[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-2]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S SUPPORT TO THE SOUTHERN BORDER
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 29, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-335 WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
KATIE HILL, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
Justin Lynch, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Gilday, VADM Michael, USN, Director of Operations (J3), Joint
Staff.......................................................... 6
Rood, Hon. John, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of
the Secretary of Defense....................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Rood, Hon. John, joint with VADM Michael Gilday.............. 59
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 75
Mr. Brown.................................................... 73
Ms. Escobar.................................................. 75
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 72
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 73
Mr. Smith.................................................... 67
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S SUPPORT TO THE SOUTHERN BORDER
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 29, 2019.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Call the meeting to order, if everyone could
please take their seats. Welcome. Since this is our first
hearing as a new committee, just one quick sort of housekeeping
measure. We talked a little bit during our organizational
meeting about the 5-minute rule. I didn't get into the
specifics of it.
So now that we have witnesses here, when each of you are
asking questions, the 5-minute rule applies to the totality of
your conversation, or at least I am going to try to have it be
that way. So in other words, if you ask a question for 5
minutes, it doesn't mean that the witnesses then answer it for
another 10; we try to stop it at 5.
Now, for the witnesses, I will not cut you off in mid-
sentence, but the second it hits that 5 minute, there will be a
light little tapping, just to remind you that we are supposed
to move on to the next person and if you could summarize at
that point that would be great.
I will try--like I said, I will try to let you finish the
thought, and then also we always have the option of, you know,
if you don't get to everything that was asked, there's the
fail-safe, you know, we will take it for the record, we will
submit it to your office when we get a chance.
But that is because, as you can see, we have a large
interest in this subject and we want to try to get to everybody
today, give every member a chance, if possible, to ask
questions.
So the purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the
deployments to the border that have been done of both Guard,
Reserve, and Active Duty members of the military.
To help us understand this policy, the Pentagon has sent us
the Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood, thank you very
much for being here; and the Director of Operations for the
Joint Staff, Vice Admiral Michael Gilday. I appreciate you both
being here and look forward to your testimony.
We have a number of questions we want to figure out. First
of all, it's just sort of the basics. How many Active Duty
members have been sent? What is the plan going forward, how
does that compare to the Guard and Reserve? Why did we choose
Active Duty for part of this instead of the Guard and Reserve?
Because as most members of this committee know, there is a
fairly substantial history of Presidents using members of the
Guard and Reserve under title 32 for border security
operations. What is a little bit more unusual is sending Active
Duty personnel to the border. It's not unprecedented, but it
has not been done before very often.
So this was an unusual step, and one of the biggest areas
of question we have there is what is the impact of this on DOD
[Department of Defense]? As this committee well knows, we fell
way behind in readiness as a result of the Iraq war and the
Afghanistan war, and just the tempo that the military had to go
through, and we began to catch up on that, which is good.
But what impact does it have to readiness to send several
thousand troops down to the southern border? It interrupts
their training, it interrupts their dwell time. How is that
impacting it? And also, we don't, to my knowledge, have a
figure for what this has cost the Pentagon yet, so we want
those details.
Another big piece of this is the reason Active Duty troops
and Guard and Reserve were sent there in the first place was
because there was a perceived crisis at the border. There
really isn't that much evidence of that crisis.
Now, that is not to say that border security isn't a
challenge, and in speaking for myself but also I believe for
all of the people on this committee, we believe border security
is enormously important and a challenge, something we have to
continually try to figure out how to get right.
Not the primary jurisdiction of this committee, other
committees are supposed to handle it, but we acknowledge its
importance and the role that the military will occasionally
play in helping it. But when you look at the statistics, the
peak of our problem on the border was in 2004 and in 2005.
Consistently up to that point, there was over a million
apprehensions of unauthorized attempted border crossings at the
border. For the last several years, that number has been below
400,000, so roughly one-third of what it was.
And this didn't happen by accident. We made an investment
in a bipartisan way. From 2005 forward, we have nearly doubled
the number of Border Patrol agents. We have built 700 miles of
wall. We have drones and sensors, and all manner of different
efforts that have been taken to reduce the amount of
unauthorized border crossings.
And as a result of that, we have actually had zero net
migration from Mexico for I think going on 4 or 5 years. So
while border security is always a challenge, there's really not
much evidence that right at the moment it is a crisis that
would call for the, if not unprecedented then highly unusual,
step of sending Active Duty troops to the border.
