    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

              ASSESSING U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
           THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 3, 2019

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-24

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California		     FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota	             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                        Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                     ------

       Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
                                   Terrorism

                     THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman

    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island            Ranking Member
    TED LIEU, California		     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     LEE ZELDIN, New York
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland		     BRIAN MAST, Florida
    BRAD SHERMAN, California	     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    JUAN VARGAS, California		     STEVE WATKINS, Kansas

                          Casey Kustin, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Ewers, Elisa Catalano, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Middle East
      Security Program, Center for a New American Security...........     8
    Benaim, Daniel, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress......    18
    Pletka, Danielle, Senior Vice President, Foreign and Defense
      Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute..................    28

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    46
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    47
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    48
    Questions for the record from Representative Allred..............    49

              ASSESSING U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

                                 April 3, 2019

                            House of Representatives

       Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
                                   Terrorism

                          Committee on Foreign Affairs

                                         Washington, DC

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in
    Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
    Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Deutch. All right. This hearing will come to order.
    Welcome, everyone.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on U.S.
    policy priorities in the Middle East. I thank our witnesses for
    appearing today and I will start by recognizing myself for an
    opening statement.
        Thanks to our panel. Thanks for being here today. Thanks
    for the work you do for our Nation.
        At the outset of the 116th Congress and 2 years into the
    Trump administration, the United States faces a multitude of
    challenges in the Middle East.
        We just marked the eighth anniversary of the start of the
    war in Syria, which has led to the deaths of more than half a
    million people, the displacement of millions both inside Syria
    and in neighboring countries.
        The conflict and humanitarian crisis that it created has
    the potential to reshape the region literally for decades to
    come. Iran continues to support Bashar al-Assad and carry out
    its destabilizing activities in countries from Lebanon to Yemen
    to Iraq.
        Outside powers, such as Russia, use military force,
    economic support, and weapons sales to increase their regional
    influence at the expense of the United States.
        Libya is fractured. Yemen is ravaged by civil war, the
    intervention of regional States, and the world's worst
    humanitarian crisis.
        While these issues receive the bulk of the headlines and
    media attention, other events and trends also deserve our
    focus. Tunisia's nascent democracy confronts serious economic
    and political challenges.
        Algeria's president submitted his resignation yesterday
    after two decades in power. The dispute splitting the Gulf
    Cooperation Council is at a stalemate and Israel has threats on
    its borders and peace that is still elusive.
        A youth bulge--approximately 45 percent of the Middle East
    is under 25 years old--presents a myriad of challenges and
    opportunities in the coming decade and more than 8 years after
    millions took to the streets around the region in protest of
    corruption and autocracy, too many regional governments remain
    unaccountable to their people and opposed to democracy and open
    civil society and human rights.
        In the wake of these challenges the United States requires
    a well-formulated clear-eyed approach to the Middle East.
    Unfortunately, the administration's policy toward the region is
    confusing and, at some points, seemingly incoherent.
        The president announced the rapid and complete withdrawal
    of U.S. troops in Syria in December with little notice given to
    international allies and partners on the ground.
        This decision prompted the resignation of Secretary of
    Defense Jim Mattis and Special Envoy to Defeat ISIS Brett
    McGurk. Yet, the administration now plans to keep anywhere from
    400 to 1,000 troops in Syria, a number that changes in the
    press almost by the day, and U.S. long-term strategy in Syria
    remains elusive and ambiguous.
        In Yemen, the Trump administration has offered unstinting
    support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and while I recognize--
    understand the risks posed by the Houthis and Iranian forces in
    Yemen, the conflict has led to tens of thousands of civilian
    casualties.
        It has shifted focus from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
    and has worsened this horrific humanitarian crisis and
    catastrophe.
        Furthermore, the Trump administration has offered an
    inconsistent message on human rights and democratic values. At
    a time when many are questioning the American commitment to the
    region, the administration has too often turned a blind eye to
    human rights abuses and has equivocated in expressing support
    for democratic development in the Middle East.
        I believe our relationships with regional States are vital
    to our national security and to geopolitical stability. These
    are ties that are enduring and many date to the end of the
    Second World War.
        However, we should view our relationship with regional
    States through the prism of our own interests and values. Where
    do our priorities align? What type of actions undermine our
    goals and undermine U.S. values?
        We should be honest in reassessing where our interests and
    values diverge and identifying actions that set back our mutual
    objectives and in expressing our opposition when our allies and
    partners do not live up to those standards.
        Furthermore, while the Trump administration often
    articulates maximalist goals in the Middle East, it has cut the
    resources needed to achieve them.
        For the third straight year the Trump administration has
    proposed drastic cuts to our foreign affairs budget. The Fiscal
    Year 2020 Trump budget request includes a 6 percent drop in
    funding for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, compared to
    Fiscal Year 2019.
        This subcommittee has oversight responsibility over the NEA
    budget and I hope this hearing can help us better grasp the
    trends, the challenges, and opportunities facing the United
    States and the Middle East and help us better execute our
    oversight responsibility.
        I also hope the witnesses will provide an honest assessment
    of recent U.S. policy and how the U.S. Government, specifically
    Congress, can take steps to foster a more successful approach
    to the region that secures our national interests without
    sacrificing the values that make us unique and admired around
    the world.
        I thank the witnesses for appearing and I now turn to
    Ranking Member Wilson for his opening statement.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Deutch.
        The complexities of the Middle East pose enduring
    challenges to U.S. interests in the region and have vexed both
    Republican and Democratic administrations alike.
        It is certainly not a region for the faint of heart. Just a
    cursory glance at the Middle East can be overwhelming. At the
    same time, I am grateful that the Trump administration has been
    achieving some important successes in such a complicated
    environment.
        The Trump administration has presided over the defeat of
    ISIS's so-called caliphate. This certainly does not mean the
    threat from ISIS has been neutralized, but seizing ISIS's
    territory denies the terrorist group both a lucrative profit
