[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COUNTERING A RESURGENT RUSSIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 1, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-31
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Democrat Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Nuland, Ambassador Victoria, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign
Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings
Institution, and Former Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs and Former United States
Permanent Representative to NATO............................... 8
Fried, Ambassador Daniel, Distinguished Fellow, Future Europe
Initiative and Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council, and Former
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
and Former United States Ambassador to Poland.................. 15
Keane, General Jack, U.S. Army, Retired, Chairman, Institute for
the Study of War, and Former Acting Chief of Staff and Vice
Chief of Staff of The U.S. Army................................ 30
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Unclassified Report submitted for the record from Representative
Bera........................................................... 63
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 95
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 96
Hearing Attendance............................................... 97
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............ 98
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Deutch...... 100
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Pence....... 101
COUNTERING A RESURGENT RUSSIA
Wednesday, May 1, 2019
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Engel [presiding]. The committee will come to
order.
Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit
statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Today we will hear from some of our best foreign policy
minds on one of our most pressing foreign policy challenges,
how to deal with an increasingly aggressive and belligerent
Russia.
Ambassador Nuland, Ambassador Fried, General Keane,
welcome. Welcome to members of the public and press as well.
If you look at a map of the world, you will not find too
many places that Russia is not stirring up trouble. On its own
borders, Russia's illegal occupation of Georgia and Ukraine has
shattered decades of work to build peace and stability in
Europe. Propaganda efforts and cyber warfare across the
continent have spread lies and confusion with the clear aim of
undermining Western unity and the Transatlantic Alliance.
Russia has weaponized its energy resources, expanding into
European markets and creating greater and greater dependency,
particularly with projects such as the Nord Stream 2 and
TurkStream. These are clear efforts to increase its influence
into European countries and advance its political aims.
In the Middle East, Russia has served as a lifeline for the
murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad, aiding in the wholesale
slaughter of innocent civilians. Russia has exported these same
so-called counterterrorism tactics to Sub-Saharan Africa,
where, for example, in the Central African Republic civilian
casualties are mounting.
As we watch events unfold here in our own neighborhood, we
are reminded that Putin has sent troops to Venezuela to prop up
the illegitimate dictator Nicolas Maduro. Here in the United
States, of course, Russia put its thumb on the scale during the
2016 election to support President Trump's campaign, as Special
Counsel Mueller's report puts it, and I quote, ``in sweeping
and systematic fashion''. Unquote. And Russia continues to work
to fuel political division and undermine American democracy.
And the largest group victimized by Russia's harmful and
destructive policies are Russians themselves living under the
tyranny of Vladimir Putin. Putin tries to silence his political
opponents, honest journalists, and anyone else who dares to
criticize his corrupt rule. His tools range from imprisonment
to torture, to assassination, as the world saw in the case of
Boris Nemtsov, whom I had the pleasure of meeting with right in
this very building before he was brutally assassinated by
Putin's people.
Putin and his thugs continue to tighten their grip on
freedom of speech, expression, and access to information and
economic opportunity. And let me add on that note that Russia
continues to hold Paul Whelan, an American citizen, under false
charges of espionage. Russia is denying him his basic human
rights and has been dragging its feet every step of the way. I
renew my demand that the Russian government end this charade
and release Paul Whelan back to his family.
What is Russia's aim with this unrelenting malevolence?
What does Putin hope to accomplish by seizing territory,
distorting reality, attacking democracy, and supporting
tyranny? First, of course, the answer is power, both
domestically and on the international stage. Putin and his
henchmen in the Kremlin are desperate to keep their grip on
power, whatever the costs. They need to hide the disaster that
their oligarchy, kleptocracy, and corruption have been for
their own country. Putin simply blames outside forces for
Russia's troubles, but we all know the troubles of the Russian
people are the result of Russia's corrupt leaders.
Second, Russia wants to peddle the lie that there is a
better alternative to democracy, a better alternative to the
West. Putin wants a new cold war, a new battle of ideas. He
thinks he can win by supporting dictators and cozying up to the
West's adversaries, including his recent attempts to reach out
to China. He is wrong, of course, but that will not stop him
from trying.
It is a challenge we need to take seriously, and I do not
think that the Administration is doing nearly enough. We are
being outplayed around the world and here on our home court. We
are ceding ground in Syria and across the Middle East. We are
letting Russia work its will in the European energy sector.
And, of course, with another Presidential race gearing up, we
have not done nearly enough to shore up our own elections from
Russian interference.
The White House says no President has ever been tougher on
Russia. I wish I could believe that. I have got to wonder why
the Administration will not meet the challenge head-on. The
Special Counsel said in his report that he could not establish
criminal conspiracy between the Trump campaign and Russia, but
let's be clear. We know the Russians offered the Trump campaign
stolen information about Hillary Clinton. We know the Trump
campaign was eager to receive it. We know there was contact
after contact after contact between campaign officials and
Russian officials, and we know that the President was working
to expand his business interests in Russia right up to the
election. The fact that such behavior is not illegal should be
a call for Congress to act.
And the fact is we still do not know how deeply the
President is involved with Putin. We have no idea what the
President and Putin discussed at their meetings. We have no
idea, and that underscores why this committee's oversight and
investigative work will proceed full speed ahead and why we
will continue to shine a light on the real challenge that
Russia poses.
In fact, the Ranking Member and I are working on
legislation to push back on Russian aggression, protect
American interests, ramp up the targeted sanctions, enhance
diplomacy, and counter propaganda efforts to meet the Russian
threat.
And I am eager to hear our witnesses' thoughts on what we
should be doing to counter Russia, both in the near and long
term. I do not think there is any disagreement about that in
this committee with the members of this committee and our
witnesses.
Before I introduce them, I will yield to our ranking
member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for any opening remarks he might
have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As General Keane said, if a politician loses his voice, it
is like losing a weapon. So, I have sort of lost a little bit
of my voice, but I am going to try to get through this very
briefly.
Russia has been a threat for a long time. That is why NATO
was formed. Russia did interfere with our elections. I was part
of the 2016 Gang of Eight briefing on their attempt to meddle
in our elections. And I have always stood firmly against that.
I asked the prior administration to stand up against that
publicly and condemn it. And I think we should still condemn
it. I did a lot as chairman of Homeland Security to enhance our
cybersecurity apparatus to protect Americans and the American
electoral system, and I am proud of that work.
I do not think this is a partisan issue. As you and I had
breakfast with the secretary of State today, it is no question,
no doubt in my mind, that Secretary Pompeo looks at Russia as a
great threat to the United States.
And one only need look at Ukraine and what they have done
in Ukraine and in Crimea, and they have been bold in their
aggression. And now, looking today at Venezuela, the fact that
Russians are in our own hemisphere posing a threat, putting
military assets in our Western Hemisphere, the likes of which
we have not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The fact that
President Maduro was on an airplane just yesterday to fly to
Havana and the Russians talked him out of it--what is going on
in our hemisphere? They would love nothing more than to poke us
in the eye in our own hemisphere.
They moved into Syria. They took over the ports in Syria.
They saw a power grab because we did nothing. We did nothing in
Syria, and inaction is a decision in and of itself, and the
Russians exploited that. Mr. Chairman, as the Foreign Minister
of Turkey told us, that is precisely why the Russians are
there, because we were not. We have to be a world leader. We
cannot lead from behind anymore. We have to be a leader.
Otherwise, the Russians, and the Chinese for that matter, will
fill that vacuum. So, I commend you for having this hearing.
There was no collusion in this last election, but did they
try to meddle in the elections? Absolutely. And the
intelligence shows that. The intelligence community shows that.
There is no doubt in my mind they are not our friend. And if
anybody thinks Putin is our friend, they are wrong.
I met with two Russian opposition leaders yesterday, and
they view Putin as a threat to the world. In my view, once KGB,
always KGB.
So, I think this should not be a partisan exercise here.
This should be an American exercise. As you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, I look forward to working with you on issues related
to this matter, and I hope we can pass legislation out of this
committee. Because I think I speak for most of my members on my
side of the aisle that we do not view Russia as our friend. We
are not complicit with Russia. Russia has been a cold war
enemy, has been an enemy of NATO, and they are an enemy of the
United States today.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
I am now pleased to introduce our witnesses. I will start
with Ambassador Victoria Nuland, who served as Assistant
secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from
September 2013 until January 2017 under President Obama and
Secretary Kerry. She was the State Department spokesperson
during Secretary Hillary Clinton's tenure, and U.S. Ambassador
to NATO during President George W. Bush's second term from 2005
until 2008. Ambassador Nuland previously served as Special
Envoy and Chief Negotiator on the Treaty on Conventional Arms
Control in Europe, as Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice
President Cheney, and in numerous overseas posts. She is now
senior counselor at the Albright Stonebridge Group and holds
positions at the Brookings Institution, Yale, and the National
Endowment for Democracy. And she is also a personal friend of
mine, and I am always amazed at how smart she is and how hard-
working and how much she knows.
So, welcome, Ambassador.
Ambassador Daniel Fried was a member of the Foreign Service
for four decades, serving as Ambassador to Poland, as Assistant
secretary of State for Europe during the era of the NATO
enlargement, and as National Security Council Senior Director
during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. He
worked to craft the West's response to Moscow's aggression
against Ukraine, starting in 2014, as the State Department's
Coordinator for Sanctions Policy. He is currently a
Distinguished Fellow with the Atlantic Council and a visiting
professor at Warsaw University, a hard worker, very competent.
And we are very delighted that you are here, Ambassador.
General Jack Keane served in the United States Army for 37
years, culminating with his appointment as Acting Chief of
Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He was a career
infantry paratrooper, a decorated combat veteran of Vietnam,
and commander of the 101st Airborne Division and the 18th
Airborne Corps. After his 2003 retirement from the Army,
General Keane spent a decade assisting senior defense officials
in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is president of GSI Consulting and
chairs the Institute for the Study of War and the Knollwood
Foundation.
And as I said, a very distinguished panel, very
distinguished general. Welcome again to all of you. We are
grateful for your time.
I will now recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes each to
summarize their testimony, and we will start with Ambassador
Nuland.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR VICTORIA NULAND, NONRESIDENT SENIOR
FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY, CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS AND FORMER UNITED STATES
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member
McCaul, members of this committee, for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I commend this committee for the bipartisanship that it has
shown on Russian-related legislation in recent years and for
its continued commitment to that, as the ranking member made
clear this morning.
The first President for whom I served, Ronald Reagan, set
the gold standard for policy leadership vis-a-vis the Kremlin.
He understood that we in the United States had a dual mission,
to contain, deter, and defeat dangerous and destabilizing
behavior by the Kremlin, but also to offer Moscow a better,
more collaborative relationship, if it were willing to change
course.
Today, I believe our greatest challenge in countering a
resurgent Russia is the lack of leadership, unity, and
consistency in the United States in managing relations with
Moscow. This, in turn, leaves our allies and partners adrift in
confronting the many challenges from the Kremlin to our
security, our democracy, and the liberal rules-based order. It
also leaves Moscow unsure what we value and even more tempted
to test the limits of U.S. and allied will to defend ourselves.
Reagan in his day did not view Moscow as a permanent enemy,
and nor should we today. The American people do not want that,
and I do not believe the Russian people want it, either. What
we do not know, and what we have to continue to test, is
whether Russian President Putin truly wants to improve
relations. It may well be that his psychology and his
leadership model are too dependent on an enemy abroad to change
course. And we also have to steel ourselves for what may be a
very long game that outlasts Putin.
In the meantime, as the chairman and ranking member have
made clear, none of us should have any illusions about the
current challenge. Just a few highlights from the Kremlin's
current playbook to set the table:
Our democracy and those of our allies have been infected
and undermined by Moscow's digital aggression.
Russia's neighbors have been intimidated, invaded, and in
the case of Crimea/Ukraine, annexed.
Arms control agreements that kept the peace for decades
have been violated.
Thugs and dictators, from Assad in Syria to Maduro in
Venezuela, survive and thrive, thanks to Kremlin support.
Moscow exports corruption and resorts to money-laundering,
criminality as tools of coercion.
And the human and civil rights of Russia's own citizens
have been trampled, and the innovation and talent of the
country have been stifled.
Today, Putin believes that the West is weak, that our
political and economic systems are vulnerable, and that the
values of tolerance, inclusion, and universal rights that we
protect when we are at our best can be exploited to divide us.
He aspires to lead a global club of autocrats who offer their
citizens and the world an ideological and political alternative
to the messiness and wonderfulness of free, open societies.
We enable Putin's quest ourselves when our own leaders call
into question the basic rights enshrined in our liberal
Constitution: an independent judiciary, a free press,
protection of minority rights, and the oversight powers of this
Congress.
So, I agree with the premise of the Trump administration's
national security strategy, that we have reentered a period of
competition of Russia. What I do not see, though, is a
coherent, full government response to that challenge which is
led by the President, in partnership with the Congress. To be
effective, that strategy has to harness all the tools of our
national power and those of our allies, military, political,
economic, informational, and now, of course, digital.
We have to harden our own defenses. We have to better
expose and blunt Russian malign activity. And we have to
increase the cost for Moscow, while also offering a path to de-
escalation and even collaboration, if the Kremlin changes
course. And we have to coordinate all of this tightly with
NATO, with the EU, with our Asian allies and partners, in order
to amplify the impact of our actions, but also to close
opportunities for Moscow to divide us.
We have to, once again, remember how to marshal a big stick
and a big carrot. And we should not forget to speak directly to
the Russian people, who are now very tired of their
government's focus on Ukraine and Syria and new weapons, to the
detriment of improved schools, hospitals, and jobs in Russia
itself, and the corruption that is rotting that country.
Let me just give two examples of how a larger strategy
might work. To address Russia's digital assault on our
democracy, here is what we need to do: we need to appoint a
cyber czar in the White House to coordinate national and
international policy. We need a national intelligence and
operational fusion center, as has been called for in some
legislation, to expose, defeat, and deter digital influence
campaigns, electoral manipulation, and inauthentic speech,
working closely with industry and with academia.
We need an agreed escalation letter of painful new economic
sanctions, legal and regulatory penalties, coordinated with
allies, ready to deploy when new malign influence is exposed.
We cannot wait until after the action has happened to start
figuring out what the cost will be.
And we need our own suite of reciprocal legal and, when
necessary, deniable digital and cyber countermeasures which
increase the cost to Putin vis-a-vis his own electorate and
demonstrate his deficiencies at home.
And for the carrot, we need a serious and standing
sustained dialog with Moscow which offers an armistice on these
issues and sanctions relief, and the prospect even of
potentially collaborating to set global digital standards, if
and when the Kremlin verifiably renounces weaponization of the
internet.
Similarly in the military sphere, where Russia's increasing
reliance on nuclear weapons and investments in hypersonic,
undersea, and cyber weapons present new threats:
We should respond to Russian violations of the INF Treaty
and its weapons buildup with new conventional deployments and
missile defenses of our own in Europe, coordinated with our
NATO allies, to deter nuclear first use and conventional
adventurism, and to push the Russians back to the negotiating
table.
We need to maintain and strengthen NATO and U.S. defenses
and exercises along the Alliance's eastern edge and in the
Baltic and Black Seas.
And we need to appoint a senior negotiator and interagency
team for comprehensive talks with Moscow on strategic
stability, which tie any future arms control agreements and the
extension of New START to a broader de-escalation of tensions
and insecurity across all the military domains of power.
And finally, we need to speak directly to the Russian
people about the costs of Putin's militarization. They need to
know where the wealth of their country has gone.
These are just two areas of challenge with Russia. A
comprehensive policy will require rigorous lines of effort also
on Ukraine, on Syria, on corruption, and on all the other areas
of concern. This level of effort will require principled,
steady Presidential leadership to unite our government,
coordinate closely with all of you in the Congress, and to
build the support of the American people and our allies.
As our intelligence community and now the Mueller report
make absolutely clear, Putin seeks to pit Americans against
each other to destroy our democratic system, to erode our trust
in each other, and to damage our alliances. This is not about
any one of us, nor is it about the President's legitimacy. It
is about the safety and security of all of us and the future of
the liberal world order that has served the United States so
well for 70 years. Preserving these must be the first
responsibility of any American President and of every Congress.
We have the national strength and the allies to meet this
challenge of a more dangerous Russia. What we have lacked is
the resolve.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Ambassador Nuland.
Ambassador Fried.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DANIEL FRIED, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW,
FUTURE EUROPE INITIATIVE AND EURASIA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND
EURASIAN AFFAIRS AND FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO POLAND
Mr. Fried. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members
of the committee, I also appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today. The topic is relevant and timely and, for the
record, I agree with my colleague and friend, Ambassador
Nuland.
President Trump once said that it would be nice if the U.S.
got along with Russia. It would. But Presidents Bush and Obama
tried and failed because neither would accept Putin's
aggression abroad and repression at home. Putin's
authoritarianism and kleptocracy keeps Russia backward. Reforms
to develop Russia, rule of law, democracy, would end Putinism.
Lacking democratic legitimacy, and increasingly economic
results, Putin seeks to assemble a counteralliance of autocrats
to support extremists to weaken the West and to counter the
U.S. wherever possible. He wants to weaken the European Union
and NATO and discredit democracy itself as an appealing
alternative for Russians. Putin needs Ukraine to fail in its
efforts to become a free market democracy closer to Europe
because a successful Ukraine would show Russians that Putinism
is not the only way for them.
