

U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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April 30, 2019
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Serial No. 116-30
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>, <http://docs.house.gov/>,
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36-134PDF

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U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

Tuesday, April 30, 2019

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,

Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,

Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Washington, DC

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in Room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Ms. BASS. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa. This hearing is in line with the overview and orientation that we are providing in this new session.

The hearing will also provide an update on the state of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and the role the U.S. plays in supporting their efforts on the continent, how we should engage the continent, and what that looks like, moving forward.

So, without objection, all members have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses who are here with us today and our ranking member who has fought for many, many years to make sure that peacekeeping is done well and that the U.S. stays involved.

We all know that Africa is vast in scope with different challenges across its geographical regions. The diversity of the continent means that our approach to policy must be flexible and strategic when looking to assist the continent's needs regionally and independently.

Due to demographic changes and increased regional integration, Africa will be the single largest market in the world in a few decades. With the support of successful partnerships within Africa and globally, the continent can overcome its development and security challenges.

U.N. peacekeepers aim to protect civilians, promote human rights, prevent conflicts, broker peace, and build the rule of law.

The recent attack on a U.N. convoy in Mali killed a peacekeeper from Egypt and injured four others. There were also 10 peacekeepers and another 25 injured at a U.N. camp in Mali in January.

Peacekeepers are oftentimes in harm's way, trying to broker peace with radical extremist groups, and peacekeepers in Mali have oftentimes been the target of extremist groups.

There have been successful U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. These missions also have organized the Burundi elections in 1995, monitored the cease-fire between Eritrea and Ethiopia, helped implement the Arusha peace agreement between the Rwandan armed forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and helped ECOWAS investigate human rights violations, monitor the electoral process, and implemented peace agreements after the Liberian civil war.

I believe that these missions have been more helpful than not but there are challenges including reported crimes of peacekeepers. There have been reports of human rights violations by security forces in the Sahel, torture in the CAR, Congo, and Somalia, sex trafficking rings.

Peacekeepers are often under equipped. Oftentimes, too few soldiers are on the ground. Many of the U.N. personnel on the ground are not local, meaning lack of in-depth knowledge of cultural institutions and lack of language skills to communicate with locals.

Considering some of the issues mentioned around protecting peacekeepers and civilians, I look forward to hearing your views and suggestions in your testimony or in the Q&A.

The numerous attacks in Mali are very concerning and I would also like to hear your thoughts on the idea of the peacekeepers decreasing their footprint in the DRC.

These are just a few questions I will pose to our witnesses and I look forward to hearing what you think we should do to strengthen peacekeeping missions on the continent and around the world.

Last, I am troubled that the administration has not emphasized supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions particularly in Africa. This administration stated that funding would be cut to the U.N.—to the United Nations and that the U.S. will no longer provide indiscriminate assistance across the entire African continent.

The U.N. National Security Advisor John Bolton added that the U.S. will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions.

This is very troubling but I do want to emphasize that U.S. relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan cooperation here in Congress and we expect that to continue.

Time after time, when funding was recommended to be reduced that directly impacts African countries we worked collectively to reinstate this crucial funding.

[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Bass follows:]

**Congressmember Karen Bass
AGH Subcommittee Hearing
Hearing: “UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa”
April 30, 2019**

This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations will come to order.

I note that a quorum is present.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on **“UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa”**.

This hearing is in line with the overview and orientation that we are providing to new members. The hearing will also provide an update on the state of UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa, and the role the U.S. plays in supporting their efforts on the continent, how we should engage the continent, and what that looks like moving forward.

So... without objection, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement.

I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses who are here with us today.

We all know that Africa is vast in scope with different challenges across its geographical regions. The diversity of the continent means that our approach to policy must be flexible and strategic when looking to assist the continent's needs regionally, and independently.

Due to demographic changes and increased regional integration, Africa will be the single largest market in the world in a few decades. With the support of successful partnerships within Africa and globally, the continent can overcome its development and security challenges.

UN peacekeepers aim to protect civilians, promote human rights, prevent conflicts, broker peace, and build rule of law. Currently, there are UN peacekeeping missions in Mali (MINUSMA), Western Sahara (MINURSO), DRC (MONUSCO), CAR (MINUSCA), South Sudan (UNMISS), Darfur (UNAMID), and Sudan's Abyei (UNISFA).

The recent attack on a UN convoy in Mali killed a peacekeeper from Egypt and injured four others. There were also 10 peacekeepers and another 25 injured at a UN camp in Mali in January. Peacekeepers are oftentimes in harm's way trying to broker peace with radical extremist groups. And peacekeepers in Mali have oftentimes been the target of extremist groups.

There have been successful UN peacekeeping missions in Africa...

I want to highlight the UN peacekeeping mission in Cote D'Ivoire. In 2010, during the presidential elections, thousands of Ivorian citizens were killed, and hundreds of thousands became refugees. The peacekeeping mission deployed troops, disarmed combatants and reintegrated them into society. Hundreds of thousands of refugees returned home by 2016, the National Commission on Human Rights decreased human rights violations, and the **1,000 Quick Impact Projects** program decreased inter-communal conflicts by 80%. The UN peacekeeping mission in Cote D'Ivoire also helped strengthen the country's security forces and helped integrate women into the military and civil law enforcement.

UN Peacekeeping missions also have organized the Burundi elections in 2005; monitored the ceasefire between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 2000-2008; helped implement the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the Rwandan patriotic Front; and helped ECOWAS investigate human rights violations, monitored the electoral process, and implemented peace agreements after the Liberian Civil War.

I believe UN peacekeeping missions have been more helpful than not, but there are challenges including reported crimes of UN peacekeepers...

- There have been reports on human rights violations by security forces in the Sahel
- Reported tortures in CAR, Congo, and Somalia
- Reported sex-trafficking rings in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Haiti
- Peacekeepers are often under-equipped (oftentimes too few soldiers on the ground) and under prepared (usually receive poorly trained and poorly paid soldiers)
- Many of the UN personnel on the ground aren't local (meaning lack of in-depth knowledge of culture institutions; and lack of language skills to communicate with locals)

Considering some of the issues mentioned around protecting peacekeepers and civilians, I look forward to hearing your views and suggestions in your testimony or in the Q & A. The numerous attacks in Mali are very concerning and I would also like to hear your thoughts on MONUSCO decreasing its footprint in the DRC...

Those are just a few questions I pose to our witnesses, and I look forward to hearing what you all think we should do to strengthen peace keeping missions on the continent and around the world.

Lastly.... I'm troubled that the administration has not emphasized supporting UN Peace keeping missions particularly in Africa. This administration stated that funding would be cut to the United Nations,

and that the “United States will no longer provide indiscriminate assistance” across the entire African continent. The US National security advisor John Bolton added, that the U.S. “will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and unaccountable UN peacekeeping missions.” This is very troubling....

But... I want to emphasize that US relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan cooperation here in Congress and we expect to continue to do so. Time after time this administration has sought to reduce funding to the State Department or USAID that directly impacts African countries, but we have worked collectively to reinstate this crucial funding.

I now recognize the Ranking Member for the purpose of making an opening statement.

I now want to recognize the ranking member for the purpose of making an opening statement.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Bass, and thank you to our witnesses for being here, for your leadership but also for taking time out of your busy schedules to convey your wisdom and insights and recommendations to our subcommittee.

This is an important hearing so I thank you, Madam Chair, for calling us together to talk about peacekeeping in general and peacekeeping in Africa in particular.

As we know, U.N. peacekeeping costs about \$7 billion a year. Fourteen U.N. peacekeeping deployments are currently underway.

About 100,000 military police and civilian personnel comprise those efforts and I think they are extraordinarily valuable but there is always gaps and always room for significant improvement.

This subcommittee had been very active on this issue dating back to the year 2000 as well as holding two hearings on peacekeeping operations in the DRC, which I held, about the exploitation of little girls—mostly little girls—in and around the Goma area, and we did hear from the U.N. at that time. Jane Holl Lute testified and what was a great focus or in great focus then was the zero tolerance policy.

In one of our hearings we even said it is zero compliance because so few of the peacekeepers themselves and their command structures are taking it seriously enough. We also looked at peacekeeping operations in 2012 and, again, in 2016, again focusing on the allegations of abuse and the absence of accountability and that was another hearing in 2016, and Peter Gallo had testified at that hearing.

Karen, it was just 3 weeks ago that we met with President Touadera of the Central African Republic during his visit to Congress along with Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn for a very productive discussion on a range of topics including the security situation in the CAR, the majority of which is not under effective control by the government.

One of the things that struck me about the dialog is how clear it was made by the president and his entourage of the need for U.N. peacekeepers in that country, which is still very much chaotic, and how U.N. peacekeepers could still fill a gap so that we do not have to put American troops in harm's way.

That said, however, recognizing a need is one thing. Meeting that need is another, and I think with respect to that how well the U.N. peacekeepers are meeting that need in countries like CAR but also in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo is still open for question and there is great room for improvement.

We know that the record is mixed in South Sudan, UNMISS's operation. We hear good things about the Mongolian peacekeepers who patrol aggressively and give civilians a sense of security.

But elsewhere the record is, at best, mixed, and in many cases very negative. I have received a statement from Bishop Nongo of the Diocese of Bossangoa in the Central African Republic, which I request be entered into the record, without objection.

Ms. BASS. No objection.

[The information referred to follows:]



WRITTEN TESTIMONY

HEARING ON PEACE KEEPING

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

May 2nd, 2019

I am Bishop Nestor-Desiré NONGO AZIAGBIA from the Diocese of Bossangoa, in the Central African Republic (CAR). I am also the President of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Central Africa and am writing you in this capacity. I was privileged to testify to this House Subcommittee on November 19th, 2013 on the crisis in Central African Republic. I urged the United States Government and their partners to contribute in ending the crisis and alleviating the sufferings of our people. My advocacy was mainly directed at:

Ensuring greater security to the people by increasing the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), better equipping them and putting them under the UN Chapter VII mandate to ensure impartiality and the ability to use force, as a last resort, to save innocent civilian lives.

Funding humanitarian assistance, promoting societal reconciliation programs and helping the Government re-establish essential social services like schools and healthcare centers.

Funding the transition process to a legitimate, democratically elected government with emphasis on fighting against impunity and criminal investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

We have gone a long way with the passage from MISCA to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the conduct of the 2015 general elections, the establishment of the International Special Court (ISC) alongside the ICC and the national judicial jurisdictions. The political process is still under way with the recent Khartoum peace agreement.

I want to thank you, Chairwoman Bass and, Ranking Member Smith for the opportunity to testify once more today on peace keeping in a failed state such as Central African Republic. I ask that my written testimony be entered into the record.

In the persistent, shocking outbreak of violence against civilians and mass atrocity crimes, one might wonder about the MINUSCA protecting mission. The population is helpless and subject to a dire and distressing situation: rape, sexual violence, racketeering, hindrances to free movement of goods and people, taxes of various types, illegal property taxes, arbitrary arrests, kidnapping,

torture, summary or extrajudicial executions, conquest of new localities, and arson of displaced camps¹. Among recent cases, one might mention the attack against and arson in the IDP camps in Batangafo and Alindao respectively on October 30th, 2018 and on November 15th, 2018. In both cases, the attacks followed almost the same modus operandi and the outcome was disastrous for the population. The attacks caused the loss of human lives (about 15 in Batangafo and over 100 in Alindao), greater insecurity, and a lot of people forced to find refuge in the bush or elsewhere (32,287 people in Batangafo as well as 26,000 in Alindao were affected). Attackers burned down homes including the parish house of Batangafo and most of the Alindao diocesan infrastructure comprising of the cathedral parish house, and the attacks against the bishop's residence and the cathedral.

The most frustrating aspect of all is that the Government and the MINUSCA forces took no preventive measures despite the prior alert given by religious leaders. One was rather struck by a bitter feeling of hypocrisy when civil authorities waited till the worst was done before coming out with sensational statements according to which proper investigations will be carried out and adequate actions taken. Repeatedly it is almost the same story. Such tragedies occurred nationwide at Fatima and PK5 in Bangui, Kaga-Bandoro, Bambari, Ippy, Kembe, Bangassou, Batangafo and Alindao.

From all indications, MINUSCA has shown weaknesses pertaining to civilians' protection, humanitarian safeguards, security access, and strict accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Yet it is reluctant to admit and correct its poor performance in protecting civilians.

'In a context of strong interfaith animosity, as in Alindao, the United Nations peacekeeping force should have taken significant steps to fulfill its mandate to protect the lives of civilians. One can really wonder if it did so in Alindao. MINUSCA told Amnesty International that it would have been impossible for the peacekeepers, to contain the violence because of their small numbers and the scale of the attack. However, one wonders if these soldiers, who were fully equipped with armored vehicles and heavier weapons, were really unable to take defensive positions that might have deterred the attackers, especially if they had carried out warning fire. In addition, it is unclear why reinforcements were not sent immediately to retaliate, as the attackers were able to ransack the area for hours. According to MINUSCA, there was not enough time. However, reinforcements could have been urgently deployed from nearby stations, such as PK35. Finally, it is of particular concern that peacekeepers have been negligent in supervising the security of the site in the months leading up to the attack, endangering the civilian population by increasing the risk of attack'².

Without throwing stones at MINUSCA and its entire mission, the Catholic Bishops' Conference in Central African Republic was critical in its January 2019 message. While acknowledging the good work and the professionalism of some of the UN Peacekeeping contingents in protecting civilians, the Bishops bemoaned, most especially, the behavior and the duplicity of the Moroccan, Mauritanian and Pakistani contingents as if they were taking some advantage from the situation³. Those contingents are widely accused of inappropriate cooperation and unlawful conduct with the ex-Seleka armed groups such as taking them along in MINUSCA armored vehicles during patrols or attacks, providing them with uniforms and ammunition. These allegations were substantiated during the Mission evaluation from November 12th to 16th, 2018. In my capacity as Bishop of Bossangoa and Chairperson of the Prefecture Committee for Social

CECA, *Message de la Conférence Episcopale Centrafricaine*, Bangui, 13 janvier 2019, p. 2.

Amnesty International, *Tout était en feu' Attaque contre un camp de déplacés à Alindao*, novembre 2018, p. 5.

CECA, *Message de la Conférence Episcopale Centrafricaine*, Bangui, 13 janvier 2019, p. 1-2.

Cohesion I was associated with this evaluation conducted by the MINUSCA Joint Protection Team (JPT) following the attack on the IDPs in Batangafo. In another incident, the anti-balaka forces claimed to have been attacked jointly by the ex-Seleka and the Pakistani UN peacekeepers. As the anti-balaka forces pushed them back with grenade fire, the Pakistani troops lost some of their ammunition, which the anti-balaka presented to the JPT mission as evidence. A sample was handed over to the JPT leader for expert analysis.

Madame Chairwoman Bass and, Ranking Member Smith, I wish to end my testimony with the following observations as I appeal to the United States of America to stand by the wounded and suffering people of Central African Republic:

1. Often MINUSCA alleges the lack of capacity to explain its inadequate protection of the civil population. Furthermore, it claims that her mandate consists only in supporting the Government in its actions and orientation. For the Central African people in general, this ambiguous language is nothing but pure cynicism considering the fact that the national army is still under UN embargo and under-equipped. This unpopular measure is widely seen as unjust and the reason why the rebel groups can buy weapons openly and without constraint. The people need their army. We rely upon the United States Government and their partners to lift this UN Security Council embargo.
2. The confusion surrounding the delivery of arms by the Federation of Russia to Central African Republic despite the mandate of the United Nations does not help reduce insecurity in the country. It is unfortunate that super power nations are once again competing at the expense of poor countries such as CAR.
3. In 2017 and 2018 I initiated two local level peace agreements between armed groups, which alleviated the sufferings of the population. Such successes need to be replicated and consolidated. I look forward to the financial support of the United States Government in that vital area. I just came back from an evaluation mission in the area. After the May 3rd, 2018 peace agreement signed in Markounda, 25,000 people who spent over one year in the Catholic Church sponsored IDP camp returned home. They have begun a new life. I am amazingly surprised with the impact that the small grant had on 160 persons gathered in 18 groups in an effort to consolidate the peace agreement.
4. We cannot speak of sustainable peace without looking squarely into the root causes of poverty and misery. The Catholic Church, through her social pastoral mission, is tackling those causes as she formulates projects in education, technical and professional training, healthcare, and human development. Could the Catholic Church rely upon the support of the United States Government in that direction and build a meaningful partnership?

Thank you for your kind attention. May God bless you and the United States of America.

Most Reverend Dr. Nestor Désiré NONGO AZIAGBIA
Bishop of Bossangoa
Chairperson of the Episcopal Conference of the Central African Republic

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. You may recall that Bishop Nongo testified before the subcommittee in 2013 in one of our two hearings of this subcommittee on the crisis in CAR.

In his statement submitted for this hearing with his unusual—his usual, I should say, frankness, Bishop Nongo identifies the CAR as a failed State and one where MINUSCA, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Civilian Mission in the Central African Republic, could only play a critical role in helping stabilize.

Yes, he says one is forced—and I quote him here—to wonder about MINUSCA’s protecting mission. He recalls shocking incidents where neither the government nor MINUSCA forces took any action whatsoever despite the prior alert given by religious leaders.

His assessment is that “MINUSCA has shown weakness pertaining to civilians’ protection, humanitarian safeguards, security access and strict accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,” closed quote.

In particular—and this is important—he calls out the Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Pakistani contingents for what he calls inappropriate cooperation and unlawful conduct with ex-Seleka groups—armed groups—who plunged CAR into the crisis back in 2012 and 2013.

Such cooperation is including taking former Seleka members on patrol and with them in armored vehicles as well as providing uniforms and ammunition.

This raises serious questions about the efficacy of U.N. peacekeeping operations, at least as far as the CAR goes.

Another written statement which we have received I also ask be included in the record is from Mike Jobbins in Search for Common Ground who addresses the failure of peacekeepers to protect and what that does to undermine the trust which needs to be there among the civilian community.

He says, and I quote, “When civilians are killed and peacekeepers are viewed as neglecting their duty, the host country loses faith in that mission in acting in their best interests and resists their presence. Ambiguity is about the role of U.N. missions when they will or will not use force and encourages public resentment and undermines the degree to which they pose a credible threat to armed forces.”

Another witness, Peter Gallo, who will be testifying today, has also previously testified before this subcommittee, has been a courageous voice in exposing sexual exploitation and abuse conducted in connection with U.N. peacekeeping missions.

We need absolute zero tolerance when it comes to that exploitation.

I look forward to this hearing—his assessment and that of the others who are testifying today, and I anticipate that a mixed record when it comes to sexual abuse and exploitation which needs to be further addressed. Zero tolerance ought to be zero tolerance.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much.

I would now like to introduce our panel. Victoria Holt is a managing director at the Henry Stimson Center and an adjunct professor at Columbia University. Her expertise includes international

security and multilateral tools, peace operations, and conflict prevention.

Previously, she served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for State for International Security in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs from '09 to 2017. In that role, she was responsible for policy and guidance for U.S. actions in the Security Council and oversaw offices handling peace operations, sanctions, counterterrorism, and U.N. political affairs.

She led development of U.S. diplomatic initiatives including the 2015 Leaders' Summit on U.N. Peacekeeping hosted by President Obama to increase capacities for U.N. operations and she previously worked on Capitol Hill on defense and foreign affairs.

Ms. Das serves as the director of peacekeeping policy at the Better World Campaign. She is a resident expert on U.N. peacekeeping operations and educates Congress and the administration on the value of peacekeeping as an effective part of the U.S. national security toolbox.

She spearheads thought leadership and authors policy papers and field reports on U.N. peacekeeping. She also served as a special advisor for the U.N. High Level Panel on humanitarian financing and providing an American perspective to the panel and her expertise on conflict resolution.

Previously, Ms. Das worked at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Thank you for joining us.

Paul Williams is an associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University where he is also associate director of the security policy studies.

Dr. Williams received his Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Wales. His research focuses on the politics of contemporary peace operations and the dynamics of war and peace in Africa. He previously worked at the Universities of Warwick and Birmingham in the U.K.

He has been a visiting scholar at Georgetown University and the University of Queensland, a visiting professor at Addis Ababa University and a fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Mr. Gallo is a qualified lawyer—glad you are not an unqualified lawyer—admitted to practice in Scotland, Hong Kong, and New York. He has an MBA and an LL.M. in international criminal law.

He spent 19 years as an investigator based in Hong Kong working on investigations in some of the most corrupt countries in Asia and was a leading authority on the identification and detection of money laundering.

In 2011, he was recruited by the U.N. as an investigator in the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigations division in New York, the office that is supposed to investigate corruption, fraud, and other criminality in the organization.

After his insights and personal experience there, he became an outspoken critic of the United Nations, particularly about the manner in which corruption is covered up.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today and I would like to ask you to summarize your written testimony, and we do not have a clock that you can all see but I have a stopwatch here. So everyone will have 5 minutes and then we will begin a round of Q&A.

Ms. HOLT.

**STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

Ms. HOLT. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a genuine pleasure to be here. Thank you very much, and I thank you for the interest in this topic.

It is one this committee has had a long history on, both the nature of peacekeeping, the link to U.S. interests, and the constant interest and demand for reform and modernization.

I have served in many roles. I have been a researcher, I have been policymaker, and I most recently was a diplomat at the Department of State.

So my comments really today come from that experience of seeing missions up close and the ongoing desire to reduce the gap between the aspirations of a Security Council resolution and actually delivering in the field.

We will never be done, but I will say this moment is a really awesome chance to move reforms forward; I have much in my comments about that.

You know the basics. The U.S. is a permanent member of the Security Council, which is focused on threats to international peace and security. Peace operations are probably the best known thing that the U.N. does.

We have over a 100,000 civilians, military, and police in the field today in 14 missions, often in remote and fragile States.

Over 120 countries contribute to these. Those numbers are huge. I will also note the U.S. provides about 40 of these total officers. So it is really an opportunity where you see a form of burden sharing. We are the largest financial contributor.

It also is a direct interest to the United States that peacekeeping is successful. It avails with stability and conflict prevention. It addresses countries that are under threat of violence and extremism and it also supports goals of democracy and rule of law.

It also supports our values. It promotes human rights and tries to address humanitarian crises, migration and refugee flows, and in places like Liberia stepped in to also try and prevent the expansion of the Ebola crisis in that country. So both for security interests and our values, we value the U.N.

I saw this up front when I was in State. Today, Co-te d'Ivoire is a successful West African country with the highest growth rate in the region. We soon forget that in 2010-2011 it almost went into civil war when that election resulted in two people believing they were president.

The small U.N. mission there quickly bunkered down, provided the election outcome and validated it, and stood firm as the political process moved forward. War was averted.

Likewise, on the values side, we have seen in South Sudan when that new country was ushered forward as the first country in the last 10 years, a small mission—a large mission was deployed to support peace building.

But in December 2013 things changed. Civil conflict broke out and people fled to the U.N.'s compounds. They opened the door. In the town of Bor, for example, a few months later an American named Ken happened to be the civilian in charge of that compound. A military crew of 80 showed up with one of the government ministers and demanded to go in. They intended to attack the civilians there. He turned around and said, "Close the door." He was unarmed. He was trained as a New York Police cop. He did the right thing. He saved lives that day and he risked his own to do so.

So I think these kinds of examples are really important to us. Whether it is in Mali and Central African Republic, what we see in Somalia or Congo, every one of these missions has details of real people in the field.

But reform is hugely needed and this is what I want to get to. Supporting political processes and solutions, governments need to abide by the agreements they make when they invite the missions in.

We, as diplomats, you, as leaders, can help reinforce those political agreements and if they are not working, ask why. Protection of civilians on the ground as well as from any bad behavior by the peacekeepers remains a top priority. Ninety-five percent of peacekeepers today serve under those mandates. And then gaps in capacity—the lack of medical health or being able to fly where you need to, French-speaking police officers who are women—it is wide. It is getting better.

The U.S. has been a leader on the reform and modernization. There has been a series of Presidential summits kicked off by the U.S. and led by other countries, high-level reviews, and now ongoing series of resolutions through the Security Council including on performance and accountability—ones that this committee had paid attention to.

So what is our challenge? We need that continued U.S. leadership and we need it strong, and we have a bit of a challenge. There is a financial crunch coming at the U.N.

The secretary general has just issued a very thick report. He is worried that most of the missions do not even have 3 months to keep their budgets operating. We have also seen troop-contributing and police-contributing countries not get reimbursed for their performance in the field, not because they did not do well but because there is not enough money.

So the U.S. Congress could help with this. We could pay our full assessment which is, roughly, 28 percent of the budget. We could pay back the arrears and lift the congressional cap, the most during both the Bush and Obama Administrations was lifted by Congress. If you want us to get to 25 percent, let us put the State Department on notice. Let us ask why they failed at the negotiations last year and let us start now with a national push to get that done.

But let us not accrue arrears in the short run. That helps nobody. It does not get our reforms and it gives every country that opposes us a talking point. I saw this in the earlier negotiations that Ambassador Holbrooke and, Congressman Smith, you were involved in.

So, finally, the U.N. needs our leadership. We are often the best at assessing and criticizing as well as being practical and inspiring to these missions. I urge you to go to the field and see them yourself.

Myself and my colleagues would be more than happy to help set that up and work with your teams on this, and let us also put some more diplomats in New York. They are shorthanded with only two of the five posts in New York there and working on the Security Council to be able to give voice and vote and enthusiasm to the modernization and reform we need.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]

Testimony of Victoria K. Holt

Managing Director
Henry L. Stimson Center

Hearing on “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa”
U.S. House of Representatives
House Foreign Affairs Committees
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations

April 30, 2019

Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify on United Nations peacekeeping in Africa. Your leadership on this issue is critical for the United States. I am a Managing Director at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington-based nonpartisan international security think tank. From 2009-2017, I served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the International Organization Affairs Bureau, which included responsibility for policies on United Nations peace operations.

