    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 116-13]

      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 13, 2019

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    36-299                      WASHINGTON : 2019

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island          Texas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                ROB BISHOP, Utah
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii                DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        MO BROOKS, Alabama
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice     PAUL COOK, California
        Chair                            BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    RO KHANNA, California                SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
    KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma             TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr.,           MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
        California                       MATT GAETZ, Florida
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       DON BACON, Nebraska
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
    XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico     LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    KATIE HILL, California               MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
    DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia

                         Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                           Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
                      Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
                              Justin Lynch, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services....................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command     6
    Wheelbarger, Hon. Kathryn, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense......     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M....................................    67
        Wheelbarger, Hon. Kathryn....................................    47

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Gallego..................................................    92
        Mr. Larsen...................................................    91
        Mr. Rogers...................................................    91
        Ms. Stefanik.................................................    93

    .
      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                             Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 13, 2019.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. If I can call the meeting to order. Welcome
    all.
        One little housekeeping item. The timer--actually, they
    appear to be working now. Miraculous. The timers were not
    working, but now they are.
        Today we are having our posture hearing on the European
    Command, and our witnesses are Ms. Kathryn Wheelbarger, who is
    the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs.
        Good to see you. I think the last time we saw you it was
    your first hearing before Congress. So welcome back as a
    veteran now.
        And General Curtis Scaparrotti, who is the commander of the
    U.S. European Command, and once upon a time, when I represented
    Joint Base Lewis-McChord, was the commander out there and did
    an outstanding job for our community.
        So I appreciate your leadership and it is good to see you
    again.
        There is a lot going on in the world, and certainly there
    is a lot going on within your jurisdiction. We appreciate you
    being here. We appreciate your leadership.
        There are a number of issues. I think the most pressing
    thing in terms of the European Command right now is maintaining
    our strong alliances within NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization].
        Certainly, it is important to meet the needs and demands
    right now that are present in Europe as we try to deal with
    Russian interference in elections and democracy writ large;
    also, obviously, what is going on in the Ukraine and elsewhere.
        But it is equally important to make sure that we maintain
    those alliances, because our allies in NATO are helping us
    throughout the world, in Afghanistan, in Africa, in the Middle
    East. Those alliances are crucial to us meeting our national
    security objectives, not just in Europe but throughout the
    globe.
        So would love to get an update from you on where you see
    that, how we are doing with our NATO partners, and how we can
    work to make sure that we maintain that alliance.
        Towards that end, I think one of the most crucial items
    that we are going to talk about is the European Defense
    Initiative and making sure that we maintain that. The
    President's budget cuts it and also puts it into OCO [overseas
    contingency operations], which makes our European allies
    uncomfortable.
        At this point, OCO may sound like it is supposed to be an
    emergency, but it seems like a rather permanent emergency. So
    they should feel better about that.
        But certainly, the cut in the spending of EDI [European
    Deterrence Initiative] is concerning, because I believe,
    General Scaparrotti, you have said that in order to present the
    credible deterrent that we need to stop Russia from doing
    anything in Eastern Europe, we need more forces, more--well, we
    need more in Europe to be able to put ourselves in that
    position. We have made quite a bit of progress in the last
    couple of years, but there is still more left to be done.
        And that, of course, is the overarching issue in that part
    of the world and, regrettably, in more, and that is Russia's
    malign influence. And would love to get your perspective on
    both what you think they are going to do next and how best we
    could deter that.
        Because I think their objectives are very straightforward
    at this point. As I like to put it, they want to make the world
    safe for kleptocratic autocracy. That is their form of
    government. And to do so, the number one thing they try to do
    is undermine confidence in democracy, make people believe that
    democracy really doesn't work, really doesn't provide for them.
        And the frightening thing about that is it is kind of
    working. If you look at polling data in the U.S. and across the
    world, support for democracy is lower than it has been in quite
    some time. And a lot of that is because of the efforts of
    Russia to undermine it. And not just the elections, but to stir
    up division and hatred within Western democracies to undermine
    people's confidence in their government.
        Now, I firmly believe--and I will go ahead and channel
    George W. Bush--that freedom works. Economic and political
    freedom makes the world a safer and more prosperous place. And
    the degree to which Russia is successful in undermining it, the
    world will be a less prosperous and less safe place. So we need
    to make sure that we work to push back on that.
        The European Command is going to be at the center of that
    because of Russia's presence and, as I mentioned, also because
    of how important our European allies are in prosecuting this
    fight.
        And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for his
    opening statement.

          STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
     REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses.
        General Scaparrotti, I understand this may, unfortunately,
    be one of the last times that you testify before us. If so, I
    want to go ahead and thank you for your service.
        You have been assigned two of the most difficult jobs that
    I think anybody in the military can be assigned, as our
    commander in Korea and now as our commander in Europe. Both of
    those jobs have required working with allies. Both of those
    jobs have required facing formidable adversaries. I think the
    fact that you have held both of them are a signal of the trust
    and respect that your colleagues and many of us have put on
    you.
        And so, like the chairman, I am interested in your views on
    the state of the alliance. I would slightly correct the
    chairman, that it is not just George W. Bush who believes
    freedom works. It has been Republicans and Democrats for the
    last 70 years have invested in a world system of systems. And
    we have put our money and our blood and treasure into the idea
    that freedom works.
        As you and I have talked before, Members of Congress,
    including members of this committee, try to play a constructive
    role in the NATO alliance. You have got folks on the Inter-
    Parliamentary Union. You have got regular visits back and
    forth, not only with parliamentarians, but with defense
    officials. A number of us were able to see you in Munich
    several weeks ago.
        So I do think it is important to know your view of the
    state of the alliance today, especially versus when you came
    there 3 years ago.
        Secondly, related to the alliance, NATO has made a
    significant decision to modernize our nuclear deterrent. And I
    think we need to hear and focus on, from you, the importance of
    that decision and especially how it relates to Russia. And we
    will, I am sure, have a number of questions related to that.
        Finally, I notice you made a little news when you testified
    in front of the Senate maybe last week that we were not yet as
    prepared as we needed to be to deal with the range of threats
    coming from Russia in Europe. I would be interested, and I am
    sure you will in your testimony, talk a little more about that.
        I am particularly interested in your perception of the
    state of our forces that are rotated through EUCOM [U.S.
    European Command], because it has been a major effort of this
    committee to improve the readiness of our forces over the last
    couple years.
        And so it will be interesting, I think, for us to hear--it
    is not your responsibility to make them ready, but you are a
    consumer of that readiness in a way--whether you are able to
    tell a difference.
        As the chairman said, there are lots of issues to discuss.
    We look forward to both of your opinions as we do so.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        I believe Ms. Wheelbarger is going to go first.

        STATEMENT OF HON. KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT
       SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes.
        Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for inviting me back again,
    this time to testify on policy matters related to the EUCOM
    theater alongside General Scaparrotti. General Scaparrotti has
    been a great partner for me in particular for the past few
    years and an impressive leader his entire career, so it is an
    honor to appear with him here today.
        Our policy approach to Europe, like other geographic areas,
    is guided by the National Defense Strategy, which recognizes
    the importance of Europe and our NATO allies and partners. We
    recognize as well the national security threats, particularly
    from Russia and China, that mark a new chapter in global great
    power competition.
        The history of the 20th century proved that our core U.S.
    interests in Western values, economic freedoms, and democratic
    legitimacy require us to defend our Western allies against
    threats from authoritarian regimes.
        If future war were to come, and hopefully it never will,
    our troops will be at the front lines, because we cannot thrive
    alone in a bleak world of dictators and autocrats. And this is
    the heart of our Article 5 commitment.
        Over the course of 70 years, NATO continues to provide an
    integral means for the United States and allies to defend our
    interests by collectively deterring potential conflict, thereby
    saving lives, saving dollars, and saving our way of life. And
    over the last 5 years, we have successfully built increasing
    multilateral pressure against Russian aggression through
    sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, coherent condemnations, and
    significant increases in NATO spending and reforms.
        Our European allies and partners are also beginning to
    grasp the security threat posed by an increasingly assertive
    China. Some of China's recent investments in Europe's critical
    infrastructure, to include telecommunications, ports, railways,
    and cutting-edge technologies, are a threat to NATO security
    and unity.
        In the face of this volatile world, our defense policy
    objectives in Europe are focused on improving our deterrence
    and confronting Russian activities that threaten a free and
    open international order.
        The Department is also focused on countering the increased
    malign activity of China, maintaining partner support of our
    efforts to handle Iranian aggression, and working with our
    allies and partners to counter the continued threat of
    terrorism. As the chairman mentioned, some of our closest
    allies and partners in Europe are deployed alongside us in
    Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and beyond.
        United States alliances, partnerships, and overseas
    presence in Europe are invaluable force multipliers for the
    United States. They allow to us project power and defend
    ourselves forward. Maintaining a credible nuclear force and a
    robust presence in Europe enables DOD [Department of Defense]
    to dissuade aggression as we position our forces forward to be
    prepared to fight the away game if we must.
        The Department is focused on encouraging an increase in the
    amount and quality of NATO burden sharing to ultimately benefit
    the entire alliance, including the United States. Our teams are
    engaging with partners and allies daily to ensure that NATO is
    adapted to today's conditions and able to deter Russian
    aggression and malign Chinese influence. Our alliance knows
    that our threats are shared and meeting their commitments on
    defense serves all of us.
        In some specifics, NATO's eastern flank, from the Baltics
    to Bulgaria, has been a recent focus of our posture response to
    an aggressive Russia. We have rotated forces to reassure our
    allies and deter Russia and welcome contributions to enhance
    forward presence in Baltic air policing missions.
        In the Baltic States and Poland, the front line of NATO's
    deterrence and defense on the eastern flank, Russia continues
    to use disinformation, cyberattacks, and military posturing to
    undermine the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. DOD, with
    the Department of State, is bolstering the eastern flank allies
    through security cooperation and capacity-building initiatives
    to improve defense and security infrastructure and improve
    resilience.
        In southeastern Europe, Russian aggression has manifested
    itself over the past decade. Like Poland, Romania has been a
    forward-leaning NATO ally that has been fully supportive of a
    U.S. presence. And we continue to review our posture in the
    region to ensure our deterrence is solid and we can respond in
    an Article 5 scenario.
        Beyond NATO, Ukraine and Georgia are vital defense partners
    in Europe's eastern flank and Black Sea region. In Ukraine,
    Russia occupies Crimea and fuels conflict in the Donbass to
    change borders by force and undermine a Europe that is whole,
    free, and at peace.
        The United States remains steadfast in its support for
    Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The $1.2
    billion in U.S. security assistance from the United States to
    Ukraine since 2014 helps it build its long-term defense to
    deter Russia in the future.
        The U.S. is equally committed to Georgia's sovereignty and
    territorial integrity. Georgia is a key strategic partner, as
    it provides unconditional ground and air transport for us to
    Afghanistan, and is the largest non-NATO contributor to NATO's
    Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. With 870 Georgians
    currently in Afghanistan, Georgia is the largest per capita
    contributor to that mission. The U.S. is developing Georgia's
    capacity to train, equip, and sustain its own forces to
    preserve its independence.
        Europe's southern flank also demands attention. Chinese and
    Russian influence, as we discussed last week, in Africa
    continues to grow. Therefore, the Department has worked with
    Southern European allies in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal
    to enhance our force posture, to protect U.S. diplomatic
    presence in Africa, protect Europe, and project security into
    the greater Mediterranean and Africa. Bases in Greece, Italy,
    and Spain host force posture elements for both EUCOM and
    AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command].
        Turkey is another critical ally on NATO's southern flank.
    Turkey contributes to coalition missions, including
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, and we continue to reiterate the
    importance of Turkey remaining grounded in the NATO security
    structures.
        At the same time, the United States has been clear in
    expressing its concern about Turkey's stated intent to procure
    the S-400 from Russia, which would introduce risks to U.S. and
    NATO defense technologies. We thank Congress for its support in
    offering the Patriot FMS [foreign military sales] case to
    Turkey as an alternative to the S-400. We will only continue to
    discuss that potential sale with Turkey if it commits to not
    accepting the S-400.
        EUCOM also covers Israel, a critical partner in a volatile
    region. The Department supports Israel through joint exercises,
    co-development of missile defense architecture, and supply of
    advanced weapons and technology, proving our commitment to
    Israel's qualitative military edge. Our defense relationship is
    extensive, covering the range of global and regional challenges
    we face together.
        In conclusion, with your continued support the Department
    will continue to meet the threats that we face in Europe and
    beyond while increasing the lethality of our Armed Forces.
    Thank you for inviting me today.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in
    the Appendix on page 47.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        General Scaparrotti.

     STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                            EUROPEAN COMMAND

        General Scaparrotti. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
    Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, good
    afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to appear before
    you today as the commander of the United States European
    Command. It is also a pleasure to appear today with Ms.
    Wheelbarger, who, as she stated, we work daily together and
    have for several years now.
        First and foremost, I want to thank you, the Congress, for
    your support of the service members, civilians, and their
    families in Europe. These warriors demonstrate selfless service
    and dedication to the Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is
    essential to our national security and to maintaining global
    peace and prosperity. We as a Nation are blessed by their
    voluntary and exceptional service. Also, thank you for your
    steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
        The threats facing U.S. interests in the EUCOM area of
    responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing.
    They are complex, transregional, all-domain, and
    multifunctional.
        This remains one of the most dynamic periods in recent
    history, in my opinion. Russia has continued its reemergence as
    a strategic competitor and remains the primary threat to a
    stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. While the United
    States maintains global military superiority over Russia,
    evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive
    military advantage, challenge our ability to operate
    uncontested in all domains, and diminish our ability to deter
    Russian aggression.
        In light of Russia's modernizing and increasingly
    aggressive force posture, EUCOM recommends augmenting our
    assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrence
    posture. EUCOM also recommends further investments that enhance
    European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support
    rapid deployment of multi-domain U.S. forces into Europe.
        In addition to the threat from Russia, the risk of
    terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline of
    fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists
    present a clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and
    its infrastructure.
        Thankfully, the United States is not alone in facing these
    and other challenges across the Euro-Atlantic theater. As our
    National Defense Strategy states, the NATO alliance deters
    Russian adventurism, contributes to the defeat of terrorism,
    and addresses instability along NATO's periphery.
        Our allies and partners play a vital role in our collective
    security, and they have made significant progress in increasing
    the cash contributions and capabilities that provide our common
    defense. For almost 70 years, NATO has been the cornerstone of
    Euro-Atlantic security. As NATO adapts to remain relevant and
    fit-for-purpose, we will find, as we always have, that every
    challenge is best addressed as an alliance.
        Let me close by again thanking Congress, and this committee
    in particular, for your continued support, especially sustained
    funding of the European Deterrence Initiative. EUCOM's future
    success in implementing our National Defense Strategy and
    fulfilling our mission is only possible with Congress' support.
        Thank you. And, again, I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
    in the Appendix on page 67.]
        The Chairman. Thank you both.
        To begin with, if you could give us a little greater
    insight on Russia and what you see their next steps are and
    what is most important for us to deter them. What do we need to
    be most worried about in terms of what Putin is going to try to
    do next in your theater? And, again, what are our best steps to
    try and counter that?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all, I am very
    concerned about their modernization program. We can cover that
    in more detail in a closed session. But it is real and it is a
    good modernization program that he has been able to keep on
    track, by and large.
        And so while today, as I noted in my opening, we have a
    dominant force, in the years ahead we won't unless we continue
    to invest as well so that we pace ahead of their modernization
    program. And I will speak in more detail in a closed hearing on
    that.
        Secondly, they continue their malign influence in Europe,
    throughout Europe, particularly in the area that they believe
    they should have preferred influence along the eastern border.
        I believe that they continue to have a goal of establishing
    themselves as a respected global leader and that they have a
    goal of increasing their influence, particularly on their
    border and their flanks, and they will use both malign
    influence as well as illegal activities to do so.
        I think your next step, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about
    the Balkans, and we see increased malign influence there in the
    past year, an area that we have invested in heavily and is
    critical to the security of Europe.
        The Chairman. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have anything to add?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I would agree with the general. I think
    Russia's ability to make the West, as you indicated in your
    opening, question its own institutions, is one of the biggest
    challenges we have because it sort of takes a whole-of-
    government effort to respond to it.
        Militarily, I think we are very adept and I trust our
    forces to be able to always outmatch any adversary, including
    Russia. But our ability as a society to ensure that we trust
    our own institutions in the face of their particularly
    aggressive information operations and use of social media to
    undermine us is significant. As the general said, we see it
    play out daily across the periphery.
        The Chairman. Can I focus in on just that one piece of it,
    because it strikes me that this is primarily--at the top, it is
    an information campaign. Certainly, as you talked about,
    General, the modernization, what forces do we have to deter if
    a war comes to pass.
        I mean, Russia understands the cost if they do that,
    regardless of what modernization they do. Not to say that there
    is not a risk of that, but the risk of that happening is lower.
    Obviously, if it does it is incredibly disruptive.
        But what is absolutely happening is the information
    campaign, is the constant effort to attack us in every medium.
    I mean, social media is the focus, but they do it through
    traditional media as well.
        They do it through different organizations as they--sorry,
    and I don't mean this in any partisan way, it is just what
    comes to mind--they infiltrated the NRA [National Rifle
    Association] here to see what they could do to stir things up.
    They have been in some cases trying to stir things up with
    Black Lives Matter, just to be bipartisan.
        So my concern is we don't seem to be doing much in
    response. It is a campaign. It is a public information
    campaign. And granted, it is complex, given social media and
    given how cyber works now. But at the end of the day every
    campaign is simple: develop a message and deliver that message
    to the people you are trying to influence.
        I don't see us doing that. I don't see us going out there
    and arguing, you know, a negative campaign--here is what is
    wrong with Russia, okay, don't believe what they are saying.
        So are we organizing that effort and working with our
    allies to fight the information battle that Russia is so
    clearly engaged in? And what can we do better in that area?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will start. I see us actually very much
    proactively working with the alliance to develop tools and
    messages to counter this information operations effort.
        We, in the North Macedonia case, I think had successes in
    helping them and learning from them, actually, in how they can
    successfully sort of develop a message in the beginning,
    expecting what the Russians were going to do and sort of
    setting the battle space, so to speak, in terms of what the
    positive messages are before the Russians even engaged. And so
    I think in that particular context, the Russians were surprised
    that they did not have a larger effect.
        So there is most definitely more to be done. It is a
    challenge whole-of-government-wise, all of alliance.
        I think one of the key things we can do is ensure strength
    and unity of messaging on the alliance itself, because one of
    the key goals of the Russians is obviously NATO disunity.
        And so every time we successfully counter that, we have a
    successful summit, successful defense ministerials, where we
    come out with advancing reforms for the alliance, I think that
    is one of the key ways we do counter their messaging.
        General Scaparrotti. Chairman, a quick response to this is,
    first of all, I think that we could do more, that we have
    greater talent. We need more focus and energy. I appreciate the
    Congress' focus on this. You have, in fact, funded some of the
    organizations that have increased what we are doing.
        I think we have improved, but we can do more. So things
    like the Russian Influence Group, which I co-chair with
    Department of State, is an interagency group that over the last
    couple of years has grown. We have had greater effect.
        And we actually have programs working, particularly in the
    eastern part of Europe today, thanks again to the funding of
    Congress. A part of that is the Communications Engagement
    Group, the CEG, which has been a big part of that and also
    would be for any response in the future.
        And then finally, our work with NATO. NATO actually has
    developed what I think is a pretty effective communication
    strategy and framework that they adjust over time. They have
    got an annual framework, and then they have it for specific
    events where things are developing. And we have actually shown
    that we can develop a message that has greater depth,
    penetration, and volume than the Russians have in the eastern
    side, and we have done this on several occasions where we set
    out early to be proactive.
        So, to me, it shows that we can do this. But we need to
    have greater focus and make this more the norm of what we do,
    because, as you said, they are pretty agile at this and they
    are everywhere.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        I neglected to make this announcement at the outset. As
    with our hearing last week, there will be a classified session
    after this. Our goal is to be done by noon and to start the
    classified session upstairs at noon. So we will endeavor to do
    that.
        And with that, Mr. Thornberry.
        Mr. Thornberry. General, I would like to at least try to
    touch on the three issues I mentioned at the beginning.
        If you look at the state of the troops that are sent to
    EUCOM, come through EUCOM, their readiness, et cetera, how
    would you compare it today versus when you first arrived 3
    years ago?
        General Scaparrotti. It is absolutely better. It is much
    improved. The investment of Congress in particular and the
    focus of the services on readiness and aligned with the
    National Defense Strategy has paid off.
        Right now, my forces in Europe are at the highest readiness
    rates that they have been since I have been in command. It is
    very good. Particularly the rotational units, those are
    delivered ready.
        And my commitment to the Army, for instance, in the Army's
    case, is to return them just as ready as they came, because I
    believe I have got an experience and a training area there that
    allows me to do just that.
        So, in short, they are in a better place, but readiness is
    something that you have got to continue to invest in.
        Mr. Thornberry. Absolutely.
        You have touched on the state of the alliance, but can you
    just, again, give us kind of your overall perspective on the
    military integration state of the alliance now versus 3 years
    ago and, at least from your perspective, the political support
    for the alliance that you see with your two hats.
        General Scaparrotti. In terms of mil-to-mil [military-to-
    military], the relationships within the alliance, I think they
    are at least as strong, if not stronger. It is a little
    difficult for me to be unbiased in this case, but over a 3-year
    period we worked this very hard.
        But when you look at what we have done in, say, the last 4
    or 5 years, my predecessor and now, the actions we have taken
    are really historic within NATO: NATO command structure
    adaptation, the deployment of forces to the east, the
    deployment of greater maritime forces at a greater schedule
    within the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and actually the North
    Atlantic as well, the deployment of air forces for air
    policing, et cetera, the changes to readiness that is taking
    place in NATO right now.
        Those are really significant steps forward for NATO, and
    that is done because we have got a very close mil-to-mil
    relationship, interoperability is working better, there is an
    agreement to work our forces in a more effective manner. So I
    think the mil-to-mil is very good.
        On the political side of it, it is affected by the dynamics
    of our environment today, whether United States or Europe.
    There is more political tension. But, again, I would point to
    the fact that when you come to 29 at the table, NATO has every
    day made the commitment and delivered on the tough decisions
    that have to be made for the security of Europe, and that is
    encouraging to me.
        Mr. Thornberry. And finally, I know we will touch more on
    Russian nuclear doctrine when we go to the classified session,
    but we had an outside witness testify last week that, in his
    view, this Russian doctrine of escalate to deescalate was not
    real, that they didn't really believe it, that it was just kind
    of for show to scare us.
        This committee may be asked to make some decisions about
    whether to continue our nuclear modernization that 29 nations
    have agreed to. In your view, are the Russians serious when
    they openly talk about a use of nuclear weapons as a regular
    part of their military doctrine?
        General Scaparrotti. I would like to get into that more in
    the closed session. But I would just say that I think it is a
    part of Russian doctrine and their way of warfare, if you will,
    traditionally over time.
        I would say it is escalate to dominate, is the way they
    look at it. And if you look at the modernization of their
    weapon systems today, I think that you can see how those, in
    some scale of escalation, could be used to do just that, and I
    think they are actually being developed for that reason. And I
    can get into that in more detail in the secure session.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay. We look forward to that.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General and Ms. Wheelbarger, thanks for coming.
        So I guess it was last month, several of us were in
    Brussels at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting with
    members of Parliament from NATO countries as well as those who
    were acceding, and North Macedonia had representatives there
    for the first time.
        Thanks for not starting my clock, too, by the way. I will
    take 7 minutes. Darn it, why did I say that? I am just trying
    to be respectful of everyone else here.
        I guess I want to get to the point about, one, North
    Macedonia's accession, and our Senate has to act on that for
    our purposes. But it brought up other questions about the
    Balkans, the fact that North Macedonia was there, and Bosnia
    and Herzegovina had representatives there and others, as well
    as current allies like Croatia.
        You mentioned the Balkans as your number three, top three
    in terms of Russia causing problems there. Can you be more
    specific here in this setting about what Russia is doing in the
    Balkans that causes so much concern for existing NATO allies,
    as well as North Macedonia, and as well as Bosnia and
    Herzegovina?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, I think, generally speaking,
    their efforts are to undermine any movement toward integration
    with the Euro-Atlantic, EU [European Union], NATO, et cetera.
    That is their general objective in every case throughout the
    Balkans.
        Primarily, they do this through disinformation. They do it
    through funding and support for fringe parties. They don't
    necessarily determine whichever side it might be on as long as
    it is undermining the present government and any forward
    movement within those governments. We see that and, as I said,
    I think that has stepped up in the past 6 or 8 months within
    the Balkans.
        I would also say that Montenegro's accession to NATO, now
    the 29th member, and North Macedonia, who would potentially be
    the 30th, I believe, is exactly what Russia did not want to
    see. I think they will continue to try and address this with
    North Macedonia, just as they tried to interfere in
    Montenegro's accession.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, because it is an alliance that needs to
    be--each alliance member needs to approve North Macedonia. It
    is not a 50 percent plus one, it is everybody, everybody is in.
        General Scaparrotti. Each nation.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah. So is there a specific EUCOM role that
    EUCOM is playing, or is this more of a NATO role or State
    Department role to counter this specific set of circumstances?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, EUCOM has a role in it. And
    within these hybrid activities or activity below the level of
    conflict or indirect activity, we have precise military
    capabilities that we bring to bear, primarily having to do with
    military information support, some of our SOF [special
    operations forces] capabilities, for instance, cyber
    capabilities.
        But then the last thing is we work very closely with the
    interagency. And I would like to think that we are one of these
    places that pulls everything together. I have within my J9
    [interagency partnering directorate] an incredible group that
    does this, and I have people from Treasury, State, USAID [U.S.
    Agency for International Development], FBI [Federal Bureau of
