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**NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE**

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NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 13, 2019.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. If I can call the meeting to order. Welcome all.

One little housekeeping item. The timer—actually, they appear to be working now. Miraculous. The timers were not working, but now they are.

Today we are having our posture hearing on the European Command, and our witnesses are Ms. Kathryn Wheelbarger, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Good to see you. I think the last time we saw you it was your first hearing before Congress. So welcome back as a veteran now.

And General Curtis Scaparrotti, who is the commander of the U.S. European Command, and once upon a time, when I represented Joint Base Lewis-McChord, was the commander out there and did an outstanding job for our community.

So I appreciate your leadership and it is good to see you again.

There is a lot going on in the world, and certainly there is a lot going on within your jurisdiction. We appreciate you being here. We appreciate your leadership.

There are a number of issues. I think the most pressing thing in terms of the European Command right now is maintaining our strong alliances within NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization].

Certainly, it is important to meet the needs and demands right now that are present in Europe as we try to deal with Russian interference in elections and democracy writ large; also, obviously, what is going on in the Ukraine and elsewhere.

But it is equally important to make sure that we maintain those alliances, because our allies in NATO are helping us throughout the world, in Afghanistan, in Africa, in the Middle East. Those alliances are crucial to us meeting our national security objectives, not just in Europe but throughout the globe.

So would love to get an update from you on where you see that, how we are doing with our NATO partners, and how we can work to make sure that we maintain that alliance.

Towards that end, I think one of the most crucial items that we are going to talk about is the European Defense Initiative and making sure that we maintain that. The President's budget cuts it and also puts it into OCO [overseas contingency operations], which makes our European allies uncomfortable.

At this point, OCO may sound like it is supposed to be an emergency, but it seems like a rather permanent emergency. So they should feel better about that.

But certainly, the cut in the spending of EDI [European Deterrence Initiative] is concerning, because I believe, General Scaparrotti, you have said that in order to present the credible deterrent that we need to stop Russia from doing anything in Eastern Europe, we need more forces, more—well, we need more in Europe to be able to put ourselves in that position. We have made quite a bit of progress in the last couple of years, but there is still more left to be done.

And that, of course, is the overarching issue in that part of the world and, regrettably, in more, and that is Russia's malign influence. And would love to get your perspective on both what you think they are going to do next and how best we could deter that.

Because I think their objectives are very straightforward at this point. As I like to put it, they want to make the world safe for kleptocratic autocracy. That is their form of government. And to do so, the number one thing they try to do is undermine confidence in democracy, make people believe that democracy really doesn't work, really doesn't provide for them.

And the frightening thing about that is it is kind of working. If you look at polling data in the U.S. and across the world, support for democracy is lower than it has been in quite some time. And a lot of that is because of the efforts of Russia to undermine it. And not just the elections, but to stir up division and hatred within Western democracies to undermine people's confidence in their government.

Now, I firmly believe—and I will go ahead and channel George W. Bush—that freedom works. Economic and political freedom makes the world a safer and more prosperous place. And the degree to which Russia is successful in undermining it, the world will be a less prosperous and less safe place. So we need to make sure that we work to push back on that.

The European Command is going to be at the center of that because of Russia's presence and, as I mentioned, also because of how important our European allies are in prosecuting this fight.

And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming our witnesses.

General Scaparrotti, I understand this may, unfortunately, be one of the last times that you testify before us. If so, I want to go ahead and thank you for your service.

You have been assigned two of the most difficult jobs that I think anybody in the military can be assigned, as our commander in Korea and now as our commander in Europe. Both of those jobs have required working with allies. Both of those jobs have required facing formidable adversaries. I think the fact that you have held both of them are a signal of the trust and respect that your colleagues and many of us have put on you.

And so, like the chairman, I am interested in your views on the state of the alliance. I would slightly correct the chairman, that it is not just George W. Bush who believes freedom works. It has been Republicans and Democrats for the last 70 years have invested in a world system of systems. And we have put our money and our blood and treasure into the idea that freedom works.

As you and I have talked before, Members of Congress, including members of this committee, try to play a constructive role in the NATO alliance. You have got folks on the Inter-Parliamentary Union. You have got regular visits back and forth, not only with parliamentarians, but with defense officials. A number of us were able to see you in Munich several weeks ago.

So I do think it is important to know your view of the state of the alliance today, especially versus when you came there 3 years ago.

Secondly, related to the alliance, NATO has made a significant decision to modernize our nuclear deterrent. And I think we need to hear and focus on, from you, the importance of that decision and especially how it relates to Russia. And we will, I am sure, have a number of questions related to that.

Finally, I notice you made a little news when you testified in front of the Senate maybe last week that we were not yet as prepared as we needed to be to deal with the range of threats coming from Russia in Europe. I would be interested, and I am sure you will in your testimony, talk a little more about that.

I am particularly interested in your perception of the state of our forces that are rotated through EUCOM [U.S. European Command], because it has been a major effort of this committee to improve the readiness of our forces over the last couple years.

And so it will be interesting, I think, for us to hear—it is not your responsibility to make them ready, but you are a consumer of that readiness in a way—whether you are able to tell a difference.

As the chairman said, there are lots of issues to discuss. We look forward to both of your opinions as we do so.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I believe Ms. Wheelbarger is going to go first.

STATEMENT OF HON. KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me back again,

this time to testify on policy matters related to the EUCOM theater alongside General Scaparrotti. General Scaparrotti has been a great partner for me in particular for the past few years and an impressive leader his entire career, so it is an honor to appear with him here today.

Our policy approach to Europe, like other geographic areas, is guided by the National Defense Strategy, which recognizes the importance of Europe and our NATO allies and partners. We recognize as well the national security threats, particularly from Russia and China, that mark a new chapter in global great power competition.

The history of the 20th century proved that our core U.S. interests in Western values, economic freedoms, and democratic legitimacy require us to defend our Western allies against threats from authoritarian regimes.

If future war were to come, and hopefully it never will, our troops will be at the front lines, because we cannot thrive alone in a bleak world of dictators and autocrats. And this is the heart of our Article 5 commitment.

Over the course of 70 years, NATO continues to provide an integral means for the United States and allies to defend our interests by collectively deterring potential conflict, thereby saving lives, saving dollars, and saving our way of life. And over the last 5 years, we have successfully built increasing multilateral pressure against Russian aggression through sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, coherent condemnations, and significant increases in NATO spending and reforms.

Our European allies and partners are also beginning to grasp the security threat posed by an increasingly assertive China. Some of China's recent investments in Europe's critical infrastructure, to include telecommunications, ports, railways, and cutting-edge technologies, are a threat to NATO security and unity.

In the face of this volatile world, our defense policy objectives in Europe are focused on improving our deterrence and confronting Russian activities that threaten a free and open international order.

The Department is also focused on countering the increased malign activity of China, maintaining partner support of our efforts to handle Iranian aggression, and working with our allies and partners to counter the continued threat of terrorism. As the chairman mentioned, some of our closest allies and partners in Europe are deployed alongside us in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and beyond.

United States alliances, partnerships, and overseas presence in Europe are invaluable force multipliers for the United States. They allow to us project power and defend ourselves forward. Maintaining a credible nuclear force and a robust presence in Europe enables DOD [Department of Defense] to dissuade aggression as we position our forces forward to be prepared to fight the away game if we must.

The Department is focused on encouraging an increase in the amount and quality of NATO burden sharing to ultimately benefit the entire alliance, including the United States. Our teams are engaging with partners and allies daily to ensure that NATO is adapted to today's conditions and able to deter Russian aggression

and malign Chinese influence. Our alliance knows that our threats are shared and meeting their commitments on defense serves all of us.

In some specifics, NATO's eastern flank, from the Baltics to Bulgaria, has been a recent focus of our posture response to an aggressive Russia. We have rotated forces to reassure our allies and deter Russia and welcome contributions to enhance forward presence in Baltic air policing missions.

In the Baltic States and Poland, the front line of NATO's deterrence and defense on the eastern flank, Russia continues to use disinformation, cyberattacks, and military posturing to undermine the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. DOD, with the Department of State, is bolstering the eastern flank allies through security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives to improve defense and security infrastructure and improve resilience.

In southeastern Europe, Russian aggression has manifested itself over the past decade. Like Poland, Romania has been a forward-leaning NATO ally that has been fully supportive of a U.S. presence. And we continue to review our posture in the region to ensure our deterrence is solid and we can respond in an Article 5 scenario.

Beyond NATO, Ukraine and Georgia are vital defense partners in Europe's eastern flank and Black Sea region. In Ukraine, Russia occupies Crimea and fuels conflict in the Donbass to change borders by force and undermine a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

The United States remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The \$1.2 billion in U.S. security assistance from the United States to Ukraine since 2014 helps it build its long-term defense to deter Russia in the future.

The U.S. is equally committed to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Georgia is a key strategic partner, as it provides unconditional ground and air transport for us to Afghanistan, and is the largest non-NATO contributor to NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. With 870 Georgians currently in Afghanistan, Georgia is the largest per capita contributor to that mission. The U.S. is developing Georgia's capacity to train, equip, and sustain its own forces to preserve its independence.

Europe's southern flank also demands attention. Chinese and Russian influence, as we discussed last week, in Africa continues to grow. Therefore, the Department has worked with Southern European allies in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal to enhance our force posture, to protect U.S. diplomatic presence in Africa, protect Europe, and project security into the greater Mediterranean and Africa. Bases in Greece, Italy, and Spain host force posture elements for both EUCOM and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command].

Turkey is another critical ally on NATO's southern flank. Turkey contributes to coalition missions, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, and we continue to reiterate the importance of Turkey remaining grounded in the NATO security structures.

At the same time, the United States has been clear in expressing its concern about Turkey's stated intent to procure the S-400 from Russia, which would introduce risks to U.S. and NATO defense technologies. We thank Congress for its support in offering the Patriot FMS [foreign military sales] case to Turkey as an alternative

to the S-400. We will only continue to discuss that potential sale with Turkey if it commits to not accepting the S-400.

EUCOM also covers Israel, a critical partner in a volatile region. The Department supports Israel through joint exercises, co-development of missile defense architecture, and supply of advanced weapons and technology, proving our commitment to Israel's qualitative military edge. Our defense relationship is extensive, covering the range of global and regional challenges we face together.

In conclusion, with your continued support the Department will continue to meet the threats that we face in Europe and beyond while increasing the lethality of our Armed Forces. Thank you for inviting me today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Scaparrotti.

**STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the commander of the United States European Command. It is also a pleasure to appear today with Ms. Wheelbarger, who, as she stated, we work daily together and have for several years now.

First and foremost, I want to thank you, the Congress, for your support of the service members, civilians, and their families in Europe. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and dedication to the Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is essential to our national security and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. We as a Nation are blessed by their voluntary and exceptional service. Also, thank you for your steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.

The threats facing U.S. interests in the EUCOM area of responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing. They are complex, transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional.

This remains one of the most dynamic periods in recent history, in my opinion. Russia has continued its reemergence as a strategic competitor and remains the primary threat to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. While the United States maintains global military superiority over Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive military advantage, challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all domains, and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression.

In light of Russia's modernizing and increasingly aggressive force posture, EUCOM recommends augmenting our assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrence posture. EUCOM also recommends further investments that enhance European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support rapid deployment of multi-domain U.S. forces into Europe.

In addition to the threat from Russia, the risk of terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline of fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists present a clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and its infrastructure.

Thankfully, the United States is not alone in facing these and other challenges across the Euro-Atlantic theater. As our National Defense Strategy states, the NATO alliance deters Russian adventurism, contributes to the defeat of terrorism, and addresses instability along NATO's periphery.

Our allies and partners play a vital role in our collective security, and they have made significant progress in increasing the cash contributions and capabilities that provide our common defense. For almost 70 years, NATO has been the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. As NATO adapts to remain relevant and fit-for-purpose, we will find, as we always have, that every challenge is best addressed as an alliance.

Let me close by again thanking Congress, and this committee in particular, for your continued support, especially sustained funding of the European Deterrence Initiative. EUCOM's future success in implementing our National Defense Strategy and fulfilling our mission is only possible with Congress' support.

Thank you. And, again, I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in the Appendix on page 67.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both.

To begin with, if you could give us a little greater insight on Russia and what you see their next steps are and what is most important for us to deter them. What do we need to be most worried about in terms of what Putin is going to try to do next in your theater? And, again, what are our best steps to try and counter that?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, first of all, I am very concerned about their modernization program. We can cover that in more detail in a closed session. But it is real and it is a good modernization program that he has been able to keep on track, by and large.

And so while today, as I noted in my opening, we have a dominant force, in the years ahead we won't unless we continue to invest as well so that we pace ahead of their modernization program. And I will speak in more detail in a closed hearing on that.

Secondly, they continue their malign influence in Europe, throughout Europe, particularly in the area that they believe they should have preferred influence along the eastern border.

I believe that they continue to have a goal of establishing themselves as a respected global leader and that they have a goal of increasing their influence, particularly on their border and their flanks, and they will use both malign influence as well as illegal activities to do so.

I think your next step, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about the Balkans, and we see increased malign influence there in the past year, an area that we have invested in heavily and is critical to the security of Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have anything to add?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I would agree with the general. I think Russia's ability to make the West, as you indicated in your opening, question its own institutions, is one of the biggest challenges we have because it sort of takes a whole-of-government effort to respond to it.

Militarily, I think we are very adept and I trust our forces to be able to always outmatch any adversary, including Russia. But our ability as a society to ensure that we trust our own institutions in the face of their particularly aggressive information operations and use of social media to undermine us is significant. As the general said, we see it play out daily across the periphery.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I focus in on just that one piece of it, because it strikes me that this is primarily—at the top, it is an information campaign. Certainly, as you talked about, General, the modernization, what forces do we have to deter if a war comes to pass.

I mean, Russia understands the cost if they do that, regardless of what modernization they do. Not to say that there is not a risk of that, but the risk of that happening is lower. Obviously, if it does it is incredibly disruptive.

But what is absolutely happening is the information campaign, is the constant effort to attack us in every medium. I mean, social media is the focus, but they do it through traditional media as well.

They do it through different organizations as they—sorry, and I don't mean this in any partisan way, it is just what comes to mind—they infiltrated the NRA [National Rifle Association] here to see what they could do to stir things up. They have been in some cases trying to stir things up with Black Lives Matter, just to be bipartisan.

So my concern is we don't seem to be doing much in response. It is a campaign. It is a public information campaign. And granted, it is complex, given social media and given how cyber works now. But at the end of the day every campaign is simple: develop a message and deliver that message to the people you are trying to influence.

I don't see us doing that. I don't see us going out there and arguing, you know, a negative campaign—here is what is wrong with Russia, okay, don't believe what they are saying.

So are we organizing that effort and working with our allies to fight the information battle that Russia is so clearly engaged in? And what can we do better in that area?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will start. I see us actually very much proactively working with the alliance to develop tools and messages to counter this information operations effort.

We, in the North Macedonia case, I think had successes in helping them and learning from them, actually, in how they can successfully sort of develop a message in the beginning, expecting what the Russians were going to do and sort of setting the battle space, so to speak, in terms of what the positive messages are before the Russians even engaged. And so I think in that particular context, the Russians were surprised that they did not have a larger effect.

So there is most definitely more to be done. It is a challenge whole-of-government-wise, all of alliance.

I think one of the key things we can do is ensure strength and unity of messaging on the alliance itself, because one of the key goals of the Russians is obviously NATO disunity.

And so every time we successfully counter that, we have a successful summit, successful defense ministerials, where we come out

with advancing reforms for the alliance, I think that is one of the key ways we do counter their messaging.

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, a quick response to this is, first of all, I think that we could do more, that we have greater talent. We need more focus and energy. I appreciate the Congress' focus on this. You have, in fact, funded some of the organizations that have increased what we are doing.

I think we have improved, but we can do more. So things like the Russian Influence Group, which I co-chair with Department of State, is an interagency group that over the last couple of years has grown. We have had greater effect.

And we actually have programs working, particularly in the eastern part of Europe today, thanks again to the funding of Congress. A part of that is the Communications Engagement Group, the CEG, which has been a big part of that and also would be for any response in the future.

And then finally, our work with NATO. NATO actually has developed what I think is a pretty effective communication strategy and framework that they adjust over time. They have got an annual framework, and then they have it for specific events where things are developing. And we have actually shown that we can develop a message that has greater depth, penetration, and volume than the Russians have in the eastern side, and we have done this on several occasions where we set out early to be proactive.

So, to me, it shows that we can do this. But we need to have greater focus and make this more the norm of what we do, because, as you said, they are pretty agile at this and they are everywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I neglected to make this announcement at the outset. As with our hearing last week, there will be a classified session after this. Our goal is to be done by noon and to start the classified session upstairs at noon. So we will endeavor to do that.

And with that, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, I would like to at least try to touch on the three issues I mentioned at the beginning.

If you look at the state of the troops that are sent to EUCOM, come through EUCOM, their readiness, et cetera, how would you compare it today versus when you first arrived 3 years ago?

General SCAPARROTTI. It is absolutely better. It is much improved. The investment of Congress in particular and the focus of the services on readiness and aligned with the National Defense Strategy has paid off.

Right now, my forces in Europe are at the highest readiness rates that they have been since I have been in command. It is very good. Particularly the rotational units, those are delivered ready.

And my commitment to the Army, for instance, in the Army's case, is to return them just as ready as they came, because I believe I have got an experience and a training area there that allows me to do just that.

So, in short, they are in a better place, but readiness is something that you have got to continue to invest in.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Absolutely.

You have touched on the state of the alliance, but can you just, again, give us kind of your overall perspective on the military inte-

gration state of the alliance now versus 3 years ago and, at least from your perspective, the political support for the alliance that you see with your two hats.

General SCAPARROTTI. In terms of mil-to-mil [military-to-military], the relationships within the alliance, I think they are at least as strong, if not stronger. It is a little difficult for me to be unbiased in this case, but over a 3-year period we worked this very hard.

But when you look at what we have done in, say, the last 4 or 5 years, my predecessor and now, the actions we have taken are really historic within NATO: NATO command structure adaptation, the deployment of forces to the east, the deployment of greater maritime forces at a greater schedule within the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and actually the North Atlantic as well, the deployment of air forces for air policing, et cetera, the changes to readiness that is taking place in NATO right now.

