    [House Hearing, 116 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

              THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019
                                   __________

                               Serial No. 116-23
                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

                      [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/,
                 http://docs.house.gov, or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                  ___________

    	            U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    35-790PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York               Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey		     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       TED S. YOHO, Florida
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York          BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California                 FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             JOHN CURTIS, Utah
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                KEN BUCK, Colorado
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  RON WRIGHT, Texas
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         TIM BURCHETT, Tennesse
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       GREG PENCE, Indiana
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland                MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    JIM COSTA, California
    JUAN VARGAS, California
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas

                        Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
                  Brendan Shields,  Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

          Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and The Environment

                    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, Chairman

    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois Ranking
    GREGORY MEEKS, New York                  Member
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    THEODORE DEUTCH, Florida             ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             GREG PENCE, Indiana
    DAVID TRONE, Maryland                RON WRIGHT, Texas
    JIM COSTA, California                MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee

                        Gabrielle Gould, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Jones, James L., USMC, Retired, Jones Group International........     6
    Farkas, Evelyn N., Resident Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund
      of the United States...........................................    13
    Wilson, Damon, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council........    22

                 ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Materials submitted for the record from General Jones............    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    47
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    48
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    49

              THE FUTURE OF NATO: NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 2019

                              House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
                                           Environment,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                         Washington, DC

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in
    Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Keating
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Keating [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.
        The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
    future of NATO and our American commitment to it.
        Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
    statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
    subject to the length limitation in the rules.
        Mr. Keating. I will now make an opening statement, and
    then, turn it over to the ranking member for his opening
    statement.
        This Thursday marks the 70th anniversary of our NATO
    alliance. We recently reflected on the importance of NATO in a
    hearing last month held by the full committee. Today, I would
    like to follow on that by discussing and examining the future
    of NATO and America's commitment to it over the next 70 years.
        We have watched NATO evolve in significant ways since its
    inception. And looking at the different threats we now face
    today, we must anticipate that it will again evolve in new ways
    to address this changing landscape. This evolution is important
    because NATO has long been, and will continue to be, a
    cornerstone of our security and defense policies. Our strategic
    advantage over our competitors is that we have a coalition.
    Russia and China cannot say the same. And that is something we
    cannot lose sight of nor ever take for granted.
        However, to maintain this advantage, we need strong
    American leadership along two fronts. The first is by making it
    clear that we are committed to NATO and that the alliance
    cannot be broken or undermined by our adversaries. The second,
    and the focus of this hearing today, is America's role in
    leading NATO and its member States and partners through this
    unique period of change, as new members join and as we face new
    threats that challenge NATO's readiness and ability to respond
    in an effective and a timely manner.
        NATO expansion has meant new and often smaller States are
    being integrated into the alliance, and this presents questions
    for how best to coordinate this integration, their
    contributions, and the strengths and the vulnerabilities that
    they bring with them.
        Further, NATO must adapt in order to address new and
    emerging threats from China, Russia, cyber, hybrid warfare,
    terrorism, and climate change, among others. This means
    contemplating possible changes in NATO's structure and thinking
    strategically, not only about how NATO should adapt to this
    landscape, but also how the U.S. and other member States must
    work together, now more closely than ever, to strengthen the
    alliance and their own capabilities. We addressed our shared
    values in our previous subcommittee hearing last week, and NATO
    is one example where our shared values really matter.
        There is no disagreement over commitment to reach the 2
    percent benchmark that has been the case since at least 2014,
    and that was the continued understanding as recently as 4 weeks
    ago when I was in Brussels. And that is the understanding as
    NATO members gather this week in Washington. As more members
    meet the 2 percent and the 20 percent thresholds for defense
    spending, I would like to examine in this hearing how member
    States should prioritize their investments within the context
    of new threats NATO members are facing.
        As I take stock of the threats we are facing, it could not
    be clearer to me that this is what we need and this is the time
    we need to be standing shoulder to shoulder with no daylight
    between us. Our friends and allies must stand together,
    defending our shared values that are most sacred to our
    security and that are under attack, values of freedom and
    democracy.
        We need NATO allies who are equally committed to those
    values as we are and who we can trust completely, because our
    NATO alliance is about our security. Lives are on the line. We
    must hold new and aspiring members to the standard, but,
    perhaps more importantly, we must hold current members
    accountable to upholding these values that are at the very core
    of our NATO alliance. We should look at what our new member
    countries are ready to bring to the table as well as democratic
    backsliding among our current members, as well as possible
    action like Turkey's purchase from Russia of S-400's and
    working with China on FG networks in Europe.
        I, therefore, look forward to addressing these important
    issues today and hearing from our witnesses. We have incredible
    insight into how we should go planning in the next 70 years as
    a country, and we have that same insight as allies. And it is a
    pleasure to hear from our witnesses today with their opinions
    about which direction we should go.
        With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to the panel for being here with us today.
        Look, NATO is not just an ally; they are our most important
    group of allies. We understand that strong alliances protect us
    from aggressors and guard our shared values.
        We appreciate you guys all being here. If you wonder why
    there may not be a huge turnout today, it is because this is
    the third hearing in 3 weeks that we have had on our friendship
    with NATO and Europe. We understand it is very important.
        Tomorrow morning, we are going to have the NATO Secretary
    General Stoltenberg address our Congress in advance of the 70th
    anniversary of our security cooperation, 70 years of working
    together to face down oppression. It is sufficient to say that
    our alliance is strong.
        That being said, there are a lot of other issues we need to
    actually finally address on this committee has well. In the
    past week, we saw the first round of elections in Ukraine,
    Brexit's status changing on a nearly hourly basis, and Russia
    landed soldiers in our own backyard to prop up the corrupt
    Maduro regime.
        And Ukraine exit polls show that the political newcomer and
    the comedian won about 30 percent of the vote, while current
    President Poroshenko won about 18 percent. These two candidates
    will now face off on April 21st. By all accounts, it is likely
    that both candidates will support Ukraine's move toward NATO
    and EU accession. It is a good thing for our alliance and the
    United States. We also need to be having a hearing on what we
    saw in that first round of elections and what we can expect
    from the runoff.
        In the U.K., Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated that
    she will resign following a successful Brexit. However, we are
    now seeing a coalition formed to push for a soft Brexit where
    the U.K. retains its membership of the European economic area.
    We could be having a hearing on how this would affect
    transatlantic trade and security with Great Britain, with whom
    we have the most special bilateral relationships.
        Russia, the largest focus of this subcommittee, is not only
    responsible for the death of thousands of Syrians, but now has
    entrenched themselves to protect Venezuelan dictator Maduro as
    he starves his own people, a firsthand example of how socialism
    never works. There was once a time when this committee cared
    about Russia's activity in our own backyard, and we need to
    continue to do that, instead of trying to handcuff the Trump
    administration from having a military option on the table
    during diplomatic negotiations. Had Congress threatened to
    block President Kennedy's strategy to militarily quarantine
    Cuba from receiving Soviet ICBMs during the Cuban missile
    crisis and use military force, if necessary, to protect our
    Nation, I do not know if our negotiations would have gone as
    well as they did.
        I believe that some on this committee are being blinded by
    their opposition of the current administration, resulting in
    the same hearing 3 weeks running. The only reason, because the
    administration is telling our NATO allies the hard truth, that
    you can do more. And I would agree at the beginning. We can say
    it differently, but it is a message that needs to be said.
        So, I reiterate my support for NATO, this committee's
    support, and the Congress' support for NATO and Europe. I just
    think it is time to begin to move on to other pressing issues
    in this world as well.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Keating. I thank the ranking member.
        And I thank our witnesses for being here today. I realize
    that your schedules are greatly under strain, and we really
    appreciate your offering your thoughts here.
        I will now introduce our witnesses. General James Jones
    served as Commander of the U.S.-European Command and Supreme
    Allied Commander in Europe. He also served as President Obama's
    National Security Advisor and the State Department's Special
    Envoy for the Middle East Regional Security. He is currently
    the chairman of Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at
    the Atlantic Council.
        Dr. Evelyn Farkas is a Resident Senior Fellow at the German
    Marshall Fund of the United States. Previously, she served as
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and
    Eurasia, and as a Senior Advisor to the Supreme Allied Command
    of Europe and Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
    the NATO summit. Welcome.
        Mr. Damon Wilson is the executive vice president of the
    Atlantic Council covering Europe and NATO. He previously served
    as Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and Senior
    Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council,
    and Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO
    Secretary.
        We appreciate hearing you today, and please limit your
    testimony to 5 minutes. And without objection, your prepared
    written statements will be made part of the record.
        I will now go to General Jones for his statement. Thank you
    very much, General, for being here. Thank you for your service.

