    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                              [H.A.S.C. No. 116-9]

                            OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON
                           NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY
                               AND POSTURE UPDATE
                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 6, 2019

                      [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ___________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    36-235                    WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island          Texas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                ROB BISHOP, Utah
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii                DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        MO BROOKS, Alabama
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice     PAUL COOK, California
        Chair                            BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
    RO KHANNA, California                SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
    KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma             TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr.,           MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
        California                       MATT GAETZ, Florida
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       DON BACON, Nebraska
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
    XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico     LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    KATIE HILL, California               MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
    DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia

                         Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                    Sarah Mineiro, Professional Staff Member
                              Justin Lynch, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services....................     4

                                   WITNESSES

    Blair, Bruce G., Research Scholar, Program on Science and Global
      Security, Princeton University.................................     7
    Miller, Hon. Franklin C., Principal, The Scowcroft Group.........     9
    Rohlfing, Joan, President and Chief Operating Officer, Nuclear
      Threat Initiative..............................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Blair, Bruce G...............................................    69
        Miller, Hon. Franklin C......................................    87
        Rohlfing, Joan...............................................    57

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mrs. Davis...................................................   113
        Mr. Kim......................................................   113

      OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY AND POSTURE UPDATE

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 2019.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. Thank you, and I want to welcome our
    witnesses, members of the audience, members of the committee.
    We are here today to discuss the Nuclear Posture Review and
    nuclear policy going forward, in terms of our nuclear weapons.
        Before we get to that, a couple of housekeeping issues.
        For the hearing today, as I understand it, the witnesses
    don't have a hard stop. I do at 12:30. If there are still
    members around that want to ask questions at that point, I will
    have somebody else on the Democratic side take the chair to get
    through those questions, and we will go from there. We will
    stop at 12:30.
        And tomorrow, when we have our first posture hearing, we
    are going to, for questioning purposes--and you should have
    gotten notice on this--go from the bottom up. So we will start
    with Mrs. Luria and work our way up for questioning. So just in
    terms of your planning tomorrow, we are going to try and do
    it--no, we are actually going to succeed, we are going to do it
    that way--have the more junior members get to go first, because
    we have so many members of committee, frequently we have
    hearings and they don't get an opportunity to ask their
    questions.
        With that, we will start this hearing. I want to start by
    welcoming our witnesses: Ms. Joan Rohlfing, president and COO
    [chief operating officer] of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; Dr.
    Bruce Blair, who is research scholar, program on science and
    global security at Princeton University; and the Honorable
    Franklin C. Miller, principal at The Scowcroft Group.
        I think this is an incredibly important topic to discuss.
    Two things I want to make clear at the start. I completely
    support a strong and robust nuclear deterrent. We need nuclear
    weapons in the world that we live in today in order to deter
    our adversaries and meet our national security objectives as a
    country.
        Personally, I don't think that is debatable. We have,
    certainly, Russia, with their nuclear weapons; China, as well;
    rising threats from North Korea and Iran. And the best and most
    straightforward way to deter people from using nuclear weapons
    is if you are in a position to assure that they will be
    destroyed if they do. So having a nuclear deterrent is
    incredibly important.
        Second, our nuclear weapons have been around for a long
    time, and I have no question that we need to update and upgrade
    those weapons, look at what is working, what isn't working. We
    need to recapitalize our nuclear structure.
        What I question is whether or not we need to do it to the
    tune of more than $1.2 trillion, as both the 2010 and the 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review has called into question. And this
    hearing, I hope, will help us answer that question.
        Do we have to have absolutely everything that we have had
    before, plus some of the weapons systems that the Trump
    administration is now talking about adding, including a new,
    long-range stand-off missile, which was requested before the
    Trump administration, and a new low-yield nuclear weapon,
    launchable from our submarines, which is new to the Trump
    administration?
        The Congressional Budget Office just recently went through
    and analyzed all that is in the Nuclear Posture Review, and
    gave some options, in terms of we could not do that and here is
    how much money we would save. And I think those are questions
    that need to be asked, for several reasons.
        First of all, we have a $22 trillion debt that is going up
    by about $1 trillion. In fact, it increased dramatically in the
    first quarter of this year over the first quarter of last year.
        We also have a large number of needs within the national
    security environment. Forget for the moment everything else
    that the Federal Government does. Just within national security
    we have had a number of studies that have come out. We have
    heard the Secretary of the Air Force say that she needs 25
    percent more aircraft for the Air Force. We just had a review
    of our missile defense program, which also said we need a
    dramatic increase. The Navy still says they need a 355-ship
    Navy, which is significantly more than we have now. The Army
    would like to build towards an end strength that is
    substantially larger than it is right now.
        And the question I have is--well, not the question. The
    statement is, that math doesn't work. We are not going to have
    enough money to do all of that. So what we have to, at least in
    part, think about is what can we not do. Where can we save
    money?
        And within the nuclear weapons area, I believe that a
    credible deterrent can be presented for less than is called for
    in the Nuclear Posture Review. Now, I understand that a
    bipartisan group of people disagree with me on that. But a
    bipartisan group of people to some degree agree with me. So we
    are here to have that discussion and that debate.
        So number one is, you know, can we save money in here and
    still meet our national security objectives, still deter our
    adversaries? Because if we can, it is something we should talk
    about. And these are things that many people have contemplated.
    Former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, you know, when asked
    about whether or not the triad was necessary, said he wasn't
    sure, and talked about, well, if we had a dyad and didn't have
    the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], then we would
    have a much smaller risk of miscalculation, based on a false
    alarm.
        You know, very, very hawkish people have contemplated the
    notion that we don't need as many nuclear weapons as are
    contemplated in the Nuclear Posture Review, and that having
    that many is potentially destabilizing. And those are the other
    two points of this hearing that I really hope we will get into
    a discussion on.
        Number one is the concept of arms control. We, I feel, need
    to have a discussion with the Russians and, yes, with the
    Chinese about that issue. A number of former defense officials,
    including former chairman of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee Sam Nunn, former Secretary William Perry, former
    Secretary George Schultz, have said that we are stumbling
    towards a nuclear catastrophe because we have not rebooted any
    sort of arms control discussion or any sort of discussion with
    the Russians since the end of the Cold War about how we prevent
    an accidental nuclear war.
        So those are our other two--we are now pulling out of the
    INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, there is the
    potential for us to pull out of the New START [Strategic Arms
    Reduction] Treaty. And I am not presupposing at the moment that
    any one treaty is the exact right one, but I am deeply
    concerned about the fact that the administration right now has
    no interest in discussing any such treaty with China or Russia,
    not even having the conversation.
        We are now about to kick off another nuclear arms race. Is
    that a smart thing to do, without at least talking to our
    adversaries, and which brings us to the third issue, and that
    is stumbling into a nuclear war.
        Throughout the Cold War--and if you read Secretary Perry's
    book about the number of times during the Cold War when we were
    this close to having a nuclear war, based on false alarms,
    based on information that was wrong--how do we make sure that
    we prevent that?
        Well, a big part of it is dialogue. And right now we don't
    have that dialogue with the Russians or the Chinese. We do have
    that dialogue with North Korea. But I think making sure that we
    have a dialogue, and we learn the lessons of the Cold War and
    what--frankly, President Reagan was the one who put those two
    things most in place: arms control treaties and open discussion
    with our then Soviet adversaries about how to prevent a nuclear
    war.
        So I believe in the deterrents, I know we need nuclear
    weapons. But do we need $1.2 trillion's worth? And it may be
    more than that, once the final bill comes done. I have served
    on this committee long enough, I have a hard time remembering a
    single program that actually came in for less than they
    projected it, much less one that's spread out over 30 years and
    encompasses as many items as the Nuclear Posture Review does.
        So how does that affect our other needs in the defense, and
    are we not able to meet our nuclear needs for less money than
    is contemplated? It is a discussion I hope to have today.
        And with that, I will yield to the ranking member for his
    opening statement.

          STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
     REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
    welcome our witnesses here. I completely agree with your
    statement that this is a very important topic, and I believe it
    is useful to have some different perspectives on our nuclear
    deterrent.
        I start from a few fundamentals that I believe have been at
    the center of U.S. strategic thought for 75 years in both
    parties. One of those fundamentals is that a strong nuclear
    deterrent is the cornerstone of American national security. And
    while various books may say we have come close--and obviously,
    there have been some instances, Cuban Missile Crisis, et
    cetera, that were far too close--it still is the fact that
    since the end of World War II nuclear weapons have not been
    used. And I believe that is largely the result of U.S. nuclear
    superiority made it clear that an aggressor could not benefit
    from it. We have had numerous Secretaries of Defense testify
    before this committee over the years that this was the highest
    priority of the Department of Defense.
        A second fundamental is that the Russians and the Chinese
    are modernizing their nuclear forces. I would simply quote from
    an article in RealClearDefense by Peter Hussey that says, in
    fact, early in the next decade, around 2021, Russia will have
    modernized close to 100 percent of its bombers, land-based
    missiles, and submarines, and China will, by the end of the
    next decade, have a fully modernized and expanded nuclear
    deterrent as well, with mobile ICBMs, a new missile-armed
    submarine, and long-range cruise missiles.
        Now, I hope that this committee will get into a classified
    session at some point with our intelligence community and get
    their assessment of what the Russians and the Chinese are
    doing. But the point is it is not just about us. It is about
    them, as well.
        Third fundamental, I believe, is that our weapons and
    delivery systems were designed and built for a different time,
    with different circumstances, and need to be updated. Part of
    it is just because of aging. It is kind of like anything else
    in life. If you neglect your health, if you neglect your roof,
    sometimes the bills are going to come due. And unfortunately,
    we are still dependent upon delivery systems and weapons that
    were largely built during the Reagan era.
        And so it makes sense that we will have to make up for past
    neglect, although at no point does that make-up require more
    than 6.4 percent of the defense budget. Now, can we afford 6
    percent of the defense budget for the cornerstone of American
    national security? Well, that may be an issue where we have
    differences.
        A couple other fundamentals. Number one--I mean number four
    in my list, we cannot wish away the existence of nuclear
    weapons. It seems to me that some of the writings that one
    comes across can kind of hope we can negotiate or wish away
    their existence. That is not going to occur. If we are going to
    fulfill our responsibilities to defend the country, we have to
    make sure that our deterrent is without question.
        And that leads me to my fifth fundamental assumption that
    has been at the center of American strategic thought for 75
    years, and that is America and our allies depend on a U.S.
    nuclear deterrent that is credible, safe, and reliable without
    question. And I think the big issue before us this year, and at
    this time, is the credibility of that deterrent. And if you are
    allies in Europe or allies in Asia, if that credibility starts
    to wane, you start to think about other options.
        And that is part of the reason, whether we modernize our
    delivery systems--in my view, all three legs of the triad--
    whether we modernize the weapons themselves is not just a
    question for us, it is a question of whether our allies trust
    that our superiority will be to such an extent that they can
    rest secured, and not having to have their own nuclear
    deterrent, that they can rest secured in depending on it, as
    well.
        All of those are part of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I agree
    with you that this is a big, important topic that we should not
    take lightly, or assume that slogans can somehow overcome the
    U.S. policy of the last 75 years. I look forward to hearing
    these witnesses and others to come.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you. We will start with Ms. Rohlfing.

       STATEMENT OF JOAN ROHLFING, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING
                   OFFICER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

        Ms. Rohlfing. Good morning, and thank you. I come before
    you as the president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-
    partisan, global security organization----
        The Chairman. I am sorry. You have to have that microphone,
    like, right here in front of you.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Even closer?
        The Chairman. Yes.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Is that better?
        The Chairman. Yes. Well, to the side. Just speak right into
    it, and that way we can hear you better.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Great.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I come before you as the president of the
    Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-partisan, global security
    organization working to reduce the risk of use of weapons of
    mass destruction and disruption.
        As a former professional staff member of this committee
    during Les Aspin's chairmanship, I am honored to appear before
    you, and I commend you for your leadership on this important
    issue.
        The topic of today's hearing is one of critical importance
    for our country and the world. In the short time that I have
    for my opening statement, I want to highlight a few key points.
        First, we have arrived at a very dangerous moment, where
    the risk of nuclear use is as high as it has ever been since
    the height of the Cold War. Today we live in an environment
    where new technologies like cyber pose significant challenges
    for the integrity of nuclear forces, where terrorists are
    trying to acquire nuclear capabilities, and where nuclear
    weapons have spread to nine states, some of which, like India
    and Pakistan, are engaged in ongoing regional conflict.
        We have reached a nadir in our relationship with Russia,
    with no strategy for how to manage the existential nuclear
    threat between us, with no ongoing dialogue between the United
    States and Russia. And with regularly occurring close calls
    between our two militaries, we are at a high risk of blundering
    into conflict.
        Second, we are headed in the wrong direction. Instead of
    focusing on policies, practices, and deployment decisions that
    move us out of danger and reduce the risk of nuclear use, we
    are taking actions that increase the chances of use. We have
    been increasing, rather than decreasing, our reliance on
    nuclear weapons. The administration is proposing to move
    forward with new types of weapons and new scenarios for their
    use.
        And, perhaps most troubling, we have been systematically
    removing the guardrails that have regulated nuclear competition
    and reduced nuclear threats for more than five decades: the
    agreements, treaties, dialogue, negotiations, and verification
    that have helped to keep us safe. We are now at a point where
    the only protective guardrail still in place is the New START
    Treaty, which will expire in less than 2 years, unless it is
    extended, something the United States and Russia can and should
    do on a priority basis.
        Finally, Congress has a critical role to play in supporting
    policies, forces, and actions that reduce the risk of use,
    prevent proliferation pressures, and keep in place the
    guardrails of nuclear stability, predictability, and
    transparency that keep our country safe.
        What can Congress do to help reduce nuclear dangers?
    Several specific recommendations for your consideration
    include: number one, Congress must take the lead in creating
    the political space for re-engagement with Russia on nuclear
    threat reduction.
        Despite all of our differences with Russia, we still have
    an existential common interest in preventing a nuclear weapon
    from being used by accident, mistake, or blunder. Congress
    should work with the administration to encourage the resumption
    of dialogue and negotiations in multiple channels:
    diplomatically, militarily, and among legislative leaders on
    both sides.
        Second, Congress should work to increase leadership
    decision time for nuclear use by supporting the removal of
    nuclear weapons from prompt launch. Our most vulnerable, least
    survivable force, the ICBM force, would be a logical place to
    begin this effort. The United States and Russia should move on
    this together.
        Third, the United States does not need to build or deploy
    new low-yield weapons. We have a robust nuclear deterrent
    today, one that is capable of being used anywhere on the globe.
    Deploying new low-yield weapons lowers the threshold for
    nuclear use, increases our reliance on nuclear weapons, and
    undermines U.S. efforts to prevent the further spread of
    nuclear weapons. It is folly to bet our children's future on
    the premise that a use or exchange of nuclear weapons could
    remain limited and controllable.
        Fourth, Congress should encourage the administration to
    extend New START this year.
        And fifth, and finally, on nuclear use policy, Congress
    should consider legislation to ensure that any decision to
    authorize the use of a nuclear weapon is deliberate,
    justifiable under international law, and consistent with
    authorities granted in the Constitution. Legislating a
    congressional role in the authorization of the use of nuclear
    weapons, in particular one that would limit the executive
    branch's ability to use a nuclear weapon first, is one option
    that should be considered.
        I will stop here, and look forward to taking your
    questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Rohlfing can be found in the
    Appendix on page 57.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Blair.