Those are really significant steps forward for NATO, and that is done because we have got a very close mil-to-mil relationship, interoperability is working better, there is an agreement to work our forces in a more effective manner. So I think the mil-to-mil is very good.

On the political side of it, it is affected by the dynamics of our environment today, whether United States or Europe. There is more political tension. But, again, I would point to the fact that when you come to 29 at the table, NATO has every day made the commitment and delivered on the tough decisions that have to be made for the security of Europe, and that is encouraging to me.

Mr. THORNBERRY. And finally, I know we will touch more on Russian nuclear doctrine when we go to the classified session, but we had an outside witness testify last week that, in his view, this Russian doctrine of escalate to deescalate was not real, that they didn't really believe it, that it was just kind of for show to scare us.

This committee may be asked to make some decisions about whether to continue our nuclear modernization that 29 nations have agreed to. In your view, are the Russians serious when they openly talk about a use of nuclear weapons as a regular part of their military doctrine?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would like to get into that more in the closed session. But I would just say that I think it is a part of Russian doctrine and their way of warfare, if you will, traditionally over time.

I would say it is escalate to dominate, is the way they look at it. And if you look at the modernization of their weapon systems today, I think that you can see how those, in some scale of escalation, could be used to do just that, and I think they are actually being developed for that reason. And I can get into that in more detail in the secure session.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. We look forward to that. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General and Ms. Wheelbarger, thanks for coming.

So I guess it was last month, several of us were in Brussels at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting with members of Parliament from NATO countries as well as those who were acceding, and North Macedonia had representatives there for the first time.

Thanks for not starting my clock, too, by the way. I will take 7 minutes. Darn it, why did I say that? I am just trying to be respectful of everyone else here.

I guess I want to get to the point about, one, North Macedonia's accession, and our Senate has to act on that for our purposes. But it brought up other questions about the Balkans, the fact that North Macedonia was there, and Bosnia and Herzegovina had representatives there and others, as well as current allies like Croatia.

You mentioned the Balkans as your number three, top three in terms of Russia causing problems there. Can you be more specific here in this setting about what Russia is doing in the Balkans that causes so much concern for existing NATO allies, as well as North Macedonia, and as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I think, generally speaking, their efforts are to undermine any movement toward integration with the Euro-Atlantic, EU [European Union], NATO, et cetera. That is their general objective in every case throughout the Balkans.

Primarily, they do this through disinformation. They do it through funding and support for fringe parties. They don't necessarily determine whichever side it might be on as long as it is undermining the present government and any forward movement within those governments. We see that and, as I said, I think that has stepped up in the past 6 or 8 months within the Balkans.

I would also say that Montenegro's accession to NATO, now the 29th member, and North Macedonia, who would potentially be the 30th, I believe, is exactly what Russia did not want to see. I think they will continue to try and address this with North Macedonia, just as they tried to interfere in Montenegro's accession.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, because it is an alliance that needs to be—each alliance member needs to approve North Macedonia. It is not a 50 percent plus one, it is everybody, everybody is in.

General SCAPARROTTI. Each nation.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. So is there a specific EUCOM role that EUCOM is playing, or is this more of a NATO role or State Department role to counter this specific set of circumstances?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, EUCOM has a role in it. And within these hybrid activities or activity below the level of conflict or indirect activity, we have precise military capabilities that we bring to bear, primarily having to do with military information support, some of our SOF [special operations forces] capabilities, for instance, cyber capabilities.

But then the last thing is we work very closely with the inter-agency. And I would like to think that we are one of these places that pulls everything together. I have within my J9 [interagency partnering directorate] an incredible group that does this, and I have people from Treasury, State, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Homeland Security, that help us ensure that we can address this as a whole-of-government approach appropriately.

And that is what it really takes to counter this. So I think that is one of the major things that we do in EUCOM to help counter Russia's activities.

Mr. LARSEN. If I can jump across the Black Sea to Georgia, and either of you can answer this. Russia is occupying two areas of Georgia. The Georgians are very interested in getting in line and to get into NATO eventually. I certainly support that.

What would be EUCOM's concerns or the Pentagon's concerns about a country like Georgia, which has territory that is occupied, from continuing to pursue a NATO membership? It is probably a civilian answer, not a military answer.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yeah. We obviously have a very close working relationship with the Georgians. They are one of our key partners. We are doing everything we can to build up their own defenses and ensure that they can train and equip for themselves, as I said in my opening.

I think the fundamental challenge is, entry into NATO immediately, you question whether you are already in an Article 5 scenario by mere entry because 20 percent of their territory is occupied. So that is the particular challenge when we look at their potential movement forward that we as an alliance have to think about and manage.

But we are doing everything we can in the meantime to encourage them to stay close to us. They are one of our key partners. I just met with them last week. And they do all they can to stay close to the alliance, and we want to continue to encourage that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all the time we have, so I will go to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to thank General Scaparrotti for providing this map. I think the American people need to know the success of the American military, of NATO, that we currently have a greater spread of freedom and democracy in Europe and across the world because of the American military presence providing freedom and democracy for countries that didn't have it.

And in particular, I was an election observer in June 1990 for the general with the new elections in Bulgaria. It was so exciting to see that country come to life. And over the years I have worked with it to see the development of Novo Selo, the training base there, with young Bulgarians and Americans training together.

I have had the opportunity to visit MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu] Air Base in Romania, again, to see what was formerly a Soviet air base or Warsaw Pact air base, now so important in the global war on terrorism.

With that background, can you let all of us know how important it is, the relationships that we have with our Black Sea allies of Bulgaria and Romania?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, it is very important. As you noted, the bases you just named are a couple of those that are accessible, but not only us, but our NATO allies as well. And when you look at the Black Sea region, the criticality of that, it is actually the collection of allies in the Black Sea working together that provide the deterrence for any malign activity, Russia's malign activity, and secures their freedom, actually.

So it is vital, and it is a very close and robust relationship. Romania, in particular, over the past 2 years has developed a force within NATO. That area, it is a forward presence there as well, common to the one that is up in the Baltics. And it is connected with joint forces, increased maritime activity by both the United States and then NATO writ large, as well as air policing. So it is critical and it is a great partner.

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you for your success, but the success of the American military really needs to be recognized.

Germany is the home of so many extraordinary American military facilities, partly fueled by natural gas. The Army Corps of Engineers is currently building the largest military hospital, the Rhine Ordnance Barracks Army Medical Center near Kaiserslautern, Germany, which is a sister city of Columbia, South Carolina. And we are very grateful, General, that you are a graduate of USC [University of South Carolina], a Gamecock. We want the best at Kaiserslautern.

But the concern I have is the reliance of Germany on Gazprom, on natural gas from the Russian Federation. We have already seen how they cut the gas off to the people of Ukraine.

What concerns do you have about the reliance of providing the proper fuel for our facilities?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, we actually watch that closely in terms of fuels that we can provide, fuel, oil, et cetera. We have separate contracts to ensure that it is a safe and secure provision for our forces.

And then within natural gas, et cetera, as we look forward to the Rhine Ordnance, we are doing a study there to make sure that we secure its energy needs as well in the future if there were a conflict or that energy source could be put at risk, primarily because, as you know, about 30 percent across Europe of—particularly their LNF [liquefied natural gas] needs are provided by Russia.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And, Madam Secretary, a great achievement was to place American troops in Poland. It was a message to the Russian Federation that we are serious about defending our NATO allies.

I had the opportunity last summer to visit with President Duda in New York. And, of course, he was so happy to be explaining how they would like to provide for a permanent military facility in Poland.

What is the status of negotiations on developing the facilities in Poland?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. As you know, the Poles have made a very generous offer to us to contribute additionally \$2 billion, perhaps more, to have additional U.S. forces and capability stationed in their country. The negotiations are actually ongoing. This very week, Under Secretary Rood is meeting with his counterpart the deputy secretary in Warsaw. I think it is today, actually. It might be tomorrow.

We have come forward with, we think, a very serious, robust offer, and we are working out some of the technicalities this very week. And we hope to have a solid foundation to work from coming out of this meeting today.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. It is great to see U.S.-Polish relations. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

I am sorry, Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, General, for your service here and all of these years. And Ms. Wheelbarger, similarly.

The question of Poland just came up, and it is a question of permanent versus rotational. General, you spoke to the rotational issues and that you are receiving trained and prepared troops and you are sending them back just as well. Would you prefer that or would you prefer permanent? Or is there a combination?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah. On the question of whether permanent or rotational forces, particularly in Poland, I think it is a mix. I am perfectly content with the large forces that we are rotating today. I get a ready force. I send it home ready. And the other thing is, is I get a large component of our Army that has been to Europe and understands the mission there. So there is some goodness in that.

Some of the enablers, et cetera, some of the headquarters, a more permanent base is helpful, because of the relationships you build and the mission they have. So you will see a little bit of a combination there, from my point of view.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ms. Wheelbarger, the issue of a permanent base, you just spoke to that timeframe. Are we looking at an agreement sooner or later, or this year, next year? What is the situation?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Essentially, the discussions that are ongoing right now in Warsaw, if we come to agreed terms on the foundation of our offer and their acceptance of that, we would then go to the State Department and seek the authority for the State Department to then be the lead negotiator for, again, the actual technical agreement that would be signed.

In terms of the actual agreement between two countries, we are looking at probably 6 months to a year for that to be finalized. And then I would defer to my military colleagues for the actual physicality and infrastructure requirements, when that would actually come to—

Mr. GARAMENDI. A couple of years, 2 to 3 years off before we would be dealing with an actual base and the money for that base. Okay.

General, you spoke about the information campaign, that what is being done is good but it is not enough. What does it take to do enough?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think that we need to have more people involved in it and more resources, people and engagement, in terms of—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can you develop a specific plan and get it to us like sooner, like soon?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, it is not really mine to develop. You know, it is really a whole-of-government approach.

Within the RIG [Russia Information Group], for instance, we have a plan for progressive improvement, and it is nested under our embassies' objectives in each of those countries. And I think that was a good start for us.

But, for instance, with probably a little more resources behind that, we could do what we are doing at a faster pace. And, again, that is a whole-of-government approach; it is not a EUCOM one. I happen to co-chair it.

Mr. GARAMENDI. In your position as co-chair, could you give us your best thoughts about the extent and the money necessary?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Because we are in the process of developing that.

General, you also have recently spoken about the S-400 and F-35 in Turkey. I believe you raised this question at the Senate, and your answer was they are incompatible. Are you still holding that position after a week and a half?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. I do believe that we shouldn't provide F-35s if there is an S-400 in Turkey.

I would say that we are continuing to work this. Turkey is an important ally. We work with them every day. I know their leaders well. And our intent is to maintain them as an important ally, a NATO ally, into the future.

Mr. GARAMENDI. With that, I will—OCO funding. The OCO funding has been reduced in the President's budget. We will deal with that. But the question is, should you have a permanent baseline funding rather than OCO funding? What effect has the—I think I am out of time. I will let my colleagues pick that up later.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, you bluffed us there. It sounded like you were done, so we zeroed it out. But as far as we know, you are out of time.

So, Mr. Turner, go ahead.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here.

I want to echo Joe Wilson's thank you, General, for the map that presents the march, as Joe Wilson was saying, the march of freedom. I know when you present a map like this you don't have to start with where we were in 1989, and I appreciate that you do, because it gives us the perspective of Russia's view and also where we have come from. So thank you for giving us that perspective.

General, I want to speak to you first as the other title that you have, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. Secretary General of NATO Stoltenberg is going to be addressing a joint session of Congress in honor of the—he has been invited to address a joint session in honor of the anniversary for NATO.

When the NATO Parliamentary Assembly just had its meeting in Brussels, and he was addressing our group at the NAC [North Atlantic Council], he indicated that as of next year it will appear as if the Wales charge of increasing to 2 percent expenditure will reach increased expenditures from our NATO allies to \$100 billion additional funds spent.

Could you speak to a moment as to how the coordination of that is happening? As increased dollars are coming into NATO, and Stoltenberg clearly has given Donald Trump's beating the drum as the credit for the success that we are having of the steep climb that is happening over the past several years, how is it being spent and are they working with you, as Supreme Allied Commander, to make certain that is efficient?

General SCAPARROTTI. First of all, it is true that—and it is based on the request for plans by last 31st of December, this last year. Each nation was required to turn in their plan for meeting the 2 percent as well as the other requirements, 20 percent of that amount toward modernization. And so as you look at that, that is the basis of what has been \$41 billion to date, will be \$100 billion by 2020, as you stated.

So a couple of ways that works. One, that is in defense spending. So that naturally builds both readiness and capability within each of the nations that are then provided in capability as well as contribution by those nations. And we have seen in NATO over the last couple of years now an increase in both capability and contribution. That is the first way that you see it.

The other is, is when we go through the NATO defense planning process, which determines any gaps that we have, what modernization we need or capabilities that we lack, it then assigns that to nations. And nations in NATO, you agree to your modernization and you are committed to it.

And that is the other area where we see that increase in funding being important, because we, just as I said for the United States, all the nations face a need to modernize, just given the change in our security environment today, the character of war, as well as our competitors' capabilities.

Mr. TURNER. For both of you, I appreciate Mr. Garamendi's question on the F-35 and the S-400 in Turkey. We had a prior conversation before we came out here. As everyone knows on the committee, I have worked very diligently on the issue of the S-400 and our opposition to Turkey having the S-400.

But I would like, if you will, to just take a moment, each of you, to give us a commercial as we really do want Turkey in the F-35 program, right? I mean, it is not that we want to take the F-35 away. They are a partner. It is not just that we are using this as an excuse. The S-400 is a real problem, but at the bottom line we do want Turkey in the F-35 program, correct?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes, absolutely.

General SCAPARROTTI. I agree. And we want them to continue, as I said earlier, as one of our key allies in a very important place in the world.

Mr. TURNER. Excellent.

General, I come from Dayton, Ohio, the site of the Dayton Peace Accord negotiations. The Balkans continue to be an area of focus. I have been very concerned that after what was I believe an unworkable long-term constitution was adopted as part of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Balkans have languished.

Bosnia-Herzegovina frequently loses our focus because people don't believe there is a risk there. General, is there a risk in Bosnia-Herzegovina of violence?

General SCAPARROTTI. The stability you see today is just kind of a veneer, in my view. I don't expect it to have the kind of confrontation we had in the past, but there is, one, increased tension, two, Russian interference. And also, I think, as the longer we go without some forward progress here, that people begin to lose hope, that, in fact, that desire to be integrated into Europe is being diminished.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. COURTNEY.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti, last year when you appeared before our committee you testified that Russian submarine activity was at a level that we hadn't seen since the 1980s. I noticed on page 5 of your testimony, again, you talked about the new guided-missile submarine, the *Severodvinsk*. So is it your testimony today that that hasn't really changed from a year ago?

General SCAPARROTTI. That is correct. And I would like to talk to you about that in particular in a closed session.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Well, I think a topic which is certainly not classified is that the submarine fleet of attack subs is at 52 today. It is slated to go to 42 with retirements in the *Los Angeles* class.

Given the capacity issues that you expressed concern about last year publicly, that decline, how would you describe the challenge that would face your successor if it were to go unmitigated?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, one, it is really a Navy issue to determine their size and how they provide it. But for me, I have to maintain at least the capacity that I have today and look to an increase probably in the next couple of years in order, I think, to be a credible deterrent.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, last year, again, on a bipartisan basis, we did authorize going to three a year, which the administration opposed at that time. A couple days ago they did come around to the position that, again, this committee advanced on a bipartisan basis. So hopefully, that dip will not be as pronounced for your successor.

In Ukraine, where the naval incident occurred back in November, I met with Admiral Voronchenko from the Ukrainian Navy who, again, described the fact that the sailors—there were about roughly around 20 sailors that were captured during that incident. He indicated that they are now being held in prisons in Moscow. Could you talk a little bit about just sort of this outrage in terms of the latest?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think it was an outrage in the sense that Russia blocked their passage to the straits. The Ukrainians made a decision not to force the straits and turn around and depart. It was actually on departure that the Russians fired on the ship, seized the ships, and took 24 sailors, and they still have them in custody today in Moscow, a breach of international law.

Mr. COURTNEY. Because their boats were in international waters, right?

General SCAPARROTTI. At least one of those was in international waters by the time that they were literally heading out and it would have been clear to anyone that they had decided not to confront Russia on this at that time.

Mr. COURTNEY. And I guess a couple of the sailors were actually cadets who were out there as training exercises. I mean, it was definitely not a hostile mission that they were engaged in.

General SCAPARROTTI. But I think this is representative of the actions that Russia is willing to take in order to, in this case I think, enforce or establish their control of those straits, as well as

the Sea of Azov, which actually is governed by both nations, Ukraine, by an agreement.

Mr. COURTNEY. So in terms of the budget and your efforts to assist Ukraine, are there any naval assets or equipment that we are going to try and boost them?

General SCAPAROTTI. We have and will continue to work on a maritime basis out of EUCOM with their naval forces. We have got a good relationship with them. And there are increases now with USAI [Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative] or the funding that we put forward in Congress here for maritime assets, two ships in particular, *Island*-class patrol boats, in order to begin to replenish their Navy, as well as other assets.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. And lastly, you described sort of the progress that our NATO allies are moving towards in terms of 2 percent GDP [gross domestic product] defense spending.

General SCAPAROTTI. So, sir, just to give you a basis today, we have got 8 allies today that meet the 2 percent. There are 10 that have committed to be there by 2024. In other words, their plan is there, and they have got a plan that demonstrates that. And I have seen a steady growth in this in terms of the dollars that have returned.

We have got to continue, in my opinion, to discuss with our allies the meeting of those responsibilities, because in today's security environment they need to invest and they need to modernize.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, the "cost plus 50," which says that these countries have to pay for housing plus 50 percent, I would rather they spent the money on military equipment and readiness than, frankly, in a policy like that.

So, anyway, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, that is worth pursuing for just a second. There have been a lot of stories about this "cost plus 50" proposal.

To your knowledge, is it real? Is it something that is actually being talked about at the White House or the Pentagon?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I would say with respect to our NATO allies in particular, our European presence, we really are focused on reaching the commitments that they have already committed to—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, that is a different question, and if you knew it was a different question.