        STATEMENT OF JAMES L. JONES, USMC, RETIRED, JONES GROUP
                             INTERNATIONAL

        General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Kinzinger.
        I am honored to be here, in part, to celebrate the 70th
    birthday of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I was
    privileged to serve as the 14th Supreme Allied Commander from
    2003 until 2006. I was honored to be in NATO when we went from
    19 to 26 countries in 2004, and I am delighted to see that
    North Macedonia will be joining us, to bring the total
    membership of NATO to 30 members in the near future.
        One of the things that NATO has to deal with, and has dealt
    with I think and is doing quite well at, is understanding that
    there is a great difference between the 20th century and the
    21st century in terms of what NATO does. Without going into too
    much detail, NATO is undergoing, in my view, a transformation
    that needs to continue from being a reactive defensive alliance
    to a more proactive, engaged alliance to actually prevent
    future conflict.
        Projecting influence in the face of new threats, in a way
    we are going back to the future to face the rise of autocrats,
    and intelligent autocrats that have the economic capability to
    cause us great harm. Dominant among those challenges is China's
    quest for influence, not only total control inside its borders,
    but also the most control as it can gain outside of its
    borders, and it is moving into the European land mass with
    alarming speed.
        Russia, not too much needs to be said about that. Mr. Putin
    is very clear on what he thinks about NATO, and his most
    cherished ambition is to do anything he can to bring about
    disruption and, in fact, ultimately, the demise of NATO.
        Iran continues to be the world's greatest exporter of
    terror. Africa remains a challenge for the European land mass
    that NATO has to be involved in, non-State actors and hybrid
    warfare, just to name a few.
        Gentlemen and ladies, the defense of Europe has shifted
    from Germany to the Black Sea and to the Baltic States in the
    east, and certainly to the North African coastline to the
    south. And that fact brings with it a number of threats that
    our friends and allies are concerned with.
        NATO is relevant today I think in real terms. It is active
    outside of its borders in many ways that not many of our
    countrymen really understand. In Afghanistan, Operation
    Resolute Support is underway since January 2015. In Kosovo,
    4,000 troops are deployed. In the Mediterranean, Active
    Endeavour has been replaced by Sea Guardian, again, a very
    important operation to counter terrorism. In Iraq, the NATO
    mission is underway since 2018 to help with training. And the
    African Union peacekeeping operations, going back to 2007 in
    Somalia, air policing in 2014 in the NATO land space where
    countries do not have adequate air forces to protect
    themselves. In short, this is a different world that we live
    in. It is a world that demands a very proactive and engaged
    NATO. And it also demands American leadership and
    participation.
        The financial picture is looking better. We have not
    arrived where we need to be, but we are getting there. NATO is
    buying the right type of equipment, in my view, and is
    partnering with the economic reality and the economic threats
    that countries like China and Russia, in particular, bring to
    the European land mass.
        In my view, peace and stability can only be maintained in
    the European land mass and elsewhere with American leadership,
    with involvement in three areas: security, economic
    development, and governance and rule of law. If you combine
    those three things, particularly I might bring to the attention
    of the committee the Three Seas Initiative, which was brought
    about by the Atlantic Council in 2014, which is to help the
    Central and Eastern Europeans with their own type of Marshall
    Plan, if you will, a north-south corridor from the Baltics to
    the Adriatic involving energy, telecommunications, and
    transportation renovation. Everything during the cold war was
    built east to west. Twelve countries are now involved in this
    project, and over 50 projects are underway. The U.S. Government
    has supported it very well. And this, combined with the
    military posture of NATO, which is encouraging, I think will
    contribute measurably to peace and stability in the European
    land mass.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Keating. Thank you, General Jones.
        Dr. Farkas?

      STATEMENT OF EVELYN N. FARKAS, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE
                             UNITED STATES

