

# LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,  
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019

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## LOOKING FORWARD: U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,  
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in Room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Karen Bass (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Ms. BASS. Good afternoon, everyone. This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony. And the title of our hearing is “Africa Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations.” Without objection all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I will now make an opening statement and then turn it over to the ranking member for his opening statement.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations. Basically, we are here to ask what U.S. engagement with African countries should look like moving forward.

We mentioned in the first hearing that we wanted to take our first few hearings as an opportunity to really provide an overview of the jurisdiction that this committee covers. And recognizing that the only two members on this committee that have been on this committee for a while, we have all new members, and so for that reason wanted to take a step back and really provide an overview.

The African continent is comprised of 50-plus countries and more than 1.2 billion culturally distinct peoples in different geographic regions. This diversity results in diverging political, economic, and social experiences across the continent. This means that our policy has to take that diversity into consideration. The continent cannot be painted with one brush.

After years of democratic progress, African democracies have faced ups and downs. Some countries are progressing while others appear to be backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens favor democracy and continue to take to the streets to demand responsive and accountable governance.

How do we encourage countries to support the desire for democracy by their citizens?

What tools should we be using?

Regarding issues around good governance, democracy, and human rights, there are a number of countries that I look forward to hearing about in your testimony or in the Q&A. Cameroon is very concerning at the moment, and the government's reaction to protests in Sudan is also an area of concern.

In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major demographic changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization. People age 35 and under account for more than 75 percent of Africa's population, with the continent expected to become the world region with the highest urbanization. While the continent is undergoing this major urban transition and youth bulge, some of the world's fastest growing economies are in African countries. In fact, several international observers have named the continent the future economic growth engine of the world.

Other nations are deepening their relationships with countries across Africa, and instead of critiquing, we have to find ways to show up and engage. I look forward to hearing witnesses' recommendations on what this engagement should entail.

Most of you know that I advocate for increased trade, investment, and business activity between Africa and the U.S. From my perspective this is a win/win situation. We help U.S. businesses again access to new markets while creating jobs and building capacity across Africa. And we know that this is increasingly essential, given the youth bulge.

We are often critical of China's involvement on the continent. And I am not sure what we expect the African countries to do, but the solution that I like to promote is that the United States needs to step up.

In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security Advisor Bolton identified three core U.S. interests in Africa: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African countries; countering the threat from terrorism and violent conflict; and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region.

My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas that we should focus on when we consider U.S.-Africa relations.

I have been disappointed that the Administration has not emphasized democracy, good governance, or human rights. That said, the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid initiatives launched by previous Congresses and, in some cases, has sought to fund them, however, at far lower levels. These include the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS, or PEPFAR, and Feed the Future, and Africa-specific Young African Leaders Initiatives, and Electrify Africa. Electrify Africa and Feed the Future were initiatives that were put in the statute by the former Chair Ed Royce.

And I am glad that those initiatives have continued, but concerned about the cuts in funding.

I will conclude by stressing that U.S.-Africa relations with—that U.S. relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan support here in Congress. And we expect to continue to work together. Each time the Administration has sought to reduce funding to the State Department or USAID, especially those that would impact

African countries, we have worked together in a bipartisan manner to restore that funding.

I now recognize the ranking member for the purpose of making an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bass follows:]

**Congressmember Karen Bass  
AGH Subcommittee Hearing  
Hearing: “Looking Forward: U.S. – Africa Relations”  
March 26, 2019**

This hearing for the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations will come to order.

I note that a quorum is present.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on **“Looking Forward: U.S. – Africa Relations”**. Basically, we are here to ask what US engagement with African countries should look like going forward.

Without objection, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement.

I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses who are here with us today.



The African continent is comprised of 54 countries and more than 1.2 billion culturally distinct peoples in different geographic regions. This diversity results in diverging political, economic and social experiences across the continent. This means that our policy has to take that diversity into consideration. The continent cannot be painted with one brush.

After years of democratic progress, African democracies have faced ups and downs. Some countries are progressing while others appear to be backsliding. Meanwhile, African citizens favor democracy and continue to take to the streets to demand responsive and accountable governance. How do we encourage countries to support the desire for democracy by their citizen's? What tools should we be using?

Regarding issues around good governance, democracy and human rights, there are a number of countries that I look forward to hearing about in your testimony or in the Q & A. Cameroon is very concerning at the moment and the government's reaction to the protests in Sudan is also an area of concern.

In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing major demographic changes, including a youth bulge and urbanization. People aged 35 and

under account for more than 75 percent of Africa's population, with the continent expected to become the world region with the highest urbanization.

While the continent is undergoing this major urban transition and youth bulge, some of the world's fastest growing economies are in African countries. In fact, several international observers have named the continent, "The future economic growth engine of the world." Other nations are deepening their relationship with countries across Africa and instead of critiquing we have to find ways to show up and engage. I look forward hearing witness recommendations on what this engagement should entail.

Most of you who know me, know that I advocate for increased trade, investment, and business activity between Africa and the US. From my perspective, this is a win-win situation. We help US businesses gain access to new markets, while creating jobs and building capacity across Africa—And we know that this is increasingly essential given the youth bulge.

I only highlighted a few areas, but I look forward to hearing what you all think we should be focusing on or emphasizing in our relations with African countries.

In his December 2018 public remarks, National Security Advisor Bolton identified three core U.S. interests in Africa: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African countries, “countering the threat from Radical Islamic Terrorism and violent conflict,” and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region. My hope is that the witnesses can highlight other areas that we should focus on when we consider US-Africa relations.

I have been disappointed that the administration has not emphasized democracy, good governance, or human rights.

That said, the Administration has maintained most Africa-focused aid initiatives launched by previous Administrations, but in some cases, they have sought to fund them at far lower levels. These include the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Feed the Future (FTF) initiatives, and the Africa-specific Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and Power Africa. PEPFAR was first authorized by Congress during the George W. Bush Administration. FTF, launched by the Obama Administration and broadly backed by Congress under the Global Food Security Act, seeks to improve food access and agricultural development in developing countries. The Obama Administration also launched Power Africa, which seeks to expand electricity access in Africa, and YALI, which aims to foster the development of young African business and civic leaders.

I will conclude by stressing that US relations with Africa has always enjoyed bipartisan support here in Congress and we expect to continue to work together. Each time the administration has sought to reduce funding to State Department or USAID funding especially those that would impact African countries, we have worked together to restore that funding.

I now recognize the Ranking Member for the purpose of making an opening statement.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the witnesses for coming forward today and spending time with us.

I believe I speak for all of us when I say that the importance of U.S. engagement in Africa cannot be overstated. I was pleased to see the Administration recognize this and release a dedicated Africa strategy in December. It's critical for the American people to understand our interest in Africa, and for Africa to see our commitment to the continent. In my opinion, the strategy goes a long way in both respects.

In recent years, policy and debate on Africa has centered on counterterrorism, foreign assistance, conservation, women empowerment, development, good governance, and human rights, among other things. While I am proud of the progress we have made in our counterterrorism efforts, we must continue to be proactive, particularly in the Sahel. As we have seen in the Middle East, left unchecked, extremist organizations have the potential to carry out deadly attacks across the globe and spur tragic humanitarian crises as people flee from harm's way.

The same can be said on development and women empowerment. The BUILD Act and the Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic Empower Act, which were both signed into law last Congress, will have a tremendous impact, but we must do more. Africa continues to grapple with high poverty rates, food insecurity, insufficient healthcare and education systems, and infrastructure deficiencies. Addressing these issues is not only in the best interests of Africans but in the best interests of Americans.

For this reason, I introduced the Digital Global Access Policy Act which promotes expanding internet access in developing countries and, in turn, will help Africa overcome many problems I just mentioned. It is my hope that this committee and the House of Representatives will soon take up this critical legislation.

While many of the previous issues I have highlighted will continue to dominate our efforts in Africa, we must turn our attention toward countering China and Russia as they expand their financial and political influence across the continent. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has secured significant leverage over many African countries, and access to Africa's precious natural resources. China's construction of its first overseas military base in Djibouti is also a cause for concern, given its close proximity to ours.

We see similar interest from Russia, albeit it even more defense-focused.

Checking Chinese and Russian investment and influence in the region, and the rest of the world, is critical to U.S. national security. We cannot write blank checks or discount requirements that come along with U.S. assistance, but we must think critically and innovatively about how we can offer an alternative.

I look forward to what will certainly be a productive and enlightening discussion about our next steps in Africa. Thank you, and I yield back.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. I now want to introduce our witnesses.

First, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield. She joined ASG as a senior counselor after serving as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 2013 to 2017. In this capacity, Am-

bassador Thomas-Greenfield led U.S. policy toward sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on peace and security, democracy and governance, economic empowerment, and investment opportunities.

Prior to this appointment she served as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources where she oversaw all personnel functions for the U.S. Department of State's 70,000-strong work force. Previously, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield served as the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia from 2008 to 2012, and held posts in several other African nations.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is also a distinguished resident fellow in African affairs at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University.

Dr. Coulibaly is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institute. His research focuses on creating economic opportunities and prosperity in sub-Saharan Africa by improving development, finance, local trade, monetary policies, and banking, financial institutions, and markets. His most recent work includes the research papers "Mobilization of Tax Revenues in Africa," "Meeting Africa's Employment Challenges in the Changing World," as well as serving as the editor for the Initiative's Annual Flagship Report, "Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent."

Joshua Meservey is a Senior Fellow Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle East, at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes in African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy. In 2009 he joined Church World Service based out of Nairobi, Kenya, and traveled extensively in East and Southern Africa interviewing refugees. He ended his time at CSW as, as field team manager responsible for a multinational team of nearly 100 staff.

In 2012 he worked at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and helped write an Army concept paper. He is the lead author of a monograph on al-Shabaab's insurgency, and his other work has appeared in many other publications.

I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time. Again, I want to thank you for your patience. Apologize for the delay. And ask you to begin your testimony.

We do not have a clock. I will be keeping track on my trusty iPhone here, and will notify you when 5 minutes are up. I know that you all have written testimony that you have submitted, so within 5 minutes if you could summarize your testimony. And could you begin, Madam Ambassador.

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD,  
SENIOR COUNSELOR, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP,  
FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN  
AFFAIRS**

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much. I will do my best.

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Wright, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on the future of United States policy toward Africa. Allow me to thank all of you for your commitment and service to Africa, and some of you for your support during my tenure as Assistant Secretary from 2013 to 2017.

I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful situation in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of Cyclone Idai which has led to hundreds of deaths, and thousands of displacement, and millions of dollars in destruction. This should be at the forefront of our thinking on Africa today.

2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been a series of long-term trends and recent developments which have put the continent at the forefront like never before. That is why it is crucial that there be sustained and consistent U.S. engagement on the content.

The U.S. has consistently shown great bipartisan leadership on African issues. The bipartisan focus of our government led to the passing of programs as the—as Congresswoman Bass mentioned, such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, YALI, the Millennium Challenge Account, Feed the Future. All of these programs have withstood the tests across, of time across administrations. And these programs are laced with our value system at the core: democracy, good governance, human rights, and prosperity, all of which made the U.S. a major player on the continent of Africa.

The positive bipartisan engagement with Africa continued with the current administration’s BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa initiatives. These initiatives seek to further strengthen trade ties with a still burgeoning Africa market full of opportunities.

The United States brings many resources to the table that other countries do not. The United States hosts a large and vibrant African diaspora community who have made significant contributions to America, both economically and socially. And as we commemorate the 400-year anniversary since the first African arrived to this land in bondage, we must remember the deep historical connections between the U.S. and Africa.

Allow me to touch briefly on a few issues we should address. My full testimony is provided in writing and gives a more fulsome list.

First, Congressman Bass, you mentioned the youth bulge. Africa is facing an unprecedented demographic evolution with half the population under the age of 19. Estimates are that by 2050, the population of the African continent will have doubled from 1.2 billion to 2.—1.2 billion to 2.5 billion, representing a quarter of the world’s population. It is vital that the United States work to help African countries use this growth to foster prosperity.

Security and terrorism, maybe one of the most critical areas of collaboration with African States, involves security. Continued U.S. engagement with African stakeholders to tackle these threats is necessary. The proposed reduction of 10 percent of American troops deployed on the continent sends the wrong message to our partners.

On democracy and democratic transition, the fact that the national security advisory did not mention democracy in his December Africa policy speech did not go unnoticed on the continent. The United States must continue to promote democracy programs across the continent. In the long-term, democracy contributes to better governance, human development, security, and economic growth.

Climate change. It is important that we engage African policy-makers on climate change and adopting environmentally conscious policies. Renewed international commitments to elements of the Paris Climate Change Agreement would benefit Africa's efforts to address some of the environmental changes it now faces.

And while I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to engage on the entire continent, there are some countries that I believe decisionmakers should prioritize.

First, Nigeria. The importance of the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa and its No. 1 economy is self evident. And as President Buhari embarks on his second and final term, the U.S. needs to remain supportive of reforms that will help entrench democratic values.

South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. And as the next administration in South Africa deals with institutional corruption and the tricky waters of land redistribution, the U.S. needs to support the country's transition to let the South African people know we are standing side by side with them.

Ethiopia. Ethiopia is an example of the profound change that African countries can go through quickly with principled leaders at the helm. The United States should ramp up its engagement with the Government of Ethiopia to ensure these reforms continue unhindered, and that they become institutionalized within Ethiopia. The United States should not squander the opportunity to build closer relationships with this vital player.

South Sudan. In South Sudan the U.S. has fallen behind on diplomatic leadership, and I believe we have abdicated responsibility for a State we helped birth. The United States should designate a special envoy to provide U.S. leadership who can work with leaders in the region to break the cycle of continued conflict in South Sudan.

I welcome in DRC the appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in November 2018. It is important following the election that the U.S. continue to engage with the Congolese president.

And I see you are about to grab, so I am going to skip.

But I have mentioned Ghana. And I do mention Tanzania, Sudan, Cameroon that I know in particular that you think is very important.

But finally, let me just say that to achieve our goals in Africa and around the globe we must have sustained, strong diplomatic efforts. The visit, recent visit of Deputy Secretary Sullivan to South Africa and Angola, and Assistant Secretary Nagy to Cameroon, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, highlight the type of engagement that is needed. But they need help from more senior officials in the administration to engage. And I think for this reason it is time for a second Africa Leaders Summit.

And also, we have, we have too many Ambassadorships in Africa that are still vacant. And many of them are in some of these important countries that I mentioned. And in order for us to have successful engagement with the African continent we need to invest in more diplomatic presence on the ground, particularly our Ambassadors.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.



Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Ultimately, the United States should take a more positive, proactive approach to Africa, emphasizing the potential of the continent rather than its risks. It is absolutely in the interests of the United States to see the continent of Africa grow and thrive.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield follows:]

**Testimony of Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield**  
**Senate Foreign Relations Committee**  
**Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy**  
**March 26, 2019**

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on the future of United States policy toward Africa. Allow me to thank you for your commitment and service to Africa and for your support during my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Africa from 2013-2017. I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the dreadful situation in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as a result of Cyclone Idai.

Indeed, 2019 is a critical time for Africa policy. There have been a series of long-term trends and recent developments which have put the continent at the forefront like never before. When looking at today's global challenges, they all have an impact on and are impacted by developments in Africa: migration and refugees, climate change, growing youth

populations, insecurity, and democratic transitions. African countries hold great promise but there are certainly perils that can undermine Africa's potential if many factors are not handled correctly. That is why it is crucial that there be sustained U.S. engagement on the continent.

*Historically Positive Bi-partisan U.S. Policy*

Over the years, the U.S. has shown great bipartisan leadership on African issues. The bipartisan focus of our government led to the passing of programs like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative, which have been crucial in the fight against these two pandemics in Africa. Likewise, the continued renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act has played a major role to further trade and investment with our African counterparts. In an even more exciting way, the Young African Leadership Initiative has seen the U.S. play host to some of Africa's youngest and brightest lights, strengthening our connections to the continent's future leaders and improving U.S. standings yet again in Africa. Power Africa brought to the forefront Africa's need for electricity to energize Africa's lagging economic growth.

The Millennium Challenge Account continues to have a major impact on Africa's infrastructure having invested in over 15 years more than \$8.3 billion dollars in 22 countries.

All of these efforts were laced with our value system at the core. Our belief in democracy, good governance, human rights, and prosperity made the U.S. a major player on the continent of Africa.

*Current U.S. Strategy*

The positive relevance of U.S. engagement with Africa will continue with the current administration's BUILD Act and PROSPER Africa initiative. While I will leave the more in-depth look at our bilateral economic relationship with the continent, to my fellow panelist Dr. Brahim Coulibaly these initiatives are positive as the U.S. seeks to further strengthen trade ties with a still burgeoning African market full of opportunities. According to the World Bank, Africa is forecast to grow at 3.4 percent this year, with Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Côte d'Ivoire expected to lead the continent with growth rates over 7 percent. Political and economic reforms in countries such as Angola are also proving key

to development, as the same World Bank forecast predicts an incredible turnaround from -1.8 percent growth in 2018 to 2.9 percent in 2019. African states are also ever so closer to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, with only one country left to ratify getting to the 22 needed to put the agreement in force with the purpose of boosting intra-Africa trade. Such a boost is also beneficial to our industries as stronger African markets mean more possibilities for business as a growing consumer class takes root on the continent. Overall, the continent continues to move forward by improving its infrastructure, increasing the use of digital technology, upgrading its business and investment climate, and diversifying its economies – all of which present considerable opportunities for our private sector and will contribute to more progress in the future. We simply cannot afford to let the opportunity to work with our African partners slip away.

The current administration correctly identifies that the “*stability, prosperity, independence, and security on the African continent are in the national security interest of the United States.*” While I am encouraged

by this clear recognition, I would steer the policy away from framing Africa as merely a battleground for great power competition against China and Russia. I would argue that it is in our interest to view engagement with the continent as a key and important element in and of itself. Our interest in Africa should be judged on its own intrinsic value and not as a zero-sum race against other powers. We should be focused on building a strong partnership with Africa which is based on shared values of peace, prosperity, sustained economic growth and development, and a firm commitment to good governance, gender equity and the rule of law.

The United States brings many resources to the table that other countries do not, whether within government, in our business community, and our non-profit organizations. Additionally, the United States hosts a large and vibrant African diaspora community, who have been great contributors to America both economically and socially. The African diaspora in the U.S. can also be a key plank of support and a force multiplier for U.S. values on the continent. As we commemorate the 400-year anniversary since

Africans arrived to this land in bondage, we must remember the deep connection between U.S. and Africa.

We, as a nation, are linked to the continent in ways that provide great strength, both domestically and in foreign policy. What the United States does well cannot be matched by competitors. Our values call for ordinary Africans to thrive along with the elites, our industries have more expertise to share with African states, and our genuine wish for partnership, and not subservience, set us apart. There are more opportunities on the continent for collaboration than there are for competition. The United States should be taking a more positive and pro-active approach to Africa, emphasizing the potential of the continent rather than its risks. With that in mind, there are four key trends that I could identify as pivotal to the future of our policy toward the continent.

