    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 116-10]

                        NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

         U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 7, 2019

                      [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ___________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    36-296                     WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island          Texas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                ROB BISHOP, Utah
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii                DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        MO BROOKS, Alabama
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice     PAUL COOK, California
        Chair                            BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    RO KHANNA, California                SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
    KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma             TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr.,           MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
        California                       MATT GAETZ, Florida
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       DON BACON, Nebraska
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
    XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico     LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    KATIE HILL, California               MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
    DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia

                         Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                   Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                   Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
                              Justin Lynch, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services....................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command.......     6
    Waldhauser, Gen Thomas D., USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa Command..     9
    Wheelbarger, Kathryn, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Affairs, Department of Defense..........     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Votel, GEN Joseph L..........................................    72
        Waldhauser, Gen Thomas D.....................................   114
        Wheelbarger, Kathryn.........................................    53

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Ms. Haaland..................................................   155
        Ms. Houlahan.................................................   155

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Brown....................................................   161
        Mr. Gallego..................................................   159
        Ms. Haaland..................................................   165
        Mr. Keating..................................................   163
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   159
        Ms. Sherrill.................................................   164
        Ms. Speier...................................................   159
        Mr. Waltz....................................................   165

                        NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

                        U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE

                         GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                               Washington, DC, Thursday, March 7, 2019.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. Good morning. I call the meeting to order.
        Welcome. Before we get started, just one quick
    announcement. I made the announcement yesterday and sent it
    around. We are going to, on the questioning, go in reverse
    order this morning, so least senior and on up.
        So welcome to this hearing. We are having our posture
    hearing this morning focusing on CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]
    and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], and we are very honored this
    morning to have with us General Thomas Waldhauser, who is the
    Commander of U.S. Africa Command; and General Joseph Votel, who
    is the Commander of U.S. Central Command; as well as Ms.
    Kathryn Wheelbarger, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Affairs.
        I want to begin by thanking General Votel and General
    Waldhauser. I know you are very sad that this is your last
    opportunity to testify before Congress and have this hearing,
    but I want to make special note of it and thank you both for
    years of outstanding service to our country. It has been a
    pleasure working with both of you.
        And this morning we are going to hear specifically from you
    about what is going on in your areas of responsibility, and
    they are areas where there is a lot going on in terms of our
    national security concerns.
        Beginning in Africa, we have a presence throughout that
    continent, and there are a number of issues we are concerned
    about. I think it begins with the threat from transnational
    terrorist groups, both in the Horn of Africa and in West Africa
    as well. We look forward to hearing an update on how our
    efforts are going there, both to keep those transnational
    terrorist threats at bay, also how are we working with our
    various partners both in the region and allies in NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] to help contain that threat.
        And then the overall issue in that region continues to be
    stability, particularly in Somalia and Libya, and how are we
    doing on building sustainable governments in those places so
    that we can reduce the threat.
        We are also curious, as we have made the transition from
    better than a decade of primarily focusing on the transnational
    terrorist threats to a new era of great power conflict in
    Russia and China. And Russia and China I know are involved
    throughout Africa, also in various places within the CENTCOM
    responsibility, so hearing about what they are up to as well
    will be of concern.
        In CENTCOM, we continue to have a specific focus on Iraq
    and Syria as the caliphate is just about wiped out, but ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is still a presence in that
    region, as are other transnational terrorist threats, and
    certainly the same is true in Afghanistan. So getting an update
    on that is our primary concern.
        Now, as a general rule, we want to try to get to the point
    where we do not have to have a military presence in as many
    places in the world as we have. That is my personal objective.
    We would like to rely on partners, reduce the necessity of us
    having troops abroad, but at the same time, we have to make
    sure that we are meeting our national security objectives and
    protecting ourselves from that.
        And the one comment I will make, and I know this is not
    either of your gentlemen's doing, but we need a consistent
    policy that our allies can rely on. I think it is problematic
    when we make dramatic altering decisions in what seems like the
    blink of an eye in a Presidential tweet.
        It is not that I don't think we need to get to the point
    where we reduce our troop presence in Syria and Afghanistan; it
    is just not something we should do in that ad hoc a manner. It
    catches our allies off guard and creates problems.
        I was reading extensively where it has significantly
    damaged our relationship with President Macron in France. He
    was caught completely by surprise by our decision that we were
    going to pull out of Syria.
        Now, the truth is, we are building towards a drawdown in
    Syria. The point was, you know, we wanted to build up to defeat
    ISIS, remove the caliphate, and get to the point where we could
    pass responsibility off to partners in the region.
        And if we had discussions with our allies and announced
    those plans in a rational way, I think that would help maintain
    the strength of our alliances. So we are concerned by the way
    the policy seems to bounce around from day to day.
        The same is true in Afghanistan, as the announcement was
    made a couple months back that we were going to--I believe the
    tweet was completely pull out of Afghanistan. I know that
    hasn't happened and I know there has been updates since then,
    but a more consistent policy, I think, would help us maintain
    our allies and help build the confidence in the United States
    that is necessary to maintain those allies and maintain our
    interests.
        I look forward to testimony from both of you.
        And also, Ms. Wheelbarger, appreciate you being here as
    well. You are not retiring, I am sorry. It is sort of like
    their day in that regard. But we appreciate your work as well.
    We thank you all for being here.
        With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr.
    Thornberry.

          STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
     REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I too want to welcome our witnesses and express my
    appreciation and respect for General Votel and General
    Waldhauser. My understanding is General Votel's change of
    command will be at the end of this month, General Waldhauser's
    sometime this summer.
        I think it is worth just stopping for a second and
    reflecting on the significant progress that has been made
    against certain terrorist networks in recent years. To me, 2014
    doesn't seem that long ago, but ISIS controlled an area the
    size of Great Britain, and today, we are talking about the last
    village and a tremendous change of affairs on the ground.
        Somalia has been a challenge for us when it comes to
    terrorism for a long time, and my sense is that we have made
    tremendous progress there as well. Now, this progress is a
    result of a lot of folks, including some decisions by this
    administration, to untie the hands of our military to be more
    effective. But the two gentlemen before us had been at the
    center of those efforts in various capacities--SOCOM [U.S.
    Special Operations Command], CENTCOM, AFRICOM, commands on the
    ground--and each of them has played a leading role in making
    this progress. And I think it is important to step back and
    reflect.
        Like you, Mr. Chairman, I share the concerns about where we
    go going forward. We made a lot of progress on terrorists, but
    they are not gone. As a matter of fact, in some ways, they have
    spread out and are more difficult to locate. And so we must
    maintain pressure on terrorist networks, and yet because of the
    rise in great power competition, our resources have to be
    spread in a variety of different ways.
        And while we maintain pressure on terrorist networks in
    CENTCOM and AFRICOM, there is great power competition going on
    in both of those regions as well, which we cannot lose sight
    of. Many of us have seen that firsthand as we travel to Africa
    as well as to the Middle East.
        So there is a lot to talk about. I want to, again, just
    return to appreciation for the--not only their service, but the
    successful results of their leadership in these challenges that
    we have faced, and I look forward to the conversations to come.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        And we will begin with Ms. Wheelbarger.

    STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WHEELBARGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Ms. Wheelbarger. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
    Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for inviting me to testify on policy matters related to the
    United States Central Command----
        The Chairman. I apologize, but could you pull the
    microphone a little bit closer to your face there.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I will try to speak up.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Wheelbarger [continuing]. Alongside commanders General
    Votel and General Waldhauser. I would also like to take this
    opportunity to thank the men and women of the Department of
    Defense, their families, whose dedication--and their families.
    Their dedication, their talent, and sacrifice enable us to
    execute our policies around the world every day.
        You said this may be General Votel's last hearing. This is
    my first, so I wanted to take this opportunity to thank the
    committee for your strong collaboration and bipartisan support
    that you provide the Department of Defense. That is a vital
    contribution this committee makes to our dialogue on defense
    issues nationwide.
        My time as a senior staff member with national security
    committees in both the House and in the Senate instilled in me
    a great respect for the leadership that this committee provides
    and the invaluable contribution you provide--connection you
    provide to the American people.
        Students of military history spend a great deal of
    attention on the relationship between military commanders and
    statesmen or, rather, the proper level of civilian oversight of
    military activity and operations. An equally important
    component of military history is understanding national will,
    and that is the will to see threats clearly, approach them with
    sound policy, and remain committed to the country's defense
    even when the cost seems high.
        In the American system, the U.S. Congress is a fulcrum
    point where thoughtful oversight and sustained national will
    can come together. It is a noble and sometimes difficult
    challenge, and we at the Department appreciate your unique role
    in ensuring our military has the resources, authorities, and
    the legitimacy necessary to deter and defeat any foe.
        It is a great privilege and honor for me to be here today
    with two very devoted commanders to explain our defense policy
    to these regions. Our policy approach is nested in the guidance
    from the 2017 National Security Strategy [NSS] and the 2018
    National Defense Strategy [NDS].
        In support of the NSS goals to protect the American people,
    defend the homeland, and promote prosperity and peace from a
    position of strength, the NDS focuses on three aspects of U.S.
    power: our lethality, our partners and allies, and our
    institutions. It sets long-term competition with other states
    as our top national security priority even while we continue to
    address regional and terrorism threats.
        To compete in today's complex security environment, to
    defend future generations of Americans against near-peer
    competitors, and to manage ongoing threats from North Korea,
    Iran, and terrorist groups, we must make certain adjustments to
    our posture. We must also avoid prioritizing urgent problems at
    the expense of building readiness and capacity for potential
    high-end conflict into the future. We must deter and confront
    adversaries, while avoiding miscalculation or escalation that
    would distract and ultimately undermine our national security
    interests.
        In the Middle East and Africa, our policy objective is to
    increase regional stability and secure and advance U.S.
    interests working by, with, and through a network of
    international partners. By enhancing the capabilities and
    capacity of our partners, we reduce the risk to our homeland
    while increasing the internal security and stability of
    vulnerable states, often playing a supporting role to other
    government agencies and partners in the region.
        Specifically with the Middle East, it remains vitally
    important to our national security interests for four
    fundamental reasons: First, we are involved in active
    operations at the request of and support to our partners in
    countering extremists that threaten the region and the
    homeland; second, the Middle East is the crossroads of global
    competition with Russia and China; third, we face an aggressive
    Iran whose actions destabilize the region; and finally, our
    national security and economy depend on open commerce through
    the Middle East maritime domain and the free flow of natural
    resources. We must remain postured and engaged throughout this
    region.
        To that end, DOD's [Department of Defense's] policy
    objectives are to ensure continued success in our campaign
    against ISIS and al-Qaida and in support of our partners in the
    region, while also preparing to compete with China, Russia, and
    Iran for regional and global influence. We also invest in
    sustainable partnerships to reduce vulnerabilities of weak
    states as part of a whole-of-government effort to address
    instability.
        With our partners, we have ongoing CT [counterterrorism]
    campaigns in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We also are investing in
    defense partnerships that continue to allow us to gain far more
    than we invest in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and throughout
    the Gulf. Our partners are key to securing our interests in the
    region.
        We understand the importance and trust emplaced upon the
    Department of Defense for the security of every American, and
    our commitment to our national security and prosperity in this
    theater remains strong even as we address a host of other
    current and future threats.
        In Africa, vast, diverse, and dynamic, Africa is a
    continent of opportunities as well as challenges, with a
    possibility of surging in either direction. The Department must
    remain engaged in the region to foster positive trends and
    arrest the negative ones.
        As outlined in the 2018 DOD Strategy for Africa, the
    Department will continue to pursue African-led security
    solutions while maintaining the ability to act unilaterally to
    protect U.S. citizens and interests. As such, DOD supports U.S.
    whole-of-government efforts to address African security
    challenges, leverages international partnerships to support
    U.S. security objectives, maintains strategic access and
    influence, and seeks low-cost, resource-sustainable, and
    innovative security solutions.
        Employing our by, with, and through approach, we use a
    variety of tools, including capacity-building programs,
    security assistance, military equipment sales, education,
    training, and exercises to work closely with African and other
    international partners to achieve our policy goals. Those goals
    are to, first, seek to advance U.S. interests and influence in
    the region and maintain strategic access, which is especially
    important in an era of increasing near-peer competition;
    second, we seek to deny safe haven to terrorists and disrupt
    their ability to direct or support external operations against
    the U.S.; third, we seek to support our Department of State and
    other interagency colleagues by securing U.S. diplomatic posts;
    fourth, we strive to grow current partners and develop new
    relationships; and finally, we seek to enhance African partner
    capability to achieve our shared objectives into the future.
        In conclusion, the Department is well positioned to address
    the range of dynamic issues facing the United States in the
    Middle East and Africa. Our balanced approach helps ensure the
    Department can meet a variety of present and future threats,
    while enhancing the strength and agility of our forces.
        I thank you for the opportunity to share our views today.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Wheelbarger can be found in
    the Appendix on page 53.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        General Votel.

    STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
                                COMMAND

        General Votel. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
    distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
    honored to testify alongside Acting Assistant Secretary Katie
    Wheelbarger and my friend and fellow Minnesotan, General Tom
    Waldhauser.
        I come before you today on behalf of the men and women
    working tirelessly across the Central Command area of
    responsibility. They are the best, and I am proud to stand
    among them as their commander. All of these great Americans
    have families and communities across our country that support
    their service members from near and far, and we are equally
    proud and appreciative of their service and sacrifice as well.
        CENTCOM remains a dynamic, challenging, dangerous, yet
    hopeful area of responsibility, an area of great contrast and
    contradiction, rich with history, culture, youth, and
    resources, but riven with sectarianism, violence,
    disenfranchisement, and economic disparity. It is an area where
    we retain vital national interests, preventing attacks on our
    homeland, countering malign and destabilizing influence,
    preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
    and ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce through
    critical international waterways.
        I would like to use my time this morning to give you a
    quick overview of our key ongoing operations and opportunities.
    In Afghanistan, the President's South Asia strategy is working.
    The efforts of our Special Representative for Afghan
    Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, show there is a
    path to progress, but there is much left to do to achieve our
    end state of reconciliation between the Government of
    Afghanistan and the Taliban.
        Toward this end, our military efforts are focused on
    supporting the Afghan Security Forces and providing Ambassador
    Khalilzad the maximum military pressure and leverage to support
    his diplomatic efforts to establish a framework that will lead
    to an Afghan dialogue, a reduction in violence, and ultimately,
    a negotiated settlement.
        Importantly, we cannot forget that Afghanistan was used as
    a platform to attack our citizens and homeland in 2001, and we
    have to ensure this never happens again. Safeguarding this
    national interest and preventing violent extremist
    organizations like al-Qaida and ISIS in the Khorasan from
    plotting attacks against our country is also a continuing
    effort for our forces, one that we will need to be prepared to
    address as long as violent extremists can operate from this
    region.
        In Iraq and Syria, the unrelenting efforts of the 79-member
    Defeat-ISIS Coalition, the determination and bravery of the
    Iraqi Security Forces and our Syrian Democratic Force partners,
    has largely liberated the so-called physical caliphate of ISIS.
    An area of 34,000 square miles which they once controlled, now
    reduced to less than a single square mile. Reduction of the
    physical caliphate is a monumental military accomplishment, but
    the fight against ISIS and violent extremism is far from over.
        While ISIS has been battered by the Syrian Democratic
    Forces and coalition forces, we should be clear that what we
    are seeing now is not the surrender of ISIS as an organization,
    but a calculated decision to preserve the safety of their
    families and preservation of their capabilities by taking their
    chances in camps for internally displaced persons and going to
    ground in remote areas and waiting for the right time to
    resurge.
        Recent observations by our men and women on the ground
    highlight that the ISIS population being evacuated from the
    remaining vestiges of the caliphate largely remain unrepentant,
    unbroken, and radicalized. We will need to maintain a vigilant
    offensive against this now widely dispersed and disaggregated
    organization that includes leaders, fighters, facilitators,
    resources, and, of course, their toxic ideology.
        And the broader international community will need to
    determine how we deal with the thousands of fighters and family
    members now being held and safeguarded by the Syrian Democratic
    Forces. In my view, this is a serious generational problem that
    if not handled properly will sow the seeds of future violent
    extremism.
        As the Defeat-ISIS campaign in Syria transitions from
    liberating terrain to enabling local security forces and
    addressing the ISIS clandestine insurgency, we will continue
    our deliberate withdrawal of forces and capabilities as
    directed by the President, but also retain a residual force on
    the ground to continue our mission and safeguard our interests.
    These details are being developed now and will emphasize
    campaign continuity and capitalize on the contributions of our
    coalition partners.
        In Yemen, the fragile cease-fire on the port of Hodeidah is
    a promising albeit increasingly challenging to implement step,
    demonstrating some willingness on both sides of the conflict to
    negotiate and end this humanitarian disaster. Towards this
    objective, CENTCOM supports the diplomatic efforts and work of
    the United Nations special envoy to facilitate the peace
    process by providing advice and assistance and serving as an
    interlocutor through our trusted relationships in the region.
        We also remain steadfast in reminding the Saudi-led
    coalition partners of their obligations under the law of armed
    conflict and ensuring that the fight in Yemen does not spread
    across the region, sowing more instability and threatening
    critical infrastructure and U.S. lives and interests.
        In Yemen, we also face a threat from violent extremist
    groups. To address this, we work closely with our indigenous
    partners to disrupt these organizations to ensure they do not
    have the capability or opportunity to attack our country or
    citizens or those of our partners. I assess that our current
    efforts are keeping these organizations in a state that limits
    their ability to conduct external operations. We must continue
    to do this.
        Against the backdrop of these conflicts is the Iranian
    regime. Their efforts are not limited to the support they
    provide to the Houthis in Yemen. They strive to be a regional
    hegemon and use malign influence, qualitatively and
    quantitatively expanded capabilities, and facilitation and
    support to multiple proxies to exert pressure, threaten other
    countries in the region, supplant U.S. and Western influence,
    and threaten access to critical waterways vital to global
    commerce.
        Our military efforts here are focused on supporting a
    broader U.S. Government pressure campaign through deterrence,
    assurance, and competition. Our longstanding military
    relationships with partners across the region are critical to
    this effort. The Iranian regime remains the long-term
    destabilizing factor in this region.
        We do see reasons for optimism across the region. The
    capabilities and resilience of the Afghan special operations
    forces are notable and mark them as a reliable counterterrorism
    partner for the future.
        The emerging relationships in the Central Asian states look
    to provide us opportunities in an area long dominated and
    influenced by Russia and China. An Iraqi Security Force that
    has risen from the ashes of 2014 and now proudly and capably
    protects their country against ISIS resurgence can be a bulwark
    to future extremism.
        Egyptian armed forces have more effectively fought ISIS in
    the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the
    underlying issues that give life to these violent extremist
    groups and are helping to contain the threat.
        Steadfast partners like Jordan are making the most of the
    support we provide to maintain their singularly unique role of
    moderation in the region.
        A highly innovative and increasingly professional Lebanese
    armed force is emerging as a legitimate protector of their
    nation and a good partner to us.
        And partners across the Gulf join us in countering
    terrorism, providing security in the maritime environment, and
    effectively defending against missile threat.
        And so it goes in the Central Region today and every day,
    great promise and opportunity mixed with contradiction and
    conflict.
        Let me conclude my remarks where I started, with our people
    and their families. They are the best America has to offer, and
    they continually demonstrate commitment and devotion to our
    Nation, our mission, and to each other. They deserve the best
    equipment, the best pay, the best health care, and the best
    housing. Their commitment is surpassed only by the families
    that support them, and they deserve our best as well.
        As I conclude my tour in the next few weeks as the
    Commander of U.S. Central Command, I want to thank all of you,
    members of this committee and your staff, and indeed all of the
    Members of Congress and the staff, for your strong support to
    our men and women in uniform, our Department of Defense
    civilians, and their families.
        I ask for your continued support to provide our service men
    and women everything they need to accomplish their missions and
    lead healthy, fulfilling lives in continuing service to our
    Nation. Thank you again for allowing me to represent CENTCOM
    before you today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in
    the Appendix on page 72.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser.