    Investigation], Homeland Security, that help us ensure that we
    can address this as a whole-of-government approach
    appropriately.
        And that is what it really takes to counter this. So I
    think that is one of the major things that we do in EUCOM to
    help counter Russia's activities.
        Mr. Larsen. If I can jump across the Black Sea to Georgia,
    and either of you can answer this. Russia is occupying two
    areas of Georgia. The Georgians are very interested in getting
    in line and to get into NATO eventually. I certainly support
    that.
        What would be EUCOM's concerns or the Pentagon's concerns
    about a country like Georgia, which has territory that is
    occupied, from continuing to pursue a NATO membership? It is
    probably a civilian answer, not a military answer.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yeah. We obviously have a very close
    working relationship with the Georgians. They are one of our
    key partners. We are doing everything we can to build up their
    own defenses and ensure that they can train and equip for
    themselves, as I said in my opening.
        I think the fundamental challenge is, entry into NATO
    immediately, you question whether you are already in an Article
    5 scenario by mere entry because 20 percent of their territory
    is occupied. So that is the particular challenge when we look
    at their potential movement forward that we as an alliance have
    to think about and manage.
        But we are doing everything we can in the meantime to
    encourage them to stay close to us. They are one of our key
    partners. I just met with them last week. And they do all they
    can to stay close to the alliance, and we want to continue to
    encourage that.
        The Chairman. That is all the time we have, so I will go to
    Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I would like to thank General Scaparrotti for providing
    this map. I think the American people need to know the success
    of the American military, of NATO, that we currently have a
    greater spread of freedom and democracy in Europe and across
    the world because of the American military presence providing
    freedom and democracy for countries that didn't have it.
        And in particular, I was an election observer in June 1990
    for the general with the new elections in Bulgaria. It was so
    exciting to see that country come to life. And over the years I
    have worked with it to see the development of Novo Selo, the
    training base there, with young Bulgarians and Americans
    training together.
        I have had the opportunity to visit MK [Mihail
    Kogalniceanu] Air Base in Romania, again, to see what was
    formerly a Soviet air base or Warsaw Pact air base, now so
    important in the global war on terrorism.
        With that background, can you let all of us know how
    important it is, the relationships that we have with our Black
    Sea allies of Bulgaria and Romania?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, it is very important. As
    you noted, the bases you just named are a couple of those that
    are accessible, but not only us, but our NATO allies as well.
    And when you look at the Black Sea region, the criticality of
    that, it is actually the collection of allies in the Black Sea
    working together that provide the deterrence for any malign
    activity, Russia's malign activity, and secures their freedom,
    actually.
        So it is vital, and it is a very close and robust
    relationship. Romania, in particular, over the past 2 years has
    developed a force within NATO. That area, it is a forward
    presence there as well, common to the one that is up in the
    Baltics. And it is connected with joint forces, increased
    maritime activity by both the United States and then NATO writ
    large, as well as air policing. So it is critical and it is a
    great partner.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for your success, but the
    success of the American military really needs to be recognized.
        Germany is the home of so many extraordinary American
    military facilities, partly fueled by natural gas. The Army
    Corps of Engineers is currently building the largest military
    hospital, the Rhine Ordnance Barracks Army Medical Center near
    Kaiserslautern, Germany, which is a sister city of Columbia,
    South Carolina. And we are very grateful, General, that you are
    a graduate of USC [University of South Carolina], a Gamecock.
    We want the best at Kaiserslautern.
        But the concern I have is the reliance of Germany on
    Gazprom, on natural gas from the Russian Federation. We have
    already seen how they cut the gas off to the people of Ukraine.
        What concerns do you have about the reliance of providing
    the proper fuel for our facilities?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, we actually watch that closely
    in terms of fuels that we can provide, fuel, oil, et cetera. We
    have separate contracts to ensure that it is a safe and secure
    provision for our forces.
        And then within natural gas, et cetera, as we look forward
    to the Rhine Ordnance, we are doing a study there to make sure
    that we secure its energy needs as well in the future if there
    were a conflict or that energy source could be put at risk,
    primarily because, as you know, about 30 percent across Europe
    of--particularly their LNF [liquefied natural gas] needs are
    provided by Russia.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        And, Madam Secretary, a great achievement was to place
    American troops in Poland. It was a message to the Russian
    Federation that we are serious about defending our NATO allies.
        I had the opportunity last summer to visit with President
    Duda in New York. And, of course, he was so happy to be
    explaining how they would like to provide for a permanent
    military facility in Poland.
        What is the status of negotiations on developing the
    facilities in Poland?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. As you know, the Poles have made a very
    generous offer to us to contribute additionally $2 billion,
    perhaps more, to have additional U.S. forces and capability
    stationed in their country. The negotiations are actually
    ongoing. This very week, Under Secretary Rood is meeting with
    his counterpart the deputy secretary in Warsaw. I think it is
    today, actually. It might be tomorrow.
        We have come forward with, we think, a very serious, robust
    offer, and we are working out some of the technicalities this
    very week. And we hope to have a solid foundation to work from
    coming out of this meeting today.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. It is great to see U.S.-
    Polish relations. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
        I am sorry, Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, General, for your service here
    and all of these years. And Ms. Wheelbarger, similarly.
        The question of Poland just came up, and it is a question
    of permanent versus rotational. General, you spoke to the
    rotational issues and that you are receiving trained and
    prepared troops and you are sending them back just as well.
    Would you prefer that or would you prefer permanent? Or is
    there a combination?
        General Scaparrotti. Yeah. On the question of whether
    permanent or rotational forces, particularly in Poland, I think
    it is a mix. I am perfectly content with the large forces that
    we are rotating today. I get a ready force. I send it home
    ready. And the other thing is, is I get a large component of
    our Army that has been to Europe and understands the mission
    there. So there is some goodness in that.
        Some of the enablers, et cetera, some of the headquarters,
    a more permanent base is helpful, because of the relationships
    you build and the mission they have. So you will see a little
    bit of a combination there, from my point of view.
        Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Wheelbarger, the issue of a permanent
    base, you just spoke to that timeframe. Are we looking at an
    agreement sooner or later, or this year, next year? What is the
    situation?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Essentially, the discussions that are
    ongoing right now in Warsaw, if we come to agreed terms on the
    foundation of our offer and their acceptance of that, we would
    then go to the State Department and seek the authority for the
    State Department to then be the lead negotiator for, again, the
    actual technical agreement that would be signed.
        In terms of the actual agreement between two countries, we
    are looking at probably 6 months to a year for that to be
    finalized. And then I would defer to my military colleagues for
    the actual physicality and infrastructure requirements, when
    that would actually come to----
        Mr. Garamendi. A couple of years, 2 to 3 years off before
    we would be dealing with an actual base and the money for that
    base. Okay.
        General, you spoke about the information campaign, that
    what is being done is good but it is not enough. What does it
    take to do enough?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that we need to have
    more people involved in it and more resources, people and
    engagement, in terms of----
        Mr. Garamendi. Can you develop a specific plan and get it
    to us like sooner, like soon?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, it is not really mine to
    develop. You know, it is really a whole-of-government approach.
        Within the RIG [Russia Information Group], for instance, we
    have a plan for progressive improvement, and it is nested under
    our embassies' objectives in each of those countries. And I
    think that was a good start for us.
        But, for instance, with probably a little more resources
    behind that, we could do what we are doing at a faster pace.
    And, again, that is a whole-of-government approach; it is not a
    EUCOM one. I happen to co-chair it.
        Mr. Garamendi. In your position as co-chair, could you give
    us your best thoughts about the extent and the money necessary?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Because we are in the process of developing
    that.
        General, you also have recently spoken about the S-400 and
    F-35 in Turkey. I believe you raised this question at the
    Senate, and your answer was they are incompatible. Are you
    still holding that position after a week and a half?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes. I do believe that we shouldn't
    provide F-35s if there is an S-400 in Turkey.
        I would say that we are continuing to work this. Turkey is
    an important ally. We work with them every day. I know their
    leaders well. And our intent is to maintain them as an
    important ally, a NATO ally, into the future.
        Mr. Garamendi. With that, I will--OCO funding. The OCO
    funding has been reduced in the President's budget. We will
    deal with that. But the question is, should you have a
    permanent baseline funding rather than OCO funding? What effect
    has the--I think I am out of time. I will let my colleagues
    pick that up later.
        The Chairman. Actually, you bluffed us there. It sounded
    like you were done, so we zeroed it out. But as far as we know,
    you are out of time.
        So, Mr. Turner, go ahead.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
    being here.
        I want to echo Joe Wilson's thank you, General, for the map
    that presents the march, as Joe Wilson was saying, the march of
    freedom. I know when you present a map like this you don't have
    to start with where we were in 1989, and I appreciate that you
    do, because it gives us the perspective of Russia's view and
    also where we have come from. So thank you for giving us that
    perspective.
        General, I want to speak to you first as the other title
    that you have, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. Secretary
    General of NATO Stoltenberg is going to be addressing a joint
    session of Congress in honor of the--he has been invited to
    address a joint session in honor of the anniversary for NATO.
        When the NATO Parliamentary Assembly just had its meeting
    in Brussels, and he was addressing our group at the NAC [North
    Atlantic Council], he indicated that as of next year it will
    appear as if the Wales charge of increasing to 2 percent
    expenditure will reach increased expenditures from our NATO
    allies to $100 billion additional funds spent.
        Could you speak to a moment as to how the coordination of
    that is happening? As increased dollars are coming into NATO,
    and Stoltenberg clearly has given Donald Trump's beating the
    drum as the credit for the success that we are having of the
    steep climb that is happening over the past several years, how
    is it being spent and are they working with you, as Supreme
    Allied Commander, to make certain that is efficient?
        General Scaparrotti. First of all, it is true that--and it
    is based on the request for plans by last 31st of December,
    this last year. Each nation was required to turn in their plan
    for meeting the 2 percent as well as the other requirements, 20
    percent of that amount toward modernization. And so as you look
    at that, that is the basis of what has been $41 billion to
    date, will be $100 billion by 2020, as you stated.
        So a couple of ways that works. One, that is in defense
    spending. So that naturally builds both readiness and
    capability within each of the nations that are then provided in
    capability as well as contribution by those nations. And we
    have seen in NATO over the last couple of years now an increase
    in both capability and contribution. That is the first way that
    you see it.
        The other is, is when we go through the NATO defense
    planning process, which determines any gaps that we have, what
    modernization we need or capabilities that we lack, it then
    assigns that to nations. And nations in NATO, you agree to your
    modernization and you are committed to it.
        And that is the other area where we see that increase in
    funding being important, because we, just as I said for the
    United States, all the nations face a need to modernize, just
    given the change in our security environment today, the
    character of war, as well as our competitors' capabilities.
        Mr. Turner. For both of you, I appreciate Mr. Garamendi's
    question on the F-35 and the S-400 in Turkey. We had a prior
    conversation before we came out here. As everyone knows on the
    committee, I have worked very diligently on the issue of the S-
    400 and our opposition to Turkey having the S-400.
        But I would like, if you will, to just take a moment, each
    of you, to give us a commercial as we really do want Turkey in
    the F-35 program, right? I mean, it is not that we want to take
    the F-35 away. They are a partner. It is not just that we are
    using this as an excuse. The S-400 is a real problem, but at
    the bottom line we do want Turkey in the F-35 program, correct?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes, absolutely.
        General Scaparrotti. I agree. And we want them to continue,
    as I said earlier, as one of our key allies in a very important
    place in the world.
        Mr. Turner. Excellent.
        General, I come from Dayton, Ohio, the site of the Dayton
    Peace Accord negotiations. The Balkans continue to be an area
    of focus. I have been very concerned that after what was I
    believe an unworkable long-term constitution was adopted as
    part of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Balkans have languished.
        Bosnia-Herzegovina frequently loses our focus because
    people don't believe there is a risk there. General, is there a
    risk in Bosnia-Herzegovina of violence?
        General Scaparrotti. The stability you see today is just
    kind of a veneer, in my view. I don't expect it to have the
    kind of confrontation we had in the past, but there is, one,
    increased tension, two, Russian interference. And also, I
    think, as the longer we go without some forward progress here,
    that people begin to lose hope, that, in fact, that desire to
    be integrated into Europe is being diminished.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti, last year when you appeared before our
    committee you testified that Russian submarine activity was at
    a level that we hadn't seen since the 1980s. I noticed on page
    5 of your testimony, again, you talked about the new guided-
    missile submarine, the Severodvinsk. So is it your testimony
    today that that hasn't really changed from a year ago?
        General Scaparrotti. That is correct. And I would like to
    talk to you about that in particular in a closed session.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, I think a topic which is
    certainly not classified is that the submarine fleet of attack
    subs is at 52 today. It is slated to go to 42 with retirements
    in the Los Angeles class.
        Given the capacity issues that you expressed concern about
    last year publicly, that decline, how would you describe the
    challenge that would face your successor if it were to go
    unmitigated?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, one, it is really a
    Navy issue to determine their size and how they provide it. But
    for me, I have to maintain at least the capacity that I have
    today and look to an increase probably in the next couple of
    years in order, I think, to be a credible deterrent.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, last year, again, on a bipartisan
    basis, we did authorize going to three a year, which the
    administration opposed at that time. A couple days ago they did
    come around to the position that, again, this committee
    advanced on a bipartisan basis. So hopefully, that dip will not
    be as pronounced for your successor.
        In Ukraine, where the naval incident occurred back in
    November, I met with Admiral Voronchenko from the Ukrainian
    Navy who, again, described the fact that the sailors--there
    were about roughly around 20 sailors that were captured during
    that incident. He indicated that they are now being held in
    prisons in Moscow. Could you talk a little bit about just sort
    of this outrage in terms of the latest?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it was an outrage in the
    sense that Russia blocked their passage to the straits. The
    Ukrainians made a decision not to force the straits and turn
    around and depart. It was actually on departure that the
    Russians fired on the ship, seized the ships, and took 24
    sailors, and they still have them in custody today in Moscow, a
    breach of international law.