We need to better understand not just that border security
is a challenge, we get that. We get that drugs come across the
border, although as has been very well documented they do not
usually come across--you know, they come across through ports
of entry. There are other areas where we need to spend money if
we are going to try to get at that issue.
So if it is an issue, why all of a sudden now is it a
crisis and what impact is it having on the military? And
lastly, we have all heard much of the discussion about the
possibility of the President declaring a state of emergency and
taking money from a variety of different places in order to
build a wall.
And when he is talking about a state of emergency, he is
talking about taking the money pretty much exclusively to build
a wall. And, you know, that is not this committee's primary
area of debate, but certainly I think all members here have a
strong opinion and don't be surprised if you get a question or
two about that.
But when it comes to the declaration of the emergency, the
President has fairly broad authority under a 1976 law to do
that. He would have to justify that emergency, and I am certain
it would be challenged in court, but the real big concern here
is where does he find the money?
And if he is talking about building a wall, I know we have
talked about $4 or $5 billion right now, but the long-term cost
of what he is talking about is much, much more than that. And
the main--the only pot of money, as I understand it, in the
Pentagon that the President could go after, would come out of
military construction.
I think there is a bipartisan opinion on this committee
that we should not be taking Department of Defense dollars out
of military construction, well, for anything, for a wall or
anything else, because again we have a readiness challenge,
that money needs to be spent there.
So what would the impact of that be is something we are
going to be interested in. There are other pots of money that
the President can go to. The primary one is the Army Corps of
Engineers and those are for projects that are primarily focused
on flood relief, not necessarily, not DOD priorities.
There are other pots of money but none of them are that
big. I mean let's face it, when you look at the discretionary
budget, the Department of Defense is where the money's at. So
we are deeply concerned that if an emergency is declared, that
money is going to be taken out of DOD for what some of us think
is a questionable purpose, but whether you support the purpose
or not, where that money is right now is important and we would
not like to see it taken away.
With that, I will yield to the ranking member for his
opening statement and I thank our witnesses again for appearing
before us.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Let me join in welcoming our witnesses,
thank you all for being here today. In my view, it is perfectly
appropriate for our committee to examine the mission and the
activities of our military on the southern border.
And I think that the questions the chairman asked at the
beginning of his statement, what are we doing down there, how
much does it cost, what effect does it have on readiness, and
so forth are perfectly legitimate questions.
I do have concerns that the broader issues related to the
immigration debate that are not the purview of this committee
may be brought into this room, even though we have no
jurisdiction and even though it threatens, at least, to begin
us this year on a more partisan contentious note than we
otherwise might.
I hope that does not happen. When it comes to DOD, I note
that the briefing material prepared for us by the staff say
that the previous five administrations have authorized the use
of Armed Forces operating under title 10 authorities in support
of border security.
And as a matter of fact, we tried to look at the various
functions going back to at least the early 1990s that include
things like surveillance and logistics and command and control
and aviation support and a whole variety of things.
I noticed that in 1997 under President Clinton, the
military was used for construction to build and improve
physical barriers. I noted in 2012 under President Obama, the
military was used for construction to install sensor equipment
and so forth.
So I guess my takeaway, trying to put this a little in
context is, number one, what the administration has done is in
line with, consistent with, the sorts of things that we have
asked the military to do for a long, long time.
My second takeaway is that under administrations of both
parties and Congresses of both parties, we obviously aren't
providing for adequate resources for border security, because
we keep having to use the military to back up the Border Patrol
when it ought to be their job to do it.
Now again, some of that takes us into areas outside of this
committee, how much we do on border security, but clearly it
has implications for us. And I hope that as we not only look at
what we are doing today but put today's mission in context,
going back what, 30 years or more, that it at least informs
maybe decisions that are made outside of this room.
Thank you all again for being here, we look forward to your
testimony and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. That, gentlemen--please, it was--
Mr. Rood you are going to go first.
Secretary Rood. Yes, thank you.
The Chairman. Okay. And for the record, in your--in your
books, there is a joint statement that they both provided for
the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rood. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thornberry, other distinguished members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the
Defense Department's support to the Department of Homeland
Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection mission to secure
the southern border of the United States.
The Department of Defense has a long history of supporting
border security. DOD has supported efforts to secure U.S.
borders since the early 1990s. DOD has supported civilian law
enforcement border security activities, counter-drug
activities, and activities to counter transnational organized
crime and other transnational threats.
Active, Reserve, and National Guard personnel have provided
operational military support such as aerial reconnaissance,
ground surveillance, search and rescue support, and medical
support. DOD has loaned facilities and special equipment such
as aerostats, ground surveillance radars, and ground sensors to
CBP, or Customs and Border Protection.
