[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-10]
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 7, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
36-296 WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
KATIE HILL, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Justin Lynch, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....... 6
Waldhauser, Gen Thomas D., USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.. 9
Wheelbarger, Kathryn, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.......... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Votel, GEN Joseph L.......................................... 72
Waldhauser, Gen Thomas D..................................... 114
Wheelbarger, Kathryn......................................... 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Haaland.................................................. 155
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 155
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brown.................................................... 161
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 159
Ms. Haaland.................................................. 165
Mr. Keating.................................................. 163
Mr. Langevin................................................. 159
Ms. Sherrill................................................. 164
Ms. Speier................................................... 159
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 165
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 7, 2019.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. I call the meeting to order.
Welcome. Before we get started, just one quick
announcement. I made the announcement yesterday and sent it
around. We are going to, on the questioning, go in reverse
order this morning, so least senior and on up.
So welcome to this hearing. We are having our posture
hearing this morning focusing on CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]
and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], and we are very honored this
morning to have with us General Thomas Waldhauser, who is the
Commander of U.S. Africa Command; and General Joseph Votel, who
is the Commander of U.S. Central Command; as well as Ms.
Kathryn Wheelbarger, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs.
I want to begin by thanking General Votel and General
Waldhauser. I know you are very sad that this is your last
opportunity to testify before Congress and have this hearing,
but I want to make special note of it and thank you both for
years of outstanding service to our country. It has been a
pleasure working with both of you.
And this morning we are going to hear specifically from you
about what is going on in your areas of responsibility, and
they are areas where there is a lot going on in terms of our
national security concerns.
Beginning in Africa, we have a presence throughout that
continent, and there are a number of issues we are concerned
about. I think it begins with the threat from transnational
terrorist groups, both in the Horn of Africa and in West Africa
as well. We look forward to hearing an update on how our
efforts are going there, both to keep those transnational
terrorist threats at bay, also how are we working with our
various partners both in the region and allies in NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] to help contain that threat.
And then the overall issue in that region continues to be
stability, particularly in Somalia and Libya, and how are we
doing on building sustainable governments in those places so
that we can reduce the threat.
We are also curious, as we have made the transition from
better than a decade of primarily focusing on the transnational
terrorist threats to a new era of great power conflict in
Russia and China. And Russia and China I know are involved
throughout Africa, also in various places within the CENTCOM
responsibility, so hearing about what they are up to as well
will be of concern.
In CENTCOM, we continue to have a specific focus on Iraq
and Syria as the caliphate is just about wiped out, but ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is still a presence in that
region, as are other transnational terrorist threats, and
certainly the same is true in Afghanistan. So getting an update
on that is our primary concern.
Now, as a general rule, we want to try to get to the point
where we do not have to have a military presence in as many
places in the world as we have. That is my personal objective.
We would like to rely on partners, reduce the necessity of us
having troops abroad, but at the same time, we have to make
sure that we are meeting our national security objectives and
protecting ourselves from that.
And the one comment I will make, and I know this is not
either of your gentlemen's doing, but we need a consistent
policy that our allies can rely on. I think it is problematic
when we make dramatic altering decisions in what seems like the
blink of an eye in a Presidential tweet.
It is not that I don't think we need to get to the point
where we reduce our troop presence in Syria and Afghanistan; it
is just not something we should do in that ad hoc a manner. It
catches our allies off guard and creates problems.
I was reading extensively where it has significantly
damaged our relationship with President Macron in France. He
was caught completely by surprise by our decision that we were
going to pull out of Syria.
Now, the truth is, we are building towards a drawdown in
Syria. The point was, you know, we wanted to build up to defeat
ISIS, remove the caliphate, and get to the point where we could
pass responsibility off to partners in the region.
And if we had discussions with our allies and announced
those plans in a rational way, I think that would help maintain
the strength of our alliances. So we are concerned by the way
the policy seems to bounce around from day to day.
The same is true in Afghanistan, as the announcement was
made a couple months back that we were going to--I believe the
tweet was completely pull out of Afghanistan. I know that
hasn't happened and I know there has been updates since then,
but a more consistent policy, I think, would help us maintain
our allies and help build the confidence in the United States
that is necessary to maintain those allies and maintain our
interests.
I look forward to testimony from both of you.
And also, Ms. Wheelbarger, appreciate you being here as
well. You are not retiring, I am sorry. It is sort of like
their day in that regard. But we appreciate your work as well.
We thank you all for being here.
With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr.
Thornberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to welcome our witnesses and express my
appreciation and respect for General Votel and General
Waldhauser. My understanding is General Votel's change of
command will be at the end of this month, General Waldhauser's
sometime this summer.
I think it is worth just stopping for a second and
reflecting on the significant progress that has been made
against certain terrorist networks in recent years. To me, 2014
doesn't seem that long ago, but ISIS controlled an area the
size of Great Britain, and today, we are talking about the last
village and a tremendous change of affairs on the ground.
Somalia has been a challenge for us when it comes to
terrorism for a long time, and my sense is that we have made
tremendous progress there as well. Now, this progress is a
result of a lot of folks, including some decisions by this
administration, to untie the hands of our military to be more
effective. But the two gentlemen before us had been at the
center of those efforts in various capacities--SOCOM [U.S.
Special Operations Command], CENTCOM, AFRICOM, commands on the
ground--and each of them has played a leading role in making
this progress. And I think it is important to step back and
reflect.
Like you, Mr. Chairman, I share the concerns about where we
go going forward. We made a lot of progress on terrorists, but
they are not gone. As a matter of fact, in some ways, they have
spread out and are more difficult to locate. And so we must
maintain pressure on terrorist networks, and yet because of the
rise in great power competition, our resources have to be
spread in a variety of different ways.
And while we maintain pressure on terrorist networks in
CENTCOM and AFRICOM, there is great power competition going on
in both of those regions as well, which we cannot lose sight
of. Many of us have seen that firsthand as we travel to Africa
as well as to the Middle East.
So there is a lot to talk about. I want to, again, just
return to appreciation for the--not only their service, but the
successful results of their leadership in these challenges that
we have faced, and I look forward to the conversations to come.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And we will begin with Ms. Wheelbarger.
STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Ms. Wheelbarger. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for inviting me to testify on policy matters related to the
United States Central Command----
The Chairman. I apologize, but could you pull the
microphone a little bit closer to your face there.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I will try to speak up.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Wheelbarger [continuing]. Alongside commanders General
Votel and General Waldhauser. I would also like to take this
opportunity to thank the men and women of the Department of
Defense, their families, whose dedication--and their families.
Their dedication, their talent, and sacrifice enable us to
execute our policies around the world every day.
You said this may be General Votel's last hearing. This is
my first, so I wanted to take this opportunity to thank the
committee for your strong collaboration and bipartisan support
that you provide the Department of Defense. That is a vital
contribution this committee makes to our dialogue on defense
issues nationwide.
My time as a senior staff member with national security
committees in both the House and in the Senate instilled in me
a great respect for the leadership that this committee provides
and the invaluable contribution you provide--connection you
provide to the American people.
Students of military history spend a great deal of
attention on the relationship between military commanders and
statesmen or, rather, the proper level of civilian oversight of
military activity and operations. An equally important
component of military history is understanding national will,
and that is the will to see threats clearly, approach them with
sound policy, and remain committed to the country's defense
even when the cost seems high.
In the American system, the U.S. Congress is a fulcrum
point where thoughtful oversight and sustained national will
can come together. It is a noble and sometimes difficult
challenge, and we at the Department appreciate your unique role
in ensuring our military has the resources, authorities, and
the legitimacy necessary to deter and defeat any foe.
It is a great privilege and honor for me to be here today
with two very devoted commanders to explain our defense policy
to these regions. Our policy approach is nested in the guidance
from the 2017 National Security Strategy [NSS] and the 2018
National Defense Strategy [NDS].
In support of the NSS goals to protect the American people,
defend the homeland, and promote prosperity and peace from a
position of strength, the NDS focuses on three aspects of U.S.
power: our lethality, our partners and allies, and our
institutions. It sets long-term competition with other states
as our top national security priority even while we continue to
address regional and terrorism threats.
To compete in today's complex security environment, to
defend future generations of Americans against near-peer
competitors, and to manage ongoing threats from North Korea,
Iran, and terrorist groups, we must make certain adjustments to
our posture. We must also avoid prioritizing urgent problems at
the expense of building readiness and capacity for potential
high-end conflict into the future. We must deter and confront
adversaries, while avoiding miscalculation or escalation that
would distract and ultimately undermine our national security
interests.
In the Middle East and Africa, our policy objective is to
increase regional stability and secure and advance U.S.
interests working by, with, and through a network of
international partners. By enhancing the capabilities and
capacity of our partners, we reduce the risk to our homeland
while increasing the internal security and stability of
vulnerable states, often playing a supporting role to other
government agencies and partners in the region.
Specifically with the Middle East, it remains vitally
important to our national security interests for four
fundamental reasons: First, we are involved in active
operations at the request of and support to our partners in
countering extremists that threaten the region and the
homeland; second, the Middle East is the crossroads of global
competition with Russia and China; third, we face an aggressive
Iran whose actions destabilize the region; and finally, our
national security and economy depend on open commerce through
the Middle East maritime domain and the free flow of natural
resources. We must remain postured and engaged throughout this
region.
To that end, DOD's [Department of Defense's] policy
objectives are to ensure continued success in our campaign
against ISIS and al-Qaida and in support of our partners in the
region, while also preparing to compete with China, Russia, and
Iran for regional and global influence. We also invest in
sustainable partnerships to reduce vulnerabilities of weak
states as part of a whole-of-government effort to address
instability.
With our partners, we have ongoing CT [counterterrorism]
campaigns in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We also are investing in
defense partnerships that continue to allow us to gain far more
than we invest in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and throughout
the Gulf. Our partners are key to securing our interests in the
region.
We understand the importance and trust emplaced upon the
Department of Defense for the security of every American, and
our commitment to our national security and prosperity in this
theater remains strong even as we address a host of other
current and future threats.
In Africa, vast, diverse, and dynamic, Africa is a
continent of opportunities as well as challenges, with a
possibility of surging in either direction. The Department must
remain engaged in the region to foster positive trends and
arrest the negative ones.
As outlined in the 2018 DOD Strategy for Africa, the
Department will continue to pursue African-led security
solutions while maintaining the ability to act unilaterally to
protect U.S. citizens and interests. As such, DOD supports U.S.
whole-of-government efforts to address African security
challenges, leverages international partnerships to support
U.S. security objectives, maintains strategic access and
influence, and seeks low-cost, resource-sustainable, and
innovative security solutions.
Employing our by, with, and through approach, we use a
variety of tools, including capacity-building programs,
security assistance, military equipment sales, education,
training, and exercises to work closely with African and other
international partners to achieve our policy goals. Those goals
are to, first, seek to advance U.S. interests and influence in
the region and maintain strategic access, which is especially
important in an era of increasing near-peer competition;
second, we seek to deny safe haven to terrorists and disrupt
their ability to direct or support external operations against
the U.S.; third, we seek to support our Department of State and
other interagency colleagues by securing U.S. diplomatic posts;
fourth, we strive to grow current partners and develop new
relationships; and finally, we seek to enhance African partner
capability to achieve our shared objectives into the future.
In conclusion, the Department is well positioned to address
the range of dynamic issues facing the United States in the
Middle East and Africa. Our balanced approach helps ensure the
Department can meet a variety of present and future threats,
while enhancing the strength and agility of our forces.
I thank you for the opportunity to share our views today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Votel.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Votel. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
honored to testify alongside Acting Assistant Secretary Katie
Wheelbarger and my friend and fellow Minnesotan, General Tom
Waldhauser.
I come before you today on behalf of the men and women
working tirelessly across the Central Command area of
responsibility. They are the best, and I am proud to stand
among them as their commander. All of these great Americans
have families and communities across our country that support
their service members from near and far, and we are equally
proud and appreciative of their service and sacrifice as well.
CENTCOM remains a dynamic, challenging, dangerous, yet
hopeful area of responsibility, an area of great contrast and
contradiction, rich with history, culture, youth, and
resources, but riven with sectarianism, violence,
disenfranchisement, and economic disparity. It is an area where
we retain vital national interests, preventing attacks on our
homeland, countering malign and destabilizing influence,
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce through
critical international waterways.
I would like to use my time this morning to give you a
quick overview of our key ongoing operations and opportunities.
In Afghanistan, the President's South Asia strategy is working.
The efforts of our Special Representative for Afghan
Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, show there is a
path to progress, but there is much left to do to achieve our
end state of reconciliation between the Government of
Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Toward this end, our military efforts are focused on
supporting the Afghan Security Forces and providing Ambassador
Khalilzad the maximum military pressure and leverage to support
his diplomatic efforts to establish a framework that will lead
to an Afghan dialogue, a reduction in violence, and ultimately,
a negotiated settlement.
Importantly, we cannot forget that Afghanistan was used as
a platform to attack our citizens and homeland in 2001, and we
have to ensure this never happens again. Safeguarding this
national interest and preventing violent extremist
organizations like al-Qaida and ISIS in the Khorasan from
plotting attacks against our country is also a continuing
effort for our forces, one that we will need to be prepared to
address as long as violent extremists can operate from this
region.
In Iraq and Syria, the unrelenting efforts of the 79-member
Defeat-ISIS Coalition, the determination and bravery of the
Iraqi Security Forces and our Syrian Democratic Force partners,
has largely liberated the so-called physical caliphate of ISIS.
An area of 34,000 square miles which they once controlled, now
reduced to less than a single square mile. Reduction of the
physical caliphate is a monumental military accomplishment, but
the fight against ISIS and violent extremism is far from over.
While ISIS has been battered by the Syrian Democratic
Forces and coalition forces, we should be clear that what we
are seeing now is not the surrender of ISIS as an organization,
but a calculated decision to preserve the safety of their
families and preservation of their capabilities by taking their
chances in camps for internally displaced persons and going to
ground in remote areas and waiting for the right time to
resurge.
Recent observations by our men and women on the ground
highlight that the ISIS population being evacuated from the
remaining vestiges of the caliphate largely remain unrepentant,
unbroken, and radicalized. We will need to maintain a vigilant
offensive against this now widely dispersed and disaggregated
organization that includes leaders, fighters, facilitators,
resources, and, of course, their toxic ideology.
And the broader international community will need to
determine how we deal with the thousands of fighters and family
members now being held and safeguarded by the Syrian Democratic
Forces. In my view, this is a serious generational problem that
if not handled properly will sow the seeds of future violent
extremism.
As the Defeat-ISIS campaign in Syria transitions from
liberating terrain to enabling local security forces and
addressing the ISIS clandestine insurgency, we will continue
our deliberate withdrawal of forces and capabilities as
directed by the President, but also retain a residual force on
the ground to continue our mission and safeguard our interests.
These details are being developed now and will emphasize
campaign continuity and capitalize on the contributions of our
coalition partners.
In Yemen, the fragile cease-fire on the port of Hodeidah is
a promising albeit increasingly challenging to implement step,
demonstrating some willingness on both sides of the conflict to
negotiate and end this humanitarian disaster. Towards this
objective, CENTCOM supports the diplomatic efforts and work of
the United Nations special envoy to facilitate the peace
process by providing advice and assistance and serving as an
interlocutor through our trusted relationships in the region.
We also remain steadfast in reminding the Saudi-led
coalition partners of their obligations under the law of armed
conflict and ensuring that the fight in Yemen does not spread
across the region, sowing more instability and threatening
critical infrastructure and U.S. lives and interests.
In Yemen, we also face a threat from violent extremist
groups. To address this, we work closely with our indigenous
partners to disrupt these organizations to ensure they do not
have the capability or opportunity to attack our country or
citizens or those of our partners. I assess that our current
efforts are keeping these organizations in a state that limits
their ability to conduct external operations. We must continue
to do this.
Against the backdrop of these conflicts is the Iranian
regime. Their efforts are not limited to the support they
provide to the Houthis in Yemen. They strive to be a regional
hegemon and use malign influence, qualitatively and
quantitatively expanded capabilities, and facilitation and
support to multiple proxies to exert pressure, threaten other
countries in the region, supplant U.S. and Western influence,
and threaten access to critical waterways vital to global
commerce.
Our military efforts here are focused on supporting a
broader U.S. Government pressure campaign through deterrence,
assurance, and competition. Our longstanding military
relationships with partners across the region are critical to
this effort. The Iranian regime remains the long-term
destabilizing factor in this region.
We do see reasons for optimism across the region. The
capabilities and resilience of the Afghan special operations
forces are notable and mark them as a reliable counterterrorism
partner for the future.
The emerging relationships in the Central Asian states look
to provide us opportunities in an area long dominated and
influenced by Russia and China. An Iraqi Security Force that
has risen from the ashes of 2014 and now proudly and capably
protects their country against ISIS resurgence can be a bulwark
to future extremism.
