    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS:
                         A REVIEW OF NASA'S DEEP SPACE
                    EXPLORATION PROGRAMS AND LUNAR PROPOSAL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                                   TECHNOLOGY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 8, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-16

                                   __________

     Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    36-255PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2020

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

                 HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma,
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois                Ranking Member
    SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon             MO BROOKS, Alabama
    AMI BERA, California,                BILL POSEY, Florida
        Vice Chair                       RANDY WEBER, Texas
    CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             BRIAN BABIN, Texas
    LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas               ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
    HALEY STEVENS, Michigan              ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
    KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma                RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               PETE OLSON, Texas
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
    ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 JIM BAIRD, Indiana
    BILL FOSTER, Illinois                JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
    DON BEYER, Virginia                  JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
    CHARLIE CRIST, Florida                   Puerto Rico
    SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                VACANCY
    KATIE HILL, California
    BEN McADAMS, Utah
    JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
                                     ------

                     Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

                     HON. KENDRA HORN, Oklahoma, Chairwoman
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Ranking Member
    AMI BERA, California                 MO BROOKS, Alabama
    ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              BILL POSEY, Florida
    DON BEYER, Virginia                  PETE OLSON, Texas
    CHARLIE CRIST, Florida               MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    KATIE HILL, California
    JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  May 8, 2019

                                                                       Page

    Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                               Opening Statements

    Statement by Representative Kendra Horn, Chairwoman, Subcommittee
      on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and
      Technology, U.S. House of Representatives......................     9
        Written Statement............................................    10

    Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member,
      Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
      Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    11
        Written Statement............................................    13

    Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Chairwoman,
      Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    14
        Written statement............................................    15

    Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    16
        Written statement............................................    16

                                   Witnesses:

    Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
      Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA
        Oral Statement...............................................    18
        Written Statement............................................    21

    Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special Assistant to the Administrator, NASA
        Oral Statement...............................................    32
        Written Statement............................................    21

    Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
        Oral Statement...............................................    34
        Written Statement............................................    36

    Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Director, Cornell Center for Astrophysics
      and Planetary Science; Co-Chair of the Former Committee on
      Human Spaceflight, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
      and Medicine
        Oral Statement...............................................    40
        Written Statement............................................    42

    Mr. J. Walter Faulconer, President, Faulconer Consulting Group
        Oral Statement...............................................    47
        Written Statement............................................    49

    Discussion.......................................................    70

                 Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

    Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
      Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA...........    96

    Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special Assistant to the Administrator, NASA.    96

    Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.....   111

    Dr. Jonathan Lunine, Director, Cornell Center for Astrophysics
      and Planetary Science; Co-Chair of the Former Committee on
      Human Spaceflight, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
      and Medicine...................................................   114

    Mr. J. Walter Faulconer, President, Faulconer Consulting Group...   116

                Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

    Article submitted by Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate
      Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission
      Directorate, NASA..............................................   122

                          KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS:
                         A REVIEW OF NASA'S DEEP SPACE
                            EXPLORATION PROGRAMS AND
                                 LUNAR PROPOSAL

                                  ----------

                             WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2019

                      House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
                   Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                       Washington, D.C.

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in
    room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Kendra
    Horn [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairwoman Horn. This hearing will come to order.
        Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
    recess at any time.
        Good afternoon, and welcome to today's hearing entitled,
    ``Keeping our Sights on Mars: A Review of NASA's Deep Space
    Exploration Programs and Lunar Proposal.'' I want to thank our
    witnesses for being here and thank you all for joining us.
        So, today, we're examining NASA's deep space exploration
    programs--the capabilities and plans that will enable Americans
    to go beyond our low-Earth orbit neighborhood and into deep
    space. Successive NASA Authorization Acts have authorized a
    stepping-stone approach to human exploration, with the most
    recent, the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017,
    establishing Mars as the long-term goal. The law also directed
    NASA to prepare a human exploration roadmap.
        In hearings from the last Congress to the present, Members
    of the Subcommittee and Full Committee have repeatedly asked
    for this roadmap, only to receive a response--in response a
    high-level strategy that was delivered over a year and a half
    late. I refer to this roadmap because, as the authorizing
    Committee, it is our responsibility to the American taxpayers
    to ensure that human space exploration plans and budget
    requests are based on sound analyses and clear goals and
    objectives.
        We support NASA and we want it to succeed, so I am
    concerned that as we prepare to reauthorize NASA again, we have
    many unanswered questions about the future of our Nation's
    human space exploration program: How and when will we get to
    Mars? What technologies and systems are needed to get us there?
    What are the interim destinations and precursor missions that
    scientists and engineers have determined to be the most
    effective means to get us there? What is the future of the
    International Space Station (ISS), and what are the priorities
    to enable an eventual Mars mission? How long should it be
    operated, and what follow--and what will follow in low-Earth
    orbit?
        Mars is the horizon goal, and I want Americans to be the
    first to set foot on the red planet. But make no mistake about
    it, there's an elephant in the room, and it's the Moon. In the
    absence of an integrated roadmap, the Administration decided
    that the Moon is the place to go with humans, that we should go
    there sustainably, and that--and be there permanently, though
    not necessarily with humans. And, as of just 6 weeks ago, the
    Vice President said that we need to get there fast, in 5 years
    rather than 9 years.
        While I can't argue with the desire to invigorate our human
    exploration efforts and find near-term milestones to
    demonstrate success, the lack of planning evident so far, is no
    way to run our Nation's human space exploration program. The
    2024 missive left NASA in a tizzy, scrambling to develop a plan
    and hastening to pull together a budget amendment that still
    has not been delivered to Congress, and upending groundwork
    with international partners on future exploration goals.
        What are the primary goals and objectives for going to the
    Moon? Are they geopolitical, scientific, commercial, or as
    risk-reduction efforts for an eventual Mars mission? On which
    goal is NASA basing its architecture and mission decisions?
    Simply saying ``yes'' to all of them is not an adequate way to
    determine our priorities. And how will we get there by 2024?
    NASA's solution? Get the private sector to do it and do it
    fast. Whether or not that will be through cost-plus or firm-
    fixed-price contracts, which are not typically used for
    development projects, whether or not contracts would involve a
    cost-sharing and at what level NASA oversight would be involved
    have not been made clear.
        While public-private partnerships have a role to play,
    their use in human spaceflight programs has not yet been
    demonstrated. Commercial crew providers were awarded contracts
    in 2014 with an initial plan for certification by 2017. It's
    2019, and while they're making good progress, we're still
    hitchhiking rides with the Russians to low-Earth orbit. Not
    only that, under those contracts, it's the companies, not NASA,
    that decide what information the public should be entitled to
    should something go wrong. We all know that spaceflight is
    risky, and things do go wrong. So let me be clear. I absolutely
    support America's robust, growing, and innovative space
    industry. A United States human space exploration program that
    leads the world should be leveraging private-sector innovation.
    The question is how.
        At present, we have a White House directive to land humans
    on the Moon in 5 years but no plan and no budget details on how
    to do so and no integrated human space exploration roadmap
    laying out how we can best achieve the horizon goal, Mars. In
    essence, we're flying blind.
        I'll close with this thought. I believe all of us--
    Republicans and Democrats alike--share the goal of a successful
    and ambitious human space exploration program that enables the
    United States, in concert with its international partners, to
    explore destinations in deep space such as the Moon and Mars.
    Such ambitious civil space goals are not only inspiring but
    essential to enabling discovery, providing benefits to society,
    and sustaining U.S. leadership in the peaceful uses of outer
    space.
        The Space Exploration Initiative of 1989 and the 2004
    Vision for Space Exploration were unfulfilled attempts to
    achieving deep space exploration goals to go to the Moon and
    Mars. Will our efforts this time be an opportunity lost or an
    opportunity gained? If they are to be an opportunity gained, we
    will need an integrated and stable plan, adequate and sustained
    resources, and a commitment that transcends political party and
    election timelines to get us there.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Horn follows:]

        Good afternoon and welcome. I'd like to extend a special
    welcome to our witnesses. Thank you for being here.
        Today, we're examining NASA's deep space exploration
    programs-the capabilities and plans that will enable Americans
    to go beyond our low-Earth orbit neighborhood and into deep
    space.
        Successive NASA Authorization Acts have authorized a
    stepping-stone approach to human exploration, with the most
    recent-the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017-
    establishing Mars as the long-term goal. The law also directed
    NASA to prepare a Human Exploration Roadmap. In hearings from
    the last Congress to the present, Members of the Subcommittee
    and Full Committee have repeatedly asked for this Roadmap, only
    to receive in response a high-level strategy that was delivered
    over a year and a half late. I refer to this Roadmap, because
    as the Authorizing Committee, it is our responsibility to the
    American taxpayers to ensure that human space exploration plans
    and budget requests are based on sound analyses and clear goals
    and objectives. We support NASA and we want it to succeed.
        So I am concerned that as we prepare to reauthorize NASA
    again, we have many unanswered questions about the future of
    our nation's human space exploration program:
         LHow and when will we get to Mars?
         LWhat technologies and systems are needed to get
    us there?
         LWhat are the interim destinations and precursor
    missions that scientists and engineers have determined to be
    the most effective means to get us there?
         LWhat is the future of the International Space
    Station and what are the priorities for it to enable an
    eventual Mars mission? How long should it be operated, and what
    will follow it in low-Earth orbit?
        Mars is the horizon goal and I want Americans to be the
    first to set foot on the Red Planet. But make no mistake about
    it. There's an elephant in the room, and it's the Moon.
        In the absence of an integrated Roadmap, the Administration
    has decided that the Moon is the place to go with humans, that
    we should go there sustainably, and be there permanently,
    though not necessarily with humans. And, as of just 6 weeks
    ago, the Vice President said we need to get there fast-in 5
    rather than 9 years. While I can't argue with the desire to
    invigorate our human exploration efforts and find near-term
    milestones to demonstrate success, the lack of planning evident
    so far, is no way to run our nation's human space exploration
    program. The 2024 missive left NASA in a tizzy-scrambling to
    develop a plan and hastening to pull together a budget
    amendment that still have not been delivered to Congress; and,
    upending groundwork with international partners on future
    exploration goals.
        What are the primary goals and objectives for going to the
    Moon? Are they geopolitical, scientific, commercial, or as
    risk-reduction efforts for an eventual Mars mission? On which
    goal is NASA basing its architecture and mission decisions?
    Simply saying ``yes'' to all of them is not an adequate way to
    determine priorities. And how will we get there by 2024? NASA's
    solution? Get the private sector to do it and do it fast.
    Whether or not that will be through cost-plus or firm-fixed-
    price contracts, which are not typically used for development
    projects, whether or not contracts would involve cost-sharing
    and what level of NASA oversight would be involved have not
    been made clear.
        While public-private partnerships have a role to play,
    their use in human spaceflight programs has not yet been
    demonstrated. Commercial crew providers were awarded contracts
    in 2014 with an initial plan for certification by 2017. It's
    2019 and while they're making good progress, we're still hitch-
    hiking with the Russians to low-Earth orbit. Not only that,
    under those contracts, it's the companies, not NASA, that
    decide what information to make public should something go
    wrong. Spaceflight is risky, and things do go wrong.Let me be
    clear. I support America's robust, growing, and innovative
    space industry. A United States human space exploration program
    that leads the world should be leveraging private sector
    innovation. The question is how.
        At present, we have a White House directive to land humans
    on the Moon in 5 years, but no plan or no budget details on how
    to do so, and no integrated Human Exploration Roadmap laying
    out how we can best achieve the horizon goal-Mars. In essence,
    we're flying blind.
        I'll close with this thought. I believe all of us-
    Republicans and Democrats alike-share the goal of a successful
    and ambitious human space exploration program that enables the
    United States, in concert with international partners, to
    explore destinations in deep space such as the Moon and Mars.
    Such ambitious civil space goals are not only inspiring but
    essential to enabling discovery, providing benefits to society,
    and sustaining U.S. leadership in the peaceful uses of outer
    space. The Space Exploration Initiative of 1989 and the 2004
    Vision for Space Exploration were unfulfilled attempts at
    achieving deep space exploration goals to go to the Moon and
    Mars. Will our efforts this time be an opportunity lost or an
    opportunity gained? If they are to be an opportunity gained, we
    will need an integrated and stable plan, adequate and sustained
    resources, and a commitment that transcends political party and
    election timelines to get us there.
        Thank you.