        Ms. Farkas. Thank you. It has been a while since I have
    been on the House side, though I worked for 7 years on the
    Senate side. But I started here with this committee as a fellow
    in 1992, and they had me sitting in that anteroom there. So, it
    is nice to be back, but I do not have familiarity with the
    buttons.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kinzinger, all of
    you members, for taking the time today, I know for now the
    third hearing on NATO. It is important because today our
    international system, NATO, and democracy around the world have
    never been in graver danger than they are today since the cold
    war.
        Today, Americans and our democratic allies in Europe, Asia,
    and elsewhere, are in a standoff against autocratic dictators
    working to destroy our democracy and to thwart our domestic and
    international objectives.
        First and foremost among these adversaries, as the ranking
    member mentioned, is the Russian government, led by Vladimir
    Putin. Russia is our greatest threat. The Kremlin is not
    satisfied solely by threatening our international interests, it
    seeks also a corrupt, weak, and undemocratic America.
        Russia, together with China, which seems to co-opt rather
    than destroy the international order, aims to return us to a
    19th century sphere-of-influence system. Now we know from
    history that this alternative to the current global order leads
    to great power military competition, economic protectionism,
    and, ultimately, war.
        Russia would like nothing more than a United States
    uncoupled from the alliances that have brought us unprecedented
    success. NATO, our only operational collective security
    alliance, is in the sights of Putin's Russia. Yet, in this
    moment of danger, NATO is strong. In the decades since 1991,
    NATO expanded in territory and mission, as the general
    mentioned, and the recent historic agreement between Greece and
    North Macedonia means the latter will become the 30th alliance
    member. Countries want to join, and when they qualify, we
    welcome them.
        NATO did not grow in size, however, solely to deter Russia,
    though that was a motivation. NATO primarily enlarged to
    strengthen democracy and free markets. Today, deterring Russia
    is, however, once again at the top of the NATO agenda. And I
    would prioritize that. Russia violated the sovereignty of
    Georgia and Ukraine with invasions and occupations and the
    sovereignty of almost all, if not all, NATO neighbors with
    cyber and information operations.
        Meanwhile, China hopes to develop 3G communications
    networks in Europe, which would leave NATO members more
    susceptible to Chinese espionage. This comes on top of Chinese
    Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects which have
    threatened to put European countries into debt traps, beholden
    to Chinese entities for decades.
        NATO must focus on countering autocracies like Russia and
    China. And again, that is where I would put the priority.
    First, NATO must provide military support and advice to
    Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. NATO should seek a way to bring
    Georgia into NATO, perhaps temporarily carving out the occupied
    areas, as we did with East Berlin during the cold war. And I am
    sort of stealing this idea from my colleague, Damon Wilson, who
    once set it forth in an Atlantic Council paper several years
    ago. Maybe it will catch on now.
        Second, NATO must prepare the two remaining Balkan
    aspirants, Bosnia and Kosovo, for membership and neutralize the
    threat posed by Russian influence and presence in the Balkan
    region.
        Third, NATO members must contribute more to building
    military conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Allies, of
    course, should meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of their
    GDP on defense and to invest 20 percent on real capabilities by
    2024, but NATO should also establish, among other things--and I
    have listed a bunch more in the written testimony--a fund to
    help Eastern European allies and partners who still have legacy
    Soviet and Russian equipment. This was something that we did
    not have money for under the Obama Administration, but I would
    have liked to have done it dearly.
        Fourth, NATO must protect its military cutting edge and
    competitiveness vis-a-vis China.
        Fifth, finally, and most importantly, NATO members must
    renew their vows to democracy. Democratic backsliding cannot be
    ignored, especially when Russia works every day to cripple
    NATO's cohesion and resolve. The governments of Hungary,
    Poland, and Turkey must be held accountable.
        In the United States as well, we must heed the warning of
    the authors of How Democracies Die. Democracies die when
    leaders do four things. One, refuse to play by the democratic
    rules. Two, de-legitimize their opponents. Three, tolerate or
    encourage violence. Four, prepare to curtail the civil rights
    of political opponents and the media.
        We must shore up our democracy and improve the processes
    and functionings of its institutions. We must ensure civility
    and democratic culture. We must fight corruption and improve
    our capitalist system to provide transparency, opportunity, and
    basic well-being for all Americans. Any alliance is only as
    good as the sum of its parts.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Farkas follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Farkas.
        Mr. Wilson?

     STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC
                                COUNCIL