Egyptian armed forces have more effectively fought ISIS in
the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the
underlying issues that give life to these violent extremist
groups and are helping to contain the threat.
Steadfast partners like Jordan are making the most of the
support we provide to maintain their singularly unique role of
moderation in the region.
A highly innovative and increasingly professional Lebanese
armed force is emerging as a legitimate protector of their
nation and a good partner to us.
And partners across the Gulf join us in countering
terrorism, providing security in the maritime environment, and
effectively defending against missile threat.
And so it goes in the Central Region today and every day,
great promise and opportunity mixed with contradiction and
conflict.
Let me conclude my remarks where I started, with our people
and their families. They are the best America has to offer, and
they continually demonstrate commitment and devotion to our
Nation, our mission, and to each other. They deserve the best
equipment, the best pay, the best health care, and the best
housing. Their commitment is surpassed only by the families
that support them, and they deserve our best as well.
As I conclude my tour in the next few weeks as the
Commander of U.S. Central Command, I want to thank all of you,
members of this committee and your staff, and indeed all of the
Members of Congress and the staff, for your strong support to
our men and women in uniform, our Department of Defense
civilians, and their families.
I ask for your continued support to provide our service men
and women everything they need to accomplish their missions and
lead healthy, fulfilling lives in continuing service to our
Nation. Thank you again for allowing me to represent CENTCOM
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in
the Appendix on page 72.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Waldhauser.
STATEMENT OF GEN THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Waldhauser. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to update you on the efforts of United
States Africa Command. I am also honored this morning to be
here with General Votel and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger to
discuss the challenges we face in our respective areas of
responsibility.
I would like to begin this morning by remembering the
soldier we lost on the continent during operations in Somalia
this past year. I offer my sincere condolences to the family of
Staff Sergeant Alexander Conrad. We honor his commitment,
service, and dedication to duty.
We also honor the sacrifice of our African partners who pay
the ultimate price advancing peace and development across the
African continent. Additionally, we thank our families, our
service members, our civilian workforce, especially those who
serve on the continent, oftentimes in remote locations, for
their professionalism and commitment to AFRICOM'S mission.
2019 marks the beginning of AFRICOM's second decade as a
combatant command. As we enter this period, we have adapted our
strategy for Africa based on updated national guidance, which
includes the President's 2017 National Security Strategy and
the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy.
Specifically, the National Defense Strategy has shaped the
focus of the armed services, outlining broad guidance to
enhance readiness for high-end combat, while instructing the
combatant commands, among other things, to strengthen alliances
and attract new partners.
The recently released U.S. Strategy Toward Africa, the
Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism refocused our whole-of-government
approach in the era of great power competition to advance U.S.
influence and maintain strategic access across the globe.
Taken comprehensively, the overall U.S. strategic interests
in Africa are very clear: Support the U.S. whole-of-government
efforts to address security challenges; leverage partnerships
to prevent transnational threats from overwhelming African
governments or endangering U.S. interests; maintain strategic
access and advance American influence, including economic
opportunities; counter violent extremist organizations; and
protect U.S. citizens and the homeland.
To underscore the strategy for disrupting extremists, we
remain committed to synchronizing our kinetic authorities.
Persistent pressure on Al Shabaab, ISIS, and the al-Qaida
associated groups remains necessary to prevent the
destabilization of African nations.
U.S. strategic interests on the continent cannot be solely
advanced through the use of military force alone. AFRICOM uses
the military tool in concert with diplomacy and development in
order to negate the drivers of conflict and create opportunity
for the African citizens.
In Somalia, we work closely with the ambassador, now
permanently located in Mogadishu, and the USAID [United States
Agency for International Development] mission director to help
the Somalians assume responsibility for their own security and
prosperity.
In Libya, our counterterrorism commitment supports the U.S.
charge who works closely with the international community to
prevent civil conflict and facilitate the political
reconciliation process.
Additionally, our engagements, exercises, and activities
throughout Africa are designed to increase U.S. influence,
strengthen local security forces, and ensure our status as the
preferred security partner. For example, in East Africa, our
programs continue to modernize partner security forces as in
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, who export security and contribute
forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia.
In North Africa, we have seen significant return on
investment with Tunisia and Morocco demonstrating the capacity
to absorb advanced U.S. programs and lead the security-related
exercises and operations.
AFRICOM provides training, advice, and assistance to the
western African nations which make up the G5 Sahel Force, as
well as to the multinational joint task force working to
contain violent extremism and secure the borders within the
Lake Chad basin countries.
Our partner networks and influence ensures access for U.S.
forces in times of crisis to protect U.S. personnel and
facilities, such as in Djibouti, a location with strategic
significance to multiple combatant commands.
In conclusion, the most important use of the U.S. military
tool on the African continent is when our engagements emphasize
relationships, capacity building, and professionalism. Our
activities go beyond military maneuvers and tactics. They focus
on a range of professional values, such as respect for the rule
of law, human rights, and the integration of gender
perspectives.
I am proud to lead a team of professionals who have built
strong and trusting relationships with African partners, the
U.S. interagency, and the international community to foster
security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
On behalf of the service members, civilian employees, and
the families of United States Africa Command, thank you for
your support, and thank you for the opportunity to be with you
here this morning.
[The prepared statement of General Waldhauser can be found
in the Appendix on page 114.]
The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
When we get into the questions--this has come up--we try to
keep it to 5 minutes. And I apologize to the witnesses, if we
hit the 5-minute mark, I will try and cut you off. If there is
a question you haven't answered, sometimes you can submit that
for the record, although we try to keep it to 5 minutes both in
terms of the answers and the questions.
And with that, we will start with Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you to the witnesses for being here
today.
And thank you, Ms. Wheelbarger, for mentioning the Middle
East maritime domain, because that is what I would like to
focus on today.
Approximately 5 years ago, the Navy implemented the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which resulted in more surge
capability but less deployed on-station time for our carriers,
basically switching from a 24-month cycle to a 36-month cycle.
And, General Votel, in fiscal year 2019, was your request
for carrier strike group presence met?
General Votel. Congresswoman, no, we did not have carriers
all the time that we would like them, and so we had to work
solutions that included other platforms and other coalition
partners to help meet those requirements.
Mrs. Luria. So understanding that this is, you know, an
unclassified hearing, could you quantify just maybe one-half,
one-fifth, one-third, approximately the amount of carrier
presence you received versus what you requested?
General Votel. Congresswoman, I will take that for the
record so I can give you a precise answer.
[The information referred to is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Mrs. Luria. Okay. So you alluded to this a little bit in
your previous comment, but was your allocation for carrier
presence sufficient to meet your ongoing security needs that
you have in the region?
General Votel. The presence that we have had has been
sufficient to support the ongoing operations that we have been
supporting in Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria in conjunction
with our land-based capabilities.
Mrs. Luria. And would you feel that they meet the
requirements that you have for maintaining maritime presence in
the AOR [area of responsibility]?
General Votel. In some cases, we have been challenged in
these areas of continuing to do that, so this, again, is
something that we have to work with our coalition partners on
to help offset this and--at times when we will not have the
presence that we would like, and we look to use our coalition
partners to help do that. And I think we have successfully done
that.
Mrs. Luria. So pivoting back to the impacts on you as a
combatant commander of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and
the idea that it creates more surge capability versus more
deployed capability, as a combatant commander, which of those
is more important to you?
General Votel. Well, I think certainly in CENTCOM, a key
part of our responsibilities is assurance, and we do that
through our presence, engagements, and other things we do, and
deterrence against, you know, the influences in the region that
would pursue malign activities.
So those to me are the most important aspects that they
provide for us, and, of course, you know, directly supporting
the freedom of navigation and commerce through the critical
choke points that exist in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Mrs. Luria. So to leverage on your comments, the surge
capability that is being created by the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan where the carriers are, for the most part,
remaining CONUS [continental United States] but available on
demand, obviously adding a transit time to report to your
theater, is limiting some of the capability you might have to
respond in a contingency?
General Votel. Well, I think we are early on in the concept
right now. So, you know, I know the Department has successfully
done this in other combatant commands. I have benefited from
some of that capability residually being able to operate in my
area and come down in my area. So we will look for
opportunities. We are looking for opportunities where we can
apply that concept as well.
So I think we have a ways to go yet before we declare that
this is not a concept that works. I think we have seen it work
in other combatant commands, and we look forward to trying it
in CENTCOM as well.
Mrs. Luria. Okay. So finally, just to wrap up, do you feel
confident in your ability to execute contingency plans
potentially from our adversaries who might become a maritime
threat within the region based off of the limited carrier
presence that you have had over the last year?
General Votel. Congresswoman, I do. I do.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you. I
especially want to thank your families who truly bear the
burden of your service. You love what you do, I know, but they
truly have to bear the burden. It is a team effort.
So I think broadly what the National Defense Strategy is
trying to do, and it is a tough one, is how do we deal with the
metastasizing Islamic extremist threat, peer competitors, rogue
states, Iran, North Korea, overlaid with $22 trillion in debt?
And what strikes me about your AOR is that it really is the
cross section. It is really the confluence of China's One Belt,
One Road, Russia's Middle East--push into the Middle East, of
Iran's hegemony and, of course, the heart of the extremist
threat.
In reading your written testimony, what concerns me a bit,
what I want to ask you about specifically as it comes to a
couple of the theaters, is just kind of language in there
shifting to being a supporting command, of doing more with
less, of doing with less resources, particularly in the AFRICOM
AOR. And while, of course, we do and this committee needs to
help you invest in those near-peer or peer, I would say now,
adversaries, I am very worried of the pendulum swinging too far
and taking our eye off the ball in this extremist threat that
is maybe on its back foot but is absolutely not defeated.
And looking at your testimony in the Senate, I think you
agree that ISIS and al-Qaida, you know, ISIS in particular may
be defeated as a caliphate but not as a movement. In fact, I
would argue, and tell me if you disagree, that that movement is
growing and metastasizing, particularly across North Africa and
absolutely can return to threaten the United States again.
So looking at Afghanistan in particular, where half the
world's terrorist organizations emanate, where the 9/11 attacks
emanate, and reading recent reporting of a withdrawal based on
a 5-year timeline as part of General Miller and Zal Khalilzad's
negotiations, you know, I feel like I am getting transported
back to 2009 with President Obama announcing withdrawal
timelines.
Do you, General Votel, think timelines as part of our
strategy is a good idea, and have you been consulted on that
timeline? Is that your best military advice?
General Votel. I think, Congressman, I think most of us
would say that these decisions have to be based more on
conditions than on specific times. But I am certainly aware of
the ongoing discussions here and, you know, have provided my
advice. My advice is that any decision to reduce forces in
Afghanistan should be done in full consultation with our
coalition partners and, of course, the Government of
Afghanistan. It should pivot off political progress in the
reconciliation process.
Mr. Waltz. Do the conditions on the ground now merit a
withdrawal? And that is both a question for you and for you,
Ms. Wheelbarger.
General Votel. Congressman, we have not been directed to
withdraw. There are no orders to withdraw anything. I have no
orders----
Mr. Waltz. But--and your advice is do the conditions merit
a withdrawal, a reduction of forces, but whether it is the
conditions of the Afghan Army, which I would think we would
agree is not ready to stand on its own, or the battlefield
conditions from a CT perspective.
General Votel. Well, it certainly is a function of the
conditions on the ground, but it is also a function of the
conditions in the political process as well.
Mr. Waltz. Right.
General Votel. And so as I indicated, as I talked about, my
best military advice is that we should make decisions based on
the political process----
Mr. Waltz. I am sorry, General, just in the interest of
time, do the conditions now merit a withdrawal and your advice
on--you know, 4 years at CENTCOM, on your way out?
General Votel. The political conditions where we are in the
reconciliation right now don't merit that.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. General Waldhauser, I only have a few
minutes. If I could ask you for the record to submit where we
are on American citizen Jeff Woodke held hostage in Mali, what
assets are being dedicated to find him. I think we owe the
families that and all American citizens that, where we are. If
you could submit that for the record, it would be great.
I understand with optimization you are shifting to a 25
percent withdrawal in a theater that was already an economy of
force where, again, the Chinese and Russians are increasingly
involved and we have a growing extremist threat. What are you
not able to do with that reduction? What risk are we taking?
General Waldhauser. First of all, Congressman, on the
Woodke issue, I will submit that, and we can talk about it in
closed session.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
General Waldhauser. Secondly, with regards to optimization,
I know we just have a few seconds left to go here, but I just
want to emphasize the fact that optimization on the African
continent has to do with counterterrorism strategy only. It is
a very small niche.
And what we have been directed to do and what we have said
we will do are two different things. And moreover, we have been
directed to do a cut for the first--an optimization or
adjustment or cut for the first 18 months, which takes us out
to June of 2020, and I think the number the Pentagon has used
was about 10 percent.
So it is difficult to get into the numbers because they
move around all the time. But if you say that there is 6,000
military people on the continent today, then that number is
roughly close, but in the next 18 months we will optimize some
conventional forces and some special operations forces,
primarily in areas where their work is pretty much done, where
they have----
The Chairman. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has expired.
If you could summarize.
We will move on to Mr. Golden.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. Just to follow up a little bit on my
colleague's questioning about Afghanistan. General Votel, could
you tell us, in your opinion, if there were a negotiated
withdrawal of U.S. forces without a Taliban-Afghan peace deal
that accompanied it, could the Afghan Security Forces at this
time provide for their own security and maintain a stable
government without U.S. forces on the ground or air support on
the battlefield?
General Votel. My assessment is the Afghan forces are
dependent upon the coalition support that we provide to them.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. This question is for Assistant
Secretary Wheelbarger. You know, it has been widely reported
that our government is engaged in peace talks with the Taliban.
In your opinion, or have you seen any indication at all that
the Taliban is willing to consider expanding talks to include
the Afghan Government at this time?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will preface by saying that Assistant
Secretary Schriver actually is responsible for Afghanistan,
Pakistan. I do cover NATO, so it is very important for me to
follow so we can stay in close alignment with our RSM [Resolute
Support Mission] colleagues.
All indications I have is that the negotiations are
proceeding with--in a positive direction. I think we all agree
that it is important if we are going to reach the level of
agreement where the insurgency is no longer a concern, it is
going to have to involve an Afghan-Taliban reconciliation.
Mr. Golden. So to summarize, given the current security
situation on the ground, without, let's say, tri-party
negotiations and a settled peace deal between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban to include the United States, we are
not on, let's say, a roadway to getting to withdrawal?
Ms. Wheelbarger. Again, I would want to defer to my
colleagues who cover this specifically, but I do think that we
are seeing that this is an opportunity that we have not
necessarily seen before and the military is poised to continue
supporting the efforts of the reconciliation talks.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. Just shifting gears a little bit.
And, General Waldhauser, Semper Fi. Very good to see you, sir.
Last year, you testified in front of the Senate Armed Services
Committee that climate change was causing some security
challenges in Africa in Sahel. It has been about a year, and I
saw some recent reporting with ICRC [International Committee of
the Red Cross] noting that temperatures are rising about 1.5
times faster than the global average, and I think in this
region we have got about 50 million people who depend upon
livestock and therefore need land. And I think your comment was
that you were seeing grasslands receding on average about a
mile per year, which is pretty significant.
I just want to give you the opportunity here, about a year
later, to follow up on that testimony and tell us how you
perceive the evolving situation in Sahel, what impact climate
change is having on the security situation in the region in
regards to competition over scarce resources, and how does this
impact the mission of AFRICOM? What kind of steps are you
having to take in order to ensure that we don't see conflict?
General Waldhauser. The climate change situation continues.
The area between--in the Sahel, between the desert to the north
and the savannah in the south, the grasslands, those continue
to recede. And this has caused problems between the farmers and
the herders. And oftentimes, governments aren't able to
establish control or laws or legislate that particular
situation. So consequently, this becomes an opportunity for
armed engagement within the various farmer-herder populations.
Secondly--so that is on the security side, if you will.
Secondly, on the humanitarian side, the issue of food
insecurity and displaced personnel is a huge issue which
continues. So this climate issue has some security aspects both
kinetically, if you will, as well as humanitarian.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Chairman. And, General Waldhauser
and General Votel, thank you for always, during your long and
very successful careers, setting the highest standards and
being an outstanding example of not only keeping those
standards, but raising the bar. As someone who served a few
days in uniform myself, I am proud as I look at what kind of
leadership the young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and
coastguardsmen have today. So thank you for your long service.
A little over a decade ago, having had the opportunity to
sit in some interesting meetings in places like Fallujah or
others and participating with various entities, tribes who
wanted to come and talk to American military leadership, could
you, if you will, describe--I have my--in the memories in my
mind what those meetings were like. Could you describe what
security cooperation and coalition building, give a couple
examples in your arena, some of the--for some of our folks who
maybe haven't sat in one of those meetings?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Congressman. I will take a
shot at that first. You know, we are building an airstrip on a
Nigerien compound in Agadez, in northern Nigeria--Niger. And
one of the first times I went up there I met with the local
population because they were very interested in what was going
on. And you have a very, very diverse group of individuals who
have different and sometimes overreach in terms of expectations
about what we can do with them.