        Chairwoman Horn. All right. The Chair now recognizes
    Ranking Member Babin for an opening statement.
        Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair. We appreciate it. And I
    want to say thank you to all you witnesses that are here today.
    I'm looking forward to hearing your testimonies.
        As this is the first formal hearing of the Space and
    Aeronautics Subcommittee of the 116th Congress, I would like to
    formally welcome you to the Committee, and I look forward to
    working with you, Chairwoman Horn, on one of the most exciting
    issues that we deal with here in Congress, and that is space
    exploration.
        This is not only one of the most exciting issues, but it is
    also one of the most exciting times for space exploration. We
    have a renewed sense of urgency and purpose that is coupled
    with focus, leadership, and enthusiasm. I am excited to be
    involved in our Nation's space enterprise at this moment in our
    history.
        We have a unique opportunity before us. We have an
    Administration that put forth a bold direction, and we have an
    agency that stands ready to meet that challenge. We've seen
    proposals to reinvigorate NASA before, but we are uniquely
    positioned at this moment to capitalize on the investments made
    over the last 2 decades.
        Unlike President Kennedy's challenge to put a man on the
    Moon within the decade, we have already made the investments in
    the systems that will turn that challenge into a reality. And
    we now have robust centers and infrastructure, an eager
    workforce, a modern industrial base, a hungry commercial
    sector, a vibrant space market, and years of hardware
    development already under our belts. We are in the final stages
    of developing the Space Launch System (SLS). We've already
    conducted a test flight of the Orion capsule, and ground
    systems at the Kennedy Space Center are being built as we
    speak. The President has provided direction, focus, and
    enthusiasm, which will only help us in making continued
    progress.
        And that isn't to say that we don't have work to do.
    Specifically, we need a clear plan and a realistic budget
    proposal. We need to be cautious about developing a plan that
    is overly ambitious or too costly, and we need to ensure that
    OMB sufficiently funds the plan in subsequent budget requests.
        We must develop next-generation spacesuits and human-class
    landers, scale up in-space propulsion and life support systems,
    and properly mitigate radiation hazards. We must also develop
    these capabilities in an extensible manner that enables an
    evolvable architecture that can explore not only the Moon, but
    also Mars and beyond. And as the National Academy's Pathways to
    Exploration report recommended, NASA should develop
    technologies that feedforward from one mission to the next and
    reduce or eliminate the development of dead-end technologies.
        Furthermore, Space Policy Directive 1 directed NASA to
    ``Lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration
    with commercial and international partners to enable human
    expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth
    new knowledge and new opportunities.'' Developing a plan that
    takes into account both the principles of extensibility and
    sustainability will be very challenging and will require NASA
    to make difficult decisions going forward, but I believe that
    NASA is well up to this task.
        We must also be mindful of artificial schedule pressures.
    The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has noted in several
    reports that it's important to set challenging but achievable
    schedules and not allow undue schedule pressure to lead to
    decisions that adversely impact safety and mission assurance.
    Maintaining a balance between setting challenging yet
    achievable goals and taking prudent steps to ensure safe
    operations will certainly need to be addressed in any future
    plans.
        Humanity will commit to the task of exploring the cosmos.
    The only real question is whether the United States will be the
    one to lead in that effort. I, for one, will do everything that
    I can to ensure that this happens.
        Before I yield back my time, I would like to make one final
    observation. The Administration is still finalizing their lunar
    plans, and while this hearing is very helpful, and I realize
    that NASA previously committed to delivering a plan to the
    Committee by now, holding the hearing without new details does
    seem premature. I would respectfully recommend that we hear
    from NASA once this plan is finalized.
        And so, with that, I'll yield back. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]

        Thank you, Chair Horn. As this is the first formal hearing
    of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee in the 116th
    Congress, I would like to formally welcome you to the
    Committee. I look forward to working with you on one of the
    most exciting issues we deal with here in Congress--space
    exploration.
        This is not only one of the most exciting issues, but it is
    also one of the most exciting times for space exploration. We
    have a renewed sense of urgency and purpose that is couple with
    focus, leadership, and enthusiasm. I am excited to be involved
    in our nation's space enterprise at this moment in history.
        We have a unique opportunity before us. We have an
    Administration that put forth a bold direction, and we have an
    agency that stands ready to meet that challenge. We've seen
    proposals to reinvigorate NASA before, but we are uniquely
    positioned at this moment to capitalize on the investments made
    over the last two decades.
        Unlike President Kennedy's challenge to put a man on the
    Moon within the decade, we have already made the investments in
    the systems that will turn that challenge into reality. We now
    have robust centers and infrastructure, an eager workforce, a
    modern industrial base, a hungry commercial sector, a vibrant
    space market, and years of hardware development under our belt.
    We are in the final stages of developing the Space Launch
    System, we've already conducted a test flight of the Orion
    capsule, and ground systems at the Kennedy Space Center are
    being built as we speak. The President has provided direction,
    focus, and enthusiasm, which will only help us continue making
    progress.
        That isn't to say that we don't have work to do.
    Specifically, we need a clear plan and a realistic budget
    proposal. We need to be cautious about developing a plan that
    is overly ambitious or costly, and we need to ensure that OMB
    sufficiently funds the plan in subsequent budget requests.
        We must develop next generation space suits and human-class
    landers, scale-up in-space propulsion and life support systems,
    and properly mitigate radiation hazards. We must also develop
    these capabilities in an extensible manner that enables an
    evolvable architecture that can explore not only the Moon, but
    also Mars, and beyond. As the National Academy's ``Pathways to
    Exploration'' report recommended, NASA should develop
    technologies that feed-forward from one mission to the next and
    reduce or eliminate the development of ``dead-end''
    technologies.
        Furthermore, Space Policy Directive 1 directed NASA to ``
    `[l]ead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration
    with commercial and international partners to enable human
    expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth
    new knowledge and opportunities.'' Developing a plan that takes
    into account both the principles of extensibility and
    sustainability will be challenging and require NASA to make
    difficult decisions going forward, but I believe NASA is up to
    the task.
        We must also be mindful of artificial schedule pressure.
    The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has noted in several
    reports that it is important to set challenging, but achievable
    schedules and not allow undue schedule pressure to lead to
    decisions that adversely impact safety and mission assurance.
    Maintaining a balance between setting challenging yet
    achievable goals and taking prudent steps to ensure safe
    operations will certainly need to be addressed in any future
    plans.
        Humanity will commit to the task of exploring the cosmos.
    The only real question is whether the United States will lead
    in that effort. I, for one, will do everything I can to ensure
    that we do.
        Before I yield back my time, I would like to make one final
    observation. The Administration is still finalizing their Lunar
    plans. While this hearing is helpful, and I realize NASA
    previously committed to delivering a plan to the Committee by
    now, holding the hearing without new details seems premature. I
    would respectfully recommend that we hear from NASA once the
    plan is finalized.
        Thank you.

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. Dr. Babin, I
    appreciate that.
        And the Chair now recognizes Chairwoman Johnson for her
    opening statement.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much, and good
    afternoon. I want to join the Chairwoman and Ranking Member in
    welcoming our witnesses to today's hearing, and I look forward
    to your testimony. I'll try to be brief in my remarks.
        It is now more than 6 weeks since Vice President Pence
    announced that NASA was being directed by the President to
    undertake a crash program to land astronauts on the Moon within
    the next 5 years. Over that 6-week period, the President has
    been uncharacteristically silent, making no public statements
    or tweets in support of his lunar initiative.
        NASA, for its part, has provided no specifics on either the
    plan or the required budget for the proposed accelerated Moon--
    well, this must be a sheet--I hope that when NASA delivers that
    plan and its revised budget to Congress, it will also provide a
    compelling rationale for the proposed crash program that
    justifies the additional resources that will be required to
    meet the President's arbitrary deadline. Because, as Chair of
    the Science Committee, I cannot look at NASA's proposal in
    isolation, nor can my colleagues on the Appropriations
    Committee.
        I just came from a hearing on the National Science
    Foundation's (NSF's) Fiscal Year 2020 budget, where we heard
    that the President's request would cut NSF's budget by $1
    billion. As you know, NSF is one of the Nation's premier
    research agencies, funding research across a range of important
    scientific disciplines. That billion-dollar cut will have
    serious negative impacts on major research areas if enacted.
        A week ago, we had a hearing on the NOAA (National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration) budget request, and the news
    was similar: The President's request would cut NOAA's budget by
    $1 billion. And 3 weeks before that, we heard that the
    President's request would cut the discretionary budget of the
    National Institute of Standards and Technology by more than 30
    percent or almost $300 million. Finally, the Department of
    Energy's research programs would be cut by $4.5 billion. So if
    Congress is to increase NASA's budget simply to speed up a
    lunar landing relative to what was already planned, Congress
    will have to weigh the opportunity costs of doing so.
        That said, I want to make it clear that I do not support
    the alternative of cannibalizing NASA's other important
    research activities just to speed up the human lunar
    exploration program.
        On Monday, Ranking Member Lucas and I visited NASA's
    Goddard Space Flight Center and heard about all the important
    space and Earth science research activities being undertaken
    there. We should be investing more in such inspiring and
    consequential research rather than cutting it, as is proposed
    in NASA's 2020 request.
        As I close, I want to reiterate my support for a strong,
    forward-leaning human and robotic exploration program. I
    believe that human missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as
    robotic exploration, will continue to inspire, as it did when
    Americans first walked on the Moon. But we need to get it right
    as we pursue such a program, and we need to strike the right
    balance across all of our important national research
    priorities. Thus, I expect that this Committee will need to
    have NASA appear before us again once it provides us with the
    information it has promised.
        And with that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I
    yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]

        Good afternoon. I want to join the Chairwoman in welcoming
    our witnesses to today's hearing, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        I will be brief in my remarks. It is now more than six
    weeks since Vice President Pence announced that NASA was being
    directed by the President to undertake a crash program to land
    astronauts on the Moon within the next five years. Over that
    six week period, the President has been uncharacteristically
    silent, making no public statements or tweets in support of his
    lunar initiative. NASA, for its part, has provided no specifics
    on either the plan or the required budget for the proposed
    accelerated Moon program, saying it hopes to have something for
    Congress ``soon''.
        I hope so. And I hope that when NASA delivers the plan and
    revised budget to Congress, it will also provide a compelling
    rationale for the proposed crash program that justifies the
    additional resources that will be required to meet the
    President's arbitrary deadline. Because as Chair of the Science
    Committee, I cannot look at NASA's proposal in isolation, nor
    can my colleagues on the appropriations committee.
        I just came from a hearing on the National Science
    Foundation's FY 2020 budget, where we heard that the
    President's request would cut NSF's budget by a billion
    dollars. As you know, NSF is one of the nation's premier
    research agencies, funding research across a range of important
    scientific disciplines. That billion dollar cut will have
    serious negative impacts on major research areas if enacted. A
    week ago, we had a hearing on the NOAA budget request, and the
    news was similar: the President's request would cut NOAA's
    budget by a billion dollars. And three weeks before that, we
    heard that the President's request would cut the discretionary
    budget of the National Institute of Standards and Technology by
    more than 30 percent, or almost $300 million. Finally, the
    Department of Energy's research programs would be cut by $4.5
    billion.
        So if Congress is to increase NASA's budget simply to speed
    up a lunar landing relative to what was already planned,
    Congress will have to weigh the opportunity costs of doing so.
        That said, I want to make it clear that I do not support
    the alternative of cannibalizing NASA's other important
    research activities just to speed up the human lunar
    exploration program. On Monday, Ranking Member Lucas and I
    visited NASA's Goddard Spaceflight Center and heard about all
    the important space and Earth science research activities being
    undertaken there. We should be investing more in such inspiring
    and consequential research, rather than cutting it as is
    proposed in NASA's FY 2020 request.
        As I close, I want to reiterate my support for a strong,
    forward-leaning human and robotic exploration program. I
    believe that human missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as
    robotic exploration, will continue to inspire as it did when
    Americans first walked on the Moon. But we need to get it right
    as we pursue such a program, and we need to strike the right
    balance across all our important national research priorities.
    Thus, I expect that this Committee will need to have NASA
    appear before us again once it provides us with the information
    it has promised us.
        With that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I
    yield back.

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member and fellow
    Oklahoman Mr. Lucas.
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair, and fellow Okie.
        Two days ago, I toured the Goddard Spaceflight Center with
    Chairwoman Johnson and Administrator Bridenstine and Director
    Scolese. The enthusiasm and focus of the NASA family is
    contagious.
        And, as I said at our last hearing, our Nation's space
    program is a source of pride. It exemplifies the greatest
    aspects of our country: The pursuit of knowledge, heroism,
    technical excellence, perseverance, and the intrepid spirit to
    chart a course into the unknown. Exploration is in our DNA, and
    no other nation embraces that gift more than the United States.
        NASA and this Administration are harnessing that gift and
    focusing our efforts to pioneer space. By continuing the
    investments made over the last 2 decades, we are progressing
    toward our national goal to send Americans to the Moon, Mars,
    and beyond.
        The Vice President challenged the Nation to return
    astronauts to the Moon by 2024. It's an exciting and ambitious
    goal that will ultimately establish a long-term presence on the
    Moon, allowing us to explore its resources and conduct
    pioneering scientific research. I look forward to reviewing a
    proposal to achieve that goal. NASA, the Administration,
    Congress, the private sector, and ultimately the American
    people will all have a role to play in making that happen.
        As we move forward, we would all benefit from remembering
    the lessons of previous proposals. The transition from Apollo
    to Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, the proposal to cancel the
    International Space Station program, the Space Exploration
    Initiative, the Vision for Space Exploration, the Constellation
    cancellation, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission all provide
    unique lessons.
        We should also realize that we can no longer take America's
    preeminence in space for granted. Other nations also have
    exploration plans. Urgency is now required to maintain our
    leadership.
        NASA must provide a detailed plan for this next phase of
    exploration. The Administration and OMB (Office of Management
    and Budget) must provide a realistic funding proposal, and
    Congress must approve and appropriately fund the plan. This is
    not impossible, but it will require tough decisions, and, as
    Americans, we are up to that challenge.
        And since this is our first hearing of this Subcommittee,
    Chair, I think there's a video that staff has that really kind
    of summarizes all this. I'd like to ask that the staff play a
    brief video in my remaining time.
        [Video shown.]
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Sometimes we need to
    remember where we came from and where we are to be able to go
    forward. I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

        Two days ago, I toured the Goddard Spaceflight Center with
    Chairwoman Johnson, Administrator Bridenstine, and Director
    Scolese. The enthusiasm and focus of the NASA family is
    contagious. As I said at our last hearing, our Nation's space
    program is a source of pride. It exemplifies the greatest
    aspects of our country: the pursuit of knowledge; heroism;
    technical excellence; perseverance; and the intrepid spirit to
    chart a course into the unknown. Exploration is in our DNA, and
    no other nation embraces that gift more than the United States.
        NASA, and this Administration, are harnessing that gift and
    focusing our efforts to pioneer space. By continuing the
    investments made over the last two decades, we are progressing
    towards our national goal to send Americans to the Moon, Mars,
    and beyond.
        The Vice President challenged the Nation to return
    astronauts to the Moon by 2024. It's an exciting and ambitious
    goal that will ultimately establish a long-term presence on the
    Moon, allowing us to explore its resources and conduct
    pioneering scientific research. I look forward to reviewing a
    proposal to achieve that goal. NASA, the Administration,
    Congress, the private sector, and ultimately the American
    people, all have a role to play in making that happen.
        As we move forward, we would all benefit from remembering
    the lessons of previous proposals. The transition from Apollo
    to Shuttle, Space Station Freedom, the proposal to cancel the
    International Space Station program, the Space Exploration
    Initiative, the Vision for Space Exploration, the Constellation
    Cancellation, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, all provide
    unique lessons.
        We should also realize that we can no longer take America's
    preeminence in space for granted. Other nations are also have
    exploration plans. Urgency is now required to maintain our
    leadership.
        NASA must provide a detailed plan for this next phase of
    exploration. The Administration and OMB must provide a
    realistic funding proposal. And Congress must approve and
    appropriately fund the plan. This is not impossible, but it
    will require tough decisions. As Americans, we are up to that
    challenge.
        I'd like to now ask the staff to play a brief video for my
    remaining time, which captures the vision and work ahead for
    NASA.Thank you.