The point is, I am trying to get at, are we truly saying to our allies that we want you now to pay the cost plus 50 percent of our presence? And I know your portfolio is broader, so it is not just Europe. Is this something that the Pentagon and DOD is talking about, whether it is in Japan, in Europe, or wherever our troops are stationed?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. That is the piece where I have to defer to our IPSA [Indo-Pacific Security Affairs] colleagues who do cover the Pacific, because my understanding is that rhetoric came from conversations from the Pacific. It is not a conversation we have had in my portfolio at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, just for the record, I think that would be a monumentally stupid approach. Our troops are present in these other countries primarily for our benefit or at least for mu-

tual benefit. And as you can see, as we have seen in Japan and elsewhere, where it is incredibly strategically important for us to have that presence, it can be difficult. And if we start pushing our allies away, I think it is a huge mistake, but that is just for the record.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Ranking Member Thornberry already asked you about readiness, but I would like to continue that train of thought.

I see that our enhanced funding and readiness is due to two things. We had a bipartisan budget deal for 2 years that ends later this year and we have an administration, the Trump administration, that is very serious about increasing defense spending. So we are in a good place, comparatively speaking.

However, if we go backward, if we don't have another budget deal going forward that keeps defense spending at a high enough level, what is going to happen to our readiness?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, I think, as I said, I think predictability is an important part of this. We have got to be able to see in the out-years what we think our spending will be in order to balance modernization and readiness as well.

And I think if we were to go back to sequestration, for instance, it would be devastating, as it has in the past, because then you can't balance that tension very well. One of them is going to have to suffer, or probably both.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

On Ukraine, you have already talked about that some and I the appreciate that. I have been there and I am aware that the people fighting for Ukraine are very brave and they are making the most with what they have. In fact, they are even exceeding some of the expectations, developing new uses for the equipment and armaments that they have in some creative ways. And you talked about the Navy. I appreciate that.

But what more can we do or should do to supply lethal aid to land and naval forces to accomplish what you say here is the first line of effort to deter Russia? You know, this is the front line of deterring Russia.

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, I think, first of all, we have got a program. We work closely with Ukraine in a couple of areas. One is the training piece of this and building capabilities. But we are building capability so that they can continue to train themselves.

So, for instance, I am about to transition from training battalions down to brigades and above, because they have established the ability now to begin training their companies and battalions. That is progress that we are making.

We are also shifting, probably if you looked at the training compared to reform and working at a defense institutional level, we are shifting more to that, with a greater perspective on that, primarily because to help them most now we have got to start helping them with their security strategy, with sustainability of a security force, and those kinds of things.

And then, finally, more to your equipment question. You will see in the latest program that we have provided to Congress that that equipment that is in our recommendation is based on what they

and we agree they need. Within that, there are some lethal aid, sniper weapons, ammunition, et cetera, and there is also a maritime component that I talked to earlier.

But I would tell you that that equipment set is based on what their chief, their chairman equivalent, has told me as well as our counterparts as we work with them.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will just add as well that, a more political level, we continue to help and encourage Ukraine to have the kind of defense reforms and institutional reforms necessary to sort of sustain the fight over the long term. That includes anti-corruption efforts within their defense industry, as well as helping them develop sound civ-mil [civil-military] relations, to be able to address this.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. And for either one of you, I was in Germany last month also, and there seems to be some schizophrenia. Germany is a very influential country, the dominant economic power of Europe. But on the one hand, Angela Merkel was the leading proponent for sanctions against the Russians after the invasion by the Russians of Ukraine. But on the other hand, they are accepting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and every time she is asked about it she comes up with a different rationale for doing it, almost like they don't really know why they are doing it.

What can we do to help the Germans be more in sync with us in opposing Russian aggression?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. You were very correct that Angela Merkel has been very key on sustaining the multilateral sanctions efforts. And from a political level, one of our key messages is having the Germans help us make sure that we sustain that over the long term.

In terms of recognizing sort of the threat to European and German security from their reliance on Russian energy sources, that continues to be one of our major sort of diplomatic efforts at very senior levels, to encourage them to diversify their energy sources for the good of their own security as well as the good of the alliance.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you both for being here.

General, I would like to talk about the United States response to Russian activities in EUCOM. The U.S. Army Europe states that Atlantic Resolve, an exercise to counter Russian influence in the region, involves three types of rotation: armored, aviation, and logistical.

According to the Army's own fact sheet, Atlantic Resolve involves over 8,000 soldiers, 87 Abrams, 125 Bradleys, about 90 helicopters, and over 1,000 other various vehicles, which doesn't even include the constant rotation of fighter aircraft from the Air Force.

Do you know the approximate cost of Atlantic Resolve to date?

General SCAPAROTTI. Not off the top of my head, but I can provide that.

Mr. MOULTON. We can get that for the record.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. MOULTON. I'd also like to just—I imagine just simply the fuel costs for this exercise is extremely high. It would be great to get those costs for the record as well.

General SCAPARROTTI. I will.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

General SCAPARROTTI. Could I make a comment on that?

Mr. MOULTON. Sure.

General SCAPARROTTI. The Atlantic Resolve exercise is literally the name that we give to this deterrence operation that is ongoing. So it is not, you know, in and of itself just an exercise. It is, in fact—

Mr. MOULTON. It is a deterrence operation.

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. A deterrence operation.

Mr. MOULTON. Exactly. I couldn't agree more. It is incredibly important.

Now, last year 4 Army Stryker vehicles collided in Lithuania, sending 15 soldiers to the hospital, and within hours an anti-American blog claimed a child was killed and posted a doctored photo of the incident.

Now, this is Russian hybrid warfare, and Russia is using it actively, aggressively against us today. How much are we spending on cyber warfare in Atlantic Resolve?

General SCAPARROTTI. Within Atlantic Resolve itself, it is not a great deal of money in terms of the cyber business, but we do spend a good deal of time training troops and then providing the capability.

Mr. MOULTON. So since we are talking about Atlantic Resolve, which as you said is the deterrence operation, and Russia is literally—this is how Russia is attacking us today. I would like to get for the record how much money in Atlantic Resolve is being spent on cyber and also just how many cyber personnel are involved.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. MOULTON. Myself, I went to Eastern Europe with Chairman Thornberry in 2015, and that delegation really opened my eyes to just how pervasive this Russian hybrid warfare is and how active it is today.

Among other things, we learned about U.S. Army tank drills in Poland. The Poles were very excited about this. In speaking to Army officers there on the ground, I got the impression that they felt Putin was probably laughing at us, that he was busy undermining European governments of our allies and we are conducting tank drills like it was 1950.

So a young captain, like the one I was speaking to there, if he understands this mismatch he can't take the money that he is allotted to spend on fuel for his tanks and put it into cyber to protect his unit, can he?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, listen, here are a couple of responses to your trend here.

First of all, when you look at hybrid activities you are not going to see a great amount of money within, say, even EDI against that, it is about 10 percent. Because it is not about the amount of money, it is actually how you use your resources.

And a good bit of it, like the response that we had to that accident and then their attempt at disinformation, is built within the standard cyber information apparatus that we have in Europe. And we did respond to that very quickly and effectively, pretty much killed that disinformation campaign quickly.

Mr. MOULTON. So you have also stated, General, that this requires a whole-of-government approach.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes.

Mr. MOULTON. I certainly appreciate that. The main U.S. counterpropaganda program is the Global Engagement Center funded by the Department of State. Would you recommend the 24 percent cut to the Department of State?

General SCAPARROTTI. You know, how much that is, is not mine to say.

Mr. MOULTON. Would you recommend that?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would recommend that we fund the State Department to the extent that they can do the critical job they need to do, and we depend on that in Europe every day.

Mr. MOULTON. General, I would just like to say, you are the commander of EUCOM, and I have deep respect for the incredible responsibility you have. But whether Russia is attacking us through the Fulda Gap or through the internet, it is your responsibility to protect our allies and our troops, and I just hope we are modernizing in the right ways.

Ms. Wheelbarger, you said that the most important thing we can do to counter Russian disinformation campaigns is to project strength and unity of message in the alliance itself. So if I were to, say, describe NATO by saying, quote, "They want us to protect against Russia, yet they pay billions of dollars to Russia and we are the schmucks paying for the whole thing," would that project strength and unity of message on the alliance?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I will just say the unity that we have seen over the course of the last 4 or 5—

Mr. MOULTON. Well, how about answering my question? Would that project strength and unity if I were to say that?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I think encouraging the alliance—

Mr. MOULTON. Just yes or no, Ms. Wheelbarger.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Could you quote it again?

Mr. MOULTON. How about when the President questions whether we would come to the defense of Montenegro if they are attacked, our newest NATO member? Raising that as a question, does that project strength and unity of the alliance?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I think we should encourage all NATO allies to stay on message, that we have a strong Article 5 commitment to the—

Mr. MOULTON. And I would argue that that might start with our Commander in Chief.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Many of my questions have been asked. But with regard to Turkey, it is not just the issue of the S-400. I have no doubt that the Russians would give the S-400 without a fee to Turkey if that

would disrupt NATO. So certainly they are an important part of our alliance.

My concern is that they have in the past held U.S. Embassy personnel against their will. Now, these are Turkish citizens that worked for the U.S. Embassy. Have those issues been resolved as the Pastor Brunson issue has been resolved?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I think the U.S. Government recognizes both the importance of the alliance with Turkey, but also that there are trends in their domestic space that are concerning to us. And we will continue to have those difficult conversations with our Turkish counterparts on their human rights record or other aspects of our relationship.

I don't think all what we would call perhaps inappropriate detentions or political prisoners have been addressed and we need to continue to do so over the course of coming weeks and months.

Mr. SCOTT. I just want to make sure that we take those detentions as seriously as we would take the wrongful detention of a United States citizen. Those are State Department employees and they should be treated with the respect that they deserve.

And, General Scaparrotti, you have talked a lot about personnel and training and the resources that you needed. You mentioned gaps, in the testimony with Congressman Turner. What recommendations do you have for eliminating gaps in coverage? And what about your ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] requirements? What percentage of the request for ISR is being met?

General SCAPARROTTI. The ones that I am most—

Mr. SCOTT. I am sorry, I can't hear you.

General SCAPARROTTI. In terms of gaps, the ones I am most concerned about is ISR, which you just mentioned. I would prefer to talk about how much of that is being met in the closed session, but I can do that immediately after this.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay.

General SCAPARROTTI. Maneuver force, in terms of the size of my maneuver force, there are some key capabilities there that I require yet. And then also on the maritime, the maritime domain, some key capabilities there. And I can talk in details on those in the closed session.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Also interested as well in the transport-related challenges of that area. But I will yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman, and I will look forward to the closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Wheelbarger and General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here.

Please describe as best as possible in an open setting the current state of Russia's efforts to utilize influence operations to interfere with elections in the United States, including: What is the role of the Russian Government and military intelligence? Have we learned any lessons about the best way to prevent Russian interference in U.S. elections? What should we be doing to accomplish that? And what other subversive activities are the Russians engaging in? Representative Moulton alluded to cyber as something more extensive that is happening.

If you can touch on that, that would be great.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. As we have discussed previously today, a key component of Russia's strategy is to undermine the electoral systems of the Western world. That includes the United States.

I think we have made significant progress over the course of the last couple years of really understanding their intent, but also harnessing whole-of-government tools to do something about it, to understand specifically not only what their intent is, but how they go about operationalizing that intent.

Some of our knowledge and how we have countered it, I would recommend we move to the closed session to go into more detail.

I think there is always more to be done because this is an area of conflict, quite frankly, that is rapidly innovative and constantly changing.

So it is one of those areas where we can't say we did well last election, we don't need to worry about the next one. We constantly have to evolve, innovate, and make sure that we stay on top of what their capabilities are to be able to counter it, both in cyber, but also in the broader messaging domain.

General SCAPARROTTI. Generally, I agree. It is both cyber information confrontation from their viewpoint, active not only in the United States in our election, but within Europe as well. And EUCOM has a part to play in this and did in this last, most recent activity to counter their interference.

And I would like to leave the rest of that, as Ms. Wheelbarger said, to the closed session.

Mr. CARBAJAL. I think just, in general, what I and many of my colleagues up here want to be assured of is that, one, we are really tracking it, and two, we are countering it, because our democracy is at stake. And we saw what transpired in the last election.

And we just can't just sit idly by to learn about it, we really need to be aggressive ourselves in countering. And I look forward to hearing in a closed setting more about this, because it is of really, really great concern.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Scaparrotti, it is good to see you again.

I had a couple of concerns about some of the past exercises. And one of the exercises that Colonel Ellis, where he had, oh, I don't know, I think it was 21 vehicles that came from Poland all the way across to Georgia, crossing the Black Sea, the Danube. Absolutely incredible. I think they lost one vehicle that broke down.

And the one thing that scared me was, and I have mentioned this before, was the EU, and the fact that for some reason they didn't get the word, they were a real problem in terms of the border police crossing. And it was primarily Romania, which I was very, very concerned about.

I hope we do those type of exercises again. I thought the troops, they were exceptional. The vehicles just very, very impressive. And we were on the tail end of it.

And, by the way, Joe Wilson was on that trip. I think he has 10,000 pictures of that. If you want to seek—he has copies that probably will go to his reelection campaign. No.

Anyway, any comments on that, whether our relations with the EU, because sometimes they seem—I am not going to say as much of an enemy as the Russians, but they can be a problem.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir.

So EUCOM, working with NATO, and NATO with the EU, all of us together, we have taken a crack at this problem. And it is a function of our mobility capability within Europe, and it is the customs and laws that are different at every border.

We have been successful in an agreement among the nations of specific timelines for the passage of military vehicles, in crisis and then for training. So that is the first step.

Now, the step we are trying to do now is get that agreement down to the person at the border. And the way we are doing that is, as we continually rotate forces, whether it is for exercises or for the rotational force, we are using different roads, different rails, different trucking companies, different ports, different airports, in order to exercise that muscle throughout Europe.

So we have exercised 22 different seaports, I think 24 or 26 different airports. Three years ago to move a brigade was difficult because of the rules and because of the availability and the muscle memory. This past month we moved four brigades simultaneously across Europe, and that is real, that is a real advance in what we are able to do now.

Mr. COOK. Just crossing the Black Sea, we had a few problems with, I don't know, the maritime administration or what have you. I hope that has been resolved. They have never done that before. But if we are going to reinforce across that large body of water, that is going to be important, I guess.

I want to shift gears a little bit. I kind of got involved in a—it is kind of a foreign affairs problem. But I was very supportive of Gibraltar. This subject has come up. I wrote a letter or signed on it.

I got a nasty letter back from the Government of Spain. And I had actually had the Catalonians in my office. I entertain everybody there. But I was a little perturbed on that, the politics. I thought they had overreacted. I am a big supporter of the Brits, they have been a friend a long, long time. It is close to Rota.

Has that been on your radar or is this just something that I should ignore? I have got enough political enemies without having more in Spain.

General SCAPARROTTI. It has been on my radar. These are policy issues for the most part. It is on my radar because of the importance of the passage.

Mr. COOK. Okay. And the last question, on Sweden and Finland. Haven't heard much about them. Lately there was talk about is there a possibility they will ever come into NATO. Your comments, Joe's comments about submarines. I always remember, this shows my age, the "whiskey on the rocks" scenario, and you younger members can read the history books about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Analogies aside, if we can get a quick answer to that because we are getting close to the time. Sweden, Finland, NATO.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Sweden, Finland, great allies, working closely with NATO. My sense is there is an increasing awareness of this in those countries.

Mr. COOK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti and Ms. Wheelbarger, thank you for being here today.

General, in your written testimony, you stated—and I know you have been asked about it today, but I want to drill down a little bit—you stated that 16 NATO countries are now on pace to reach or exceed the 2 percent mark established under the Wales commitment, one more than you expected around this time last year. So that is progress.

However, in addition to the amount that is being spent on defense, we need to ensure that our allies are spending on the right capabilities and the right equipment. There is a NATO-mandated spending threshold of 20 percent of defense expenditures on major equipment and research and development, yet according to a CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] report done within the last year, only 11 of 28 member countries meet this threshold.

The question is, are there specific capabilities that we need more investment in from our allies?

General SCAPARROTTI. Today they are at 15 now with the 20 percent, which is a growth, and I think 11 that said by their plan they are going to meet that 20 percent.

We give them specifically, each country, given the makeup of their nation, their location, their capability, specific capabilities that we need within NATO, and that is the way that is determined.

But, generally, I would say that the larger things of long-range precision munitions and platforms that use those munitions, integrated air and missile defense, are two of the larger things that are fundamental to security today and what we need in Europe.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. And so you are confident that sort of like the balance of capabilities between nations and their ability to fulfill those requirements, it is either in place or on track to be in place?

General SCAPARROTTI. I think the system to ensure that we get the right things noted to each of those countries is in place, but we have to continue to monitor whether or not they deliver that capability.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. Ms. Wheelbarger, on the same line of questioning. In 2016, the International Board of Auditors for NATO found that under the NATO defense planning process, the process by which defense planning activities are harmonized across NATO, NATO struggles to deliver capabilities in time to meet dates set by its commanders and agreed by the NATO nations. I realize that is a 2-plus-year-old audit.

The question is, what can be done to better ensure member nations are investing in the right capabilities and setting goals for national or collective development of capabilities? Sort of building on what General Scaparrotti mentioned. So we have got to stay vigilant. Is there anything in the process that we might do better?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Well, I will just highlight one of the initiatives coming out of the last summit, which is our 430s initiative, which is to increase the readiness across the domains of the NATO allies.

And watching that be implemented over the course of the next couple years I think will advance significantly what you are talking about, which is ensuring not only that we are meeting—that our allies are meeting number targets, but they are actually meeting the capability requirements and have the readiness of forces to be able to move in a timely fashion to actually address burgeoning threats.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. With the little time I have remaining, just following up on Mr. Cook's question about essentially freedom of movement.

Last year, General, I asked you about freedom of movement, I asked you to rate it green, yellow, red. You may remember, you gave it a yellow rating.

And a few weeks after you testified, the EU released an action plan to create a military Schengen zone through a series of operational measures that tackle physical, procedural, and regulatory barriers which hamper military mobility.

Using that same traffic light evaluation system, how would you rate the freedom of movement in Europe and what could we do to improve it?

General SCAPAROTTI. I think it is definitely improved, but it is still yellow. Some of this takes investment in both rail and road, particularly bridges and tunnels that meet our military needs.

So it is one of those things, for instance, the EU is putting about \$7 billion into this. That has got to go into the right things at the right places. We in EUCOM have been an integral part of mapping this mobility problem out, and where are the things that we need to invest in.