For this testimony, I am drawing on my 25 years working as a diplomat, researcher, and policymaker involved in improving United Nations peace operations, both from inside and outside of the U.S. government. I first visited peacekeeping missions in the mid-1990s, in Haiti and the Balkans, places where the United States supported deploying UN peacekeepers after U.S. military and political interventions. Over the last decade, I have visited UN peace operations in Africa, including in Mali, Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo multiple times. Many of these operations also deployed after military interventions (primarily by African and French forces), and all were supported by the United States.

Having travelled both as a researcher and as a U.S. diplomat with responsibility for these issues, I am keenly aware of the gap between the peacekeeping debates that happen in New York and in capitals, and the reality in the field for the thousands of civilian, police, and military personnel working to implement UN mandates. Understanding both worlds is the basis of good policy. I know members of this Committee are committed to bridging that gap, including through today's discussion.

Today I offer observations on the role of United Nations operations in Africa, how they serve United States interests and values, the current momentum behind UN modernization and reform, and key issues that deserve the attention of this committee and Congress. I will also address how U.S. policies and funding positively influence missions and reforms, but highlight the negative impact of growing U.S. arrears for peacekeeping. Both issues deserve attention.

UN Peacekeeping in Africa

Overview. As this Committee knows, the core function of the UN Security Council is to address threats to international peace and security. Actions by the Security Council offer international credibility and legitimacy, as well as galvanize political and material resources. Peace operations, one of the Security Council's most visible and important tools, deploy to address conflicts and crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. The goals of peace operations are to increase stability, support political resolutions to conflicts, protect civilians, strengthen governance and the rule of law, and support human rights, among other objectives. These civilian-led operations tap a wide range of assets – including military and police contingents, engineers and medical hospitals, as well as civilian experts and diplomats – to operate in austere conditions with little infrastructure in fragile states. Missions are reliant on capacities provided by member states, which are reimbursed for their participation.

Today, roughly 100,000 uniformed and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries are deployed to United Nations-led peace operations.¹ Most UN peacekeepers serve in Africa, including in: Mali, the Central African Republic, Western Sahara, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), Abyei, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Security Council has increasingly given peacekeepers authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use force to carry out their mandates. The United States deploys diplomatic and military personnel worldwide, but few to UN missions (roughly 40 personnel).² UN missions are estimated as much less expensive than an equivalent United States-led operation.³

The United Nations also supports political operations in Somalia, Libya, and Guinea-Bissau; regional offices in Central Africa, the African Union, and West Africa/the Sahel; and special envoys for the Great Lakes, Sudan and South Sudan, and Western Sahara. These political and peacebuilding efforts aim to strengthen security and uphold peace agreements. UN expert teams monitor targeted sanctions regimes and counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, Libya, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many peacekeeping missions work alongside these political UN actors, as well as UN humanitarian and development agencies, to reinforce each other's work, share capacities, and coordinate activities. In South Sudan, the UN peacekeeping operation provides physical protection to roughly 180,000 civilians in their compounds, while humanitarians provide the

¹ Countries providing their uniformed personnel for peacekeeping missions are reimbursed at a standard rate of \$1,428 per soldier per month as of July 1, 2018. As of March 31, 2019, there are 88,477 uniformed personnel and 122 countries contributing uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>).

² As of March 31, 2019, the United States is reported as contributing 40 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>).

³ In 2018, for example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) compared the UN mission in Central African Republic with a hypothetical U.S. operation, and estimated it would have cost twice as much for a comparable U.S. operation. They also found that while U.S. would have greater military capability, the UN brought greater international acceptance. *UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation*, GAO-18-243; Feb 6, 2018. (<https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-243>).

civilians with basic services such as food and education – a measure the mission took after conflict broke out in December 2013 to save lives.⁴

Why peacekeeping supports U.S. interests. During my service for the Department of State, I saw firsthand the U.S. government's reliance on UN peacekeeping missions to support U.S. national and strategic interests, especially in Africa. The United States has long-standing policies to work with African nations to strengthen governance and security, promote trade and economic prosperity, prevent violent extremism and conflict, increase development, and address humanitarian crises and human rights abuses. Our bilateral skills and tools are immense; yet working with other nations and through regional and international organizations enables us to have greater impact.

That is where peacekeeping missions come in, and contribute substantially to U.S. national and strategic interests, especially in Africa. These missions promote regional stability and security, prevent the spread of violence and extremism, and contribute to atrocity prevention. Missions help democratic governance in a region of the world that represents some of the most promising potential for the future of democracy. They promote the establishment of rule of law, which allows more U.S. investors to invest in the region's vast natural wealth and human capital. Finally, they respond to some of the world's most devastating humanitarian crises and help to curb refugee flows, displacement, migration, and further conflict. Peacekeeping missions also robustly support core U.S. values. They protect civilians caught in crossfire or targeted in conflicts. Missions promote participatory governance and strong civic engagement. They protect help human rights and promote accountability. They work toward preventing harm to children, preventing sexual violence, and achieving equal rights for all people.

Examples of Real Impact. From a U.S. government perspective, I saw peacekeeping deliver real and credible results in supporting stability, preventing wider conflict, and upholding U.S. interests and values. During the electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010-2011, for example, the country nearly turned to civil conflict. After the leading candidates for president disputed the election's outcome in late 2010, the peacekeeping mission there played a key, urgent role in validating the election results. The UN mission then offered protection to both sides, despite threats from forces loyal to the prior president, and provided a steadying presence as the crisis was addressed by political pressure, backed by the United States and international community. By May 2011, that brave effort enabled the rightfully elected leader to be sworn in and for democracy to take root. Today, the peacekeepers have returned home and Côte d'Ivoire is secure, prospering with nine percent economic growth, and the president is in his second term.

In 2012, as separatist armed groups and violent extremists threatened Mali and the Sahel, the Malian government faced a coup from within its own military ranks, leaving the country in disarray. The

⁴ According to the UN Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, 181,891 civilians were seeking safety in six Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites located on UNMISS bases as of March 14, 2019. (https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2019-03-19_-_poc_population_update.pdf).

U.S. and other countries supported French and African-led military interventions to prevent the state's collapse and reverse the spread of violent extremist groups. Shortly thereafter, recognizing the longer-term political, security and humanitarian consequences, the United States supported a new UN peacekeeping mission to help stem further instability, bring armed groups to the negotiating table, and implement the peace agreement. Despite unbelievable logistical challenges and direct threats to UN personnel, the UN organized and deployed a new mission that garnered forces from Africa, Europe, and Asia. That mission, MINUSMA, operates today, continuing to navigate tough political and security challenges.

UN peacekeepers have demonstrated flexibility to meet new challenges in dynamic post-conflict environments. They have offered protection to civilians caught in violence and support to those trying to bring peace, even when they originally deployed to support other aims such as promoting governance and the rule of law. The United Nations assisted as South Sudan established itself as a newly independent nation in 2011, for example, providing peacekeepers to help support the young country. That role shifted dramatically after civil war broke out in December 2013, and the UN mission opened up its compounds to protect thousands of fleeing civilians, often coming under attack for doing so, including from government forces. Today, the mission, UNMISS, continues to provide vital aid and shelter to the displaced and war-affected population while supporting efforts to bring about a lasting political resolution to the conflict.

There are many other examples. When sectarian violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) threatened to escalate into ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities in 2013, the UN again stepped in to set up a new mission to halt such extreme violence, alongside African and French forces, backed by the United States. In a country facing extremists on its borders, near state collapse, and a humanitarian crisis that affected nearly the whole population, the UN mission, MINUSCA, helped re-establish stability, support the election of a new government, and halt atrocities. Likewise, UN troops stepped in to keep the disputed territory of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan from becoming a flash point. That mission, UNISFA, continues to play a useful role in preventing violence.

Other missions achieved their goals and departed, such as in Sierra Leone, where peace is stabilized, and former militia have disarmed and no longer threaten to amputate the limbs of civilians. Instead, Sierra Leone today provides UN peacekeepers to *other nations*. In Liberia, the UN has also completed its mission after helping that nation move from a devastating conflict – and an outbreak of Ebola – to a country where justice and security institutions are rebuilt, people have returned home, and peaceful democratic elections have elected new leaders.

Challenges for Peacekeeping. While this record is impressive, peacekeeping missions face serious challenges. Fundamentally, missions need to have the capacity to deliver on their mandates and to perform as required. Many areas deserve attention, but I will highlight four challenges that peace

operations often face: the erosion of weak political agreements, the inconsistent ability to protect civilians, weak consent by host nations and local parties, and critical capacity gaps.

A central goal of UN peace operations is to support political solutions and processes. Efforts to intervene in complex conflict environments and support peace – even with the best-designed peace agreement – can face reversals in the field. Weak or ineffectual peace agreements can undermine the ability of these missions to succeed. In countries like Mali, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Western Sahara, parties to the conflict have signed peace agreements that they lack the capacity or intention to implement in good faith. These political agreements need reinforcement and diplomatic strengthening from the international community, even after peacekeeping missions deploy, to complement the missions' efforts.

A second major challenge is protecting civilians from violence. The lessons of earlier mission failures led the Security Council to emphasize more robust, multidimensional mandates, with clear direction to protect civilians under threat. Indeed, 95 percent of peacekeepers today are mandated to protect civilians – a role that involves anticipating and preventing physical violence, including atrocities, as well as efforts to create a more secure environment and support local capacity to ensure protection once the mission leaves. Challenges include inadequate consideration of threats to civilians in the analysis and planning of the mission, lack of political will or caveats on contingents that restrain peacekeeper response, insufficient links between early warning and early action, and restrictions by host governments on the mission's actions to protect. UN practices and leadership must also uphold the highest standards and prevent harm to others, including sexual exploitation and abuse.

Missions continue to face issues regarding host state consent and cooperation. Although the Security Council obtains the consent of a host state before deploying a peacekeeping mission, that consent does not always translate to full cooperation in the field. Host governments may obstruct peacekeepers from carrying out specific activities to which the government is opposed, or may decide that they do not share the same vision for the country outlined in the peace process that the mission is mandated to support. In some cases, governments may deliberately attack their own populations, putting them in direct confrontation with peacekeepers mandated to protect civilians. Governments in Darfur and in South Sudan have restricted peacekeepers' access and ability to move around the country, for example, and have deliberately delayed critical materials and equipment for the mission. These restrictions severely inhibit the ability of missions to deliver on their mandates and protect the most vulnerable people. Moreover, without host state cooperation, peacekeepers are unable to help build local capacity for the government to provide security and maintain the rule of law, leaving missions without an exit strategy.

Finally, gaps in the capacity of a mission can undercut its function and success. Traditionally missions need aviation assets, medical personnel and hospitals, and engineers and logistics capacities, which can be in short supply. In the past, sufficient numbers of female military and police officers were a challenge, as was medical and casualty evacuation. Some needs depend on the mission. Today

more UN peacekeepers operate in complex, high-risk environments, for example, and have experienced increased hostile attacks, such as deliberate attacks against UN peacekeepers by violent extremist groups in Mali. Without the right equipment or counter-IED training and awareness, peacekeepers are at a disadvantage, cannot protect themselves and often are restricted in their ability to access vulnerable populations and unstable areas.

The U.S. and other members of the international community that support peacekeeping missions need to make sure that missions are better prepared and equipped to protect civilians from violent parties; address gaps in equipment and capabilities; use carrots and sticks to ensure that host governments abide by their commitments to support peacekeeping missions; and make sure that political agreements that need diplomatic reinforcement receive it.

Momentum with Reform Initiatives for Peacekeeping. In recognition of these challenges, the United States has supported a series of high-level reviews and meetings to identify central and emerging issues, including the report of the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and 2017 Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (Santos Cruz report). In 2014, the United States kicked off and led a series of high-level member state-hosted summits, and in 2015, hosted a Presidential Summit on Peacekeeping, which required countries to pledge new capacities for peacekeeping missions. This Summit included five regionally led conferences in advance – led by the Netherlands, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Uruguay and Rwanda – that helped garnered pledges. By 2016, when the United Kingdom hosted a summit, more than 50,000 additional troops, police, and key enabling capacities were pledged. The effort continued in 2017, when Canada hosted a defense ministerial on peacekeeping, followed by a ministerial in New York led by the United Nations in March 2019. These efforts succeeded in creating a new pool of capacities to match mission requirements, including a push for rapid deployment; improved operational readiness, planning, threat assessment and force generation; and specialized capabilities, among other goals.

The United States has called directly for a greater emphasis on performance and accountability. Efforts to halt and end impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), for example, have helped change the way the UN and member states operate, an issue rightly championed by this Committee and members of Congress.⁵ In 2018, countries identified priorities to support peacekeeping and embraced the Secretary-General's recent roadmap Action for Peacekeeping (A4P). These reform initiatives, backed by the United States, have produced more capacity, data, and accountability. In the September 2018, the Security Council approved Resolution 2436, led by the United States, calling on the UN Secretary-General to ensure that UN missions have capable and accountable leadership, and that missions report on actions to improve mission performance and accountability.

⁵ This included the U.S. marshaling support for UN Security Council resolution 2272 on strengthening prevention and accountability regarding SEA.

The United States has played a critical leadership role in supporting reform and modernization, calling for more nations to offer capacity, pressing to protect civilians, engaging in diplomatic efforts to broker and uphold peace agreements and prevent conflicts, and demanding accountability and performance to match the goals of mandates.

Today, that U.S. diplomatic role is still needed: to continue support for implementing the reforms underway; to bolster the efforts of the Secretary-General; to work with troop and police-contributing countries; to engage with missions and to assist host nations. The alternative is worrisome. Important initiatives could be sidelined or lose their impact. In short, the U.S. should press for peace operations to be fit for purpose.⁶

U.S. Policy and Funding for Peacekeeping: A Growing Mismatch?

Overview. With a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the United States has substantial influence on the design and review of peacekeeping missions. Often holding the pen on resolutions, we are directly involved in drafting and negotiating UN peacekeeping mandates, as well as participating in regular briefings in the Council with leaders on peacekeeping missions. Bilaterally, the United States provides high-quality training programs, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), launched in 2004. GPOI supports capacity-building and operational readiness for partner nations deploying to peace operations. A wide range of U.S. diplomatic, military and humanitarian assistance has supported the deployment and sustainment of African-led missions in Darfur, Burundi, CAR, and Mali, which then transitioned to UN-led missions. The U.S. has provided expertise in counter-terrorism techniques in the Sahel; assisted with accountability mechanisms for human rights abuse in eastern DRC; and supplied humanitarian relief in South Sudan, just to name a few areas. The United States also has championed consultations with leading troop and police contributing countries and hosted high-level exchanges; participated in war-gaming and simulations; led regional military exercises; trained police for peacekeeping missions; supported senior leadership training; and developed guidance and doctrine for peace operations, among other efforts.

These national efforts, along with the American ability to assess candidly what works, and what does not work, have given the United States robust influence. UN leaders, allied countries and those who serve in these missions respect the U.S. role, and find some inspiration in our support for mission success. Thanks to U.S. engagement, we have bolstered UN leaders in the field, pressed the international community to support missions in resolving conflicts, and urged host nations to do more to protect civilians. That U.S. approach – idealistic and practical, simultaneously can-do and critical – produces results.

⁶ A recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) cited areas deserving added attention from the State Department. See, GAO, “UN Peace Operations, State Should Take Additional Steps to Work with the UN to Improve Effectiveness and Performance Information,” GAO-19-224, March 2019. (<https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697655.pdf>).

U.S. Funding for UN missions. UN peacekeeping missions are funded by assessed contributions from member states. The assessments rates are set as a percentage of the cost for each peacekeeping operation approved by the Security Council. The United States is the top financial contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and is currently assessed at 27.88 percent of the budget.⁷ As this Committee knows, Congress is requested by the Administration to authorize and appropriate this funding through the State Department's *Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities* (CIPA) account, for peacekeeping, which "promotes the peaceful resolution of conflict."⁸ That is the main way that UN peacekeeping missions are financed. The United States is assessed over the course of the year for individual missions, and payments are expected to be made within 30 days.

Today, arrears and delayed payments to the United Nations and for peacekeeping missions are growing more severe and impacting cash flow. In March, the UN Secretary-General took the unusual step of issuing a thick report on the financial situation of the United Nations, and urged new measures and authorities to address the shortage of funding for current UN missions. He identified multiple problems for UN missions, including the lack of cash available for active peacekeeping operations and the decision of "one Member State to contribute at a level approximately 3 per cent below its applicable rate of assessment," a polite reference to the United States.⁹ Only two missions had a "minimum cash reserve of three months of operating costs," he reported.¹⁰ This gap resulted in a paradox, namely, that the United Nations is now "effectively borrowing for prolonged periods from troop- and police-contributing countries. Many of them are low-income countries for which that imposes a significant financial burden."¹¹ Further, the delay in reimbursing troop and police contributing countries exposes them to financial hardship and impacts their ability to serve effectively.

The United States' current financial approach to peacekeeping is to seek cuts in mission budgets; to pay at a rate that is less than the U.S. assessment for missions; and to ask Congress for an amount that is less than necessary even at the 25 percent level. Together, this has contributed to a funding shortfall for missions, hazards U.S. priorities for missions and reforms and could reduce U.S. credibility with other member states. Congress should address these financial and policy problems, realigning U.S. interests and actions.

First, Congress should authorize and appropriate FY2020 funding that meets U.S. requirements to pay our bills in full, and urge the Administration to align their budget request for UN peacekeeping with the actual budget requirements. Starting with the fiscal year 2018 (FY2018) budget, and again for fiscal years 2019 and 2020, the Administration requested

⁷ The UN assessment rates were renegotiated in 2018. The U.S. rate shifted slightly from 28.43 percent to 27.88 percent, the rate the United States will be assessed for the next three years. The next negotiations are in 2021.

⁸ "Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities," *Congressional Budget Justification*, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. (www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2020_CBJ.pdf).

⁹ A/73/809, "Improving the financial situation of the United Nations," Report of the Secretary-General, March 26, 2019.

¹⁰ Ibid. A/73/809.

¹¹ Ibid. A/73/809.

annual CIPA funding far below the anticipated U.S. budget obligations. While Congress has mostly restored the funding level to meet current U.S. current assessments, the Administration is again proposing funding levels for FY2020 associated with an assessment rate of 16 percent, not the nearly 28 percent at which we are assessed. For FY2020, the Administration is asking Congress for \$1.1 billion for peacekeeping assessment yet \$1.4 - \$1.5 billion is estimated as the needed amount for the U.S. share of peacekeeping assessments.

There is no clear public explanation from the Administration, including OMB, of how that number was determined or how it will impact missions in the field. The State Department has not presented a strategy to justify the request or how it achieves stated U.S. goals. Despite calls for reform of peacekeeping, the Administration is proposing to Congress that the United States not meet its obligations to pay our dues in full and on time. In turn, that shortchanges the missions and puts the burden on the countries that contribute personnel and equipment, and undercuts our standing with other nations.

Second, Congress should lift the cap on the U.S. paying more than 25 percent of the peacekeeping budget and prevent further arrears, as it has before. Even when the U.S. supports a peacekeeping mission, the Congressional cap forces the United States to pay less than our UN assessment – now, roughly three percent less – regardless of the overall mission budget. The result is increasing arrears by the United States to UN peace operations with no positive impact. The growing U.S. peacekeeping arrears – funding commitments that are more than a year overdue – stand at roughly \$750 million today.

In late 2018, the Administration participated in negotiations at the United Nations regarding the assessment rate. U.S. Ambassador Haley had committed to a goal of negotiating a 25 percent assessment rate, as favored by Congress. Yet the U.S. failed to lead a strong diplomatic campaign in advance, and did not win support from other nations to reduce the U.S. share. Those U.S. arrears are expected to approach \$1 billion by the end of this year. That level of arrears will be difficult to resolve. Such unilateral withholdings undermine our credibility, undercut United States efforts to achieve peace and security, and sideline improving peacekeeping effectiveness and reform.

Congress should request a full briefing from the administration on why their rate negotiation strategy failed to get to 25 percent, direct that the Administration assess its options in advance of the next negotiations in 2021, and ask for their plans for those negotiations to start now. In the meantime, Congress should lift the cap, as it did during most of the Bush and Obama administrations, to prevent further accumulation of arrears, and to increase the U.S. ability to realign the U.S. share in 2021. The U.S. should pay its dues in full, without limitations and on time, which is also the best position for future negotiations.

Third, the United States needs to bolster its leadership in support of peacekeeping missions and for reform initiatives – rather than cede that role. The Administration's stated goal of

pressing for “effective and efficient operations”¹² to “resolve conflicts” is falling short, undercut by its lack of senior diplomats serving in key positions. In New York, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations is awaiting a new Permanent Representative, and operating with only two of its five ambassadorial positions filled. As a result, our diplomats are short-handed, including at the Security Council, the premier venue for addressing international security. The U.S. has reportedly reduced the number of military officers in New York who advise the Mission and liaise with the Department of Defense from seven to two officers, which impacts the U.S. ability to engage with the military side of UN missions and promote reform. The Administration is also dismantling the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, a valuable interagency and joint organization at the Army War College, founded 25 years ago to support and lead on trainings, lessons learned and professional education for such complex operations.

This reduced financial and diplomatic posture has diminished the U.S. role in support to peacekeeping reform and objectives. Some have expressed concern that the UN is unwilling to send home contingents in peacekeeping missions that do not perform well, for example; usually the U.S. would work to press for taking such action. The United States also faces competition for a leadership role on peace operations from countries that may not embrace the same values or approach. China’s influence has grown, for example, now that it deploys roughly 2,500 peacekeepers in UN missions, is the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping (recently increasing from 10 to 15 percent assessed share of the peacekeeping budget), and has expanded its training capacities for international peacekeeping.

Conclusion. Over the last two decades, the United States has played a prominent and substantive role in peacekeeping operations and policies in Africa, as well as advocated for modernization and reforms. The reasons for U.S. engagement are many, as noted earlier: support for stability and security; as a bulwark against terrorism and as a means to prevent and counter violent extremism; as a basis for reducing refugee flows and displacements; and as a tool to constrain illegal trafficking and violators of sanctions. Missions also bolster positive U.S. goals, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights, prevention of atrocities and reoccurring cycles of violence, support to legitimate governance and regional stability, and strengthening the rule of law. In short, peace operations seek to uphold objectives and values that are deeply American, even as they are primarily carried out and funded by other nations.

Yet there is a clear mismatch between the Administration’s laudable ambition to strengthen peacekeeping missions, increase accountability and performance, support political solutions, and protect civilians – and the adverse posture toward paying the U.S. share of our assessments. Growing U.S. peacekeeping arrears, especially as it heads toward \$1 billion, has strategic implications

¹² Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the The Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy, Heritage Foundation, December 13, 2018. (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/>).

for the United States and its efforts to achieve greater peace and security internationally, as well as support peacekeeping effectiveness and reform.

Congress can address this problem and align U.S. objectives and policies.

I urge all Members here to visit peacekeeping missions themselves, to bridge the gap between debates in capitals and what happens in the field. Peacekeeping missions and leaders, and the nations and civilians who seek the support of these operations, will welcome and benefit from your engagement and diplomatic support. Rather than have a U.S. absence from the policy arena, I hope Congress and the leadership of this committee can play an important role in oversight of current U.S. programs and policies, as well as in reversing trends that undermine U.S. interests. This is of both moral and strategic importance to the United States and the region.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, and I would just say before I go on to the next guest, you know, for my colleagues who are new on the committee, an opportunity to go visit peacekeeping I think should be high on your agenda and we can make sure that happens.

Ms. DAS.

**STATEMENT OF CHANDRIMA DAS, PEACEKEEPING POLICY
DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION**

Ms. DAS. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to testify about the value of United Nations Peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

Having travelled to six U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa over the last 5 years, I believe continued U.S. financial support for these operations is an investment worthy of American taxpayer dollars.

U.N. peacekeepers serve 100 million people aiming to create stability in fragile States. Each mission is tasked with varying responsibilities authorized by the U.N. Security Council.

Some missions serve as buffers between two parties. Other missions are more complex and are tasked with protecting civilians, monitoring human rights, facilitating delivery of aid, training security sector, and building the capacity of government institutions and providing electoral assistance.

They do this at a relatively modest cost. The U.N. peacekeeping budget covers more than 100,000 personnel deployed at 14 missions, which half are in Africa.

The total cost of U.N. peacekeeping is \$7 billion a year of which the U.S. is assessed for \$1.8 billion. For comparison's sake, this is 1 percent of the U.S. military spending.

According to the report released by the GAO last year, it is eight times less expensive for the U.S. to financially support U.N. peacekeeping missions than to deploy U.S. forces alone.

Last year, I travelled to Mali, home to the third largest U.N. peacekeeping mission in the world. After a military coup in 2012, well-armed radical Islamist groups linked to al-Qaida took over large sections of the country. These extremists imposed Sharia law, carrying out stonings and amputations as punishment.

In Timbuktu, once a famous center of trade and learning, extremists destroyed the historic town's library and mausoleums, antiquities now lost to the world forever.

After French forces intervened at the request of the Malian government, U.N. peacekeepers were tasked with stabilizing the country. Sixteen thousand peacekeepers covered an area so vast it is equivalent to the territory from New York to Florida.

However, terrorist organizations linked to ISIS and al-Qaida continue to threaten and manipulate inter-ethnic disputes to their advantage.

Just yesterday, ISIS leader Baghdadi pledged allegiance to the "brothers" in Mali and Burkina Faso, highlighting the security challenges in the region. Recently, the conflict has shifted to the center of the country and last month 160 villagers—men, women and children—were massacred by extremists.

Despite these horrifying conditions, there are signs of hope. The presence of U.N. peacekeepers allow for U.N. agencies like the World Food Program to partner with 40 villages to grow their own food and make them less dependent on local militias.

I visited a farm supported by U.N. peacekeepers that provided food for families and gave youth an alternative opportunity to the extremist ideologies that surrounded them.

Also, I have witnessed the work of U.N. peacekeepers in Central African Republic. In 2014, it was the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the mission allowed the international community to live up to the promise of never again when it helped contain vicious sectarian violence between Christian and Muslim communities. Amnesty International reported that the U.N. mission saved many lives and prevented much bloodshed.

In South Sudan, where a civil war once raged, tens of thousands of civilians came to the U.N. compounds to seek shelter. The mission opened its doors serving large numbers of people who otherwise would have been directly targeted, and peacekeeping forces continue to protect nearly 200,000 people at six sites around the country.