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. That was
    inspirational. I think it's clear that this Committee, there's
    a lot of agreement on both sides that we are fully in support,
    but we have some unanswered questions, and so I want to again
    thank the witnesses for being here today.
        And at this time I'm going to begin with introduction and
    allow you all your opening statements.
        Our first witness today is Mr. William Gerstenmaier,
    Associate Administrator for the Human Exploration and
    Operations Mission Directorate at NASA. Mr. Gerstenmaier
    provides strategic direction for all aspects of NASA's human
    exploration of space and cross-agency space support functions
    of the space communications and space launch vehicles.
        Prior to his current position, Mr. Gerstenmaier served as
    the Manager for the International Space Station program. He
    also served as the Associate Administrator for the Space
    Operations Mission Directorate during the completion of the
    Space Station.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier holds a bachelor of science in
    aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a master of
    science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of
    Toledo. Welcome, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        OK. I apologize. I'm going to do the whole introductions
    and then I'll turn it over to you all.
        Our second witness today is Mr. Mark Sirangelo, Special
    Assistant to the NASA Administrator, who is developing plans
    for deep space exploration. In this role, he will manage the
    programs to develop the Gateway, human-rated lander, and
    surface systems needed for a lunar program. Previously, Mr.
    Sirangelo headed Sierra Nevada Corporation's Space Systems, a
    producer of satellites, space transportation vehicles,
    propulsion systems, and space subsystems.
        Mr. Sirangelo holds a bachelor of science and a master's of
    business administration and a doctorate. Welcome, Mr.
    Sirangelo. Thank you for being here today.
        Our third witness is Dr. Patricia Sanders. We're going to
    go a little bit out of order from where you are. I promise, Dr.
    Lunine, I'll get back to you. I haven't forgotten about you.
        Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair of the Aerospace Safety
    Advisory Panel and an independent aerospace consultant.
    Previously, Dr. Sanders served as Executive Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency. She has also previously held positions
    in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force
    Operational Test Center, and the U.S. Space Command.
        Dr. Sanders is a fellow of the American Institute of
    Aeronautics and Astronautics and has received the three
    Presidential Rank Awards for executive achievements.
        Dr. Sanders received her doctorate in mathematics from
    Wayne State University. Welcome, Dr. Sanders. We're glad you're
    here.
        Our fourth witness is Dr. Jonathan Lunine--see, I didn't
    forget--Director of the Cornell Center for Astrophysics and
    Planetary Science. Dr. Lunine is the David Baltimore
    Distinguished Visiting Science--Scientist at NASA's Jet
    Propulsion Laboratory. Dr. Lunine works on the Cassini mission
    and the James Webb Space Telescope and is a coinvestigator on
    the Juno mission. He is also a member of the National Academy
    of Sciences where he has been involved in numerous advisory and
    strategic planning committees, including Pathways to
    Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of
    Human Space Exploration, which he co-chaired in 2014.
        Dr. Lunine holds a bachelor's degree in physics and
    astronomy from the University of Rochester and a master's and
    doctorate degrees in planetary science from the California
    Institute of Technology. Welcome, Dr. Lunine.
        And our fifth and final witness is Mr. Walter Faulconer,
    President of Faulconer Consulting Group, which provides
    strategic planning and business management services. Mr.
    Faulconer is currently a member of the NOAA Science Advisory
    Board and Executive Secretary for the Department of Defense
    Strategic Capabilities Office Advisory Group. He previously
    held the position of Director of Business Development for Space
    Transportation at Lockheed Martin. He also served as a Director
    of Strategic Planning and Development for Space Systems
    Company.
        Mr. Faulconer holds a bachelor's from Florida Institute of
    Technology and master's degree from the University of Southern
    California. Welcome, Mr. Faulconer.
        As our witnesses should know, you each have--will each have
    5 minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony
    will also be included in the record for the hearing. When you
    have completed your spoken testimony, we'll begin with
    questions. Each Member will have 5 minutes for questions. And
    we will start today with Mr. Gerstenmaier.

                TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,

               ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION

                          AND OPERATIONS, NASA

        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you very much for allowing me to
    testify on behalf of the NASA team. I think, as you saw on the
    video, this is an amazing time in human spaceflight.
        We have more hardware in development than at any time in
    the history of NASA. There are three different capsule designs
    in work: Starliner, Dragon 2, and Orion. Multiple flight
    vehicles exist for each of these designs, and the purpose of
    the designs, either for low-Earth orbit or for deep space, are
    very different.
        There's also a new winged commercial cargo vehicle also in
    work for the International Space Station. We also have a large
    heavy lift launch vehicle in work. The first launch vehicle
    core is scheduled for completion this year for further testing
    and assembly. The second launch vehicle core is also under
    construction. Today, you can go, see, and touch the vehicles
    that will return crews to the Moon and enable research and
    technology development that will allow us to go to Mars.
        Further, we have an amazing international research facility
    in low-Earth orbit. We've had crews in space continuously since
    October 2000, almost 19 years. The International Space Station
    is allowing commercial industry to experiment with revenue
    concepts in low-Earth orbit, NASA to test the next generation
    of life support systems, NASA to understand how to keep crews
    healthy for long durations in deep space, and perform
    fundamental research in a variety of fields. All of this ISS
    research ultimately supports improving life here on Earth.
        With all this activity and work, there's a new excitement
    in the space workforce. It is very timely and fitting today
    that we have this hearing entitled, ``Keeping Our Sights on
    Mars: A Review of NASA's Deep Space Exploration Programs and
    Lunar Proposal.'' Ultimately, all of these hardware development
    efforts are tied together, and they all support building
    systems that will allow us to move human presence into the
    solar system. By taking the long view, we can keep the
    individual activities linked. We do not have time or funds to
    build unique one-of-a-kind systems. We need to build systems
    that can improve technical knowledge and can be used to support
    multiple objectives.
        The challenge of Mars with humans is large and requires all
    of us with commercial industry, universities, the public,
    international partners to work together to make this goal a
    reality. Interoperability standards being developed such as the
    international docking standard will allow all to participate in
    this goal.
        Recently, we were challenged to return to the surface of
    the Moon with humans in 2024. Having a sense of real urgency is
    critical. This can help focus our efforts and create a
    framework for timely decisions. Keeping the long view but
    creating the urgency for near-term objectives can create a
    strong framework for us to work together.
        NASA's building off the systems already in work, as
    mentioned earlier. We will select partners to develop the first
    element of Gateway, the power and propulsion element, by this
    summer. We will select partners to begin studying the lunar
    descent systems, transfer vehicles, and investigate refueling
    options. We have a synopsis out for review of the human lunar
    lander system. All--some of these systems for the Moon such as
    the ascent vehicle can be used for Mars. The transfer vehicles
    and power systems all have applications toward Mars.
        Learning to operate reusable systems at Gateway and
    navigate around the Moon are all helping us to learn how to
    keep crews safe on journeys toward Mars. The Gateway itself can
    help us to understand Mars transit vehicle requirements. The
    Moon is a great proving ground, a great place to learn for deep
    space systems that are necessary for Mars.
        We are taking the next generation of space engineers, and
    we are training them for the future. The risk and challenges
    are huge, but so are the gains. The challenges that we face all
    help to improve life here on Earth. The recycling systems on
    ISS needed for deep space travel have applications here on
    Earth. We must never think that tests or operations are easy or
    routine. We will stay vigilant with a sense of urgency. We will
    look forward to continuing to work with this Committee to
    achieve amazing things in space.
        This Committee has been tremendously supportive in the past
    and often asks for concrete plans for human exploration. We are
    ready to finalize those plans and work together with a sense of
    urgency. Working together, we can accomplish amazing things.
        I look forward to your questions and to the dialog.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr.
    Sirangelo follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Sirangelo.

                    TESTIMONY OF MR. MARK SIRANGELO,

              SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA

        Mr. Sirangelo. Good afternoon. Thank you for having me.
        It's really an amazing time to be able to come here and
    talk about America's deep space program. It's been 50 years
    since we first went to the Moon and 47 years since we've been
    back. I believe it's time we take another step. That step will
    be the first on a renewal that we will have not only to the
    Moon but to Mars and beyond, and from NASA's perspective the
    next step will be taken by the first American woman on the
    Moon.
        We will return to the Moon this time not just to visit but
    to stay. After building on our success in low-Earth orbit,
    we'll be combining the expertise of NASA, along with our
    commercial partners, our universities, our laboratories, and
    our international partners to develop the exploration
    capabilities we'll need and the architecture that will get us
    back to the lunar surface as safely and as quickly as possible.
        But there's more to that. We will create new jobs. We will
    create new economic opportunities. We will motivate generations
    of young people. The science and technology we'll develop along
    the way will improve our life on Earth.
        Even though our eyes are on 2024, we're not beginning
    there. This year, coming up in the next few months, we will
    start with a small series of commercial robotic missions--
    precursor missions, we call them--to the Moon. We will use
    these landers and robots and technology to conduct science
    across the lunar surface.
        Throughout my long history in the space industry, I've been
    fortunate to lead teams that have participated in hundreds of
    space missions, including missions to multiple planets,
    asteroid, the sun, and of course the Moon. Whenever I get asked
    questions, most of the time I get asked about the shiny
    spaceships or the rockets or the technology, and that's a
    wonderful thing to do, and as a technologist, as a builder,
    it's a--it is wonderful to talk about those.
        But today, I'm here is a futurist and now as a proud new
    member of the NASA team and as an American. I want to put the
    technologies aside and talk a little bit about the why. Why go
    back to the Moon? Why now? Why this expedited effort? Why
    America? Just as Apollo inspired previous generations, NASA
    today is uniquely positioned to continue that inspiration to
    inspire the future generations, we already work with over 60
    universities and have created thousands of internships which
    have turned--sparked thousands of dreams, but we're not
    satisfied. There's more that we can do.
        By bringing the capabilities of our country together to
    return to the Moon and on to Mars we'll demonstrate to the
    young people of this country and around the world the power of
    dreaming big. We hope to create an unparalleled example that
    humankind can do when it comes together to do an uncommon task
    for the common good.
        These next generations may or may not take the power of
    this lesson to space or to the space industry, but they will
    take them somewhere. In my view, the biggest legacy of the
    Apollo program was not the rocks that we brought back but it
    was the people that we inspired, generations of those people,
    some sitting in this room today that went on to make America a
    better place.
        The Moon is a treasure chest of science. The lunar samples
    returned by the Apollo program dramatically changed our view,
    but it's just the beginning. We believe the South Pole, which
    is our first destination, holds millions of tons of water ice.
    That ice represents power, it represents fuel, it represents
    scientific discoveries. As we go further into space, it's going
    to become even more necessary for us to learn how to live in
    space without the connection to Earth. We need to learn to do
    this, and the Moon is a good place to make it happen.
        As was said earlier today, the exploration is in our DNA.
    The ability for humans to want to go to places we haven't been
    has been around as long as humans have been around not only
    through the oceans, underneath the oceans, across the lands,
    but now into vast regions of space. It's really part of our
    psychological makeup. But more importantly, it fuels our soul.
    You don't have to go any further than just see the faces of the
    young kids who come to visit NASA or to know that the Air and
    Space Museum is the most visited museum in the world.
        We believe the Moon is a test bed, a test bed for learning
    and a test bed for Mars that provides opportunities to
    demonstrate new technologies that are necessary for those
    missions. But along this path we're also going to be creating a
    new revolution, an economic revolution. Generations past had
    the Industrial Revolution, the computing revolution, the
    internet revolution, all of which helped make the U.S. a leader
    in the world. The next revolution in our view is going to be
    happening in space.
        Finally, as we approach this Memorial Day, I'd like to take
    a moment to reflect on all those who have given their lives for
    us, and today, everywhere in the world, they're standing watch
    for us. If you ask those people who are doing that why they're
    doing it, most of them will say to protect their families, to
    protect their homes, to protect their country, and I think one
    more thing they'd say is to protect the American way of life.
    As part of that, I believe that American way of life not only
    has all the things that we live for and exist every day, but
    it's also an important part to understand that it gives us the
    chance to dream, to dream big, and to chase those dreams. I
    know I had this chance, and it brought me to this hearing and
    gave me a chance to touch the stars, and we want to make that
    happen for a lot of other young people in the world.
        Even now, 50 years later, people around the world would
    point to the Apollo landings as one of the most important
    things that we've ever done, and we think it is, but we think
    the way to honor those people who have been part of that Apollo
    program is to not only look at those grainy videos and pictures
    but to create new high-definition views of the future. Thank
    you very much.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Sirangelo.
        Dr. Sanders.

                   TESTIMONY OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS,

                 CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

        Dr. Sanders. Chairman Horn and Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to discuss NASA's deep space
    exploration program.
        A principal role of my panel is advising NASA and the
    Congress on the safety and risk of human spaceflight. I
    emphasize that our responsibility is to provide advice driving
    down risk to the lowest level consistent with accomplishing the
    mission. Space exploration is inherently dangerous. The
    environment is hostile; the systems needed to survive in it are
    complex. The aim is not to avoid risk at all costs but manage
    the risk intelligently.
        Over the--our advice over the years has had consistent
    themes. One, as Representative Babin has quoted, is the
    importance of setting challenging but achievable schedules and
    not allowing undue schedule pressure lead to decisions
    adversely impacting safety and mission assurance. A second is
    addressing the question of how safe is safe enough within the
    context of the overall risk-benefit equation. The third is the
    importance of constancy of purpose, and fourth, holding to the
    fundamentals of risk management or recognizing that no single
    approach dictates the success of such an approach. I'll speak
    briefly to each of them in the context of the current programs.
        The Administration's policy of the--is to return astronauts
    to the Moon within the next 5 years, adding urgency to a
    complex and ambitious endeavor. Our panel continues to caution
    that targeted launch dates, while useful to impart a sense of
    urgency, should be used judiciously. Unrealistic schedules can
    result in poor decisions at least from a safety perspective if
    they lead to unwise shortcuts or elimination of critical
    testing.
        For example, we know that NASA is exploring options for
    launching Exploration Mission (EM) 1 as early as possible. This
    could have positive results, perhaps achieve greater decision
    velocity, restructured and more efficient work flow, a more
    streamlined approach. But we should not forget that the
    ultimate purpose of that flight is to mitigate risk and
    understand operational margins prior to the first crewed
    flight. Critical data is required to ensure as much as possible
    a safe EM-2 mission, including a successful green run, an
    effective heatshield, effective operation of parachute systems,
    abort mechanisms, and environmental control and life-support
    systems, among other things.
        In addressing safety in human space exploration, balancing
    the risk with value is important. It's paramount. As
    Congresswoman Horn had said, NASA's role in advancing space
    exploration pushes the envelope with great uncertainties and
    inherent risks, but safe as a term in this context does not
    have the same connotation as in a typical day-to-day life. With
    no excuse for negligence, it is impossible to control,
    eliminate, or mitigate every risk. So determining an acceptable
    level of risk balances many factors to decide if the chance of
    a mishap is outweighed by the likely mission benefit. Return to
    the Moon should not be an end in and of itself but considered
    in a risk-value framework.
        We should ask, as she has, is the objective--what is the
    objective of the mission? Is it part of a cohesive long-term
    strategy? Will it buy down risk for future exploration? Will it
    provide infrastructure-enabling next steps? Does it further the
    national goal of commercial space self-sufficiency? Does it
    support national leadership and foster international
    cooperation? Great exploration has involved major risk whether
    it was Magellan or Lewis and Clark, but it has been undertaken
    with an expectation of great benefits.
        Hand-in-hand with the risk-value proposition is constancy
    of purpose, national steadfastness, and pursuing stated goals
    that do not waiver over time and a willingness to support those
    goals with the necessary resources. Fluctuating policy,
    ambiguous objectives, budget inadequacies, and uncertainties
    add complexity and inefficiency to program management. They
    detract from meeting technical goals, and they dilute focus on
    safety and mission assurance.
        Last, as NASA embarks on the next phase of space
    exploration, I encourage them, in partnership with the
    Congress, to sustain the foundational standards of risk
    management while embracing new approaches. To that end, we can
    learn from and expand on the positive aspects of the experience
    with the Commercial Crew Program. We evolved there over time,
    and the establishment of mutual trust and transparency, the use
    of ``badgeless'' teams, early engagement, and appropriate
    engagement of the government, appropriate contract flexibility,
    and timely decisionmaking. These bring the potential to not
    only lower cost and shorten development time but also to reduce
    risk.
        In closing, I note that NASA and the Nation have made great
    progress in the last few years, but a lot of work remains
    ahead. It is a time for excitement, optimism, and reasoned
    caution.
        Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Dr. Sanders.
        Dr. Lunine.

