    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                            GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                          INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 April 30, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-30

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
                        or http://http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota	             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                    Jason Steinbaum, Democrat Staff Director
                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                     ------

        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
                          International Organizations

                         KAREN BASS, California, Chair

    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota                 Ranking Member
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       RON WRIGHT, Texas
                                         TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee

                        Janette Yarwood, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS

    Prepared statement for the record from Chair Bass................     3

                      INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Information submitted for the record from Representative Smith...     9

                                   WITNESSES

    Holt, Victoria K., Managing Director, Henry L. Stimson Center,
      Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
      Security.......................................................    17
    Das, Chandrima, Peacekeeping Policy Director, United Nations
      Foundation.....................................................    30
    Paul, Dr. Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington
      University.....................................................    40
    Gallo, Peter, Director, Hear Their Cries.........................    51

                       MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Information submitted for the record from Representative Smith...    68

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    94
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    95
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    96

                ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Written submission for the record from Represtative Smith........    97

                     U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

                            Tuesday, April 30, 2019

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,

             Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                         Washington, DC

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
    Room 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair
    of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Bass. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa,
    Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
    Organizations will come to order.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on U.N.
    peacekeeping operations in Africa. This hearing is in line with
    the overview and orientation that we are providing in this new
    session.
        The hearing will also provide an update on the state of
    U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and the role the U.S.
    plays in supporting their efforts on the continent, how we
    should engage the continent, and what that looks like, moving
    forward.
        So, without objection, all members have 5 days to submit
    statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record
    subject to the length limitation in the rules.
        I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
    statement. I would also like to thank our distinguished
    witnesses who are here with us today and our ranking member who
    has fought for many, many years to make sure that peacekeeping
    is done well and that the U.S. stays involved.
        We all know that Africa is vast in scope with different
    challenges across its geographical regions. The diversity of
    the continent means that our approach to policy must be
    flexible and strategic when looking to assist the continent's
    needs regionally and independently.
        Due to demographic changes and increased regional
    integration, Africa will be the single largest market in the
    world in a few decades. With the support of successful
    partnerships within Africa and globally, the continent can
    overcome its development and security challenges.
        U.N. peacekeepers aim to protect civilians, promote human
    rights, prevent conflicts, broker peace, and build the rule of
    law.
        The recent attack on a U.N. convoy in Mali killed a
    peacekeeper from Egypt and injured four others. There were also
    10 peacekeepers and another 25 injured at a U.N. camp in Mali
    in January.
        Peacekeepers are oftentimes in harm's way, trying to broker
    peace with radical extremist groups, and peacekeepers in Mali
    have oftentimes been the target of extremist groups.
        There have been successful U.N. peacekeeping missions in
    Africa. These missions also have organized the Burundi
    elections in 1905, monitored the cease-fire between Eritrea and
    Ethiopia, helped implement the Arusha peace agreement between
    the Rwandan armed forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and
    helped ECOWAS investigate human rights violations, monitor the
    electoral process, and implemented peace agreements after the
    Liberian civil war.
        I believe that these missions have been more helpful than
    not but there are challenges including reported crimes of
    peacekeepers. There have been reports of human rights
    violations by security forces in the Sahel, torture in the CAR,
    Congo, and Somalia, sex trafficking rings.
        Peacekeepers are often under equipped. Oftentimes, too few
    soldiers are on the ground. Many of the U.N. personnel on the
    ground are not local, meaning lack of in-depth knowledge of
    cultural institutions and lack of language skills to
    communicate with locals.
        Considering some of the issues mentioned around protecting
    peacekeepers and civilians, I look forward to hearing your
    views and suggestions in your testimony or in the Q&A.
        The numerous attacks in Mali are very concerning and I
    would also like to hear your thoughts on the idea of the
    peacekeepers decreasing their footprint in the DRC.
        These are just a few questions I will pose to our witnesses
    and I look forward to hearing what you think we should do to
    strengthen peacekeeping missions on the continent and around
    the world.
        Last, I am troubled that the administration has not
    emphasized supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions particularly
    in Africa. This administration stated that funding would be cut
    to the U.N.--to the United Nations and that the U.S. will no
    longer provide indiscriminate assistance across the entire
    African continent.
        The U.N. National Security Advisor John Bolton added that
    the U.S. will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful, and
    unaccountable U.N. peacekeeping missions.
        This is very troubling but I do want to emphasize that U.S.
    relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan cooperation
    here in Congress and we expect that to continue.
        Time after time, when funding was recommended to be reduced
    that directly impacts African countries we worked collectively
    to reinstate this crucial funding.
        [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Bass follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        I now want to recognize the ranking member for the purpose
    of making an opening statement.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Bass, and thank
    you to our witnesses for being here, for your leadership but
    also for taking time out of your busy schedules to convey your
    wisdom and insights and recommendations to our subcommittee.
        This is an important hearing so I thank you, Madam Chair,
    for calling us together to talk about peacekeeping in general
    and peacekeeping in Africa in particular.
        As we know, U.N. peacekeeping costs about $7 billion a
    year. Fourteen U.N. peacekeeping deployments are currently
    underway.
        About 100,000 military police and civilian personnel
    comprise those efforts and I think they are extraordinarily
    valuable but there is always gaps and always room for
    significant improvement.
        This subcommittee had been very active on this issue dating
    back to the year 2000 as well as holding two hearings on
    peacekeeping operations in the DRC, which I held, about the
    exploitation of little girls--mostly little girls--in and
    around the Goma area, and we did hear from the U.N. at that
    time. Jane Holl Lute testified and what was a great focus or in
    great focus then was the zero tolerance policy.
        In one of our hearings we even said it is zero compliance
    because so few of the peacekeepers themselves and their command
    structures are taking it seriously enough. We also looked at
    peacekeeping operations in 2012 and, again, in 2016, again
    focusing on the allegations of abuse and the absence of
    accountability and that was another hearing in 2016, and Peter
    Gallo had testified at that hearing.
        Karen, it was just 3 weeks ago that we met with President
    Touadera of the Central African Republic during his visit to
    Congress along with Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn for a very
    productive discussion on a range of topics including the
    security situation in the CAR, the majority of which is not
    under effective control by the government.
        One of the things that struck me about the dialog is how
    clear it was made by the president and his entourage of the
    need for U.N. peacekeepers in that country, which is still very
    much chaotic, and how U.N. peacekeepers could still fill a gap
    so that we do not have to put American troops in harm's way.
        That said, however, recognizing a need is one thing.
    Meeting that need is another, and I think with respect to that
    how well the U.N. peacekeepers are meeting that need in
    countries like CAR but also in South Sudan and the Democratic
    Republic of Congo is still open for question and there is great
    room for improvement.
        We know that the record is mixed in South Sudan, UNMISSS's
    operation. We hear good things about the Mongolian peacekeepers
    who patrol aggressively and give civilians a sense of security.
        But elsewhere the record is, at best, mixed, and in many
    cases very negative. I have received a statement from Bishop
    Nongo of the Diocese of Bossangoa in the Central African
    Republic, which I request be entered into the record, without
    objection.
        Ms. Bass. No objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Smith. Thank you. You may recall that Bishop Nongo
    testified before the subcommittee in 2013 in one of our two
    hearings of this subcommittee on the crisis in CAR.
        In his statement submitted for this hearing with his
    unusual--his usual, I should say, frankness, Bishop Nongo
    identifies the CAR as a failed State and one where MINUSCA, the
    United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Civilization Mission
    in the Central African Republic, could only play a critical
    role in helping stabilize.
        Yes, he says one is forced--and I quote him here--to wonder
    about MINUSCA's protecting mission. He recalls shocking
    incidents where neither the government nor MINUSCA forces took
    any action whatsoever despite the prior alert given by
    religious leaders.
        His assessment is that ``MINUSCA has shown weakness
    pertaining to civilians' protection, humanitarian safeguards,
    security access and strict accountability for violations of
    international humanitarian and human rights law,'' closed
    quote.
        In particular--and this is important--he calls out the
    Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Pakistani contingents for what he
    calls inappropriate cooperation and unlawful conduct with ex-
    Seleka groups--armed groups--who plunged CAR into the crisis
    back in 2012 and 2013.
        Such cooperation is including taking former Seleka members
    on patrol and with them in armored vehicles as well as
    providing uniforms and ammunition.
        This raises serious questions about the efficacy of U.N.
    peacekeeping operations, at least as far as the CAR goes.
        Another written statement which we have received I also ask
    be included in the record is from Mike Jobbins in Search for
    Common Ground who addresses the failure of peacekeepers to
    protect and what that does to undermine the trust which needs
    to be there among the civilian community.
        He says, and I quote, ``When civilians are killed and
    peacekeepers are viewed as neglecting their duty, the host
    country loses faith in that mission in acting in their best
    interests and resists their presence. Ambiguity is about the
    role of U.N. missions when they will or will not use force and
    encourages public resentment and undermines the degree to which
    they pose a credible threat to armed forces.''
        Another witness, Peter Gallo, who will be testifying today,
    has also previously testified before this subcommittee, has
    been a courageous voice in exposing sexual exploitation and
    abuse conducted in connection with U.N. peacekeeping missions.
        We need absolute zero tolerance when it comes to that
    exploitation.
        I look forward to this hearing--his assessment and that of
    the others who are testifying today, and I anticipate that a
    mixed record when it comes to sexual abuse and exploitation
    which needs to be further addressed. Zero tolerance ought to be
    zero tolerance.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        I would now like to introduce our panel. Victoria Holt is a
    managing director at the Henry Stimson Center and an adjunct
    professor at Columbia University. Her expertise includes
    international security and multilateral tools, peace
    operations, and conflict prevention.
        Previously, she served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for State for International Security in the Bureau of
    International Organization Affairs from '09 to 2017. In that
    role, she was responsible for policy and guidance for U.S.
    actions in the Security Council and oversaw offices handling
    peace operations, sanctions, counterterrorism, and U.N.
    political affairs.
        She led development of U.S. diplomatic initiatives
    including the 2015 Leaders' Summit on U.N. Peacekeeping hosted
    by President Obama to increase capacities for U.N. operations
    and she previously worked on Capitol Hill on defense and
    foreign affairs.
        Ms. Das serves as the director of peacekeeping policy at
    the Better World Campaign. She is a resident expert on U.N.
    peacekeeping operations and educates Congress and the
    administration on the value of peacekeeping as an effective
    part of the U.S. national security toolbox.
        She spearheads thought leadership and authors policy papers
    and field reports on U.N. peacekeeping. She also served as a
    special advisor for the U.N. High Level Panel on humanitarian
    financing and providing an American perspective to the panel
    and her expertise on conflict resolution.
        Previously, Ms. Das worked at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
    Thank you for joining us.
        Paul Williams is an associate professor in the Elliott
    School of International Affairs at George Washington University
    where he is also associate director of the security policy
    studies.
        Dr. Williams received his Ph.D. in international politics
    from the University of Wales. His research focuses on the
    politics of contemporary peace operations and the dynamics of
    war and peace in Africa. He previously worked at the
    Universities of Warwick and Birmingham in the U.K.
        He has been a visiting scholar at Georgetown University and
    the University of Queensland, a visiting professor at Addis
    Ababa University and a fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center.
        Mr. Gallo is a qualified lawyer--glad you are not an
    unqualified lawyer--admitted to practice in Scotland, Hong
    Kong, and New York. He has an MBA and an LL.M. in international
    criminal law.
        He spent 19 years as an investigator based in Hong Kong
    working on investigations in some of the most corrupt countries
    in Asia and was a leading authority on the identification and
    detection of money laundering.
        In 2011, he was recruited by the U.N. as an investigator in
    the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigations
    division in New York, the office that is supposed to
    investigate corruption, fraud, and other criminality in the
    organization.
        After his insights and personal experience there, he became
    an outspoken critic of the United Nations, particularly about
    the manner in which corruption is covered up.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today
    and I would like to ask you to summarize your written
    testimony, and we do not have a clock that you can all see but
    I have a stopwatch here. So everyone will have 5 minutes and
    then we will begin a round of Q&A.
        Ms. Holt.

      STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HENRY L.
    STIMSON CENTER, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
                         INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

        Ms. Holt. Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and
    distinguished members of the committee, it is a genuine
    pleasure to be here. Thank you very much, and I thank you for
    the interest in this topic.
        It is one this committee has had a long history on, both
    the nature of peacekeeping, the link to U.S. interests, and the
    constant interest and demand for reform and modernization.
        I have served in many roles. I have been a researcher, I
    have been policymaker, and I most recently was a diplomat at
    the Department of State.
        So my comments really today come from that experience of
    seeing missions up close and the ongoing desire to reduce the
    gap between the aspirations of a Security Council resolution
    and actually delivering in the field.
        We will never be done, but I will say this moment is a
    really awesome chance to move reforms forward; I have much in
    my comments about that.
        You know the basics. The U.S. is a permanent member of the
    Security Council, which is focused on threats to international
    peace and security. Peace operations are probably the best
    known thing that the U.N. does.
        We have over a 100,000 civilians, military, and police in
    the field today in 14 missions, often in remote and fragile
    States.
        Over 120 countries contribute to these. Those numbers are
    huge. I will also note the U.S. provides about 40 of these
    total officers. So it is really an opportunity where you see a
    form of burden sharing. We are the largest financial
    contributor.
        It also is a direct interest to the United States that
    peacekeeping is successful. It avails with stability and
    conflict prevention. It addresses countries that are under
    threat of violence and extremism and it also supports goals of
    democracy and rule of law.
        It also supports our values. It promotes human rights and
    tries to address humanitarian crises, migration and refugee
    flows, and in places like Liberia stepped in to also try and
    prevent the expansion of the Ebola crisis in that country. So
    both for security interests and our values, we value the U.N.
        I saw this up front when I was in State. Today, Co-te
    d'Ivoire is a successful West African country with the highest
    growth rate in the region. We soon forget that in 2010-2011 it
    almost went into civil war when that election resulted in two
    people believing they were president.
        The small U.N. mission there quickly bunkered down,
    provided the election outcome and validated it, and stood firm
    as the political process moved forward. War was averted.
        Likewise, on the values side, we have seen in South Sudan
    when that new country was ushered forward as the first country
    in the last 10 years, a small mission--a large mission was
    deployed to support peace building.
        But in December 2013 things changed. Civil conflict broke
    out and people fled to the U.N.'s compounds. They opened the
    door. In the town of Bor, for example, a few months later an
    American named Ken happened to be the civilian in charge of
    that compound. A military crew of 80 showed up with one of the
    government ministers and demanded to go in. They intended to
    attack the civilians there. He turned around and said, ``Close
    the door.'' He was unarmed. He was trained as a New York Police
    cop. He did the right thing. He saved lives that day and he
    risked his own to do so.
        So I think these kinds of examples are really important to
    us. Whether it is in Mali and Central African Republic, what we
    see in Somalia or Congo, every one of these missions has
    details of real people in the field.
        But reform is hugely needed and this is what I want to get
    to. Supporting political processes and solutions, governments
    need to abide by the agreements they make when they invite the
    missions in.
        We, as diplomats, you, as leaders, can help reinforce those
    political agreements and if they are not working, ask why.
    Protection of civilians on the ground as well as from any bad
    behavior by the peacekeepers remains a top priority. Ninety-
    five percent of peacekeepers today serve under those mandates.
    And then gaps in capacity--the lack of medical health or being
    able to fly where you need to, French-speaking police officers
    who are women--it is wide. It is getting better.
        The U.S. has been a leader on the reform and modernization.
    There has been a series of Presidential summits kicked off by
    the U.S. and led by other countries, high-level reviews, and
    now ongoing series of resolutions through the Security Council
    including on performance and accountability--ones that this
    committee had paid attention to.
        So what is our challenge? We need that continued U.S.
    leadership and we need it strong, and we have a bit of a
    challenge. There is a financial crunch coming at the U.N.
        The secretary general has just issued a very thick report.
    He is worried that most of the missions do not even have 3
    months to keep their budgets operating. We have also seen
    troop-contributing and police-contributing countries not get
    reimbursed for their performance in the field, not because they
    did not do well but because there is not enough money.
        So the U.S. Congress could help with this. We could pay our
    full assessment which is, roughly, 28 percent of the budget. We
    could pay back the arrears and lift the congressional cap, the
    most during both the Bush and Obama Administrations was lifted
    by Congress. If you want us to get to 25 percent, let us put
    the State Department on notice. Let us ask why they failed at
    the negotiations last year and let us start now with a national
    push to get that done.
        But let us not accrue arrears in the short run. That helps
    nobody. It does not get our reforms and it gives every country
    that opposes us a talking point. I saw this in the earlier
    negotiations that Ambassador Holbrooke and, Congressman Smith,
    you were involved in.
        So, finally, the U.N. needs our leadership. We are often
    the best at assessing and criticizing as well as being
    practical and inspiring to these missions. I urge you to go to
    the field and see them yourself.
        Myself and my colleagues would be more than happy to help
    set that up and work with your teams on this, and let us also
    put some more diplomats in New York. They are shorthanded with
    only two of the five posts in New York there and working on the
    Security Council to be able to give voice and vote and
    enthusiasm to the modernization and reform we need.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, and I would just say before
    I go on to the next guest, you know, for my colleagues who are
    new on the committee, an opportunity to go visit peacekeeping I
    think should be high on your agenda and we can make sure that
    happens.
        Ms. Das.

       STATEMENT OF CHANDRIMA DAS, PEACEKEEPING POLICY DIRECTOR,
                       UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION

        Ms. Das. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, members of
    the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to testify
    about the value of United Nations Peacekeeping efforts in
    Africa.
        Having travelled to six U.N. peacekeeping missions in
    Africa over the last 5 years, I believe continued U.S.
    financial support for these operations is an investment worthy
    of American taxpayer dollars.
        U.N. peacekeepers serve 100 million people aiming to create
    stability in fragile States. Each mission is tasked with
    varying responsibilities authorized by the U.N. Security
    Council.
        Some missions serve as buffers between two parties. Other
    missions are more complex and are tasked with protecting
    civilians, monitoring human rights, facilitating delivery of
    aid, training security sector, and building the capacity of
    government institutions and providing electoral assistance.
        They do this at a relatively modest cost. The U.N.
    peacekeeping budget covers more than 100,000 personnel deployed
    at 14 missions, which half are in Africa.
        The total cost of U.N. peacekeeping is $7 billion a year of
    which the U.S. is assessed for $1.8 billion. For comparison's
    sake, this is 1 percent of the U.S. military spending.
        According to the report released by the GAO last year, it
    is eight times less expensive for the U.S. to financially
    support U.N. peacekeeping missions than to deploy U.S. forces
    alone.
        Last year, I travelled to Mali, home to the third largest
    U.N. peacekeeping mission in the world. After a military coup
    in 2012, well-armed radical Islamist groups linked to al-Qaida
    took over large sections of the country. These extremists
    imposed Sharia law, carrying out stonings and amputations as
    punishment.
        In Timbuktu, once a famous center of trade and learning,
    extremists destroyed the historic town's library and
    mausoleums, antiquities now lost to the world forever.
        After French forces intervened at the request of the Malian
    government, U.N. peacekeepers were tasked with stabilizing the
    country. Sixteen thousand peacekeepers covered an area so vast
    it is equivalent to the territory from New York to Florida.
        However, terrorist organizations linked to ISIS and al-
    Qaida continue to threaten and manipulate inter-ethnic disputes
    to their advantage.
        Just yesterday, ISIS leader Baghdadi pledged allegiance to
    the ``brothers'' in Mali and Burkina Faso, highlighting the
    security challenges in the region. Recently, the conflict has
    shifted to the center of the country and last month 160
    villagers--men, women and children--were massacred by
    extremists.
        Despite these horrifying conditions, there are signs of
    hope. The presence of U.N. peacekeepers allow for U.N. agencies
    like the World Food Program to partner with 40 villages to grow
    their own food and make them less dependent on local militias.
        I visited a farm supported by U.N. peacekeepers that
    provided food for families and gave youth an alternative
    opportunity to the extremist ideologies that surrounded them.
        Also, I have witnessed the work of U.N. peacekeepers in
    Central African Republic. In 2014, it was the 20th anniversary
    of the Rwandan genocide and the mission allowed the
    international community to live up to the promise of never
    again when it helped contain vicious sectarian violence between
    Christian and Muslim communities. Amnesty International
    reported that the U.N. mission saved many lives and prevented
    much bloodshed.
        In South Sudan, where a civil war once raged, tens of
    thousands of civilians came to the U.N. compounds to seek
    shelter. The mission opened its doors serving large numbers of
    people who otherwise would have been directly targeted, and
    peacekeeping forces continue to protect nearly 200,000 people
    at six sites around the country.
        I want to take a moment now to address some of the
    misconceptions--one, that peacekeeping missions last forever.
    They do not. In fact, the last 2 years peacekeeping missions in
    Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire closed after peaceful democratic
    elections and this coming October the mission in Haiti is set
    to close.
        And No. 2, the U.N. peacekeeping is incapable of change.
    U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has instituted a series
    of reforms backed by majority member States aimed at greater
    accountability, transparency, and clarity in peacekeeping.
        In partnership with the U.S., the secretary general is
    working to modernize the U.N. None of this is possible,
    however, without full U.S. engagement and support. The U.S. is
    currently the biggest financial donor for U.N. peacekeeping
    paying 27.8 percent of the peacekeeping budget.
        In December, this rate was lowered from 28.4 and was agreed
    to by the Trump administration. However, since the mid-1990's
    U.S. law has arbitrarily capped U.S. contributions at 25
    percent.
        As a result, the U.S. currently owes $750 million in
    arrears, contributing to a cash crunch. This means that allies
    like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and India are not receiving full payment
    for the thousands of police and troop contributions of
    peacekeeping, in comparison to the U.S. that only contributes
    40 peacekeepers.
        Peacekeepers go where no one else will. They protect the
    world's most vulnerable in some of the world's most challenging
    places. We ask that Congress honor our financial obligations to
    U.N. peacekeeping and allow us to pay at our assessed rate. It
    not only serves American national security interests but it is
    the right thing to do.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Das follows:]