A wise U.S. policy toward Russia, therefore, would combine
resistance to Russian aggression, efforts to reduce the risks
of destabilizing clashes, and arms control, when possible,
without unwarranted concessions or apologies; cooperation with
Russia where our interests overlap, maybe on the DPRK and
spread of weapons of mass destruction, without expecting too
much too soon, and planning for potentially better relations
with a better Russia. We should act in all of these things with
our allies. The world's great and emerging democracies have the
power and political legitimacy to maintain a rules-based system
that favors freedom and advances our Nation's interests and
other nations' interests.
Mr. Chairman, your invitation to this hearing requested
recommendations to combat Russian coercion. So, I offer the
following:
Strengthen NATO's Eastern defenses. After the cold war, the
U.S. drew down its forces in Europe, and many European
countries allowed their militaries to decline. I get it. We all
wanted a peace dividend, and Russia appeared to be an emerging
partner. But, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and
NATO changed course, deploying forces to the most vulnerable
NATO neighbors. Our allies stepped up. The British lead NATO
forces in Estonia, the Canadians in Latvia, and the Germans in
Lithuania. And the U.S. leads NATO's battalion in Poland and
has stationed an armored brigade in Poland on a rotational
basis. These deployments seek to deter, to show Russia that it
cannot mount a sudden assault on NATO countries, conventional
or hybrid, without triggering a wider conflict.
The Obama Administration deserves credit for leading NATO
to make this shift, and the Trump administration deserves
credit for continuing, even strengthening, it. More needs to be
done. That means strengthening NATO and U.S. capacity for rapid
reinforcement through additional forces and military
infrastructure in Europe. It means strengthening NATO and U.S.
cyber defense and deterrent capacity now underway.
The U.S. and Poland have launched discussions about
increasing the U.S. military presence in that country. This is
a worthy initiative, and the Poles seem willing to carry their
share of the burden. I support putting in Poland a mix of
rotational units, standing deployments, and permanent
infrastructure, integrated with NATO's defense plans.
Second, defend against disinformation using democratic
means. We need to combat Russian and others' disinformation
while remaining true to our democratic values. As we learned in
the cold war, we need not become them in order to fight them.
Here is an action plan:
The U.S. Government should support transparency and
authenticity on social media, not heavy content control. This
means disclosure of funders for political and issues ads,
removing inauthentic and impersonator accounts, reassessing
online anonymity. Angry Bob from Boise may, in fact, be Ivan
from the St. Petersburg troll farm, and we should not let Ivan
get away with it.
We should also deal with the algorithmic bias on social
media companies toward sensational and extreme content.
Legislation and regulation do have a place. The U.S. needs to
get organized to fight disinformation, a lead agency or
interagency body, such as a national counter-disinformation
center. We need to work with our friends. The EU is way ahead
of the U.S. in addressing Russian disinformation. And we should
consider a counter-disinformation coalition of like-minded
governments, social media companies, and civil society groups
to pool knowledge. Social resilience will work best in the long
run. Teaching everyone from civil servants to children how to
spot disinformation and manipulation ought to be standard
practice.
Third, we should employ the sanctions tool wisely. We are
using sanctions a lot to deal with a lot of Russian
misbehavior. There is a lot of Russian aggression around, but
sorting out our options is a challenge. We need to decide what
we are trying to achieve and with what priority. Do we want to
use the threat of sanctions to push for a settlement in
Ukraine? To deter Russia from interfering in next year's U.S.
elections? To focus on Russian actions in support of Maduro?
All of the above equally?
I suggest the following: some sanctions options are
available right now. We should be going after corrupt Russian
oligarchs close to Putin. We should curtail channels for
corrupt Russian funds and others' corrupt funds, such as the
use of nontransparent LLCs for high-end real estate deals. We
should proceed with care on energy sanctions. If we escalate,
we should go after future Russian production, not cause a spike
in energy prices, giving the Kremlin a windfall. We should
focus our best sanctions options on key goals.
The DETER Act aims to prevent Russian election
interference. Its focus is laudable, but we have got other
objectives as well. I think we ought to save our best sanctions
escalatory options for Ukraine-related and election-related.
Get them ready, because if the Russians act, we need to be able
to respond promptly, and the Russians need to know that we are
prepared to act.
We should also continue human rights-related sanctions, the
Magnitsky Act and Global Magnitsky, keyed to actual abuses.
Volume is less important than the right targets. We should work
with allies and maintain operational flexibility. We need to be
able to remove sanctions if Russian behavior improves.
Licensing authority is not a loophole; it is a safety net.
Two thoughts at the end. Sanctions work if they are
embedded in a policy that makes sense. The administration needs
to articulate a Russia policy and mean it. But there is more. A
Russia policy should be linked to an American grand strategy
that recognizes that a rules-based world that favors freedom is
in our national interest. At our best, America has recognized
that our interests and values advance together or not at all.
Putin and like-minded nationalists and despots stand for
nothing but power. We saw the results of such thinking in the
first half of the 20th century. America can do better. In fact,
after 1945, and again after 1989, we did do better. Despite our
mistakes and inconsistencies, U.S. leadership generated the
longest period of general great power peace in human history
and unprecedented global prosperity.
Our current problems are severe, some of our own making.
But I hope and believe that we will recall the values and
purposes which propelled U.S. world leadership and produced so
much good for so many.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss these issues and
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Ambassador.
General Keane.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN,
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, AND FORMER ACTING CHIEF OF
STAFF AND VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY
General Keane. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me today to testify. I am honored to be here with my esteemed
colleagues, Ambassador Nuland and Ambassador Fried. I want to
thank the committee also for your leadership in establishing a
broad bipartisan effort in the Congress in holding Russia
accountable, particularly for a tough sanction regime.
The United States and our allies are facing a resurgent
Russia to be sure that desires to change the international
order that existed for 70-plus years, relitigate the end of the
cold war, return Russia to the world stage as a global power,
while challenging the American hegemon and increasing its own
sphere of influence in a multipolar world. This sphere of
influence, which is historically based, has grown rapidly in
the last two decades to include Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, South Asia, Latin and South America, Africa, and the
Arctic.
I spent over a year on the bipartisan congressional
Commission on the National Defense Strategy, and we found the
NDS accurately describes the strategic framework we are facing
today with a return of big power competition with Russia and
China while confronting North Korea, Iran, and radical Islam.
However, the Commission believes the execution of the NDS is
less than satisfactory and we are at considerable risk if we
were to fight a conventional war with Russia or China today.
The risk is driven by the harsh reality that United States
military capability and dominance has seriously eroded. 9/11
wars, budget reductions, and sequestration have enabled Russia
and China to close the technology advantage that we enjoyed,
and in some capabilities they actually exceed us.
You asked for some recommendations, Mr. Chairman, and I
will mention a few, and certainly we can take on some more in
Q&A.
First, we need to develop a comprehensive strategy to
deter, confront, and engage Russia. The strategy should include
ways, means, and ends to counter the Russian challenge,
particularly the doctrine of hybrid warfare, which includes
influence operations, election meddling, et cetera. It should
be publicly endorsed by the President of the United States,
using a whole-of-government approach, and developed in
collaboration with our allies. That recommendation absolutely
subsumes everything I am about to say in terms of its
criticality.
The Russian hybrid war threat advantages doubt and
confusion. Making a positive declaration statement puts Russia
on notice. A suggested statement, quote: ``The United States
and NATO will regard the appearance of any Russian military
forces, whether in uniform or out, and including private
military companies, in any NATO member state as an attack
defined by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and will
come to the defense of the member States.'' Unquote.
Hybrid warfare is Russia's norm for applying force,
influencing, and taking control, and the statement is just a
step in the right direction in countering it. NATO, the world's
most successful, enduring political and military alliance,
which to date has prevented the calamity of another world war,
NATO is an alliance that must be strengthened, as Ambassador
Fried just mentioned, not just in terms of financial burden-
sharing, but in specific military capabilities from each member
that directly contributes to deterrence.
While there has been some improvement in forward-deployed
forces in Europe, it is inadequate for a credible defense.
Remember what we have learned through the cold war: to prevent
a war, you have to be able to capably deter war. What is
deterrence? Your adversary has to see the capability and he has
know that you are willing to use it.
While European forces need to be increased, it is essential
that the United States deploy a corps-level joint and combined
headquarters and a division headquarters with two armored
brigades, in addition to what we already have. This is not a
return to the cold war where we had two corps, four divisions,
close to 400,000 troops.
In Ukraine, Russia will try to manipulate the new,
inexperienced President Zelensky, and, hopefully, not move him
down the path of normalizing relations with Russia in order to
get the Ukraine economy moving and to placate the oligarchs in
getting Russian money. Europe and the United States must
strongly engage Zelensky to support Ukraine's anti-corruption
efforts and to strengthen their economic viability. And also,
we need to help them add military capability.
The Middle East. The United States should persist in
renewing its leadership role in forming a Middle East Strategic
Alliance, MESA, to counter Iran and reduce Russia's influence.
Publicize Russian atrocities in Syria and those it facilitates
by the Assad regime in Iran. Move diplomatically to reduce
Russia's influence in Egypt and in Libya.
And in Venezuela, Russia, who has made significant military
and economic investments in Venezuela for years, is attempting
to accomplish in the Western Hemisphere what so successfully
they have done in the Middle East and Syria, prop up a
repressive regime, which is an ally, and if successful,
diminish U.S. influence in our own region. Russia, as part of
its hybrid warfare doctrine, in January deployed 400 personnel
from the Wagner Group, a private military firm that operates as
a military unit. Their mission? Protect Maduro. Last month,
Russia brought in actual military leaders and advisers to help
with Venezuela's overall security. There is no doubt that these
leaders are talking to Putin and his elites on a regular basis
and they are in control of Maduro.
The reality is that I give the Trump team high marks so far
in dealing with Venezuela. However, when Putin interfered
militarily--and let's face it, he truly has--we should have
responded not just with rhetoric, but with strong
confrontation. What am I talking about? We should have told
Putin that we are going to put increased lethal aid in his back
yard in Ukraine. And a phone conversation with Vladimir should
go like this, ``Vladimir, you put military intervention into
the Western Hemisphere. I am putting military aid into Ukraine.
I am not going to stop it until you get out of Venezuela. You
moved in there secretly; you can get out secretly. I do not
need to talk about it publicly.'' And also expose the fact that
Putin, in violation of the U.N. resolutions that he supported,
is providing economic assistance to North Korea on a regular
basis.
Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but I just want to mention
two more recommendations.
One, the most important issue for this committee is keeping
the sanctions on Russia. They help to deprive Putin of the
resources he needs to build his military to conduct major
offensive operations, major conventional operations. Excuse me.
They also help with his hybrid warfare threat, to deprive Putin
of the resources to buy influence in other countries. So,
continue to sanction additional oligarchs and entities involved
in illegal activities.
On human rights, one of the best pressure tools available,
given Russia's obvious and continued pushback on it, the
President should speak to this issue personally and hold Putin
accountable. Reagan demonstrated that personal diplomacy with
Gorbachev was still effective, despite Reagan's identification
of the Soviet Union's human rights abuses.
In conclusion, countering Russian aggressive requires
steadfast American leadership in collaboration with our allies
to establish a credible deterrence to war, the courage to
confront aggression, and the openness to continue to engage
Russia on issues of mutual benefit and concern. Certainly,
nuclear disarmament is at the top of that list. Despite the
progress made in countering Russia, there is much more work to
be done, particularly in developing a comprehensive strategy to
counter the Russian advance.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member McCaul, I thank
you for permitting me to testify today and I look forward to
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Applause.]
Chairman Engel. OK, you brought your own cheering section.
Thank you very much.
While I know that my colleagues in the Senate are at this
moment questioning Attorney General Barr about the Mueller
report and Russia's interference in our own elections, I am
concerned about the relationship between the President and
Vladimir Putin and what that means for our foreign policy vis-
a-vis Russia.
Ms. Nuland, in your statement you noted that ``our greatest
challenge in countering the resurgent Russia is the lack of
leadership, unity, and consistency in the United States in
managing relations with Moscow.''
So, I would like to ask the witnesses to address how
President Trump's leadership on a series of issues have, I
believe, undermined our response to Russia. First of all, I am
concerned that President Trump's stated plan to withdraw from
Syria essentially cedes the ground to Russia and other
nefarious actors such as Turkey, and rewarding Putin's military
intervention in Syria appears to have only emboldened him to
act in Venezuela, as we saw yesterday.
So, let me ask, starting with Ms. Nuland, how concerned are
you that Putin feels free to intervene in a growing list of
countries?
Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I agree with you, and as I said in my
statement, when we are unclear, when we are not strongly led
from the Presidential level, that is the time for adventurism
by Moscow. We have seen that in past decades and we see it now.
And I do not think that this began with President Trump. I
think we have been ambivalent about our leadership role for
some time, including in Syria. But there have also been
enormous opportunities missed by this administration.
I will start, as you did, with Syria. When the
administration redoubled force to clean out ISIS in Raqqa, that
would have been the moment to redouble diplomatic pressure on
Russia for a lasting settlement that would have kept Iran out
and given the Syrian people an opportunity to choose their own
path. And we squandered that.
Similarly with regard to Ukraine, we had an opportunity
when Russia moved in the Azov Sea to put passive naval monitors
into that sea and protect the entire literal from the Azov into
the Black Sea and into the Med, and we missed that opportunity.
With regard to disinformation, Putin has understood that he
presented the greatest national security challenge to U.S.
freedom and democracy perhaps since the Cuban Missile Crisis,
and we are inchoate and unclear in the way we are responding.
And the statements by the President have all been about the
linkages to his own legitimacy rather than the threat to U.S.
national security. I would hope that the lesson from the
Mueller report will be that it is time to turn the page and
protect America now.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Second, President Trump seems to find common cause with
certain autocrats, right-wing autocrats, in Europe, people like
Viktor Orban of Hungary, who frequently supports Russia and
serves as Putin's Trojan Horse in Europe. And this extends to
Turkey, as I mentioned before, where we must not accede to
President Erdogan's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile
system, which will be disastrous for U.S.-Turkey ties. The
procurement is a grave concern because it would undermine NATO
interoperability and potentially give Russia critical technical
insights into the F-35 fighter, which Turkey helps build and is
planning to operate. It would also likely trigger sanctions
against Turkey under Section 231 of CAATSA. We have made a
last-ditch effort to convince Turkey to cancel the deal,
offering the Patriot missile system instead.
Let me ask, what other levers can the United States use to
show Turkey that it is headed down the wrong path and that
cozying up to Putin is a grave mistake? If anyone would like to
answer that one?
General Keane. Well, I certainly agree that Turkey
acquiring the S-400, the most advanced air defense missile
system in the world, is certainly contrary to our national
interests, and particularly given the fact that I think you
recognize that Turkey is part of that multinational group that
is actually manufacturing the F-35. And you put those two
together, and clearly, Russian technicians and intelligence
personnel would have access to the stealth technology that the
F-35 represents as a major U.S. penetrator. So, clearly, we
have to push back on this and push back on it strongly.
I also want to say something that you mentioned before, Mr.
Chairman, about Syria. Russia saw the opportunity in Syria
because we were not taking any consequential action to do
anything about it, frankly. We had abandoned Mubarak as a
result of the Arab Spring in 2010. We pulled out of Iraq in
2011. We had a leader elected to replace Gaddafi, and all he
wanted was some help to put down the militias that helped to
overthrow Gaddafi, knowing they would overthrow him. And we
refused him.
As a result of that, Putin correctly assumed that the
United States' normal leadership role in the Middle East had
largely been abandoned, and he moved into Syria and conducted a
tactical operational move with huge strategic implications for
it. Every Arab country is now doing arms deal with him, and he
is proliferating the building of nuclear power stations in the
Middle East as well.
And I believe our policy is uneven in this response.
Certainly, the issue over Syria was not handled very well. We
had made a commitment to stay in Syria I think for two reasons.
The stated purpose was dealing with ISIS and make certain it
does not reemerge, and certainly to counter the Iranians'
influence in Syria, which is encroaching on Israel. And to
suggest that we would just summarily pull out of Syria and
abandon those two goals clearly was not in U.S. national
interest. Fortunately, the President listened to advisors and
was able to readdress that decision, and at least for the time
being we are remaining there.
But the unevenness of the policy I think creates doubt in
the minds of our allies and, also, in the minds of our
adversaries about the United States' determination to provide a
leadership role in the Middle East, which I think is critical
to U.S. national interests.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, General. I absolutely agree with
your statement. I think you hit it right on the head.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we both agree on Syria, and I think Turkey, a NATO
ally, buying Russian S-400's is so contrary to the NATO
doctrine. I go back to Reagan, Ambassador, you talked about,
Churchill, Kennedy. You know, weakness invites aggression. If
we leave a power vacuum in the world, and we do not lead,
others will lead and they will follow. And that is kind of the
primary premise. I think that is a problem in Syria. I think it
is a problem with Turkey.
You know, Reagan had deterrence, and that is why Gorbachev
and Yeltsin came to the table and we had Perestroika. And we
were able to actually have a conversation with Russia.
Putin is a very different animal with a very different
profile. I think he views, and if I had a behavioral scientist,
he would say, or she, that he views them as traitors to his
country, that they betrayed the glory of the old Soviet Empire.