And so not only to build the airfield there, we have a
significant civil-military engagement program so that we work
with the schools there to provide desks, we work with the
medical people there to provide extra care, and we do things
like find children who are lost in the middle of the desert, to
help that population.
So the bottom line is, your actions speak louder than
words, and sometimes with diverse groups, small things go a
long way. And it is important to understand the capabilities
and limitations, and their expectations therefore can be met.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
General Votel. Congressman, I would add that one of the
most successful coalition efforts that we have in CENTCOM is
our coalition maritime force that operates in the waters of the
Gulf and, in some cases, outside of the Gulf. And these involve
nations in the region and, in fact, some nations from outside
of the region who contribute people and ships to our--to the
combined maritime force and help us conduct operations that are
focused on counter-piracy, on combating terrorism, and on
providing security in these critical waterways.
And in all of these cases we have three subordinate
combined maritime forces that operate under our naval commander
in the region. These are all led by coalition partners. And
these are all deeply valued relationships and missions by our
coalition partners.
And the authorities and the resources that are provided to
us by Congress to maintain these things I think are being very
well used. And it is one of the ways that we help make them
more resilient, more capable of addressing their own security
concerns. So of many coalition efforts, this is one that stands
out in my mind.
Mr. Bergman. Would either of you, just using Djibouti as an
example, in an unclassified way, explain why we are there in
that particular place, and also what other countries might be
exerting a presence there now that maybe weren't there a while
ago?
General Waldhauser. The strategic geography of Djibouti is
significant to our national strategies, and although it is in
the AFRICOM AOR because as Djibouti is, various COCOMs
[combatant commands], to include CENTCOM, utilize that
location: CENTCOM, SOCOM, EUCOM [U.S. European Command],
TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]. So this is a very
strategic location for us.
And I would tell you that this issue of either optimization
or being able to share assets, CENTCOM and AFRICOM share
assets, in this particular case ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance] assets, attack aircraft assets,
and we use Djibouti as a hub that allows us to be more
efficient in use of some of our material.
General Votel. No, I would absolutely agree. And I think it
also makes better use of our resources. When we are able to
shift resources back and forth across our combatant command
boundaries, I think we are making better use of the resources
the American people provide to us, and I think we are actually
being more effective in terms of it.
So locations like Djibouti, I think, are incredibly
important to what is going on. Of course, it sits astride the
Bab al-Mandeb, one of the three critical choke points. We do
see the presence of others in the area. Certainly, the Chinese
have interests here and are steaming in the waters of the
Central Command on a regular basis.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you. I hate to cut you off, but I know
the chairman is going to say my time is expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate you for doing that
for me. But thank you.
Ms. Haaland.
Ms. Haaland. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, and thank
you all for being here this morning. Really appreciate it. And
thank you for your service to our country.
I understand that the framework for the negotiations
between the U.S. and the Taliban would see Taliban vow to
prevent the country from being used as a hub for terrorism in
return for a U.S. military withdrawal.
While Taliban leaders have recently expressed willingness
to acknowledge some fundamental women's rights, I am deeply
concerned that respect for human rights be a core part of the
framework for peace. Any negotiated settlement must include
respect for human rights and the rights of women in particular.
Women's equality is enshrined in the Afghan Constitution, and
the women of Afghanistan should have a seat at the negotiating
table.
General Votel, can you tell me how the framework addresses
the rights of women in Afghanistan and how women are being
included in the negotiation process, if you can?
General Votel. Thank you. Thank you, Congresswoman. So I
think at this particular point where we are in the ongoing
talks is that Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts are really focused
on developing a framework that can lead to intra-Afghan
discussions. And this involves, I think, overcoming some
obstacles that right now are preventing the Taliban from
talking to the Government of Afghanistan. But, again,
Ambassador Khalilzad is working through those issues. And then
once that--once those intra-Afghan discussions are commenced,
then I think we will have the opportunity to address the issues
that you are talking about directly.
But I am aware, while these are being led by our Department
of State colleagues and Ambassador Khalilzad in particular, I
am aware that, exactly as you state, it remains key points that
we are interested in ensuring are included in the overall
discussions and framework.
Ms. Haaland. Thank you so much for that.
I would like to turn now to the Afghan women serving in the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. And if you can
answer this question, how many women are currently serving in
the Afghan National Army, and how are the challenges in
recruitment and retention being addressed, and is that
recruitment sustainable?
General Votel. Congresswoman, I will take that question for
the record so I can provide you a precise response.
[The information referred to is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Haaland. Thank you so much.
And this question will go to Assistant Secretary
Wheelbarger. Thank you so much for being here. Can you tell me
how your office is pursuing the implementation of the United
States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I don't directly cover that issue, so
unfortunately, I think I am going to have to take that for the
record, and I will converse with my colleagues who are
responsible for it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Ms. Haaland. Okay. Thank you so much. I would appreciate
that.
And I yield back my time, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much.
And thank you, both of you, for--I join my colleagues in
congratulating you on your careers. I wish you well in your
retirement. Your families deserve some of your time.
I would like to follow up on Mr. Waltz's questions about
AFRICOM, if I could. Given the discussions about reducing our
footprint there, could you define for me what impact it may
have on our counterterrorism effort in Africa, and does that
undermine or threaten some of those efforts?
General Waldhauser. First of all, let me just say that with
regards to the terrorism effort, for sure. Somalia and Libya
will really have--there is no impact there. There is no
optimization. There is really no cutback. We will maintain our
capability and capacity there. And by the way, those are the
two countries on the continent where we have authorities to
conduct kinetic operations.
In other areas in the continent where we were directed to
take a look at this, we looked at the locations where we have
been training with partner forces for some time, in some cases,
5, 6, 7 years. And so for the most part, those units are
prepared and ready to execute on their own, and they have been
for quite some time. So that is where we made the cut in our
first tranche, if you will.
But moreover, we continue to provide intelligence. We will
continue to provide logistic support. And with partners like
the French in Western Africa, we have got a great relationship
with them and will maintain that partnership.
So as I said, at the moment, we have been directed to
conduct tranche one, which takes us out to June of 2020. So
that is roughly, you know, 300 or so people coming off the
continent, half of whom are conventional forces. And so at the
moment, we don't see a significant issue there. And whether we
will ever be directed to execute the second half is to be
determined.
And the final point I would make is what we have told the
secretary, is that every one of these decisions will be made
individually, and if we feel that it is not in our best
interest to do so, we will reclama and push back on the plan
that is in place at the moment.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you, it may not be appropriate
here but maybe in closed session, to summarize systemic changes
that have been made since the incident that happened in Niger
where we had the four soldiers lose their life there. It may
not be appropriate here, but I think it is appropriate in terms
of some forum to get some feedback on that. I would like it
because I am concerned the reduced footprint puts more people
at risk.
I was in Landstuhl right before the holidays and spoke with
an officer there that is working on intelligence, and we can't
get into where, but frankly, support for him was a long way
away. And I am concerned, given the size of Africa, that we are
not putting resources into that that we need to to deal with
that.
I guess it lets me pivot to the next question. Maybe it is
more--I think for both of you and the secretary. Given the
increased engagement of China, in particular in Africa, both in
terms of their investment, and with that almost instantaneously
comes to military engagement, do we have enough resources there
both military as well as diplomatic and development resources
to address those concerns? Because I know we deal with
counterterrorism, but we have near-peer concerns I think we are
overlooking.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Well, I will start by saying that we
definitely see China's influence in Africa as a key priority
for us. Our efforts are multilateral in the sense of we look at
all of our activities on the DOD side, whether it be exercises,
training missions, military----
Mr. Mitchell. Let me interrupt you. I apologize, but he
will be a tough guy on time. The question I have for both of
you is, are--do we have enough resources both in terms of
military, development, and diplomacy to address the threats we
have in Africa from not just terrorism, but from our near-peer
adversaries? That is what I would like to address. Do we have
them, and what do we do to get them?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I think particularly on the development
and the commercial side where China has a much more focused
capability to, you know, bring resources to bear, we are
challenged to keep up. And we could, particularly on the
nonmilitary side of our government efforts, we could be seeking
ways--we should be seeking and I know the interagency is very
focused on finding ways to compete in the private commercial
sphere in particular.
Mr. Mitchell. What do you think, General?
General Waldhauser. Very quickly, on the Niger thing, we
can talk in closed session, but the bottom line is we have
instituted practices and procedures that negate some of the
issues that have taken place there in the past, as you referred
to.
With regards to the Chinese, and what is important for
AFRICOM, in the Defense Department strategy on China, it
specifically states in there that we can expect to get no more
resources and maybe less. So that is fine. That is the
umbrella. That is the intent.
So my point would be is that we need to--we have 6,000 or
so conventional forces plus special operations forces on the
continent today. We need to maintain that threshold force in
order to accomplish what you just described.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you believe that is sufficient?
General Waldhauser. It is adequate.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. I think we will have to have a dictionary
definition between what is the difference between
``sufficient'' and ``adequate.'' I will let you guys discuss
that later.
Ms. Escobar.
Ms. Escobar. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to our panel. Thanks, especially, General Votel
and General Waldhauser, for your service. Please thank the men
and women who serve with you for their service as well on our
behalf.
I am especially concerned about something that the chairman
mentioned in his opening statement about how our posture meets
the threats, and obviously all of us here are interested and
concerned about that, and what risks exactly, as he said, we
are willing to accept.
And to the question that just came before me and to the
definition of ``adequate,'' I would like to expand a little bit
on that. What is--at what point does it become inadequate, and
what are the risks that we will have to accept if we don't move
out of the adequate phase?
General Waldhauser. Congresswoman, one of the challenges we
have on the African continent is trying to accurately
characterize the threat that we are up against. So, for
example, one of the reasons why the Department gave us the
optimization task is because the threats that we are working
against aren't necessarily a threat to the homeland and may not
be a threat to the region overall.
Because many of these groups, you have the intersection of
jihadist philosophy with crime, historical influence, criminal
activity, shipping of weapons, drugs, people, cattle, and so
forth. So because these groups may hang out a shingle and say
we are with ISIS today, they may or may not have the intent or
capability to attack outside their particular part of the
country.
So that is one of the challenges that we have. And so when
it--again, to come more in compliance with the National Defense
Strategy, to get more in line toward depth to dwell time, if
you look at some of the threats on the African continent,
sometimes, even though they may call themselves al-Qaida or
ISIS, sometimes it is difficult to say they are a threat to the
homeland.
Ms. Escobar. Well, and last year, the Pentagon announced a
reduction in forces to the AFRICOM region by 10 percent,
obviously over time, but what will that reduction mean?
General Waldhauser. So, again, I want to emphasize that 10
percent reduction is in the counterterrorism forces only. And
so the conventional forces that are on the continent every day
right now conducting--for example, we have a shipping port in
Algeria today. We have numerous small engagements across the
continent. We have exercises that are ongoing that are
conducted by our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
components. We need to make sure those things maintain. We need
to make sure we have threshold force for that. And then as we
continue to observe and watch the threat from these
counterterrorism groups, if we believe they are at a point
where they have grown and their intent is perhaps more along
threats to the United States, then we have to go back and ask
for that.
So in sum, I want to make sure that the line that we are
walking away from the continent or we are leaving the
continent, you have to remember that the task we were given was
counterterrorism forces only. We have tried to take forces that
have been involved in working with units that have been trained
for quite some time and that their threat for the homeland is
questionable, at best.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you. Now, despite opening up a military
base in Djibouti, some analysts say that China does not intend
to grow its military presence in Africa but rather use
telecommunication, infrastructure projects, and trade as their
primary tools of influence on the continent. How will these
avenues of influence change our ability to work with African
partners?
General Waldhauser. Well, there is no doubt about the fact
that in AFRICOM, we are the only place really on the planet
where China has an overseas base in Djibouti, as we have
discussed, and we have talked about why that location is
important for us and the challenges that it brings to AFRICOM
and as well as the other combatant commanders. One of our key
tasks is to maintain influence and gain influence vis-a-vis the
Chinese. And so we want to make sure we are the partner of
choice, and we will do that militarily through our training,
through our equipment sales because of the quality, and so
forth.
But I think one of the things that needs to be done for the
whole-of-government approach, which is what the Chinese do very
well, is they work at the relationship. The number of high-
level officials who come to visit just to say hello and just
work at the relationship is very high, and that is very
meaningful to the Africans. The Africans don't want to be in
the middle of great power competition between the U.S. and
China. They want to be our partner of choice, but they will
make decisions in their own best interest at times. But I think
one of--again, one of the things we have to do from a whole-of-
government approach is, if we want to be the partner of choice,
we have got to work at the relationship with high level of
visits and engagements.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, General, for your testimony
today. And I am so glad that I had the opportunity to meet you.
I know this is your final hearing, and so I feel very
fortunate. Thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all very
much for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter for the record a piece
by Tom Jocelyn and Bill Roggio, ``The cost of withdrawal from
Afghanistan,'' from December 22.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Cheney. Also, ``al-Qaida continues to view Afghanistan
as a safe haven,'' by the same authors, in the Long War
journal. And a third piece by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, ``I was
ambassador to Afghanistan, and this deal is a surrender.''
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Cheney. General Votel, I appreciate your determination
and your commitment in your testimony today to talking about
how important it is that we be guided by conditions on the
ground. But I have to say, when I look at the situation in
Afghanistan and the policy that I am afraid we are pursuing now
here, it looks like we are aggressively setting those
conditions aside, aggressively ignoring the conditions on the
ground. In particular, the discussions that are underway that
both you and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger have referenced
that Ambassador Khalilzad is leading, I think you mentioned
them as a path to progress, and then Assistant Secretary
Wheelbarger said that they were going in a positive direction.
We seem to be pursuing the same fantasy that we did in the
Obama administration, which is that al-Qaida is somehow
distinct from the Taliban. When I look at what has happened,
when I look at the fact that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of
al-Qaida, has sworn an oath of allegiance to the Taliban. More
recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the same leader of al-Qaida,
claimed that the Taliban's resurrected Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan would be, quote, the nucleus of a new caliphate.
So when I look at the situation there and I look at the
extent to which we are dealing with the very entity that
attacked us on 9/11, none of us want what the President has
called endless wars; however, it would be far worse if we
handed a victory to our jihadist enemies. And it would be, God
forbid, far worse if we had another mass casualty attack in the
United States.
So I wonder, General Votel, if you could point me to
anything that the Taliban has said or done to either renounce
violence, to abandon their alliance with al-Qaida, or to say
that they will abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan that
should give us any hope that these talks are anything but a
fantasy.
General Votel. Well, they haven't made any of those
statements, Congresswoman, as you know. But, again, as I have
tried to cover in my opening statement here, this--we are very
early in the process of this. There have been no agreements
from either side. We have not given anything up and they have
not given anything up.
Ms. Cheney. But, General, is there anything you see that
gives you confidence that it would be your best military advice
that we could, in fact, negotiate any kind of agreement that
you could count on the Taliban to uphold?
General Votel. I think the fact that we are actually having
discussions is a point that we have not reached in the 18 years
we have been involved in this.
Ms. Cheney. Well, General, I am sorry to interrupt. We
actually did have discussions during the Obama administration.
Secretary Clinton initially set these conditions and then
completely abandoned them. And, you know, I don't have to tell
you the history when we released the prisoners from Guantanamo
in exchange for Bergdahl. So we have gone down this path
before.
But my concern is, even if, let's say for the sake of
argument, that you believe that those negotiations could lead
someplace, that we could, in fact, be doing the best we could
for our national security by talking to the Taliban who are
inextricably linked with al-Qaida, the organization that
attacked us on 9/11, would it be your best military advice that
withdrawing forces in the middle of that would, in fact, help
to increase our credibility?
General Votel. Congresswoman, we have remained very focused
on the terrorism and counterterrorism mission that is
happening.
Ms. Cheney. But specifically the withdrawal of forces.
General Votel. We could withdraw forces and not have an
impact on our counterterrorism mission----
Ms. Cheney. That is right, but, General----
General Votel [continuing]. Against al-Qaida or any other
groups.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. But you mentioned making
sure that we had the maximum military pressure on the Taliban
and on al-Qaida. And I fail to understand how it could be the
situation that announcing withdrawal of forces is maintaining
the maximum military pressure.
An additional question would be, how is it conceivably
possible that a negotiation that actively leaves out the very
government that we say we are trying to help to encourage and
sustain would lead us in the right direction?
General Votel. It is not leaving out the government.
Ambassador Khalilzad is well engaged with the Government of
Afghanistan----
Ms. Cheney. But the Taliban continues to refuse to talk to
the Government of Afghanistan.