Mr. BROWN. Do you know whether the investments in infrastructure that can be related directly to freedom of movement for military purposes, whether that counts against the 2 percent? Perhaps Ms. Wheelbarger.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. In certain instances, yes.

Mr. BROWN. It does?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. If it meets military requirements, certain investments under NATO standards will apply to the 2 percent.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I was very pleased to see the recent deployment of a THAAD [Theater High Altitude Area Defense] battery to Israel. I like what it says to Israel, but I like even more what it says to people that might wish Israel ill.

I would like to know from you specifically, what does this add to our missile defense posture in the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility].

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, an integrated air and missile defense system is developed in a layered—the best ones are in a lay-

ered system. This one adds a high altitude, very, very good air defense system within Europe.

And, importantly, it also gives us the opportunity to train with and work with the Israelis within a very good system that they have as well, which is something we need to do, given the mission to support that defense.

Mr. BYRNE. Do you see us having other needs for THAAD batteries or THAAD deployments in the EUCOM AOR?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, I do. And it is a part of our system. Again, it is a very good asset, and linked in at times with us would be very helpful.

Mr. BYRNE. Do you see other needs changing in EUCOM with the end of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty?

General SCAPARROTTI. I do.

Mr. BYRNE. What would those be?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think that, first of all, we have been aware of the deployment of the SSC-8 [Russian cruise missile system], for instance. So there is a whole-of-government approach. There is also a multi-domain approach simply from the military that we have already looked at.

But we have got to begin to look at what our response is holistically and work with our allies on that, and we are in the process of doing that now.

Mr. BYRNE. And maybe you can't be more specific in a nonclassified setting. Can you be more specific than what you just said?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would prefer to do that in a classified session.

Mr. BYRNE. I understand.

Let me shift over to the three Baltic nations. There was, at least a couple years ago, a lot of concern about our ability to fulfill our requirements under the NATO treaty with them. Where do we stand on that today?

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, within the planning or the defense of the Baltics?

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, sir.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah. Well, NATO has made good progress there as well. I mean, we have not only produced a plan, we are on the revision of the plan already from lessons learned. And it is we in EUCOM, from the U.S. perspective, have troops in the Baltics all the time as a part of our planning as well and interoperability.

So I think it has advanced a good deal. It is not done. I mean, I think we have got some work to do yet.

Mr. BYRNE. I know that Ukraine is not a part of NATO, but I know that you watch it and are involved with it pretty carefully. Do you feel like Ukraine is making any progress in their efforts to push back against Russian aggression?

General SCAPARROTTI. I absolutely do. I see the effectiveness and the confidence in their troops on the line of contact. It has definitely changed in the time that I have been in command. They are confident and good, disciplined, hard troops.

Mr. BYRNE. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have some more you would like to add to what the general just said about the situation in Ukraine?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yeah, I would add at an institutional level there is also a healthy recognition in their leadership that they have to not only continue to improve their military capabilities, but again, as we discussed earlier today, improve their and reform their institutions, address their corruption challenges within their defense industry, as well as build and develop a sort of civ-mil relationship within their Ministry of Defence that they have actually made significant progress on.

And we are going to continue to impress upon them the importance of continuing that progress, particularly if they want the whole of the U.S. assistance to be able to be utilized.

Congress put a certification requirement for half of our assistance to go forward to make sure that they are making progress on these reforms, and they are making significant progress, including passing a national security law recently that they are now in the phase of implementing.

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I just want to say that I really appreciate what you said actually is confirming what I have been observing, but I wanted to sort of hear it from you. It seems like we have made a lot of progress with Ukraine in the last couple of years.

Frankly, I got on this committee, and 1 month later is when Russia came and literally took Crimea. And for 2 or 3 years, sir, I have got to tell you, I was pretty worried where that was heading. But it seems like we have turned that situation around or they have turned that situation around with our and others' assistance. And I just appreciate the more aggressive stance that we are taking in helping them, and I hope that we will continue that.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the general for meeting with us, too, a couple weeks ago in Europe and for taking the time to meet with our delegation, the Speaker, and the people that accompanied her, like myself. And we had the opportunity to discuss issues that way.

One of my roles is not just as a member of this committee, but also as chair of Europe, Eurasia, global energy, environmental issues in Foreign Affairs. And I recall the conversation I had with former Secretary of Defense Mattis one time, just saying that a lot of the investment issues, a lot of the trade issues there we are engaged with, I remember saying to him: That may not be directly in your lane, General, when it comes to Europe and NATO issues. And he stopped me right there and he said: It is definitely right in my lane in terms of those issues.

And you have mentioned the threat of China. When I came away even as recently as a couple weeks ago looking long range at the challenges that we have and our European allies have, China was front and center in my mind coming home with the kind of strategy investments they are making. Not necessarily economic investments, but investments in obtaining intellectual property and to undermine some of the alliances or compete with some—in a better way of phrasing it—some of the alliances we have with our people.

Could you comment on the nature of these and the challenges and the threats, potentially, of these Chinese investments in the European area with our NATO allies as well? I come away every

time I think of this thinking that is where one of our primary focal points should be.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. If you take a look at Europe and you had a map before you and we could draw a circle around every seaport, airport, or critical commercial property that they have invested in, as an economic investment, one, you would be surprised at how many circles there are on that map in key places, in key ports and airports, as an economic investment by them, but they are security related as well.

And so as Secretary Mattis said, when I am talking to my counterparts and the ministers of defense, that is one of the things I point out. I want to make sure they understand this isn't just about economics, it is about security also.

Mr. KEATING. Exactly.

General SCAPARROTTI. And in the closed session, if you desire, I can go into a little more detail in that.

Mr. KEATING. Maybe more specifically, too, and generally, one of the things we are moving on in the Foreign Affairs Committee as well is giving alternatives with U.S. exports for energy and bolstering that. We all know that Russia has used that as a weapon in the past.

Can you comment on the importance strategically of having diversity of energy in Europe as well?

General SCAPARROTTI. I think it is critical, because we have got plenty of examples of Russia using that as leverage with countries. And within Europe it is about a third of the fuel oil and about a third of the liquefied gas, that they depend on Russia for that, generally, but some countries it is above 75 percent of their—you know, some of those countries, 75 percent of their need is given by Russia.

So it is absolutely a security issue, and diversity helps them not be leveraged by Russia in specific ways.

Mr. KEATING. Finally, Ms. Wheelbarger, you mentioned about Poland and the discussions. I don't know if you can mention this in an open setting, but are part of those discussions on issues, like the ones we are having with Poland right now in terms of military, do they include concerns about China and Huawei and other related issues as an example?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I can assure you that in all our conversations with all our European partners we make very clear the threat of Chinese investment or development of the telecommunications infrastructure in Europe. The specific negotiations right now in Poland are very tied to the nature of our enablers and the presence there.

But, again, throughout Europe, our concerns with the Chinese building their telecommunications infrastructure and the significant importance that has to our security footprint, as well as the ability for us to be confident in the security of our communications, both private communications as well as military, yes. But I am not going to say it is part of the negotiations going on right now.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. DesJarlais.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti, you mentioned the great power competition requires that we maintain a credible strategic deterrence. What contributions will our modernized nuclear triad system contribute to European stability and security, to the NATO alliance, and to our homeland defense, specifically in regards to the B-61 and the W76-2.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, specifically, I think it is just simply that that strategic deterrent is the foundation of our deterrence. Frankly, it is the most critical part. And we have got two adversaries at least, the two prominent adversaries in Russia and China, who are well into their modernization.

So our triad has to be modernized in order to present that credible deterrent. And I think the investment that is being made is correct, and it is necessary.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Do you think the low yield, the development on our part is essential?

General SCAPARROTTI. I do. I can talk to that more in the closed session, but I think it plays a vital role in this, yes.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. You mentioned China and Russia's advancement in their modernization. Can you elaborate a little further exactly where they are at compared to where we are at or where we need to be?

General SCAPARROTTI. I missed that, sir.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. I said, you mentioned where China and Russia are at in their modernization. How does that compare and contrast to where we are at and where we need to be?

General SCAPARROTTI. They are more advanced in theirs than we are.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. In your testimony you discussed Russia's whole-of-society approach towards undermining U.S. and European objectives. Among other things, you specifically mentioned Russia's use of religious leverage. Could you elaborate on this whole-of-society approach and specifically what is meant by religious leverage?

General SCAPARROTTI. For instance, in Eastern Europe the Orthodox Church is a very fundamental part of the fabric there of lives, and it is a Russian Orthodox Church. In some countries, like Ukraine, they have made a decision to have a separate Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

That is being contested by the Russian leadership and by the Russian Government itself, and I believe that they promote the Russian Government's messaging and preferences through that religious capability.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I also have another question or two about ISR and hypersonic development. I think that would be best served in the classified setting.

So thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. And, General Scaparrotti, best wishes to you as well.

I wanted to go back. I know you had a discussion about NATO and the uncertainty that may perhaps our allies have in the region. I wonder if you could just really speak to that specifically, what

you see, and whether there is an acknowledgment, even here, how would you like to see that better promoted of really the benefits of the alliance to the United States?

Do you feel that that's been undermined to a great extent? Minimal extent? Could you speak about that a little bit more?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, I think that, first of all, there is a recent poll that I saw, and I can't quote where it came from, but it stated that at least the support within the United States public for NATO had come up this year. I saw it when I was in Brussels here not long ago. And that is a good indicator of the conversation we have had about NATO and our public's realization of the importance of Euro-Atlantic security. So I think that has improved actually because of the debate.

There is a part of this, and I think it is true in Europe, where we had gone a long time period where we really didn't talk about NATO, we just kind of assumed it is important, everybody knew that. So this discussion has actually helped in some ways.

The second I would say is what we need to do is we need to understand that we need to be collaborative with our allies. The nations in NATO understand that each nation in its sovereignty makes decisions and that they won't always be in agreement among the allies, but what they ask for is collaboration. And so that is what I would say is probably the most important, is making sure that we bring them in, that we are talking to them.

When we did the INF here in the latter two stages in December and February, we were in discussion with them and we got a strong statement in support of that because we worked it as we went through it.

Mrs. DAVIS. Ms. Wheelbarger, would you like to respond to that as well? If you could incorporate also the whole-of-government approach. You know, we talk about that, but we also know that often at the State Department, our diplomatic efforts, and the fact that we don't have ambassadors in places that we should, that that certainly compromises our ability to project power, soft power, if you will.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Sure. So the NATO alliance is, obviously, a military alliance, a security alliance, but they have a diplomatic component as well. And there are foreign ministerials as often as there are defense ministerials.

So it is very important that the alliance, as we are with all our partnerships, quite frankly, that we look at them in a whole-of-government context. Our country teams are very important around the world. Obviously, having ambassadors in place helps us a great deal and having stability and continuity of messaging and highlighting the importance of our partnerships. So I do encourage the Senate to move forward on any pending nominations, because it is extremely important to our—

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you feel that that has been true and that we have been able to counter some of the Russian disinformation campaigns that we have seen? Has that approach worked?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I do think we are having successes. As we discussed earlier, we could most certainly always do more. We do need to make sure, for example, the Global Engagement Center that we discussed today is as robustly staffed and pushing forward

on their mission as they can be. We are in close coordination with them on a daily basis to try to encourage as much interagency cooperation and forward-leaning activity as we can.

It is a monumental challenge to try to stay both strategically on message but tactically agile in this space, and it is something that I do actually think we have seen successes, both bilaterally as well as in the alliance, in getting after the information operations challenge.

Mrs. DAVIS. General, you have seen a lot in the European theater. What is it that wouldn't surprise you if you were to look at a paper 2 years from now and see some changes?

General SCAPARROTTI. What would surprise me?

Mrs. DAVIS. It is a little bit of the "what keeps you up at night" question. But I am just wondering, as you are leaving, what you can share with us in this setting that we ought to pay attention to.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I kind of usually answer that in two ways, frankly.

One is that we are in close proximity with Russian forces in a number of areas today, and at times they are very aggressive in their activity, and that I am concerned about. We have very disciplined forces, but Russia will occasionally put particularly our ships captains in a tight spot with their maneuvers. And that is one.

The other is—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I am going to have to ask you to wrap up so we can get to other people. If you have a quick summary, I don't want to cut you off.

General SCAPARROTTI. And the second one is Balkans.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Chairman. And I appreciate both of you being here today. Very grateful to hear your thoughts.

And, General Scaparrotti, I think forward presence is a big part of deterrence, and of course, over the last 25 years we have cut that down by about half in your theater.

I also think a big part is training and equipping our allies on the forward line there. And you have talked a little bit about Poland, we are having some negotiations now. Can you talk a little bit more about the Baltics, because I think they are the most vulnerable. What more can we do to ensure or build deterrence with our Baltic friends?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, we are now presently making sure that we have troops there, as I said, just about all the time. I think to do more is to continue to build their capability with them, to have our forces present. We try to rotate our units out of that rotational unit there as often as we can. So that is one.

We've got to continue to work with them. We need to continue to understand their plan vis-a-vis ours so that we know that we are nested.

I think that in terms of our capabilities and theirs in indirect activity, below the level of warfare, is very important there because that is really Russia's first objective, and we can do much in that area as well.

And then probably intelligence, because there again it is we are best as allies. They have some very good intelligence capabilities that we just don't have.

Mr. BACON. I have been very impressed with all three states in my travels there. Is there any interest or need for permanent air basing there or surface-to-air missile-type basing in any of those three countries?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would rather go into that in a closed session.

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Getting to a question that Mr. Wilson asked about our energy reliance on Russian gas with some of our bases. If I understood you correctly, you are saying you are studying this reliance on Russian gas now to include the new hospital?

General SCAPARROTTI. With respect to the hospital, in fact, there was a requirement in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to look at it from that perspective. And my understanding is that is working through this summer.

Mr. BACON. We all put that in the NDAA last time, because I am concerned. I was the commander at Ramstein at one time, so I happen to know that some of our bases there, to include the new hospital, do intend on using Russian gas. And it concerns me, because in a time of crisis the Russians could just turn that off.

Is our concern well-founded or are we missing the boat here? I would just love to get your impression of this.

General SCAPARROTTI. No, it is well-founded.

Mr. BACON. I have talked to some folks, and if we are using this Russian gas and it gets turned off, we could see some of our facilities down for 2 or 3 weeks. And I just think we have to have that resilience.

So I would like to make sure I have your commitment or the EUCOM's commitment that they are looking at this and building a resilience plan.

General SCAPARROTTI. You do, you have that. And you also can be assured that we look at how other fuels, et cetera, that we have to have, that we have got an assured delivery. So we look at it across the board.

Mr. BACON. Thank you. One last question on ISR. You have brought it up for 2 years now that there is a shortage, and we are going to talk a little bit more about it here shortly.

But there is a proposal, I have seen one in the Pentagon that talks about doing away with our manned ISR, relying on space or RPAs [remotely piloted aircraft]. In a Phase Zero environment, how reliant are you on manned IRS right now?

General SCAPARROTTI. I am reliant on manned ISR in a large way. But I would also—

Mr. BACON. It is a loaded question, I realize. I just wanted to hear how important it is to you because I think we need to keep it.

General SCAPARROTTI. It is important. But I also think a mix is important, too.

Mr. BACON. I agree.

General SCAPARROTTI. You know, a man in the loop there and driving it gives you some capabilities that an unmanned one doesn't. So I think both are important.

Mr. BACON. I absolutely agree, we need a mix, but I don't think walking away from manned ISR anytime in the near future makes sense, because I think in Phase Zero that is the lion's share of your intelligence production.

Is there a EUCOM requirement to utilize—the F-35 has an extraordinary amount of sensors on board. And day-to-day operations, even a Phase II environment, that would be a big source of intelligence.

Is there is a requirement there to get that information off the plane back to the AOC [air operations center] so the joint users can use that data?

General SCAPAROTTI. Yes, there is. I can talk about that in a closed session as well, but it is an incredible aircraft.

Mr. BACON. That is great to hear.

I yield back, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Sherrill.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you.

Thank you both for being here to testify today. I actually served at CINCUSNAVEUR [Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe] as a Russian policy officer when it was in London. So I can tell you from personal experience how key our alliances are and our ability to project our power. And we have heard testimony in this committee about how key our alliances will be in our new National Defense Strategy.

So I think I was particularly concerned about reports from the Munich Defense Conference about the success of Iran in courting our allies as we have seen a growing kind of schism between the United States and our traditional allies in Western Europe, politically speaking at the very least.

I know you spoke a bit about Iran in opening statements, and I was wondering if you could comment on what you are seeing with respect to the influence of Iran and what we are doing to combat that influence.

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Our European partners obviously have some differences of opinion on some issues with respect to Iran, the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] being one of them.

From our perspective in the Department of Defense, our goals over the last 2 years have been very much to stay aligned at a mil-to-mil or MOD [Ministry of Defense] level to make sure that we have a shared understanding of the threat, particularly the multi-natured of it, whether it be the cyber threat, the ballistic missile threat, the maritime threat.

And so—most of our work is focused on making sure we are aligned in how we see the threat and what joint efforts, whether they be planning or messaging, we can do to contest it. So we actively engage our European partners.

It is true that we, again, we have differences of opinion about the JCPOA, and we have been attempting to keep the mil-to-mil and MOD relationships strong so we can both understand the threat and be prepared to respond if we can and need to together.

Ms. SHERRILL. And do you think that is resonating with our allies, that they understand the threat that Iran poses?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. I do think there is an increasing understanding, particularly with respect to the ballistic missile challenge.

I think the threats emanating from Yemen, in particular, into Saudi Arabia and UAE [United Arab Emirates] that pose a significant real day-to-day threat to our partners in that region and potentially risk sort of a regional conflict in a way that nobody wants to see, there is an increasing understanding of that challenge. I mean, we are even seeing some of our European partners start talking again about sanctions related to the missile program.

So those are the sorts of activities that the Department of Defense is very much focused on with respect to Europe and Iran.

Ms. SHERRILL. Great. And then just to give some context, do you have a sense of what percentage of the telecom infrastructure China has been involved in, in Europe?

General SCAPARROTTI. What I would like to do, I can give you that in the closed session. I would just say that there is substantial involvement in telecommunications in specific countries, some included NATO, NATO countries.