        Mr. Wilson. Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Kinzinger,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the future of NATO, and thank you for
    your leadership on our alliance.
        NATO is the most successful alliance in history, in large
    part because of its ability to adapt. So, as ministers gather
    in Washington today, it is appropriate that this committee
    focuses not on the past, but on the future. As our Nation
    prepares for a long period of strategic geopolitical
    competition, we need to put our alliances in NATO, in
    particular, at the core of our strategy. And to make them
    effective, U.S. leadership is the key ingredient.
        The United States and its allies increasingly agree that
    the great challenge of the 21st century will be the competition
    between a free world and authoritarian, State-led capitalism,
    especially China and Russia. That means U.S. interests are best
    served when Washington and its allies act together. We need our
    allies as force multipliers of our interests and values when we
    face Moscow and Beijing. For NATO, this means responding to
    Russia's aggression today while preparing for the challenge
    posed by China's global reach.
        With regard to Russia, in my view, this requires a
    significant continuous U.S. military presence in the Baltic
    States, Poland, in the Black Sea, and Balkan regions, together
    with our allies. Today, our allies are forward positioned in
    the Baltic States; the United States is not and should be.
        The Russian challenge to us is likely to remain asymmetric.
    Therefore, we should double down on our support, working with
    the European Union to strengthen the resilience of democratic
    societies through efforts that range from diversifying energy
    routes and supplies to democratic defense of disinformation.
        At the same time, we need a common approach with our allies
    on how to handle China's challenge, including by agreeing to
    common trade practices and approaches to set global standards,
    supporting our allies and establishing CFIUS-like review of
    foreign investment, and forging a concerted transatlantic
    effort to ensure the free world harnesses new technologies such
    as secure 5G before the authoritarians do.
        In an era of great power competition, our goals should be
    to keep and expand our alliances. This means that we should
    stand by NATO's open-door policy, recognizing that welcoming
    new members is about expanding the zone of security and the
    community willing to defend freedom. Enlargement to those
    willing and able to accept the responsibility of membership
    should be seen as in our interest, not just in the interest of
    the aspirants. The Senate will have the next opportunity to act
    to welcome North Macedonia as NATO's 30th member, demonstrating
    that Russia's effort to disrupt our interest in the Balkans is
    failing.
        Looking ahead, however, we should keep an open mind with
    regard to additional members, whether that be other Balkan
    nations, Cyprus as part of a settlement, Ukraine and Georgia in
    a way that Article 5 would not apply to their occupied
    territories, or Sweden, Finland, or Malta, if their publics and
    governments opted for it.
        While geopolitics have returned to Europe, today's
    competition is global. Russia is back in the Middle East and
    Latin America. Witness China's global reach.
        Recognizing this reality, the United States should lead a
    more concerted effort to thicken the political bonds and
    operational ties between NATO and its global partners. Today,
    these partnerships are an under-invested asset at NATO
    Headquarters, and we should begin to change that. This means
    the United States could consider formalizing the links among
    U.S. treaty allies in Europe and those in Asia. And at the same
    time, we should begin fostering alliance-like links among our
    existing allies with strategic partners such as India and, in
    Latin America, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, as we consider
    what unfolds in Venezuela.
        Beginning to build a network of alliances now with the
    United States at the center would provide a more capable and
    intentional global democratic response to the authoritarian
    challenge. It could also be a precursor to a more formal set of
    alliances among democracies who are committed to protecting
    their way of life and a democratic international order.
        So, as NATO leaders being arriving here today, there is no
    doubt a lot of attention will focus on which allies are making
    strides toward their defense investment pledges, and rightly
    so. While much more remains to be done, we can recognize that,
    since 2016, European allies have spent an additional $41
    billion and have plans through 2020 of an additional $100
    billion.
        That said, I am concerned about the current burden-sharing
    debate, that it can misplace the focus on what is strategically
    important inside the alliance. America's friends and allies are
    the United States' best competitive advantage. Indeed,
    Congress, the administration, and the American people can view
    our alliances as a national strategic asset. As such, each
    administration serves as a steward of these assets with a
    responsibility to defend, strengthen, and lead them. U.S.
    leadership, after all, is the decisive element in determining
    the success of NATO's future.
        Thank you for the privilege to testify today. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        This week, we look back and celebrate NATO and look back at
    the history. But this hearing is about looking forward.
        General Jones, you hit, I think, the theme of that hearing,
    talking about a new way of viewing, a much more proactive way.
    We will look at the 2 percent, the 20 percent, but, really,
    what is NATO's role in coordinating how that is going to be
    spent, how we are going to move in that direction, eliminating
    unnecessary redundancies and ensure improved deterrence and
    readiness in that regard? So, in that proactive sense that you
    spoke about, could you share some of your thoughts in that
    regard?
        General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think that this is really the moment for the alliance to
    really transform itself in its thinking philosophically in
    response to some very, very serious threats that are coming our
    way. NATO is included in all of these 5G discussions that are
    going on about China and the U.S. and Huawei, and the like.
    NATO can, and is showing signs of moving toward, buying the
    right type of equipment for the future. It is showing signs of
    moving into the countries that border the Black Sea and the
    Baltic States with expeditionary missions. There is even talk
    in Poland about encouraging the United States to establish
    fixed bases again in Poland.
        China and Russia are devoting a large part of their weapons
    acquisition to area and access denial in terms of reinforcing
    NATO, the European land mass, or in the Pacific. That will
    cause us to have to think about how we are able to react
    quickly in times of emergency.
        But I also really think that, as the example--and if you do
    not mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include this manual on
    the Three Seas Initiative as part of my testimony.
        Mr. Keating. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Jones. Thank you.
        Because it is the combination, I think--the future of NATO
    is not just a military future. It is about economic strength.
    It is about governance and rule of law, as Dr. Farkas pointed
    out. And it is about ways in which we can and must be
    successful against the rise of these new autocracies that are
    actually quite smart in terms of using----
        Mr. Keating. If I could, General, I would like to use that
    comment you just gave as a point to include our other witnesses
    on this question.
        General Jones. Sure.
        Mr. Keating. Mr. Wilson mentioned a misplaced focus on just
    the percentages. It does not mean it is not important. It just
    means that it seems to be too much of a focus.
        And going back to Dr. Farkas' comments in that regard, I
    was troubled when I was in the Munich Security Conference just
    about 4 weeks ago--there was a poll in Germany that said the
    view of the German people is 85 percent unfavorable to the
    United States.
        Dr. Farkas, you were mentioning the role of the U.S. in
    NATO, particularly in terms of trying to stop democratic
    backsliding. And if you look at areas like civil rights and
    issues of autocracy in Hungary and Poland and Turkey, how can
    the U.S. do a better job assuming that mantle that we should
    have in this regard, given the current way the U.S. is being
    viewed? What can we do to perhaps resume being the mantle of
    all these civil rights, rule-of-law, democracy issues that you
    mentioned?
        Your microphone. There you go. You are in the House again.
    All right.
        Ms. Farkas. So, first, Mr. Chairman, I would say, looking
    internationally, which is where most of my expertise is, we
    need to do more helping put pressure, helping the opposition,
    frankly speaking, in Hungary, in Poland, in Turkey, to put
    pressure on the government to do better, so to be more of a
    liberal democracy, if you will. If you recall the famous
    statement by Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, he
    very proudly said, we are not a liberal democracy, but without
    the liberal you are not really much of a democracy.
        So, there needs to be more pressure put on these countries.