I want to take a moment now to address some of the misconceptions—one, that peacekeeping missions last forever. They do not. In fact, the last 2 years peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire closed after peaceful democratic elections and this coming October the mission in Haiti is set to close.

And No. 2, the U.N. peacekeeping is incapable of change. U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has instituted a series of reforms backed by majority member States aimed at greater accountability, transparency, and clarity in peacekeeping.

In partnership with the U.S., the secretary general is working to modernize the U.N. None of this is possible, however, without full U.S. engagement and support. The U.S. is currently the biggest financial donor for U.N. peacekeeping paying 27.8 percent of the peacekeeping budget.

In December, this rate was lowered from 28.4 and was agreed to by the Trump administration. However, since the mid-1990's U.S. law has arbitrarily capped U.S. contributions at 25 percent.

As a result, the U.S. currently owes \$750 million in arrears, contributing to a cash crunch. This means that allies like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and India are not receiving full payment for the thousands of police and troop contributions of peacekeeping, in comparison to the U.S. that only contributes 40 peacekeepers.

Peacekeepers go where no one else will. They protect the world's most vulnerable in some of the world's most challenging places. We ask that Congress honor our financial obligations to U.N. peacekeeping and allow us to pay at our assessed rate. It not only serves American national security interests but it is the right thing to do.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Das follows:]

Ms. Chandrima G.R. Das
Director, Peacekeeping Policy
Better World Campaign
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations
UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa
April 30, 2019

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to testify about the value of United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Africa. I am Director of the Peacekeeping Policy at the Better World Campaign, an organization that was created to support strong, consistent, and constructive U.S. engagement with the United Nations. Having traveled to six UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa over the last five years to observe their work in the field, I would like to speak to you today about the importance of UN peacekeeping activities on the continent and why continued U.S. financial support for these operations is an investment worthy of American taxpayer dollars.

While not specifically referenced in the UN Charter—the treaty signed in San Francisco nearly 74 years ago that established the UN—peacekeeping operations have become one of the most visible and significant manifestations of the UN’s work around the world. These missions are a concrete embodiment of the core purpose of the organization, as elaborated in the Charter: “to maintain international peace and security” through “effective and collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” Deployed to some of the most dangerous and inhospitable environments in the world, blue helmets are tasked with a number of critical responsibilities by the UN Security Council, including but not limited to: promoting stability in countries torn apart by conflict; protecting civilians from violence; facilitating delivery of international humanitarian and development assistance to communities in need; training police forces and building the capacity of governing institutions; monitoring human rights violations; providing electoral assistance; and more.

They do all of this at a relatively modest cost: at just over \$7 billion this year (equivalent to approximately one percent of the annual U.S. defense budget), the UN’s peacekeeping budget covers more than 100,000 personnel deployed to 14 missions spanning four continents. According to a report released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in 2018, UN peacekeeping missions are eight times less expensive than deploying U.S. forces alone.

The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion in the size and scope of peacekeeping missions, a trend strongly supported by a succession of both Democratic and Republican Administrations. The reasons for this are manifold: countries undergoing conflict provide fertile ground for the growth of extremist groups and organized crime, threatening U.S. national security and economic interests. By undertaking a range of stabilization and protection measures, such as those described above, peacekeepers help avert the collapse of fragile states, prevent civil wars from metastasizing into full-blown regional conflicts, decrease the likelihood that dormant conflicts will flare up again, and create conditions on the ground that support peaceful transitions of power and allow for displaced civilians to return home.

Let me touch on what this looks like in the field. Last year, I traveled to Mali, a land-locked country in West Africa that currently hosts the third largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world. In March 2012, Mali was plunged into turmoil when its democratically elected president was overthrown in a military coup d’état. In the security vacuum that followed, secular Tuareg rebels, who have long accused the Malian state of marginalization and neglect and had mounted a rebellion against the government, seized control of the northern two-thirds of the country and declared an independent Tuareg state. These forces were later pushed aside by a collection of

well-armed radical Islamist groups, including an organization linked to al-Qaeda. These extremists imposed a harsh interpretation of Sharia law in the territories they controlled, reportedly carrying out inhumane punishments such as beatings, stonings, and amputations, and destroying key elements of Mali's cultural heritage.

In early 2013, the situation became even more dire: the extremists launched an advance south, capturing several towns and threatening the Malian capital of Bamako. At the request of Mali's government, France initiated a military intervention and, together with African forces, drove militants out of the country's northern population centers. In the wake of these events, the Security Council voted to authorize a UN peacekeeping mission—known by its French acronym MINUSMA—to help support long-term stabilization activities. The mission was tasked with working to secure key population centers and help reestablish state authority in northern Mali; supporting peace talks and the implementation of the eventual 2015 peace agreement between the Malian government and Tuareg separatists; and aiding efforts to restore democratic governance, which they accomplished by supporting free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, the first-of-their-kind since the coup.

During my trip, I witnessed the impact of the UN's efforts in the fabled town of Timbuktu, a center of Islamic scholarship and trans-Saharan trade during the Middle Ages that had been reduced to a decimated shell of its once glorious existence. When extremists occupied the area in 2012, they destroyed the town's famed historic libraries, books, and mausoleums of Sufi saints, and administered harsh punishments against musicians and artists who dared to play music and women who refused to wear hijab. Since their deployment, MINUSMA troops have worked hard to stabilize the situation, providing security and carrying out joint patrols with local forces to prevent the extremists from returning, and supporting efforts to rebuild local governance and justice institutions. Further south, in the town of Gao, I saw another hopeful aspect of this work: we met with local youth who, with the help of the UN, were building a garden, establishing roots and investing in the land with the hope that it will someday feed their community.

Make no mistake, however, the security challenges that Mali faces are immense. While no longer in control of major population centers, extremists still operate in the country's vast northern region, posing major asymmetric threats to Malian and international forces. This has made MINUSMA one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions in the world, with 122 personnel killed in militant attacks since 2013. Just last week, one Egyptian peacekeeper was killed and four more were wounded when their convoy was struck by an IED, an atrocity claimed by the "Group to Support Islam and Muslims," a militant organization linked to al-Qaeda. Together with the G5 Sahel regional force and French counterterrorism forces, MINUSMA is also facing challenges from a regional affiliate of ISIL—the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The establishment of terrorist safe havens in Mali and the wider Sahel is a potential threat not only to the region itself, but to our European allies and our own national security. As a result, it is critical for the U.S. to continue to support a robust MINUSMA presence in Mali.

In addition to continuing concerns over security in the north, a worrying new development is forming in the Mopti region in central Mali. Here, long-running interethnic disputes are being manipulated by extremist groups with predictable consequences. More than 200 civilians have been killed in violence in this region in 2019 alone, including more than 160 villagers who were

massacred in towns near the border with Burkina Faso in March. As a result, Security Council Member States—particularly the United States—are debating the reconfiguration of MINUSMA in order to bolster the mission’s presence in the center of the country ahead of its mandate renewal in June. While increasing MINUSMA’s presence in these areas would be a welcome development, retooling the mission must not come at the expense of its activities in the north, which continue to be vital to regional security.

I have also been privileged to witness the work of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), a mission that, in 2014, allowed the international community to live up to the promise of “Never Again,” when it helped prevent vicious sectarian violence between Christian and Muslim communities from spiraling into genocide. In fact, in 2016, Amnesty International released a report saying that the UN mission, “has saved many lives and prevented much bloodshed.” Furthermore, in 2016, MINUSCA helped the country hold free and fair elections and supported a peaceful transition of power from an interim government to an elected one. Nevertheless, while the Central African Republic—a country whose political history has been marked by successive coups and instability since it gained independence from France in 1960—has made important strides in recent years in large part due to the assistance of UN peacekeepers, serious challenges remain. The government only controls about one-fifth of the country’s territory, and while a peace agreement reached with 14 armed groups this February provides some hope of greater stability in the future, it remains quite fragile. The Central African Republic is also experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis: the country has been deemed the most dangerous place in the world to be a child, with an estimated 1.5 million children at risk of starvation. The country is also extremely dangerous for humanitarian workers: according to UNICEF, there were nearly 396 violent incidents against humanitarians in 2018 alone.

All of this demands a continued robust posture by UN forces in the country, and MINUSCA is working to help the government extend its authority and prevent remote areas of the country from turning into safe havens for extremists and criminals. Earlier this month, for example, peacekeepers launched an attack on a local militia group that was attempting to control the main road between the capital of Bangui and Cameroon. In January, Portuguese peacekeepers were in a firefight for five hours with militia in the town of Bambari to protect civilians after two police officers were killed. MINUSCA is armed with a robust mandate from the Security Council to pursue armed groups that are targeting civilians, and the mission has proven itself willing to step up to the plate to address insecurity.

The UN is working to protect civilians and address insecurity in other critical corners of the African continent as well. In 2015, I traveled to see the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Here again, UN peacekeepers are doing invaluable work. In 2013, just two years after the country gained independence from Sudan—a milestone that the U.S. worked hard to make a reality under the Bush and Obama administrations—the country descended into a vicious inter-ethnic civil war, with fighting breaking out between forces loyal to the President, Salva Kiir, and Vice President, Riek Machar. Tens of thousands of civilians fled to UN compounds to seek shelter, and in an unprecedented move, the mission opened its doors, saving large numbers of people who otherwise would have been directly targeted by warring parties. Today, UNMISS continues to protect nearly 200,000 people at six Protection of Civilians sites around the country. In addition, UNMISS troops have helped deliver humanitarian access to more than 100,000

people, despite efforts by the warring parties to obstruct its freedom of movement. In recent interviews with two researchers—Adam Day of United Nations University and Charles T. Hunt of RMIT University, Melbourne—some South Sudanese credited the mission’s actions—particularly during the height of the fighting—as having “prevented a genocide.”

Last fall, Kiir and Machar signed a peace deal which, while fragile and far from perfect, offers what is perhaps the best opportunity in years to find a way out of this crisis. The UN, which helped support talks between the two sides with regional partners, is working to hold the parties accountable for their commitments. Robust U.S. engagement, both on the Security Council and through its bilateral channels with the South Sudanese, will be critical to ensuring an end to the violence and putting the country on the path to fulfilling the promise of its 2011 independence.

U.S. engagement will also be critical to ensuring the continued protection of civilians in the near term. Given the reduction in violence since the signing of the peace deal, UNMISS is currently evaluating how and when to eventually close the Protection of Civilians sites and facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced civilians to their homes. It is important that, as this process moves forward, and civilians do leave the UN sites, the U.S. insists that peacekeepers be given a strong mandate to provide security in areas where civilians are returning. Such measures will be critical to preventing a reoccurrence of the devastating violence and horrific abuses against civilians that has characterized South Sudan’s civil war, and providing breathing space for the peace agreement to take hold at the local level.

It will also be crucial for the U.S. to maintain a watchful eye on developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has seen some hopeful signs of progress recently but still faces significant challenges. UN peacekeepers were first deployed to DR Congo in 1999 in the wake of two devastating “African World Wars,” which claimed nearly five million lives. However, persistent violence in the country prompted the Security Council to authorize an extension of that force in 2010, as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The mission was established to protect civilians from violence, facilitate humanitarian access, and disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants back into society. Since the adoption of MONUSCO’s original mandate, the Security Council has altered its scope of work, most notably creating a “Force Intervention Brigade,” the first-of-its-kind for a UN peacekeeping mission, to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups in eastern Congo. As part of these efforts, the mission has sought to confront the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a Ugandan Islamist rebel group accused of killing hundreds of civilians—in the Beni area of North Kivu, which is currently also in the midst of a large Ebola outbreak.

Recently, there have been indications that the DR Congo may be on the cusp of turning a corner in its decades-long struggle for stability and peace. Early 2019, for example, saw the first peaceful transfer of power in Congo’s history—albeit one marred by irregularities—when Félix Tshisekedi assumed the presidency from Joseph Kabila, a leader who had repeatedly delayed constitutionally-mandated elections in order to cling to power. Nevertheless, the new government faces ongoing questions regarding its legitimacy, given the controversial circumstances under which the recent elections took place. In addition, serious human rights abuses and violent attacks by armed groups persist in eastern Congo—particularly in areas where

the ADF is active—and in the Kasai region in the center of the country. This is happening at a time when the Security Council, some of whose members are eager to reduce the size of the UN's peacekeeping budget, are seeking to downsize the mission. Indeed, MONUSCO is already planning to close seven offices across the country, including four in the volatile east, by June 30th as a way to save the mission \$100 million. While the push for a reduction in the mission's footprint is understandable in the context of improved conditions in certain parts of the country, it will be important for the U.S. to keep a watchful eye to ensure that there is not an escalation of violence and consider supporting a return to those areas—and a corresponding increase in budget—if violence does escalate.

It is important to take a moment and address one repeated criticism of peacekeeping—that missions continue in perpetuity and never shut down, regardless of changes in conditions on the ground. While some missions have existed for decades, that is because members of the Security Council have deemed it beneficial to maintain a stabilizing presence in highly contentious areas like Cyprus and the Israeli/Syrian/Lebanese borders and it is the responsibility of the Security Council, Host Countries, and Member States to work towards a political solution, not solely the work of peacekeepers. Also, in any of these missions, the U.S. could have vetoed mandate renewal and if they had chosen to do so, the mission would have had to close.

Moreover, in recent years, several large missions have closed, most notably Liberia in 2018 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2017. As I witnessed during a trip to both countries, each missions had a significant positive impact on security in their respective countries; in Liberia from a devastating civil war and in Côte d'Ivoire a major political crisis. UN peacekeeping forces successfully supported peaceful democratic elections and transitions of power in both countries, helped disarm and demobilize former combatants, and trained local police forces to ensure law and order. The stability engendered in part by the presence of peacekeepers has helped allow hundreds of thousands of displaced Liberians and Ivoirians to return home. After 74 years, Liberia saw its first peaceful transition of power between President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and President George Weah in 2018. Liberia, a country founded by former slaves from the U.S., has important historic ties with our country—a fact that was underlined by the leadership role taken by the U.S. in responding to the country's Ebola outbreak in 2016. Côte d'Ivoire, in recent years, has been Africa's fastest growing economy, due in significant part to the stabilization efforts of peacekeepers from 2010-2016. In both cases, the work of peacekeepers was not a quick overnight fix—the benefits of their activities took years to reach fruition. But when they did, the Security Council ended their mandates, and brought the international troops, police, and civilian personnel home. In the end, the decision to downsize or withdraw a mission must reflect realities on the ground, not artificial timetables dictated by politics in New York, Washington, DC, or anywhere else.

None of this is meant to imply, however, that the UN is a perfect institution or that the organization's peacekeeping architecture does not need to be re-tooled or improved to meet the challenges of the 21st century. That is why UN Secretary-General António Guterres, with strong support from the U.S., has made it priority to reform UN peacekeeping to make the enterprise more efficient and effective for the future. These measures include implementing strategic reviews of each mission and evaluating if peacekeeping is the right tool to address the unique challenges facing a given country. Such evaluations led to the closure of the missions in Liberia

and Côte d' Ivoire, as well as the down-sizing of the military footprint in Haiti to create a police mission to better address the situation on the ground. The mission in Haiti is scheduled to close in October 2019. With U.S. pressure on the mission in Western Sahara, the parties in conflict recently met for the first time in six years and are scheduled to meet again this spring. It remains clear that constructive U.S. engagement at the UN—focused on more than just budget cuts—drives reform and better transparency and accountability.

Of course, none of these activities can happen in the first place without dedicated funding from UN Member States, and here—like on the Security Council, where it uses its status as a permanent, veto-wielding member to influence peacekeeping mandates and deployment timetables—the U.S. plays a pivotal role. UN peacekeeping operations are financed through Member State assessments, determined by a complex formula that considers several economic indicators and is also used to determine assessments for the UN regular budget. The five permanent members of the Security Council are assessed at a slightly higher rate than what they would otherwise pay for the regular budget, however, because of their veto power over the establishment of peacekeeping missions. Assessment rates are renegotiated by the UN General Assembly every three years, and the current U.S. rate of 27.89 percent represents a reduction from the 1990s, when it paid nearly 32 percent. Meanwhile, China's rate has ballooned from just 3.1 percent in 2008 to 15.2 percent in 2019.

Unfortunately, since the mid-1990s, U.S. law has arbitrarily capped U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping at 25 percent. This policy is anachronistic and unnecessary: since 2000, the U.S.'s regular budget contributions have been subject to a 22 percent ceiling agreed to by the UN, an arrangement that no other developed country benefits from. Because a country's regular budget assessment rate is one of the key determinants of its peacekeeping assessment, the regular budget cap keeps the U.S. peacekeeping rate at a significantly lower level than what it otherwise would be. According to a document released by the U.S. State Department in December, without this ceiling, the U.S. would be obliged to pay 27 percent of regular budget and 33 percent of peacekeeping costs. This is one reason why the U.S. voted for the final assessment rate resolution in the General Assembly. Thus, if we are benefitting from the arrangement and voting for it, we should honor our commitments and pay at the assessed rate.

While Congress has frequently waived this requirement in its annual appropriations bills, since FY'17 it has declined to do so, causing the U.S. to accrue \$750 million in peacekeeping arrears. The effect of these underpayments is quite worrisome: the UN is currently facing a significant and growing cash crunch, with the result that countries who provide troops to peacekeeping missions—including U.S. partners and allies like Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Egypt, and Indonesia—are not being fully reimbursed for their contributions, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. This is fundamentally unwise, particularly given that the U.S. itself contributes few uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (currently just several dozen military observers and police officers out of a total force of more than 90,000) and therefore relies on poorer countries—who have fewer resources at their disposal to sustain large military deployments—to fill the gap in missions that we ourselves voted to send into the field.

Moreover, this is happening at a time when rivals of the U.S.—particularly China—are increasing their profile at the UN and using their new-found clout to champion their own

worldview at the expense of American values and priorities. The risk of this was illustrated most recently during UN negotiations last June over the 2018-2019 peacekeeping budget, when Russia and China sought to use arguments over cost savings to eliminate a number of critical human rights monitoring posts in UN missions. The fact that this was even attempted in the first place is a clear indication of China's growing influence over UN peacekeeping, which is in large part a function of its status as one of the biggest troop contributors and second largest funder of UN peacekeeping operations. By weakening our credibility and ceding our influence over the decision-making process to countries that are willing to fill the gap and put their money where their mouth is, further unilateral U.S. cuts are likely to only exacerbate this trend.

This state of affairs is counter-productive and should be addressed by Congress this year. Therefore, we call on Congress, for Fiscal Year 2020, to honor our financial obligations to UN peacekeeping operations, and include language in final appropriations legislation allowing us to pay our peacekeeping assessments at the full assessed rate.

Finally, peacekeepers are a last resort and go when and where no one else will go to help the most vulnerable communities living in forgotten crises. I believe it is the U.S. obligation to fully fund our peacekeeping dues and provide peacekeepers the resources to support global peace in security, not just because it serves American national security interests, but because it is also the right thing to do.

Thank you for your time.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much.
Dr. WILLIAMS.

**STATEMENT OF PAUL WILLIAMS, PH.D., ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY**

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, members of the subcommittee. Thanks for inviting me to testify at this hearing today.

I am an academic who has studied the politics and effectiveness of peace operations in Africa and elsewhere for over two decades now and my testimony today focuses on partnership peacekeeping in Africa—that is, collaboration between different international organizations and States to deliver effective field missions, and specifically it highlights the roles played by missions that are mandated and authorized by the African Union and explains why the United States should support the use of U.N.-assessed contributions to finance AU peace operations that have been authorized by the Security Council.

Since 2003, the African Union has proved that its peace operations provide a global public good by helping to keep the peace in Africa. A strong and effective African Union is, therefore, good for Africa but it is also good for the world.

The AU has now mandated and authorized 16 peace operations ranging from small observer missions to large forces engaged in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and even counterterrorism activities against groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Lord's Resistance Army.

By 2015, African States deployed nearly 70,000 uniformed peacekeepers across Africa, nearly 50,000 in U.N. missions and, roughly, 22,000 in Somalia, and this was partly thanks to training programs like the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative.

AU missions have carried out critical peace and security tasks that are not usually performed by U.N. peacekeeping operations including counterinsurgency efforts as in Somalia and Mali, and this is likely to become even more important as more Islamist fighters are moving from the Middle Eastern theater into north Africa, the Sahel, and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, AU missions have suffered major capability gaps related to finance, logistics, and mission support. These have been partially filled by external partners, notably, the United Nations and European Union as well as the U.S.

But AU forces were unable to sustain themselves in the field and were rehatted into larger U.N. missions in Burundi, Darfur, Mali, and the Central African Republic.

Nevertheless, as the AU has developed and strengthened, future peace operations in Africa are likely to be either mandated or authorized by the AU with U.N. peacekeeping missions being rehatted African missions.

It is, therefore, imperative that we find a long-term solution for financial AU peace operations in part to ensure that U.N. peacekeeping is not being set up to fail when it is forced to take on mandates and tasks that run counter to its principles of impartiality, consent, and minimum use of force.

To help do this, the African Union established a Peace Fund recently which generates revenues via a 0.2 percent levy that is imposed on eligible goods imported into the African continent.

So far, that has raised \$105 million. This could pay for some of the costs of the AU's missions but not the whole bill. AMISOM in Somalia, for example, costs about \$1 billion a year.

For the last decade, the U.N. Security Council has debated whether it should pay the rest through the U.N.'s assessed peacekeeping contributions.

The AU has tried to lock in this principal because it would move beyond ad hoc means of support and provide a more predictable framework which could be the basis for long-term capacity building and institutional development for the African Union.

This makes sense. The United States should empower the African Union by supporting its access to predictable and sustainable finance. This would be in line with previous bipartisan U.S. policy, which was based on four preferences: one, ensuring that the U.N. Security Council remains the primary multilateral decisionmaking body for matters of international peace and security; No. 2, ensuring that U.N. funds are used in an accountable and transparent manner; three, that decisions on how to respond to particular crises are taken on a case by case basis; and four, that the African Union should pay some if not all of the bills for its peace operations.

Instead of supporting the African Union with ad hoc mixture of bilateral programs and trust funds, which has produced highly uneven capabilities available to different AU missions, the United States would be better served by supporting a more predictable framework, namely, using U.N.-assessed contributions to finance AU peace operations that have been authorized by the Security Council.

This would do three things. No. 1, it would empower the African Union Commission to better administer and oversee African peace operations and it would allow international partners to hold a single entity accountable for the mission's performance and effectiveness in the field.

Two, it would improve African capabilities and their adherence to international human rights and humanitarian law for all the contributing countries across the board, and third, it would actually reduce the overall cost to the United States compared to providing the same capabilities on a bilateral basis to the respective contributing countries because the U.S. pays about 28 percent of the peacekeeping bill and other countries pay 72 percent.

Now, at present, different elements of U.S. policy toward peace operations in Africa are not coherently aligned. The stated goal of supporting effective and accountable missions is being undermined by the lack of a coherent diplomatic strategy, a failure to empower the African Union, and a failure to pay our assessed contributions in full and on time.

The U.S. should pay its peacekeeping dues in full and on time. Refusing to do so undermines our credibility and influence at the United Nations. It undermines the principle of international negotiations and it hurts the U.N.'s major contributing countries, many of whom are key U.S. partners in the field.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

Testimony of Paul D. Williams, Ph.D.
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Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

Hearing on “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa”
U.S. House of Representatives
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations

April 30, 2019

Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing on “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.” I am an academic who has studied the politics and effectiveness of peace operations in Africa and elsewhere for over two decades. Since my fellow panelists have already addressed trends in United Nations (UN) operations, and because “partnership peacekeeping” between different international actors has become the norm on the African continent, my testimony focuses on two central questions:

1. What roles has the African Union (AU) played in peace operations in Africa?
2. Should the U.S. Government support the use of UN assessed peacekeeping contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council?

Summary

For over fifteen years, the AU has proved that its peace operations provide a global public good by helping to keep the peace in Africa. A strong and effective African Union is therefore good for Africa, but it is also good for the world. However, the AU continues to suffer from a range of capability gaps that have been only partially filled by its international partners. The United States should therefore empower the AU by supporting its access to predictable, sustainable and flexible finance. Instead of supporting AU peace operations with an ad hoc mixture of programs and trust funds, the United States Government should open the way to a more predictable framework of support by agreeing to the principle of using UN assessed contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.

The African Union’s Roles in Peace Operations in Africa

Since 2003, the AU has mandated or authorized sixteen peace support operations, ranging from small observer missions to large forces engaged in stabilization, counter-insurgency and even counter-terrorism activities (see table 1). Of the operations under AU command and control, the largest have been in Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, and Somalia. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been—by a considerable margin—the AU’s longest, largest and most

costly operation.¹ The AU has also authorized six missions not under the Union's command and control: a special task force of South African soldiers who provided VIP protection for actors engaged in peace talks in Burundi, a Southern African Development Community mission to stabilize the Kingdom of Lesotho after the country's army commander was assassinated, as well as four ad hoc coalitions to undertake peace enforcement activities. Those coalitions were Operation Democracy in the Comoros, to oust an illegitimate government; the Regional Coalition Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa; the Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa in the Lake Chad Basin; and the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat various non-state armed actors across the Sahel.