    stream as well as a safe haven from which to orchestrate
    attacks against the U.S. and our allies.
        There is no doubt that this is a major achievement that has
    made our country and world safer. President Trump rightfully
    withdrew from the flawed Iran nuclear agreement.
        The Trump administration has increased the pressure on
    Tehran to--in response to its reckless development of ballistic
    missiles and continued sponsorship of global terrorism.
        The pressure on Iran has yielded concrete dividends. U.S.
    sanctions have prevented Iran from delivering any oil to its
    Syrian client, the Assad regime, since January 2d.
        In the last 3 months of 2018, Iran was sending 66,000
    barrels a day to Syria. The Syrian will never forget that it
    was the Trump administration that finally enforced the previous
    administration's ``red line,'' striking Assad twice for using
    chemical weapons against civilians.
        Sanctions in Iran have also affected Tehran's sponsorship
    of regional terrorism. Just last week reports indicated that
    Iran had to slash payments to fighter in Syria by a third due
    to the pain of the American sanctions.
        Even employees of Hezbollah have missed paychecks and lost
    perks. The administration has also made the bold move of
    designated major Iranian-backed militias for terrorism
    including the Nujaba in Iraq and the brigades of Afghan and
    Pakistani mercenaries Iran has been exploited as cheap fodder
    in Syria's bloody civil war.
        Under the leadership of President Trump, the dynamics of
    the Middle East appear to be shifting. His first international
    trip was to Riyadh where Gulf Cooperation Council countries
    along with other Muslim countries agreed on the need to counter
    extremism.
        The journey is far from complete but the step was
    unprecedented and positive. In February, the administration
    convened a conference in Warsaw, bringing Arab countries and
    Israel together to confront the Iranian regional threat.
    Notably, this came after the Trump administration's relocation
    of the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, a move that many
    incorrectly predicted would upend ties between the Jewish State
    and its Arab neighbors.
        The Trump administration must continue to build on these
    achievements. Like Chairman Deutch, I too was concerned by the
    August 2018 decision to freeze U.S. stabilization funding to
    Syria and the 2018 decision to withdraw troops from the
    country.
        There is simply no substitute for U.S. leadership in the
    Middle East, especially given that Russia and Iran are more
    than happy to fill the void.
        The administration must also continue going after the
    Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Some of these militias won
    seats in Iraq's parliamentary elections in May and stand to
    receive U.S. taxpayer money sent to the Iraqi government.
        These groups include those with American blood on their
    hands such as the AAH and the Badr Organization. It is time to
    correct this long-time standing failure of U.S. policy and
    cutoff all armed groups taking orders from the mullahs in
    Tehran.
        There is no way to simplify the thorny challenges to the
    U.S. policy in the Middle East. This is a region that will
    unfortunately continue to trouble U.S. policymakers for years
    to come.
        While we may disagree on the details, I think we can all
    agree on one guiding principle. U.S. leadership and engagement
    in the Middle East is essential.
        I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses today.
    I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        I will now recognize members of the subcommittee for a 1-
    minute opening statement should they wish to make one.
        Mr. Chabot, you are recognized.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
        As a former chair of this committee, I just want to
    emphasize that the importance of U.S. engagement it is just
    critical.
        It really cannot be overemphasized, and I would just note
    that the chair did tag this administration with their policy
    being--I think confusing, incoherent were the terms that the
    gentleman used, and I would--I would just make the point that I
    think many, including myself, believe that the previous
    administration's policies there were far worse from, for
    example--and I happened to also chair the Asia and Pacific
    Subcommittee a while back, and the previous administration was
    bound and determined to de-emphasize our role in the Middle
    East and pivot was the initial term they used to Asia.
        And then they later on called it a rebalance because pivot
    seemed a little too clear on what they were trying to do and
    rebalance, for whatever reason, seemed a little more
    politically correct.
        And, ultimately, it is questionable whether they did that
    or not. I would argue they perhaps de-emphasized both regions
    rather than strengthen us in either place, which was a mistake.
        The previous administration famously drew a red line and
    then ignored it, and we have seen untold deaths in Syria as a
    direct result of that policy, and probably the most disastrous
    thing the previous administration did was that after all the
    blood and treasure that were spent in Iraq was then to, against
    the advice of just about everybody, just pull all our troops
    out.
        Having been there a number of times, having talked to
    troops and the leaders on the ground and our allies there, no
    one really anticipated that the administration would actually
    do that, but they did, and that left a power vacuum which then
    was filled by ISIS and we saw the horrors that occurred under
    the hands of ISIS.
        And then the administration's response to that--yes, they
    ultimately did respond after they had taken over a significant
    portion of the area, especially Iraq, but also Syria.
        And then they kind of handcuffed our troops there and we
    were not really able to respond as was necessary. The current
    administration took those handcuffs off and we saw the demise
    of ISIS.
        That does not mean that we can ignore them. Some of them
    scattered into other areas and so we have to, I think, be very
    aware that they could still be a threat. But compared to where
    they were, we are much better off.
        So just a few points. We do need to continue to be engaged
    in the Middle East and work with our allies there.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
        Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
    statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
    subject to the length limitation in the rules.
        I will now introduce our witnesses. First, Ms. Elisa
    Catalano Ewers is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center For a
    New American Security and a faculty lecturer at the Johns
    Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
    International Studies.
        For over a decade, Ms. Catalano Ewers served in senior
    foreign policy and national security positions in the U.S.
    Government including as a director for the Middle East and
    North Africa on the National Security Council staff and in
    multiple positions at the Department of State.
        Mr. Daniel Benaim is a senior fellow at the Center for
    American Progress, researching U.S. policy in the Middle East
    as well as a visiting assistant professor at New York
    University's program in international relations.
        He previously served as a Middle East policy advisor and
    foreign policy speech writer at the White House, the Department
    of State, and the U.S. Senate. He was also an international
    affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
        And, finally, Ms. Danielle Pletka is senior vice president
    for foreign and defense policy studies at the American
    Enterprise Institute where she oversees the institute's work on
    foreign and defense issues.
        She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's
    Walsh School of Foreign Service. Ms. Pletka was a long-time
    senior professional staff member for the Senate Committee on
    Foreign Relations where she specialized in Near East and South
    Asia and where she also worked with our friend who is not here
    so I will wait until he returns to reunite the two of you.
        Thanks very much to all of our witnesses. We appreciate
    your being here. We appreciate your taking the time to offer
    your insight with this committee, and Ms. Catalano Ewers, I
    will recognize you first.
        I will remind all of the witnesses to please limit your
    testimony to 5 minutes and, without objection, your prepared
    written statements will be made a part of the hearing record.
        Again, thanks so much, and Ms. Catalano Ewers, you are
    recognized.