So, my question is, I mean, how do you deal--and I could
talk about cyber forever and the cyberattacks going on--how do
you deal with a personality, and that is what we are dealing
with, who is leading his country, I think, in the wrong
direction? But how do you sit down and do what Reagan did with
Gorbachev and Yeltsin when you are dealing with a mindset that
goes back to the KGB, and he wants to become Stalinesque? I
think it is very, very difficult.
And then, General Keane, I have one question for you after
that. But if I could ask the panel that question? Yes?
Mr. Fried. Mr. McCaul, I agree that Putin is leading Russia
in a bad direction, bad for us, bad for Russia's neighbors, but
also bad for Russia and the Russian people. Russian history
suggests that authoritarianism at home goes along with
aggression abroad, and that Russia turns to reform and
modernization at home usually when their foreign aggression
fails. That is a rough--that is not a precise rule. But the
best way to get to a better Russia is to counter the aggressive
Russia we now see.
Gorbachev had to turn inward toward reforms because
Brezhnev's aggression in Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the
world, was seen to be failing. And then, we had the most
hopeful period we have had since before World War II. Because
Reagan was able to resist the Soviet Union's aggression abroad,
we were able, then, to turn and help a genuine reformist Soviet
leader. Now it did not turn out as we hoped, but the general
pattern is there.
I do not believe that Russia is destined by virtue of its
history to be our adversary forever. It is now, but we can get
to a better Russia if we are realistic about the Russia we have
got now. We should not do dirty deals with Putin, sell out
Ukraine, recognize his sphere of influence, none of that. We
should be true to our values and confident that, if we are, we
raise the odds of a better Russia we can deal with, and we
should not rule out that possibility. I think your question is
right.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. I would agree 100 percent with that. I would
simply add that Reagan also made Kremlin adventurism extremely
expensive, whether it was having to match our own deterrence
and arms buildup, whether it was playing directly to the
Russian people about the human rights abuses and failures of
their own country, thereby stirring up an appetite for change
or, as Ambassador Fried said, supporting those countries that
faced Russian aggression strongly.
I have had--I am looking for the verb--the privilege of
being in the room with President Putin five or six times over
the period of 2015-16 on U.S. delegations. He is a highly
transactional player, and the entire conversation is usually
about what it is going to cost me and my friends if I do not
work with you and how serious are you about the opportunity.
So, this is a relationship that needs to be thoughtful or from
a position of extreme strength and collaboration with our
allies, but also with a clear path forward.
Mr. McCaul. So, General Keane, you mentioned Russia in our
hemisphere. I do not think we have seen anything like this
since the Cuban Missile Crisis you mentioned. They have defense
systems in Venezuela. They, by all accounts--and we talked to
the Secretary this morning-stopped Maduro on the tarmac from
leaving Venezuela to go to Havana because it is in their best
interest to have Maduro in power.
What is your take on that? I am very interested in your
policy response to that. And that is the transactional nature,
Ambassador Nuland, you mentioned. And that is, if you do this,
if you go forward in the Western Hemisphere, what I worry about
is you are going to say, ``Maduro, we are going to prop you up
if you give us the military port in Caracas,'' strategic
military port in Caracas. And your response is we are going to
put more lethal aid in Ukraine?
General Keane. Yes, I mean, this is a serious strategic
issue that is taking place here. The framework for it is
certainly Russia, China, and Iran, Turkey to a lesser degree,
are supporting communist and socialist regimes that are not in
the interest of the United States, and that is Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba.
This administration I believe has taken an action to push
back on that, and I applaud them for doing it, not just dealing
with Venezuela, but recognizing what the strategic framework
truly is. In reference, Putin and China have both made
significant investments in Venezuela for their own self and
national interests, and they are about protecting that. But,
for Putin, it is much more than that. This is a strategic move
on his part into the Western Hemisphere, no less than his
strategic move into the Middle East and using Syria as the
vehicle of opportunity. And that is what he sees here.
And he is using the same doctrine in a sense to do that. In
the Middle East, he brought in a modest amount of military
capability to achieve a strategic goal, because the Arabs all
saw Russia standing up behind an ally in the region, at the
expense of the United States who had failed to do that on a
number of occasions just prior to that, and also failed to
stand up significantly for the Syrian modern opposition forces
which wanted to overthrow the Assad regime. So, that was a
clarion call there.
And the benefit he achieved out of that has encouraged him
to take this other step in the Western Hemisphere. So, make no
mistake about it, even though he is using hybrid warfare, 400
military personnel, the Wagner Group--by the way, that is the
same group that was in eastern Ukraine. That is the same group
that we killed a couple of hundred of in Syria. That is the
same group that is in Africa. He brought them in here for one
reason only, to successfully prop up this regime. And then, he
brought his advisors in here, and he has got highly qualified
military and political advisors who are shoring up the Maduro
regime.
So, when the secretary of State says on national
television, international television I would suggest, that
Maduro is about to leave and Russia is calling the shots, about
the same time Russia was having a national security meeting, is
words for it. You know that Putin was told by his advisors that
he is talking to on a regular basis what the actions were, and
he is telling them, ``Hold him. Hold him, even if you have to
do him at gunpoint. Do not let him get out of there.''
And when Ambassador Bolton is talking about the three
leaders, which was unprecedented to see the National Security
Advisor of the United States on international television
calling out the Defense Minister, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the head of the Presidential Guard for not
complying with the weeks of effort that the United States
diplomats had put into getting them to turn against Maduro, and
calling them out for failure to do that is really
extraordinary.
While the Cubans have 20,000 goons in that country
conducting paramilitary operations and killing the Venezuelan
people, it is Putin who is impacting on the political control
of that regime for their own national and self-interest, and
the stakes are high because this is the Western Hemisphere.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, General.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I will pick up on what Ambassador Nuland, that we have got
to make adventurism expensive. And the greatest adventurism of
this administration, of the Putin administration, was not to
tamper with the territory integrity or sovereignty of Georgia
or Ukraine, but rather, and boldly, to tamper with the
democracy and the sovereignty of the United States. The U.S.
intelligence has said unambiguously that the Russian Federation
interfered with the 2016 Presidential election. And so far, our
only response, the only pushback we have had, is we have
identified a few Russian individuals who will not be able to
visit Disneyland. They will not get visas. That is it.
And so, which of the witnesses would agree that we should,
in response to their interference with our sovereignty,
prohibit U.S. persons from buying Russian sovereign debt? I
just need a yes/no. I only have time for a yes/no.
I see a yes from General Keane, a yes from Ambassador
Fried, and a yes from Ambassador Nuland. Sounds like a good
bill.
General, I am sure that is it never a good military
strategy to only have a defense and not have an offense. Should
it be the policy of the United States to use our intel
resources to discover, document, and publish the private
communications of Putin, his government, and the oligarchs
around him for the purpose of showing to the Russian people
their theft, their crime, and their corruption? Again, I will
ask for yes/no answers.
Ambassador Nuland.
Ms. Nuland. As I said in my statement, I do not know if I
would phrase it exactly the way you did or speak in public
about precisely what we would do, but certainly Putin's
greatest vulnerability at home is----
Mr. Sherman. Well, since we have done nothing yet, Congress
would have to establish our policy. We do not have a secret way
to do that.
Ms. Nuland. Well, Congress has been doing a good job
holding the line on policy. We commend you.
My point would simply be that I think that we need to make
sure the Russian people understand that they are being ripped
off by their own government.
Mr. Sherman. We have done nothing to accomplish that goal
with the executive branch making the decisions. So, either the
Congress requires that by statute, and there is no secret way
to do it, or we continue the policy of having a dozen people
not able to visit Disneyland.
Ambassador Fried?
Mr. Fried. I think one of the best pieces of the CAATSA
sanctions legislation was the Congress' demand for a report of
Putin's power structure. And it was called ``The Kremlin
Report,'' identifying those cronies close to Putin. That really
rattled Moscow----
Mr. Sherman. But not nearly as rattled as they were by the
Panama Papers.
Mr. Fried. Right.
Mr. Sherman. And if we could show pictures to the Russian
people of the theft that has gone on, we can do a lot.
I want to move on to another question, and it is really a
question for all my colleagues here, because we are all part of
political organizations. We saw in the last election that a
foreign hostile power was able to obtain allies in the United
States to provide information that was used. In this case, the
NRCC took the information stolen by the Russians and made use
of it in their campaign materials. And so, I would hope each of
us, for the record, would answer the question, will we for our
own campaigns, for organizations that we support, insist that
campaigns not make use of materials stolen by hostile
adversaries? I will ask everyone to respond to the record for
that, since I cannot get answers from my colleagues.
But if this committee cannot set the example and say, ``We
do not want to benefit from the theft of information by foreign
adversaries,'' then we are going to have a tough time.
General Keane, you were with IP3. That is viewed as a
spinoff of ACU, which was trying to get the Saudis to buy both
Russian and American nuclear programs or power plants. Should
we support selling Soviet reactors or Russian reactors to Saudi
Arabia? And I do not know if you have or not.
General Keane. No, that is not an accurate
characterization. But I got involved with IP3 simply, as with
three other foreign national security experts, simply for one
reason, because the Middle East was going to go nuclear with 40
nuclear power plants and Russia and China was going after that.
Mr. Sherman. General, should we draw the line and tell the
Saudis----
General Keane. Absolutely----
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. No nuclear weapons, no nuclear
program----
General Keane. Of course not.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Without adequate safeguards. We
drew the line for Iran and we told them they could not. Why
not----
General Keane. I am trying to say, Mr. Congressman, we got
involved in this to prevent that from happening. We got
involved in it because we did not want any nuclear
proliferation, and we got involved in it because we knew they
would not know how to secure it.
There is no----
Mr. Sherman. So, would you support turning to the----
General Keane. There is no industry that is more regulated
than that. The one----
Mr. Sherman. General, I am going to reclaim my time and ask
you, should we insist that, before Saudi Arabia goes with
nuclear power plants, that they sign the additional protocol,
agree to the gold standard limitations, and make sure that they
are not using it as a front for developing nuclear weapons?
General Keane. Absolutely, because there is no doubt the
United States policy, and everybody I know who is supporting
it, whether it is Saudi Arabia or any other country in the
world, they have to sign a 123 Agreement. The government has to
before any commercial entity can work with them to establish
nuclear power, not nuclear weapons, because we do not want that
proliferation. And Congress has oversight of the 123. You are
going to have the say about it.
Mr. Sherman. Our say on 123 Agreements is too weak, and we
have legislation to make that say stronger. But my time has
gone on. And I agree with you, we need tough controls.
Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony and for your leadership,
each and every one of you.
Let me just ask, Ambassador Nuland, hindsight is 20/20, and
I think you made a very powerful statement about how Ronald
Reagan set the gold standard for policy leadership vis-a-vis
the Kremlin, and I agree with that. But, frankly, I lived
through that. I have been on this committee since 1983. I got
elected in 1981, 1980; took office in 1981. And Ronald Reagan
was branded a warmonger when he responded to the Soviet Union's
aggression and buildup with Pershing II missiles and with
cruise missiles. He was branded a warmonger. And I sat on this
committee. We had one debate after another. And yet, in
hindsight looking back, peace through strength made a huge
difference in terms of outcome. Even when he walked away from
Reykjavik, he was branded by especially Members of the U.S.
Senate in a very, very pejorative and very negative way by
those individuals.
Even when I traveled to the Soviet Union, my first trip on
human rights on behalf of Soviet Jews, 1982, in January, the
delegation members kept mocking Ronald Reagan in the presence
of Kremlin leaders saying, ``Do not worry, he will be gone in
1984. He is a grade B actor. And then, you can work with people
that will work with you.''
So, I do think that Donald Trump needs space. Now that the
Mueller report said there was no collusion, he needs more
space, I think, to operate within and to be strong. And, of
course, what is happening in Venezuela is another clear example
of a manifestation of Russian power. We saw it during the
Reagan years with the FMLN and the Sandinistas operating
through Cuba again. And again, that was branded as very
negative as well. So, my hope is that there will be more space
for the President to act decisively on behalf of American and
Western interests.
And you even said, Ambassador Nuland, that we need to
respond to INF Treaty violations with advanced conventional
deployments, and I agree with you. Peace through strength is
the only way we are going to get from here to there.
Let me also ask you, if you could, all of you, Poland has
come forward--and, Ambassador Fried, you made mention of this,
called it a worthy initiative. They have offered to put up $2
billion for a permanent base there as a deterrent. And as you
pointed out, the purpose of deployments is deterrence, and I
think that buys a tremendous amount of deterrence. I met with
President Duda and others; and they are very serious. Again,
they are willing to put up real money. You might want to speak
to that. It is very, very important.
We also say that, when it comes to Africa--and, General,
thank you for again bringing up the Wagner Group. Just
yesterday, we had a hearing with Karen Bass in our subcommittee
on CAR. And we know the Wagner Group is very active in CAR.
They are facilitating the fleecing of that country of very
precious metals. And, of course, they are bypassing the arms
embargo imposed upon CAR, and the Russians are the ones that
are bypassing it. And the U.N. peacekeepers are not doing, I
believe, a good job in trying to stop that.
Equally important is that Russia, since sanctions were
rightfully imposed after the annexation of the Crimea in 2014,
19 have signed on with Russia for agreements. Most recently,
Burundi, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Madagascar now have cooperation
agreements for weapons and training. So, again, the Russians
are, in a nefarious way, spreading their tentacles, like the
Chinese are doing, throughout Africa and the world. And we are
seeing it, of course. So, we have a mega-threat with Russia.
That said, one final comment, we do have to find places of
cooperation, as you said, Ambassador Nuland, in the area of
carrots. One carrot that I think we need to use now, and
aggressively, is to work with them on mitigating the scourge of
human trafficking. I am the prime author of Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000. And after that was enacted, President
Bush_W. Bush_went ahead and did some great work with the FSB in
trying to combat the buying and selling and the commodification
of Russian women who were being sold in New York, being sold in
northern New Jersey, all over the country, especially being
sold in Russia. So, my hope would be that that would be an area
where we could work in a cooperative way to protect those
Russian women who are being so cruelly exploited. It would be a
carrot, Ambassador. So, any comments, please?
General Keane. I am glad you brought up Africa because
Russia clearly is moving rapidly into Africa. They are
interested in strategic bases in the Med, in Libya, also at the
Red Sea, in Eritrea, and Sudan. They are expanding their
military influence across Africa with security agreements, with
arms sales, and with training programs. You mentioned the
Central African Republic. Also, in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and
the Sub-Saharan. And they are also seeking new economic markets
in energy resources, and Russia has major oil and gas interests
in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Senegal, South Africa,
Uganda, and Nigeria. There is no doubt that they see Africa
clearly as a sphere of influence for them, much as China does.
Our commitment to Africa is very modest, to say the least.
We have about a thousand civilians working there and about
6,000 military there. And obviously, the State Department has
the lead on Africa, but it is something we truly have to look
at to see if our resources that we are applying is in our
interest, given the geopolitical interest that China and Russia
both have in Africa.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you. Hi to all Ambassadors and general.
Sometimes it seems funny, Mr. Chairman, anytime we are
talking about Russia on the other side, I look and say, where
is Dana Rohrabacher?
Chairman Engel. I think he used to sit in your seat, Mr.
Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. And the reason why I say that is, just sitting
here and I was listening to some of the testimony in my office,
actually, and thinking through my time here in Congress. When I
first came in, my thought was Russia was a big, growing country
post-the cold war; things should change. We were more
interdependent now with other countries around the world, and
we were looking to talk about getting rid of Jackson-Vanik, so
that we could have a better relationship. Things seemed to be
moving a little bit better at that time.
And then, actually, former President Barack Obama had an
open mic talking to Medvedev, and he says, ``After the
election, we will talk a little bit more.'' And then, we end
up, starting with the Obama Administration, where we are now.
So, it seems to me that, when it comes to counting Russia,
it is difficult to prioritize where we should direct most of
our efforts because in some instances it appears as though
Russia is taking the shotgun approach to foreign policy, that
they are shooting out anything that they can do, basically, to
undermine the United States and its allies. And they try to see
what sticks. They just throw something out against us and see
what might stick against the wall. Other times, however, it
seems like Russia is operating with a coherent strategy that is
being directed from the top.
So, I will start with Ambassador Nuland. In your opinion,
does Russia have a coherent strategy for achieving its foreign
policy goals? And does it have a specific end game that it is
trying to reach? What are you thoughts on that?
Ms. Nuland. I think President Putin initially, as he said
in 2005, sought to restore the glory and spheres of influence
of the Soviet Union, but now his appetite has grown with the
eating. And as I said in my testimony, he believes we are weak
and he can exploit our divisions. He believes we did not
respond with the kind of strength he would have expected,
whether it was in Syria or Ukraine or against the INF Treaty
violations, or now in Venezuela. And therefore, as you said, he
will take any target of opportunity to exploit and accrete into
those spaces where we are not, whether it is undercutting
democratic development in the Balkans, an area that the
chairman and I have worked on a lot together, with corruption
and those kinds of things; whether it is aligning with China on
digital aggression and other things.
So, I think he has a very coherent strategy. He wants to
make the world safe for autocracy, and not just safe for it,
but to make that an alternative governance model. And he wants
to do that, in part, to stay at power at home because he is not
offering his own people better schools or better hospitals or a
better economy. He has to only offer them this illusion of
glory.