Table 1: Peace Support Operations Authorized or Mandated by the African Union

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Years Active</i>
African Union-Mandated Missions		
AU Mission in Burundi	Burundi	2003-04
AU Mission in Sudan	Sudan	2004-07
AU Observer Mission in the Comoros	Comoros	2004
AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros	Comoros	2006
AU Mission in Somalia	Somalia	2007-present
AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros	Comoros	2007-08
AU-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Sudan	2008-present
African-led International Support Mission in Mali	Mali	2012-13
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	2013-14
African Prevention and Protection Mission* * This mission was mandated but did not deploy.	Burundi	2015-present
African Union-Authorized Missions		
AU Special Task Force	Burundi	2006-09
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Comoros	2008
Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Uganda	2011-18
Multinational Joint Task Force	Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	2015-present
G5 Sahel Joint Force	Burkina-Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger	2017-present
SADC Prevention Mission to Lesotho	Lesotho	2018-present

Several trends are evident from the conduct of these operations since 2003. First, AU member states have dramatically increased the numbers of peacekeepers they can deploy, thanks in part to assistance from external training programs, including the U.S. Global Peace Operations

¹ For details see Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Initiative. By 2015, African states were deploying nearly 70,000 uniformed peacekeepers across Africa—nearly 50,000 in UN peacekeeping operations and roughly 22,000 in AMISOM. Second, because the AU suffered from major gaps in its financial, logistical and mission support capabilities, most of its missions required considerable external assistance from partners, notably the UN, European Union and bilateral assistance programs. This assistance usually came in the form of financial, technical, training & equipment, and logistical support.² Third, as a result of these capability gaps, AU forces have played an important early-responder role but often subsequently been re-hatted into larger UN forces, as in Burundi, Darfur, Mali, and Central African Republic. Such re-hatting processes have not always gone smoothly but important lessons have now been learned.³ Finally, AU peace support operations have suffered significant deficits regarding transparency, accountability, and conduct and discipline issues, and developing an agreed reporting framework as called for in UN Security Council resolution 2378 (2017). It was only very recently, for instance, that the AU finalized policies and procedures on financial systems, combating sexual exploitation and abuse, and conduct and discipline for its peace support operations.

Despite the capability gaps identified above, over the last fifteen years, AU-mandated missions perform critical tasks related to international peace and security that are not performed by UN peacekeeping operations. Not only have they deployed to areas where the UN Security Council was not explicitly engaged (e.g. the Comoros and Darfur), the AU has sometimes been able to generate more local legitimacy with host governments than UN operations (e.g. in Darfur). Crucially, AU peace support operations have also undertaken peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism tasks that fall outside the usual bounds of UN peacekeeping operations (e.g. in Somalia and Mali). This is likely to become more important in the context of increased levels of violence generated by jihadist fighters moving from the Middle East into North Africa, the Sahel and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. The contributing countries of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in particular have displayed enormous levels of sacrifice while combating al-Shabaab in the deadliest peace operation in modern history.⁴ But the AU has also shown itself willing to engage in similar activities elsewhere, notably in Mali. Finally, AU-authorized missions have generally been used to conduct enforcement tasks against designated “spoiler” groups, notably with four cases that have an area of operations straddling multiple countries in line with rebel group activity.

² See UN doc. A/71/410-S/2016/809, 28 September 2016, <https://undocs.org/S/2016/809>; Katharina P. Coleman & Paul D. Williams, *Logistics Partnerships in Peace Operations* (International Peace Institute report, June 2017), <https://www.ipinst.org/2017/06/logistics-partnerships-in-peace-operations>

³ See *Evaluation of re-hatting in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)* (UN OIOS Evaluation Report no. IED-18-002, 12 February 2018).

⁴ See Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*, pp.356-358.

More broadly, the international political dynamics related to mandating missions means that, in the future, new peace operations in Africa are likely to be either AU-mandated or AU-authorized, with the only new United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa being re-hatted AU missions, as was the case in Mali and Central African Republic. In both of these situations, however, the UN was forced to take on missions in which there was no peace to keep and the conditions required for successful UN peacekeeping did not exist in large part because the AU was not able to finance these missions. For this reason, finding a long-term solution for financing is necessary both to ensure the viability of AU peace support operations and to ensure that UN peacekeeping is not being set up to fail when it is forced to take on mandates and tasks that run counter to the principles of impartiality, consent and minimum use of force.

Financing African Union Peace Operations

AU peace operations have clearly helped promote peace and security in Africa in several ways. But questions persist about how to generate adequate, sustainable and flexible financing for them. This has been a source of political controversy for well over a decade with various expert bodies making recommendations to resolve it.⁵ Thus far, however, the UN Security Council has not reached a principled consensus on this issue. In December 2018, for example, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution on the topic—a resolution that the United States threatened to veto. Failure to agree on language about financing African peace support operations was also the main reason why a substantive report could not be adopted by the 2019 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the UN General Assembly last month.

There are two options for financing AU peace support operations: either (1) the AU self-finances its missions; or (2) the Union continues to rely on some level of multilateral or bilateral external financial assistance. The first option is unrealistic, but the UN Security Council cannot agree on how to implement the second.

After struggling with this issue for many years, the AU has recently made major progress on raising funds to pay for its peace and security activities. In 2015, the AU Assembly set itself the target of financing 25% of its peace and security activities, 75% of its program budget, and 100% of its operational budget by 2020. To do so, it established a new AU Peace Fund which has generated revenues via a 0.2% levy that the AU has imposed on eligible goods imported into the

⁵ See, for example, *Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations* (the Prodi Report) UN doc. A/63/666-S/2008/813, 31 December 2008, <https://undocs.org/S/2008/813>; *Report of the joint African Union-United Nations review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council*, UN doc. A/71/410-S/2016/809, 28 September 2016, <https://undocs.org/S/2016/809>; and *Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa* (the Kaberuka Report), AU doc. August 2016, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-on-predictable-and-sustainable-financing-for-peace-in-africa>

African continent. This is an AU directive that is binding on all AU members, but it permits flexibility on how each state delivers on its commitment. As of April 2019, fifty-one of the AU's fifty-five members had contributed a total of \$105.2 million to the Peace Fund. The Peace Fund also comes equipped with a new set of enhanced governance, financial and administrative oversight mechanisms.

It is hoped that the Peace Fund can generate approximately \$400 million for the AU by 2020. Given that AMISOM costs approximately \$1 billion per year, this sum might be enough to cover 25% of the bill for AU-mandated peace support operations, assuming no new operations are required. But where will the rest of the money come from? In addition, and in comparison, the much smaller AU-authorized missions in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin cost about \$500 million and \$700 million per year, respectively.

For the last decade, the Security Council has debated whether to pay the rest through the UN's assessed peacekeeping contributions. So far, this mechanism has been used to provide modest support to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004-07) but most significantly with the creation of the UN Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS), which delivers logistical and other forms of support to AMISOM and some elements of the Somali National Army.⁶ In 2018/19, UNSOS had a budget of approximately \$550 million.

The AU has tried to lock in the principle of using UN assessed contributions to finance its missions because it would move beyond ad hoc support mechanisms and provide a more predictable framework, which could be the basis for long-term capacity building and institutional development. Operational decisions will still be made on a case-by-case basis and it would apply only to future not current peace operations. Crucially, it would facilitate the building of more effective and efficient systems for conflict management over the long-term.

United States Policy on Financing African Union Peace Operations

Current U.S. policy on using UN assessed peacekeeping contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council appears to be based on several interrelated preferences, most of which have been shared across the Obama and Trump administrations.

These bipartisan concerns are, first, ensuring the UN Security Council remains the primary multilateral decision-making body on matters of international peace and security. Second, ensuring that UN funds are used in an accountable and transparent manner. Third, decisions on how to respond to crises must be decided on a case-by-case basis. And, fourth, the AU should pay some if not all of the bill for its peace operations. However, the U.S. has stressed that the

⁶ Paul D. Williams, *UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: The Case of UNSOA* (International Peace Institute, February 2017), <https://www.ipinst.org/2017/02/un-support-regional-peace-ops-unsoa>

AU's revenue should not be generated by using tariffs on goods imported into Africa, which is the case for the 0.2% levy instituted by the new AU Peace Fund. The U.S. position is that this is not in line with World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations because it discriminates against non-AU members. The AU disputes this, arguing that none of the African WTO members have been asked to break their WTO obligations in order to make financial contributions to the AU via the levy, nor have any of them done so in practice. It has also pointed to the ongoing use of tariffs by the current U.S. Government.

As noted above, these concerns created an impasse in the 2019 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations⁷ and led the Trump Administration to threaten to veto a Security Council resolution that sought to endorse the principle of using UN assessed peacekeeping contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council, albeit it on a case-by-case basis.

What policy should the United States adopt on this issue? The United States and other donors must recognize that AU peace support operations are not going away, and that these—rather than UN peacekeeping operations—have become the preferred tool for addressing at least some of the key peace and security challenges in the African continent. To date, the preferred approach of the U.S. Government has been to provide bilateral support to individual troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) for respective AU-mandated and/or AU-authorized peace operations. However, this fragmented, ad hoc approach to support has meant that AU missions have varied considerably in terms of the capabilities of their troops, the strength of their command and control systems, the level of oversight exercised by the AU Commission, and the uneven application of international norms and standards across missions and across T/PCCs.

If the U.S. Government believes AU peace operations can play useful roles in securing the continent, then it should empower the organization to that end. A more strategic approach would be to support and empower the African Union Commission to better administer and oversee African peace support operations, as this will not only allow the United States and other donors to hold a single entity—the AU—accountable for the performance and effectiveness of operations, but it will also improve capabilities and adherence to international human rights and humanitarian law for AU T/PCCs across the board. This, however, may require use of the UN's assessed peacekeeping contributions to cover part of the costs of AU-mandated peace support operations—and perhaps some AU-authorized missions—that are authorized by the Security Council.

These two options are not mutually exclusive. Option 1 has benefits inasmuch as providing bilateral support to individual African T/PCCs allows the U.S. to be more selective about how its

⁷ While the African Group insisted on including language about the AU Peace Fund, the U.S. would only accept such language if it reflected U.S. concerns that the AU's 0.2% levy caused problems for WTO compliance.

funds are used and might produce greater leverage to meet broader foreign and security policy objectives.

Nevertheless, Option 2 makes sense for several reasons. First, the overall cost to the U.S. would be less than if Washington provided the same capabilities on a bilateral basis to the respective T/PCCs. This is because using UN assessed peacekeeping contributions shares the burden across the UN's membership—the United States pays approximately 28% of the total bill for UN peacekeeping and the U.S. assessed rate has been gradually shrinking. Second, it provides a more predictable framework for support that would facilitate long-term capacity-building and institutional development at the AU. Third, because the U.S. pays such a large proportion of the UN's peacekeeping bill, it can wield significant influence over how and where those funds are used. Finally, the United Nations has taken important steps to improve the performance and efficiency of its peacekeeping operations.⁸

If, however, the United States is not comfortable with having the AU Commission manage funds provided through assessed contributions, it could have the UN continue to manage these funds, as there are ways to ensure that it is applied directly to meet specific types of costs in individual country contexts. The UN support office model, as represented by UNSOS in Somalia, would be the key case in point.⁹ While this model does have the drawback of not empowering the African Union or supporting the strengthening of its mission management apparatus, it provides a way to sidestep any U.S. concerns about WTO compliance.

Recommendations for United States Policy

Recommendation 1: Support the principle of using UN assessed contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council

If the AU can prove it has the capacity to use financial, technical and logistical assistance in a transparent and accountable manner then the United States should support the principle of using UN assessed peacekeeping contributions to finance AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.

Recommendation 2: Consider a peace and security exemption for the AU Peace Fund

If the United States continues to believe the AU levy is not in line with WTO obligations it should show clearly where this has been the case. In addition, the U.S. should consider allowing

⁸ The UN's new approach to improve mission performance is set out in Security Council resolution 2436 (2018). On efficiency, the UN has reduced the average per capita cost of deploying its military peacekeepers by 23% from 2008/09 to 2017/18 (from roughly \$90,000 to roughly \$70,000). This is in spite of the fact that the monthly base reimbursement rate for uniformed peacekeepers increased over the same period from approximately \$1,028 per person to \$1,428.

⁹ See Williams, *UN Support to Regional Peace Operations*.

a peace and security exemption to allay its concerns about WTO compliance.¹⁰ In sum, what the U.S. perceives as the discriminatory effects of the AU levy is a price worth paying for enhancing peace and security in Africa.

Recommendation 3: Pay UN assessed peacekeeping contributions in full and on time

Refusing to pay its full assessed rate of UN peacekeeping contributions has undermined the credibility of the U.S. government and contributed to the reduction of its influence at the United Nations. It also sets a bad example that undermines the principle of international negotiations and the idea that member states should meet their financial obligations. Not paying the full rate of assessed contributions also hurts the UN's major T/PCCs and acts as a disincentive to making such contributions, especially for poorer countries.¹¹ Arrears and late payments are also having detrimental effects on contemporary UN peacekeeping operations in the field.¹²

Recommendation 4: Kick-start a debate about changing the formulas by which the assessed rates for UN peacekeeping are negotiated

The United States should pay its full assessed rate of UN peacekeeping contributions but there is a good case for reducing the U.S. share of the UN's peacekeeping bill on the grounds that it is politically unwise to have the entire system rely so heavily on a single member state. In other words, the UN should negotiate and adopt a maximum level of assessment payable by a single member state. Since the AU wants the U.S. and UN to pay a large part of the bill for its peace support operations, and the United States wants to pay less for peacekeeping, a sensible approach might be for the U.S. to increase its diplomatic efforts to find African support for lowering its portion of the overall peacekeeping bill and developing alternative options for negotiating the assessed rates of contributions in the General Assembly.

¹⁰ One argument along these lines is using the security exception under Article XXI(c) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as justification for applying the 0.2% import levy because it is done in pursuit of what the UN Charter refers to as the maintenance of international peace and security. Philomena Apiko and Faten Aggad, *Can the 0.2% levy fund peace and security in Africa?* (ECDPM Briefing Note No.103, April 2018), <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN-103-Financing-the-African-Union.pdf>

¹¹ The details of the UN's current arrears are set out in Report of the Secretary-General, *Improving the financial situation of the United Nations*, UN doc. A/73/809, 26 March 2019, <https://undocs.org/a/73/809>

¹² Ibid and Wasim Mir, *Financing UN Peacekeeping: Avoiding Another Crisis* (International Peace Institute, April 2019), <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/04/financing-un-peacekeeping-avoiding-another-crisis>

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Mr. GALLO.

STATEMENT OF PETER GALLO, DIRECTOR, HEAR THEIR CRIES

Mr. GALLO. Thank you, Chairman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee.

I spent 4 years as an internal investigator in the U.N. and I have since spoken extensively about the corruption and the lack of accountability in the organization, and I know that the U.N. and others like to portray me as some kind of disenchanted extremists.

So I like to often begin by deliberately misquoting Shakespeare, specifically, Marc Antony's speech about coming to bury Caesar, not to praise him.

Being critical of the U.N. in any way is often interpreted as an attempt to destroy the organization. Nothing could be further from the truth. We are not anarchists.

Of course, there is a need for peacekeeping but the U.N. is wilfully blind to the harm that that peacekeeping brings with it and my concern for the future, as Marc Antony went on, is that the evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones. And nobody wants the U.N. to be more remembered for the sexual abuse of children in Africa rather than the reason the organization was there in the first place.

Given my background, I focus on accountability and I appreciate that the committee is concerned with the lack of independent information about what is actually happening in the field missions. Those two are far from unrelated.

Peacekeeping, by its very nature, takes place in remote areas not well covered by an independent free press, leaving the outside world with the U.N. as the sole source of information.

But as was seen in the Central African Republic, the staff working in those missions will not speak out about anything no matter how egregious, corrupt, or wasteful it may be, and when they do there are plenty of case studies as to what happens, like the cases of Miranda Brown, Anders Kompass, and Emma Reilly.

U.N. peacekeeping has to be understood on the ground in terms of the U.N. culture, which involves, on one hand, a lack of accountability for senior staff and those who enjoy the patronage, and a lack of whistle blower protection for those who do not.

In the U.N. it is not what you do that matters; it is who you know, and that applies for career advancement and the prosecution of misconduct. It is carrot and stick, and the most important rule in the United Nations, what I call the prime directive, is to protect the U.N.'s image above all else.

It is not the scale of the sexual abuse and, particularly, the child rape but the failure to deal with it that is seriously undermining the U.N.'s credibility.

Now, Hear Their Cries has been criticized for our estimate 60,000 women and children raped or sexually abused by the U.N. personnel over 10 years. That figure is an estimate, but neither the U.N. nor anyone else is willing to debate it. And shocking as though it may be, 60,000 may be a conservative estimate.

Still, the number of cases that are acknowledged by the U.N. remains tiny. But the U.N. does not report all the complaints. They

are very good at filtering out most of them at the assessment stage whereas journalists seem to have very little difficulty finding victims when they look for them.

Why are more of these rape cases not reported? Because U.N. staff are not stupid and they know what will happen if they do. One, any investigation will fail to establish wrongdoing, and two, the organization will retaliate against the staff member for having reported it.

In the United Nations, whistleblower protection does not work because the U.N. does not want it to work. So the staff who report wrongdoing are committing career suicide. Staff will look at cases like Miranda Brown and ask why should they risk it.

Now, the U.S. Government has tried to pressure the U.N. into strengthening whistleblower protection. These provisions have been unsuccessful. The U.N. Ethics Office continues to go through extraordinary lengths never to find retaliation and when they do, OIOS, instead of investigating it, simply asks the subject to come up with a plausible explanation for its actions, essentially abdicating any investigative responsibility. But the investigations director claims this is to, and I quote, “keep the Americans off our backs.”

With regard to the misconduct by military personnel, in the CAR the U.N. knowingly deployed ill-disciplined troops with a history of human rights abuses. Unsurprisingly, they turned out to be so bad they had to be withdrawn. But why were they deployed in the first place?

Given the financial incentive, any competent investigator would consider the possibility of bribery influencing that decision. But the U.N. will not consider that possibility, far less investigate it.

Ironically, it was not those peacekeepers who were responsible for the child sex abuse in 2015. That was only exposed because a single U.N. staff member, Miranda Brown, was prepared to stand up against an abusive authority.

That may have sparked off a media firestorm, focused world attention on the CAR, and journalists began finding hundreds of other SEA victims.

The U.N. was forced to act. The Deschamps enquiry was empanelled. But, ultimately, the only thing that is changed is that Miranda Brown has lost her career.

Now, the U.N. claims that the allegations in the CAR were fully and professionally investigated at a cost, by the way, of half a million U.S. dollars, though they established next to nothing.

But as early as October 2016, OIOS was already undermining the integrity and the credibility of complainants in the town of Dekoa. I am aware of an internal review having been carried out within the OIOS into the sexual abuse investigations in the CAR in Dekoa.

This was essentially instructed to identify what lessons could be learned but was never released. Instead, it was made to disappear and has been concealed even from the OIOS staff for whom it was written, casting serious doubts on how reliable the U.N. investigations were.

In 2017, the secretary general announced a new approach to combatting sexual exploitation and abuse. On closer inspection,

however, this is not a new approach at all. It continues with the same mind set as before and is doomed to fail for four basic and fundamental reasons.

No. 1 is that the U.N. continues to ignore the fact that sexual exploitation is criminal. Second, the U.N. does not want to recognize that effective deterrence of any criminal conduct is directly related to the likelihood of the offender being held accountable. And three, the U.N. still wants to believe that raising awareness of the conduct being criminal will somehow deter it. It will not.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallo follows:]

**Statement
by
Peter Anthony Gallo**

before the
US Congress
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, & International Organizations
Hearing
on
UN Peacekeeping in Africa

Washington, DC
30 April 2019

Thank you Chairman Bass and Ranking Member Smith for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.

I spent four years as an investigator in the UN, in the Office of Internal Oversight Services (“OIOS”) - the office which is supposed to investigate¹ reports of violations of UN rules and other misconduct.

Prior to joining the UN I had spent 18 years as an investigator in the private sector in Asia where I am recognized as an authority on money laundering and terrorist financing. I am admitted to practice law in my home country of Scotland, in Hong Kong and in New York. I also MBA from Strathclyde, in the UK and an LLM from the University of Torino in Italy.

I am a Director of 'Hear their Cries' a small and specialised NGO focused sexual abuse of children by UN personnel, and have published many articles on investigation management and other issues, including an assessment of the UN's misguided strategy towards sexual offences committed by its own personnel. I recently published 'Neither Protection Nor New', an analysis of the UN's “new approach” to the investigation of 'Sexual Exploitation and Abuse'² and have drawn on some of the research for that book for my presentation today.

1 ST/SGB/273 Online at: <https://undocs.org/ST/SGB/273>

2 Peter A Gallo. 'Neither Protection nor New; Why the UN's policies on 'Sexual Exploitation and Abuse' are guaranteed to be ineffective.' ISBN-10: 1642542547 / ISBN-13: 9781642542547. Available online at: <http://thebp.site/165757>

Introduction

I would like to begin by deliberately misquoting Shakespeare, specifically Mark Antony's speech where he explains that he came "*not to bury Caesar, but to praise him.*"

Being critical of the UN in any way is often interpreted as promoting a form of anarchy and an attempt to destroy the Organization. Nothing could be further from the truth.

That there is a need for the intervention of international organizations in a peacekeeping role in Africa is not in dispute, but my concern is that the UN continues to be wilfully blind to the harm that those peacekeeping activities brings with them.

My concern for the future is, as Shakespeare went on: "*The evil that men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones.*"

There is a danger that the UN will be more remembered for the sexual abuse of children in Africa than the reason the Organization was there in the first place.

The world needs the UN to function efficiently, and in accordance with the Charter, not to exploit the people it is supposed to protect or to harbour the criminals who do so.

Given my background, my position focuses on accountability, and I appreciate that yours is the lack of independent information about what is actually happening in the UN field missions. Those two are not unrelated.

UN Peacekeeping, by its very nature, takes place in remote areas not well covered by independent information sources, leaving the outside world with the UN as the sole source of information. This is not healthy, particularly where – as was seen in the Central African Republic – the staff working in the mission will not speak out about anything, no matter how egregious, corrupt or wasteful it may be.

The UN has elevated obfuscation to a professional level, but understanding what is really happening in the peacekeeping missions has to be understood in terms of the UN culture, which involves its lack of accountability for senior staff and those who enjoy their patronage, and the lack of whistleblower protection for those who do not. It also requires a realistic appreciation of the risks, specifically the financial corruption risk.

It is the scale of sexual abuse - particularly child rape – and the UN's failure to take resolute action to eradicate the practice, that is seriously undermining any credibility that UN Peacekeeping has.

In addition, I am concerned that the flow of funds from badly managed UN peacekeeping operations is, at least in part, funding the armed conflicts that required the intervention of a peacekeeping mission in the first place.

The problem with the flow of information from peacekeeping environments is that they are remote and independent reporting is sparse. As a result, Member States are dependent on information provided by

the UN itself.

When it involves anything negative – such as wrongdoing - the problem is that the UN is so conflicted and biased that I believe any information is so seriously tainted as to be unreliable.³

Extent of the Problem

Hear their Cries' has been soundly criticised for our estimate that there were 60,000 women and children raped or sexually abused by UN personnel in the 10 years that Ban Ki Moon was Secretary-General.

That figure is an estimate – but neither the UN, any NGO or any other organization has been willing to challenge the basis⁴ on which that estimate was based.

Shocking as though that figure may be, it is likely to be a very conservative estimate. An academic study published in 2016 indicated the number of women sexually exploited (mostly) by UN personnel in Liberia alone to be in the region of 58,000.⁵

The number of 'Sexual Exploitation and Abuse' cases reported to the UN remains very small, and the number successfully investigated is miniscule.

In September 2017 however, speaking at the “high-level meeting on the UN's response to sexual exploitation and abuse” Secretary-General Guterres admitted: “*it is necessary to say that the majority of the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse are done by the civilian organizations of the United Nations, and not in peacekeeping operations.*”⁶

This contradicts the UN's traditional response to questions about such abuses, which was to deflect attention on to the Troop Contributing Countries and explain that the UN has no jurisdiction over them.

That is not entirely correct, but what is more significant is that the UN was responsible for accepting those peacekeeping troops in the first place. Although the UN is obligated to vet the troop members for histories of sexual crimes, it has often failed to do so.⁷

³ Colum Lynch, 'They Just Stood Watching' Foreign Policy, 7 April 2014. Online at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/07/they-just-stood-watching-2/>

⁴ Hear Their Cries. Explaining 60,000 Estimate. Online at: <http://www.heartheircries.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Explaining-HtC-60000-Estimate.pdf>

⁵ Beber, Gilligan, Guardado & Karim, 'Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia.' International Organization, 71(1). Online at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/peacekeeping-compliance-with-international-norms-and-transactional-sex-in-monrovia-liberia/A4CEBAC07B57B1DF13DA6E12CDDA9D6C>

⁶ UN Press Release: SG/SM/18691-HR/5369. 18 September 2017. Online at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sgsm18691.doc.htm> Para 2

⁷ OIOS/IED Evaluation Report 'Evaluation of re-hatting in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). 12 February 2018 Assignment No. IED-18-002. Online at: <https://oios.un.org/page/download2/id/49>

Deployment of Ill-Disciplined troops to the CAR

In March 2016, the recently retired Assistant Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support disclosed, in an op-ed piece for the New York Times, that the UN had knowingly deployed troops that were known to be ill-disciplined, in a peace-keeping role in the Central African Republic.⁸

Unsurprisingly, their performance subsequently turned out to be so poor that they had to be withdrawn.⁹

This raises serious questions about why the decision was made to deploy them in the first place.

The argument seems to be that the UN is beholden to any Member States willing to contribute troops, and appears to be concerned that they will not do so if their soldiers are to be prosecuted for rape.

This argument overlooks the fact that there is a financial incentive for Troop Contributing Countries to provide troops. To suggest that they would forego this revenue in order to protect an individual soldier from prosecution for something for which he could be prosecuted at home anyway is simply irrational.

Why then, did the UN knowingly deploy ill-disciplined troops in the CAR? Given the financial incentive, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of bribery influencing that deployment decision – but the UN will simply not consider the possibility, much less investigate it.¹⁰

Military/Civilian Proportional Complaints

When I worked in OIOS, one of the projects I worked on was an analysis of the reports of sexual exploitation and abuse from the various peacekeeping missions.

This showed that the numbers of complaints were about evenly split between military personnel and civilian staff, but given the huge imbalance in numbers between the military and civilian personnel deployed, it was very clear that the problem was proportionally much worse among the civilian staff – over whom the UN most certainly does have jurisdiction.¹¹

Rather than prosecute complaints against UN personnel to the full extent of the law, the UN relies on the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities¹² to shield corrupt staff members and insulate them from prosecution.

Other Crimes etc

Sexual abuse and child rape are, however, far from the only outrages being perpetrated in the name of the UN, and by UN personnel in peacekeeping environments.