Ms. SHERRILL. Great. Thank you both.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

As I mentioned at the outset, we have a hard stop at noon. As the questions have sort of generated here, there is a lot of stuff to talk about in the classified setting. So I am going to stick to that, which means in all likelihood Mr. Gallagher and Mrs. Luria are the last two people who are going to ask questions, unless they do it really quick. So we will see.

Mr. Gallagher, you are up.

Mr. GALLAGHER. First of all, I would agree with what the chairman said earlier that any cost plus 50 demand on our allies would be—I forget the adjective he used, monstrously stupid, something to that effect, stupendously ill-advised, extravagantly dumb. I just think it is the wrong time to be sending that message and would like to go on record as agreeing with the chairman in that regard.

I want to pull the string on the earlier line of questioning. General Scaparrotti, help us tease out sort of the operational implications of companies like Huawei and ZTE signing contracts with Germany, or take your pick, European allies. What does that actually mean from an operational perspective? How does it affect you as a theater commander?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, we are concerned about their telecommunications backbone being compromised in the sense that, particularly with 5G, the bandwidth capability and the ability to pull data is incredible. And with that system you also tend to get an Internet of Things.

So its influence is much greater. This is a big difference from 4G. And because of that, it would have a critical impact on our ability just to communicate with those nations, some of which are NATO nations.

Now, secondly, if it also is inside of their defense communications then we are not going to communicate with them across those defense communications, and for the military that would be a problem.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Are there ways to mitigate that problem from your perspective, besides convincing them not to sign those contracts in the first place?

General SCAPARROTTI. Probably best to ask to someone that does this, but to my knowledge right now, to be sure that we have a secure system, I don't know of one if they are shifting to Huawei.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have anything to add?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yeah. Having looked into Huawei quite a bit a few years ago, I realized the challenges of even having a mitigation plan or strategy for the 4G infrastructure. Given the sort of generational shift that is between 4G and 5G, I am not aware of something that would give us the kind of security we would need to mitigate the challenges that it would impose on us.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Appreciate that. General, I know you are a ground guy, but something we are trying to pay more attention to on the Seapower Subcommittee is mine warfare. Since World War II, sea mines have damaged or sunk four times more U.S. Navy ships than all other means of attack.

Do we have a capacity and capabilities gap in the Mediterranean with respect to the Russian mine threat? I would just be interested in your thoughts on that.

General SCAPARROTTI. Within that capability we rely on our allies to provide part of that. I think with our allies we are doing pretty good. But as a U.S. only, I would say we probably have a gap.

But, again, that is one of those where you look at your allies, what capabilities they have and where can they do a mission, so that we can apply our capabilities in other areas. So I am pretty comfortable with it right now.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then there was an earlier line of questioning, I forget from who, that seemed to suggest that investments in tanks in Eastern Europe were not as efficacious as perhaps investment in cyber, or it was an either-or scenario. I would like to give you a chance to respond to that. I mean, what role do systems like tanks play in doing deterrence by denial in Eastern Europe?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah, I am glad you allowed me to come back to that.

It is not an either-or. In today's world this is a multi-domain environment that we are in. And the Russians have a very credible and increasing mechanized armor capability, particularly in our east, across the border. And you can't say it is simply one or the other. It is all things, cyber connected to that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I appreciate that.

And I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Hill.

Ms. HILL. Are you ready? I just didn't have my stuff out. Give me a moment.

Mrs. Luria, can I trade with you?

Mrs. LURIA. Well, General Scaparrotti and Ms. Wheelbarger, thank you for being here today.

General Scaparrotti, in your prepared remarks you noted the increase in Russian maritime presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the deployment of the submarine *Severodvinsk* in the northern

Atlantic. And in the past 15 years we have really focused our naval efforts in both the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and the PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] AORs.

Does this submarine deployment and other Russian naval activity increase the need that you have for U.S. naval presence in EUCOM?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah, that is the basis of my request for an increase. For instance, in the Med, we saw the largest grouping of Russian ships in probably 15 years, it was 8 Kalibr [cruise missile] shooters, 12 ships total.

Mrs. LURIA. And so to add to that, public reporting shows that those Russian ships are also operating in coordination with the Chinese in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Is that correct?

General SCAPARROTTI. I wouldn't go so far as to say in coordination. They do train together from time to time in small numbers.

Mrs. LURIA. So NATO has four standing NATO maritime groups, SNMGs. I am particularly interested in SNMG 1 and 2. So in the past 3 years has the U.S. provided consistent rotational presence for both of these maritime groups?

General SCAPARROTTI. I think we provided the presence that they expect. We rely on our NATOs to fill, you know, our NATO allies to fill those mostly.

Mrs. LURIA. So we don't consistently participate? Am I correct in saying that we have only participated in the last 4 years when we were the flagship in charge of the group?

General SCAPARROTTI. Usually when we are the flagship, that is correct. But we typically have the ships that are also at sea in other areas.

So I think, again, this is one of those where you look at what capabilities you have and what nations can provide and what we are best at providing.

Mrs. LURIA. So having operated with NATO allies, I know that it takes a long time to fold in, to become proficient in the C2 [command and control] architecture operating with NATO. So if we don't consistently operate with our NATO allies and have that practice and officers and crews who are knowledgeable about how to integrate with those C2 systems, does it really reinforce our commitment to NATO that when we show up to the fight we are ready to fight in a coordinated way?

General SCAPARROTTI. We work in a C2 architecture with NATO every day, 24 hours a day. And we can bring a ship in and out, connect and disconnect, we keep that architecture, both air and sea, up.

An example of that was the fires into Syria with two of our NATO allies, put together in about 72 hours, a very intricate high-end mission, and we executed it time on target.

So to your point, we do have to work with them, but it doesn't necessarily mean they have got to be in that group. But we do have to work with them throughout exercises and day to day.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. And shifting topics, did the Navy provide your requested carrier presence in FY [fiscal year] 2019? And saying that this is an unclassified setting, would you classify that as roughly one-half, one-third of what you requested did you actually receive?

General SCAPARROTTI. I would say no, and it was less than half.

Mrs. LURIA. And we have shifted to the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the OFRP, and that creates more surge capability than it does actual deployed capability for our naval forces. As a combatant commander, which of those two is most important to you for doing your mission?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, again, mine is predictability.

Mrs. LURIA. Right. So is it more important for you to have presence in the Mediterranean and the northern Atlantic, or to have the ships ready a week away next to the pier in Norfolk and Mayport?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, to answer your question, the system that the Navy has shifted to has actually given me more capability at the times that I need it in very large ways, like Trident Juncture [exercise], and in an unpredictable pattern for our adversaries.

So it has improved; it is not everything that I want.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. Thank you. I yield my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

If I may, Ms. Hill, I am going to do this a little awkwardly here, it is not worth getting into, but we are going to take Mrs. Hartzler and Ms. Hill before we get done. We will just do it that way.

So, Mrs. Hartzler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Then, after, this I will recognize Ms. Hill for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not obligated to take all 5, however.

Mrs. HARTZLER. You bet. You bet. I am going to talk quick.

Follow up on two lines of questioning from earlier to expand a little bit. You mentioned and we talked about the Chinese influence in Europe and their economic presence. You mentioned the seaport investments, the airport.

But last year we had a joint military exercise between China and Russia, and I don't believe we talked about that yet. So can you discuss some of China's military objectives in the region and what we should take away from such partnership events as the 2018 Russia and China war games?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think it was just to show some unity when they can. They did take part in the war games in Russia's eastern command this year. But while significant in the fact that the two were working together, and we should recognize that, it was not all that Russia promoted it to be.

And, again, in terms of their operations within Europe, again, it is in small numbers, not highly involved operations when they do it, or at least exercises, but it is becoming routine. And, again, we need to pay attention to that.

I think their objective is, China's objective is to show their presence in Europe, not only in an economic way, but in small ways with their military.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Great.

We talked about the infrastructure issues and the freedom of movement. I was encouraged to hear about moving the brigades and the advancements we have had.

But specifically with railroad track gauges, this is something that came to our attention through this committee a couple years ago, and I have been really trying to focus in on this.

Can you tell me kind of what is being done to address some of these challenges?

General SCAPARROTTI. That is predominantly, as I noted before, that is the work that we are doing through NATO and EU to focus that infrastructure funding that they are doing on things like that, and that is one of the major ones. It is still not resolved.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is there any discussion taking place about changing the railcar capabilities versus the gauges. I come from a farm equipment background and my first thought was, why can't you just have the wheels on the actual railroad car be able to move in and move out?

General SCAPARROTTI. I don't know the answer to that question.

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right. Well, it might be something worth pursuing.

Thank you very much, and I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hill.

Ms. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for dealing with me making the situation awkward, particularly when I sit down at the wrong chair and can't find my questions.

But, Ms. Wheelbarger and General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here.

In 2018, Greek officials said that there was irrefutable evidence that Russia was working to interfere with negotiations over North Macedonia's name change and its accession to NATO.

Can you describe what that was, as well as what the U.S. and other alliance members' counterresponse was?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Yes. I think we saw the basic behavior that we typically see from Russia, which is information operations attempting to sow discord within North Macedonia, to suggest that NATO was not in their future, that the East was really to their future.

So it was really across the spectrum of what we see from Russia. I think what we said, we discussed a little bit earlier, they did not have the success they were expecting.

I think in some ways, I heard from the North Macedonians recently, that Russian efforts to undermine NATO actually worked against them. NATO has a very strong standing within North Macedonian society, and that we were able to—the North Macedonians themselves did a very effective job in countering those messages and getting out in front of the messages before they were even sent from the Russians.

Ms. HILL. Okay.

General SCAPARROTTI. I would agree.

Ms. HILL. Great. Thank you.

And what has the U.S. been doing right or wrong in the Balkans? And I will continue with that so you don't have to answer multiple things. What risks still exist and what more should be done?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. As General Scaparrotti said earlier, the Balkans remains one of our areas of most concern. It has a historical legacy of fomenting discord. I think the Russians are very much active there, whether it be religion, ethnicity, or other aspects of the society. In all these countries they are seeking to pull them apart and pull them away from the West. We can always do more to in-

fluence their decision making and try to bring societies there along to the West.

I think of particular concern for us right now are the ongoing challenges between Kosovo and Serbia and we have sort of a whole-of-government effort to try to get them back to the table to resolve their differences.

I think we could probably be better at making sure, just in general, that our messages as a government are aligned so they understand clearly that we want them to negotiate this amongst themselves and that we see it being in both Serbia and Kosovo's favor to do so quickly.

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah, I would leave it at that in the sense that I think a redoubled effort within Kosovo and Serbia for their resolution of those problems, as well as what comes beyond the Dayton Accord within Bosnia, just a renewed focus from the West I think would go a long way. Because the people need to see that we are still engaged and supportive of their desire to look West.

Ms. HILL. And when you say consistency, where is the disconnect there? What do you see that manifesting in?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Maybe for closed door I can explain a little bit more. But I just think we need to make sure that we are always explaining that all of their tools should be on their table to solve and bring to normalization in the best interests of those two countries. There are ongoing disputes about the tariffs, for example, in Kosovo and how we should be addressing that challenge. I think we need to be putting this always in the broader context of what is the best for the two countries.

Ms. HILL. Thank you so much. And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed session.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 13, 2019

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 13, 2019

Statement by

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on policy matters related to the USEUCOM theater, alongside Commander General Scaparrotti. General Scaparrotti has been a great partner and it is an honor to appear beside him today.

The threats we face as a nation are clear. National security threats from Russia and China mark a new chapter in global great power competition. The history of the 20th Century proved that core U.S. interests—in western values, economic freedoms, and democratic legitimacy—will require us to come to the defense of our western allies against threats from authoritarian regimes. If that future war were to come, and hopefully it never will, our troops would be at the front lines -- because we cannot thrive alone in a bleak world of dictators and autocrats.

Over the course of 70 years, NATO has provided an integral means for the United States and Allies to defend our interests by collectively deterring a potential conflict, saving lives, saving dollars, and saving our way of life. And over the last five years, we have successfully built increasing multilateral pressure against Russian aggression—through sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, coherent condemnations, and significant increases in NATO spending and reforms. The alliance and our partners stand together against autocrats who seek neither truth nor human flourishing, but only care for their own personal power.

Our force posture in Europe is not just about military competition. It is about staying true to our national values and preparing for the next fight—together—with a goal that we remain so strong that we never actually have to endure that fight.

European Strategy and Great Power Competition

The Department's approach to European policy, including Israel, is based on the 2017

National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The goals of the NSS are to protect the American people, defend the Homeland, and to promote peace and prosperity from a position of strength. Our NDS supports the NSS by setting a course to rebuild our military strength and sustain competitive advantages against our nation's critical challenges. The NDS is clear about the central problem it is focused on solving: the erosion of our military's competitive edge vis-à-vis Russia and China. These powers are developing capabilities and doctrine designed to offset traditional U.S. military advantages and contest our ability to project power in every domain. This competition, not terrorism, is now the principal priority for the Department. Failure to meet this challenge will result in decreasing U.S. global influence and security.

To compete in this environment and defend future generations of Americans against near-peer competitors, the Department is aggressively pursuing three NDS lines of effort: enhancing our lethality, strengthening our alliances and attracting new partners around the globe, and reforming the way we do business. The future Joint Force must be more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready to compete with and deter aggression from China and Russia, while still contending with persistent threats from North Korea, Iran, and terrorist groups. This range of threats requires the Department to prioritize modernization, innovation, technological adaptation, and high-end readiness, while ensuring we remain economical stewards of U.S. taxpayers' dollars.

This complex, volatile, and dangerous security environment is readily apparent in Europe and along its periphery. The need to address near-peer competition in the European theater now and in the future not only requires sound investments in the Joint Force, but also that we posture and employ our forces in ways that ensure a combat-credible forward deterrent. In Europe, we are prioritizing increasing Allied military readiness to enhance North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO) deterrence and defense. We will continue to forward deploy forces, including through the use of dynamic force employment, to further bolster the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture. And we must continue to deter and confront adversaries, while avoiding miscalculation or escalation that would ultimately undermine our national security interests.

While the United States remains the pre-eminent military power, Russia's and China's military modernization, combined with the challenges in time and distance we face, provide the opportunity for these actors to pursue rapid, short duration actions – what is commonly called the “fait accompli” scenario. Were such a scenario to transpire, it places the United States in an untenable position of responding in ways that may be viewed as escalating the conflict – a deeply problematic path when confronting nuclear-armed powers. Our strategy is focused on making sure we have the right capabilities and posture, reinforced by our Allies and partners, to bolster our deterrence in this environment. Put simply, our strategy is to deter aggression by making clear that our competitors will not gain from it.

Defense policy objectives in Europe are therefore focused on improving our deterrence and confronting Russian activities that threaten to undermine the NATO and the free and open international order that the United States Armed Forces, working in concert with Allies and partners in Europe, strive to uphold every day. The Department is also focused on countering the increased malign activity of China in Europe; maintaining partner support of our efforts to handle Iranian aggression; and working with our Allies and partners to counter the continued threat of terrorism. Europe and Israel are among our strongest and most vital allies and partners in countering the many shared threats we face in Europe and around the world. Some of our closest allies and partners in Europe are deployed alongside us to our coalition operations in

Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq and beyond.

The United States' alliances, partnerships, and overseas presence in Europe are invaluable force multipliers for the U.S. Armed Forces and provide us an asymmetric ability to project power and defend forward. Maintaining a credible nuclear force and a robust posture in Europe enables DoD to provide a credible deterrent as we leverage our constellation of alliances and partnerships to position our forces to fight the away game, if necessary. With near-peer adversaries such as Russia, investing in our nuclear deterrent is critical to ensuring that tensions with Moscow—regardless of where or how they arise—do not escalate into full-scale war.

Our posture in the European also plays a critical role in supporting global security objectives. The access, basing, and overflight permissions we receive from our European allies enable U.S. forces to support multiple Combatant Commands in many ongoing missions across the globe.

The support from Congress for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is instrumental in pursuing U.S. objectives in Europe by strengthening our relationship with European Allies and partners, and deterring Russian aggression. EDI supports DoD's ability to position capabilities forward in Europe to increase our reaction time in the event of a crises and strengthen our deterrence posture. As our critical prepositioned equipment is set in strategic locations and as we look to our allies for additional burden-sharing in our overseas military construction program, the Department has reduced the EDI request to Congress. This does not represent a change to the planned level of forces, capabilities or activities in Europe; or weakening of support for our European allies. This is a recognition of the progress we have made under EDI and the importance of allies contributing to our shared defense. The threats facing Europe are not diminishing.

Russia's destabilizing activities, enabled by its conventional, unconventional, and nuclear forces, threaten global peace and security. Over the past year, we have seen Russia blatantly poison a UK citizen, and a person under the British government's protection, on UK sovereign soil; continue its occupation of Crimea and Georgia, engage in military activity in Ukraine, and 20 percent of Georgia; deny freedom of navigation in the Sea Azov by attacking ships and continuing to hold prisoner 24 Ukrainian sailors; hold one of its largest conventional exercises with Chinese participation; continue to undermine U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Syria; threaten to field a new missile system in clear violation of the INF Treaty, and work day in and day out to get the West to hate its governing institutions through disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and political interference. The list goes on, but it is abundantly clear: Russian aggression is a threat to Europe, the United States, and the stability of the international order.

Russia continues to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, including its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Paired with its strategy and doctrine that include an emphasis on the threat of limited nuclear escalation, Russia makes clear it is prepared to use these capabilities for coercive and military purposes, with the goal of undermining European security. This underscores the importance of modernizing our own nuclear triad, as well as the continued development of U.S. nuclear supplemental capabilities called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review—the low-yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and the Nuclear Sea Launched Cruise Missile. These supplemental capabilities are needed to help overcome Russia's mistaken belief that it can gain an advantage through limited use of nuclear weapons and reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.

Beyond Russia's increasingly aggressive actions, our European partners are starting to

grasp the security threat of an increasingly assertive China. While many investments are beneficial, others present security concerns – requiring careful screening. Some of China’s recent investments in Europe’s critical technology and infrastructure, to include telecommunications, ports, railways, and cutting-edge technologies with military application, are a threat to NATO’s security and unity. In order to ensure Alliance integrity, we are working with our partners to recognize and mitigate the growing threat posed by China’s targeted investments. Though the threats have increased, we are also strengthening our alliances and partnerships to better counter these threats.