       STATEMENT OF BRUCE G. BLAIR, RESEARCH SCHOLAR, PROGRAM ON
           SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Blair. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry, and
    other distinguished members of this committee, thank you very
    much for the invitation to appear here today. It is a great
    honor for me to testify.
        Like many other Americans of my generation, I first learned
    about nuclear weapons in 1962, when President Kennedy
    threatened the Soviet Union to--that we would unleash our
    nuclear might against them if they were to launch nuclear
    weapons from Cuba against the United States. At that time it
    was quite reassuring to me to hear that we had a secure second-
    strike force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage in
    retaliation to such an attack.
        Now I first learned that simply being able to destroy
    Russia as a viable country was not, in fact, the reality of our
    nuclear weapons policy when I became a nuclear missile launch
    officer and a support officer for the Strategic Air Command's
    Looking Glass airborne command post. Our planners saw nuclear
    weapons quite differently. They saw them as tools for the
    actual or coercive use during a nuclear conflict, primarily to
    destroy the deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union and
    China/North Korea.
        This warfighting strategy thus ran contrary to and
    contradicted the idea of stability based on mutual deterrence,
    which is the very foundation of our nuclear security. And as we
    tried to neutralize each other's second-strike forces, we
    managed only to fuel an arms race and increase the chances of
    nuclear war by design or by accident.
        Thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons
    aimed largely at each other stood--and still stand today--ready
    for immediate first use or launch on warning. Back then, as
    now, the President would have just a few minutes to authorize
    launch on warning, on the basis of enemy attack indications
    that could be false or misleading, and today possibly caused by
    cyber interference.
        We heard during the opening remarks about false alarms
    during the Cold War. None of them rose to the level of a
    President of the United States. Over the last 10 years we have
    had, on multiple occasions, ambiguous ballistic missile threats
    that have risen to the level of Presidents. So this is not a
    historical concern.
        Our and Russia's hair-trigger launch postures, driven by
    vulnerabilities of our own making, continue to run the risk
    that fear, miscalculation, misperception, accident, or false
    warning could trigger a nuclear exchange. As you have heard--
    and I agree--the risk of blundering into nuclear war presents
    what is, by far, the greatest immediate threat to the United
    States today.
        So what do we do? I agree with all the suggestions that I
    have heard from Joan. But I would also propose that we return
    to first principles, and design for ourselves a posture for
    assured retaliation that is smaller, but is more survivable and
    more stable than the one we presently have and the one that we
    currently plan to have.
        This posture would hold at risk Russia's, China's, and
    North Korea's key elements of state power, economy, and
    leadership. It would require, by my estimation--and I think the
    Pentagon planning is in--aligned with this--it would require
    covering about 450 aim points in those 3 countries, coverage
    that, in my view, would easily meet any reasonable judgement of
    actual deterrent requirements.
        But pivoting away from targeting opposing forces and from
    the fantasy of controlling and dominating nuclear escalation
    would allow us to eliminate most of the 4,000 weapons in the
    current active stockpile. Only five or six of the planned
    Columbia-class submarines would be needed to be built. That is
    it.
        All other existing and planned U.S. nuclear weapons could
    be scrapped. This would mean eliminating the land-based missile
    force, the ICBMs. But it is a vulnerable force that weakens,
    not strengthens the triad. We are better off without it.
        If you want a stable triad that includes land-based
    missiles, then a mobile basing mode is required. Are you
    prepared to go that way?
        The most important project in this modernization program
    should be fixing our vulnerable command, control,
    communications, and intelligence systems, C3I. It has always
    been the Achilles heel of our posture. It would likely collapse
    within hours into a nuclear conflict. So fixing this is
    essential for any strategy, including assured retaliation, and
    for enabling the President to intelligently choose a response
    if deterrence should fail.
        So instead of modernizing the--all three of these legs, I
    think it is most important that we--as Joan indicated--increase
    Presidential decision time. That should be our top priority.
        And last but not least, pivoting away from warfighting
    means recognizing that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is
    to deter their use by others. It is not to deter conventional
    aggression. We have ample capabilities with our allies to
    deter, defeat, and punish conventional aggression.
        And the flip side, the operational side of sole purpose, is
    no first use. No first use is axiomatic and true deterrence
    because it means threatening to respond to an attack, not to
    initiating one. No first use is further justified by the
    absence of foreseeable scenarios, in my view, that would ever
    motivate a U.S. President to use nuclear weapons first.
        Let me close there, and thank you for your attention and
    look forward to questions, discussion.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Blair can be found in the
    Appendix on page 69.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Miller.

    STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN C. MILLER, PRINCIPAL, THE SCOWCROFT
                                 GROUP