                    TESTIMONY OF DR. JONATHAN LUNINE,

                DIRECTOR, CORNELL CENTER FOR ASTROPHYSICS

                         AND PLANETARY SCIENCE;

                CO-CHAIR OF THE FORMER COMMITTEE ON HUMAN

              SPACEFLIGHT, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,

                       ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE

        Dr. Lunine. Chairwoman Horn, Ranking Member Babin, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to discuss NASA's deep space human
    exploration program, including proposed lunar activities.
        In June 2014, the National Academies of Science,
    Engineering, and Medicine released a report entitled,
    ``Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for U.S.
    Program of Human Space Exploration.'' I co-chaired that
    committee together with Mitch Daniels, President of Purdue
    University. The Pathways report was a response to a charge from
    Congress in the 2010 Authorization Bill to review NASA human
    spaceflight and to determine the value and benefits of the
    program if possible.
        The key findings of our report were the following: First,
    Mars is the horizon goal for human spaceflight for a number of
    reasons, but it is also decades away due to the enormous
    distance and the need for substantial technology development.
        Second, a program to send humans to Mars ought to be based
    on a pathways approach, the pathways being different options by
    which to get there through intermediate steppingstones that
    provide short-term successes and technologies that can
    feedforward to an eventual Mars mission. The Moon represents--
    and particularly the surface of the Moon, represents one
    intermediate destination, and although it was not in our
    purview to choose, we found that it had the highest feedforward
    to humans on Mars.
        Third, crucial to such a long-range endeavor are
    international partnerships in which the space agencies of other
    nations play significant and meaningful roles.
        And fourth, key technologies that must be developed for
    humans on Mars are entry, descent, and landing on Mars;
    advanced in-space propulsion and power; and radiation safety,
    among others.
        So why the Moon? The Moon offers a number of opportunities
    and advantages over the direct-to-Mars approach. First, the
    Moon is less than 5 days away, greatly simplifying logistics in
    response to emergency situations.
        Second, the Moon provides a superb opportunity to do
    important planetary science, particularly regarding planet
    formation and evolution in the earliest history of the Earth.
        Third, the Moon allows a more permanent rather than a
    sortie concept of operations over time as surface systems are
    developed, including continued development of environmental
    control systems that are more nearly closed and require less
    provisioning from Earth than does the International Space
    Station.
        So what lessons then should the human spaceflight program
    and its return to the Moon take from the Pathways report? Well,
    first and foremost, we must be in it for the long haul. An
    Apollo-style sprint to the Moon in and of itself is not a
    steppingstone to more distant goals in deep space exploration.
        And second, the agency has to balance schedule against
    budget. Schedule-driven programs will cost considerably more
    per year than budget-driven programs, and the 2024 goal of
    putting humans on the Moon should not be undertaken without
    resources adequate to that goal but also without cannibalizing
    other important programs that NASA is conducting, including its
    remarkable space science program, which has made groundbreaking
    discoveries from the cosmos to the planets to the Earth.
        Third, engage international and commercial partners in the
    program as they are crucial to a successful program of sending
    humans to the Moon and Mars, but the U.S. civil space program,
    NASA, must lead the effort.
        And finally, recognize that if the Nation wishes to
    undertake a program of deep space exploration, it must always
    bear in mind and never forget that the Moon is a steppingstone.
    It's a steppingstone to Mars.
        In remarks last month to the University Space Research
    Association, Scott Pace from the National Space Council talked
    about sustainability of exploration. One of the points he made
    was the programmatic sustainability in human exploration
    requires sustained political support, and, in turn, sustained
    political support requires a good cadence of successes.
    Taxpayers can see a return on their investment in a short
    enough time for the relationship between investment and payoff
    to be clear. And it is precisely that approach which our
    Pathways report endorsed and detailed in order to assure that
    Americans will return in a timely manner to the Moon and one
    day walk on the red soil of Mars.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lunine follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Dr. Lunine.
        Mr. Faulconer.