⁸ Anthony Banbury 'I love the UN, but it is failing' New York Times, Sunday Review. 18 March 2016. Online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-but-it-is-failing.html>

⁹ Code Blue Statement on Withdrawal of Congo/Brazzaville Battalion from CAR. 20 June 2017. Online at: <http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press-releases/2017/6/20>

¹⁰ When the previous Investigations Director sought to create a Proactive Investigations Unit within OIOS/ID there was considerable opposition to the idea from within the Division, from senior staff who have repeatedly been enjoyed the patronage and protection of senior management.

¹¹ I do not have a copy of that report or any of the supporting research.

¹² Convention on the Privileges & Immunities of the United Nations. 13 February 1946. Online at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=5&p3=3>

Just a few weeks ago, after a long and thorough investigation, NBC news reported that UNHCR staff in Kenya soliciting bribes from refugees hoping for resettlement abroad¹³ and from men victimized by sexual violence who turned to the UN for help.¹⁴

Like many UN scandals, investigative journalists were able to identify serious criminal activities while UNHCR investigators were either unable or unwilling to establish misconduct in relation to these allegations.¹⁵

A large part of this is due to a combination of inept investigations and an institutional unwillingness to recognise wrongdoing.

My own investigative background includes a lot of work on money laundering & terrorist financing. One of my concerns is that the budgets of the various UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa are not insignificant sums; MONUSCO (D.R. Congo) has a budget of \$1.2 Billion. UNMISS (South Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), MINUSMA (Mali) and MINUSCA (Central African Republic) all running about a billion dollars.

All Organizations lose money to fraud waste and abuse, so even if that were only 10% of the total; 10% of a Billion is \$100 Million.

That would be a significant sum anywhere, but these missions operate in countries that have some of the highest levels of corruption anywhere in the world; so we have to be concerned about where that money might be going – particularly in view of the terrorist financing risk.

This is not just a hypothetical scenario.

In 2015, OIOS investigated just three NGOs in Somalia, and found fraud or otherwise unexplained losses of between 70 and 80% of the funds they received from the UN Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (“OCHA”). OIOS also uncovered evidence of funds being diverted to the Al Shabaab terrorist organization.¹⁶

The UN's response was to withhold this information from the Member States and try to bury it.

When I was with OIOS, on one particular matter, the office spent \$1.8 Million investigating some 80 individuals for fraud and – despite information that all the claims were inflated – relied on statements from co-conspirators to close all of the cases and find no fraud anywhere.

13 Sally Hayden. 'Refugees say some U.N. workers demand bribes for resettlement.' NBC News. 6 April 2019. Online at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/asylum-sale-refugees-say-some-u-n-workers-demand-bribes-n988351>

14 Sally Hayden. 'Male refugees victimized by sexual violence say officials wanted bribes to help' NBC News. 7 April 2019 Online at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/asylum-sale-male-refugees-victimized-sexual-violence-say-officials-wanted-n988326>

15 Sally Hayden. 'Whistleblowers say U.N. refugee agency does not always address corruption' NBC News. 7 April 2019. Online at: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/asylum-sale-whistleblowers-say-u-n-refugee-agency-does-not-n988391>

16 George Russell. 'Millions in UN Somalia aid diverted: hints that some went to terrorists.' Fox News. 20 January 2015. Online at: <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/20/millions-in-un-somalia-aid-diverted-hints-that-some-went-to-terrorists/>

When I later pointed out that one of the witnesses whose information was material in the decision to close all those cases clearly had strong connections to a proscribed terrorist organisation; the USG/OIOS wanted to hear nothing of it.

Even if we completely disregard the possibility of senior UN officials being influenced by bribery and corruption, it is still necessary for Member States to question whose interests they are actually representing.

A video¹⁷ was recently brought to my attention, where Mr. Wu Hongbo a former UN Under-Secretary-General for the Department for Economic & Social Affairs explained to a Chinese television audience of how he used his position to protect Chinese national interests and had a Uyghur politician and Human Rights activist barred from the UN.

This certainly appears to be a violation of the UN Charter, but it should come as no surprise that this sort of partisan bias is quite acceptable in the UN today.

This is particularly suspicious in view of the UN's recent corruption scandals involving Chinese entities, which the Organization appears very anxious not to investigate fully.¹⁸

In general, senior officials of the UN are so concerned with protecting one another that there is no political will to address serious misconduct, and the UN "justice" system serves to defend and protect mismanagement. The UN Dispute Tribunal – and by extension, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance - is exclusively concerned with *processes*. That Department is, perversely, unconcerned with the *merits* of any actions taken or decisions made, no matter how unreasonable or ridiculous they may be, or the motives or implications of those decisions.

The UN's gymnastics of reasoning are very useful in ensuring that absolutely any decision can be justified, even where it borders on insanity. I was recently consulted on a ruling by the UN Ethics Office where they determined that it is not "misconduct" for a staff member to knowingly breach rules that were established by the Member States for an intergovernmental body, and even complicity in international crimes was not "misconduct" for the purposes of the UN because that was not specifically prohibited in the UN staff rules.

In OIOS, a Deputy Director was cleared (by his own staff) of withholding evidence in an investigation on the basis that nothing in the Staff Rules, or even in the OIOS Investigations Manual, specifically prohibited withholding evidence.¹⁹

Leaving aside the logic of these decisions, they illustrate the lengths the UN senior managers will go to in order to justify mismanagement, *when they wish to do so*.

¹⁷ Online at: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=649658305496919>

¹⁸ <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-un-general-assembly-president-and-five-others-charged-13-million-bribery-scheme>

¹⁹ Nguyen-Kropp & Postica (UNDT/2013/176) Online at: <http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2013-176.pdf>

The lesson for the ordinary staff member is clear, and it serves to discourage them from speaking out against fraud, waste and abuse – and in peacekeeping environments, that is usually enough to ensure the Member States are never made aware of the matter.

The UN Appeals Tribunal can be just as perverse, and is clearly unconcerned with the rights of staff members. In the case of Wasserstrom,²⁰ for example, the Tribunal rendered the entire “whistleblower protection” mechanism in the UN to be only advisory and not legally enforceable.

Judge Faherty said, in para. 41 of her dissenting opinion in that judgement: “[I]t is inconceivable that a finding of the Ethics Office pursuant to its statutory mandate can be otherwise than an “administrative decision” capable of review by the Dispute Tribunal. **To hold otherwise would render nugatory the substantive protection and remedies afforded to staff members under ST/SGB/2005/21.**” (Emphasis added). That was, however, the majority ruling, which was a veritable gift to vindictive UN supervisors and managers; the perfectly foreseeable result of the Wasserstrom judgement was to further encourage them to retaliate against anyone they consider to be a “trouble-maker” or simply a threat.

UN staff are usually very well aware of the risks of reporting misconduct. Doing so can be career suicide because the Organisation's mindset is invariably focussed on how to protect the UN's reputation.

The CAR Child Sex Abuse Scandal

This “defensive” culture was amply demonstrated in the scandal of the child sex abuse in the Central African Republic in 2015, when no fewer than six of the most senior level officials of the UN failed to recognise the need to take immediate action to stop the sexual abuse of children. They were more concerned with taking punitive action against Mr. Anders Kompass - the one official who had taken the only action the UN could possibly have taken to do something about it.²¹

That entire scandal was only exposed because a single UN staff member in OHCHR – Ms. Miranda Brown – was prepared to take action and inform the outside world.²² That decision, of course, cost Ms. Brown her career with the UN, but the scale of the public outrage her information unleashed forced the UN to take action and appoint what they described as an independent and external enquiry. Unfortunately, the UN's definition of “external and independent” was a three member panel where one of the three was a professional consultant who relied on UN agencies for her income²³ and the other was a serving UN staff member who had himself been cleared of a fraud charge under very

20 Wasserstrom (2014/UNAT/457). Online at www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat/judgments/2014-UNAT-457.pdf

21 Code Blue Campaign. 'The UN's Dirty Secret: The untold story of child sexual abuse in the Central African Republic and Anders Kompass' Online at: <http://www.codebluecampaign.com/carstatement>

22 Sandra Laville. 'UN aid worker suspended for leaking report on child abuse by French troops.' The Guardian. 29 April 2015. Online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/un-aid-worker-suspended-leaking-report-child-abuse-french-troops-car>

23 Bea Edwards. 'The UN's Independent External Panel on Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers in Africa Not Independent, Not External' Government Accountability Project. 30 July 2015. Online at: <https://www.whistleblower.org/uncategorized/the-uns-independent-external-panel-on-sexual-abuse-by-peacekeepers-in-africa-not-independent-not-external/>

questionable circumstances and who was looking for a new post.²⁴

Moreover, the Terms of Reference for that panel were approved by Susanna Malcorra, then Chef de Cabinet who was herself implicated in the attempt to retaliate against Mr. Kompass rather than address the sexual abuse of the children.

There is no unbiased independence or any oversight of disciplinary decisions or indeed anything that suggests corruption; leaving the UN in control of any investigation.

The UN claims that the multiple allegations of sexual abuse in the CAR were fully and professionally investigated, but a Reuters press report from October 2016 indicates that – far from being “independent” OIOS was sharing information with the UN Conduct & Discipline Unit and already undermining the integrity and credibility of complainants from the town of Dekoa in the south-eastern Central African Republic.²⁵

Moreover, I am aware of an internal review having been carried out within OIOS into what appears to be their sexual abuse investigations in the CAR, co-incidentally also in the Dekoa region, on which they are believed to have spent US\$500,000 and established next to nothing.

Such reviews are very uncommon in OIOS, but it is my understanding that this one, which was ostensibly instructed to identify what lessons could be learned - was never completed but instead made to disappear.

The only logical explanation for which is that it was very critical of the investigation, and for that reason (like many other uncomplimentary documents) is being concealed, not just from the Fifth Committee and the Member States, but also from the OIOS staff supposed to learn the lessons from what went wrong.

This casts serious doubt on just how reliable the UN's own investigations into the allegations in the CAR might have been.

Quality of Investigations

On my very first day in OIOS in 2011, I asked what was what was the operational definition of the word fraud and was told that despite being established in 1994, OIOS did not actually have one. For an Organization that operates with \$14 Billion of the worlds taxpayers money, and had been in existence for some 70 years, I found this quite strange. My concern was later reflected by the Joint Inspection Unit that confirmed the UN was clearly unable to even identify 'fraud'.²⁶

24 Bea Edwards. 'UN External Panel Reviewing Child Sexual Abuse Charges Compromised by Member's Conflict of Interest.' Huffington Post. 8 July 2016. Online at: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/un-external-panel-reviewi_b_7752992

25 Reuters 'U.N. memo casts doubt on some Central African sex abuse accusations' 11 October 2016. Online at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrica-un-crime-exclusive-idUSKCN12B268>

26 Joint Inspection Unit Report; 'Fraud Prevention, Detection and Response in the UN System' 2016. Online at: https://www.unjui.org/sites/www.unjui.org/files/jiu_document_files/products/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2016_4_English.pdf

Attempts to investigate financial irregularities therefore (when the complaints were not just been summarily dismissed) have verged on the comical.

A very recent example of this can be seen in the case of Aahooja (UNDT/2019/033).²⁷

UNICEF have so far failed to respond to my letter (which I am happy to make available) about the implications of this judgement.

Quite apart from holding that an investigator “*must never ask questions just to satisfy their curiosity*” - OIOS has repeatedly promoted individuals who have been responsible for a number of investigations that are publicly known to have been mismanaged because the facts were made public in UNDT judgements.

For their part, the Department of Management – motivated by a desire to protect the individuals responsible – has refused to disclose the financial cost of settling these UNDT cases before the facts of were publicly established in a published judgment.

The result is that there is no disincentive for investigators to do bad work! Promotion is based on patronage not competence so investigators will not be penalised for unethical behaviour or gross incompetence – provided their actions do not embarrass any senior official (or associate of any such official) the Organization wishes to protect.

The importance of Whistleblowers and Member States access to independent information

The UN field missions in Africa operate in areas remote from any oversight. If there is malfeasance or criminality of any sort, the only way this will be discovered is if the UN staff on the ground are prepared to report it.

The reality is that reporting misconduct is tantamount to *career suicide* in the UN and US Government pressure to strengthen 'whistleblower protection' provisions in the Organization have hitherto been unsuccessful.

The UN Ethics Office continues to go to extraordinary lengths never to find 'retaliation' and the OIOS Investigations Director has now begun simply asking the subject to come up for a plausible explanation for his actions; essentially abdicating any investigative responsibility under an already flawed 'whistleblower protection' policy²⁸ but one unashamedly implemented for the purpose of “*keeping the Americans off our backs.*”

UN staff members who have offended more senior and/or politically protected managers by reporting misconduct - including some who have testified before this very committee – all to often suffer for their efforts.

The UN “justice” system offers no relief. The various offices invariably concur in insisting that the

²⁷ <https://www.un.org/en/oa/iaj/files/undt/judgments/undt-2019-033.pdf>

²⁸ Peter A Gallo. 'Designed to Fail; an analysis of ST/SGB/2017/2' February 2017. Online at: <http://peteragallos.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Designed-to-Fail-PAG-on-ST-SGB-2017-2.pdf>

staff member's subsequent grievances are both illusory and completely unconnected with their having reported misconduct.

The UN Press Office has also been particularly vitriolic in condemning them, impugning their character and assisting in the destructing of their reputation. When a journalist in the UK received libelous emails from the spokesman for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCHR) savaging the reputations of both Anders Kompass and Miranda Brown (who testified before Congress in 2016²⁹), a US-based NGO brought this defamation to the attention of the Under-Secretary-General for Management, who later she determined that no action was appropriate because the Spokesman was only expressing his *personal* opinions. This was a preposterous conclusion; the offending email was sent from the spokesman's official OHCHR email account in the course of his official duties responding to an official press inquiry.

That was another example of the Organizations pay-back against the whistleblowers who had the temerity to expose the allegations of child rape; and it sends a signal that other staff members take heed of.

In short, the UN is happy for the Press Office to misrepresent the facts to the point of defamation, while subtly discouraging staff members from reporting misconduct.

The result is that Member States have a biased and unrealistic impression of how UN peacekeeping operations are conducted.

I am consulted by UN staff members from all over the world on a regular basis on a variety of investigative and disciplinary questions, and am no longer willing to recommend that they report misconduct within the UN system, or that they waste their time trying to challenge decisions through the UN "justice" system.

The Organization has no political will to investigate serious misconduct and the retaliation risk for staff members willing to report it is simply too great.

The Cover-up Culture

An illustration of how investigations are manipulated can be seen in how OIOS reacted when the FBI arrested and charged two UN diplomats in October 2015. Acting in concert with a Chinese businessman, John Ashe and Francis Lorenzo were charged with bribery and money laundering, over a scheme which involved the falsification of an official UN document; something that could not have been done without the complicity of a senior official named Mr. Ion Botnaru; identified as "UN Official-1" in the Sealed Complaint.³⁰

The UN's response to those implications illustrate the Organization's unwillingness to hold the official³¹

²⁹ <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20160224/104528/1HHRG-114-FA16-Wstate-BrownM-20160224.pdf>

³⁰ <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/781076/download>

³¹ Mr Botnaru held the post of Director, General Assembly & ECOSOC Affairs Division in the Department for General Assembly & Conference Management. In that role, he reported to Under-Secretary-General Ms. Catherine Pollard. She was previously ASG/OHRM, and has a history of protecting senior OIOS officials implicated in corrupt and otherwise

accountable for his actions. Mr. David Kanja, then the acting Under-Secretary-General of OIOS, ordered that the matter be reviewed by the Internal Audit Division. This allowed the Secretary-General to state (not untruthfully) that OIOS was looking into the matter, but it also allowed the OIOS Investigation Division to then drag their feet for five months, waiting for the Audit Division to complete an assignment that was pointless to begin with.³²

When, after the audit was completed and the investigation began, I have a document that shows it was handled by the most junior and least experienced investigator in OIOS, under the supervision of a senior investigator who has a history of mismanaging major investigations and who is on record as stating that an investigator should “never ask questions just to satisfy their curiosity.”³³ The result was that the investigation report was completed and sent to the Department of Management far too late for any disciplinary action to be taken.

OIOS did find that almost \$2.7 Million that had been contributed by 13 Member States, was embezzled or otherwise diverted to the personal bank accounts of “various high-level United Nations officials.”³⁴ No criminal action appears to have followed and Mr. Botnaru retired with an unblemished record, even to be lauded for his contributions to the Organisation.³⁵

This was not the only occasion when OIOS sabotaged an investigation by delaying sending the report until the staff member had retired.³⁶

The “new approach” to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

The CAR child sex abuse scandal may have been a crisis for the UN, but nothing has changed. The Deschamps Report³⁷ has been filed away and quietly forgotten. Instead, when he took up his post as Secretary-General, António Guterres promulgated what the UN has been keen to describe as a “new approach” policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.³⁸

On closer inspection however, this is not a “new” approach at all. It continues with the same mindset as before, concentrating on *processes*, establishing yet more senior posts, setting up more committees and more working groups and focussing on the public relations effort, all in the attempt to somehow combat the problem by *raising awareness* of its existence or persistence.

unethical behavior. Ms. Pollard was the subject of the complaint by the then Investigations Director that the Organization was anxious to covered up. See UNDT Order No. 185 (NY/2015).
<https://www.un.org/en/oa/iaj/files/undt/orders/ny-2015-185.pdf>

32 email Vlad Dzuro to Michael Dudley. Subject: Nine new cases initiated in relation to the FBI investigation to John Ashe et al. 15 March 2016 at 18:01Hrs.

33 email Vlad Dzuro to Michael Dudley. Subject: Job well done! 4 August 2016 at 13:46hrs

34 OIOS Annual Report for the year to 30 June 2017. A/72/330 (Part I) Online at: [https://undocs.org/A/72/330\(Part %20I\)](https://undocs.org/A/72/330(Part%20I)) . Para 59

35 Iseek. (UN Intranet, not accessible to outside parties) 'Behind the scenes: Ion Botnaru's memories' .Monday, 17 October 2016

36 See 0496/11. http://peteragallo.com/?page_id=424

37 ‘Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers; Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic.’ December 2015. Online at: [http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/cenafrirepub/Independent-Review- Report.pdf](http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/cenafrirepub/Independent-Review-Report.pdf)

38 Online at: <https://undocs.org/A/71/818>

What the “new approach” does, however, is reflect the UN's love for lots of activity, with no actual result.

This “new approach” strategy is doomed to fail for four basic and fundamental reasons, namely:

1. The UN refuses to acknowledge that ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ (most importantly the sexual abuse of minors) is inherently **criminal** conduct.
2. The UN refuses to acknowledge that effective deterrence of any criminal conduct is directly related to the likelihood of the offender being apprehended and held accountable for their criminal acts.
3. The UN still prefers to consider that ‘raising awareness’ of certain conduct being a criminal offence will somehow deter the activity.

And finally:

4. That the UN fails to recognise that that the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was never intended to provide immunity for sexual offences.

Sexual abuse, which is endemic in UN peacekeeping environments, could (like all misconduct and criminal activity carried out by UN personnel) be addressed by removing the investigative and disciplinary functions from the Organization and having complaints investigated thoroughly and independently by a genuinely impartial external agency.³⁹

Even just increasing the *perception* that perpetrators will be apprehended and punished will increase the effectiveness of that deterrence effort.

The UN will resist such a move; it would expose senior officials to the risk of prosecution for their own misconduct, and remove the Organization's ability to use and misuse the Staff Rules selectively to protect individuals they wish to protect and harass others they wish to dismiss. The result of this resistance will be an Organization doomed to remain blighted with the same corruption, inefficiencies and scandals as it has been for the past 70 years

Reform of the UN Investigative Function

The idea that OIOS needs to be abolished is not a new one. Even the former Under-Secretary-General of OIOS (with whom I have openly disagreed on many things) came to that conclusion.⁴⁰

The Secretary-General has even called for an external review of OIOS, saying:

“The implementation of my strategy to combat sexual exploitation and abuse and our strengthened whistleblower policy will be greatly enhanced by our ability to conduct robust and timely investigations. OIOS is an important partner in those efforts. I encourage Member States

³⁹ See previous proposal: <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20160413/104766/HHRG-114-FA16-20160413-SD001.pdf>

⁴⁰ Colum Lynch. ‘The UN's Investigation Wars’. Foreign Policy. 26 August 2015. Online at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/26/the-u-n-s- investigation-wars/>

to mandate an external review of the mandate and capacity of the Office, focusing on its functions in the areas of auditing, investigation and evaluation.”⁴¹

If the Secretary-General seriously believes that the UN has a “whistleblower protection” system worthy of the name or that investigations are “robust”- he is being badly misled. The investigative regime as it exists today is part of the problem, not part of the solution, but it protects certain politically protected individuals, so there are elements in UN management who will prefer the *status quo*.

I would venture to suggest that is why, after 18 months, there is no enthusiasm among senior managers of the Secretariat to encourage the Member States to take a hard and serious look at the corruption within OIOS.⁴²

There is often a misperception that any suggestion of reform is an attack on the very existence of the UN itself. This is erroneous; the objective is not to abolish the UN but simply to ensure that the Organization functions efficiently, and in accordance with the Charter.

Until the Member States take cognisance of the serious problems associated with corruption and the lack of accountability in the UN, the organization will continue as before. This means the Organization will retain control over the information available Member States and condemns (at least) another 60,000 women and children to sexual abuse.

That will ensure that refugee camps in Africa remain occupied so the refugees can continue to be exploited and extorted to pay bribes in return for resettlement.

It will also ensure that funds embezzled or otherwise wasted from the UN peacekeeping budget will continue to fund armed groups and ensure that progress towards a real and lasting peace is never achieved.

That is not the UN that the world needs or that the Member States should be paying for.

Thank you very much

⁴¹ Secretary-General's Report on United Nations Reform: Measures and Proposals: *'Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all.'* A/72/492 dated 27 September 2017. Online at <https://undocs.org/A/72/492>, Para 62. (See also para 63)

⁴² See also JIU Report: The Investigations Function in United Nations System' (JIU/REP/2011/7) Online at: https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2011_7_English.pdf

Ms. BASS. We are going to move on.
We need to—you passed your 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLO. I am sorry.

Ms. BASS. You will have an opportunity in the Q&A to continue to make your points.

We are going to move into questions and answers with the members that are here. I will begin and we will each take 5 minutes and be consistent with that as well so everybody can have an opportunity to ask questions.

Why do not I begin by speaking with Ms. Holt? And you were talking about the funding and, you know, I think—I wanted you to clarify something that I am not sure if I heard you say.

I know I am concerned that Congress has capped the U.S. peacekeeping assessment at 25 percent and I wanted to know the impact of the cap. But I thought you said even before talking about that the resources were being reduced on the U.N. level as well, not even including what the U.S. was doing. Did I hear you correctly?

Ms. HOLT. United States is not the only country but the U.S. is probably the largest country that has outstanding obligations to the U.N.

There are a few issues, as you noted. One, the congressional cap, which was initiated, roughly, 20 years ago and has been lifted repeatedly by Congress was meant to help reduce our assessment. Those negotiations just happened last year and for some reason the administration was not able to align the actual rate which we pay through negotiations with our U.N.—through the U.N.

So Congress faces a problem. The cap will continue to accrue arrears. It is about \$750 million today and it is approaching a billion by the end of the year.

Ms. BASS. Who are some of the biggest, you know, offenders in terms of not making their contributions?

Ms. HOLT. Well, the secretary general has put out a report with every single country and the amount they owe. The U.S., in my understanding, is the largest, and I did not study it to understand the way to rank the countries. But I would be happy to, maybe Paul knows.

Ms. BASS. Dr. Williams.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. The U.N. secretary general's report said the next largest culprits, if you like, were Brazil, which owed \$243 million, Ukraine \$108 million, Venezuela \$50 million, UAE \$38.7 million, then Belarus, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, and Greece. They were the top 10.

Ms. BASS. And I also think one of you—and I am not sure if it was Ms. Holt or Ms. Das—talked about the AU contributions. And so my question is what does the AU contribute.

Was that you, Dr. Williams, that said the AU does not contribute?

Mr. WILLIAMS. The African Union contributes in terms of African Union members.

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. WILLIAMS. So the 54 members of the AU that are also members of the U.N. contribute to the U.N. peacekeeping budget. But the African Union has also just recently set up a new peace fund,

which is trying to fund its own African Union operations and that is where the \$105 million new resources has come from.

But some African countries will be behind in terms of on time and in full in their payments as well. But they have very small percentage contributions to the peacekeeping budget. So it does not figure anywhere near the top 10 countries I just mentioned.

Ms. BASS. What do you think that the U.S. could do to strengthen the African Union so that they get to the point where there is less reliance, frankly, on peacekeepers outside of the continent?

Mr. WILLIAMS. There's a couple of things. No. 1 is to invest in the long term. So provide a stable set of relationships and platforms and mechanisms to allow everybody to know what they are doing over the longer-term period and by that I mean we need to look a decade or so ahead and prepare to enhance the capabilities of this organization.

We do not have funding mechanisms at the moment to do that. It is only the U.N.'s peacekeeping financial mechanisms that provide that degree of stability, and because, as I just mentioned, the African Union is raising money to pay for its own missions at the moment. But it cannot pay for them all.

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. WILLIAMS. And that is where we are stuck. So the U.S. could therefore, I think, invest in that long-term relationship more sensibly.

Ms. BASS. Since we have, you know, capped ours maybe resources could go to assist the AU. Did any of you else want to comment on that?

Ms. HOLT.

Ms. HOLT. Just one point. The U.S. has a very well-known global peace operations initiative, which comes through the peacekeeping account, and it was established in 2004 by the Bush Administration to train African peacekeepers and peacekeepers worldwide.

So that is a long-range capacity building program that has had huge results.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Ms. Das and Mr. Gallo.

Ms. DAS. Just to add to what Tori was saying, the impact of arrears, we are seeing allies—Ethiopia, Rwanda—not getting paid for its contributions and they are doing the bulk of the work, as well as, you know, at the end of the day when helicopters are not being able to deploy, logistics as being affected.