    STATEMENT OF MS. CATALANO EWERS, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE
       EAST SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Thank you.
        Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join
    you here today. I am humbled to be sitting here alongside two
    very respected colleagues.
        Nation States and institutions in the region have suffered
    severe blows. Some States have turned inward, like Egypt. Some
    have disintegrated, like Syria. And others have taken on a more
    aggressive foreign policy, like Saudi Arabia.
        Non-State actors such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
    have sought to exploit these power vacuums and multiple levels
    of competition are happening across the region.
        The perception of the last decade is a United States in
    withdrawal. Whether the perception is correct or not is no
    longer the point. This view has unsettled partners and
    encouraged competitors.
        What happens in the Middle East rarely stays there, whether
    in the form of clear and imminent threats, such as terrorism or
    proliferation, or more intractable threats, like the
    humanitarian crises that reverb inside and outside the region.
        The reality is that the United States cannot extricate
    itself from the region and should not try to. However, it could
    deploy itself smartly and more effectively.
        This administration inherited these systemic challenges. It
    also inherited strategies, some of which, like the counter ISIS
    campaign, has managed to pursue its success. But such campaigns
    never end with battlefield wins.
        The administration has also relied on cults of personality
    rather than statecraft. It has placed a high value on
    individual personal relations with Egypt, Saudi, and others at
    the expense of institutional engagement.
        It has promulgated rhetoric but also a sense of
    unpredictability. Some governments in the region may embrace
    the more aggressive posture on Iran but the Syria withdrawal
    announcement, the lack of active engagement with Iraq, and the
    absence at the highest level of U.S. diplomatic pressure in
    Yemen all illustrate that there is not a single comprehensive
    regional strategy on Iran.
        It has ignored bad actions from partners in pursuit of
    wins. The administration's unwillingness to press partners when
    they act inconsistently with U.S. interests conveys a sense
    that some have a blank check.
        Going forward, we will need to watch for the resurgence of
    groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, the disintegration of political
    processes in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the unintended escalation
    and conflict between Israel and Hezbollah or conflict in the
    seas around the Arabian Peninsula, humanitarian displacement
    and refugee crises, repression against citizens across the
    region, and the consequences of unanswered economic and
    political grievances.
        In light of all this complexity, I would offer just a
    number of immediate steps Congress could consider. First,
    Congress should exercise its powers to receive a full strategy
    on Iran beyond just the campaign of economic pressure.
        Congress should act consistent with the notion that
    diplomacy and development are tools of first resort, continue
    the trend of restoring budgets to the State Department and
    USAID, and field qualified Ambassadors and senior officials.
        Congress should insist that the administration pursue
    diplomatic ends, ways, and means, such as actively supporting
    political negotiations in Yemen and sustaining full partnership
    with Iraq.
        Congress should also insist that the U.S. support to
    partners comes with a firm commitment to hold partners
    accountable for their actions. This includes a full accounting
    into the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
        The United States retains leverage but it must be
    exercised. Congress should continue to remind partners that the
    United States' views on human rights violations and overall
    repressive policies are part of the continuum of regional
    instability, not separate from it.
        There is no shortage of bipartisan issues on which Congress
    can use the power of its own outreach, its pulpit, and its
    purse to support balanced and reasoned approaches. Whether it
    be support for Israel's security while also keeping the road to
    peace viable or reaffirming commitments to the security of
    regional partners without conceding to proxy wars throughout
    the region, Congress can help ensure U.S. relationships are
    assessed honestly and in all of their complexity.
        I look forward to your questions, and thank you again.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Catalano Ewers follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Catalano Ewers.
        Mr. Benaim, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF MR. BENAIM, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
                                PROGRESS