     STATEMENT OF GEN THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
                             AFRICA COMMAND

        General Waldhauser. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
    Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to update you on the efforts of United
    States Africa Command. I am also honored this morning to be
    here with General Votel and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger to
    discuss the challenges we face in our respective areas of
    responsibility.
        I would like to begin this morning by remembering the
    soldier we lost on the continent during operations in Somalia
    this past year. I offer my sincere condolences to the family of
    Staff Sergeant Alexander Conrad. We honor his commitment,
    service, and dedication to duty.
        We also honor the sacrifice of our African partners who pay
    the ultimate price advancing peace and development across the
    African continent. Additionally, we thank our families, our
    service members, our civilian workforce, especially those who
    serve on the continent, oftentimes in remote locations, for
    their professionalism and commitment to AFRICOM'S mission.
        2019 marks the beginning of AFRICOM's second decade as a
    combatant command. As we enter this period, we have adapted our
    strategy for Africa based on updated national guidance, which
    includes the President's 2017 National Security Strategy and
    the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy.
        Specifically, the National Defense Strategy has shaped the
    focus of the armed services, outlining broad guidance to
    enhance readiness for high-end combat, while instructing the
    combatant commands, among other things, to strengthen alliances
    and attract new partners.
        The recently released U.S. Strategy Toward Africa, the
    Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and the National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism refocused our whole-of-government
    approach in the era of great power competition to advance U.S.
    influence and maintain strategic access across the globe.
        Taken comprehensively, the overall U.S. strategic interests
    in Africa are very clear: Support the U.S. whole-of-government
    efforts to address security challenges; leverage partnerships
    to prevent transnational threats from overwhelming African
    governments or endangering U.S. interests; maintain strategic
    access and advance American influence, including economic
    opportunities; counter violent extremist organizations; and
    protect U.S. citizens and the homeland.
        To underscore the strategy for disrupting extremists, we
    remain committed to synchronizing our kinetic authorities.
    Persistent pressure on Al Shabaab, ISIS, and the al-Qaida
    associated groups remains necessary to prevent the
    destabilization of African nations.
        U.S. strategic interests on the continent cannot be solely
    advanced through the use of military force alone. AFRICOM uses
    the military tool in concert with diplomacy and development in
    order to negate the drivers of conflict and create opportunity
    for the African citizens.
        In Somalia, we work closely with the ambassador, now
    permanently located in Mogadishu, and the USAID [United States
    Agency for International Development] mission director to help
    the Somalians assume responsibility for their own security and
    prosperity.
        In Libya, our counterterrorism commitment supports the U.S.
    charge who works closely with the international community to
    prevent civil conflict and facilitate the political
    reconciliation process.
        Additionally, our engagements, exercises, and activities
    throughout Africa are designed to increase U.S. influence,
    strengthen local security forces, and ensure our status as the
    preferred security partner. For example, in East Africa, our
    programs continue to modernize partner security forces as in
    Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, who export security and contribute
    forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia.
        In North Africa, we have seen significant return on
    investment with Tunisia and Morocco demonstrating the capacity
    to absorb advanced U.S. programs and lead the security-related
    exercises and operations.
        AFRICOM provides training, advice, and assistance to the
    western African nations which make up the G5 Sahel Force, as
    well as to the multinational joint task force working to
    contain violent extremism and secure the borders within the
    Lake Chad basin countries.
        Our partner networks and influence ensures access for U.S.
    forces in times of crisis to protect U.S. personnel and
    facilities, such as in Djibouti, a location with strategic
    significance to multiple combatant commands.
        In conclusion, the most important use of the U.S. military
    tool on the African continent is when our engagements emphasize
    relationships, capacity building, and professionalism. Our
    activities go beyond military maneuvers and tactics. They focus
    on a range of professional values, such as respect for the rule
    of law, human rights, and the integration of gender
    perspectives.
        I am proud to lead a team of professionals who have built
    strong and trusting relationships with African partners, the
    U.S. interagency, and the international community to foster
    security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
        On behalf of the service members, civilian employees, and
    the families of United States Africa Command, thank you for
    your support, and thank you for the opportunity to be with you
    here this morning.
        [The prepared statement of General Waldhauser can be found
    in the Appendix on page 114.]
        The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
        When we get into the questions--this has come up--we try to
    keep it to 5 minutes. And I apologize to the witnesses, if we
    hit the 5-minute mark, I will try and cut you off. If there is
    a question you haven't answered, sometimes you can submit that
    for the record, although we try to keep it to 5 minutes both in
    terms of the answers and the questions.
        And with that, we will start with Mrs. Luria.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you to the witnesses for being here
    today.
        And thank you, Ms. Wheelbarger, for mentioning the Middle
    East maritime domain, because that is what I would like to
    focus on today.
        Approximately 5 years ago, the Navy implemented the
    Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which resulted in more surge
    capability but less deployed on-station time for our carriers,
    basically switching from a 24-month cycle to a 36-month cycle.
        And, General Votel, in fiscal year 2019, was your request
    for carrier strike group presence met?
        General Votel. Congresswoman, no, we did not have carriers
    all the time that we would like them, and so we had to work
    solutions that included other platforms and other coalition
    partners to help meet those requirements.
        Mrs. Luria. So understanding that this is, you know, an
    unclassified hearing, could you quantify just maybe one-half,
    one-fifth, one-third, approximately the amount of carrier
    presence you received versus what you requested?
        General Votel. Congresswoman, I will take that for the
    record so I can give you a precise answer.
        [The information referred to is for official use only and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. So you alluded to this a little bit in
    your previous comment, but was your allocation for carrier
    presence sufficient to meet your ongoing security needs that
    you have in the region?
        General Votel. The presence that we have had has been
    sufficient to support the ongoing operations that we have been
    supporting in Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria in conjunction
    with our land-based capabilities.
        Mrs. Luria. And would you feel that they meet the
    requirements that you have for maintaining maritime presence in
    the AOR [area of responsibility]?
        General Votel. In some cases, we have been challenged in
    these areas of continuing to do that, so this, again, is
    something that we have to work with our coalition partners on
    to help offset this and--at times when we will not have the
    presence that we would like, and we look to use our coalition
    partners to help do that. And I think we have successfully done
    that.
        Mrs. Luria. So pivoting back to the impacts on you as a
    combatant commander of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and
    the idea that it creates more surge capability versus more
    deployed capability, as a combatant commander, which of those
    is more important to you?
        General Votel. Well, I think certainly in CENTCOM, a key
    part of our responsibilities is assurance, and we do that
    through our presence, engagements, and other things we do, and
    deterrence against, you know, the influences in the region that
    would pursue malign activities.
        So those to me are the most important aspects that they
    provide for us, and, of course, you know, directly supporting
    the freedom of navigation and commerce through the critical
    choke points that exist in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
        Mrs. Luria. So to leverage on your comments, the surge
    capability that is being created by the Optimized Fleet
    Response Plan where the carriers are, for the most part,
    remaining CONUS [continental United States] but available on
    demand, obviously adding a transit time to report to your
    theater, is limiting some of the capability you might have to
    respond in a contingency?
        General Votel. Well, I think we are early on in the concept
    right now. So, you know, I know the Department has successfully
    done this in other combatant commands. I have benefited from
    some of that capability residually being able to operate in my
    area and come down in my area. So we will look for
    opportunities. We are looking for opportunities where we can
    apply that concept as well.
        So I think we have a ways to go yet before we declare that
    this is not a concept that works. I think we have seen it work
    in other combatant commands, and we look forward to trying it
    in CENTCOM as well.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. So finally, just to wrap up, do you feel
    confident in your ability to execute contingency plans
    potentially from our adversaries who might become a maritime
    threat within the region based off of the limited carrier
    presence that you have had over the last year?
        General Votel. Congresswoman, I do. I do.
        Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you. I
    especially want to thank your families who truly bear the
    burden of your service. You love what you do, I know, but they
    truly have to bear the burden. It is a team effort.
        So I think broadly what the National Defense Strategy is
    trying to do, and it is a tough one, is how do we deal with the
    metastasizing Islamic extremist threat, peer competitors, rogue
    states, Iran, North Korea, overlaid with $22 trillion in debt?
    And what strikes me about your AOR is that it really is the
    cross section. It is really the confluence of China's One Belt,
    One Road, Russia's Middle East--push into the Middle East, of
    Iran's hegemony and, of course, the heart of the extremist
    threat.
        In reading your written testimony, what concerns me a bit,
    what I want to ask you about specifically as it comes to a
    couple of the theaters, is just kind of language in there
    shifting to being a supporting command, of doing more with
    less, of doing with less resources, particularly in the AFRICOM
    AOR. And while, of course, we do and this committee needs to
    help you invest in those near-peer or peer, I would say now,
    adversaries, I am very worried of the pendulum swinging too far
    and taking our eye off the ball in this extremist threat that
    is maybe on its back foot but is absolutely not defeated.
        And looking at your testimony in the Senate, I think you
    agree that ISIS and al-Qaida, you know, ISIS in particular may
    be defeated as a caliphate but not as a movement. In fact, I
    would argue, and tell me if you disagree, that that movement is
    growing and metastasizing, particularly across North Africa and
    absolutely can return to threaten the United States again.
        So looking at Afghanistan in particular, where half the
    world's terrorist organizations emanate, where the 9/11 attacks
    emanate, and reading recent reporting of a withdrawal based on
    a 5-year timeline as part of General Miller and Zal Khalilzad's
    negotiations, you know, I feel like I am getting transported
    back to 2009 with President Obama announcing withdrawal
    timelines.
        Do you, General Votel, think timelines as part of our
    strategy is a good idea, and have you been consulted on that
    timeline? Is that your best military advice?
        General Votel. I think, Congressman, I think most of us
    would say that these decisions have to be based more on
    conditions than on specific times. But I am certainly aware of
    the ongoing discussions here and, you know, have provided my
    advice. My advice is that any decision to reduce forces in
    Afghanistan should be done in full consultation with our
    coalition partners and, of course, the Government of
    Afghanistan. It should pivot off political progress in the
    reconciliation process.
        Mr. Waltz. Do the conditions on the ground now merit a
    withdrawal? And that is both a question for you and for you,
    Ms. Wheelbarger.
        General Votel. Congressman, we have not been directed to
    withdraw. There are no orders to withdraw anything. I have no
    orders----
        Mr. Waltz. But--and your advice is do the conditions merit
    a withdrawal, a reduction of forces, but whether it is the
    conditions of the Afghan Army, which I would think we would
    agree is not ready to stand on its own, or the battlefield
    conditions from a CT perspective.
        General Votel. Well, it certainly is a function of the
    conditions on the ground, but it is also a function of the
    conditions in the political process as well.
        Mr. Waltz. Right.
        General Votel. And so as I indicated, as I talked about, my
    best military advice is that we should make decisions based on
    the political process----
        Mr. Waltz. I am sorry, General, just in the interest of
    time, do the conditions now merit a withdrawal and your advice
    on--you know, 4 years at CENTCOM, on your way out?
        General Votel. The political conditions where we are in the
    reconciliation right now don't merit that.
        Mr. Waltz. Okay. General Waldhauser, I only have a few
    minutes. If I could ask you for the record to submit where we
    are on American citizen Jeff Woodke held hostage in Mali, what
    assets are being dedicated to find him. I think we owe the
    families that and all American citizens that, where we are. If
    you could submit that for the record, it would be great.
        I understand with optimization you are shifting to a 25
    percent withdrawal in a theater that was already an economy of
    force where, again, the Chinese and Russians are increasingly
    involved and we have a growing extremist threat. What are you
    not able to do with that reduction? What risk are we taking?
        General Waldhauser. First of all, Congressman, on the
    Woodke issue, I will submit that, and we can talk about it in
    closed session.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser. Secondly, with regards to optimization,
    I know we just have a few seconds left to go here, but I just
    want to emphasize the fact that optimization on the African
    continent has to do with counterterrorism strategy only. It is
    a very small niche.
        And what we have been directed to do and what we have said
    we will do are two different things. And moreover, we have been
    directed to do a cut for the first--an optimization or
    adjustment or cut for the first 18 months, which takes us out
    to June of 2020, and I think the number the Pentagon has used
    was about 10 percent.
        So it is difficult to get into the numbers because they
    move around all the time. But if you say that there is 6,000
    military people on the continent today, then that number is
    roughly close, but in the next 18 months we will optimize some
    conventional forces and some special operations forces,
    primarily in areas where their work is pretty much done, where
    they have----
        The Chairman. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has expired.
    If you could summarize.
        We will move on to Mr. Golden.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you. Just to follow up a little bit on my
    colleague's questioning about Afghanistan. General Votel, could
    you tell us, in your opinion, if there were a negotiated
    withdrawal of U.S. forces without a Taliban-Afghan peace deal
    that accompanied it, could the Afghan Security Forces at this
    time provide for their own security and maintain a stable
    government without U.S. forces on the ground or air support on
    the battlefield?
        General Votel. My assessment is the Afghan forces are
    dependent upon the coalition support that we provide to them.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you. This question is for Assistant
    Secretary Wheelbarger. You know, it has been widely reported
    that our government is engaged in peace talks with the Taliban.
    In your opinion, or have you seen any indication at all that
    the Taliban is willing to consider expanding talks to include
    the Afghan Government at this time?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will preface by saying that Assistant
    Secretary Schriver actually is responsible for Afghanistan,
    Pakistan. I do cover NATO, so it is very important for me to
    follow so we can stay in close alignment with our RSM [Resolute
    Support Mission] colleagues.
        All indications I have is that the negotiations are
    proceeding with--in a positive direction. I think we all agree
    that it is important if we are going to reach the level of
    agreement where the insurgency is no longer a concern, it is
    going to have to involve an Afghan-Taliban reconciliation.
        Mr. Golden. So to summarize, given the current security
    situation on the ground, without, let's say, tri-party
    negotiations and a settled peace deal between the Afghan
    Government and the Taliban to include the United States, we are
    not on, let's say, a roadway to getting to withdrawal?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Again, I would want to defer to my
    colleagues who cover this specifically, but I do think that we
    are seeing that this is an opportunity that we have not
    necessarily seen before and the military is poised to continue
    supporting the efforts of the reconciliation talks.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you. Just shifting gears a little bit.
    And, General Waldhauser, Semper Fi. Very good to see you, sir.
    Last year, you testified in front of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee that climate change was causing some security
    challenges in Africa in Sahel. It has been about a year, and I
    saw some recent reporting with ICRC [International Committee of
    the Red Cross] noting that temperatures are rising about 1.5
    times faster than the global average, and I think in this
    region we have got about 50 million people who depend upon
    livestock and therefore need land. And I think your comment was
    that you were seeing grasslands receding on average about a
    mile per year, which is pretty significant.
        I just want to give you the opportunity here, about a year
    later, to follow up on that testimony and tell us how you
    perceive the evolving situation in Sahel, what impact climate
    change is having on the security situation in the region in
    regards to competition over scarce resources, and how does this
    impact the mission of AFRICOM? What kind of steps are you
    having to take in order to ensure that we don't see conflict?
        General Waldhauser. The climate change situation continues.
    The area between--in the Sahel, between the desert to the north
    and the savannah in the south, the grasslands, those continue
    to recede. And this has caused problems between the farmers and
    the herders. And oftentimes, governments aren't able to
    establish control or laws or legislate that particular
    situation. So consequently, this becomes an opportunity for
    armed engagement within the various farmer-herder populations.
    Secondly--so that is on the security side, if you will.
        Secondly, on the humanitarian side, the issue of food
    insecurity and displaced personnel is a huge issue which
    continues. So this climate issue has some security aspects both
    kinetically, if you will, as well as humanitarian.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Bergman.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Chairman. And, General Waldhauser
    and General Votel, thank you for always, during your long and
    very successful careers, setting the highest standards and
    being an outstanding example of not only keeping those
    standards, but raising the bar. As someone who served a few
    days in uniform myself, I am proud as I look at what kind of
    leadership the young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and
    coastguardsmen have today. So thank you for your long service.
        A little over a decade ago, having had the opportunity to
    sit in some interesting meetings in places like Fallujah or
    others and participating with various entities, tribes who
    wanted to come and talk to American military leadership, could
    you, if you will, describe--I have my--in the memories in my
    mind what those meetings were like. Could you describe what
    security cooperation and coalition building, give a couple
    examples in your arena, some of the--for some of our folks who
    maybe haven't sat in one of those meetings?
        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Congressman. I will take a
    shot at that first. You know, we are building an airstrip on a
    Nigerien compound in Agadez, in northern Nigeria--Niger. And
    one of the first times I went up there I met with the local
    population because they were very interested in what was going
    on. And you have a very, very diverse group of individuals who
    have different and sometimes overreach in terms of expectations
    about what we can do with them.
        And so not only to build the airfield there, we have a
    significant civil-military engagement program so that we work
    with the schools there to provide desks, we work with the
    medical people there to provide extra care, and we do things
    like find children who are lost in the middle of the desert, to
    help that population.
        So the bottom line is, your actions speak louder than
    words, and sometimes with diverse groups, small things go a
    long way. And it is important to understand the capabilities
    and limitations, and their expectations therefore can be met.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
        General Votel. Congressman, I would add that one of the
    most successful coalition efforts that we have in CENTCOM is
    our coalition maritime force that operates in the waters of the
    Gulf and, in some cases, outside of the Gulf. And these involve
    nations in the region and, in fact, some nations from outside
    of the region who contribute people and ships to our--to the
    combined maritime force and help us conduct operations that are
    focused on counter-piracy, on combating terrorism, and on
    providing security in these critical waterways.
        And in all of these cases we have three subordinate
    combined maritime forces that operate under our naval commander
    in the region. These are all led by coalition partners. And
    these are all deeply valued relationships and missions by our
    coalition partners.
        And the authorities and the resources that are provided to
    us by Congress to maintain these things I think are being very
    well used. And it is one of the ways that we help make them
    more resilient, more capable of addressing their own security
    concerns. So of many coalition efforts, this is one that stands
    out in my mind.
        Mr. Bergman. Would either of you, just using Djibouti as an
    example, in an unclassified way, explain why we are there in
    that particular place, and also what other countries might be
    exerting a presence there now that maybe weren't there a while
    ago?
        General Waldhauser. The strategic geography of Djibouti is
    significant to our national strategies, and although it is in
    the AFRICOM AOR because as Djibouti is, various COCOMs
    [combatant commands], to include CENTCOM, utilize that
    location: CENTCOM, SOCOM, EUCOM [U.S. European Command],
    TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]. So this is a very
    strategic location for us.
        And I would tell you that this issue of either optimization
    or being able to share assets, CENTCOM and AFRICOM share
    assets, in this particular case ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance] assets, attack aircraft assets,
    and we use Djibouti as a hub that allows us to be more
    efficient in use of some of our material.
        General Votel. No, I would absolutely agree. And I think it