    But what we have found--and here we saw different types of
    approaches taken to Hungary under the administration. I worked
    for the Obama Administration and now the Trump administration.
    And I think we need kind of a mix of the two, where we speak
    frankly and directly to the Hungarians and to our allies, to
    the leadership, and we appreciate them for their military
    contributions, because those three countries are actually very
    strong contributors, with Turkey and Poland making the 2
    percent cut and, also, having the highest--Turkey certainly has
    one of the highest numbers of people under arms. So, we
    recognize that, but at the same time we know that their
    democracies are weak; we know that they need help. We need to
    put more money into that through our foreign assistance
    programs to help the opposition, to help their democracy and
    their civil society.
        Here at home. I would say the polls--and I think Damon is
    probably also familiar with these polls--the polls, I believe
    that they tend to ask about our President and how the German
    public views our President, and then, America. But these two
    things obviously become intertwined. And President Trump is not
    popular in Europe because of how he has spoken out with regard
    to the German Chancellor and the Prime Minister of the U.K., so
    Prime Minister May, and other leaders. He is seen as not being
    respectful, and I think the push for increased assistance to
    NATO, while it is very consistent with all of the other
    Presidents who have come before our current President, he does
    it in a way that, obviously, is irritating not just to the
    leadership, but to the people.
        With regard to what we have to do about shoring up our
    democracy----
        Mr. Keating. Appreciate that.
        Ms. Farkas. Yes, sorry. Obviously, more needs to be done
    there. And I would really just urge Congress to do what you do
    best. I love Congress, and Congress just needs to have a robust
    role in our democracy.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Dr. Farkas.
        I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Kinzinger.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And just respectfully, on the polling front, as you were
    asking that, I looked up an old poll from 1983. And in Britain,
    Great Britain, in England, Ronald Reagan's popularity was 21
    percent in 1983 in England. And I would argue that he was
    actually a pretty good President in hindsight.
        Typically, I think if we look at Eastern Europe, there
    would probably be a much more popular, as we have always seen,
    view of the United States because they remember what it was
    like to live under oppression. And this is why I think this is
    so important to keep NATO together.
        I am going to go 2 degrees of separation from NATO for a
    second and just say one of the challenges I think we face as a
    country is people think they are tired. I think they feel
    exhausted, even though they really are not. And we are fighting
    on an economic front in many cases, I think primarily China.
        And so, I think this is part of the reason I came out and
    said that I think cutting off aid, for instance, to El
    Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala was not smart, because as we
    back away from it, right now I think Central and South America
    are on the verge of, frankly, democratic governance, a major
    change. But every time we pull away, the Chinese will show up
    and they are going to ask how much money we were giving El
    Salvador, for instance, get that number and double it.
        We saw, in fact, a few months ago El Salvador de-recognized
    Taiwan. And you wonder why that happened? Well, it was because
    they got money from China to do it. So, this is the battle we
    are in.
        So, I think when we talk about, whether it is in Europe and
    NATO, and things like that, we have to keep in mind the
    importance of the economic side of what we do. And so, with
    that, I want to talk, because obviously Putin being a prime, I
    guess, adversary of the United States, I want to talk about his
    movement into Venezuela, even though this is not, again,
    specifically NATO.
        Maduro has lost trust in his own armed forces. So, Putin
    has to come in and protect him. That is what is going on. We
    have seen this play out before when Russian forces entered
    Syria to protect Bashar al-Assad. And I remember Russia said
    they are just here for maintenance; they are here to take care
    of a base we have. The next thing we knew, there were thousands
    of them. Now they illegally occupied Georgia, Ukranian
    territory, and now they are in Venezuela.
        So, Mr. Wilson, should we be concerned with Russia's
    strategy of illegally occupying land as well as propping up
    despot regimes around the world? And what would you recommend
    to this administration to do to counter Russia in that?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, thank you for that question.
        I think the reality is we are facing a declining Russia
    which is seeking to disrupt our interests, and doing so pretty
    effectively. When your goal is disruption rather than building,
    it is actually an easier threshold to achieve. We have seen
    that close to their neighborhood. We are seeing it play out
    globally.
        So, I think the twofold issue of an alliance that is
    transforming, to be focused more on defense and deterrence, is
    quite important. And I think the alliance has begun that
    process. I think it is still begun and playing out on the home
    front in Europe.
        But I think we need to be a little bit more strategic about
    how we think of disrupting Russia's interests on a more global
    platform. We should have a strategy that thinks about how
    Beijing and Moscow do not become allied in their efforts, but
    that we drive that wedge. We should be paying attention to what
    Russian forces are doing in the Central African Republic and in
    Venezuela. It is pretty astonishing. So, I think thinking
    through a strategy of not just deterrence in Europe, but
    disruption of Russian interests on the global playing field is
    overdue.
        We look at Venezuela, where Cuban intelligence, Russian
    military, and Chinese money, debt, is fueling this crisis. It
    is why I have suggested that we should not just support what is
    happening on the part of the Venezuelan people, but think about
    how we work with Colombia, Brazil, and back the regional
    countries, and bring our European allies into this kind of
    conversation, so that we can actually have a more intentional
    effort of disrupting this effort here in Venezuela.
        A quick word on what you said at the beginning, the Chinese
    strategy. The economic piece is fundamental. We are never going
    to outspend the Belt and Road Initiative, and we should not. It
    is not how we play. We do need to recognize that U.S. capital
    markets, private sector investments, private equity dwarf what
    the Chinese government can do in BRI over time.
        Part of it is that it is difficult. We do not want our
    government telling our private sector what to do. But how do we
    think of harnessing in a geo-economic term American capital
    markets to advance American interests and values in these
    places? At the end of the day, whether you are in Serbia or
    other countries, they will accept and take Chinese money, but
    usually a mother wants her child to study in the United States
    or Europe. And if a young person is competing for a job, they
    want the opportunity to work for a U.S. company, where they
    know there will be a meritocracy.
        We can win this because we see individual decisions
    recognize the difference between their strategy and ours, but
    we need a stronger approach to a geo-economic----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
        And I think Eximbank is a prime example. That is still
    languishing right now. And that is, I think, a very effective
    thing for our economy.
        I had more questions for you, General, but I am out of
    time. So, I yield back.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Costa of California.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
    my colleague for yielding.
        General, we appreciate your commitment and service to our
    country.
        And you made a number of comments. I think we are all in
    agreement that the 2 percent goal for commitments by NATO
    countries is something that has been determined necessary. We
    need to continue to press them, especially some of our allies
    who have been backsliding. We know who they are. How we do that
    is critical.
        You talked about their making the right choices on
    equipment. In terms of procurement, what do you mean by that?
        General Jones. I am sorry, in terms of equipment?
        Mr. Costa. Procurement of equipment. You say they are
    making the right decisions.
        General Jones. I am really talking about investing in real
    war-fighting capability and upgrading the systems that they
    have in terms of airplanes, ships, and war-fighting equipment,
    as opposed to----
        Mr. Costa. What about the notion that the European Union is
    talking about putting its own defensive capabilities? Do you
    think that is compatible? I know that is still being sorted out
    among the EU.
        General Jones. Well, I think that whatever the alliance can
    do in the regard of organizing itself in such a way that they
    buy the right things and they do not all try to do the same
    thing----
        Mr. Costa. I think that is very important.
        General Jones. It is very important.
        Mr. Costa. They do not all need--some of them have certain