The Department is committed to strengthening our alliances and partnerships with European countries and Israel. Close coordination on policy enables U.S. forces to be safer and more effective globally, as we work through NATO to further shared security priorities. I strive every day to deepen cooperation on a wide array of DoD priorities and my job is only possible with consistent Congressional support and stable funding. Congressional support for our Allies and partners in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is invaluable. Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in EUCOM as well as the EDI have been, and will continue to be, critical to achieving NDS priorities and U.S. national security objectives. I want to thank you for your continued support to our men and women overseas in Europe who play an integral part in supporting our commitment to NATO Article 5, training and exercising with our closest military partners, and also the critical supporting role they play to operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM as well.

Importance of NATO and our European Partners

NATO is vital to U.S. objectives and strategy in Europe and globally. Allies have made considerable progress on the “three c’s” of burden sharing: cash, contributions, and capabilities.

The Department is very focused on increasing the amount and quality of NATO burden sharing that ultimately benefits the United States as a member of the Alliance. In the Department, our teams are engaging with partners and Allies daily to ensure that NATO is fit for our times and able to deter increased Russian aggression and malign Chinese influence.

If the question is whether the Department of Defense cares about alliances, we state clearly that we do and we must. We are charged with keeping Americans secure and preserving our way of life. We may not always see eye to eye with our partners—and family disputes can often be challenge. But our alliance know that our threats are shared threats and that spending their share on defense serves all of us.

The Department of Defense trusts its allies and partners as we encourage them to do more. And over the past four years, we have seen contributions exponentially increase. Alliance cooperation and cohesion is at its strongest in years.

We are doing this by pushing our NATO Allies to increase their defense budgets, increase their procurement of needed capabilities, and increase their contributions to NATO and other global operations. The emphasis on increased burden-sharing is bearing fruit. According to Secretary General Stoltenberg, non-U.S. NATO Allies are on track to spend an additional \$100 billion by the end of 2020.

Acting Secretary Shanahan recently returned from his first NATO Defense Ministerial in February. Allies were reassured by his message that the United States commitment to Article 5 remains ironclad and that the United States will continue to be a reliable security partner committed to the transatlantic bond. We will continue to work with Allies to ensure NATO's deterrence and defense posture is adequate to meet the global security challenges facing the Alliance. The Department will continue to prioritize working with Allies to improve NATO

readiness levels, to implement NATO's adapted command structure, increase Allied speed of decision making, and to improve military mobility across Europe.

The United States' commitment to transatlantic security is also underpinned by continued investments in missile defense in Europe. Missile defense plays a critical role in NATO's defense of Europe from coercion and aggression. Interoperable NATO missile defense systems will improve the Alliance's collective defense capabilities and strengthen our own security.

The Department is committed to completing the deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense and will expand defensive coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from the Middle East. EPAA includes deployment of the first operational Aegis Ashore system in Romania and an Aegis Ashore system in Poland that is under construction.

In addition to these EPAA capabilities, individual NATO Allies are also fielding national air and missile defense systems designed to defend against shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles. These active defenses will play a crucial role in countering missile strikes that underpin potential adversaries' anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD operations to limit U.S. power projection through missile attacks on U.S. forces, allies, and critical in-theater infrastructure.

Nuclear policy is also a primary focus for the Department, given Russian capabilities. Russia's long-standing violation of the INF Treaty is glaring reminder of Russia's desire to erode European peace, prosperity, and unity. While the Kremlin was certainly hoping for a difference outcome, our Allies have staunchly supported our declaration of Russia's material breach and our decision in February to suspend our obligations and initiate withdrawal from the treaty. The United States and our Allies have made every attempt possible to convince Russia to come back into compliance with the Treaty. We have held over thirty meetings with Russia, over more than

five years, and at every level—from the Presidential level down to technical experts. We have even provided Russia in writing specific steps it could take to return to compliance and save the INF Treaty. Only the complete and verifiable destruction of Russia's 9M729 missiles, launchers, and associated equipment will resolve Russia's violation.

An arms control treaty that one side abides by while the other openly and brazenly violates does not make us safer. Violations must have consequences. This is Russia's final opportunity to return to compliance. The onus is entirely on Russia to save the INF Treaty. Instead of engaging on how to return to compliance, Russia has refused to admit that it is in violation of the Treaty and has attempted to spread falsehoods and disinformation about the capabilities of the 9M729 missile. On March 4, 2019, Russia announced its own suspension of the Treaty. The Department continues to work with Allies and partners to ensure our continued collective security in the face of Russia's new intermediate-range threat and deny Moscow any advantage from its unlawful conduct.

While the Department engages regularly with our Allies in NATO, we also continue to emphasize the importance of close coordination between NATO and the European Union (EU). Military mobility – which enables forces to move seamlessly across Europe – is a flagship of NATO-EU cooperation. We encourage our Allies and partners to see even more examples of cooperation between NATO, as the cornerstone of transatlantic defense cooperation, and the EU come to fruition. As the EU moves forward on developing a host of its own defense initiatives, we insist they must not duplicate, but rather complement, NATO efforts, and that they must be transparent and open to non-EU NATO Allies to reinforce our ability to effectively deter our common adversaries.

The Arctic

I would be remiss to discuss the resurgence of great power competition without also addressing the growing importance of the Arctic as strategic terrain. As the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible due to seasonal ice melt, the Department continues to seek a secure and stable region where the homeland is defended and U.S. interests are safeguarded, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges. The increased activity and investment of both Russia and China are concerning not only to us, but to many of our Arctic partners as well. Our activity and investments in the region are based on our national interests and informed by our strategy, which we are in the process of updating in response to the NDAA. While it is too early to give much detail, I can share that the new strategy will nest within the framework of the National Defense Strategy and will continue to address military security issues together with appropriate stakeholders through the existing network of relevant binational, bilateral and multilateral relationships, to include NORAD and NATO. DoD will continue our active engagement in this region, including through multilateral military training and exercises in and around the Arctic.

Europe's Eastern Flank

NATO's Eastern Flank—from the Baltics to Bulgaria—has been a recent focus of U.S. force posture in response to an increasingly aggressive Russia. Starting in 2015, under OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE, the United States began rotating forces through and along the Eastern Flank to reassure our Allies and deter Russia. This continues to be a Departmental priority, and we welcome the support of our NATO Allies through their contributions to the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and Baltic Air Policing missions.

Poland has been a hub for these efforts, and the Department has greatly increased its rotational presence there as a result, including through the deployment of a rotational Armored

Brigade Combat Team. The United States has on average 4,200 rotational personnel in country, though the numbers fluctuate depending on exercises and deployment schedules. This presence includes the rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team, a battalion in support of NATO's eFP, an aviation detachment, and a combat aviation detachment. Additional personnel will staff the planned Aegis Ashore missile defense site that will become operational next year. DoD contributions to eFP support EUCOM's deterrence and defense posture and underscore our commitment to transatlantic security through NATO.

The United States is also considering expanding its presence in Poland as a result of Poland's stated willingness to provide financial support for such an effort. We are currently in the midst of bilateral discussions with the Polish Government on this matter, and the Department views Poland's offer as yet another indication of Poland's commitment to promoting regional security and burden-sharing.. Although I realize there is great interest in this issue, I unfortunately cannot discuss these discussions in this unclassified setting, especially given their pre-decisional nature. The Department is committed to keeping this Committee updated if and when a bilateral agreement with Poland is reached.

The Baltic States and Poland are on the frontline of NATO's deterrence and defense on the eastern flank. Russia continues to use disinformation, cyber attacks, and military posturing to undermine the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. DoD, with the Department of State, is bolstering the eastern flank Allies through security cooperation and capacity building initiatives targeted at improving defense and security infrastructure in the Baltics, strengthening national resilience, and building defense capacity through programs such as the EDI, section 333, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. The United States has stepped up security cooperation since 2015 following Russia's attempted

annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine. DoD is providing nearly \$100 million for joint procurement of large-caliber ammunition; and over \$70 million in training and equipping programs to the Baltics to build the capacity of the national military or national-level security forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to conduct border-security operations. DoD intends to continue exercises and periodic deployment of forces to the Baltic States to strengthen deterrence and to catalyze the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to develop their national defense.

U.S. force posture and deterrence efforts in the Eastern Flank are not just focused on the Nordic-Baltic region. Southeastern Europe—specifically the Black Sea region, including Romania and Bulgaria—is just as important an emphasis. Indeed, this is the region where Russian aggression has actually manifested itself over the past decade. Like Poland, Romania has been a forward-leaning NATO Ally that has been fully supportive of a U.S. presence in country. Our force posture in Romania, and especially our Army presence there, has grown in the past five years with the rotation of a battalion from the Armored Brigade Combat Team at the Mihail Kogalniceanu—or “MK”—Base. In addition, about 150 U.S. sailors man the Aegis Ashore missile defense site in Deveselu. We continue to review our force posture in this region to ensure that there are no weak spots along NATO’s Eastern Flank when it comes to deterrence or NATO’s ability to respond to an Article 5 situation.

Beyond NATO, Ukraine and Georgia are vital partners in Europe’s Eastern Flank and Black sea region. In Ukraine, Russia occupies Crimea and fuels conflict in the Donbas in its attempt to change borders by force and to thwart our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. In November, Russia attacked Ukrainian vessels and personnel near the Kerch Strait in a brazen violation of international law. We once again call on Russia to immediately return the

seized vessels and 24 detained personnel, and keep the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov open to ships transiting to Ukrainian ports. In the Crimea Declaration of July 25, 2018, the United States reaffirmed its refusal to recognize the Kremlin's claims of sovereignty over Crimea. The United States also condemns Russia's illegal actions in Crimea and its continued aggression against Ukraine. The United States will maintain respective sanctions against Russia until the Russian government returns control of Crimea to Ukraine and fully implements the Minsk agreements.

The United States remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. The \$1.2 billion in security assistance the United States has provided to Ukraine since 2014 includes Javelin anti-tank missile systems and other train and equip programs to help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity, defend its territorial integrity, and deter further Russian aggression. Going forward, we intend to focus more U.S. security assistance resources for Ukraine in the maritime domain by providing equipment to support its most critical operational needs, in line with Ukraine's recently released Naval Strategy.

Ukraine has made significant strides on defense reform, including the 2018 adoption of a Law on National Security, which provides a legislative framework for aligning Ukraine's national security architecture with Euro-Atlantic principles. This constitutes a major step toward Ukraine's goal of achieving NATO interoperability.

As the U.S. Senior Defense Advisor to Ukraine, LTG (Ret) Keith Dayton is helping Ukraine implement key provisions of the law to ensure that Ukraine's defense and security sectors embody Euro-Atlantic principles. The implementation of these reforms will bolster Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity in support of a secure and a thriving, democratic Ukraine.

The Republic of Georgia is a key strategic partner in the South Caucasus and Black Sea region. Georgia provides the U.S. with unconditional ground and air transit to Afghanistan. Despite the Russian military occupying 20% of its territory, Georgia is the largest non-NATO and fourth overall force contributor to NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. With 870 Georgians currently serving alongside U.S. forces without caveat, Georgia is the largest per capita contributor to RSM. U.S. forces provide pre-deployment training and mobilization to Georgian forces through the Georgia Deployment Program-Resolute Support Mission. Georgia's Ministry of Defense has a U.S.-only procurement policy, spending 2% of GDP on defense and 20% on major equipment acquisition.

The U.S. is steadfastly committed to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Through the three year, bilateral Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP), the U.S. is developing Georgia's institutional capacity to man, train, equip, and sustain the Georgian Defense Forces. Georgia's capacity to self-train its defense forces for all national missions, to counter external threats, and to provide support for Black Sea security will preserve Georgia's independence.

Europe's Southern Flank

Meanwhile, Europe's southern flank also demands attention and a well-coordinated approach. Chinese and Russian influence in Africa continues to grow, and both competitors seek access to African natural resources and African support in international fora. Terrorist attacks in Europe and the recent migrant crisis are fueling European engagement in Africa, both to project stability and to stem the migrant flow. Building on the U.S. Africa Strategy published last year, and NATO's Projecting Stability concept, the Department of Defense is working with European partners to address these complex southern flank challenges. Since the attack on our compounds in Benghazi, Libya in 2012, the Department has worked with our Southern European Allies Italy,

Spain, Greece, and Portugal to enhance our force posture to protect U.S. diplomatic presence in Africa, protect Europe, and project security into the greater Mediterranean and Africa. Bases in Greece, Italy, and Spain host force posture elements from both EUCOM and AFRICOM.

Italy hosts 13,500 U.S. military, civilian and contractor personnel for operations and training on five major bases and other smaller installations. Naval Air Station Sigonella, in particular, has become an important hub for logistics; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; maritime situational awareness; crisis response, and theater cooperation, with temporary deployments by AFRICOM's SPMAGTF-Crisis Response-AF and the basing of U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, among other force posture assets.

This year marks 66 years of U.S. military presence in Spain, and in 2018 we celebrated the 30th anniversary of the U.S.-Spain bilateral Agreement on Defense Cooperation. Spain hosts over 7,000 U.S. military, civilian and contract personnel in Rota and Moron, and these strategic bases support operational deployments throughout Africa and the Middle East. Spain actively promotes security in North and West Africa, and is a significant contributor to NATO, EU, and UN peacekeeping missions. As evidence of their robust military capabilities, a Spanish destroyer will join a U.S. Carrier Strike Group on patrol in the Pacific.

The cornerstone of our bilateral defense relationship with Greece is U.S. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Souda Bay, Crete with 650 U.S. personnel. Souda is critical for strategic access and support to regional operations. It is the largest deep-water port in the Mediterranean, hosting approximately 240 NATO ship visits per year, and serves as an air and sea logistics hub and Ballistic Missile Defense trans-loading point for U.S. forces assigned to EUCOM. The Government of Greece has also been flexible with permissions to deploy AFRICOM assets from Souda for crisis response and has permitted the temporary basing of U.S. unarmed MQ-9s at

Larissa and the rotation of USAREUR's 4th Combat Aviation Brigade to Stefanoviko Army Base for winter training. Portugal remains a staunch trans-Atlantic ally with linguistic ties throughout West and South Africa and remains a strong U.S. partner and reliable NATO ally whose forces deploy in small but meaningful capacities in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, the Baltics, and Africa.

Turkey is a critical Ally on NATO's southern flank. Turkey contributes to coalition missions, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. We continue to reiterate the importance of Turkey remaining grounded in the NATO security structures. The United States has been clear in expressing its concern about Turkey's stated intent to procure S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia. We believe this would undermine the NATO Alliance, introduce risks to U.S. and NATO defense technology, and run counter to Allies' pledges to reduce dependency on Russian equipment.

The Department also recognizes that there are significant challenges with Turkey as an ally. Specifically, we have been clear that Turkey will very likely face sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) if it proceeds with its S-400 purchase. We thank Congress for its support for offering the PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense Foreign Military Sales case to Turkey as an alternative to the S-400. We have been clear that we will continue to discuss the potential PATRIOT sale with Turkey only if it commits to cancelling its S-400 purchase.

The Department is also prioritizing engagement with the Balkans. Russia stokes and exploits ethnic tensions in the Balkans and employs disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, political subversion, and economic manipulation as tools to undermine regional stability, democratic processes, and Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO unity. Despite Moscow's efforts,

Montenegro became the 29th NATO Ally in June 2017 and NATO is poised to welcome its 30th Ally, North Macedonia, once Allied ratifications are complete.

DoD is bolstering regional Allies and partners through security cooperation and capacity building initiatives, including cybersecurity with Montenegro and North Macedonia. The key to our capacity building initiatives is to eliminate regional militaries' dependence on Soviet legacy systems. We are leveraging security cooperation tools to modernize regional militaries with U.S.-origin and NATO interoperable equipment.

Israel

EUCOM also covers Israel, a critical partner for whom the Administration requested \$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and \$500 million in missile defense assistance this fiscal year. The Administration appreciates the Congress' support for this request in FY 2019. The Department ensures Israel's defense through joint exercises, co-development of a multi-tiered missile defense architecture, and supply of advanced weapons and technology – proving our commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge. Our strong missile defense partnership with Israel is underpinned by a new U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding that includes a commitment of \$500 million for Israeli missile defense each year beginning in FY 2019 through FY 2028. American longstanding support of Israeli ballistic missile defense programs now includes co-development and co-production of the David's Sling and Arrow-3 missile defense systems. DoD also continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron Dome program to provide critical defense against short-range rocket, artillery, and mortar attack. Our defense policy dialogues are also extensive and cover the range of global and regional challenges we face together.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense is working within the framework of the NDS to ensure the national security and defense objectives of the United States are met. With continued Congressional support, the Department will be able to continue to meet the threats of this increasingly volatile world, while increasing the lethality of our Armed Forces and fostering sustained alliances and partnerships that enable our global operations. Alliances and partnerships are vital in the EUCOM AOR and the enduring importance of NATO cannot be overstated as we pursue a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and thank you for your ongoing support of the Department of Defense.

Kathryn Wheelbarger
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Kathryn Wheelbarger is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. She performed the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from July 2017 to November 2017. She oversees policy issues related to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.

Previously, Ms. Wheelbarger served as Vice President for Litigation and Chief Compliance Officer at CSRA Inc. In this position, Ms. Wheelbarger managed CSRA's litigation and investigations portfolio as well as oversaw the company's Ethics and Compliance Office.

From 2011–2017, Ms. Wheelbarger served within Congress as Policy Director and Counsel on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where she specifically handled the Committee's intelligence portfolio for Chairman John McCain; and as Deputy Staff Director and Senior Counsel on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where she performed budget and policy reviews of IC programs, led investigations, and developed policy positions for Chairman Mike Rogers.

Prior to working in Congress, Ms. Wheelbarger served as Counsel to Vice President Richard Cheney and general counsel to the Vice President's 80-person staff from 2007–2009, and as Counselor to Secretary Chertoff and Associate General Counsel at the Department of Homeland Security from 2005–2007. Before entering the Executive Branch, Ms. Wheelbarger was a litigator with two law firms and served as a judicial clerk on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Boise, Idaho. Ms. Wheelbarger is a Summa Cum Laude graduate from UCLA and Cum Laude graduate from Harvard Law School.

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
MARCH 13, 2019

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, it is my honor to testify today in what is likely my final year as Commander of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). I humbly represent over 68,000 brave and dedicated men and women who are forward-deployed or stationed in the European theater of operations. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is essential to our national security and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. We as a Nation are blessed by their voluntary and exceptional service. Thank you for your steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.