    also makes better use of our resources. When we are able to
    shift resources back and forth across our combatant command
    boundaries, I think we are making better use of the resources
    the American people provide to us, and I think we are actually
    being more effective in terms of it.
        So locations like Djibouti, I think, are incredibly
    important to what is going on. Of course, it sits astride the
    Bab al-Mandeb, one of the three critical choke points. We do
    see the presence of others in the area. Certainly, the Chinese
    have interests here and are steaming in the waters of the
    Central Command on a regular basis.
        Mr. Bergman. Thank you. I hate to cut you off, but I know
    the chairman is going to say my time is expired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate you for doing that
    for me. But thank you.
        Ms. Haaland.
        Ms. Haaland. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, and thank
    you all for being here this morning. Really appreciate it. And
    thank you for your service to our country.
        I understand that the framework for the negotiations
    between the U.S. and the Taliban would see Taliban vow to
    prevent the country from being used as a hub for terrorism in
    return for a U.S. military withdrawal.
        While Taliban leaders have recently expressed willingness
    to acknowledge some fundamental women's rights, I am deeply
    concerned that respect for human rights be a core part of the
    framework for peace. Any negotiated settlement must include
    respect for human rights and the rights of women in particular.
    Women's equality is enshrined in the Afghan Constitution, and
    the women of Afghanistan should have a seat at the negotiating
    table.
        General Votel, can you tell me how the framework addresses
    the rights of women in Afghanistan and how women are being
    included in the negotiation process, if you can?
        General Votel. Thank you. Thank you, Congresswoman. So I
    think at this particular point where we are in the ongoing
    talks is that Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts are really focused
    on developing a framework that can lead to intra-Afghan
    discussions. And this involves, I think, overcoming some
    obstacles that right now are preventing the Taliban from
    talking to the Government of Afghanistan. But, again,
    Ambassador Khalilzad is working through those issues. And then
    once that--once those intra-Afghan discussions are commenced,
    then I think we will have the opportunity to address the issues
    that you are talking about directly.
        But I am aware, while these are being led by our Department
    of State colleagues and Ambassador Khalilzad in particular, I
    am aware that, exactly as you state, it remains key points that
    we are interested in ensuring are included in the overall
    discussions and framework.
        Ms. Haaland. Thank you so much for that.
        I would like to turn now to the Afghan women serving in the
    Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. And if you can
    answer this question, how many women are currently serving in
    the Afghan National Army, and how are the challenges in
    recruitment and retention being addressed, and is that
    recruitment sustainable?
        General Votel. Congresswoman, I will take that question for
    the record so I can provide you a precise response.
        [The information referred to is for official use only and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Ms. Haaland. Thank you so much.
        And this question will go to Assistant Secretary
    Wheelbarger. Thank you so much for being here. Can you tell me
    how your office is pursuing the implementation of the United
    States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I don't directly cover that issue, so
    unfortunately, I think I am going to have to take that for the
    record, and I will converse with my colleagues who are
    responsible for it.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 155.]
        Ms. Haaland. Okay. Thank you so much. I would appreciate
    that.
        And I yield back my time, Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Mitchell.
        Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much.
        And thank you, both of you, for--I join my colleagues in
    congratulating you on your careers. I wish you well in your
    retirement. Your families deserve some of your time.
        I would like to follow up on Mr. Waltz's questions about
    AFRICOM, if I could. Given the discussions about reducing our
    footprint there, could you define for me what impact it may
    have on our counterterrorism effort in Africa, and does that
    undermine or threaten some of those efforts?
        General Waldhauser. First of all, let me just say that with
    regards to the terrorism effort, for sure. Somalia and Libya
    will really have--there is no impact there. There is no
    optimization. There is really no cutback. We will maintain our
    capability and capacity there. And by the way, those are the
    two countries on the continent where we have authorities to
    conduct kinetic operations.
        In other areas in the continent where we were directed to
    take a look at this, we looked at the locations where we have
    been training with partner forces for some time, in some cases,
    5, 6, 7 years. And so for the most part, those units are
    prepared and ready to execute on their own, and they have been
    for quite some time. So that is where we made the cut in our
    first tranche, if you will.
        But moreover, we continue to provide intelligence. We will
    continue to provide logistic support. And with partners like
    the French in Western Africa, we have got a great relationship
    with them and will maintain that partnership.
        So as I said, at the moment, we have been directed to
    conduct tranche one, which takes us out to June of 2020. So
    that is roughly, you know, 300 or so people coming off the
    continent, half of whom are conventional forces. And so at the
    moment, we don't see a significant issue there. And whether we
    will ever be directed to execute the second half is to be
    determined.
        And the final point I would make is what we have told the
    secretary, is that every one of these decisions will be made
    individually, and if we feel that it is not in our best
    interest to do so, we will reclama and push back on the plan
    that is in place at the moment.
        Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you, it may not be appropriate
    here but maybe in closed session, to summarize systemic changes
    that have been made since the incident that happened in Niger
    where we had the four soldiers lose their life there. It may
    not be appropriate here, but I think it is appropriate in terms
    of some forum to get some feedback on that. I would like it
    because I am concerned the reduced footprint puts more people
    at risk.
        I was in Landstuhl right before the holidays and spoke with
    an officer there that is working on intelligence, and we can't
    get into where, but frankly, support for him was a long way
    away. And I am concerned, given the size of Africa, that we are
    not putting resources into that that we need to to deal with
    that.
        I guess it lets me pivot to the next question. Maybe it is
    more--I think for both of you and the secretary. Given the
    increased engagement of China, in particular in Africa, both in
    terms of their investment, and with that almost instantaneously
    comes to military engagement, do we have enough resources there
    both military as well as diplomatic and development resources
    to address those concerns? Because I know we deal with
    counterterrorism, but we have near-peer concerns I think we are
    overlooking.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Well, I will start by saying that we
    definitely see China's influence in Africa as a key priority
    for us. Our efforts are multilateral in the sense of we look at
    all of our activities on the DOD side, whether it be exercises,
    training missions, military----
        Mr. Mitchell. Let me interrupt you. I apologize, but he
    will be a tough guy on time. The question I have for both of
    you is, are--do we have enough resources both in terms of
    military, development, and diplomacy to address the threats we
    have in Africa from not just terrorism, but from our near-peer
    adversaries? That is what I would like to address. Do we have
    them, and what do we do to get them?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I think particularly on the development
    and the commercial side where China has a much more focused
    capability to, you know, bring resources to bear, we are
    challenged to keep up. And we could, particularly on the
    nonmilitary side of our government efforts, we could be seeking
    ways--we should be seeking and I know the interagency is very
    focused on finding ways to compete in the private commercial
    sphere in particular.
        Mr. Mitchell. What do you think, General?
        General Waldhauser. Very quickly, on the Niger thing, we
    can talk in closed session, but the bottom line is we have
    instituted practices and procedures that negate some of the
    issues that have taken place there in the past, as you referred
    to.
        With regards to the Chinese, and what is important for
    AFRICOM, in the Defense Department strategy on China, it
    specifically states in there that we can expect to get no more
    resources and maybe less. So that is fine. That is the
    umbrella. That is the intent.
        So my point would be is that we need to--we have 6,000 or
    so conventional forces plus special operations forces on the
    continent today. We need to maintain that threshold force in
    order to accomplish what you just described.
        Mr. Mitchell. Do you believe that is sufficient?
        General Waldhauser. It is adequate.
        Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
        I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. I think we will have to have a dictionary
    definition between what is the difference between
    ``sufficient'' and ``adequate.'' I will let you guys discuss
    that later.
        Ms. Escobar.
        Ms. Escobar. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And thanks to our panel. Thanks, especially, General Votel
    and General Waldhauser, for your service. Please thank the men
    and women who serve with you for their service as well on our
    behalf.
        I am especially concerned about something that the chairman
    mentioned in his opening statement about how our posture meets
    the threats, and obviously all of us here are interested and
    concerned about that, and what risks exactly, as he said, we
    are willing to accept.
        And to the question that just came before me and to the
    definition of ``adequate,'' I would like to expand a little bit
    on that. What is--at what point does it become inadequate, and
    what are the risks that we will have to accept if we don't move
    out of the adequate phase?
        General Waldhauser. Congresswoman, one of the challenges we
    have on the African continent is trying to accurately
    characterize the threat that we are up against. So, for
    example, one of the reasons why the Department gave us the
    optimization task is because the threats that we are working
    against aren't necessarily a threat to the homeland and may not
    be a threat to the region overall.
        Because many of these groups, you have the intersection of
    jihadist philosophy with crime, historical influence, criminal
    activity, shipping of weapons, drugs, people, cattle, and so
    forth. So because these groups may hang out a shingle and say
    we are with ISIS today, they may or may not have the intent or
    capability to attack outside their particular part of the
    country.
        So that is one of the challenges that we have. And so when
    it--again, to come more in compliance with the National Defense
    Strategy, to get more in line toward depth to dwell time, if
    you look at some of the threats on the African continent,
    sometimes, even though they may call themselves al-Qaida or
    ISIS, sometimes it is difficult to say they are a threat to the
    homeland.
        Ms. Escobar. Well, and last year, the Pentagon announced a
    reduction in forces to the AFRICOM region by 10 percent,
    obviously over time, but what will that reduction mean?
        General Waldhauser. So, again, I want to emphasize that 10
    percent reduction is in the counterterrorism forces only. And
    so the conventional forces that are on the continent every day
    right now conducting--for example, we have a shipping port in
    Algeria today. We have numerous small engagements across the
    continent. We have exercises that are ongoing that are
    conducted by our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
    components. We need to make sure those things maintain. We need
    to make sure we have threshold force for that. And then as we
    continue to observe and watch the threat from these
    counterterrorism groups, if we believe they are at a point
    where they have grown and their intent is perhaps more along
    threats to the United States, then we have to go back and ask
    for that.
        So in sum, I want to make sure that the line that we are
    walking away from the continent or we are leaving the
    continent, you have to remember that the task we were given was
    counterterrorism forces only. We have tried to take forces that
    have been involved in working with units that have been trained
    for quite some time and that their threat for the homeland is
    questionable, at best.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you. Now, despite opening up a military
    base in Djibouti, some analysts say that China does not intend
    to grow its military presence in Africa but rather use
    telecommunication, infrastructure projects, and trade as their
    primary tools of influence on the continent. How will these
    avenues of influence change our ability to work with African
    partners?
        General Waldhauser. Well, there is no doubt about the fact
    that in AFRICOM, we are the only place really on the planet
    where China has an overseas base in Djibouti, as we have
    discussed, and we have talked about why that location is
    important for us and the challenges that it brings to AFRICOM
    and as well as the other combatant commanders. One of our key
    tasks is to maintain influence and gain influence vis-a-vis the
    Chinese. And so we want to make sure we are the partner of
    choice, and we will do that militarily through our training,
    through our equipment sales because of the quality, and so
    forth.
        But I think one of the things that needs to be done for the
    whole-of-government approach, which is what the Chinese do very
    well, is they work at the relationship. The number of high-
    level officials who come to visit just to say hello and just
    work at the relationship is very high, and that is very
    meaningful to the Africans. The Africans don't want to be in
    the middle of great power competition between the U.S. and
    China. They want to be our partner of choice, but they will
    make decisions in their own best interest at times. But I think
    one of--again, one of the things we have to do from a whole-of-
    government approach is, if we want to be the partner of choice,
    we have got to work at the relationship with high level of
    visits and engagements.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, General, for your testimony
    today. And I am so glad that I had the opportunity to meet you.
    I know this is your final hearing, and so I feel very
    fortunate. Thank you for your service.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Cheney.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all very
    much for being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter for the record a piece
    by Tom Jocelyn and Bill Roggio, ``The cost of withdrawal from
    Afghanistan,'' from December 22.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Cheney. Also, ``al-Qaida continues to view Afghanistan
    as a safe haven,'' by the same authors, in the Long War
    journal. And a third piece by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, ``I was
    ambassador to Afghanistan, and this deal is a surrender.''
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Ms. Cheney. General Votel, I appreciate your determination
    and your commitment in your testimony today to talking about
    how important it is that we be guided by conditions on the
    ground. But I have to say, when I look at the situation in
    Afghanistan and the policy that I am afraid we are pursuing now
    here, it looks like we are aggressively setting those
    conditions aside, aggressively ignoring the conditions on the
    ground. In particular, the discussions that are underway that
    both you and Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger have referenced
    that Ambassador Khalilzad is leading, I think you mentioned
    them as a path to progress, and then Assistant Secretary
    Wheelbarger said that they were going in a positive direction.
        We seem to be pursuing the same fantasy that we did in the
    Obama administration, which is that al-Qaida is somehow
    distinct from the Taliban. When I look at what has happened,
    when I look at the fact that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of
    al-Qaida, has sworn an oath of allegiance to the Taliban. More
    recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the same leader of al-Qaida,
    claimed that the Taliban's resurrected Islamic Emirate of
    Afghanistan would be, quote, the nucleus of a new caliphate.
        So when I look at the situation there and I look at the
    extent to which we are dealing with the very entity that
    attacked us on 9/11, none of us want what the President has
    called endless wars; however, it would be far worse if we
    handed a victory to our jihadist enemies. And it would be, God
    forbid, far worse if we had another mass casualty attack in the
    United States.
        So I wonder, General Votel, if you could point me to
    anything that the Taliban has said or done to either renounce
    violence, to abandon their alliance with al-Qaida, or to say
    that they will abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan that
    should give us any hope that these talks are anything but a
    fantasy.
        General Votel. Well, they haven't made any of those
    statements, Congresswoman, as you know. But, again, as I have
    tried to cover in my opening statement here, this--we are very
    early in the process of this. There have been no agreements
    from either side. We have not given anything up and they have
    not given anything up.
        Ms. Cheney. But, General, is there anything you see that
    gives you confidence that it would be your best military advice
    that we could, in fact, negotiate any kind of agreement that
    you could count on the Taliban to uphold?
        General Votel. I think the fact that we are actually having
    discussions is a point that we have not reached in the 18 years
    we have been involved in this.
        Ms. Cheney. Well, General, I am sorry to interrupt. We
    actually did have discussions during the Obama administration.
    Secretary Clinton initially set these conditions and then
    completely abandoned them. And, you know, I don't have to tell
    you the history when we released the prisoners from Guantanamo
    in exchange for Bergdahl. So we have gone down this path
    before.
        But my concern is, even if, let's say for the sake of
    argument, that you believe that those negotiations could lead
    someplace, that we could, in fact, be doing the best we could
    for our national security by talking to the Taliban who are
    inextricably linked with al-Qaida, the organization that
    attacked us on 9/11, would it be your best military advice that
    withdrawing forces in the middle of that would, in fact, help
    to increase our credibility?
        General Votel. Congresswoman, we have remained very focused
    on the terrorism and counterterrorism mission that is
    happening.
        Ms. Cheney. But specifically the withdrawal of forces.
        General Votel. We could withdraw forces and not have an
    impact on our counterterrorism mission----
        Ms. Cheney. That is right, but, General----
        General Votel [continuing]. Against al-Qaida or any other
    groups.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. But you mentioned making
    sure that we had the maximum military pressure on the Taliban
    and on al-Qaida. And I fail to understand how it could be the
    situation that announcing withdrawal of forces is maintaining
    the maximum military pressure.
        An additional question would be, how is it conceivably
    possible that a negotiation that actively leaves out the very
    government that we say we are trying to help to encourage and
    sustain would lead us in the right direction?
        General Votel. It is not leaving out the government.
    Ambassador Khalilzad is well engaged with the Government of
    Afghanistan----
        Ms. Cheney. But the Taliban continues to refuse to talk to
    the Government of Afghanistan.
        General Votel. And this is the purpose of the framework
    discussions that are underway right now. I want to get to that
    point.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you, General. I remain very concerned
    that we are headed down an extremely dangerous path. We will
    continue this in the classified setting, but this would be,
    were we to leave, a jihadist victory for the very forces that
    attacked us on 9/11. And while we have got to ensure that we
    are engaged in countering great power conflict in the threats
    we face, we cannot go down the path of ignoring the fact that
    these were the folks that provided safe haven to al-Qaida for
    the attacks on 9/11.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Hill.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you, Generals and Ms. Wheelbarger, for
    being here. I also want to give a shout-out to the fellow
    Centurion in the room. I think we are the only two Katies from
    Saugus [California] who are in Washington, DC, right now.
        I want to dig in a little bit more on the focus on the
    great power competition. You all have mentioned the increased
    engagement in Africa and the Middle East by our near-peer
    adversaries, including referencing the regions of the
    crossroads of global competition with Russia and China.
        So, General Waldhauser, you mention in your report that
    Russia is actively involved in Libya and is invoking Qadafi-era
    relationships. Reporting also indicates that Russia is
    supporting the Libyan National Army. How is this challenging
    our efforts to help the current Libyan Government and our
    counterterrorism efforts in the country, and what are Russia's
    aims in Libya overall?
        General Waldhauser. We have three missions in Libya. One of
    them is the counterterrorism piece, which we have been at for
    quite some time. After the liberation of Sirte, if you will,
    where we had over almost 500 strikes, we have had 13 strikes in
    the last 2 years of a CT effort, but we maintain that. That is
    the first thing.
        The second thing we do, we are trying to--one of our
    missions is to prevent civil war, and we do that by not going
    one side or the other.
        And the third one is support the political process. And so
    what the Russians have done is overtly they have supported the
    U.N. [United Nations]-GNA [Government of National Accord]-
    President Sarraj framework. But behind the scenes, there is no
    doubt about the fact they have supported the LNA [Libyan
    National Army] with all kinds of equipment, people, training,
    and the like. And they have supported Haftar, who has moved now
    from the east to the west, and essentially has taken a lot of
    real estate to get into a good position for leverage for
    diplomatic talks.
        Ms. Hill. And why would they want to do that?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think when the music stops,
    they want to be on the winning side. And right now, you know,
    Sarraj has been the President for over 2 years. He has been a
    good partner for us. Special Representative Salame is trying to
    get elections by the end of year. And it is unclear whether
    Haftar would run for election, but he is going to be involved
    in some way, shape, or form. So when the music stops, the
    Russians want to be on the side if he gets in.
        Ms. Hill. But what strategic advantage would that give
    them?
        General Waldhauser. It gives them influence and it gives
    them influence in a key location in the southern Med on the
    southern part of NATO, if you will. And it allows them then to
    reinvigorate some old Qadafi era-contracts in the oil field,
    weapon sales, and the like. So there is a strategic interest
    for them to be behind both sides, but primarily really Haftar.
        Ms. Hill. So it is about resources and access to being
    closer to the southern border of----
        General Waldhauser. Correct. And influence as well.
        Ms. Hill. Okay, great. Not great, but thank you.
        You also discuss the Russian efforts in Central African
    Republic, which leads me to ask what are the Russian objectives
    on the continent more broadly? Why there? What are the other
    areas where they're----
        General Waldhauser. What the Russians are doing in the
    Central African Republic is very concerning, because they have
    the paramilitary group, the Wagner group, which is heavily