        Mr. Miller. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
    members of the committee, I appear before you today in my
    capacity as a private individual, not representing or speaking
    for any other individual, institution, or entity. And the
    answers and positions I take before you reflect solely my
    personal views, except when I quote specifically official U.S.
    policy.
        I thank you for inviting me to discuss a subject to which I
    have dedicated my entire professional life, and I spent most of
    three decades actively formulating deterrence in defense policy
    in the Department of Defense and at the National Security
    Council.
        In the two Bush administrations I led reviews that lowered
    the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons by 65 percent and
    37 percent, respectively. Those reductions created the START II
    Treaty, enabled the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and resulted,
    cumulatively, in about an 80 percent cut from U.S. force levels
    in 1989.
        So I sit before you this morning as neither an advocate of
    massive arsenals, nor an opponent of arms control. My principal
    purpose this morning is to distinguish fact from rhetoric and
    fiction.
        For starters, the nuclear deterrence policy and posture of
    the United States today is squarely in the mainstream of U.S.
    policy as it has existed in Democratic and Republican
    administrations for over almost 60 years. That policy and that
    posture is premised on the firm belief that a nuclear war
    cannot be won and must not be fought.
        That recognition on our part, however, is not sufficient.
    It is essential that potential enemy leaders understand and
    accept that, as well. And the greatest risk of nuclear war
    today lies in a potential enemy leadership miscalculating and
    believing it can carry out a successful attack against
    ourselves or our allies.
        As a result, U.S. policy seeks to deter, to prevent nuclear
    and major conventional attack against ourselves and our allies.
    It is not what some call a warfighting policy. It is a
    deterrence policy.
        Deterrence rests on the premise that we will maintain the
    capability to retaliate against the assets which potential
    enemy leaders value most. In the case of Russia and China,
    those valued assets are the elements of state power: the senior
    leadership itself; yes, their military forces; their internal
    security forces; their ability to command and control their
    nation; and the industrial potential to sustain war.
        For almost 60 years the United States has accomplished this
    goal principally by maintaining a triad of nuclear forces
    undergirded by a command and control infrastructure in a
    nuclear weapons complex. And that triad has been recognized by
    all administrations since President Eisenhower, Democratic and
    Republican alike, as unique and vital. Its combination of three
    basing modes, each with unique strengths and different but
    offsetting vulnerabilities, separate attack azimuths, and
    complementary alert postures, presents potential enemy offenses
    and defenses with insurmountable obstacles. It is that
    combination which provides for deterrent stability, because an
    aggressor cannot preemptively destroy the triad or prevent the
    retaliation it would impose. That is why it is the underpinning
    for our nuclear forces today.
        And Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Secretary Mattis's doubts
    about the triad when he came to office. But this is what the
    nuclear posture--as you said, using Secretary Mattis's voice,
    ``I have questioned the triad and I cannot solve the deterrent
    problem reducing it from a triad. I have been persuaded that
    the triad, in its framework, is the right way to go.''
        Due to deferrals of modernization that should have started
    about 15 years ago, our nuclear forces are well beyond their
    expected service lives, and they must either be modernized or
    retired. History has demonstrated that modernization is the
    surer path towards limiting the chances of nuclear war.
        There are two fundamental facts with regard to that
    modernization I would like to point out to the committee.
    First, the U.S. program is not creating a nuclear arms race.
    Russia and China began modernizing and expanding their nuclear
    forces in the early 2000s, and they have been and continue to
    field many new and advanced nuclear systems.
        In sharp contrast, the United States will not begin to
    field replacements for its Cold War-era triad until the mid to
    late 2020s. And any notion, therefore, that the U.S.
    modernization is spurring a new arms race is counter-factual
    and wholly without merit.
        Second, modernizing the triad is eminently affordable.
    Critics of modernization have dramatically inflated that cost,
    throwing around a 30-year life cycle to produce a sticker
    shock.
        The truth is that the cost of maintaining the nuclear
    modernization program, even when in full swing by the 2020s, is
    not expected to exceed between 3 to 4 percent of the defense
    budget. When including the cost of operating the deterrent, the
    total cost of protecting America and our allies from nuclear
    and major non-nuclear attack is between 6 to 7 percent of the
    defense budget, not too much to pay to prevent an existential
    threat.
        I look forward to elaborating on these points and other
    topics of the committee. In particular, I look forward to
    elaborating on why the concepts of de-alerting our nuclear
    forces and adopting a policy of no first use, while of
    superficial and popular appeal, will in fact produce
    instability, undercut deterrence, and cause great concern among
    U.S. allies, while having no effect on Russia or China.
        Importantly, I look forward to discussing arms control, the
    New START Treaty, the INF Treaty, and I look forward to
    discussing why the introduction of a small yield--a small
    number of low-yield Trident warheads into our force is so very
    important today. I cannot think of another weapons system in
    the recent past which is so misunderstood, mischaracterized, or
    demonized as the low-yield Trident.
        I have submitted formal written testimony to the committee
    and respectfully request that it be included in the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
    Appendix on page 87.]
        The Chairman. Thank you. I have more questions than I have
    time for. I will try to be quick about it.
        On the triad issue, the ICBMs are stationary, they are
    easily identifiable by the enemy, in terms of knowing where
    they are. And also, since they are not as survivable as, you
    know, the bombers and the nuclear subs, which can--which they
    will not know where they are, in all likelihood, you know, if
    they are launched on, it is sort of use it or lose it at that
    point. If you think there is missiles coming in, you had better
    launch them, or the ICBMs are gone.
        So what exactly do the ICBMs add to that deterrence? And I
    completely agree with you, we have to have the capability that
    they know that even if they try and strike us, that they can't
    take out our weapons. That is the beauty of the submarines and
    the bombers, is that they are far easier to conceal. But what
    exactly do the ICBMs add to the deterrents?
        Yeah, I will start with Mr. Miller and then go to Dr.
    Blair.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir. First of all, I point out that,
    on a day-to-day basis, we only have two legs of the triad. The
    bombers are not on alert, they are not armed, and so you are
    basically dealing with ICBMs and submarines.
        Second, we don't have a launch under--attack launch-on-
    warning posture that the deterrent relies upon.
        Many, many years ago we came up with plans and procedures
    so that the President has the option to launch ICBMs or not.
    But our deterrent does not rely on launch on warning.
        The Chairman. Right.
        Mr. Miller. Third, 400 ICBM silos scattered across the
    United States. If an enemy wants to neutralize those, that
    means putting at least 400 to 800 warheads in the air. There is
    no question that that is a massive attack on the United States,
    which will draw a massive response. And that is an important
    indicator of what is going on in the world at that time.
        And last, the ICBMs are single-warhead systems. So that
    provides flexibility in a crisis, as a single warhead.
        The Chairman. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. As Frank mentioned, we actually have a monad
    today because the bombers are off alert and vulnerable. The
    ICBM force is vulnerable, and offers nothing to second-strike
    deterrence. Our second-strike deterrence capability resides
    entirely in our submarine force at sea.
        What is worse is that it not only doesn't contribute to
    deterrence as the way I define it, as opposed to, let's say,
    the use of those weapons in a first strike, in a warfighting
    capacity, that those weapons on hair-trigger alert--and I will
    define that, if you would like, because I use the term in a
    very specific sense--create pressure on the President to
    consider the launch of those weapons very quickly, if there are
    indications of an attack against North America.
        And I use the term ``hair-trigger'' in the following sense.
        First, those Minuteman missiles are armed, they are
    targeted, they are fueled, and their gyroscopes are spinning.
    And they will fire instantly upon receipt of three short bursts
    of computer code. The weapons themselves, they will fire if
    they get that code. Hopefully, it only would come from
    authorized sources directed by the President.
        Secondly, because of the pressure to use or lose those
    forces, we would start a launch emergency procedure involving
    the President that--it is almost like, you know, showdown at
    O.K. Corral at high noon. You get indications of a possible
    attack against us, or even a flinch or a false alarm, a process
    begins that I describe as the rote enactment of a prepared
    script. There is no deliberation involved.
        The Chairman. I have got to move on, because I want to get
    some other people.
        Dr. Blair. Right, okay.
        The Chairman. Dr.----
        Dr. Blair. Sorry.
        The Chairman. Ms. Rohlfing, sorry, do you have anything?
        Ms. Rohlfing. Thank you. So I would go back to first
    principles, and just note that we, as a nation, ought to be
    really focused on preventing the risk of use of nuclear
    weapons. And when I evaluate the ICBM leg of the triad, I am
    concerned about its lack of survivability.
        And I agree with Bruce. The fact that they are use it or
    lose it weapons puts pressure on a decision maker to make a
    rapid decision in a very short amount of time----
        The Chairman. And I think that that is the ultimate
    question from all three. There is not a lot of disagreement
    here, in terms of what the purpose of the nuclear weapons are.
    The question is how much is enough. And that is really what I
    am debating.
        And yes, when you look at the number of nuclear weapons
    that we had during the height of the Cold War, we have a lot
    less now. But the number of nuclear weapons we had during the
    height of the Cold War--and this may be--it was enough to,
    like, destroy the world, like, seven times over or something.
        So, you know, a nuclear weapon packs a hell of a lot of
    punch. And China's approach--and I know they are modernizing
    their force, but China has less than 300 nuclear weapons, and
    they figure that is enough to inflict an enormous amount of
    damage on anyone who would try to attack them, enough to
    discourage them. And that is what I question.
        And I know the New START Treaty has pulled it way down. I
    think the number is 1,550 delivery systems. But keep in mind
    delivery systems--there is an unlimited amount of weapons that
    you can have in storage. There is no limit on that. These are
    merely the ones that are ``deployed.''
        So you got 15--and also 1,550 delivery mechanisms. That is
    not 1,550 warheads. It can be more warheads than that.
        So--and I guess, Mr. Miller, I will close with you and two
    questions. One, 1,000 nuclear weapons, I mean, that is a pretty
    powerful amount, in and of itself. And we have a lot more than
    that. What is the calculus that says that we need more than
    that?
        And then I will ask you a quick question about the low-
    yield thing.
        Mr. Miller. The calculus as to what it takes to deter is
    something that is worked out by Strategic Command and given to
    the President through the Secretary of Defense, based on what
    are the strategic valued assets of the Russian and Chinese
    leaderships, not mirror imaging what we hold dear, but what
    they hold dear, what----
        The Chairman. See, do you think that we couldn't
    sufficiently discourage that? I mean if we dropped 100 nuclear
    weapons on Russia, that wouldn't be enough of a discouragement?
        Mr. Miller. I think that the Russian leadership looks at
    nuclear war differently than we do. And I am not going to give
    you a number. You can always say take the 10 least important
    weapons off. I mean I did that. I cut the force dramatically
    in----
        The Chairman. You did.
        Mr. Miller. But the question is what do you need to hold
    that risk? And I think the current answer is what you get from
    Strategic Command. It is what you need to hold Russia and China
    and a reserve force for other contingencies.
        The Chairman. Just quick--one thing I have learned on this
    committee is within the Defense Department and within the
    people who make the weapons and lobby them, I have never had
    them come up and say, ``We are good, don't buy any more.''
    There is a certain bias built into that system that says we
    always need a little more.
        And to some extent, as chairman of the committee, that is
    something I am trying to do differently. I have been here for
    22 years, and that is what we do. We come in, oh my gosh, we
    are not ready. We need more, more, more, more, more.
        So I hear what you are saying. But I have seen that bias
    over and over again. So I want that bias balanced against some
    actual numbers. And, you know, when I asked you if 100 nuclear
    weapons would discourage Russia, the look on your face was
    basically yes. I mean you didn't say it, but, you know, that is
    a pretty powerful punch. So that is what I am trying to balance
    out.
        Now, quickly on the low-yield thing, the problem with the
    low-yield thing is when you start contemplating--the argument
    is you contemplate the discussion that you could win a
    nuclear--that you could launch a low-yield nuclear weapon and
    it wouldn't trigger a catastrophic response. Okay? I don't
    agree with that.
        Mr. Miller. I don't, either.
        The Chairman. I think it is unbelievably risky if you----
        Mr. Miller. I agree with that.
        The Chairman. So the benefit of a low-yield nuclear weapon,
    supposedly, is, well, if they hit us with a low-yield, we can
    have a proportionate response.
        When it comes to nuclear deterrents, I don't really care
    about a proportionate response. I think we need to make it
    clear if you use a nuclear weapon, it is a nuclear weapon. And
    if the smallest thing we have is bigger than the one you
    launched at us, well, too damn bad. Okay? We are going to hit
    you with it.
        So I don't get the notion that a low-yield nuclear weapon
    does anything other than potentially make people think wrong,
    and doesn't add anything to our deterrent capability.
        Mr. Miller. Well, back to the broad discussion, Congressman
    Smith, I agree with that. You and I may absolutely agree on
    that point.
        But I think where we start is the fact that, beginning at
    the--in the late 1990s, early 2000s, the Russian military
    devised a strategy for the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to
    win on the battlefield. They then went out and bought new
    weapons to carry out that strategy, and they have practiced
    that strategy. And they did all of that in the face of our
    existing triad----
        The Chairman. Got that. Sorry to interrupt, but why don't
    we tell them that, okay, if you do that, we are going to hit
    you with a nuclear weapon----
        Mr. Miller. Well, again----
        The Chairman [continuing]. And we don't care what size it
    is.
        Mr. Miller. My point is they seem to be convinced that
    they--that there was a gap in our deterrence structure, and
    that they spent a lot of money to go out and build these
    weapons.
        Now, deterrence is about getting in the mind of the other
    person. Not in your mind, sir, or in mine. And if they spent
    that money, and if they have exercised it, and if they have
    threatened it, the point is to have something that goes back
    and says, ``We are not going to match your whole theater
    nuclear force structure. We are going to have a small number of
    these weapons that can respond to meet what you thought was a
    deterrent gap.'' That is all.
        Don't go there in the first place, don't use a nuclear
    weapon, because it could escalate out of control. Are you
    prepared to bet Mother Russia on a small piece of Latvia?
        The Chairman. All right, fair enough. I have got to get to
    Mr. Thornberry.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Miller, I
    thought that was a helpful conversation.
        One of the largest problems we have, I think, in thinking
    about nuclear deterrents, is that credibility is in the mind of
    the adversary. And we can make all sorts of proclamations, and
    we can sign all sorts of pieces of paper and do all sorts of
    things, but it--the question is what is in their mind, in their
    calculation, what do they see as vulnerabilities, and what do
    they see that they can get away with. If they think we are just
    a little bit better than they are, then the tendency is to test
    it. If we are a whole bunch better than they are, then you have
    less of a tendency to test it. At least that is part of my
    theory.
        I may stretch you for a second in going back in history, so
    tell me if you are not comfortable with this. Ms. Rohlfing
    talked about coming--working on the committee during Les--
    Secretary Aspin's time. My staff time in Washington goes back a
    little further than that, when Glickham and Pershing II
    deployments were being debated. And it--I am struck by the
    fact, with all of this debate on the INF Treaty, that so little
    discussion occurs around the vicious opposition that President
    Reagan got to deploying the intermediate-range systems in
    Europe to begin with.
        We heard a lot of the same arguments: ``Well, this will
    lower the threshold of nuclear weapons,'' ``This is provocative
    to the Russians,'' even though the Russians already had their
    systems there. All sorts--that there is less flying time, so
    that will make it more likely that there will be a nuclear
    exchange.
        There were demonstrations here, demonstrations in Europe--
    some of which we later found out were paid for by the KGB
    [Soviet Committee for State Security], by the way--but the
    tremendous opposition to those deployments. And yet NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] stuck together, NATO deployed
    those systems, and it was only because NATO deployed the
    systems that an INF Treaty was able to be signed by Reagan and
    Gorbachev.
        I would be interested in your historical reflection,
    because sometimes I think we get the cart before the horse. We
    think the paper is the thing that matters, but what really
    matters is the military strength that leads both sides to
    believe that it is in their best interest to sign some sort of
    treaty, or reach some sort of agreement. To me, that is the
    lesson of INF.
        But again, I am stretching you. I don't know. We didn't
    talk about this. Do you have reflections over your 30 years?
        Mr. Miller. Mr. Thornberry, I think you are right. I think
    that was an interesting time, when the Russians thought they
    could intimidate the NATO allies and that they could break the
    consensus on deployments.
        What I find disturbing is that, in a period where after the
    Bush 41-Gorbachev initiative, where we virtually eliminated our
    theater-based nuclear forces, the Russians who had signed that
    same pledge decided in the late 1990s to start building those
    forces up.
        Again, one can say that the Russians are foolish, that they
    waste their money, that this is a wrongheaded thing, that the
    leadership didn't know what the military was doing. I don't
    believe any of that. What I am concerned about is the Russian
    military believes that there are advantages that they could
    obtain by putting those weapons in the field and threatening
    our allies.
        So again, a small deterrent capability in the form of a
    limited number of low-yield Trident, I believe, answers that
    without having to return to a whole panoply of theater nuclear
    weapons to defend the alliance. And I think the lessons apply.
    Yes, sir.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will give other
    folks a chance.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    the witnesses and, you know, very thoughtful hearing,
    important, because the Nuclear Posture Review kind of came over
    late last year, and it really, I think, had some substantive
    changes that really need to be drilled down and explored much
    more deeply.
        And one point I just would like to get clarification from
    you, Mr. Miller, is that, you know, as Ms. Rohlfing said, New
    START, the clock is ticking, in terms of its expiration. Do you
    support extending New START?
        Mr. Miller. I believe that New START is a necessary, but
    not sufficient approach to our current condition.
        If I could describe, New START caps the traditional
    strategic forces of both sides. New START does nothing to cover
    the threat of the exotic weapons that Mr. Putin has been waving
    around. New START does nothing to cover the short-range threat
    to our allies.
        I would like to see New START extended in the context of a
    new negotiation which captures all U.S. and Russian nuclear
    weapons of all ranges and all types. That, I think, would cover
    our security----
        Mr. Courtney. Well, actually, I think there would probably
    be agreement across the table about the fact that New START
    should be enhanced, as well as extended. But, I mean, frankly,
    I think we are--with this administration, I mean, we may be
    looking at a situation where there is no effort made to extend
    it. And I just think it is important to really emphasize that,
    you know, that is a foundational backdrop to this, you know,
    nuclear posture policy of the country.
        In terms of low-yield, which, again, was really, I think,
    one of the real differentiating aspects of the review that came
    over last year, you know, coming from a district where there is
    a submarine force, and talking to folks there--and maybe, you