        Mr. Benaim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
    members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity and
    invitation to testify.
        I start from the premise that no party and no president has
    monopoly on wisdom or wishful thinking, on success or failure,
    least of all in this region that has thwarted so many good
    intentions.
        There are no easy choices, but there are better and worse
    ones, in my mind, and better and worse outcomes to expect as a
    result.
        The retaking of the last ISIS-held villages in Syria, a
    bipartisan project started by one president and finished by
    another, shows that U.S. leadership can still tackle major
    regional challenges.
        But other developments make clear the need for
    congressional oversight and tough questions in service of
    bringing out the best policies to serve the country's interest.
        That starts with making sure that ISIS cannot come back,
    Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon or hurt our allies,
    protecting our ally, Israel, and key partners.
        But I would argue that these goals cannot be cleanly
    separated from the destabilization and radicalization due to
    ongoing regional conflicts and deficits outlined over the years
    in the Arab Human Development Reports.
        Two years in, I am worried that the current approach will
    leave the Middle East's conflicts deeper and the region less
    stable, more dangerous, and more likely to require U.S.
    resources and attention for years to come.
        Two years in, I would say the record is decidedly mixed. I
    think the Trump administration deserves credit for seeing
    through the military campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
        But I am worried that they are under investing in the
    aftermath. They have sought to reorient Middle East policy
    around Iran but have yet to offer a realistic path to reconcile
    maximalist goals and rhetoric with minimal investment beyond
    sanctions to create the conditions for progress.
        They have sought to restore regional partnerships that the
    chairman spoke of earlier. But they have done so too often by
    offering a blank check to Saudi Arabia and giving rulers
    impunity for abuses at home and destabilizing moves abroad.
        This committee has held, I thought, commendable hearings on
    the subject of Yemen and I agree with the need to use
    legislation to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen and to
    send a clear signal and give leverage to people pushing for
    peace to turn a cease-fire into peace talks_while still
    fighting al-Qaeda and helping Saudi Arabia defend its territory
    against Houthi missiles.
        Tools and process also matter to outcomes, and I worry also
    about a systematic downgrading and even dismantling of
    diplomacy and development, leading to uneven and overly
    personalized approaches that seem to be hurting what should be
    broad bipartisan support for key partnerships.
        Instead, in brief, I would enhance civilian engagement
    post-ISIS in Iraq and Syria. I would reset the terms for a
    partnership and cooperation with Saudi Arabia and demand more
    responsible action.
        I would vote to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen in
    service of a larger peace, which is a bigger project than
    simply voting on U.S. support.
        I would demand an Iran strategy with realistic objectives,
    and I would protect U.S. diplomacy and development and seek to
    restore human rights as a U.S. policy priority.
        It is not easy, but it is essential to engage with not just
    States and rulers but societies who will be drivers for long-
    term stability or instability.
        I thank you for having me and look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Benaim follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Benaim.
        Ms. Pletka, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF MS. PLETKA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND
         DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Ms. Pletka. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wilson, and members of the
    committee, it is always an honor to testify before this
    committee.
        If I may, I would like to suggest an amendment to the
    question you pose in this hearing. You ask what are U.S. policy
    priorities in the Middle East, and that question really cannot
    be answered without asking what the United States seeks to
    achieve in the region.
        If our only interest is the immediate suppression of ISIS,
    our leaders should feel free to declare mission accomplished.
    But for those of us who recognize that ISIS is the fourth
    iteration of what used to be called al-Qaeda in Iraq and that
    it will be back, sooner or later, the truth is that our mission
    is far from accomplished.
        Indeed, it seems right to question what our mission
    actually is, not just in Syria but throughout the region. The
    real question before us is what is the just and lasting end
    game for the United States in the Middle East.
        We can talk about Syria, and we will, or Iraq or Iran or
    Yemen or Saudi Arabia in endless detail. I promise. And your
    members can offer more legislation disincentivizing terrorism,
    incentivizing cooperation with U.S. allies, arming good guys,
    sanctioning bad guys.
        But without an end game, our policies are nothing more than
    this year's tactics. What should the end game be? To my mind,
    the right question to ask is how future presidents of the
    United States can avoid being drawn into Middle Eastern
    conflicts.
        The problems of the Middle East are national; they are
    sectarian, regional, political, and economic in nature. Some
    have suggested that the right thing to do is to ignore them and
    let the people of the region sort them out. After all, why does
    who governs Yemen or Syria matter in Florida or South Carolina?
        And the answer is, for the most part, it does not until it
    does. Because we so often wait for a problem to become a
    crisis, those in the Middle East who are suffering under
    tyranny or inequality or discrimination or privation seek
    solutions that do have an impact on us.
        Think of the people of Syria turning to ISIS or the
    Shi'ites of Yemen turning to the Houthis or the people of Iran
    turning to the ayatollahs. Problems that were smaller and
    manageable become unmanageable challenges to U.S. interests and
    security.
        The region attracts Salafi jihadis, outside powers, and
    sundry bad actors because it is rife with opportunity and the
    question before us whether we want to continue to give them
    those opportunities.
        Every time we decide to do so, Americans are put in harm's
    way. Every time we decided Iran does not matter, Hezbollah does
    not matter or Shi'ites get what they deserve or Saudis deserve
    to be threatened or southern Yemenis do not deserve access to
    their nation's wealth or Libyans are somehow ungovernable or
    Muslims are uninterested in democracy, we open the door to
    those who offer to resolve those problems for the region.
        So what should our policies be? In Lebanon, we need to end
    the fiction that the government is independent of Hezbollah, a
    terrorist group. Any other nation in that situation would not
    be allowed to have a U.S.-designated terrorist group sitting in
    the cabinet and itself avoid designation as a State sponsor.
        We need to more aggressively pinpoint Hezbollah financiers
    and supporters. We need to be more sure that the Lebanese armed
    forces has absolutely no relationship with Hezbollah. I am
    certainly not sure of that.
        In Syria, we definitely need to support Syrian democratic
    forces and oppose the reinstatement of the Assad regime. We
    need to keep the Russians out. We need to penalize the Iranians
    as strongly as possible for their involvement in Iraq.
        As my colleague said, we need to end the involvement of the
    popular mobilization forces in the Iraqi government and we need
    to compete with the Iranians on the ground. In Saudi, we need
    to demand the end to imprisonment and targeting of political
    dissidents and move toward a peace process in Yemen,
    understanding that that is a two-sided problem. We need to lean
    on the Iranians for perpetuating that conflict as well.
        We need to signal to Saudi Arabia that global arms sales
    are contingent on improvement in its rights and military
    records, but to do that, we need to work with our allies to
    ensure that they do not back fill where we pull out.
        In Yemen, we definitely need to recognize the complexity of
    the situation on the ground and bring both parties to the
    table. We also need to remember al-Qaeda and ISIS are not
    defeated in Yemen. That is a battle that we need to work with
    our Arab allies to continue in our own national security
    interests.
        And on Iran, we need to begin to answer the questions that
    underpin the Trump administration's very successful sanctions
    campaign. What is the aim of that campaign?
        Is it regime change or is it something else? Those are
    legitimate questions to ask. Salafi jihadi groups, including
    ISIS and others, need to--we need to be clear these groups
    remain resilient.
        When they leave Syria, Iraq, and, I hope, Yemen, they have
    opened beachheads in Africa and in Southeast Asia.
        I am going to finish in a second. But, you know, there are
    just so many challenges in the region. I did not list half of
    them. We have not talked about Algeria or Libya or Egypt or
    Israel and the Palestinians.
        Our priority should be getting our strategy right rather
    than constantly addressing the most recent crisis. We can do a
    lot of good in the Middle East. It is really time we think
    about both the challenges and the opportunities.
        Thank you for your time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Pletka.
        Thanks to all of our witnesses for your excellent
    testimony. I will--I will begin the questions.
        Ms. Pletka, I will actually--I will accept your premise for
    the hearing. What do we seek to achieve? What is our mission? I
    am going to ask those questions about Syria because that is the