So, it is both a defensive and an offensive strategy for
him, but he is not a thousand feet tall. You know, Russia has a
GDP the size of Italy and three times the population and five
times the land mass. We just do not have our act together, and
we need to get our act together and be stronger at home,
stronger with our allies, and roll it back. And I think we can,
and give the Russian people another set of choices and call
them to question whether they are actually living better in
this system that he has offered.
Mr. Meeks. Ambassador Fried.
Mr. Fried. I agree with what Ambassador Nuland said, and I
would like to build on it. Putin is an opportunist and his
theory of autocrats can make progress because we have pulled
ourselves out of the game. We need to remember that our
strength was derived from our association and leadership of the
free world. That is, we understood that values and interests
ultimately were the same. That was our big strategic
breakthrough decades ago, and we need to remember this.
Because when we are spending--the Trump administration is
right that we have reentered a period of great power rivalry,
but, then, for God's sakes, let's align ourselves with our
friends, the better to deal with our adversaries. We waste too
much political capital in ideological fights with the European
Union. The European Union can be a headache, but they are not
our problem. They are not a strategic rival. We need to align
ourselves with our friends on behalf of our values, and when we
start doing that, we can push back most effectively against
Putinism. Because, as Ambassador Nuland said, he offers power
and not betterment of his own people. And we won the cold war
when it became clear that the Soviet Union offered nothing but
chaos and poverty, and that to its own people. We need to get
back at that vision of ourselves.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you. I am out of time.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank each of you for being here today.
Ambassador Fried, with your background, having been
Ambassador to Poland, the question that Congressman Smith had
proposed relative to our association with that NATO ally, can
you expound on this?
Mr. Fried. Happily. I spent many years in Poland. The Trump
administration is right to be talking with the Poles about
increasing the U.S. military presence there. It is not just a
bilateral deal. We need to do this within the NATO framework,
and the Poles understand this. I should add that this is
bipartisan in Poland. The government supports it. It is a
conservative government. The liberal opposition supports it. I
have asked them.
This is the right thing to do, and it needs to be taken out
of--our military presence in Poland needs to be put in a
context of the united West, NATO, the U.S. and the EU, standing
for our values of democracy and defending NATO allies. This is
the right thing to do. I appreciate what the Trump
administration is doing. I hope they close the deal. I really
do.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
And, Ambassador Nuland and General Keane, in line with
Congressman Meeks, the interference or strategy of Russia to
interfere in elections, with the most recent elections in
Ukraine, what is your assessment of the interference and did it
have an outcome? Ambassador Nuland?
Ms. Nuland. Well, interestingly, in the latest Ukrainian
elections, the Russians had almost no influence. They did not
have a candidate. As you saw, the outsider won an overwhelming
majority all across the country, in part, because the citizenry
does not think that there has been enough change in the anti-
corruption side and saw the other candidates as representatives
of the old guard.
So, it is interesting to watch Moscow unsure how to work
with President-Elect Zelensky. I think we need to offer Ukraine
strong, strong support and get in there with Zelensky when he
sits, and encourage further reform, particularly on the anti-
corruption side, and continue to tie our assistance to Ukraine,
to positive development there.
The greatest nightmare for Russia is a successful Ukraine
because, then, they will have a neighbor at their door that is
democratic, and not to mention the example that Ukraine sets
with democratic alternation of power that could not be
manipulated from the presidency. That is something Russia has
not seen in a long time.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
General.
General Keane. Yes, dealing with Ukraine, I really think
Putin has sort of got a wait-and-see attitude with it.
Obviously, he is directly involved, but he is also exercising
some patience. Because I think he fundamentally believes, given
the problems that Poroshenko had in this election, so
resoundingly defeated, the domestic reforms were never really
put in place. He tied to corruption himself personally. And
now, we have someone with no political experience whatsoever
who is running the country. While that may not have been
Putin's choice, I think he looks at it very favorably.
And if the government cannot really produce a degree of
political stability, and also a degree of economic viability
and prosperity, Putin, it is on his side. He would be able to
wait this thing out and achieve what his national interests
are. I firmly believe that we have got to be more involved than
what we currently are in terms of politically, diplomatically,
and, also, militarily, in terms of helping their military
forces.
So, yes, in terms of our own election, I will take it at
face value that it did not impact on the election. But I do not
believe that that is the only goal that Putin has when he is
meddling in elections in France and Brexit and the United
States, and other countries. He is really seeking to undermine
the democratic and political process. And given what happened
in our country with investigations that are still going on as
the Congress is meeting today, and the significant political
divisions that we have in our country as a result of his
meddling, he probably thinks that is a major victory for
himself and encourages him to do even more of it.
Mr. Wilson. And I thank each of you for your being here
today and your insight, and we appreciate your service to our
country.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to underscore your comments in terms of the outrage
of holding Paul Whelan for no legal reasons whatsoever in
Russia.
And also, I just want to comment briefly, I find it
extraordinary that the top-line message of all of our witnesses
today is that we are absent the resolve as a country right now
in having a consistent Russia policy. I think that is something
that is so obvious by your testimony, but really has to be
highlighted. We have to do better than this as a country.
Now let me probe a little more deeply in things you touched
upon. Could you tell us, any of you, the relationship you have
seen with like Deutsche Bank, dealing with the oligarchs and
that relationship? Anything that you might want to comment
about that kind of financial relationship with really the power
brokers of Russia, the oligarchs? Plus, if you would comment on
Putin's use of the VEB bank?
Mr. Fried. In my last job in government, I was the State
Department Sanctions Coordinator. So, I got into some of these
issues.
There is plenty of evidence that the Russians and Putin use
the Western financial system to launder money and park it. They
take advantage of our system because they trust our banking
system more than they trust their own. We should start drying
up the channels for potentially corrupt Russian money flows.
For example, why should high-end real estate deals be allowed
to exist without full disclosure of the beneficial owner? That
means that Russian secret money can flow into New York or Miami
or London or, you know, various places in Europe, without any
kind of oversight.
Mr. Keating. And we can do something stronger than we are
doing now----
Mr. Fried. Sure.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. To influence that? Make sure, for
instance, that there is compliance with our request for banks
like this that might be conducting themselves this way right
now.
Mr. Fried. Well, I also believe that there are regulatory
and legislative changes that could mandate disclosure of
beneficial owners----
Mr. Keating. OK.
Mr. Fried [continuing]. In high-end real estate deals. I am
in favor of that.
Mr. Keating. Also, you know, the VEB bank, is it safe to
say, fair to say that is Putin's bank, basically? That he has
enormous influence? Is that fair to say, a fair statement?
Mr. Fried. Let me say that----
Mr. Keating. What message are we getting when past and
current members of the Trump administration or campaign are
meeting with the head of that bank in secret meetings? What
message does that send back to Russia?
Mr. Fried. In general, and without getting into the
specifics, I think it is good to send the Russians a message
that we do not appreciate what they are doing and passing that
message, also, to the heads of the big state Russian banks.
Mr. Keating. OK. I just want to shift gears, too. We have
something that Russia does not have, for that matter China. But
we have a coalition. So, in my subcommittee of this committee,
I am going to have a laser-like view on strengthening that
coalition.
Just a few weeks ago, I was in Europe, met with our
officials, and happy to report that the strength we have
together with NATO is still vibrant. It is still formidable. It
is obviously important.
But it is no mistaking that Russia is using significant
resources in Central Europe and the Balkans to extend their
influence. And yet, they seem to have these relationships with
Viktor Orban and Hungary, with Erdogan and Turkey, which is a
great concern, and even influence in Serbia. That is something,
if you could spend the rest of my time just commenting on
briefly, because I think that is a concern. We want to keep
this strong, and they are trying to divide us.
Mr. Fried. With respect to Central Europe, we need to be
active and present. I do not like a lot of what Viktor Orban
has said about the Russians, but I do not regard Hungary as a
lost cause. I think we need to show up. I think we need to be
present in that space. I think that the Russian aggression has
spoiled their relations with even some of their more
traditional friends.
Mr. Keating. Ambassador Nuland? I am sorry, I am running
out of time, but I would welcome anything you have to say in
that regard.
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Congressman Keating.
As you and I have discussed privately, we know a lot about
Russian money sloshing around Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
We know a lot about its corrupting influence. I think it is
time to shine a light on that and expose those who take it and
expose the Kremlin's use of the Russian taxpayers' money for
malign purposes.
Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you.
My time is up and I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the panel. We are privileged to have folks of
your breadth and scope of knowledge.
I want to start out with a basic premise, just to see if I
can set the table, and then, go through some rhetorical
questions to set up a question here. To me, contrary to popular
belief, Russia really does not have a particular preference of
which party in the United States. Their goal I think is to
cause discord and spread disinformation and make people in
America generally distrust our political system. Does anybody
vehemently disagree with that, any of the panel members? I am
not seeing any big yeses.
So, with that, these are rhetorical questions. Let me
preface it with this: every one of us here is probably
disappointed in every administration's response to some of this
stuff at some level. However, I think it is important to kind
of correct the record over the long term here.
How was it in the United States' interest to not realize
the full extent of Russian influence operations, and then, the
reluctance to act until after the election? How was that in
America's interests? How was it in America's interest to do
almost nothing of import and effectiveness regarding Ukraine
and Crimea, regarding a resurgent Russia? How was it in
America's interest to happily cut our military capability and
telegraph that all around the world? How was it in our interest
to scale back missile defense plans in Europe? How was it in
our interest to allow Russia to play a pivotal role in the Iran
nuclear agreement? And it was not in our interest, I do not
think, to fail to get a multilateral agreement with Russia on
the Syrian civil war.
How was it in our interest when the previous President said
to Medvedev that he just needed a little more time regarding
missiles and our missile capability in Europe? How did it serve
America to have the sale of U.S. uranium capability? And how
did it serve America's interest to provide access to Russia
regarding technology, including hypersonic cruise missile
technology at Skolkovo? That is all the previous
administration. Like I said, there is frustration on both
sides.
I wonder how long that Russia has been suspected of
violating all the missile agreements or arms agreements. It has
been since we have had them, essentially, right? So, my
question essentially is this--and, Ambassador Fried, I agree
with you; Americans do not want to be in a fight with Russia or
anybody. We would like to get along with everybody.
Unfortunately, the Russians have a vote, or at least their
leaders do, and they vote otherwise, right? And we have to deal
with the reality of that.
And I wonder, because each of you has spoken about unity,
Ambassador Nuland, Ambassador Fried, about unity in the United
States, and, General Keane, you have as well, about our unity
and our singular purpose regarding Russia. How can there be
unity when some in positions of great leadership and authority
continue to promulgate the narrative that this President is a
traitor and a collaborator with Russia, based on what has now
been determined by the Special Counsel, millions of dollars, 2
years, subpoenas, interviews, et cetera, to be patently false?
How can there be unity? How can there be unity when this body
passes bills to limit this President's capabilities in
Venezuela? That is just a general question. You can comment on
that, any of that.
Ambassador Nuland, you said a lot fast, and I wish I had
your testimony, but you said something about the lesson from
the Mueller report. And I think you referenced that this is the
President's victory; it did not have anything to do with
Russia. And I think the assumption was that this President
needs to learn that lesson and move on. But I do not want to
put words in your mouth. So, the lesson to who? Is it to the
President or to folks in the United States and in this Congress
that continue to accuse the President of being a traitor and
collaborating with Russia? I am wondering who the lesson is
for.
Ms. Nuland. Congressman Perry, just to repeat what I said,
the lesson of the Mueller report, and from our intelligence
community before, was that Putin seeks, as you said, to pit
Americans against each other, to destroy our democratic system,
to erode trust. So, what I was trying to say was I think we are
all seeking stronger Presidential leadership vis-a-vis the
Kremlin to ensure that he cannot do it again in 2020, in 2022,
in 2024, starting with some stronger statements. And I would
like to have stronger statements about Russian activities in
Venezuela and in Ukraine and in Syria. That would be a start
and it would change Putin's calculus immediately. And then, if
we had actual actions to strengthen ourselves and make it cost
for him from this White House, that would also begin to reverse
it.
Mr. Perry. I think you will find few people up here on
either side that would object to that. But would you agree that
this President has been limited by the anchor that has been
placed around his neck and thrown to the bottom of the ocean
with this whole Russian collusion, ``you are a traitor, and you
are working with them to undermine the United States,'' and
that anything he does, even when the Russians actually come
into compliance, we refuse to lift the sanctions on certain
occasions in this body? Is that a limitation for this
President, to this President, to this administration, in
dealing with Russia effectively?
Ms. Nuland. I would have argued the opposite, that if the
President had taken a very strong stand against Russian
aggression in our democracy from the day of his inauguration,
he would have been stronger domestically as well in the context
of the Mueller investigation.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Perry. General, I would love to hear your comment.
General Keane. Well, I think that list that you presented,
certainly, the degree that all that happened I suspect was a
strategic surprise to Putin to a certain degree. I mean,
clearly, when he came into power, he wanted to weaken the
Transatlantic Alliance, for all the reasons we know so well.
But, then, he was given, I think, an opportunity as the United
States was disengaging to pursue other strategic objectives.
And that is why he is in the Middle East. That is why he is
aggressively in Africa, and now he is also in the Western
Hemisphere.
As Ambassador Fried said, he is an opportunist. He is
smart. He thinks strategically, and he has taken advantage of
the playing field. And that is what we are facing.
Now I think it is a mistake to assume that, because
President Trump desires to have a personal relationship with
Putin as a result of his diplomatic efforts, that the United
States is not pushing back on Russia. When you look at the
policy, they are. What we are suggesting, and certainly what I
am suggesting, is we can do considerably better than where we
are right now, much more comprehensively, much more
strategically, and much more involved with our allies in doing
it.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, General.
Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses. I am grateful you are here.
There is a hearing occurring right now on the other side of
the Capitol that surely is filled to the brim with observers,
media, cameras, surely more Senators. And frankly, I am
appalled and surprised and disappointed that this hearing is
not attracting the same attention because I think that the
gravity, the consequences, and the acute nature of it is one of
the great risks to our country right now.
If there is one element of the Mueller report I think on
which we all agree, it is that Russia meddled in our recent
elections and they seek to undermine our democratic process,
and they will surely do so again. And we are not alone. I know
the Alliance for Securing Democracy, in 2017, identified at
least 27 examples of Russia meddling since 2004 in other
countries.
So, my first question is, are there methods being deployed
by any of our allies around the world that have curbed or
diminished the impact of such behavior? We would start with
you, Ambassador Fried.
Mr. Fried. Yes, during the French elections, the Russians
hacked the Macron campaign and released a bunch of emails that
were intended to embarrass him. But the impact in France was
very different than what happened in the United States. The
French civil society activists exposed the Russian play. And
the big story in France, instead of the contents of the emails,
was the Russians are trying to interfere in our election and
the hell with them. That is my characterization.
And that was an example of turning back a Russian effort in
interfering in elections. What happened was society rejected
it. And you also had civil society activists able to spot the
Russian interference and a general population and media ready
to expose it. That was a successful example.
Now the Russians are not going to repeat the same tactics.
They are going to evolve, but the basic model is there. That
is, expose what the Russians are doing and, then, focus on that
rather than get involved in whatever nonsense the Russians are
peddling or whatever documents they have stolen. Yes, we can
push back.
Mr. Phillips. OK. Thank you.
Ambassador Nuland.
Ms. Nuland. Just to say I agree completely that the Macron
example is the best one and the most publicly understood one.
Sunshine is the best disinfectant. So, exposing this stuff for
what it is, which is inauthentic interference in what should be
a domestic conversation--the Germans also did very well with
the influence campaign the Russians tried to enact when
claiming that a Russian-German girl had been attacked, when, in
fact, she had not. And the German leadership, led by Chancellor
Merkel, exposed that for what it was, and created a much better
understanding, I think, within the German public that they
should question what they read in this regard.
So, that is something that needs to be done in the United
States. We also need better public education about this stuff
and with our allies across Europe.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
General Keane, anything to add?
General Keane. I associate myself with my colleagues on
those comments. The one thing I would add is this
administration has taken a positive step in deregulating our
capability to respond through offensive cyber much more timely
and rapidly than what we have had in the past in terms of
decisionmaking authority and the layers of bureaucracy and
lawyers you had to go through to do it.
And we have been somewhat reluctant. We have absolutely
hands-down the best offensive cyber capability in the world.
The Russians have the second. And there are times when,
clearly, it is appropriate to use it, when they are attacking
us.
As a result of that, that in itself becomes a deterrent.
And I think now that there is more freedom to be able to use
that, in concert with our values and in concert with
appropriate oversight, hopefully, we will be able to use that
as a way, also, of pushing back.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
One more question for Ambassador Fried. In the first weeks
of the current administration, did it, indeed, try to lift
sanctions against Russia?
Mr. Fried. I believe that there was some consideration
being given to that. I am being very careful the way I phrase
it because I cannot prove it. I do not have documents. But I
believe that there were some in the incoming team who simply
wanted to do a quick deal. Now that was defeated, and it was
defeated partly, in fact, principally, because of the strong
reaction in Congress.
As an executive branch veteran, I am not usually a believer
in legislation to impose sanctions. In this case, I think what
Congress did with the CAATSA bill, now law, it was the right
thing to do under those circumstances.
Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for the panel.