        Mr. Courtney. Because their boats were in international
    waters, right?
        General Scaparrotti. At least one of those was in
    international waters by the time that they were literally
    heading out and it would have been clear to anyone that they
    had decided not to confront Russia on this at that time.
        Mr. Courtney. And I guess a couple of the sailors were
    actually cadets who were out there as training exercises. I
    mean, it was definitely not a hostile mission that they were
    engaged in.
        General Scaparrotti. But I think this is representative of
    the actions that Russia is willing to take in order to, in this
    case I think, enforce or establish their control of those
    straits, as well as the Sea of Azov, which actually is governed
    by both nations, Ukraine, by an agreement.
        Mr. Courtney. So in terms of the budget and your efforts to
    assist Ukraine, are there any naval assets or equipment that we
    are going to try and boost them?
        General Scaparrotti. We have and will continue to work on a
    maritime basis out of EUCOM with their naval forces. We have
    got a good relationship with them. And there are increases now
    with USAI [Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative] or the
    funding that we put forward in Congress here for maritime
    assets, two ships in particular, Island-class patrol boats, in
    order to begin to replenish their Navy, as well as other
    assets.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And lastly, you described sort of
    the progress that our NATO allies are moving towards in terms
    of 2 percent GDP [gross domestic product] defense spending.
        General Scaparrotti. So, sir, just to give you a basis
    today, we have got 8 allies today that meet the 2 percent.
    There are 10 that have committed to be there by 2024. In other
    words, their plan is there, and they have got a plan that
    demonstrates that. And I have seen a steady growth in this in
    terms of the dollars that have returned.
        We have got to continue, in my opinion, to discuss with our
    allies the meeting of those responsibilities, because in
    today's security environment they need to invest and they need
    to modernize.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, the ``cost plus 50,'' which says that
    these countries have to pay for housing plus 50 percent, I
    would rather they spent the money on military equipment and
    readiness than, frankly, in a policy like that.
        So, anyway, I yield back.
        The Chairman. I am sorry, that is worth pursuing for just a
    second. There have been a lot of stories about this ``cost plus
    50'' proposal.
        To your knowledge, is it real? Is it something that is
    actually being talked about at the White House or the Pentagon?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I would say with respect to our NATO
    allies in particular, our European presence, we really are
    focused on reaching the commitments that they have already
    committed to----
        The Chairman. I am sorry, that is a different question, and
    if you knew it was a different question.
        The point is, I am trying to get at, are we truly saying to
    our allies that we want you now to pay the cost plus 50 percent
    of our presence? And I know your portfolio is broader, so it is
    not just Europe. Is this something that the Pentagon and DOD is
    talking about, whether it is in Japan, in Europe, or wherever
    our troops are stationed?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. That is the piece where I have to defer to
    our IPSA [Indo-Pacific Security Affairs] colleagues who do
    cover the Pacific, because my understanding is that rhetoric
    came from conversations from the Pacific. It is not a
    conversation we have had in my portfolio at all.
        The Chairman. Okay. Well, just for the record, I think that
    would be a monumentally stupid approach. Our troops are present
    in these other countries primarily for our benefit or at least
    for mutual benefit. And as you can see, as we have seen in
    Japan and elsewhere, where it is incredibly strategically
    important for us to have that presence, it can be difficult.
    And if we start pushing our allies away, I think it is a huge
    mistake, but that is just for the record.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And Ranking Member Thornberry already asked you about
    readiness, but I would like to continue that train of thought.
        I see that our enhanced funding and readiness is due to two
    things. We had a bipartisan budget deal for 2 years that ends
    later this year and we have an administration, the Trump
    administration, that is very serious about increasing defense
    spending. So we are in a good place, comparatively speaking.
        However, if we go backward, if we don't have another budget
    deal going forward that keeps defense spending at a high enough
    level, what is going to happen to our readiness?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, as I said, I think
    predictability is an important part of this. We have got to be
    able to see in the out-years what we think our spending will be
    in order to balance modernization and readiness as well.
        And I think if we were to go back to sequestration, for
    instance, it would be devastating, as it has in the past,
    because then you can't balance that tension very well. One of
    them is going to have to suffer, or probably both.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        On Ukraine, you have already talked about that some and I
    the appreciate that. I have been there and I am aware that the
    people fighting for Ukraine are very brave and they are making
    the most with what they have. In fact, they are even exceeding
    some of the expectations, developing new uses for the equipment
    and armaments that they have in some creative ways. And you
    talked about the Navy. I appreciate that.
        But what more can we do or should do to supply lethal aid
    to land and naval forces to accomplish what you say here is the
    first line of effort to deter Russia? You know, this is the
    front line of deterring Russia.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, first of all, we have
    got a program. We work closely with Ukraine in a couple of
    areas. One is the training piece of this and building
    capabilities. But we are building capability so that they can
    continue to train themselves.
        So, for instance, I am about to transition from training
    battalions down to brigades and above, because they have
    established the ability now to begin training their companies
    and battalions. That is progress that we are making.
        We are also shifting, probably if you looked at the
    training compared to reform and working at a defense
    institutional level, we are shifting more to that, with a
    greater perspective on that, primarily because to help them
    most now we have got to start helping them with their security
    strategy, with sustainability of a security force, and those
    kinds of things.
        And then, finally, more to your equipment question. You
    will see in the latest program that we have provided to
    Congress that that equipment that is in our recommendation is
    based on what they and we agree they need. Within that, there
    are some lethal aid, sniper weapons, ammunition, et cetera, and
    there is also a maritime component that I talked to earlier.
        But I would tell you that that equipment set is based on
    what their chief, their chairman equivalent, has told me as
    well as our counterparts as we work with them.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just add as well that, a more
    political level, we continue to help and encourage Ukraine to
    have the kind of defense reforms and institutional reforms
    necessary to sort of sustain the fight over the long term. That
    includes anti-corruption efforts within their defense industry,
    as well as helping them develop sound civ-mil [civil-military]
    relations, to be able to address this.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And for either one of you, I was in
    Germany last month also, and there seems to be some
    schizophrenia. Germany is a very influential country, the
    dominant economic power of Europe. But on the one hand, Angela
    Merkel was the leading proponent for sanctions against the
    Russians after the invasion by the Russians of Ukraine. But on
    the other hand, they are accepting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline,
    and every time she is asked about it she comes up with a
    different rationale for doing it, almost like they don't really
    know why they are doing it.
        What can we do to help the Germans be more in sync with us
    in opposing Russian aggression?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. You were very correct that Angela Merkel
    has been very key on sustaining the multilateral sanctions
    efforts. And from a political level, one of our key messages is
    having the Germans help us make sure that we sustain that over
    the long term.
        In terms of recognizing sort of the threat to European and
    German security from their reliance on Russian energy sources,
    that continues to be one of our major sort of diplomatic
    efforts at very senior levels, to encourage them to diversify
    their energy sources for the good of their own security as well
    as the good of the alliance.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you both for being here.
        General, I would like to talk about the United States
    response to Russian activities in EUCOM. The U.S. Army Europe
    states that Atlantic Resolve, an exercise to counter Russian
    influence in the region, involves three types of rotation:
    armored, aviation, and logistical.
        According to the Army's own fact sheet, Atlantic Resolve
    involves over 8,000 soldiers, 87 Abrams, 125 Bradleys, about 90
    helicopters, and over 1,000 other various vehicles, which
    doesn't even include the constant rotation of fighter aircraft
    from the Air Force.
        Do you know the approximate cost of Atlantic Resolve to
    date?
        General Scaparrotti. Not off the top of my head, but I can
    provide that.
        Mr. Moulton. We can get that for the record.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mr. Moulton. I'd also like to just--I imagine just simply
    the fuel costs for this exercise is extremely high. It would be
    great to get those costs for the record as well.
        General Scaparrotti. I will.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        General Scaparrotti. Could I make a comment on that?
        Mr. Moulton. Sure.
        General Scaparrotti. The Atlantic Resolve exercise is
    literally the name that we give to this deterrence operation
    that is ongoing. So it is not, you know, in and of itself just
    an exercise. It is, in fact----
        Mr. Moulton. It is a deterrence operation.
        General Scaparrotti [continuing]. A deterrence operation.
        Mr. Moulton. Exactly. I couldn't agree more. It is
    incredibly important.
        Now, last year 4 Army Stryker vehicles collided in
    Lithuania, sending 15 soldiers to the hospital, and within
    hours an anti-American blog claimed a child was killed and
    posted a doctored photo of the incident.
        Now, this is Russian hybrid warfare, and Russia is using it
    actively, aggressively against us today. How much are we
    spending on cyber warfare in Atlantic Resolve?
        General Scaparrotti. Within Atlantic Resolve itself, it is
    not a great deal of money in terms of the cyber business, but
    we do spend a good deal of time training troops and then
    providing the capability.
        Mr. Moulton. So since we are talking about Atlantic
    Resolve, which as you said is the deterrence operation, and
    Russia is literally--this is how Russia is attacking us today.
    I would like to get for the record how much money in Atlantic
    Resolve is being spent on cyber and also just how many cyber
    personnel are involved.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mr. Moulton. Myself, I went to Eastern Europe with Chairman
    Thornberry in 2015, and that delegation really opened my eyes
    to just how pervasive this Russian hybrid warfare is and how
    active it is today.
        Among other things, we learned about U.S. Army tank drills
    in Poland. The Poles were very excited about this. In speaking
    to Army officers there on the ground, I got the impression that
    they felt Putin was probably laughing at us, that he was busy
    undermining European governments of our allies and we are
    conducting tank drills like it was 1950.
        So a young captain, like the one I was speaking to there,
    if he understands this mismatch he can't take the money that he
    is allotted to spend on fuel for his tanks and put it into
    cyber to protect his unit, can he?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, listen, here are a couple of
    responses to your trend here.
        First of all, when you look at hybrid activities you are
    not going to see a great amount of money within, say, even EDI
    against that, it is about 10 percent. Because it is not about
    the amount of money, it is actually how you use your resources.
        And a good bit of it, like the response that we had to that
    accident and then their attempt at disinformation, is built
    within the standard cyber information apparatus that we have in
    Europe. And we did respond to that very quickly and
    effectively, pretty much killed that disinformation campaign
    quickly.
        Mr. Moulton. So you have also stated, General, that this
    requires a whole-of-government approach.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes.
        Mr. Moulton. I certainly appreciate that. The main U.S.
    counterpropaganda program is the Global Engagement Center
    funded by the Department of State. Would you recommend the 24
    percent cut to the Department of State?
        General Scaparrotti. You know, how much that is, is not
    mine to say.
        Mr. Moulton. Would you recommend that?
        General Scaparrotti. I would recommend that we fund the
    State Department to the extent that they can do the critical
    job they need to do, and we depend on that in Europe every day.
        Mr. Moulton. General, I would just like to say, you are the
    commander of EUCOM, and I have deep respect for the incredible
    responsibility you have. But whether Russia is attacking us
    through the Fulda Gap or through the internet, it is your
    responsibility to protect our allies and our troops, and I just
    hope we are modernizing in the right ways.
        Ms. Wheelbarger, you said that the most important thing we
    can do to counter Russian disinformation campaigns is to
    project strength and unity of message in the alliance itself.
    So if I were to, say, describe NATO by saying, quote, ``They
    want us to protect against Russia, yet they pay billions of
    dollars to Russia and we are the schmucks paying for the whole
    thing,'' would that project strength and unity of message on
    the alliance?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just say the unity that we have
    seen over the course of the last 4 or 5----
        Mr. Moulton. Well, how about answering my question? Would
    that project strength and unity if I were to say that?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I think encouraging the alliance----
        Mr. Moulton. Just yes or no, Ms. Wheelbarger.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Could you quote it again?
        Mr. Moulton. How about when the President questions whether
    we would come to the defense of Montenegro if they are
    attacked, our newest NATO member? Raising that as a question,
    does that project strength and unity of the alliance?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I think we should encourage all NATO
    allies to stay on message, that we have a strong Article 5
    commitment to the----
        Mr. Moulton. And I would argue that that might start with
    our Commander in Chief.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Many of my questions have been asked. But with regard to
    Turkey, it is not just the issue of the S-400. I have no doubt
    that the Russians would give the S-400 without a fee to Turkey
    if that would disrupt NATO. So certainly they are an important
    part of our alliance.
        My concern is that they have in the past held U.S. Embassy
    personnel against their will. Now, these are Turkish citizens
    that worked for the U.S. Embassy. Have those issues been
    resolved as the Pastor Brunson issue has been resolved?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I think the U.S. Government recognizes
    both the importance of the alliance with Turkey, but also that
    there are trends in their domestic space that are concerning to
    us. And we will continue to have those difficult conversations
    with our Turkish counterparts on their human rights record or
    other aspects of our relationship.
        I don't think all what we would call perhaps inappropriate
    detentions or political prisoners have been addressed and we
    need to continue to do so over the course of coming weeks and
    months.
        Mr. Scott. I just want to make sure that we take those
    detentions as seriously as we would take the wrongful detention
    of a United States citizen. Those are State Department
    employees and they should be treated with the respect that they
    deserve.
        And, General Scaparrotti, you have talked a lot about
    personnel and training and the resources that you needed. You
    mentioned gaps, in the testimony with Congressman Turner. What
    recommendations do you have for eliminating gaps in coverage?
    And what about your ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] requirements? What percentage of the request
    for ISR is being met?
        General Scaparrotti. The ones that I am most----
        Mr. Scott. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
        General Scaparrotti. In terms of gaps, the ones I am most
    concerned about is ISR, which you just mentioned. I would
    prefer to talk about how much of that is being met in the
    closed session, but I can do that immediately after this.
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General Scaparrotti. Maneuver force, in terms of the size
    of my maneuver force, there are some key capabilities there
    that I require yet. And then also on the maritime, the maritime
    domain, some key capabilities there. And I can talk in details
    on those in the closed session.
        Mr. Scott. Okay. Also interested as well in the transport-
    related challenges of that area. But I will yield the remainder
    of my time, Mr. Chairman, and I will look forward to the closed
    session.