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        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Williams.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL WILLIAMS, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, GEORGE
                         WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Williams. Thank you, Chair Bass, Ranking Member Smith,
    members of the subcommittee. Thanks for inviting me to testify
    at this hearing today.
        I am an academic who has studied the politics and
    effectiveness of peace operations in Africa and elsewhere for
    over two decades now and my testimony today focuses on
    partnership peacekeeping in Africa--that is, collaboration
    between different international organizations and States to
    deliver effective field missions, and specifically it
    highlights the roles played by missions that are mandated and
    authorized by the African Union and explains why the United
    States should support the use of U.N.-assessed contributions to
    finance AU peace operations that have been authorized by the
    Security Council.
        Since 2003, the African Union has proved that its peace
    operations provide a global public good by helping to keep the
    peace in Africa. A strong and effective African Union is,
    therefore, good for Africa but it is also good for the world.
        The AU has now mandated and authorized 16 peace operations
    ranging from small observer missions to large forces engaged in
    stabilization, counterinsurgency, and even counterterrorism
    activities against groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the
    Lord's Resistance Army.
        By 2015, African States deployed nearly 70,000 uniformed
    peacekeepers across Africa, nearly 50,000 in U.N. missions and,
    roughly, 22,000 in Somalia, and this was partly thanks to
    training programs like the U.S. Global Peace Operations
    Initiative.
        AU missions have carried out critical peace and security
    tasks that are not usually performed by U.N. peacekeeping
    operations including counterinsurgency efforts as in Somalia
    and Mali, and this is likely to become even more important as
    more Islamist fighters are moving from the Middle Eastern
    theater into north Africa, the Sahel, and elsewhere in sub-
    Saharan Africa.
        However, AU missions have suffered major capability gaps
    related to finance, logistics, and mission support. These have
    been partially filled by external partners, notably, the United
    Nations and European Union as well as the U.S.
        But AU forces were unable to sustain themselves in the
    field and were rehatted into larger U.N. missions in Burundi,
    Darfur, Mali, and the Central African Republic.
        Nevertheless, as the AU has developed and strengthened,
    future peace operations in Africa are likely to be either
    mandated or authorized by the AU with U.N. peacekeeping
    missions being rehatted African missions.
        It is, therefore, imperative that we find a long-term
    solution for financial AU peace operations in part to ensure
    that U.N. peacekeeping is not being set up to fail when it is
    forced to take on mandates and tasks that run counter to its
    principles of impartiality, consent, and minimum use of force.
        To help do this, the African Union established a Peace Fund
    recently which generates revenues via a 0.2 percent levy that
    is imposed on eligible goods imported into the African
    continent.
        So far, that has raised $105 million. This could pay for
    some of the costs of the AU's missions but not the whole bill.
    AMISOM in Somalia, for example, costs about $1 billion a year.
        For the last decade, the U.N. Security Council has debated
    whether it should pay the rest through the U.N.'s assessed
    peacekeeping contributions.
        The AU has tried to lock in this principal because it would
    move beyond ad hoc means of support and provide a more
    predictable framework which could be the basis for long-term
    capacity building and institutional development for the African
    Union.
        This makes sense. The United States should empower the
    African Union by supporting its access to predictable and
    sustainable finance. This would be in line with previous
    bipartisan U.S. policy, which was based on four preferences:
    one, ensuring that the U.N. Security Council remains the
    primary multilateral decisionmaking body for matters of
    international peace and security; No. 2, ensuring that U.N.
    funds are used in an accountable and transparent manner; three,
    that decisions on how to respond to particular crises are taken
    on a case by case basis; and four, that the African Union
    should pay some if not all of the bills for its peace
    operations.
        Instead of supporting the African Union with ad hoc mixture
    of bilateral programs and trust funds, which has produced
    highly uneven capabilities available to different AU missions,
    the United States would be better served by supporting a more
    predictable framework, namely, using U.N.-assessed
    contributions to finance AU peace operations that have been
    authorized by the Security Council.
        This would do three things. No. 1, it would empower the
    African Union Commission to better administer and oversee
    African peace operations and it would allow international
    partners to hold a single entity accountable for the mission's
    performance and effectiveness in the field.
        Two, it would improve African capabilities and their
    adherence to international human rights and humanitarian law
    for all the contributing countries across the board, and third,
    it would actually reduce the overall cost to the United States
    compared to providing the same capabilities on a bilateral
    basis to the respective contributing countries because the U.S.
    pays about 28 percent of the peacekeeping bill and other
    countries pay 72 percent.
        Now, at present, different elements of U.S. policy toward
    peace operations in Africa are not coherently aligned. The
    stated goal of supporting effective and accountable missions is
    being undermined by the lack of a coherent diplomatic strategy,
    a failure to empower the African Union, and a failure to pay
    our assessed contributions in full and on time.
        The U.S. should pay its peacekeeping dues in full and on
    time. Refusing to do so undermines our credibility and
    influence at the United Nations. It undermines the principle of
    international negotiations and it hurts the U.N.'s major
    contributing countries, many of whom are key U.S. partners in
    the field.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

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        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Mr. Gallo.

          STATEMENT OF PETER GALLO, DIRECTOR, HEAR THEIR CRIES

        Mr. Gallo. Thank you, Chairman Bass, Ranking Member Smith,
    and distinguished members of the committee.
        I spent 4 years as an internal investigator in the U.N. and
    I have since spoken extensively about the corruption and the
    lack of accountability in the organization, and I know that the
    U.N. and others like to portray me as some kind of disenchanted
    extremists.
        So I like to often begin by deliberately misquoting
    Shakespeare, specifically, Marc Antony's speech about coming to
    bury Caesar, not to praise him.
        Being critical of the U.N. in any way is often interpreted
    as an attempt to destroy the organization. Nothing could be
    further from the truth. We are not anarchists.
        Of course, there is a need for peacekeeping but the U.N. is
    wilfully blind to the harm that that peacekeeping brings with
    it and my concern for the future, as Marc Antony went on, is
    that the evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft
    interred with their bones. And nobody wants the U.N. to be more
    remembered for the sexual abuse of children in Africa rather
    than the reason the organization was there in the first place.
        Given my background, I focus on accountability and I
    appreciate that the committee is concerned with the lack of
    independent information about what is actually happening in the
    field missions. Those two are far from unrelated.
        Peacekeeping, by its very nature, takes place in remote
    areas not well covered by an independent free press, leaving
    the outside world with the U.N. as the sole source of
    information.
        But as was seen in the Central African Republic, the staff
    working in those missions will not speak out about anything no
    matter how egregious, corrupt, or wasteful it may be, and when
    they do there are plenty of case studies as to what happens,
    like the cases of Miranda Brown, Anders Kompass, and Emma
    Reilly.
        U.N. peacekeeping has to be understood on the ground in
    terms of the U.N. culture, which involves, on one hand, a lack
    of accountability for senior staff and those who enjoy the
    patronage, and a lack of whistle blower protection for those
    who do not.
        In the U.N. it is not what you do that matters; it is who
    you know, and that applies for career advancement and the
    prosecution of misconduct. It is carrot and stick, and the most
    important rule in the United Nations, what I call the prime
    directive, is to protect the U.N.'s image above all else.
        It is not the scale of the sexual abuse and, particularly,
    the child rape but the failure to deal with it that is
    seriously undermining the U.N.'s credibility.
        Now, Hear Their Cries has been criticized for our estimate
    60,000 women and children raped or sexually abused by the U.N.
    personnel over 10 years. That figure is an estimate, but
    neither the U.N. nor anyone else is willing to debate it. And
    shocking as though it may be, 60,000 may be a conservative
    estimate.
        Still, the number of cases that are acknowledged by the
    U.N. remains tiny. But the U.N. does not report all the
    complaints. They are very good at filtering out most of them at
    the assessment stage whereas journalists seem to have very
    little difficulty finding victims when they look for them.
        Why are more of these rape cases not reported? Because U.N.
    staff are not stupid and they know what will happen if they do.
    One, any investigation will fail to establish wrongdoing, and
    two, the organization will retaliate against the staff member
    for having reported it.
        In the United Nations, whistleblower protection does not
    work because the U.N. does not want it to work. So the staff
    who report wrongdoing are committing career suicide. Staff will
    look at cases like Miranda Brown and ask why should they risk
    it.
        Now, the U.S. Government has tried to pressure the U.N.
    into strengthening whistleblower protection. These provisions
    have been unsuccessful. The U.N. Ethics Office continues to go
    through extraordinary lengths never to find retaliation and
    when they do, OIOS, instead of investigating it, simply asks
    the subject to come up with a plausible explanation for its
    actions, essentially abdicating any investigative
    responsibility. But the investigations director claims this is
    to, and I quote, ``keep the Americans off our backs.''
        With regard to the misconduct by military personnel, in the
    CAR the U.N. knowingly deployed ill-disciplined troops with a
    history of human rights abuses. Unsurprisingly, they turned out
    to be so bad they had to be withdrawn. But why were they
    deployed in the first place?
        Given the financial incentive, any competent investigator
    would consider the possibility of bribery influencing that
    decision. But the U.N. will not consider that possibility, far
    less investigate it.
        Ironically, it was not those peacekeepers who were
    responsible for the child sex abuse in 2015. That was only
    exposed because a single U.N. staff member, Miranda Brown, was
    prepared to stand up against an abusive authority.
        That may have sparked off a media firestorm, focused world
    attention on the CAR, and journalists began finding hundreds of
    other SEA victims.
        The U.N. was forced to act. The Deschamps enquiry was
    empanelled. But, ultimately, the only thing that is changed is
    that Miranda Brown has lost her career.
        Now, the U.N. claims that the allegations in the CAR were
    fully and professionally investigated at a cost, by the way, of
    half a million U.S. dollars, though they established next to
    nothing.
        But as early as October 2016, OIOS was already undermining
    the integrity and the credibility of complainants in the town
    of Dekoa. I am aware of an internal review having been carried
    out within the OIOS into the sexual abuse investigations in the
    CAR in Dekoa.
        This was essentially instructed to identify what lessons
    could be learned but was never released. Instead, it was made
    to disappear and has been concealed even from the OIOS staff
    for whom it was written, casting serious doubts on how reliable
    the U.N. investigations were.
        In 2017, the secretary general announced a new approach to
    combatting sexual exploitation and abuse. On closer inspection,
    however, this is not a new approach at all. It continues with
    the same mind set as before and is doomed to fail for four
    basic and fundamental reasons.
        No. 1 is that the U.N. continues to ignore the fact that
    sexual exploitation is criminal. Second, the U.N. does not want
    to recognize that effective deterrence of any criminal conduct
    is directly related to the likelihood of the offender being
    held accountable. And three, the U.N. still wants to believe
    that raising awareness of the conduct being criminal will
    somehow deter it. It will not.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallo follows:]