    involved there, not only in training, but also in influence at
    the highest levels of the government, to include the President.
    And meanwhile, they have been able to work the situation so
    they can have mineral extraction and so forth, gold, et cetera,
    to generate revenue as well.
        And so this model is very concerning in that if you bring
    in a paramilitary group, they influence the government, they
    extract resources. This is very concerning if that model would
    be applied in another country.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you. General Votel, in your assessment, how
    did the Russians react to the President's December announcement
    to withdraw from Syria?
        General Votel. I think they viewed it positively.
        Ms. Hill. The Russians viewed that decision positively?
        General Votel. They did, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Hill. Can you describe what advantage Russia gains with
    our withdrawal from Syria--proposed withdrawal from Syria and
    Afghanistan?
        General Votel. Well, I think what they looked at that, they
    looked at this as an opportunity to fill the void that we had
    provided in the support to the partners that we work with on
    the ground there. So they look to gain and perpetuate what the
    Assad regime was doing.
        Ms. Hill. And, again, why? What does this do for us? What
    harm does this potentially cause us and our allies? How does
    this help Russia as a whole as it is trying to regain its
    power?
        General Votel. Well, it makes Russia a bigger player in
    this area. And as we move, albeit slowly, towards some kind of
    end state in Syria, it puts Russia more in the driver's seat in
    terms of what that solution might be. And, of course, it
    solidifies their presence in the Middle East in this critical
    part of the Levant right here. So I think that is an important
    objective of theirs.
        Ms. Hill. So to put it very bluntly, the President's
    proposals directly allow Russia to gain more influence in the
    Middle East, potentially endangering us and our allies?
        General Votel. No, I don't think that is what I said. I
    said our withdrawal from there gave them the opportunity to
    fill the void. Obviously, things would come after that would
    increase their influence in pursuing, you know, some kind of
    political settlement, but it would certainly give them the
    ability to be in a better position.
        Ms. Hill. So, again, the proposal to withdraw troops from
    Syria and Afghanistan provides an opportunity for Russia to
    gain additional power and to potentially grow the global
    threat?
        The Chairman. I am sorry, the gentlelady's time has
    expired.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I do want to ask one quick followup on that.
    As of right now, is there any specific plan on the withdrawal?
    And you can tell me what is classified and what is not. A
    timeline, I know the President announced it in a tweet, as I
    said in my opening remarks. I don't think that was a
    particularly wise way to set up policy, and then we sort of set
    up the policy after he tweeted. But what is the timeline, if
    there is one, on withdrawal from Syria? And what do the numbers
    look like?
        General Votel. I look forward to talking about this in the
    classified session.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        General Votel. But what I would say is that what is driving
    withdrawal of course is our mission, which is defeat of ISIS.
    And so that is our principal focus, and that is making sure
    that we protect our forces, that we don't withdraw in a manner
    that increases the risk to our forces. There is not pressure on
    me to meet a specific date at this particular time. And I look
    forward to talking more in details in a closed session.
        The Chairman. I am sorry. We can do it in closed session. I
    just want to make one final, you know, policy political point.
    What seems to be driving the withdrawal is the President's
    split-second decision to send out a tweet saying we are going
    to get out of Syria. Okay. Now, I hear what you are saying in
    terms of what you are working on, but in terms of the public
    perception, the international perception, is that prior to that
    tweet, it wasn't planned. He sent it out, now we are
    responding.
        So I take your point, and that is obviously the argument we
    want to make, is that what is driving our military decisions is
    military necessity. It does not appear that way in this case,
    given the way the President has communicated.
        Mr. Banks.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Votel, you have already heard a great deal of
    skepticism expressed about Special Envoy Khalilzad's
    negotiations with the Taliban for reconciliation. Why shouldn't
    we be skeptical?
        General Votel. Congressman, my view, we have come further
    in the last 6 months than we have at any time in the last 18
    years. Since the announcement of the South Asia strategy by our
    President, the Government of Afghanistan, the President of
    Afghanistan has announced that he is willing to meet. We have
    had a cease-fire. The first time we have done that, both sides
    did that. It was short, but it gave a glimpse of what could be.
    And the meetings and the sessions that have taken place over
    the last 5 or 6 months I think have moved this further along
    than it is.
        It is a difficult problem. We are still at the front end of
    this. I acknowledge that. And we have a ways to go. But the
    Taliban has come to the table. We have seen Pakistan play a
    more helpful role in helping that occur. So to me, these are
    things that we have not seen in the past that we are now
    seeing.
        Mr. Banks. I appreciate that, but with all due respect, the
    vagueness of what we hear about timelines and conditions, it
    paints a skeptical picture for me and so many others in
    wondering if this path will lead anywhere. But yet in a rose-
    colored world, if these negotiations were successful, if there
    was an agreement that was signed between us and the Taliban,
    what would happen at that point in that rose-colored world?
        General Votel. I think if you look at what I think winning
    in Afghanistan means, it means two things, Congressman. It
    means a negotiated settlement between the Government of
    Afghanistan and the Taliban, and it also means safeguarding
    U.S. national interests, particularly ensuring that this
    country, this region can't be used to attack our homeland. So
    that would have to be satisfied as part of any overall
    agreement here in terms of that. And I think that is a lot of
    the nuance of the ongoing discussions that are taking place
    right now.
        Mr. Banks. Is ISIS-K potentially a threat to the homeland?
        General Votel. I think ISIS-Khorasan does have ideations
    focused on external operations towards our homeland, yes.
        Mr. Banks. General, some of your predecessors have
    testified before this committee before and articulated a
    sustained presence strategy in Afghanistan. Would you agree
    with that approach, maybe articulate what that means?
        General Votel. I think as long as there is a terrorist
    threat, whether it comes from al-Qaida or ISIS or any other
    group that perpetrates threats against our country, I think we
    have to ensure that they are either through our own presence or
    through whatever other arrangements we can make, that we can
    address that particular threat.
        Mr. Banks. So therefore a sustained presence in Afghanistan
    in some shape or fashion would allow us to combat that ongoing
    presence of ISIS-K or other threats that might be posed from
    Afghanistan?
        General Votel. That would certainly be one way of doing it,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Banks. What would a sustained presence look like?
        General Votel. Well, again, I think this might be a better
    discussion for a closed-session hearing to give you a little
    bit more detail. But I think it looks a lot like it looks right
    now. It looks like making sure we have got partners on the
    ground we can operate with; it looks like we have the right
    collection assets in so we can keep an eye on this; and it
    means that we have the right unique capabilities from a U.S.
    standpoint to address this particular--and keep the pressure on
    this network like we have been doing.
        Mr. Banks. General, when should the American people and
    members of this committee expect a better defined idea of the
    timeline of these negotiations between Special Envoy Khalilzad
    and the Taliban?
        General Votel. I think I would have to refer you to the
    Department of State on that since that is who Ambassador
    Khalilzad works for, and they would probably be better to
    provide some type of timeline, if there is one.
        Mr. Banks. So no reasonable expectation of when that
    timeline would be?
        General Votel. Congressman, it is underway right now. I
    mean, it is proceeding, and it is a complex environment. In my
    estimation, I think Ambassador Khalilzad is doing the very best
    that he can to move this forward. And our job, my job as a
    CENTCOM commander is to make sure he has the military support
    to move forward on that objective. Our end state here is
    reconciliation, that is the end state of the President's South
    Asia strategy and that is what we are focused on. So the whole
    of our efforts is supporting Ambassador Khalilzad.
        Mr. Banks. I appreciate that. I had hoped today that I
    could eliminate some of my skepticism, but the vagueness of the
    nature of these negotiations and what I have heard today leave
    me even more skeptical than before. I am not sure that Special
    Envoy Khalilzad's best that he can do is good enough.
        With that, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Slotkin.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
        Thanks to our witnesses. I certainly know, Ms. Wheelbarger,
    exactly how it feels to be exactly in your shoes. And to both
    generals, I have really enjoyed my time working with you.
        And, General Votel, since you were so short, I think it is
    worth noting you are one of the most creative, out-of-the-box
    thinkers we have in our senior leadership. Your career defines
    what it means to fight in the post-9/11 world. And I think the
    American public will probably never know what you did to help
    us protect ourselves from terrorist threats. So I thank you for
    everything you have done.
        And I would be remiss if I didn't take advantage of this
    opportunity with you with more--just 3 weeks left to ask you
    kind of some bigger picture questions on how the U.S. fights in
    the post-9/11 era. The theory of the case for me is that we
    cannot fight global threats without a global coalition, that
    without partners and allies, our ability to protect ourselves
    is at least diminished, at best diminished, and at worst leaves
    us less safe.
        So can you just walk me through what you believe happens if
    allies and partners are not providing support to us in these
    global fights in your region?
        General Votel. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. So very
    clearly, we are very dependent upon our coalition partners, not
    just for basing and accessing in the region, but certainly for
    the additional capabilities that they take. We bring a lot, the
    United States brings a lot to these operations, but we don't
    bring everything. And so many of the unique capabilities that
    we rely on in these coalitions do come from our coalition
    partners, whether it is medical, whether it is sustainment,
    whether it is training, whether it is advising. They augment,
    they supplement, they complement the things that we are doing.
    And so that is an important aspect.
        But the other thing is it brings with--the coalition aspect
    brings with it the will of the world, if you will, or the will
    of the coalition. So it is more than just one nation who is
    standing up for something. In the case of Iraq and Syria, it is
    79 nations and international organizations that are saying we
    are focused on this particular mission right here. So to me
    that is one of the most important aspects of the coalition
    approach.
        Ms. Slotkin. So many of the members of this committee went
    on a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Munich Security
    Conference. We heard in real time from our allies their deep,
    deep concern with the way that the U.S. and the administration
    was handling informing them about our plans in the world,
    particularly, as was referenced, the tweet to get out of Syria,
    when many of them are fighting with us in Syria.
        In your experience, if we alienate our allies and make it
    politically difficult for them to join with us in these
    operations, what happens to the quality of our operations? Do
    they go up or do they go down? And kind of--I know General
    Mattis was really clear about this in his final letter, but if
    you could just talk to us about, you know, the quality of our
    operations if these partners and allies just say no to joining
    with us.
        General Votel. Well, Congresswoman, I think it certainly
    makes it more difficult to pursue some of these missions
    without the partnerships that we depend on out here. And as I
    have already mentioned, we lose capabilities, we lose some of
    the sustainment that comes along with our operations there. So
    I think it makes it much more difficult without--doing these
    things without partners.
        Ms. Slotkin. And, you know, we were--a number of us wrote a
    letter, a bipartisan letter to the President asking that he
    reconsider his decision to fully pull out of Syria. A number of
    us are very happy to see that a small force is going to be
    remaining there. We all take note when you say that ISIS, while
    the caliphate has certainly been depleted, that ISIS has
    largely gone to ground, that they have not sort of had a change
    of heart in how they feel.
        Tell me, if you could in an unclassified setting, what you
    believe the likelihood is that we will, with the small force
    that we have staying behind, ability to keep them suppressed at
    least from returning at least a piece of that caliphate.
        General Votel. I am confident in this. And I think we have
    to look at the force, not just as U.S. forces that retain on
    the ground, but other coalition forces. We need to look at our
    Syrian Democratic Force partners that number 60,000. And then
    we need to look at our over-the-horizon capabilities that we
    can bring to bear. And as we go through the planning of this,
    we are looking at all of those capabilities. As I mentioned,
    this is ongoing right now. But I think by looking at all those
    different pools of forces and capabilities that we have, we
    will have the capabilities we need to do the mission we have
    been asked to do.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. And to both generals,
    congratulations on your retirement, well earned, and thank you
    for your service.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Gaetz.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Waldhauser, I have a number of constituents who
    contribute to the train and equip mission in Africa. Can you
    share with us the circumstances where we have been most
    successful at moving the needle in the capabilities of our
    partner nations and then where there are places where we
    haven't made as many strides as we would have hoped?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think one example that I will
    always use is Tunisia, Tunisia, where the whole revolution
    began and so forth. And over the past few years, they have done
    a tremendous job to essentially restructure their entire
    military towards a threat that is relevant to them. And they
    have been a willing partner. They have been able to absorb a
    lot of institutional-level guidance and training, so they have
    been a success story as well.
        And I think in other places, even like Cameroon, for
    example, with the challenges there with the Anglophone region
    and the like, the Buea force has been a good counterterrorism
    partner, and they have progressed to the point where they are
    operating on their own and so forth. And I would just mention
    that as part of that, you know, the whole law of war, the whole
    battlefield ethics speech, that is always a part of the
    training and equipping that we do. And so we have programs
    across the continent, these 333 programs where we will put
    equipment in various countries, you know, whether it is
    Djibouti or Somalia or Burkina Faso, these are very, very
    important to us. So those are a couple of examples where we
    have had success.
        Mr. Gaetz. And where have we not met our expectations
    regarding capabilities of partner nations?
        General Waldhauser. Well, without singling out specific
    nations, I think the point is, is that when we embark on these
    engagements, we have to make sure we understand what the
    country can absorb. And we can't do things or expect things if
    they don't have the institutional capacity to deal with
    logistical training, to deal with sourcing and so forth.
        Mr. Gaetz. Should I make much of the fact that you didn't
    identify many Central African nations among the successes?
        General Waldhauser. Well, the Central African nations that
    we work with to a large degree our train, advise, assist, and
    equip piece is probably not as robust in other places. I mean,
    the countries that we deal with to a large degree have the
    terrorism threat, because one of the key things is to fight
    that threat over there and keep it over there. And our
    engagements with other countries, we take our cues from State
    Department too. If there is issues in terms of law of war
    violations or governmental problems, we sometimes take our cues
    from the State Department with regards to how much we engage.
        Mr. Gaetz. Very illuminating. General Votel, is Yemen a
    failed state?
        General Votel. Yes, I do consider Yemen a failed state.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thanks.
        I will yield the remaining time to General Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. I appreciate the leadership and your careers.
    Congratulations on your retirement, and thanks to all three of
    you for being here today.
        I just want to add my skepticism as well on our
    negotiations with the Taliban. You know, they continue to be
    closely aligned with ISIS, al-Qaida. They have murdered
    thousands of--continue to murder thousands of people in
    Afghanistan. And I think it looks terrible when we are
    negotiating with them without the Government of Afghanistan, so
    I just wanted to publicly state that.
        In Syria, what are we going to do with 800 or so detainees
    I have been hearing about that are from ISIS? General Votel.
        General Votel. Well, this is a matter for our Department of
    State and Department of Justice to work with international
    partners. As the President has said, they need to go back to
    their nations where they can be properly prosecuted right here.
    The Syrian Democratic Forces are performing a service for the
    world by holding these foreign terrorist fighters right now,
    and they need to go home where they can be dealt with properly.
    So that is the principal mechanism that we are pursuing right
    now.
        Mr. Bacon. That would be a terrible development if they get
    released, one way or the other way, outside of being a threat
    to us and Europe and beyond.
        In Yemen, are we still seeing evidence of Iran arming the
    Houthi rebels?
        General Votel. Absolutely, Congressman.
        Mr. Bacon. And when was the last time we saw Scud missile
    launches or any other kind of ballistic missile launch into
    Saudi Arabia? Because I think that is not being widely reported
    that that was going on, and that has been part of the reason
    the Saudis are taking actions the way they have.
        General Votel. We have seen a decrease in ballistic missile
    launches, and there is some reasons for that that we can talk
    about in the closed session, but we have seen an increase in
    unmanned aerial systems and, again, this at the hand of Iran
    providing these advanced capabilities to the Houthi rebels.
        Mr. Bacon. Our political debate on how to support Saudi
    Arabia, whether to or whether not, that is just a forgotten
    part of what is going on with Iran, helping the rebels and how
    they are also attacking the Saudis.
        One last question to General Votel. Are we having any
    success or progress of Pakistan in the safe havens they are
    providing the Taliban?
        General Votel. We have had--as I mentioned a little bit
    earlier, we have had success with Pakistan. They have been more
    helpful in terms of bringing the Taliban to the table as we
    have requested them. We have seen instances where they have
    taken action against the safe haven areas. Clearly, there is
    more they can do, and we have encouraged them to continue to do
    that. But we have seen some positive indications.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I thank my friend for yielding, and I
    yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Torres Small.
        Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you,
    General Votel and General Waldhauser, so much for your service.
    Thank you as well, Assistant Secretary Wheelbarger.
        I specifically appreciate your discussion about coalition
    building. And Congresswoman Slotkin as well as Congressman
    Bergman, both recognized that need as well. And we also had
    some discussion about China and their impact on Africa and how
    that affects potential coalition building.
        So we have seen China open up the military base in
    Djibouti, but it appears and some analysts think that they are
    increasing their focus more so on the telecommunications, the
    infrastructure, and the trade. Do you see those avenues as more
    of a threat for our engagement with African partners than if
    China had opened up more military bases, for example, or
    conducted training or conventional military operations?
        General Waldhauser. That is a very interesting question and
    complex in several different ways. Obviously, Djibouti is the
    first overseas Chinese base. I have said before, I don't
    believe it will be the last. They are looking for other areas
    and so forth, especially ports. Because what they want to do to
    a large degree, the infrastructure they build--ports, roads,
    bridges and whatnot--is tied to the extraction, mineral
    extraction they are conducting in those countries. So
    consequently, there is a tie there.
        Now moreover, their military growth for the future,
    although unclear, they certainly want to protect those
    investments. They want to protect the population and the
    workers that they have there. So some would say that this was
    just a first step and that they are getting many lessons
    learned. Because it is a challenge to have a base in Djibouti
    from China. And there is a lot of growing pains with that. But
    they are learning from that, and some would say that--and we
    have some reports that I could probably go into in the closed
    session that they may look to increase their contributions to
    some of these groups that are in the counterterrorism effort.
    So I think that in the future, it is very likely that they
    could increase their military presence.
        But real quickly on the trade business. You know, when
    Secretary Tillerson visited there a while back as a previous
    Secretary of State, you know, he talked about how the Chinese
    should be very careful--or the Africans should be very careful
    about some of the deals they make with the Chinese, because it
    is no secret about the debt issue in Djibouti that the Chinese
    own. There is other countries where some of the projects that
    the countries are walking away from because either it is too
    expensive or they have figured out the deal is really not good
    for them. And so there are some challenges.
        But, again, those countries need to make those decisions
    for themselves. And that was one of the issues that senior--you
    know, Paul Kagame, who at the time was the AU [African Union]
    chairperson, made that point that these governments can make
    those decisions for themselves. And our point is, when you make
    those decisions, just go into them clear-eyed and understand
    what you are signing on the dotted line when you sign with the
    Chinese.
        Ms. Torres Small. Speaking to that clear-eyed aspect, has
    China operated this way with other regions? And if so, are
    there additional phases of involvement that we might
    anticipate?
        General Waldhauser. Well, I think that--I will just speak
    to the African continent. I mean, the Chinese have been there
    for quite some time. Their investments in infrastructure, they
    do a great job. They will build soccer stadiums. You know, they
    will do things for the population that, you know, gains and
    maintains influence. Meanwhile, we do things like Millennium
    Challenge Corporation, power programs in the Senegal or even in
    Niger, these huge programs over a 5-year period, $437 million
    in Niger, for example. This is a whole-of-government approach
    too. And we need to do a better job of publicizing those things