        The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Ms. Wheelbarger and General Scaparrotti, thank you for
    being here.
        Please describe as best as possible in an open setting the
    current state of Russia's efforts to utilize influence
    operations to interfere with elections in the United States,
    including: What is the role of the Russian Government and
    military intelligence? Have we learned any lessons about the
    best way to prevent Russian interference in U.S. elections?
    What should we be doing to accomplish that? And what other
    subversive activities are the Russians engaging in?
    Representative Moulton alluded to cyber as something more
    extensive that is happening.
        If you can touch on that, that would be great.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. As we have discussed previously today, a
    key component of Russia's strategy is to undermine the
    electoral systems of the Western world. That includes the
    United States.
        I think we have made significant progress over the course
    of the last couple years of really understanding their intent,
    but also harnessing whole-of-government tools to do something
    about it, to understand specifically not only what their intent
    is, but how they go about operationalizing that intent.
        Some of our knowledge and how we have countered it, I would
    recommend we move to the closed session to go into more detail.
        I think there is always more to be done because this is an
    area of conflict, quite frankly, that is rapidly innovative and
    constantly changing.
        So it is one of those areas where we can't say we did well
    last election, we don't need to worry about the next one. We
    constantly have to evolve, innovate, and make sure that we stay
    on top of what their capabilities are to be able to counter it,
    both in cyber, but also in the broader messaging domain.
        General Scaparrotti. Generally, I agree. It is both cyber
    information confrontation from their viewpoint, active not only
    in the United States in our election, but within Europe as
    well. And EUCOM has a part to play in this and did in this
    last, most recent activity to counter their interference.
        And I would like to leave the rest of that, as Ms.
    Wheelbarger said, to the closed session.
        Mr. Carbajal. I think just, in general, what I and many of
    my colleagues up here want to be assured of is that, one, we
    are really tracking it, and two, we are countering it, because
    our democracy is at stake. And we saw what transpired in the
    last election.
        And we just can't just sit idly by to learn about it, we
    really need to be aggressive ourselves in countering. And I
    look forward to hearing in a closed setting more about this,
    because it is of really, really great concern.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Cook.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Scaparrotti, it
    is good to see you again.
        I had a couple of concerns about some of the past
    exercises. And one of the exercises that Colonel Ellis, where
    he had, oh, I don't know, I think it was 21 vehicles that came
    from Poland all the way across to Georgia, crossing the Black
    Sea, the Danube. Absolutely incredible. I think they lost one
    vehicle that broke down.
        And the one thing that scared me was, and I have mentioned
    this before, was the EU, and the fact that for some reason they
    didn't get the word, they were a real problem in terms of the
    border police crossing. And it was primarily Romania, which I
    was very, very concerned about.
        I hope we do those type of exercises again. I thought the
    troops, they were exceptional. The vehicles just very, very
    impressive. And we were on the tail end of it.
        And, by the way, Joe Wilson was on that trip. I think he
    has 10,000 pictures of that. If you want to seek--he has copies
    that probably will go to his reelection campaign. No.
        Anyway, any comments on that, whether our relations with
    the EU, because sometimes they seem--I am not going to say as
    much of an enemy as the Russians, but they can be a problem.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
        So EUCOM, working with NATO, and NATO with the EU, all of
    us together, we have taken a crack at this problem. And it is a
    function of our mobility capability within Europe, and it is
    the customs and laws that are different at every border.
        We have been successful in an agreement among the nations
    of specific timelines for the passage of military vehicles, in
    crisis and then for training. So that is the first step.
        Now, the step we are trying to do now is get that agreement
    down to the person at the border. And the way we are doing that
    is, as we continually rotate forces, whether it is for
    exercises or for the rotational force, we are using different
    roads, different rails, different trucking companies, different
    ports, different airports, in order to exercise that muscle
    throughout Europe.
        So we have exercised 22 different seaports, I think 24 or
    26 different airports. Three years ago to move a brigade was
    difficult because of the rules and because of the availability
    and the muscle memory. This past month we moved four brigades
    simultaneously across Europe, and that is real, that is a real
    advance in what we are able to do now.
        Mr. Cook. Just crossing the Black Sea, we had a few
    problems with, I don't know, the maritime administration or
    what have you. I hope that has been resolved. They have never
    done that before. But if we are going to reinforce across that
    large body of water, that is going to be important, I guess.
        I want to shift gears a little bit. I kind of got involved
    in a--it is kind of a foreign affairs problem. But I was very
    supportive of Gibraltar. This subject has come up. I wrote a
    letter or signed on it.
        I got a nasty letter back from the Government of Spain. And
    I had actually had the Catalonians in my office. I entertain
    everybody there. But I was a little perturbed on that, the
    politics. I thought they had overreacted. I am a big supporter
    of the Brits, they have been a friend a long, long time. It is
    close to Rota.
        Has that been on your radar or is this just something that
    I should ignore? I have got enough political enemies without
    having more in Spain.
        General Scaparrotti. It has been on my radar. These are
    policy issues for the most part. It is on my radar because of
    the importance of the passage.
        Mr. Cook. Okay. And the last question, on Sweden and
    Finland. Haven't heard much about them. Lately there was talk
    about is there a possibility they will ever come into NATO.
    Your comments, Joe's comments about submarines. I always
    remember, this shows my age, the ``whiskey on the rocks''
    scenario, and you younger members can read the history books
    about that.
        The Chairman. Analogies aside, if we can get a quick answer
    to that because we are getting close to the time. Sweden,
    Finland, NATO.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Sweden, Finland, great
    allies, working closely with NATO. My sense is there is an
    increasing awareness of this in those countries.
        Mr. Cook. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Brown.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti and Ms. Wheelbarger, thank you for
    being here today.
        General, in your written testimony, you stated--and I know
    you have been asked about it today, but I want to drill down a
    little bit--you stated that 16 NATO countries are now on pace
    to reach or exceed the 2 percent mark established under the
    Wales commitment, one more than you expected around this time
    last year. So that is progress.
        However, in addition to the amount that is being spent on
    defense, we need to ensure that our allies are spending on the
    right capabilities and the right equipment. There is a NATO-
    mandated spending threshold of 20 percent of defense
    expenditures on major equipment and research and development,
    yet according to a CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
    Studies] report done within the last year, only 11 of 28 member
    countries meet this threshold.
        The question is, are there specific capabilities that we
    need more investment in from our allies?
        General Scaparrotti. Today they are at 15 now with the 20
    percent, which is a growth, and I think 11 that said by their
    plan they are going to meet that 20 percent.
        We give them specifically, each country, given the makeup
    of their nation, their location, their capability, specific
    capabilities that we need within NATO, and that is the way that
    is determined.
        But, generally, I would say that the larger things of long-
    range precision munitions and platforms that use those
    munitions, integrated air and missile defense, are two of the
    larger things that are fundamental to security today and what
    we need in Europe.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. And so you are confident that sort of
    like the balance of capabilities between nations and their
    ability to fulfill those requirements, it is either in place or
    on track to be in place?
        General Scaparrotti. I think the system to ensure that we
    get the right things noted to each of those countries is in
    place, but we have to continue to monitor whether or not they
    deliver that capability.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Wheelbarger, on the same line of
    questioning. In 2016, the International Board of Auditors for
    NATO found that under the NATO defense planning process, the
    process by which defense planning activities are harmonized
    across NATO, NATO struggles to deliver capabilities in time to
    meet dates set by its commanders and agreed by the NATO
    nations. I realize that is a 2-plus-year-old audit.
        The question is, what can be done to better ensure member
    nations are investing in the right capabilities and setting
    goals for national or collective development of capabilities?
    Sort of building on what General Scaparrotti mentioned. So we
    have got to stay vigilant. Is there anything in the process
    that we might do better?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Well, I will just highlight one of the
    initiatives coming out of the last summit, which is our 430s
    initiative, which is to increase the readiness across the
    domains of the NATO allies.
        And watching that be implemented over the course of the
    next couple years I think will advance significantly what you
    are talking about, which is ensuring not only that we are
    meeting--that our allies are meeting number targets, but they
    are actually meeting the capability requirements and have the
    readiness of forces to be able to move in a timely fashion to
    actually address burgeoning threats.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. With the little time I have
    remaining, just following up on Mr. Cook's question about
    essentially freedom of movement.
        Last year, General, I asked you about freedom of movement,
    I asked you to rate it green, yellow, red. You may remember,
    you gave it a yellow rating.
        And a few weeks after you testified, the EU released an
    action plan to create a military Schengen zone through a series
    of operational measures that tackle physical, procedural, and
    regulatory barriers which hamper military mobility.
        Using that same traffic light evaluation system, how would
    you rate the freedom of movement in Europe and what could we do
    to improve it?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is definitely improved, but
    it is still yellow. Some of this takes investment in both rail
    and road, particularly bridges and tunnels that meet our
    military needs.
        So it is one of those things, for instance, the EU is
    putting about $7 billion into this. That has got to go into the
    right things at the right places. We in EUCOM have been an
    integral part of mapping this mobility problem out, and where
    are the things that we need to invest in.
        Mr. Brown. Do you know whether the investments in
    infrastructure that can be related directly to freedom of
    movement for military purposes, whether that counts against the
    2 percent? Perhaps Ms. Wheelbarger.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. In certain instances, yes.
        Mr. Brown. It does?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. If it meets military requirements, certain
    investments under NATO standards will apply to the 2 percent.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I was very pleased to see the recent deployment of
    a THAAD [Theater High Altitude Area Defense] battery to Israel.
    I like what it says to Israel, but I like even more what it
    says to people that might wish Israel ill.
        I would like to know from you specifically, what does this
    add to our missile defense posture in the EUCOM AOR [area of
    responsibility].
        General Scaparrotti. Well, an integrated air and missile
    defense system is developed in a layered--the best ones are in
    a layered system. This one adds a high altitude, very, very
    good air defense system within Europe.
        And, importantly, it also gives us the opportunity to train
    with and work with the Israelis within a very good system that
    they have as well, which is something we need to do, given the
    mission to support that defense.
        Mr. Byrne. Do you see us having other needs for THAAD
    batteries or THAAD deployments in the EUCOM AOR?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, I do. And it is a part of our
    system. Again, it is a very good asset, and linked in at times
    with us would be very helpful.
        Mr. Byrne. Do you see other needs changing in EUCOM with
    the end of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. I do.
        Mr. Byrne. What would those be?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, first of all, we
    have been aware of the deployment of the SSC-8 [Russian cruise
    missile system], for instance. So there is a whole-of-
    government approach. There is also a multi-domain approach
    simply from the military that we have already looked at.
        But we have got to begin to look at what our response is
    holistically and work with our allies on that, and we are in
    the process of doing that now.
        Mr. Byrne. And maybe you can't be more specific in a
    nonclassified setting. Can you be more specific than what you
    just said?
        General Scaparrotti. I would prefer to do that in a
    classified session.
        Mr. Byrne. I understand.
        Let me shift over to the three Baltic nations. There was,
    at least a couple years ago, a lot of concern about our ability
    to fulfill our requirements under the NATO treaty with them.
    Where do we stand on that today?
        General Scaparrotti. Sir, within the planning or the
    defense of the Baltics?
        Mr. Byrne. Yes, sir.
        General Scaparrotti. Yeah. Well, NATO has made good
    progress there as well. I mean, we have not only produced a
    plan, we are on the revision of the plan already from lessons
    learned. And it is we in EUCOM, from the U.S. perspective, have
    troops in the Baltics all the time as a part of our planning as
    well and interoperability.
        So I think it has advanced a good deal. It is not done. I
    mean, I think we have got some work to do yet.
        Mr. Byrne. I know that Ukraine is not a part of NATO, but I
    know that you watch it and are involved with it pretty
    carefully. Do you feel like Ukraine is making any progress in
    their efforts to push back against Russian aggression?
        General Scaparrotti. I absolutely do. I see the
    effectiveness and the confidence in their troops on the line of
    contact. It has definitely changed in the time that I have been
    in command. They are confident and good, disciplined, hard
    troops.
        Mr. Byrne. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have some more you would
    like to add to what the general just said about the situation
    in Ukraine?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yeah, I would add at an institutional
    level there is also a healthy recognition in their leadership
    that they have to not only continue to improve their military
    capabilities, but again, as we discussed earlier today, improve
    their and reform their institutions, address their corruption
    challenges within their defense industry, as well as build and
    develop a sort of civ-mil relationship within their Ministry of
    Defence that they have actually made significant progress on.
        And we are going to continue to impress upon them the
    importance of continuing that progress, particularly if they
    want the whole of the U.S. assistance to be able to be
    utilized.
        Congress put a certification requirement for half of our
    assistance to go forward to make sure that they are making
    progress on these reforms, and they are making significant
    progress, including passing a national security law recently
    that they are now in the phase of implementing.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, I just want to say that I really
    appreciate what you said actually is confirming what I have
    been observing, but I wanted to sort of hear it from you. It
    seems like we have made a lot of progress with Ukraine in the
    last couple of years.
        Frankly, I got on this committee, and 1 month later is when
    Russia came and literally took Crimea. And for 2 or 3 years,
    sir, I have got to tell you, I was pretty worried where that
    was heading. But it seems like we have turned that situation
    around or they have turned that situation around with our and
    others' assistance. And I just appreciate the more aggressive
    stance that we are taking in helping them, and I hope that we
    will continue that.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to thank the general for meeting with us, too,
    a couple weeks ago in Europe and for taking the time to meet
    with our delegation, the Speaker, and the people that
    accompanied her, like myself. And we had the opportunity to
    discuss issues that way.
        One of my roles is not just as a member of this committee,
    but also as chair of Europe, Eurasia, global energy,
    environmental issues in Foreign Affairs. And I recall the
    conversation I had with former Secretary of Defense Mattis one
    time, just saying that a lot of the investment issues, a lot of
    the trade issues there we are engaged with, I remember saying
    to him: That may not be directly in your lane, General, when it