#### Four Key Trends

##### *Youth Bulge*

As many of you know, Africa is facing an unprecedented demographic evolution. Estimates are that by 2050, the population of the African

continent will have doubled from 1.2 billion to 2.5 billion, representing a quarter of the world's population. In 2050, Africa will have 362 million young people between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. More to the point, today half of that population is under the age of 19. The huge proportion of youth in African populations can either be Africa's golden ticket or its greatest challenges. To punch in that ticket, I believe there is a need to create opportunities for Africa's youth. That means creating jobs. It also means strengthening education systems. It means mentoring and providing opportunity, especially expanding opportunities for girls and women.

It is vital that the United States work to help African countries to use this growth to foster prosperity. If there is not adequate education or jobs to meet demand, then the youth bulge could see an increase in scale in unsafe migration, insecurity, and radicalization.

#### *Security and Terrorism*

Maybe one of the most critical area of collaboration with African states involves security. It is undeniable that the continent has continued to face



serious challenges in that regard, as recently evident by the horrific terrorist attack in Kenya in January this year. However, it is equally unmistakable that Africans are progressively stepping up to the plate and taking seriously their own security needs. The pulling together of the G5 Sahel and the AU's offer to take on a higher share of fiscal responsibility in regional peacekeeping efforts are both positive signs. In the near term, continued U.S. engagement with African stakeholders to tackle these threats is necessary. The U.S. should not only focus on security assistance, but recognize the importance of helping Africa to deal with many of its pressing economic and social challenges as a way to combat and reduce the insecurity and instability that feeds conflict in Africa. The proposed reduction of 10% of American troops deployed on the continent sends the wrong message to our partners. Moreover, the presence of our troops encourages a professional demeanor from security forces with whom they work hand in hand in other African countries. It is also important to devote increased resources to diplomatic engagement, economic development and to reinvest in democracy promotion to highlight

universal values that we share with our African counterparts. Military solutions alone will not stop insecurity and conflict in Africa.

*Democracy and Democratic Transition*

The rising number of youths also has an effect on what should be another American priority: consolidating democracy across the continent. America is about values. We must connect with populations on the continent to continue sharing the values we have in common with African populations. The United States must continue to promote democracy programs across the continent and hold leaders accountable to their increasingly youthful populations. While today, 70 percent of Africa's population is under 30, only 14 percent of the region's politicians are under 40. Democratic leaders make not only for better allies, but also are more likely to see their youth as an opportunity for their country, not a threat to be countered. Too many African countries still struggle with democratic transitions. Leaders need to focus on plans for a peaceful, political handover and stable elections from the minute they come to power. In the long term, democracy contributes to better governance,

human development, security, and economic growth. The vast majority of Africans want to live in a democracy, but the proportion who believe they actually do falls almost every year.

#### *Climate Change*

As mentioned earlier, the fallout of cyclone Idai in southern Africa has shown the importance of engaging African policymakers on climate change and adopting environmentally conscious policies. As forests shrink and deserts grow, populations are ever more vulnerable in the face of increasingly unpredictable weather patterns. In response to Idai, the U.S. offer of assistance to the affected countries in what the UN has categorized as “*one of the worst weather-related disasters ever to hit the southern hemisphere*” is an important statement. Renewed international commitment to elements of the Paris Climate Change Agreement would benefit Africa’s efforts to address some of the environmental challenges it now faces.

While I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to engage on the entire continent, there are some that I believe decision makers should watch.

#### Countries to Watch

##### *Nigeria*

The Nigerian elections showed that states that are looking to consolidate democracy still have a long way to go. While there is widespread consensus that these elections fell short of the high standards set in 2015, the Nigerian people and its leadership still show a strong commitment to democracy. The importance of the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, and its number one economy, is self-evident. Its potential is boundless, with an established human capital, growing consumer class, and burgeoning private sector. Yet the country still struggles with insecurity, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure, among other things. As President Buhari embarks on his second and final term, the U.S. need to remain supportive of reforms that will help entrench democratic values.

##### *South Africa*

South Africa will hold elections in May of this year. These elections will hopefully put the country back on a positive economic path after almost a decade of economic decline. South Africans hope that these polls will help reestablish democratic values, which they fought so hard to achieve during the apartheid regime, as a priority for the country. As the next administration in South Africa deals with institutional corruption and the tricky waters of land redistribution, the U.S. needs to support the country's transition to let the South African people know we are standing side by side with them.

#### *Ethiopia*

Ethiopia is an example of the profound change that African countries can go through quickly with principled leaders at the helm. The U.S. should be very pleased with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's decisions to implement reforms that we had been pushing for decades, including economic liberalization, opening up political space, and making peace within the region. The United States should ramp up its engagement with the government of Ethiopia to ensure these reforms continue unhindered

and that they become institutionalized within Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa is an increasingly important region geopolitically and the United States should not squander the opportunity to build closer relations with the vital player that is Ethiopia.

*South Sudan*

In South Sudan, the U.S. has fallen behind on diplomatic leadership and abdicated responsibility for a state which we helped birth. While Horn of Africa member states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have tried to fill the role, the level of influence that the U.S. brings will be the kind of strong leadership needed to ensure the terms of the recent ceasefires and treaties are followed. As recommended by the International Crisis Group, it is critical for third-party mediation to help work with both sides to solve the intractable issues of reconciling armed groups and drawing internal boundaries if preparations to form a unity government in May 2019 are to succeed. The United States should designate a special envoy to provide U.S. leadership on this issue, an individual who can work with leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and

Sudan to break the cycle of continued conflict in South Sudan, providing peace for the long-suffering people of South Sudan.

*Democratic Republic of Congo*

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the first peaceful transition of power in the country's history remains fragile. This is an important period for Africa's sleeping giant. It remains unclear how much this transition will turn the pages on the DRC's past and show real change. The DRC still faces daunting challenges that must be addressed. I am especially concerned about lingering high levels of corruption, armed conflicts involving numerous militias in the east, and the presence of Ebola in that region of the country as well, which international health workers have had great difficulty to address due to the persistent insecurity. I welcomed the appointment of Dr. Peter Pham as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa in November of 2018 and it is in U.S. interests to engage Congolese leadership. Likewise, we should strengthen our ties to civil society groups working to support meaningful reforms that will help the country overcome its substantial challenges to take its rightful place in the

upper echelon of African countries. Through these engagements, the U.S. should work hand in hand with the Congolese people to make progressive change for the country and the region.

#### *Zimbabwe*

There were high expectations in 2018 when President Mnangagwa was elected President. However, the behavior of the government in cracking down on dissent following the elections, and protests earlier this year, remains a grave concern. Though there has been increased engagement by Zimbabwean leadership with multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, much progress remains for Zimbabwe to prove it is embarking on a new path. There must be continued U.S. engagement with the government of Zimbabwe to show that the transition from the long-time Mugabe regime, recent disputed elections, and protests will ultimately give way to a more democratic and transparent process of governing that will justify removal of sanctions and increased investments.

#### *Ghana*



I would like to speak about Ghana because it is a valuable partner to the United States and in many ways an example of what U.S.-Africa relations are transitioning towards. Ghana is a model for African nations for its long history of resilient democratic institutions and strong rule of law. The new focus of Ghana to be a partner for “trade, not aid” should be welcomed by the United States. U.S. relations with Ghana are an emblem of what the U.S. should hope to have in the future with many African states. As the African middle class continues to grow, African leaders are more interested in economic partnerships rather than subsidiary relationships. To the many states that are developing economically and politically, Ghana shows that democracy and rule of law are vital to long-term prosperity for all nations.

*Three Concerning Mentions*

Others where there have also been concerning developments and are worthy of more scrutiny on our parts include Tanzania, where there has been a surge in anti-democratic policies, Sudan, which is in the midst of growing unrest and uncertainty, and Cameroon, a huge recipient of U.S.

security assistance and partner against Boko Haram where the conflict between the government and separatists is growing increasingly violent.

### Diplomacy

To achieve our goals in Africa and around the globe, we must have sustained and strong diplomatic efforts. The recent visits of Deputy Secretary Sullivan to South Africa and Angola and Assistant Secretary Tibor Nagy to Cameroon, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda are welcome and highlight the type of direct engagement that is needed. However, too many ambassadorships in Africa are still vacant. Postings in South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Chad, Egypt, Libya and Morocco, as well as others are yet to be filled. In fact, in order to have successful engagement with the African continent, we need to invest in more diplomatic presence on the ground, not less. Many of our embassies are still short-staffed and under resourced. Over the past five years, America's spending on core diplomacy has fallen by a third. A third! We should not scale back, but rather push on! Push on to confirm our friendship to the African people, push on to maintain critical ties with

communities who share an affinity for us, push on to support private sector investment and to showcase that American global leadership is truly alive and well.

*Conclusion*

Ultimately, how Africans define their future is up to Africans themselves, but we must partner with them to achieve our mutual goals. It is absolutely in the interests of the United States to see the continent of Africa grow and thrive.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.  
Dr. COULIBALY.

**STATEMENT OF BRAHIMA COULIBALY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, THE  
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Mr. COULIBALY. Thank you, Madam Chair Bass, and Ranking Member Wright. So let me begin by applauding your leadership as well as that of Congressman Smith, and your active role in fostering the bipartisan collaboration that has traditionally characterized the U.S. legislation in Africa.

And my appreciation to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my views on the subject.

This is indeed an opportune time to reassess the future of U.S.-Africa relations because there is an emerging consensus, which I share, that the U.S. is falling behind in Africa. In my view, this is not because U.S. policies toward Africa have failed. In fact, and as was mentioned earlier, U.S. policies and programs such as AGOA, PEPFAR, the Malaria Initiative, Power Africa, YALI, have all been successful in impact overall.

But whether it is because Africa is transforming rapidly and the architecture of our engagements needs to adapt to this dynamism and to the evolving aspirations of the African countries. So, following a period of political and social instability, as well as weak economic growth, Africa's fortunes have begun to turn around the year 2000. Since then, thanks to better domestic policies and favorable global environment, economic growth has been strong, boosting commercial opportunities.

Importantly, Africa is experiencing a demographic boom and rapid urbanization. By the turn of the century, 40 percent of the world's population, and 42 percent of its work force will be African.

And to better respond to the growing needs of the populations, Africa's leadership and institutions are becoming more assertive in the ownership and advancement of the continent's agenda. The unprecedented dynamism on the continent is creating tremendous commercial opportunities in trade and investment, and it is not an exaggeration to say that Africa is on a course to be the world's next big growth market.

Earlier this month the cover page of the Economist magazine read, "The New Scramble for Africa." It was capturing what those following developments on the continent already knew. Commercial opportunities that Africa presents, as well as some of the transnational threats originating from the region are attracting interest from an increasingly diverse group of foreign countries working proactively to strengthen diplomatic, defense, and commercial ties with the continent.

The most active foreign countries are non-traditional partners, and their emergence is challenging the partner of choice status that traditional partners, including the United States, have enjoyed. While diplomatic and the defense ties are broadening and strengthening, shifts in commercial ties have been the most significant.

Between 2010 and 2017, Africa's trade with countries such as Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China, have risen very fast. In contrast, trade with the United States fell by more than

half over this period. And the United States is no longer among Africa's top three trading partners.

Although the United States still has the largest stock of foreign direct investment, this stock has barely increased since 2010, while investment from other countries, particularly China, has increased significantly.

So, in this new scramble for Africa what can the United States do to keep up?

First, I think the U.S. should articulate a clear bipartisan, long-term vision for its U.S.-Africa policy following broad consultation with key stakeholders, including U.S. and Africa businesses but, importantly, the African Union. The vision should align to the extent possible with the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the U.N.'s Agenda 2030 that African countries have adopted.

Given increasing interdependencies between defense, diplomacy, and development, the vision should encompass engagements on all three dimensions but with greater emphasis on the commercial ties with the most potential to yield the most significant mutually beneficial outcomes.

Second, to accelerate the commercial engagement, the United States should appoint a high level White House official with a mandate to work across U.S. agencies to advance U.S. commercial policy.

Third, the U.S. should initiate a regular high level summit between the United States and African States, as the external partners, including China, India, Japan, Turkey, and the European Union, all have held two or more high level summits in recent years which have advanced their engagement with Africa. In contrast, the U.S. has held only one high level summit, and that was in 2014.

While not a panacea, I believe these recommendations will go a long way to provide the needed clarity, predictability, and stability in U.S. engagement with Africa. The presence of other countries on the continent will only strengthen with time. And the United States does have a solid foundation and the legacy in Africa on which to build. However, without more proactive approaches the U.S. is just falling further behind.

Ultimately, the future of U.S.-Africa relations will be determined more by U.S. policy and actions, or lack thereof, toward Africa than by those of other countries toward Africa.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coulibaly follows:]

March 26, 2019

**Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations**

Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations

Dr. Brahim Coulibaly, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Growth Initiative, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

Rayburn House Office Building 2200

Thank you, Chairwoman Bass and Ranking Member Smith, for your leadership with respect to U.S. engagement with Africa. Your active role in fostering the bipartisan cooperation that has historically characterized U.S.-Africa legislation is exemplary. Thank you to the members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on the way forward for U.S.-Africa relations.

I am Dr. Brahim Coulibaly, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution.

This is an opportune time to re-examine the future of U.S.-Africa relations because there is an emerging consensus, which I share, that the U.S. is falling behind in Africa. In my view, this is not because U.S. policies toward Africa have failed, but rather because Africa is transforming rapidly and the architecture of the United States' engagement is not adapting fast enough to this dynamism and to the evolving aspirations of African countries.

**Africa is transforming very fast**

Following a period of political and social instability as well as weak economic growth, Africa's fortunes began to turn around the year 2000. Since then, economic policies and business environments on the continent have, for the most part, improved significantly. Today, institutions are increasingly resilient and good governance is spreading. Most notably, Africa has embraced the digital revolution. For example, the number of mobile phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan Africa increased to 75 per 100 people in 2017 from less than 2 in 2000. The advent of information and telecommunication technology is enabling economic and social inclusion, as well as unleashing innovation and entrepreneurial potential across the continent. These factors—along with a favorable external environment, notably debt relief and higher commodity prices—have contributed to strong

economic growth over the past two decades. In addition, the middle class is expanding and is boosting consumer and business spending, at a rate of almost 4 percent a year.<sup>1</sup>

This momentum is expected to continue alongside sizeable demographic changes. Over the next five years, half of the world's 10 fastest-growing economies will be on the continent, and Africa's middle class will expand from 245 million to 380 million people over the next decade.<sup>2</sup> The youth bulge will have even more significant consequences: Over the next three decades, the youth population will increase by over 500 million—more than offsetting the declines in youth populations outside of Africa—and doubling the region's overall population by 2050.<sup>3</sup> Urbanization has also been very rapid: The number of cities with 5 million or more inhabitants will triple to 17 over the next 10 years.<sup>4</sup> This rapid population growth and urbanization is increasing demand for goods and services, as well as for infrastructure in various sectors such as housing, health, transport, and power. Africa's infrastructure financing needs are sizeable ranging from \$130 billion to \$170 billion per year, about two-thirds of which is currently unfunded.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, to better respond to the growing needs and demands of the populations, Africa's leadership and institutions are becoming more assertive in the ownership and advancement of the continent's agenda. The region's countries, through the African Union, adopted a common long-term plan—known as Agenda 2063—that outlines their economic and social vision and aspirations over the next several decades. Chief among its priorities is the need for greater integration of the region's markets and populations. Under the leadership of the African Union, regional integration is advancing, specifically through policies in support of the free movement of Africans across the continent and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA, now one year old, aims to create a single African market of over 1 billion consumers for goods and services. This unprecedented dynamism is creating tremendous commercial opportunities in trade and investment, and it is not an exaggeration to say that Africa is on course to be the world's next big growth market.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lions on the move II: Realizing the Potential of Africa's Economies, 2016. McKinsey Global Institute.

<sup>2</sup> Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2019, 2019. The Brookings Institution.

<sup>3</sup> Based on United Nations World Population Prospects 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Leke, Acha, Mutsa Chironga, and Georges Desvaux. 2018. "Africa's Business Revolution: How to Succeed in the World's next Big Growth Market." Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.

<sup>5</sup> African Economic Outlook, 2018. African Development Bank Group.

<sup>6</sup> Leke Acha and Landry Signé. 2019. "Spotlighting opportunities for business in Africa and strategies to succeed in the world's next big growth market." Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2019, Africa Growth Initiative, The Brookings Institution.

How much of Africa's potential is realized depends on its success in addressing lingering and future challenges. Parts of Africa continue to struggle with the effects of climate change, extreme poverty, state fragility, and insecurity. Democracy is consolidating, although tensions and, in some countries, violence around elections point to areas for improvement. Despite progress on governance, more efforts are needed to eradicate corruption and elevate the voice of women and young people in decision-making. The demographic tidal wave looms closer, and job creation has not yet been able to catch up, contributing to emigration.

#### **Why Africa matters for the United States and the rest of the world**

Of the challenges outlined, the demographic boom is the most consequential. By the turn of this century, Africa will be home to 40 percent of the world's population, or 4.4 billion people, according to United Nations population projections. That is more than double the populations of Europe, North America, Oceania, and Latin America and the Caribbean combined. At the same time, populations are aging elsewhere, notably in advanced economies and several Asian countries. As a result, 42 percent of the global working-age population will be in Africa, providing a large offset to this elderly bulge. This is a great opportunity for Africa and the global economy if this large labor force is equipped with the necessary skills for the jobs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and beyond. As healthy and productive members of the global economy, this workforce will significantly expand global economic opportunities; the African middle class will expand exponentially and create tremendous market opportunities for the benefit of all.

If, on the other hand, Africa does not overcome its development challenges, does not impart its young people with the education and skills of the future, and does not create enough good quality jobs for its young people, then the youth bulge, which should be a global economic asset, could become a global liability. We could experience mass unemployment among millions of desperate young people, leading to widespread social and political instability the likes of which we have not seen before. Migration challenges will rise multifold, as will insecurity, given the prevalence of state fragility in parts of Africa. Terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, among others, will exploit this instability. Given that terrorism is global and increasingly sophisticated, no country will be immune from the consequences of a significantly deteriorated security situation in Africa.



Although the scenarios I have laid out assess the situation by the turn of the century, which may seem very far away, action is needed now. The actions we take or do not take over the next few years will determine which of the two scenarios materialize, and the problems or opportunities associated with each scenario will play out long before the end of the century. In the end, U.S. engagement with Africa is not good just for Africa, but for the U.S. too. As the first World Bank president, Eugene Meyer, put it, “Prosperity, like peace, must therefore be viewed as indivisible. And even from the narrowest considerations of self-interest, each of us must be concerned with the economic development of the world as a whole. For we shall prosper individually only as we prosper collectively.”

#### **Unprecedented foreign engagement in Africa is shifting ties**

The opportunities that Africa presents and, to some extent, the transnational threats originating from the region have generated unprecedented interest from an increasingly diverse group of global partners looking to proactively strengthen diplomatic, defense, and commercial ties with the continent.

In this “new scramble for Africa,” as [\*The Economist\*](#) labelled it, more than 300 new foreign embassies opened in Africa between 2010 and 2016, the largest embassy-building boom ever, led by nontraditional actors.<sup>7</sup> For example, Turkey opened the highest number of embassies, followed by Qatar and India. Commercial ties with Africa are also shifting. Between 2010 and 2017, Africa’s trade has risen particularly fast with Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Indonesia, and China. Meanwhile, trade with Japan and several European countries declined, and trade with the United States more than halved. In 2000, the U.S., France, and Italy were Africa’s top three trading partners, in that order. In 2017, the top three trading partners were China, India, and France. The U.S. still has the largest amount of foreign direct investment in Africa as of 2016, but that U.S. investment has barely increased since 2010. By contrast, investment from some other countries has increased significantly, with that of China rising twofold over this period. Along with increased diplomatic and commercial engagement, defense ties with nontraditional actors have also deepened and more countries now possess outposts in Africa.