    place where so many of these issues in the region come
    together.
        The Syrian policy and--Mr. Chabot, I was referring only to
    the Syria policy in my opening comments--but the Syria policy I
    do find confusing.
        I noticed many of us the decision to pull back our military
    presence and to declare ISIS defeated, depending upon how you
    characterize it--the end of the caliphate--we all acknowledge
    that ISIS can come back--that the fighters are--that they are
    still fighters--that they could take back territory in months.
        So as we make those pronouncements are not we turning our
    back on the SDF and then are we relying on shaky talks with
    Turkey to prevent a military incursion?
        We have got the stagnant peace process that we hope results
    in the ejection of foreign forces. But Iran continues to cement
    its position in Syria, which poses a threat there and to our
    allies.
        And, Ms. Pletka, you said our goal in Syria ought to be to
    keep the Russians--to keep the Russians out and to prevent
    Assad from holding power. It looks like we failed on both
    counts.
        I do not want to see the U.S. in an unending war. But our
    current policy seems to simply perpetuate chaos and
    instability. What should it look like, Ms. Pletka, to your
    question?
        What should our mission--how should we be defining our
    mission in Syria, since it is not clear that that has been
    defined or, ultimately, what we are doing to accomplish that
    mission?
        Ms. Pletka. Thank you for being amendable to the question.
        It is the important one to ask. What we need to achieve in
    Syria is a lasting and secure government that rests on the
    authority of the Syrian people. That should be the end game in
    Syria.
        If we know what that end game is, we can begin to work
    toward it. I think there are ways, but I agree with you, they
    do involve the continued commitment of U.S. troops.
        You said absolutely rightly that there is a coincidence of
    the moral and the strategic imperative. Martin Indyk and I said
    the exact same thing to the Obama Administration. People like
    you and people like me were ignored when we said that when this
    problem was eminently solvable.
        It is much harder now. But we need to recognize that
    through proxies, if we continue with train and equip, if we
    leave troops on the ground, if we use the territory that has
    already been liberated, and if we are committed to the notion
    that Assad cannot remain and therefore that we must work with
    the Syrian people to find an alternative government to which we
    can lend some credibility and authority along with the current
    liberated Syrian people, we will begin at that moment to
    understand how we can build the blocks toward that.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
        Mr. Benaim, what role does--I mean, you talked about the
    need to focus on our values and human rights need to be a U.S.
    policy priority. I agree with you.
        That should be the case, I would argue, through the entire
    region. What happens when it is not viewed that way? How does
    that impact our ability to succeed in Syria or to hold our
    allies together as we confront Iran, for example?
        Mr. Benaim. Well, thank you very much for the question.
        I think what happens when human rights are not respected is
    you see a growing trend of impunity where one regime's actions
    embolden another and that is certainly the case. I think that
    it is a tragedy that Bashar al-Assad has been able to do what
    he has been able to do in the western half of Syria. And to see
    what has happened and his efforts to consolidate power in
    western Syria is to have regrets about that.
        I think from where we stand today, it seems to me that
    Assad is likely to remain in power in Damascus and that no
    configuration of forces is well positioned to remove him in the
    near term.
        In eastern Syria, however, there is a real live dynamic
    process underway and a U.S. opportunity for--a U.S. opportunity
    to shape the terms of the rest of Syria over territory where
    the U.S. has exercised a security guarantee and protected a
    group of people who have fought very ably against ISIS and are
    still figuring out the terms of their readmission into Syria.
        And I would think about how to use that leverage in that
    time, even having squandered some of it and already announcing
    a departure. I would think about how to use that to shape
    meaningful autonomy in eastern Syria and changing western Syria
    as well as possible.
        Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
        Ms. Catalano, just a really quick answer before I turn it
    over to Mr. Wilson. If we leaned in more to the American value
    of human rights as we interacted with Saudi Arabia, would it
    change Saudi behavior?
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. I think the short answer is it does not
    matter whether it changes Saudi behavior in the near term or in
    the longer term. It needs to be talked about.
        This is part and parcel of what relationships with friends
    include and that sometimes is a hard conversation, and when we
    do not include that in our consistent and constant engagement
    with Saudi Arabia, we send the signal that it is something the
    United States does not care about.
        And so to the extent that it has to be part of how we
    approach our engagement our relationships, it is vital to do. I
    would argue it probably does on the margins have impact over
    time, as long as we look at it as a constant and strategic
    element of our discourse.
        Mr. Deutch. OK. And I know we will get to talk more about
    that.
        Mr. Wilson, you are recognized.
        Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of
    you for being here today.
        Ms. Pletka, last May I was grateful to lead the
    congressional delegation with the opening of the U.S. embassy
    in Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.
        At the same time, policymakers and analysts suggested that
    such a move would result in major negative consequences for the
    region.
        What have been the consequences?
        Ms. Pletka. All of the warnings that were made about the
    region lighting on fire, about all of the Arabs who had moved
    closer to Israel in concert with--in concert with Israel's
    efforts against Iran actually did not do as was predicted.
        There was certainly some pro forma reactions from Arab
    States, much stronger reactions from Palestinians and from the
    Iranians, from Lebanon and from Syria.
        But I think that in terms of what many predicted, frankly,
    at a certain moment I was not sure either. The reaction was
    very, very different than it would have been 10 years ago or 20
    years ago or 30 years ago.
        That is a remarkable change in the Middle East.
        Mr. Wilson. And it is great to see that Congress had
    authorized this back in 1994, and so it has been achieved.
        And Ms. Ewers and Mr. Benaim, one of the--it is
    disappointing to see the electoral gains that Hezbollah and its
    allies made last May and by Hezbollah's control over the health
    ministry in the new Lebanese government.
        It is clear that the U.S. strategy to counter Hezbollah's
    influence in Lebanon has not been as successful as it needs to
    be. What changes do you see need to be made to have greater
    success in countering Hezbollah in Lebanon and what role would
    any U.S. assistance have in the revised strategy?
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Thank you, Congressman. I think part of
    what I will say is do no harm. How do you--how do we ensure
    that Hezbollah and Iran continue to use Lebanon for whatever
    nefarious activity you want to list, whether it be a position
    from which to threaten Israel or to continue to foment
    instability in Syria?
        To detach entirely from our engagement from Lebanon, I
    believe, would be a fundamental mistake. I think it is
    difficult but not impossible to be able to find those areas,
    whether it be in supporting institutions that demonstrate that
    they are not completely owned subsidiaries of Hezbollah inside
    of Lebanon and to cultivate relationships with opposition
    groups and political leaders inside the system.
        It will be a long, long game. It will not have results
    overnight. But it is one where the United States and, more
    importantly, its Arab partners in the region have an interest
    in ensuring that Lebanon is not completely ceded to Iran.
        Mr. Benaim. I mean, I think first and foremost we have to
    support a strong Israeli military deterrent against Hezbollah.
        What they are able to do inside Lebanon, they have gained a
    great deal of power and I think that we should strongly
    sanction Hezbollah as we have and I think that we should look
    for areas of the Lebanese armed forces that we can work with.
        But I think taking our ball and going home--what we have to
    do is engage and compete here. Show up places and act, because
    ceding the entire country to Iran and Hezbollah only puts us in
    a weaker position, I think, ultimately.
        Mr. Wilson. And I was grateful, Ms. Pletka. You actually
    cited the Hezbollah influence in Lebanon earlier. What is your
    view of how we can counter this?
        Ms. Pletka. I agree with my colleagues. I do not think the
    right thing to do was to turn around and simply give up on
    Lebanon, although I think Hezbollah and Iranian influence has
    grown very, very dramatically.
        We need to be a little bit more honest with ourselves about
    the influence that Hezbollah has inside the government and in
    the Lebanese armed forces and in the Lebanese banking system.
        Our Treasury Department has been after the Central Bank for
    some time but not with complete success, and the reality is
    that for as long as we are willing to look away because we want
    to preserve some goodness in Lebanon that is separate from
    Hezbollah and Iran, the more we make excuses for certain
    sectors of the government that Hezbollah then uses to finance
    itself and to arm itself and to extend its power throughout the
    country.
        So it is a real challenge. We need to compete and we need
    to use our leverage a lot more than we currently are.