    comes to Europe and NATO issues. And he stopped me right there
    and he said: It is definitely right in my lane in terms of
    those issues.
        And you have mentioned the threat of China. When I came
    away even as recently as a couple weeks ago looking long range
    at the challenges that we have and our European allies have,
    China was front and center in my mind coming home with the kind
    of strategy investments they are making. Not necessarily
    economic investments, but investments in obtaining intellectual
    property and to undermine some of the alliances or compete with
    some--in a better way of phrasing it--some of the alliances we
    have with our people.
        Could you comment on the nature of these and the challenges
    and the threats, potentially, of these Chinese investments in
    the European area with our NATO allies as well? I come away
    every time I think of this thinking that is where one of our
    primary focal points should be.
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. If you take a look at Europe
    and you had a map before you and we could draw a circle around
    every seaport, airport, or critical commercial property that
    they have invested in, as an economic investment, one, you
    would be surprised at how many circles there are on that map in
    key places, in key ports and airports, as an economic
    investment by them, but they are security related as well.
        And so as Secretary Mattis said, when I am talking to my
    counterparts and the ministers of defense, that is one of the
    things I point out. I want to make sure they understand this
    isn't just about economics, it is about security also.
        Mr. Keating. Exactly.
        General Scaparrotti. And in the closed session, if you
    desire, I can go into a little more detail in that.
        Mr. Keating. Maybe more specifically, too, and generally,
    one of the things we are moving on in the Foreign Affairs
    Committee as well is giving alternatives with U.S. exports for
    energy and bolstering that. We all know that Russia has used
    that as a weapon in the past.
        Can you comment on the importance strategically of having
    diversity of energy in Europe as well?
        General Scaparrotti. I think it is critical, because we
    have got plenty of examples of Russia using that as leverage
    with countries. And within Europe it is about a third of the
    fuel oil and about a third of the liquefied gas, that they
    depend on Russia for that, generally, but some countries it is
    above 75 percent of their--you know, some of those countries,
    75 percent of their need is given by Russia.
        So it is absolutely a security issue, and diversity helps
    them not be leveraged by Russia in specific ways.
        Mr. Keating. Finally, Ms. Wheelbarger, you mentioned about
    Poland and the discussions. I don't know if you can mention
    this in an open setting, but are part of those discussions on
    issues, like the ones we are having with Poland right now in
    terms of military, do they include concerns about China and
    Huawei and other related issues as an example?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I can assure you that in all our
    conversations with all our European partners we make very clear
    the threat of Chinese investment or development of the
    telecommunications infrastructure in Europe. The specific
    negotiations right now in Poland are very tied to the nature of
    our enablers and the presence there.
        But, again, throughout Europe, our concerns with the
    Chinese building their telecommunications infrastructure and
    the significant importance that has to our security footprint,
    as well as the ability for us to be confident in the security
    of our communications, both private communications as well as
    military, yes. But I am not going to say it is part of the
    negotiations going on right now.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Scaparrotti, you mentioned the great power
    competition requires that we maintain a credible strategic
    deterrence. What contributions will our modernized nuclear
    triad system contribute to European stability and security, to
    the NATO alliance, and to our homeland defense, specifically in
    regards to the B-61 and the W76-2.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, specifically, I think it is just
    simply that that strategic deterrent is the foundation of our
    deterrence. Frankly, it is the most critical part. And we have
    got two adversaries at least, the two prominent adversaries in
    Russia and China, who are well into their modernization.
        So our triad has to be modernized in order to present that
    credible deterrent. And I think the investment that is being
    made is correct, and it is necessary.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Do you think the low yield, the development
    on our part is essential?
        General Scaparrotti. I do. I can talk to that more in the
    closed session, but I think it plays a vital role in this, yes.
        Dr. DesJarlais. You mentioned China and Russia's
    advancement in their modernization. Can you elaborate a little
    further exactly where they are at compared to where we are at
    or where we need to be?
        General Scaparrotti. I missed that, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I said, you mentioned where China and
    Russia are at in their modernization. How does that compare and
    contrast to where we are at and where we need to be?
        General Scaparrotti. They are more advanced in theirs than
    we are.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. In your testimony you discussed
    Russia's whole-of-society approach towards undermining U.S. and
    European objectives. Among other things, you specifically
    mentioned Russia's use of religious leverage. Could you
    elaborate on this whole-of-society approach and specifically
    what is meant by religious leverage?
        General Scaparrotti. For instance, in Eastern Europe the
    Orthodox Church is a very fundamental part of the fabric there
    of lives, and it is a Russian Orthodox Church. In some
    countries, like Ukraine, they have made a decision to have a
    separate Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
        That is being contested by the Russian leadership and by
    the Russian Government itself, and I believe that they promote
    the Russian Government's messaging and preferences through that
    religious capability.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I also have another question or two
    about ISR and hypersonic development. I think that would be
    best served in the classified setting.
        So thank you, and I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
    being here. And, General Scaparrotti, best wishes to you as
    well.
        I wanted to go back. I know you had a discussion about NATO
    and the uncertainty that may perhaps our allies have in the
    region. I wonder if you could just really speak to that
    specifically, what you see, and whether there is an
    acknowledgment, even here, how would you like to see that
    better promoted of really the benefits of the alliance to the
    United States?
        Do you feel that that's been undermined to a great extent?
    Minimal extent? Could you speak about that a little bit more?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think that, first of all,
    there is a recent poll that I saw, and I can't quote where it
    came from, but it stated that at least the support within the
    United States public for NATO had come up this year. I saw it
    when I was in Brussels here not long ago. And that is a good
    indicator of the conversation we have had about NATO and our
    public's realization of the importance of Euro-Atlantic
    security. So I think that has improved actually because of the
    debate.
        There is a part of this, and I think it is true in Europe,
    where we had gone a long time period where we really didn't
    talk about NATO, we just kind of assumed it is important,
    everybody knew that. So this discussion has actually helped in
    some ways.
        The second I would say is what we need to do is we need to
    understand that we need to be collaborative with our allies.
    The nations in NATO understand that each nation in its
    sovereignty makes decisions and that they won't always be in
    agreement among the allies, but what they ask for is
    collaboration. And so that is what I would say is probably the
    most important, is making sure that we bring them in, that we
    are talking to them.
        When we did the INF here in the latter two stages in
    December and February, we were in discussion with them and we
    got a strong statement in support of that because we worked it
    as we went through it.
        Mrs. Davis. Ms. Wheelbarger, would you like to respond to
    that as well? If you could incorporate also the whole-of-
    government approach. You know, we talk about that, but we also
    know that often at the State Department, our diplomatic
    efforts, and the fact that we don't have ambassadors in places
    that we should, that that certainly compromises our ability to
    project power, soft power, if you will.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. So the NATO alliance is, obviously,
    a military alliance, a security alliance, but they have a
    diplomatic component as well. And there are foreign
    ministerials as often as there are defense ministerials.
        So it is very important that the alliance, as we are with
    all our partnerships, quite frankly, that we look at them in a
    whole-of-government context. Our country teams are very
    important around the world. Obviously, having ambassadors in
    place helps us a great deal and having stability and continuity
    of messaging and highlighting the importance of our
    partnerships. So I do encourage the Senate to move forward on
    any pending nominations, because it is extremely important to
    our----
        Mrs. Davis. Do you feel that that has been true and that we
    have been able to counter some of the Russian disinformation
    campaigns that we have seen? Has that approach worked?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I do think we are having successes. As we
    discussed earlier, we could most certainly always do more. We
    do need to make sure, for example, the Global Engagement Center
    that we discussed today is as robustly staffed and pushing
    forward on their mission as they can be. We are in close
    coordination with them on a daily basis to try to encourage as
    much interagency cooperation and forward-leaning activity as we
    can.
        It is a monumental challenge to try to stay both
    strategically on message but tactically agile in this space,
    and it is something that I do actually think we have seen
    successes, both bilaterally as well as in the alliance, in
    getting after the information operations challenge.
        Mrs. Davis. General, you have seen a lot in the European
    theater. What is it that wouldn't surprise you if you were to
    look at a paper 2 years from now and see some changes?
        General Scaparrotti. What would surprise me?
        Mrs. Davis. It is a little bit of the ``what keeps you up
    at night'' question. But I am just wondering, as you are
    leaving, what you can share with us in this setting that we
    ought to pay attention to.
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I kind of usually answer that in
    two ways, frankly.
        One is that we are in close proximity with Russian forces
    in a number of areas today, and at times they are very
    aggressive in their activity, and that I am concerned about. We
    have very disciplined forces, but Russia will occasionally put
    particularly our ships captains in a tight spot with their
    maneuvers. And that is one.
        The other is----
        The Chairman. I am sorry, I am going to have to ask you to
    wrap up so we can get to other people. If you have a quick
    summary, I don't want to cut you off.
        General Scaparrotti. And the second one is Balkans.
        The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chairman. And I appreciate both of
    you being here today. Very grateful to hear your thoughts.
        And, General Scaparrotti, I think forward presence is a big
    part of deterrence, and of course, over the last 25 years we
    have cut that down by about half in your theater.
        I also think a big part is training and equipping our
    allies on the forward line there. And you have talked a little
    bit about Poland, we are having some negotiations now. Can you
    talk a little bit more about the Baltics, because I think they
    are the most vulnerable. What more can we do to ensure or build
    deterrence with our Baltic friends?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, we are now presently making sure
    that we have troops there, as I said, just about all the time.
    I think to do more is to continue to build their capability
    with them, to have our forces present. We try to rotate our
    units out of that rotational unit there as often as we can. So
    that is one.
        We've got to continue to work with them. We need to
    continue to understand their plan vis-a-vis ours so that we
    know that we are nested.
        I think that in terms of our capabilities and theirs in
    indirect activity, below the level of warfare, is very
    important there because that is really Russia's first
    objective, and we can do much in that area as well.
        And then probably intelligence, because there again it is
    we are best as allies. They have some very good intelligence
    capabilities that we just don't have.
        Mr. Bacon. I have been very impressed with all three states
    in my travels there. Is there any interest or need for
    permanent air basing there or surface-to-air missile-type
    basing in any of those three countries?
        General Scaparrotti. I would rather go into that in a
    closed session.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Getting to a question that Mr. Wilson
    asked about our energy reliance on Russian gas with some of our
    bases. If I understood you correctly, you are saying you are
    studying this reliance on Russian gas now to include the new
    hospital?
        General Scaparrotti. With respect to the hospital, in fact,
    there was a requirement in the NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] to look at it from that perspective. And my
    understanding is that is working through this summer.
        Mr. Bacon. We all put that in the NDAA last time, because I
    am concerned. I was the commander at Ramstein at one time, so I
    happen to know that some of our bases there, to include the new
    hospital, do intend on using Russian gas. And it concerns me,
    because in a time of crisis the Russians could just turn that
    off.
        Is our concern well-founded or are we missing the boat
    here? I would just love to get your impression of this.
        General Scaparrotti. No, it is well-founded.
        Mr. Bacon. I have talked to some folks, and if we are using
    this Russian gas and it gets turned off, we could see some of
    our facilities down for 2 or 3 weeks. And I just think we have
    to have that resilience.
        So I would like to make sure I have your commitment or the
    EUCOM's commitment that they are looking at this and building a
    resilience plan.
        General Scaparrotti. You do, you have that. And you also
    can be assured that we look at how other fuels, et cetera, that
    we have to have, that we have got an assured delivery. So we
    look at it across the board.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. One last question on ISR. You have
    brought it up for 2 years now that there is a shortage, and we
    are going to talk a little bit more about it here shortly.
        But there is a proposal, I have seen one in the Pentagon
    that talks about doing away with our manned ISR, relying on
    space or RPAs [remotely piloted aircraft]. In a Phase Zero
    environment, how reliant are you on manned IRS right now?
        General Scaparrotti. I am reliant on manned ISR in a large
    way. But I would also----
        Mr. Bacon. It is a loaded question, I realize. I just
    wanted to hear how important it is to you because I think we
    need to keep it.
        General Scaparrotti. It is important. But I also think a
    mix is important, too.
        Mr. Bacon. I agree.
        General Scaparrotti. You know, a man in the loop there and
    driving it gives you some capabilities that an unmanned one
    doesn't. So I think both are important.
        Mr. Bacon. I absolutely agree, we need a mix, but I don't
    think walking away from manned ISR anytime in the near future
    makes sense, because I think in Phase Zero that is the lion's
    share of your intelligence production.
        Is there a EUCOM requirement to utilize--the F-35 has an
    extraordinary amount of sensors on board. And day-to-day
    operations, even a Phase II environment, that would be a big
    source of intelligence.
        Is there is a requirement there to get that information off
    the plane back to the AOC [air operations center] so the joint
    users can use that data?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, there is. I can talk about that
    in a closed session as well, but it is an incredible aircraft.
        Mr. Bacon. That is great to hear.
        I yield back, Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Sherrill.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
        Thank you both for being here to testify today. I actually
    served at CINCUSNAVEUR [Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces,
    Europe] as a Russian policy officer when it was in London. So I
    can tell you from personal experience how key our alliances are
    and our ability to project our power. And we have heard
    testimony in this committee about how key our alliances will be
    in our new National Defense Strategy.
        So I think I was particularly concerned about reports from
    the Munich Defense Conference about the success of Iran in
    courting our allies as we have seen a growing kind of schism
    between the United States and our traditional allies in Western
    Europe, politically speaking at the very least.
        I know you spoke a bit about Iran in opening statements,
    and I was wondering if you could comment on what you are seeing
    with respect to the influence of Iran and what we are doing to
    combat that influence.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Our European partners obviously have some
    differences of opinion on some issues with respect to Iran, the
    JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] being one of them.
        From our perspective in the Department of Defense, our
    goals over the last 2 years have been very much to stay aligned