    that we are doing on the soft side of power that will help our
    influence, vis-a-vis China.
        Ms. Torres Small. In my short amount left, I want to switch
    very quickly to Yemen and touch base about the end of the in-
    flight refueling Saudi coalition. When did CENTCOM make the
    decision to end that mission?
        General Votel. We ended that in November of 2018,
    Congresswoman.
        Ms. Torres Small. And who made that decision to end it?
        General Votel. That was a request by the Saudis, but it was
    directed to me by the Secretary of Defense at the time.
        Ms. Torres Small. Under what authority was CENTCOM
    operating when the decision was made not to charge over $300
    million in U.S. fuel in in-flight refueling services?
        General Votel. Thank you for asking that. And, Chairman, I
    would just ask for a little allowance here so I can address
    this in a little bit of detail.
        First of all, it is--as the CENTCOM commander, it is my
    responsibility. I am responsible for everything that happens
    within CENTCOM and doesn't happen within CENTCOM. And so when
    we fail to charge properly on this thing, I accept the
    responsibility for that on behalf of our command.
        There are a variety of things that went wrong. Mostly, we
    ignored our own well-developed protocols and procedures in this
    case. We identified those problems that we began identifying
    that last fall and put together a team, a cross-agency team to
    make sure that we understood what was happening and that we
    could. We worked through the issue, identified what the costs
    were, and then delivered those to the appropriate countries.
    And we will receive full and proper reimbursement for that.
        Ms. Torres Small. It's a mark of a great leader to take
    responsibility. I deeply appreciate that.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Gallagher.
        Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to pull the string on a previous line of
    questioning. I think it is important, because when we talk
    about NDS implementation, it is easy to focus myopically on
    INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and EUCOM. And I am glad
    that we have had a variety of questions about Chinese influence
    and access in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.
        And I just would just ask, General Votel, to what extent
    does the Shanghai International Port Group's agreement
    regarding the Haifa port in Israel represent a problem for the
    U.S. military over the long term? We heard some reporting that
    the U.S. Navy was considering reducing some commitment to
    Israel. I know that sort of spans a lot of different COCOM
    authorities there, but just to what extent do you view that as
    a problem, and what do you think we should do about it?
        General Votel. Congressman, again, I would remind you that
    the Haifa port is in Israel and is outside of my area of
    responsibility, but I do recognize that that does have
    influences on areas. So we are concerned about that, the fact
    that there is--the great power competitors have access into
    those ports along the Mediterranean that have very direct
    access into the region. I think this is a reason for concern.
        Mr. Gallagher. Can you, both of you, I just--what parts, as
    you look at the Belt and Road initiative in your respective
    AORs, where would it present a difficulty for us in terms of
    operational access, either in terms of our ability to operate
    with key partners or new potential access by Chinese forces?
    Just help flesh that out for us a bit.
        General Votel. Congressman, in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility, the principal place for seeing this is in
    Pakistan, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is
    an artery of the One Belt, One Road aspect. So that is in
    progress right now. And it is--and there is definite Chinese
    influence in that particular area. So as they develop that land
    route, what they are attempting to do then, we expect, is they
    will then be looking for ports that they can connect that to,
    ports in southern Pakistan, leaving the ports in AFRICOM. And
    then for us, it is going to lead to a permanent presence of
    Chinese maritime--military maritime activity in the region that
    we will need to be concerned with.
        General Waldhauser. So with regards to AFRICOM on the
    ports, let me just first say that overall--and I am not an
    expert in port operations, but the Chinese have equities in
    ports around the globe. So it is not unique, for example, that
    they have equities in Israel. It is not unique that they have
    equities in Djibouti and other places. That is the first point.
        The second point is, with regards to the Djiboutian port,
    you know, this is the maritime piece of the One Belt, One Road
    initiative, if you come into Djibouti in that part of the
    continent up into Africa. So that is a big part of their
    strategy, and they are trying to tie it together.
        Inside Djibouti, you know, the port facility there has
    about five or six separate ports. The one we are concerned
    about is the Doraleh container port. Last year at this time
    when I testified, the Djiboutians just took it back over from
    the Emiratis. The fear is that if the debt issue with Djibouti
    is not taken care of, that perhaps the Chinese could take that
    port over.
        But I can tell you that in conversations that I have had
    with President Guelleh and other leaders have had with
    President Guelleh, they have assured us that that is not going
    to be the case, that they will make sure that we have access to
    that particular port. Because 98 percent of what the logistics
    effort that we need on the eastern part of Africa, in Somalia,
    in Djibouti comes through that port there.
        Mr. Gallagher. I take your point about, to the extent I
    understand it, that the Chinese obviously have legitimate
    economic interests in a variety of ports around the world. But
    the whole reason we did the comprehensive review of our CFIUS
    [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] process
    last year was because the line between legitimate economic
    interests and CCP [Communist Party of China]-directed espionage
    and PLA [People's Liberation Army] military duty is often very
    opaque. Right?
        I wonder, do you have conversations with your partners sort
    of in the way we have conversations amongst ourselves about
    CFIUS and foreign investment about the structures they have in
    place to analyze Chinese investment and really determine what
    is legitimate and what isn't? In either order.
        General Waldhauser. Well, I can say--and perhaps, Katie,
    you should take that--I know our country teams and ambassadors
    do that. From the military perspective, we try to make sure
    that we make the case that we are the best partners and try to
    give that top cover.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will most definitely say that is a key
    point with all of our engagements with the international
    community, not just in these AORs but in Europe as well. And I
    know the previous Congresswoman touched on telecommunications
    infrastructure. That is a priority of our Department right now,
    to highlight the real challenge that we will face both
    militarily as well if the Chinese build out these 5G networks
    all over the world. The telecommunications security is sort of
    a backbone security requirement for all of us. So it is very
    much a top line in all of our engagements.
        Mr. Gallagher. I yield my 2 seconds left.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate the benefit. And I
    was going to say, we have a hard stop at noon. We will get to
    as many people as we can.
        Mr. Crow.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
    three of you for your insightful, candid testimony.
        General Votel, always good to see a fellow Ranger. Rangers
    lead the way. Thank you for your continued service.
        In my time in Iraq and Afghanistan, I learned of the value
    of our partners and our alliances. And I have been very
    troubled by some of the comments of this administration with
    regard to those partnerships and those alliances. And I know,
    General Votel, you weren't consulted in the Syria decision.
    Have the three of you had to spend time in the last 2 years
    talking with our partners and our allies, NATO and others, to
    reassure them that we remain committed? And have you received
    questions and concerns from those allies?
        General Votel. I will start, Congressman. Certainly we
    have. I think this is a very standard thing that we talk with
    all of our partners about routinely here, about our strategies
    and where we are going with this and reassurance on our
    commitment to the collective security of the region here. So it
    certainly is something we talk with our partners about all the
    time, have for the entire time I have been in this position.
        Mr. Crow. But within the past, let's say within the past
    year, especially with respect to comments on unilateral
    withdrawal from Afghanistan and Syria, has that created
    especially acute concerns?
        General Votel. Well, it certainly has. I mean, some of the
    rather sharp announcements here are things that have caught
    their attention, and we have had to talk about that. But again,
    this is something that we have routinely talked about. As I
    came into this position in 2016, a big topic was JCPOA [Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action] and our decision to enter into
    that. And so that was a big discussion point with all the
    partners in the arrangement, many who did not agree with that
    decision. And so we had almost the opposite situation in that
    particular case. So I think this is something we always have to
    talk to our partners about.
        General Waldhauser. Very briefly, I would just say that
    this is a conversation we always have, and we will always
    continue to have. Because the bottom line is it is important to
    have a good working relationship, mil-to-mil relationship.
    Because if for whatever reason the political relationship goes
    off tracks or hits a bump in the road, if you have a strong
    mil-to-mil relationship, if you have a good partnership, that
    will carry the day. And that is where we try to come at it for
    the military side.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. In particular with respect to on the
    political side or the policymaking side, the coalition,
    particularly the 79-strong D-ISIS [Defeat-ISIS] coalition is a
    huge value, as the general said, to sort of the moral authority
    of the global campaign--or the global effort to address a
    global threat. I think in the days and weeks after certain
    decisions, yes, we obviously keep up the level of transparency
    as much as possible.
        I mean, everybody knows that the Syria tweet was somewhat
    of a surprise. And so, you know, I did call all of the core
    group of the coalition the day after to make sure that they
    understood both what it was but also what it wasn't. And it
    wasn't sort of they are all leaving tomorrow. Of course, as
    decisions evolve and we are living in a dynamic world, we are
    living in a dynamic policymaking world as well, you know, we
    continue to keep them as informed transparently and in
    connection as possible.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you. One last question. Do you all believe
    that you have sufficient data and information regarding the
    emerging threats posed by climate change, namely disease
    outbreaks, pandemics, displacement of populations, and drought
    to take into account as you develop your op [operation] plans
    within your respective commands?
        General Votel. Congressman, I do. That is provided to us at
    the Department of Defense. And from my staff's standpoint, I
    believe we do.
        General Waldhauser. I believe we do as well. And I would
    just echo the fact that in the AFRICOM AOR, this is a big part
    of whatever we do. A crisis response not only is kinetic, but
    tied to the Ebola outbreaks, the disease outbreaks, and it is a
    big part of our strategy with regards to containing that type
    of threat on the continent.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Kelly.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I just don't think I can go and let people
    say things without responding. First of all, our failure to
    respond in Syria in 2013 left a void, which the Russians
    quickly filled where they had not been before, but because we
    had no action whatsoever for a long period of time, even a
    delayed reaction after the gassing, the government gassed their
    own people. That is part of the reason that we have Russian
    influence in Syria now, not just the tweets of recent days.
        Second, I had a much different experience in the Munich
    Security Conference with Senator Inhofe, with our allies and
    our people there, than obviously other people, my colleagues
    did. Because what I found in our European allies and allies
    across the Nation, we met with Germany, we met with Afghan
    President, we met with Poland, is there is a much greater
    participation in meeting their 2 percent GDP [gross domestic
    product] requirements as to their militaries across Europe,
    which means we have partners who are actually contributing
    rather than talking. So I think that is very important to point
    out.
        We also went to Africa and met with President Kagame, with
    Prime Minister Dr. Abiy in Ethiopia. I think those
    relationships with Senator Inhofe and us as Members of Congress
    can be sustained long term. He has been doing it for over 25
    years, but I think many times they are much more valuable, even
    in those who have stayed some time, as well as the mil-to-mil
    relationships.
        All that being said, I guess now I am going to try to get
    to a question. First of all, General Votel, thank you for your
    leadership of my 155th BCT [Brigade Combat Team], my old
    brigade in Operation Spartan Shield, and my 184th ESC
    [Expeditionary Sustainment Command], which are currently
    deployed and doing logistics missions over there.
        General Votel and General Waldhauser, after I ask this
    question, I want you to respond what we can do better with the
    State Partnership Program in Africa. But Mississippi has a
    State partnership with Uzbekistan. We have made great, great
    strides there. As a matter of fact, almost every time I go, I
    meet with the President of Uzbekistan and all of their cabinet.
        General Votel, how valuable are those in the negotiations
    when we are talking about negotiating with the Taliban or
    logistics contracts? How valuable is that State Partnership
    Program?
        General Votel. Across the region, Congressman, State
    Partnership Program is a diamond for us, frankly. And it is
    highly sought after by partners across the region. It not only
    augments the things that we do with the Active forces and the
    other rotational forces, as you highlighted, that come into the
    region, but more importantly, it provides a long-term sustained
    relationship with these countries.
        As you have experienced in Uzbekistan, I know we recently
    had the minister of defense visit your State for an exercise
    here. Thank you for hosting him. We cannot replace these types
    of relationships. This is absolutely vital to the things we are
    doing.
        Mr. Kelly. And, General Waldhauser, I think there are some
    opportunities in Africa to sustain long-term relationships. Do
    we have good partnership programs or is there opportunity
    there?
        General Waldhauser. Congressman, I could take the rest of
    the time and really the rest of the day up till noon and beyond
    to talk about the value of these programs. Let me just give you
    one quick example. We have 13 State Partnership Programs in the
    continent. We appreciate the funding that comes from them, and
    we would certainly ask for more there.
        Recently, we had an exercise in Burkina Faso. There have
    been some issues there as to the uptick in attacks and whatnot.
    And just recently here in January, the District of Columbia,
    DC, just signed a State Partnership Program with Burkina Faso.
    So on one hand, you could say that are we doing enough there?
    But this is another tool in the tool kit for long-term
    continuity with relationship building and so forth in an area
    where there is a counterterrorism issue. This is a big plus for
    us. I can't say enough about the State Partnership Program in
    AFRICOM.
        Mr. Kelly. And, finally, I guess this is just a comment.
    Ms. Wheelbarger, you can comment if there is time left. But I
    don't have a problem with negotiating with the Taliban or any
    other. You know, as we just saw our President do in North
    Korea, it is okay to have a meeting and to walk away with that
    meeting if your objectives are not achieved. It is not okay not
    to ever have a meeting, because I can tell you, you can never
    reach consensus if you are not talking.
        And so I think we have a lot of opportunity. I am
    skeptical, just like everyone else, General Votel, but I know
    we also have Uzbekistan involved in that, I know Pakistan is
    involved in that. I know there are a lot of people involved in
    the peace process there. And I am quite confident that our
    President and our military and our State Department will walk
    away if we don't get the conditions met that we need to for
    peace, but we have to talk to get the peace.
        And if you could comment very briefly, Ms. Wheelbarger.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. Sure. I will just briefly say long-term
    insurgencies mostly need to end by reconciliation; that is sort
    of the history of these kind of conflicts. And I also agree
    that the military, both U.S. military, but in conjunction with
    our partners on the ground will continue the military pressure
    during these talks.
        The Chairman. I completely agree with Mr. Kelly's
    assessment that we do need to talk. That is the only way to get
    there.
        Ms. Houlahan.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you to the chairman. And thank you to
    the panel for coming.
        In addition to sitting on the Armed Services, I also sit in
    Foreign Affairs in Africa and the Asia Subcommittees. And in
    the Africa Subcommittee, human rights is a center area of that.
    And it has been lovely to also hear about China in this
    conversation too.
        So my question is for General Waldhauser. I was wondering
    if we could talk a little bit about the importance of
    supporting women and particularly the impact that they have on
    bolstering economies, which is one of the best ways that we
    have to combat VEOs [violent extremist organizations]. And as
    we continue to provide support to our African partners to
    combat VEOs, are there members of our current Multinational
    Joint Task Force that have not perhaps passed the Leahy vetting
    or who have raised human rights concerns, especially as they
    relate to women and girls?
        General Waldhauser. Thank you for the question. Let me just
    talk real quick about the women, peace, and security initiative
    that we have in AFRICOM and one of the things that I think we
    do very well. And I will just give you several examples. So
    over the past couple of years, we have introduced women from
    the military in the communications field across the continent
    through various exercise engagements. And since we have
    emphasized that, we have noticed the numbers of women who
    participate in that particular event has grown.
        We also do an intelligence assessment and training for the
    women of intelligence branches around the continent. That
    number has grown. We have a leadership that we run out of
    AFRICOM every year. It is a small group, around 50 or 60, but
    we take them around the country to various bases and they talk
    with various leaders, and we promote leadership for women in a
    small way, but we think a highly effective way.
        And here recently, we've had the operation I mentioned in
    Burkina Faso, it is a special operations operation where we
    have brought women together to have conferences, discuss their
    way ahead, and try to get them and highlight their visibility
    for the military. So we take that seriously, and I am very
    proud of our women and peace program.
        With regards to the Leahy vetting, look, one of the things
    that we do with all of our training on the African continent is
    this whole issue of battlefield ethics, law of war compliance,
    and the like. And even though, you know, we run into issues
    every once in a while, we maintain that this is a big part of
    how we train. And we make it very clear to these governments
    that if there is violations or allegations of violations, that
    they have to look at them for investigation and be transparent
    with what they do.
        So on one hand, the question of Leahy vetting, yes,
    sometimes, you know, there are some issues we have to work
    around because of whole units for one individual. But in the
    main on the African continent, we need to maintain that because
    the human rights piece is a big part of how we train, and we
    just have to try to perhaps streamline some of the Leahy
    issues, but we can't walk away from that.
        Ms. Houlahan. Sir, are there curing processes or curing
    timelines if you do see some sort of violation that--I
    understand that you can't help if you are not there. Is there
    any sort of process that is codified that helps with that?
        General Waldhauser. I would have to take that for the
    record, ma'am.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 155.]
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. My next question is also for you.
    And I read in your written statement that Niger remains very
    unstable and that you are worried about that because of the
    youth, the age of--that is a large part of the country. And my
    question is, you also seem to indicate that the people who you
    were withdrawing in the 10 percent reduction were
    counterterrorism related. Is that true? Doesn't that provide
    some sort of angst on your part that you have got this sort of
    unstable, very young nation-state and we are withdrawing the
    very people who may be helpful if there is some sort of VEO
    activity there?
        General Waldhauser. So I don't want to get into specific
    countries and specific numbers, but the short answer to your
    question is yes. We have to take a look at where we optimize.
    And as I tried to indicate previously, for the first tranche,
    we have taken individuals from locations where they have been
    training for quite some time and those units are on their own.
    And so, yes, you know, every country, especially in Western
    Africa, where we have bilateral agreements and where we train
    with them, we are concerned. But we understand the intent, and
    so far, there has been minimal impact. And if we continue to
    work with our partners, primarily the French in the west, and
    we watch, if the groups grow, we may have to revisit some of
    these decisions.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and with my last 50 seconds, my
    last question is also for you, which has to do with Congo and
    the most recent Ebola outbreak. We have had about 550, 560
    deaths so far and 800 people who have fallen ill again. And I
    just wanted to ask you sort of to assess the biosecurity
    threats in the area and whether or not you feel as though we
    are doing enough or the right things to build partnerships
    across the African partners that we have, and whether or not
    you think you are appropriately staffed in that particular
    area, and how you are working with USAID and the State
    Department to make sure we don't all get befelled by a
    pandemic.
        General Waldhauser. So I am looking at the time countdown
    and I am counting the questions and trying to--the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo is a very, very complex place right now.
    They just had a reelection. Joseph Kabila, finally after a long
    time, is gone.
        The issue on the Ebola crisis in the east is one of the
    most remote parts of the African continent. There are numerous
    violent extremist organizations, groups there. That is one of
    the problems, it is one of the threats. And we have been asked
    to look at what it would take security-wise by the State
    Department if we upped our footprint, and we have done that.
        I would just finally say just for perspective, when the big
    Ebola outbreak took place several years ago, 28,000-plus cases,
    11,000-plus died. So as you said, about 900 cases thus far,
    600, 550 or so died. A key has been vaccinations. Over 70- to
    80,000 have been vaccinated. But the security environment there
    is very difficult, and that is what makes this one a particular
    challenge and a concern.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        We are going to stretch a little and try to get the last
    few people in here, so we probably won't start the classified
    until 12:15. But the last--if the last few people can help out
    at all with any time there, it would be appreciated.
        Ms. Stefanik.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to follow up on the previous lines of
    questions regarding the future of Afghanistan. Like many of my
    colleagues, I am deeply concerned about the ongoing talks with
    the Taliban. And last month, I also attended the Munich