General Votel. And this is the purpose of the framework
discussions that are underway right now. I want to get to that
point.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. I remain very concerned
that we are headed down an extremely dangerous path. We will
continue this in the classified setting, but this would be,
were we to leave, a jihadist victory for the very forces that
attacked us on 9/11. And while we have got to ensure that we
are engaged in countering great power conflict in the threats
we face, we cannot go down the path of ignoring the fact that
these were the folks that provided safe haven to al-Qaida for
the attacks on 9/11.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Generals and Ms. Wheelbarger, for
being here. I also want to give a shout-out to the fellow
Centurion in the room. I think we are the only two Katies from
Saugus [California] who are in Washington, DC, right now.
I want to dig in a little bit more on the focus on the
great power competition. You all have mentioned the increased
engagement in Africa and the Middle East by our near-peer
adversaries, including referencing the regions of the
crossroads of global competition with Russia and China.
So, General Waldhauser, you mention in your report that
Russia is actively involved in Libya and is invoking Qadafi-era
relationships. Reporting also indicates that Russia is
supporting the Libyan National Army. How is this challenging
our efforts to help the current Libyan Government and our
counterterrorism efforts in the country, and what are Russia's
aims in Libya overall?
General Waldhauser. We have three missions in Libya. One of
them is the counterterrorism piece, which we have been at for
quite some time. After the liberation of Sirte, if you will,
where we had over almost 500 strikes, we have had 13 strikes in
the last 2 years of a CT effort, but we maintain that. That is
the first thing.
The second thing we do, we are trying to--one of our
missions is to prevent civil war, and we do that by not going
one side or the other.
And the third one is support the political process. And so
what the Russians have done is overtly they have supported the
U.N. [United Nations]-GNA [Government of National Accord]-
President Sarraj framework. But behind the scenes, there is no
doubt about the fact they have supported the LNA [Libyan
National Army] with all kinds of equipment, people, training,
and the like. And they have supported Haftar, who has moved now
from the east to the west, and essentially has taken a lot of
real estate to get into a good position for leverage for
diplomatic talks.
Ms. Hill. And why would they want to do that?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think when the music stops,
they want to be on the winning side. And right now, you know,
Sarraj has been the President for over 2 years. He has been a
good partner for us. Special Representative Salame is trying to
get elections by the end of year. And it is unclear whether
Haftar would run for election, but he is going to be involved
in some way, shape, or form. So when the music stops, the
Russians want to be on the side if he gets in.
Ms. Hill. But what strategic advantage would that give
them?
General Waldhauser. It gives them influence and it gives
them influence in a key location in the southern Med on the
southern part of NATO, if you will. And it allows them then to
reinvigorate some old Qadafi era-contracts in the oil field,
weapon sales, and the like. So there is a strategic interest
for them to be behind both sides, but primarily really Haftar.
Ms. Hill. So it is about resources and access to being
closer to the southern border of----
General Waldhauser. Correct. And influence as well.
Ms. Hill. Okay, great. Not great, but thank you.
You also discuss the Russian efforts in Central African
Republic, which leads me to ask what are the Russian objectives
on the continent more broadly? Why there? What are the other
areas where they're----
General Waldhauser. What the Russians are doing in the
Central African Republic is very concerning, because they have
the paramilitary group, the Wagner group, which is heavily
involved there, not only in training, but also in influence at
the highest levels of the government, to include the President.
And meanwhile, they have been able to work the situation so
they can have mineral extraction and so forth, gold, et cetera,
to generate revenue as well.
And so this model is very concerning in that if you bring
in a paramilitary group, they influence the government, they
extract resources. This is very concerning if that model would
be applied in another country.
Ms. Hill. Thank you. General Votel, in your assessment, how
did the Russians react to the President's December announcement
to withdraw from Syria?
General Votel. I think they viewed it positively.
Ms. Hill. The Russians viewed that decision positively?
General Votel. They did, Congresswoman.
Ms. Hill. Can you describe what advantage Russia gains with
our withdrawal from Syria--proposed withdrawal from Syria and
Afghanistan?
General Votel. Well, I think what they looked at that, they
looked at this as an opportunity to fill the void that we had
provided in the support to the partners that we work with on
the ground there. So they look to gain and perpetuate what the
Assad regime was doing.
Ms. Hill. And, again, why? What does this do for us? What
harm does this potentially cause us and our allies? How does
this help Russia as a whole as it is trying to regain its
power?
General Votel. Well, it makes Russia a bigger player in
this area. And as we move, albeit slowly, towards some kind of
end state in Syria, it puts Russia more in the driver's seat in
terms of what that solution might be. And, of course, it
solidifies their presence in the Middle East in this critical
part of the Levant right here. So I think that is an important
objective of theirs.
Ms. Hill. So to put it very bluntly, the President's
proposals directly allow Russia to gain more influence in the
Middle East, potentially endangering us and our allies?
General Votel. No, I don't think that is what I said. I
said our withdrawal from there gave them the opportunity to
fill the void. Obviously, things would come after that would
increase their influence in pursuing, you know, some kind of
political settlement, but it would certainly give them the
ability to be in a better position.
Ms. Hill. So, again, the proposal to withdraw troops from
Syria and Afghanistan provides an opportunity for Russia to
gain additional power and to potentially grow the global
threat?
The Chairman. I am sorry, the gentlelady's time has
expired.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
The Chairman. I do want to ask one quick followup on that.
As of right now, is there any specific plan on the withdrawal?
And you can tell me what is classified and what is not. A
timeline, I know the President announced it in a tweet, as I
said in my opening remarks. I don't think that was a
particularly wise way to set up policy, and then we sort of set
up the policy after he tweeted. But what is the timeline, if
there is one, on withdrawal from Syria? And what do the numbers
look like?
General Votel. I look forward to talking about this in the
classified session.
The Chairman. Okay.
General Votel. But what I would say is that what is driving
withdrawal of course is our mission, which is defeat of ISIS.
And so that is our principal focus, and that is making sure
that we protect our forces, that we don't withdraw in a manner
that increases the risk to our forces. There is not pressure on
me to meet a specific date at this particular time. And I look
forward to talking more in details in a closed session.
The Chairman. I am sorry. We can do it in closed session. I
just want to make one final, you know, policy political point.
What seems to be driving the withdrawal is the President's
split-second decision to send out a tweet saying we are going
to get out of Syria. Okay. Now, I hear what you are saying in
terms of what you are working on, but in terms of the public
perception, the international perception, is that prior to that
tweet, it wasn't planned. He sent it out, now we are
responding.
So I take your point, and that is obviously the argument we
want to make, is that what is driving our military decisions is
military necessity. It does not appear that way in this case,
given the way the President has communicated.
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, you have already heard a great deal of
skepticism expressed about Special Envoy Khalilzad's
negotiations with the Taliban for reconciliation. Why shouldn't
we be skeptical?
General Votel. Congressman, my view, we have come further
in the last 6 months than we have at any time in the last 18
years. Since the announcement of the South Asia strategy by our
President, the Government of Afghanistan, the President of
Afghanistan has announced that he is willing to meet. We have
had a cease-fire. The first time we have done that, both sides
did that. It was short, but it gave a glimpse of what could be.
And the meetings and the sessions that have taken place over
the last 5 or 6 months I think have moved this further along
than it is.
It is a difficult problem. We are still at the front end of
this. I acknowledge that. And we have a ways to go. But the
Taliban has come to the table. We have seen Pakistan play a
more helpful role in helping that occur. So to me, these are
things that we have not seen in the past that we are now
seeing.
Mr. Banks. I appreciate that, but with all due respect, the
vagueness of what we hear about timelines and conditions, it
paints a skeptical picture for me and so many others in
wondering if this path will lead anywhere. But yet in a rose-
colored world, if these negotiations were successful, if there
was an agreement that was signed between us and the Taliban,
what would happen at that point in that rose-colored world?
General Votel. I think if you look at what I think winning
in Afghanistan means, it means two things, Congressman. It
means a negotiated settlement between the Government of
Afghanistan and the Taliban, and it also means safeguarding
U.S. national interests, particularly ensuring that this
country, this region can't be used to attack our homeland. So
that would have to be satisfied as part of any overall
agreement here in terms of that. And I think that is a lot of
the nuance of the ongoing discussions that are taking place
right now.
Mr. Banks. Is ISIS-K potentially a threat to the homeland?
General Votel. I think ISIS-Khorasan does have ideations
focused on external operations towards our homeland, yes.
Mr. Banks. General, some of your predecessors have
testified before this committee before and articulated a
sustained presence strategy in Afghanistan. Would you agree
with that approach, maybe articulate what that means?
General Votel. I think as long as there is a terrorist
threat, whether it comes from al-Qaida or ISIS or any other
group that perpetrates threats against our country, I think we
have to ensure that they are either through our own presence or
through whatever other arrangements we can make, that we can
address that particular threat.
Mr. Banks. So therefore a sustained presence in Afghanistan
in some shape or fashion would allow us to combat that ongoing
presence of ISIS-K or other threats that might be posed from
Afghanistan?
General Votel. That would certainly be one way of doing it,
Congressman.
Mr. Banks. What would a sustained presence look like?
General Votel. Well, again, I think this might be a better
discussion for a closed-session hearing to give you a little
bit more detail. But I think it looks a lot like it looks right
now. It looks like making sure we have got partners on the
ground we can operate with; it looks like we have the right
collection assets in so we can keep an eye on this; and it
means that we have the right unique capabilities from a U.S.
standpoint to address this particular--and keep the pressure on
this network like we have been doing.
Mr. Banks. General, when should the American people and
members of this committee expect a better defined idea of the
timeline of these negotiations between Special Envoy Khalilzad
and the Taliban?
General Votel. I think I would have to refer you to the
Department of State on that since that is who Ambassador
Khalilzad works for, and they would probably be better to
provide some type of timeline, if there is one.
Mr. Banks. So no reasonable expectation of when that
timeline would be?
General Votel. Congressman, it is underway right now. I
mean, it is proceeding, and it is a complex environment. In my
estimation, I think Ambassador Khalilzad is doing the very best
that he can to move this forward. And our job, my job as a
CENTCOM commander is to make sure he has the military support
to move forward on that objective. Our end state here is
reconciliation, that is the end state of the President's South
Asia strategy and that is what we are focused on. So the whole
of our efforts is supporting Ambassador Khalilzad.
Mr. Banks. I appreciate that. I had hoped today that I
could eliminate some of my skepticism, but the vagueness of the
nature of these negotiations and what I have heard today leave
me even more skeptical than before. I am not sure that Special
Envoy Khalilzad's best that he can do is good enough.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
Thanks to our witnesses. I certainly know, Ms. Wheelbarger,
exactly how it feels to be exactly in your shoes. And to both
generals, I have really enjoyed my time working with you.
And, General Votel, since you were so short, I think it is
worth noting you are one of the most creative, out-of-the-box
thinkers we have in our senior leadership. Your career defines
what it means to fight in the post-9/11 world. And I think the
American public will probably never know what you did to help
us protect ourselves from terrorist threats. So I thank you for
everything you have done.
And I would be remiss if I didn't take advantage of this
opportunity with you with more--just 3 weeks left to ask you
kind of some bigger picture questions on how the U.S. fights in
the post-9/11 era. The theory of the case for me is that we
cannot fight global threats without a global coalition, that
without partners and allies, our ability to protect ourselves
is at least diminished, at best diminished, and at worst leaves
us less safe.
So can you just walk me through what you believe happens if
allies and partners are not providing support to us in these
global fights in your region?
General Votel. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. So very
clearly, we are very dependent upon our coalition partners, not
just for basing and accessing in the region, but certainly for
the additional capabilities that they take. We bring a lot, the
United States brings a lot to these operations, but we don't
bring everything. And so many of the unique capabilities that
we rely on in these coalitions do come from our coalition
partners, whether it is medical, whether it is sustainment,
whether it is training, whether it is advising. They augment,
they supplement, they complement the things that we are doing.
And so that is an important aspect.
But the other thing is it brings with--the coalition aspect
brings with it the will of the world, if you will, or the will
of the coalition. So it is more than just one nation who is
standing up for something. In the case of Iraq and Syria, it is
79 nations and international organizations that are saying we
are focused on this particular mission right here. So to me
that is one of the most important aspects of the coalition
approach.
Ms. Slotkin. So many of the members of this committee went
on a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Munich Security
Conference. We heard in real time from our allies their deep,
deep concern with the way that the U.S. and the administration
was handling informing them about our plans in the world,
particularly, as was referenced, the tweet to get out of Syria,
when many of them are fighting with us in Syria.
In your experience, if we alienate our allies and make it
politically difficult for them to join with us in these
operations, what happens to the quality of our operations? Do
they go up or do they go down? And kind of--I know General
Mattis was really clear about this in his final letter, but if
you could just talk to us about, you know, the quality of our
operations if these partners and allies just say no to joining
with us.
General Votel. Well, Congresswoman, I think it certainly
makes it more difficult to pursue some of these missions
without the partnerships that we depend on out here. And as I
have already mentioned, we lose capabilities, we lose some of
the sustainment that comes along with our operations there. So
I think it makes it much more difficult without--doing these
things without partners.
Ms. Slotkin. And, you know, we were--a number of us wrote a
letter, a bipartisan letter to the President asking that he
reconsider his decision to fully pull out of Syria. A number of
us are very happy to see that a small force is going to be
remaining there. We all take note when you say that ISIS, while
the caliphate has certainly been depleted, that ISIS has
largely gone to ground, that they have not sort of had a change
of heart in how they feel.
Tell me, if you could in an unclassified setting, what you
believe the likelihood is that we will, with the small force
that we have staying behind, ability to keep them suppressed at
least from returning at least a piece of that caliphate.
General Votel. I am confident in this. And I think we have
to look at the force, not just as U.S. forces that retain on
the ground, but other coalition forces. We need to look at our
Syrian Democratic Force partners that number 60,000. And then
we need to look at our over-the-horizon capabilities that we
can bring to bear. And as we go through the planning of this,
we are looking at all of those capabilities. As I mentioned,
this is ongoing right now. But I think by looking at all those
different pools of forces and capabilities that we have, we
will have the capabilities we need to do the mission we have
been asked to do.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. And to both generals,
congratulations on your retirement, well earned, and thank you
for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Waldhauser, I have a number of constituents who
contribute to the train and equip mission in Africa. Can you
share with us the circumstances where we have been most
successful at moving the needle in the capabilities of our
partner nations and then where there are places where we
haven't made as many strides as we would have hoped?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think one example that I will
always use is Tunisia, Tunisia, where the whole revolution
began and so forth. And over the past few years, they have done
a tremendous job to essentially restructure their entire
military towards a threat that is relevant to them. And they
have been a willing partner. They have been able to absorb a
lot of institutional-level guidance and training, so they have
been a success story as well.
And I think in other places, even like Cameroon, for
example, with the challenges there with the Anglophone region
and the like, the Buea force has been a good counterterrorism
partner, and they have progressed to the point where they are
operating on their own and so forth. And I would just mention
that as part of that, you know, the whole law of war, the whole
battlefield ethics speech, that is always a part of the
training and equipping that we do. And so we have programs
across the continent, these 333 programs where we will put
equipment in various countries, you know, whether it is
Djibouti or Somalia or Burkina Faso, these are very, very
important to us. So those are a couple of examples where we
have had success.
Mr. Gaetz. And where have we not met our expectations
regarding capabilities of partner nations?
General Waldhauser. Well, without singling out specific
nations, I think the point is, is that when we embark on these
engagements, we have to make sure we understand what the
country can absorb. And we can't do things or expect things if
they don't have the institutional capacity to deal with
logistical training, to deal with sourcing and so forth.
Mr. Gaetz. Should I make much of the fact that you didn't
identify many Central African nations among the successes?
General Waldhauser. Well, the Central African nations that
we work with to a large degree our train, advise, assist, and
equip piece is probably not as robust in other places. I mean,
the countries that we deal with to a large degree have the
terrorism threat, because one of the key things is to fight
that threat over there and keep it over there. And our
engagements with other countries, we take our cues from State
Department too. If there is issues in terms of law of war
violations or governmental problems, we sometimes take our cues
from the State Department with regards to how much we engage.
Mr. Gaetz. Very illuminating. General Votel, is Yemen a
failed state?
General Votel. Yes, I do consider Yemen a failed state.
Mr. Gaetz. Thanks.
I will yield the remaining time to General Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. I appreciate the leadership and your careers.
Congratulations on your retirement, and thanks to all three of
you for being here today.
I just want to add my skepticism as well on our
negotiations with the Taliban. You know, they continue to be
closely aligned with ISIS, al-Qaida. They have murdered
thousands of--continue to murder thousands of people in
Afghanistan. And I think it looks terrible when we are
negotiating with them without the Government of Afghanistan, so
I just wanted to publicly state that.
In Syria, what are we going to do with 800 or so detainees
I have been hearing about that are from ISIS? General Votel.
General Votel. Well, this is a matter for our Department of
State and Department of Justice to work with international
partners. As the President has said, they need to go back to
their nations where they can be properly prosecuted right here.
The Syrian Democratic Forces are performing a service for the
world by holding these foreign terrorist fighters right now,
and they need to go home where they can be dealt with properly.