One of the growing concerns, obviously, is Russia, and that
is why we are here today. We see them going from the failed
USSR to where they are today. And we all know that Putin wants
to rebuild the Russian Empire. And we cannot change what has
happened in the past, you know, with past administrations. We
are here today at this point.
And what I see is that change in world powers, the tectonic
shift in world powers that we have not seen since World War II
and at the end of the cold war. And now we are seeing a
resurgence with a strong China. And the concern that we have
today is what is going on in the Western Hemisphere. It is
something that we really need to pay attention. And I think
this goes way beyond just Venezuela and Maduro. I think this is
a rubicon moment where Russia cannot allow Maduro to fail; Cuba
cannot allow Maduro to fail, because if they do, if he does
fail, that means the Russian system and the Cuban system, and
even the Chinese and Iran with their influence in there, and a
little bit of Turkey, it all shows that those kind of
autocratic or communist regimes or dictatorial type of regimes
that suppress people cannot succeed.
What are your thoughts on that as far as moving forward, as
far as holding Russia accountable? What can we do to offset
what they are doing in the Western Hemisphere? Whoever wants to
take the first--General Keane?
General Keane. Well, I totally agree with the premise that,
strategically, it is much more important, what is taking place
in our Western Hemisphere because of the implications; that I
think the Trump administration got it right strategically
immediately; that asking for a transition of government with
Maduro after he manipulated the election, and there was
somebody available to take over who is President of the
National Assembly, and working to get global support for that,
now up to 54 countries, was the right thing to do because I do
believe the national security team saw the strategic
implications of it in terms of the impact on Nicaragua and,
also, Cuba, and particularly the heavy hand that the countries
that you identified have in these States in terms of Russia,
China, Iran.
Mr. Yoho. And they are all anti-Western democracies.
General Keane. Absolutely. And particularly, Russia and
China see this--China, obviously, leads with economic
investment----
Mr. Yoho. Sure.
General Keane [continuing]. And intimidating along with
that, but Russia leads also with hybrid warfare intervention as
well as economic investment. And they certainly see the
opportunity to exploit their national interests in our
hemisphere.
Mr. Yoho. Let me come back to you because I want to ask you
about----
General Keane. And it is critical----
Mr. Yoho [continuing]. The hyper warfare.
Ambassador Fried, if you would want to weigh-in on what
your thoughts are on that?
Mr. Fried. Maduro and the Cubans and the Russians want to
make this about the Yankees leaning on a sovereign state.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Fried. That is not the real issue. Therefore, our play
ought to include working as closely as we can with Latin
American countries, which I think this administration is doing,
and with the European Union, which the Europeans are on the
side of Venezuelan democracy. We ought to use this to isolate
the Russians and not let them frame this as a kind of Yankee
imperialist thing.
And that is why I hope that this administration will keep
building relations and investing capital in our allies, so we
can use it in common causes.
Mr. Yoho. We are going to help them do that. We just came
back from a bipartisan delegation trip to Colombia, and we
bordered the Venezuelan border.
Ambassador Nuland, if you have anything you want to add to
that?
Ms. Nuland. Just to say that I think your premise is right.
This is not only about great power competition; this is about
ideological----
Mr. Yoho. Exactly.
Ms. Nuland [continuing]. And systemic competition again.
And we need to fight with and for our team.
Mr. Yoho. We cannot afford for this not to--Maduro has to
go. And I hope the first thing that legitimate President Guaido
does is throws out all foreign military personnel out of his
country.
General Keane, I want to go back to, during a recent
speech, the top general of Russia, Valery--I am going to
butcher this--Gerasimov, the so-called creator of the Russian
``active measures,'' doubled down on Russia's use of hyper
warfare. Do you feel Russia is ahead of us in hyper warfare?
And if so, do you think that Bradley Manning or Edward Snowden,
with the intelligence breaches that they did, played into
Russia's hand and made them jump ahead of us in this? What are
your thoughts on that?
General Keane. Well, first of all, General--Gerasimov is a
brilliant strategist.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you for saying that properly.
General Keane. And what drove them to this is they were
quite stunned by the liberation of Kuwait, when they saw the
prowess of the United States military and coalition partners,
but largely the United States military and the integration of
air power and ground power and high-end conventional warfare.
And then, once again repeated with the liberation of Iraq in
2003, so much so that they changed their strategies. They
recognized they could never deal at that time with a high-end
conventional war.
And General Gerasimov developed a doctrine with some
leaders around him that we can try to achieve our geopolitical
objectives and operate below the level of major conventional
confrontation. And so, influence operations, election meddling,
they are all part of the fabric of that, disguising the use of
Russian troops, massive disinformation campaigns. And
particularly, on their own domestic audience, on the United
States audience, the information campaign, when they went into
Crimea and Ukraine, was so significant, it paralyzed
decisionmakers in the United States----
Mr. Yoho. Right.
General Keane [continuing]. And in Europe as to what is
this. It cast doubt about the execution of it. It does not look
like warfare, but, yet, they seem to be taking control.
Mr. Yoho. And very astute at it.
General Keane. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. I am out of time, but I would love to followup
with you on that. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the panel for being here today.
We have seen just in the past decade or so Russia has
launched military incursions into Georgia and Ukraine,
intervened in Syria to support Assad, in Venezuela to boost
Maduro, backed a coup attempt in Montenegro, used chemical
weapons as a tool of assassination in Europe. They tried to
destabilize democracy in Europe, in the United States, most
notably, interfering in the 2016 election. Volume 1 of Special
Counsel Mueller's report notes that ``The Russian government
interfered in the 2016 Presidential election in sweeping and
systematic fashion,'' but, then, meticulously details how the
Kremlin meddled in our democracy. And the U.S. intelligence
community unanimously reached the same conclusion in January
2017.
Let me start with that last point and move backward. That
is what the Kremlin tried to do here in 2016. I ask, starting
with you, Ambassador Nuland, to talk about Russia's attempts to
meddle in democratic elections elsewhere and, as we are having
this discussion in advance of the EU elections, let's talk
about that, and then, the role that Russia has played in Europe
in helping to promote some of the far-right parties who have
now attained places in government in countries for the first
time in history, please.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Deutch.
Just to remind that Russia's manipulation of elections, and
its perfection of its strategies and tactics for this, began in
Russia itself as it sought to manipulate elections for
President Putin and his allies and various techniques there,
moving into the first cyber efforts that we saw in Estonia in
the aught years, and then, as we have discussed throughout the
hearing, their efforts in France, their efforts to strengthen
far-right and far-left parties in order to stress the center of
politics in countries from Germany to Italy, to many believe
that they were active in the Brexit vote as well, and
certainly, playing in the Eastern and Central European Rim.
And it is not simply their digital tactics and techniques.
It is also their other tools of influence that are as old as
Russia and the Soviet Union itself, buying politicians, setting
up false flag NGO's, creating inauthentic conversation within
politics and policies.
So, this is well-practiced. It predated the digital age,
but it is now turbocharged in the digital age. So, as we all
said in our testimony--and we outlined some concrete steps--
this is not an insurmountable challenge if we harden ourselves
here, if we expose what is going on, both with digital and with
money, and with corruption of politicians, and if we work in
concert with our allies to pool information, and if we are
willing to apply some of the same medicine to Putin himself
where he is vulnerable at home, notably, on corruption.
Mr. Deutch. Ambassador Fried.
Mr. Fried. So, one of the knocks against the European Union
is that it is a big bureaucracy, but they are way ahead of us
in dealing with disinformation. One thing they know how to do
is regulate. The European Union has forced big social media
companies to sign onto a voluntary code of practice, basically,
promising they are going to clean up their act. This gives the
Europeans leverage. In my view, we ought to be talking to the
Europeans, coming up with a joint plan, and using our combined
leverage to get the social media companies to do the right
thing. Exactly as Ambassador Nuland said, purge the inauthentic
accounts, the imposters, cleanup social media, so that the
Russians cannot infiltrate it.
These are all doable, and I am not talking about censorship
or content control. If the Trump administration believes that
great power rivalry pits us against autocratic foes, then we
ought to align ourselves with our democratic friends,
operationally, not just rhetorically.
Mr. Deutch. General, if I may, although I have a lot of
questions, I would like to ask a followup there. And actually,
Ambassador Fried, I am particularly interested in Russian
support in promoting white nationalist narratives and ideology.
Perhaps we could talk about that after.
General, I just want to turn to Russia in Syria. Is there a
role to play--talk about Russia's relationship to Iran and
Syria. Can they be counted upon to limit Iranian influence in
Syria? Is their sole goal, as you referred to, to achieve their
positions with the port? What can we expect? What is reasonable
to expect?
General Keane. You know, that is a great question,
Congressman. Qassem Suleimani, acting on behalf of the Supreme
Leader, in 2014, visited Moscow twice and met with Vladimir
Putin to motivate him to conduct a military intervention into
Syria. Initially, they did not agree, and they were painting a
picture that the Syrian opposition forces, largely led by the
radicals, were having their way with the regime that they had
not had in some time. And then, finally, Putin agreed that
summer, and you saw the intervention take place in the fall.
The Iranians run the war in Syria. They run the ground war.
The IRGC has had two to three of their generals killed. They
direct the air power that is being used. So, even though Russia
is a much larger country geopolitically, it is the Iranians who
are really truly in charge.
And so, the thought that Putin is somehow going to curb
Iranian behavior, it is not going to happen. The Iranians are
fixed on their strategic objective, which is regional hegemon,
at the expense of the United States, and to encroach on the
sovereignty of Israel. They are about that business, and Russia
will not be able to reduce their strategic objectives.
Mr. Deutch. OK. Thanks. Thank you.
Yes, yes, go ahead.
Ms. Nuland. Just to say that it actually serves Russia's
interest to have Iran there because they learned from
Afghanistan and from our experience in Iraq that they,
themselves, do not want to be on the ground. They want to have
another country do that dirty work. So, they want the Iranians
on the ground keeping social order and those things, and they
want the Cubans on the ground in Venezuela. So, this is a
strategy that is well-honed now.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, all of you, thank you for being here. This is a
great panel and on a really important subject.
I actually am really worried about really the last few
years kind of where foreign policy has gone in terms of our
ability to talk about it. I think the days of kind of consensus
foreign policy and having polite debates has kind of gone away
and everything is now being seen through a political spectrum,
which is actually pretty frightening to me, given that we are
the United States of America and we have such an important role
to play in the world.
Look, under the last administration, Russia meddled in the
election. I a hundred percent believe that. I believe President
Obama should have been clear at the very beginning of what was
happening. The question now is not how do we continue to look
back and lay blame at people's feet; it is, how do we prevent
it in the future? How do we go forward and make it clear to the
American people when they are reading a news article that is
actually produced by Russian propaganda, and then, is being
retweeted by RT, and then, ends up on Facebook? It ends up in
Twitter, and now is basically seen as gospel. We saw that
happen the last election, and it is going to happen again this
time.
So, I think if we can now as a committee come together, and
as a country come together and figure out how to expose that,
and say, look, I do not care who you elect for President of the
United States, but I want it to be an American decision, not
influenced by especially the Russians.
I want to look at our hemisphere. We have talked a little
about Venezuela, and I want to ask you, General, a question. If
the United States--so, this committee passed, I do not know if
you guys know this; thankfully, it has not passed, I do not
think, the floor yet, but passed a preemptive prevention of the
President from using military action in Venezuela. So,
thankfully, it is not going to be passed by the Senate and
signed by the President, but I think it was a terrible message
to send out of the foreign policy committee.
But let me ask a question of you, General. If the United
States--we are talking hypothetically and just your
definition--if the United States placed a 20 to 25 thousand
troops into Venezuela and surrounded Guaido, would you consider
that--do you think the Webster definition would call that a
military intervention? I mean, I am just asking generally,
would that be considered a military----
General Keane. Where are the troops?
Mr. Kinzinger. U.S. troops, let's say.
General Keane. Yes, but where physically are they?
Mr. Kinzinger. We would put them right in the middle of
Venezuela.
General Keane. Of course.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. What about if the United States had,
basically, intelligence assets and counterdefense, things like
that, if we put them in Venezuela? I would say that would also
be considered military intervention. So, the question, the
point I make is, Cuba has already intervened militarily in our
hemisphere. The Russians have already intervened militarily in
our hemisphere. So, when there is this preemptive thing about
we are worried about military intervention in the hemisphere of
the United States of America, Russia and its allies have
already intervened militarily in our hemisphere in Venezuela.
And so, my question to you is this: we, obviously, know the
terrible thing of what is going on. And I think the future of
the United States of America and our hemisphere is going to be
dependent on what happens in Venezuela. It is going to be, is
this a march toward freedom? I mean, we talk about our issues
on the southern border and they are serious, but the reason is
because people are fleeing corrupt leaders; they are fleeing
corrupt countries, and they are fleeing the inability to have
freedom. They are fleeing cartels. A strong Central and South
America is good for the United States.
So, let me ask you a question. Would a U.S. show of force--
so, as we are looking at this debate in Venezuela and saying,
really, the key is what side is the military on, does the
military side with Guaido or does it stay with the illegitimate
government of Maduro? Would a U.S. show of force, not a
military intervention, but putting military assets nearby and
making it clear that we exist, would that be beneficial, do you
think, General, in helping to change the calculus of some of
these military generals?
General Keane. Well, certainly the premise that you are
making about intervention militarily by the Cubans and
certainly by Russia--as I said, it is part of their hybrid
warfare doctrinal playbook--is a serious intervention and has
huge strategic implications. I think the opening of the door to
Cuba and hoping that somehow they would move toward democratic
values and free enterprise, I do not see any evidence of that.
They are still maintaining their aggressive stance.
Given the volatility of the situation that exists in
Venezuela, I do not think, one, we should take any military
action at this time. Two, I do not think we should even
contemplate such a thing without consulting with our allies in
the region and, if military action was called for, to do it in
concert with them.
I would, if I was working for the administration, I would
not be recommending military action. I would be recommending
exactly what the administration is trying to do, which is
cultivate the leadership that is around Maduro and separate
that leadership from Maduro--and there is some evidence that
some of that has been working--and continue those efforts.
And why? Can the United States roll into Venezuela and
conduct some kind of military operation similar to what we have
done in the past in Haiti or Panama and bring it to a
conclusion? Yes, but, also, military operations, despite the
best of intentions, have a tendency not necessarily to go in
the direction that you want them to go. And then, as a result
of it, we also own the aftermath of that, what has taken place
in that country.
So, I would exercise caution, even though there is energy
surrounding this and there is the desire to want to do
something. And we certainly do not want thousands of Venezuelan
people killed in the streets.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. And I will just say, but taking
that option off the table preemptively does not help diplomacy
in that matter.
General Keane. Well, it should never come off the table.
Mr. Kinzinger. Right.
General Keane. I mean, I can imagine any President,
Democrat or Republican, would always want that on the table as
leverage to use diplomatically.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
And, Ambassador Nuland, I had so many questions for you.
Good to see you.
I am way out of time. I will yield back.
Chairman Engel. Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Ambassador Fried, for continuing to point
back to the CAATSA Act of 2017 as things that we can actually
do in Congress.
And, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Fried made reference to a
report, and I ask unanimous consent to add to the record the
unclassified report to Congress to Section 241 of the CAATSA
Act of 2017. And that was dated January 29, 2018. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent to add that to the record?
Chairman Engel. Yes. Yes, without objection.
Mr. Bera. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Bera. I think the Russian people would be pretty
interested in the large number of oligarchs that are worth over
a billion dollars. I think the Russian people would be
interested in who their top government officials are, what they
are worth, et cetera, where the wealth of Russia is actually
going. I think some of my concern--we do have strategic tools
to get this information out there. I think it ought to make
them a little bit worried, and we ought to be using those
tools.
My concern with the administration is Vladimir Putin is
playing, if we were playing cards, he does not have a great
hand that he is playing, but we keep folding our hand, so he
keeps winning round after round.
We had our disagreements with the Obama Administration, but
we had the ability, as Members of Congress and as the Foreign
Affairs Committee, to sit down in classified and unclassified
settings, to voice those differences, but at the end of the day
to speak with one voice. And we understood what that strategy
was, whether we agreed with it or did not agree with it.
The challenge we are having with the current administration
is, you know, Ambassador Nuland, you were asking me what our
strategy in Venezuela is. I do not have an answer for you right
now. And that concerns me. We can do our job, having hearings
and trying to shine the light on it, and express our voice as
Congress, but we have got to come up with a coherent, sustained
strategy with agreed-upon goals that both the administration
and Congress is doing.
I guess my question to the three of you, as the chair of
the Subcommittee on Oversight, what would be some
recommendations that you would have me do or this full
committee do from the congressional perspective. We do not want
to dictate foreign policy, but we have a role in this foreign
policy. Similar to what we did with CAATSA, what are some
things that you would like us to do to send a strong message to
Russia that this is not OK? Ambassador Nuland, why do not you
start?
Ms. Nuland. I think the increased pace of hearings of this
committee is very, very important. You should have a government
panel on Russia where you ask what the overall strategy is and
how it is being implemented. Similarly on China, I do not know
whether you have been having hearings on China. I assume you
have. But I think it has been difficult for folks who are
working at the level that Ambassador Fried and I and General
Keane work to know, in fact, what is a legitimate place to push
and what is not.