                    TESTIMONY OF MR. WALT FAULCONER,

               PRESIDENT, FAULCONER CONSULTING GROUP, LLC

        Mr. Faulconer. Chairwoman Horn, Ranking Member Babin, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to
    discuss and support NASA's deep space exploration program,
    first returning United States to the surface of the Moon by
    2024 and onto Mars in the 2030s.
        This year, while we're celebrating the 50th anniversary of
    the Apollo 11 Moon landing, China, India, and Israel are
    sending their craft to the Moon. Where is the United States?
        We are currently facing a formidable challenge from China
    to surpass our leadership. I for one actually welcome this
    challenge because it helps us to focus and galvanize to
    maintain our leadership in space. Leveraging over 60 years that
    has brought us the Space Shuttle, the International Space
    Station, and now new craft like SLS and Orion, CST-100, New
    Shepard, Dream Chaser, Cygnus, Dragon, we have an armada of
    capabilities to build upon to return to the Moon and head onto
    Mars.
        I applaud the goal of returning to the surface of the Moon
    by 2024 because it provides needed urgency and focus. It is
    also very achievable. It took us 7 years from President
    Kennedy's speech in September 1962 starting with very little to
    get to the Moon by July 1969 with Apollo 11. In fact, when
    President Kennedy gave us the challenge to go to the Moon, only
    three Americans had ever flown in space, Shepard, Grissom, and
    Glenn. That was it.
        And this time it will be different. When we go back to the
    Moon, because besides investing in all these different
    spacecraft over the last 10 years, we'll be going with
    international partners and a very robust commercial industry.
        The second core requirement is to go back to the Moon in a
    sustainable way. We are going back to stay. That means we have
    to address what are we going to do on the Moon after we get
    back in 2024? As I addressed in the paper I provided you, there
    are key questions we'll be able to answer on the Moon in our
    endeavor to explore, including science questions. We have
    discovered many new questions in science pursuits since the
    Apollo program that include things called lunar swirls,
    skylights, and the applied science providing ground truth to
    the resources and minerals that we have seen from orbit.
        Exploration questions: Do humans have a future in space?
    Can we live off the land? What adjustments do our plans to Mars
    do we have to make along the way?
        Business questions: Is there a sustainable commercial
    business case on or around the Moon?
        National interest questions: How do we ensure American
    leadership in space?
        The third core requirement is keeping our sights on Mars.
    The National Academy Pathways study that Dr. Lunine represents
    had a key recommendation to maintain long-term focus on Mars as
    the horizon goal for human space exploration. It is correct,
    but let's face it, we're not ready to go to Mars today because
    the risk is too high.
        One of the studies going on at JPL (Jet Propulsion
    Laboratory), for example, is quantifying the risk and
    determining how much of the risk can be retired by going to the
    surface of the Moon or identifying what risks are not being
    retired by anything we're currently planning. That will be
    important to help us create an extensible exploration
    architecture starting with the end goal in mind. When we go
    back to the Moon, we need to learn how to live off the land,
    live for longer durations on the surface, and deal with the
    hazards that the astronauts will be facing on Mars.
        We can achieve all of these goals, but our largest
    challenge is not the technology, engineering, or ingenuity.
    Rather, it's overcoming the institutional momentum that slows
    down the process, keeps the status quo, and protects rice
    bowls, stifling innovation. We need to organize and streamline
    for success.
        When Dr. George Mueller came to NASA from Bell Labs to lead
    us to getting to the Moon in 1963, he recognized that NASA,
    even in its infancy, needed to be reorganized and refocused
    from top to bottom. He bravely and fearlessly took on the
    establishment and streamlined program efficiencies borrowing
    from the successes of the Air Force Minuteman program while
    strengthening independent systems engineering by bringing on
    Bellcomm to provide the needed enterprise-level systems
    engineering and integration. All of this can be accomplished
    with courageous leadership.
        I really look forward to very soon seeing Americans walking
    on the surface of the Moon and soon after walking on Mars. As
    President Kennedy stated, the goal will serve to organize and
    measure the best of our energies and skills, a challenge we are
    willing to accept and one we are unwilling to postpone.
        Thank you very much for the invitation to appear in front
    of you today, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Faulconer follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Faulconer, and
    thank you to all the witnesses for your opening statements. I
    know we have a lot to discuss today, and I'll start with
    questions and then we'll go from there.
        So the Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes for the first
    round of questions if I can find my questions, that is. Here
    they are.
        So, Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, thank you for being
    here. I think was a great reminder that the Full Committee
    Ranking Member played that video. There's a lot of really
    important and inspirational things that NASA has brought to us
    that each of you has touched on.
        So I have a series of questions because we've got to get
    this right for so many reasons that many of you have mentioned.
        The NASA Administrator committed to providing the Committee
    with an amended budget request very close to April 15, so it's
    now May 8, and my question is what is the reason for the delay,
    and can you commit to providing this Committee with a lunar
    plan and budget amendment on what date?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I guess I can start. I think, first of
    all, we recognize that this is a really serious challenge we
    have to lay in front of us, and we need a really solid plan.
    And it was discussed by many of the testimonies here. We need
    to make sure it's all integrated and all put together in a way
    that really makes sense.
        So we've been taking the time. We brought Mark on board.
    He's been working with us. We've been working to develop
    detailed plans building off of what we've already done, so
    we're taking a lot of the equipment that we've already been
    doing, the teams we've had in place, and we're figuring out how
    to use those in a new, creative way moving forward. So we're
    busy establishing those plans.
        We also have to go through the Administration, get budget
    approval, make sure we understand where we are, even look at
    the out years because if we work just near-term and we think
    about just the next year and we don't have those future plans
    all the way through 2024, answer some of your questions about
    how the ``why'' fits in, and then how this feeds to Mars, we
    need to put all that together. So we're taking the time to get
    that right.
        We're probably several weeks away, maybe 1 week to 2 weeks
    away from being able to give you a plan and show you what we
    have moving forward with specifics. But we can--at a high level
    we can describe to you today some of the things that we're
    doing and moving forward and how we build off of the existing
    programs.
        Chairwoman Horn. Mr. Sirangelo, do you have anything to add
    to that?
        Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you for the question. It's a serious
    question, and we take it that way. This isn't just about moving
    a date forward. It's about trying to figure out how to do
    something different and better at the same time. The process
    that we've gone through is to make sure that the architecture
    that we need to design makes sense.
        One of the--I think the highest things we have to do for
    this Committee and for Congress is to come back with answers
    that we can really believe in that we can speak to, and those
    are in the works. We have gone through the architectural
    design, we've gone through the understanding of what it's going
    to take to make that happen, but it's also more than that. How
    does NASA change? How does NASA organize? How do we incorporate
    the commercial and other parts of our industry to enable this?
        I think, as Bill said, we are well on that way to doing it.
    We also have an obligation to make sure that we work together
    with the budgeting process. So from our perspective at NASA
    we're very close to doing that, and we understand that the
    delay is frustrating, but this is a big challenge and we want
    to get it right.
        Chairwoman Horn. So thank you very much. It is a big
    challenge, and we absolutely have to get it right, which is why
    we need detailed plans and proposals. We'll look for that in a
    couple of weeks. And I think, as Ranking Member Babin and
    Chairwoman Johnson mentioned, there will likely be follow up
    within this Committee on that issue.
        So following up on those questions about these plans
    because sustainability and long-term planning is critical for
    something that is this challenging and this important, who in
    the Administration will have final approval and signoff on the
    plan? And who in the Administration will have final signoff and
    approval on the budget amendment?
        Mr. Sirangelo. From the NASA perspective, the NASA
    Administrator is responsible for the plan and for the
    delivering of the plan. We are supporting that. The budget is
    then provided as an estimate to OMB, and OMB would then provide
    the budget when it's thoroughly completed it.
        Chairwoman Horn. OK. Thank you. So what--and following up
    further, what acquisition approach--when you're looking at
    this, what acquisition approach is NASA planning to use to
    procure the elements needed for the 2024 lander? Are you
    looking at firm-fixed price, cost-plus? What is the approach
    that you're looking at right now?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think we're looking kind of at a
    mixture of approaches depending upon the hardware and systems
    that we put together. We've been using broad agency
    announcement called BAAs that have been pretty effective.
    They're typically a contracting instrument that has a fixed-
    price provision in them. I think there's also a role for some
    cases to have some cost-plus activities, but I think you'll see
    a mixture of acquisition approaches moving forward depending
    upon the risk level, the speed, and the maturity of the
    industry.
        As you see, we talked--Mark talked a little bit about the
    commercial lander services program that the Science Mission
    Directorate is doing. That's a small lander system that--when
    we land small payloads on the Moon. We'll get a chance to see
    how that works in the Science Mission Directorate where they
    can take significantly more risk than we can. And depending on
    how well that works, we can get a chance to judge how ready
    industry is to go take on the challenges of human-class
    landers. So we'll use these acquisitions to inform other
    acquisitions moving forward, but it's a variety of acquisition
    instruments.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you. And will the acquisition
    approach be included as a part of the plan when you submit it?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, at a top level, and we're actually
    implementing some of that acquisition approach today as we sit
    here.
        Chairwoman Horn. OK. I know I am a little bit over time.
    I'm just going to--have a couple more and then we'll turn it
    over to Ranking Member Babin.
        Will--so will NASA--my next question is about authorities
    because there have been a few things. Will NASA be seeking any
    statutory authorities to achieve this 2024 Moon landing level
    in the overall program, and if so, when do you plan to provide
    those to the Committee?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. They would be provided when we provide
    the overall plan to you.
        Chairwoman Horn. OK. I mention this because I want to note
    that the reason that I question this is that the approach of
    using a reprogramming request rather than going through the
    authorizing committee to propose major reorganizational
    changes, especially since NASA still--we don't have the plan
    yet, and it hasn't been provided to the Committee with any
    specific plan changes or budget amendment to evaluate it, and
    the request to the Appropriations Committee takes that
    approach.
        Following up, do you have any--do you have a lunar--and I
    think this is--we've seen--you know where I'm going--questions
    about this. Do you have a lunar surface spacesuit that will be
    ready for the 2024 mission right now? If so, which suit is it?
    And if not, when do you anticipate that being available?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. We don't have a suit that's appropriate
    for the activity for the Moon today. We have portions of the
    suit that are sufficient but not the entire suit. Again, we're
    going to understand the test that we want to do on the first
    mission in 2024 and then, based on that, we're going to
    probably develop a suit to move forward in that direction.
        In the past, we started suit activities before. We did it
    in the Constellation program. That suit cost for that program
    became very prohibitive. We need to look at a way that we
    understand the requirements and we incrementally move forward
    and build off of what we've got, so we need to do some work,
    and that'll be discussed again. And there's a plan is--will--
    there will be a discussion of the plan for suit acquisition as
    part of the overall lunar plans moving forward.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. I know we'll have
    many more questions for the rest of you. For now, I'm going to
    wrap that up.
        And I recognize Ranking Member Babin.
        Mr. Babin. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much.
        I guess, first, I want to recognize two interns from Texas
    A&M University we have out there in the crowd. Josh Mendez back
    there and Rachel Gill in the back as well, thank you for being
    here.
        In 2011, this Committee held a hearing entitled, ``NASA
    Human Spaceflight Past, Present, and Future: Where Do We Go
    from Here?'' Former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin testified,
    and I'd like to quote from several passages from his testimony
    and seek very brief yes or no answers from our witnesses. And
    if you would like to elaborate more, please wait until the end.
        So to start, this is, quote, ``What does a real space
    program look like and not look like? A real space program sets
    and meets stable national strategic goals for the leadership on
    the space frontier by developing, evolving, and preserving
    national capabilities to operate on that frontier. It does not
    allow that capability to be held hostage to the goodwill of
    other powers or to the vagaries of a nascent and fragile
    marketplace.'' All very briefly, I would like to go down the
    line, start with you, Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you agree with this
    sentiment, yes or no?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
        Mr. Sirangelo. I do.
        Dr. Lunine. Partially, I agree.
        Dr. Sanders. Yes.
        Mr. Faulconer. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. Thank you very much.
        All right, second, ``A real space program may'', I'm still
    quoting, ``and, indeed, should offer a stable market to be
    addressed by commercial providers, but it cannot be dependent
    upon such providers for strategic capabilities. A real space
    program recognizes that this Nation has interests that rise
    above the fortunes of individual private contractors, and it
    protects those interests. The proper role of government is to
    reward winners, not to pick them, nor to step in as an investor
    in enterprises which cannot pass the test that the capital
    markets impose.''
        Mr. Gerstenmaier, yes or no, do you agree with that?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. Mr. Sirangelo?
        Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, I do.
        Mr. Babin. Yes, sir. Dr. Lunine.
        Dr. Lunine. I agree with that statement.
        Mr. Babin. OK.
        Dr. Sanders. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. Yes.
        Mr. Faulconer. Yes, I agree.
        Mr. Babin. All right, thank you.
        Going on, a real space program is grounded in physics, not
    politics, and stepping outward beyond low-Earth orbit and the
    ISS a human return to the Moon is the next logical goal from a
    host of scientific, engineering, operational, and even
    commercial perspectives. From there, and with the experience
    thus gained, we should proceed onward to Mars, and should do so
    in a timely way, else Mars will always be the destination in
    the future.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
        Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, I do.
        Dr. Lunine. Absolutely.
        Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
        Dr. Sanders. Yes, with a caveat.
        Mr. Babin. OK. Well, if I have time at the end, we'll hear
    about that.
        Mr. Faulconer. I agree.
        Mr. Babin. All right, thank you.
        And then finally, these truths were recognized in the NASA
    Authorization Act of 2005, and again in 2008, both of which
    were originated by this Committee. The course for this Nation's
    future in space that was laid out in those Acts does not need
    to be changed, it needs to be followed. We must stay that
    course. If we do so, the right rocket designs will emerge. If
    we cannot, the rocket design doesn't matter.
        Concerning the larger perspective of this hearing, I can
    thus offer no better counsel to this Committee than the
    guidance which it has previously issued.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you agree?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. Mr. Sirangelo?
        Mr. Sirangelo. I do.
        Mr. Babin. Dr. Lunine?
        Dr. Lunine. I do.
        Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
        Dr. Sanders. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. Dr. Faulconer?
        Mr. Faulconer. Yes.
        Mr. Babin. OK. Now, we still have about an--1 minute and 6
    seconds left, would any of you like to elaborate further on
    these? Dr. Lunine?
        Dr. Lunine. So first, I'd like to know if I passed the pop
    quiz or not, being a professor. Second, my one caveat with the
    first question was that it is crucial that we engage other
    agencies of other countries in any program going to Mars. The
    cost of the undertaking is going to be such, and the magnitude
    is going to be such that not engaging with international
    partners, I think, would be a mistake. Certainly, we should be
    leading, and we need to lead from the front, not from behind,
    but I just want to make clear that international participation
    in sending humans onto Mars is crucial.
        Mr. Babin. Do you think that those international partners
    should be on that critical path as well?
        Dr. Lunine. I think that the answer for Mars at least, not
    necessarily for the Moon, but for Mars the answer is yes, in my
    view.
        Mr. Babin. Dr. Sanders?
        Dr. Sanders. The statement said that the space program
    should be physics-based and not politics-based, and I agree
    that the solutions, the technical means, are physics- and
    engineering-based, but sometimes the reason why a program is
    important is--has to do with national goals beyond the
    technical goals.
        Mr. Babin. I would agree. I would agree. Thank you very
    much.
        And I think my time has expired, so I want to thank you
    all, witnesses. And I yield back, Madam Chair.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Babin.
        The Chair now recognizes Full Committee Chairwoman Johnson
    for 5 minutes.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much.
        I'm just filled with questions, and I know there's not time
    to answer all of them, but I am very impressed with all of the
    research that's going on now with NASA, and I'm very concerned
    that much of it might be interrupted to afford the new
    direction. And I need your opinions on that. Could you start,
    and just go down the line?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Sure. I think do we need the--we need to
    invest in new research and new technology to achieve the kind
    of goals for Mars. So we need to balance the near-term urgency
    with the need to do the investment into long-term research and
    science and technology development.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Does that include discontinuing or
    slowing down substantially the type of research that's going on
    now at NASA in Maryland?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. We should not slow down the research
    that's--that fits our objectives moving forward. It needs to
    continue in parallel. And we can use some of that research