    at a mil-to-mil or MOD [Ministry of Defense] level to make sure
    that we have a shared understanding of the threat, particularly
    the multi-natured of it, whether it be the cyber threat, the
    ballistic missile threat, the maritime threat.
        And so--most of our work is focused on making sure we are
    aligned in how we see the threat and what joint efforts,
    whether they be planning or messaging, we can do to contest it.
    So we actively engage our European partners.
        It is true that we, again, we have differences of opinion
    about the JCPOA, and we have been attempting to keep the mil-
    to-mil and MOD relationships strong so we can both understand
    the threat and be prepared to respond if we can and need to
    together.
        Ms. Sherrill. And do you think that is resonating with our
    allies, that they understand the threat that Iran poses?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I do think there is an increasing
    understanding, particularly with respect to the ballistic
    missile challenge.
        I think the threats emanating from Yemen, in particular,
    into Saudi Arabia and UAE [United Arab Emirates] that pose a
    significant real day-to-day threat to our partners in that
    region and potentially risk sort of a regional conflict in a
    way that nobody wants to see, there is an increasing
    understanding of that challenge. I mean, we are even seeing
    some of our European partners start talking again about
    sanctions related to the missile program.
        So those are the sorts of activities that the Department of
    Defense is very much focused on with respect to Europe and
    Iran.
        Ms. Sherrill. Great. And then just to give some context, do
    you have a sense of what percentage of the telecom
    infrastructure China has been involved in, in Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. What I would like to do, I can give
    you that in the closed session. I would just say that there is
    substantial involvement in telecommunications in specific
    countries, some included NATO, NATO countries.
        Ms. Sherrill. Great. Thank you both.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        As I mentioned at the outset, we have a hard stop at noon.
    As the questions have sort of generated here, there is a lot of
    stuff to talk about in the classified setting. So I am going to
    stick to that, which means in all likelihood Mr. Gallagher and
    Mrs. Luria are the last two people who are going to ask
    questions, unless they do it really quick. So we will see.
        Mr. Gallagher, you are up.
        Mr. Gallagher. First of all, I would agree with what the
    chairman said earlier that any cost plus 50 demand on our
    allies would be--I forget the adjective he used, monstrously
    stupid, something to that effect, stupendously ill-advised,
    extravagantly dumb. I just think it is the wrong time to be
    sending that message and would like to go on record as agreeing
    with the chairman in that regard.
        I want to pull the string on the earlier line of
    questioning. General Scaparrotti, help us tease out sort of the
    operational implications of companies like Huawei and ZTE
    signing contracts with Germany, or take your pick, European
    allies. What does that actually mean from an operational
    perspective? How does it affect you as a theater commander?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, we are concerned about their
    telecommunications backbone being compromised in the sense
    that, particularly with 5G, the bandwidth capability and the
    ability to pull data is incredible. And with that system you
    also tend to get an Internet of Things.
        So its influence is much greater. This is a big difference
    from 4G. And because of that, it would have a critical impact
    on our ability just to communicate with those nations, some of
    which are NATO nations.
        Now, secondly, if it also is inside of their defense
    communications then we are not going to communicate with them
    across those defense communications, and for the military that
    would be a problem.
        Mr. Gallagher. Are there ways to mitigate that problem from
    your perspective, besides convincing them not to sign those
    contracts in the first place?
        General Scaparrotti. Probably best to ask to someone that
    does this, but to my knowledge right now, to be sure that we
    have a secure system, I don't know of one if they are shifting
    to Huawei.
        Mr. Gallagher. Ms. Wheelbarger, do you have anything to
    add?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yeah. Having looked into Huawei quite a
    bit a few years ago, I realized the challenges of even having a
    mitigation plan or strategy for the 4G infrastructure. Given
    the sort of generational shift that is between 4G and 5G, I am
    not aware of something that would give us the kind of security
    we would need to mitigate the challenges that it would impose
    on us.
        Mr. Gallagher. Appreciate that. General, I know you are a
    ground guy, but something we are trying to pay more attention
    to on the Seapower Subcommittee is mine warfare. Since World
    War II, sea mines have damaged or sunk four times more U.S.
    Navy ships than all other means of attack.
        Do we have a capacity and capabilities gap in the
    Mediterranean with respect to the Russian mine threat? I would
    just be interested in your thoughts on that.
        General Scaparrotti. Within that capability we rely on our
    allies to provide part of that. I think with our allies we are
    doing pretty good. But as a U.S. only, I would say we probably
    have a gap.
        But, again, that is one of those where you look at your
    allies, what capabilities they have and where can they do a
    mission, so that we can apply our capabilities in other areas.
    So I am pretty comfortable with it right now.
        Mr. Gallagher. And then there was an earlier line of
    questioning, I forget from who, that seemed to suggest that
    investments in tanks in Eastern Europe were not as efficacious
    as perhaps investment in cyber, or it was an either-or
    scenario. I would like to give you a chance to respond to that.
    I mean, what role do systems like tanks play in doing
    deterrence by denial in Eastern Europe?
        General Scaparrotti. Yeah, I am glad you allowed me to come
    back to that.
        It is not an either-or. In today's world this is a multi-
    domain environment that we are in. And the Russians have a very
    credible and increasing mechanized armor capability,
    particularly in our east, across the border. And you can't say
    it is simply one or the other. It is all things, cyber
    connected to that.
        Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate that.
        And I yield the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Hill.
        Ms. Hill. Are you ready? I just didn't have my stuff out.
    Give me a moment.
        Mrs. Luria, can I trade with you?
        Mrs. Luria. Well, General Scaparrotti and Ms. Wheelbarger,
    thank you for being here today.
        General Scaparrotti, in your prepared remarks you noted the
    increase in Russian maritime presence in the Eastern
    Mediterranean and the deployment of the submarine Severodvinsk
    in the northern Atlantic. And in the past 15 years we have
    really focused our naval efforts in both the CENTCOM [U.S.
    Central Command] and the PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]
    AORs.
        Does this submarine deployment and other Russian naval
    activity increase the need that you have for U.S. naval
    presence in EUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. Yeah, that is the basis of my request
    for an increase. For instance, in the Med, we saw the largest
    grouping of Russian ships in probably 15 years, it was 8 Kalibr
    [cruise missile] shooters, 12 ships total.
        Mrs. Luria. And so to add to that, public reporting shows
    that those Russian ships are also operating in coordination
    with the Chinese in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Is
    that correct?
        General Scaparrotti. I wouldn't go so far as to say in
    coordination. They do train together from time to time in small
    numbers.
        Mrs. Luria. So NATO has four standing NATO maritime groups,
    SNMGs. I am particularly interested in SNMG 1 and 2. So in the
    past 3 years has the U.S. provided consistent rotational
    presence for both of these maritime groups?
        General Scaparrotti. I think we provided the presence that
    they expect. We rely on our NATOs to fill, you know, our NATO
    allies to fill those mostly.
        Mrs. Luria. So we don't consistently participate? Am I
    correct in saying that we have only participated in the last 4
    years when we were the flagship in charge of the group?
        General Scaparrotti. Usually when we are the flagship, that
    is correct. But we typically have the ships that are also at
    sea in other areas.
        So I think, again, this is one of those where you look at
    what capabilities you have and what nations can provide and
    what we are best at providing.
        Mrs. Luria. So having operated with NATO allies, I know
    that it takes a long time to fold in, to become proficient in
    the C2 [command and control] architecture operating with NATO.
    So if we don't consistently operate with our NATO allies and
    have that practice and officers and crews who are knowledgeable
    about how to integrate with those C2 systems, does it really
    reinforce our commitment to NATO that when we show up to the
    fight we are ready to fight in a coordinated way?
        General Scaparrotti. We work in a C2 architecture with NATO
    every day, 24 hours a day. And we can bring a ship in and out,
    connect and disconnect, we keep that architecture, both air and
    sea, up.
        An example of that was the fires into Syria with two of our
    NATO allies, put together in about 72 hours, a very intricate
    high-end mission, and we executed it time on target.
        So to your point, we do have to work with them, but it
    doesn't necessarily mean they have got to be in that group. But
    we do have to work with them throughout exercises and day to
    day.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. And shifting topics, did the Navy provide
    your requested carrier presence in FY [fiscal year] 2019? And
    saying that this is an unclassified setting, would you classify
    that as roughly one-half, one-third of what you requested did
    you actually receive?
        General Scaparrotti. I would say no, and it was less than
    half.
        Mrs. Luria. And we have shifted to the Optimized Fleet
    Response Plan, the OFRP, and that creates more surge capability
    than it does actual deployed capability for our naval forces.
    As a combatant commander, which of those two is most important
    to you for doing your mission?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, again, mine is predictability.
        Mrs. Luria. Right. So is it more important for you to have
    presence in the Mediterranean and the northern Atlantic, or to
    have the ships ready a week away next to the pier in Norfolk
    and Mayport?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, to answer your question, the
    system that the Navy has shifted to has actually given me more
    capability at the times that I need it in very large ways, like
    Trident Juncture [exercise], and in an unpredictable pattern
    for our adversaries.
        So it has improved; it is not everything that I want.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. Thank you. I yield my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        If I may, Ms. Hill, I am going to do this a little
    awkwardly here, it is not worth getting into, but we are going
    to take Mrs. Hartzler and Ms. Hill before we get done. We will
    just do it that way.
        So, Mrs. Hartzler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Then,
    after, this I will recognize Ms. Hill for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. You are not obligated to take all 5, however.
        Mrs. Hartzler. You bet. You bet. I am going to talk quick.
        Follow up on two lines of questioning from earlier to
    expand a little bit. You mentioned and we talked about the
    Chinese influence in Europe and their economic presence. You
    mentioned the seaport investments, the airport.
        But last year we had a joint military exercise between
    China and Russia, and I don't believe we talked about that yet.
    So can you discuss some of China's military objectives in the
    region and what we should take away from such partnership
    events as the 2018 Russia and China war games?
        General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it was just to show some
    unity when they can. They did take part in the war games in
    Russia's eastern command this year. But while significant in
    the fact that the two were working together, and we should
    recognize that, it was not all that Russia promoted it to be.
        And, again, in terms of their operations within Europe,
    again, it is in small numbers, not highly involved operations
    when they do it, or at least exercises, but it is becoming
    routine. And, again, we need to pay attention to that.
        I think their objective is, China's objective is to show
    their presence in Europe, not only in an economic way, but in
    small ways with their military.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great.
        We talked about the infrastructure issues and the freedom
    of movement. I was encouraged to hear about moving the brigades
    and the advancements we have had.
        But specifically with railroad track gauges, this is
    something that came to our attention through this committee a
    couple years ago, and I have been really trying to focus in on
    this.
        Can you tell me kind of what is being done to address some
    of these challenges?
        General Scaparrotti. That is predominantly, as I noted
    before, that is the work that we are doing through NATO and EU
    to focus that infrastructure funding that they are doing on
    things like that, and that is one of the major ones. It is
    still not resolved.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Is there any discussion taking place about
    changing the railcar capabilities versus the gauges. I come
    from a farm equipment background and my first thought was, why
    can't you just have the wheels on the actual railroad car be
    able to move in and move out?
        General Scaparrotti. I don't know the answer to that
    question.
        Mrs. Hartzler. All right. Well, it might be something worth
    pursuing.
        Thank you very much, and I yield back. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Ms. Hill.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for dealing with me
    making the situation awkward, particularly when I sit down at
    the wrong chair and can't find my questions.
        But, Ms. Wheelbarger and General Scaparrotti, thank you for
    being here.
        In 2018, Greek officials said that there was irrefutable
    evidence that Russia was working to interfere with negotiations
    over North Macedonia's name change and its accession to NATO.
        Can you describe what that was, as well as what the U.S.
    and other alliance members' counterresponse was?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Yes. I think we saw the basic behavior
    that we typically see from Russia, which is information
    operations attempting to sow discord within North Macedonia, to
    suggest that NATO was not in their future, that the East was
    really to their future.
        So it was really across the spectrum of what we see from
    Russia. I think what we said, we discussed a little bit
    earlier, they did not have the success they were expecting.
        I think in some ways, I heard from the North Macedonians
    recently, that Russian efforts to undermine NATO actually
    worked against them. NATO has a very strong standing within
    North Macedonian society, and that we were able to--the North
    Macedonians themselves did a very effective job in countering
    those messages and getting out in front of the messages before
    they were even sent from the Russians.
        Ms. Hill. Okay.
        General Scaparrotti. I would agree.
        Ms. Hill. Great. Thank you.
        And what has the U.S. been doing right or wrong in the
    Balkans? And I will continue with that so you don't have to
    answer multiple things. What risks still exist and what more
    should be done?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. As General Scaparrotti said earlier, the
    Balkans remains one of our areas of most concern. It has a
    historical legacy of fomenting discord. I think the Russians
    are very much active there, whether it be religion, ethnicity,
    or other aspects of the society. In all these countries they
    are seeking to pull them apart and pull them away from the
    West. We can always do more to influence their decision making
    and try to bring societies there along to the West.
        I think of particular concern for us right now are the
    ongoing challenges between Kosovo and Serbia and we have sort
    of a whole-of-government effort to try to get them back to the
    table to resolve their differences.
        I think we could probably be better at making sure, just in
    general, that our messages as a government are aligned so they
    understand clearly that we want them to negotiate this amongst
    themselves and that we see it being in both Serbia and Kosovo's
    favor to do so quickly.
        General Scaparrotti. Yeah, I would leave it at that in the
    sense that I think a redoubled effort within Kosovo and Serbia
    for their resolution of those problems, as well as what comes
    beyond the Dayton Accord within Bosnia, just a renewed focus
    from the West I think would go a long way. Because the people
    need to see that we are still engaged and supportive of their
    desire to look West.
        Ms. Hill. And when you say consistency, where is the
    disconnect there? What do you see that manifesting in?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Maybe for closed door I can explain a
    little bit more. But I just think we need to make sure that we
    are always explaining that all of their tools should be on
    their table to solve and bring to normalization in the best
    interests of those two countries. There are ongoing disputes
    about the tariffs, for example, in Kosovo and how we should be
    addressing that challenge. I think we need to be putting this
    always in the broader context of what is the best for the two
    countries.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you so much. And I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 13, 2019