So that is the principal mechanism that we are pursuing right
now.
Mr. Bacon. That would be a terrible development if they get
released, one way or the other way, outside of being a threat
to us and Europe and beyond.
In Yemen, are we still seeing evidence of Iran arming the
Houthi rebels?
General Votel. Absolutely, Congressman.
Mr. Bacon. And when was the last time we saw Scud missile
launches or any other kind of ballistic missile launch into
Saudi Arabia? Because I think that is not being widely reported
that that was going on, and that has been part of the reason
the Saudis are taking actions the way they have.
General Votel. We have seen a decrease in ballistic missile
launches, and there is some reasons for that that we can talk
about in the closed session, but we have seen an increase in
unmanned aerial systems and, again, this at the hand of Iran
providing these advanced capabilities to the Houthi rebels.
Mr. Bacon. Our political debate on how to support Saudi
Arabia, whether to or whether not, that is just a forgotten
part of what is going on with Iran, helping the rebels and how
they are also attacking the Saudis.
One last question to General Votel. Are we having any
success or progress of Pakistan in the safe havens they are
providing the Taliban?
General Votel. We have had--as I mentioned a little bit
earlier, we have had success with Pakistan. They have been more
helpful in terms of bringing the Taliban to the table as we
have requested them. We have seen instances where they have
taken action against the safe haven areas. Clearly, there is
more they can do, and we have encouraged them to continue to do
that. But we have seen some positive indications.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I thank my friend for yielding, and I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Torres Small.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you,
General Votel and General Waldhauser, so much for your service.
Thank you as well, Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger.
I specifically appreciate your discussion about coalition
building. And Congresswoman Slotkin as well as Congressman
Bergman, both recognized that need as well. And we also had
some discussion about China and their impact on Africa and how
that affects potential coalition building.
So we have seen China open up the military base in
Djibouti, but it appears and some analysts think that they are
increasing their focus more so on the telecommunications, the
infrastructure, and the trade. Do you see those avenues as more
of a threat for our engagement with African partners than if
China had opened up more military bases, for example, or
conducted training or conventional military operations?
General Waldhauser. That is a very interesting question and
complex in several different ways. Obviously, Djibouti is the
first overseas Chinese base. I have said before, I don't
believe it will be the last. They are looking for other areas
and so forth, especially ports. Because what they want to do to
a large degree, the infrastructure they build--ports, roads,
bridges and whatnot--is tied to the extraction, mineral
extraction they are conducting in those countries. So
consequently, there is a tie there.
Now moreover, their military growth for the future,
although unclear, they certainly want to protect those
investments. They want to protect the population and the
workers that they have there. So some would say that this was
just a first step and that they are getting many lessons
learned. Because it is a challenge to have a base in Djibouti
from China. And there is a lot of growing pains with that. But
they are learning from that, and some would say that--and we
have some reports that I could probably go into in the closed
session that they may look to increase their contributions to
some of these groups that are in the counterterrorism effort.
So I think that in the future, it is very likely that they
could increase their military presence.
But real quickly on the trade business. You know, when
Secretary Tillerson visited there a while back as a previous
Secretary of State, you know, he talked about how the Chinese
should be very careful--or the Africans should be very careful
about some of the deals they make with the Chinese, because it
is no secret about the debt issue in Djibouti that the Chinese
own. There is other countries where some of the projects that
the countries are walking away from because either it is too
expensive or they have figured out the deal is really not good
for them. And so there are some challenges.
But, again, those countries need to make those decisions
for themselves. And that was one of the issues that senior--you
know, Paul Kagame, who at the time was the AU [African Union]
chairperson, made that point that these governments can make
those decisions for themselves. And our point is, when you make
those decisions, just go into them clear-eyed and understand
what you are signing on the dotted line when you sign with the
Chinese.
Ms. Torres Small. Speaking to that clear-eyed aspect, has
China operated this way with other regions? And if so, are
there additional phases of involvement that we might
anticipate?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think that--I will just speak
to the African continent. I mean, the Chinese have been there
for quite some time. Their investments in infrastructure, they
do a great job. They will build soccer stadiums. You know, they
will do things for the population that, you know, gains and
maintains influence. Meanwhile, we do things like Millennium
Challenge Corporation, power programs in the Senegal or even in
Niger, these huge programs over a 5-year period, $437 million
in Niger, for example. This is a whole-of-government approach
too. And we need to do a better job of publicizing those things
that we are doing on the soft side of power that will help our
influence, vis-a-vis China.
Ms. Torres Small. In my short amount left, I want to switch
very quickly to Yemen and touch base about the end of the in-
flight refueling Saudi coalition. When did CENTCOM make the
decision to end that mission?
General Votel. We ended that in November of 2018,
Congresswoman.
Ms. Torres Small. And who made that decision to end it?
General Votel. That was a request by the Saudis, but it was
directed to me by the Secretary of Defense at the time.
Ms. Torres Small. Under what authority was CENTCOM
operating when the decision was made not to charge over $300
million in U.S. fuel in in-flight refueling services?
General Votel. Thank you for asking that. And, Chairman, I
would just ask for a little allowance here so I can address
this in a little bit of detail.
First of all, it is--as the CENTCOM commander, it is my
responsibility. I am responsible for everything that happens
within CENTCOM and doesn't happen within CENTCOM. And so when
we fail to charge properly on this thing, I accept the
responsibility for that on behalf of our command.
There are a variety of things that went wrong. Mostly, we
ignored our own well-developed protocols and procedures in this
case. We identified those problems that we began identifying
that last fall and put together a team, a cross-agency team to
make sure that we understood what was happening and that we
could. We worked through the issue, identified what the costs
were, and then delivered those to the appropriate countries.
And we will receive full and proper reimbursement for that.
Ms. Torres Small. It's a mark of a great leader to take
responsibility. I deeply appreciate that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to pull the string on a previous line of
questioning. I think it is important, because when we talk
about NDS implementation, it is easy to focus myopically on
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and EUCOM. And I am glad
that we have had a variety of questions about Chinese influence
and access in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.
And I just would just ask, General Votel, to what extent
does the Shanghai International Port Group's agreement
regarding the Haifa port in Israel represent a problem for the
U.S. military over the long term? We heard some reporting that
the U.S. Navy was considering reducing some commitment to
Israel. I know that sort of spans a lot of different COCOM
authorities there, but just to what extent do you view that as
a problem, and what do you think we should do about it?
General Votel. Congressman, again, I would remind you that
the Haifa port is in Israel and is outside of my area of
responsibility, but I do recognize that that does have
influences on areas. So we are concerned about that, the fact
that there is--the great power competitors have access into
those ports along the Mediterranean that have very direct
access into the region. I think this is a reason for concern.
Mr. Gallagher. Can you, both of you, I just--what parts, as
you look at the Belt and Road initiative in your respective
AORs, where would it present a difficulty for us in terms of
operational access, either in terms of our ability to operate
with key partners or new potential access by Chinese forces?
Just help flesh that out for us a bit.
General Votel. Congressman, in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, the principal place for seeing this is in
Pakistan, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is
an artery of the One Belt, One Road aspect. So that is in
progress right now. And it is--and there is definite Chinese
influence in that particular area. So as they develop that land
route, what they are attempting to do then, we expect, is they
will then be looking for ports that they can connect that to,
ports in southern Pakistan, leaving the ports in AFRICOM. And
then for us, it is going to lead to a permanent presence of
Chinese maritime--military maritime activity in the region that
we will need to be concerned with.
General Waldhauser. So with regards to AFRICOM on the
ports, let me just first say that overall--and I am not an
expert in port operations, but the Chinese have equities in
ports around the globe. So it is not unique, for example, that
they have equities in Israel. It is not unique that they have
equities in Djibouti and other places. That is the first point.
The second point is, with regards to the Djiboutian port,
you know, this is the maritime piece of the One Belt, One Road
initiative, if you come into Djibouti in that part of the
continent up into Africa. So that is a big part of their
strategy, and they are trying to tie it together.
Inside Djibouti, you know, the port facility there has
about five or six separate ports. The one we are concerned
about is the Doraleh container port. Last year at this time
when I testified, the Djiboutians just took it back over from
the Emiratis. The fear is that if the debt issue with Djibouti
is not taken care of, that perhaps the Chinese could take that
port over.
But I can tell you that in conversations that I have had
with President Guelleh and other leaders have had with
President Guelleh, they have assured us that that is not going
to be the case, that they will make sure that we have access to
that particular port. Because 98 percent of what the logistics
effort that we need on the eastern part of Africa, in Somalia,
in Djibouti comes through that port there.
Mr. Gallagher. I take your point about, to the extent I
understand it, that the Chinese obviously have legitimate
economic interests in a variety of ports around the world. But
the whole reason we did the comprehensive review of our CFIUS
[Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] process
last year was because the line between legitimate economic
interests and CCP [Communist Party of China]-directed espionage
and PLA [People's Liberation Army] military duty is often very
opaque. Right?
I wonder, do you have conversations with your partners sort
of in the way we have conversations amongst ourselves about
CFIUS and foreign investment about the structures they have in
place to analyze Chinese investment and really determine what
is legitimate and what isn't? In either order.
General Waldhauser. Well, I can say--and perhaps, Katie,
you should take that--I know our country teams and ambassadors
do that. From the military perspective, we try to make sure
that we make the case that we are the best partners and try to
give that top cover.
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will most definitely say that is a key
point with all of our engagements with the international
community, not just in these AORs but in Europe as well. And I
know the previous Congresswoman touched on telecommunications
infrastructure. That is a priority of our Department right now,
to highlight the real challenge that we will face both
militarily as well if the Chinese build out these 5G networks
all over the world. The telecommunications security is sort of
a backbone security requirement for all of us. So it is very
much a top line in all of our engagements.
Mr. Gallagher. I yield my 2 seconds left.
The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate the benefit. And I
was going to say, we have a hard stop at noon. We will get to
as many people as we can.
Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
three of you for your insightful, candid testimony.
General Votel, always good to see a fellow Ranger. Rangers
lead the way. Thank you for your continued service.
In my time in Iraq and Afghanistan, I learned of the value
of our partners and our alliances. And I have been very
troubled by some of the comments of this administration with
regard to those partnerships and those alliances. And I know,
General Votel, you weren't consulted in the Syria decision.
Have the three of you had to spend time in the last 2 years
talking with our partners and our allies, NATO and others, to
reassure them that we remain committed? And have you received
questions and concerns from those allies?
General Votel. I will start, Congressman. Certainly we
have. I think this is a very standard thing that we talk with
all of our partners about routinely here, about our strategies
and where we are going with this and reassurance on our
commitment to the collective security of the region here. So it
certainly is something we talk with our partners about all the
time, have for the entire time I have been in this position.
Mr. Crow. But within the past, let's say within the past
year, especially with respect to comments on unilateral
withdrawal from Afghanistan and Syria, has that created
especially acute concerns?
General Votel. Well, it certainly has. I mean, some of the
rather sharp announcements here are things that have caught
their attention, and we have had to talk about that. But again,
this is something that we have routinely talked about. As I
came into this position in 2016, a big topic was JCPOA [Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action] and our decision to enter into
that. And so that was a big discussion point with all the
partners in the arrangement, many who did not agree with that
decision. And so we had almost the opposite situation in that
particular case. So I think this is something we always have to
talk to our partners about.
General Waldhauser. Very briefly, I would just say that
this is a conversation we always have, and we will always
continue to have. Because the bottom line is it is important to
have a good working relationship, mil-to-mil relationship.
Because if for whatever reason the political relationship goes
off tracks or hits a bump in the road, if you have a strong
mil-to-mil relationship, if you have a good partnership, that
will carry the day. And that is where we try to come at it for
the military side.
Ms. Wheelbarger. In particular with respect to on the
political side or the policymaking side, the coalition,
particularly the 79-strong D-ISIS [Defeat-ISIS] coalition is a
huge value, as the general said, to sort of the moral authority
of the global campaign--or the global effort to address a
global threat. I think in the days and weeks after certain
decisions, yes, we obviously keep up the level of transparency
as much as possible.
I mean, everybody knows that the Syria tweet was somewhat
of a surprise. And so, you know, I did call all of the core
group of the coalition the day after to make sure that they
understood both what it was but also what it wasn't. And it
wasn't sort of they are all leaving tomorrow. Of course, as
decisions evolve and we are living in a dynamic world, we are
living in a dynamic policymaking world as well, you know, we
continue to keep them as informed transparently and in
connection as possible.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. One last question. Do you all believe
that you have sufficient data and information regarding the
emerging threats posed by climate change, namely disease
outbreaks, pandemics, displacement of populations, and drought
to take into account as you develop your op [operation] plans
within your respective commands?
General Votel. Congressman, I do. That is provided to us at
the Department of Defense. And from my staff's standpoint, I
believe we do.
General Waldhauser. I believe we do as well. And I would
just echo the fact that in the AFRICOM AOR, this is a big part
of whatever we do. A crisis response not only is kinetic, but
tied to the Ebola outbreaks, the disease outbreaks, and it is a
big part of our strategy with regards to containing that type
of threat on the continent.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I just don't think I can go and let people
say things without responding. First of all, our failure to
respond in Syria in 2013 left a void, which the Russians
quickly filled where they had not been before, but because we
had no action whatsoever for a long period of time, even a
delayed reaction after the gassing, the government gassed their
own people. That is part of the reason that we have Russian
influence in Syria now, not just the tweets of recent days.
Second, I had a much different experience in the Munich
Security Conference with Senator Inhofe, with our allies and
our people there, than obviously other people, my colleagues
did. Because what I found in our European allies and allies
across the Nation, we met with Germany, we met with Afghan
President, we met with Poland, is there is a much greater
participation in meeting their 2 percent GDP [gross domestic
product] requirements as to their militaries across Europe,
which means we have partners who are actually contributing
rather than talking. So I think that is very important to point
out.
We also went to Africa and met with President Kagame, with
Prime Minister Dr. Abiy in Ethiopia. I think those
relationships with Senator Inhofe and us as Members of Congress
can be sustained long term. He has been doing it for over 25
years, but I think many times they are much more valuable, even
in those who have stayed some time, as well as the mil-to-mil
relationships.
All that being said, I guess now I am going to try to get
to a question. First of all, General Votel, thank you for your
leadership of my 155th BCT [Brigade Combat Team], my old
brigade in Operation Spartan Shield, and my 184th ESC
[Expeditionary Sustainment Command], which are currently
deployed and doing logistics missions over there.
General Votel and General Waldhauser, after I ask this
question, I want you to respond what we can do better with the
State Partnership Program in Africa. But Mississippi has a
State partnership with Uzbekistan. We have made great, great
strides there. As a matter of fact, almost every time I go, I
meet with the President of Uzbekistan and all of their cabinet.
General Votel, how valuable are those in the negotiations
when we are talking about negotiating with the Taliban or
logistics contracts? How valuable is that State Partnership
Program?
General Votel. Across the region, Congressman, State
Partnership Program is a diamond for us, frankly. And it is
highly sought after by partners across the region. It not only
augments the things that we do with the Active forces and the
other rotational forces, as you highlighted, that come into the
region, but more importantly, it provides a long-term sustained
relationship with these countries.
As you have experienced in Uzbekistan, I know we recently
had the minister of defense visit your State for an exercise
here. Thank you for hosting him. We cannot replace these types
of relationships. This is absolutely vital to the things we are
doing.
Mr. Kelly. And, General Waldhauser, I think there are some
opportunities in Africa to sustain long-term relationships. Do
we have good partnership programs or is there opportunity
there?
General Waldhauser. Congressman, I could take the rest of
the time and really the rest of the day up till noon and beyond
to talk about the value of these programs. Let me just give you
one quick example. We have 13 State Partnership Programs in the
continent. We appreciate the funding that comes from them, and
we would certainly ask for more there.
Recently, we had an exercise in Burkina Faso. There have
been some issues there as to the uptick in attacks and whatnot.
And just recently here in January, the District of Columbia,
DC, just signed a State Partnership Program with Burkina Faso.
So on one hand, you could say that are we doing enough there?
But this is another tool in the tool kit for long-term
continuity with relationship building and so forth in an area
where there is a counterterrorism issue. This is a big plus for
us. I can't say enough about the State Partnership Program in
AFRICOM.
Mr. Kelly. And, finally, I guess this is just a comment.
Ms. Wheelbarger, you can comment if there is time left. But I
don't have a problem with negotiating with the Taliban or any
other. You know, as we just saw our President do in North
Korea, it is okay to have a meeting and to walk away with that
meeting if your objectives are not achieved. It is not okay not
to ever have a meeting, because I can tell you, you can never
reach consensus if you are not talking.
And so I think we have a lot of opportunity. I am
skeptical, just like everyone else, General Votel, but I know
we also have Uzbekistan involved in that, I know Pakistan is
involved in that. I know there are a lot of people involved in
the peace process there. And I am quite confident that our
President and our military and our State Department will walk
away if we don't get the conditions met that we need to for
peace, but we have to talk to get the peace.