    Security Conference with some of the members here. And we had
    the opportunity to meet with President Ghani, who made it very
    clear that he does not respect the validity of these talks,
    considering the fact that the democratically elected government
    is completely excluded from these talks.
        So my question for General Votel is, I share that concern
    that the democratically elected government is not a part of
    these negotiations. And at the same time, we are heading
    towards presidential elections in Afghanistan. So how do the
    ongoing talks impact the overall legitimacy of the upcoming
    elections and the overall stability as we head into the
    upcoming elections?
        General Votel. Well, I think certainly the fact that there
    is an upcoming election is a factor in the overall situation
    right at this particular point. So, you know, I can't dispute
    the fact that that is an aspect of this. But, Congresswoman, I
    am not orchestrating the talks that Ambassador Khalilzad is
    doing. We speak with him obviously very regularly. We support
    him as closely as we can. It is my observation, from my close
    discussions with him, that he is in fact consulting with
    President Ghani on a regular basis, keeping him well informed,
    and that the actual initiation of these discussions was done
    with President Ghani's knowledge and support.
        So I--we are--he is continuing to do that and he continues
    to do that throughout this process. We recognize that the
    discussions and the negotiations ultimately have to be Afghan-
    to-Afghan discussions, and that is what Ambassador Khalilzad is
    focused on at this particular point.
        Ms. Stefanik. I appreciate that, General Votel, but
    President Ghani's message to us was crystal clear, that not
    having the democratically elected government have a seat at the
    table during the negotiations nullifies how they could come to
    a positive outcome. So I just wanted to share my concern,
    particularly as it relates to the legitimacy of the upcoming
    elections and how we are potentially undermining that by
    engaging in these talks with the Taliban.
        My next question is also for you, General Votel. You talked
    about shrinking the physical caliphate to less than 1 square
    mile, which is an enormous achievement. Can you talk about this
    next phase that as ISIS fighters go underground, you said,
    quote, ''They are unrepentant, unbroken, and they are still
    deeply radicalized.'' What does that next phase look like from
    your perspective?
        General Votel. This will look very much like an insurgency,
    meaning that what we will see is we will see low-level attacks.
    We will see assassinations, we will see IED [improvised
    explosive device] attacks, we will see ambush-type things as
    they begin to emerge from this. So therefore, what our focus
    has to be is working with our partners on the ground, as we are
    doing in--fairly effectively in Iraq right now, is working with
    our partners on the ground. We are going to have to keep
    pressure on this. Our intelligence capabilities will continue
    to be very, very important in feeding their operations. Our
    train, advise, assist, our enabling capabilities on the ground
    will be very, very important to this.
        So what we are attempting to do is prevent those things
    from disrupting the other stability operations that we are
    trying to conduct with local governance, local security forces.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        And, General Waldhauser, I wanted to follow up on your
    opening statement. What I noticed was absent is lessons learned
    regarding the fateful attack in Niger that took place in
    October 2017. How has USAFRICOM, along with interagency and by,
    with, and through partnerships, what have we learned? How have
    we updated our intel collection, how are we making sure that
    our operators have access to the most up-to-date, accurate
    exquisite intel possible? And I also wanted to ask, when can we
    expect to see the report in section 1276 of the fiscal year
    2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]?
        General Waldhauser. So first of all, Congresswoman, there
    has been many lessons learned and changes to procedures since
    the Niger incident awhile back. And at the tactical level,
    which I won't go into in great detail, I can assure you that
    minimum force, reaction times for MEDEVAC [medical evacuation],
    standard procedures for how orders are issued and who approves
    those orders, those have all been really dealt with and taken
    care of at the component level, and those are all in place. The
    investigation itself had 23 findings, 19 of which required
    action; 7 of those were work for AFRICOM, the others were for
    the Army and for USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command].
        The items that AFRICOM had, as an example, would be
    formalizing memorandums of agreement with the French for
    MEDEVAC, which we have done; updating the number of blue force
    trackers, for example, that troops have on the ground and those
    type of things. So for the AFRICOM perspective, all the
    tactical items which weren't part of the investigation but
    needed to be fixed, those have been taken care of, and we can
    talk in closed session if you want more detail. And as far as
    the investigation goes, we are good.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        The Chairman. We can talk more. A lot of this is better in
    a closed session. We can talk more when we get upstairs.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Cisneros.
        Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here today, and thank you for your service to our
    country.
        I will keep this brief, but, you know, since the seventies,
    spending for military and civilian tools of national security
    have ebbed and flowed; during the eighties, they both went up;
    during the nineties, they both went down. Former Secretary of
    Defense James Mattis said, if you don't fund the State
    Department fully, then I have to buy more ammunition
    ultimately. You both have been on the record as saying how
    important diplomatic relations are and humanitarian aid are to
    national security.
        With the budget coming out and we kind of expecting maybe
    another cut in both in the State Department, USAID, oversees
    contingency operations, I mean, would you both agree--or all of
    you agree that reduced resources for the State Department and
    USAID will have an impact on national security in your regions?
        General Waldhauser. Absolutely, yes.
        General Votel. Yes, I would absolutely agree, Congressman.
        Mr. Cisneros. Okay. So by failing to address like famine,
    disease, humanitarian catastrophes, education, whether it be
    Syria or Niger, Yemen, anywhere in your regions, as these
    resources are cut, what kind of impact is that going to have on
    national security in your regions?
        General Waldhauser. Well, Congressman, I think first of all
    we have to understand the global effort in some of these areas,
    the global NGO, nongovernmental organizational effort that
    really have done a good job. So in places like Somalia, for
    example, where this year, food insecurity is somewhere around
    4.2 million people, we have offered assistance to the NGOs, for
    example, logistical, even intelligence, but for the most part,
    they have learned a lot of lessons, staged a lot of logistical
    support, and they are dealing with that situation.
        Now, with regard to the U.S. specifically though, I mean,
    our engagement and our involvement needs to be maintained,
    because there is like 12.5 million displaced persons on the
    African continent, which causes security issues and challenges
    for the governments to have to deal with them from a fiscal
    perspective.
        General Votel. Congressman, I would agree with General
    Waldhauser on this. I think our involvement in this continues
    to be extraordinarily important. As we look and clear through
    areas as we conduct our counterterrorism operations, such as we
    are doing against ISIS right now, the resources that come along
    with some of the stability aspects that must always follow
    these combat operations we are doing, are absolutely essential
    to bring people back into their communities, to start standing
    up the essential services, and to give the local governance,
    local security an opportunity to begin to reestablish life in
    these areas.
        So I would agree this is absolutely essential and we have
    to stay engaged in this.
        Mr. Cisneros. So just to follow up on that. As you have
    kind of talked about how the Chinese and the Russians are kind
    of filling the void diplomatically in some of these regions.
    Are they filling the void humanitarian as we cut humanitarian
    aid or are they kind of picking up their humanitarian efforts
    in order to build better relationships with these foreign
    governments?
        General Waldhauser. To a certain degree, yes. I mean, they
    have got about 2,000 U.N. peacekeepers. They have tried to
    insert themselves. I don't say that in a negative way, but they
    have tried to contribute to the Ebola crisis we talked about in
    the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. They want to become
    a leader in that particular medical technology. They have made,
    you know, strides in that area and, you know, at the end of the
    day, that is not bad.
        I mean, there are places certainly on the African continent
    where, you know, we have to cooperate with the Chinese, but
    there are times we have to confront and also compete with them.
    But when they build infrastructure, if they contribute to, you
    know, vaccinations and the Ebola crisis and so forth, that is
    not necessarily bad; it is actually helpful.
        Mr. Cisneros. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Kim.
        Mr. Kim. Thank you so much for coming out here and
    answering our questions. I wanted to address General Votel.
    First of all, I just want to echo the comments of a lot of my
    colleagues and just thanking you for your service. As someone
    who has been working this space before, I know we are indebted
    as a Nation for what you have done and the great work that you
    have done over the years.
        I wanted to follow up on something you said earlier. You
    were talking about how a lot of the efforts that we are
    engaging now in Syria and in Iraq, in particular, which is what
    I am focused on with this question line, is about now shifting
    towards dealing with an insurgency. That a lot of the
    territorial land held by ISIS has been taken back. We are in
    some ways changing the mission in terms of what we are trying
    to be doing now. And my question to you is just trying to get
    your honest assessments of where the Iraqi security forces are
    in terms of that.
        You know, we have been working so much with this by, with,
    and through, and I am just trying to get a sense of what is
    different now in 2019 compared to 2013, specifically in terms
    of how they are ready to handle this newer mission of averting
    back to dealing with an insurgency.
        General Votel. Thank you, Congressman. From our
    perspective, we don't look at this as a change of mission. Our
    mission still is, at the invitation of the Government of Iraq,
    to assist them in defeating ISIS. So from our perspective, we
    look at it very much the same. My assessment of the Iraqi
    security forces right now is that they are doing a pretty good
    job of keeping pressure on the remnants of ISIS that exist in
    Iraq. In some cases, they are doing this unilaterally, and in
    other cases, they are doing this with our assistance.
        Each of their units across the country have different
    levels of readiness and different levels of capability, and we
    are continuing to work to raise those to a higher standard so
    they can be self-sustaining. But they are continuing to do
    that. What is different, I think, is that they have been, from
    2013, 2014, whatnot, they have been well supported by their
    civilian government. The current Iraqi leadership is very, very
    strong supporters of their military. The former prime minister,
    Prime Minister Abadi, was an extraordinary wartime leader, in
    my opinion, and he provided exceptional support to them. I
    think the military leaders saw this. They saw the necessity of
    the situation, and they rallied behind the coalition support
    that we provided to them and rose to the occasion. Good leaders
    emerged on the Iraqi side that helped them orchestrate this
    campaign, and we are continuing to see that today.
        They certainly have more that needs to be done. It needs to
    be a more inclusive force, it needs to include more Sunnis, it
    needs to include more Kurds in it, and we are working towards
    that. We are going to have to address popular mobilization
    forces, these elements that are part of the security forces as
    well. But I am very confident in the current military
    leadership that we see in Iraq in this, again, moving in the
    right direction.
        Mr. Kim. That is right. I share a lot of those concerns
    going forward about how we can do this and make sure that the
    skills that we have been building up aren't going to atrophy as
    we start to move on. And as we have seen before, we have
    certainly seen a lot of success with the counterterrorism
    service and others in terms of going in, being able to
    penetrate ISIS defenses, but we have also seen the difficulties
    of what happened in 2013 and 2014 when the Iraqi security
    forces were asked to hold onto territory and what is their
    ability to hold. And that is where I am just trying to delve
    off of.
        Just one last question here. I know that, you know, in your
    past work you have done a lot with the Counter Terrorism
    Service in Iraq, and I know that they were such a critical
    force there that had gone through a lot over the last couple of
    years, in terms what was asked of them, in terms of going
    through some very difficult circumstance. Specifically with
    that organization, the CTS, what is their current capacity? And
    how crucial are they in this now mission--again, I agree with
    you it is not a changing mission, but certainly a focus more on
    hold rather than the other components. How crucial is the CTS
    in maintaining that?
        General Votel. CTS remains extraordinarily critical in
    terms of--and it is their desire and our support to that desire
    to return the CTS to their more traditional missions of
    counterterrorism operations, and that is what we are working
    on. So we stayed with the CTS when we left in 2011. That was
    important. And that was a reliable force, and they carried the
    heavy load over the campaign. And as we move in the future, we
    have to sustain that, but we also have to stay with the Iraqi
    security forces as well. The Iraqi Army can be the bulwark
    against extremism in this country, and we need to support them.
        Mr. Kim. Well, I certainly hope so. I will do everything I
    can from this angle to be able to support those missions.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Ranking member.
        Mr. Thornberry. A major focus for both parties and the
    administration in the last 2 years has been to repair the
    readiness of our forces. I had one of your fellow combatant
    commanders tell me recently that he can already tell a
    difference in the forces that are being rotated through his
    command. I don't know if it applies so much to CENTCOM because
    you-all have been the priority theater for 17 years. But my
    question to each of you is, can you at this point tell the
    difference yet in the readiness of the forces that are rotated
    through your commands?
        General Votel. Congressman, from our perspective, I think
    we certainly can. As you know, we have been dependent upon the
    services to provide us well-trained forces, and we have been
    the lucky recipients of that for a long period of time. So I
    remain very, very grateful for that.
        I would highlight one thing. The Army's investment in
    security force assistance brigades I think is a good example of
    how our services are really supporting us in the way that we
    need. This is an organization that is specifically designed to
    help with the by, with, and through approach that we are
    applying so effectively on the ground in a number of areas. And
    so to me, I think the services, my service in particular in
    this case, I think is doing an excellent job of providing us
    the capabilities that we need to pursue these missions.
        Mr. Thornberry. And just to emphasize, you can tell the
    readiness level is improving already?
        General Votel. It has always been uniformly high in
    CENTCOM, and so it is certainly sustained. And I have no
    concerns about any of the forces that are coming into the
    CENTCOM area of responsibility.
        Mr. Thornberry. General Waldhauser, is it getting better
    yet?
        General Waldhauser. Congressman, a little bit more nuance,
    I think, for AFRICOM, and that is, I would say that the special
    operations forces that we have that are engaged in the kinetic
    activities are as good as they ever have been. Their readiness
    has been always good and continues to be so.
        I would just say a quick point on the SFAB [security force
    assistance brigade] that General Votel mentioned. We have--we
    would have a lot of work for them if we had one assigned to
    AFRICOM. There is plenty of things they could do to contribute.
        And finally, I would just say that also in AFRICOM, we have
    locations with ranges and so forth that will allow readiness to
    be maintained and even improved, and we would like to sell that
    to the services too. Sometimes they think that perhaps on the
    African continent they will lose readiness, but we always like
    to say that they can gain--maintain and even gain readiness at
    some of the places where they could train.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        The Chairman. We are over time, but, Mr. Gallego, I will
    yield to you. We will have to do it quickly. Got to get
    upstairs for the classified session. When we are done here, we
    will move up.
        Mr. Gallego.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Waldhauser, last week, The New York Times published
    an account of an Operation Sudan in 2013 that suffered from
    problems eerily similar to what we saw in the Niger ambush of
    2017. I personally as a Marine know what it is like to have bad
    leadership and bad equipment but still be required to go into
    combat several times. I can tell you, General, it is an awful
    feeling.
        So please tell me, General, what has AFRICOM or DOD done to
    change the way they do business so that we don't see more Niger
    ambush situations or Sudan or any number of unreported
    incidents in your command over the past several years that are
    no longer, quote/unquote, ``situation normal''?
        General Waldhauser. So, Congressman, as indicated earlier,
    some of the things that we have done since Niger incident have
    to do with the tactical actions and procedures on the ground.
    And minimum force requirements, timelines for MEDEVAC and
    CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] coordination efforts, weather and
    so forth, overhead armed ISR where it is applicable, ISR
    together with that, and then when you tie in with what we have
    been doing recently, after a long time of working with these
    units, we are now advising them at a higher level where we do
    mostly at the battalion level and to a large degree remotely.
    We have the ability to do the same thing, and so those are some
    of the things we have changed since.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General. And I am aware of some of
    that. One of the things that I am not aware of is who has been
    held responsible for this epic failure that had cost some men
    our lives. So far what I have read is that the Army brass is
    basically trying to blame junior officers both before and after
    the Niger ambush. So who is being held responsible? You are the
    AFRICOM commander. Who is responsible for these failures? And
    it is not junior officers.
        General Waldhauser. So, Congressman, the issue of the
    investigation right now lies with the Secretary of Defense. The
    issue of accountability and awards and so forth come from
    SOCOM. I know--I am not privy to those discussions, but I know
    they have been ongoing. But perhaps, Katie, I don't know from
    the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] perspective the
    status. But I would just say, again, this--the investigation
    completed and the actions----
        Mr. Gallego. How much longer is the investigation going to
    take place? This is almost 2 years now.
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I will just add that the report and that
    very question on the responsibilities and the awards is with
    Secretary of Defense. He takes this very seriously. Obviously,
    we have had a transition of authority within the--having a new
    Secretary. He is reviewing this carefully, and we are expecting
    you to get that final report here shortly, which will answer
    that very question.
        Mr. Gallego. And once that report comes out, you are going
    to actually go hold the DOD personnel, whether they be generals
    or below, responsible for this disaster, correct?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. That is a decision with the Secretary at
    this moment, and he will be able to provide you that
    information as soon as he finalizes his decision.
        Mr. Gallego. Okay. Ms. Wheelbarger, section 1212 of last
    year's NDAA required a review of advise, assist, and accompany
    missions from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. There
    were clearly issues about these missions as laid bare by the
    ambush. So why haven't you provided this report to us?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I believe this report is tied up in
    finally having the Secretary's complete decisions on all of the
    recommendations going forward. And as soon as he does, we will
    provide the report.
        Mr. Gallego. Okay. I would also like to know what is the--
    and it could be either General Waldhauser or General
    Wheelbarger, or Ms. Wheelbarger, I apologize, what is the
    status of providing redacted reports of the Niger investigation
    to the families of the deceased U.S. soldiers?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. My understanding is all of the reporting
    requirements are--will be released as soon as--including the
    redacted reports to the families as soon as the final decisions
    that are outstanding are made by the Secretary.
        Mr. Gallego. So that is including the autopsy reports?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. I would have to take that back.
        General Waldhauser. Well, my understanding is that once the
    Secretary signs off on this, then those redacted versions will
    go to the family first, just like we did at the outset of this.
    As you may recall, the team went to each family and spent hours
    with them to give them the first look at this, and I am sure it
    has been taking a long time, and I know that they have had a
    lot to process and probably have more questions. But it is my
    understanding that----
        Mr. Gallego. General, without a doubt that the family has
    actually been able to process this, I think the problem that we
    have is we actually can't process what actually occurred
    because we are not getting a full report. I think that is my
    dissatisfaction right now, because there are currently, you
    know, operations probably happening in AFRICOM, and I have zero
    doubt that it is actually being fully changed because I don't
    know who actually was responsible for this major mess-up. And
    it scares me that the DOD is at this point still hiding this
    information, and it has been 2 years.
        So I hope that that will be coming up soon, because I think
    then we will have to take extraordinary measures to actually
    get that to happen.
        I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Just quickly at the end, the only comment I will make, I
    know a lot of people have raised concerns about Afghanistan,
    and no matter which path you take, there are going to be
    concerns about Afghanistan. But trying to find a negotiated
    settlement is the best way forward, without question. We don't
    presume what that settlement is going to be, but I for one am
    supportive of the negotiations and the discussion you are
    having, because ultimately, our goal is to reduce our footprint
    in Afghanistan, reduce the risk, you know.
        Men and women in our Armed Forces lives are at risk in
    Afghanistan every day right now. To the extent that we can
    shift that responsibility to people in the region, I am all for
    it. It is not going to be easy. It is a very, very difficult
    part of the world, as you know far, far better than I do, but
    it is the direction we have to go if we are going to get to the
    outcome that we want.
        So I appreciate those efforts, and we will certainly stay
    in touch with you on the details. And then with that, take a
    brief break, and we will reconvene upstairs in a few minutes.
        [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee proceeded in
    closed session.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 7, 2019