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        Ms. Bass. We are going to move on.
        We need to--you passed your 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gallo. I am sorry.
        Ms. Bass. You will have an opportunity in the Q&A to
    continue to make your points.
        We are going to move into questions and answers with the
    members that are here. I will begin and we will each take 5
    minutes and be consistent with that as well so everybody can
    have an opportunity to ask questions.
        Why do not I begin by speaking with Ms. Holt? And you were
    talking about the funding and, you know, I think--I wanted you
    to clarify something that I am not sure if I heard you say.
        I know I am concerned that Congress has capped the U.S.
    peacekeeping assessment at 25 percent and I wanted to know the
    impact of the cap. But I thought you said even before talking
    about that the resources were being reduced on the U.N. level
    as well, not even including what the U.S. was doing. Did I hear
    you correctly?
        Ms. Holt. United States is not the only country but the
    U.S. is probably the largest country that has outstanding
    obligations to the U.N.
        There are a few issues, as you noted. One, the
    congressional cap, which was initiated, roughly, 20 years ago
    and has been lifted repeatedly by Congress was meant to help
    reduce our assessment. Those negotiations just happened last
    year and for some reason the administration was not able to
    align the actual rate which we pay through negotiations with
    our U.N.--through the U.N.
        So Congress faces a problem. The cap will continue to
    accrue arrears. It is about $750 million today and it is
    approaching a billion by the end of the year.
        Ms. Bass. Who are some of the biggest, you know, offenders
    in terms of not making their contributions?
        Ms. Holt. Well, the secretary general has put out a report
    with every single country and the amount they owe. The U.S., in
    my understanding, is the largest, and I did not study it to
    understand the way to rank the countries. But I would be happy
    to, maybe Paul knows.
        Ms. Bass. Dr. Williams.
        Mr. Williams. Yes. The U.N. secretary general's report said
    the next largest culprits, if you like, were Brazil, which owed
    $243 million, Ukraine $108 million, Venezuela $50 million, UAE
    $38.7 million, then Belarus, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, and
    Greece. They were the top 10.
        Ms. Bass. And I also think one of you--and I am not sure if
    it was Ms. Holt or Ms. Das--talked about the AU contributions.
    And so my question is what does the AU contribute.
        Was that you, Dr. Williams, that said the AU does not
    contribute?
        Mr. Williams. The African Union contributes in terms of
    African Union members.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Williams. So the 54 members of the AU that are also
    members of the U.N. contribute to the U.N. peacekeeping budget.
    But the African Union has also just recently set up a new peace
    fund, which is trying to fund its own African Union operations
    and that is where the $105 million new resources has come from.
        But some African countries will be behind in terms of on
    time and in full in their payments as well. But they have very
    small percentage contributions to the peacekeeping budget. So
    it does not figure anywhere near the top 10 countries I just
    mentioned.
        Ms. Bass. What do you think that the U.S. could do to
    strengthen the African Union so that they get to the point
    where there is less reliance, frankly, on peacekeepers outside
    of the continent?
        Mr. Williams. There's a couple of things. No. 1 is to
    invest in the long term. So provide a stable set of
    relationships and platforms and mechanisms to allow everybody
    to know what they are doing over the longer-term period and by
    that I mean we need to look a decade or so ahead and prepare to
    enhance the capabilities of this organization.
        We do not have funding mechanisms at the moment to do that.
    It is only the U.N.'s peacekeeping financial mechanisms that
    provide that degree of stability, and because, as I just
    mentioned, the African Union is raising money to pay for its
    own missions at the moment. But it cannot pay for them all.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Williams. And that is where we are stuck. So the U.S.
    could therefore, I think, invest in that long-term relationship
    more sensibly.
        Ms. Bass. Since we have, you know, capped ours maybe
    resources could go to assist the AU. Did any of you else want
    to comment on that?
        Ms. Holt.
        Ms. Holt. Just one point. The U.S. has a very well-known
    global peace operations initiative, which comes through the
    peacekeeping account, and it was established in 2004 by the
    Bush Administration to train African peacekeepers and
    peacekeepers worldwide.
        So that is a long-range capacity building program that has
    had huge results.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you. Ms. Das and Mr. Gallo.
        Ms. Das. Just to add to what Tori was saying, the impact of
    arrears, we are seeing allies--Ethiopia, Rwanda--not getting
    paid for its contributions and they are doing the bulk of the
    work, as well as, you know, at the end of the day when
    helicopters are not being able to deploy, logistics as being
    affected.
        So it is really having an impact on the ground on what
    peacekeepers are able to do. So lifting the cap would be really
    recommended and I hope that we can pay our dues in full.
        Ms. Bass. Mr. Gallo.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Gallo. If I could answer the question the other way. If
    you look at the amount of money that is being spent, the Congo
    costs $1.2 billion. CAR and South Sudan are running about a
    billion each.
        All organizations lose money through fraud, waste, and
    abuse, and even if those missions are only losing 10 percent,
    that is $100 million a year.
        And it is my concern that there is inefficiency in the way
    that the money is spent.
        Ms. Bass. So I am just about out of time. But could you
    quickly say what do you think the solution is?
        Mr. Gallo. In terms of increasing accountability from the
    efficiency for which that money is spent, there are some
    peacekeeping missions which have been rolling on for years and
    years with no end in sight, and the question is why is the U.N.
    peacekeeping operations haemorrhaging money to maintain the
    organizations that are actually involved in the fighting and
    that is a question that no one will ask.
        Ms. Bass. So your answer would be more accountability?
        Mr. Gallo. It would.
        Ms. Bass. That is the first step that needs to happen? Is
    that----
        Mr. Gallo. Indeed.
        Ms. Bass. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you
    again all for your testimony.
        You know, in July 2016 in South Sudan we all remember
    this--a compound called the Terrain compound was overrun by
    Salva Kiir's troops in Juba. The United Nations peacekeeping
    mission was asked to intervene. They were asked emphatically,
    including by the U.S. Government by our mission, and they would
    not do it.
        I went there a month later in August and met not only with
    Salva Kiir but many others. Asked for accountability but also
    met with the U.N. peacekeepers and they admitted that mistakes
    were made and they have made some improvements since, which is
    a positive thing.
        But then when you get other examples of where the U.N.
    peacekeepers, and I mentioned Bishop Nongo earlier, in the
    Central African Republic who--you know, he's speaking for all
    of the bishops of Central Africa in his testimony today. He
    wants the peacekeepers to have a better, as he points out,
    rules of engagement.
        They need to have enough of them, and that is one question
    I would ask. You know, we often see that there is a deployment
    number but there is usually a higher number of authorized slots
    that are unfulfilled. How are those numbers reached? Is it
    accurate? Do we need more? Less?
        You know, there are always guesstimates, I would suspect.
    So if you could speak to that issue, because I find that very
    disturbing. I mean, when I looked eyeball to eyeball with the
    U.N. peacekeeping leadership in Juba and then we went back the
    next year, the chair and I, and had another set of meetings,
    they were making improvements. But it is always like there is a
    whole lot of atrocity that happens in the interim.
        Earlier today we had a big hearing in the full committee on
    Kosovo, and UNMIK's terrible record there was highlighted. I
    asked my questions along the realm of UNMIK and their
    complicity in human rights abuse.
        So it is a problem and I would say to Mr. Gallo I had the
    hearings when we tried to hold U.N. personnel leadership to
    account on whistleblowers.
        To me, a whistleblower, if they are honest and sincere and
    they bring forth information, we need to put sand bags around
    them rather than have them put out of their job or put into a
    situation where they are in dire--you know, they will never
    move up, like a ceiling on their upward mobility.
        It was way back when Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
    appeared before our committee in 1980, and I was there, and he
    said how desperately they need IGs. Not IGs that are part of
    the system but IGs that are independent with a capital I, and
    we are still striving to get there. Hopefully, we are getting
    there but we are still striving to get there.
        But that is one reason why I think a lot of people, you
    know, just want to say if we are going to spend money--and I am
    a passionate believer in U.N. peacekeeping dollars--we need to
    do it in a way that is absolutely transparent, that they vet
    the individuals who are deployed.
        After I had those four hearings on what was going on in
    Goma and went there, I found that there was still a
    lackadaisical attitude. Jane Holl Lute and a few others were
    absolutely on the mark. But so many others was, like, well, so
    what.
        Somebody might be sent back from that mission when they got
    back to their country of origin. They were not prosecuted, and
    for a time they could even be put or redeployed at a future
    peacekeeping mission. I think that has changed.
        So along those lines, I would also ask rapid DNA technology
    has been shown to be very effective in addressing sexual
    assaults. It could also help stop trafficking in persons.
        It also could, if we were to do rapid DNA technology for
    every peacekeeper, when there is an allegation there is a way
    of proving at least in a paternity effort whether or not they
    are the ones who are responsible. I mean, it could also have a
    chilling effect that they know that they will be discovered and
    they will be prosecuted hopefully by their home country.
        Finally, let me just ask you--I have a lot of questions--
    but in--I would ask unanimous consent, Madam Chair, that Brent
    Schaefer's----
        Ms. Bass. Without objection.
        Mr. Smith [continuing]. Testimony be included from the
    Heritage Foundation.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Smith. He makes an excellent point that even at 25
    percent the U.S. pays more than 182 countries combined for
    peacekeeping. And, again, a lot of what we do never gets on the
    ledger. AFRICOM, all that we do there, never on the ledger of
    what we are doing to try to mitigate war and conflict and to
    promote peace and humanitarianism.
        Airlift--all the things we do--which never is on that
    assessment page. Also, he points out that Brunei, Kuwait,
    Qatar, Singapore, and the UAE, despite having a per capital
    gross national income more than twice the world average, they
    are assessed peacekeeping dues that is equivalent to the poor
    developing countries.
        So that needs to change so that there is more partners
    contributing to this, and your thoughts on that. I am not sure
    if that is because they are part of the G-77 or whatever it
    might be.
        But it seems to me a better assessment of who is capable to
    pay and, again, I would go to 30 percent, whatever it takes.
    But there are other countries that need to be providing
    additional money. So DNA rapid technology--if you could speak
    to that, and also the other questions that I raised.
        Yes, Ms. Holt.
        Ms. Holt. I would like to comment briefly, if you do not
    mind, on the South Sudan case. It was horrific, the attacks in
    Juba.
        Mr. Smith. Just to interrupt briefly.
        Ms. Holt. Yes.
        Mr. Smith. I found out after I started raising it, and 3
    days before I got on the plane to go over there that a member
    of my--of a humanitarian organization from my district was one
    of the women who almost got raped. I mean, that is how bad it
    was, and luckily, you know, she was resisting--heroic, strong--
    two guys with AK-47s who actually shot and said, you know--and,
    luckily, the door was broken in and these guys were stopped.
    But that was Salva Kiir's people. But the U.N. peacekeepers, I
    say again, would not respond.
        Please.