And if you could comment very briefly, Ms. Wheelbarger.
Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I will just briefly say long-term
insurgencies mostly need to end by reconciliation; that is sort
of the history of these kind of conflicts. And I also agree
that the military, both U.S. military, but in conjunction with
our partners on the ground will continue the military pressure
during these talks.
The Chairman. I completely agree with Mr. Kelly's
assessment that we do need to talk. That is the only way to get
there.
Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you to the chairman. And thank you to
the panel for coming.
In addition to sitting on the Armed Services, I also sit in
Foreign Affairs in Africa and the Asia Subcommittees. And in
the Africa Subcommittee, human rights is a center area of that.
And it has been lovely to also hear about China in this
conversation too.
So my question is for General Waldhauser. I was wondering
if we could talk a little bit about the importance of
supporting women and particularly the impact that they have on
bolstering economies, which is one of the best ways that we
have to combat VEOs [violent extremist organizations]. And as
we continue to provide support to our African partners to
combat VEOs, are there members of our current Multinational
Joint Task Force that have not perhaps passed the Leahy vetting
or who have raised human rights concerns, especially as they
relate to women and girls?
General Waldhauser. Thank you for the question. Let me just
talk real quick about the women, peace, and security initiative
that we have in AFRICOM and one of the things that I think we
do very well. And I will just give you several examples. So
over the past couple of years, we have introduced women from
the military in the communications field across the continent
through various exercise engagements. And since we have
emphasized that, we have noticed the numbers of women who
participate in that particular event has grown.
We also do an intelligence assessment and training for the
women of intelligence branches around the continent. That
number has grown. We have a leadership that we run out of
AFRICOM every year. It is a small group, around 50 or 60, but
we take them around the country to various bases and they talk
with various leaders, and we promote leadership for women in a
small way, but we think a highly effective way.
And here recently, we've had the operation I mentioned in
Burkina Faso, it is a special operations operation where we
have brought women together to have conferences, discuss their
way ahead, and try to get them and highlight their visibility
for the military. So we take that seriously, and I am very
proud of our women and peace program.
With regards to the Leahy vetting, look, one of the things
that we do with all of our training on the African continent is
this whole issue of battlefield ethics, law of war compliance,
and the like. And even though, you know, we run into issues
every once in a while, we maintain that this is a big part of
how we train. And we make it very clear to these governments
that if there is violations or allegations of violations, that
they have to look at them for investigation and be transparent
with what they do.
So on one hand, the question of Leahy vetting, yes,
sometimes, you know, there are some issues we have to work
around because of whole units for one individual. But in the
main on the African continent, we need to maintain that because
the human rights piece is a big part of how we train, and we
just have to try to perhaps streamline some of the Leahy
issues, but we can't walk away from that.
Ms. Houlahan. Sir, are there curing processes or curing
timelines if you do see some sort of violation that--I
understand that you can't help if you are not there. Is there
any sort of process that is codified that helps with that?
General Waldhauser. I would have to take that for the
record, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. My next question is also for you.
And I read in your written statement that Niger remains very
unstable and that you are worried about that because of the
youth, the age of--that is a large part of the country. And my
question is, you also seem to indicate that the people who you
were withdrawing in the 10 percent reduction were
counterterrorism related. Is that true? Doesn't that provide
some sort of angst on your part that you have got this sort of
unstable, very young nation-state and we are withdrawing the
very people who may be helpful if there is some sort of VEO
activity there?
General Waldhauser. So I don't want to get into specific
countries and specific numbers, but the short answer to your
question is yes. We have to take a look at where we optimize.
And as I tried to indicate previously, for the first tranche,
we have taken individuals from locations where they have been
training for quite some time and those units are on their own.
And so, yes, you know, every country, especially in Western
Africa, where we have bilateral agreements and where we train
with them, we are concerned. But we understand the intent, and
so far, there has been minimal impact. And if we continue to
work with our partners, primarily the French in the west, and
we watch, if the groups grow, we may have to revisit some of
these decisions.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and with my last 50 seconds, my
last question is also for you, which has to do with Congo and
the most recent Ebola outbreak. We have had about 550, 560
deaths so far and 800 people who have fallen ill again. And I
just wanted to ask you sort of to assess the biosecurity
threats in the area and whether or not you feel as though we
are doing enough or the right things to build partnerships
across the African partners that we have, and whether or not
you think you are appropriately staffed in that particular
area, and how you are working with USAID and the State
Department to make sure we don't all get befelled by a
pandemic.
General Waldhauser. So I am looking at the time countdown
and I am counting the questions and trying to--the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is a very, very complex place right now.
They just had a reelection. Joseph Kabila, finally after a long
time, is gone.
The issue on the Ebola crisis in the east is one of the
most remote parts of the African continent. There are numerous
violent extremist organizations, groups there. That is one of
the problems, it is one of the threats. And we have been asked
to look at what it would take security-wise by the State
Department if we upped our footprint, and we have done that.
I would just finally say just for perspective, when the big
Ebola outbreak took place several years ago, 28,000-plus cases,
11,000-plus died. So as you said, about 900 cases thus far,
600, 550 or so died. A key has been vaccinations. Over 70- to
80,000 have been vaccinated. But the security environment there
is very difficult, and that is what makes this one a particular
challenge and a concern.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We are going to stretch a little and try to get the last
few people in here, so we probably won't start the classified
until 12:15. But the last--if the last few people can help out
at all with any time there, it would be appreciated.
Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to follow up on the previous lines of
questions regarding the future of Afghanistan. Like many of my
colleagues, I am deeply concerned about the ongoing talks with
the Taliban. And last month, I also attended the Munich
Security Conference with some of the members here. And we had
the opportunity to meet with President Ghani, who made it very
clear that he does not respect the validity of these talks,
considering the fact that the democratically elected government
is completely excluded from these talks.
So my question for General Votel is, I share that concern
that the democratically elected government is not a part of
these negotiations. And at the same time, we are heading
towards presidential elections in Afghanistan. So how do the
ongoing talks impact the overall legitimacy of the upcoming
elections and the overall stability as we head into the
upcoming elections?
General Votel. Well, I think certainly the fact that there
is an upcoming election is a factor in the overall situation
right at this particular point. So, you know, I can't dispute
the fact that that is an aspect of this. But, Congresswoman, I
am not orchestrating the talks that Ambassador Khalilzad is
doing. We speak with him obviously very regularly. We support
him as closely as we can. It is my observation, from my close
discussions with him, that he is in fact consulting with
President Ghani on a regular basis, keeping him well informed,
and that the actual initiation of these discussions was done
with President Ghani's knowledge and support.
So I--we are--he is continuing to do that and he continues
to do that throughout this process. We recognize that the
discussions and the negotiations ultimately have to be Afghan-
to-Afghan discussions, and that is what Ambassador Khalilzad is
focused on at this particular point.
Ms. Stefanik. I appreciate that, General Votel, but
President Ghani's message to us was crystal clear, that not
having the democratically elected government have a seat at the
table during the negotiations nullifies how they could come to
a positive outcome. So I just wanted to share my concern,
particularly as it relates to the legitimacy of the upcoming
elections and how we are potentially undermining that by
engaging in these talks with the Taliban.
My next question is also for you, General Votel. You talked
about shrinking the physical caliphate to less than 1 square
mile, which is an enormous achievement. Can you talk about this
next phase that as ISIS fighters go underground, you said,
quote, ''They are unrepentant, unbroken, and they are still
deeply radicalized.'' What does that next phase look like from
your perspective?
General Votel. This will look very much like an insurgency,
meaning that what we will see is we will see low-level attacks.
We will see assassinations, we will see IED [improvised
explosive device] attacks, we will see ambush-type things as
they begin to emerge from this. So therefore, what our focus
has to be is working with our partners on the ground, as we are
doing in--fairly effectively in Iraq right now, is working with
our partners on the ground. We are going to have to keep
pressure on this. Our intelligence capabilities will continue
to be very, very important in feeding their operations. Our
train, advise, assist, our enabling capabilities on the ground
will be very, very important to this.
So what we are attempting to do is prevent those things
from disrupting the other stability operations that we are
trying to conduct with local governance, local security forces.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
And, General Waldhauser, I wanted to follow up on your
opening statement. What I noticed was absent is lessons learned
regarding the fateful attack in Niger that took place in
October 2017. How has USAFRICOM, along with interagency and by,
with, and through partnerships, what have we learned? How have
we updated our intel collection, how are we making sure that
our operators have access to the most up-to-date, accurate
exquisite intel possible? And I also wanted to ask, when can we
expect to see the report in section 1276 of the fiscal year
2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]?
General Waldhauser. So first of all, Congresswoman, there
has been many lessons learned and changes to procedures since
the Niger incident awhile back. And at the tactical level,
which I won't go into in great detail, I can assure you that
minimum force, reaction times for MEDEVAC [medical evacuation],
standard procedures for how orders are issued and who approves
those orders, those have all been really dealt with and taken
care of at the component level, and those are all in place. The
investigation itself had 23 findings, 19 of which required
action; 7 of those were work for AFRICOM, the others were for
the Army and for USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command].
The items that AFRICOM had, as an example, would be
formalizing memorandums of agreement with the French for
MEDEVAC, which we have done; updating the number of blue force
trackers, for example, that troops have on the ground and those
type of things. So for the AFRICOM perspective, all the
tactical items which weren't part of the investigation but
needed to be fixed, those have been taken care of, and we can
talk in closed session if you want more detail. And as far as
the investigation goes, we are good.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
The Chairman. We can talk more. A lot of this is better in
a closed session. We can talk more when we get upstairs.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here today, and thank you for your service to our
country.
I will keep this brief, but, you know, since the seventies,
spending for military and civilian tools of national security
have ebbed and flowed; during the eighties, they both went up;
during the nineties, they both went down. Former Secretary of
Defense James Mattis said, if you don't fund the State
Department fully, then I have to buy more ammunition
ultimately. You both have been on the record as saying how
important diplomatic relations are and humanitarian aid are to
national security.
With the budget coming out and we kind of expecting maybe
another cut in both in the State Department, USAID, oversees
contingency operations, I mean, would you both agree--or all of
you agree that reduced resources for the State Department and
USAID will have an impact on national security in your regions?
General Waldhauser. Absolutely, yes.
General Votel. Yes, I would absolutely agree, Congressman.
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. So by failing to address like famine,
disease, humanitarian catastrophes, education, whether it be
Syria or Niger, Yemen, anywhere in your regions, as these
resources are cut, what kind of impact is that going to have on
national security in your regions?
General Waldhauser. Well, Congressman, I think first of all
we have to understand the global effort in some of these areas,
the global NGO, nongovernmental organizational effort that
really have done a good job. So in places like Somalia, for
example, where this year, food insecurity is somewhere around
4.2 million people, we have offered assistance to the NGOs, for
example, logistical, even intelligence, but for the most part,
they have learned a lot of lessons, staged a lot of logistical
support, and they are dealing with that situation.
Now, with regard to the U.S. specifically though, I mean,
our engagement and our involvement needs to be maintained,
because there is like 12.5 million displaced persons on the
African continent, which causes security issues and challenges
for the governments to have to deal with them from a fiscal
perspective.
General Votel. Congressman, I would agree with General
Waldhauser on this. I think our involvement in this continues
to be extraordinarily important. As we look and clear through
areas as we conduct our counterterrorism operations, such as we
are doing against ISIS right now, the resources that come along
with some of the stability aspects that must always follow
these combat operations we are doing, are absolutely essential
to bring people back into their communities, to start standing
up the essential services, and to give the local governance,
local security an opportunity to begin to reestablish life in
these areas.
So I would agree this is absolutely essential and we have
to stay engaged in this.
Mr. Cisneros. So just to follow up on that. As you have
kind of talked about how the Chinese and the Russians are kind
of filling the void diplomatically in some of these regions.
Are they filling the void humanitarian as we cut humanitarian
aid or are they kind of picking up their humanitarian efforts
in order to build better relationships with these foreign
governments?
General Waldhauser. To a certain degree, yes. I mean, they
have got about 2,000 U.N. peacekeepers. They have tried to
insert themselves. I don't say that in a negative way, but they
have tried to contribute to the Ebola crisis we talked about in
the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. They want to become
a leader in that particular medical technology. They have made,
you know, strides in that area and, you know, at the end of the
day, that is not bad.
I mean, there are places certainly on the African continent
where, you know, we have to cooperate with the Chinese, but
there are times we have to confront and also compete with them.
But when they build infrastructure, if they contribute to, you
know, vaccinations and the Ebola crisis and so forth, that is
not necessarily bad; it is actually helpful.
Mr. Cisneros. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kim.
Mr. Kim. Thank you so much for coming out here and
answering our questions. I wanted to address General Votel.
First of all, I just want to echo the comments of a lot of my
colleagues and just thanking you for your service. As someone
who has been working this space before, I know we are indebted
as a Nation for what you have done and the great work that you
have done over the years.
I wanted to follow up on something you said earlier. You
were talking about how a lot of the efforts that we are
engaging now in Syria and in Iraq, in particular, which is what
I am focused on with this question line, is about now shifting
towards dealing with an insurgency. That a lot of the
territorial land held by ISIS has been taken back. We are in
some ways changing the mission in terms of what we are trying
to be doing now. And my question to you is just trying to get
your honest assessments of where the Iraqi security forces are
in terms of that.
You know, we have been working so much with this by, with,
and through, and I am just trying to get a sense of what is
different now in 2019 compared to 2013, specifically in terms
of how they are ready to handle this newer mission of averting
back to dealing with an insurgency.
General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. From our
perspective, we don't look at this as a change of mission. Our
mission still is, at the invitation of the Government of Iraq,
to assist them in defeating ISIS. So from our perspective, we
look at it very much the same. My assessment of the Iraqi
security forces right now is that they are doing a pretty good
job of keeping pressure on the remnants of ISIS that exist in
Iraq. In some cases, they are doing this unilaterally, and in
other cases, they are doing this with our assistance.
Each of their units across the country have different
levels of readiness and different levels of capability, and we
are continuing to work to raise those to a higher standard so
they can be self-sustaining. But they are continuing to do
that. What is different, I think, is that they have been, from
2013, 2014, whatnot, they have been well supported by their
civilian government. The current Iraqi leadership is very, very
strong supporters of their military. The former prime minister,
Prime Minister Abadi, was an extraordinary wartime leader, in
my opinion, and he provided exceptional support to them. I
think the military leaders saw this. They saw the necessity of
the situation, and they rallied behind the coalition support
that we provided to them and rose to the occasion. Good leaders
emerged on the Iraqi side that helped them orchestrate this
campaign, and we are continuing to see that today.
They certainly have more that needs to be done. It needs to
be a more inclusive force, it needs to include more Sunnis, it
needs to include more Kurds in it, and we are working towards
that. We are going to have to address popular mobilization
forces, these elements that are part of the security forces as
well. But I am very confident in the current military
leadership that we see in Iraq in this, again, moving in the
right direction.
Mr. Kim. That is right. I share a lot of those concerns
going forward about how we can do this and make sure that the
skills that we have been building up aren't going to atrophy as
we start to move on. And as we have seen before, we have
certainly seen a lot of success with the counterterrorism
service and others in terms of going in, being able to
penetrate ISIS defenses, but we have also seen the difficulties
of what happened in 2013 and 2014 when the Iraqi security
forces were asked to hold onto territory and what is their
ability to hold. And that is where I am just trying to delve
off of.
Just one last question here. I know that, you know, in your
past work you have done a lot with the Counter Terrorism
Service in Iraq, and I know that they were such a critical
force there that had gone through a lot over the last couple of
years, in terms what was asked of them, in terms of going
through some very difficult circumstance. Specifically with
that organization, the CTS, what is their current capacity? And
how crucial are they in this now mission--again, I agree with
you it is not a changing mission, but certainly a focus more on
hold rather than the other components. How crucial is the CTS
in maintaining that?
General Votel. CTS remains extraordinarily critical in
terms of--and it is their desire and our support to that desire
to return the CTS to their more traditional missions of
counterterrorism operations, and that is what we are working
on. So we stayed with the CTS when we left in 2011. That was
important. And that was a reliable force, and they carried the
heavy load over the campaign. And as we move in the future, we
have to sustain that, but we also have to stay with the Iraqi
security forces as well. The Iraqi Army can be the bulwark
against extremism in this country, and we need to support them.
Mr. Kim. Well, I certainly hope so. I will do everything I
can from this angle to be able to support those missions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ranking member.
Mr. Thornberry. A major focus for both parties and the
administration in the last 2 years has been to repair the
readiness of our forces. I had one of your fellow combatant
commanders tell me recently that he can already tell a
difference in the forces that are being rotated through his
command. I don't know if it applies so much to CENTCOM because
you-all have been the priority theater for 17 years. But my
question to each of you is, can you at this point tell the
difference yet in the readiness of the forces that are rotated
through your commands?