    =======================================================================

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 7, 2019

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 7, 2019

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

        General Waldhauser. The DOD Leahy Law, 10 USC 362 (a)(1), provides
    that DOD appropriated funds may not be used for any training,
    equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a foreign
    security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information
    that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Further,
    10 USC 362 (b) permits an exception in cases where the Secretary of
    Defense, in consultation with the Security of State, determines that
    the government of such country ``has taken all necessary corrective
    steps.'' More specifically, this exception is known as remediation and
    is akin to a curative process.
        Pursuant to Joint DOD and DOS Policy on Remediation and the
    Resumption of Assistance under the Leahy Laws, remediation measures
    will focus on the primary three components of investigation; judicial
    or administrative adjudication, as appropriate; and sentencing or
    comparable administrative actions, as appropriate. No specific
    remediation or curative timeline exists, but the DOD must provide
    notification to Congress not more than 15 days after the use of this
    exception.
        During Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. Africa Command assisted Chiefs of
    U.S. Missions prepare remediation cases for units accused of gross
    violations of human rights. Though none of these specific cases were
    approved by the Department of State, we will continued to support
    remediation efforts when warranted. (U) The DOD Leahy Law, 10 USC 362
    (a)(1), provides that DOD appropriated funds may not be used for any
    training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a
    foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible
    information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human
    rights. Further, 10 USC 362 (b) permits an exception in cases where the
    Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Security of State,
    determines that the government of such country ``has taken all
    necessary corrective steps.'' More specifically, this exception is
    known as remediation and is akin to a curative process.
        Pursuant to Joint DOD and DOS Policy on Remediation and the
    Resumption of Assistance under the Leahy Laws, remediation measures
    will focus on the primary three components of investigation; judicial
    or administrative adjudication, as appropriate; and sentencing or
    comparable administrative actions, as appropriate. No specific
    remediation or curative timeline exists, but the DOD must provide
    notification to Congress not more than 15 days after the use of this
    exception.
        During Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. Africa Command assisted Chiefs of
    U.S. Missions prepare remediation cases for units accused of gross
    violations of human rights. Though none of these specific cases were
    approved by the Department of State, we will continued to support
    remediation efforts when warranted.   [See page 39.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HAALAND
        Ms. Wheelbarger. The National Security Council has taken the U.S.
    Government lead on developing the U.S. National Strategy on Women,
    Peace, and Security (WPS), as required by the 2017 WPS Act. DOD has
    provided input to the draft WPS strategy and is currently working with
    our interagency counterparts to finalize the document. Once the WPS
    Strategy is completed, the DOD is required to draft a WPS
    implementation plan for the Department within 120 days. In addition, we
    are developing a plan, using the $4M of funding that we received in the
    FY19 Defense Appropriation Act, to place gender advisors within each
    geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the
    Joint Staff, and OSD Policy.   [See page 18.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 7, 2019