    talents in certain areas.
        General Jones. Exactly.
        Mr. Costa. And we should encourage them to pursue that
    instead of areas that are less effective.
        General Jones. Exactly. You will find that some of the
    smaller countries in NATO are actually specializing in quite
    impressive special operations capability, abilities to make
    significant contributions in electronic warfare, and the like.
    So, there is some specialization going on.
        And if you look at the graph that shows the equipment
    expenditure as a share of defense expenditures, well over half
    of the countries in NATO are approaching the NATO guideline of
    20 percent of their purchasing power being spent on relevant
    equipment. And so, that is very encouraging.
        Mr. Costa. Because of my time situation, I do not know--I
    think General Gerasimov, who is, I guess, equivalent to the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked about their asymmetrical
    potential. And, Mr. Wilson, you made reference to Russia
    playing a disruptive hand, but smartly--those are my words, not
    yours--but using democratic elections as a means to undermine
    not only NATO as a deterrent to peace, but also undermine the
    European Union as an economic force.
        And frankly, if you look back to 2013-14, he gave that
    speech. They have done a fairly effective job. I mean, they
    have been undermining European elections even before 2016 with
    ours.
        And so, I guess my question to you is, what is the best
    way, Mr. Wilson and Dr. Farkas, to combat this, this real
    threat? Because while this may be the third hearing on NATO, I
    think it is important, when we tomorrow hold the Joint Session
    of Congress, realize that not only has this been the safeguard
    of our common values and rule of law, but it is the longest
    peacetime period in Europe for the last 70 years in over 1,000
    years. And that gets overlooked.
        Mr. Keating. And if you could--we are up against a roll
    call--if you could just keep that combined under a minute, that
    would be great.
        Ms. Farkas. I can be very quick.
        I did cover this in my written testimony. I would just say
    one part is resilience, so strengthening our democracy and
    transparency. The second part is deterrence.
        And then, I would say a little bit, based on the comments
    and question from the ranking member. We need to communicate
    very clearly to Russia what our expectations are, and if they
    cross a line, we need to be willing to take action. That was
    critical in Syria when the Russians attacked us, when their
    contract workers attacked us. And I think if we keep a firm
    line against Russia, keep the dialog open, hopefully, we will
    have a new regime at some point in the not-foreseeable future.
        Mr. Keating. General?
        General Jones. If I could just add to that, to the ranking
    member's statement, there is a difference, I think, in Europe--
    and I noticed at the Munich Security Conference as well--
    between how Western Europeans feel about the United States and
    how Eastern Europeans feel about the United States. So, that is
    something that it is real and it has to be dealt with.
        But what I have noticed in Western Europe is more of a
    trend toward appeasement against these autocrats in Russia and
    China. And that is a very dangerous thing. But the further east
    you go, the more you have solidarity with the U.S. philosophy,
    U.S. fears, U.S. identification of the threats that are coming
    toward us, be they military or economic or political.
        So, we really need to shore up the Western Europeans, I
    think, more so than we have. And that is why I think these
    initiatives, like I mentioned the Three Seas Initiative, are
    important in righting the balance in Europe, where the Eastern
    Europeans' economies can rise and make Europe a more powerful
    entity to combat these----
        Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you, General.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I thank all of you for being here today.
        But, General Jones, your colleagues have already addressed
    this, and that is the admission of Georgia into NATO. I would
    be interested, because Georgia was promised in 2008 at the
    Bucharest summit that they would have the opportunity to join.
    Since then, the alliance has recognized Georgia already
    possesses all the practical tools for NATO membership. Georgia
    spends more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense, has committed
    the largest number of soldiers per capita of any allied nation
    in Afghanistan. How would you assess the potential for
    Georgia's admission to NATO?
        General Jones. Speaking as a personal opinion, I think
    Georgia has demonstrated fight way beyond its weight in terms
    of its contribution to Afghanistan and the quality of their
    soldiers and their commitment. Of course, admission to NATO and
    accession to NATO is largely a political question, but on the
    basis of performance, I would say that Georgia deserves our
    admiration, our support, and our encouragement for whatever it
    is they want to do with their own future.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I agree. Thank you to all
    three of you. It is amazing.
        Mr. Wilson, Poland, which appreciates very much the
    temporary placement of troops, currently U.S. troops, in the
    country, has announced that they would support stationing a
    permanent U.S. brigade in the country and finance the
    infrastructure and basing. What would be your view of putting a
    permanent U.S.-NATO presence in Poland?
        Mr. Wilson. I think we need to recognize that the challenge
    we are facing from the Kremlin today is not temporary and we
    should not plan as such. This is a long-term challenge. We need
    to have a continuous presence and be permanent as long as we
    face a Kremlin that is intimidating and threatening our allies.
        Two other small things I would say is that we need to be
    comfortable with an uncomfortable relationship with Russia. And
    in response to some of the conversation, we should not be going
    through a political cycle that would consider any reset
    approach with Russia, for example.
        And finally, to consider enlargement as a stabilizing force
    rather than a provocative one. And that is a way to
    reconceptualize how we think about Georgia's role.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I an really grateful to
    serve as the co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus. March the 29th
    marked the 15th year of Bulgaria being part of NATO. How would
    you assess, Mr. Wilson, the benefits of Bulgaria as a part of
    the NATO alliance?
        Mr. Wilson. I think Bulgaria has been the fundamental story
    of how you create a Europe whole and free, where former
    adversaries become allies. That is the story from France-
    Germany to former Warsaw Pact countries, to Bulgaria itself. It
    has been an important ally, helping to anchor the southeast
    flank.
        It also is where I have some concerns about Russian
    disinformation and penetration, where I think some of the
    Russian efforts are the most active and sometimes the most
    effective. I think Bulgaria is underappreciated in terms of our
    ability to push back on those influences.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And, Dr. Farkas, you have
    already addressed this, but, again, Russia has described
    further NATO enlargement as provocation in a variety of efforts
    to intimidate. Again, what can we do to push back on the
    infringement by the Russian Federation?
        Ms. Farkas. Well, first, of course, the Russians themselves
    have been provocative, not us. And our enlargement, as Damon
    said, and as I said in the opening statement, was aimed at
    spreading stability, not at provoking Russia. However, we found
    out we really do need to deter Russia. We need to keep having a
    dialog with Russia. Unfortunately, it is not going to happen
    within the normal context that NATO used to have the dialog
    because of Russia's infringements, because of the things that
    they have done, first and foremost, of course, occupying and
    illegally annexing territory.
        But I would argue that we have to hold the firm line on
    deterrence. For too long, we were hoping--and this spans
    multiple administrations and really the whole NATO alliance--
    there was a hope that somehow the Russians would realize that
    this was a bad policy. Unfortunately, this Kremlin, this leader
    of Russia is not going to realize that. So, we have to hold a
    firm line.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you.
        And a final question for the general. In regard to Turkey
    purchasing S-400's, should the United States still be
    providing, through NATO, F-35s?
        General Jones. Yes, I believe that that topic is being
    discussed almost as we speak between Turkey and the United
    States. I also serve as the chairman of the American-Turkish
    Council, a venerable institution for over 40 years. We just
    returned from a big trip to Turkey where we were received by
    the President, the Vice President, and every cabinet minister
    we wanted to speak. They are very active and very desirous to
    rebalance the relationship with the United States, working on
    these difficult problems, but also some resurgence in the trade
    relationships between our two countries.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Well, thank you for your
    personal efforts.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes the vice chairman of the committee,
    Ms. Spanberger from Virginia.