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<sup>7</sup> The New Scramble for Africa, 2019. *The Economist*

#### **U.S. policies and programs toward Africa have been impactful**

Past U.S. policies and programs toward Africa, which have benefited from bipartisan support in Congress, have been positive and impactful overall. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has boosted trade between the U.S. and Africa, and created thousands of jobs in Africa as well as in the United States. The U.S. trade and investment hubs in Africa are facilitating intraregional as well as U.S.-Africa trade. The President's Malaria Initiative has benefited almost 500 million people and caused a significant decline in malaria cases, and the President's Program for Emergency AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has helped contain the scourge of HIV/AIDS. Feed the Future boosted crop yields and has saved 5.2 million from hunger. Meanwhile, through Power Africa, more than 12 million homes and businesses have gained electricity connections since 2014, and the program is on track to reach the goal of 60 million connections in 2030. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is also providing tailored, country-specific support for economic growth and poverty reduction. The Young African Leaders Initiative (known as YALI), has trained about 4,000 of the next generation of African leaders, and created a vast network among them across almost 50 countries. YALI anticipates the rise of African youth and facilitates ties among these future leaders and with the United States. In this way, Congress and the administration should continue to support cultural and educational exchange for Africa's youth as well as for young Americans to enhance their understanding of the continent. Each summer, we have been privileged to host at Brookings a cohort of the fellows. My colleagues and I have been impressed by their energy, creativity, and commitment to the greater cause of the continent.

#### **The need to refine the framework for U.S.-Africa cooperation to keep up in Africa**

While past U.S. policies toward Africa have been impactful, the architecture of the U.S. engagement requires modifications to keep up with the dynamism on the continent and the aspirations of the African people. In this regard, I would submit the following as priority areas for action and as guiding principles for an enhanced U.S.-Africa cooperation.

First, the United States should **articulate a clear, comprehensive bipartisan long-term vision for its U.S.-Africa policy** following broad consultations with key stakeholders, including U.S. and African businesses, and the African Union. Given the interdependencies between defense, diplomacy, and development, the vision should flexibly balance engagement on all three dimensions, but with a greater emphasis on the commercial ties with the potential to yield the most mutually beneficial outcomes. The BUILD Act and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

that will soon replace the Overseas Private Investment Corporation have the scope to significantly transform U.S.-Africa relations, and are an important step in this direction.

Given the expertise of U.S. companies in infrastructure development and the critical role of infrastructure in Africa's development, I see this sector as a key priority area in U.S.-Africa relations. As noted earlier, Africa has very large infrastructure financing needs of \$130 billion-\$170 billion a year, two-thirds of which is currently unfunded. The economic benefits to Africa from improved infrastructure are substantial—up to 2 percentage points in income per capita growth.<sup>8</sup> The empowerment of young people and women is another important area for the future of Africa, and hence U.S.-Africa relations, and should be considered among the priority areas for engagement.

To ensure that this vision is in accordance with Africa's aspirations, it should align, to the extent possible, with the Africa Union's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations' Agenda 2030, which encompasses the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that African countries adopted. China and the European Union have already taken these steps. At the same time, indications suggest that the U.S.'s current bilateral, country-by-country approach does not reflect the preferences of the continent for a regional approach, consistent with the AfCFTA. In the planning for the Post-AGOA U.S. trade policies with Africa, it would be important to consider the regional approach.

Second, the U.S. will benefit from **leveraging USAID's regional trade and investment hubs** more to strengthen U.S. commercial engagement on the continent, and from a **high-level White House coordinator for U.S. commercial policy** in Africa. Currently, USAID has regional trade and investment hubs in three countries—Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa—with an objective to “deepen regional economic integration,” “promote two-way trade with the U.S. under AGOA,” and “attract investment that drives commercial expansion within the region and to global markets.” Compared to some other external partners, U.S. companies often lack an understanding of the African business environment, which is a barrier to entry. The mandate of the trade and investment hubs could be broadened to include collection of timely information on investment opportunities on the continent, guidance for U.S. businesses looking to expand their activities on the continent, and assistance in identifying various risk mitigation and financing instruments available across U.S. agencies or elsewhere. A high-level White House appointee on U.S.-Africa commercial activities

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<sup>8</sup> African Economic Outlook, 2018. African Development Bank

would supervise and operationalize the recommendations of the President's Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa, coordinate U.S. commercial activities in Africa across U.S. agencies, and help resolve problems, such as possible unfair competition, faced by U.S. companies doing business in Africa.

Third, as part of the operational framework of the U.S.-Africa relations, a **regular high-level summit between the United States and African heads of states** will consolidate U.S.-Africa cooperation and improve the narrative on Africa's importance to the United States. The venue can alternate between the U.S. and Africa. The high-level summit will go a long way in fostering U.S.-Africa cooperation as we have outlined in *Foresight Africa 2019*, Brookings' annual publication on Africa. Frequently mistaken for a little more than photo opportunities, these summits actually foster regular interactions between governments, businesses, civil society, and other interested parties at various levels. Summits also signal clear policy priorities of participating governments and, as a result, are important vehicles for advancing national interests. Other external partners, including China, India, Japan, Turkey, and the European Union, have all held two or more high-level summits as part of their engagement with Africa in recent years.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, over the course of six Africa-EU summits, European and African leaders have addressed a number of issues including trade, migration, peace and security, and technological innovation. The most recent summit, held in November 2017 in Côte d'Ivoire, yielded substantive results, including plans for the creation of a continent-to-continent free trade agreement between the EU and Africa.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, since 2006, there have been five Forums for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in which virtually every African head of state has participated. Over this time, China has become Africa's largest trading partner and, at each of the past two summits, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged \$60 billion in financing.

In contrast to the EU and China, the U.S. has held only one high-level summit, in 2014, when former President Barack Obama hosted leaders from 50 African states. It was a resounding success, resulting in \$14 billion worth of commitments from U.S. companies to invest in Africa and

<sup>9</sup> Schneidman, Witney (2019): "Is the US Keeping pace in Africa?" *Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2019*, Africa Growth Initiative, The Brookings Institution.

<sup>10</sup> Other key outcomes of the summit included: the development by the EU of a trade strategy that gives European companies and products preferential access to the region's market and on the priority issue of immigration, the European Commission will soon build a \$5.8 million facility to improve the relationship between African diaspora organizations and their country of origin.

underscoring the potential of summits to boost U.S. commercial ties with Africa. More regular lower-level consultations would supplement the high-level summits to ensure effective implementation of the resulting agreements and to address challenges that arise.

In closing, while not a panacea, I believe that the recommendations outlined in this testimony will go a long way to provide needed clarity, predictability, and stability in the United States' engagement with Africa. They will underscore the importance of Africa for the U.S. and help to fast-track future administrations' strategies toward Africa. U.S. administrations do not generally unveil an Africa strategy until well into their first terms, and there are often delays in filling key personnel positions for Africa. This vacuum and uncertainty make U.S. policy appear passive, leaving the impression that Africa is not a priority. The attention Africa has been receiving from other external partners will only increase with time. I believe that the U.S. has a solid foundation and a strong legacy in Africa, through the success of its past programs and actions on the continent, on which to build. Without more proactive approaches, however, the U.S. risks falling further behind on this vastly important and strategic continent. Ultimately, the future of U.S.-Africa relations will be determined more by U.S. policies and actions (or lack thereof) toward Africa, than those of other countries toward Africa.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

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Ms. BASS. Thank you very much.

**STATEMENT OF JOSHUA MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY  
ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

Mr. MESERVEY. Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Members Wright, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. Thank you as well for your continued focus on and championing of deeper U.S.-Africa ties. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

In my remarks I will focus on what I consider to be the four most important U.S. strategic priorities in Africa.

First, the U.S. must retain sufficient influence and positioning to protect its national interests on the continent. This is an evergreen challenge that has grown more urgent given the rising great and middle power competition in Africa.

As is often commented upon, Djibouti is a good example of this problem. Its port is critical to U.S. military operations in East Africa, yet the Chinese government has built such influence there that there is concern the U.S. will be unable to maintain the necessary level of access.

The U.S. is already far behind in the competition to develop and deploy 5G mobile network technology in Africa. The winner of this competition will gain great economic and other advantages. Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have built most of the existing telecoms infrastructure in Africa, and several large African telecom companies are already negotiating with Huawei on building 5G networks.

Huawei's and ZTE's dominance in Africa is also an obvious counterintelligence problem for the United States. Relatedly, Chinese companies have built, or renovated, or Beijing has financed at least 63 sensitive government buildings in at least 29 African countries. We should assume most, if not all, of those buildings are bugged or otherwise compromised, as was the Chinese-built African Union headquarters.

Second, the U.S. should facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even footing in Africa. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies will be growing by 5 percent or more per year and the continent will likely constitute a \$3 trillion economy. It will harm the U.S. and ordinary Africans if anti-competitive behavior becomes the norm and further disadvantages U.S. firms.

Third, the U.S. should encourage the growth of African democracy. It is the political system that best promotes human flourishing. And shared democratic values facilitate mutually beneficial relationships between the U.S. and other countries. After years of progress on the continent in this regard there has been worrisome backsliding in a number of countries.

Finally, the U.S. must ensure terrorists cannot use Africa as a staging ground for attacks against the U.S. There have been gains against some of the continent's worst groups, but we are also in the midst of a resurgence of terrorist activity in the Sahel region. The Islamic State West Africa Province and Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen have been particularly active and ambitious.

A long-term component of the terrorism problem is the spread of the Wahhabist practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi Arabia in particular has proselytized this fundamentalist practice, important components of which most current Islamist terrorist groups subscribe to.

Responding in a constructive way to the problems and prospects of Africa requires a thoughtful, committed approach. In that spirit, I think the U.S. should do the following, and this is not a comprehensive list:

Assess with which governments it can reasonably expect to have a mutually beneficial partnership. Good candidates should receive a full suite of U.S. engagement, while poor candidates should be more economy-of-force operations.

Assist African countries to become more business friendly; foster African entrepreneurs; aid African countries to get the best possible deals from Chinese investments; task U.S. embassies with identifying and facilitating commercial opportunity for U.S. companies, foster good governance in Africa by assisting civil society, fighting corruption, and deepening cooperation with non-African allies active on the continent; create a strategic messaging plan that explains to African countries the benefits of partnering with the United States; make the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a routine event; and ensure that the new International Development Finance Corporation achieves its stated purpose of supporting the U.S. in its strategic competition with China.

The U.S. already has a strong foundation of African engagement of which it should be proud. But it also can and should do more. I thank the committee again for doing its part to ensure that U.S. policies protect American interests and contribute to a safe, prosperous, and free Africa.

I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]





## CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

### Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations

Testimony before the  
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and  
International Organizations  
House Foreign Affairs Committee  
United States House of Representatives

March 26, 2019

Joshua Meservey  
Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle East  
The Heritage Foundation

Chairwoman Bass, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you. With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony into the record.

The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

#### U.S. Strategic Priorities in Africa

In this testimony, I will focus on what I consider to be the four most important U.S. strategic priorities in Africa that should guide American engagement with the continent.

#### First, the U.S. must retain sufficient influence and positioning on the continent

<sup>1</sup> General Thomas D. Waldhauser, "Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Africa Command," testimony before the Senate Committee

to protect its national interests there. This is an evergreen challenge that has grown more urgent given the rising great and middle power competition in Africa. Many countries are rapidly expanding their engagement on the continent—the U.S. should welcome that development in the case of its allies, but for aggressive American competitors such as China and Russia, it is a challenge.

One example of this problem is the port in Djibouti. Ninety percent of the equipment the U.S. military uses to conduct its operations in East Africa flow through Djibouti.<sup>1</sup> Chinese companies now operate three of the five terminals in Djibouti port, whereas in early 2017 they did not operate

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 7, 2019, [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser\\_02-07-19.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_02-07-19.pdf).

## CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

any.<sup>2</sup> Losing influence and leverage in a place like Djibouti and other strategic locations across the continent will negatively affect U.S. national interests.

Another concern for the U.S. in this vein is the competition, of which Africa is a part, to develop and deploy 5G mobile network technology. Whichever country dominates the provision of 5G infrastructure will likely gain great economic benefit and a headstart on developing other future, critical technologies.

China has an immense lead in Africa. Two of its national champion companies, Huawei and ZTE, have built more than 50 3G networks in 36 African countries.<sup>3</sup> Huawei

alone has built around 70 percent of Africa's 4G networks.<sup>4</sup> A number of large African telecom companies are already negotiating with Huawei on building 5G networks.<sup>5</sup>

Huawei and ZTE's dominance of the African telecommunications infrastructure also presents a significant counterintelligence problem for the U.S. Both companies have numerous links to the Chinese state.<sup>6</sup> Huawei also built the ICT infrastructure inside the Chinese-built African Union headquarters that uploaded the contents of its servers every morning to mainland China,<sup>7</sup> and China's 2017 National Intelligence Law obligates individuals and

<sup>2</sup> Chinese companies have recently built two of those terminals—the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and the terminal servicing the Chinese military base there, both opened in 2017—and China Merchants Port, a Chinese state-owned company, owns a stake in the Doraleh Container terminal and recently began running its daily operations. For a report on China Merchants Port running daily operations at the Doraleh Container terminal, see Costas Paris, "China Tightens Grip on East African Port," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 21, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port-11550746800>.

<sup>3</sup> "African Countries Close Cooperation with China Huawei," translated, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, December 26, 2018, <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201812/20181202820364.shtml>.

<sup>4</sup> Amy Mackinnon, "For Africa, Chinese-Built Internet Is Better Than No Internet at All," *Foreign Policy*, March 19, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africa-chinese-built-internet-is-better-than-no-internet-at-all/>.

<sup>5</sup> "African Countries Close Cooperation with China Huawei."

<sup>6</sup> Huawei and ZTE are supposedly private, but have so many links to the Chinese government that the distinction is likely meaningless. Huawei's founder was once the director of the People's Liberation Army's Information Engineering Academy, in which capacity he had contact with a PLA unit dedicated to cyber espionage. In U.S. court filings, ZTE exercised

the "State Secrets Privilege," a tacit admission, the plaintiff argued, that ZTE is part of the Chinese government. Both companies have received significant government subsidies and other forms of help, such as Chinese banks financing many of their projects in Africa. For Huawei's founder's links to the PLA, see Elsa Kania, "Much Ado about Huawei (Part 1)," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 27, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawei-part-1/>. For ZTE asserting the "State Secrets Privilege," see Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, Request for Additional Time for Discovery, and Opposition to Confirmation of Arbitration Award, *Universal Telephone Exchange, Inc., vs. ZTE Corporation and ZTE USA, Inc.*, No. DC-10-07052 (44<sup>th</sup> Judicial Dist. Ct. Dallas County, TX), [https://courtsportal.dallascounty.org/DALLASPROD/DocumentViewer/Embedded/3AuGlai3SrO6C3ZROtqiZnufl3EWn98jvm0sxCmznzg9FZCcjaHw120CGQWdtPBh20djoc7n4k0vTOb-0bGnClkUf2i\\_HNMtqM5AW7VNa11?p=0](https://courtsportal.dallascounty.org/DALLASPROD/DocumentViewer/Embedded/3AuGlai3SrO6C3ZROtqiZnufl3EWn98jvm0sxCmznzg9FZCcjaHw120CGQWdtPBh20djoc7n4k0vTOb-0bGnClkUf2i_HNMtqM5AW7VNa11?p=0). For reports of the subsidies and financing, see "A Transactional Risk Profile of Huawei," RWR Advisory Group, February 13, 2018, <https://www.rwradvisory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RWR-Huawei-Risk-Report-2-13-2018.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Danielle Cave, "The African Union Headquarters Hack and Australia's 5G Network," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 13, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-african-union-headquarters-hack-and-australias-5g-network/>.

companies to help China's national intelligence work.<sup>8</sup>

Another perhaps underappreciated problem for the U.S. is that Chinese companies have built or renovated, or Beijing has financed, at least 63 sensitive government buildings in at least 29 African countries.<sup>9</sup> Beijing is the world leader in economic espionage; all Chinese companies, state-owned or private, are obliged to obey the Chinese Communist Party; and Beijing has already shown it will use its access to an important African building to bug it and compromise its ICT systems. U.S. officials should assume the many Chinese-built government buildings in Africa are compromised, and avoid divulging sensitive information inside the buildings or on their ICT systems.

Second, the U.S. should facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even footing in Africa. If unfair economic norms that reward anti-competitive behavior

develop, U.S. companies will be at a disadvantage, and ordinary Africans will not reap as much economic benefit as they should. The U.S. will suffer too, as prosperous American companies strengthen U.S. economic might and contribute to American soft power.

In fact, American companies have already lost some business in Africa because of rivals' anti-competitive behavior,<sup>10</sup> and the future opportunities on the continent are so significant that it is a matter of national importance that American companies have a fair chance there. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies will be growing by 5 percent or more per year, and the continent will likely constitute a \$3 trillion economy.<sup>11</sup> The African Development Bank predicts that consumer spending in Africa will grow to \$1.4 trillion by 2020.<sup>12</sup> Between 2015 and 2040, about 30 percent of the world's increase in energy demand will be in Africa,<sup>13</sup> while experts forecast the continent's mobile internet connections will double between 2017 and 2022.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Elsa Kania, "Much Ado about Huawei (Part 2)," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 28, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawei-part-2/>.

<sup>9</sup> Author derived numbers from a variety of sources. "Sensitive government buildings" include, for example, presidential offices, various ministry buildings, parliaments, regional council offices, and auditor-general offices. The number cited does not include the African Union headquarters or the yet-to-be-built ECOWAS headquarters, which Beijing has agreed to fund and which a Chinese company will likely build.

<sup>10</sup> Joshua Meservey, "Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines Beijing's Rhetoric About Friendship with the Continent," The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4895, August 8, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/chinese-corruption-africa-undermines-beijings-rhetoric-about-friendship-the-and-nick-mckenzie-and-angus-grigg>. "China's ZTE was Built to Spy and Bribe, Court Documents Allege," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, May 31, 2018, <https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/chi>

na-s-zte-was-built-to-spy-and-bribe-court-documents-allege-20180531-p4ziqd.html.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Lalor, et al., "Connectivity Redefined," EY's Attractiveness Program Africa, May 2017, [http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/eyafrika-attractiveness-report/\\$FILE/ey-africaattractiveness-report.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/eyafrika-attractiveness-report/$FILE/ey-africaattractiveness-report.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> "Future of Africa's Youth Does Not Lie in Migration to Europe, Adesina Tells G7," African Development Bank Group, May, 29, 2017, <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/future-of-africas-youth-does-not-lie-in-migration-to-europe-adesina-tells-g7-17056/>.

<sup>13</sup> "2017 Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040," ExxonMobil, n.d., <http://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~media/global/files/outlook-for-energy/2017/2017-outlook-for-energy.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Tiisetso Motsoeneng, "Africa Set to Top 1 Billion Mobile Internet Connections in Five Years: Study," *Reuters*, November 6, 2017, <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1D61SV-0ZATP>.