So it is really having an impact on the ground on what peacekeepers are able to do. So lifting the cap would be really recommended and I hope that we can pay our dues in full.

Ms. BASS. Mr. Gallo.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLO. If I could answer the question the other way. If you look at the amount of money that is being spent, the Congo costs \$1.2 billion. CAR and South Sudan are running about a billion each.

All organizations lose money through fraud, waste, and abuse, and even if those missions are only losing 10 percent, that is \$100 million a year.

And it is my concern that there is inefficiency in the way that the money is spent.

Ms. BASS. So I am just about out of time. But could you quickly say what do you think the solution is?

Mr. GALLO. In terms of increasing accountability from the efficiency for which that money is spent, there are some peacekeeping missions which have been rolling on for years and years with no end in sight, and the question is why is the U.N. peacekeeping operations hemorrhaging money to maintain the organizations that are actually involved in the fighting and that is a question that no one will ask.

Ms. BASS. So your answer would be more accountability?

Mr. GALLO. It would.

Ms. BASS. That is the first step that needs to happen? Is that—

Mr. GALLO. Indeed.

Ms. BASS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you again all for your testimony.

You know, in July 2016 in South Sudan we all remember this—a compound called the Terrain compound was overrun by Salva Kiir's troops in Juba. The United Nations peacekeeping mission was asked to intervene. They were asked emphatically, including by the U.S. Government by our mission, and they would not do it.

I went there a month later in August and met not only with Salva Kiir but many others. Asked for accountability but also met with the U.N. peacekeepers and they admitted that mistakes were made and they have made some improvements since, which is a positive thing.

But then when you get other examples of where the U.N. peacekeepers, and I mentioned Bishop Nongo earlier, in the Central African Republic who—you know, he's speaking for all of the bishops of Central Africa in his testimony today. He wants the peacekeepers to have a better, as he points out, rules of engagement.

They need to have enough of them, and that is one question I would ask. You know, we often see that there is a deployment number but there is usually a higher number of authorized slots that are unfulfilled. How are those numbers reached? Is it accurate? Do we need more? Less?

You know, there are always guesstimates, I would suspect. So if you could speak to that issue, because I find that very disturbing. I mean, when I looked eyeball to eyeball with the U.N. peacekeeping leadership in Juba and then we went back the next year, the chair and I, and had another set of meetings, they were making improvements. But it is always like there is a whole lot of atrocity that happens in the interim.

Earlier today we had a big hearing in the full committee on Kosovo, and UNMIK's terrible record there was highlighted. I asked my questions along the realm of UNMIK and their complicity in human rights abuse.

So it is a problem and I would say to Mr. Gallo I had the hearings when we tried to hold U.N. personnel leadership to account on whistleblowers.

To me, a whistleblower, if they are honest and sincere and they bring forth information, we need to put sand bags around them rather than have them put out of their job or put into a situation

where they are in dire—you know, they will never move up, like a ceiling on their upward mobility.

It was way back when Attorney General Dick Thornburgh appeared before our committee in 1980, and I was there, and he said how desperately they need IGs. Not IGs that are part of the system but IGs that are independent with a capital I, and we are still striving to get there. Hopefully, we are getting there but we are still striving to get there.

But that is one reason why I think a lot of people, you know, just want to say if we are going to spend money—and I am a passionate believer in U.N. peacekeeping dollars—we need to do it in a way that is absolutely transparent, that they vet the individuals who are deployed.

After I had those four hearings on what was going on in Goma and went there, I found that there was still a lackadaisical attitude. Jane Holl Lute and a few others were absolutely on the mark. But so many others was, like, well, so what.

Somebody might be sent back from that mission when they got back to their country of origin. They were not prosecuted, and for a time they could even be put or redeployed at a future peacekeeping mission. I think that has changed.

So along those lines, I would also ask rapid DNA technology has been shown to be very effective in addressing sexual assaults. It could also help stop trafficking in persons.

It also could, if we were to do rapid DNA technology for every peacekeeper, when there is an allegation there is a way of proving at least in a paternity effort whether or not they are the ones who are responsible. I mean, it could also have a chilling effect that they know that they will be discovered and they will be prosecuted hopefully by their home country.

Finally, let me just ask you—I have a lot of questions—but in—I would ask unanimous consent, Madam Chair, that Brent Schaefer's—

Ms. BASS. Without objection.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Testimony be included from the Heritage Foundation.

[The information referred to follows:]



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Written Submission to Congress

The U.N. Peacekeeping Scale of Assessment: Methodology and Disproportionate Burdens

Written submission in conjunction with the hearing titled, *UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

April 30, 2019

Brett D. Schaefer
Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
The Heritage Foundation

My name is Brett Schaefer. I am the Jay Kingham Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this written submission are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

I appreciate the opportunity to submit this written statement in conjunction with the hearing titled, *UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. While the witnesses will be discussing challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, I believe that the members of the committee would benefit from a brief overview of financing for peacekeeping operations.

History of the Scale of Assessments

The United Nations Charter does not specify a method for paying for the expenses of the organization even though the U.S. was concerned about shouldering an excessive portion of the funding even in the early negotiations to establish the U.N.¹ The Charter, completed at the 1945 San Francisco conference, references budgetary procedures only in Articles 17, 18, and 19.

- Article 17 states: “The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization” and that the “expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.”
- Article 18 states that each member state has one vote, and that important matters, including budgetary questions, require approval “by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.”
- Article 19 stipulates that any member state “in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years” unless the General Assembly “is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.”²

The lack of detail on financial contributions was deliberate. In the words of the Venezuelan delegate to the San Francisco conference, how the U.N. should be funded was “one of the most delicate and debated questions” and was avoided out of concern that it could undermine the delicate negotiations underway.³ Avoiding the issue facilitated negotiations in 1945, but laid the groundwork for repeated budgetary clashes with the U.S.

Since the U.N.’s establishment, its member states agreed to apportion its expenses “broadly according to capacity to pay.”⁴ This means that wealthier nations, based principally on per capita income, pay larger shares of the budget than poorer nations. The United States has been the U.N.’s largest financial supporter ever since the organization’s founding and was assessed 39.89 percent in the first scale adopted in 1946.⁵ Even in 1946, however, the U.S. strongly objected to paying more than 25 percent of the expenses of the U.N. and sought consistently in subsequent decades to reduce the U.S. assessment.⁶

¹For a detailed history of this practice, see Brett D. Schaefer, “The Window of Opportunity to Overhaul the U.N. Scale of Assessments Is Closing,” Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 2701, June 18, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/06/the-window-of-opportunity-to-overhaul-the-un-scale-of-assessments-is-closing>.

²Charter of the United Nations, Arts. 17–19, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> (accessed March 12, 2019).

³J. David Singer, *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 6.

⁴United Nations General Assembly, “Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations,” Resolution No. 73/271, January 4, 2019, <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/271> (accessed March 12, 2019).

⁵United Nations General Assembly, “Scale of Contributions to the Budgets of the United Nations for the Financial Years 1946 and 1947 and the Working Capital Fund,” Resolution No. 69 (I), December 14, 1946, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69\(I\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69(I)) (accessed April 30, 2019).

⁶See Schaefer, “The Window of Opportunity to Overhaul the U.N. Scale of Assessments Is Closing.”

The U.S. sought to more equitably distribute the costs of the U.N. for several reasons. As the financial burden of U.N. budgets increased, the desire to reduce the cost for U.S. taxpayers has risen as a motivation. Indeed, when the U.S. pays more than 184 nations combined, it is hardly shocking that the U.S. would like other nations to assume a larger share of the cost of the U.N.

However, this was not and is not the sole motive. From the beginning, the U.S. maintained that relying too heavily on one country would distort incentives within the organization and undermine “the sovereign equality of nations.”⁷ The historical struggle of the U.S. to improve U.N. oversight and accountability, and focus resources on high-priority, effective activities—instead of outdated, duplicative, or unproductive activities—illustrates the presence of this concern.

Indeed, as evidenced by their actions in establishing a minimum assessment of 0.04 percent in 1946, the founders of the U.N. did not believe that membership should be costless or insignificant, even though the original member states included extremely poor countries, such as Liberia. Over the past six decades, however, the regular budget assessments provided by poor or small U.N. member states have steadily ratcheted downward.⁸

Adjusting for inflation, a country with the minimum assessment is charged far less in real terms in 2019 than it was charged 70 years ago. For instance, the General Assembly approved \$47.8 million for the expenses of the organization for 1951.⁹ Adjusting for inflation, this would be \$467.3 million in 2019. Thus, with a 0.04 percent assessment in 1951, Liberia was expected to pay the 2019 equivalent of \$187,000—more than five times the amount it will be assessed for both the regular and peacekeeping U.N. budgets in 2019.


The adjustments to the scale over the years has sharply increased the disparity of the financial burden between the member states. Under the current scale, the top 10 contributors are assessed more than 69 percent of the U.N. regular budget and over 80 percent of the peacekeeping budget.

U.N. Regular Budget Scale of Assessments

CHART 1

U.S. Assessed More to U.N. than 184 Other Nations Combined

The United States is assessed more than \$2.5 billion for U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets in 2019, more than the combined contributions of the 184 lowest-assessed nations. More than half of all U.N. member states—101 nations—are assessed less than \$1 million.



NOTE: The regular budget amount is half of the biennial budget for 2018 and 2019 as adjusted mid-biennium in December 2018. The peacekeeping budget amount is the approved resources for July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019.
 SOURCE: United Nations General Assembly, “Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019,” A/C.S/72/25, July 5, 2018, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/72/25> (accessed March 11, 2019); United Nations General Assembly, “Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236,” A/73/350/Add.1, December 24, 2018, <https://undocs.org/en/A/73/350/Add.1> (accessed March 11, 2019); and United Nations General Assembly, “Programme Budget for the Biennium 2019-2020,” A/RES/73/280 A-C, January 7, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/280%20A (accessed March 11, 2019).

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⁷Singer, *Financing International Organization*, pp. 125–126.

⁸Specifically, the minimum assessment for the regular budget fell from 0.04 percent to 0.02 percent in 1974, then to 0.01 percent in 1978, and then to the current minimum assessment of 0.001 percent adopted in 1998. See Schaefer, “The Window of Opportunity to Overhaul the U.N. Scale of Assessments Is Closing.”

⁹Prior budgets were less representative as the organization was going through the process of being established, hiring staff, moving to its permanent headquarters, etc. United Nations General Assembly, “Budget Appropriations for the Financial Year 1951,” Resolution 471 (V), December 15, 1950, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/356\(IV\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/356(IV)) (accessed April 30, 2019).

The current scale of assessments for the U.N. regular budget, which covers the expenses of the Secretariat, the General Assembly, and other U.N. bodies, uses the methodology agreed to in 2001.¹⁰ The calculation of assessments starts with a country's gross national income (GNI) converted into U.S. dollars according to market exchange rates.

For countries under a specified income threshold, the U.N. adjusts the income data downward by 12.5 percent of the country's debt burden (the theoretical debt-service ratio). In addition, countries with low per capita incomes, defined as under the world average for the period, have their incomes further reduced by 80 percent of the difference between a country's per capita GNI (PCGNI) and the world average. The methodology distributes the cost of the debt and low per capita income adjustments on a proportional basis among the member states that do not qualify for those reductions.

Finally, the scale incorporates a maximum assessment of 0.01 percent for "least developed countries" and, for all countries, a minimum assessment of 0.001 percent and a maximum assessment of 22 percent. The methodology distributes the cost of these minimum and maximum assessments on a proportional basis among the member states that do not qualify for those adjustments. The resulting adjusted income over two periods (the preceding six years and preceding three years) are used to derive the final assessments.¹¹

All told, approximately two-thirds of the 193 U.N. member states receive some sort of reduction to their regular budget assessment through various adjustments—in other words, their assessment is less than their share of world GNI.¹²

U.N. Peacekeeping Budget Scale of Assessments

The current scale of assessments for the U.N. peacekeeping budget uses the methodology agreed to in 2001. Under this methodology, the peacekeeping assessment rate uses the regular budget as its starting point and divides the U.N. member states into 10 levels based on (1) permanent membership on the Security Council and (2) their PCGNI.¹³

- Permanent members of the Security Council, placed in "Level A," are assessed at a higher rate than their regular budget assessments. This surcharge, called a "premium," is the total amount of the peacekeeping discounts awarded to other member states in Levels C through J and is distributed on a pro rata basis among the five permanent members.
- Most countries with a PCGNI higher than twice the average for all U.N. member states are placed in "Level B" and receive no discount off their regular budget assessment, that is, they are assessed the same percentage for the regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.
- A small number of countries—currently Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates in the 2019–2021 scale of assessments—with a PCGNI above twice the world average are placed in "Level C" and receive a 7.5 percent discount. This discount is awarded because

¹⁰United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations," Resolution No. 55/5, January 22, 2001, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/55/5b-f> (accessed March 12, 2019); United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Resolution No. 55/235, January 30, 2001, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/55/235> (accessed March 12, 2019); and United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Resolution No. 55/236, January 29, 2001, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/55/236> (accessed March 12, 2019).

¹¹For a detailed explanation, see United Nations Statistics Division, "The Methodology Used for the Preparation of the United Nations Scale of Assessments for the Period 2016–2018," 78th Session of the Committee on Contributions, June 4–29, 2018, PowerPoint file, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/2016-2018%20scale%20methodology%20-%2078%20Session%20-%205%20June%202018.pptx> (accessed March 12, 2019).

¹²For a detailed breakdown of how these adjustments are applied, see United Nations, "Report of the Committee on Contributions," 78th Session, 2018, <https://undocs.org/en/A/73/11> (accessed March 12, 2019).

¹³United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations," Resolution No. 55/5; United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Resolution No. 55/235; and United Nations General Assembly, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Resolution No. 55/236.

they are members of the Group of 77 and are considered “developing countries” even though their PCGNIs are higher than about a third of the countries in “Level B.”

- All countries at or below twice the average world PCGNI are placed in “Level D” through “Level I” and receive discounts between 20 percent and 80 percent off their regular budget assessment. The discounts increase as PCGNI falls below specified thresholds.
- Finally, all countries considered “least developed countries” are in “Level J” and receive a discount of 90 percent off their regular budget assessment.

Over 80 percent of all U.N. member states receive some sort of discount on their peacekeeping assessment. These discounts apply in addition to any regular budget discounts they receive. Overall, discounts applied for the peacekeeping scale of assessments totaled 12.1583 percentage points in 2019 (\$813.5 million under the current peacekeeping budget),¹⁴ which the permanent members of the Security Council shoulder as the premium surcharge.¹⁵

Disparities in U.N. Assessments

The primary result of assessment adjustments has been to shift the costs of the organization away from the bulk of the membership onto a relative handful of high-income nations. The U.S. is the highest assessed country and is charged 27.8912 percent of the peacekeeping budget in 2019. In dollar terms, this equates to \$1.866 billion for the current U.N. peacekeeping budget. As illustrated in the Table:

- The U.S. is assessed more than 186 other countries combined and 280,000 times more than the least-assessed countries.
- Under the current peacekeeping scale of assessment, the 17 countries paying the minimum peacekeeping assessment of 0.0001 percent each will be assessed approximately \$6,691 based on the approved peacekeeping budget for 2018–2019. The standard reimbursement to countries for uniformed personnel deployed on U.N. peacekeeping operations is \$1,428 per soldier per month.¹⁶ This means that the yearly peacekeeping assessment of the least assessed member states covers less than five months of the cost of one U.N. peacekeeper.
- The U.N. will assess 78 of 193 U.N. member states less than \$100,000 this year for peacekeeping and 120 out of 193 member states will be charged less than \$1 million this year for U.N. peacekeeping.

This imbalance is long-standing, but was tolerable when the cost of peacekeeping was minimal as was the case during the Cold War when operations tended to be relatively small and rare and expenditures similarly constrained. However, spiraling costs of peacekeeping in the early 1990s led Congress to cap unilaterally U.S. payments for U.N. peacekeeping at 25 percent of the budget. The resulting arrears put stress on the organization, but created incentives for the other member states to agree to a number of reforms in return for payment, including agreeing to adopt the current methodology for peacekeeping assessments that was projected to lower the U.S. share to 25 percent as required by U.S. law.¹⁷

Unfortunately, the U.S. share of the peacekeeping budget never fell to 25 percent as projected. The difference between 25 percent and what the U.N. charges the U.S. may seem small, but it costs American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars each year.

The U.S. share of the peacekeeping budget is currently 27.8912 percent and Congress has stopped overriding the 25 percent cap on payments for peacekeeping. As a result, the U.S. has again been accruing

¹⁴United Nations General Assembly, “Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236,” A/73/350/Add.1, December 24, 2018, <http://undocs.org/en/A/73/350/Add.1> (accessed April 30, 2019).

¹⁵United Nations General Assembly, “Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019,” A/C.5/72/25, July 5, 2018, <http://undocs.org/A/C.5/72/25> (accessed April 30, 2019).

¹⁶United Nations Peacekeeping, “How We Are Funded,” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded> (accessed April 30, 2019).

¹⁷Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 9, 2001.

arrears. Although the U.S. currently has the largest amount of arrears, it is hardly the only nation in arrears currently nor was it the first nation to withhold funding to the U.N.

In fact, the willingness of the U.S. to withhold U.N. funding dates back to a dispute over two peacekeeping operations in the late 1950s and early 1960s (ONUC and UNEF I) to which the Soviet Union, France, and dozens of other nations withheld payment for political reasons. Tens of millions of dollars in assessments for these missions remain in arrears and are considered to be unpaid contributions, but were placed in a special account and are not included in calculations for Article 19 purposes.¹⁸

While accepting this arrangement, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations at the time, former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Arthur Goldberg, stated:

[I]f any Member can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the organization, *the United States reserves the same option to make exceptions to the principles of collective financial responsibility if, in our view, strong and compelling reasons exist for doing so.* There can be no double standard among the members of the organization.¹⁹

In other words, once other member states established precedent for withholding funding to the U.N., the U.S. made clear that it would in the future be justified in withholding from the U.N. for reasons it found reasonable.

Reapplying Past Lessons

While the U.S. is a powerful and influential nation, in the U.N. it is only one of 193 member states. The U.N. scale of assessments is a zero-sum game. In order for the U.S. assessment to fall, the assessments for other countries must rise. Negotiating the previous reduction in the U.S. assessment took years of skillful, tough diplomatic negotiations led by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, backed by the financial pressure of nearly \$1 billion in U.S. arrears. In good faith, the U.S. paid the arrears that had accrued in expectation that the U.S. peacekeeping assessment would fall to 25 percent. Unfortunately, that never happened.

Reducing the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent will require similar effort over the next three years. As occurred in the 1990s, the U.S. should continue to use its financial leverage and withhold the difference between its peacekeeping assessment and the 25 percent cap enacted under U.S. law until the U.N. implements a maximum peacekeeping assessment of 25 percent. To avoid a repetition of the Helms–Biden disappointment, the U.S. should pay these arrears only after the U.N. incorporates a maximum assessment of 25 percent in the methodology for calculating the peacekeeping scales of assessment.

While this will create short-term financial hardship for U.N. peacekeeping, a more equitable distribution of peacekeeping assessments will benefit the U.N. in the long term and ease the burden on U.S. taxpayers. Peacekeeping benefits all U.N. member states and it is entirely reasonable for the U.S. to call on non-permanent members of the Security Council—whose support is necessary to approve peacekeeping operations—as well as upper-middle-income and high-income countries that have the capacity to pay more and forego peacekeeping assessment discounts.

¹⁸See Schaefer, “The Window of Opportunity to Overhaul the U.N. Scale of Assessments Is Closing.”

¹⁹As quoted in Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force: Political and Moral Dimensions* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1988), p. 269 (emphasis added).

TABLE 1

United Nations Scale of Assessments for 2019 (Page 1 of 2)

	REGULAR BUDGET		PEACEKEEPING BUDGET	
	Assessment (%)	Dollars	Assessment (%)	Dollars
Total	100.000%	\$2,905,898,900	100.000%	\$6,690,542,200
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council				
United States of America	22.000%	\$639,297,758	27.8912%	\$1,866,072,506
France	4.427%	\$128,644,144	5.6125%	\$375,596,681
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.567%	\$132,712,403	5.7900%	\$387,382,393
China	12.005%	\$348,853,163	15.2197%	\$1,018,280,451
Russian Federation	2.405%	\$69,886,869	3.0490%	\$202,994,632
Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council				
Belgium	0.821%	\$23,857,430	0.8210%	\$54,929,351
Cote d'Ivoire	0.013%	\$377,767	0.0026%	\$173,954
Dominican Republic	0.053%	\$1,540,126	0.0105%	\$709,197
Equatorial Guinea	0.016%	\$464,944	0.0024%	\$160,573
Germany	6.090%	\$176,969,243	6.0900%	\$407,454,020
Indonesia	0.543%	\$15,729,021	0.1886%	\$7,265,920
Kuwait	0.252%	\$7,322,865	0.2331%	\$15,595,654
Peru	0.152%	\$4,416,966	0.0304%	\$2,033,925
Poland	0.802%	\$23,305,309	0.2406%	\$16,097,445
South Africa	0.272%	\$7,904,045	0.0544%	\$3,639,655
Total All Current Security Council Members	54.418%	\$1,581,332,063	65.1561%	\$4,359,296,366
Other Highly Assessed Countries				
Australia	2.210%	\$64,220,366	2.2100%	\$147,860,983
Brazil	2.948%	\$85,665,900	0.5896%	\$39,447,437
Canada	2.734%	\$79,447,276	2.7340%	\$182,919,424
Italy	3.307%	\$96,098,077	3.3070%	\$221,256,231
Republic of Korea	2.267%	\$65,876,728	2.267%	\$151,674,592
Saudi Arabia	1.172%	\$34,067,135	1.0841%	\$72,532,168
Japan	8.564%	\$248,961,182	8.5640%	\$572,978,034
Turkey	1.371%	\$39,839,874	0.2742%	\$18,345,467
Spain	2.146%	\$62,360,590	2.1460%	\$143,579,836
Large Peacekeeping Troop Contributors				
Bangladesh	0.010%	\$290,590	0.0010%	\$66,906
Ethiopia	0.010%	\$290,590	0.0010%	\$66,906
India	0.854%	\$24,235,197	0.1666%	\$11,159,824
Nepal	0.007%	\$203,413	0.0007%	\$46,834
Pakistan	0.115%	\$3,341,784	0.0230%	\$1,538,825
Rwanda	0.003%	\$87,177	0.0003%	\$20,072

TABLE 1

United Nations Scale of Assessments for 2019 (Page 2 of 2)

	REGULAR BUDGET		PEACEKEEPING BUDGET	
	Assessment (%)	Dollars	Assessment (%)	Dollars
Notable Groupings				
Lowest assessment (30 countries regular budget, 17 countries peacekeeping budget)	0.001%	\$29,059	0.0001%	\$6,691
Least assessed 129 countries (regular budget)	1.633%	\$47,453,329		
Least assessed 178 countries (regular budget)	21.603%	\$627,761,339		
Least assessed 186 countries (peacekeeping budget)			27.5258%	\$1,841,625,265
Geneva Group (17 countries)	67.462%	\$1,960,377,516	74.2753%	\$4,969,420,291
G-77 + China (133 countries)	25.477%	\$740,335,863	20.2829%	\$1,357,035,984
G-77 without China	13.472%	\$391,482,700	5.0632%	\$338,755,533
NAM (19 countries)	9.533%	\$277,019,342	4.1673%	\$278,814,965
OIC (56 countries)	6.615%	\$192,225,212	3.0984%	\$207,299,760

NOTES:

- * The regular budget amount is half of the biennial budget for 2018 and 2019 as adjusted mid-biennium in December 2018. The peacekeeping budget amount is the approved resources for July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019.
- * The Geneva Group is comprised of countries who share a common view on administrative and budgetary matters. Membership is Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A membership list is available at The Geneva Group, "About the Geneva Group," <http://www.thegenegroup.net/cms/home/about-the-geneva-group.html>.
- * The G-77 is comprised of 132 countries and "Palestine." A membership list is available at The Group of 77, "The Member States of the Group of 77," <http://www.g77.org/g77/members.htm>.
- * The NAM is comprised of 119 countries and "Palestine." A membership list is available at 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, "NAM Members & Observers," May 2012, <https://web.archive.org/web/2014020620076/http://nam.gov.ar/Portal/Home/Default.aspx?categoryID=2775&obj=84394444-8557-4673-8a9e-7774>.
- * The OIC is comprised of 56 countries and the "State of Palestine." A membership list is available at Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, "Members," <https://www.oic-oci.org/States/79an-en>.

SOURCES:

- United Nations General Assembly, "Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019," A/C.5/72/25, July 5, 2018, <https://undocs.org/A/C.5/72/25> (accessed March 11, 2019); Report of the Secretary-General, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236," A/73/350/Add.1, December 24, 2018, <https://undocs.org/en/A/73/350/Add.1> (accessed March 11, 2019); and United Nations General Assembly, "Programme Budget for the Biennium 2018-2019," A/RES/73/280 A-C, January 7, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/280/S/AM (accessed March 11, 2019).

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Conclusion

The negotiators in 1945 did not wish U.N. membership to cause financial hardship, but also recognized that divorcing the costs of the organization from the privileges of membership would create perverse incentives among the member states. The historical struggle of the U.S. to constrain growth in U.N. budgets, improve accountability and oversight, and focus resources on high-priority, effective activities—instead of outdated, duplicative, or unproductive activities—illustrates the prescience of this concern.

To resist this outcome, the U.S. since the founding of the U.N. has argued for a maximum assessment level and, subsequently, for lowering that maximum. In 2001, the U.S. succeeded through use of financial withholding and diplomacy to get the U.N. to adopt a maximum assessment of 22 percent for the U.N. regular budget. Unfortunately, the U.S. was not able to get the U.N. member states to agree to a maximum peacekeeping assessment of 25 percent. This failure has cost U.S. taxpayers well over two billion dollars.

Two decades later, it is time for the U.S. to address this matter. U.N. revenues are at record levels and the demands for finite resources is increasing.²⁰ The U.S. is and always has been the largest financial supporter of the U.N. and should continue to fulfill that leadership role. However, the U.N. would be healthier, and more member states would have an incentive to scrutinize the budget to maximize efficiency and focus resources on priorities, if the costs were more equitably distributed.