    know, I will talk to one of the other witnesses about this--is
    that--I mean one of the concerns that I have heard is just that
    if you have got a submarine out there that has got, you know,
    sort of mixed and matched missiles, in terms of low-yield/high-
    yield, if the decision is made to fire one of those, it is
    really--for the adversary, it is impossible to determine what
    kind of missile is coming at them. I mean they are not sort of
    color-coded.
        And I guess, you know, again, Ms. Rohlfing, I just sort of
    wonder if you would sort of talk about, you know, that question
    about whether or not you can really control a nuclear conflict
    once the missiles start flying, regardless of whether they are
    high-yield or low-yield.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Thank you. I want to reply and say, first of
    all, I don't believe there is a deterrence gap at low-yield. We
    have other low-yield options in the arsenal. And even setting
    that aside, I think our deterrent today is robust,
    comprehensive, and is perfectly capable of deterring a nuclear
    attack at any yield.
        So you raised the question of could an adversary
    discriminate, if we were to launch a submarine-launched
    ballistic missile, whether it is a low-yield or a regular-yield
    weapon, and the answer is no. I think, from the standpoint of
    watching an incoming launch, our adversary would expect--would
    have to anticipate that it is a regular--that is, high, you
    know, highly capable weapon, capable of enormous destruction.
    So that is another issue.
        But I think we are also focused on the wrong question here.
    We are putting so much emphasis into figuring out what does it
    take to persuade the adversary that we have a credible
    deterrent. And while that is certainly important, I believe we
    have today a robust comprehensive deterrent. I believe that a
    reasonable modernization program can sustain that deterrent
    over time, and we need to step back and balance our investments
    in our deterrent force against not only other needs of the
    Defense Department and our military, but also we need to look
    at the implications of our current posture for increasing the
    risk of use and the spread of these weapons.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        And actually, just to follow on that point--and you know,
    again, Dr. Blair, you talked about a possible smaller fleet of
    subs, of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines]. I think it is
    important to note that the fleet today is 14 SSBN Ohio-class.
    They are going to be over 40 years old. The hull life is giving
    out. So, I mean, it is really not even a question of nuclear
    policy, it is really a question of just--you know, they are not
    going to be safe for sailors.
        And the number of subs that are going to replace it is 12,
    so we are actually reducing the fleet from 14 to 12, and
    reducing the missile tubes from 24 to 16. I mean if you do the
    math, I mean, we are actually going to have a smaller fleet.
    But maintaining that second-strike capability does seem to be
    somewhat of a consensus issue here. I just wanted to make that
    point before yielding----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has----
        Mr. Miller. Mr. Courtney, may I make a factual----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's----
        Mr. Miller. May I make a factual statement?
        The Chairman [continuing]. Time has expired. I am sorry.
        Mr. Miller. A factual statement, may I, please?
        The Chairman. Oh, sure. But I just--I try not to do this,
    because if this happens we wind up in big trouble. Go ahead.
        Mr. Miller. Mr. Courtney, right now the Trident force
    carries two different types of warheads. One, a W76 warhead,
    and a W88 warhead, a much larger warhead. So if you are talking
    about discrimination problems, that exists right now today.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Miller. And it is contextual.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of our
    witnesses for being here today.
        And Mr. Miller, I want to thank you for your decades of
    service with the Department of Defense and the National
    Security Council. And with your background, in your testimony
    you identified the overall age of our nuclear deterrent
    capabilities as a weakness in the strategic triad, and argue
    for the modernization of nuclear forces.
        U.S. nuclear weapons are surpassing their intended service
    lives, with the average age of our nuclear warheads at 26
    years.
        The Nuclear Posture Review addressed the importance of
    tritium production and the increase of pit production to 80
    pits per year by 2030. Both of these critical missions are
    connected to the Savannah River Site that I am very grateful to
    represent.
        What negative impacts do you see if the U.S. fails to
    modernize our nuclear inventory?
        Mr. Miller. Mr. Wilson, the United States today is the only
    nuclear weapon state that cannot produce a nuclear pit to be
    placed into the operational force. The nuclear enterprise, run
    by DOE [U.S. Department of Energy], is on its back legs. It
    is--it desperately needs to be modernized. We need to be able
    to replace weapons, some of which are 60, 70 years old, in the
    arsenal. So the infrastructure in DOE must be upgraded, or the
    deterrent over time will not have credibility.
        Mr. Wilson. And then that relates to the next question, and
    the National Defense Strategy rightfully addresses the great
    power competition and dynamic threats the U.S. faces. I believe
    this provides a clear path for the U.S. to modernize, reform,
    and build partner capacity through an emphasis on peace through
    strength. Deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence, is
    critical to protect the U.S. and our allies across the globe by
    projecting strength.
        Can you discuss how essential it is for a nuclear triad to
    maintain both a first- and second-strike capability, with a
    flexible response option? How does this deter a massive
    conventional or nuclear attack by the enemy?
        Mr. Miller. I think that the triad, in its overall
    strength, as I have described earlier, is capable of deterring
    a massive Russian or Chinese attack.
        I believe that our capability to respond flexibly is
    necessary to assure our European allies that a Russian land
    grab, where they have conventional superiority to date all
    along the NATO-Russia border would not succeed, and it could
    not succeed because they can't use a nuclear weapon to cement
    their victory. So they--the tie between our strategic forces
    and the defense of NATO is, I believe, a critical element of
    our deterrence.
        Mr. Wilson. And the deterrence is so absolutely critical.
        In 2016 the Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, and General
    John Hyten both testified that funding for nuclear weapons
    modernization of the nuclear triad was affordable. Secretary of
    Defense James Mattis then made it his number one priority,
    since our inventory has atrophied.
        Can you discuss how modernizing our nuclear triad over 30
    years is a minimal percentage of the defense budget and explain
    the urgent need for the investment in our nuclear inventory?
        Mr. Miller. As far as the urgency, as Mr. Courtney pointed
    out, the submarines are getting old and will, at some point in
    the 2020s and beyond, have to be retired, one by one. They are
    not safe to operate.
        Minuteman systems are about 1970s vintage. They have been
    upgraded, but they are to the point where they can't be
    upgraded. The air-launched cruise missile, introduced in 1980,
    had a projected service life of 10 years. So the modernization
    of the force is critical. You either have to modernize it or
    retire it. You can't afford to retire it.
        And even the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] agrees that
    the full modernization program in the 2020s is going to cost
    between 6-7 percent of the defense budget.
        Mr. Wilson. And----
        Mr. Miller. Six to seven percent.
        Mr. Wilson. And it should be known by the American people
    that the Russian state-owned media has reported that hypersonic
    missiles that Russia is developing would be able to hit
    multiple sites in the United States, and they actually
    identified Maryland, California, and Washington. These threats
    only reinforce the need for an effective deterrent strategy.
        General Hyten recently testified to the Senate Armed
    Services Committee that our defense against hypersonic missiles
    is our nuclear deterrent. What component of the nuclear triad
    is most in need of modernization to counter and deter the use
    of hypersonic missiles?
        Mr. Miller. I don't think any--again, sir, each leg is
    getting to the end of its service life. If you believe in a
    triad--and I do--because we didn't do it during the George W.
    Bush administration, the force needs to be modernized. The
    entire force needs to be modernized.
        Mr. Wilson. And again, I appreciate your efforts, because
    it is so clear it is peace through strength. And it comes
    from--and Congressman Thornberry has identified how that has
    been successful in the past. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Miller, you stated that a no first use policy would be
    destabilizing. In other words, would create a higher likelihood
    of nuclear conflict. Why is this the case?
        Mr. Miller. I think there are four points, Mr. Moulton.
        The first is our allies have, for decades, depended on a
    U.S. policy that we would escalate to nuclear use to end a
    conventional war in Europe. If we were in these very tumultuous
    transatlantic times to remove that guarantee, we would cause
    allies to doubt the U.S. guarantee of their safety.
        Second, because some of those allies can build their own
    nuclear weapons, if we remove that guarantee, we could well
    lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapon states in the
    world.
        Third, we are not going to change Chinese and Russian
    views. The Russian view is first use. The Chinese say they have
    a no first use policy, but there is enough intelligence to
    indicate that that is a very questionable condition, and it
    could change in a moment, with an authoritarian government.
        And fourth, there is absolutely no reason in the world why
    the Russian or Chinese leaderships would believe in a no first
    use pledge on our part. So it wouldn't have any effect in
    managing a crisis. Those are the four reasons no first use
    makes no sense.
        Mr. Moulton. Ms. Rohlfing, how would you respond to Mr.
    Miller's argument? I hate the idea that a single person,
    especially this President, could make a decision to launch
    nuclear weapons in a matter of minutes. But how else do we
    defer a--we deter, rather, a preemptive attack on us?
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I think no first use is the right goal. It
    is the right aspiration for United States policy.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, it is wonderful if it is an aspiration,
    but we live in a real world, where we have an adversary that
    advocates first use. So how do we deter first use----
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I think we need----
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Without having that in our----
        Ms. Rohlfing. You know, we need to step back and think
    about, again, what are the consequences of continuing with a
    first use policy, in terms of implications for the spread of
    these weapons to other states, in terms of increasing the risk
    of use----
        Mr. Moulton. That is all well and good, but that is not my
    question, Ms. Rohlfing. My question is how do you deter a
    preemptive attack from an adversary that has a policy of being
    open to first use, if you do not--if you require----
        Ms. Rohlfing. So----
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Congressional authorization for a
    response?
        Ms. Rohlfing. We have a policy of deterrence, and we have
    the world's most powerful conventional forces. We also have
    said that we will retaliate using nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay, I mean----
        Ms. Rohlfing. That is a----
        Mr. Moulton. I just don't----
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. That is a very solid deterrent--
    --
        Mr. Moulton. The argument that--so we respond to a Russian
    first use, a massive attack, with conventional forces? I mean
    it just seems totally unrealistic. Now----
        Ms. Rohlfing. Well, that is where our policy of retaliating
    comes in. I mean that is at the heart of our deterrent----
        Mr. Moulton. Okay, so let's get to the heart of that. You
    have criticized ICBMs as a ``use it or lose it weapon.'' But
    isn't that the fundamental purpose, that if the Russians were
    to launch a massive attack on our ICBM force, we would, in
    fact, respond immediately? And that is what prevents, that is
    what deters that attack?
        Ms. Rohlfing. So the issue with ICBMs is twofold. One is it
    increases the risk of use, because these are weapons that,
    because they are so vulnerable, decrease crisis stability and
    could invite an attack.
        And, by the way, I would just----
        Mr. Moulton. How would they invite an attack, Mr. Rohlfing?
        Ms. Rohlfing. Well, because they are sitting-duck targets.
    They are vulnerable. They are not survivable. So we have to
    worry that in today's world, where----
        Mr. Moulton. But the point of having them is that it deters
    an attack because that is how we respond. So if we just get rid
    of them, or we say we are not going to use them on the hair-
    trigger we have now, how does that make it less likely for the
    Russians to attack us?
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I think if we could stand down with the
    Russians and, frankly, all other nuclear weapon states, we
    would be in a much safer world.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay.
        Ms. Rohlfing. We would be----
        Mr. Moulton. So I agree with you on that point.
        Ms. Rohlfing. And I think that----
        Mr. Moulton. I mean that is not----
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Is why we should----
        Mr. Moulton. That is not an answer to my question. But I
    agree with----
        Ms. Rohlfing. That is why we should set it as a goal, and
    work toward it.
        Mr. Moulton. That is wonderful, it is a goal. But we live
    in a real world where the Russians have hundreds of nuclear
    weapons targeted at us, and a policy of being willing to----
        Ms. Rohlfing. Correct.
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Use them for--use them
    preemptively.
        Ms. Rohlfing. And I believe the United States threat to
    retaliate using the full force of our nuclear arsenal is plenty
    of deterrent capability.
        I also cannot imagine a world where we, as the world's
    strongest superpower, would be prepared to use nuclear weapons
    first in a preemptive way, and be willing to bear the----
        Mr. Moulton. Well, I agree with you.
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. The opprobrium that would come
    with that----
        Mr. Moulton. The fact--it is pretty clear from this
    discussion that the Russians are less likely to attack us
    because we have ICBMs than if we were to just get rid of them.
        Now, Mr. Miller, with regards to low-yield weapons, you
    stated that the Russians there see a deterrence gap, where they
    don't see it with ICBMs, as we just discussed with Ms.
    Rohlfing.
        But what is wrong with Chairman Smith's argument? You can't
    tell whether it is a low-yield weapon or a high-yield weapon as
    it is being used. If they think that we have a deterrence gap,
    it is about the fundamental willingness to use nuclear weapons.
    It shouldn't matter what size they are.
        Mr. Miller. It--because they have invested so much in a new
    strategy and have fleshed that out with new weapons systems, I
    believe they think we have a weakness in our posture.
        Why would they do this, from a standing start, without any
    good reason? They don't invest money foolishly. And the----
        The Chairman. Sorry, Mr. Miller. I hate to keep doing this
    to you, but we are again over time.
        Mr. Moulton. I think the Russians do invest money foolishly
    sometimes, Mr. Miller. But thank you.
        The Chairman. I am sorry, I have to address a couple issues
    here.
        On the no first use issue, the point there, the reason that
    no first use makes sense is we are saying that the purpose of
    our nuclear arsenal is to stop nuclear war. And I think this
    point has not been yet made at the hearing, that nuclear war is
    one of the few things that can actually destroy the planet.
    Wars are like--stopping us from getting into an all-out nuclear
    war is enormously important.
        Now, I get all the arguments about can you really trust the
    no first use policy, can you--and then back and forth, what
    good is it going to do. I don't agree with the argument that
    somehow there is ever a scenario where we need to use nuclear
    weapons first. I simply don't agree with that. Our nuclear
    weapons should exist to stop nuclear war, not to start it. That
    is the purpose of no first use.
        And as far as the ICBMs, and whether or not they are useful
    or not, the problem with them is they are identifiable targets.
    And also, I don't think they are necessary for deterrence
    because of the submarines we have. And the bombers you
    mentioned, yes, they are not deployed. They are quickly
    deployable, and can be used.
        That is the answers--I think Mr. Moulton raised some very
    good questions, but those are the answers that I think would
    better address that.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
        The Chairman. Sorry, Mac, go ahead.
        Mr. Thornberry. Yeah. And I know it is tempting to get into
    a back-and-forth debate on a whole variety of things.
        I would say, for my standpoint, I don't want to simplify
    the calculations of the Russians on any issue. I--you know, are
    we going to be the first to use nuclear weapons? I cannot
    imagine such a scenario. Do I want to tell the Russians what we
    are never going to do? No. I want them to guess. I want to have
    a wide panoply of nuclear deterrents, and I want to not say
    what we are not going to do, so that they are more cautious in
    making their decisions.
        So I do think--back to the point of getting into the minds
    of the adversaries--I don't want to make that easier.
        The Chairman. Yeah. The only thing I would raise on that
    issue, in the spirit of good conversation here, is that having
    an adversary completely freaked out, not knowing what we are
    going to do with a whole lot of nuclear weapons, and not sure
    when they would use them----
        Mr. Thornberry. I don't want to completely freak them out.
        The Chairman. That has a downside, as well.
        Mr. Thornberry. I want to have uncertainty.
        The Chairman. That is fair.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I come here usually to hear the
    witnesses testify. If we have every member ask questions and
    then the chairman intervene, I think it is certainly going to
    make for a very, very long hearing. I appreciate----
        The Chairman. It is. I did it once.
        Mr. Turner [continuing]. The time that I have received.
        The Chairman. I apologize. Go ahead----
        Mr. Turner. I do want to associate myself with Mr.
    Moulton's comments and certainly Mac Thornberry's. It is the
    threat, not the use of the weapons that keep us safe. And the
    proof that they have kept us safe, obviously, is that they have
    kept us safe the entire time that we have had the triad.
        So to all of our witnesses, I am going to ask you a series
    of questions and ask if you--I am going to make a series of
    statements and ask if you agree or disagree. They are actually
    fairly simple statements, there is no tricks here.
        And then after we go through these agree or disagrees, then
    I am going to ask for your comments on them, and have a
    discussion with you. But I want to get these agree-disagree to
    see to the extent that we have a disagreement among the
    members.
        My first statement is, over the last 20 years the United
    States has reduced its number of nuclear warheads. Agree or
    disagree, Mr. Miller?
        Mr. Miller. Agree.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. Agree.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing?
        Ms. Rohlfing. Agree.
        Mr. Turner. Over the last 50 years the United States has
    decreased its number of nuclear warheads.
        Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. Yes.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Yes.
        Mr. Turner. Okay. Over the last 20 years the number of
    nuclear warheads on the planet have increased. Over the last 20
    years the number of nuclear warheads on the planet have
    increased.
        Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Yes.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. Yes.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. The total number of warheads----
        Mr. Turner. Yes.
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. On the planet?
        Mr. Turner. Yes.
        Ms. Rohlfing. No.
        Mr. Turner. Over the last 20 years, the number of nuclear
    warheads on the planet has not increased.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Yes.
        Mr. Turner. Yes. Okay. Over the last 50 years, Mr. Miller,
    has the number of nuclear warheads on the planet increased?
        Mr. Miller. No, not given the large--no.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. No.
        Mr. Turner. Okay, Ms.----
        Ms. Rohlfing. No.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing, no. Okay. So my next statement is
    a statement based upon the answers that you just gave.
        There appears to be no relationship between the reduction
    of the number of United States nuclear warheads and the
    reduction of the total number of nuclear warheads on the
    planet. You both--all of you just answered yes at the number--
    you agreed that the number of nuclear warheads in the United
    States over the past 20 years has decreased, and you have all
    agreed the number of nuclear warheads on the planet over the
    last 20 years has increased.
        Therefore, the conclusion of there is no correlation
    between the reduction of the United States nuclear warheads
    resulting in the total reduction in nuclear warheads on the
    planet. Do you agree, Mr. Miller?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. I didn't quite follow that. I would have to
    think about that, sorry.
        Mr. Turner. If we reduced our nuclear warheads and the
    total number on the planet did not go down, there is no
    correlation between our reduction of our nuclear warhead
    numbers and the aggregate number on the planet. Correct, Dr.