Third, the U.S. should encourage the growth of African democracy. The U.S. has recognized for decades the importance of promoting the global growth of democracy. It is the political system that best promotes human flourishing, and shared democratic values facilitate mutually beneficial relationships between the U.S. and other countries.

The progress in Africa on this front is mixed. In 1991, there were only four African electoral democracies, but that number rose to 20 by 2014.<sup>15</sup> However, in recent years democratic backsliding has beset some countries, with repressive laws designed to muzzle civil society and internet shutdowns by the authorities becoming more common.

The pressure on African democracies is likely to continue in the coming years, not least because of China's influence across the continent. The Chinese Communist Party disdains democracy, viewing it as a threat to its own authoritarian model and as a chaotic and inefficient system.<sup>16</sup> Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing is more aggressively seeking to persuade African rulers and thought leaders to embrace its own repressive governance model and eschew democracy.<sup>17</sup> We are likely already seeing the effects of

China's efforts in the recent undemocratic trends in some countries.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, the U.S. must ensure terrorists cannot use the continent as a staging ground for attacks on U.S. soil or its overseas interests. One of the lessons of the 9/11 terror attacks was that a terrorist safe haven even thousands of miles away can threaten the U.S. homeland. Unfortunately, the conditions in a number of African countries make them susceptible to use as safe havens. According to the 2018 Fragile States Index, four of the world's six most-unstable states are African. The best-ranked African country is the small island nation of Seychelles, which was the only African country in the "stable" category.<sup>19</sup> The prevalence of impoverished and poorly governed states contributes to this unfortunate reality.

Despite some of the continent's most prominent terror groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and ISIS in Libya suffering setbacks in recent years, the terror threat on the continent remains potent. According to the 2018 Global Terrorism Index, 12 of the world's 23 countries most affected by terrorism were in Africa.<sup>20</sup> The African Center for Strategic

<sup>15</sup> "Tracking Africa's Progress in Figures," African Development Bank Group, 2014, [https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Tracking\\_Africa%E2%80%99s\\_Progress\\_in\\_Figures.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Tracking_Africa%E2%80%99s_Progress_in_Figures.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Liza Tobin, "Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies," *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, November 2018, <https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/>.

<sup>17</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, "Competing with China," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (June–July 2018), pp. 7–64, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-junejuly->

2018/603-02-friedberg, and Denis M. Tull, "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 459–479, <http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Tull.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Adrian Shahbaz, "Fake News, Data Collection, and the Challenge to Democracy," *Freedom on the Net 2018*, Freedom House, n.d., <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism>.

<sup>19</sup> *2018 Fragile States Index*, Fund For Peace, n.d., <http://fundforpeace.org/global/2018/04/24/fragile-states-index-2018-annual-report/>.

<sup>20</sup> *Global Terrorism Index 2018*, Institute for Economics & Peace, n.d., <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf>

Studies counts 27 discrete terror groups on the continent operating primarily in 11 countries.<sup>21</sup>

The resurgence of Islamist terror groups in the Sahel region is particularly worrisome. The collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011 poured weapons and trained fighters into particularly northern Mali, contributing to the surge in the capabilities of Sahelian armed groups. Reports of violent acts by Islamist terror groups in the Sahel have doubled every year since 2016, as have reports of fatalities linked to the violence.<sup>22</sup>

Two groups merit particular attention. The Islamic State West Africa Province conquered hundreds of square miles in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger at the beginning of this year alone, overwhelmed a dozen military bases, and has an estimated 3,500 fighters.<sup>23</sup> Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen is an alliance of four terror groups that formed in 2017, and was responsible for about half of all the terrorist-related violence in the Sahel in 2018.<sup>24</sup>

A long-term component of the terrorist problem is the spread of the Wahhabist practice of Islam in Africa. Saudi Arabia in particular has proselytized across the world this fundamentalist practice of Islam<sup>25</sup> to which most current Islamist terrorist groups subscribe.<sup>26</sup> In many part of Africa, Wahhabism has pushed back Sufism, the syncretic and generally tolerant practice of Islam traditional to much of the continent, and has supplanted it entirely as the dominant practice in East Africa.<sup>27</sup> While only a small minority of Wahhabists ever radicalize to Islamist violence, Wahhabism's spread has broadened the pool of people who share many theological tenets with Islamist terrorists.<sup>28</sup>

Saudi Arabia and other governments such as Qatar and Kuwait that financed terrorist organizations or Wahhabist proselytization, or whose citizens did so, appear to have decreased or largely stopped those activities. However, the challenge of the spread of Wahhabism in Africa remains, and any U.S. strategy towards the continent should address it.

<sup>21</sup> "More Activity but Fewer Fatalities Linked to African Militant Islamist Groups in 2017," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 26, 2018, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/activity-fewer-fatalities-linked-african-militant-islamist-groups-2017/>.

<sup>22</sup> "The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 15, 2019, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/>.

<sup>23</sup> Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw, "Islamic State, Seeking Next Chapter, Makes Inroads Through West Africa," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-seeking-next-chapter-makes-inroads-through-west-africa-11549220824>.

<sup>24</sup> "The Complex and Growing Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel."

<sup>25</sup> Andrew L. Peek, "The Roots of Lone Wolf Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, January 12, 2016,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-01-12/roots-lone-wolf-terrorism>

<sup>26</sup> For an explanation of the (minor) differences between Wahhabism and Salafism, another term analysts frequently use to describe the ideology of most current Islamist terrorist groups, see Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 247

<sup>27</sup> Abdisaid M. Ali, "Islamist Extremism in East Africa," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 9, 2016, <http://africacenter.org/publication/islamist-extremism-east-africa/>.

<sup>28</sup> "Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation," International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 85, January 25, 2012, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.pdf> and Mark Woodward, "Turning Up the Heat on Wahhabi Colonialism," Arizona State University, September 2, 2009, <http://csc.asu.edu/2009/09/02/turning-up-the-heat-on-wahhabi-colonialism/>.

### The Stakes

Africa will only increase in significance in the coming decades. In addition to its economic importance mentioned earlier, the continent touches three of the world's eight maritime chokepoints, abuts Europe and Asia, and has thousands of miles of Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastline. In 2014, the continent also had the largest or second-largest known reserves of ten important mineral resources.<sup>29</sup> Included in Africa's share of the world's reserves are 22 of the 33 mineral commodities the U.S. deems critical to its economy and national defense, and for which the U.S. is more than 50 percent import reliant.<sup>30</sup>

African countries are diplomatically important as well, comprising the largest geographical voting bloc in many international fora. Africa is also the world's fastest growing, and youngest, continent. Its population is projected to double by 2050 and quadruple by 2100, which would mean one-third of the world's population would be African.<sup>31</sup> The only sure prediction surrounding this trend is that it will have a profound impact on the world, one policymakers need to be planning for now.

For these and other reasons, powers such as China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India, and many others are jockeying for influence on the continent. Seven different countries, including the U.S., have military bases in the Horn of Africa. Some of these countries are American competitors, and the U.S. needs a strategic and energetic approach to successfully manage the challenges they bring.

### The Way Ahead

Late last year, National Security Advisor John Bolton unveiled the Trump administration's Africa strategy. Strategies focus on "big-picture" ideas and guiding principles, so it is unsurprising the administration's Africa strategy lacked detail in some areas. We will have to wait for more specifics on some of the promised new programs before we can fully assess the strategy.

For now, however, I believe the strategy got the "big-picture" themes correct. It acknowledged the paramount challenge of powerful and increasingly expeditionary geopolitical competitors such as China and Russia, but did not abandon counterterrorism altogether. Trade and investment is, happily, a central

<sup>29</sup> 2014 *Minerals Yearbook: Africa*, U.S. Geological Survey of the U.S. Department of Interior, December 2017, <https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2014/myb3-sum-2014-africa.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> The U.S. currently imports at least some of its supply of 15 of those 22 critical mineral commodities from China and/or Russia. China dominates the global supply chain for cobalt—necessary for making lithium-ion batteries which may be critical to powering self-driving cars, a potentially massive industry in the near future—50 percent of which is produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For the statistics on cobalt, see Scott Patterson and Russell Gold, "There's a Global Race to Control Batteries—and China Is Winning," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 11, 2018,

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-a-global-race-to-control-batteries-and-china-is-winning-1518374815?mod=e2tw>. The 22 critical mineral commodities found in Africa are Aluminum, Antimony, Arsenic, Barite, Cesium, Chromium, Cobalt, Fluorspar, Graphite, Lithium, Manganese, Niobium, Platinum-Group Metals, Rare Earths, Rubidium, Tantalum, Tin, Titanium Mineral Concentrate, Tungsten, Uranium, Vanadium, and Zirconium. Variety of sources compiled by author.

<sup>31</sup> Gilles Pison, "There's a Strong Chance that One-Third of All People will be African by 2100," *The Conversation*, October 10, 2017, <http://theconversation.com/theres-a-strong-chance-that-one-third-of-all-people-will-be-african-by-2100-84576>.

component—having as many of the U.S.'s world-class companies operate on the continent as possible will create jobs in the U.S. and Africa, give African governments value for their money, and create deeper and more equitable partnerships with African countries.

The details of the strategy's "Prosper Africa" initiative will be key, as it appears designed to translate the strategy's vision for a trade and investment-centric approach to Africa into reality. Indications are that the administration is serious about the effort and is approaching it in a thoughtful way, but we will have to wait for the final details to emerge to know how effective it can be.

The strategy is an important development for U.S.-Africa relations, but all branches of government, the business community, the African diaspora in the U.S., and civil society have an important role to play in making U.S. engagement with Africa as effective as possible.

A smart approach to Africa requires the U.S. to stretch its limited resources farther. The U.S. should assess with which governments it can reasonably expect to have a positive, mutually beneficial, and strategic partnership. Considerations should include whether a government has a demonstrated desire and capacity to meaningfully improve its governance, and whether the country is strategically important enough to merit special engagement. That calculation should hinge on the country's geostrategic positioning, endowment of natural resources, economic potential, population size, and the presence of competitors, allies, and other relevant challenges.

Countries that are good candidates for a strategic partnership should receive the full suite of U.S. engagements, such as: consideration for a free-trade agreement, if

practicable; fully staffed U.S. embassies, including with a commercial attache; U.S. government-facilitated visits by U.S. business delegations; high-level U.S. official visits and interventions on behalf of U.S. companies; and mobilization of that country's U.S. diaspora to invest and engage in other constructive ways.

There are additional ways the U.S. can help African countries boost their economic growth that will also benefit the U.S. Ideas include:

- Helping U.S. businesses identify local African partners, often a critical component for success;
- Facilitating linkages between African countries and U.S. state governments, which best understand their local companies and the opportunities they might enjoy in Africa;
- Fostering African entrepreneurs by facilitating exchanges or internships with them and U.S. tech companies; hosting innovation competitions in Africa; and persuading U.S. business luminaries to visit the continent or get involved in other ways;
- Assisting African countries to become more business friendly by helping them improve their regulatory environments by, for example, embedding U.S. technical experts in the central banks or commercial ministries of willing countries; and helping the regional economic communities more deeply integrate, thereby creating larger markets and lowering costs of doing business across borders;
- Aiding African countries to get the best possible deals from Chinese investment by helping build their capacity to assess contracts and ensure compliance;
- Tasking U.S. embassies with identifying and facilitating commercial opportunities for U.S. companies. The

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Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act has good ideas for achieving this.

Fostering good governance must continue to be a critical part of U.S. engagement with African countries. The U.S. can:

- Assist civil society in Africa by, for instance, facilitating exchange programs for African civil society leaders within the continent, or to the U.S., to learn from one another;
- Fight corruption by elevating the issue as part of U.S. development assistance, helping civil society organizations track and publicize corruption, and promoting economic freedom;<sup>32</sup>
- Deepen coordination and cooperation with allies active on the continent, and who are a positive influence towards good governance.

Other efforts the U.S. should make to pursue its strategic priorities in Africa include:

- Creating a strategic messaging initiative that explains to African countries the benefits of partnering with the U.S. The initiative should refute the narrative that the U.S. is withdrawing from Africa. The U.S. remains the largest investor in Africa,<sup>33</sup> is by far the continent's largest provider of overseas development assistance, has significant numbers of its major companies operating on the continent, and continues large, innovative initiatives—some now nearly two decades old—such as the

President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Power Africa, and Feed the Future, that have saved and improved millions of lives across the continent. The initiative should also advocate for democracy as the political system with the best record of not only protecting individual rights, but also delivering economic prosperity;

- Making the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit a Routine Event;
- Pressuring any states still funding the proselytizing of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam to stop, and to crack down on their citizens' funding;
- Ensuring that the new United States International Development Finance Corporation achieves its stated purpose of supporting the U.S. in its strategic competition with China. Congress should vigorously exercise its oversight authority to ensure it does so.

Africa is a hugely important continent, and U.S. engagement has not recalibrated to account for the rapid changes on the continent. There is still time, and hearings like this one and other activities happening across the government, private sector, and civil society give me hope that the U.S. is moving in the right direction.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions you may have.

<sup>32</sup> For a more in-depth discussion, see Joshua Meservey, "The Impact of Corruption on Economic Development in sub-Saharan Africa" in 2017 Global Agenda for Economic Freedom, James M. Roberts and William T. Wilson, eds., The Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 188, <https://www.heritage.org/international->

[economies/report/2017-global-agenda-economic-freedom](https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/2017-global-agenda-economic-freedom).

<sup>33</sup> *EY Attractiveness Program: Africa*, EY, October 2018, <https://www.ey.com/za/en/issues/business-environment/ey-attractiveness-program-africa-2018#section4>.



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Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of our witnesses today for your testimony. And would now like to begin with members asking questions. And I actually will hold my questions and ask them last, since I know members have numerous conflicts.

So, I will go to the ranking member.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I was happy to hear you mention Cameroon in your opening statement because I also have very deep interest there. I have a number of constituents in my district from Cameroon. And I have heard from both sides.

And there is a concern that as the resistance in Anglophone Cameroon continues that security forces of the Government of Cameroon will continue to clamp down which will cause even further growth in resistance and the whole thing will spiral.

And so, my question is what can and should, in your opinion, the U.S. Government do in Cameroon? And, Madam, I am going to ask all of you that question. Madam Ambassador, I am going to start with you.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much.

I think the first thing that we can do, and this has already, was already done by Assistant Secretary Nagy, was engage with the government on this issue. I think for a number of months and for the past year we have ignored what was happening in any consistent way.

So Assistant Secretary Nagy was there and I know that he did raise this issue with the government. I do not know the gist of the conversation, but I can imagine that he expressed our concerns about this issue.

I think in the long run we may have to take some actions against the government and other parties who are committing human rights violations. I am sure you have seen the pictures that we have all seen coming from that situation. And the pictures are coming from both sides. The atrocities are being committed by both sides, and people should be held accountable for that to send a strong message, that this is not the way you address these kinds of issues.

Mr. WRIGHT. Dr. Coulibaly.

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes, I would echo off Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's sentiment for the U.S. to take a stronger stance where it deems there to have been some already violations of the human rights and an opportunity to put as much pressure on the government as possible to respect the rights of all.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Meservey.

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, I agree with my colleagues comments. I think it is very important that the Cameroonian Government understand that the U.S. is watching. I think regional engagement is always very important in these sorts of conflict, so the U.S. should be working very actively with neighbors and other concerned countries, the Africa Union.

This doubtlessly concerns many African countries, and the U.S. should be playing the unique role that it can as a facilitator and a convener to try to get them working or pulling in the same direction, working with a singular purpose on Cameroon.

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. BASS. Oh, wonderful.

Representative OMAR.

Ms. OMAR. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Very excited to see all of you and hear your testimony.

Ambassador, I do not know if you remember me, but we met in Minneapolis right after I had been elected to the Minnesota House. And so, as you probably know, there is a little crisis right now that is happening to many of my constituents and friends and neighbors who are from Liberia, who are on a DED status. And I know that in your history that you served as an ambassador to Liberia.

And so, I wanted to see if we can maybe chat about this particular crisis that is being visited upon many of my constituents. Last week was a recess week for us, and so I got home. And, you know, we visited many workplaces. There are the majority of the Liberians in my district and in Minnesota are healthcare workers, and so one of the places that I visited was an assisted living center where 177 of their employees were DED recipients. And their status ends on the 31st of this month. And so if that is not renewed, most of them are most likely going to be returned back to Liberia.

And so I know that there is going to be a great impact on our community. There is going to be a great impact on my district. But I wanted to see if you maybe can help us sort of fully understand the impact that it might have on the folks in Liberia.

Do you know how many, how much money in remittances do Liberians here in this country send back to Liberia?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I do not know that exact figure. But I know that it is significant, just as it is across the continent of Africa. It plays a huge role in the economy of Liberia.

But I appreciate the question related to Liberians who are beneficiaries of DED. This was an issue that came up numerous times during my tenure as the Ambassador to Liberia. I will admit that at the time, given the fact that President Sirleaf was president of the country, and the country was going through significant transformation in a positive way, that I wanted to encourage Liberians who were living in the U.S. to come back and be part of the success that was Liberia.

In the meantime, you know, as I have returned to the U.S., this is a much more comprehensive and bigger issue than Liberia. I met a young Liberian women a few—last week, in fact, who was a DACA recipient. And she had lived here in the United States since she was 4 years old. She does not know anyone in Liberia. She is currently a student at a university here in the United States, doing quite well, interning in Washington, DC. And she is fearful of what she will find in Liberia.

And I tried to encourage her by telling her there is nothing to fear. But it is easy for me to say that sitting here without the fear of being returned to a place that I do not know. And I left that discussion with her extraordinarily sympathetic to her plight. And I do believe that as we look at the broader DACA issues related to all of the nationalities here in the United States, the Liberians have to be part of that comprehensive solution.

Whether that can happen by the end of March, I do not know. But I do know that if they are to return to Liberia, right now they are going to return to a country that is at peace. But I think the

economy there is in a bit of a downfall. And so it will be very, very difficult for these individuals to reintegrate back into Liberia, having been out of Liberia as long as they have been out of Liberia.

Ms. OMAR. Yes.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. In addition, their family members who have been dependent on their remittances will no longer have that benefit.

Ms. OMAR. Yes. Thank you for that broad overview of the issue.

And that brings me, actually, to the second question I was going to ask you is that while you say it is at peace, many of my constituents and my friends and neighbors say that it is not economically or physically safe for them to return. And we know that an assessment usually is done for a country before we decide to terminate the temporary status. And so, do you think that this president and Secretary Nielsen have done or at least asked for that assessment to be made before making a decision to terminate? That is the first part of my question.

And then the second part is do you think Liberia is ready to absorb all of the people that are going to be returned back to it? And will that maybe harm any peace or stability it might currently have?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would assume, and I do not know, that any assessments that are required have been done either by our embassy or by the State Department. But I cannot answer that question with any—

Ms. OMAR. We have not been able to see one, so.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. So, again, I do not know the answer to that.

Again, having lived in Liberia for 4 years and worked on Liberia, Liberian issues my entire life, I know the country quite well. I think the country will have difficulty absorbing a large number of people because they are having difficulty dealing with the economic challenges of the people who are living there now.

That said, in terms of the safety factor, we were dealing with a country that was at war for 14 years, where people were being killed regularly. That does not happen in Liberia anymore. I did find Liberia to be safe.