I just want to come back to something you said at the
beginning. I was honored when I was Assistant Secretary to come
before this committee probably eight times, I think, between
2013 and 2016, to talk primarily about Ukraine, but also
Ukraine, Russia, Cypress. And I felt at all times, even when we
disagreed or even when we were not doing as much as you might
have wanted, the bipartisan conversation and the rigor of that
that we could have helped us to be better. So, I would
encourage you to bring the administration up, because that
might also strengthen folks in the engine room, because they
will have to articulate the policy.
Mr. Bera. And we do think there are good folks within the
various agencies, et cetera, that share the same concern.
So, Ambassador Fried?
Mr. Fried. There are certainly capable people throughout
the U.S. Government, NSC, State Department, Treasury,
intelligence community, who understand the Russia problem, who
are capable of dealing with it at that level. They need, the
U.S. Government needs clear Presidential leadership and a
strategic framework in which the elements that we have been
discussing here all morning can be fit.
Mr. Bera. Great. And let me make sure. So, the employees of
the State Department, USAID, the DoD, et cetera, I think we
have patriotic Americans out there serving us every day that
want that clear direction and want that ability to go out there
and execute a strategy,
General Keane.
General Keane. Well, I think what we lack is what we have
tried to talk about, all three panel members in our own
individual way. Dealing with Putin today is very different than
what Reagan was dealing with Gorbachev, who was trying to
salvage a regime that was in decline. And we are dealing with a
very aggressive and assertive Russia here who is operating
right on the edge in terms of achieving his national and self-
interest.
But, yet, given the seriousness of this, the administration
has done a very good job in their national security strategy,
in national defense strategy, in laying out the problem. But
what they have not done a very good job in is putting together
implementation and a strategy to deal comprehensively with
Russia and comprehensively with China. And then, also, have the
President personally and publicly be an advocate for that
strategy. That needs to be done.
Mr. Bera. And, General Keane, maybe that is what we can do
in our appropriate oversight role, is help lay out that
strategy in a way that we can hand over to the administration
and, obviously, let them execute a strategy that does not stop
with one administration or another. In the cold war, it was a
sustained strategy and Congress did have a big role. So, I do
look forward to our doing that. There is nothing that stops us
from creating a select committee to look at the Russian
interference in the 2016 election and come up with strong
recommendations of how we can counteract that.
So, thank you for your service.
With that, I will yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you.
Mrs. Wagner.
Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman and the ranking member
for organizing this hearing.
And I thank our witnesses for their time and their
tremendous public service.
I represent the St. Louis metro area, which is home to the
largest Bosnian community outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
About 20 years ago, our Bosnian neighbors fled to St. Louis
after war criminal Ratko Mladic initiated a horrific genocide
against majority Muslim Bosniaks. The Dayton Agreement ended
the Bosnian War in 1995, as we know, but today Russia is
undermining the peace agreement. Frankly, they are undermining
peace and freedom, as we have seen in Syria, as we have seen in
Georgia, the Ukraine, our own elections, now in Venezuela, and
across the globe. But they are undermining the peace agreement
by encouraging separatists in the Serb-majority Republika
Srpska. I am deeply concerned that Russia is fueling ethnic
divides in the interest of weakening the Bosnian state.
Ambassador Fried, how can the United States counteract
Russian activities in Bosnia?
Mr. Fried. The Russians are acting throughout the Balkans
to try to prevent those countries from drawing closer to or
joining the EU and NATO. An attempted coup in Montenegro; the
Russians tried to block the agreement between Greece and North
Macedonia----
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. Fried [continuing]. Which is one of the best pieces of
news----
Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
Mr. Fried [continuing]. To come out of the Balkans in
years. And I am reasonably confident that the Russians would
rather instigate conflict rather than let Bosnia-Herzegovina
succeed in reforming itself. So, I think they are playing the
card of potential secession of Republika Srpska, to prevent
that from happening, and, also, to prevent Serbia, which is the
big game, from turning westward in a decisive way.
What we can do is principally show up, work with Europe in
support of plans to integrate all of these countries into the
West; have them draw closer to the European Union and get on
track for EU ascension. That is powerful. The EU has money;
Russia does not. The EU, throughout Europe and throughout the
Balkans, means prosperity and----
Mrs. Wagner. Well, the EU needs to engage----
Mr. Fried. Right.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Because I am very concerned about
this. And further, let me just say, because I have got such
limited time----
Mr. Fried. Yes.
Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Further, in Georgia, Russia uses
a strategy of, I will call it creeping annexation, to quietly
seize more and more Georgian sovereign territory. Sometimes it
is yards at a time. Today, Russia has managed to convert about
20 percent of Georgia's internationally recognized territory to
disputed territory.
General Keane, how should the U.S. response to Russian
aggression in Georgia differ from its response to the Ukraine
conflict, where Russia moved much more quickly and decisively?
General Keane. Appreciate the question. We have begun to
take some steps to assist them. Certainly, last year we
provided them anti-tank weapons to the Georgia military, and we
conducted some critical military exercises with the Georgians
right on the 10th anniversary of Russia's invasion. So, we are
not ignoring them certainly.
And I also think what we need to do is encourage our
European allies to be as involved as we have begun to be in
Georgia. Also, obviously, they already are dealing with
Ukraine.
I do not believe for a minute that the issues of success
that Russia has enjoyed using the hybrid warfare, that we have
to cede to that success. We have significant geopolitical
influence. We have economically things that we can do. And
certainly, militarily, there are some things that we could do.
Mrs. Wagner. Well, we all must collectively step up, NATO,
the EU, and the U.S.
Russia's behavior has been increasingly aggressive in the
Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. After Russia seized the three
Ukrainian vessels near the Strait last November, the United
States conducted, I think, a freedom of navigation operation in
Peter the Great Bay, the first since the cold war.
Ambassador Nuland, what other methods can the U.S. use to
encourage Russia to comply with international laws that govern
the use of maritime commons?
Ms. Nuland. Well, we eventually did exact some sanctions,
but it took about 6 months. If we had been ready ahead of time
and been able to move quickly, and move in a way that had hurt
the Kremlin a little bit more, we might have been able to have
more immediate impact.
But what is most important, I think, is how do you keep
Russia from accreting into more Ukrainian territory.
Mrs. Wagner. Right.
Ms. Nuland. So, when they build bridge across the Strait,
and then, they landlock, essentially, with that bridge major
grain ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk in Ukraine, they
essentially gain by sea what they could not gain by land.
So, my favorite idea--and I do not know whether the
administration considered it--was put forward by Carl Bildt,
former Swedish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, which would
have been to have the OSCE or some coalition of interested
neutral naval powers like Finland and Sweden offer patrolling
to keep the Sea of Azov open for both Ukraine and Russia. And
that is the kind of passive eyes on the street, if you will,
that we might have been able to organize and help pay for.
Mrs. Wagner. Very important. I am glad we had the testimony
today for the record to submit to the administration.
I have run out of time. I appreciate the chair's
indulgence.
I thank you all for your service.
And I yield back.
Chairman Engel. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
Ms. Wild.
Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon. Thank you all for being here.
I represent a district in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania, as
you undoubtedly know, has the second largest population of
Ukrainian-Americans in the United States. My district, which is
the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania, has a very significant
Ukrainian-American population, and they have shared with me
some of their concerns about Russia and its activities in
Ukraine.
Mr. Fried, if I may, you wrote in your testimony that
``Putin, like Soviet leaders before him, seeks to weaken the
European Union and NATO and to discredit the idea of democracy
as a potentially appealing alternative for Russia.'' Clearly,
the Kremlin does not want Ukraine to succeed in its attempt to
transform itself from a Putin-dependent government into a free
market democracy that grows closer with Europe, because,
obviously, that would show Russians that, if Ukrainians can
succeed in such a transformation, perhaps so could they.
So, what I wanted to ask you is whether you could discuss
Russia's strategy to counteract the efforts of nearby countries
that are trying to build or expand democratic governments, and
what we, the United States, need to do, in turn, to counteract
Russia's efforts to stop democracy in those countries such as
Ukraine?
Mr. Fried. You are right that Russia fears a successful
democratic Ukraine because that would be a body blow, and
possibly a fatal body blow, to Putinism, not to Russia, but to
Putinism. Russia's tactics, well, Russia seeks to prevent all
of its immediate neighbors, Georgia, Ukraine, from becoming
successful, modern democracies drawing closer to Europe.
They manufacture conflicts. They create border problems.
They seize territory. In the case of Ukraine, it was their
association agreement that triggered the protests that led to
bloodshed and, then, the Russian intervention.
What we can do is help the reformers in those countries. We
know how to do this. We did it after 1989 when the Berlin Wall
came down. We helped the Poles. We helped the Baltic States. We
helped the Romanians. And we succeeded. We ought to be getting
behind the reformist forces there.
Ukrainians have had trouble maintaining a steady pace of
reform. Now they have demonstrated a free and fair election.
They are going to have a new President. They are going to have
parliamentary elections.
General Keane has said this, and I agree with him, we need
to help the Ukrainians deliver at home for their people and
fight corruption. That was the big deal in the last elections.
In doing so, the Ukrainians will generate political capital for
themselves, draw closer to Europe. And all the world's big
problems, Ukraine is the one with the greatest chances of a
really good outcome for the United States, for the Ukrainian
people, and for freedom generally.
Ms. Wild. And do you believe that U.S. support is critical
in order for Ukraine to accomplish that?
Mr. Fried. U.S. support and European support together.
Ms. Wild. OK. Thank you.
And to Ambassador Fried or Ambassador Nuland, since 2014,
the United States has used sanctions as a central tenet of
foreign policy to counter Russian aggression. And yet,
sanctions have not led to Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine, nor
did they prevent an escalation of Russian involvement in Syria,
or prevent Russia from increasing support to the Maduro regime
in Venezuela. How important is it that we coordinate United
States sanctions with our European and other allies? And how
can we do a better job of coordinating those sanctions? And the
last part of this, because time is running out, is, what advice
would you give to this administration to improve the
effectiveness of sanctions?
Mr. Fried. The last administration coordinated sanctions
with the European Union. I was the chief negotiator. So, I did
this.
We may have to escalate our sanctions in support of a
Ukraine settlement. If we do so, we should do so with Europe. I
hate to say it, but my old office, the Sanctions Coordinator's
Office at State, was abolished. You need a negotiator. You need
somebody with rank doing it.
Ms. Wild. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Engel. Thank you very much.
Mr. Zeldin.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having today's
hearing.
I wanted to ask a couple of important questions to give
everyone an opportunity to respond with the limited amount of
time.
Nord Stream 2, I think it is, in my opinion, not in the
best interest of the United States and our allies to be
pursuing further development of Nord Stream 2; that it would be
great for an ally like Germany to be pursuing more energy
cooperation and expansion between the United States and
Germany, rather than seeing expansion between Germany and
Russia. Thoughts on Nord Stream 2? Thoughts on the way Germany
should be handling it?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Congressman Zeldin.
We worked very hard on this in the previous administration
to try to slow down the process of Nord Stream 2 and to work
specifically with the European Union. So, the European Union
has very tough rules, called the Third Energy Package, on when
and where you can build pipelines. And so, when we worked with
the European Union, we were able to question things like the
security sustainability, the environmental reliability, whether
Germany actually needed this energy, whether there were other
alternatives. We also worked with all the literal States, the
States whose territory and undersea passages the pipeline would
pass through. And we were able to slow it significantly. I
think that is a better strategy than simply rhetorically
beating the drum, at the same time that we try to bring more
U.S. LNG and other global LNG as an alternative to Europe, and
particularly to Germany.
Mr. Zeldin. Any other witnesses want to weigh-in with
regards to Nord Stream 2?
General Keane. Well, I agree with the sentiments already
expressed. I would just add that I think the United States, in
concert with our European friends, can do more in the energy
sector, particularly natural gas, in terms of impacting
Russia's major sources of income, which largely surrounds
energy, obviously, as almost a one-commodity country. And the
geopolitical implications of that are obvious, and we can
clearly be more aggressive about it.
Mr. Fried. I never liked Nord Stream 2, did not much like
Nord Stream 1. I do not favor the use of sanctions to try to
kill it, but I think Germany needs to do more to mitigate the
strategic downsides of this bad idea, by which I mean they
ought to show leadership in Europe to create alternative
sources of natural gas and LNG, and weaken the Russians'
ability to put Europe in a hammerlock through the use of energy
blackmail.
Mr. Zeldin. Any of the witnesses familiar with letters sent
last week by the German ambassador to the United States to
Members of the U.S. Senate with regards to Nord Stream 2 and
possible retaliatory actions by Germany? There was a story that
came out yesterday in The Wall Street Journal. It was
previously reported just before the weekend. The German
ambassador sent letters to United States Senators threatening
retaliatory action as it relates to the LNG that was just
referenced in your answers to the last question.
What we have been experiencing with the--by the way, the
United States Ambassador to Germany, Ric Grenell, is doing a
fantastic job. Every time he sneezes in a way that a German
politician does not like, someone is calling for him to be
kicked out of the country or some other horrible response. And
it is unfortunate that Germany is not embracing an opportunity
to improve dialog with someone who is honestly reflecting the
policy of the United States under the current administration.
I, in response to the letters being sent by the German
ambassador to the United States, am not going to do what the
Germany politicians will do to Ambassador Grenell. The German
ambassador is stating a policy, a position, a statement, a
threat, however you want to take it, on behalf of the German
government, and I do not believe that it is a good idea for us
to stop talking to the German ambassador. I do not think it is
a productive idea to threaten the German ambassador or call on
Germany to replace the German ambassador.
So, I think that this is an important moment, specifically
as it relates to Nord Stream 2, and a reflection of the
behavior of German politicians as it relates to our U.S.
Ambassador to German, who is doing a fantastic job; that
between allies we should be able to have honest conversations
between our countries and move forward in a healthier, more
productive manner. We might be in a different place with Nord
Stream 2. We should get to a better place with Nord Stream 2 as
well as increased LNG imports. And the threats are not helpful,
but I am not going to respond the way the German politicians
would respond to Ambassador Grenell.
But I appreciate all the witnesses for being here, and for
the chairman for holding today's hearing.
I yield back.
Ms. Spanberger [presiding]. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Espaillat.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to focus my questioning in a different light,
really more about the 2016 elections and Russian meddling. And
we may differ on collusion; we may differ on obstruction of
justice, but, clearly, given the Mueller report, there is no
doubt, absolutely no doubt, that the Russian government
blatantly interfered in U.S. elections in 2016.
We saw that in Volume 1 of the Mueller report, as early as
2014, the Russian Internet Research Agency, IRA, was actively
working to influence the 2016 elections through aggressive
social media campaigns and actually on the ground in the U.S.
In fact, they sent agents to gather intelligence in the U.S. as
early as 2014. The IRA used political ads, bought social media
space, forums falsely engaging American voters, and to stoke
hate and fear. And the IRA also hacked into state election
boards and voter systems and companies which sold election
software to state boards of elections across the country. They
targeted congressional races as well. Maybe some of the members
in this committee, their districts were targeted.
My question is the following: did the Russians tamper with
State voter systems? Did they tamper with voter lists or
systems across different States? Ambassador Nuland, or anybody
on the panel?
Ms. Nuland. I believe that it is publicly disclosed now
that they successfully acquired voter rolls in some States, but
I do not believe was proven that they were able to actually
manipulate or change voting, which is not to say that they did
not try and not to say that they will not try going forward. It
is certainly a strategy that they use at home.
Mr. Espaillat. Do you know which districts or which States
were targeted by this activity?
Ms. Nuland. I do not have that. I am sorry. But I have
testified a number of times before Senate Intel and House
Intel. I think they can help you with that.
Mr. Espaillat. OK. The Mueller report further States that
the Russian government interfered in the 2016 Presidential
election ``in sweeping and systematic fashion'' in regards to
hacking attempts of state boards of elections. So, I want to
also ask, if proven that they have, in fact, tampered with
state elections and voter rolls or lists in those respective
States where you may have front-line or competitive races that
will determine the majority of this institution, do you feel
that state law enforcement or Federal prosecutors have the
right to go after these folks, including some potential
collaborators in the United States? Anybody?
Ms. Nuland. I mean, I think as we have all said, we need a
much stronger, Presidentially led set of policies and tools to
deal with this. I would include in that strengthening our legal
and regulatory regime, so that any Americans who are
participatory willingly and knowingly in any of this, including
influence campaigns or voter suppression, or any of it, face
far harsher legal penalties, including LPRs and others in the
United States. So, there is a lot more we can do within this
basket. What you mentioned is one aspect, but it is much bigger
than that.
I just, while I have the mic, will mention that I think
when CIA Director Haspel came up to the Hill not too long ago,
she called for more resources for the CIA. FBI also has seen
its ability to counter this stuff attrit at the end of the cold
war. So, when you think about what Congress can do, that is
another area to really strengthen our intelligence resources
and coordination through a fusion center.
Mr. Espaillat. Finally, as we work to counter Russia's
malign activity in the U.S. and around the globe, I want to
ensure that we are targeting the Russian government and
ensuring that Russian citizens and civil society do not suffer
because of the Putin regime. Can you suggest principles
Congress should follow to strengthen dialog with the Russian
people and for supporting the civil society in general in
Russia? I think that is an important component that has not
been addressed.
Mr. Fried. During the cold war, we successfully reached out
to Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, all manner of people. We
let some of that capacity atrophy. It is now a digital age. I
think that we ought to develop tools to reach out to them, both
directly, but also by supporting civil society groups.