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²⁰Brett D. Schaefer, "The U.S. Must Improve Tracking of Its Contributions to the U.N. and Other International Organizations," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 3394, March 11, 2019, <https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/the-us-must-improve-tracking-its-contributions-the-un-and-other>.

Mr. SMITH. He makes an excellent point that even at 25 percent the U.S. pays more than 182 countries combined for peacekeeping. And, again, a lot of what we do never gets on the ledger. AFRICOM, all that we do there, never on the ledger of what we are doing to try to mitigate war and conflict and to promote peace and humanitarianism.

Airlift—all the things we do—which never is on that assessment page. Also, he points out that Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, and the UAE, despite having a per capital gross national income more than twice the world average, they are assessed peacekeeping dues that is equivalent to the poor developing countries.

So that needs to change so that there is more partners contributing to this, and your thoughts on that. I am not sure if that is because they are part of the G-77 or whatever it might be.

But it seems to me a better assessment of who is capable to pay and, again, I would go to 30 percent, whatever it takes. But there are other countries that need to be providing additional money. So DNA rapid technology—if you could speak to that, and also the other questions that I raised.

Yes, Ms. Holt.

Ms. HOLT. I would like to comment briefly, if you do not mind, on the South Sudan case. It was horrific, the attacks in Juba.

Mr. SMITH. Just to interrupt briefly.

Ms. HOLT. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. I found out after I started raising it, and 3 days before I got on the plane to go over there that a member of my—of a humanitarian organization from my district was one of the women who almost got raped. I mean, that is how bad it was, and luckily, you know, she was resisting—heroic, strong—two guys with AK-47s who actually shot and said, you know—and, luckily, the door was broken in and these guys were stopped. But that was Salva Kiir's people. But the U.N. peacekeepers, I say again, would not respond.

Please.

Ms. HOLT. I mean, what you are pointing to is this was an attack by the government forces. But the mission failed to intervene and the civilian—there is a number of Americans involved had called and were reassured peacekeepers were on their way.

We pursued this deeply when I was in the government. We had a very strong—General Patrick Cammaert did a intense review with a whole range of things that we then pressed to put in place.

So I will not argue that—it was never acceptable but it has pushed for a whole new set of protocols so the contingents not be in doubt. This is one of the tensions. When missions go in and think they are partnered with the government but then government forces turn on civilians or even on the peacekeeping missions themselves, as they have in South Sudan, contingents get confused. They are often outgunned by the military forces of the other country in the country that they are serving in.

So it is a horrific example. But I will tell you that it was one that went to the highest levels of our government and other governments, which is why U.S. engagement on these issues—modernization, reform, and the diplomatic muscle that Congress and the

American government can bring—is so critical to continuing to push for these reforms.

I will just say, briefly, also I have not had a chance to read Brett Schaefer's testimony. He is very knowledgeable on these issues. But I will say it would be worth this committee getting a briefing from the administration on why, given some of the points you have pointed out, we were unable to win over diplomatic support to reduce our assessment rate.

I did not mean to take up the whole time.

I was just going to say because there could be a case made and the best way to do it is to start now with that diplomatic push, and I do not understand why the administration was not able to do that. It is a problem.

Ms. WILD [presiding]. OK. Go ahead.

Ms. DAS. Just to comment on the tragic attack at the Terrain Hotel, I have been there before. I know how close it is to the peacekeeping base, and just knowing that peacekeepers did not respond it was a failure.

But many things have happened since then, including pretty much immediately after that attack happened the force commander that did—there was a breakdown in communication—the force commander was fired and then there was an independent investigation that Tori was mentioning which led to recommendations on that this does not happen again.

You know, this is—when peacekeepers are not deployed at the right numbers they are—we do not get to protect as many civilians as we should. But this was a real failure and the U.N. has acknowledged that and they are doing—they are trying to do better.

And just on the DNA testing, we know that a part of the reforms are happening and so looking into DNA testing for paternity claims. And so that is something the U.N. is already pursuing, and we could probably get you more information on what is out there on that.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. On the 25 percent and then the vacancy rates in force generation, I have read Brett Schaefer's testimony and I agree with him on this. There is a very good case politically for lowering the United States rate below 25 percent. It is politically unwise for an organization like the U.N. to rely so much on one member State.

The question, as Tori raised, is why have we failed diplomatically to get our position there accepted at the U.N. General Assembly, and I would submit that a good diplomatic strategy here is to get the 54 members—African members of the U.N.—on side in part by giving in to their requests that we support AU peace operations through the U.N. Security Council and link those two issues. I think diplomatically that would make sense.

On the force generation issue, peacekeeping missions need both numbers and capabilities. So you have to get the numbers of soldiers, police, and civilians. But you also need capabilities, logistics support, ISR support, medical, special forces, increasingly, and military engineering.

Why we need or what we need really is a much better bench because the accountability issues that have been raised means the

U.N. is often desperate to fill missions without the top tier troop-contributing countries providing troops and support.

So we need a broader bench of countries that can provide these types of capabilities. That, unfortunately, is a long-term process of building up militaries and police forces in other countries and we have done that well through programs like the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative.

But it takes time. But we are in a much better situation with the U.N. in 2019. The bench is pretty strong. Countries like Mongolia that you have already mentioned that have come from literally nowhere, but others—Kazakhstan, Serbia—these are all good peacekeeping countries now that did not really exist on the radar screen 20 years ago.

The problem is the political acceptability. It is the U.N. Security Council that pushes the numbers down and the capabilities of peace operations down for political and financial reasons.

So it is hard for the secretariat to make an objective assessment of how many troops and capabilities are needed really to protect civilians in South Sudan or Congo because that number is way higher and the capabilities are way higher than are seen as being politically or financially acceptable at the Security Council.

Mr. GALLO. I think the remaining question is the one you raised on DNA testing. In addition to that, there is no plausible argument against it that I will suggest.

But the investigative capacity has required a first responder ability. The U.N. at the moment does not have that, and the question of DNA samples have to be taken as soon as possible and not stored for a year so that they are useless when they are analyzed—the form of investigation.

And, of course, the other thing is that the international criminal court works on the basis of command responsibility and you hold the first commander accountable for misconduct by his troops.

The United Nations, for internal purposes, for misconduct does not do that.

Ms. WILD. Thank you.

Ms. Das, I wanted to direct this to you. One of the benefits of the U.N. peacekeeping operations is that it promotes institutional stability and fragile States, and democracy building by outside forces can be met with significant opposition by locals.

In those countries that have shown democratic potential, what can be done to avoid democratic backsliding and who is giving institutional and electoral guidance and how do we make sure that the democratic framework being established addresses local needs and challenges?

Ms. DAS. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. We have seen the U.N. support democratic elections in Central African Republic. We have seen it in Co-côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, where we have helped government institutions build capacity and longstanding capacity that they continue to build resilience.

So the U.N. peacekeeping is one partner. But there are other U.N. agencies including UNDP that play a critical role on helping to establish democratic practices.

And this is another way that when the U.S. is engaged we push for democracy in these places and it is really important that the

U.N. peacekeeping continues on this. I mean, the Central African Republic is a great example of where we have seen successful transfer of power from a transitional government and then having elections where the elected leader is trying to do the right thing.

It needs support from the U.N. and from the U.S. to continue—it is a very fragile State—continue to pursue the right things, the right—democracy and have—extend State authority.

So that is one thing that U.N. peacekeepers have been working on is to support the government institutions to help extend State authority in that country.

So that is one example that we have been working with the U.N. on quite a bit.

Ms. WILD. And what kind of oversight does the U.N. have, for instance, in a country like Liberia where the peacekeeping missions were closed in 2018?

Ms. DAS. So there is a country team there that continues to work to support the government institutions and it is led by UNDP.

So there is a continuing footprint of U.N. presence there to continue the work that peacekeepers have already built on and then to make sure that it does not slide back, as you had mentioned before.

Ms. WILD. What kind of enforcement mechanisms do they have, if any?

Ms. DAS. I do not—I am not sure if there is an enforcement mechanism in the sense of boots on the ground. But there is definitely—you know, I think there is definitely support within the Security Council and others to make sure that the gains made by peacekeepers are trying to move forward and continued.

Ms. WILD. And let me just ask you this. Well, actually, let me ask this of Dr. Williams or Mr. Gallo.

While I appreciate the AU's utility of peacekeeping operations and I certainly understand why the AU peacekeeping operations may have more local legitimacy with host governments than U.N. operations, I think it is vital that the AU operate in a manner that is consistent with U.N. priorities, objectives, and policies.

What are the best ways to give the AU autonomy in conducting peacekeeping operations while also retaining, implementing, and enforcing U.N. oversight?

I will put that out there for either one of you or both of you.

Mr. WILLIAMS. So there is two ways we can think about how to enhance the AU's accountability and performance on the ground. Option one is to let it do it all itself and to have no oversight mechanisms. Option two is to support the AU with multilateral legitimacy of a Security Council resolution authorizing its missions.

And then if it comes with U.N. support, that has to meet what we call the HRDDP—the human rights due diligence policies—which means that any U.N. support that is given to the African Union has to come with the types of accountability mechanisms that Peter was talking about earlier to make sure the AU troops are acting in conformity with international humanitarian law and human rights law.

And so I think that is the two real options here. And so the better one I think is to provide external support.

Now, that has been happening on an ad hoc basis for about the last 10 years. And so when the African Union has asked for U.N. or partner support from the European Union or United States, we have then said to the AU that you need to improve your conduct and discipline policies.

You need to produce a policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and how to reduce it. You need to provide policies on accountability across the board. In that, the organization, in my opinion, has made significant strides and progress over the last 10 years.

It is still not perfect. But I think the best way to ensure that it gets better is to work, as I have said, through the U.N. and provide those types of accountability mechanisms that are built in.

Ms. WILD. Mr. Gallo, did you want to add anything to that?

Mr. GALLO. No, ma'am. You are asking a political question, which is outside the scope of my comfort zone.

Ms. WILD. Thank you.

Ms. Houlahan, I believe you are up.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you very much for the chance to speak with you all, and I really appreciated the conversation. I also serve on the Armed Services Committee and so I have the opportunity to watch the budgetary process for the DOD go through the Congress.

And one thing that I have consistently heard through that NDAA process is the DOD and contractors alike will talk about the importance of consistency of funding and something, you know, not being erratic.

And I know you guys, almost every one of you, had the same kind of plea was not only funding but consistent funding regular and predictable.

My question is, in the DOD side of things we hear very specific examples of what happens when you do not fund on time or you do not fund to the proper amount—you know, steel plants shuttering, production lines of helicopters shut down, losing our resident labor unions—those kinds of things.

I know that this is a quantifiable amount of money that you are asking for. But what happens when it does not happen on time? Can you give us some anecdotal stories of what happens when we do not get the funding that we are asking for?

Ms. DAS. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.

The first thing that happens is that troop-contributing countries do not get reimbursed for providing troops. So I had mentioned India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia. These are—Rwanda—these are our allies who do a bulk of the peacekeeping. They are the ones who send out their troops in harm's way.

And then the second thing that happens is—one anecdote that we heard recently was a country that provided helicopters. Their helicopter was—needed maintenance.

But because that maintenance was not able to be provided, that helicopter no longer deploys and that country no longer provides helicopters to peacekeeping, which is a main way a lot of these places in Africa do not have the necessary roads or places to get to. So helicopters are a vital resource that is lacking.

And so these are some of the major things. But then, you know, even getting peacekeepers to project and leave their bases and do

protection of civilians outside is really critical and not having that capacity because their logistics or their vehicles do not have the fuel or what not is really problematic.

So these resources have critical needs that are not being met. But I will let my colleagues—

Ms. HOLT. I would just add this as to your report, maybe we could submit it for the committee's consideration. This is the report on the financial situation.

Among the things pointed out in that report is that it looked like only two of the peacekeeping missions have a minimum cash reserve of 3 months of operating costs. So it puts them in an uncertain posture. And so some of it is also the psychological problems.

So I would worry that if a mission faced a crisis such as Congresswoman Smith was describing in South Sudan, you know, would that impact the mobility because your fuel supply may have run out of the funding for that month. That's a hypothetical. But you can see how this would cramp the operational pace of the mission.

I would also say by borrowing from troop-contributing countries to fund missions it also puts the U.S. in a precarious position for our own leadership. It gives every country that wants to push us aside a talking point. Like, why should we listen to you—you are not even paying your fair share.

And so it is a wonderful way to distract from our calls for performance and accountability, modernization and reform. And so I would say that is another kind of substantive impact.

And then, third, it suggests that we do not take these missions seriously. As a member of the council we vote for them. We often write the mandates ourselves. We have often trained many of the troops that go in. And so for us not to fund it is really confusing to other countries as well.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Just to add one more point, it undermines the attempt to get that bench that I was talking about earlier because, like anything in life, you are disincentivized doing a job if you are not sure you are going to get reimbursed for the money that you are owed doing that and that is what we are doing to the world's biggest troop-contributing countries, as has already been mentioned.

So we are, on the one hand, trying to get more effective and accountable missions deployed in the field but, with the other hand, we are taking away the money in reimbursement that we are giving to those peacekeepers that should be operating in the field.

So it disincentivizes particularly the more least-developed and poorer countries where financial incentives are, you know, one of the factors.

Mr. GALLO. Let me point out that there is a financial incentive for troop-contributing countries to provide troops to the United Nations.

If the United Nations budget is short, the government—the TCC should still be paying its own troops on the ground. So it is not—it is not the direct cause and effect, and if you are telling me or if anyone is suggesting that the financial situation is so precarious that the—those troops cannot be deployed because they have not

been paid by the host nation government, I would question the fitness for role—for being in a peacekeeping role in the first place.

Ms. HOLT. With permission, if I could just say one thing.

Ms. WILD. Yes, go ahead.

Ms. HOLT. When I was in the State Department, an African country came to us and said, we have been asked to deploy. We took out a large loan to pay for not the troops but all the equipment they need to bring with them and have been delayed in the deployment and then the loan was due.

So they were in a bit of a bind because they had put out a lot of funds for which it was not—they were not a wealthy country.

So there are things beyond paying soldiers that actually are part of the budget.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I appreciate your time. Thank you. I yield back.

Ms. BASS [presiding]. Representative Omar.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Chairwoman.

So my question really is, to begin with, Dr. Williams, I wanted to address your fourth recommendation. I do agree that it is a problem politically and logistically for the U.N. to rely heavily on the United States.

The efforts of peacekeeping forces are too important to depend the whims of U.S. politics. We have seen the consequences of this administration that is outright hostile to international organizations and allies, and for those of us who believe in the importance of these organizations to figure out a more sustainable way is important.

But one of the unfortunate realities has been that when the United States steps back its obligations, other countries do not step up.

So I wanted to talk to you. Can you tell me a little more about what the strategy would be in encouraging African countries to step up on peacekeeping contributions and what that would look like? Is there a political will in Africa or in Europe or in any other country to pick up the burden if the United States keeps paying less in peacekeeping efforts?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you very much for the question. So there is a couple of ways to answer it. At the general macro level, we need to make this thing worth investing in.

And so this thing—this enterprise of U.N. peacekeeping has got to be seen to be across the board of the U.N. membership something that works and can be effective and accountable and can do things that we really need to do. So that is the first challenge is selling it that way.

That is undermined by our absence of the Ambassadorial positions and others at New York at the moment and by not paying our own contributions.

The second part of this, though, is that when the U.S. retreats from its leadership others are stepping up and filling that vacuum. China is the key player here when it comes to U.N. peacekeeping.

China's financial contributions have risen quite significantly over the last few years. It is now paying about 15 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget and it has a quite different set of views of the types of things that U.N. peacekeepers should be doing in the field.

And so the vacuum will not remain a vacuum for long. Others will fill it.

And third, then, for the African countries themselves, they are stepping up or they are starting to step up now with the new peace fund that they are trying to develop indigenous sources of funding for their own missions.

But in the short term, it is completely unrealistic to expect these countries to pay the nearly \$1 billion, for example, that AMISOM costs in Somalia.

My suggestion is that we make a sort of diplomatic quid pro quo or linking of these issues. The African Union wants us to support their missions through the U.N.

The United States wants to pay less for U.N. peacekeeping. And so I am sure there is some diplomatic middle ground in there. So that is how I would approach that issue.

Ms. OMAR. That is great, and thank you for bringing up Somalia. That was going to be the sort of next question that I was going to ask in another, I think, important dynamic in peacekeeping is the discrepancy between peacekeepers, national police, and the military.

If we use Somalia, for example, when you speak to Somalis they will mention the fact that peacekeepers get a salary of about \$1,400 a month.

And when the salary for the Somali military individually is \$50 with the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia now drawing down, there is a lot of anxiety in the region within Somalia that is exasperated because people are trying to figure out what that looks like.

And so I just wanted to know if you had any suggestions on how we should invest in building local capacity, what the transition—what are the best practices for a full transition to happen when AMISOM leaves Somalia, which I am guessing is happening pretty soon, and how do we invest in gaining the trust of the countries that we have peacekeeping missions and knowing that we have made the right investment so that they can now transition into guarding their own peace.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. That is a difficult set of questions but I will try my best.

The first point—

Ms. OMAR. We have a limited time so—

Mr. WILLIAMS. Sure. AMISOM is not, in my opinion, going to leave nor should it leave Somalia completely anytime soon. But the issue will be can it reconfigure its size and its mobility over time.

The current debate is looking to, about a year or so after the elections if they happen in Somalia in 2020 and 2021, AMISOM can start drawing a bit more down there.

But it is not on the table to leave completely. Second, when it comes to the money the one thing we should not do is cut the budget to the U.N. support office in Somalia.

So the Somalia National Army Forces that you mentioned and AMISOM get all their logistics and mission support coming through the U.N. support office in Somalia.

So when we are saying here another effect of not paying our fees or dues at the U.N. is that UNSOS is undermined that means the

Somali National Army and AMISOM is basically suffering less logistical support to conduct operations against al-Shabaab.

So we need to maintain that. And then on the individual level, SNA troops are getting, roughly, or should get, I should say, about \$250 a month. An AMISOM peacekeeper, at the moment, is getting about \$800 a month. So I can see that their—the Somalis you mentioned earlier that discrepancy is real.

Ms. OMAR. Yes. Our records, what I have, says \$1,440 a month for AMISOM.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is what the—no, the U.N. guard force. UNSOM, the U.N.'s political mission in Somalia, has a Ugandan guard force that are paid at the U.N. rate of, roughly, \$1,400 a month.

The African Union peacekeepers in Somalia get a lower rate, a different rate, which is at the moment about \$800 a month, because that is paid for by the European Union.

As I said earlier, the African Union cannot pay its own money. So the European Union actually pays the AMISOM peacekeepers at a rate of \$800 a month.

Ms. BASS. Representative Phillips.

And when we are done—when Representative Phillips finishes, I will go back to Representative Smith. But if anybody else after that on the committee wants to continue, we can certainly do that.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, and to each of our witnesses.

My first question is about China, and with our diminished role or seemingly diminished role and increased interest by China throughout Africa, my question to each of you is are you seeing growing Chinese influence through the U.N.

I believe China is now one of the largest troop contributors and, I think, the second largest funder of our peacekeeping efforts.

If so, are you seeing it? If so, how, and then what are the implications in the near and long term?

Ms. Holt, if you might begin.

Ms. HOLT. Thank you very much.

I think each of us might have an aspect answer. China is aggressively moving forward to be seen as a leading country on peacekeeping. As you note, they are the largest member of the permanent members of the Security Council with, roughly, 2,400 troops on the field, which is a huge change.

When I was in government, we led a dialog with China in 2009 and 1910 and at the time they had very small numbers and they mostly were building roads.

Today, they have a diversity of capacity. Second, as you note, they have increased their financial contribution, and with this, frankly, comes voice and sway in the larger organization.

The evidence that I know of is still somewhat anecdotal. But they did try and cut staff positions for protection of civilians and human rights during a budget committee debate and overview of peacekeeping missions.

Usually the U.S. would be there and say that is ridiculous—no, we are not doing that. But they will continue to have a different vision for what peacekeeping missions should do in the field.

They, traditionally, have not been as forward leading as we have on human rights, on protection of civilians, and ability to use force on behalf of civilians.

So I think the trends are still working themselves out. The U.N. has turned to China for a number of major studies and one was quite forthright on the security of missions themselves, and I think that you see also a shift in these extra budgetary funding, sometimes for a good cause but it will give them more leadership capability and sway, particularly if the U.S. is not at the table and aggressively engaging in the way we are used to.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you.

Ms. DAS.

Ms. DAS. Eighty percent of the Chinese peacekeepers are actually deployed in Africa and they have a 8,000-person standby force that they are eager to test out.

Mr. PHILLIPS. How large? I am sorry.

Ms. DAS. Eight thousand.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Eight thousand.

Ms. DAS. The standby force that is—that they have offered to the U.N. peacekeepers. And they are wanting to deploy their new technologies and peacekeeping and try different things out.

So they are happy to deploy in these ways and, again, I had mentioned before the U.S. only provides 40. We do a lot of ways and, obviously, our financial contribution is huge.

But, as Tori is mentioning, when the U.S. is not engaged in these conversations about budget cuts we have seen China try to take out positions on human rights or protections of civilians.

And so it is really important that the U.S. continue to be engaged because China is happy to take that role and kind of push their own agenda forward in these discussions.

So China's influence is rising and it is something that we should—the U.S. should be countering at the U.N.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you.

Dr. WILLIAMS.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would agree with everything you have just heard. I think it is spot on. I would just add one thing. I think China is learning at the moment how difficult U.N. peacekeeping can be.

In Representative Smith's earlier question about UNMISS and Juba, China was one of the contributing countries that was caught up in those issues and it is facing a very difficult set of dilemmas that all the other U.N. contributing countries have faced over time.

So it is learning. The way it is learning, though, is in part by putting more effort into doing this enterprise. It has now had a couple of force commander slot submissions so it has got experience about how to run these operations.

It has increased over the years not just deploying engineers and logisticians and medical soldiers. It has been now deploying actually infantry battalions into Mali and South Sudan. So its military forces are getting more operational experience on the ground here.

China, obviously, does not have the equivalent of NATO or a lot of overseas theaters to practice this. So I think it is learning through operational experience that it is getting in the peacekeeping missions.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you.

Mr. GALLO.

Mr. GALLO. To further add on to that, the question of voice and sway, when the United States is not at the table China, clearly, has a very different approach to human rights.

In our perception, human rights is imperative in building democracy and institution building, and if the function of peacekeeping is to, you know, make countries safe and to institute a lasting peace, that is something that has to be done because it cannot be separated from the human rights issue.

And the other question to be looked at is look at the corruption cases being prosecuted by the FBI in New York involving Chinese corruption involving the U.N. and why is the U.N. not diligent in eradicating this corruption from the inside.

Thank you.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Before I—Mr. Gallo, you have spoken on this on a number of times. But if we could wave a magic wand here in Congress where would we start relative to the oversight and anti-corruption efforts that you deemed so necessary?

Mr. GALLO. With regard to oversight? There is no oversight of the investigation function in the U.N. So, basically, that means the U.N. carry out the most shambolic investigation that you have ever seen in your life and I can give you plenty of examples of this.

And the legal system within the U.N. is only concerned with the process. There is no concept of the unreasonableness of the decision. So long as the U.N. can hold that the decision was made in accordance with the process, the legal system is not concerned with what that decision is, and that is what leads to some of the most ridiculous things that we have ever seen and that is what leads to the lack of whistleblower protection and that is germane to the corruption inside the U.N.

U.N. reform on a global basis is a massive undertaking and a daunting international challenge. Reform of the investigation function is a lot more manageable, a lot more feasible and will affect the culture of the organization.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you. I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Phillips.

Mr. SMITH.

Mr. SMITH. Real quick, if I could.

Mr. Gallo, you had mentioned one Wu Hongbo, a former U.N. undersecretary general for the diplomatic Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the U.N. who, in a Chinese television appearance, told how he used his position to protect Chinese national interests and had a Uighur Muslim politician and human rights activist barred from the U.N.

Those examples—I mean, I held a hearing last year on the Uighurs. We had a woman who had been severely tortured and when she asked her torturer why in China, in the autonomous region, Xinjiang, why it was happening, he goes, because you are a Muslim.

And yet many of these people—cannot say certainly, but many like Wu Hongbo, carry that mind set into the United Nations, which I think is a—and you might want to speak to that.

But you also in your testimony talked about the Dekoa investigation and how children fathered by peacekeepers and a subsequent U.N. investigation with regard to paternity claims, if you might want to elaborate bit on that. I am not sure you did so in your opening comments.

And, again, as I asked earlier, whether rapid DNA tests have helped insofar as the spoilage of the evidence. I would also ask Secretary Guterres has launched the Action for Peacekeeping Initiative. How do you feel about it, all of you?

Is it a good idea? Does it have flaws? Is it well-meaning but not necessarily effective enough? Please speak on it.

And then, finally, is there a conflict or an emergency somewhere on the planet that cries out for a deployment now or is on the precipice of being in need of such a deployment of U.N. peacekeepers?

Mr. GALLO.

If I can start with the Dekoa investigation. I cannot answer that question fully because neither I nor anyone else has seen that report.

It exists, but we do not know what is in it and there are all sorts of rumors going around, and the one about the DNA, and I was told and I had absolutely—I mean, I cannot testify to this because I do not know it but the story is that DNA samples were taken and stored in a drawer for a year.

So when they were tested they were useless and that allowed the investigation to conclude that the DNA results did not establish paternity.

Now, I do not know if that is true or not and that is the importance of the Dekoa report and that is why it has not been released or I believe that is why it has not been released.

Now, I understand there is a lot more to it. But it is a bit a holy grail. So I am afraid you are going to have to find that one for yourself.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will leave the action for peacekeeping to my colleagues who are better placed to answer that. But on your—is there a crisis anywhere on the planet, in Africa I think the two places that concern me most would be the sort of the spillover effects from Mali.