General Votel. Congressman, from our perspective, I think
we certainly can. As you know, we have been dependent upon the
services to provide us well-trained forces, and we have been
the lucky recipients of that for a long period of time. So I
remain very, very grateful for that.
I would highlight one thing. The Army's investment in
security force assistance brigades I think is a good example of
how our services are really supporting us in the way that we
need. This is an organization that is specifically designed to
help with the by, with, and through approach that we are
applying so effectively on the ground in a number of areas. And
so to me, I think the services, my service in particular in
this case, I think is doing an excellent job of providing us
the capabilities that we need to pursue these missions.
Mr. Thornberry. And just to emphasize, you can tell the
readiness level is improving already?
General Votel. It has always been uniformly high in
CENTCOM, and so it is certainly sustained. And I have no
concerns about any of the forces that are coming into the
CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Mr. Thornberry. General Waldhauser, is it getting better
yet?
General Waldhauser. Congressman, a little bit more nuance,
I think, for AFRICOM, and that is, I would say that the special
operations forces that we have that are engaged in the kinetic
activities are as good as they ever have been. Their readiness
has been always good and continues to be so.
I would just say a quick point on the SFAB [security force
assistance brigade] that General Votel mentioned. We have--we
would have a lot of work for them if we had one assigned to
AFRICOM. There is plenty of things they could do to contribute.
And finally, I would just say that also in AFRICOM, we have
locations with ranges and so forth that will allow readiness to
be maintained and even improved, and we would like to sell that
to the services too. Sometimes they think that perhaps on the
African continent they will lose readiness, but we always like
to say that they can gain--maintain and even gain readiness at
some of the places where they could train.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
The Chairman. We are over time, but, Mr. Gallego, I will
yield to you. We will have to do it quickly. Got to get
upstairs for the classified session. When we are done here, we
will move up.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Waldhauser, last week, The New York Times published
an account of an Operation Sudan in 2013 that suffered from
problems eerily similar to what we saw in the Niger ambush of
2017. I personally as a Marine know what it is like to have bad
leadership and bad equipment but still be required to go into
combat several times. I can tell you, General, it is an awful
feeling.
So please tell me, General, what has AFRICOM or DOD done to
change the way they do business so that we don't see more Niger
ambush situations or Sudan or any number of unreported
incidents in your command over the past several years that are
no longer, quote/unquote, ``situation normal''?
General Waldhauser. So, Congressman, as indicated earlier,
some of the things that we have done since Niger incident have
to do with the tactical actions and procedures on the ground.
And minimum force requirements, timelines for MEDEVAC and
CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] coordination efforts, weather and
so forth, overhead armed ISR where it is applicable, ISR
together with that, and then when you tie in with what we have
been doing recently, after a long time of working with these
units, we are now advising them at a higher level where we do
mostly at the battalion level and to a large degree remotely.
We have the ability to do the same thing, and so those are some
of the things we have changed since.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General. And I am aware of some of
that. One of the things that I am not aware of is who has been
held responsible for this epic failure that had cost some men
our lives. So far what I have read is that the Army brass is
basically trying to blame junior officers both before and after
the Niger ambush. So who is being held responsible? You are the
AFRICOM commander. Who is responsible for these failures? And
it is not junior officers.
General Waldhauser. So, Congressman, the issue of the
investigation right now lies with the Secretary of Defense. The
issue of accountability and awards and so forth come from
SOCOM. I know--I am not privy to those discussions, but I know
they have been ongoing. But perhaps, Katie, I don't know from
the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] perspective the
status. But I would just say, again, this--the investigation
completed and the actions----
Mr. Gallego. How much longer is the investigation going to
take place? This is almost 2 years now.
Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just add that the report and that
very question on the responsibilities and the awards is with
Secretary of Defense. He takes this very seriously. Obviously,
we have had a transition of authority within the--having a new
Secretary. He is reviewing this carefully, and we are expecting
you to get that final report here shortly, which will answer
that very question.
Mr. Gallego. And once that report comes out, you are going
to actually go hold the DOD personnel, whether they be generals
or below, responsible for this disaster, correct?
Ms. Wheelbarger. That is a decision with the Secretary at
this moment, and he will be able to provide you that
information as soon as he finalizes his decision.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. Ms. Wheelbarger, section 1212 of last
year's NDAA required a review of advise, assist, and accompany
missions from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. There
were clearly issues about these missions as laid bare by the
ambush. So why haven't you provided this report to us?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I believe this report is tied up in
finally having the Secretary's complete decisions on all of the
recommendations going forward. And as soon as he does, we will
provide the report.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. I would also like to know what is the--
and it could be either General Waldhauser or General
Wheelbarger, or Ms. Wheelbarger, I apologize, what is the
status of providing redacted reports of the Niger investigation
to the families of the deceased U.S. soldiers?
Ms. Wheelbarger. My understanding is all of the reporting
requirements are--will be released as soon as--including the
redacted reports to the families as soon as the final decisions
that are outstanding are made by the Secretary.
Mr. Gallego. So that is including the autopsy reports?
Ms. Wheelbarger. I would have to take that back.
General Waldhauser. Well, my understanding is that once the
Secretary signs off on this, then those redacted versions will
go to the family first, just like we did at the outset of this.
As you may recall, the team went to each family and spent hours
with them to give them the first look at this, and I am sure it
has been taking a long time, and I know that they have had a
lot to process and probably have more questions. But it is my
understanding that----
Mr. Gallego. General, without a doubt that the family has
actually been able to process this, I think the problem that we
have is we actually can't process what actually occurred
because we are not getting a full report. I think that is my
dissatisfaction right now, because there are currently, you
know, operations probably happening in AFRICOM, and I have zero
doubt that it is actually being fully changed because I don't
know who actually was responsible for this major mess-up. And
it scares me that the DOD is at this point still hiding this
information, and it has been 2 years.
So I hope that that will be coming up soon, because I think
then we will have to take extraordinary measures to actually
get that to happen.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Just quickly at the end, the only comment I will make, I
know a lot of people have raised concerns about Afghanistan,
and no matter which path you take, there are going to be
concerns about Afghanistan. But trying to find a negotiated
settlement is the best way forward, without question. We don't
presume what that settlement is going to be, but I for one am
supportive of the negotiations and the discussion you are
having, because ultimately, our goal is to reduce our footprint
in Afghanistan, reduce the risk, you know.
Men and women in our Armed Forces lives are at risk in
Afghanistan every day right now. To the extent that we can
shift that responsibility to people in the region, I am all for
it. It is not going to be easy. It is a very, very difficult
part of the world, as you know far, far better than I do, but
it is the direction we have to go if we are going to get to the
outcome that we want.
So I appreciate those efforts, and we will certainly stay
in touch with you on the details. And then with that, take a
brief break, and we will reconvene upstairs in a few minutes.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 7, 2019
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=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 7, 2019
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 7, 2019
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
General Waldhauser. The DOD Leahy Law, 10 USC 362 (a)(1), provides
that DOD appropriated funds may not be used for any training,
equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a foreign
security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Further,
10 USC 362 (b) permits an exception in cases where the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Security of State, determines that
the government of such country ``has taken all necessary corrective
steps.'' More specifically, this exception is known as remediation and
is akin to a curative process.
Pursuant to Joint DOD and DOS Policy on Remediation and the
Resumption of Assistance under the Leahy Laws, remediation measures
will focus on the primary three components of investigation; judicial
or administrative adjudication, as appropriate; and sentencing or
comparable administrative actions, as appropriate. No specific
remediation or curative timeline exists, but the DOD must provide
notification to Congress not more than 15 days after the use of this
exception.
During Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. Africa Command assisted Chiefs of
U.S. Missions prepare remediation cases for units accused of gross
violations of human rights. Though none of these specific cases were
approved by the Department of State, we will continued to support
remediation efforts when warranted. (U) The DOD Leahy Law, 10 USC 362
(a)(1), provides that DOD appropriated funds may not be used for any
training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a
foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible
information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights. Further, 10 USC 362 (b) permits an exception in cases where the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Security of State,
determines that the government of such country ``has taken all
necessary corrective steps.'' More specifically, this exception is
known as remediation and is akin to a curative process.
Pursuant to Joint DOD and DOS Policy on Remediation and the
Resumption of Assistance under the Leahy Laws, remediation measures
will focus on the primary three components of investigation; judicial
or administrative adjudication, as appropriate; and sentencing or
comparable administrative actions, as appropriate. No specific
remediation or curative timeline exists, but the DOD must provide
notification to Congress not more than 15 days after the use of this
exception.
During Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. Africa Command assisted Chiefs of
U.S. Missions prepare remediation cases for units accused of gross
violations of human rights. Though none of these specific cases were
approved by the Department of State, we will continued to support
remediation efforts when warranted. [See page 39.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HAALAND
Ms. Wheelbarger. The National Security Council has taken the U.S.
Government lead on developing the U.S. National Strategy on Women,
Peace, and Security (WPS), as required by the 2017 WPS Act. DOD has
provided input to the draft WPS strategy and is currently working with
our interagency counterparts to finalize the document. Once the WPS
Strategy is completed, the DOD is required to draft a WPS
implementation plan for the Department within 120 days. In addition, we
are developing a plan, using the $4M of funding that we received in the
FY19 Defense Appropriation Act, to place gender advisors within each
geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the
Joint Staff, and OSD Policy. [See page 18.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 7, 2019
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. General Waldhauser testified that 150 special
operations personnel and 150 conventional force personnel were removed
from AFRICOM as a result of the optimization that has taken place over
the past 18 months. What missions were scaled back, curtailed, rendered
inactive, transitioned to episodic engagement, transitioned from
special operations forces to conventional forces or transitioned in
authority (i.e. 127e transitioned to 333) to accomplish the manpower
optimization. Please note specifically where these manpower changes
occurred, over what timeline, with what notice (if any) to the partner
force and to what extent the Department of State played a role in the
decision.
General Waldhauser. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. General Waldhauser testified that he has not been
ordered to execute the second ``tranche'' of this plan by removing 300
more personnel from the AFRICOM area of responsibility. If the second
``tranche'' of this is ordered, what missions will be scaled back,
curtailed, rendered inactive, transitioned to episodic engagement,
transitioned from special operations forces to conventional forces or
transitioned in authority (i.e. 127e transitioned to 333) to accomplish
the manpower reduction requirement. Please note specifically where
these manpower changes will occur, over what timeline, with what notice
(if any) to the partner force and to what extent the Department of
State will play a role in the decision to reduce forces.
General Waldhauser. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. What is the DOD doing to help Egypt secure and foster
economic development in the Sinai?
Ms. Wheelbarger. DOD supports the State Department to secure and
foster economic development in the Sinai along three lines of effort:
(1) training, equipping, and advising the Egyptian Armed Forces in
counter-terrorism to foster the security necessary for economic
development; (2) engaging within the military to military relationship
to prioritize population security and Ministry of Defense support to
economic development as one focus of their campaign; and (3) providing
logistics and equipment support to economic development projects led by
the State Department and USAID.
Ms. Speier. What is the DOD doing to help Egypt secure and foster
economic development in the Sinai?
General Votel. I would defer to Department of State to answer this
question.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Mr. Gallego. Despite repeated requests, the Armed Services
Committee has not been provided access to execute orders (EXORDS)
necessary for oversight purposes following the Niger ambush in 2017.
Assistant Secretary West committed to Chairman Smith and Mr. Larsen at
the counterterrorism hearing several weeks ago that DOD would resolve
this issue. When and in what manner will DOD allow the committee access
to EXORDS in question?
Ms. Wheelbarger. In an effort to remain completely transparent
regarding the investigation, Members of Congress and Professional Staff
Members were granted access to a reading room which contained all
applicable Execute Orders (EXORDS) associated with the Niger
investigation report. These included the Joint Staff Counterterrorism
EXORD, the Juniper Shield EXORD, the North West Africa EXORD, and the
AQIM EXORD. The Secretary of Defense is currently considering policies
and protocols to respond to the Committees' request to view additional
DOD EXORDs.
Mr. Gallego. How are allies and partners being included in
decisions regarding force presence and posture in Syria following
recent announcements that U.S. presence in the country would sunset?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The DOD remains actively and continuously engaged
with allies and partners on decisions regarding force presence and
posture in Syria as we transition from liberating territory to
addressing the threat from ISIS as a clandestine insurgency. Since
January, the Acting Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have each
held in-person multilateral meetings regarding these decisions with
their Coalition counterparts--meetings that directly informed the
Acting Secretary of Defense deliberations about a residual U.S.
presence in Syria. Additionally, these and other senior Defense
officials have conducted discussions and calls with a broad range of
Coalition allies and partners directly involved with detailed military
planning at U.S. Central Command focused on force presence and posture
in Syria.
Mr. Gallego. In his announcement that he would declare a national
emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said,
quote: ``We have certain funds being used at the discretion of
generals'' . . . ``Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of
the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple
of them--they think this is far more important than what they were
going to use it for. I said `What were you going to use it for?' I
won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me.''
General Votel, do you believe that unallocated funds designated for
USCENTCOM are better spent at the southern border than in USCENTCOM?
General Votel. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to ensure the defense of
the United States from threats wherever they may emanate from. That
said, in a resource constrained environment and with the challenges we
have historically faced in the CENTCOM AOR I would welcome more
resources.
Mr. Gallego. How are allies and partners being included in
decisions regarding force presence and posture in Syria following
recent announcements that U.S. presence in the country would sunset?
General Votel. Our engagement with allies and partners supports
diplomatic engagements by the President, the Secretary of State, the
Acting Secretary of Defense, and other senior administration officials.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has taken a prominent role in engaging
with his uniformed counterparts from member nations from the Defeat-
ISIS coalition as well as other non-coalition nations. My staff and I
have held numerous engagements with military leaders and planners from
interested countries ranging from one-on-one phone conversations to
multi-nation conferences in order to convey the military situation
including U.S. posture, threats, risks, and opportunities in northeast
Syria. We recognize long term success will require working with our
partners and to that end we coordinate as closely as possible.
Mr. Gallego. In his announcement that he would declare a national
emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said,
quote: ``We have certain funds being used at the discretion of
generals'' . . . ``Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of
the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple
of them--they think this is far more important than what they were
going to use it for. I said `What were you going to use it for?' I
won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me.''
General Waldhauser, do you believe that unallocated funds
designated for USAFRICOM are better spent at the southern border than
in USAFRICOM?
General Waldhauser. I am unaware of the discussions between the
President and other general officers and not in a position to fully
understand the challenges and risks associated with conditions along
the United States southern border. While reductions in funding could
have repercussions to USAFRICOM's mission, it would be difficult to
weigh the competing requirements without further context on a national
emergency declaration.
Mr. Gallego. Do you stand by the Niger Report issued last year as
written, or are parts in need of review, correction, or retraction?
General Waldhauser. I stand by my approval of the findings and
recommendations of the investigating officer, a two-star general
officer, into the facts and circumstances surrounding the 4 October
2017 attack in Niger which killed four U.S. service members and four
partner Nigeriens. The comprehensive Army 15-6 investigation, or Niger
Report, took three months to assemble by the investigation team and was
substantiated by testimonials from 143 witnesses, including 37 American
and Nigerien survivors of the attack. The team analyzed thousands of
pages of documents and reviewed hundreds of hours of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance video. Critical to the thoroughness of
the report was an investigative survey of the attack site in Tongo
Tongo by the investigation team, accompanied by a Nigerien soldier who
survived the attack and the Commander of the Nigerien Response Forces.
During the survey, the team spoke to villagers and collected evidence
for forensic analysis which reinforced the facts and circumstances of
the attack. The investigation had 23 findings, 19 of which required
action, covering issues of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine,
training, judgement, and leadership. All of the material was forwarded
to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Secretary concurred with all findings and
recommendations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. Africa is the intersection of the previous focus of our
national security strategy, the fight against terrorism, and the new
priority of our national security strategy, a renewal of great power
competition with China and Russia. What diplomatic solutions do we need
in addition to the military and economic initiatives such that we have
a comprehensive strategy on the continent? How can we improve military
partnerships with African countries so they view the U.S. as a trusted
ally? How have we aligned our basing and force structure to address
both the continuing threat of terrorism and the expanding influence of
China?
Ms. Wheelbarger. The U.S. Government strongly supports diplomatic
solutions to complex international problems. The Department of
Defense's (DOD) engagements in Africa are in support of the bilateral
relationships managed by U.S. Embassy Chiefs of Mission. These
diplomatic relationships play a critical role in strengthening our
military-to-military relationships on a continent where we have limited
forward presence. For example, in Somalia, Libya and the Sahel,
diplomacy and development are critical to progress; military efforts
alone will not resolve issues there.
As laid out in the U.S. Strategy for Africa, our primary lines of
effort are promoting prosperity, strengthening security, and striving
for stability. Thus the U.S. Government is focused on furthering trade
and investment, fostering peace and security, and encouraging
governance and self-reliance. These priorities could not be advanced
without strong and enduring diplomatic efforts developed by the State
Department.
