa, are critical to ending the HIV/AIDS epidemic. PEPFAR finds solutions to tackle problems in new ways by leveraging private sector resources, infrastructure, core competencies, and approaches. PEPFAR maintains working relationships with a variety of private sector actors, including the pharmaceutical industry and other Fortune 500 companies, to better leverage expenditures and best serve both the taxpayer and the PEPFAR recipient. PEPFAR also pursues relationships with several smaller scale companies to find unique solutions to better reach those affected or vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. In collaboration with the private sector, PEPFAR made remarkable contributions to ensure partner countries have sustainable laboratory systems to accurately detect, confirm, treat, and monitor disease in developing countries, which not only assists in the control of HIV, but also throughout the broader global health security agenda. PEPFAR’s inclusion of private sector partners helps to reduce cost sharing burden, further enhances U.S. efforts to save lives, and encourages economic sustainability beyond PEPFAR’s core mission.
PEPFAR is one of the most successful U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Over 85 million people have received testing and counselling because of PEPFAR, and 14 million people receive lifesaving treatment. Part of our success in the PEPFAR program, and all our global health efforts is from our continued and sustained contributions to the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. The U.S. remains the largest supporter of the Global Fund, as it is an effective platform to pool donor funding, maximize impact, and encourage other countries to do more. I fully support continued robust support for the Global Fund, including following through on U.S. pledging commitments. Through years of sustained investment in health systems strengthening, we have the opportunity to work with the private sector, NGOs and leading medical institutions such as Texas Children’s Hospital to build on these successes. Our robust support for bilateral programs such as PEPFAR, and multilateral programs such as the Global Fund, has created a strong foundation where the U.S. can address other global health challenges such as cancer. That is why I am excited to work with the administration on an initiative to combat childhood cancer in Africa. Supporting global health is in the national interest of the United States.

**Question 1:**

Do you support maintaining robust U.S. support for the Global Fund, including fulfilling our previous pledging commitment, and continued PEPFAR allocations to defeat HIV/AIDS globally?

*Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.*

**Question 2:**

How can the U.S. leverage the success of PEPFAR to combat childhood cancer in Africa?

*Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.*

**Question 3:**

What is the role for the private sector in U.S. supported health initiatives in Africa? How can we better leverage and support private sector engagement?

*Mr. Day did not respond in time for printing.*