        Ms. Spanberger. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you to our witnesses today.
        So much of our national security relies on global
    telecommunications infrastructure, including military systems,
    diplomatic channels, intelligence reporting, not to mention the
    critical infrastructure for day-to-day uses across this country
    and the world. Several countries, in addition to the U.S., have
    barred the Chinese company Huawei from supplying components for
    5G networks, citing national security concerns, including
    Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Yet, European allies have
    not. As recently as February of this year, the head of
    Britain's cybersecurity agency, GCHQ, said they needed to
    better understand the opportunities and threats from China's
    technology. My question for you all today is, how great of a
    risk do Chinese 5G network providers pose to NATO's security in
    your estimation?
        General Jones. Thank you for that question.
        5G represents to me one of the big challenges that the
    United States faces with its competition with China. It is up
    there with John F. Kennedy's man-on-the-moon project. It is up
    there with the Manhattan Project for the 1940's. When I was a
    teenager in Europe in 1957, I witnessed the Sputnik moment
    where the headlines of the newspapers around the world said,
    ``Russia Beats the United States to Space''. I do not want to
    see a headline where it says, ``China Beats the United States
    in Technology of 5G''.
        5G is the most disruptive technology that is going to come
    our way. It is absolutely critical to our national security and
    economic future that the United States not cede control over
    the infrastructure required for 5G and, more importantly,
    secure 5G. NATO's interoperability will be affected if there
    are countries in NATO who are showing signs of forgiving China
    and believing the theology that they advocate, which is
    cheaper, more reliable, no strings attached, and, you know,
    back doors to Beijing. This is a very, very serious threat.
        We are behind. And our private sector is going a pretty
    good job of developing the technology we need to ensure our
    security, but we need more government oversight and
    participation because this is really a moonshot for us. This is
    as important as anything we have ever done. If we lose this, we
    will lose a substantial portion of our ability to influence the
    world.
        Ms. Spanberger. And in your assessment, is there a way for
    NATO to mitigate the risks from Chinese 5G technology or do you
    believe that the United States should continue to pressure our
    European allies to avoid any agreements with China altogether?
        General Jones. So, there is 5G and there is secure 5G. By
    far the most important one is the secure 5G. On that score, I
    can tell you that our private sector is coming up with some
    very exciting technologies that would give us hope that we can
    prevail at least in the secure 5G world, technologies that are
    impenetrable, technologies that cannot be reverse-engineered.
        You cannot have a smart city without a secure network. That
    is obvious. And the United States I think can prevail. There
    will be countries that will buy Huawei equipment. And by the
    way, a lot of them are thinking twice about that right now, and
    that is a good thing. But if they do not care about it, if they
    just want cheap equipment and they do not care about the back
    door or the ability of China to eavesdrop on what they are
    doing, then more power to them.
        But it is absolutely incompatible, since we are talking
    about NATO, with the 30-nation alliance, that they would have a
    combination of Chinese technology and Western technology. That
    is just simply not going to happen.
        Ms. Spanberger. OK. Thank you, General Jones.
        I yield bak.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you.
        We have Mr. Pence, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Guest. Having called
    the roll call, those members can choose to cut their questions,
    if they so choose, to 3 minutes, so we can get them all in
    there.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Pence from Indiana.
        Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairman Keating, Ranking Member
    Kinzinger.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        Mr. Wilson, in your prepared testimony, you stated the
    following, and I quote: ``But the Russian challenge to us is
    likely to remain asymmetric. Therefore, we should double down
    on our support, working with the European Union to strengthen
    resilience of democratic societies through efforts that range
    from diversifying energy routes and supplies to democratic
    defense of disinformation.''
        I am glad you mentioned energy security. In our hearing
    last week that Congressman Kinzinger mentioned, I brought up
    this very topic and would be interested in your thoughts. This
    is my question to you all: is NATO doing enough to enhance
    energy security in the alliance, and how might we encourage
    NATO to engage with the EU to address their collective energy
    security challenges?
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for that question.
        I will sort of refer to, as General Jones noted, this Three
    Seas Initiative. I do not think NATO is doing enough, and I
    think the key is an integrated strategy between NATO and the
    European Union. If Russia uses energy and weaponizes it against
    our allies, we need to work with our allies in a common
    strategy to defend against that. That, obviously, requires work
    with the European Union. So, part of this effort is how can the
    European Union, with the United States, help diversify those
    energy routes and supplies, particularly into Central and
    Eastern Europe, so that they are not found in a vulnerable
    position.
        And I think that is where the effort of the Three Seas
    Initiative is, how to build a cross-border infrastructure that
    is required, that is often not attractive to some private
    investment, but is quite necessary to give options to some of
    our more vulnerable allies. We have made progress on this
    agenda, but it has been too slow. We have not treated it as a
    first-order strategic priority of alignment between NATO and
    the EU on a common strategy, and I think it is an imperative
    one to add to that.
        Ms. Farkas. Yes, I would basically agree with all of the
    points that Damon made. NATO needs to get more actively
    involved, at a minimum, in a consultative fashion. But NATO
    members rely, their militaries rely on energy; they rely on
    fuel, and maybe to some extent on natural gas. So, there is a
    role for the defense ministries of these countries as well in
    putting pressure on their governments. But the EU largely has
    the lead on the issue. They took a while to become activated
    again, to become sufficiently alarmed to coordinate this, and
    they are doing a better job.
        General Jones. Thank you for that question.
        Philosophically, President Putin of Russia has shown that
    he is more than capable and willing of using energy as a
    weapon, and he has done so. The U.S., having catapulted itself
    into a position of global leadership on energy, has adopted a
    much more benevolent strategy. We care about military security,
    economic security, political security, and energy security.
        And with the Three Seas Initiative, and what it does, it
    reduces the dependency of about 20 different countries in
    Central and Eastern Europe off of the Russian ability to
    manipulate the political spectrum through threats to cutoff
    energy. It will effect better prices. It will effect the whole
    stability of the continent. And I think that arrival of the
    United States as a great power on energy should go beyond
    Europe. We should also compete with China aggressively in
    Africa on energy security as well, because energy is not the
    commodity that China can export. We can.
        Mr. Pence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
        Mr. Keating. The chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline of Rhode
    Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses.
        As you have all said, NATO is, obviously, rooted in a
    bedrock of shared democratic values. And I think, like many,
    you have expressed concern about democratic backsliding,
    particularly in Hungary and Poland, and, of course, Turkey is
    hardly democratic today. And I am just curious, maybe starting
    with you, Mr. Wilson, what can Congress do to kind of shore up
    these democracies in Europe and within the alliance? Some have
    suggested NATO should begin an annual report or review of
    democracy within the alliance. I wonder what you think of that
    and what Congress might do to support that.
        And, Dr. Farkas, if you could follow? I know you said that
    these countries must be accountable. I think we all agree, but
    it is unclear exactly how we do that under the current kind of
    structure of NATO. How do we actually hold these countries
    accountable?
        So, maybe start with you, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that question.
        My approach is a little bit different perhaps than as Dr.
    Farkas outlined. I think our premise should be to keep our
    allies as our allies. And if we look 10-20 years out, the last
    thing we want to see is an alliance in which Turkey is not
    aligned with us, but perhaps someone else. I think the openings
    there of the cleavages within our alliance are a strategic
    vulnerability that a country like Russia can exploit.
        It does not mean that we do not have concerns about what is