Building trusted military partnerships with African countries is
the cornerstone of DOD's ``by, with, and through'' approach on the
continent. Partner forces almost exclusively execute security
operations, with USAFRICOM acting in a supporting role. The extent to
which we work with partner forces is based on their operational and
institutional needs. With all of our African partners, we work to
achieve shared strategic objectives through cooperative relationships.
Continued engagement helps to build deep, enduring, and reliable
military ties.
One program that highlights these ties is our State Partnership
Program (SPP) administered by the National Guard Bureau. This program
is guided by State Department foreign policy goals, and supports U.S.
Chief of Missions' security cooperation objectives. Through the SPP,
the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements that
leverage whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate
broader engagements spanning military, government, economic, and social
spheres. We currently have SPPs with 14 African countries and are
seeking to develop more such programs with African countries.
Partnering with a state allows for continued engagement and enduring,
without the rotation of regular active duty units.
Finally, proper alignment of basing and force structure are very
important to address the threat of terrorism and great power
competition, as detailed in the National Defense Strategy. Any response
to crises or conflicts in the region will require adequate access,
basing, and overflight authorities. To address this, the Department has
established a network of operating locations across the continent that
enable required access while employing a light footprint. These
locations also promote constructive security partnerships with key
African countries that improve regional security and help keep pressure
on priority violent extremist organizations. Our posture also provides
our partners with assurance of our resolve and capacity to help secure
our shared interests.
Mr. Brown. DOD spends over $10 billion each year on security sector
assistance, much of which goes to counterterrorism (about $5 billion is
Afghanistan funding). In a 2018 report, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies recommended that the U.S. ``establish a baseline
assessment of the security partnership before expending resources,''
and that those reports should include the partners ability to absorb
assets, reform political institutions, and their compliance with human
rights.
Does CENTCOM conduct such baseline assessments with the ANA? Do you
have a timeline for achieving particular benchmarks and goals? More
generally, for all of the forces in your AOR that you partner with, how
does CENTCOM evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism partners
capability and programs? What are the benchmarks you use to assess
whether the investment is an appropriate and cost effective use of
taxpayer funds?
General Votel. Yes, CENTCOM conducts baseline assessments that
estimate the operating environment to include Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) (which includes the Afghan National Army)
objective force capabilities to sustain progress along the Roadmap,
Afghan Security Forces Fund stewardship and strategic and operational
risks to NATO and Resolute Support objectives. The congressionally
mandated, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 1225 Report,
is an in-depth Department of Defense assessment of costs associated
with developing the Afghan security forces and government institutions.
USCENTCOM supports this assessment through our U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
component with cost and performance information. USCENTCOM also
complements the 1225 report with an assessment of Operation Freedom's
Sentinel. This assessment provides me with a measure of progress of
achieving military objectives, while building partner capacity, with
the ANDSF.
When President Trump announced the South Asia Strategy (SAS) in
August 2017, this marked a change from a time-based approach
telegraphing artificial timelines to a conditions-based approach,
creating the conditions to bring about reconciliation on coalition
terms. This conditions-based approach allows the United States to
target realistic, attainable, and measurable strategic objectives. The
SAS supports the Afghan Security Roadmap, the blueprint to develop
professional and capable Afghan security forces. This roadmap is not
anchored to a timeline and is tailored to meet Afghan's security
capability threshold.
We assess our Theater Campaign Plan quarterly and annually. Our
assessments include evaluations of Partner Nations' capabilities to
address violent extremist organizations and terrorist threats in their
countries. These assessments include evaluation of progress towards
objectives detailed in our Security Cooperation Country Plans; every
country in our AOR has a Security Cooperation Plan, with the exception
of Iran and Syria. Many of our country plans include specific
counterterrorism objectives for which we are working with our Partner
Nations' to build capability and capacity. Additionally, we conduct
operations assessments of our named operations in Afghanistan and to
defeat the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS). These operations have
specific objectives for our by-with-and-through approach to combatting
terrorism with our partners so we routinely evaluate our progress in
establishing specific desired conditions that we have for our partners'
counterterrorism capabilities in these two conflicts.
We conduct a Theater Campaign Assessment on a quarterly basis,
which measures progress toward objectives and end states. This
assessment includes measuring the effectiveness of our operations,
activities, and investments. One of our end states is: ``USCENTCOM's
influence with allies and partners is maintained and facilitates by-
with-through operations and training that strengthens counterterrorism
and conventional military capabilities.'' We assess the four objectives
for this end state during our quarterly campaign assessment; each
objective has evaluation metrics which include measures of ``cost and
return.'' Overall, our campaign assessment is one means by which I
evaluate execution of our theater strategy to achieve U.S. national
objectives established in the National Military Strategy, National
Defense Strategy, and the National Security Strategy. Additionally, for
Afghanistan, I recently endorsed the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) Plan of Record (APoR) report. The APoR analysis
provides an estimate of the operating environment in Afghanistan, ANDSF
objective force capabilities to sustain progress along the ANDSF
Roadmap, and offers recommendations to better align the Roadmap to
evolving conditions. An example of this continuous assessment process
is the review that General Miller is conducting that allows us to
evaluate the ANDSF from this perspective and make recommendations
through various mechanisms, such as the 1225 Report and the semi-annual
NATO Periodic Mission Review.
Mr. Brown. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's
most water scarce region. MENA is home to 6 percent of the world's
population, but only 1 percent of the world's freshwater resources,
according to the World Bank. Seventeen countries in the region fall
below the water poverty line set by the United Nations, and some
experts believe that drought played a part in sparking Syria's civil
war.
Do you agree that scarce resources can be a flashpoint for violence
and conflict? Do you agree that the scarcity of water in the Lake Chad
basin has increased over the last few decades? Do you agree that this
situation increases the likelihood that an increasing number of U.S.
troops may be deployed, putting American lives at risk?
General Waldhauser. The scarcity of natural resources contributes
to conflict throughout Africa. Lake Chad, which has historically been
the main artery of commerce in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region, has
progressively declined over the last five decades. To a degree the
result of poor resource management, Lake Chad's decline has severely
impacted agro-pastoral communities, who depend on it for food, water,
and trade, resulting in the displacement of thousands of people from
the region. This displacement, along with the competition over scarce
resources, serves as one of many drivers of instability on the African
continent. USAFRICOM continues to work with the international and
interagency community to equip our African Partners with available
resources and security mechanisms to support their efforts to prevent
conflict and maintain stability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
Mr. Keating. Earlier this year, the Lead Inspector General put out
a report that gave a status update on Operation Inherent Resolve that
report, U.S. Central Command provided the following quote: ``If Sunni
socio-economic, political, and sectarian grievances are not adequately
addressed by the national and local governments of Iraq and Syria it is
very likely that ISIS will have the opportunity to set conditions for
future resurgence and territorial control.'' The report also goes on to
say ``Absent sustained counterterrorism pressure, ISIS could likely
resurge in Syria within six to twelve months.''
Are you confident Sunni grievances have been addressed or will be
addressed so that conditions are not set for an ISIS resurgence?
In terms of ISIS reconstituting its forces, do you expect the bulk
of ISIS' leadership, including those who head the group's various
Shura's, to largely remain in Syria and/or Iraq? Or do you anticipate
those members will flee to other provinces in North Africa or South
Asia?
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Keating. General Waldhauser, in your written testimony you
state that the second emergent challenge in Africa is ``the effect of
environmental change on African Security.'' You go on to highlight the
large number of African farmers, the potential for land disputes, poor
land-use policies, as well as changing weather patterns and rising
temperatures.
Could you also speak to the challenges climate change poses to
Nigeria in particular? John Campbell, former U.S. Ambassador to
Nigeria, in 2015 and in 2017 stated that Nigeria is of great strategic
importance to the United States. It has a rapidly growing population of
200 million, it has Africa's largest economy, is the largest producer
of oil and gas in Africa, and has contributed to international
peacekeeping missions in the region. Climate change however raises
risks for Nigeria, from enhancing drought in the northeast and fueling
the Boko Haram insurgency; to raising sea levels and displacing
thousands in Lagos, Nigeria's coastal mega-city and economic
powerhouse. How are you and your staff incorporating the impact that
climate change may have on these risks and scenarios in Africa and
Nigeria in particular?
General Waldhauser. Factors associated with the changing climate
heighten Nigeria's existing humanitarian and security challenges.
Nigeria's rapid population growth, and its reliance on subsistence
agriculture, increases its vulnerability to climate-related hazards,
including variable rainfall, drought, desertification, and flooding.
About 70% of the Nigerian population is engaged in subsistence farming.
Thus, an extreme climate event such as drought or flooding can have
devastating effects, often leading to food shortages and the
displacement of millions of people. These events have regional impacts
as well. Nigeria is responsible for 70% of West Africa's overall
agricultural output, with any significant reduction felt throughout the
region. Greater competition for access to arable land also contributes
to violence in Nigeria and more broadly, across Africa. In Nigeria,
this has most prominently featured violence between herders and farmers
in Nigeria's bread basket, the Middle Belt, where deaths in resource
conflict have far-outpaced deaths to terrorism.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead
agency for development initiatives in Africa, and USAFRICOM works in
support of these efforts. USAID supports agriculture and food security
programs in Nigeria which take into account the changing climate and
environmental conditions. USAID programs provide clean water and
sanitation, increase access to energy, reduce obstacles to trade, and
improve market access to strengthen the capacity of local groups to
address violence and mitigate conflict in their communities.
Additionally, USAID programs target improved governance at the state
and local levels to enhance the delivery of services (e.g., health,
education, rule of law, etc.) to the public, thereby addressing many
underlying grievances easily exploited by extremist or criminal
networks.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
Ms. Sherrill. I understand that Picatinny Arsenal developed the
only large-scale Howitzer capable of being lifted throughout the
CENTCOM theatre, the M777A2 towed 155mm Howitzer. It has proven
invaluable, firing hundreds of thousands of rounds in support of ground
forces there. Because we never want our troops to have a fair fight,
and we must hit the enemy before they even see us coming, the Army is
looking at even greater range Long Range Precision Fires.
Across the vast area of operations in the CENTCOM AOR, there is a
clear requirement for both greater range and lethality for our ground
forces. Please share with the committee what you see as critical
lethality requirements when it comes to the range of our weapons and
munitions against our adversaries.
General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Sherrill. I have deep reservations that the damage this
administration has done to our critical alliances, particularly NATO,
will have consequences that impact our security interests well outside
of Europe. The premise of our efforts to train and equip local forces
to combat terrorism is that they will be step up as we step back. This
requires both regional partnership and continued support from our NATO
allies in these vital missions.
Please describe how our NATO allies are contributing to
counterterrorism efforts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and
what more can we ask of them in places such as Syria, as we are looking
to scale down.
General Votel. Our NATO allies continue to capably support
Coalition efforts in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility focusing on
training local forces and supporting counterterrorism efforts against
ISIS and other terrorist threats in Afghanistan using a ``by, with, and
through'' approach which emphasizes giving local forces the capability
to plan and execute their own operations. Under Combined Joint Task
Force Operation Inherent Resolve and NATO Mission Iraq, as well the
Resolute Support Mission, our NATO allies currently contribute well
over 3,000 troops to the Defeat-ISIS mission and 7000 troops to the
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, our NATO allies
are working with us to develop enduring training plans that will
continue to sustain the development, professionalism and expertise of
the Afghani and Iraqi military forces so they can bring and sustain
security and stability in their respective countries. As we look to
reduce the U.S. footprint in Syria, we are identifying the critical
mission sets, training requirements, forces required, and authorities
necessary to ensure the safety and security of the local population.
Ms. Sherrill. I come from an area of New Jersey that suffered
greatly in the 9/11 attacks. While a significant reduction in the
number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan may be in U.S. national security
interests, it is critical that the reduction occur in a thoughtful way,
with careful planning, and in coordination with our allies. We do not
want Afghanistan to yet again provide safe-haven for terrorists who
would attack our homeland.
As the primary U.S. objective for being in Afghanistan is to enable
a political settlement that creates the conditions for another such
attack to be much less likely, with the President's abrupt announcement
to reduce our military presence by half, don't you agree that we are
significantly damaging our ability to accomplish the mission?
General Votel. No. While USCENTCOM has not received an order to
reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan we are always evaluating the mission
and the resourcing necessary to accomplish that mission. GEN Miller, in
his capacity as Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan, has determined the
appropriate force level in order to execute his missions (U.S./NATO)
based upon his assessment of the conditions on the ground. USCENTCOM
will continue to play a vital role in supporting diplomatic efforts to
find an Afghan led political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. We
remain focused on doing all we can to support a political settlement.
Ms. Sherrill. I have deep reservations that the damage this
administration has done to our critical alliances, particularly NATO,
will have consequences that impact our security interests well outside
of Europe. The premise of our efforts to train and equip local forces
to combat terrorism is that they will be step up as we step back. This
requires both regional partnership and continued support from our NATO
allies in these vital missions.
Please describe how our NATO allies are contributing to
counterterrorism efforts in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, and
what more can we ask of them, particularly in places where we are
looking to reduce the U.S. military footprint.
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM works with NATO, the European Union
(EU), the African Union (AU), and other Partner Nations to advance U.S.
national security interests and promote regional security, stability,
and prosperity. Protection of the NATO southern flank is a key concern
for the Alliance, and any expanded NATO presence on the continent is
driven by its member nations. Currently, 22 of the 29 NATO Allies are
in the EU, and the EU provides close to 3,000 security forces in Mali,
Central African Republic, and Somalia. EU forces also conduct counter-
piracy off the Horn of Africa and counter-trafficking and migration
efforts in the Mediterranean through executive operations and training
missions. NATO is pursuing CT-focused engagements with the AU, namely
the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. NATO held
initial discussions with EU advisors to the G5 Sahel to identifying
areas where NATO can contribute personnel and expertise.
More broadly, NATO is developing a comprehensive understanding of
the situation in the Middle East-North Africa region through political
engagement and consultation with individual partner countries, as well
as with regional organizations. Under the Mediterranean Dialogue,
established by the North Atlantic Council in 1994, which includes
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, NATO
hosts thematic meetings, seminars, and workshops on issues of shared
interest. Also, NATO is in the process of finalizing a Defense Capacity
Building (DCB) package for Tunisia to provide support to the Tunisian
authorities in seven priority areas of cooperation: development of
special operations forces; force preparation; intelligence capability;
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense; cyber
defense; counter-Improvised Explosive Devices; and integrity
development.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. What is the status of the search for Jeffrey Woodke and
what assets have been dedicated to looking for him?
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM continues to coordinate with
USAFRICOM Components, other U.S. Government Agencies and Partner
Nations to determine the location of American Citizen, Jeffery R.
Woodke. Mr. Woodke is an American humanitarian worker who was kidnapped
in October of 2016 in Abalak, Niger. The U.S. Government is aware both
terrorist and criminal elements operating in the Northern Sahel regions
of Africa are currently holding several other Western Hostages, to
include citizens of France, Colombia, Romania, Switzerland, and
Australia. These terrorist and criminal groups are assessed to present
a grave threat to both regional stability and to the physical safety of
Americans and westerners transiting the region.
The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC) is coordinating interagency
efforts to safely recover Mr. Woodke. Interagency intelligence analysts
are vetting information and U.S. Government agencies are following up
on all leads, while the HRFC continues to access diplomatic efforts in
collaboration with foreign partners. These efforts represent a whole of
government approach to recovering Mr. Woodke and mitigating the threat
of future hostage takings to Americans in the region. Additionally,
HRFC's Family Engagement Team is in routine communication with Mr.
Woodke's family. As a caveat, Mr. Woodke's family has consistently
indicated their desires to avoid discussing or highlighting our
combined efforts in the public domain over concerns for his safety. Mr.
Woodke's family has expressed appreciation when we have avoided
discussing the ongoing recovery efforts in public testimony.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HAALAND
Ms. Haaland. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC), in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, developed an ombudsman program to enable external
reporting, oversight, and victim support for MoD and MoI female
employees. As of December of last year, The ombudsman program, although
developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented. Is that
still the case? What steps are being taken toward implementation? What
is standing in the way of implementation?
General Votel.The program referenced is an internal GIRoA program
that is not part of U.S. Central Command's Train, Advise, and Assist
(TAA) efforts and it is not funded by Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF). The program is being worked by GIRoA MoD and MoI Gender
Integration Offices, MoD Gender Director, MoI Director of Human Rights,
Women's Affairs and Children. To date, they have implemented and hosted
seminars discussing topics on gender integration to include female
participation, employment, and career progression in the Afghan
National Defense Security Force (ANDSF). There are steps being taken by
GIRoA MoD and MoI Gender Integration Offices to develop policies and
processes to prevent and report sexual harassment and assault as part
of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/134. The Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission received approximately $5.5M from
donors in 2017. The United Kingdom alone provided $124K specifically
for the Ombudsman program.
[all]