        Ms. Holt. I mean, what you are pointing to is this was an
    attack by the government forces. But the mission failed to
    intervene and the civilian--there is a number of Americans
    involved had called and were reassured peacekeepers were on
    their way.
        We pursued this deeply when I was in the government. We had
    a very strong--General Patrick Cammaert did a intense review
    with a whole range of things that we then pressed to put in
    place.
        So I will not argue that--it was never acceptable but it
    has pushed for a whole new set of protocols so the contingents
    not be in doubt. This is one of the tensions. When missions go
    in and think they are partnered with the government but then
    government forces turn on civilians or even on the peacekeeping
    missions themselves, as they have in South Sudan, contingents
    get confused. They are often outgunned by the military forces
    of the other country in the country that they are serving in.
        So it is a horrific example. But I will tell you that it
    was one that went to the highest levels of our government and
    other governments, which is why U.S. engagement on these
    issues--modernization, reform, and the diplomatic muscle that
    Congress and the American government can bring--is so critical
    to continuing to push for these reforms.
        I will just say, briefly, also I have not had a chance to
    read Brett Schaefer's testimony. He is very knowledgeable on
    these issues. But I will say it would be worth this committee
    getting a briefing from the administration on why, given some
    of the points you have pointed out, we were unable to win over
    diplomatic support to reduce our assessment rate.
        I did not mean to take up the whole time.
        I was just going to say because there could be a case made
    and the best way to do it is to start now with that diplomatic
    push, and I do not understand why the administration was not
    able to do that. It is a problem.
        Ms. Wild [presiding]. OK. Go ahead.
        Ms. Das. Just to comment on the tragic attack at the
    Terrain Hotel, I have been there before. I know how close it is
    to the peacekeeping base, and just knowing that peacekeepers
    did not respond it was a failure.
        But many things have happened since then, including pretty
    much immediately after that attack happened the force commander
    that did--there was a breakdown in communication--the force
    commander was fired and then there was an independent
    investigation that Tori was mentioning which led to
    recommendations on that this does not happen again.
        You know, this is--when peacekeepers are not deployed at
    the right numbers they are--we do not get to protect as many
    civilians as we should. But this was a real failure and the
    U.N. has acknowledged that and they are doing--they are trying
    to do better.
        And just on the DNA testing, we know that a part of the
    reforms are happening and so looking into DNA testing for
    paternity claims. And so that is something the U.N. is already
    pursuing, and we could probably get you more information on
    what is out there on that.
        Mr. Williams. Thank you. On the 25 percent and then the
    vacancy rates in force generation, I have read Brett Schaefer's
    testimony and I agree with him on this. There is a very good
    case politically for lowering the United States rate below 25
    percent. It is politically unwise for an organization like the
    U.N. to rely so much on one member State.
        The question, as Tori raised, is why have we failed
    diplomatically to get our position there accepted at the U.N.
    General Assembly, and I would submit that a good diplomatic
    strategy here is to get the 54 members--African members of the
    U.N.--on side in part by giving in to their requests that we
    support AU peace operations through the U.N. Security Council
    and link those two issues. I think diplomatically that would
    make sense.
        On the force generation issue, peacekeeping missions need
    both numbers and capabilities. So you have to get the numbers
    of soldiers, police, and civilians. But you also need
    capabilities, logistics support, ISR support, medical, special
    forces, increasingly, and military engineering.
        Why we need or what we need really is a much better bench
    because the accountability issues that have been raised means
    the U.N. is often desperate to fill missions without the top
    tier troop-contributing countries providing troops and support.
        So we need a broader bench of countries that can provide
    these types of capabilities. That, unfortunately, is a long-
    term process of building up militaries and police forces in
    other countries and we have done that well through programs
    like the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative.
        But it takes time. But we are in a much better situation
    with the U.N. in 2019. The bench is pretty strong. Countries
    like Mongolia that you have already mentioned that have come
    from literally nowhere, but others--Kazakhstan, Serbia--these
    are all good peacekeeping countries now that did not really
    exist on the radar screen 20 years ago.
        The problem is the political acceptability. It is the U.N.
    Security Council that pushes the numbers down and the
    capabilities of peace operations down for political and
    financial reasons.
        So it is hard for the secretariat to make an objective
    assessment of how many troops and capabilities are needed
    really to protect civilians in South Sudan or Congo because
    that number is way higher and the capabilities are way higher
    than are seen as being politically or financially acceptable at
    the Security Council.
        Mr. Gallo. I think the remaining question is the one you
    raised on DNA testing. In addition to that, there is no
    plausible argument against it that I will suggest.
        But the investigative capacity has required a first
    responder ability. The U.N. at the moment does not have that,
    and the question of DNA samples have to be taken as soon as
    possible and not stored for a year so that they are useless
    when they are analyzed--the form of investigation.
        And, of course, the other thing is that the international
    criminal court works on the basis of command responsibility and
    you hold the first commander accountable for misconduct by his
    troops.
        The United Nations, for internal purposes, for misconduct
    does not do that.
        Ms. Wild. Thank you.
        Ms. Das, I wanted to direct this to you. One of the
    benefits of the U.N. peacekeeping operations is that it
    promotes institutional stability and fragile States, and
    democracy building by outside forces can be met with
    significant opposition by locals.
        In those countries that have shown democratic potential,
    what can be done to avoid democratic backsliding and who is
    giving institutional and electoral guidance and how do we make
    sure that the democratic framework being established addresses
    local needs and challenges?
        Ms. Das. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. We have
    seen the U.N. support democratic elections in Central African
    Republic. We have seen it in Co-te D'Ivoire, Liberia, where we
    have helped government institutions build capacity and
    longstanding capacity that they continue to build resilience.
        So the U.N. peacekeeping is one partner. But there are
    other U.N. agencies including UNDP that play a critical role on
    helping to establish democratic practices.
        And this is another way that when the U.S. is engaged we
    push for democracy in these places and it is really important
    that the U.N. peacekeeping continues on this. I mean, the
    Central African Republic is a great example of where we have
    seen successful transfer of power from a transitional
    government and then having elections where the elected leader
    is trying to do the right thing.
        It needs support from the U.N. and from the U.S. to
    continue--it is a very fragile State--continue to pursue the
    right things, the right--democracy and have--extend State
    authority.
        So that is one thing that U.N. peacekeepers have been
    working on is to support the government institutions to help
    extend State authority in that country.
        So that is one example that we have been working with the
    U.N. on quite a bit.
        Ms. Wild. And what kind of oversight does the U.N. have,
    for instance, in a country like Liberia where the peacekeeping
    missions were closed in 2018?
        Ms. Das. So there is a country team there that continues to
    work to support the government institutions and it is led by
    UNDP.
        So there is a continuing footprint of U.N. presence there
    to continue the work that peacekeepers have already built on
    and then to make sure that it does not slide back, as you had
    mentioned before.
        Ms. Wild. What kind of enforcement mechanisms do they have,
    if any?
        Ms. Das. I do not--I am not sure if there is an enforcement
    mechanism in the sense of boots on the ground. But there is
    definitely--you know, I think there is definitely support
    within the Security Council and others to make sure that the
    gains made by peacekeepers are trying to move forward and
    continued.
        Ms. Wild. And let me just ask you this. Well, actually, let
    me ask this of Dr. Williams or Mr. Gallo.
        While I appreciate the AU's utility of peacekeeping
    operations and I certainly understand why the AU peacekeeping
    operations may have more local legitimacy with host governments
    than U.N. operations, I think it is vital that the AU operate
    in a manner that is consistent with U.N. priorities,
    objectives, and policies.
        What are the best ways to give the AU autonomy in
    conducting peacekeeping operations while also retaining,
    implementing, and enforcing U.N. oversight?
        I will put that out there for either one of you or both of
    you.
        Mr. Williams. So there is two ways we can think about how
    to enhance the AU's accountability and performance on the
    ground. Option one is to let it do it all itself and to have no
    oversight mechanisms. Option two is to support the AU with
    multilateral legitimacy of a Security Council resolution
    authorizing its missions.
        And then if it comes with U.N. support, that has to meet
    what we call the HRDDP--the human rights due diligence
    policies--which means that any U.N. support that is given to
    the African Union has to come with the types of accountability
    mechanisms that Peter was talking about earlier to make sure
    the AU troops are acting in conformity with international
    humanitarian law and human rights law.
        And so I think that is the two real options here. And so
    the better one I think is to provide external support.
        Now, that has been happening on an ad hoc basis for about
    the last 10 years. And so when the African Union has asked for
    U.N. or partner support from the European Union or United
    States, we have then said to the AU that you need to improve
    your conduct and discipline policies.
        You need to produce a policy on sexual exploitation and
    abuse and how to reduce it. You need to provide policies on
    accountability across the board. In that, the organization, in
    my opinion, has made significant strides and progress over the
    last 10 years.
        It is still not perfect. But I think the best way to ensure
    that it gets better is to work, as I have said, through the
    U.N. and provide those types of accountability mechanisms that
    are built in.
        Ms. Wild. Mr. Gallo, did you want to add anything to that?
        Mr. Gallo. No, ma'am. You are asking a political question,
    which is outside the scope of my comfort zone.
        Ms. Wild. Thank you.
        Ms. Houlahan, I believe you are up.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much for the chance to speak
    with you all, and I really appreciated the conversation. I also
    serve on the Armed Services Committee and so I have the
    opportunity to watch the budgetary process for the DOD go
    through the Congress.
        And one thing that I have consistently heard through that
    NDAA process is the DOD and contractors alike will talk about
    the importance of consistency of funding and something, you
    know, not being erratic.
        And I know you guys, almost every one of you, had the same
    kind of plea was not only funding but consistent funding
    regular and predictable.
        My question is, in the DOD side of things we hear very
    specific examples of what happens when you do not fund on time
    or you do not fund to the proper amount--you know, steel plants
    shuttering, production lines of helicopters shut down, losing
    our resident labor unions--those kinds of things.
        I know that this is a quantifiable amount of money that you
    are asking for. But what happens when it does not happen on
    time? Can you give us some anecdotal stories of what happens
    when we do not get the funding that we are asking for?
        Ms. Das. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
        The first thing that happens is that troop-contributing
    countries do not get reimbursed for providing troops. So I had
    mentioned India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia. These are--Rwanda--these