Europe and the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance remain crucial to our national security, as clearly stated in the President's 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS). USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments are aligned with the principles and guidance provided by these strategic documents. I cannot stress enough that USEUCOM's ongoing and future success in implementing and executing these strategies is only possible with Congress' support, especially the sustained funding of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).

A Dynamic Security Environment

The threats facing U.S. interests in the USEUCOM area of responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing. They are complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional. They require the United States, together with our European allies and partners, to constantly adapt with forces and concepts that are able to out-pace the evolution of these threats. A revisionist Russia is the primary threat to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. Russia has invaded Ukraine, occupied Crimea, launched cyber-attacks against the Baltic States and Ukraine, interfered in U.S. and other Western elections, and attacked Ukrainian navy vessels

attempting to transit the Kerch Strait to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. It is also overhauling its nuclear forces—including those that threaten European territory, such as the dual-capable, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)-violating SSC-8/9M729 ground-launched cruise missile. Given Moscow's demonstrated willingness to violate international law and legally-binding treaties, and to exercise malign influence, Russia threatens the United States' vital national interests in preserving a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

We have already made significant strides in adapting our European force posture to meet these threats. As we continue to adapt, USEUCOM remains steadfastly committed to fielding a lethal, agile, and resilient force and to strengthening the NATO Alliance. With continued investment, innovative use of resources, and the strength of our Nation's resolve, I am confident that we will continue to meet the challenges of the dynamic security environment. This includes ensuring the continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which backstops all U.S. military and diplomatic operations across the globe and helps ensure that tensions with Russia—no matter where or how they arise—do not escalate into large-scale war.

RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Russia

Russia is a long-term, strategic competitor that wants to advance its own objectives at the expense of U.S. prosperity and security and that sees the United States and the NATO Alliance as the principal threat to its geopolitical ambitions. In pursuit of its objectives, Moscow seeks to assert its influence over nations along its periphery, undermine NATO solidarity, and fracture the rules-based international order. Russia actively pursues an aggressive foreign policy in violation of other nations' sovereignty, carrying out subversive and destabilizing activities in Europe and the U.S. and exploiting opportunities to increase its influence and expand its presence in Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia.

Russia employs a whole-of-society approach through a wide array of tools to include political provocateurs, information operations, economic intimidation, cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies, special operations, conventional military forces, and nuclear forces. Russia pursues its strategic objectives in Europe, while avoiding direct military conflict with the U.S. and NATO, by targeting countries through indirect action – backed up by the coercive threat of its conventional and nuclear forces. Such actions include questioning a government's legitimacy, threatening a country's economic interests, mobilizing fringe opposition groups, and utilizing proxies or armed civilians, such as private military contracting companies with opaque ties to the state.

Russia's military capability improvements are significant. Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to complete its broad-based upgrade of its nuclear forces and produce advanced weapons and capabilities specifically designed to counter U.S. military superiority. Russia's nuclear modernization program covers every leg of its strategic triad and includes advanced modern road-mobile and silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Long Range Strategic Bombers. Russia is also developing and deploying new strategic nuclear delivery platforms, to include its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater unmanned vehicle, intercontinental-range cruise missile, and its air-launched ballistic missile, all of which Russia seeks to keep outside of existing arms control agreements. Additionally, they are pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons, which could provide them the capability to attack anywhere in the globe with little or no notice.

Russia is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic, dual-capable weapons. It currently has an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 of these theater-range systems, which are not subject to the New START Treaty's limitations on deployed warheads. These systems include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic-missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges, and Russia's INF-violating ground-launched cruise missile, among others.

Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern because it facilitates Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for adjustments to U.S. nuclear forces to close this perceived gap on the escalation ladder and reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.

Outside of its nuclear forces, Russia is fielding advanced anti-access/area denial (A2AD) integrated air defense systems (IADS), precision guided cruise and ballistic missiles, modern cyber and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and counter-space weapons meant to impede U.S. power projection in Europe. They have improved readiness via investments in infrastructure, training, and compensation, and their exercise program demonstrates increasingly sophisticated command and control and integration across multiple warfare areas. In the Arctic, Russia continues to invest in their forces as environmental changes open up access to the High North.

The Kremlin has also demonstrated the ability and political will to deploy its modernized military and expand its operational footprint. Last year we observed a historically high combat maritime presence in the East Mediterranean along with military deployments and demonstrations in Syria. Their most advanced and quietest guided missile submarine, the Severodvinsk, conducted extended deployments in the northern Atlantic.

Russia seeks advantage over the U.S. and its European allies through its non-compliance with long-standing arms control treaties. Its violations of the INF Treaty allowed Moscow to develop capabilities that the United States continued to forego. Its "suspension" of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty gave it greater flexibility to posture forces in regions of special interest to Moscow and to do so with significantly less transparency towards its neighbors in ways we do not because of our adherence to these treaties. Its violation of certain provisions of the Open Skies Treaty—as well as its selective implementation of Vienna Document transparency measures—poses challenges for ensuring full military transparency.

Our NATO allies supported the U.S. announcement to begin withdrawal from the INF Treaty because they recognize that Russia's Treaty-banned systems hold much of Europe at risk and that despite significant diplomatic efforts—more than 30 engagements over nearly six years—Russia refuses to return to compliance.

While the United States maintains global military superiority over Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive military advantage, challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all domains, and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression.

Ukraine

Moscow persists in its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine and block Ukraine's democratic choice to align with the West. Following Russia's purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia's aggressive activities, including those of Russia-led forces in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, target Ukraine's defense, economic, and political sectors. Russia has not implemented its commitments in the Minsk agreements, and Russia continues to arm, train, lean, and fight alongside antigovernment forces in eastern Ukraine. The conflict in eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous ceasefire violations reported weekly. The UN reports that approximately 13,000 people have been killed in the Donbas since Russia instigated the conflict in 2014. More than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2018 as well as 55 civilians. Due to Russian intransigence, no peacekeeping initiative has been implemented. Russia's unjustified use of force against Ukrainian vessels and naval personnel in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait last November demonstrated Russia's disregard for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, denying Ukraine its right of free passage in accordance with international law. In addition, through its support of illegitimate elections in the so-called "Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics", Russia has sought to undermine the government of Ukraine. Russia will likely attempt to interfere in Ukraine's upcoming presidential elections, as it did in 2014.

Georgia

After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia stationed 7,000 troops on sovereign Georgian territory. Russia now occupies approximately 20% of Georgian territory and maintains a significant military and border presence in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has recognized the two territories as independent, entering into defense agreements with these territories and incorporating South Ossetian and Abkhazian "national military forces" into Russian Army command structures. Russia exacerbates tensions by fomenting discord between these territories and the rest of Georgia. While Georgia supports confidence building measures, such as granting the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) access to the occupied territories in accordance with its mandate. Russia opposes them.

Balkans

Security in the Balkans, a strategically significant region, is tenuous, and Balkan nations are a primary target of Russian malign influence. Negotiations between Kosovo and neighboring Serbia to normalize their relations and agree on a long-term solution that is viable for both countries have struggled to make progress for some time and are currently on hold. Russia fuels regional instability in an effort to prevent individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path toward greater Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Seeking to maintain its influence in Serbia through political, military, and economic support, Russia also opposes the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign country. NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes over 3,500 troops from both NATO and non-NATO nations, plays an important role in maintaining security and stability in this region. Bosnia and Herzegovina also continues to work toward long-term peace and stability. Despite challenges from Republika Srpska, which is influenced by Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina partners with the U.S. and NATO, supporting the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

Baltics and Poland

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are a focal point of U.S. and NATO deterrence posture and activities as Russia attempts to intimidate these nations, both politically and militarily. Russia also tries to influence ethnic Russian populations, especially in Estonia and Latvia, and both countries remain mindful that in Crimea, Russia used these ethnic groups as a justification for intervention. Poland has offered at least \$2 billion towards U.S. basing in Poland, and the form of such an increased U.S. troop posture in Poland is currently being discussed in Working Groups under the auspices of a DoD-led Executive Steering Group.

Turkey

Turkey is a strategically important ally facing significant security challenges, the most pressing of which is the ongoing Syrian conflict. It must maintain security along its border with Syria, and within its borders, Turkey hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees. Turkey continues to view the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as a single entity, one that constitutes a greater threat than ISIS. This has complicated U.S.-Turkey cooperation on Syria. USEUCOM works closely with Turkey to help secure its borders, and we have improved our efforts, in support of Turkey, to counter the PKK and the threats this terrorist organization poses to Turkish citizens. USEUCOM also supports U.S. interagency efforts to effect a deliberate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria that ensures the enduring defeat of ISIS, preserves Turkey's security, and keeps faith with U.S. partners on the ground. Finally, USEUCOM supported U.S. interagency efforts to provide an NATO-interoperable alternative to avert Turkey's planned purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense system, which risks triggering the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Such an opposition puts at risk NATO cohesion and our longstanding and mutually beneficial U.S.-Turkish defense industrial cooperation.

Violent Extremist Networks

The risk of terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline in fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists present a clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and infrastructure. ISIS seeks to re-establish itself in Iraq and Syria, expand into new safe havens, and plan attacks against Western targets. We must remain vigilant to all jihadist groups trying to extend their operational networks and radicalize recruits in Europe.

Israel

In the Levant, Israel faces a complex set of security challenges from numerous actors across multiple domains. Israel must constantly defend itself from threats posed by Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran, which has expanded its network of proxies while also pursuing advancements in its missile program to assert its influence throughout the Middle East. Israel must also guard against Russia's increased presence in Syria, its facilitation of Iran's presence, and ISIS militants along its Syrian border.

Additional European Security Challenges

Several other issues present ongoing challenges to European security. Though migrant flows slowed in 2018, Europe's migrant crisis has led to difficult political discussions about demographic integration and the allocation of resources. Transnational organized crime and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons, to include weapons of mass destruction and related materials, can be linked with terrorism and place an added burden on European security and police forces. USEUCOM is also monitoring China's activities in Europe as it seeks to expand its influence and grow its presence. For example, China is looking to secure access to strategic geographic locations and economic sectors through financial stakes in ports, airlines, hotels, and utility providers, while providing a source of capital for struggling European

economies. Russia and China have increased their transactional collaboration based on some common objectives and opportunities to increase their power and influence at the expense of the U.S. and our allies.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES - "STRENGTH AND BALANCE"

Strategy Implementation

USEUCOM is confronting the risks and challenges in its area of responsibility by aggressively adapting our thinking and posture in accordance with the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the Secretary's National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman's National Military Strategy (NMS). We are particularly focused on expanding the competitive space with Russia by increasing the lethality of our forces and strengthening alliances and partnerships. Our forces demonstrate commitment to the defense of our allies while our execution of the Dynamic Force Employment concept, along with our operations and exercises, introduce operational unpredictability to our adversaries. USEUCOM will help ensure that our Nation successfully competes with Russia, deters aggression, and if necessary, prevails in conflict.

Supporting NATO

The NSS, NDS, and NMS all emphasize the central role of a revitalized NATO in securing our vital national interests. NATO allies help shoulder our common defense burden through cash (defense spending), contributions (such as troop deployments), and critical capabilities (e.g., advanced missile defense systems). Allies have made considerable progress in each of these areas.

Since January 2017, allies have added more than \$41 billion in increased defense spending over the 2016 level; and by the end of 2020, Allies – according to NATO Secretary General

Stoltenberg – are on track to add approximately \$100 billion in increased defense spending. In 2018, eight allies spent 2% of their GDP on defense and ten more have presented plans or made political commitments to do so by 2024. 15 allies are already allocating at least 20% of their defense budgets to major new equipment in 2018, and 11 more have presented plans or commitments to do so by 2024. In addition, all U.S. EDI-funded military construction is being submitted for consideration of future funding via recoupment through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).

At last year's Brussels Summit, NATO Heads of State agreed that ensuring alliance responsiveness, readiness, and reinforcement are strategic imperatives for implementing a credible deterrence and defense posture. There are several distinct elements to this commitment. Implementation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) Adaptation will include a refined Initial State Peacetime Establishment (ISPE) manning increase, the stand-up of NATO Headquarters Joint Forces Command – Norfolk (JFCNF) to command and control (C2) operations in the Atlantic, and the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany.

NATO allies are also making progress in developing a more capable, interoperable, and ready alliance force. NATO's Political Guidance for defense planning (PG19) provides direction for a variety of required cross-domain capabilities. PG19, discussed at the February 2019 NATO Defense Ministers conference, is the first step in the process NATO uses to influence allied nations, develop and deliver interoperable forces, and ensure the alliance has the required capabilities and readiness needed to strengthen deterrence and defense. Additionally, the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), which builds upon the 2014 Readiness Action Plan's comprehensive package of Assurance and Adaptation Measures, will provide "4-30s" – 30 major naval combatants, 30 medium or heavy maneuver battalions, and 30 air squadrons ready to fight within 30 days – by the year 2020.

In terms of contributions, allies have stepped up their support for NATO-led missions. From 2014 to 2017, the number of NATO troops serving on deployment was up from 18,000 to just under 23,000 (with almost half of that number, 10,500, from outside the U.S.). In addition to the U.S., Germany, Canada, and the UK serve as Framework Nations for the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in the Baltics and Poland. The UK, Romania, and Croatia all contribute forces to the U.S. eFP mission. Germany serves as the Framework Nation for the 2019 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) brigade. NATO allies and partners also contribute forces to NATO's Baltic Air Policing, enhanced Air Policing in the Black Sea region, Standing Maritime Group, Resolute Support Mission (RSM), and KFOR.

As directed by the NDS, we will 'fortify the Trans-Atlantic Alliance' in part by increasing our collaboration with our European allies and partners. With thanks to Congress for its support to our security cooperation and security assistance initiatives, USEUCOM continues to bolster our engagement in places like Ukraine, Georgia, the Balkans, and in other allied and partner nations along Russia's border. USEUCOM employs programs such as the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative, Section 333 of the FY17 NDAA, and Title 22 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to build partner capabilities in key European nations, enhancing their abilities to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to operate in coalition with the United States. Additionally, USEUCOM works closely with NATO planners and forces to integrate our collective capabilities, and we will regularly test and improve these capabilities through Title 10 exercises, our Joint Exercise Program, and through NATO Response Force (NRF) certification exercises to ensure interoperability on the battlefield. We will continue to press allies to meet the important 2% mark, advocate for individual nation capability targets that meet their most pressing force requirements, and align with their assigned NATO capability targets.

NATO is also a key platform for engagement and displaying solidarity on issues such as Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. The Alliance unanimously supported our declaration of Russia's material breach of the INF Treaty in December and our announcement that we were

suspending our legal obligations and initiating withdrawal from the Treaty in February. We remain engaged on this issue with our NATO Allies to ensure NATO is postured to defend against Russia's new intermediate-range capability and to deny Russia any military advantage from its unlawful conduct.

Working with Non-NATO Partners

Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in Afghanistan, where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute Support with almost 900 troops currently deployed. The U.S.-Georgia security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in 2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea region.

Ukraine seeks to partner more closely with the U.S., NATO, and the European Union (EU), and it has made progress in developing a capable, sustainable, and professional force. USEUCOM supports Ukraine's efforts through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U), combined exercises including the annual naval Exercise SEA BREEZE, and other activities. The United States delivered the Javelin anti-armor capability to Ukraine in April 2018 to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine. Continued senior-level engagement and support for Ukrainian self-defense capabilities and institutional reform will help enhance regional security and demonstrate our continued commitment to Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, and a rules-based international order in Europe.

Thanks to the historic agreement this past summer between Greece and North Macedonia, we are poised to welcome NATO's newest member once Allied ratifications are complete. North Macedonia is a consistent contributor to security, regularly deploying forces to

Afghanistan and to other U.S. and NATO-led exercises, and the Alliance will be stronger with North Macedonia as a full member.

The EU has moved to enact multiple defense reforms and initiatives in an attempt to create efficiencies and commonalities in European defense. These include the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, which serves as the basis for preparing the EU's long-term Capability Development Plan and identifying defense and investment capability shortfalls; the European Defense Fund, which will amplify research and development undertaken by multiple participants to achieve economies of scale and free up funds for additional capability development; and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a legal framework to cooperate more intensively on defense issues and jointly develop defense capabilities for EU military operations. NATO continues to work with the EU to ensure these efforts complement rather than duplicate NATO initiatives or undermine NATO as the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security.

Strengthening U.S. Deterrence Posture

A combat-credible U.S. deterrence posture in Europe means fielding a force that is lethal, agile, and able to maneuver across the continent, capable of delivering joint fires, flexible enough to operate inside a highly contested environment, integrated with multi-domain capabilities, resilient through redundant systems, protected through integrated air and missile defense systems, and prepared to leverage the full power of our allies and partners. Establishing this force requires us to make resource-informed decisions about the appropriate combination of persistent forces (assigned, forward stationed, or persistent heel-to-toe 365 day rotations), and those that can quickly reach and operate in theater under the Dynamic Force Employment concept.

Each of USEUCOM's Service Component Commands has strengthened our deterrence posture. The capability and lethality of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) forces stationed in Europe were enhanced by persistent armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and Combat

Aviation Brigade (CAB) rotations. The forward stationing of long-range fires and air defense units will further improve the lethality and resilience of USAREUR forces. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) executed a no-notice deployment of the Harry S. Truman (HST) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the Mediterranean in the summer 2018 and to the North Atlantic in the fall 2018. As part of its deployment, the CSG participated in TRIDENT JUNCTURE 18, which had not involved a CSG in over 20 years. In Eastern Europe, strategic bombers and fourth- and fifth-generation fighters deployed to support U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) deterrence missions. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) sustained rotational elements in both the Black Sea region and Norway. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provided rotational teams that helped build the resiliency of allies and partners exposed to Russian malign influence. In support of the Service Components, our nation's reserve component forces continue to play a critical role in supporting our assurance and deterrence mission, especially through the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).

Enhancing our logistical infrastructure and capacity is another key element to fielding a combat-credible force. EDI investments in resilient joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) have resulted in infrastructure improvements as well as the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and European Contingency Air Operation Sets (ECAOS). USEUCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM in the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to find integrated solutions and facilitate strategic movement and maneuver through our military and commercial partners. The EU is also addressing logistics through its PESCO project focused on military mobility, with the goal of partnering with NATO to better facilitate the movement of troops and equipment across European borders. Furthermore, we are working to enhance munition stocks and ensure interchangeability with NATO munitions to allow flexibility within the Alliance.