Ms. BASS. I am going to go to Mr. Burchett and then we will do another round.

Mr. BURCHETT. I can yield a minute if she wants to finish her thoughts. I hate to come back. She might have to go somewhere. I have got to go somewhere, too, but I would be—

Ms. OMAR. I have got time. I am good.

Mr. BURCHETT. You are good?

Ms. OMAR. Yes.

Mr. BURCHETT. OK. I thank the chairlady, ranking member, Ms. Omar.

I have just about two or three different questions, and I will try to hit them pretty fast because I know our time is limited.

As you all know, violent extremist groups threaten State stability, regional security, and international interests in Africa. And I want to focus mainly on the Lake Chad Basin region and Boko Haram. What are your thoughts on this terror group now that the Islamic State has recognized a rival faction as opposed to Abubakar

Shekau; does this fragmentation make them more or less of a threat?

Go ahead, ma'am, in that pretty outfit. I am going to call on you first, if that is all right, Chairlady. Am I allowed to do that.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, I think the threat that Boko Haram and any groups that have spiraled from that organization continue to have a major impact in the region. We have seen that impact in Northern Nigeria, we have seen that in Chad, in Niger, and further afield. And this is why I think it is important that we continue to engage with African countries to address this issue, because terrorism, wherever it happens, impacts all of us.

When there was an attack on a hotel in Mali a couple years ago an American citizen was killed in that attack. So we are not safe if we are not working with those countries to address these issues.

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I think the Lake Chad region more broadly to look at it is basically where issues like terrorism, climate change, State fragility all come together. And the solution in my view today has to be a long-lasting one that is able to encompass both economics as well as security interventions.

If you take the Lake Chad region, for example, in 1963 we have the bed shed of about 25,000 square kilometers. Now it is only 2,500 square kilometers due to climate change. So it is now one-tenth of what it used to be. So, what that has done is create conditions for conflict that is affecting now about 50 million people or so in that region.

So, I think a comprehensive approach needs to be taken to a solution if we want it to be really long-lasting and impactful.

Mr. MESERVEY. And I think the terrorism challenge associated with Boko Haram and its splinter group is profound. The good news is that Boko Haram has lost most of its strongholds over the last number of years because of this multinational force.

But the Nigerian Government has been unable to deliver the security and the services and other things that are necessary to really stabilize the northeast, so Boko Haram has survived and is now actually resurgent, I would say, as is its splinter group ISIS West Africa Province, which just at the beginning of this year conquered hundreds of square miles of territory in three different countries.

They are establishing a State. They are now administering it in some ways. They have—it is not nearly as extensive, of course, as the ISIS State in, or was in the Middle East, but those are clearly their aspirations. And they have made very serious gains in recent times.

So it is a very difficult problem set in a belt, as my colleague just mentioned here, where you have all sorts of very negative trends converging that makes it very hard to eliminate these groups.

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you. One more, if I have time, Chairlady, for one more question?

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. BURCHETT. Thank you, ma'am.

I am concerned about the investments that China is making. And I am wondering what the U.S. should be doing to counter some of the influence that they are having in Africa? And to what extent are some of these investments a threat to our interests, including our diplomatic development and security objectives?

And the followup of that, if the United States were to significantly reduce its foreign aid to Africa, would China, do you all feel like China would seek to fill the gap, and how they would do that?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. China, over I would say the past decade, has gone into Africa fast and furiously. They have changed their approach. It has evolved over, over time.

Initially, they would go in and do a stadium or some small project and to buy influence. Now they are doing major infrastructural projects. The issue at hand is that all of these infrastructural projects, some of them better than others, are needed on the continent of Africa. Africans need railroads, they need roads, they need refurbished airports and ports. And we have ceded that space to China.

And it is important if the U.S. sees its role as competing—and I do not see us as competing with China because I think we have different resources that we bring to the table; we are not going to bring those large projects—I think the better approach for us to take is to work with our African partners to ensure that they have the capacity to strike and negotiate better deals with the Chinese. Because, again, the kind of deals that they are getting with the Chinese, we do not have the wherewithal to do that.

But we need to pay attention to what is happening because our influence on the continent is waning in comparison to China. And if we start to decrease our foreign aid the Chinese will come in in some way or another to support these countries. They are not going to come in with the same values that we bring to the table.

And in my conversations with African leaders and business people alike, their preference is to have the United States there. And their question to us every day is: Where are you? Why are you not there? And you cannot tell us we cannot engage with the Chinese if you are not prepared to engage with us.

Ms. BASS. Did anybody else want to respond to that?

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I just wanted to underscore the Ambassador's point.

So, the really best way to counter China, if that was the objective, really is to solve Africa's infrastructure problem. It is really huge.

Mr. BURCHETT. Say that again.

Mr. COULIBALY. Is to solve—

Mr. BURCHETT. I am sorry, I am from East Tennessee and I did not understand that.

Mr. COULIBALY. Is to solve Africa's infrastructure problems. I mean, the demand there is huge, huge because of the low point where they are starting from given the stage of economic development. But also huge because they are experiencing very rapid demographic growth and rapid rate of urbanization. Estimates put it at about \$130 to \$170 billion a year. That is what is needed for infrastructure financing in Africa. And two-thirds of that amount, or 60 percent or more, is unfunded.

And I think that is what China has aligned itself with the African nations, and that is why they are responding positively. But I am hopeful that at least as we roll out the Development Finance Corporations that was part of the BUILD Act, that is going to be

able to come in and allow the U.S. to begin to play more in that space.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Did you want to say something? Go ahead.

Mr. MESERVEY. Just briefly.

Ms. BASS. Sure.

Mr. MESERVEY. I think it is I agree, I do not think the message to our African partners should be us or them. That is not going to work because China does provide certain things that African countries need. But helping African countries strike better deals, as the Ambassador mentioned, with China is really important, but also providing an alternative.

We cannot do that, frankly, on most big infrastructure projects because we do not have a lot of companies that do that sort of thing. We do not heavily subsidize them as the Chinese Government does with its State-owned, obviously, enterprises. So, we need to look at competitive advantages that the United States has, which industries do we have a real, obvious advantage, focus on those.

And I think that we need to in terms of the larger competition with China, where we do compete is around the model. And, you know, Beijing is increasingly pushing this idea to African countries that you can have economic growth but you just need to crack down on the pesky journalists and the civil society and things of that nature, as we do. And look at how successful we have been.

So that is, there is an obvious competition there. And the U.S. needs to engage in that competition of ideas especially, and make sure we are messaging properly about the benefits of democracy, of the free enterprise system, and things of that nature.

Ms. BASS. You know, I would continue with that because I think one of the big concerns right now is we are not really sending a strong message from the Administration in that regard to counter that. And, you know, my experience, along with the witnesses, and I am sure many people in the room, is that the African countries would rather do business with us. But we cannot, we are not in a position to tell them they should turn their backs on China when China is there and we are not.

And really, the question is, you know, for us to step up our involvement.

And so, to my colleague from Tennessee, two things. You know, one, hopefully, because you were asking the question about security, hopefully, if you are available, you could attend the CODEL, the congressional delegation. Because that is exactly what we want to look at.

And then in terms of Africa's infrastructure, we are working on a piece of legislation we are calling Move Africa that the purpose is to incentivize U.S. businesses to do transportation-related infrastructure projects. And so, I think that overall our perspective on Africa, we treat the continent, frankly, like we treat inner city communities, which is from a point of view of charity as a point of view, as opposed to partnership, and recognizing that on the African continent there are tremendous opportunities.

It seems like the rest of the world knows that but we are a little bit, you know, late to the party. So we need to, you know, improve our game.

One of the—so my questions are really focused on what we need to do here in Congress to improve the situation. So, one of the issues is our designation of middle income countries that then make some countries not eligible for, like, MCC and other programs. And I wanted to know if anybody on the panel has any solution as to how we should come up with the—what formula we should use. Because if we just use income, it does not take into account the inequity. So, you know, the annual income of somebody might be \$15,000 but we know that that is, that is averaged because people at the top are making so much.

So, I would like to take a look at middle income countries, that designation, since I believe it excludes so many other countries.

In terms of Mozambique, want to know your thoughts on if we are doing enough. Should we be providing more assistance?

On the issue of Sudan, there is a lot of people that are concerned with what is happening in Sudan right now. And the Obama Administration and the Trump administration was continuing, I do not know about a rollback but, I mean, you know, the different phases, and we have not gotten to Phase 2. But there is some push here in Congress to actually move back to sanctions, you know, in a much bigger way as opposed to the movement forward toward normalization and relationships.

And so my question is, given what is happening in Sudan right now, do you think the time is now for us to strengthen sanctions, strengthen State-sponsored terrorism in terms of that designation. And by strengthening it I mean in moving it from the administration deciding to, you know, having to have congressional approval, which is actually kind of the way it is now, but restating it and making it stronger, stricter before we would consider lifting it.

So, I will start with those. And I will start with Madam Ambassador, go down the row. And then if Representative Omar has additional questions she would like to ask, we will go there.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I am going to bunt a little bit on the designation of middle income countries because I think, I am not sure it is a U.S., it is just the U.S. that makes that designation. And I do, I am aware of several countries who benefited from the MCC—

Ms. BASS. Right.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD [continuing]. And then suddenly they no longer benefited because they had moved up the scale. So, we punish them for their improvement.

Ms. BASS. Yes. We do that domestically, too.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes. So we—

Ms. BASS. As soon as you get better we cut you off.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. So we need to look at, I agree that we need to look at it. I do not know how.

Ms. BASS. But where does that designation come from? That is not—is it U.N. or?

Mr. COULIBALY. No. I am not aware of really a precise scientific method that has allowed for that limitation.



Ms. BASS. Well, I am sure it is not scientific. I just wondered where it came from.

I am glad you guys do not know. That means there is room there then.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. There is room there.

Ms. BASS. OK.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. On Mozambique, Madam Chair, there is so much to be done there. The pictures that we are seeing coming out of Mozambique are just horrifying. And I know that the U.S. is there on the ground, along with others. I think we were a little bit late in responding. It was almost a week before it even started getting press coverage here in the United States.

So, again, I think our colleagues from USAID and the State Department are actively engaged. Our military is engaged. But I think it is going to take more engagement and more resources for them. So I think we need to look at the resource, resource base that they are working from and see if there are any possibilities of increasing the funding and the resources that they have to respond to this.

Ms. BASS. Well, it is appropriations season, so it is definitely time for us to look at that.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And on Sudan, you know, your question was an interesting one. I think part of what is happening in Sudan is because of what we have been working toward in the Sudan. So I do think, and again I am coming from a position of having worked on this issue during the Obama Administration, but I do think that we should continue the path we are on with them, continue pushing and pressuring the government. Part of the reason the government is responding to our pressure is because they want this to continue.

And on the issue of State sponsor of terror, they have regularly told us that we have continued to move the goalposts on them on that particular issue. And I believe that this is an unrelated issue, but I suspect that the handwriting is on the wall in Sudan, and the transition and the changes that are taking place are changes that we have all been watching and waiting for. And I think any efforts on our part to pull back now may send the wrong signal. The government may decide there is no reason that they cannot really crack down. And they have, I think they have been somewhat restrained.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Mr. COULIBALY. On the issue of the middle income country, the limitation, so, although I am not aware of a scientific method that determines it, one of the guiding principles for this is that is these are countries that have reached a certain stage whereby they can now tap into the markets. They can use their other sources for financial needs.

Ms. BASS. But it is not true; right?

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes, it is not exactly always true.

One perhaps approach, and I think you are right that with inequality sometimes you may have the income and the country as a whole at a high level of income, but many parts of it are still struggling. And I think that was an important clause of the BUILD Act in setting the U.S. IDFC to recognize there could be needs even

for upper-middle income countries where it is showing that some segments of the population are still, still struggling.

So one possibility then is to, to start there, but then to also look at the Sustainable Development Goals.

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. COULIBALY. The Sustainable Development Goals trackers are now just coming out.

Ms. BASS. Yes. Are you saying maybe look at both? Because if you look at, if you add in the Sustainable Development Goals then it goes south. You know what I am saying? Because just because you reached an income status does not mean you achieved those goals at all.

Mr. COULIBALY. Well, I think the Sustainable Development Goals, of course, should be taken certainly into account, particularly some of the priority area targets. Right? So we can start there.

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. COULIBALY. And then see, which are the countries that are way off track.

If you look at, for example, sub-Saharan Africa, the poverty rates we have been tracking out of Brookings, some of my colleagues' work, show indeed that the continent, the number of people, poor people is actually increasing.

If you take a closer look, a large part of it is due to Nigeria, for example, which it would classify as being in a better income level than some other countries. But Nigeria is one of the countries that is way off track.

Ms. BASS. Do you know a country where they graduated to middle income status where they cannot actually tap into the world markets?

Mr. COULIBALY. So, I think you take a country like South Africa, I think they can tap into markets. And over the past years, since 2006, we have had about over a dozen countries across Africa that have tapped into the global financial markets for the first time.

But I also subscribe that some of them may have tapped into it while not being fully ready to—

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. To take on more debt than they should be taking on.

And you may very well know that there is now an issue of whether Africa is facing another debt crisis.

Ms. BASS. To China?

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. Reminiscent—China is part of it.

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY. But there is also the markets precisely, a lot of Euro bonds that have been issued.

And then there is a question then as to whether we are facing, again, another debt forgiveness episode like what we have seen earlier in the decade. So I think starting with the SDGs, trying to see whether we can come in and then assess the alternative sources of financing that they might have. Do they really have access to markets at a reasonable cost like it is somewhat portrayed today.

And then speaking of debt and Mozambique, to get to your question on Mozambique, I think they could definitely use help because it is one of the countries that has had a debt level over 100 percent of GDP. And they are now classified as being in debt distress.

So there is really not much scope from them to mobilize their own resources to deal with this tragedy. And I think they could use as much help as possible, especially through regional actors as well as the U.S., to step in a leadership role to galvanize more support for Mozambique.

Ms. BASS. Mr. Meservey?

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. On Mozambique I agree, I think the critical part of this will also be a sustained effort. Because the level of devastation is really extraordinary. And this is going to be a long-term challenge. So, yes, obviously the disaster response is crucial and the U.S. is involved in that and should continue to look for options to ramp up its engagement. But certainly thinking through, OK, after, you know, a week has passed, or two or 3 weeks, how do we continue to help ameliorate some of the fallout of this crisis.

And then just quickly on Sudan. I think it is important to keep what is happening as far as protestor concerns separate from Phase 2 because they are in some ways separate issues. So, I do not think that the any sort of activity or actions by the U.S. to punish what Sudan is doing, and they have engaged in a brutal crack-down, to use the Phase 2 negotiations as a vehicle, I do not think that is the best vehicle to use.

I think it is very appropriate to think about Magnitsky, for instance, or some other avenue that we have because the Sudanese Government has responded brutally and it should be held accountable. But it is a separate issue from the Phase 2 negotiations.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Representative Omar.

Ms. OMAR. Dr. Coulibaly, you talked about the use in Africa on the continent that 40 percent of the world's population are going to be in Africa and 42 percent of the work force will be in Africa. And when we were in Ethiopia and Eritrea just recently, a lot of the young people talked to us about the hopes and aspirations that they have as we move into the world in ways that we can invest.

So, I just wanted to see if you had an idea of one particular investment we can make as a country to assist the youth in Africa that would make a real impact.

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. I would emphasize the area of education and skills. I think, as I mentioned, 42 percent of the global work force, and now imagine that work force being imparted with the skills of the 21st Century. This would really be a global, not just African, economic success. And the opportunity is going to really expand the global middle class and create market opportunities that everybody is going to benefit from.

But when you look at the educational systems they are being crammed because of demographic growth, the infrastructure in classrooms—we touched on that earlier—is not keeping up. So, in classes where they are supposed to have 40 students they now have, like, 80 students or 100 students. In that context, it is becoming difficult to test them. The quality of education itself, even the lucky ones who get one, could be decreasing.

And another area that could be helpful is to leverage technology, for example, initiatives that can bring technology to education can allow to maintain that quality and be able to scale up.

Ms. OMAR. That is wonderful.

I was just meeting with some tech folks from Africa. And when the Black Caucus has its conference in September I hope that that will be my sort of sessions around technology and investments that we could make in Africa. So, we will see how that goes.

But I wanted to come back to something that was in the testimony of Mr. Meservey. Right?

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes.

Ms. OMAR. All right. You had mentioned in your testimony that Saudi Arabia has promoted Wahhabism in Africa, and that has contributed to the rise of jihadist thinking and terrorist recruitment on the continent. I would say, you know, we could, we could sort of agree on that.

Is it fair to say that our unwavering support for the Saudi Government has been counterproductive to our security goals in Africa?

Mr. MESERVEY. Saudi Arabia is one of those very difficult situations because there is no doubt that they are an important counterweight to Iran in the Middle East which, as we know, is involved in all sorts of nefarious activities in Syria and beyond. But I also, as you referenced in my testimony, I think there is no doubt that their activities—and it is not just Saudi Arabia that is engaged in this but they have been the primary and the most aggressive in proselytizing this way, that I think that is a long, that presents a long-term strategic challenge to the United States, and to African countries frankly.

There are African governments concerned about this phenomenon as well.

So, I think that the U.S. has addressed this, or I know it has, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Needs to do more. And I also think it needs to press Saudi Arabia to think, OK, how do you put the genie back in bottle so to speak because they have proselytized this all across the world. Now what? How do you start rolling this back? Because I think it is very much part of their responsibility to work on that.

Now, whether their domestic politics will ever allow them to do that is an entirely different question. But I think that is part of the message the U.S. should be sending.

Ms. OMAR. OK. So let me see if I understand. They are spreading this ideology. And then we have reports that they are actually funding terrorists. But we are partnering with them to help us fight the ideology and terrorism? Is that what you are saying? That is the suggestion?

Mr. MESERVEY. Well, it is two separate ideologies we are talking about.

Ms. OMAR. You are the problem and we need you to fix the problem?

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. Well, so Iran is, is——

Ms. OMAR. No, no, I, I get that. I am just saying on Saudi Arabia,——

Mr. MESERVEY. Sure, sure.

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. So they are the problem but they are, we are also going to partner with them to fix themselves. And the problem that they are creating is precisely what you said; right?

Mr. MESERVEY. Well, it is, I mean, unfortunately these are the sorts of decisions you have to make in foreign policy sometimes. And so in the Middle East arena we have this very obvious problem of a country, talking about Iran, that has, for instance, during the Khobar Tower bombings killed scores of American soldiers. They did it in Afghanistan. They have been aggressive enemies of the United States.

Ms. OMAR. Yes.

Mr. MESERVEY. So, so there is that sphere. And then you have this other sphere of this Wahhabist problem that I referenced.

And I think you can do both. It is one of those strange bedfellow situations but it is the unfortunately reality, frankly, of the Middle East.

Ms. OMAR. Right.

Mr. MESERVEY. So I——

Ms. OMAR. No, I, I hear you. I appreciate that. It is a challenge but one that is not often looked at with clear lenses.

So, in your testimony you also mentioned that 12 of the 23 countries most affected by terrorism are in Africa. In the report you reference Somalia, which is where my family is from and I was born, and it is ranked sixth in the world and second in Africa after Nigeria in terms of impact of terrorism. As you know, the major part of U.S. strategy of combating al-Shabaab in Somalia has been the use of drones. Under the Trump administration, drone strikes in Somalia have tripled, now totaling more than Libya and Yemen combined.