    are our allies who do a bulk of the peacekeeping. They are the
    ones who send out their troops in harm's way.
        And then the second thing that happens is--one anecdote
    that we heard recently was a country that provided helicopters.
    Their helicopter was--needed maintenance.
        But because that maintenance was not able to be provided,
    that helicopter no longer deploys and that country no longer
    provides helicopters to peacekeeping, which is a main way a lot
    of these places in Africa do not have the necessary roads or
    places to get to. So helicopters are a vital resource that is
    lacking.
        And so these are some of the major things. But then, you
    know, even getting peacekeepers to project and leave their
    bases and do protection of civilians outside is really critical
    and not having that capacity because their logistics or their
    vehicles do not have the fuel or what not is really
    problematic.
        So these resources have critical needs that are not being
    met. But I will let my colleagues----
        Ms. Holt. I would just add this as to your report, maybe we
    could submit it for the committee's consideration. This is the
    report on the financial situation.
        Among the things pointed out in that report is that it
    looked like only two of the peacekeeping missions have a
    minimum cash reserve of 3 months of operating costs. So it puts
    them in an uncertain posture. And so some of it is also the
    psychological problems.
        So I would worry that if a mission faced a crisis such as
    Congresswoman Smith was describing in South Sudan, you know,
    would that impact the mobility because your fuel supply may
    have run out of the funding for that month. That's a
    hypothetical. But you can see how this would cramp the
    operational pace of the mission.
        I would also say by borrowing from troop-contributing
    countries to fund missions it also puts the U.S. in a
    precarious position for our own leadership. It gives every
    country that wants to push us aside a talking point. Like, why
    should we listen to you--you are not even paying your fair
    share.
        And so it is a wonderful way to distract from our calls for
    performance and accountability, modernization and reform. And
    so I would say that is another kind of substantive impact.
        And then, third, it suggests that we do not take these
    missions seriously. As a member of the council we vote for
    them. We often write the mandates ourselves. We have often
    trained many of the troops that go in. And so for us not to
    fund it is really confusing to other countries as well.
        Mr. Williams. Just to add one more point, it undermines the
    attempt to get that bench that I was talking about earlier
    because, like anything in life, you are disincentivized doing a
    job if you are not sure you are going to get reimbursed for the
    money that you are owed doing that and that is what we are
    doing to the world's biggest troop-contributing countries, as
    has already been mentioned.
        So we are, on the one hand, trying to get more effective
    and accountable missions deployed in the field but, with the
    other hand, we are taking away the money in reimbursement that
    we are giving to those peacekeepers that should be operating in
    the field.
        So it disincentivizes particularly the more least-developed
    and poorer countries where financial incentives are, you know,
    one of the factors.
        Mr. Gallo. Let me point out that there is a financial
    incentive for troop-contributing countries to provide troops to
    the United Nations.
        If the United Nations budget is short, the government--the
    TCC should still be paying its own troops on the ground. So it
    is not--it is not the direct cause and effect, and if you are
    telling me or if anyone is suggesting that the financial
    situation is so precarious that the--those troops cannot be
    deployed because they have not been paid by the host nation
    government, I would question the fitness for role--for being in
    a peacekeeping role in the first place.
        Ms. Holt. With permission, if I could just say one thing.
        Ms. Wild. Yes, go ahead.
        Ms. Holt. When I was in the State Department, an African
    country came to us and said, we have been asked to deploy. We
    took out a large loan to pay for not the troops but all the
    equipment they need to bring with them and have been delayed in
    the deployment and then the loan was due.
        So they were in a bit of a bind because they had put out a
    lot of funds for which it was not--they were not a wealthy
    country.
        So there are things beyond paying soldiers that actually
    are part of the budget.
        Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate your time. Thank you. I yield
    back.
        Ms. Bass [presiding]. Representative Omar.
        Ms. Omar. Thank you, Chairwoman.
        So my question really is, to begin with, Dr. Williams, I
    wanted to address your fourth recommendation. I do agree that
    it is a problem politically and logistically for the U.N. to
    rely heavily on the United States.
        The efforts of peacekeeping forces are too important to
    depend the whims of U.S. politics. We have seen the
    consequences of this administration that is outright hostile to
    international organizations and allies, and for those of us who
    believe in the importance of these organizations to figure out
    a more sustainable way is important.
        But one of the unfortunate realities has been that when the
    United States steps back its obligations, other countries do
    not step up.
        So I wanted to talk to you. Can you tell me a little more
    about what the strategy would be in encouraging African
    countries to step up on peacekeeping contributions and what
    that would look like? Is there a political will in Africa or in
    Europe or in any other country to pick up the burden if the
    United States keeps paying less in peacekeeping efforts?
        Mr. Williams. Thank you very much for the question. So
    there is a couple of ways to answer it. At the general macro
    level, we need to make this thing worth investing in.
        And so this thing--this enterprise of U.N. peacekeeping has
    got to be seen to be across the board of the U.N. membership
    something that works and can be effective and accountable and
    can do things that we really need to do. So that is the first
    challenge is selling it that way.
        That is undermined by our absence of the Ambassadorial
    positions and others at New York at the moment and by not
    paying our own contributions.
        The second part of this, though, is that when the U.S.
    retreats from its leadership others are stepping up and filling
    that vacuum. China is the key player here when it comes to U.N.
    peacekeeping.
        China's financial contributions have risen quite
    significantly over the last few years. It is now paying about
    15 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget and it has a quite
    different set of views of the types of things that U.N.
    peacekeepers should be doing in the field.
        And so the vacuum will not remain a vacuum for long. Others
    will fill it.
        And third, then, for the African countries themselves, they
    are stepping up or they are starting to step up now with the
    new peace fund that they are trying to develop indigenous
    sources of funding for their own missions.
        But in the short term, it is completely unrealistic to
    expect these countries to pay the nearly $1 billion, for
    example, that AMISOM costs in Somalia.
        My suggestion is that we make a sort of diplomatic quid pro
    quo or linking of these issues. The African Union wants us to
    support their missions through the U.N.
        The United States wants to pay less for U.N. peacekeeping.
    And so I am sure there is some diplomatic middle ground in
    there. So that is how I would approach that issue.
        Ms. Omar. That is great, and thank you for bringing up
    Somalia. That was going to be the sort of next question that I
    was going to ask in another, I think, important dynamic in
    peacekeeping is the discrepancy between peacekeepers, national
    police, and the military.
        If we use Somalia, for example, when you speak to Somalis
    they will mention the fact that peacekeepers get a salary of
    about $1,400 a month.
        And when the salary for the Somali military individually is
    $50 with the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia now
    drawing down, there is a lot of anxiety in the region within
    Somalia that is exasperated because people are trying to figure
    out what that looks like.
        And so I just wanted to know if you had any suggestions on
    how we should invest in building local capacity, what the
    transition--what are the best practices for a full transition
    to happen when AMISOM leaves Somalia, which I am guessing is
    happening pretty soon, and how do we invest in gaining the
    trust of the countries that we have peacekeeping missions and
    knowing that we have made the right investment so that they can
    now transition into guarding their own peace.
        Mr. Williams. Thank you. That is a difficult set of
    questions but I will try my best.
        The first point----
        Ms. Omar. We have a limited time so----
        Mr. Williams. Sure. AMISOM is not, in my opinion, going to
    leave nor should it leave Somalia completely anytime soon. But
    the issue will be can it reconfigure its size and its mobility
    over time.
        The current debate is looking to, about a year or so after
    the elections if they happen in Somalia in 2020 and 2021,
    AMISOM can start drawing a bit more down there.
        But it is not on the table to leave completely. Second,
    when it comes to the money the one thing we should not do is
    cut the budget to the U.N. support office in Somalia.
        So the Somalia National Army Forces that you mentioned and
    AMISOM get all their logistics and mission support coming
    through the U.N. support office in Somalia.
        So when we are saying here another effect of not paying our
    fees or dues at the U.N. is that UNSOS is undermined that means
    the Somali National Army and AMISOM is basically suffering less
    logistical support to conduct operations against al-Shabaab.
        So we need to maintain that. And then on the individual
    level, SNA troops are getting, roughly, or should get, I should
    say, about $250 a month. An AMISOM peacekeeper, at the moment,
    is getting about $800 a month. So I can see that their--the
    Somalis you mentioned earlier that discrepancy is real.
        Ms. Omar. Yes. Our records, what I have, says $1,440 a
    month for AMISOM.
        Mr. Williams. That is what the--no, the U.N. guard force.
    UNSOM, the U.N.'s political mission in Somalia, has a Ugandan
    guard force that are paid at the U.N. rate of, roughly, $1,400
    a month.
        The African Union peacekeepers in Somalia get a lower rate,
    a different rate, which is at the moment about $800 a month,
    because that is paid for by the European Union.
        As I said earlier, the African Union cannot pay its own
    money. So the European Union actually pays the AMISOM
    peacekeepers at a rate of $800 a month.
        Ms. Bass. Representative Phillips.
        And when we are done--when Representative Phillips
    finishes, I will go back to Representative Smith. But if
    anybody else after that on the committee wants to continue, we
    can certainly do that.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Chairwoman Bass, and to each of
    our witnesses.
        My first question is about China, and with our diminished
    role or seemingly diminished role and increased interest by
    China throughout Africa, my question to each of you is are you
    seeing growing Chinese influence through the U.N.
        I believe China is now one of the largest troop
    contributors and, I think, the second largest funder of our
    peacekeeping efforts.
        If so, are you seeing it? If so, how, and then what are the
    implications in the near and long term?
        Ms. Holt, if you might begin.
        Ms. Holt. Thank you very much.
        I think each of us might have an aspect answer. China is
    aggressively moving forward to be seen as a leading country on
    peacekeeping. As you note, they are the largest member of the
    permanent members of the Security Council with, roughly, 2,400
    troops on the field, which is a huge change.
        When I was in government, we led a dialog with China in
    2009 and 1910 and at the time they had very small numbers and
    they mostly were building roads.
        Today, they have a diversity of capacity. Second, as you
    note, they have increased their financial contribution, and
    with this, frankly, comes voice and sway in the larger
    organization.
        The evidence that I know of is still somewhat anecdotal.
    But they did try and cut staff positions for protection of
    civilians and human rights during a budget committee debate and
    overview of peacekeeping missions.
        Usually the U.S. would be there and say that is
    ridiculous--no, we are not doing that. But they will continue
    to have a different vision for what peacekeeping missions
    should do in the field.
        They, traditionally, have not been as forward leading as we
    have on human rights, on protection of civilians, and ability