And so, particularly, in the Sahel we have seen a lot more Islamist fighters moving particularly into Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, that area. So the spillover effects that the U.N. peacekeeping mission cannot deal with because it is confined to Mali is one place.

The second place in Africa for me that is very worrying is Cameroon and the violence that we have seen over the last 18 months or so there.

Where the government is problematic elsewhere in the world it is Ukraine and Yemen are the two places where we are actively debating whether U.N. and what type of U.N. types of operations might be helpfully deployed there.

Ms. DAS. Just carrying off of what Paul had mentioned I think concerns Ukraine and there has been debate about peacekeeping there. But because of where the Security Council is, it is very doubtful that there would be anything happening.

And another concern in Africa would be Burundi. Their government has been very strategic about pushing the U.N. out and mak-

ing sure that there are not human rights or anybody kind of watching what's happening there. So that is a place I would be worried about.

Regarding action for peacekeeping, it is a really innovative idea took hold of the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries as well as the financiers, the U.S., together hold them accountable from when you deploy peacekeepers in making sure that there is a political process.

So peacekeepers are being deployed to some of these places for long times because the political process or political solution has not come to fruition.

So making sure that these three—these counterparts are working together that there is a political solution so we can end some of these peacekeeping missions. So it is really about the implementation and, you know, we are very hopeful that this will move forward some of these missions that have been longstanding.

Ms. HOLT. I will just add to the excellent comments. On the newest A4P agenda for peacekeeping, it has, as been described, pushed back to the politics a little. If you have a weak peace agreement, the best peacekeeping in the world cannot tape it back together again. And so some of that is reinvesting in the diplomatic and the negotiations behind the peace agreement.

And I will suggest to you, given where your interests are, there is a role for Congress to even raise that politically and help.

I was in New York a few weeks ago and I got lobbied by a member State to say, this is a great platform. You folks in the outside community need to be helping us—basically, implement these reforms, and I am, like, OK.

So I think there is some momentum behind it, and with support from countries like the U.S. and others, it is a continuation of this 5-year effort for really getting serious about modernizing and reforming in the field, including on protection of civilians, sequencing, and basically making missions fit for purpose.

I will say as far as the new places my colleagues have mentioned, Yemen in particular, there has least been an observer team sent out to figure out what the future might hold.

We would all have long-term hopes for places like Syria. Countries do not always invite the U.N. in, and I would put Venezuela on that list right now, and then also we'll see what other parts I would concur, and Cameroon it is quite curious.

My last point might just be briefly the U.N. is a living breathing organization. Just like Congress it is full of people. People who want to basically do well and do better. But they need push and they need help and they need support.

So it is not whether—I think much of the problems we have heard on accountability and corruption it requires governments like ours and outsiders like us to push in and do the best they can and I think that is part of our role.

Thank you.

Ms. BASS. I think it is like Congress.

[Laughter.]

Ms. BASS. I am just—

Ms. HOLT. May I clarify for the record? That was not about corruption. That is about the ambition.

Ms. BASS. No. No. You know—
Representative OMAR.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you. I just felt like my last question was not answered. So I will rephrase it and see if we can start with Ms. Holt and then maybe get all three of you on the record.

So the peacekeeping mission in Somalia has now been in effect for 12 years. Oh my God, it is 12 years. And I just wanted to see if you would agree that there has been efforts made to strengthen the police force, the military force within Somalia so that there could be a process set up for success once the peace mission ends.

Was that always the plan that this will ultimately end at some point and were there mechanisms—are there mechanisms put in place for that to happen?

And then the second piece of that question is that because there is this gap in compensation for whether it is U.N. or AU or the local military, we hear reports—newspaper reports that some of the military or the police within Somalia sometimes might—because they cannot—they are not getting paid for months sometimes that they might sell their weapons to militia or maybe even terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab—is there conflict in that and could their remedy be to help in trying to give them proper compensation?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will answer it this time.

Ms. OMAR. Yes. Whoever wants to take and then the three of you will—

Ms. HOLT. I will make some points, Paul.

Just a minor distinction. It is often said it is peace keeping in Somalia. But the distinction I might make it is a Chapter 7 authorized peace enforcement mission. It is not led and run by the United Nations even as it is authorized by the Security Council and the African Union.

It is able to use force to achieve its aims, which is including going after al-Shabaab. So I just want to make that distinction between most of the missions we are describing today, which are invited in with consent and use force in defense of the mandate to protect civilians themselves and their—so one is able to do war fighting, the other is not.

And as I understand it, you know, the aim has been that this peace enforcement mission works alongside the U.N. political office, has U.N. logistics, and there is a U.N. country team which is focused on development and humanitarian enterprises.

So it is not exactly a peace keeping mission. But the idea was if Amazon could create a secure and stable environment, it should be handing off, as you describe, to local police, work with local communities, have governance take root, and we were trying to encourage all of this to happen simultaneously.

Professor Williams will know better than I the state of play. The gap that was always, unfortunately, well recognized was you did not have enough capability coming in behind to then play that stabilizing role for police and rule of law, and to work appropriately with the communities which—

Ms. OMAR. And that lack of capability is with the country or with—

Ms. HOLT. Probably a combination. Amazon cannot bring everything with it and the government was still, as I understood, working to try and build out and work also with local authorities. So I think that is a work in progress.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would agree with everything said.

Just to add, one is that AMISOM has not even reached year zero in the world of normal peace keeping, and what I mean by that is all these other missions we have talked about normally deploy after a cease-fire or after a peace agreement.

There is no peace deal in Somalia and there has not been. So the 12 years that AMISOM so far is—we are still not even at year zero for peace keeping—which is why fatigue might be setting in.

Second, as Tori mentioned, AMISOM is basically a conventional military force that is trying to degrade a network transnational terror network in the form of al-Shabaab.

And so there is no way that a conventional force like AMISOM is able to militarily defeat al-Shabaab. It relies ultimately on trying to stabilize the recovered areas that al-Shabaab used to control and that requires police, administrators, civilians, and that is where the Somali government and the Federal member States have been in short supply.

But to your final—to your question and, finally, about has AMISOM boosted local police forces and the army, yes. Over that 12 years, there is no comparison.

If you look at the 12-year period, the Somalian national army, the State police forces and the regional police forces and also the Darwish and the militia groups in Somalia, they are in a much better situation to deal with these issues now than they were 12 years ago.

But have they reached the level where you would want to pull AMISOM out in the last couple of years, as we talked about, I do not think we have reached that stage yet.

And yes, the SNA are sometimes guilty as are the regional forces of selling ammunition, food supplies, rations, and other things.

They have just recently completed their biometric identity data base for the Somalian national army which quite—it is amazing if you think about it. Until this year, we did not know who was in the Somalian national army. And if you do not know who is in the army we cannot do all the other things subsequently.

So that has only just happened but that is a sign of positive progress there. Now the job is to pay them through, basically, mobile phone and secure banking networks linked to their biometric IDs and when they are paid they can properly focus on pushing back al-Shabaab and not on some of other issues that they have unfortunately strayed into previously.

Ms. OMAR. I know we have to go, but can I ask one more question? OK.

And this question is for Mr. Gallo. I know that I would be in trouble if I did not—in talking about accountability and oversight, not bring his up with many of my constituents.

There is the question of rape and sexual violence with some of the peacekeepers in Somalia and the process of accountability has not really been quite transparent and I wonder in your conversation about waste and fraud does the other kind of tragedies that

sometimes might be caused by those that are deployed by the U.N. to engage in peace keeping go along the same line?

Mr. GALLO. Ma'am, I mentioned in my written statement my concern about the U.N.'s lack of concern with known cases of corruption in Somalia.

In 2015, I believe my former office conducted a number of investigations and discovered \$0.80 on the dollar of aid money going into Somalia was being lost or was otherwise unaccounted for.

We know that that was—there were connections in that case to al-Shabaab and the U.N. was simply not interested in pursuing it.

What can I, as an individual, do about that other than to tell you that it exists and that it happened?

Ms. OMAR. So only 20 percent was going to do the work and 80 percent—

Mr. GALLO. Yes, between 70—

Ms. OMAR. We do not know—it could have gotten into the hands of a terrorist organization like—and there is no accountability measure for it?

Mr. GALLO. Well, it was even worse than that. As I understand it, OCHA received these reports and stuck them in a bottom drawer for 3 months and refused to tell the member States, because if the member States knew about it they might reduce their contributions for the following financial year.

But that is the culture of the U.N. There is no accountability. Nobody's career is going to be harmed for doing something like that.

Ms. OMAR. But yes, thank you for pointing that out. I was not really here when you gave your testimony. I think it is important for us to see clarity in reports like that and make sure that that level of corruption is not being perpetuated without any remedy for it.

But if one of you wants to help address maybe what transparency and accountability had looked like for the cases of rape by AMISON within Somalia or any of the countries where they are doing peacekeeping work.

Mr. GALLO. I can tell you how the system works.

Ms. OMAR. I was going to have—yes.

Thank you.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. Yes, the statistics are right. Transparency International has put Somalia as the most corrupt country for the last 11 years or so. The figures of 70 percent or so disappearing were normally, at least according the U.N.'s monitoring group reports, from about the 2012–13 period and it has got better since then.

The fact that a lot of that money is disappearing, though, does not automatically mean it has ended up in the hands of al-Shabaab. The vast majority of this just means we cannot track it financially in the normal ways that we would track accounts.

But that was because Somalia did not have a finance ministry and a central banking system that worked. So the money not being traced did not automatically mean it was going to terrorism actors like al-Shabaab.

On AMISOM, yes, there was—allocations were seriously raised against AMISOM troops in 2014 by Human Rights Watch research-

ers and reports, and they made various allegations about SEA and rape in some cases.

The African Union conducted an internal investigation looking into that, the results of which were published subsequently in 2015. But more to the point, what has happened in practical terms is Uganda started as the main troop contributing country in AMISOM.

It started to hold court marshals in Mogadishu itself for two reasons—one, to obviously, reiterate that this is not acceptable behavior and there would be consequences, but second, this would need to be done on Somali territory so that Somalis could see the impact of the African Union actually trying to promote justice and accountability here, and those things continue to this day.

Ms. OMAR. Go ahead.

Ms. DAS. Just to add to what Paul had mentioned, not necessarily for AMISOM but just in general, in 2015 the secretary general put together an online data base. So every allegation that was ever reported is in this data base and where they are in the reporting, so in their investigation as well as what—have they been prosecuted and what the justices look like.

In 2016, the U.S. put together a resolution called 2272, giving executive power to the secretary general to remove any troops that are doing systematic wide abuse. So this has been implemented in Central African Republic where the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo both countries were repatriated from that country.

And then Congressman Smith mentioned Jane Holl Lute. She is looking at sexual exploitation and abuse across the U.N. system, not just within peacekeeping. So it is—you know, we are looking at UNDP and others. It is something that this secretary general is very focused on and addressing this.

And then, you know, in the last 2 years we have seen the numbers decrease significantly. In 2016, there was 103 cases of SEA—sexual exploitation and abuse—by peacekeepers. That has dropped to 50.

And, last, it is really important for the secretary general that we are assisting victims. So there is a victims rights advocate, Jane Connors, who reports directly to the secretary general, and on top of that, she has victims' rights advocates that are embedded within the mission, so making sure that victims have access to—access to legal services as well as health services on the ground.

But any case—one case of sexual exploitation and abuse is one too many by peacekeepers.

Ms. OMAR. Well, thank you all for your testimony. I think, you know, we all understand how valuable—I mean, I speak from first-hand experience how valuable the work that international organizations do are.

And to Mr. Gallo, I would say thank you so much for your testimony and for really seeking accountability. I do not believe that we should throw the baby out with the bath water and I think that there are a lot of people who are very much interested in being advocates for accountability and transparency and seeing where we could create reforms and where we could be truth seekers.

Again, I know this has been very informative for me and probably for a lot of our committee members and I do want Ms. Holt to take you up on that offer of going with you and seeing what the work looks like on the ground.

Thank you.

Ms. BASS. Once again, I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today and the meeting is now adjourned.

Mr. GALLO. If I could interject with a clarification, Chairman, the conduct and discipline website which Ms. Das refers to does not list all of the allegations.

It lists the investigations. The United Nations does not publish the numbers of complaints received. I cannot remember the General Assembly resolution which mandates it. But there is a requirement to report to the GA the number of sexual exploitation and abuse cases.

The U.N. defines case as one which is being investigated, and what happens is that the vast majority of these complaints are screened out at what they call the assessment phase.

So we do not know the number—the total number—of complaints that are received. And with regard to the victims' rights advocates, the problem there is that the United Nations definition of a victim is someone who has had a case—whose sexual exploitation and abuse has been determined by a U.N. investigation. And if you look at the statistics of them, they are tiny.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

**SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128**

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations

Karen Bass (D-CA), Chair

April 30, 2019

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>):

DATE: Tuesday, April 30, 2019

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

WITNESS: Ms. Victoria K. Holt
Managing Director
Henry L. Stimson Center
(Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security)

Ms. Chandrima Das
Peacekeeping Policy Director
United Nations Foundation

Paul Williams, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
George Washington University

Mr. Peter Gallo
Director
Hear Their Cries

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations* HEARING

Day Tuesday Date April 30, 2019 Room 2200

Starting Time 2:00pm Ending Time 3:56pm

Recesses 0 (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Karen Bass, Rep. Susan Wild

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Executive (closed) Session

Stenographic Record

Televised

TITLE OF HEARING:

UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

N/A

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

SFR, Smith (3 statements)

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 3:56pm


Subcommittee Staff Associate

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
*SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*
COMMITTEE HEARING

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Written Submission

Submitted to the

House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations

Mike Jobbins, Search for Common Ground

Hearing on “UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa”

April 30th, 2019

Thank you very much for convening this timely and important meeting to focus on United Nations’ Peacekeeping in Africa, and for the attention that this committee has shown to African countries experiencing violent conflicts as well as to addressing the root causes. I would like to submit several thoughts for your consideration. This perspective is informed by my work with Search for Common Ground, an international peacebuilding NGO with 30 offices in sub-Saharan Africa, but the reflections are my own.

In line with Search for Common Ground’s long-term commitment to supporting people and partners in Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and Somalia and elsewhere to build healthy, safe, and just societies, we have worked alongside the UN system and peacekeeping missions. We have also worked with peacekeeping missions that have ended in Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The Role of Peacekeeping in Africa’s Crises

Deploying peacekeepers has become the preferred international policy response to deal with violent conflict in Africa. Often those peacekeepers are deployed by the U.N. and sourced from around the world, primarily from other developing countries in Africa and Asia. Today, 86,855 United Nations peacekeepers are deployed to support the six peacekeeping missions across Sub-Saharan Africa, a force larger than the entire armed forces of South Africa. While peacekeeping budgets have declined in recent years, UN peacekeeping missions still represent some of the largest and most visible commitments to countries experiencing violent conflict.

Within these missions there have been examples of true heroism and sacrifice. More than 240 peacekeepers have given their lives serving in these six missions, dying far from home protecting a people who are not their own, and in areas little-known to many of their countrymen and women. From sheltering civilians in PoC sites in South Sudan to shoring up Bambari in the Central African Republic, peacekeepers have protected civilians and saved lives in very direct ways.

The humanitarian organizations, NGOs, and local communities also benefit directly and indirectly on peacekeeping missions to achieve access to remote areas. In our own experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, we have relied on MONUSCO air links and MONUSCO-rehabilitated roads to reach displaced people and remote regions. Roads maintained

— END VIOLENT CONFLICT —

Belgium · Burkina Faso · Burundi · Central African Republic · DR Congo · Ethiopia · Guinea · Indonesia · Iraq · Jerusalem · Kenya · Kyrgyz Republic · Lebanon · Liberia · Macedonia · Madagascar · Mali · Morocco · Myanmar · Nepal · Niger · Nigeria · Rwanda · Senegal · Sierra Leone · South Sudan · Sri Lanka · Sudan · Tanzania · The Gambia · Tunisia · United States · Yemen

and patrolled by peacekeepers not only benefit international actors, but open communication, enable businesses to resume, and improves stability for those living along these axes.

Like humanitarian aid, peacekeeping is an instrument crafted to deal with acute crises – the imminent threat of violence by identified armed actors, often deployed where fragility and insecurity is chronic. Peacekeeping is fundamentally a military instrument, deployed to places where there is no enduring military solution. As such, it is a vital and necessary capability but within an international peace architecture that is struggling to build peace in the most fragile places.

The international response to crises in Africa – DRC, South Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, Sudan, Somalia – has undoubtedly saved many thousands of lives. But it is impossible to look at ongoing violence in a place like Beni in the DRC today and say that we are where we thought we would be 20 years ago when MONUC was first mandated. If I look at the places where there were peacekeeping missions when I was a teenager, almost all still have peacekeeping missions today. Only the Mano River countries – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire have I seen peacekeeping missions end in my lifetime. That is not a failure of the peacekeeping missions themselves, but it does represent a failure to create the environment in which they can succeed.

Improving Peacekeeping Effectiveness at an Operational Level

As this committee considers how best to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions narrowly and achieving America's interest in helping the six countries where peacekeepers are deployed become stable, prosperous, and open societies broadly, I would like to suggest a set of recommendations both on the strategic role of peacekeeping as well as operational level in how missions are implemented. Operationally:

- 1. Peacekeeping missions should manage expectations and improve trust, accountability and buy-in among the communities they serve.** Peacekeepers lose credibility with host communities when they are seen as failing to save civilian lives. The grand arrival and high visibility of seemingly-well equipped and armed troops naturally raises expectations among civilians that a fighting force will be in place to counter violent threats and protect civilians. This can be reinforced by the UN, the international community, and local leaders seeking to assert confidence and project that the situation is "under control."

However, in places where peacekeepers only use force when they come under attack, whether by mandate or practice it comes as a brutal shock when they do not seem to adequately defend the civilian population. When civilians are killed, and peacekeepers are viewed as neglecting their duty, the host community loses faith that the mission is acting in their best interest and resists its presence. Ambiguity about the role of UN missions, when they will or won't use force, in the public and social discourse encourages public resentment and undermines the degree to which they pose a credible threat to armed actors. It also opens the UN force to harassment from local communities, armed actors, and security forces. In addition to the structural question of the mandate of the mission itself – whatever the mandate may be – establishing clear and predictable expectations in terms of the use of force.

- 2. Violations of human rights and the perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence must be dealt with seriously and transparently.** When abuses by peacekeepers occur, there

is very little transparency or accountability to the communities or victims. Human rights abuses by peacekeepers – and the way in which they are handled – not only take advantage of some of the neediest people in the world, but they undermine the effectiveness of the mission, normalize impunity, and reinforce a culture of exploitation. In addition to systemic reform at the New York level, abuses must be investigated locally and with the engagement of communities, victims, and transparency to the wider society within the boundaries of protecting confidentiality.

Peacekeeping troop deployments have inherently high risks of abuse. Many troop contingents are being deployed from countries with (a) mixed internal training and accountability cultures prior to deployment; (b) are being put into a new and stressful environment with little connection to the civilian population – often not even a shared language; (c) without the command-and-control structure of their regular units; (d) with serious power-imbalances with the local population; and in geographically remote areas. All of these are known to be risk factors in any military deployment. Beyond only pre-deployment training, peacekeeping missions should consider ongoing *in situ* capacity building focused on increasing understanding of the civilian population and creating positive behavioral norms around reporting abuses and encouraging positive engagement with the civilian population.

3. **UN missions should employ a communications strategy that focuses on building buy-in, and not just improving public image.** Many UN missions have established their own radio stations, such as Radio Miraya in South Sudan or Radio Okapi in the DRC. One of the reasons why MONUSCO (formerly MONUC) was initially accepted by the Congolese population was because of widespread appreciation for Radio Okapi. The radio brought real value to millions of lives and importantly brought clarity and transparency to the peace process, international activities, *including* the work and mandate of the UN mission. The success of Radio Okapi came in large part due to the UN's partnership with the Swiss NGO Fondation Hirondelle a professional media organization with a distinct and independent editorial line and professional journalistic practices. In South Sudan, Radio Miraya airs content from independent radio producers such as the popular *Sergeant Esther* which explains South Sudanese laws through an *NYPD Blue*-style radio drama.

The trust and credibility of UN radio programs are enhanced through deep structural partnerships with professional media organizations able to craft a distinct editorial line and journalistic practice. Creating communications channels in politically charged, highly-conflictual, complex crises require discipline, professionalism and independence. Where they do not have these qualities, UN communications platforms risk becoming mere mouthpieces for the mission itself, and giving “voice” to their public affairs personnel, rather than serving as a channel to raise the voices of ordinary citizens hungry for objective information, debate, creative content and a chance to speak out on matters of war and peace in their country.

Improving Peacekeeping Effectiveness at a Strategic Level

American and international policymakers are overly reliant on measures to address acute crises without a coherent vision to resolve chronic problems. In 2012, I was in Bangui in the Central African Republic – a country that has had five peacekeeping missions – as the Seleka rebellion was marching across the country. As we were reviewing the towns that had fallen and the

humanitarian needs, one discouraged UN official remarked to me that *“the problem with this country is that for the last ten years, we’ve been substituting peacekeeping for peace; and humanitarian aid for development.”* The analysis stuck, and it is a trap that we risk falling into again, without more coherent strategies. Specifically:

1. **The U.S. should accompany its peacekeeping support with robust diplomatic and development engagement aimed at solving crises.** The underlying causes of the six crises that have created the need for each of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa cannot be solved with peacekeeping or humanitarian aid, yet these represent the overwhelming U.S. financial and political commitment. Places like South Sudan, the DRC or the Central African Republic require a whole-of-government strategy and commitment close coordination with international partners, and assistance instruments that can support an end to the crises: reconciliation, justice, security, and inclusive economic recovery. This includes adequately resourcing USAID and the State Department and ensuring sufficient interagency attention and resources are also brought to bear.

The proposed USAID Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization of the Violence and the Administration’s vision for a Journey to Self-Reliance create a window for fresh thinking, and the six countries with active peacekeeping missions should be among their priority areas. Congress can play its role by elevating the visibility of these countries, engaging with the Administration to develop long-term strategy, and creating problem-solving instruments by passing the Global Fragility Act (HR 1580), following implementation on the Eli Wiesel Act and using the annual appropriations process to fund the Complex Crisis Fund, USAID’s People-to-People Reconciliation Program and Conflict and Stabilization Operations at State.

For example, MINUSCA partnered with Search for Common Ground and a group of religious youth groups – supported by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor – to re-open and rehabilitate the main Muslim cemetery in Bangui after a year of crisis, one part of a strategy to desegregate the capital. MINUSCA brought its security guarantees and support, Search engaged with the armed groups, Christian and Muslim youth mobilized their communities, working in close partnership between peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

2. **Peacekeeping missions should have realistic goals, expectations, and close coordination with local actors.** While Civil Affairs, protection, and community liaison staff are vital components of a mission, peacekeeping is still a fundamentally military instrument. One Congolese activist reflected *“if you look at some of the worst violence here – say, an old woman who is killed in the night, or a baby has been dashed against rocks – what is a young soldier from Tanzania or South Africa supposed to do about that? How can he understand why that happened, or help ‘protect’ from it?”* In many places the triggers for violence lie in the histories of conflict, trauma, local politics, injustice and grievance, rooted in place and society. UNMISS struggles to deal with intra-Nuer frictions within PoC sites in South Sudan; to address the brutal local dynamics of violence and vengeance in North Kivu; to help Muslims and Christians feel safe moving freely in the CAR. These are not – and cannot be -- soldiers’ skillsets.

The answer is not for UN peacekeeping missions to move into civilian-led peacebuilding, or for an endless mission-creep pushing peacekeepers to have in-house capabilities to solve every

social problem in areas where they are deployed. They are one actor within a complex system. Instead, missions need to have right kind of personnel and the strategic vision to coordinate with local government and peacebuilding groups.

For example, in the DRC, Search for Common Ground organized “protection mornings:” regular meetings between MONUSCO staff, local civil society, the religious community, national security groups, and aid workers to share intelligence, concerns and risks, and figure out who was best placed to respond.

3. **Peacekeeping missions should include local voices and use participatory in setting clear benchmarks and objectives from drafting the mandate to implementation to exit strategies.** The nature of multilateral cooperation means that the mission and mandate of U.N. Peacekeeping missions are inherently diplomatic exercises, involving cooperation and coordination in New York, with troop contributing countries, with the host-country government and many more. As a result, strategy development risks becoming a top-down, international expert-driven process. Yet, the ultimate success – and particularly a successful exit – requires the buy-in and ownership from those who are most affected by the crises and those who will be critical to long-term success. This should be reflected in agreeing to a shared definition of purpose and benchmarks for success, involving communities, local government, and the whole of the U.N. system.

For example, UNMIL, the Liberian Government, Search for Common Ground, and a team of local and international researchers partnered to use the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index to benchmark UNMIL’s drawdown. The adoption of this set of standards for measuring progress in social cohesion and reconciliation before, during, and after the UNMIL exit enabled wide citizen participation and a shared definition of “success” by all the actors in the system. More than 2,300 citizens across the country participated in the SCORE process, it was widely discussed on the radio, and achieved high levels of popular and political buy-in, ultimately laying the groundwork for a reconciliation roadmap along with the mission’s drawdown. At the launch, Liberian President George Weah praised the process at its launch, observing that the process reflected the “*voices [of] the ordinary people, who became frontline soldiers during our war, whose communities were destroyed, their children raped or used as instruments of death... Conclusive reconciliation in Liberia cannot be achieved if the voices of locals are not heard.*”

In sum, while there have been undeniable successes in UN peacekeeping in Africa, it is hard to say that the international community is succeeding in the six African contexts where peacekeepers are deployed. Like humanitarian aid, peacekeeping missions are a valuable tool to save lives and create space in acute crises. But to move from peacekeeping to lasting peace, we must build and deploy new instruments and partnerships to address the chronic nature of each of these crises, while improving transparency, accountability, and communications within each of the operations. These kinds of changes will require tactical and strategic shifts within the UN system, close coordination with other partners, but also determined commitment by the U.S. Administration and Congress to ensure our strategy is focused on problem-solving, supporting safe, healthy and just societies, and ending the chronic need for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.