    Blair? Agree?
        Dr. Blair. I think so, yes.
        Mr. Turner. Yes. Mr. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I don't buy the logic of it. I think it is
    the wrong----
        Mr. Turner. It is just math, Ms. Rohlfing. It is not logic.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I think it is the wrong question.
        Mr. Turner. It is just math. If our number goes down and
    the number----
        Ms. Rohlfing. I don't dispute the math.
        Mr. Turner [continuing]. On the planet does not go down----
        Ms. Rohlfing. I dispute----
        Mr. Turner [continuing]. There is no correlation between
    the aggregate number----
        Ms. Rohlfing. I dispute the conclusion that you are making.
        Mr. Turner. And that is why I ask these questions, because,
    Ms. Rohlfing, your answer is fantasy. I mean it is absolutely
    total numbers. It is just math.
        Let's go to the next one. Would you rather--if the United
    States was forced to use a nuclear weapon, would you rather
    that the United States use a high-yield nuclear weapon or a
    low-yield nuclear weapon?
        Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. I would rather deter any Russian use in the
    first place.
        Mr. Turner. I am just saying if the United States was
    forced to use a nuclear weapon.
        Mr. Miller. Low-yield.
        Mr. Turner. Would you rather them use a high-yield or a
    low-yield?
        Mr. Miller. Low-yield.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Miller.
        Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and a low-
    yield weapon is a misnomer, because it is actually a very high-
    yield weapon.
        Mr. Turner. So you say there is no difference.
        Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I agree with Bruce.
        Mr. Turner. That there is no difference.
        The Russian nuclear policy states that they will use
    nuclear weapons to escalate a conflict for the purposes of de-
    escalating the conflict. It has been said that the fact that
    they have low-yield nuclear weapons factors into this nuclear
    posture statement, and that it is because they believe that if
    they use a low-yield nuclear weapon and the only thing we have
    to respond with is a high-yield nuclear weapon, that, in fact,
    we would not respond. That, in fact, we would be forced to
    pause.
        Now, Mr. Miller, do you agree with that?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair, do you agree with that?
        Dr. Blair. Totally disagree.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing, do you agree with that?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I disagree, as well.
        Mr. Turner. Well, I am going to now do my portion of
    testimony, as the chairman has.
        I agree with Mr. Miller. If you are Putin, and you think we
    only have big ones and we are not going to use them because
    they are big, I think that you actually change the calculus of
    first use for Russia.
        Now, on no first use, since Russia believes in escalating
    to de-escalating, wouldn't our adopting a no first use have no
    effect on their nuclear posture? Because their calculus is use
    to--escalate to de-escalate. So if we say we are no first use,
    it has no calculus in their military strategy to use or not use
    nuclear weapons.
        Correct, Mr. Miller?
        Mr. Miller. That is absolutely correct.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. That is right, because the Russians rely on the
    escalation to the use of nuclear weapons to compensate for
    their conventional weakness.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I am not sure I am following the question
    about the linkage----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Turner. Well, let me just say I agree with Dr. Blair in
    what he has just said, because it is very important that it
    does not affect the Russian calculus if we have no first use.
        Thank you----
        The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Miller, you reiterate in your testimony that we have to
    have confidence in our deterrent and potential adversaries must
    have respect for it. Currently, the U.S. nuclear force consists
    of nearly 4,000 deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Miller, do you have confidence in our current
    deterrent, in our retaliatory capability?
        Mr. Miller. I have confidence in it today. I have a lack of
    confidence in it in 10 to 15 years, if those systems aren't
    replaced. Two commanders of Strategic Command, the retired
    admiral--retired previous admiral and currently General Hyten
    say those forces are going to have to leave the inventory,
    replaced or without replacement. That is a simple fact. Not
    modernizing will leave us without a triad.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Dr. Blair and Ms. Rohlfing.
        Dr. Blair. So yes, we have ample forces to underwrite
    deterrence. I think the number of primary aim points in our
    current nuclear planning is on the order of 1,000 aim points in
    Russia, China, and North Korea, in total. And we have at sea in
    our Ohio-class submarine force enough warheads to cover all of
    those aim points.
        So we have the forces, but I do have serious reservations
    and concerns about the viability and performance and resilience
    of our nuclear command and control system. This, as I said in
    my testimony at the opening, has always been the Achilles heel
    of our nuclear deterrent.
        So yes, it is extremely robust, in terms of forces. But it
    is creaky and somewhat fragile and worrisome, from the
    standpoint of command and control.
        Mr. Carbajal. Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I have confidence in our force today, and I
    think here the issue is not whether or not we modernize. We
    must continue to support a safe, secure, effective nuclear
    deterrent for our security.
        But the issue is, you know, what do we invest in, and how
    much do we need?
        Mr. Carbajal. I am interested to hear from all of you how
    you think Russia and China are perceiving us, the United
    States, moving forward with a significant nuclear modernization
    effort, while at the same time disengaging in the arms control
    front. All of you.
        Mr. Miller. First of all, Russia and China have been
    modernizing their forces for the last 10 years. And they
    continue to do so. We won't have new forces in the field until
    the middle of the next decade, at the beginning. So there is no
    suggestion of an arms race here. Ash Carter, former Defense
    Secretary, said there is a nuclear arms race, it is between
    Russia and China. We are not playing.
        On arms control, and specifically with respect to the INF
    Treaty, the treaty was killed by the Russians. It was a clear,
    cynical act by the Russian Government beginning in about 2013
    to develop and field a system that broke the treaty. And
    despite the fact that the United States has been engaged in
    negotiations with the Russians since 2013 on that, the only
    thing those negotiations have produced is over 100 of these
    treaty-busting SSC-8 missiles in the field. So we didn't
    disengage from the INF Treaty, the Russians killed it.
        Mr. Carbajal. But wouldn't you agree that the INF Treaty
    provides more opportunities than just this treaty to have some
    objectives in it, provides for ongoing communication----
        Mr. Miller. The INF Treaty was a vitally important treaty,
    which the Russians have gone out and killed. We were fully
    within the treaty. We respected the treaty. The Russians
    covertly developed a cruise missile. They tried to hide it from
    us. Our intelligence caught it. There are 100 of these things
    in the field, and the Russians still claim that they are part
    of the treaty.
        Mr. Carbajal. But wouldn't you agree that that was a
    vehicle for ongoing communications, to try to come back----
        Mr. Miller. Until----
        Mr. Carbajal [continuing]. To the table, and to address
    those challenges?
        Mr. Miller. We tried for 5 years under the Obama and Trump
    administrations to engage them in diplomacy in that treaty. And
    all they did was produce more missiles.
        Mr. Carbajal. Well, I disagree with you in that it wasn't
    of utility to continue to stay in it.
        Mr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. I think we pulled out too abruptly, and it did
    not give an adequate opportunity for further work to try to
    save the treaty, nor did we consult adequately with our allies
    in NATO. So I think that it was a mistake.
        There are consequences from pulling out of these treaties,
    as well. We pulled out of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile]
    Treaty very abruptly in 2002. That was John Bolton's wrecking
    ball for arms control. And, as a result, today we are seeing
    appear on the scene all these novel nuclear weapon systems that
    President Putin has been brandishing over the last several
    months: the hypersonic vehicles, the cruise missiles, the
    undersea autonomous nuclear submarine that can travel for 6,000
    kilometers. All these systems were stimulated by Putin's desire
    to deal with the elimination of the ABM Treaty and develop
    weapons that could defeat it. And it took them about 15 years.
        So we have to keep in mind these timescales. Russia, China,
    the United States, we all know that we have been going through
    overlapping modernizations for, like, 40 years.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you----
        Dr. Blair. Every 25 years we all modernize. And as long----
        The Chairman. Sorry, the----
        Dr. Blair. [continuing]. As we keep these weapons----
        The Chairman [continuing]. Gentleman's time is expired.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. We have to modernize----
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
    hearing. Thank you all, witnesses, for being here. And I would
    like to speak to Ms. Rohlfing and Mr. Miller about the low-
    yield option first, and then I have another follow-up question
    for Mr. Miller.
        If we are in a context where a low-yield tactical nuclear
    weapon is used by Russia against us or one of our NATO allies
    or a country under our nuclear umbrella, and we have to use a
    submarine-based response, we cannot make a proportional
    response. So, to me, that leaves only three options: we use a
    conventional response, we use a high-yield nuclear response, or
    we make no response.
        Ms. Rohlfing, do you prefer one of those three options to a
    proportional, low-yield response that we would otherwise have?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I think there is little difference between a
    so-called proportional, low-yield response and a response of
    another kind. I think Bruce hit the nail on the head when he
    said a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and even these so-
    called low-yield weapons are still quite powerful in their
    destructive power.
        So I think we should not be sanguine that a low-yield
    response is not going to yield massive retaliation. And
    therefore, it is very risky. Lowering the threshold for nuclear
    use is risky business, and very destabilizing.
        Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Miller, how do you respond to that?
        Mr. Miller. My response is the Nuclear Posture Review says
    a small number of these weapons will raise the nuclear
    threshold as a matter of official policy, not seek to lower it.
        I think that your description is exactly right. I don't
    think there is any doubt that anybody in this room would
    disagree with the fact of what Bruce said: a nuclear weapon is
    a nuclear weapon. That is a huge, explosive charge.
        Sadly, we are not trying to get agreement among ourselves
    on deterrents. We are worried about the Russian military, which
    has come up with a doctrine and forces and exercises which seem
    to indicate they believe they can use a low-yield nuclear
    weapon. That is my concern.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, I--and I have to agree with that. If our
    threat of a high-yield response hasn't deterred them for all
    the work that--and money that you say has been invested, why
    would it deter them in the future?
        Mr. Miller, I want to ask you about the triad versus a
    dyad. If we were to get rid of our land-based nuclear missiles,
    the Minutemen, in 3 fields, 450 or so missiles around the U.S.,
    and only relied on a dyad of bombers and submarines, would that
    make us more vulnerable because of either a technological
    problem that we had with bombers or submarines that came up in
    the future, or a technological breakthrough on the part of an
    adversary that would make either of those forces more
    vulnerable?
        Mr. Miller. Mr. Lamborn, you have described the reason why
    we have had a triad since the Eisenhower administration, that
    the various potential vulnerabilities of each leg offset the
    other.
        As we were saying, if we only have today ICBMs and SLBMs
    [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] on alert, if there was
    a breakthrough in ASW [anti-submarine warfare], then all you
    have got is the ICBMs. And a massive attack on the ICBMs
    triggers an all-out war, which no one wants to go to. So the
    Russians shouldn't go there. You have described exactly the
    reason for the triad, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. So you wouldn't be in favor of a unilateral
    disarmament, going from a triad to a dyad?
        Mr. Miller. No, sir. I would maintain the triad.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very
    important and enlightening hearing. And even though there are
    differences of opinion on these issues, I really respect the
    way they are being discussed. But I think there is an area
    where I can find some common ground, and I want to get back to
    the comments of Dr. Blair, when he talked about the issues of
    miscalculation.
        Just a couple of weeks ago I was in Europe as part of an
    international discussion with Senator Nunn and former cabinet
    officials, international leaders, discussing this issues. So I
    want to just gear in on one specific area.
        What would you say, Doctor, is the importance of
    interagency coordination and communication within the
    administration on these issues? And what is the importance of
    intelligence agencies and the coordination and communication
    and integrity of the security of those different agencies to
    try and prevent miscalculation? What are the dangers in that--
    if that doesn't happen?
        Dr. Blair. Well, we are living in an era that is becoming
    increasingly fraught with risk. And one of the reasons for that
    is the proliferation of ballistic missiles around the world.
    Everybody wants a ballistic missile, and everyone is getting
    them.
        There are thousands of ballistic missiles that didn't exist
    10 years ago that have been deployed. They have technological
    features that make it difficult to predict where they are going
    to land, because they are more maneuverable. They can take a
    right turn at the apex of their trajectory, and we don't know
    where they are going to land.
        So, as a result of that, we have entered an era in which we
    face false alarms, ambiguous ballistic missile threats all the
    time that we didn't during the Cold War. As I said earlier,
    some of them have risen to the level of Presidents, which never
    happened during the Cold War.
        So we have--we are--have to creatively solve the problem of
    developing confidence-building measures and other mechanisms
    that involve the intelligence community and require----
        Mr. Keating. I am just talking about----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Interagency----
        Mr. Keating. I understand that. I think you are bringing up
    some good points that exacerbate the situation. But I am
    talking within our own administration, when there is gaps,
    interagency gaps in communication and coordination. When there
    is gaps in the intelligence field, what are the dangers there?
        And do you think that Congress has a role in oversight to
    really do our best to make sure those gaps don't exist?
        Dr. Blair. Well, I guess I am not exactly clear what you
    are talking about----
        Mr. Keating. Within our own administration----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. In terms of a gap. Hmm?
        Mr. Keating. There has been instances where there is gaps
    that I don't think we have seen before in the administration,
    in our intel people, in our intelligence agencies. Now, if
    those gaps are there, and the communication isn't seamless,
    isn't that a major factor in miscalculation?
        Dr. Blair. Yeah. I mean one of the important factors in
    assessing the nature of the threat, assessing whether North
    America is under attack or if there are other nefarious
    activities underway, we rely heavily on our intelligence
    community to be able to provide the decision maker----
        Mr. Keating. And----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. With the background----
        Mr. Keating [continuing]. Is the role of Congress as an
    oversight agent critical in that regard, to maintain that we
    are doing all we can so those gaps do not exist between
    different agencies and our intel agencies?
        Dr. Blair. Well, yes, I think so. I think that you have the
    power of the purse over space and other assets----
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. That are critical----
        Mr. Keating. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
    the witnesses for joining us today.
        Dr. Blair, I wanted to go to you first. In your testimony
    you had spoken about reducing the number of ballistic missile
    submarines down to 5, and strategic bombers down to 40.
        I am troubled by that, because if you look at the
    availability of those submarines, we have the number we have to
    be able to put at sea any one time the necessary number to
    deter. Some of those are in port being overhauled, some of the
    sailors are on break or in training. So to have five, you don't
    have five at one time. And the same with bombers. Bomber
    availability today is based on the maintenance schedules for
    the aircraft, the bomber crews, deployment.
        So having 5 and 40 doesn't get us 5 and 40 at one time. It
    gets us significantly less than that. And obviously, that is a
    classified number, but significantly less than what is
    available in those raw numbers.
        Secondly is that our adversaries today are building attack
    submarines to take out our ballistic missile submarines at a
    record pace. In fact, some of the most advanced submarines in
    the world are the attack submarines, like the Severodvinsk
    class that the Russians are building. And they are doing
    everything they can to build those, as well as the Chinese.
        I am wondering how you believe that those will be
    significantly impactful deterrents to our adversaries, as they
    are building up, having more opportunities to take those assets
    out, and we have fewer of those assets. And even with the
    numbers there, fewer of those assets ever available at one
    time.
        I am wondering how the strategic deterrents adds up with
    those. I wanted to get your perspective on that.
        Dr. Blair. In general, you take the number of submarines
    that you build, and you can safely deploy roughly two-thirds of
    those at sea. So two-thirds of the 14 we have now is around 9.
    We can put nine at sea----
        Mr. Wittman. But--no, but your number is five. So----
        Dr. Blair. So, yeah, I am just saying----
        Mr. Wittman. Two-thirds, so you----
        Dr. Blair. I am just giving you the----
        Mr. Wittman. No, you deploy three----
        Dr. Blair. I am giving you the formula, and then--of--so I
    guess we would need--if we wanted to have five at sea, we would
    probably have to have roughly eight, all together. So----
        Mr. Wittman. But that is----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Two-thirds of----
        Mr. Wittman. That is not what your number says. Your number
    says 5 SSBNs and 40 bombers. It doesn't qualify that----
        Dr. Blair. Five with--actually, with five SSBNs, if you
    could keep three at sea, that would be sufficient to cover the
    aim points that I have defined as constituting a fully adequate
    deterrent threat.
        Mr. Wittman. In the face of the multiples of attack
    submarines so they could deploy out there. If all I had to
    worry about was three of our submarines being out there at any
    one point, don't you think that they would try to hunt those
    down and destroy them? Doesn't that take it out with the----
        Dr. Blair. I think----
        Mr. Wittman. Literally----
        Dr. Blair. I think both sides try to do that, and we are
    actually very good at----
        Mr. Wittman. We are actually on the down side of attack
    submarines. We are going to be down to 42 in 2028, so we don't
    even have a deterrent to go after their ballistic missile
    submarine----
        Dr. Blair. Well, the Russians and the Chinese are the sides
    that have to worry about the attack submarine problem, not us
    at the present time.
        Mr. Wittman. I----
        Dr. Blair. You can get a classified briefing from the Navy,
    and they may refute what I say, but I think that there is no
    credible intelligence for now or in the foreseeable future that
    would suggest that a ballistic missile submarine on patrol at
    sea is vulnerable to any form of Russian or Chinese attack.
        Mr. Wittman. That--really? That--there is no risk to our
    submarines by the attack submarines from our adversaries?
        Dr. Blair. I think that the Navy--you can ask them, but I
    think that they would say that the submarines that we have on--
    --
        Mr. Wittman. Well, if----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Patrol, on launch-ready status,
    are----
        Mr. Wittman. If there is no risk there, then why do we have
    submarines and ships to try to hunt----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Invulnerable to any--are completely
    invulnerable for the foreseeable future.
        Mr. Wittman. Mr. Miller, I would like to get your
    perspective on that.
        Mr. Miller. Sir, I believe that the best way we hide those
    submarines is to give them vast amounts of ocean to patrol in.
        A force of 12 gives you 10 operational boats. That is
    enough to have a Pacific base and an Atlantic base. I think if
    that number came down much smaller, we would be driven to one
    base, which means we would lose an ocean's worth of patrol
    area.
        Second, if you want to maintain the same number of warheads
    at sea with a much smaller number of submarines, you have to
    put more warheads on each missile. By the basic physics, that
    reduces the range of the missile and it again reduces the
    patrol area.
        All of this moves towards instability and threatening the
    overall force. So I believe what the posture review says, that
    a minimum of 12 SSBNs is required, is in fact the--where we