Democracy promotion can work if we are not too impatient. It
takes time, but it can yield spectacularly good results. Again,
we learned this during the cold war.
And I think reaching out to the Russian people is possible,
but it is probably not possible if the lead is a bunch of
government bureaucrats. I think outsourcing, as the Reagan
Administration did in its day, is the way to go. But I think
that a long-term struggle and long-term outreach to the Russian
people is in our interests.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Spanberger. The chair recognizes Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
We have had several hearings during this 116th Congress.
Many of those have dealt with both China and Russia. And my
question to each of you is, do you feel that the greatest
threat to our national security comes from China or Russia? And
I guess it is two-part. As it exists today, and then, looking
forward 5 to 10 years from now, do you see that change? Ms.
Ambassador?
Ms. Nuland. Congressman Guest, I believe that we face
significant challenge from both. As we have talked about today,
I do not think Putin's Russia is a thousand feet tall. I think
we have got the tools and the organization, if we choose to use
it, to blunt his ability to hurt us.
I think the China challenge is much different, much less
well understood, and will require a very long-term effort
because they are richer, because they are more ambitious,
because they have been more successful at accreting
economically and industrially into our and our allies'
strategic areas of concern. So, again, if this were a China
hearing, I would be calling for a whole-of-government approach,
Presidentially led, rather than simply trade talks or these
talks, but China is a generationally issue, I believe.
General Keane. The way I would express it is, I do not
think we should play one off against the other, but I do
believe that China is a long-term strategic threat to our
national security interests. The engine of their economy
certainly is that. President Xi has made some rather
fundamental strategic decisions that his predecessors had not
made, and that is to dominate the Western Pacific and Asia, and
they are well on their way to achieving that. They are using
gray zone operations, again, operating below the level of
conflict, to achieve those ends. And he has also publicly
stated, again, very different from his predecessors, that they
fully intend to replace the United States as the global leader
of the world.
And they are the fastest-growing military in the world.
They now have 355 combat ships. That is a little north of the
amount of ships the United States Navy has in its entirety.
They have offensive missiles that can hold our carrier battle
group at bay in the Western Pacific and can reach every, every
single air base that we have in the Pacific today. They are
rapidly developing hypersonic missiles which can destroy
surface fleets in a manner of minutes.
So, clearly, their geopolitical No. 1 strategy is economic
around infrastructure and energy, but they are also at the same
time projecting power globally militarily with bases in the
Mediterranean, in Pakistan, and major investment tools, at the
same time building a military capability that would take
advantage of some of the vulnerabilities that the United States
military has.
Long-term strategic threat, to be sure; the most important
bilateral relationship I think the United States is involved
in. We have got to work this thing to try to get it right. We
certainly do not want to go to war. I do not think they want to
go to war with us, but their strategy is very aggressive and it
is being done at the United States' national interests and
those of our allies.
Mr. Guest. Ambassador Fried, let me ask you another
question because my time is limited here. In your report, you
state that, ``For the last 20 years after the end of the cold
war the United States drew down its forces in Europe, and many
European countries allowed their militaries to decline.'' Have
we begun seeing in Europe the rebuilding of those militaries
which were allowed to decline after the end of the cold war?
And to what extent?
Mr. Fried. Yes, but not enough, is the short answer. Partly
under pressure from President Trump and President Obama,
European defense spending has increased, deployable forces is
increasing, and NATO has decided to take seriously the Russian
security threat. So, this is good news. Not enough has been
done, but, clearly, the direction is going the right way.
The countries closest to Russia, the Balts, the Poles, the
Romanians, are spending a lot more and their capability is
growing. The Germans need to do more, but their defense
spending is increasing. We get too involved in a lot of
rhetorical battles, but we need to build on this good momentum
while we keep pushing for more.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Thank you to our guests.
I am going to recognize myself right now.
My first question is in response to the question that Mr.
Guest posed. Ambassador Nuland, you made the comment--and I
hope I quote you correctly--that we have ``the tools and the
organization'' to address the threat posed by Russia. And I was
curious if you could quickly expound on that. What are the
tools, what are the organizations, and how could we make them
stronger, so that we are successfully addressing the threats
posed by Russia?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Spanberger.
As I say in my testimony, we need, first, unity of effort
inside the U.S. Government, then with the Congress, and then,
with allies, and then, with our populations. We need to use all
the tools of power, military, economic, digital, et cetera.
Each of these challenges is different and requires a
separate line of effort. I tried in the testimony to go through
the kinds of steps that I would recommend to deal with the
digital aggression, to deal with military buildup, et cetera.
But, specifically, sanctions are useful, but only when they
are with allies, when they are targeted, when they can be
ratcheted up, and ratcheted down when we can come to agreement.
So, in the Donbass negotiations that I was working on, we were
getting to the point where we were going to need to show Russia
that good behavior would lead to some sanctions coming off. But
when Russia stalled in those negotiations, I could have used an
escalatory ladder. But, by the same token, what is most
important is that we are strong and that we are not willing to
give on things that Russia wants or to give them the prestige
or the face, if you will, of good relations unless they are
working with us, rather than against us. And that has to be
Presidentially led.
Ms. Spanberger. You mentioned the Presidentially led
element of this, and I think that does present some unique
challenges. Certainly, as we have seen in the past couple of
days, the past week, a focus on the Mueller report. And I know
that a number of my colleagues have mentioned this. I am
curious, from your perspective--we have seen the Mueller report
highlighted the systematic disinformation campaign and
offensive cyber efforts against our election system. One of my
concerns, as a former intelligence officer, is that this is an
example of a first-step overture; this is an example of
aggressive behavior and tactics that they were willing to take
in 2016 against our elections, perhaps before that, perhaps in
2018. Speaking specifically about what is in the Mueller
report, it is 2016.
Do you have concerns that these same sorts of aggressive
tactics could be used against our electrical infrastructure,
our electrical grid, our financial institutions, the hacking,
spearfishing, those sorts of efforts, separate from some of the
information and disinformation campaigns? Do you have concerns
that those might be in Russia's toolbox in things that they
might be willing under some circumstances to deploy against us?
And, Ambassador Fried, you were visually responsive. So, I
am going to start with you.
Mr. Fried. Sure. We would be derelict in our duty as a
nation if we were not concerned about this. And this is not
hypothetical. We saw the Russians go after the Georgians, go
after the Estonians. And this was 11 years ago, 12, and the
Ukrainians all the time.
Of course, this is going to be in our toolkit. Now I want
to give the U.S. Government some credit. We have stood up Cyber
Command. They are active. They are working on hard security.
But, as Ambassador Nuland has said, this has to be a whole-of-
government effort, it has to be Presidentially led, and we
cannot send mixed signals.
General Keane. To understand that issue, first of all, yes,
the Russians have clearly the capability, as the second best
offensive capability in the world, to impact our financial
banking system as part of our critical infrastructure, our
utility grids, our transportation system, et cetera. They would
not do that, in my judgment, pre-conflict operations because we
would know they did it, and they know that we would respond
very aggressively to something like that, because the impact on
us would be catastrophic. It is like using a nuclear weapon.
However, during conflict operations--and we know this for a
fact--all of those tools would be used against the American
people in the homeland. Not only that, as we are trying to
deploy our forces--and you saw our forces deploy to Iraq and to
Kuwait and to Afghanistan, and we called that a permissive
deployment, where we moved at a time and place of our choosing
and no interference. That is over. That will never ever happen
again with a major power like Russia or China. They will
interfere with all of that and disrupt it with cyber and, also,
with kinetic weapons. So, yes, conflict operations have changed
dramatically because of the very sophisticated offensive cyber
operations that our adversaries could conduct if we were in
that kind of a conflict.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you to the witnesses.
And the chair recognizes my colleague from Tennessee, Mr.
Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady.
And I will be brief because I realize I am standing in the
way of possibly you all getting to the restroom and lunch. So,
I will be brief in my questions.
I actually had this for the general, but I am curious if
any of you all else would like to comment on it, that China and
Russia, they have shown an incredible ability to work together
almost hand-in-glove with each other when it comes to thwarting
U.S. interests. However, opposite the cold war era, it is now
Moscow that plays the junior partner, it seems to me, junior
partner to Beijing. Do you all think that Putin is OK with this
as long as U.S. interests are checked or Russian pride
eventually will win out? I guess this is getting more into the
psyche of Mr. Putin, who I have seen pictures of him riding a
bear, but I think those are Photoshopped, for the record, but I
would just be curious.
Mr. Fried. I think that is an important point.
Mr. Burchett. And for the record, I do not care at all for
him.
Mr. Fried. I think you have made an important point. I
believe that China and Russia are perfectly willing to work
together to thwart the United States on an opportunistic basis.
However, in any kind of Russian-Chinese alliance, Russia is the
junior partner. And I do not believe the Chinese have forgotten
how the Russians treated them when they were the senior partner
in the 19th century. And what I have said to Russian audiences
is that light at the end of the tunnel that you think you see
may simply be the Chinese waiting for you to emerge and they
will eat you alive, because Russia should think twice before it
signs on to be the junior partner of China. I think that that
would be a mistake, and I think that someday the Russians will
start to realize it. And even now, some of them will whisper,
if they think no one else is listening, that they are concerned
about where Putinism leads them.
Ms. Nuland. I have served in both countries, lived in both
countries. They are not natural allies politically, culturally,
economically. In fact, they are quite vicious about each other
in closed chambers.
I do think the worry now is that there is a lot of learning
going on both ways, particularly in the digital space. You
know, the Russians are learning about facial recognition and
deepfakes from the Chinese, and the Chinese are learning about
influence operations and voter suppression from the Russians,
and that is just the beginning, not to mention their military
interest beginning to align, and particularly what we have
talked about throughout the morning about this club of
autocrats trying to reverse and change the rules of the liberal
international system. So, I think we have to watch it.
The Russians did not enjoy after we put on crippling
sanctions in 2015 in their energy sector and their banking
sector. They went to the Chinese for investment, and they did
not enjoy that exchange because the Chinese really jacked them
up. So, we can also play in that space, if we are playing to
contain and deter both of them.
General Keane. When you look at it politically,
economically, and militarily, I do not see them coming together
in an alliance to support each other across all of those
sectors. I think they find each other useful at times, and
certainly dealing with what was the American hegemon. And
certainly, China does have some economic interest in Russia,
surprisingly, even though they have only 150 million people in
that country and their economy is in the tank. Russia is
currently building a pipeline to China for oil, which is pretty
significant because 62 percent of China's oil still comes from
the Middle East. And it is why China is opening a navy base in
Djibouti, because they know that, if we had a conflict with
China, we would shut down that oil coming out of the Middle
East. So, I think that they see utility in the relationship,
but I do not see an alliance.
Mr. Burchett. A young man from--it is not in my notes--but
visited me yesterday, and he was from an area, the district of
Powell. And he wrote a poster and I guess a brief on China and
their ability to go into these countries and do things, you
know, dams, hydroelectric, and things like that. And they would
get into it, and they would get about three-quarters of the
way, and then, they would pull the plug on some of it. And he
surmised that the reason they did that was they would be more
dependent upon them, and then, they would be more indebted to
them. Does that ring any truth to you all, that sort of
philosophy with China?
You know, I was in Israel and I was saddened to see that
their deep port was, in fact, done by the Chinese, or, as my
father would say, ``the Red Chinese,'' but the Chinese.
General Keane. The strategy you are talking about there
deals with mostly emerging nations where China has come in and
they are going to build infrastructure projects for them, and
they negotiate high-interest loans where the country has
difficulty paying off the interest. And as a result of it,
China owns the infrastructure. When it is an energy
infrastructure, it impacts geopolitically on influencing
control in that country.
But, with a more industrialized state where they have
significant investment projects in Africa, South America, South
Asia, et cetera, they do not deliver a quality product. They
insist on Chinese labor force. And second, the product is not
up to standard. I believe this strategy is eventually going to
catch up to them, unless they make some significant changes.
One, they are bullies and intimidators. And I have been
around Southeast Asia and other places talking about China to
those leaders there. Clearly, China has huge influence, but
going along with that, there is a price to be paid in that
relationship. And some of that price is not welcome in Beijing;
that is for sure. They are quick learners. So, they may solve
this problem certainly. But that is kind of the thrust that I
see happening.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady.
Of my 103 days in Congress, this has probably been one of
the more informative meetings, and I appreciate it. I wish my
father was alive to hear what you had to say about the Chinese.
He fought them after the Second World War in some limited
engagements in the United States Marine Corps. You have
educated me. I want to thank you all very much, all three of
you.
Chairlady, I am sorry I went over.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Spanberger. I apologize. The chair now recognizes--no,
Mr. Malinowski. Sorry.
Mr. Malinowski. We are good?
Ms. Spanberger. Yes, we are good.
Mr. Malinowski. OK.
Ms. Spanberger. I apologize.
Mr. Malinowski. Thanks.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
Mr. Malinowski. When I used to ask Russian dissidents, how
can we help you, they would sometimes shoot back, well, at
least stop hurting us by allowing Putin's cronies and oligarchs
to hide their money in American real estate, shell companies,
and banks. So, I am very glad that you raised that issue,
Ambassador Fried.
The good news is we have a bipartisan bill. It was
introduced in the last Congress. It is about to be
reintroduced. I think it may be supported by the
administration; I am hopeful. It will basically say that the
true owners of shell companies, of companies registered in the
United States, their identities have to be disclosed to the
Treasury Department. I just want to ask all three of you, would
you support that kind of legislation? I see a thumbs-up. Three
thumbs-up. Good. Well, you will have an opportunity to tell us
more formally soon, I hope.
Let me go bigger picture. I think in all of your
testimoneys there is a common theme that this is not just a
battle of armies; it is a battle of ideas. Putin has an idea
that dictatorships and kleptocracies should be left alone. He
seems threatened and offended by institutions like NATO and the
EU that try to uphold standards in the world. He seems to be
offended and threatened by the notion of the United States
leading by example, being a shining city on a hill. So, he
tries to undermine the institutions. He tries to undermine our
reputation. Makes us seem like just about any other country.
So, let me do a little bit of a lightning round with you
guys, and maybe I will start with you, Ambassador Fried, but
anybody can jump in. Do we validate or counter Putin's idea
when we say that NATO needs to pay us to protect them and
question whether we should even defending small NATO allies
like Montenegro? Just quickly.
Mr. Fried. We are right to push for NATO countries to step
up in defense spending. We are wrong to speak in terms of NATO
as a protection racket.
Mr. Malinowski. How when we denigrate the EU and suggest
that we are cheering on Brexit? Are we validating or countering
Putin's idea?
Mr. Fried. We should support the unity of the democracies
because we need our friends to deal with our adversaries. The
EU at worst can be a bit of a pain to work with, but that is a
friend. They are a friend, and an important one.
Mr. Malinowski. What about when we throw our support behind
a Russian-backed Libyan warlord who is trying to overthrow a
government that the U.N. and the U.S. has recognized? Are we
validating or countering Putin's world view and strategy?
Victoria, do you want to----
Ms. Nuland. Congressman Malinowski, the Russians have been
supporting Haftar's civil war inside Libya for at least 2
years. Why we would want to exacerbate and accelerate that does
not make any sense to me.
Mr. Malinowski. Let's take this closer to home. Are we
validating or countering his idea when we call the free press
in our country the enemy of the people?
Mr. Fried. American values and American interests are
ultimately indivisible, and this has been the core of America's
grand strategy for 100 years. So, we ought to get behind our
own best traditions. It makes us stronger, not weaker.
Mr. Malinowski. Does it help us in this battle of ideas or
hurt us when an American President maintains his own personal
business empire and takes payments from foreign governments?
Mr. Fried. Transparency, probity, decency, and financial
disclosure are all good things, the mark, as used to be said,
of a healthy republic.
Mr. Malinowski. And what about when we accuse our
intelligence community of being a deep state that is trying to
engage in a coup against our elected leadership? Is that----
Mr. Fried. Talk of coups, treason, enemies is the language
that I had not heard in common discourse in the West since I
was reading about it in history books, and I do not like to see
it now.
Ms. Nuland. Just to repeat a line from my opening
statement, we enable Putin's quest when our own leaders ``call
into question the basic rights enshrined in our liberal
Constitution: an independent judiciary, a free press,
protection of minority rights, and the oversight powers of this
Congress.'' You named several others, in addition.
Mr. Malinowski. And just a final question----
General Keane. Mr. Congressman, can I say something here?
And I really appreciate your being here from the very outset.
I understand what you are saying, and I deal with leaders
around the world on the very issue you are talking about. And
that is the President's comments, and he makes them on a
regular basis, almost daily. And what I tell those leaders,
one, you should try to understand the comments. I am not
telling you do not pay attention to it. But what you have to
pay attention to is U.S. policy. And U.S. policy is supporting
NATO 100 percent.
Now are there denigrating comments about countries in NATO?
Yes. And the President's speech when he went to Poland in the
first year of his office, and stood up there and talked about
the values in NATO and how it has preserved peace and stability
in the world, how it is the bastion of all the advanced
democracies in the world, and we share all those values
together. Yes, we have to look at policy, where we do have a
President that talks and expresses his own views at times, what
on the surface appears to undermine some of those policies. I
am not disputing that. I will acknowledge that. But I come back
to policies, and that is what our adversaries are primarily
looking at, our policies.