    directly in what we're doing. I think Space Station is a great
    example. The OCO-3 experiment, the carbon experiment, is going
    to station. It'll be installed Thursday night. That was a spare
    instrument that was available on the ground that was able to go
    fly from Goddard up to Space Station, and it essentially takes
    advantage of Space Station. So the human spacecraft has
    essentially provided a home for this instrument that's going to
    give us a new look at carbon generation that we would not be
    able to see without the tie between human and research.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Um-hum.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. So I think there's not a--necessarily an
    incompatibility between the two objectives.
        Chairwoman Johnson. What is the future of the Orion, of the
    SLS?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. They look strong. We've got a lot of work
    in place. As I described in my opening remarks, there's a lot
    of hardware in place, a lot of hard folks working on that
    hardware. We're in the middle of very heavy integration down at
    the Kennedy Space Center with Orion. We're in the final
    construction of the core stage at Michoud Assembly Facility in
    New Orleans--outside New Orleans. It's a very busy time for us;
    turning kind of dreams, aspirations into real hardware that
    will take us to the Moon and on to Mars.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you.
        Mr. Sirangelo. I agree with Bill's comments, but I want to
    take it one step further because I think your question is
    really an important one.
        As a technologist, one thing to do is to develop the
    technology. The second part of it is to actually put it into
    service, to make it work. And I think one of the aspects of
    this program, by accelerating what we actually are doing, is
    enhancing the science. We're not just doing the technology,
    doing the science in theory, or in prototype, but we're
    bringing it to a place where we can actually use it, make it
    better, and bring it back and improve it for the next
    generation. And that's a really key and critical part of what
    we're trying to accomplish.
        I think the other thing which is really important on this
    plan is that by going and getting ourselves in service by 2024,
    what we actually are doing is then starting operations in 2024
    going forward, many years sooner than what we would have done.
    And it's in that operational phase, it is in that ability to
    continue to move forward that we really see the strides that
    are necessary.
        If you go back and look at any part of our history in
    aviation, the difference between the airplane when we entered
    World War II and when we came out of World War II was
    incredible. The difference in the airplane when we entered
    World War I and we came out of World War I is incredible. And I
    think what we're seeing here is this opportunity over the next
    5 years to enhance that science, to bring it to the next level,
    and to put it out in the field where it can do some good, is
    really the difference-maker because that's what creates the
    jobs for the future, that's what takes that technology and
    makes it useful for the American people.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you.
        Dr. Lunine. Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson. It's a pleasure
    to be testifying in front of you again.
        With respect to research having to do with space science,
    as you mentioned Maryland, there are places that robots can go
    that humans cannot. Our committee was serious about Mars being
    the horizon destination for a number of reasons. NASA's
    spacecrafts have gone out through the whole solar system, have
    looked at the universe, virtually to the end of the universe,
    and those kinds of discoveries must continue as we continue to
    develop this human spaceflight capability. Having said that,
    there are things that robots and humans can do together on the
    Moon and Mars that will open up a whole new dimension of
    science and exploration if we can implement that kind of dual
    approach.
        Dr. Sanders. NASA's portfolio is a lot bigger than just
    human space exploration and deep space exploration. There's a
    lot of Earth science work that's very important to a lot of our
    Nation. There's very deep space probing sensors that we'll see
    with the James Webb Space Telescope when it get--and the first
    A in NASA aeronautics, what they're doing with low-boom
    technology and other things, that shouldn't go away just in
    order to make this one happen.
        Mr. Faulconer. So coming from the Johns Hopkins Applied
    Physics Laboratory in Maryland, I am very much concerned about
    the science portfolio as well. But I think it's healthy, and if
    you look at the portfolio, there's a great raft of missions
    being planned. And I agree with Mark that I believe that this
    initiative will actually help us accelerate not only the
    science missions, but also the technology that will then
    benefit the science missions.
        Chairwoman Johnson. Thank you very much. My time has
    expired.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Chairwoman.
        The Chair now recognizes Full Committee Ranking Member
    Lucas for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair.
        Mr. Faulconer, the Vice President has challenged NASA to
    return to the Moon by 2024. Your testimony indicates this is
    the appropriate course for NASA to pursue. Based on your
    experience with other programs, let's talk for just a moment
    about the greatest challenges to achieving the goal, and how we
    can mitigate those challenges.
        Mr. Faulconer. Well, as I mentioned, the institutional
    momentum was one issue, but another one I agree with Dr.
    Sanders about is the consistency of purpose. You know, quite
    honestly, a lot of us in this industry suffer from professional
    whiplash because every few years we change what direction we're
    going, and where we're going, and how fast we're going. We need
    that consistency of purpose so that we can stay focused. And so
    I--that's one reason why I welcome it's logical to go back to
    the Moon and get on to going to Mars.
        Mr. Lucas. Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, speaking of
    that, President George H. W. Bush's Space Exploration
    Initiative was challenged by a $400 billion price tag, which
    Congress at the time rejected. President George W. Bush's
    vision for space exploration was challenged by a lack of
    support from OMB, which failed to request sufficient funds to
    support the plan. We've made considerable progress since those
    two proposals. NASA's exploration budget now eclipses $10
    billion per year, and we're invested in the Space Launch
    System, the Orion Capsule, and the supporting ground
    infrastructure. We've already made investments in next-
    generation systems that are necessary for lunar exploration and
    a steppingstone to the Moon. What's NASA doing to implement
    lessons from those previous initiatives, and specifically, what
    is NASA doing to ensure that any plan it submits to Congress
    for review is sufficient, that being a very key phrase,
    sufficient to achieve the goal, but also focusing only on the
    necessary investments?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think as we take a look at the
    lunar objective for 2024, again, as I described kind of in my
    opening testimony, we're taking the hardware we've already
    built that's already in pieces, and we've figured out how to
    implement that hardware to go to achieve the lunar goal. And
    the discussion about the spacesuits, again, we've got to be
    careful we don't put more than we absolutely need for the
    suits, for the missions to begin with, but they're evolvable
    and they're sustainable moving forward.
        So I think we need to take this in steps, the way it's been
    described where we put pieces in place, that we can build and
    build the next piece moving forward.
        The ascent vehicle that we'll look at for the lunar
    activity, that ascent vehicle has direct applications to the
    Mars ascent vehicle on Mars. So if we look at where our
    hardware fits and how it moves forward, we don't have dead
    ends, we don't build hardware that's unique to one application
    and move forward. And we need to be very cautious about how we
    build our contracts, how we acquire our hardware, to make sure
    we get good value for ourselves, and to continue to do the
    right--or don't drive the budget to the levels that are not
    sustainable.
        Mr. Sirangelo. Sir, I think one of the things that is
    really different this time is that we are--when you're
    investing in technology as the way we have done as a government
    and as a country, it's an accumulative process. We are a lot
    smarter not only because we've learned the lessons of the past,
    but because we now are--exist in an industry that has
    significantly more space flight activity, more significant,
    more technology on orbit, and we have just understood the
    environments that we're working in to a greatly different
    level.
        I know in your district you have farmers who are working
    many generations, and in doing that you learn from generation
    to generation, and I think we have done the same thing in our
    area. We are also backed now by commercial industry throughout
    the United States, which has invested heavily on its own. So it
    isn't just government that's making that investment; we're
    making that investment throughout our entire economy.
        Mr. Lucas. So understand when I make this next comment, in
    many ways as my town meeting constituents speak through me to
    the body, I speak through you to those who make decisions. Your
    folks are the can-do people; but OMB, the Administration at the
    top levels, there are so many elements there. So when I make
    this following comment, bear that in mind. The previous
    Administration submitted budget requests that required on what
    I would describe as creative bookkeeping; switching NASA
    funding from discretionary to mandatory spending, tying it to
    increases in gasoline taxes. Those proposals were rejected by
    Congress. I hope that the proposals we'll receive are not
    funded in a similar fashion to the things done in the previous
    Administration, because that will cut the legs out from under
    us. If we don't accomplish this this time, I don't know when
    we'll have a fourth opportunity in certainly my lifetime.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Lucas.
        The Chair now recognizes Congressman Bera for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chair Horn, and Ranking Member Babin.
        You know, I got my colleague from Colorado riled up when I
    was mentioning the Mars 2033 report suggested that we couldn't
    get to Mars until 2037, and he said he's invested a lot of time
    and effort into making these bumper stickers. And, you know, he
    made some really good points, and I think I want to touch on a
    couple.
        Mr. Faulconer, you touched on consistency of purpose. Part
    of what made us successful in the 1960s was congressional
    support, Administration support, and a consistent goal and a
    consistent timeline. And I have no doubt that if we set 2033 as
    a goal, put the resources and focus on it, we couldn't
    accomplish that. What I worry about is the politics, and the
    politics of going from one Administration to the next. You
    know, you have the Constellation Program that said let's go to
    the Moon, and then Constellation got canceled, and we were
    going to go do asteroid retrieval. New Administration comes in,
    we're no longer doing the asteroid retrieval, we're now going
    to go back to the Moon. And unless we have that consistency of
    purpose, we won't get there by 2033.
        So, you know, I'll leave it to the scientists to decide,
    you know, if going to--a return to the Moon is the right next
    step or something different, but for us to do our job and
    provide the support to not just NASA, and the difference today
    is, you know, in the Apollo Program, NASA was the launch
    vehicle, they were the Lunar Lander, they were, you know, the
    science mission. Well, today's world is much more complicated.
    You've got commercial launch vehicles, you've got much more
    robust international engagement, you certainly have the
    subcontractors that are out there. And when we think about
    going to Mars by 2033, we're not thinking about doing this by
    ourselves, so we really do have to then bring in that
    international community.
        A couple of questions that, you know, I haven't been able
    to find answers for, but I think it would make our jobs easier
    as Members of Congress to advocate for that consistency of
    mission. We always look at programs and Congress as an expense
    item, and I haven't really been able to get an answer on what
    was the return on investment of the Apollo Mission, the number
    of jobs created, the number of discoveries, inventions, new
    companies found, what was the benefit to not just our economy,
    and I don't know, maybe, Mr. Gerstenmaier, would you have those
    numbers, or is there a good place that you could direct those,
    or should we direct the Academies to perhaps do a study so it's
    not just the cost, but here's our return on investment that
    we're going to get?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, I think that would be best if I took
    that question for the record, because there's been numerous
    studies in the past, and rather than recall those from memory,
    we could actually pull those, we could provide those to you,
    and then you could determine if they're sufficient or you want
    to pursue something else.
        Mr. Bera. That'd be great, because again, it certainly
    would help us make our case. You know, we're going to spend
    billions of dollars, you know, both going to the Moon, but then
    if the goal beyond the Moon--you know, and another question
    that--you know, one of the opening comments, there's--you know,
    China is going to the Moon. They're not putting a person on the
    Moon. India is going to the Moon, et cetera. Our focus is to go
    to the polar icecaps. And, you know, one question--and I've
    talked to my colleague; he's a lawyer, I'm a doctor, when
    they--when we get there or they get there, and they start
    extracting some of that ice, who actually owns that ice? I
    mean--and, you know, I don't just put that out there, because
    it--you know, what are our property rights? Is it the gold
    rush? Is it whoever gets there first can claim that? Because in
    my mind, you know, we're going to think of the Moon a little
    bit as a gas station if we're looking at it in the context of
    going to Mars. We're going to take that ice, turn it into fuel,
    and obviously it'll be a lot easier to launch from the Moon.
        I don't know if that's too simplistic, but I'd toss that
    out there, and whoever--anyone want to take a gander at that?
    Or is that the type of thing that we ought to think about
    proactively and set the parameters? Will this be like
    Antarctica where, you know, this is really an international
    resource for an international project? But I do--because
    commercial companies are already talking about trying to get
    there as well and, you know, is that the right question that we
    should be asking or thinking about, or should we be working--
    anyone want to take a crack at it?
        Mr. Sirangelo. I think the question is an appropriate
    question. When we're talking about doing the plans for what
    we're doing, it's not just a plan for the hardware or the
    technology, it's a plan to be there, which means all aspects of
    being there; the human life, the science, the research, but
    also the understanding of how to do it properly. Exploration
    has been going on for quite a long time in the human race, and
    there have been these issues before. We've sorted out those
    issues on the oceans. For example, there is the maritime law
    that handles it. So I think as we do this, it's beyond our
    scope today and we can't really answer the question. But I
    think the question is an appropriate one that we need to
    consider as part of our longer-term plan.
        Mr. Bera. Right. And I certainly think that's a question
    that, you know, American space industry ought to think about,
    and we ought to grapple with and take it to the international
    community.
        So thank you. And with that, I'll yield back.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Bera.
        The Chair now recognizes Congressman Brooks for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Brooks. Dr. Sanders, the Aerospace Safety Advisory
    Panel previously cited a number of safety concerns with both
    Boeing and SpaceX commercial crew vehicles. One item in your
    report cited was parachute-related concerns. Have there been
    any recent tests of the parachute system conducted?
        Dr. Sanders. Yes, there's actually been a large number of
    tests of the parachute systems conducted, both for Orion in the
    longer-range program, and both--and the SpaceX and Boeing
    commercial crew programs. And I think they've made a great deal
    of progress in understanding those uncertainties involved with
    that. It's one of the largest risks they have to solve.
        Mr. Brooks. Can you tell us about the results of recent
    tests, say, in the last month or two?
        Dr. Sanders. I think Mr. Gerstenmaier probably could do a
    better job with that, but there have been a number of very
    positive tests, results confirming that--what we would expect
    or would desire in terms of re-entry performance of the
    parachutes. There have been a few less satisfactory results,
    and some tests that are indicating that there may need to be
    some redesign or some adjustments made to the design that they
    have as now. And those are important to get right before you
    launch humans.
        Mr. Brooks. More specifically then, did SpaceX conduct in
    April 2019 a parachute test in Delamar Dry Lake, Nevada?
        Dr. Sanders. Yes, I believe.
        Mr. Brooks. And what happened in that test?
        Dr. Sanders. I cannot answer that right now. Mr.
    Gerstenmaier might have better data than I have at the moment.
        Mr. Brooks. Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you know what the result
    of that test was?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, the test is going to force us to go
    back and look at some potential--well, I--we're not sure
    exactly. The test did not--was not satisfactory. We did not get
    the results we wanted, but we learned some information that's
    going to affect potentially future parachute designs. The other
    thing we need to understand, was it a test-unique circumstance?
    Was it driven by an actual design problem in the hardware, or
    was it driven by the set-up of the test or the particular
    equipment that was used during the test?
        Mr. Brooks. Can you get more specific when you say it
    wasn't what we wanted?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, it didn't fail--it failed. The
    parachutes did not work as designed. It was a one single-out
    test for this parachute, so typically that test would involve
    four parachutes. One was--proactively failed ahead of time, and
    then the three remaining chutes did not operate properly.
        The good thing on the test was we had instrumented lines
    going up to the parachute, so we know exactly what the loads
    were in the system, but we still need to understand whether it
    was a test set-up configuration coming out of the aircraft, or
    if there was something associated with the packing of the
    parachutes, the rigging, all that. But this is part of the
    learning process. By these failures, we're going to learn the
    data and information to effect a design, to end up with a safe
    design for our crews.
        So I don't see this as a negative. This is why we test.
    This is why we want to push things. This is why we want to
    learn----
        Mr. Brooks. What was the impact on the vehicle of the
    parachute failures?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. It was a test sled, and the test sled was
    damaged upon impact with the ground.
        Mr. Brooks. And you're comfortable that corrective measures
    will be undertaken?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. There's no question. I am very
    comfortable. Their teams are fully engaged. We are
    understanding this is a gift to us. We have--we've gotten data
    that is unique that will help us design and understand if this
    is something that needs to be fixed, or if it's something that
    was just a nuance of the test and the configuration. And the--
    --
        Mr. Brooks. All right, let me----
        Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. NASA teams are fully engaged
    in----
        Mr. Brooks. Let me move on to another one because I've only
    got 60 seconds left.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. The NASA teams are fully engaged in----
        Mr. Brooks. The goal, as I understand it from the Vice
    President, is to reach the south pole of the Moon by 2024. Can
    any of you tell me what the additional cost will be, or
    appropriations needed by NASA in order to achieve a landing on
    the south pole of the Moon by 2024?
        Mr. Sirangelo. Not at this time, sir. We are--we have
    provided preliminary estimates to OMB. OMB is reviewing those
    along with our CFO, and that information is imminent.