    should go.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay, very good.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Kim.
        Mr. Kim. Thank you, and thank you so much, the three of
    you, for coming out and talking about such a critically
    important issue.
        Dr. Blair, I would like to start with you. Something that
    caught my attention during your opening statements, and it is
    something that I have seen in previous work that you have,
    talking about the command, control, communications, the C3
    component of this.
        You have previously said that it is required that we have a
    C3 network that is highly survivable, flexible, impervious to
    cyberattack, and fail-safe. Yet you also recognize that--and
    have pointed out that our network was last comprehensively
    updated some three decades ago. In fact, some of the
    components, you have said, date back to the 1950s, especially
    with some of the Minuteman capabilities that we have.
        So I just wanted to dig into this some more, and just ask
    how confident are you in our current nuclear command, control,
    communications, especially with regards to cybersecurity?
        Dr. Blair. I am not confident at all. And I don't think
    anyone knows the answer to that question with any degree of
    high confidence, because we have lost control over the chain of
    supply of our electronic components and our command and control
    system writ large, including our nuclear, from the level of the
    President of the United States all the way down to the cell
    towers built by Huawei that are deployed around our Minutemen
    missile fields.
        The--every now and then we conduct a study and we find new
    and worrisome vulnerabilities in this arena. The last study
    that I am aware of happened after a squadron of 50 ICBMs went
    black in 2010 because of a breakdown in our obsolete command
    and control systems. No one could monitor those weapons, no one
    could launch them on authority, or prevent their unauthorized
    launch.
        When President Obama ordered a study of the possible cyber
    vulnerability of Minuteman, it took a year. And they came up
    with some pretty interesting findings, including the fact that
    we had actually wired our nuclear launch facilities, our silo
    complexes, with the internet, and created a vulnerability to
    outside hackers.
        So there are ongoing concerns about this, and we are not
    really going to get a handle on it unless and until we can
    figure out a way to actually manage the chain of supply of
    these components.
        Mr. Kim. And that is very helpful. I mean, certainly from
    my perspective, when I try to think of worst-case scenarios,
    when it comes down to it, the possibility of a foreign agent,
    you know, to be injected into the launch procedures of this, or
    about a launch could be set off by false early detection and
    early warning, these are the same concerns that you share, it
    sounds like.
        Dr. Blair. That is right. And I think, if you talk to
    professionals in this arena, they would tell you that one of
    the most worrisome parts of this C3I complex, in terms of cyber
    vulnerability, is the early warning network. Because there are
    so many apertures in that network: satellites that have to link
    with ground sites, et cetera.
        And there is concern that the President, who has only about
    5 minutes under current strategy, to make a decision on whether
    and how to retaliate to an attack, 5 minutes, may have to rely
    on information that has been corrupted.
        Mr. Kim. When I am thinking about what can we do today to
    make sure we are moving in that process, where we have greater
    control over this and a more secure system--you have mentioned
    just now the supply chain and making sure that we can better
    understand where that is coming from, and having control over
    that.
        What are some of the other steps that we should be taking
    right now to be able to get this----
        Dr. Blair. We----
        Mr. Kim [continuing]. In a better place?
        Dr. Blair. We really have to look at the whole question of
    the insider threat.
        We have a threat model that is about 50 years old for
    assessing whether an insider could cause something really bad
    to happen with nuclear weapons. That threat model doesn't work,
    because a single insider, which is the threat model, aided by
    some outsiders today could cause far more damage, as we know
    from the case of Edward Snowden. A single insider could cause
    much more damage than ever.
        The C3I system is more vulnerable because of these new
    technologies coming along that defeat the ability to detect an
    attack. Space is becoming more vulnerable. We rely extremely
    heavily on space for our nuclear command and control systems.
    The list goes on and on and on.
        We are falling behind. That has to be the first priority of
    our nuclear modernization program. That and modernizing the
    submarines.
        Mr. Kim. Thank you----
        Dr. Blair. Don't bother with the ICBMs.
        Mr. Kim. Well, thank you. This is critically important, and
    an area where I hope all of us can find common agreement on.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There seems to be,
    you know, a bit of debate on whether the low-yield nuclear
    weapons are effective as a deterrence. But let's assume that we
    say they are.
        Mr. Miller, are we currently at a significant disadvantage,
    in terms of tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons, in--compared
    with Russia?
        Mr. Miller. The Russians, sir, have about 2,000 low-yield
    weapons of all types: artillery shells, land mines, torpedoes,
    cruise missiles, short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The
    United States has a very small number of air-drop weapons that
    are carried by aging aircraft in Europe, period, full stop.
        But the United States made a decision in the late 1980s,
    early 1990s, that we did not need to match the Russian arsenal.
    That is in the Nuclear Posture Review, we don't need to mirror
    or match that. We simply need to deter Russian use of their
    tactical arsenal. That is where the low-yield Trident weapon
    comes in.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Do you feel that their intention is to arm
    the hypersonic glide weapon with a nuclear warhead, as well,
    perhaps low-yield----
        Mr. Miller. It is a possibility. I can't tell you. I don't
    know what Putin's--what his intentions are.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I have heard your colleagues say that a
    low-yield and a high-yield, there is really no different--they
    are both very destructive. But if you talk about the Russians
    having capabilities to arm an artillery shell, certainly that
    wouldn't pack the same punch as some of the other low-yield
    weapons that you have described.
        Mr. Miller. I keep saying, sir, that what we think here
    doesn't matter. What the Russian planner and the Russian
    leadership believes does matter. And the Russian leadership and
    the Russian planners seem to believe that there is tactical
    utility, battlefield utility, in low-yield weapons. And that
    concerns me. And that we have to deter.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, the chairman made a statement
    earlier in his opening, I guess, that all we simply need to do
    is tell Russia that if they use a low-yield weapon, we are
    going to respond with a high-yield. Does that hold water?
        Mr. Miller. I don't think it holds water in Moscow.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Why is that?
        Mr. Miller. Because, given all of our capabilities, in the
    late 1990s, early 2000s, they began to develop the new weapons
    to support the new strategy.
        Dr. DesJarlais. So you are saying----
        Mr. Miller. So clearly----
        Dr. DesJarlais. In your mind they believe that they can use
    a low-yield tactical weapon without us doing what the chairman
    said, that perhaps we would pause, and that we would not
    retaliate with a large-scale, because if we did that would
    ultimately lead to nuclear annihilation, in all likelihood.
        Mr. Miller. I believe that is the essence of Russian
    strategy today.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So getting back to the importance of
    our needs, we have a gravity bomb that can be dropped from an
    airframe, but nothing that can be delivered in any other
    fashion. Is that right?
        Mr. Miller. That is correct. It cannot get there with an
    assured payload.
        And the other thing is we are not interested in fighting a
    nuclear war on any battlefield. The Trident weapon indicates
    that we are prepared to escalate this war, which means to Mr.
    Putin, ``Are you prepared to try to seize a piece of the
    Baltics, and are you prepared to bet Mother Russia in the
    gamble? Don't use a nuclear weapon at all.'' And that is what
    the low-yield Trident does.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And back to our current delivery
    system, is it capable of penetrating Russian air defenses as
    well as a cruise missile or Trident III?
        Mr. Miller. Russian air defenses are extraordinarily
    capable. We have got brave young pilots and very old airframes.
    In 10 years, when the F-35 is in the field, then it will be a
    more capable force. But again, the legs are much shorter than
    what a Trident could cover.
        Dr. DesJarlais. And do we have air defenses in Eastern and
    Western Europe that are comparable to what Russia has around
    Moscow?
        Mr. Miller. No.
        Dr. DesJarlais. So they could perceivably launch a strike
    of a low yield on Eastern Europe, and we would really have no
    means to stop it?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So I guess your point is that there
    is a deterrence factor that would be beneficial in advancing
    the low-yield nuclear weapon. Is that right?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Do you think that having these
    weapons and deploying them in Europe would strengthen our hand
    in negotiating the--Ranking Member Thornberry went down this
    road with you and how Reagan used that in the 1980s to bring
    Gorbachev to the table on the INF. Do you feel that if we did
    that again we could see a similar result?
        Mr. Miller. No, not in this case, because it is 30 years
    later. The allies would fracture over whether or not we were
    going to deploy a new nuclear weapons system. That is exactly
    what Mr. Putin wants. He would like to fracture the NATO
    alliance.
        So the need to deter Russian low-yield weapon use has to be
    an offshore platform, and that is why the Trident is the best
    way to do it.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So you are saying that the only
    course of action that we really have right now--and that we
    should take this course of action--is to build the low-yield
    weapon you are talking about.
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. All right. I guess my time has run out. I
    was going to ask you a question about the nuclear
    infrastructure modernization, but hopefully we will get to
    that.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Hill.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is to the entire
    panel.
        As I understand it--and again, I think I feel a little bit
    like I am behind the curve, in terms of understanding a lot of
    this, but what is being referred to as a low-yield nuclear
    warhead has about a third the power as the atomic weapons
    dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Can you help put that into
    perspective for me, how widespread the damage would be from the
    blast, and how long-lasting the radiation fallout would be?
        Dr. Blair. I will start.
        Ms. Hill. And, I guess, does it matter?
        Dr. Blair. If this 5 kiloton weapon is being produced for
    the submarine force were detonated over the White House right
    now, it would kill about 100,000 people and injure about
    125,000 people. It is extremely powerful. It is 2,500 times
    more powerful than that big bomb that destroyed Oklahoma City,
    by Timothy McVeigh.
        So we are really not talking about, you know, a low-yield
    nuclear weapon. It would be a horrendous amount of devastation
    that would be--that would result just from the immediate
    effects. That is what I am talking about. There would be the
    potential, you know, fires and other things that could cause
    even more damage than what I described.
        Ms. Hill. Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. The first point about the low-yield weapon is
    to prevent any nuclear weapon use at all. Russian nuclear use
    in the theater would have catastrophic effects.
        But your--Dr. Blair's description of what this weapon would
    cause assumes that it would be aimed at a population center.
    And again, if one wants to get into the nuclear exchange game--
    and I don't recommend doing that, I think the risk of
    escalation is too high--then it would be insane to fire that
    weapon at a populated area.
        Is it destructive? Yes. The point is to deter nuclear use
    by the Russians so the nuclear weapons are never used and the
    nuclear war cannot be fought.
        Ms. Hill. So it is having the effectiveness of that tool
    that would deter it. Is that the idea?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Hill. Okay. So a kind of unrelated question. France and
    Germany recently signed a treaty where the French agreed to use
    their nuclear deterrent to protect Germany. What--am I--is that
    an incorrect assessment? Do you--why do you feel they felt the
    need to do this, on top of the existing NATO alliance?
        Mr. Miller. Well, there were obvious transatlantic problems
    at this time. But the news article, in my estimation, is
    completely wrong. And having checked with friends in the Quai
    d'Orsay, France will never fully extend its nuclear deterrent
    to any other country.
        The French deterrent is based on the principle that it is--
    it responds to France's vital interests. And if you ask a
    senior French official, ``What are France's vital interests,''
    you will be told that the president of the republic will
    determine that at the moment of crisis. That is not a strong
    reed to bend--to lean on.
        Ms. Hill. Do either of you have any thoughts on--I guess,
    to me, I am--my question is whether that is an indication of
    this broader instability, and what we need to do to sort of----
        Dr. Blair. Well----
        Ms. Hill [continuing]. Attempt to----
        Dr. Blair. Yeah, I think there is clearly a sign this--even
    having that kind of a discussion amongst semi-serious people is
    a clear sign of a splintering of the NATO alliance that is
    underway. And if it continues, it could become a very serious
    problem for alliance maintenance, and could lead to all kinds
    of unanticipated and adverse consequences.
        We are not managing NATO alliance very well, in the way
    that we have pulled out of INF abruptly, the way that the
    President talks about the importance of the alliance, et
    cetera. So this is something that is worrisome, but it is
    symptomatic of some deeper issues here.
        I just would like to comment once--I think we have missed
    the boat on this whole question of Russian strategy. You know,
    their escalate to de-escalate strategy has really emerged in
    the year 2000 under Putin in response to the NATO bombing of
    Yugoslavia in 1999 in the Balkans. And the Russians looked at
    that and said, ``Wait a minute. What if this happens to us? We
    are inferior, we can't match NATO. What do we do?'' This is
    when Russia was on its knees, of course.
        And so they came up with a last-ditch approach to use
    nuclear weapons under this strategy that has been discussed,
    that it was--really highlights their--the weakness of their
    hand, and the fact that they would only resort to such use of
    weapons as a, you know, as a last resort, because they are
    losing a conflict with NATO. It is not like they have said,
    ``Wow, we can come up with some new weapon that, you know,
    fills some gap in the spectrum of Western--of U.S. nuclear
    weapons and exploit it and, you know, we can go forward with
    that.'' That is just not the way that this comes down.
        Now, if Russia were to use a so-called low-yield weapon
    because they are losing a conventional conflict, we could--we
    have several options. One is just to let them continue to use--
    --
        Ms. Hill. Sorry----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Lose the conventional----
        Ms. Hill. Dr. Blair, I just have a little bit of time left.
    I wanted to--I appreciate that, but in the remaining time I
    just want to ask all three of you. Top line, as we are going
    into this next phase of planning, new Congress, we have got--we
    are looking at 2 years, but we are also looking at the long
    term. What are the top one or two things that we need to
    consider, and recommendations as we move forward?
        Just really, really top line, as we are going back and
    explaining to our constituents why we are choosing to invest
    money in this regard, as opposed to anything else. And given
    the dynamics with this administration, with the weakening of
    the NATO alliance, or the perceived weakening of the NATO
    alliance, and everything else.
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I would like to give just two
    recommendations to that question.
        Number one is Congress needs to create space for re-
    engagement with Russia on this issue of existential common
    interests. We have got to get back to the negotiating table if
    we are going to try and lower tensions and maintain the
    guardrails around nuclear forces that have served us well over
    50 years.
        Ms. Hill. I am going to cut you off in, like, six----
        Ms. Rohlfing. That is not much time for another answer.
        Just number two, you need to filter your investments in
    modernization through the prism of reducing nuclear risk and
    stability of forces.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you----
        Ms. Rohlfing. And I think that will lead you to certain
    answers.
        Ms. Hill. Thank you. Mr. Miller, and then I will go back to
    Dr. Blair.
        Mr. Miller. Quickly, modernize the triad and its supporting
    command and control, which has preserved the peace.
        Second, understand that there is no place today on the
    NATO-Russia border where Russia does not have military
    superiority.
        And third, if we are concerned--and I am--about keeping the
    NATO alliance together, no first use will create a huge schism.
        Ms. Hill. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. I think no first use is the first order of
    business, by far, along with modernization and fixing of the
    command and control weaknesses that we have.
        The Chairman. I am sorry, the----
        Dr. Blair. Thirdly, reviving our relationship with Russia
    and restoring a dialogue that could lead to real arms control
    talks.
        The Chairman. You will have to----
        Ms. Hill. Thank you all.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Close there.
        Mr. Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate all three of you being here today. In my 16
    assignments in the Air Force, my very first one was at SAC
    [Strategic Air Command] headquarters, and I remember General
    LeMay, who was retired at the time, walking in, quite the sight
    to see. And as a general officer, I was airborne emergency
    officer in case the ground command and control was taken out.
    So I was the person airborne to make sure that we had the
    second-strike capability.
        But from that I have made the assessment that I do think we
    need to modernize our nuclear inventory, our nuclear
    enterprise, to include all three legs of the triad. I think it
    is important for deterrence that we do that. Russia and China
    are clearly modernizing their forms of the triad, as we speak,
    while we have been falling behind. And I think if we continue
    this, or make the decision we are going to go from a triad to a
    dyad or a triad to a monad, if you will, I think that makes us
    vulnerable.
        And do we want to--how close do we want to make it? You
    know, I believe in--in my 30 years in the Air Force I never
    wanted a close fight. We want to win overwhelmingly. But in a
    nuclear deterrence we don't want to fight at all. How close do
    you measure what deterrence is? I would rather make sure that
    we have clear deterrence. I don't want to just make it close. A
    nuclear war should never be fought, and I think that--the triad
    provides us that assurance.
        And this modernization is very critical. If you look at our
    B-52s, they are created under--or built largely under John F.
    Kennedy's era. We have granddaughters today flying them that
    their grandfathers used to fly. Our Minuteman III was primarily
    built with Lyndon Baines Johnson era. Our nuclear C3 under
    Jimmy Carter's era. And we got our B-2s and our submarines that
    are 20 to 30 years old now. I think it is clear that we need to
    start this modernization. So, with that, my first question is
    with Mr. Miller.
        I believe the nuclear command and control--the nuclear C3
    is very important. Can you just explain to us why this has to
    be included into this nuclear modernization plan? We think of
    the triad a lot. We tend to forget the nuclear C3. Can you give
    us a little more reasons why we've got to make this as an
    emphasis?
        Mr. Miller. I absolutely agree with Bruce, that the nuclear
    command and control system is the backbone of the triad. If you
    can kill the nuclear command and control system, the forces
    don't work.
        The airplanes are old, the communication systems are old.
    The satellites are old and vulnerable. And so one of the key
    elements of the Nuclear Posture Review is to modernize the
    nuclear command and control system.
        You probably know that General Hyten was put in charge of
    that recently by----
        Mr. Bacon. Right.
        Mr. Miller [continuing]. Then-Secretary Mattis. That is
    absolutely critical.
        Mr. Bacon. When I flew on it, it was 1970s technology, and
    that is what we still have today.
        I am concerned about our airborne NC3 [nuclear command,
    control, and communications]. We used to have the ability--we,
    for decades, always had an airborne alert or capability
    airborne--not just alert--on the ground. I am not sure we can
    sustain that. Do we need to invest more to ensure that we have
    a 24-hour airborne capability?
        And I just open that up to any of you three.
        Dr. Blair. You know, I think you have served in the 55th
    STRAT RECON [Strategic Reconnaissance] wing?
        Mr. Bacon. In fact, I was the commander. Best wing in the
    Air Force.
        Dr. Blair. Well, I was in that wing, myself.
        Mr. Bacon. I digress.
        Dr. Blair. I was in that wing, and I supported----
        Mr. Bacon. Awesome.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. The Looking Glass.
        Mr. Bacon. Right.
        Dr. Blair. So I know what you are talking about. And as you