AFRICOM denies any civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes in Somalia. But this is contradicted by reports from numerous investigative journalists and human rights organizations. Just last week Amnesty International released a report, which I will be submitting for the record, a report documenting the killings of 14 civilians in just five drone strikes.

[The information referred to follows:]

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**“The noise of the plane was louder than before...The weeks before it used to come and leave, only that night it was not leaving. It was coming and coming and coming... when the noise [of an airstrike] happened everything ceased... I was so frightened. I couldn't keep watch on the farm at all. I went under the shelter of the tree and hid... These three young men were not expecting to be killed by a plane, and we did not expect the world to be silent.”**

Liban, a farmer from Darusalaam village, Lower Shabelle.

Since April 2017, the United States of America (USA) has dramatically increased the number of air strikes – from manned aircraft and unmanned drones – it has launched in Somalia, tripling the annual rate of attacks and, in 2018, outpacing US strikes in Libya and Yemen combined. Despite this escalation, the US government claims that it has not killed any civilians in Somalia during this period. In this report, Amnesty International provides credible evidence to the contrary. The report investigates five incidents in Lower Shabelle, Somalia, in which 14 civilians were killed and eight injured. It provides credible evidence that US air strikes were responsible for four of these incidents and that the fifth was most plausibly caused by a US air strike. In the incidents presented in this report, civilians were killed and injured in attacks that may have violated international humanitarian law (IHL) and could, in some cases, constitute war crimes. The seriousness of the allegations underscores the need for the USA and Somalia to conduct urgent and transparent investigations.

The conflict in Somalia between Somali government forces and Al-Shabaab, an armed group which controls significant territory in the country, is a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) under international law. Amnesty International considers the USA to be a party to this NIAC. Since at least 2016 it has claimed that its military operations are conducted at the request of the Government of Somalia, under the right of collective self-defense. However, when asked by Amnesty International, both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) refused to confirm or deny whether the US is at war in Somalia. This refusal is consistent with testimony given by General Thomas D. Waldhauser, the commander of AFRICOM, to Congress in March 2018. When he was asked about the nature of US military intervention in Somalia, he responded, “I wouldn't characterize that we're at war. It's specifically designed for us not to own that.”

In 2011, the USA launched its first drone strike in Somalia against Al-Shabaab, which controls large swathes of south-central Somalia, including of the Lower Shabelle region which surrounds the capital, Mogadishu. Between 2011 and March 2017, air strikes were infrequent. American airpower was originally used only to target “high value targets” (HVT, i.e. known ‘terrorists’ who the administration argued posed a threat to the USA) and were justified initially as part for the global war on Al-Qa’ida and associated forces, and then, beginning in 2016, to support operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a United Nations (UN) and African Union-authorized peace enforcement force based in the country. In March 2017,

President Donald Trump issued a directive designating parts of Somalia an “area of active hostilities” (AAH), after which the number of reported air strikes increased dramatically.

The directive has not been made public, but reports indicate it weakened the protections afforded to civilians in Somalia, increasing the likelihood of their death or injury in US military operations. Previously, under the 2013 ‘Presidential Policy Guidance’ (PPG), which established the operating procedures for action “against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities” and governed all air strikes in Somalia until the AAH directive, for an air strike to be approved in Somalia, there needed to be “near certainty” that the target – “an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target” – was present and civilians would not be killed or injured. Now, the content of the directive supersedes the PPG and reportedly gives US forces the greatest latitude to carry out strikes as is allowable under the USA’s interpretation of IHL. As a result, those planning or deciding an attack are, according to the USA’s own standards, permitted to target anyone who they are ‘reasonably certain’ is formally or functionally a member of a non-state armed group, regardless of whether he or she is directly participating in hostilities. Civilian fatalities and injuries are now permissible if they are lawful under IHL.

Moreover, in a meeting with Amnesty International, retired Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, who served as Commander, Special Operations Command Africa, from April 2015 until June 2017, but did not oversee any of the five incidents detailed in this report, said that since the issuance of the AAH directive, individuals are now considered to be lawfully targetable based solely on four criteria: age, gender, location, and geographical proximity to Al-Shabaab. According to General Bolduc, all military-aged males observed with known Al-Shabaab members, inside specific areas – areas in which the US military has deemed the population to be supporting or sympathetic to Al-Shabaab – are now considered legitimate military targets. In reply to a request for an official response on General’s Bolduc’s assertion, AFRICOM stated that: “BG Bolduc’s [sic] purported articulation of targeting standards does not accurately reflect the targeting standards of AFRICOM or [Department of Defense].” However, if General Bolduc is accurate in how the policy is practically applied during operations, then US forces appear to be acting in violation of IHL, as well as the US’s own laws and policies regarding who is lawfully targetable during conflicts.

Despite this broadening of the strike mandate, a weakening of civilian protections, and a significant uptick in air strikes, the Department of Defense (DoD), in a June 2018 report to the US Congress, stated that its military operations – including air strikes – in Somalia in 2017 had resulted in zero civilians killed or injured. A series of AFRICOM press releases, and a response from a DoD spokesperson to a specific request from Amnesty International in March 2019 asserted the same about the USA’s 2018 military operations.

This report investigates US strikes carried out in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. According to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a media organization which tracks and compiles strike data, the US military conducted at least 25 air strikes in Lower Shabelle between April 2017 and December 2018.

Security concerns and access restrictions prevented Amnesty International from conducting on-site investigations and severely limited the organization’s ability to freely gather testimonial and physical evidence. All interviews took place in-person or over encrypted voice calls placed from phones located outside Al-Shabaab-held territory.

Despite the difficulties, Amnesty International interviewed 65 witnesses and survivors of five alleged US air strikes carried out during this period. Amnesty International interviewed a further 77 witnesses and survivors of other alleged US air strikes in Somalia which are not detailed in this report. In addition to this first-hand testimony, the report draws on several types of evidence, including analysis of satellite imagery and data, photographic material, interviews with government officials, medical personnel and other experts, and an open-source investigation including analysis of traditional and social media, academic articles, and reports from NGOs and international bodies.

While Al-Shabaab controls the areas of Lower Shabelle where the attacks in this report took place, and members of Al-Shabaab were present in relatively large numbers in parts of Lower Shabelle that were attacked, in some cases the rural areas and villages attacked had no evident Al-Shabaab presence at the time of the attack.

The five incidents investigated in this report fall into two categories. The first category includes two incidents in which the US military appears to have targeted suspected Al-Shabaab members riding in vehicles, killing civilians near the targeted vehicle. On 16 October 2017, a US armed drone targeted a suspected Al-Shabaab vehicle travelling between the towns of Awdheegle and Barire. The first of two strikes missed the apparent target, killing two civilians, and injuring five civilians, including two children, who were residing in the Farah Waays settlement next to the road at the time of the attack. The second strike destroyed the vehicle and killed the suspected Al-Shabaab fighters inside. On 6 December 2017, five civilians, including two children, were killed when a truck carrying suspected Al-Shabaab fighters exploded in the isolated hamlet of Illimey. The explosion injured a further two civilians, including an 18-month-old girl. All those in the vehicle were also killed. Based on the evidence presented in this report, Amnesty International believes that the explosion was most plausibly caused by a US air strike. In these two incidents, it appears that US forces had ample opportunity to avoid civilian deaths and injuries, by taking feasible precautions, as required by IHL, including by carrying out the attack before the vehicle entered, or drove by, the civilian areas.

The second category includes three incidents in which civilians were killed apparently either after being mistakenly identified as Al-Shabaab fighters or another lawful military objective, or incidentally in a strike against a lawful military objective. The misidentification appears to have occurred either because the target was wrongly identified as a specific individual or individuals or because the target was wrongly targeted by a "signature strike" where the victim's identity was unknown by US forces, but their actions, as viewed from the air, were perceived to fit a suspicious pattern of behaviour. On 12 November 2017, three civilian farmers were killed by a US air strike outside the village of Darusalaam as they camped out on the edge of a road. They had been irrigating their farm late into the night, a practice that is common at night in the region, where farmers rely on flood irrigation from the nearby Shabelle river. They were armed with nothing more than their farming tools. On 2 August 2018, a US drone strike killed three civilians, including two well-diggers and an employee from Hormuud Telecommunications Company, as they drove a vehicle in a rural area near Gobanle village. Also in the vehicle was a suspected Al-Shabaab member, who was also killed and whose presence may have led US forces to wrongly conclude that the civilians in the vehicle were also Al-Shabaab. In the most recent attack documented by Amnesty International, in the early hours of 9 December 2018, US forces conducted an air strike near the village of Baladul-Rahma. One civilian farmer was killed and another injured as they irrigated their farm. In these three instances, civilians who were not directly participating in hostilities either appear to have been misidentified and then targeted and killed or killed incidentally. These attacks either targeted civilians, or those who planned the attack failed to take adequate measures to verify that the objectives were not civilian in nature, or those who carried out the attack failed to cancel or suspend the attack when it became apparent that it was wrongly-directed or that the attack may be disproportionate. As a result, the attacks appear to violate the principle of distinction or proportionality.

US military operations are shrouded in secrecy. Although AFRICOM proactively issues press releases on some air strikes, others are only publicly acknowledged after AFRICOM receives a request for information on specific strikes. If no one asks questions, strikes may remain undisclosed, meaning the actual number of strikes conducted in Somalia is likely higher than current numbers suggest. Furthermore, AFRICOM's reports often leave out crucial details, including information about the location and the intended targets, making it difficult to assess a strike's compliance with international law.

On 15 February 2019, Amnesty International requested an official response from the USA to allegations in this report. On 12 March 2019, AFRICOM confirmed that US forces had conducted air strikes corresponding to the dates and locations of four of the incidents in this report. With respect to the allegations of civilian casualties in each of these incidents, AFRICOM stated they "do not appear likely based on contradictory intelligence that cannot be disclosed because of operational security limitations". In regard to the incident in the hamlet of Illimey on 6 December 2017, AFRICOM stated that it did not match "AFRICOM records in regards to times, dates, and locations of lethal strikes".

Amnesty International's research points to a failure by the US and Somali governments to adequately investigate allegations of civilian casualties resulting from US operations in Somalia. A lack of transparency characterizes all aspects of US air strikes in Somalia, including the process employed by AFRICOM to assess the credibility of allegations of civilian casualties, and, when an allegation is deemed credible, how this is



then investigated. On 12 March 2019, AFRICOM provided Amnesty International with a description of its procedure for reviewing civilian casualty allegations. The description does not provide information about the practical application of the guidance however, including on how it was applied to the incidents in this report, and does not contain clear criteria for assessing credibility of allegations. Furthermore, the US and Somali governments do not have adequate accountability mechanisms in place in Somalia for reporting and responding to allegations of civilian casualties, including an accessible means for survivors and families of victims to self-report their losses.

A failure to investigate adequately denies individuals and families the right to justice, accountability and reparation, including compensation and guarantees of non-repetition.

In this context, Amnesty International is calling on the Government of the USA to:

- Conduct thorough, transparent, independent and impartial investigations into all credible allegations of civilian casualties of air strikes and other military operations in Somalia, including those documented in this report. Where there is sufficient admissible evidence of crimes, bring suspected perpetrators to justice in fair trials without recourse to the death penalty.
- Acknowledge civilian casualties caused by US attacks and offer compensation and explanation to survivors and families of civilians killed in US strikes regardless of whether the casualties were caused by a lawful attack.
- Provide victims of violations of international humanitarian law by US forces, and their families with access to justice and to full reparation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition from the US government.
- Implement an effective mechanism to ensure a safe and accessible means for families and communities to self-report civilian casualties arising from US air strikes and other military operations.
- Ensure the planning and execution of attacks fully respects international humanitarian law, including by reviewing its criteria for selecting targets, its definitions of “combatant” and “non-combatant”, practices such as “signature strikes,” and whether all feasible precautions to spare civilians are being taken.

Amnesty International is also calling on the Government of Somalia to:

- Conduct its own thorough, transparent, independent and impartial investigations into allegations of civilian casualties resulting from US air strikes.
- Seek reparations from the US government for survivors and families of victims of US air strikes.
- Implement an effective mechanism to ensure a safe and accessible means for families and communities to self-report civilian casualties arising from US air strikes and other military operations.

# METHODOLOGY

This report investigates five incidents in Lower Shabelle, Somalia, between April 2017 and December 2018 where civilians allegedly were killed by US air strikes. The report draws on significant first-hand testimony from witnesses and survivors from each of the five strikes. The report also draws on several other types of evidence including analysis of satellite imagery and data, photographic material, interviews with medical personnel and other experts, and an open-source investigation including an analysis of traditional and social media, academic articles, and reports from NGOs and international bodies.

The research for this report took place in an environment that was extraordinarily hostile to human rights research. Security concerns and access restrictions prevented Amnesty International from conducting on-site investigations and severely limited the organization's ability to freely gather testimonial and physical evidence.

The strikes all took place in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab severely restricts national and international human rights investigators and journalists operating in areas under its control, and civilians living in its territory are forbidden from speaking freely with investigators and journalists. Moreover, the group monitors and restricts the movements of civilians, especially in and out of its territory. Al-Shabaab bans all smartphones that have the capability to take photographs, record audio, or access the internet in areas under their control.<sup>1</sup> According to people from Al-Shabaab territory interviewed for this report, the penalty for violating these rules can be severe and even fatal, especially in cases where Al-Shabaab believes the individual to be spying.

Given the lack of access and the serious risks facing civilians who attempt to share information, researchers investigating the impact of the conflict on the population in Al-Shabaab-controlled territory face numerous impediments. To overcome access restrictions and to minimize the risks to Amnesty International staff, interviewees and their communities, the research for this report was conducted from government-controlled areas in-person in Somalia and remotely, from outside of Somalia.

In addition to the risks associated with Al-Shabaab, mobile communications within and from Al-Shabaab territories are reportedly monitored by the US and Somali governments.<sup>2</sup> Information from these communications can be used to direct attacks inside Al-Shabaab territory. To reduce the likelihood of being monitored by Al-Shabaab or by the US and Somali governments, all interviews took place in-person or over encrypted voice calls from phones outside of Al-Shabaab territory.

**Many interviewees were afraid of reprisals from Al-Shabaab or the Somali government if they were identified as having spoken to Amnesty International. As a result, information that could identify interviewees, or members of their communities, as having spoken with Amnesty International has been removed from the report but remain on file with Amnesty International. This includes age, gender, occupation, and relationship to the victims and survivors. The names of all victims in the report are real. Pseudonyms have been used in**

<sup>1</sup> Amnesty International in-person and telephone interviews, dates and locations withheld for security reasons.

<sup>2</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya: In Brief*, 14 November 2013, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43245.pdf> and; The Drive, *The U.S. Army's Newest Spy Plane Is in Action in Africa and Latin America*, 20 March 2017, <http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/8443/the-u-s-armys-newest-spy-plane-is-in-action-in-africa-and-latin-america>

all cases when quoting people who were interviewed. Specific dates and locations of interviews have also been withheld for security reasons.

The investigation was carried out by four Amnesty International researchers, along with staff experts in remote sensing and photographic and video verification, and members of Amnesty International's Digital Verification Corps.<sup>3</sup> Amnesty International also hired individuals living in Somalia with extensive networks of contacts to locate survivors and witnesses and gather information about specific air strikes. For a strike to be included in the report, testimonial evidence had to be deemed sufficient and credible by Amnesty International researchers and needed to be corroborated by testimony from individuals identified by at least two independent entry points into the strike-affected population.

In instances where significant testimonial information obtained from an individual could not be corroborated, the entire testimony was excluded from the report and did not form any part of the factual basis for any of the report's conclusions. Amnesty International researchers also determined that numerous interviewees knowingly and wilfully provided false information. Their testimonies, along with *all* other testimonies from interviewees brought from the same sources, even if the underlying information appeared reliable, were likewise excluded from the report.

Between August 2018 and February 2019, Amnesty International interviewed 65 survivors and witnesses of the five incidents documented in this report. Amnesty International interviewed a further 77 survivors and witnesses of a further 15 alleged US air strikes in Somalia which are not detailed in this report. Amnesty International also interviewed staff from international organizations, members of the US military and US State Department, Somali government officials, journalists, humanitarian workers, and local human rights monitors.

Amnesty International interviewed survivors and witnesses individually. Interviews generally lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. Interviews with survivors and witnesses were conducted in Somali and Garre languages, often with interpretation from Somali or Garre languages to English.

Potential interviewees were informed about the nature and purpose of the research, as well as how the information they provided would be used, before deciding to meet with Amnesty International researchers. This information was shared again by Amnesty International researchers before the start of each interview. Oral consent was obtained from each interviewee at the start of interviews. Interviewees were also given the option – both before and at the end of the interview – to choose not to have their names included in the report. No incentives or monetary compensation were provided to interviewees in exchange for their accounts. Individuals were told that they could end the interview at any time and that they could choose whether to answer any specific question.

Some of the villages or hamlets referenced in this report do not appear on any publicly available map. The locations of these villages were determined by interviewing residents or former residents of the villages who described the geography of the village and the surrounding area in enough detail to allow Amnesty International to identify the village in high resolution satellite imagery.

People's ages in the report are based on information provided by the interviewee. Referenced ages are often approximations.

On 11 July 2018, Amnesty International filed a Freedom of Information Act Request with US Africa Command and US Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, asking for "all after action reports, debriefings, lessons learned, strike logs, mission summaries, white papers, research reports, and other documents related to air strikes accomplished in Somalia between 1 Jan 17 and 1 Jul 18." Other than an

<sup>3</sup> The Digital Verification Corps is a network of volunteers trained in discovering and verifying audio-visual content sourced from social media. Established in 2016 with volunteers based at three universities (University of California, Berkeley (USA), Pretoria (South Africa) and Essex (UK)), the network has grown to include Toronto (Canada), Cambridge (UK) and Hong Kong University. After the initial verification work by the trained volunteers, Amnesty International staff experts make the final determination of whether the digital content is sufficiently verified to be relied on in the organization's investigations.

acknowledgement of receipt, Amnesty International had not, at time of printing, received a substantive reply to this request.

On 15 February 2019, Amnesty International formally requested an official response, from AFRICOM, to the allegations in this report. On 12 March 2019, AFRICOM provided a formal response to some of Amnesty International's questions. On 13 March 2018, a DoD spokesperson provided an email response to some of the questions that Amnesty International put to AFRICOM. Relevant portions of Amnesty International's request and AFRICOM's response have been included in the report.

On 7 March 2019, Amnesty International formally requested an official response, from the Government of Somalia, to the allegations in this report. At the time of printing, the government had not replied.