    =======================================================================

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. General Waldhauser testified that 150 special
    operations personnel and 150 conventional force personnel were removed
    from AFRICOM as a result of the optimization that has taken place over
    the past 18 months. What missions were scaled back, curtailed, rendered
    inactive, transitioned to episodic engagement, transitioned from
    special operations forces to conventional forces or transitioned in
    authority (i.e. 127e transitioned to 333) to accomplish the manpower
    optimization. Please note specifically where these manpower changes
    occurred, over what timeline, with what notice (if any) to the partner
    force and to what extent the Department of State played a role in the
    decision.
        General Waldhauser. [The information is classified and retained in
    the committee files.]
        Mr. Langevin. General Waldhauser testified that he has not been
    ordered to execute the second ``tranche'' of this plan by removing 300
    more personnel from the AFRICOM area of responsibility. If the second
    ``tranche'' of this is ordered, what missions will be scaled back,
    curtailed, rendered inactive, transitioned to episodic engagement,
    transitioned from special operations forces to conventional forces or
    transitioned in authority (i.e. 127e transitioned to 333) to accomplish
    the manpower reduction requirement. Please note specifically where
    these manpower changes will occur, over what timeline, with what notice
    (if any) to the partner force and to what extent the Department of
    State will play a role in the decision to reduce forces.
        General Waldhauser. [The information is for official use only and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
        Ms. Speier. What is the DOD doing to help Egypt secure and foster
    economic development in the Sinai?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. DOD supports the State Department to secure and
    foster economic development in the Sinai along three lines of effort:
    (1) training, equipping, and advising the Egyptian Armed Forces in
    counter-terrorism to foster the security necessary for economic
    development; (2) engaging within the military to military relationship
    to prioritize population security and Ministry of Defense support to
    economic development as one focus of their campaign; and (3) providing
    logistics and equipment support to economic development projects led by
    the State Department and USAID.
        Ms. Speier. What is the DOD doing to help Egypt secure and foster
    economic development in the Sinai?
        General Votel. I would defer to Department of State to answer this
    question.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
        Mr. Gallego. Despite repeated requests, the Armed Services
    Committee has not been provided access to execute orders (EXORDS)
    necessary for oversight purposes following the Niger ambush in 2017.
    Assistant Secretary West committed to Chairman Smith and Mr. Larsen at
    the counterterrorism hearing several weeks ago that DOD would resolve
    this issue. When and in what manner will DOD allow the committee access
    to EXORDS in question?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. In an effort to remain completely transparent
    regarding the investigation, Members of Congress and Professional Staff
    Members were granted access to a reading room which contained all
    applicable Execute Orders (EXORDS) associated with the Niger
    investigation report. These included the Joint Staff Counterterrorism
    EXORD, the Juniper Shield EXORD, the North West Africa EXORD, and the
    AQIM EXORD. The Secretary of Defense is currently considering policies
    and protocols to respond to the Committees' request to view additional
    DOD EXORDs.
        Mr. Gallego. How are allies and partners being included in
    decisions regarding force presence and posture in Syria following
    recent announcements that U.S. presence in the country would sunset?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. The DOD remains actively and continuously engaged
    with allies and partners on decisions regarding force presence and
    posture in Syria as we transition from liberating territory to
    addressing the threat from ISIS as a clandestine insurgency. Since
    January, the Acting Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have each
    held in-person multilateral meetings regarding these decisions with
    their Coalition counterparts--meetings that directly informed the
    Acting Secretary of Defense deliberations about a residual U.S.
    presence in Syria. Additionally, these and other senior Defense
    officials have conducted discussions and calls with a broad range of
    Coalition allies and partners directly involved with detailed military
    planning at U.S. Central Command focused on force presence and posture
    in Syria.
        Mr. Gallego. In his announcement that he would declare a national
    emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said,
    quote: ``We have certain funds being used at the discretion of
    generals'' . . . ``Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of
    the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple
    of them--they think this is far more important than what they were
    going to use it for. I said `What were you going to use it for?' I
    won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me.''
        General Votel, do you believe that unallocated funds designated for
    USCENTCOM are better spent at the southern border than in USCENTCOM?
        General Votel. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to ensure the defense of
    the United States from threats wherever they may emanate from. That
    said, in a resource constrained environment and with the challenges we
    have historically faced in the CENTCOM AOR I would welcome more
    resources.
        Mr. Gallego. How are allies and partners being included in
    decisions regarding force presence and posture in Syria following
    recent announcements that U.S. presence in the country would sunset?
        General Votel. Our engagement with allies and partners supports
    diplomatic engagements by the President, the Secretary of State, the
    Acting Secretary of Defense, and other senior administration officials.
    The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has taken a prominent role in engaging
    with his uniformed counterparts from member nations from the Defeat-
    ISIS coalition as well as other non-coalition nations. My staff and I
    have held numerous engagements with military leaders and planners from
    interested countries ranging from one-on-one phone conversations to
    multi-nation conferences in order to convey the military situation
    including U.S. posture, threats, risks, and opportunities in northeast
    Syria. We recognize long term success will require working with our
    partners and to that end we coordinate as closely as possible.
        Mr. Gallego. In his announcement that he would declare a national
    emergency at the southern border to build a wall, President Trump said,
    quote: ``We have certain funds being used at the discretion of
    generals'' . . . ``Some of them haven't been allocated yet, and some of
    the generals think this is more important. I was speaking to a couple
    of them--they think this is far more important than what they were
    going to use it for. I said `What were you going to use it for?' I
    won't go into details, but it didn't sound too important to me.''
        General Waldhauser, do you believe that unallocated funds
    designated for USAFRICOM are better spent at the southern border than
    in USAFRICOM?
        General Waldhauser. I am unaware of the discussions between the
    President and other general officers and not in a position to fully
    understand the challenges and risks associated with conditions along
    the United States southern border. While reductions in funding could
    have repercussions to USAFRICOM's mission, it would be difficult to
    weigh the competing requirements without further context on a national
    emergency declaration.
        Mr. Gallego. Do you stand by the Niger Report issued last year as
    written, or are parts in need of review, correction, or retraction?
        General Waldhauser. I stand by my approval of the findings and
    recommendations of the investigating officer, a two-star general
    officer, into the facts and circumstances surrounding the 4 October
    2017 attack in Niger which killed four U.S. service members and four
    partner Nigeriens. The comprehensive Army 15-6 investigation, or Niger
    Report, took three months to assemble by the investigation team and was
    substantiated by testimonials from 143 witnesses, including 37 American
    and Nigerien survivors of the attack. The team analyzed thousands of
    pages of documents and reviewed hundreds of hours of intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance video. Critical to the thoroughness of
    the report was an investigative survey of the attack site in Tongo
    Tongo by the investigation team, accompanied by a Nigerien soldier who
    survived the attack and the Commander of the Nigerien Response Forces.
    During the survey, the team spoke to villagers and collected evidence
    for forensic analysis which reinforced the facts and circumstances of
    the attack. The investigation had 23 findings, 19 of which required
    action, covering issues of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine,
    training, judgement, and leadership. All of the material was forwarded
    to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and the Secretary concurred with all findings and
    recommendations.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
        Mr. Brown. Africa is the intersection of the previous focus of our
    national security strategy, the fight against terrorism, and the new
    priority of our national security strategy, a renewal of great power
    competition with China and Russia. What diplomatic solutions do we need
    in addition to the military and economic initiatives such that we have
    a comprehensive strategy on the continent? How can we improve military
    partnerships with African countries so they view the U.S. as a trusted
    ally? How have we aligned our basing and force structure to address
    both the continuing threat of terrorism and the expanding influence of
    China?
        Ms. Wheelbarger. The U.S. Government strongly supports diplomatic
    solutions to complex international problems. The Department of
    Defense's (DOD) engagements in Africa are in support of the bilateral
    relationships managed by U.S. Embassy Chiefs of Mission. These
    diplomatic relationships play a critical role in strengthening our
    military-to-military relationships on a continent where we have limited
    forward presence. For example, in Somalia, Libya and the Sahel,
    diplomacy and development are critical to progress; military efforts
    alone will not resolve issues there.
        As laid out in the U.S. Strategy for Africa, our primary lines of
    effort are promoting prosperity, strengthening security, and striving
    for stability. Thus the U.S. Government is focused on furthering trade
    and investment, fostering peace and security, and encouraging
    governance and self-reliance. These priorities could not be advanced
    without strong and enduring diplomatic efforts developed by the State
    Department.
        Building trusted military partnerships with African countries is
    the cornerstone of DOD's ``by, with, and through'' approach on the
    continent. Partner forces almost exclusively execute security
    operations, with USAFRICOM acting in a supporting role. The extent to
    which we work with partner forces is based on their operational and
    institutional needs. With all of our African partners, we work to
    achieve shared strategic objectives through cooperative relationships.
    Continued engagement helps to build deep, enduring, and reliable
    military ties.
        One program that highlights these ties is our State Partnership
    Program (SPP) administered by the National Guard Bureau. This program
    is guided by State Department foreign policy goals, and supports U.S.
    Chief of Missions' security cooperation objectives. Through the SPP,
    the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements that
    leverage whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate
    broader engagements spanning military, government, economic, and social
    spheres. We currently have SPPs with 14 African countries and are
    seeking to develop more such programs with African countries.
    Partnering with a state allows for continued engagement and enduring,
    without the rotation of regular active duty units.
        Finally, proper alignment of basing and force structure are very
    important to address the threat of terrorism and great power
    competition, as detailed in the National Defense Strategy. Any response
    to crises or conflicts in the region will require adequate access,
    basing, and overflight authorities. To address this, the Department has
    established a network of operating locations across the continent that
    enable required access while employing a light footprint. These
    locations also promote constructive security partnerships with key
    African countries that improve regional security and help keep pressure
    on priority violent extremist organizations. Our posture also provides
    our partners with assurance of our resolve and capacity to help secure
    our shared interests.
        Mr. Brown. DOD spends over $10 billion each year on security sector
    assistance, much of which goes to counterterrorism (about $5 billion is
    Afghanistan funding). In a 2018 report, the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies recommended that the U.S. ``establish a baseline
    assessment of the security partnership before expending resources,''
    and that those reports should include the partners ability to absorb
    assets, reform political institutions, and their compliance with human
    rights.
        Does CENTCOM conduct such baseline assessments with the ANA? Do you
    have a timeline for achieving particular benchmarks and goals? More
    generally, for all of the forces in your AOR that you partner with, how
    does CENTCOM evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism partners
    capability and programs? What are the benchmarks you use to assess
    whether the investment is an appropriate and cost effective use of
    taxpayer funds?
        General Votel. Yes, CENTCOM conducts baseline assessments that
    estimate the operating environment to include Afghan National Defense
    and Security Forces (ANDSF) (which includes the Afghan National Army)
    objective force capabilities to sustain progress along the Roadmap,
    Afghan Security Forces Fund stewardship and strategic and operational
    risks to NATO and Resolute Support objectives. The congressionally
    mandated, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan 1225 Report,
    is an in-depth Department of Defense assessment of costs associated
    with developing the Afghan security forces and government institutions.
    USCENTCOM supports this assessment through our U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
    component with cost and performance information. USCENTCOM also
    complements the 1225 report with an assessment of Operation Freedom's
    Sentinel. This assessment provides me with a measure of progress of
    achieving military objectives, while building partner capacity, with
    the ANDSF.
        When President Trump announced the South Asia Strategy (SAS) in
    August 2017, this marked a change from a time-based approach
    telegraphing artificial timelines to a conditions-based approach,
    creating the conditions to bring about reconciliation on coalition
    terms. This conditions-based approach allows the United States to
    target realistic, attainable, and measurable strategic objectives. The
    SAS supports the Afghan Security Roadmap, the blueprint to develop
    professional and capable Afghan security forces. This roadmap is not
    anchored to a timeline and is tailored to meet Afghan's security
    capability threshold.
        We assess our Theater Campaign Plan quarterly and annually. Our
    assessments include evaluations of Partner Nations' capabilities to
    address violent extremist organizations and terrorist threats in their
    countries. These assessments include evaluation of progress towards
    objectives detailed in our Security Cooperation Country Plans; every
    country in our AOR has a Security Cooperation Plan, with the exception
    of Iran and Syria. Many of our country plans include specific
    counterterrorism objectives for which we are working with our Partner
    Nations' to build capability and capacity. Additionally, we conduct
    operations assessments of our named operations in Afghanistan and to
    defeat the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS). These operations have
    specific objectives for our by-with-and-through approach to combatting
    terrorism with our partners so we routinely evaluate our progress in
    establishing specific desired conditions that we have for our partners'
    counterterrorism capabilities in these two conflicts.
        We conduct a Theater Campaign Assessment on a quarterly basis,
    which measures progress toward objectives and end states. This
    assessment includes measuring the effectiveness of our operations,
    activities, and investments. One of our end states is: ``USCENTCOM's
    influence with allies and partners is maintained and facilitates by-
    with-through operations and training that strengthens counterterrorism
    and conventional military capabilities.'' We assess the four objectives
    for this end state during our quarterly campaign assessment; each
    objective has evaluation metrics which include measures of ``cost and
    return.'' Overall, our campaign assessment is one means by which I
    evaluate execution of our theater strategy to achieve U.S. national
    objectives established in the National Military Strategy, National
    Defense Strategy, and the National Security Strategy. Additionally, for
    Afghanistan, I recently endorsed the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces (ANDSF) Plan of Record (APoR) report. The APoR analysis
    provides an estimate of the operating environment in Afghanistan, ANDSF
    objective force capabilities to sustain progress along the ANDSF
    Roadmap, and offers recommendations to better align the Roadmap to
    evolving conditions. An example of this continuous assessment process
    is the review that General Miller is conducting that allows us to
    evaluate the ANDSF from this perspective and make recommendations
    through various mechanisms, such as the 1225 Report and the semi-annual
    NATO Periodic Mission Review.
        Mr. Brown. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's
    most water scarce region. MENA is home to 6 percent of the world's
    population, but only 1 percent of the world's freshwater resources,
    according to the World Bank. Seventeen countries in the region fall
    below the water poverty line set by the United Nations, and some
    experts believe that drought played a part in sparking Syria's civil
    war.
        Do you agree that scarce resources can be a flashpoint for violence
    and conflict? Do you agree that the scarcity of water in the Lake Chad
    basin has increased over the last few decades? Do you agree that this
    situation increases the likelihood that an increasing number of U.S.
    troops may be deployed, putting American lives at risk?
        General Waldhauser. The scarcity of natural resources contributes
    to conflict throughout Africa. Lake Chad, which has historically been
    the main artery of commerce in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region, has
    progressively declined over the last five decades. To a degree the
    result of poor resource management, Lake Chad's decline has severely
    impacted agro-pastoral communities, who depend on it for food, water,
    and trade, resulting in the displacement of thousands of people from
    the region. This displacement, along with the competition over scarce
    resources, serves as one of many drivers of instability on the African
    continent. USAFRICOM continues to work with the international and
    interagency community to equip our African Partners with available
    resources and security mechanisms to support their efforts to prevent
    conflict and maintain stability.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
        Mr. Keating. Earlier this year, the Lead Inspector General put out
    a report that gave a status update on Operation Inherent Resolve that
    report, U.S. Central Command provided the following quote: ``If Sunni
    socio-economic, political, and sectarian grievances are not adequately
    addressed by the national and local governments of Iraq and Syria it is
    very likely that ISIS will have the opportunity to set conditions for
    future resurgence and territorial control.'' The report also goes on to
    say ``Absent sustained counterterrorism pressure, ISIS could likely
    resurge in Syria within six to twelve months.''
        Are you confident Sunni grievances have been addressed or will be
    addressed so that conditions are not set for an ISIS resurgence?
        In terms of ISIS reconstituting its forces, do you expect the bulk
    of ISIS' leadership, including those who head the group's various
    Shura's, to largely remain in Syria and/or Iraq? Or do you anticipate
    those members will flee to other provinces in North Africa or South
    Asia?
        General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Keating. General Waldhauser, in your written testimony you
    state that the second emergent challenge in Africa is ``the effect of
    environmental change on African Security.'' You go on to highlight the
    large number of African farmers, the potential for land disputes, poor
    land-use policies, as well as changing weather patterns and rising
    temperatures.
        Could you also speak to the challenges climate change poses to
    Nigeria in particular? John Campbell, former U.S. Ambassador to
    Nigeria, in 2015 and in 2017 stated that Nigeria is of great strategic
    importance to the United States. It has a rapidly growing population of
    200 million, it has Africa's largest economy, is the largest producer
    of oil and gas in Africa, and has contributed to international
    peacekeeping missions in the region. Climate change however raises
    risks for Nigeria, from enhancing drought in the northeast and fueling
    the Boko Haram insurgency; to raising sea levels and displacing
    thousands in Lagos, Nigeria's coastal mega-city and economic
    powerhouse. How are you and your staff incorporating the impact that
    climate change may have on these risks and scenarios in Africa and
    Nigeria in particular?
        General Waldhauser. Factors associated with the changing climate
    heighten Nigeria's existing humanitarian and security challenges.
    Nigeria's rapid population growth, and its reliance on subsistence
    agriculture, increases its vulnerability to climate-related hazards,
    including variable rainfall, drought, desertification, and flooding.
    About 70% of the Nigerian population is engaged in subsistence farming.
    Thus, an extreme climate event such as drought or flooding can have
    devastating effects, often leading to food shortages and the
    displacement of millions of people. These events have regional impacts
    as well. Nigeria is responsible for 70% of West Africa's overall
    agricultural output, with any significant reduction felt throughout the
    region. Greater competition for access to arable land also contributes
    to violence in Nigeria and more broadly, across Africa. In Nigeria,
    this has most prominently featured violence between herders and farmers
    in Nigeria's bread basket, the Middle Belt, where deaths in resource
    conflict have far-outpaced deaths to terrorism.
        The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead
    agency for development initiatives in Africa, and USAFRICOM works in
    support of these efforts. USAID supports agriculture and food security
    programs in Nigeria which take into account the changing climate and
    environmental conditions. USAID programs provide clean water and
    sanitation, increase access to energy, reduce obstacles to trade, and
    improve market access to strengthen the capacity of local groups to
    address violence and mitigate conflict in their communities.
    Additionally, USAID programs target improved governance at the state
    and local levels to enhance the delivery of services (e.g., health,
    education, rule of law, etc.) to the public, thereby addressing many
    underlying grievances easily exploited by extremist or criminal
    networks.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
        Ms. Sherrill. I understand that Picatinny Arsenal developed the
    only large-scale Howitzer capable of being lifted throughout the
    CENTCOM theatre, the M777A2 towed 155mm Howitzer. It has proven
    invaluable, firing hundreds of thousands of rounds in support of ground
    forces there. Because we never want our troops to have a fair fight,
    and we must hit the enemy before they even see us coming, the Army is
    looking at even greater range Long Range Precision Fires.
        Across the vast area of operations in the CENTCOM AOR, there is a
    clear requirement for both greater range and lethality for our ground
    forces. Please share with the committee what you see as critical
    lethality requirements when it comes to the range of our weapons and
    munitions against our adversaries.
        General Votel. [The information is for official use only and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Ms. Sherrill. I have deep reservations that the damage this
    administration has done to our critical alliances, particularly NATO,
    will have consequences that impact our security interests well outside
    of Europe. The premise of our efforts to train and equip local forces
    to combat terrorism is that they will be step up as we step back. This
    requires both regional partnership and continued support from our NATO
    allies in these vital missions.
        Please describe how our NATO allies are contributing to
    counterterrorism efforts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and
    what more can we ask of them in places such as Syria, as we are looking
    to scale down.
        General Votel. Our NATO allies continue to capably support
    Coalition efforts in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility focusing on
    training local forces and supporting counterterrorism efforts against
    ISIS and other terrorist threats in Afghanistan using a ``by, with, and
    through'' approach which emphasizes giving local forces the capability
    to plan and execute their own operations. Under Combined Joint Task
    Force Operation Inherent Resolve and NATO Mission Iraq, as well the
    Resolute Support Mission, our NATO allies currently contribute well
    over 3,000 troops to the Defeat-ISIS mission and 7000 troops to the
    Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, our NATO allies
    are working with us to develop enduring training plans that will
    continue to sustain the development, professionalism and expertise of
    the Afghani and Iraqi military forces so they can bring and sustain
    security and stability in their respective countries. As we look to
    reduce the U.S. footprint in Syria, we are identifying the critical
    mission sets, training requirements, forces required, and authorities
    necessary to ensure the safety and security of the local population.
        Ms. Sherrill. I come from an area of New Jersey that suffered
    greatly in the 9/11 attacks. While a significant reduction in the
    number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan may be in U.S. national security
    interests, it is critical that the reduction occur in a thoughtful way,
    with careful planning, and in coordination with our allies. We do not
    want Afghanistan to yet again provide safe-haven for terrorists who
    would attack our homeland.
        As the primary U.S. objective for being in Afghanistan is to enable
    a political settlement that creates the conditions for another such
    attack to be much less likely, with the President's abrupt announcement
    to reduce our military presence by half, don't you agree that we are
    significantly damaging our ability to accomplish the mission?
        General Votel. No. While USCENTCOM has not received an order to
    reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan we are always evaluating the mission
    and the resourcing necessary to accomplish that mission. GEN Miller, in
    his capacity as Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan, has determined the
    appropriate force level in order to execute his missions (U.S./NATO)
    based upon his assessment of the conditions on the ground. USCENTCOM
    will continue to play a vital role in supporting diplomatic efforts to
    find an Afghan led political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. We
    remain focused on doing all we can to support a political settlement.
        Ms. Sherrill. I have deep reservations that the damage this
    administration has done to our critical alliances, particularly NATO,
    will have consequences that impact our security interests well outside
    of Europe. The premise of our efforts to train and equip local forces
    to combat terrorism is that they will be step up as we step back. This
    requires both regional partnership and continued support from our NATO
    allies in these vital missions.
        Please describe how our NATO allies are contributing to
    counterterrorism efforts in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, and
    what more can we ask of them, particularly in places where we are
    looking to reduce the U.S. military footprint.
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM works with NATO, the European Union
    (EU), the African Union (AU), and other Partner Nations to advance U.S.
    national security interests and promote regional security, stability,
    and prosperity. Protection of the NATO southern flank is a key concern
    for the Alliance, and any expanded NATO presence on the continent is
    driven by its member nations. Currently, 22 of the 29 NATO Allies are
    in the EU, and the EU provides close to 3,000 security forces in Mali,
    Central African Republic, and Somalia. EU forces also conduct counter-
    piracy off the Horn of Africa and counter-trafficking and migration
    efforts in the Mediterranean through executive operations and training
    missions. NATO is pursuing CT-focused engagements with the AU, namely
    the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. NATO held
    initial discussions with EU advisors to the G5 Sahel to identifying
    areas where NATO can contribute personnel and expertise.
        More broadly, NATO is developing a comprehensive understanding of
    the situation in the Middle East-North Africa region through political
    engagement and consultation with individual partner countries, as well
    as with regional organizations. Under the Mediterranean Dialogue,
    established by the North Atlantic Council in 1994, which includes
    Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, NATO
    hosts thematic meetings, seminars, and workshops on issues of shared
    interest. Also, NATO is in the process of finalizing a Defense Capacity
    Building (DCB) package for Tunisia to provide support to the Tunisian
    authorities in seven priority areas of cooperation: development of
    special operations forces; force preparation; intelligence capability;
    chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense; cyber
    defense; counter-Improvised Explosive Devices; and integrity
    development.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
        Mr. Waltz. What is the status of the search for Jeffrey Woodke and
    what assets have been dedicated to looking for him?
        General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM continues to coordinate with
    USAFRICOM Components, other U.S. Government Agencies and Partner
    Nations to determine the location of American Citizen, Jeffery R.
    Woodke. Mr. Woodke is an American humanitarian worker who was kidnapped
    in October of 2016 in Abalak, Niger. The U.S. Government is aware both
    terrorist and criminal elements operating in the Northern Sahel regions
    of Africa are currently holding several other Western Hostages, to
    include citizens of France, Colombia, Romania, Switzerland, and
    Australia. These terrorist and criminal groups are assessed to present
    a grave threat to both regional stability and to the physical safety of
    Americans and westerners transiting the region.
        The Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC) is coordinating interagency
    efforts to safely recover Mr. Woodke. Interagency intelligence analysts
    are vetting information and U.S. Government agencies are following up
    on all leads, while the HRFC continues to access diplomatic efforts in
    collaboration with foreign partners. These efforts represent a whole of
    government approach to recovering Mr. Woodke and mitigating the threat
    of future hostage takings to Americans in the region. Additionally,
    HRFC's Family Engagement Team is in routine communication with Mr.
    Woodke's family. As a caveat, Mr. Woodke's family has consistently
    indicated their desires to avoid discussing or highlighting our
    combined efforts in the public domain over concerns for his safety. Mr.
    Woodke's family has expressed appreciation when we have avoided
    discussing the ongoing recovery efforts in public testimony.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HAALAND
        Ms. Haaland. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
    (AIHRC), in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and
    Ministry of Interior, developed an ombudsman program to enable external
    reporting, oversight, and victim support for MoD and MoI female
    employees. As of December of last year, The ombudsman program, although
    developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented. Is that
    still the case? What steps are being taken toward implementation? What
    is standing in the way of implementation?
        General Votel.The program referenced is an internal GIRoA program
    that is not part of U.S. Central Command's Train, Advise, and Assist
    (TAA) efforts and it is not funded by Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
    (ASFF). The program is being worked by GIRoA MoD and MoI Gender
    Integration Offices, MoD Gender Director, MoI Director of Human Rights,
    Women's Affairs and Children. To date, they have implemented and hosted
    seminars discussing topics on gender integration to include female
    participation, employment, and career progression in the Afghan
    National Defense Security Force (ANDSF). There are steps being taken by
    GIRoA MoD and MoI Gender Integration Offices to develop policies and
    processes to prevent and report sexual harassment and assault as part
    of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/134. The Afghan
    Independent Human Rights Commission received approximately $5.5M from
    donors in 2017. The United Kingdom alone provided $124K specifically
    for the Ombudsman program.

                                      [all]