    know, the endurance of the airborne system in an environment of
    nuclear war is not going to be very long. So I don't think the
    airborne system should be the backbone of our command and
    control system.
        We--in the 1980s, under Reagan, we started to look at
    ground mobile systems to support continuity of government and
    all the rest. I think we need to completely relook at the
    architecture of our command and control system. Airplanes don't
    last nearly as long as our forces. Submarines can operate for
    months at sea. And our command system collapses in 24 hours. It
    doesn't make sense.
        So yeah, and then we modernize--if you like the triad, you
    really want to have a triad, Congress, I think, should ask for
    some new ideas beyond and besides putting new ground-based
    strategic deterrent missiles, 642 of them, available to put
    into vulnerable silos. That doesn't make--that is not
    eliminating vulnerability, that is just compounding a problem
    that already exists.
        Mr. Bacon. If I may, I would just like to ask you a
    separate question, Dr. Blair, and it is something that you
    mentioned earlier.
        I feel like what Russia is doing, they are producing more
    cruise missiles, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, hypersonic
    weapons. They admit to having low-yield weapons. They have
    almost fully modernized their ICBMs, they are looking at
    bombers. Who--sometimes--and I hear the critical--or people
    being critical towards the President, as if he is creating an
    arms race. Isn't Russia initiating an arms race? And so far we
    have not really been participating. What is your thoughts on
    that?
        Dr. Blair. Like I say, I think, going back for half a
    century, you will see cycles of modernization that we like to
    call an arms race, but they are actually just replacing aging
    and obsolete systems.
        The Chairman. And we are, unfortunately, out of time, this
    witness. I apologize.
        Ms. Houlahan.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much to the panel for coming
    and speaking to us on this really important topic. Similarly, I
    served in the Air Force, as well. Also in the late 1980s and
    early 1990s was my time in the military. And actually, in terms
    of what my job was, was about command and control decisions in
    the event of a nuclear apocalypse, or Armageddon, and helping
    to think about human-in-the-loop, and what sort of information
    was needed by whom at what point in time to make really good
    decisions.
        And interestingly, I was there being told that my job was
    to predict and build for the next generation's worth of
    technologies. So 25 years later, here I sit. And so,
    theoretically, what I was working on in the field then should
    be deployed now, hopefully--or maybe not hopefully. So here I
    am. Everything old is new again; 20, 25 years later I am having
    a conversation about a threat that I thought went away in the
    early 1990s.
        And so, my questions have to do a little bit with Chairman
    Smith's statement that we need to figure out what we need to
    do, and where we don't need to spend money, we shouldn't be
    spending money, how we can be most effective in modernizing,
    how we can be most effective in helping the President and other
    decision makers make effective decisions with modern
    technology, specifically with C3I.
        And so I know that Andy Kim, Representative Kim, asked you
    questions about cyber, cyber vulnerabilities. My questions have
    to do with artificial intelligence, and whether or not we have
    thought about the use of AI in the command and control
    structure as we are modernizing.
        If we are using something like AI as it is currently
    evolving, is that something that would help us minimize costs
    at all?
        Or it is something that is not yet kind of developed enough
    that we can effectively think about employing it because it is
    not really this generation when we are thinking about something
    as terrifying as nuclear weapons and their deployment?
        Should we be developing these technologies that--can they
    save us any money in testing? And what are the risks?
        And my next question has to do with whether our adversaries
    are, in fact, thinking about AI, since they are ahead of the
    curve, in terms of modernization with command and control
    issues.
        Ms. Rohlfing. So I would like to jump in on that, if I
    could. I would just observe that the deployment of new
    technologies is outpacing our understanding of the threats they
    pose at the same time as, you know, we know that they bring
    benefits.
        And I think on AI, as well as with cyber, we need to be
    sitting down with our adversaries and having a much better
    understanding of potential implications and red lines.
        On cyber, I would just say, echoing what we have already
    heard a number of people in the room say, I think it is
    essential that we invest in secure communications. That is an
    important priority for this committee and the Congress'
    investments in general.
        But I would just note that, even as we do that, we should
    not be sanguine that we can buy our way out of the cyber
    vulnerability of nuclear systems. And this is a really
    important point. And I don't think it is one that has had any
    airtime here today, and that is in 2013 the Defense Science
    Board issued a report that basically said we cannot have
    confidence that any of our nuclear weapons systems have not
    been compromised, meaning----
        Ms. Houlahan. No, and I----
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Right, they all have.
        Ms. Houlahan. Trust me, I understand. And I am also
    concerned about cyber. But I am also, in terms of emerging
    threats and uses of technologies, concerned about artificial
    intelligence, too, and making sure that it is sophisticated
    enough and developed enough to be useful.
        So I would love it if we could focus on artificial
    intelligence and the deployment of that, in terms of command
    and control. If--to the degree that we have any understanding
    of whether we are going to be implementing it or not.
        Ms. Rohlfing. So in that--I would just say to that I think
    what we need to be doing is talking with Russia, with China,
    with others on making sure we understand red lines, rules of
    the road. And we should also be looking at, if we cannot come
    up with the perfect technical solution, what kind of policy and
    posture changes should we be thinking about putting into effect
    to make us safer. And that goes for both cyber and AI in the
    future.
        Ms. Houlahan. Mr. Miller, do you have anything to add?
        Mr. Miller. Congresswoman, there is nobody in this room
    more ignorant on AI than I am.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Miller. That said, it does--I would be concerned that,
    in the process of a nuclear launch decision or execution, that
    AI is involved. These are hugely life-shattering events. I
    think a human in the loop is absolutely critical.
        Ms. Houlahan. And I agree with you. And when I served,
    human-in-the-loop was absolutely--you know, and it sounds like
    to this day, you know--kind of a important procedure.
        But if we are talking about seconds, you know, milliseconds
    that can be saved by decisions that can be helped by AI that
    are helping the human-in-the-loop, that is what is alarming and
    concerning to me that I would love to hear a little bit about.
        Mr. Miller. I agree with that. But I do think that we have
    overloaded our people. And, you know, we don't want robotics to
    take over the nuclear decision and execution process. But they
    can be very useful, I think, in----
        The Chairman. We are out of time, we have to move on.
        Mr. Miller [continuing]. Relieving the overload.
        The Chairman. I completely agree with you, don't want a
    robot in charge of launching nuclear weapons. I think that----
        Mr. Miller. The Russians have one.
        The Chairman. Yeah, fun thought.
        Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to
    reiterate my colleagues that--statements, that U.S.
    modernization, or anticipated modernization, is not kicking off
    a renewed arms race. It is Russian and Chinese modernization
    that have already occurred, or is occurring that is kicking off
    this new arms race, and that also--the United States didn't
    withdraw from INF unilaterally; the Russians withdrew
    effectively about 10 years ago. And we have since matched that
    withdrawal. And then also need to address the Chinese
    continually growing missile threat.
        So, question on low-yield, because I am still a little
    confused where you are, and I know we beat this dead horse, but
    just one more question on it.
        Do you believe, as expert witnesses, that if the Russians
    launched low-yield--meaning carrier battle group, port, took
    out critical capability--that the United States would and
    should--and should signal that we will mount a full
    retaliation, and then, therefore, that is our--should be our
    posture, going forward?
        Do you believe the United States would essentially destroy
    the world in response to a low-yield attack?
        Ms. Rohlfing.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Well, again, I think the goal here--and I
    agree with Frank--is to prevent these weapons from----
        Mr. Waltz. Totally agree, but the Russians----
        Ms. Rohlfing [continuing]. Ever being used.
        Mr. Waltz. Getting in the Russian mindset----
        Ms. Rohlfing. But I think----
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. If they are going to launch it, and
    they do launch it----
        Ms. Rohlfing. I think----
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Our response?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I think we have an arsenal today that is a
    fully capable deterrent, capable of deterring any kind of
    nuclear use by the Russians.
        Mr. Waltz. Do the Russians believe that?
        Ms. Rohlfing. That----
        Mr. Waltz. In your estimation.
        Ms. Rohlfing. That is a debatable proposition that is--
    there is, in fact, one thing that has not even come up, whether
    the Russians even truly have adopted a policy of escalate to
    de-escalate is under debate within the community of people who
    follow this very closely.
        Mr. Waltz. Dr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. That is right. And I think that they have been
    working hard to dig themselves out of that hole.
        I think they did have a escalate to de-escalate, or--early
    on, but that they recognized that that is a liability, that
    Russians, like us, would like to reduce reliance on nuclear
    weapons.
        And so they have developed a very sophisticated doctrine of
    attacking critical civilian infrastructure using special
    operations, cyber, and conventional forces that I think they
    understand would be even more devastating----
        Mr. Waltz. Let me ask you differently. Do you----
        Dr. Blair. So if they did----
        Mr. Waltz. If we had a----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. If they did use a low-yield----
        Mr. Waltz. Sorry, I have very limited time, so----
        Dr. Blair. If they did use a low-yield weapon, I think we
    have three choices.
        One is to continue to win the conventional conflict and
    keep the burn of escalation on the Russians. Second----
        Mr. Waltz. Right.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. We have a lot of low-yield weapons.
    We could use those.
        And third, if--Russians believe escalate to de-escalate is
    a----
        Mr. Waltz. But we have testimony that many of our current
    low-yields are not effective.
        Dr. Blair. If they think it is a viable doctrine, then they
    must understand that we could escalate to de-escalate. And----
        Mr. Waltz. Dr.----
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. And we are in an infinite loop.
    Everyone loses, because the ultimate escalate to de-escalate is
    an all-out nuclear war.
        Mr. Miller. I think, Congressman, you have described the
    reason that the Russians have proceeded to develop a new
    generation of low-yield weapons, a doctrine to support that
    use, and the exercise of those weapons.
        Mr. Waltz. Dr. Miller, do you think that the Russians would
    be less likely and, therefore, to your point, Ms. Rohlfing, to
    go to the bargaining table, or back to the bargaining table, if
    we had a credible low-yield deterrent----
        Mr. Miller. I think----
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. For them to use low-yield nuclear
    weapons? And therefore, I think we would be in a safer place.
        Mr. Miller. Bargaining table, sir?
        Mr. Waltz. Well, would the Russians be less likely to use
    their now-modernized--if we modernized ours, as well, and
    matched----
        Mr. Miller. That is the purpose of the low-yield Trident.
    The Nuclear Posture Review says that. It is to raise the
    nuclear threshold and to discourage any miscalculation by the
    Russian leadership.
        Mr. Waltz. We are moving towards the expiration of New
    START, as we have talked about. We are--we have moved beyond an
    era. We have bilateral treaties, and now a--in a previous
    bilateral nuclear world. Now we have a multi-lateral nuclear
    world.
        Should we move--I mean where do you think we should go?
    Obviously, we have talked about extending New START, we have
    talked about broadening it to get the full capability of
    weapons, including China.
        Mr. Miller. I think we should continue to talk to the
    Chinese, but there is absolutely no indication that they have
    any interest in entering into any arms control discussion.
        The Russians have violated--are violating, as we sit here--
    nine arms control agreements. I think that we need to proceed
    ahead to try to get our arms around their strategic weapons,
    their novel weapons, and their non-strategic weapons.
        Mr. Waltz. Doctor----
        Dr. Blair. Global Zero----
        Mr. Waltz. Please, very quickly.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. My organization, convened a panel
    at the Munich Security Conference, at which a senior Russian--
    sorry, Chinese--general laid out their position, which is that
    the United States and Russia need to deeply reduce their
    nuclear forces.
        Mr. Waltz. I am sure they do think so.
        Dr. Blair. And then they would be prepared to enter into--
    this is a long-standing position that goes all the way back to
    Huang Hua in 1982. What the Chinese are willing to talk about
    are confidence-building measures at this point. And they
    propose a no first use agreement to everyone.
        Everyone has spurned it, except for the Russians. And so
    the Chinese and the Russians have a no first use agreement to--
    with each other right now. And so they are----
        Mr. Waltz. Which I have very little confidence in.
        But finally, do you--just very quickly, do you agree the
    number of countries marching towards a full nuclear capability,
    or even a partial, is growing in the world.
        Back to my colleague's questions, Iran, of course, North
    Korea, Pakistan, with its growing arsenal, potentially the
    Saudis, is that--a proliferation and a growing, fully capable
    missile command and control and nuclear threat, is that
    increasing or decreasing, in terms of the threat around the
    world?
        Ms. Rohlfing. Increasing.
        Dr. Blair. Definitely increasing, particularly in South
    Asia.
        Mr. Miller. Actually, I think the non-proliferation treaty
    has worked, and I think--I worry about Iran and North Korea,
    but I don't see major nuclear programs developing at this time.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you. I yield my time.
        The Chairman. Mrs. Luria.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for being here today. In the
    recent nuclear review, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the
    review found that ``the nuclear triad supported by the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, dual-capable aircraft, and
    a robust nuclear command, control, and communications system is
    the most cost-effective and strategically sound means of
    ensuring nuclear deterrence.''
        One could read this statement and think, of course, coming
    from the current administration, but I also want to point out
    that the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review under President Obama
    said, quote, that the ``nuclear triad continues to play an
    essential role in deterring potential adversaries, and
    reassuring allies and partners around the world. And thus,
    maintains strategic stability at a reasonable cost.''
        As a committee we should be steadfast in our support for
    maintaining and modernizing the nuclear triad. So while I
    appreciate the differing points of view today, I think it is
    dangerous to allow someone to come before this committee and
    suggest that the United States should reduce or completely
    eliminate its nuclear stockpile, and I base that off reading
    previous writings that some of the committee members had
    previously published.
        And to suggest that other countries would follow suit out
    of goodness of their heart--in fact, I think we have seen the
    opposite in the past 10 years. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
    contained the following quote: ``Russia and the United States
    are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military
    confrontation have declined dramatically.''
        Mr. Miller, do you agree that Russia and the United States
    are no longer adversaries?
        Mr. Miller. I think that the Russians think that we are
    adversaries. I think that the threats that Putin is making,
    which are reminiscent of the Khrushchev-like threats, are
    utterly out of place in the 21st century world. And I worry
    about where the Russian leadership is going.
        Mrs. Luria. So I take that you think we are still
    adversaries.
        Mr. Miller. Yes, ma'am, I do.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. And I liked a quote that you used
    earlier. You said that deterrence is about getting in the mind
    of the other person, or not. And to use that, do you think that
    the 2010 statement of what I would see as appeasement
    contributed to the global security situation we find ourselves
    in today with Russia, such as their continuing modernization of
    their nuclear arsenal, the invasion of Crimea, meddling in our
    election process, et cetera?
        Mr. Miller. I think President Obama made a bold move to try
    to get the Russians to--to try to lead. I think 8, 9 years
    later, we find ourselves in the position where the evidence is
    overwhelming that the Russians have rejected that idea, as they
    have rejected other ideas to move towards nuclear stability,
    like moving to single warhead ICBMs. The Russians rejected
    that. They rejected getting out of the business of tactical
    nuclear weapons.
        So the notion that we can lead the Russians to some path
    where they will lay down their arms or become more peace-loving
    has been disproven over the last 10 years.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. And do you think that the testimony we
    have heard today from Mr. Blair and Ms. Rohlfing could be
    construed by our allies and our potential adversaries as a lack
    of commitment on the part of the United States to modernization
    of our nuclear triad?
        Mr. Miller. No, I don't, because I think the strength and
    the essence of our democracy is that we have contesting views
    back and forth, and that is--we are a democratic alliance in
    NATO. And I think this is--this debate is good. And for this
    committee to hear this debate--and as we did last week in front
    of the Senate, this is an important part of democracy.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you. And I just want to close
    by clearly stating my position is that I think the United
    States should be committed to maintaining and modernizing all
    three legs of the nuclear triad, and continuing to provide an
    effective and modernized nuclear umbrella--both the protection
    of ourselves and of our allies.
        Thank you. I yield my time.
        The Chairman. Ms. Cheney.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
    our witnesses.
        Mr. Miller, one of the threads that you hear frequently
    among those who advocate Global Zero is this notion that
    somehow, if we just cut our arsenal, our adversaries will
    follow suit. We saw this very clearly, for example, when
    President Obama was in Strasbourg, France, in 2009. And he
    actually said if the United States would just cut the size of
    its nuclear arsenal, we could then convince the Iranians and
    North Koreans to do the same.
        Have you seen any evidence in all of your years of work
    that this is an approach that would yield fruit?
        Mr. Miller. No, absolutely not. In fact, under your
    father's strong leadership, the Department of Defense, we
    dramatically reduced our non-strategic nuclear forces. The
    Russians pledged they would do the same thing, and they
    maintained their forces. And now they have modernized them.
        We said we would move to single warhead ICBMs to be more
    stable. The Russians have maintained multiple-warhead ICBMs and
    are now going back to this large, heavy ICBM, which is clearly
    known to be destabilizing.
        So I see no evidence that the Russians have bought into
    anything that we do in this area.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And with respect to treaties, to
    INF, to New START, to some of the other treaties that we have
    discussed today, do you see any historic evidence of a treaty
    increasing American security if the United States is the only
    party to the treaty that is, in fact, adhering to the
    limitations of the treaty?
        Mr. Miller. If the United States is the only party in a
    treaty, it is unilateral restraint, it is not a treaty. And
    that is what happened to INF. It was a treaty. The Russians
    moved out, leaving us in a position of unilateral restraint.
    The treaty was dead.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And I know all of us on this
    committee share the view that we have to ensure that a nuclear
    war is never fought. And part of that is, obviously, making
    sure that, in terms of deterrents, we also have the ability to
    have an effective extended deterrence.
        Could you talk about the impact on our ability to provide
    extended deterrence if we are, in fact, seen as failing to
    modernize our own strategic forces, if we are seen as failing
    to make the investments that are necessary, with respect to our
    own stockpile?
        Mr. Miller. I think it would break NATO. I think it could
    lead to the development of other nuclear weapon states inside
    the alliance, as they went to save themselves. I think it would
    be a terribly destabilizing thing.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And then on no first use, that is