    developing. But if you look at local elections in Poland, local
    elections in Turkey, there is a vibrancy to these civil
    societies, to these opposition parties, to their political
    class. And I think that, through engagement rather than
    isolation, rather than ostracizing our allies, being engaged,
    and I think that helps with the congressional body, with other
    parliaments, meeting cross-party--you know, as you are doing
    meetings, doing cross-party parliamentary meetings with your
    counterparts. Because my view of the alliance is to provide an
    architecture, an infrastructure, which provides a bedrock sense
    of security that our democracies, whether it is our own or
    others, can be self-correcting and help nurture this.
        So, I am reluctant to go down the path of a NATO passing
    judgment on democracies within that club while trying to set
    the standards that we want to uphold, but understand that this
    isolating, calling out, or not meeting with, going 20 years
    without a head-of-State meeting with the Hungarian leadership,
    is not the best way to pursue democracy, in my view. I think it
    opens up opportunities for the Russians to play games and to
    potentially cause danger of peeling back our alliance.
        Mr. Cicilline. Dr. Farkas?
        Ms. Farkas. Yes, in my written testimony I also wrote a
    little bit more extensively on this. And I noted that, when
    Secretary Pompeo was recently in Budapest, he talked about a
    new fund, new funding to help boost the civil society, to boost
    the--he did not say the opposition, but the civil society in
    Hungary.
        So, I think I would agree with Damon's approach, which is
    we do not need to set, certainly not another public litmus test
    like 2 percent, because I do not think it helps. And as he
    said, our adversaries will exploit it. But, behind closed
    doors, I think we have to speak frankly with the heads of State
    and the ministers, but, then, engage, as Damon said, not just
    in the meetings we hold, but our government needs to put more
    money back into those programs that we used to fund to help
    bolster civil society in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. So, I
    think those are very important, and media outreach programs,
    and Fulbrights, and all of these people-to-people things, so
    that, hopefully, we can help their societies evolve either back
    to where they were before or to a better place.
        General Jones. Thank you for that question.
        I would strongly encourage more congressional engagement
    with NATO. When I was over in SACEUR, the congressional visits
    were always well-received by our European partners. I would
    double down on those missions. I think they are very important.
        I would recommend that our country reaffirm, without any
    question, our commitment to Article 5 and NATO. I think that
    has got to be--we should not ever dangle that as a negotiating
    tool because it makes everybody nervous. And by the way, Russia
    needs to hear that as well.
        We should praise what the alliance has done. We criticize
    it quite a bit, but I do not see enough praise coming from this
    side of the Atlantic to what they are doing.
        I think, frankly, I would champion a revamping of the
    partnership program and the membership program, which I think
    should be divided. There are countries like Brazil and
    countries all over the world that would like to have an
    interoperable mission with NATO, and I think we should
    encourage that. The membership side should be completely
    distinct. There should be a very rigid, step-by-step process
    where countries can become members. But, right now, the two are
    kind of in the same building, if you will, and it is unclear.
    The distinction between the two is unclear.
        So, I think there is a lot more we can do. I just think we
    need to praise NATO when they deserve to be praised because we
    do not hesitate to criticize them.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, General.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Guest from Mississippi.
        Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        NBC News reported earlier today that the United States has
    blocked turkey from receiving equipment related to the F-35
    fighter jet until its NATO ally cancels an order of the Russian
    missile defense system, which we know to be the S-400. Assuming
    that that information is correct, General, do you agree with us
    canceling their receiving the F-35s?
        General Jones. Before the hearing started, I saw another
    newsclip that said that Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan
    said that he believes that the S-400 issue will be resolved and
    that the F-35 will be included in Turkey's architecture. So, I
    am on the private sector. I cannot----
        Mr. Guest. Well, let me ask, as a former general and as a
    private citizen, would you agree with canceling the F-35 if
    Turkey does not agree to cancel the S-400 missile system? Do
    you think that is a prudent decision by the United States
    Government?
        General Jones. My military friends tell me that the
    compatibility of the F-35 operating in the same vicinity as the
    S-400 gives away some of the technology of the F-35 that the S-
    400 system could not otherwise acquire. I am very hopeful that
    this is going to be resolved because this is really important
    for the alliance. It is important for the bilateral
    relationships.
        I would like to remind the committee that years ago Greece
    bought the S-300 from Russia, and the alliance put so much
    pressure on Greece that they bought the system, but they never
    deployed it, and it averted a crisis.
        I know from my Turkish friends that there is some
    willingness to consider the deployment options available to
    them. And so, I hope this thing is working out. I was very
    encouraged to see this clip before I appeared before you.
        Mr. Guest. And, Dr. Farkas, the same question to you. If
    Turkey refuses to cancel that order, do you agree that we
    should not sell them the F-35s?
        Ms. Farkas. Congressman, I am not sure whether I would link
    the two, just because I have not studied the issue. So, the
    kind of political scientist, policymaker, geek in me says I
    need to study it.
        But I will tell you that it is deeply disturbing that
    Turkey is dangling this in front of us. I do not know how
    serious it is. And the reason I say that is because, when I was
    in the Pentagon, they also were toying with buying a Chinese
    system. And some of this plays into Turkey's desire to show
    that they are somehow independent of the United States, of our
    pressure. It is not helpful at this time in history.
        It may also be part of their overall effort to put pressure
    on our government vis-a-vis Syria and what is happening there.
    So, I think I would look very closely at the macro picture. I
    am not sure I would, again, tie the F-35 directly to this S-400
    deal, but the S-400 deal, I would say it cannot stand.
        Mr. Guest. And, Mr. Wilson, I will give you an opportunity
    to answer the question as well.
        Mr. Wilson. I think, strategically, we want Turkey in the
    F-35 program. We need to recognize that we are in the Turkish
    bazaar negotiating right now. And I think even today's
    statements are playing out. There is a high-stakes negotiation.
        Now that we are through Turkish elections, I hope they can
    be serious. We understand that the Russians put real pressure
    on Erdogan after the shootdown of a Russian jet over Syria in
    Turkish airspace to go through with this. I think we need to
    see it either canceled or deployed in such a way that it is
    actually deployed/mothballed at the same time, so that it does
    not provide a cleavage place, a vulnerability for the F-35,
    which has to be our No. 1 priority to protect that program's
    integrity.
        Mr. Guest. And would you agree, Mr. Wilson, as the general
    spoke of a few moments ago, that if the S-400 was deployed in
    Turkey at the same time our fighter jets were, that it would be
    able to give the Russians or our adversaries information about
    capabilities that they do not currently have?
        Mr. Wilson. That is what I understand from people who have
    more technical expertise than I do. That is where this either
    comes in, do we either come out of a negotiation that leads to
    a cancellation or is there a saving-face option where the Turks
    end up paying for this and it is not deployed and used in such
    a way that it would cause that concern for us?
        Mr. Guest. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
        I would like to thank our witnesses for being here and the
    subcommittee members as well, working around roll calls and
    hearings.
        It is critical to have a strategy for NATO to grow and
    evolve and address the new and emerging threats. And I look
    forward to working with my colleagues on the committee this
    Congress to address it.
        We appreciate the comments you have made about the role of
    Congress going forward. I think it is a very important role.
        Members of the committee may have an additional time to ask
    questions of our witnesses in writing, and we ask our witnesses
    to please respond to those questions in writing as well. The
    record will be open for 10 more business days to receive those
    responses.
        Mr. Keating. Again, we thank all of you for being here and
    an important discussion about the future of NATO and where we
    are going, certainly an evolving one.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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