        Mr. Wilson. And I have had the opportunity to visit Beirut
    and Lebanon itself. What an extraordinary country it has been
    and can be in the future.
        And so I appreciate each of you having a positive proposal
    on how we can help restore what was an extraordinary country
    back to what it should be.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Malinowski, you are recognized.
        Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        When then current administration took office in 2017,
    President Trump made his trip to Saudi Arabia, changed a bunch
    of policies. He met with the king of Bahrain and he said that
    Bahrain would not have to worry anymore about strains in our
    relationship over human rights.
        Resumed arms sales to that country. Resumed arms sales that
    had been suspended to Saudi Arabia over the use of those arms
    in the war in Yemen.
        A question to any of you--what signal did that send to the
    region about our commitment to human rights and the post-Arab
    Spring Middle East?
        Mr. Benaim. I think that the signal that it sent was a
    fairly clear one of impunity and it was--the literal words that
    he used were, ``You will not have a problem anymore.''
        And it is striking that the hands that held that glowing
    orb in Riyadh went back to their own countries and in fairly
    short order in Saudi launched the Qatar blockade, a policy that
    has divided U.S. partners; in Bahrain, went back and arrested,
    I think, 300 people from the village of Isa Qassim, the major
    opposition leader; and in Egypt, went back and signed a
    restrictive civil society law that had been sitting on the
    president's desk for 6 months.
        Now, I think on these questions of how to think about U.S.
    influence over authoritarians in the Middle East, we have to
    keep two truths in mind: one of which is that each of these
    authoritarians is dealing with their own internal dynamic and
    is domestically driven, in many ways; but we set the conditions
    externally and the dynamics in which they act. And I think when
    you see a set of steps like that in rapid order, what you are
    seeing is the effect of a green light.
        It is not to suggest that had we done nothing they would
    have, you know, acted very differently or been more--much more
    virtuous. But I think you do see a real calculable effect of
    impunity there.
        Ms. Pletka. If I may, you certainly--you know--I think you
    know full well what the signal was that was sent and I think
    that the countries in the region got it as well.
        Unfortunately, we have been sending that signal for a long
    time. The reality is cutting off the Bahrainis, punishing the
    Saudis, was the end of the process that should have been paid
    attention to long ago. The Obama Administration and even the
    Bush and previous administrations have not paid attention.
        There was a minority government in Bahrain. The majority
    Shi'ites are oppressed. The United States has done almost
    nothing to stand with them and has ceded that ground to the
    Iranians over decades.
        The fact is we have our Fifth Fleet there. The fact is that
    we have forces in Qatar and this also causes us to make
    concessions to the kind of governance that we see that we ought
    to be pushing against.
        It is not--it is not just--it is not just Donald Trump.
        Mr. Malinowski. Oh, I would agree with you. Nothing is
    quite that simple. I would suggest there is a slight difference
    between the inconsistency of our previous approach and the
    tremendous consistency of our current approach.
        Let me ask you the follow-on question, though, because I
    think this is an interesting part of the dynamic. Does that
    signal help us or hurt us with respect to Iran?
        In other words, when we give the impression that we are no
    longer even inconsistently going to press the Saudis, the
    Emiratis, the Egyptians, on human rights, torture, women,
    living within their constitutions, allowing public protest, et
    cetera, how does it affect our ability to reach out to the
    Iranian people and to promote whether you want to call it
    reform, regime change, or respect for human rights, the kind of
    change that we all want to see in that country?
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. I am happy--I am happy to start.
        I think it is demoralizing to populations who are looking
    for signals from the international community--not just from the
    United States but, more broadly, that acknowledge their
    legitimate grievances.
        And so for a population like that of Iran, it simply
    underscores what the United States is not willing to engage on
    and that is the wellbeing of the people.
        I would also add to that that it continues to assist the
    regime in Iran to do what it does best, which is exploit
    grievances not just inside of Iran but outside of it, right.
        So when you look at Yemen, when you look at Bahrain, when
    you look at Iraq, when you look at Syria, the lack of
    consistency and the way the United States talks about the
    values of human rights allows those communities that are
    disenfranchised to become much more exploitable by Iran
    relatively cheaply and with little effort.
        Mr. Benaim. I think it also undercuts the message that--
    supposedly being sent to the Iranian people that we care about
    their human rights and their wellbeing.
        It sometimes seems as though human rights are a weapon that
    you use against your enemy in the way that they are applied
    rather than something that we should support to make our
    partners stronger and more durable and viable over time.
        So I think there is that as well, and I mean, the nature of
    Iranian influence--the reason that it has grown_is their
    ability to exploit these kinds of rifts, fault lines, societal
    grievances, to make proxies out of minorities within countries
    that--or even majorities that_have not been treated well.
        So I think even just on the basic idea of containing Iran,
    a policy that abjures human rights, we should be clear that it
    does earn good will from leaders. Leaders appreciate not having
    to answer these questions. And that is exactly why we should
    ask them.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Malinowski.
        Mr. Zeldin, you are recognized.
        Mr. Zeldin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
    hearing, and I guess kind of building off of this exchange that
    was just happening but, you know, taking in a couple of other
    directions, I was critical of the entry into the Iran nuclear
    deal. There might be a diversity of opinion among today's
    speakers. Thank you to today's witnesses for being here.
        At the time, I was outspoken about the need to tackle
    Iran's other non-nuclear bad activities because the leverage
    that brought the Iranians to the table--they wanted the
    sanctions relief. When we negotiated away the sanctions relief
    in entering the Iran nuclear deal there was a lot that we were
    not negotiating.
        But before I get to a couple of the human rights issues, I
    just wanted to ask a question, and this applies regardless of
    whether you are the strongest supporter of the Iran nuclear
    deal or the biggest critic of the Iran nuclear deal.
        Regardless, there is still an issue with regard--with
    respect to the sunset provisions, with the verification regime,
    and the non-nuclear bad activities.
        But specifically with regard to the first two, anything
    that the witnesses can add? Whether you support the deal or
    not, there is an issue with regards to sunset provisions and
    the verification regime.
        Path forward for U.S. foreign policy?
        Mr. Benaim. I think, you know, you negotiate the best deal
    that you can get. And whether you oppose it or not, there were
    indeed provisions that over time would allow the Iranians very
    slowly to begin enriching again.
        There are some provisions of the deal that extend
    permanently and the fact is that the visibility and
    verification under the deal is far greater than under any other
    equivalent agreement and would continue indefinitely.
        These are unsatisfying answers to many, I realize that.
        Mr. Zeldin. In all fairness, I mean, with all due respect,
    I, as a Member of Congress, I have not read the verification.
    This side deal that was entered into with IAEA and Iran has not
    even been provided to Congress.
        When John Kerry was here sitting in your seat, I asked him
    if he had read the verification deal between the IAEA and Iran
    and he said no. He said he had been briefed on it.
        So it is hard to defend the verification regime to enforce
    the Iran nuclear deal. I do not know of a single Member of
    Congress who has even seen it.
        Mr. Benaim. I cannot speak to the details of that
    particular verification.
        Mr. Zeldin. What about the sunset provisions that do exist?
    What do you recommend as far as a path forward if we were to be
    able to re-enter negotiations?
        Mr. Benaim. I think--I think it is the right question.
        Mr. Deutch. Excuse me, Mr. Benaim. Can you pull the mic in
    front a little closer, please?
        Mr. Benaim. Oh, yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Deutch. Great.
        Mr. Benaim. Is that better?
        It is exactly the right question because, ultimately,
    whether you supported this deal or opposed it, what we are
    trying to do here is accumulate pressure toward an end.
        Pressure is not the goal. The goal is a change in Iranian
    behavior. The nuclear question is the single--as our allies
    told us, when Iran was one to 3 months away from a nuclear
    break out, this is the single question that can take every
    other issue and turbo charge it and put a nuclear deterrent
    behind it or lead the United States into war.
        Now, I think it is going to be hard to re-enter this
    agreement because we are going to ask Iran to buy the same
    horse twice, essentially, to make concessions for things that
    we did not deliver the last time.
        But I think it is going to be necessary to try to offer
    more to get more time, because you are right, we need more
    time. We need longer restrictions and that may, frankly,