    another thing that we hear repeatedly, in terms of--that is
    supposed to bring some sort of stability to this entire issue.
    Could you talk about the damage that a no first use policy
    would do?
        Mr. Miller. I think it would have four effects.
        One, it would fracture NATO. This is the wrong time to get
    into more transatlantic angst, and it would create angst.
        Second, it could create a movement in some of our NATO
    allies to think about building their own weapons.
        Third, it would not change Russian and Chinese doctrine in
    the slightest.
        And fourth, I don't believe Russia or China would believe
    that we actually did it, because they are conspiratorial, and
    so it wouldn't change crisis management behavior.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And then finally, in testimony by
    one of the other witnesses today ICBM--the ICBM force was
    referred to as ``sitting ducks that invite attack.'' Could you
    respond to that, and explain to me whether or not you view that
    as an accurate description of our ICBM force?
        Mr. Miller. The ICBM could, obviously, be fired if it was
    under attack. And any--an enemy leadership would have no
    confidence that it could preempt that force. That is a powerful
    deterrent. Launching 400 or 800 warheads to destroy that force
    is an unmistakable signal the United States is under massive
    attack. And therefore, again, it raises the bar to aggression
    and attack against us.
        I think the ICBM force is a critical part of the triad, the
    triad is a critical part of the deterrent.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much. I had the opportunity to
    spend time on Friday with General Hyten at STRATCOM. I think
    that our strategic forces underpin absolutely everything we do.
    I think it would be the height of irresponsibility for us to be
    in a position where we decide that we are going to unilaterally
    disarm. We have to modernize. I think that we ought to be in a
    position where we are all absolutely affirming the importance
    of the triad.
        And I look forward very much to General Hyten coming to
    testify, and I hope that will be soon, Mr. Chairman, in front
    of this committee, the way he has in front of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee.
        Thank you to our witnesses, and I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I am not sure of the exact timing,
    but as part of our posture review hearings he is scheduled to
    testify.
        Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today. We have heard a lot of
    discussion about how we must maintain our nuclear weapons
    systems, not to--not designed to be used, but to act as a
    deterrent because they are so powerful, so dangerous, and the
    effects of using these nuclear weapons would be so devastating
    that they are not actually intended to be used. Would you agree
    with that?
        [Nonverbal response.]
        Ms. Gabbard. So if we understand that, then we must also
    understand that low-yield nuclear weapons are not designed to
    act as a deterrent, but are instead actually designed to be
    used.
        Mr. Miller. I--Russian low-yield weapons are designed to
    implement a Russian strategy of use. The low-yield Trident that
    the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] calls for is designed to
    prevent the Russians from reaching for that low-yield nuclear
    weapon and using it in the field.
        Ms. Gabbard. Dr. Blair.
        Mr. Miller. It is a deterrent.
        Dr. Blair. Well, I think it is--I think it--I think the
    Russians clearly understand, and I have been there dozens of
    times over many decades, and talked to their experts and their
    generals. I think they clearly understand that any use of
    nuclear weapons would run the risk of escalation to all-out
    use, and that the role--the Russians, essentially, accept that
    the role--sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use
    of nuclear weapons by others.
        But they also leave open the possibility that they could
    use nuclear weapons to defeat or to complicate conventional
    aggression against Russia.
        Ms. Gabbard. Ms. Rohlfing, you have anything to add on
    that?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I agree with what Dr. Blair just said.
        Ms. Gabbard. I think it is very clear to me that a nuclear
    weapon is a nuclear weapon. And if you are talking about a
    nuclear weapon as a deterrent, but then you want to develop
    low-yield nuclear weapons, it is clear that they would not be
    necessary if you see that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon,
    and that the system that we currently have acts as a deterrent.
        Secretary of State George Shultz said, as they were
    negotiating and signing the INF Treaty, ``A nuclear weapon is a
    nuclear weapon. You use a small one, then you go to a bigger
    one. There is an inevitable chain of nuclear escalation that
    puts the world at risk,'' which is why these low-yield nuclear
    weapons being developed are so dangerous.
        I want to switch over to the INF Treaty. Mr. Miller, where
    do you see the path forward? You have said the INF Treaty is
    dead. What is the path forward?
        Mr. Miller. The INF Treaty is dead because the Russians now
    have 100 of the systems that are----
        Ms. Gabbard. But what is the path forward?
        Mr. Miller. I would think that a new negotiation, which
    encompasses an extension of New START, in conjunction with new
    negotiations that cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons,
    would be a preferred path forward.
        Ms. Gabbard. So it is the wrong move for the United States
    to withdraw from this INF Treaty----
        Mr. Miller. I----
        Ms. Gabbard [continuing]. Because of the repercussions that
    we are seeing already beginning.
        Mr. Miller. I dispute the--the treaty was dead. The
    Russians killed the treaty. There are 100 new treaty-busting
    missiles in the field, period, full stop. They have been--
    developed them since 2013. We have been asking them about it
    since 2013. The end result is the fielding of at least 100 of
    these missiles, and more are coming.
        Ms. Gabbard. President Trump's withdrawal from this INF
    Treaty exacerbates the situation, and kicks off--and increases
    this nuclear arms race.
        Gorbachev and George Shultz wrote a piece on this, very
    clearly stating that they participated in INF negotiations, and
    abandoning this treaty threatens our very existence. They said,
    ``The answer to the problems that have come up is not to
    abandon the INF Treaty, but to preserve and fix it. Military
    and diplomatic officials from the U.S. and Russia should meet
    to address and resolve the issues of verification and
    compliance. Equally difficult problems have been solved in the
    past, once the two sides put their mind to it. We are confident
    this can be done again.'' That is quoting them.
        This is the direction that we need to take, not to add more
    fuel to the flames, but instead seek to strengthen, address the
    issues that have been raised, strengthen this treaty, and bring
    in others to join.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    as well as our three witnesses, I want to thank you for an
    extraordinarily important discussion, perhaps more important
    than any other thing this committee will consider over the next
    4 or 5 months, as we put together the NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act]. So thank you very much.
        I do want to pick up on Mr. Moulton's questions, insofar as
    you were able to answer. One of the questions that he raised is
    do the ICBMs deter Russia's attack more than our other nuclear
    weapons, specifically the SSBNs.
        Mr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. I think the SSBNs are a secure second strike.
    They are what underwrites deterrence. The ICBM force is a
    vulnerable force. I don't see how anyone could make any sense
    out of the view that they are a force to be replaced.
        Mr. Garamendi. With regard to that question, it also
    appears as though Russia and China both would agree with you
    that the ICBMs in a silo are vulnerable. And therefore, they
    have gone to mobile ICBMs.
        Dr. Blair. That is right. And we try very hard----
        Mr. Garamendi. I think that is going to be a yes or a no,
    because I want to get on----
        Dr. Blair. Oh, we try very hard to find, fix, and track
    their--both Russian and Chinese ICBMs. This is part of the----
        Mr. Garamendi. And North Korea.
        Dr. Blair [continuing]. Warfighting mindset that is
    pervasive in both----
        Mr. Garamendi. But with regard to the question of
    vulnerability, are--China, Russia, and North Korea have all
    decided that it has to be mobile, otherwise it is vulnerable.
    Is that correct, Mr. Miller?
        Mr. Miller. [Nonverbal response.]
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay, thank you. And I take that as a yes.
        Mr. Miller. Yes, but that Russia does maintain silo-based
    missiles, and the new monster SS-18 follow-on will be silo-
    based. And some Chinese missiles are still silo-based. But your
    point is correct.
        Mr. Garamendi. We are going to go around and around on this
    very, very fundamental issue for some time. We are going to
    have to deal with the issue. There may be questions,
    ultimately, of how fast we move forward with the new ICBM, and
    we will deal with that.
        However, there appears, Mr. Blair, that you have one thing
    very, very much in mind that the three of you would agree to,
    and that is the command and control systems. If we are to do
    anything useful, aside from the negotiations, which I think all
    three of you say we ought to push forward as far and as fast as
    possible--is that a yes from all three of you on negotiations,
    get on with it?
        [Nonverbal response.]
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. So that--take that as a yes from
    the three of you.
        Command and control. If we do anything useful in the
    upcoming NDAA, would you recommend that the command and control
    system be at the priority and the top of that list?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Yes.
        Dr. Blair. Yes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, I have got 3 minutes to go back and
    plow this field again, but I heard very clearly that--well, let
    me just state my position.
        We are not going to solve this very, very fundamental
    debate about the very important differences--ICBMs and low-
    yield and the rest--in the near term. It seems to me that that
    is a fundamental negotiating thing. And I think, from my--
    listening to this, that all three of you would say, ``Get on
    with the negotiations.''
        There are things in the--and there are things that we can
    do in the next 4 months or 5 months, and that is command and
    control, put the money there, put the emphasis there, and get
    on with it.
        Is that correct?
        Mr. Miller. It is certainly part of the modernization of
    the triad, and I support the triad and the modernization, the
    C3.
        Dr. Blair. Top priority.
        Mr. Garamendi. I knew you were going to go there, Mr.
    Miller, but I take that as a yes, get on with the command and
    control.
        Mr. Miller.
        Dr. Blair. Yes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Blair, rather.
        Dr. Blair. Totally agree.
        Ms. Rohlfing. Yes, I would prioritize command and control.
        Mr. Garamendi. Very good. Beyond that, there are elements
    in the current law that make it very difficult for our military
    to have discussions with our counterparts in Russia,
    specifically, and somewhat in China.
        I think it was your--two of you, anyway, maybe all three of
    you--that we eliminate those hindrances for discussion. Is that
    agreed amongst the three of you, that we should eliminate
    those?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I would say yes. Those prohibitions embedded
    in the NDAA over the last several years should be repealed. And
    in fact, the administration should be encouraged to pursue
    military-to-military dialogue.
        Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Blair.
        Dr. Blair. Chairman Dunford has just recently just met with
    the chief of the general staff of Russia, Gerasimov, and I
    think that that kind of dialogue is absolutely critical in this
    period of tension.
        Mr. Miller. And CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Richardson
    has just been to China. So yes, the military-to-military
    contacts are important.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Well, there is at least agreement that
    there is something that we can accomplish in a positive way.
        My final point in the next 53 minutes is--or 53 seconds--is
    that we do not have an agreement on what deterrence is, nor the
    definition of deterrence. And until we have some sort of an
    agreement on what that is, it is going to be a round and round,
    and not much resolution.
        With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony this
    morning. And let me begin with saying that, as you know, the
    United States has demonstrated strong leadership over the past
    decade to minimize and, where possible, all but eliminate the
    use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes. And I
    advocated for continued assessment to identify the feasibility
    of using low-enriched uranium in naval reactor fuel that would
    meet military requirements for aircraft carriers and
    submarines.
        So as I see it, using low-enriched uranium in naval reactor
    fuel has the potential to bring significant national security
    benefits related to nuclear non-proliferation, and lower
    security costs. It also supports naval reactor research and
    development at the cutting edge of nuclear science.
        Other nations do use low-enriched uranium to power their
    vessels, including submarines.
        Moreover, unless an alternative to using low-enriched
    uranium fuel is developed in the coming decades, the U.S. will
    have to resume production of bomb-grade uranium for the first
    time since 1992, ultimately undermining, I believe, U.S. non-
    proliferation efforts.
        So with all that being said, is this something that you
    considered in your research? And what are the risks associated
    with the recommencement of HEU [highly enriched uranium]
    production in the United States?
        Dr. Blair. It is not in my wheelhouse, but I have a
    colleague at Princeton, Professor Frank von Hippel, who has
    persuaded me of everything that you just said. So I think that
    you are on the right--totally on the right track with that set
    of proposals.
        Ms. Rohlfing. I would just add to that this is something
    that we have looked at at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and I
    think that it would be a very important investment to see if we
    can develop a next-generation reactor that maintains only, you
    know, as much as possible, current operations with the low-
    enriched uranium fuel for our naval reactors. So I would
    encourage it. It is an important plank in our non-proliferation
    policy.
        We need to prevent the spread of these materials around the
    world. And if we are continuing to produce it ourselves, and
    stockpile it in large numbers, that is hard to do.
        Mr. Miller. Sir, in my time in the Navy I was on a
    conventionally powered ship. I am not competent to talk about
    HEU, LEU [low enriched uranium], and reactors, but I think it
    is a mistake to think that if the United States does something,
    the rest of the world will follow. I think the sad history of
    the past 20-odd years indicates that we have proposed bold
    initiatives and, except for the British and the French, it is
    very difficult to bring other countries along with us.
        Mr. Langevin. But I am primarily focused on U.S. use of
    LEU. As long as it is going to meet military requirements--and
    again, certainly France is already doing it, powering their
    nuclear submarines, as I understand it. So it is technically
    feasible, it is happening, and I see no reason why the United
    States should not pursue that, and that type of technology and
    use in our aircraft carriers and submarines. But----
        Mr. Miller. Sure, and----
        Mr. Langevin [continuing]. I appreciate your----
        Mr. Miller. I am sure Admiral Caldwell will have a time in
    front of the committee. You can talk to that.
        Mr. Langevin. I thank you for your input on that topic.
        Next, though, the use of emerging technologies, such as
    machine learning to conduct predictive maintenance and additive
    manufacturing to help defray costs is something that we should
    be considering.
        The Defense Department has seen some success with these
    types of technology. However, the effort is in a nascent state.
    Do you see a place for these technologies in the nuclear force?
    And what do you think they will--what effect do you think they
    will have?
        Ms. Rohlfing. I think we need to do more research to better
    understand both the benefits and the disadvantages of pursuing
    those technologies as part of the nuclear force before I could
    make a recommendation.
        Dr. Blair. You know, I think existing technology, even 10
    years old, it could be incorporated into our systems, including
    our nuclear command and control system, which operates on--in
    some cases, on 1950s technology. So I don't think we have to
    leap too far into the future with new technology to fix a lot
    of the problems that we currently confront.
        Mr. Miller. I am not competent to answer your question,
    sir.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you all very much. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses. I
    think it was a very, very informative discussion, and I
    appreciate your expertise and your answers to our questions.
    And we learned a great deal.
        I just want to close by saying that I don't think there is
    anybody on this committee--there is probably people in the
    country, but there is not anybody on this committee who is not
    in support of modernizing our nuclear force. And I don't think
    there is anybody on this committee who is not in support of the
    idea that we need to have a nuclear deterrent.
        To the extent that some of the questions from members
    implied that somehow, if we don't do everything in the Nuclear
    Posture Review that means that we are in favor of unilateral
    disarmament and being weak, is exactly--the type of argument
    that has always troubled me on this committee is you can always
    build more. Well, okay if the Nuclear Posture Review is the
    gold standard for what makes you strong, why not another 1,000
    missiles, you know?
        I mean what if someone came up with a Nuclear Posture
    Review that said no, you are wrong, you know, we need five more
    submarines. So then the Nuclear Posture Review becomes evidence
    that you are weak.
        So I am very--the only thing that really troubles me about
    the discussion is people say that if we don't build absolutely
    everything we say we are going to build, that means that our
    adversaries are going to perceive us as weak and attack us.
    That is--I think the analogy I have heard in the military--the
    ultimate self-licking ice cream cone. It will never stop.
        So I think a robust discussion about what is actually in
    the Nuclear Posture Review and whether or not it makes sense to
    maintain that deterrence, that is the debate we were having. I
    understand in politics it is always easier if you can set up a
    straw man and then knock it down--the straw man being that, you
    know, well, let's not be weak. That is not the discussion here.
    The discussion here: what is a credible nuclear deterrent? And
    I completely agree that that is what we need.
        I would point out that, over the course of the next 15
    years, the nuclear modernization plan that we are talking about
    is going to add somewhere between $10 and $15 billion a year to
    what we already spend on nuclear weapons, and we already spend
    a great deal. That is $10 to $15 billion that isn't going to go
    to anything else.
        So we need to have that discussion, in my view. But it is
    not a matter of disarming or, you know, standing down. I think
    we need to have a strong nuclear deterrent, and we need to
    modernize. But we will continue to have this debate, going
    forward.
        Again, you were all excellent, and I really appreciate you
    taking the time to help inform our committee on this crucially
    important issue.
        With that, we are adjourned.
        I forgot something. I am going to ask unanimous consent to
    include into the record all members' statements and extraneous
    material.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        And now we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 6, 2019

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 6, 2019

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 6, 2019

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

        Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes
    that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that
    enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The
    administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is
    in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty
    meets that threshold?
        Ms. Rohlfing. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes
    that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that
    enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The
    administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is
    in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty
    meets that threshold?
        Dr. Blair. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mrs. Davis. The Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review notes
    that the administration will ``seek arms control agreements that
    enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable.'' The
    administration has also noted as recently as this month that Russia is
    in compliance with the Treaty. Do you believe the New START Treaty
    meets that threshold?
        Mr. Miller. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
                                     ______

                         QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
        Mr. Kim. How confident are you in our current nuclear command,
    control, and communication (C3) systems, especially regarding
    cybersecurity? If no, why not? What can be done in the short and long
    term to reduce these cyber vulnerabilities?
        Dr. Blair. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Kim. How confident are you in our current nuclear command,
    control, and communication (C3) systems, especially regarding
    cybersecurity? If no, why not? What can be done in the short and long
    term to reduce these cyber vulnerabilities?
        Mr. Miller. [The information was not available at the time of
    printing.]

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