# 1. BACKGROUND

## 1.1 BACKGROUND ON SOMALIA

A former Italian colony and British protectorate, the Federal Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 and lies on the eastern horn of Africa, sharing borders with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Somalia is currently composed of five Federal Member States: Jubaland,<sup>4</sup> South West,<sup>5</sup> Galmudug,<sup>6</sup> Hirshabelle<sup>7</sup> and Puntland.<sup>8</sup> Puntland, in north eastern Somalia, declared itself a semi-autonomous state in 1998, but recognizes its status as a constituent part of Somalia. Somaliland, an area in north-western Somalia, declared independence from Somalia in 1991; however, its independence has not been formally recognized by any country.<sup>9</sup>

The Lower Shabelle region, the focus of this report, forms part of the South West state. It sits to the west, southwest and northwest of the capital, Mogadishu, and is home to around one million people,<sup>10</sup> most of whom live in rural areas. The region is home to many nomadic and semi-nomadic people, as well as many who are sedentary. Much of the population lives on the banks of the Shabelle River, which serves as an important source of livelihood, providing water for livestock and the irrigation of farms. More than 100,000 people are currently internally displaced in the region due to drought, flooding and conflict.<sup>11</sup>

Lower Shabelle is the gateway to Mogadishu and is a very fertile region making it one of the most strategic regions in Somalia. Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, the region has been characterized by inter-clan conflict over land ownership and political power. Since 2012, AMISOM alongside Somali government forces have taken over key towns from Al-Shabaab which had controlled the region since 2008. Due to these shifting political dynamics and the introduction of the federal system in Somalia in 2012, powerful clan militias started fighting to control the region and its resources, their alliances shifting frequently between the government and Al-Shabaab depending on who controlled their territory and who they thought would advance their interests at a given time; Somali government forces, AMISOM and Al-Shabaab have therefore also all fought against clan militias which they had previously supported. Al-Shabaab fighters

<sup>4</sup> This includes Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions.

<sup>5</sup> This includes Lower Shabelle, Bay, and Bakool regions.

<sup>6</sup> This includes Galgaduud and the southern part of Mudug regions.

<sup>7</sup> Hiraa and Middle Shabelle regions.

<sup>8</sup> The status of the Banadir regional administration within the federal system in which Mogadishu is located has not been determined yet. See UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia," S/2017/751, 5 September 2017, para. 7. And "Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia," S/2018/411, 2 May 2018, para 8.

<sup>9</sup> The Economist, *Why Somaliland is not a recognized state*, 1 November 2015, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/11/01/why-somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state>

<sup>10</sup> As of 2014. See: UN Population Fund, *Population Estimation Survey 2014*, October 2014, p.31, <https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PFSS-2013-2014.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> As of July 2018. See: UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance, *2018 Humanitarian Response Plan – Revised, July – December 2018*, July 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20Revised%20HRP%20July%202018-FINAL.pdf>

Ms. OMAR. AFRICOM confirms that four of the strikes were conducted by the United States but denies any civilian casualties took place. Their spokesperson said that the way they determine civilian casualties is not available to Amnesty International or, indeed, any other non-military resource.

My question to you is do you find this to be credible in the face of overwhelming reports that are to the contrary? And that we have not killed any civilians in the decades of drone strikes that we have had in Somalia?

Mr. MESERVEY. Sure. Thank you for the question.

So, a couple thoughts. One, it is I know that the U.S. military takes every effort to avoid civilian casualties. It is part of their SOPs, it is part of the ethic to which they subscribe. I also know that there is a fog of war in a place like Somalia and that, given the context of the conflict there, it is very difficult to sometimes distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

So it is, you know, you can either have indiv—

Ms. OMAR. Could a drone strike be 100 percent accurately, right, attacking? Or could—

Mr. MESERVEY. I think it is possible.

Ms. OMAR [continuing]. A report that says 100 percent no civilians—

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes, so that is actually—

Ms. OMAR. Would that be correct, is what I am asking you?

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. I think it is possible. But I think it is, frankly, impossible to know given how, what a non-permissive environment it is.

How do you even gather the facts on the ground in some of these places that are still controlled by al-Shabaab? You cannot go there safely. And, again, how do you distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant when, you know, you have farmers who are armed sometimes? Some join al-Shabaab and leave, and then join again and leave. So it is incredibly difficult.

And so I think it is possible that civilians have been killed. I also think it is possible, maybe not. For me it is, frankly, impossible to know, I think.

Ms. OMAR. Right. I hope it is not. It is a very challenging thing which, you know, it is one of those situations where they were making an investment to infrastructure, or figuring out if we invest in education, or how to best fight terrorism if we are not truly finding a path to have partnerships with the individual countries that are being impacted. Then we sort of kind, you know, are short-ending ourselves and them. And any investment that we are making, really, truly it is not ever going to have the kind of impact that we want it to have because there is a correlation between every—some of the reports say that there are correlations between every drone attack and the increase of suicide bombs that happen in Somalia.

And so when we are trying to be effective in combating terrorism but our actions could lead to an increase, and we get to have a problem for investing in education, and we, we are saying, you know, we are going to be sending you books but we do not really make the investment that the communities themselves need where they need the brick and mortar investment, then there is a problem if we are talking about diplomacy. And we are not really hav-

ing a conversation about what it means for us to send thousands and thousands of Liberians back to a country that could be fractured by that, without having the proper conversations with the Government of Liberia whether they could sustain that. Then it is a problem.

And I hope that as we continue to have a conversation about Africa, that we engage Africa and what that process looks like.

Ms. BASS. OK. I just have one last question and then we will wrap up.

I believe a couple of you mentioned the idea that we needed to have a second African Leaders Summit. And I wanted to know if you would just expand on that. How do we do that now?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I was part of the planning for the first Africa Summit that took place in 2014. I saw the positive impact that came from that summit, bringing African leaders from across the continent to the United States to engage with our leaders.

Other countries are doing it on a regular basis. China has one I think every other year. The Japanese host one every other year. The Europeans are hosting one.

Ms. BASS. So the question would be who would host it?

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Who would host that?

Ms. BASS. Right. I mean, you know, the issue would be would the African leaders respond to Congress.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think they would.

Ms. BASS. You do.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think they would respond to a request to come to the United States by President Trump. They want to engage with our leadership. They want to engage on issues that are important to them. And I think it will send a positive signal if the president were to invite them to attend.

Ms. BASS. So, what I said was Congress.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes.

Ms. BASS. I mean, you know, and I am just saying that just because I do not know. You know what I mean, in terms of the Administration, if the Administration was not interested in doing it, you know, is there another way you would convene a leaders summit.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, when I think about the prayer breakfast and how many leaders come to that, I think an invitation from our Congress would probably—you may not get all 54 but you would get a significant enough number that it would, it would be successful. And others would be, the ones who did not come would regret that they had not come. And it would, you know, you can set some goals to achieve during this conference. And I think leaders would respond.

Ms. BASS. You know, to my ranking member, when we, as Representative Omar mentioned, we went to Eritrea and Ethiopia. And, you know, just so excited about the potential in Ethiopia and the fact that the prime minister has established peace with Eritrea. And, you know, they are trying to come together in the Horn. That it would be nice to invite the prime minister over. Maybe he could even, you know, address both houses of Congress. We have that happen occasionally as to send a strong signal.

If either of you have any other closing thoughts?

Mr. COULIBALY. I would like to even go a step further to suggest a regular, every three or 4 years, kind of a summit between U.S. and African head of States. That gives us an agenda to work toward and some clear targets to achieve by then. But then in between obviously lower level staff can engage across the different African governments and the U.S. agencies, et cetera, to prepare for the summit, also to work on what came out of the summit.

And as the Ambassador mentioned, it has been a resounding success for all the countries who are holding those regular summits in terms of advancing their agenda in Africa. And it is really one place where there is a feeling that the U.S. is missing.

So I think that is very critical. When the U.S. held the summit in 2014, I think about \$14 billion or so was mobilized as far as U.S. businesses' investments intentions in Africa. So, clearly, there is scope for it to really boost the U.S. commercial ties with the continent.

Just one point in closing. It is basically the level of engagement with Africa, there is really a strong tendency now or aspiration for Africa to unite and then to take some regional approach to some issues that are of mutual interest. And you may be very well aware of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area.

Ms. BASS. Yes. I am familiar with that, yes.

Mr. COULIBALY. That is advancing. And I think as of—

Ms. BASS. How many countries are left to sign on?

Mr. COULIBALY. As of last—

Ms. BASS. Just one? Who is that?

Mr. COULIBALY. As of last week we are one vote away, from it coming into effect.

Ms. BASS. Good.

Mr. COULIBALY. However, I think as outlined, too, in Ambassador Bolton's strategy but also some commentary that came out of the AGOA summit over the summer, the U.S. approach and that of the African counterparts is not quite fully syncing yet. The U.S. is currently talking bilateral engagement while the African countries—

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Are talking regional engagement.

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY. So, hopefully, there could be some middle grounds where they will feel like—

Ms. BASS. That is a little bit of a disconnect.

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. So they will feel like that their viewpoint is important—

Ms. BASS. The administration as Congress'.

Mr. COULIBALY. But it is an important one because it is going to signal to what extent the U.S.—

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Is supportive—

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Of the regional initiatives for integration. And we know that they need that integration because the States are sort of small States—

Ms. BASS. Right.



Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. And it is going to scale that integration that can help boost economic opportunities and competitiveness on the continent.

For example, intra-Africa trade is only 17 percent.

Ms. BASS. Uh-huh.

Mr. COULIBALY. And if you look at intra-European trade, 70 percent. Asia, 60 percent plus. Here in North America you are looking at 30 percent or more. So it is indeed quite important and critical.

So as I begin to think about the post-AGOA architecture for U.S.-Africa engagement, taking into account that regional dimension would be important.

Ms. BASS. And I think it is right to think about post-AGOA. But we do still have a few more years left. And so I would also like to think about how do we maximize the time that we have.

Mr. COULIBALY. Yes. To be able to have something even earlier—

Ms. BASS. Right.

Mr. COULIBALY. —I think that is better.

Ms. BASS. It is right to think about that.

Mr. COULIBALY. But clearly the thinking should be—

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. COULIBALY [continuing]. Going on now. And if you look at the European Union at their summit in 2017, they made a promise to actually go toward a continent-to-continent kind of arrangement.

If you look at China during FOCAC, they try to align their programs with Africa's aspirations such as the Continental Free Trade Area, for example. So it is important also in the U.S.'s engagement to incorporate the views and aspirations of the African people to align the two agendas.

Ms. BASS. You would think?

Any more thoughts?

Mr. MESERVEY. Yes. I think I would like to see a routine U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit as well for all the mentioned, or for all the reasons that Dr. Coulibaly laid out.

I also think regular meetings between the presidents in the Oval Office with a head of state or African head of state maybe once a quarter or something. These high level engagements really matter.

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. MESERVEY. The, you know, CODELs are important. I am glad when those happen.

Ms. BASS. Yes.

Mr. MESERVEY. Just to maybe give some—to put a point on this, you know, President Xi Jinping his, in each of his two terms his first overseas trip was to Africa. The Chinese foreign minister's first overseas trip every year is to Africa.

They understand the importance of this high level engagement. And the U.S. just, this is one of the areas the U.S. needs to be better.

Ms. BASS. Yes. And I think, you know, one of our challenges is to, you know, as I have learned in Congress, administrations come and go but Congress stays the same. So I think all of us would love to see high level engagements but we cannot, you know, control that.

And so, and I do know from talking to a number of heads of State that they want to come over here. But, frankly, it is a little inappropriate unless they meet the head of State. And they have not received an invitation from the President. So a number of them have not come because it is like, you know, I cannot go over there until, you know.

So that is, that is a little bit of a dilemma. And I would really like to——

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I would argue against that though, Madam.

Ms. BASS. OK, please.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I know that the President of Ghana has been here several times.

Ms. BASS. Yes, that is true.

Ambassador THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And he has had very good meetings on The Hill, with the private sector, with its diaspora.

When I meet with African leaders and they tell me they do not want to come because they cannot get a meeting with the president, I tell them they are missing out on the opportunity to meet with you.

Ms. BASS. OK. OK. And you know what, as actually the President of Ghana is in the U.S. right now. I mean, he is going to be speaking at Harvard in a day or so. And we both recently met with the President of Sierra Leone. And maybe we could ask them to take that message back. Because I could see us having consistency with leaders, but it is not—you cannot speak for whatever, you know, administration is going to come and go.

Well, I want to thank everyone for the time, the patience. And just in closing, a couple of closing comments.

You know, we have said that we were doing this hearing. And we are going to do several more that really we are calling Africa 101. It is to just give the broad strokes as to where the continent is, where U.S. policy is, to figure out where we go from here, recognizing that we do have some immediate crises and issues that we need to attend to right away, but to provide the members of the committee with a broad overview of U.S.-Africa relations.

So, I want to thank the witnesses and members for being here today. And if there is no further business, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

**SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128**

**Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International  
Organizations**

**Karen Bass (D-CA), Chair**

March 26, 2019

**TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>):

**DATE:** Tuesday, March 26, 2019

**TIME:** 2:00 p.m.

**SUBJECT:** Looking Forward: U.S. – Africa Relations

**WITNESS:** Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield  
Senior Counselor  
Albright Stonebridge Group  
(Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs)

Brahima Coulibaly, Ph.D.  
Director  
The Brookings Institution

Mr. Joshua Meservey  
Senior Policy Analyst  
The Heritage Foundation

**By Direction of the Chairman**

*The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.*

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations HEARINGDay 03/26/2019 Date 2:00pm Room RHOB 2200Starting Time 2:50pm Ending Time 4:13pmRecesses 0 ( to ) ( to ) ( to ) ( to ) ( to ) ( to )

Presiding Member(s)

*Chairman Karen Bass*

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒Executive (closed) Session ☐Televised ☒Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒Stenographic Record ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

*Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations*

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

*See attached*

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an \* if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

*IFR - Rep. Michael McCaul**QFR - Rep. Chris Smith**IFR - Rep. Ilhan Omar*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE \_\_\_\_\_

or

TIME ADJOURNED 4:13pm*Nacmia*  
Subcommittee Staff Associate

**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
*SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND  
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*  
*COMMITTEE HEARING*

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
X	Karen Bass, CA
	Susan Wild, PA
X	Dean Phillips, MN
X	Ilhan Omar, MN
X	Chrissy Houlahan, PA

<i>PRESENT</i>	<i>MEMBER</i>
	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
	James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., WI
X	Ron Wright, TX
X	Tim Burchett, TN

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**HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751-9951**

11 March 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR MS TIRANA HASSAN

SUBJECT: AFRICOM RESPONSE TO LETTER DTD 15FEB2019, CIVILIAN CASUALTY ALLEGATIONS

Thank you for your letter on February 15, 2019, which seeks information about eight AFRICOM strikes in Somalia during 2017 and 2018. This letter responds to your request for information and provides additional information in the attachment.

Although the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Amnesty International may at times disagree about the facts concerning an alleged incident or even the applicable law, AFRICOM respects the work of Amnesty International and other similar NGOs. Amnesty International's report reflects a sincere effort to address a very important issue, dangerous work in an unstable country, and a humanitarian concern for innocent civilians that is one of the main purposes of the law of war.

In response to your questions regarding U.S. operations in Somalia, AFRICOM's use of military force in Somalia provides legitimacy to, and creates an opportunity for the Federal Government of Somalia to provide the security and economic growth required for long-term stability and prosperity. In Africa, Violent Extremist Organizations and criminal networks prey upon disenfranchised populations creating a cycle of recruitment and allowing extremist ideology to fester. Extremist networks also exploit criminal networks for the illicit transport of narcotics, weapons, and persons. Violent Extremist Organizations cultivate and encourage an environment of distrust, despair, and hopelessness to undermine governments, allowing for the expansion of their radical ideology. Violent Extremist Organizations on the African continent continue to be a serious threat to the shared interests of our partners, allies, and the U.S. In particular, al-Shabaab has extracted extreme costs on the civilian population in one attack alone, killing over 500 civilians in October 2017 using VBIEDs.

Prior to conducting strikes, AFRICOM takes precautions to protect the civilian population and avoid civilian casualties by establishing positive identification of the target as a legitimate military target authorized by the law of armed conflict; ensuring the target complies with AFRICOM Rules of Engagement; and minimizing potential adverse effects of weapon impacts..

The AFRICOM Combatant Commander has provided civilian casualty avoidance guidance, and has directed his staff to report and respond to civilian casualties. His guidance follows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3160.01C and is codified in the

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SUBJECT: AFRICOM RESPONSE TO LETTER DTD 15FEB2019, CIVILIAN CASUALTY  
ALLEGATIONS

Africa Command Instruction (ACI) 3200.03 Reporting and Responding to Civilian Casualties.  
Both of these documents are included in this response for your review.

In accordance with the Commander's guidance, AFRICOM reviewed the eight allegations that Amnesty International submitted in February 2019. Four of the allegations do not appear likely based on contradictory intelligence that cannot be disclosed because of operational security limitations. The remaining four allegations do not match AFRICOM records in regards to times, dates, and locations of lethal strikes. In those cases, AFRICOM personnel have had continued dialogue with your representatives, Jonathon Loeb, Brian Castner, and Elle McKnight to ascertain additional information regarding the reported strikes.

Protecting civilians is a fundamental part of AFRICOM's mission. Thank you for your efforts and emphasis on civilian casualties. We look forward to a continuing, productive dialogue with your organization as we seek stability and peace in Africa.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William P. West".

WILLIAM P. WEST  
Brigadier General, U. S. Air Force  
Deputy Director of Operations, J3

1. STRIKE Allegation #1. *In the middle of the afternoon on or around 16 October 2017, an airstrike targeted a suspected al-Shabaab vehicle travelling between the towns of Awdheegle and Bariire. The strike resulted in the death of two civilians, and the injury of five civilians, including two children, all of whom were residing in makeshift dwellings next to the road at the time of the attack. The vehicle was destroyed, and an unknown number of suspected al-Shabaab fighters who were inside were killed. Amnesty International spoke to nine eyewitnesses and survivors of the attack, and assessed media reports, US government reports, and photographic evidence of injuries sustained by civilians during the attack.*
  - RESPONSE: AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting a vehicle containing al-Shabaab fighters. Social media posts alleged CIVCAS shortly after the event. AFRICOM conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment regarding this strike and determined it is not likely to have caused the civilian casualties. Information gathered before and after the strike indicated that all individuals injured or killed were members or affiliates of al-Shabaab.
2. STRIKE Allegation #2. *During the evening on or around 16 October 2017, at least two airstrikes hit the northern outskirts of the town of Awdheegle, near an Al-Shabaab police station, killing several civilians who were residing in the vicinity, and an unknown number of suspected Al-Shabaab fighters.*
  - RESPONSE: AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest strike to this location was more than 3 km away and was not near any permanent structures such as a police station.
3. STRIKE Allegation #3. *In the early hours of the morning on 12 November 2017, the United States military conducted an airstrike in the farms to the southeast of the village of DaraSalaam, killing three civilian men who were sleeping under a tree after spending the evening irrigating the fields. Amnesty International conducted a total of 18 interviews with residents of DaraSalaam and its vicinity, including six eyewitnesses of the strike, and relatives of the deceased; and we conducted an open source investigation using social media posts, satellite imagery, news reports, and photos posted online on a pro-Al-Shabaab website.*
  - RESPONSE: AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting al-Shabaab fighters. The Shahada News Agency, an al-Shabaab media outlet, alleged CIVCAS shortly after the event and supported the claim using staged photos. AFRICOM conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment and determined that the three men described in the allegation were not sleeping at the time of the strike and were members of al-Shabaab.
4. STRIKE Allegation #4. *Between 10 and 17 November 2017, two civilians in the village of Bagdad were killed by an airstrike, and a further two civilians are missing and presumed dead following the strike. The strike was launched in support of a ground*



*raid against Al-Shabaab, and the men were killed as they swam across the river and a munition struck where they were in the water. Amnesty International interviewed 26 witnesses and relatives of the deceased, and consulted satellite imagery, media reports, and social media to verify this attack and the civilian status of the four deceased. An unknown number of Al-Shabaab fighters were also killed during the raid.*

- **RESPONSE:** AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest strike was more than 7.5 km away against an al-Shabaab group armed with mortars and RPGs.