Mr. Malinowski. But Article 5 does depend on our
adversaries having absolute confidence that the President of
the United States believes in NATO and in our commitment to
defend every single ally, large or small, does it not? They
have to believe that he believes it. Isn't that important?
General Keane. Yes, and in my view, I do not think there is
an issue there. The United States will respond to an Article 5
incursion.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Thank you. I yield back. Well, unless
you want to----
Mr. Fried. I agree with General Keane that the policies of
this administration are like what Mark Twain said of Wagner's
music, ``Better than it sounds.'' But there is no substitute
for Presidential leadership. And I have said the same thing to
Europeans that General Keane has been saying all over the
world. Look what they do. They have not done anything--the
administration has not acted on the more problematic
Presidential statements. And I say it and I believe it. But I
wish I did not have to make that defense.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Chrissy Houlahan from
Pennsylvania, and apologies to my colleague for skipping you in
the last section.
Ms. Houlahan. Not a problem at all.
And thank you very much, Ambassadors and General, for
coming today.
My first question, sir, is for you, General. It has to do
with the Russian military development and the recent
revelation/realization that, in 2018, Russian defense spending
actually went down and for the first time Russia became one of
the less than five highest people spending on DoD expenditures.
And my question has to do with whether or not, in doing
this, you think that Russia's--is Russia actually still a great
power? Or, with the assessment now that there are great powers
that are China and Russia, as they are declining in their
military expenditures, do you feel as though that is a
reflection in their power and might, or is the fact that they
are moving their expenditures into other areas, non-military
areas, a reflection that they still continue to be a threat?
General Keane. Well, it is a reflection of the economic
challenges that Russia is facing in their country. As you know,
they have significant inflation problems, unemployment
problems, and the list goes on.
But I spent over a year in a bipartisan congressional
committee looking at principally where are we with Russia and
China in terms of a national defense strategy. We are
challenged by the fact that, if we got involved in a
confrontation in Europe, the United States in an ocean away and
we have to move to that conflict. So, that is a challenge in
and of itself.
But I can flat tell you that Russia and China have both
developed asymmetric capabilities. They have not tried to build
a force like ours, although China is building a navy like ours.
But they have built asymmetric capabilities that have the
capacity to take away something that we have always had
dominance in, and that is the use of air power, not just from
airplanes, but cruise missiles from ships.
The Russians have that capability at Kaliningrad right now,
if we got involved in a conflict over the Baltics or in Poland,
et cetera. So, yes, and Russia is a significant nuclear power.
They have improved all of their strategic weapons, and we are
just now getting around to putting some money in the budget to
do that. And they have developing tactical nuclear weapons, as
we know, in violation of the INF 1987 Treaty. So, yes, Russia
has significant military capability to this day that can impose
cost on the United States and our allies in a conventional
conflict. Likely, that is not what they want to do, because
hybrid warfare, operating below the level of that conflict, has
proven to be geopolitically successful for them.
Ms. Houlahan. And, sir, where are they failing. If they are
succeeding in those areas that you just outlined, where is
Russia failing?
General Keane. Well, Russia has a conscript military, and
they only really professionalized about 30 to 40 percent of it.
And the conscripts stay for 1 year. And therefore, their morale
is not what it should be. Their leadership is not what it
should be in two-thirds of that military. So, I am not about
hyping the threat. I am about trying to be realistic about what
it is and what is likely. But there is no doubt, when you put a
microscope on it, that Russia does have a capability to impose
cost on us in a conventional war. Over time, we win that war,
but, initially, it is significant.
Ms. Houlahan. And that is my final question, which is,
given the expenditures that we are making in terms of dollars,
and given their capabilities and their weaknesses, do you feel
as though we are collectively gaining ground on Russia or
losing ground?
General Keane. Our problem is we have had--Russia and China
have caught us technology-wise, where we had a significant
technological advantage for years. So, they have got precision-
guided munitions, stealth technology, electronic warfare. The
list goes on and on and on where we had dominance over them. We
do not have that kind of dominance now.
And what we are trying to do with the Trump defense buildup
is get the kind of dominance and parity that we are used to
having, for one reason only. That capability, just like the
capability we had during the cold war, prevents war, and that
is what we want to do. We want to make certain that the erosion
that we have experienced--why? Seventeen years of 9/11 wars,
budget reduction and sequestration, particularly the latter,
kneecapped us rather significantly. And this is close to two
decades now of impact on military capability.
The Trump defense buildup I think is more critical than
actually the Reagan defense buildup, given the adversaries that
we are facing and what their capabilities are. We cannot do it
just for one or 2 years, Madam. We have got to do it for about
five or 6 years to get back to where we have a credible
deterrence.
Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate it. I know that my time is up. I
guess the bigger part of my question is, why, with $700-plus
billion every year, or increasingly every year, we are still
behind or not spending our money appropriately, so that we can
counter those asymmetrical threats?
General Keane. Well, you answered the question. Some of
that money has not been spent appropriately, and I hope, as we
are going forward, that we are really focused on what
capabilities--I will just give you one example. If a military
service is taking a legacy system and they are going to want to
improve that legacy system that is going to be with us for the
next 20 or 30 years, wrong decision. Why is that? Because we
have artificial intelligence coming. We have quantum sensors
coming. We have directed-energy coming that our opponents are
all going to have. We have got to get up on that next
technological edge, is where we have to be, and not spend money
on systems that fought a war in the past and is not going to
fight a war in the future.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I am sorry for going over my time. I yield back.
Ms. Spanberger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Trone from Maryland.
Mr. Trone. Good afternoon. We are almost finished.
First, I want to thank you guys for your excellent
responses to Mr. Malinowski's questions. I thought that was
very helpful, and I really appreciate your candor. Thank you.
Russia appears to be fomenting conflict along its border
region to the west in order to block any chance of accesion to
NATO. I am thinking specifically about Georgia, Moldova.
Regardless of whether NATO should seek to expand in those
countries, do you believe the NATO alliance should tolerate
such behavior from Russia? And if not, what can NATO do to
counteract it? Who wants to take a stab?
Ms. Nuland. I think we have, across multiple
administrations and with the help of the Congress, worked hard
to strengthen those leaders in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine--
and it has not been monolithic in any of those countries--who
seek more democratic, open, tolerant societies. We have also
worked hard to push back against Russian militarization of
parts of those countries.
I think the question now is whether, even absent the parts
of those countries that are occupied, if you will, or under
foreign influence, is the rest of the country, whether it is
Georgia, whether it is Moldova, whether it is Ukraine. Are they
meeting the highest standards that we demand of NATO members?
And I think our goal now should be to work with each of them to
make clear that it is not about the pieces of territory that
they have lost. It is about whether they are clean enough,
strong enough, democratic enough, to be in our family. And
frankly, we have also got NATO members where we have got a
problem there.
Mr. Trone. Agreed. We have Russia invest significant
resources, expanding its influence in Central Europe, in the
Balkans. President Putin has a like-minded ally now in NATO, in
the EU, in Viktor Orban in Hungary. He is testing NATO unity in
Turkey, and continues to make inroads in Serbia, to your point.
Are you concerned that President Putin is establishing an
alliance of illiberal autocrats in Europe? And to what extent
does this rollback of democracy in some places undermine the
Transatlantic Alliance?
Mr. Fried. I think President Putin will seek out autocrats
on principle, but his interference in European elections goes
far beyond. I mean, Russians were involved in Spain's Catalonia
referendum. They were involved, as it turns out, in Brexit.
They will work everywhere they can, looking for opportunities
to divide. I do think that they have an inclination toward
hard-right nationalism, but they will go with an extremist,
right or left.
I think that Putin is able to do this--that is, he is able
to try to assemble an international alliance of autocrats and
nationalists--partly because the United States has stepped back
from its leadership of the free world. And I do not mean just
this administration, though I mean that, too. But, even in the
last administration, we did not seem to be stepping up to our
traditional role. It is tough. The United States gets hit when
we lead, but when we do not lead, things are worse.
And I think that the fallout from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and American war weariness and economic problems
at home, have tended to weaken the national consensus for
American leadership abroad. I think it will take a lot of
effort to maintain that. I think it is important. I think both
American political parties have strong traditions of supporting
international leaders, but isolationism, or kind of inward-
looking unilateralism and nationalism, also have a tradition in
American politics. I wish it did not, but it does. And I think
that ultimately is the answer to Putinism. We need to step up
and remember our best traditions and who we are.
Mr. Trone. Well said. What about the yellow vests? Is he
part of that mess in France?
Mr. Fried. I think that the Russians go for anybody willing
to play their game. I think what they do in our country, which
is take socially divisive issues and play both sides to
exacerbate it, they will play in every European country where
they can. I think the players change, that is, their tools
change, but their tactics are the same.
Mr. Trone. That sounds like a yes.
I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. I would just say it bears investigating where
their funding is coming from.
Mr. Trone. Yes.
Ms. Houlahan [presiding]. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Congressman Andy Levin from Michigan.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you all for coming in today.
I know there has been some focus on Russia's activities in
Ukraine, and I want to go back there a little bit and explore
in more detail. A Brookings fellow, Alina Polyakova, wrote
that, ``While Russian interference in Western elections came as
a surprise to many, Russia has a long track record of
intervening in Ukraine's elections since 2004. Ukraine's
experience is, thus, a bellwether for assessing the Russian
tactics that may be deployed against the West.''
Ms. Nuland, can you share a bit more about the kinds of
tactics that we have seen from Russia with respect to Ukrainian
elections and what, if any, Russian interference did we see
during or in the leadup to the recent Presidential elections?
Ms. Nuland. The traditional Russian playbook in Ukraine had
been less about influence campaigns on Ukrainian voters and
more about support along with the oligarchs who are in their
orbit of individual candidates who they thought would be more
favorable to Russia's interests, its economic interest and its
military interest. So, to try to squeeze out democrats and,
when they come into office, to damage them, to hurt them with
the electorate, and in the case of Yushchenko actually throw
acid on his face, and there were some vicious things that went
on.
The interesting thing about these elections is that the
mandate, the margin by which President-Elect Zelensky won was
so massive that any manipulation that may or may not have been
by anybody got swamped by the people's will. I think the
question now, Zelensky said a lot of the right things about
anti-corruption and about breaking the oligarchic system in
Ukraine, but he, himself, has been in business with senior
oligarchic figures. So, he has got to now prove it, and we
should support him if he does, but we should tie our assistance
to a cleaner, more democratic, more economically open Ukraine.
Mr. Levin. What do you and others think about the role of
independent media in Ukraine and whether the U.S. could play a
helpful role there in supporting the growth of an independent
media, as part of that broadening you are talking about?
Ms. Nuland. We have done a considerable amount to offer
training. I think it is very important that foreign media not
be controlled by us, but be indigenous. The problem has been
that there is so much oligarchic money, not just in Ukraine,
but throughout Central Europe as well, in the media space, you
know, the owning of television stations, et cetera; that it is
very hard for independent journalists to survive and thrive.
So, support for independent journalism, training, solidarity
with them, protection of them, is very important.
General Keane. My reaction in watching Russia, certainly
meddling in elections is clearly part of their foreplay, so to
speak. But, when it comes to Ukraine, it was not too long ago
when their stooge was running the country. And the reason why
he is no longer running the country, obviously, is the impasse
of Ukraine looking for the West, looking for economic ties with
Europe, in particular, and eventually in a political-military
alliance with NATO.
So, what I see Putin influencing more in a country is
pushing back on the domestic reforms that are necessary to gain
economic viability and political stability as a result of that,
because that is clearly not in his interest. So, oligarchs are
a part of that. Flushing money in there is a part of all of
that and the obvious corruption.
Even the Kerch Strait issue, while the focus was certainly
on naval-to-naval issue, what he was really interfering with is
economically the ports that are to the north of the Kerch
Strait----
Mr. Levin. Right.
General Keane [continuing]. And the transit of commodities
out of those ports is what----
Mr. Levin. All right. Let me try to shoehorn one more
question in, really about the application of the tactics to the
U.S. Last week, The New York Times reported that the White
House Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, instructed former Homeland
Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen not to talk about Russian
election interference around the President because, quote,
``Mr. Trump still equated any public discussion of malign
Russian election activity with questions about the legitimacy
of his victory.'' Consequently, according the Times, the issue
did not gain the urgency or widespread attention that a
President can command, and it meant that many Americans remain
unaware of the latest Russian versions of interference.
Do any of you want to comment about whether it is fair to
say that, until the President acknowledges the facts about
Russia's interference in our elections, and mobilizes the
defenses we will need to counter that interference, we will
remain vulnerable to those attacks?
Mr. Fried. I think one of the themes from this panel has
been that Presidential leadership is critical. And as someone
who, like Ambassador Nuland, did a lot of crafting talking
points for Secretaries, and even Presidents, Vice Presidents,
it should not be that hard to speak about the policy challenge
of Russian election interference and disinformation without
getting into the more difficult and partisan issues of the
Mueller report. It is not that hard, or it should not be that
hard.
Presidential leadership is crucial. Acknowledging the facts
of Russian attempted election interference can be separated
from the partisan question, and even the political question, of
the actual 2016 campaign. You could put it aside, draw a thick
line, and say, OK, this is what we have to do to prevent it.
And there is a viable set of toolkits. I mean, there is a
consensus emerging among policy experts about how to deal with
disinformation. Cyber experts know what they are doing. The
level of knowledge is well ahead of the political ability to
sustain it into Presidential-level policy, I think.
Mr. Levin. All right. Well, I really appreciate the
chairwoman and now the chairman's tolerance because I have gone
over my time.
But I really appreciate your answer. I mean, it really is a
question of the integrity of our democracy. So, I agree it goes
above all politics and above all partisanship.
Thanks, and I yield back.
Chairman Engel [presiding]. Thank you.
Mr. Allred.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the Ambassadors and general for being here
today. I think I am likely your last questioner. So,
congratulations.
Before seeking this office, I was a voting rights attorney.
And one of the things that we were always concerned with was,
of course, methods of state voter suppression, but also of
conditions that might cause people not to vote, lack of
confidence in our system, belief that their vote does not
matter, and, of course, misinformation.
And I know we have had a lot of discussion about Russian
interference in the 2016 election today. Ambassador Fried, I
wanted to ask you about what we can do in our civil society,
our media, our social media, our people, to prepare ourselves
and to perhaps innoculate ourselves for 2020. Because I visited
the NSA. I think there has been some pretty accurate public
reporting about what Russia's efforts were in the 2018 election
and how they were interrupted. And I think we can, obviously,
anticipate more in 2020. What do you think we can do in our
civil society to prepare ourselves for this?
Mr. Fried. Let me focus on one aspect of it. I expect that
Russians, but maybe others, will use social media to disinform
and misinform potential voters, stuff like polling places are
not open or changing the address of polling places, or you have
to bring this or that document with you, and if you do not, you
will be arrested. There will be all kinds of garbage out there.
The way to fight that, or one way to fight that, is to get
in place in advance civil society groups, activists who can
expose this misinformation, and then, link them up with
reliable and trusted local community leaders, and have kind of
a war room setup to respond, to expose misinformation and
disinformation in real time, and then, get the word out to
people what to ignore.
Now it is hard. The bad guys are always going to be faster,
but we should not allow that kind of disinformation to go
unchallenged. And the time to set that stuff up is now, and
raise people's awareness. It can be the Russians. It can be
various extremists. They are going to be in that space. And the
Russians love voter suppression because they want to exacerbate
our existing social divisions.
So, this is, whatever the source, there are tools available
to fight it, and you do not have to go through--it does not
require a Federal Government program. Local activists can do
it, but you need tech-savvy people who can expose it, and then,
you need to link them with community leaders that have
credibility.
Mr. Allred. Thank you so much.
And I want to point to something you wrote in your written
testimony. You said, ``The United States was different from
previous great powers, exceptional, if you will, because we
understood that our Nation would do well when, and only when,
other nations also did well. We were not interested in merely
guarding a sphere of influence, like the great powers of the
past. Instead, in a breathtaking display of confidence and
vision, we understood that we could make the world a better
place and do well for ourselves in the process.''
I want to finish just by commending that and saying that I
could not agree more. I think that our values, and as I think
you have talked about with other questioners, leading with our
values is important in terms of our response to Russia. And if
you could, just finish by maybe summarizing some of your
thoughts there.
Mr. Fried. Well, thank you for recalling that. I believe
that strongly. The key professional experience in my career was
the overthrow of communism and the successful replacement of it
by democratic governments. And that taught me something about
what we used to call ``the American way''. So, I do have what
sounds like a naive faith in the power of the best American
ideals to overcome the darker sides of our tradition. And I
still have that faith.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I
have learned a lot, and I really appreciate all of your
testimony today.
Chairman Engel. Thank you, Mr. Allred.
Well, in fact, it is the time of the now late afternoon
when I can thank the three of you for truly excellent
testimony. And you can see by the level of participation that
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle think so, too. We had
so many people come here and participate and ask questions.
So, I just want to thank you. I know I have learned a lot.
And I want to just thank you, the three of you, for all you do,
and it was a pleasure listening to you. I think you made so
many excellent points, that I think it gives a lot of us on
this committee pause for thought. And thank you so much.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
PRIORITY INTERCONNECTION PROJECTS FOR THE SEAS INITIATIVE
To see a complete list please use the following link:
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190501/109399/
HHRG-116-FA00-20190501-SD001.pdf
[all]