    to use force on behalf of civilians.
        So I think the trends are still working themselves out. The
    U.N. has turned to China for a number of major studies and one
    was quite forthright on the security of missions themselves,
    and I think that you see also a shift in these extra budgetary
    funding, sometimes for a good cause but it will give them more
    leadership capability and sway, particularly if the U.S. is not
    at the table and aggressively engaging in the way we are used
    to.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
        Ms. Das.
        Ms. Das. Eighty percent of the Chinese peacekeepers are
    actually deployed in Africa and they have a 8,000-person
    standby force that they are eager to test out.
        Mr. Phillips. How large? I am sorry.
        Ms. Das. Eight thousand.
        Mr. Phillips. Eight thousand.
        Ms. Das. The standby force that is--that they have offered
    to the U.N. peacekeepers. And they are wanting to deploy their
    new technologies and peacekeeping and try different things out.
        So they are happy to deploy in these ways and, again, I had
    mentioned before the U.S. only provides 40. We do a lot of ways
    and, obviously, our financial contribution is huge.
        But, as Tori is mentioning, when the U.S. is not engaged in
    these conversations about budget cuts we have seen China try to
    take out positions on human rights or protections of civilians.
        And so it is really important that the U.S. continue to be
    engaged because China is happy to take that role and kind of
    push their own agenda forward in these discussions.
        So China's influence is rising and it is something that we
    should--the U.S. should be countering at the U.N.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
        Dr. Williams.
        Mr. Williams. I would agree with everything you have just
    heard. I think it is spot on. I would just add one thing. I
    think China is learning at the moment how difficult U.N.
    peacekeeping can be.
        In Representative Smith's earlier question about UNMISS and
    Juba, China was one of the contributing countries that was
    caught up in those issues and it is facing a very difficult set
    of dilemmas that all the other U.N. contributing countries have
    faced over time.
        So it is learning. The way it is learning, though, is in
    part by putting more effort into doing this enterprise. It has
    now had a couple of force commander slot submissions so it has
    got experience about how to run these operations.
        It has increased over the years not just deploying
    engineers and logisticians and medical soldiers. It has been
    now deploying actually infantry battalions into Mali and South
    Sudan. So its military forces are getting more operational
    experience on the ground here.
        China, obviously, does not have the equivalent of NATO or a
    lot of overseas theaters to practice this. So I think it is
    learning through operational experience that it is getting in
    the peacekeeping missions.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you.
        Mr. Gallo.
        Mr. Gallo. To further add on to that, the question of voice
    and sway, when the United States is not at the table China,
    clearly, has a very different approach to human rights.
        In our perception, human rights is imperative in building
    democracy and institution building, and if the function of
    peacekeeping is to, you know, make countries safe and to
    institute a lasting peace, that is something that has to be
    done because it cannot be separated from the human rights
    issue.
        And the other question to be looked at is look at the
    corruption cases being prosecuted by the FBI in New York
    involving Chinese corruption involving the U.N. and why is the
    U.N. not diligent in eradicating this corruption from the
    inside.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Phillips. Before I--Mr. Gallo, you have spoken on this
    on a number of times. But if we could wave a magic wand here in
    Congress where would we start relative to the oversight and
    anti-corruption efforts that you deemed so necessary?
        Mr. Gallo. With regard to oversight? There is no oversight
    of the investigation function in the U.N. So, basically, that
    means the U.N. carry out the most shambolic investigation that
    you have ever seen in your life and I can give you plenty of
    examples of this.
        And the legal system within the U.N. is only concerned with
    the process. There is no concept of the unreasonableness of the
    decision. So long as the U.N. can hold that the decision was
    made in accordance with the process, the legal system is not
    concerned with what that decision is, and that is what leads to
    some of the most ridiculous things that we have ever seen and
    that is what leads to the lack of whistleblower protection and
    that is germane to the corruption inside the U.N.
        U.N. reform on a global basis is a massive undertaking and
    a daunting international challenge. Reform of the investigation
    function is a lot more manageable, a lot more feasible and will
    affect the culture of the organization.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
        Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Real quick, if I could.
        Mr. Gallo, you had mentioned one Wu Hongbo, a former U.N.
    undersecretary general for the diplomatic Department of
    Economic and Social Affairs at the U.N. who, in a Chinese
    television appearance, told how he used his position to protect
    Chinese national interests and had a Uighur Muslim politician
    and human rights activist barred from the U.N.
        Those examples--I mean, I held a hearing last year on the
    Uighurs. We had a woman who had been severely tortured and when
    she asked her torturer why in China, in the autonomous region,
    Xinjiang, why it was happening, he goes, because you are a
    Muslim.
        And yet many of these people--cannot say certainly, but
    many like Wu Hongbo, carry that mind set into the United
    Nations, which I think is a--and you might want to speak to
    that.
        But you also in your testimony talked about the Dekoa
    investigation and how children fathered by peacekeepers and a
    subsequent U.N. investigation with regard to paternity claims,
    if you might want to elaborate bit on that. I am not sure you
    did so in your opening comments.
        And, again, as I asked earlier, whether rapid DNA tests
    have helped insofar as the spoilage of the evidence. I would
    also ask Secretary Guterres has launched the Action for
    Peacekeeping Initiative. How do you feel about it, all of you?
        Is it a good idea? Does it have flaws? Is it well-meaning
    but not necessarily effective enough? Please speak on it.
        And then, finally, is there a conflict or an emergency
    somewhere on the planet that cries out for a deployment now or
    is on the precipice of being in need of such a deployment of
    U.N. peacekeepers?
        Mr. Gallo.
        Mr. Gallo. If I can start with the Dekoa investigation. I
    cannot answer that question fully because neither I nor anyone
    else has seen that report.
        It exists, but we do not know what is in it and there are
    all sorts of rumors going around, and the one about the DNA,
    and I was told and I had absolutely--I mean, I cannot testify
    to this because I do not know it but the story is that DNA
    samples were taken and stored in a drawer for a year.
        So when they were tested they were useless and that allowed
    the investigation to conclude that the DNA results did not
    establish paternity.
        Now, I do not know if that is true or not and that is the
    importance of the Dekoa report and that is why it has not been
    released or I believe that is why it has not been released.
        Now, I understand there is a lot more to it. But it is a
    bit a holy grail. So I am afraid you are going to have to find
    that one for yourself.
        Mr. Williams. I will leave the action for peacekeeping to
    my colleagues who are better placed to answer that. But on
    your--is there a crisis anywhere on the planet, in Africa I
    think the two places that concern me most would be the sort of
    the spillover effects from Mali.
        And so, particularly, in the Sahel we have seen a lot more
    Islamist fighters moving particularly into Burkina Faso, Niger,
    Mali, that area. So the spillover effects that the U.N.
    peacekeeping mission cannot deal with because it is confined to
    Mali is one place.
        The second place in Africa for me that is very worrying is
    Cameroon and the violence that we have seen over the last 18
    months or so there.
        Where the government is problematic elsewhere in the world
    it is Ukraine and Yemen are the two places where we are
    actively debating whether U.N. and what type of U.N. types of
    operations might be helpfully deployed there.
        Ms. Das. Just carrying off of what Paul had mentioned I
    think concerns Ukraine and there has been debate about
    peacekeeping there. But because of where the Security Council
    is, it is very doubtful that there would be anything happening.
        And another concern in Africa would be Burundi. Their
    government has been very strategic about pushing the U.N. out
    and making sure that there are not human rights or anybody kind
    of watching what's happening there. So that is a place I would
    be worried about.
        Regarding action for peacekeeping, it is a really
    innovative idea took hold of the Security Council, the troop-
    contributing countries as well as the financiers, the U.S.,
    together hold them accountable from when you deploy
    peacekeepers in making sure that there is a political process.
        So peacekeepers are being deployed to some of these places
    for long times because the political process or political
    solution has not come to fruition.
        So making sure that these three--these counterparts are
    working together that there is a political solution so we can
    end some of these peacekeeping missions. So it is really about
    the implementation and, you know, we are very hopeful that this
    will move forward some of these missions that have been
    longstanding.
        Ms. Holt. I will just add to the excellent comments. On the
    newest A4P agenda for peacekeeping, it has, as been described,
    pushed back to the politics a little. If you have a weak peace
    agreement, the best peacekeeping in the world cannot tape it
    back together again. And so some of that is reinvesting in the
    diplomatic and the negotiations behind the peace agreement.
        And I will suggest to you, given where your interests are,
    there is a role for Congress to even raise that politically and
    help.
        I was in New York a few weeks ago and I got lobbied by a
    member State to say, this is a great platform. You folks in the
    outside community need to be helping us--basically, implement
    these reforms, and I am, like, OK.
        So I think there is some momentum behind it, and with
    support from countries like the U.S. and others, it is a
    continuation of this 5-year effort for really getting serious
    about modernizing and reforming in the field, including on
    protection of civilians, sequencing, and basically making
    missions fit for purpose.
        I will say as far as the new places my colleagues have
    mentioned, Yemen in particular, there has least been an
    observer team sent out to figure out what the future might
    hold.
        We would all have long-term hopes for places like Syria.
    Countries do not always invite the U.N. in, and I would put
    Venezuela on that list right now, and then also we'll see what
    other parts I would concur, and Cameroon it is quite curious.
        My last point might just be briefly the U.N. is a living
    breathing organization. Just like Congress it is full of
    people. People who want to basically do well and do better. But
    they need push and they need help and they need support.
        So it is not whether--I think much of the problems we have
    heard on accountability and corruption it requires governments
    like ours and outsiders like us to push in and do the best they
    can and I think that is part of our role.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Bass. I think it is like Congress.
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Bass. I am just----
        Ms. Holt. May I clarify for the record? That was not about
    corruption. That is about the ambition.
        Ms. Bass. No. No. You know----
        Representative Omar.
        Ms. Omar. Thank you. I just felt like my last question was
    not answered. So I will rephrase it and see if we can start
    with Ms. Holt and then maybe get all three of you on the
    record.
        So the peacekeeping mission in Somalia has now been in
    effect for 12 years. Oh my God, it is 12 years. And I just
    wanted to see if you would agree that there has been efforts
    made to strengthen the police force, the military force within
    Somalia so that there could be a process set up for success
    once the peace mission ends.
        Was that always the plan that this will ultimately end at
    some point and were there mechanisms--are there mechanisms put
    in place for that to happen?
        And then the second piece of that question is that because