    require offering more in return.
        But I think that is what we need to do because there are
    not other choices. Eventually, Iran will start to enrich again,
    absent an agreement, and we need a new and better deal.
        Mr. Zeldin. And we are running a little short on time and I
    want to hear from you with regards to their LGBT issues that we
    are seeing in the Middle East. We are reading about the new
    news today from Brunei.
        Congressman Cicilline and I have been involved in an effort
    with regard to Chechnya. It is all over the world. So I want
    you to be able to speak about LGBT and the human rights.
        But I would just also offer there has been a lot of
    misinformation that has gone on all around the world as it
    relates to Iran's behavior as it relates the IR-6s, IR-8s,
    access to military sites, acquiring heavy water, and more.
        But we only have a limited amount of time. Is there
    anything that you can add specifically, continuing the
    conversation that you had with Mr. Malinowski about this--I
    mean, there is growing bipartisan concern here in Congress with
    regards to criminalizing in the worst ways the LGBT community
    around the world and including Iran and elsewhere?
        Mr. Benaim. I think it is a terrific question and I am
    delighted that you asked it. I am in the process of doing
    research on this topic with a group of graduate students at
    NYU.
        These are human rights. They should be part of human
    rights. When we talk about human rights anywhere, we should be
    talking about these issues as well. And we may disagree about
    marriage or other things. But we can all agree on stoning to
    death. We can all agree that somebody whose life is in danger
    for their orientation should be able to gain humanitarian
    parole. These are the kinds of things that we can and should
    work on, in some places quietly because they create a backlash
    that can be disadvantageous to the people involved.
        But I think it is a bold and important area and I am
    delighted to see it gain bipartisan support and have a degree
    of policy continuity going forward. Because I think it is part
    of the future of human rights.
        Mr. Zeldin. Well, for lack of time I will have to yield
    back to the chair. Thank you.
        Mr. Deutch. OK. Thanks.
        Mr. Trone, you are recognized.
        Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This week marks the sixth month anniversary since Jamal
    Khashoggi was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
    Our own intelligence community has indicated the Crown Prince,
    Mohammad bin Salman, has been responsible of the murder. We all
    could agree this is unacceptable. It goes against all notions
    of human rights and dignity.
        I have been disappointed by President Trump's response,
    which is basically no response. What should Congress be doing
    to ensure Saudi leadership does not take away the message that
    they are free to kill dissidents, use diplomatic cover to do
    so, and how do we send a clear message to the kingdom we cannot
    tolerate these actions?
        Let us start on the left and work our way across.
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Thank you for the question,
    Congressman.
        I think what Congress has been doing to date is exactly
    what it needs to continue to do, and more, keeping the
    spotlight on this. Despite the fact that the administration is
    less interested in talking about this in a full-throated way,
    particularly publicly, leaves this body with some of that work
    and I think that this Congress needs to continue to demand the
    information that it demanded last week from Secretary Pompeo,
    which means full transparency with respect to the information
    that is available, and whatever continues to become available
    with respect to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
        I think this needs to be scrutinized. I think, based on
    your judgments of that information, there could be discussion
    about an independent investigation that goes beyond what was
    started by the U.N. earlier this year, but I think keeping
    conversation both publicly and, of course, privately when
    Members of Congress as well as the administration talks to the
    Saudi government about why this is so fundamentally against
    U.S. interests.
        Mr. Benaim. I agree. We need a full accounting. We need a
    full accounting and no impunity, and I think the clearest and
    most important message to send is that this kind of thing
    affects the entire nature of the partnership.
        This goes to basic questions of judgment and I think that
    this is part and parcel of other reckless moves that we have
    seen require a broader review of all sorts of cooperation that
    we would engage in with an ally where we respected their
    judgement. But, in this case, we might have to think twice
    about including offensive weaponry and nuclear cooperation and
    U.S. security and intelligence firms that have worked with
    Saudi as well.
        Mr. Trone. Do you think we should discontinue those
    efforts?
        Mr. Benaim. No, I think we should take a careful look at
    each one and figure out which is appropriate and which is not.
    I think that with Saudi Arabia we have to be careful to both
    send a message of impunity and not tear down the relationship
    as a whole. But I think on offensive weaponry there certainly
    are things that we should pull back on.
        Mr. Trone. But if we coach--if we coach the discussion
    regarding aimed at that one individual--not at the kingdom
    itself but the individual--that did this act that we are
    setting up to rule the kingdom for the next 50 years, would not
    it be better to bite the bullet now?
        Mr. Benaim. It is a very good question and it is a very
    complicated question, and I think we should follow the law
    where it takes us here in terms of a full and transparent
    accounting in whatever legal sanction exists there.
        And I think when it comes to somebody who may rule a
    country for 50 years, we should look for the possibility to
    treat it as a country and get that country to be incentivized
    to behave more responsibly.
        You have got your hands around the core of dilemma--the
    crux of the dilemma, which is that singling out a person risks
    giving impunity and singling out a person risks damaging a
    relationship for half a century.
        And I think we should follow the law. Follow the Magnitsky
    Act. Let the law goes where it takes us and demand a full
    investigation with no impunity.
        Ms. Pletka. First I would like to welcome back everybody
    who I really, really missed during the Obama Administration and
    your support for democracy and human freedom.
        Where were you?
        Second of all, Jamal Khashoggi did not deserve to be
    murdered by anybody. But I want to really underscore the point
    that he is not the only person who has been murdered by his
    government, right, that we have ignored for the last decade,
    whether it is our friends in Egypt.
        And you want to talk about LGBT rights? How much money do
    we give Egypt? We do not give any money to Saudi Arabia. What
    about our NATO ally, Turkey, that is so excited about the Jamal
    Khashoggi murder that they are leaking to us all of their
    intelligence about surveillance on the Saudi consulate.
        And yet, it is the country with the most journalists in
    prison of any country in the world--the country that we just
    had to cutoff F-35 purchases to because they are buying an S-
    400 air defense system from the Russians.
        What I am trying to say is not that we should excuse the
    murder of Jamal Khashoggi or that we should not investigate it
    to its fullest. What I am saying is that if those are our
    standards, then let them be our standards about everything and
    everybody.
        You will have my support.
        Mr. Trone. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
        Mr. Cicilline, you are recognized.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    calling this hearing to examine U.S. policy in what is truly a
    very important region of the world, and thank you to our
    witnesses for sharing your insights.
        I think, like many members of this committee, I am deeply
    concerned about the lack of clarity, the contradictions, and
    the dangerous decisions that have been offered as a substitute
    for cohesive policy toward the Middle East and North Africa by
    this administration.
        On issue after issue, we see a truly alarming lack of
    strategy or clear priorities. In Syria, we are leaving 1
    minute, staying the next. The administration's unilateral
    actions vis-a-vis Israel have caused considerable concern
    regarding the prospect for peace and a two-State solution.
        In Saudi Arabia, the administration embraces a crown prince
    who is believed to have had a journalist hacked to death. In
    Yemen, the administration supports a military operation that
    furthers a conflict with catastrophic humanitarian
    consequences.
        In Iraq, millions of dollars in foreign assistance has been
    redirected from established aid institutions to instead fund
    religious organizations with little oversight or transparency.
        The administration unilaterally pulled out the Iran nuclear
    deal with no plan to stem Iran's nuclear ambitions, and so it
    goes on and on. Throughout the region we see no coherent
    strategy or policy. It seems that the administration lurches
    from one half-baked idea to the next with dire and sometimes
    deadly consequences.
        So I do think this is an opportunity for Congress and this
    committee in particular to hold the administration to account
    and to ensure that some coherent strategy is actually developed
    and implemented.
        So I would first like to ask a broad question, because
    there has been a lot of discussion about our values, and I am
    just wondering whether the witnesses believe that this
    administration's de-emphasis of human rights, which I think
    most objective observers would say is a fact, that whether or
    not that has harmed our image in this region of the world? Has
    it reduced our leverage?
        Because we all remain very concerned about what it means to