        Mr. Brooks. What is the preliminary estimate?
        Mr. Sirangelo. I'm sorry, sir, we can't--right now it is
    under review, and we can't come up with a number.
        Mr. Brooks. How would it be paid for? Where would the money
    come from?
        Mr. Sirangelo. That's why we're not here today to be able
    to speak to the money side of the equation because at this
    point in time there's--it's still under discussion with OMB and
    NASA.
        Mr. Brooks. And do you have a judgment as to when we will
    know what the requested amount of additional budget will be?
        Mr. Sirangelo. That will come when OMB releases it. We've
    provided the information. I will say there have been
    significant discussions. The discussions have been very
    positive and open, and as soon as those discussions are
    complete and OMB has approved the numbers, they'll provide it
    to you.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
        The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Hill for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for
    being here.
        A couple of questions. For NASA's deep exploration systems,
    nearly 4,000 employees in California supplier companies work on
    SLS, Orion, or the Exploration Ground Systems, which is the
    largest supplier workforce of all 50 States. These programs
    are, of course, critical to our national space exploration
    program, and engineers, technicians, and software programmers
    in my district help contribute to the space program and our
    return to the Moon and beyond.
        The Chairwoman already mentioned acquisition. I know you've
    spoken about it some, but I'd like to learn more about how NASA
    will utilize existing contracts and supply chain infrastructure
    in getting to the Moon by 2024, and beyond to Mars.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. In the case of SLS and Orion, we're--and
    Exploration Ground Systems, those contracts are--we're
    completing the design phase, and then we're going to go into
    production and operation. So we're starting to put out requests
    for proposals for sustained cadence of buying those vehicles,
    and we're looking for ways to buy multiples of the vehicles at
    one time to get a more effective cost plan for us. And that
    also allows industry to then plan for a more stable workforce
    moving forward.
        Ms. Hill. Great. Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Sirangelo, I
    understand that NASA believes there are a small number of basic
    elements needed for the 2024 lunar landing, a power and
    propulsion element, a small habitat, and an Integrated Landing
    System. Given the rapid timeline in which work would need to
    occur to meet the 2024 deadline, can you please explain a few
    things? What are the dates when each of these elements will be
    on contract?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. We've received proposals for the power
    and propulsion element. Those are being evaluated now by the
    NASA teams, and it should be probably by this summer we should
    make an award or awards for that activity, for the power and
    propulsion element.
        The mini habitation piece that will need to be on the
    Gateway, that's still kind of an early acquisition. We're going
    to go through acquisition strategy meetings at the agency
    probably in the next couple of weeks, then we'll be ready to go
    out with some kind of activity.
        For the lander systems, we've done a synopsis already for
    the descent portion, the transfer vehicle, and the refueling
    piece. We've received proposals for those. We're evaluating
    those now. Probably again, in probably a month or so we're
    ready to go make some awards for study phases for that.
        And then we just recently dropped a synopsis out which
    looks at the entire Integrated Landing System from Gateway down
    to the surface, and the surface back to Gateway. After we
    receive comments to the synopsis, we'll put out an instrument--
    a broad agency announcement to go acquire that. And that's
    probably also within about a month or two.
        So in probably 2 months, all the pieces necessary to get to
    2024 will be in some serious study phase, or will be in serious
    acquisition for the hardware and systems to move forward.
        Ms. Hill. OK. You're in agreement, Mr. Sirangelo?
        Mr. Sirangelo. I am in agreement. I would also add that
    what Bill has been speaking to represents a substantial
    utilization of the American industrial base to make that
    happen. And the idea of being able to contract this out, and
    contract this out in this rapid fashion, is one of the benefits
    of being able to move forward quickly, is to make sure that
    industrial base stays strong and stable, and that we have
    access to that for the long-term.
        Ms. Hill. So that relates to would either NASA or the
    contractor be willing to provide Congress with a clear
    understanding of the details of the contracts? So, you know,
    who would be responsible for cost growth and development or
    testing, the government or the contractor, and what's the
    timeline involved in the test program, et cetera, et cetera?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. We can provide that when we get to that
    phase, or when the plan comes out we can describe that to you.
        I think the thing that's important is in the past NASA had
    to do all of this development on its own in the Apollo era.
    What's really unique now is industry is very capable of doing
    some of these things, and we need to utilize industry where we
    can and take expertise from industry, and work approaches where
    we share risk with them, we share acquisition approaches with
    them. We're doing that in the Commercial Crew Program that we
    just discussed where there's a shared accountability for
    resources and for safety kind of aspects, and we're working
    those. And we'll build off of what we've learned in the
    Commercial Crew Program, and take that forward as we go to the
    lunar systems.
        Ms. Hill. Thanks. So I guess the final question then, we're
    almost 6 months into 2019, and elements are going to need to
    be, of course, completed months in advance of the launch to
    enable integration and with the launch vehicles and
    preparations. How much real confidence do you have that a human
    landing on the Moon in 2024 is achievable?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think it's very achievable. The
    challenge will be can we get through the political process, can
    we get the political stability, can we get the funding
    necessary to go do this in the timeframe to move forward, can
    we get any legislation relief that we might need, and get a
    clarity of purpose, can we get united in this goal enough to
    move forward at the pace that we'd like to go. That'll be the
    biggest challenge.
        Ms. Hill. The money my colleague was talking about.
        Thank you all so much. I yield back.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Congresswoman Hill.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Posey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        It was great to see that NASA has provided recently a
    roadmap to go back to the Moon by 2024. Great step toward
    getting to Mars. Exciting that it's finally happened. To
    achieve, you know, the ambitious timeline, I think that we all
    agree that we need to ensure that there's, number one,
    sufficient funding to get that done. We've had a diagram of
    missions to nowhere. I think we had over 2 dozen different
    missions, over $20 billion up in smoke, because we couldn't
    stay on one plan from Administration to Administration,
    Congress to new Congress.
        Both the Administration and Congress should continually
    fund our critical space assets, such as the SLS, Orion crew
    vehicle, Exploration Ground Systems, Mobile Launcher 2, and the
    Lunar Orbital Platform, obviously.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier, can you, without getting too deep in the
    bushes, just give me a little brief summary of the benefits of
    an SLS Green Run.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. OK. So I think that the simplest
    advantage is that it allows us to see the integrated system
    work is an integrated system. The engines actually pressurize
    the tank for the Space Launch System, and that's a very complex
    mathematical model of how the cryogenic propellants and things
    interact, and the really--way to see all that is in a full-up
    integrated test. You can test individual components but you
    can't test it as an integrated system, as well as you can, for
    a fairly long duration, test through the Green Run.
        Mr. Posey. OK.
        Mr. Sirangelo. I would add to that that what this test
    essentially is, is a full-run test of the system. We're going
    to take humans; Americans, and put them on top of this rocket.
    We want to see the system work for its full duration burn, and
    the best way to do that is to conduct a full-duration burn
    before we then integrate the rocket and put people on top.
        Mr. Posey. OK. Mr. Sirangelo, in order to support the 2024
    launch date of the SLS with the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS),
    NASA needs to award a contract for the second Mobile Launcher
    at Kennedy Space Center. The Administrator mentioned that the
    contract is likely to be awarded in May, and I wonder if you
    can provide us with a status update on both the EUS development
    and the schedule, as well as when the contract will be awarded
    for the second Mobile Launcher.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I can help. We're ready, we're poised to
    go ahead and make the award for the Mobile Launcher as soon as
    the teams do the evaluations. So that award is on track and it
    will be either this month or next month, but it's on track
    moving forward.
        And then the Exploration Upper Stage, we slowed things down
    a little bit. We're running it at a slower rate this year for
    the Exploration Upper Stage. We went from 300 million down to
    150 million expenditure this year for the Exploration Upper
    Stage. That was so we could focus on Exploration Mission-1 on
    the core rocket to make sure that the teams and the equipment
    and effort are getting ready to go support Exploration Mission-
    1.
        Mr. Sirangelo. I would add to that, sir, that one of the
    aspects we wanted to make sure the Committee understands is
    that work has not stopped because we've changed the date. We've
    continued to push forward on many elements of the program. We
    continue to look to award, and you'll see several awards coming
    off in the next quarter. So as we go forth and try to look at
    the plan and find ways to accelerate it safely, we are also
    keeping elements of the program which are not going to be
    affected moving forward.
        Mr. Posey. Thank you very much. Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Beyer for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, guys,
    very much for being here with us today.
        On the NASA thing, you talked a number of times about
    international partners. Could you talk more about who those
    international partners are? Will they be China, will they be
    Russia, or is this typically France and the U.K., or what's
    left of the U.K.?
        Mr. Sirangelo. We have a number of international partners
    who have been working with us on the Space Station for many
    years. That includes the European Space Agency, the agencies
    within Europe, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Canadian
    Space Agency, and others around the world. We expect to
    continue those relationships and move them forward.
        Mr. Beyer. But not China? Despite how prominent they are in
    The Martian.
        Mr. Sirangelo. Currently, we're precluded from having those
    discussions, sir.
        Mr. Beyer. Yes. I was fascinated by the notion that one of
    the driving forces for thinking about Mars was thinking about
    the long-term sustainability of the human race. And if any of
    you would like to specifically address that idea of building as
    many alternatives into our possible human future, and how the
    Moon-Mars mission builds upon that.
        Dr. Lunine. So, Congressman, I'll try to address that. In
    our Pathways report, we talked about the various reasons for
    human spaceflight, both practical and aspirational, and one of
    them is the aspiration not only to explore, but for humans to
    become a multi-planet species at some point.
        We recognize though the realities of humans living entirely
    independently on a planet as inhospitable as Mars, and so we
    put the two planet species rationale as an aspirational one
    rather than a practical one, in the sense that I don't think
    anybody is at all under the misapprehension that by putting a
    base on Mars we would avoid human extinction should some
    planet-wide catastrophe occur on the Earth. I mean very quickly
    the Mars colony itself would also go away. So we must take care
    of our own planet in order to ensure that we can survive as a
    species, but in living on another planet and having the
    aspiration and the goal to do that, I think it will change our
    perspective as a species and perhaps lead to a future that we
    might not otherwise be able to imagine.
        Mr. Beyer. But you do talk about living off the land as an
    aspirational goal also.
        Dr. Lunine. Yes, we do in the report. That's right.
        Mr. Beyer. But is this also part of the energetic search
    for exoplanets that resemble Earth?
        Dr. Lunine. So that search is, of course, going on
    independently of the Human Spaceflight Program. Within our--I
    think within the understanding today of technology and the
    human condition, the ability to sustain humans beyond Mars is
    something that doesn't seem practical, and the primary issue is
    that there's a type of radiation: Galactic cosmic rays, which
    are very, very difficult to shield against because they're very
    high energy, and so they produce secondary particles when they
    collide with spacecraft and with shields. So that's one of the
    reasons why Mars is the horizon goal.
        Sending humans to other planetary systems around other
    stars is something that one can imagine, but the practicalities
    of it, I think, are beyond us at this point in time. That
    doesn't mean we should not be looking for other Earths, because
    that again, if we find them, will change our perspective on
    what our place really is in the universe.
        Mr. Beyer. I would imagine the excitement has to be too if
    there are other Earths, is there also then other intelligences.
        Dr. Lunine. That's one of the great questions not only of
    science but of humankind. Are we alone in the universe, and are
    there other sentient self-aware beings that we can ultimately
    communicate with.
        Mr. Beyer. Dr. Sanders, you talk about the overall risk-
    benefit equation, you know, how safe is safe enough. Who
    determines that equation?
        Dr. Sanders. Anyone who makes a decision on accepting risk.
    When NASA--and usually that's done at a fairly high level in
    NASA, in the administration, depending on how much risk it is
    and what the specific causes are. But it's a decision that our
    panel has advocated and strongly recommended that always be
    documented, which we always say, you know, what are the
    alternatives you looked at, what was your rationale for
    deciding that you're ready to accept that risk and that there
    isn't another--a safer alternative, and the--and what do you
    expect to gain by going forward with that risk.
        Mr. Beyer. Great. Great. Thank you very much.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Olson for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Olson. I thank The Chair. And welcome to our five
    witnesses.
        I'd like to start out by talking about a hero of mine and
    probably all of yours, a man named Gene Cernan. Gene is the
    only American to go to the Moon twice. Did that in Apollo 17,
    when he landed, walked on the Moon, our most recent moonwalker,
    and also Apollo 10, the flight that did everything Apollo 11
    did except for land. Gene was here in this very room in 2009
    when this Committee, in a bipartisan manner, fought to save the
    last mission to go to the Moon. It was called Constellation. We
    saved the crew capsule in that battle, but Gene was very
    adamant the best reason to go to the Moon is because that's the
    best place in the universe to train for going to Mars. He
    pointed out a few things. First of all, the gravity. The Moon
    is about one-sixth of our gravity. Mars is one-third of our
    gravity. To train up there, it's much better training than in a
    pool outside the Johnson Space Center. It's real training. In
    fact, the first steps on the Moon were steps, they started
    hopping, they realized I can hop quicker and go places quicker
    by hopping instead of walking. He also pointed out that we
    found out long after he left the Moon there is water on the
    Moon. He said we don't know what we don't know about the Moon.
        And it sounds like all of our panelists agreed that the
    Moon is a good starting point to go to Mars. In fact, I think
    the quote from you, Dr. Lunine, was the Moon is a stepping
    stone for Mars. And, Brother Gerstenmaier, you said it's a
    proving ground for Mars.
        So could all of you go into detail about the benefits of us
    going to the Moon to get us to Mars as quickly as possible? How
    is the Moon tied directly for us going to Mars? Gerst, you're
    up first.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think first of all that the Moon is a--
    in a proving ground sense is a great place for us to check out
    the technology to go beyond the Earth Moon system, to build the
    rockets that need to go there, they can have application moving
    forward, we can test them and check them out.
        It's also good from a risk standpoint. Today, we're very
    comfortable in low-Earth orbit where, if something goes wrong
    on station, we can be back in an hour or so, hour and a half.
    When we go out to the Moon, we're now 5 days away. That's a
    challenge, but it's not months away like it is when you go to
    Mars. So learning how to operate, build the procedures in,
    build the stuff that the control center folks do in Houston,
    and understand how to operate around the Moon will be
    absolutely critical to build those skills, to build the
    technology and prove it before it absolutely positively has to
    work as we go toward Mars. And I think it's a--it's very strong
    in that sense.
        Mr. Olson. Mr. Sirangelo, sir. Thank you, Gerst.
        Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you, sir. I would add to that that one
    of the best things that one needs to do in order to get good at
    something is to practice, and to practice consistently. Being
    able to be 5 days away, being able to make the missions that
    we're doing, and to be able to do them in a frequency that we
    can actually learn, develop, reiterate, improve what we're
    doing and do it again, allows us to get much better, much
    sooner.
        So being able to go to the Moon and doing all the things
    that we've been talking about for the last 2 hours is very
    good. Being able to do it on a frequency that we can actually
    take the things back and do it better really makes it a much
    more feasible and practical path. And what it does is actually
    gets us to Mars sooner rather than later.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you. Dr. Lunine.
        Dr. Lunine. Lunine. Yes, thank you.
        Mr. Olson. Sorry about that.
        Dr. Lunine. No, thank you, Congressman. So a number of
    technologies, as Mr. Gerstenmaier mentioned. Radiation safety,
    if we spend a long time on the surface of the Moon we're going
    to have to deal with shielding, that will also be critical for
    transits to Mars. The environmental control and life support
    systems for long-term stays on the Moon will also be applicable
    directly to Mars. We talked about habitats as well. We talked
    about crew health. And aspects of in situ resource utilization,
    even though on Mars it would be primarily for the atmosphere,
    there are aspects of it we would use--we would test on the
    Moon.
        And let me also say that successfully using the Moon as a
    stepping stone, bringing humans back there, working and
    exploring on the Moon provides a success that the public will
    see and recognize as a critical moment, that will then project
    us on to Mars. And we made that point in the report, but let me
    say personally, as a 12-year-old watching--13-year-old watching
    Gene Cernan and Harrison Schmitt in the last Apollo mission,
    exploring the Moon for 3 days, I felt inside of myself that we
    were going on to Mars, and that I would be a part of that. And
    even though we're here almost 50 years later and we're not on
    that journey, going back to the Moon, working on the Moon will
    create that same sense that, yes, we can do that for Mars that
    I felt back in 1972.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you, sir. I'm sorry, Dr. Sanders and Mr.
    Faulconer, I'm out of time, but one comment about Dr. Lunine's
    comments. There's a big radiation belt between Earth and Mars.
    It's called the Van Allen radiation belt. No human being has
    ever gone through that intense radiation. So it sounds like
    Mars has something like we've experienced in the Space Station
    and radiation that we kind of take for granted because we've