DOD has also provided temporary housing support to the
Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS, as part of the
national response to the surge of unaccompanied alien children,
or UAC, at the U.S. southern border.
From 2012 to 2017, DOD provided shelter for nearly 16,000
unaccompanied alien children who received care, security,
transportation, and medical services from HHS.
Consistent with section 2815 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Secretary of
Defense certified that providing this sheltering support to HHS
would not negatively affect military training, operations,
readiness, or other military requirements, including National
Guard and Reserve readiness.
At the direction of President Bush, in support of CBP's
Operation Jump Start, DOD provided National Guard personnel--
some 6,000 from June of 2006 to July of 2007 and some 3,000
from July of 2007 to July of 2008--to augment and enhance CBP's
ability to execute its border security mission.
National Guard personnel provided aviation, engineering,
medical, entry identification, communications, vehicle
maintenance, administrative, and other non-law enforcement
support. In addition, the National Guard improved the southern
border's security infrastructure by building more than 38 miles
of fence, 96 miles of vehicle barrier, more than 19 miles of
new all-weather road, and conducting road repairs exceeding 700
miles.
At the direction of President Obama, DOD provided up to
1,200 National Guard personnel annually from 2010 to 2016 in
support of CBP's Operation Phalanx. National Guard personnel
provided aerial reconnaissance, analytical support, and support
to counterdrug enforcement activities that enabled CBP to
recruit and train additional officers to serve along the
southern border.
DOD works closely with the Department of Homeland Security
[DHS] on requests for assistance. Across the full range of
support that DOD has provided DHS--border security support,
disaster support, special event security support, and support
for protection of the President--DOD has worked closely with
DHS as that department develops its request for DOD assistance
as deliberately, expeditiously, and as effectively as possible
to meet mission needs.
DOD carefully considers all requests for assistance,
including in order to determine whether DOD has the requested
capabilities and resources and whether providing the requested
assistance is consistent with the law.
When a request is approved, DOD works with the requester to
select the right forces and resources to meet the requester's
mission needs and to avoid or mitigate potential impacts on
military readiness. DOD has used the same process for every DHS
request for assistance related to DHS's border security
mission.
In our current type of support, in his April 4, 2018,
memorandum titled, Securing the Southern Border of the United
States, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to
support DHS in, quote, securing the southern border and taking
other necessary actions to stop the flow of deadly drugs and
other contraband, gang members, and other criminals and illegal
aliens into this country, end quote.
The President also directed the Secretary of Defense to
request the use of the National Guard to assist in fulfilling
this mission, pursuant to section 502 of title 32, and to use
such other authorities as appropriate and consistent with
applicable law.
The President also directed the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
Attorney General, to determine what other resources and actions
are necessary to protect our southern border, including Federal
law enforcement and U.S. military resources.
All of this military support has been, and will continue to
be, provided consistent with the law, including the Posse
Comitatus Act, section 1385, title 18. Military personnel have
supported civilian law enforcement efforts but do not directly
participate in law enforcement activities such as search,
seizure, and arrest.
Military personnel protecting CBP personnel performing
their Federal functions at points of entry are consistent with
the April 1971 opinion of the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, also complying with the Posse Comitatus Act.
So, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me say the military's
presence and support increase the effectiveness of CBP's border
security operations, free U.S. Border Patrol agents to conduct
law enforcement duties at the southern border, and enhance
situational awareness to stem the tide of illegal immigration,
human smuggling, and drug trafficking along the southern
border.
The ongoing temporary DOD support is a continuation of the
Department's long history of supporting DHS and CBP in their
mission to secure the U.S. border. These decisions are far from
static, and we continue to work with the services, the National
Guard Bureau, and U.S. Northern Command to evaluate mission
requirements and associated risks.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Rood and Admiral
Gilday can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday.
STATEMENT OF VADM MICHAEL GILDAY, USN, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
(J3), JOINT STAFF
Admiral Gilday. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Thornberry, distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for your support of the men and women in uniform who
serve our Nation. And thanks for the opportunity this morning
to address our military's support to the Department of Homeland
Security in their mission to secure our southwest border.
As Secretary Rood mentioned, DOD has a well-established
relationship with DHS. This includes our recent efforts to
support the responses to hurricanes Michael and Florence, the
wildfires in California, and our joint cybersecurity
initiatives protecting our Nation's critical infrastructure.