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 13, 2019

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        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 13, 2019

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

        Mr. Larsen. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you highlight
    Russia's violation of the Open Skies treaty as undermining military
    transparency in Europe. But late in 2018, the State Department stated
    that Russia was back into compliance. It seems to many of us, myself
    included, that this Administration is inherently hostile to arms
    control agreements with Russia, as demonstrated by INF withdrawal and
    the lack of public commitment to extending New START. But I know that
    allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, value the information gained
    from Open Skies flights, and see this treaty as a key component to
    stability in the region. In light of the State Department certification
    of Russian aircraft, can you please clarify your statement on Russia's
    compliance with the Open Skies Treaty, and speak to the interest our
    allies have in the U.S. remaining in the treaty?
        General Scaparrotti. Our European Allies place great value on the
    Open Skies Treaty as well as other arms control treaties and
    agreements. Despite this, many of our Allies are frustrated with
    Russia's lack of compliance, or partial compliance, with arms control
    agreements. NATO issued strong unified statements in support of the
    U.S. position on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, placing
    blame for the demise of the treaty solely on Russia. On the Open Skies
    Treaty, State Department originally cited Russia for noncompliance in
    three areas. The first violation involved Russia giving priority to air
    traffic over Open Skies missions over Russia, resulting in the
    overflights being delayed or canceled altogether. In Sep 18, Andrea
    Thompson, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, stated that Russia
    had corrected this violation during testimony to the Senate Committee
    on Foreign Relations. Second, Russia remains in violation of Open Skies
    for limiting the flight distance allowed for countries conducting
    missions over Kaliningrad, preventing them from fully observing that
    strategically sensitive enclave. Many Allies, not just the U.S., have
    encountered this violation. Missions over Russia so far this year
    confirm that these restrictions remain in place and that Russia is
    still in violation of the treaty in this area. The third violation
    involves Russian-imposed limits for flights near the Georgian
    territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia recognizes them as
    sovereign countries, not party to the Open Skies Treaty, and therefore
    restricts flights from coming within 10 kilometers of the Russian
    border with those territories. Georgia, the U.S., and all other
    countries party to the treaty, with the exception of Belarus, disagree
    with this position. Russia suggested it would resolve this issue in
    late 2018, however, during a recent 2019 mission Russia again refused
    overflight within 10 kilometers of its borders with South Ossetia and
    Abkhazia and remains in violation of this provision of the Open Skies
    Treaty.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
        Mr. Rogers. The Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania remain a
    high priority for me because they provide first line missile defense
    capabilities for our allies in EUCOM against Iranian missile threats.
    I'm disappointed to hear that there has been significant delay on the
    Poland site. When do you expect this capability to be on-line? How much
    of a slip is that from the original project start? Who is being held
    accountable for this mismanagement? How is EUCOM working to get this
    project back on track?
        General Scaparrotti. The Aegis Ashore Poland site is on track to
    achieve Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) along with Operational
    Acceptance in CY 20. This will be approximately 18 months from the
    planned TCD of Dec 2018. This project was delayed for several reasons,
    including underestimating project complexity, slow mobilization, and
    challenges with staffing of skilled trades. Missile Defense Agency,
    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the United States Navy, continue to
    use all available tools to keep the project on track for CY 2020
    completion.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
        Mr. Gallego. A number of congressional colleagues, particularly
    those not on this committee, are often surprised to hear that we have
    no permanently based troops in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, despite
    them being NATO allies. The main reason given for this state of affairs
    is that Russia would be upset by our proximity to their borders. Why
    does Russia continue to get a veto of NATO and U.S. activity within the
    alliance when Moscow persists in fomenting unrest along those borders?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Russia has no veto on U.S. or NATO activity.
    Allies recently agreed to invite Montenegro and North Macedonia to join
    the Alliance despite the Russian Government's strong objections.
    Additionally, NATO has seen a remarkable increase in defense spending,
    readiness, and exercises over the past few years. Our forces in Europe
    are postured to provide our theater commander the maximum flexibility
    to deter aggression and to defend, fight, and win should deterrence
    fail. This is in accordance with our National Defense Strategy concept
    of Dynamic Force Employment and our Global Operating Model. U.S. force
    posture is closely linked to, and integrated with, that of our NATO
    Allies. Each Baltic State, and Poland, enjoy the presence of a NATO
    enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup of approximately 1,200
    military personnel. The United States is the framework nation for the
    battlegroup located in Eastern Poland. The United States is also a
    regular contributor to the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission over
    Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which provides a continuous presence of
    Allied fighter aircraft that are ready to respond quickly to the
    violation of the Baltic States' airspace. In 2018, more than 6,000 U.S.
    military personnel trained and exercised in the Baltic States and more
    than 28,000 personnel, along with U.S. strategic bombers, guided
    missile destroyers, and U.S. Navy carrier aviation, were present in the
    broader Baltic Sea region providing deterrence. U.S. military personnel
    are permanently assigned to the NATO force integration units located in
    the Baltic States as well as to various multinational headquarters, and
    centers of excellence.
        Mr. Gallego. A number of European Deterrence Initiative projects
    are on the list of MILCON projects that are at risk of cuts associated
    with the President's National Emergency declaration. Please identify
    which specific EDI MILCON projects, designed to increase readiness and
    lethality, previously identified by DOD as critically needed to deter
    Russian aggression, and funded by Congress, are less important than a
    wall in Texas, Arizona, or California?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. On March 19, 2018, the Department identified a
    complete pool of unawarded military construction projects from which
    funding could be reallocated to support the construction of a border
    barrier. The Department is reviewing the pool of unawarded projects,
    focusing on those projects with award dates planned for fiscal year
    2020 or later, in order to minimize potential impacts due to a delay in
    funding. No military housing, barracks, or dormitory projects will be
    impacted. No definitive date has been set for the Acting Secretary of
    Defense's determination on the use of Section 2808 authority or for
    identifying a final list of military construction projects that could
    be deferred.
        Mr. Gallego. The President's Budget Request once again puts
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) money in the Overseas Contingency
    Fund (OCO). How can you effectively deter Russia using 1-year money?
    Isn't deterrence a multi-year, continuing commitment? Should EDI money
    be in the base budget?
        General Scaparrotti. Yes, EDI money should be in the Department's
    base budget as base budgets have greater stability. The sustained
    funding of EDI by Congress has been instrumental in ensuring a ready
    and capable force in order to implement the National Defense Strategy
    as well as fulfilling the deterrence and military missions assigned to
    USEUCOM and its Components. While it has been included as part of the
    OCO budget since its inception, the Department annually develops an EDI
    multi-year budget plan to ensure all stakeholders, to include Congress,
    have an understanding of what future investments are required.
        Mr. Gallego. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, recently retired
    commander of U.S. Army Europe, has said that he could support basing in
    Poland if NATO as a whole agreed to it. What is your position on basing
    in NATO's east? Have you pushed NATO as an organization to agree on
    additional U.S. or allied basing in Poland, the Baltic States, or the
    Baltic Sea region?
        General Scaparrotti. NATO's rotational enhanced Forward Presence
    battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are demonstrating
    NATO's commitment to deterrence and posturing for defense in
    northeastern Europe. We believe that permanently stationing U.S. forces
    in NATO's east would be unnecessarily provocative, and that many of our
    Allies would not be supportive. It would give Moscow an easy
    opportunity to claim that NATO is an aggressor and provide Russia a
    narrative that they need to respond to protect Russian sovereignty.
    Additionally, a base in Eastern Europe may not even be necessary, as
    our exercise and deployment program, along with the placement of
    prepositioned stocks, are part of a robust effort to ensure sufficient
    deterrence. U.S. Army forces execute regular rotational deployments
    from their home stations in the U.S. to Central and Eastern Europe.
    These deployments enhance Army readiness and exercise those exact
    processes required to rapidly deploy in a real crisis.
        Mr. Gallego. A number of congressional colleagues, particularly
    those not on this committee, are often surprised to hear that we have
    no permanently based troops in Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, despite
    them being NATO allies. The main reason given for this state of affairs
    is that Russia would be upset by our proximity to their borders. Why
    does Russia continue to get a veto of NATO and U.S. activity within the
    alliance when Moscow persists in fomenting unrest along those borders?
        General Scaparrotti. Russia does not have a veto on U.S. or NATO
    rotational or permanent force posture within the Alliance. U.S. and
    NATO posture is based on multiple strategic and operational
    considerations. These includes existing U.S. and NATO policies, such as
    the Alliance's continued adherence to the NATO-Russia Founding Act
    which provides a commitment to all of the parties that Allies would not
    to permanently station substantial combat forces on the territory of
    former Warsaw Pact nations. Other critical considerations include
    maintaining the combat readiness of our forces to respond to a crisis
    wherever one might arise, military mobility within the theater, and
    managing the risk of escalation in light of a pattern of unsafe
    behavior by Russian personnel in close proximity to NATO and U.S.
    forces.
        Mr. Gallego. A number of European Deterrence Initiative projects
    are on the list of MILCON projects that are at risk of cuts associated
    with the President's National Emergency declaration. Please identify
    which specific EDI MILCON projects, designed to increase readiness and
    lethality, previously identified by DOD as critically needed to deter
    Russian aggression, and funded by Congress, are less important than a
    wall in Texas, Arizona, or California?
        General Scaparrotti. European Command continues to focus on
    identifying the requirements needed to successfully execute the
    missions and responsibilities tasked in the National Defense Strategy.
    The Department's military construction program (funded by the base
    budget as well as the European Deterrence Initiative) is critical to
    establishing a combat-credible posture in Europe. In particular, the
    infrastructure and prepositioning projects supported by military
    construction will set the theater to enable the rapid deployment of
    U.S. forces to the theater as well as increase military mobility within
    the theater. Delaying the implementation of these projects lengthens
    the window of increased risk to strategic competition with Russia and
    deterrence and defense in Europe.
        Mr. Gallego. In his announcement that he would declare a national
    emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said,
    quote: ``We have certain funds being used at the discretion of
    generals''. . . ``Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of
    the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple
    of them--they think this is far more important than what they were
    going to use it for. I said `What were you going to use it for?' I
    won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me.''
    General Scaparrotti, do you believe that unallocated funds designated
    for USEUCOM are better spent at the southern border than in USEUCOM?
        General Scaparrotti. The Department's military construction program
    (funded by the base budget as well as the European Deterrence
    Initiative) is critical to establishing a combat-credible posture in
    Europe in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. In particular,
    the infrastructure and prepositioning projects supported by military
    construction set the theater to enable the rapid deployment of U.S.
    forces to the theater as well as increase military mobility within the
    theater. Delaying the implementation of these projects lengthens the
    window of increased risk to strategic competition with Russia and
    deterrence and defense in Europe.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you have any concerns about China's influence over
    European information and communication technologies, such as
    development of 5G networks across Europe? Is this something you are
    monitoring? Are there any actions needed?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. The Department of Defense is indeed closely
    monitoring China's influence in Europe, in particular, as Chinese
    information and communication technology firms, such as Huawei and ZTE,
    increase investments in the European market. Although 5G and other
    emerging technologies are certain to improve vastly our communication
    with Allies and partners across the globe, these new tools also present
    new challenges and vulnerabilities that adversaries are likely to
    exploit. We are working closely with our NATO Allies and with our
    European partners to reinforce an informed and forward-leaning
    collective approach to dealing with Chinese investment in European
    information and communication technologies and address potential
    threats from Chinese investments, technologies, and other influence in
    a clear manner.
        Ms. Stefanik. In light of the new cyber strategy and out recent
    efforts to keep our 2018 elections secure from adversarial influence,
    can you update us on how your relationship is maturing with U.S. Cyber
    Command?
        General Scaparrotti. [The information was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you have any concerns about China's influence over
    European information and communication technologies, such as
    development of 5G networks across Europe? Is this something you are
    monitoring? Are there any actions needed?
        General Scaparrotti. [The information referred to is for official
    use only and retained in the committee files.]

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