    America's leadership in the world and our ability to kind of
    exercise real influence in the Middle East.
        But I am wondering whether your view is that this de-
    emphasis, which seems very clear and noticed by leaders around
    the world whether that is in fact happening. I will start with
    you, if I may, Ms. Catalano Ewers.
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Thank you very much for the question.
        I think the de-emphasis has harmed our leverage to the
    extent that those partners who are perhaps quite content to not
    have it be part of the conversation, it is a freebie, right.
        It allows them to continue to take these actions, whether
    it be the arrests of journalists or of oppositionists or
    actions more severe like assassinations. The fact that this
    administration has not found it necessary both privately and
    diplomatically as well as publicly to keep this as part of the
    discussion.
        It is not a zero sum. It is not the only issue we talk to
    partners about. But that it is not consistently raised suggests
    to these leaders that we do not care and in fact they can act
    with impunity.
        And so I think it has--it has eroded leverage
    unnecessarily.
        Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Benaim?
        Mr. Benaim. I think that is exactly right. I think that is
    exactly right. I think that this is something that they do not
    want to talk about and sometimes they have convinced their
    publics not to trust us about.
        So I do not think it is as clear cut, as everywhere we go,
    when we talk about this, publics cheer. There is nationalism in
    many of these countries. It is an underrated force at work in
    places like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, and criticizing the
    government can lead to that kind of backlash.
        But I think what is important is that it gives governments
    pause engaging in these kinds of activities to know that we
    just might show up and actually exercise our values.
        Now, the natural by-product of mixing principle and
    prudence is inconsistency. It is what happens. It is part of
    balancing our various interests.
        But the fact that we care and the fact that we show up
    really does constrain behavior in ways that I think are
    meaningful.
        So I think it is less about our influence with populations
    than our leverage to work on things we care about. And,
    ultimately it is about the value of these partnerships and the
    ability of our partners to hold up as durable partners and not
    find ourselves in the kind of situation we do with Saudi Arabia
    where their domestic repression makes them a less valuable
    partner for the things we need to do together.
        Mr. Cicilline. And is that problem exacerbated when the
    president of the United States in fact describes the free press
    as enemies of the people, questions the legitimacy of election
    outcomes, attacks the rule of law in this country, or the
    independence of the judiciary or undermines law enforcement?
        It seems really difficult for the United States to be an
    effective powerful advocate for democracy, rule of law, self-
    governance, frankly, when we have a president of the United
    States who is saying things which undermine those very
    institutions we are trying to promote.
        How can Congress respond to that in an effective way if
    there is any way? Or am I just being overly sensitive?
        Mr. Benaim. I think you have described the problem
    admirably and I think you have, hopefully, opportunities to
    vote on all sorts of matters pertaining to the promotion of and
    preservation of various democratic institutions and reform and
    revitalization of them in this country.
        And it is outside of my expertise that I have been brought
    to discuss before the committee. But I think it is all very
    deeply connected.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
        Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We have spent several hundred hours
    in this room, now maybe several thousand hours in this room,
    trying to discuss what policies would prevent Iran from getting
    its hands on a nuclear weapon.
        I would like to discuss preventing Saudi Arabia from
    getting its hands on a nuclear weapon, because as I have said
    all too graphically and all too often, if you cannot trust a
    regime with a bone saw, you should not trust them with nuclear
    weapons.
        Now, the Emirates entered into a nuclear cooperation
    agreement with the United States with all the controls. But
    they are going forward, apparently, with nuclear power. I do
    not know if this is within the expertise of any of our
    panellists.
        Are the Emiratis going forward with generating nuclear
    power and does it make any economic sense, given that they are
    on a peninsula that produces far more natural gas than it
    consumes and therefore that natural gas is either flared or, at
    great expense, liquefied?
        So does it make sense if you are on the Arabian Peninsula
    to generate electricity with nuclear power the way the Emiratis
    say they are going to do?
        Anybody have an answer?
        Ms. Pletka. It depends what your attitude toward nuclear
    power is as an environmental issue. Certainly----
        Mr. Sherman. I have never--the Green New Deal is a major
    motivating factor in many places. Probably not Dubai.
        Ms. Pletka. I have not spoken to them about that.
        Mr. Sherman. So assume that--I mean, obviously, there is
    some reputational plus for saying we are not emitting
    greenhouse gases. There is a minus for saying we are using
    nuclear power. Nobody ever got the Sierra Club award by
    building a nuclear power plant. Assume that they are
    indifferent for their worldwide image and on the carbon issue.
        Ms. Pletka. I actually think it is a very interesting area
    of questioning and I think it is an important area for Congress
    to pursue. The United--the United----
        Mr. Sherman. OK. If there is--if there is anybody that can
    get us an answer for the record, that would be helpful----
        Ms. Pletka. I would be happy----
        Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Because I know these questions
    are coming out of left or right field.
        So, now, one question that answers itself. Saudi Arabia
    could enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with us with
    all the controls that the Emiratis agreed to. They are balking
    at that because they want the capacity to do more than generate
    electricity with nuclear power.
        Does this inference or anything else cause you to think
    that the Saudis would like to have the capacity to move toward
    a nuclear weapon, should they later make the decision to go
    forward?
        I will start with--yes.
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Thank you, Congressman.
        I will start with the end of that question and then--and
    then add a couple of points. I am not sure that I would infer
    directly that the desire to not adhere to the same kind of
    agreement that the UAE already has with the United States on
    civil nuclear energy is directly attributable to Saudi Arabia's
    desire to maintain the ability to develop a nuclear weapon at
    some point.
        I think it has as much to do with issues of sovereignty,
    certainly, Saudi Arabia's desire to not telegraph that it gets
    a shorter deal than Iran.
        And so I think there are other considerations.
        Mr. Sherman. Well, I would point out, the deal Iran gets is
    significant limits on its nuclear program and enemy status with
    the United States. They get both of that.
        So to say that will they get to have a few centrifuges,
    they get centrifuges and if there is any sanction that we can
    put on them that we have not legislated, yes, that should be
    our next market.
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. I wholly concur, Congressman.
        But I think from the perspective of the Saudi government--
    --
        Mr. Sherman. Yes.
        Ms. Catalano Ewers [continuing]. There is this perception
    that if Iran has any indigenous enrichment capability, then the
    Saudis would not concede to giving that up just as a matter of
    practice.
        Now, I think when we come back to the discussion of a 1-2-3
    agreement with Saudi Arabia, what we need to keep in mind is
    what is in the primary U.S. interest and that is that agreement
    in various forms, and I am not an expert in this particular
    area, but I can say that we need to demand that commitment that
    abides by normative standards and----
        Mr. Sherman. And I see my time is----
        Ms. Catalano Ewers. Sorry.
        Mr. Sherman [continuing]. And I do want to bring up one
    thing. The administration has issued seven licenses under Part
    810 to allow the transfer of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia
    and Congress has not one millimeter of knowledge as to what is
    in it. That is a departure from the--from not only practice but
    law.
        And I hope this committee joins with my committee, which is
    the Nonproliferation Committee, among other things, in
    demanding that we get those Part 810 licenses. And it is simply
    absurd for the administration to say yes, Congress has a role
    with regard to nuclear cooperation agreements so we will figure
    out a way to transfer nuclear technology to the Saudis without
    having such an agreement.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
        I thank the witnesses and all of the members for being here
    today. Witnesses, thanks for your testimony.
        Members to the subcommittee may have some additional
    questions for you. We ask that you respond in writing to any of
    those questions.
        I request my colleagues--to my colleagues that any witness
    questions be submitted to the subcommittee clerk within five
    business days on a whole range of issues that we will be
    touching on over the rest of this Congress--our alliances and
    security and democracy and terrorism and human rights, and so
    many others.
        Thanks for helping to set the stage for what comes next.
        And with that, this committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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