    been so short in terms of our time on the Moon or in the Space
    Station compared to a trip right now to Mars with our current
    propulsion systems.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. Go Navy, beat
    Army.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perlmutter for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks. And thank you to the panel for
    being here today.
        And, Dr. Lunine, I want to start with your last comments
    about thinking that we would be moving on to Mars at some point
    after we had traveled to the Moon. And that's really been my
    driving motivation here is, OK, it's about time, it's about
    time we move on and we get--and I've been agnostic as to
    whether we go straight to Mars, we go to the Moon as a
    waystation, but ultimately to get to Mars. And Mr. Gerstenmaier
    has heard me say this a dozen times or more now, which is--and
    we heard from some NASA experts that 2033 was a feasible
    timeframe when the orbits, so the orbital mechanics, it's not
    just schedule-driven, but it's actually driven by, you know,
    the orbits of these two planets, that that's a shorter travel,
    you know, shorter journey than before.
        So as I listen to you all, I mean there's the rocket
    science and how we deal with the potential radiation issues and
    our astronauts' health, and I'm convinced that we have the
    ability and the technology and the scientists who can work on
    that; the doctors. So we need from you, if I were to get the
    money, OK, and I've said this before, it's a chicken and egg,
    if you were assured that you had unlimited funds to get to Mars
    by 2033, Dr. Lunine, could we do it? We heard from NASA
    earlier, like 2 years ago, that we could do it.
        Dr. Lunine. So I would have----
        Mr. Perlmutter. Not 2.5 percent, not a cadence of 4.4,
    but----
        Dr. Lunine. No, I----
        Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. Maybe 2.4 or 2.2.
        Dr. Lunine. I understand. So I don't--you know, in all
    honesty, Congressman, I don't know what infinite resources
    actually mean. I will say----
        Mr. Perlmutter. OK. I'll give you an example. Do you know
    how much we came up for the banks over a weekend?
        Dr. Lunine. No, I don't.
        Mr. Perlmutter. $800 billion.
        Dr. Lunine. $800 billion. So----
        Mr. Perlmutter. OK? Now, they paid it back----
        Dr. Lunine. Yes, that's right.
        Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. With 15 percent interest.
        Dr. Lunine. Right. So let me answer the question, and then
    maybe yield to my colleagues at NASA, if you wish. So in our
    report, we estimated the cost of getting humans to Mars as
    being essentially in that range. Now, in the schedule-driven
    version of our study where you're driven by a schedule, we
    found that you could get to Mars in the mid-2030s, but bear in
    mind that report was written in 2014, so that's already 5 years
    ago. Our estimates based on the Design Reference Missions, and
    so on, require that the human spaceflight part of the NASA
    budget grow each year by about 4 times the inflation rate
    through 2030 in order to make that happen. But again, that was
    2014, and I think I'd like to, if you wish, yield to my NASA
    colleagues now.
        Mr. Perlmutter. Certainly. And I do want to welcome the two
    Coloradans to the panel: Mr. Sirangelo and Mr. Faulconer. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Sirangelo. Thank you, sir. I can't answer the 2033
    question as you asked, but what I can answer is to say that
    this expediting the plan to the Moon, expediting our knowledge
    of how to move in space, how to live in space, how to work in
    space, how to build the systems that allow us to do these
    things, is only going to have a positive effect on our ability
    to get to Mars. So I think the two are linked.
        Mr. Perlmutter. So let's talk about the politics of this
    for a second. And, Dr. Sanders, I appreciate you talking about
    you can't have too aggressive a schedule because the potential
    risk is a problem. But on the other hand, if we don't have a
    schedule, then you've got a problem up here. OK, this isn't so
    much the engineering feats that you all will have to
    accomplish, there has to be a financing sort of goal here,
    otherwise you'll never see it. So it is a chicken and egg.
    We've got to have something that says we can do this by this
    date if you give us this kind of money. And that's what I need.
    And Mr. Gerstenmaier spends about 2 weeks every month here
    testifying before this Committee, so he's heard this before.
    And it may be completely a Pollyannaish vision that I have, but
    I have, Dr. Lunine, that drive that you talked about from being
    a kid who wants to see us get to Mars, with the Moon being
    maybe the stepping stone, but the goal being Mars. And I'm
    saying that to my friend, Mr. Sirangelo, too.
        With that, I yield back to The Chair.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. And
    thank you for your clear intention. I think we always know
    we're going to see one of the bumper stickers every time.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Waltz for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Thank you so much for coming today, and I'm really thrilled
    to be on this Committee. My district runs just north of Cape
    Canaveral, with Embry-Riddle University front and center there.
    The world's leading aeronautical university. And the Chairwoman
    and I are, I think, a handful of Members that are on both Armed
    Services and the Space Committee. So we're seeing both sides of
    what we're calling the 21st century space race.
        The Acting Secretary of Defense likes to use the term new
    space to describe the expanding role of the commercial space
    industry and developing defense space technology and also
    commercial space technology. Can you discuss the critical
    importance of commercial space to NASA's deep space missions,
    the lessons you're learning from their launches from Cape
    Canaveral, we're expecting launches every week by 2021, and
    then, you know, as you're in phase, I guess, phase alpha, or
    phase A of your planning for the Moon landing, how are you
    engaging commercial space in the private sector in your
    planning sessions? We'll start with Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think we're at a very unique
    time where commercial space could really contribute in a major
    way to what we're doing. And I think that's really important.
    And I don't consider it new space and old space, I consider it
    space.
        We learn a lot from the new participants in the space
    program. They don't have some of the concerns and some of the
    slowness that we have. We can learn how to move fast again, but
    then we also have some experience and some things that actually
    help them too. So this working together actually makes us much
    stronger working together and moving forward. We're very
    actively engaged with them. We're asking them for ideas on how
    to move forward. Where NASA would have probably done the total
    design before, we're now actually involving them in the design
    process. So we can get their good ideas to see what they've
    learned, to see how we can keep manufacturing low, and how we
    can meet the timeframes moving forward.
        So I see this as a tremendously positive time. I think we
    might be in a unique opportunity where we can really team
    together, work together as a team and achieve these aggressive
    goals toward 2024 and on to Mars.
        Mr. Waltz. So the various companies, which we probably
    don't need to go through, but they're being actively engaged
    now, so that the budget and the plan that will come to the
    Committee in the next, I hope in the next few weeks will have
    commercial private-sector participation built into those
    planning procedures?
        Mr. Sirangelo. Yes, sir. And I'll go a step further. As
    Bill mentioned, the teaming, you're seeing the teaming here
    evidence in front of you, sir. I've spent my career in the
    commercial space industry, was one of the founders of the
    Commercial Spaceflight Federation, and chaired it for several
    years. So the idea of NASA creating the team not only outside,
    but inside, is a very useful thing for what we're trying to
    accomplish.
        One of the reasons for the delay in the planning process
    here is that we did reach out to industry, and have had dozens
    of meetings at the Space Symposium and since then, with
    industry throughout the United States, throughout the different
    types of companies in the industry to make sure we did hear
    these voices, make sure we did understand what--how they could
    be part of this. And I think the plan you will see will show a
    balance of using traditional space, NASA centers, NASA space,
    along with a very significant contribution from the commercial
    industry.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Earlier this year, the Defense
    Intelligence Agency released a report about Russia and China's
    activities in space, and long story short, Russia and China
    both explicitly intend to eclipse the United States in space,
    and they are both developing rockets comparable to SLS. From
    your perspective, why is it important that the U.S. have the
    most powerful rocket for both exploration and national
    security, and what do you make of the Chinese landing on the
    backside of the Moon, but then also the recently announced
    research station?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think having a heavy lift launch
    capability is critical to us to be able to get large masses to
    the vicinity of the Moon. That's really important. And I think
    this is where this commercial and government approach works
    well together. The SLS can launch as a backbone and carry the
    pieces that have to be launched as one combined package in one
    shot. Then you can use the commercial industry to launch
    multiple other small pieces to aggregate around the Moon. So I
    think that's critical to us keeping forward and being a leader
    in space, to continue to push those things that don't yet have
    a real opportunity yet for big revenue. That's the appropriate
    role for government. Mark, anything?
        Mr. Sirangelo. I agree with that, but I would--I also take
    one step forward. You know from your time being a Green Beret
    that sometimes you need to stand up and take a stand, and I
    think in this instance what we're doing is saying that we're
    not going to let that happen. It is part of America's DNA as we
    talk about it be part of the leadership of this industry, and I
    think what we are doing here and the whole aspect of our plan
    is to be able to step up and ensure that we keep ourselves at
    the forefront of that.
        Mr. Waltz. Absolutely. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
        And thank you to all the witnesses. But before we adjourn,
    the Chair and Ranking Member have a few additional questions,
    so if you'll indulge us for a few more moments.
        So I think we've raised some really important issues, and
    that was the critical component of having this hearing today,
    even without the full plan.
        So directing these first couple of questions for Mr.
    Sirangelo and Mr. Gerstenmaier, so you've said that NASA has
    come up with preliminary cost estimates for the moving of the
    2024 program, but right now that those cost estimates are under
    review by NASA CFO (Chief Financial Officer), and then OMB. So
    we've got some more steps to go. So I can understand, of
    course, having the CFO review it, but I'm curious about what
    role--what OMB's review will entail. Do they have in-house
    expertise in engineering or program management, and program
    management that's going to be really sufficient enough to
    credibly modify NASA's cost estimates, because you're clearly
    the ones with the expertise on what it's going to take to do
    this, and what it will take to carry out your mission.
        So what is OMB's role in this, and what resources do they
    have?
        Mr. Sirangelo. OMB's role is as a statutory role, ma'am,
    and from our perspective it's a--we have to go through this.
    It's not just a technical plan that has to be done in order for
    this to be communicated and brought to the Committee in the
    proper manner, we have to have an entire plan put together that
    includes not only the funding, but how do we get it, where does
    it come from, and how does it fit into the Administration's
    view.
        Chairwoman Horn. Yes, I appreciate that and know that role.
    I think the basic concern here, as it's pretty clear that
    regardless of party, we are supportive of NASA, we want to see
    this succeed, but we've seen in the past what happens when we
    don't have all the pieces of the puzzle together. And so I
    think the basic concern is whether NASA is going to be allowed
    to ask for the budget it needs, that--going back to Mr. Lucas'
    point about sufficient funding, the budget it needs to do these
    lunar missions, or is it going to be a lesser amount, because--
    that OMB would find acceptable, because, you know, OMB doesn't
    have accountability if these things succeed or fail, they have
    a different role, but we know if it fails, the blame is going
    to fall to NASA. And that goes back to the need for the plan
    and the sufficient budget. So if the mission fails, it's NASA
    that's going to shoulder that burden, and I think all of us
    lose in the end for so many reasons that we've discussed.
        And so, Dr. Sanders, I want to turn to you for a moment and
    ask you to talk for a moment about any risks related to a hard
    goal that is insufficiently funding--insufficiently funded.
        Dr. Sanders. It's a huge risk because it puts NASA in the
    position of having to try to achieve something that's not
    really achievable. And NASA is full of people who are can-do
    people. I mean they're enthusiastic, they're technically
    capable, they will work their hearts out to try and make it
    work, and--but then it's easy--easy, it's possible then to
    start to rationalize that, OK, well, we can take this shortcut
    because it's important and we're going to get there, we'll do
    it, we're going to--we'll make it work, whether it's actually
    feasible to do it. So I think there's a huge risk if you don't
    get the adequate resources to go with the schedule. You know,
    it's always a three-legged stool. You have the cost, schedule,
    performance. You fix two of them, the other one, that's where
    it goes.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much. And I think that goes
    to the underlying need to see a more detailed plan so that we
    can ensure the next steps and there's sufficient funding,
    because I think many points, so we have to balance risk; what
    is the right risk, and ensure that schedule pressure doesn't
    overcome that, and that there's sufficient funding to do what
    NASA is being asked to do.
        And with that, I will yield to Ranking Member Babin.
        Mr. Babin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Just a couple more questions here. I wanted to ask about
    the ISS, Mr. Gerstenmaier. It's one of our Nation's greatest
    technological international achievements. Currently, the U.S.
    and its partners are planning to operate it through 2024.
    According to the National Research Council's Pathways report
    from 2014, if NASA maintains their presence on the ISS past
    2024 without significant increases to NASA's overall budget, it
    will lack the resources to fund the development of systems that
    will push human presence beyond low-Earth orbit until late in
    the next decade. This would leave the Orion vehicle without a
    clearly defined mission, yet abandoning the ISS could mean
    ceding global leadership in low-Earth orbit to other nations
    and our competitors.
        How do we solve this dilemma? If additional funding is the
    answer, where do you propose that we get this additional
    funding? Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think our proposal is to do both: To
    continue to use the ISS because it's a critical testbed to test
    the technology that's going to be needed going forward. For
    example, the carbon dioxide scrubbing system that's going to be
    flown on the Orion capsule, it's actually been tested onboard
    the International Space Station. So there's a synergy between
    Space Station and the exploration.
        I think a lot of times we see this as an either/or trade. I
    really see it as an and. We need to go look at the needs for
    Station and the budget required for Station. We can gain some
    efficiencies potentially in ops. and maintenance a little bit,
    reduce some of those costs, but I think ultimately we need to
    be in low-Earth orbit at the same time we're moving out to deep
    space to test technologies. Space Station is a good testbed to
    do that. We need to utilize Station as long as it's viable from
    a technical standpoint, and it's a piece of exploration. It is
    truly the first step in exploration. Granted, if a couple of
    crew members go almost a year in space, that's going to give us
    tremendous insight into the health mitigations that are
    required for crews when they go to Mars and other destinations.
    Station is paying real benefits today for exploration that if
    you remove Space Station, you actually cripple Space Station,
    you slow down our goals to get to the Moon, you slow down our
    activities to move to--on to Mars.
        So we need to use Station today in an effective manner. We
    need to figure out a way to fund both. It will not be easy for
    you or for us to find that funding. We'll figure out a way to
    do it.
        Mr. Babin. OK.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. It's necessary for us in the future.
        Mr. Babin. All right, thank you. Then another one to you as
    well. Will NASA develop spacesuits for surface operations and
    update NASA's aging extravehicular mobility units (EMUs)? EMUs
    were designed over 40 years ago. They were designed to fit
    astronauts who made up the Astronaut Corps at that time. Since
    then the Astronaut Corps has diversified, requiring a broader
    range of sizes. If we are to extend ISS, what are your plans
    for EMUs?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, we're working on both. The answer,
    basically, is yes to both. We're working on a new spacesuit for
    the Space Station. The goal was to demonstrate, I think in
    2024, and that suit, the life support system on the back part
    of the suit that provides oxygen and CO2 scrubbing
    for the crew members, also a humidity control and temperature
    control. That's common between an orbit spacesuit, and it's
    common to potentially a spacesuit used on the surface of the
    Moon. So there's applications there. But our intent is to
    develop the suits necessary for both cases. And the Johnson
    Space Center in-house team is working on that spacesuit
    development today. They've actually been in NBL (Neutral
    Buoyancy Laboratory) doing some activities with that suit.
        Mr. Babin. OK. All right, great. Thank you.
        And last, the European Service Module is currently
    manifested through Exploration Mission-2. After that, should
    NASA plan on using a European service module, or should it seek
    other more capable alternatives that may facilitate a broader
    architecture? Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think there's real advantages
    of--to us working with our partners in space, and we can
    selectively choose where we put those partners in the critical
    path. We have put the European Space Agency in the critical
    path for the Orion service module. That's a propellant system
    that maneuvers Orion around in space. They've delivered on
    their promises. They were a little late with the first module--
    --
        Mr. Babin. Right.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. They're doing well on the
    second module, and they're actually starting to procure and
    acquire hardware for the third service module. So----
        Mr. Babin. OK.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier [continuing]. But again, I think if they
    continue to deliver, they're a strong partner, they can work
    with us, they help achieve our goals in a more effective manner
    and build the international strength that makes these future
    activities possible.
        Mr. Babin. Anybody else like to add to that? No. Nobody
    wants to chomp on that one. OK, thank you very much, Madam
    Chair.
        Chairwoman Horn. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Babin.
    I want to once again thank all the witnesses for being here,
    before we close.
        These are critical conversations that we need to have, and
    information that we need to obtain. And I think it's safe to
    say that Mr. Gerstenmaier, we'll probably see you here again,
    and many of you, so hopefully, you like seeing our faces. So
    thank you all for being here.
        And need to say that the record will remain open for 2
    weeks for any Members who wish to add statements to the record
    or additional questions, and the questions taken for the
    record. We'll look forward to getting those from you. And the
    witnesses are now excused, and we're adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                   Appendix I

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  Appendix II

                                  ----------

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     [all]