    there is this gap in compensation for whether it is U.N. or AU
    or the local military, we hear reports--newspaper reports that
    some of the military or the police within Somalia sometimes
    might--because they cannot--they are not getting paid for
    months sometimes that they might sell their weapons to militia
    or maybe even terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab--is there
    conflict in that and could their remedy be to help in trying to
    give them proper compensation?
        Mr. Williams. I will answer it this time.
        Ms. Omar. Yes. Whoever wants to take and then the three of
    you will----
        Ms. Holt. I will make some points, Paul.
        Just a minor distinction. It is often said it is peace
    keeping in Somalia. But the distinction I might make it is a
    Chapter 7 authorized peace enforcement mission. It is not led
    and run by the United Nations even as it is authorized by the
    Security Council and the African Union.
        It is able to use force to achieve its aims, which is
    including going after al-Shabaab. So I just want to make that
    distinction between most of the missions we are describing
    today, which are invited in with consent and use force in
    defense of the mandate to protect civilians themselves and
    their--so one is able to do war fighting, the other is not.
        And as I understand it, you know, the aim has been that
    this peace enforcement mission works alongside the U.N.
    political office, has U.N. logistics, and there is a U.N.
    country team which is focused on development and humanitarian
    enterprises.
        So it is not exactly a peace keeping mission. But the idea
    was if Amazon could create a secure and stable environment, it
    should be handing off, as you describe, to local police, work
    with local communities, have governance take root, and we were
    trying to encourage all of this to happen simultaneously.
        Professor Williams will know better than I the state of
    play. The gap that was always, unfortunately, well recognized
    was you did not have enough capability coming in behind to then
    play that stabilizing role for police and rule of law, and to
    work appropriately with the communities which----
        Ms. Omar. And that lack of capability is with the country
    or with----
        Ms. Holt. Probably a combination. Amazon cannot bring
    everything with it and the government was still, as I
    understood, working to try and build out and work also with
    local authorities. So I think that is a work in progress.
        Mr. Williams. I would agree with everything said.
        Just to add, one is that AMISOM has not even reached year
    zero in the world of normal peace keeping, and what I mean by
    that is all these other missions we have talked about normally
    deploy after a cease-fire or after a peace agreement.
        There is no peace deal in Somalia and there has not been.
    So the 12 years that AMISOM so far is--we are still not even at
    year zero for peace keeping--which is why fatigue might be
    setting in.
        Second, as Tori mentioned, AMISOM is basically a
    conventional military force that is trying to degrade a network
    transnational terror network in the form of al-Shabaab.
        And so there is no way that a conventional force like
    AMISOM is able to militarily defeat al-Shabaab. It relies
    ultimately on trying to stabilize the recovered areas that al-
    Shabaab used to control and that requires police,
    administrators, civilians, and that is where the Somali
    government and the Federal member States have been in short
    supply.
        But to your final--to your question and, finally, about has
    AMISOM boosted local police forces and the army, yes. Over that
    12 years, there is no comparison.
        If you look at the 12-year period, the Somalian national
    army, the State police forces and the regional police forces
    and also the Darwish and the militia groups in Somalia, they
    are in a much better situation to deal with these issues now
    than they were 12 years ago.
        But have they reached the level where you would want to
    pull AMISOM out in the last couple of years, as we talked
    about, I do not think we have reached that stage yet.
        And yes, the SNA are sometimes guilty as are the regional
    forces of selling ammunition, food supplies, rations, and other
    things.
        They have just recently completed their biometric identity
    data base for the Somalian national army which quite--it is
    amazing if you think about it. Until this year, we did not know
    who was in the Somalian national army. And if you do not know
    who is in the army we cannot do all the other things
    subsequently.
        So that has only just happened but that is a sign of
    positive progress there. Now the job is to pay them through,
    basically, mobile phone and secure banking networks linked to
    their biometric IDs and when they are paid they can properly
    focus on pushing back al-Shabaab and not on some of other
    issues that they have unfortunately strayed into previously.
        Ms. Omar. I know we have to go, but can I ask one more
    question? OK.
        And this question is for Mr. Gallo. I know that I would be
    in trouble if I did not--in talking about accountability and
    oversight, not bring his up with many of my constituents.
        There is the question of rape and sexual violence with some
    of the peacekeepers in Somalia and the process of
    accountability has not really been quite transparent and I
    wonder in your conversation about waste and fraud does the
    other kind of tragedies that sometimes might be caused by those
    that are deployed by the U.N. to engage in peace keeping go
    along the same line?
        Mr. Gallo. Ma'am, I mentioned in my written statement my
    concern about the U.N.'s lack of concern with known cases of
    corruption in Somalia.
        In 2015, I believe my former office conducted a number of
    investigations and discovered $0.80 on the dollar of aid money
    going into Somalia was being lost or was otherwise unaccounted
    for.
        We know that that was--there were connections in that case
    to al-Shabaab and the U.N. was simply not interested in
    pursuing it.
        What can I, as an individual, do about that other than to
    tell you that it exists and that it happened?
        Ms. Omar. So only 20 percent was going to do the work and
    80 percent----
        Mr. Gallo. Yes, between 70----
        Ms. Omar. We do not know--it could have gotten into the
    hands of a terrorist organization like--and there is no
    accountability measure for it?
        Mr. Gallo. Well, it was even worse than that. As I
    understand it, OCHA received these reports and stuck them in a
    bottom drawer for 3 months and refused to tell the member
    States, because if the member States knew about it they might
    reduce their contributions for the following financial year.
        But that is the culture of the U.N. There is no
    accountability. Nobody's career is going to be harmed for doing
    something like that.
        Ms. Omar. But yes, thank you for pointing that out. I was
    not really here when you gave your testimony. I think it is
    important for us to see clarity in reports like that and make
    sure that that level of corruption is not being perpetuated
    without any remedy for it.
        But if one of you wants to help address maybe what
    transparency and accountability had looked like for the cases
    of rape by AMISON within Somalia or any of the countries where
    they are doing peacekeeping work.
        Mr. Gallo. I can tell you how the system works.
        Ms. Omar. I was going to have--yes.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Williams. Thank you. Yes, the statistics are right.
    Transparency International has put Somalia as the most corrupt
    country for the last 11 years or so. The figures of 70 percent
    or so disappearing were normally, at least according the U.N.'s
    monitoring group reports, from about the 2012-13 period and it
    has got better since then.
        The fact that a lot of that money is disappearing, though,
    does not automatically mean it has ended up in the hands of al-
    Shabaab. The vast majority of this just means we cannot track
    it financially in the normal ways that we would track accounts.
        But that was because Somalia did not have a finance
    ministry and a central banking system that worked. So the money
    not being traced did not automatically mean it was going to
    terrorism actors like al-Shabaab.
        On AMISOM, yes, there was--allocations were seriously
    raised against AMISOM troops in 2014 by Human Rights Watch
    researchers and reports, and they made various allegations
    about SEA and rape in some cases.
        The African Union conducted an internal investigation
    looking into that, the results of which were published
    subsequently in 2015. But more to the point, what has happened
    in practical terms is Uganda started as the main troop
    contributing country in AMISOM.
        It started to hold court marshals in Mogadishu itself for
    two reasons--one, to obviously, reiterate that this is not
    acceptable behavior and there would be consequences, but
    second, this would need to be done on Somali territory so that
    Somalis could see the impact of the African Union actually
    trying to promote justice and accountability here, and those
    things continue to this day.
        Ms. Omar. Go ahead.
        Ms. Das. Just to add to what Paul had mentioned, not
    necessarily for AMISOM but just in general, in 2015 the
    secretary general put together an online data base. So every
    allegation that was ever reported is in this data base and
    where they are in the reporting, so in their investigation as
    well as what--have they been prosecuted and what the justices
    look like.
        In 2016, the U.S. put together a resolution called 2272,
    giving executive power to the secretary general to remove any
    troops that are doing systematic wide abuse. So this has been
    implemented in Central African Republic where the Republic of
    Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo both countries were
    repatriated from that country.
        And then Congressman Smith mentioned Jane Holl Lute. She is
    looking at sexual exploitation and abuse across the U.N.
    system, not just within peacekeeping. So it is--you know, we
    are looking at UNDP and others. It is something that this
    secretary general is very focused on and addressing this.
        And then, you know, in the last 2 years we have seen the
    numbers decrease significantly. In 2016, there was 103 cases of
    SEA--sexual exploitation and abuse--by peacekeepers. That has
    dropped to 50.
        And, last, it is really important for the secretary general
    that we are assisting victims. So there is a victims rights
    advocate, Jane Connors, who reports directly to the secretary
    general, and on top of that, she has victims' rights advocates
    that are embedded within the mission, so making sure that
    victims have access to--access to legal services as well as
    health services on the ground.
        But any case--one case of sexual exploitation and abuse is
    one too many by peacekeepers.
        Ms. Omar. Well, thank you all for your testimony. I think,
    you know, we all understand how valuable--I mean, I speak from
    firsthand experience how valuable the work that international
    organizations do are.
        And to Mr. Gallo, I would say thank you so much for your
    testimony and for really seeking accountability. I do not
    believe that we should throw the baby out with the bath water
    and I think that there are a lot of people who are very much
    interested in being advocates for accountability and
    transparency and seeing where we could create reforms and where
    we could be truth seekers.
        Again, I know this has been very informative for me and
    probably for a lot of our committee members and I do want Ms.
    Holt to take you up on that offer of going with you and seeing
    what the work looks like on the ground.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Bass. Once again, I want to thank all of the witnesses
    for being here today and the meeting is now adjourned.
        Mr. Gallo. If I could interject with a clarification,
    Chairman, the conduct and discipline website which Ms. Das
    refers to does not list all of the allegations.
        It lists the investigations. The United Nations does not
    publish the numbers of complaints received. I cannot remember
    the General Assembly resolution which mandates it. But there is
    a requirement to report to the GA the number of sexual
    exploitation and abuse cases.
        The U.N. defines case as one which is being investigated,
    and what happens is that the vast majority of these complaints
    are screened out at what they call the assessment phase.
        So we do not know the number--the total number--of
    complaints that are received. And with regard to the victims'
    rights advocates, the problem there is that the United Nations
    definition of a victim is someone who has had a case--whose
    sexual exploitation and abuse has been determined by a U.N.
    investigation. And if you look at the statistics of them, they
    are tiny.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
        [Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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