5. **STRIKE Allegation #5.** *Between 10 and 17 November 2017, potentially at the same time as the above-mentioned strike in Bagdad village, survivors fled across the river to the neighboring village of Beledul-Karim. But at the same time, a US aircraft launched a strike on the village of Beledul-Karim itself. This attack hit two structures, killing a child, Mohamed Salah Mohamed, and an elderly man, Mahamood Osman Shaarib, and wounding at least four other civilians. To investigate this attack, Amnesty International interviewed eight residents of Beledul-Karim, and consulted satellite imagery and social media accounts.*

- **RESPONSE:** AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. The closest strike was more than 7.5 km away against an al-Shabaab group armed with mortars and RPGs.

6. **STRIKE Allegation #6.** *On 6 December 2017, five civilians were killed, including two children, and a further two civilians, including a small child, were injured, when an airstrike targeted a vehicle carrying suspected Al-Shabaab fighters in the isolated hamlet of Illimeey. All those in the vehicle were also killed. Up to seven homes and one shop were partially or completely destroyed in the blast and resulting fires. Amnesty International interviewed several people who were in Illimeey or its immediate vicinity at the time of the attack, and reviewed photographs taken at a hospital and the burial, satellite imagery and media reports to corroborate testimonies.*

- **RESPONSE:** AFRICOM did not conduct a strike at this location. Additional information provided by Brian Castner of Amnesty International indicated that the strike in question involved secondary explosions. On 11 December 2017, one week after the alleged incident, AFRICOM did strike a VBIED approximately 35 miles from this location but no secondary explosions were observed.

7. **STRIKE Allegation #7.** *On 2 August 2018, an airstrike killed three civilians, and one suspected Al-Shabaab member or former member, who were driving in a rural area approximately 1km east of Goobaanle village. The three civilians included a local businessman, 35-year-old Abdisamad Sheikh Issack Mohamed Gabow, who also worked for the Hormuud Telecommunications Company in Goobaanle village. According to information gathered by Amnesty International, the target of the strike*

was a suspected Al-Shabaab member in the vehicle. The van was destroyed. Amnesty International interviewed five people including two who witnessed the attack as well as close relatives and friends of the victims. Amnesty International also reviewed a number of media reports about the attack and spoke to an official from Hormuud Telecommunications who confirmed that Abdisamad Sheikh Issack Mohamed Gabow was an employee of theirs.

- **RESPONSE:** AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting individuals who were members of al-Shabaab. The pro-al-Shabaab media outlet, Somaliamemo.net alleged CIVCAS shortly after the event. AFRICOM conducted a CIVCAS allegation assessment and determined that the allegation was not credible based on the unreliability of the source and the fact that the individuals targeted were members of al-Shabaab.

8. **STRIKE Allegation #8.** *In the early hours of 9 December 2018, a US airstrike near the village of Beledul-Rahman, killed one civilian farmer and wounded another. A 47-year-old farmer named Dahir Abdi Qoriyow was irrigating his fields about 500 meters west of Beledul-Rahman. He had been in the fields since the afternoon. Relatives and neighbors explained to Amnesty International that he worked at night because many farms utilized the same canal and associated generators and watering equipment, forcing everyone to share and use each in turn; one businessman owned the pump and rented it to each farmer on a set schedule, which included times of darkness. At approximately 2am, Dahir's friend Rambow brought food for dinner, and at that moment the airstrike hit where the two men stood. Amnesty International interviewed 18 people, including eyewitnesses and relatives of the victims, and corroborated their testimony with social media posts, news accounts, US military statements, and NGO situational reports.*

- **RESPONSE:** AFRICOM conducted a precision-guided strike that corresponds to the time and location alleged, targeting individuals attacking partner forces.

**Questions for the Record from Representative Chris Smith  
Looking Forward: U.S.-Africa Relations  
March 26, 2019**

**Question:**

At the hearing, reference has been made to the role played by China, and to a lesser extent, by Russia, in Africa.

- a) What about the role of Turkey, particularly in the Horn of Africa, and especially Somalia?
- b) What are Turkey's objectives? Are they strictly economic and geopolitical, or is there an ideological and religious aim as well?
- c) If ideological and religious, how would you characterize that – is it promotion of “neo-Ottomanism?” A variant of Sunni Islam?
- d) With respect to Turkish promotion of Sunni Islam, such as by engaging in mosque building projects and proselytism, how does this compare with respect to Saudi Arabia's promotion of Wahhabism? Is it more benign? Do the Turks see themselves in competition with other Sunni schools, particularly Gülenist interpretations?
- e) What about the role of other outside actors, including Gulf States such as Qatar?

**Answers:**

**Amb. Linda Thomas-Greenfield:** Turkey plays a significant role in the Horn of Africa through direct budgetary support, humanitarian relief, infrastructure development, and by training military forces. Nowhere is this more evident than Somalia. Turkey's involvement with the Federal Government of Somalia began in 2011 ostensibly to provide famine relief. In the last eight years, the relationship has grown significantly: Turkey's largest embassy and largest foreign military base are now in Somalia. In addition to the increasing trade between the two countries, Turkey's heavy investment in Somalia's reconstruction demonstrates Turkey's desire to be seen as a leader in the Muslim world. Somalia is the most prominent example of Turkey's widespread diplomatic and economic investment in Africa. President Erdogan, who has already opened 26 new embassies on the continent, and has 41 embassies in Africa today, has stated that he wants Turkey to have a presence in every African capital.

Turkey's actions in Somalia, along with its ally Qatar, are one of many instances of increased militarization of the Red Sea. What began as a response to threats of Somali piracy, has grown due to the war in Yemen and the influence of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The proliferation of military bases surrounding the Red Sea is concerning given the massive amounts of global trade which passes through the Bab al-Mandeb strait each day.

Some Gulf State activity has been productive for the African countries in the Horn of Africa. For example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates hosted and mediated successful peace talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea last year. Gulf States have an interest in promoting stability in the Horn of Africa as they increasingly invest in its growing economies and fertile land.

However, Gulf state competition can also be divisive. In theory, increased competition among investors could offer greater funding for African states in need. Unfortunately, competition has exacerbated internal conflicts. This has played out in Somalia, where Turkey and Qatar back the Federal Government while the UAE pours funding into the autonomous regions, creating an unproductive dynamic for rebuilding the fragile state.

It is in the United States' interest that rivalries between the Gulf Cooperation Council and associated states not destabilize a region trying to get on its feet. The U.S. should work to empower domestic reform agendas and regional integration among states in the Horn of Africa to ensure increased foreign investment is in the best interest of the host country. In the future, U.S. diplomats and policymakers must recognize that developments in the Horn of Africa and on the Arabian peninsula are heavily co-dependent and should craft policy to reflect regional dynamics.

**Dr. Brahim Coulibaly:** Turkey's influence in the Horn, and especially in Somalia, has steadily been growing since 2011 through diplomatic, security, economic, and humanitarian channels. Though there can be several motivations for Turkey's increasing interest in the region, our reading is that Turkey's engagement is largely driven by the same factors as other actors in Africa, namely to become an important partner, capitalize on commercial opportunities and, help African partners address security challenges.

Notably, President Erdogan has ramped up his country's presence on the continent, having made official visits to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sudan,

Chad, and Tunisia. Turkey also opened the largest number of embassies on the continent between 2010 and 2016. The country also contributes \$1 million to the African Union annually. The year 2019 will witness the third Turkey-Africa heads of state summit.

Turkey sees the continent as a new, growing market for its products. As a nontraditional actor, Turkey's experience and emphasis on economics and trade relations makes engagement with the country appealing to fast-growing African nations. Indeed, Ankara has been careful to emphasize that Turkish-African relations are different than traditional donor-African ones, as partners rather than colonizers. Turkish Airlines operates 52 flights to Africa from Istanbul, more than any other airline. The "Anatolian Tigers," Turkey's small but quickly growing businesses, are particularly looking to Africa as the next frontier for their products and investments. In fact, between 2003 and 2017, Turkey's total trade with the continent grew by 400 percent, with particular growth in iron, steel, mineral fuels, and machinery. Turkey's experience in construction and infrastructure also make it attractive to African partners badly in need of infrastructure projects and upgrades. In October 2018, Turkey hosted the Second Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum, in which over 3000 delegates engaged each other over issues of energy, infrastructure, and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.

Somalia is a microcosm of Turkish-African relations. Ankara's aid during the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa sparked a positive relationship that has been cemented by continued support for schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure projects. Turkey continues to be one of Somalia's top aid donors. In terms of trade and business, in 2014, the Turkish Albayrak Group became the managing company of the Port of Mogadishu. Renovation in 2015 of Somalia's only international airport—also in Mogadishu—was led by Turkey's development agency, TIKA, and is operated by FAVORI LLC, a Turkish company. Turkish Airlines is also the only international carrier flying into Somalia, which creates opportunities for Turkish businesses to enter the country. In 2016, Turkey opened its largest embassy in the world in Somalia's capital. In September 2017, Turkey opened a \$50 million military base in Mogadishu, which will, among other tasks, be used to train Somali soldiers. Trade has been another aspect of growing Turkish-Somali relations: Between 2010 and 2016, Turkish exports to Somalia exploded from \$5.1 million to \$123 million.

Other nontraditional, Middle Eastern actors have their roles to play in Africa. In fact, between 2000 and 2017, the Horn saw \$13 billion in investment from Gulf states. Notably, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been jockeying for increased influence in the Horn, with mixed results. In particular, Qatar is planning to build a port on the Sudanese coast along the Red Sea. Qatar has also provided financing for Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam. The UAE, while historically involved in Djibouti, has been facing legal push back from local authorities over its control of its port. The UAE is also under pressure from Mogadishu as the UAE engages leaders from separatist Somaliland and Puntland. Its buildup of military assets in Eritrea has aggravated relations with Ethiopia as well.

**Mr. Joshua Meservey:** In 1998, Ankara promulgated a policy of increased engagement with Africa, and revived it with an Africa initiative launched in 2005.<sup>1</sup> As a result, its trade with Africa has dramatically increased, growing eightfold from 2000 to 2016.<sup>2</sup> It is pouring investment into Somalia and Ethiopia particularly, with the latter being the largest recipient of Turkey's Africa investments, and its fourth-largest African trading partner.

Turkey is lavishing its full suite of diplomatic engagements on the continent as well. As of 2018, Turkey had 44 embassies in Africa, nearly quadruple the 12 it had in 2009.<sup>3</sup> As prime minister and president, Erdogan, as of 2018, had visited the continent 40 times, which included visits to 23 African countries that had never received a Turkish leader.<sup>4</sup> In 2005, the African Union granted Turkey observer status, and in 2008, designated Turkey as a strategic partner to Africa.

Turkey has as well struck military training agreements with some African countries, such as Nigeria. Of particular significance is the recent announcement

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise noted, this response derives from Joshua Meservey, "The Saudi-Qatari Dispute: Why the U.S. Must Prevent Spillover into East Africa," The Heritage Foundation, November 29, 2017, <https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/the-saudi-qatari-dispute-why-the-us-must-prevent-spillover-east-africa>

<sup>2</sup> Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Turkey: Africa's friend, compatriot and partner," *Aljazeera*, June 1, 2019, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/turkey-africa-friend-compatriot-partner-160601070207148.html>

<sup>3</sup> Akihiro Sano, "Turkey jockeys with China for influence in Africa," *Nikkei Asian Review*, May 12, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Turkey-jockeys-with-China-for-influence-in-Africa>

<sup>4</sup> Yunus Paksoy, "Turkey's ties with Africa deeper, stronger in all areas," *Daily Sabah*, February 24, 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2018/02/24/turkeys-ties-with-africa-deeper-stronger-in-all-areas> and Abdinor Hassan Dahir, "How effective is Turkey's Africa Initiative?," *Daily Sabah*, September 19, 2017, <https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2017/09/19/how-effective-is-turkeys-africa-initiative>

that Turkey will participate in restoring Sudan's Suakin Island in the Red Sea, and its agreement with Sudan to establish a military presence in Port Sudan.<sup>5</sup>

Erdogan has particularly emphasized relations with Somalia. He visited Mogadishu three times between 2011 and 2016, and was the first non-African leader to visit since the fall of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Turkey established its largest African embassy and largest overseas military base in the world in Somalia, and Turkish Airlines was the only international carrier that flew to Somalia until November last year, when Ethiopian Air opened a Mogadishu route. Turkish companies also manage the Mogadishu seaport and airport that account for almost 80 percent of the Somali government's revenue.

Turkey has a range of objectives in its Africa engagements. As the Middle East remains unstable and Europe's economic outlook somewhat weak, Turkey is looking for new export markets. This includes prioritizing finding in Africa new markets for weapons sales.<sup>6</sup> Turkish companies have also made investments in particularly agriculture and energy, and are managing and building ports and other infrastructure on the continent.

Ankara may also be seeking African friendship as a hedge against potential diplomatic isolation from countries alarmed at Erdogan's increasingly authoritarian turn. The Turkish public sympathized with their fellow Muslims' suffering in Somalia during the 2011 famine, so there are also domestic political reasons for Erdogan to engage in Somalia.

Ankara likely recognizes the strategic importance of particularly the Horn of Africa, given its long Indian Ocean coastline and commanding position over the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait. Turkey also positioned itself on the Qatari side of the Gulf States rift, and the increasing presence of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in East Africa likely spurs some of Turkey's own activities in the region.

Finally, Erdogan appears to have a certain nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire that had a presence throughout the Horn of Africa, and seeks to position Turkey as the defender of Muslims around the world. Suakin Island is a historic waypoint for

<sup>5</sup> Mohammad Amin, "Suakin: 'Forgotten' Sudanese island becomes focus for Red Sea rivalries," *Middle East Eye*, March 18, 2018, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/suakin-forgotten-sudanese-island-becomes-focus-red-sea-rivalries>

<sup>6</sup> Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coskun, "Turkey opens military base in Mogadishu to train Somali soldier," *Reuters*, September 30, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH>

Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca, and Turkey has embarked on a global mosque-building spree. Given Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP's) Islamist beliefs and affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood, these developments should concern the United States.

Ankara's promotion of Islam does not appear to have been as extensive as Saudi Arabia's proselytization of Wahhabism. An estimate from 2004 held that Saudi Arabia had already spent over \$75 billion proselytizing Wahhabism,<sup>7</sup> and there is no indication Turkey has spent comparable amounts. Furthermore, the Saudi royal family's domestic political legitimacy relies in part on its propagation of Wahhabism, which gave Saudi leadership a strong motivation to vigorously promote it. Erdogan's domestic popularity is not as closely tied to his facilitation of the spread of Turkish Islam. Turkey's Islam has a strong nationalist component, however, which presents its own set of challenges, such as slowing the integration of the Turkish diaspora in Europe.<sup>8</sup>

Erdogan used the foiled 2016 coup to press his campaign against Turkish cleric in exile Fethullah Gulen, a political rival he accuses of complicity in the coup. In Africa alone, the Turkish government took control of 32 schools associated with Gulen,<sup>9</sup> who leads the moderate Hizmet Islamic movement.

Similar to Turkey, Gulf states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. have dramatically escalated their involvement in particularly the Horn of Africa. The U.A.E. recently built a military base in Assab, Eritrea—also used by the Saudis—and is building one in Berbera, Somaliland. Last year, it also delivered a \$1 billion bailout to Ethiopia's central bank. Saudi Arabia has its own plans to build a base in Djibouti, and has made a range of large investments—particularly in agriculture—in East African countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan.

Qatar is increasingly active in Somalia, particularly since a falling out between the U.A.E. and Mogadishu. It also struck a deal last year with Sudan to develop the latter's Suakin Island port, the same island where Turkey plans to restore Suakin town.

<sup>7</sup> David D. Aufhauser, "An Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Terrorism Financing," testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 15, 2004, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg95189/html/CHRG-108shrg95189.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Gonul Tol, "Turkey's Bid for Religious Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, January 10, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeys-bid-religious-leadership>

<sup>9</sup> Paksoy, "Turkey's ties with Africa deeper, stronger in all areas."



**Question:**

With respect to presidential elections which took place earlier this year in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, would you characterize them as “free and fair?”

**Answers:**

**Amb. Linda Thomas-Greenfield:** I will address these two elections separately.

In the DRC, the electoral process encountered some well documented issues as evidenced by U.S. Treasury sanctions against officials of the electoral commission for obstructing the elections. This would not lead us to describe the elections as free and fair. Nevertheless, the victory of President Tshisekedi seems to have been widely accepted by many in the international community including the U.S., and, most importantly, heads of state on the African continent. The transition helped avert a much-feared escalation to electoral violence and allowed the country’s first peaceful transfer of power.

As I noted in my testimony, the Nigerian elections showed that states looking to consolidate democracy still have a long way to go. There is widespread consensus that these elections fell short of the high standards set in 2015. Unfortunately, there were some instances of violence and irregularities, though we can conclude that the disturbances did not ultimately upset the legitimacy of the results. Nevertheless, the opposition party is contesting the elections through the Nigerian court system. The Nigerian government still needs to make progress in future electoral reform, but the Nigerian people still show a strong commitment to democracy.

**Dr. Brahim Coulibaly:** While there have been questions from trustworthy sources raised over the legitimacy of the recent elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), after a Constitutional Court rejected a recount, leaders across sub-Saharan Africa have congratulated now-President Felix Tshisekedi on his victory. Though the elections’ administration was not perfect, it seems that Tshisekedi did not play a role in the process: He was not involved in organizing nor overseeing the elections. Now, it is in the best interest of the country and the region as a whole to recognize the deficiencies in the electoral process, but note that the transition of leadership to the opposition, the first of its kind in the country, has been peaceful. I believe the best course of action is to engage him and provide the necessary support to steer his policies in the right

direction, including creating the environment for more credible elections in a few years.

In Nigeria, despite tensions and their controversial postponement, elections observers have largely agreed that the elections were free and fair overall. Importantly, according to observers, any irregularities have not been severe enough to have affected to outcome.

**Mr. Joshua Meservey:** All available evidence shows that the December 2018 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo were not free or fair. The Catholic Church, Congo's most authoritative and legitimate institution, announced that data collected by its 40,000 election observers contradicted the electoral commission's results announcing Felix Tshisekedi as winner. Two other independent analyses determined Tshisekedi's win was a "huge fraud," and that the probability of winning his announced vote share was "less than 0.0000."<sup>10</sup>

Tshisekedi's ascension is the likely result of a backroom deal between him and the former president, Joseph Kabila, who will continue to wield significant influence in the government. While the DRC is well rid of the kleptocratic and brutal Kabila, Tshisekedi may prove to be little of an upgrade given his apparent contempt for the rights of the Congolese people to choose their leadership. His uneasy détente with Kabila could also shatter, leading to a violent struggle for full control of the government. His lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the plurality of voters in the recent election will make it hard for him to be an effective leader as well.

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<sup>10</sup> Joshua Meservey, "America Must Not Endorse Faulty Elections in the Congo," *The National Interest*, February 20, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-not-endorse-faulty-elections-congo-45122>