We have also strengthened our deterrence and defense through the Joint Force Headquarters Exercise Program, which prepares USEUCOM to effectively carry out its wartime

mission and trains our Component Commands to assume Joint Force Component Command and Joint Task Force (JTF) missions. Our exercises maintain and enhance our ability to jointly operate in a multi-domain and multi-functional environment. We execute four Tier 1 exercises--AUSTERE CHALLENGE, JUNIPER COBRA, JUNIPER FALCON, and JACKAL STONE, along with numerous theater-specific and global integration exercises.

Although we have increased our forces, improved our infrastructure, and successfully executed multiple rotations, deployments, and exercises, a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary.

As for our nuclear forces, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review validated the importance of maintaining the nuclear triad for strategic stability with Russia and China. Great power competition requires that we maintain a credible strategic deterrence, which includes modernizing its supporting infrastructure. This underwrites U.S. security, diplomacy, and our conventional military operations worldwide.

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)

USEUCOM works directly with our Combatant Command counterparts and our European partners to identify and counter terrorist threats. We are increasing our intelligence-sharing and strengthening a counter-VEO network that includes NATO, partner nations, and international organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL. Our EU, NATO, and USEUCOM-shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO networks and facilitates expanded intelligence-sharing with law enforcement. European allies provide the U.S. with critical strategic access for counter-terrorism operations in USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM theaters, and they also deploy their own forces to support U.S.-led operations, including Operation Inherent Resolve. Counter VEO efforts led to a significant decline in directed and enabled attacks across Europe in 2018.

Competing in Cyberspace

USEUCOM's ongoing efforts to build operational-level cyberspace capabilities are critical to implementing the NDS. USEUCOM benefits from resources and authorities that enable us to partner more closely with USCYBERCOM. We are well-aligned in the planning and conduct of cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives that include deterring Russia, countering misinformation, and defending computer networks. Our Joint Cyber Center (JCC) continues to mature in manning, facilities, and authorities to actively counter cyber-attacks and help strengthen ally and partner nation cyber capabilities.

Building Intelligence Capacity

USEUCOM is working alongside our allies and partners to grow our intelligence and analytical capability in order to meet both steady state and contingency planning requirements. We are leveraging language expertise resident in European nations and are utilizing non-traditional ISR platforms to mitigate the global shortage of high-demand, low-density assets. In addition, USEUCOM is leveraging the growing capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in sourcing intelligence communication and dissemination platforms, such as the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System (MARS), Publicly Available Information and Open Source Intelligence (PAI-OSINT), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

Countering Russian Malign Influence

As we expand the competitive space with Russia, USEUCOM is working with the interagency to effectively compete below the level of armed conflict. A leading effort in this domain of competition is the Russian Influence Group (RIG), jointly led by USEUCOM and our State Department counterparts in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The RIG brings together the interagency to share information and collaborate in efforts to counter

Russian malign activities in Europe. Separately, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are also working with select European allies and partners to enhance their defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian malign influence. USEUCOM and USSOCOM work together to employ SOF in Europe, where their unique access and capabilities can be utilized to compete below the level of armed conflict.

Providing Assistance to Israel

USEUCOM directly supports our Nation's unwavering commitment to the security of Israel. We meet regularly with senior Israeli military leaders, coordinate in planning, and regularly participate in combined exercises. USEUCOM also assists in the defense of Israel through a continuous missile defense presence in the Mediterranean under OPERATION SHARP SENTRY. Israel continues to be the largest recipient of Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funds, and in September 2016, the U.S. and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provides \$3.8B per year in military assistance over the FY2019 – FY2028 period, totaling \$38B, enabling Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge over its adversaries.

Enabling Global Operations

Strategic geographic access, forward basing, and overflight permissions within Europe support multiple Combatant Commands and enable allied, coalition, and U.S. operations. European basing and access remains our strategic military "high-ground" for the United States and a key enabler of our global power projection. The bilateral agreements that grant the U.S. these permissions are built on trust and sustained by maintaining relationships with our allies and partners. Last year's U.S.-led cruise missile strike in Syria is the latest in a number of examples in which European access, basing, and overflight were critical in executing short-notice, contingency operations.

FY20 Requests

The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) provides funding to improve our deterrence posture and execute our deterrent initiatives and activities. First, EDI ensures that we position the right capabilities and refine the necessary infrastructure to respond to adversaries in a timely manner. Second, it underwrites our commitment to Article 5 and to the territorial integrity of all NATO nations. Third, EDI increases the capability and readiness of U.S. Forces, NATO allies, and regional partners so we can effectively deter adversary aggression and adventurism. USEUCOM has remained disciplined in nominating EDI projects that are consistent with Congressional guidance and follow five distinct lines of effort: increased presence, exercises and training, enhanced prepositioning, improved infrastructure, and building partnership capacity.

In accordance with your Congressional guidance, we plan and execute EDI as if it were a Future Years Defense Program. This allows us to maintain fiscal and program discipline and prepares the command for when EDI transfers from overseas contingency operations (OCO) to base service budgets.

Our FY20 Budget request focuses on: (1) continued implementation of Enhancing Army Prepositioned Stocks to improve responsiveness of ground forces and provide rapidly deployable combat capability in the event of contingencies; (2) continued implementation of the Air Force Prepositioned Stocks and airfield facilities to improve flexibility and resilience of air forces and provide rapidly deployable combat capability in the event of contingencies; (3) continued enhancement to the Theater's Anti-Submarine Warfare through the procurement of additional equipment and the improvement to theater infrastructure; and (4) enhancing other key capabilities and requirements throughout the theater including, but not limited to: (a) Naval logistics hubs; (b) Integrated Air and Missile Defense; and (c) JRSOI.

Conclusion

Given the transformation of the European security environment and its impact on U.S. national security, a strong commitment to the USEUCOM area of responsibility is more important than ever. I would like to thank Congress for their acknowledgement of these threats and their continued support of efforts within the USEUCOM theater. Russia continues to engage in armed aggression in eastern Ukraine, is yet to fulfill Minsk Agreement obligations, maintains an illegal occupation of Crimea with reinforced forces, openly violates International law, to include the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Open Skies Treaties, and blocks Vienna Document revisions which are needed to address non-accountability of political-military realities. As witnessed last March with the Skripal poisoning, the Kremlin is willing to act boldly, employing banned military-grade nerve agents against civilian targets on the territory of our ally, contrary to all international norms, expectations of civilized society, and their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The growing capability of Iran and its proxies is challenging Israel's security. Violent extremists, though slightly abridged in activities last year, remain intent on destroying a rules-based system of government and will continue to target U.S. and European civilians and infrastructure.

Fortunately, we are not alone in meeting these challenges. As stated in the NDS, the NATO Alliance will "deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of instability building on NATO's periphery." NATO has been, and will remain, vital to our national security, and a central element in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. Our Trans-Atlantic bond is strengthened by a shared commitment of collective defense, democratic principles, and mutual respect of national sovereignty.

The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians at USEUCOM continue to display selfless service and dedication to meet the demands of the European theater. They are the lethal, agile, and resilient force that will protect and defend the Homeland and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
Commander, U.S. European Command and
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

U.S. Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti assumed duties as Commander of European Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in late spring of 2016.

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is a native of Logan, Ohio, graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1978, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.

A career infantry officer, General Scaparrotti was previously assigned as the Commander, United Nations Command I Combined Forces Command I United States Forces Korea. He also served as the Director, Joint Staff. Prior to his tour with the Joint Staff, General Scaparrotti served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In addition, General Scaparrotti has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of the United States military to include Director of Operations, United States Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia).

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a Master's Degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and the Army Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat Action Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 13, 2019

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you highlight Russia's violation of the Open Skies treaty as undermining military transparency in Europe. But late in 2018, the State Department stated that Russia was back into compliance. It seems to many of us, myself included, that this Administration is inherently hostile to arms control agreements with Russia, as demonstrated by INF withdrawal and the lack of public commitment to extending New START. But I know that allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, value the information gained from Open Skies flights, and see this treaty as a key component to stability in the region. In light of the State Department certification of Russian aircraft, can you please clarify your statement on Russia's compliance with the Open Skies Treaty, and speak to the interest our allies have in the U.S. remaining in the treaty?

General SCAPARROTTI. Our European Allies place great value on the Open Skies Treaty as well as other arms control treaties and agreements. Despite this, many of our Allies are frustrated with Russia's lack of compliance, or partial compliance, with arms control agreements. NATO issued strong unified statements in support of the U.S. position on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, placing blame for the demise of the treaty solely on Russia. On the Open Skies Treaty, State Department originally cited Russia for noncompliance in three areas. The first violation involved Russia giving priority to air traffic over Open Skies missions over Russia, resulting in the overflights being delayed or canceled altogether. In Sep 18, Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, stated that Russia had corrected this violation during testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Second, Russia remains in violation of Open Skies for limiting the flight distance allowed for countries conducting missions over Kaliningrad, preventing them from fully observing that strategically sensitive enclave. Many Allies, not just the U.S., have encountered this violation. Missions over Russia so far this year confirm that these restrictions remain in place and that Russia is still in violation of the treaty in this area. The third violation involves Russian-imposed limits for flights near the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia recognizes them as sovereign countries, not party to the Open Skies Treaty, and therefore restricts flights from coming within 10 kilometers of the Russian border with those territories. Georgia, the U.S., and all other countries party to the treaty, with the exception of Belarus, disagree with this position. Russia suggested it would resolve this issue in late 2018, however, during a recent 2019 mission Russia again refused overflight within 10 kilometers of its borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and remains in violation of this provision of the Open Skies Treaty.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. The Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania remain a high priority for me because they provide first line missile defense capabilities for our allies in EUCOM against Iranian missile threats. I'm disappointed to hear that there has been significant delay on the Poland site. When do you expect this capability to be on-line? How much of a slip is that from the original project start? Who is being held accountable for this mismanagement? How is EUCOM working to get this project back on track?

General SCAPARROTTI. The Aegis Ashore Poland site is on track to achieve Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) along with Operational Acceptance in CY 20. This will be approximately 18 months from the planned TCD of Dec 2018. This project was delayed for several reasons, including underestimating project complexity, slow mobilization, and challenges with staffing of skilled trades. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the United States Navy, continue to use all available tools to keep the project on track for CY 2020 completion.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO

Mr. GALLEGO. A number of congressional colleagues, particularly those not on this committee, are often surprised to hear that we have no permanently based troops in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, despite them being NATO allies. The main reason given for this state of affairs is that Russia would be upset by our proximity to their borders. Why does Russia continue to get a veto of NATO and U.S. activity within the alliance when Moscow persists in fomenting unrest along those borders?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. Russia has no veto on U.S. or NATO activity. Allies recently agreed to invite Montenegro and North Macedonia to join the Alliance despite the Russian Government's strong objections. Additionally, NATO has seen a remarkable increase in defense spending, readiness, and exercises over the past few years. Our forces in Europe are postured to provide our theater commander the maximum flexibility to deter aggression and to defend, fight, and win should deterrence fail. This is in accordance with our National Defense Strategy concept of Dynamic Force Employment and our Global Operating Model. U.S. force posture is closely linked to, and integrated with, that of our NATO Allies. Each Baltic State, and Poland, enjoy the presence of a NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup of approximately 1,200 military personnel. The United States is the framework nation for the battlegroup located in Eastern Poland. The United States is also a regular contributor to the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which provides a continuous presence of Allied fighter aircraft that are ready to respond quickly to the violation of the Baltic States' airspace. In 2018, more than 6,000 U.S. military personnel trained and exercised in the Baltic States and more than 28,000 personnel, along with U.S. strategic bombers, guided missile destroyers, and U.S. Navy carrier aviation, were present in the broader Baltic Sea region providing deterrence. U.S. military personnel are permanently assigned to the NATO force integration units located in the Baltic States as well as to various multinational headquarters, and centers of excellence.

Mr. GALLEGO. A number of European Deterrence Initiative projects are on the list of MILCON projects that are at risk of cuts associated with the President's National Emergency declaration. Please identify which specific EDI MILCON projects, designed to increase readiness and lethality, previously identified by DOD as critically needed to deter Russian aggression, and funded by Congress, are less important than a wall in Texas, Arizona, or California?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. On March 19, 2018, the Department identified a complete pool of unawarded military construction projects from which funding could be reallocated to support the construction of a border barrier. The Department is reviewing the pool of unawarded projects, focusing on those projects with award dates planned for fiscal year 2020 or later, in order to minimize potential impacts due to a delay in funding. No military housing, barracks, or dormitory projects will be impacted. No definitive date has been set for the Acting Secretary of Defense's determination on the use of Section 2808 authority or for identifying a final list of military construction projects that could be deferred.

Mr. GALLEGO. The President's Budget Request once again puts European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) money in the Overseas Contingency Fund (OCO). How can you effectively deter Russia using 1-year money? Isn't deterrence a multi-year, continuing commitment? Should EDI money be in the base budget?

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, EDI money should be in the Department's base budget as base budgets have greater stability. The sustained funding of EDI by Congress has been instrumental in ensuring a ready and capable force in order to implement the National Defense Strategy as well as fulfilling the deterrence and military missions assigned to USEUCOM and its Components. While it has been included as part of the OCO budget since its inception, the Department annually develops an EDI multi-year budget plan to ensure all stakeholders, to include Congress, have an understanding of what future investments are required.

Mr. GALLEGO. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, recently retired commander of U.S. Army Europe, has said that he could support basing in Poland if NATO as a whole agreed to it. What is your position on basing in NATO's east? Have you pushed NATO as an organization to agree on additional U.S. or allied basing in Poland, the Baltic States, or the Baltic Sea region?

General SCAPARROTTI. NATO's rotational enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are demonstrating NATO's commitment to deterrence and posturing for defense in northeastern Europe. We believe that permanently stationing U.S. forces in NATO's east would be unnecessarily provocative, and that many of our Allies would not be supportive. It would give Moscow an easy opportunity to claim that NATO is an aggressor and provide Russia a narrative that they need to respond to protect Russian sovereignty. Additionally, a base

in Eastern Europe may not even be necessary, as our exercise and deployment program, along with the placement of prepositioned stocks, are part of a robust effort to ensure sufficient deterrence. U.S. Army forces execute regular rotational deployments from their home stations in the U.S. to Central and Eastern Europe. These deployments enhance Army readiness and exercise those exact processes required to rapidly deploy in a real crisis.

Mr. GALLEGO. A number of congressional colleagues, particularly those not on this committee, are often surprised to hear that we have no permanently based troops in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, despite them being NATO allies. The main reason given for this state of affairs is that Russia would be upset by our proximity to their borders. Why does Russia continue to get a veto of NATO and U.S. activity within the alliance when Moscow persists in fomenting unrest along those borders?

General SCAPARROTTI. Russia does not have a veto on U.S. or NATO rotational or permanent force posture within the Alliance. U.S. and NATO posture is based on multiple strategic and operational considerations. These includes existing U.S. and NATO policies, such as the Alliance's continued adherence to the NATO-Russia Founding Act which provides a commitment to all of the parties that Allies would not to permanently station substantial combat forces on the territory of former Warsaw Pact nations. Other critical considerations include maintaining the combat readiness of our forces to respond to a crisis wherever one might arise, military mobility within the theater, and managing the risk of escalation in light of a pattern of unsafe behavior by Russian personnel in close proximity to NATO and U.S. forces.

Mr. GALLEGO. A number of European Deterrence Initiative projects are on the list of MILCON projects that are at risk of cuts associated with the President's National Emergency declaration. Please identify which specific EDI MILCON projects, designed to increase readiness and lethality, previously identified by DOD as critically needed to deter Russian aggression, and funded by Congress, are less important than a wall in Texas, Arizona, or California?

General SCAPARROTTI. European Command continues to focus on identifying the requirements needed to successfully execute the missions and responsibilities tasked in the National Defense Strategy. The Department's military construction program (funded by the base budget as well as the European Deterrence Initiative) is critical to establishing a combat-credible posture in Europe. In particular, the infrastructure and prepositioning projects supported by military construction will set the theater to enable the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to the theater as well as increase military mobility within the theater. Delaying the implementation of these projects lengthens the window of increased risk to strategic competition with Russia and deterrence and defense in Europe.

Mr. GALLEGO. In his announcement that he would declare a national emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said, quote: "We have certain funds being used at the discretion of generals"... "Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple of them—they think this is far more important than what they were going to use it for. I said 'What were you going to use it for?' I won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me." General Scaparrotti, do you believe that unallocated funds designated for USEUCOM are better spent at the southern border than in USEUCOM?

General SCAPARROTTI. The Department's military construction program (funded by the base budget as well as the European Deterrence Initiative) is critical to establishing a combat-credible posture in Europe in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. In particular, the infrastructure and prepositioning projects supported by military construction set the theater to enable the rapid deployment of U.S. forces to the theater as well as increase military mobility within the theater. Delaying the implementation of these projects lengthens the window of increased risk to strategic competition with Russia and deterrence and defense in Europe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK

Ms. STEFANIK. Do you have any concerns about China's influence over European information and communication technologies, such as development of 5G networks across Europe? Is this something you are monitoring? Are there any actions needed?

Ms. WHEELBARGER. The Department of Defense is indeed closely monitoring China's influence in Europe, in particular, as Chinese information and communication technology firms, such as Huawei and ZTE, increase investments in the European market. Although 5G and other emerging technologies are certain to improve vastly our communication with Allies and partners across the globe, these new tools also

present new challenges and vulnerabilities that adversaries are likely to exploit. We are working closely with our NATO Allies and with our European partners to reinforce an informed and forward-leaning collective approach to dealing with Chinese investment in European information and communication technologies and address potential threats from Chinese investments, technologies, and other influence in a clear manner.

Ms. STEFANIK. In light of the new cyber strategy and our recent efforts to keep our 2018 elections secure from adversarial influence, can you update us on how your relationship is maturing with U.S. Cyber Command?

General SCAPAROTTI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Ms. STEFANIK. Do you have any concerns about China's influence over European information and communication technologies, such as development of 5G networks across Europe? Is this something you are monitoring? Are there any actions needed?

General SCAPAROTTI. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained in the committee files.]