DOD's mission of homeland defense is inextricably linked to
DHS's mission of homeland security. There is no better example
than the ongoing efforts of our Active and Guard personnel
supporting Customs and Border Protection along our southern
border today.
Since the Commander in Chief directed the military to
support DHS in securing the southern--the southern border in
April, National Guard personnel have supported CBP Operation
Guardian Support, augmenting CBP efforts to secure the border
by performing administrative, logistical, and operational
support tasks from April to the present day.
Active Duty military personnel have supported CBP's
Operation Secure Line since October in the areas of aviation,
engineering, facilities, and medical support, and by providing
protection for CBP personnel while they perform their Federal
functions at our ports of entry.
This support is now transitioning to the operation of
mobile surveillance cameras in support of CBP in all nine
border patrol sectors across four States and the placement of
concertina wire on existing barriers at areas designated by CBP
between ports of entry in Arizona and in California.
We believe that our military's presence and support have
served to increase the effectiveness of CBP's border security
operation by enabling them to focus on their law enforcement
duties at our ports of entry.
Our strong partnership with DHS has allowed us to match
their mission requirements to existing core competencies of our
Guard and Active force, while operating under existing DOD
authorities. Thus far, the results have been very successful.
I would like to thank you again for your support and for
the opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward
to taking your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Could you give us the
specifics, as a starting point, on the Active Duty troops that
were deployed, when they were first deployed, how many are
there now, and how long they are supposed to be there for.
Secretary Rood. With regard to Active Duty troops, sir, we
presently have just a little under 2,300--or excuse me, just
over 2,300 Active Duty troops. They are scheduled, right now,
to be deployed through January of 2019.
One portion of them has been approved to be deployed
through January of 2019. There will be additional deployments
of Active Duty troops that will go through the end of this
fiscal year, September 30th, in response to the latest request
from the Department of Homeland Security.
The Chairman. And what was the original number was, like,
5,600 I believe, something like that? How long were that many
troops there?
Secretary Rood. There's a combination, sir, of National
Guard and Active Duty troops that were deployed, and the
numbers fluctuate. And so as you recall----
The Chairman. I know the numbers--I am sorry, I know the
numbers fluctuate. But the number of Active Duty troops that
were sent there in the first place--and I am focused on the
Active Duty piece--I believe was 5,600. Is that correct?
Secretary Rood. It was about 5,900.
The Chairman. 5,900. Okay.
Secretary Rood. And that was at the beginning of November.
The Chairman. And that is the part that is kind of
different from everything else, here. Most of what Mr.
Thornberry referred to in terms of the Active Duty side of it
is under title 10. We have provided equipment, sensors, and
various other things.
It is very, very rare to send Active Duty troops to the
border. We have used the Guard and Reserve consistently. And
what was different about this set of circumstances that made us
send, 5,800 Active Duty troops to the border? I don't see it.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I will provide some context----
The Chairman. I am sorry, could you pull the microphone a
little closer to you, there?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. These things are not as sensitive as they
could be.
Admiral Gilday. Is that better?
The Chairman. That is much better, yes.
Admiral Gilday. At that particular time, the group of
migrants that were massing in southern Mexico was approaching
about 10,000. And at that time, we weren't sure, DHS wasn't
sure, which route or routes that they were going to take to the
southwest border. There were four or five different routes that
they could have come by.
There was some concern with respect to timing, on whether
they were going to go by foot, whether they were going to go by
vehicle, or whether they were going to go by rail.
So at that time, the President directed that we examine
options to augment CBP at the border so that they could mass
their personnel at the ports of entry, and we could provide an
augmentation force to allow them to do that.
The Chairman. And did those--those border caravans all went
to the ports of entry, did they not?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, they actually all went to the ports of
entry in California, initially.
The Chairman. Right.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It's kind of what they said they were going
to do, from what I was reading, anyway.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, not initially. So they made that
determination when they arrived in Mexico City, but at the time
they were down in Hidalgo, we didn't know where they were going
to go. We didn't know if they were going to go to Brownsville
or if they were going to go to New Mexico.
The Chairman. Just for reference, Mexico City is a pretty
fair distance from the border. And for the most part, these
people are walking. And that was one of the things that struck
me at the time, every estimate that we got out of you folks was
that they were going to get here in roughly January.
And the border deployment--I believe the Active Duty troops
were first sent to the border in September, correct?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, the Active Duty----
The Chairman. October----
Admiral Gilday. The Active Duty troops, the request came in
the end of October.
The Chairman. End of October, okay.
Admiral Gilday. And we deployed them in early November.
The Chairman. I just--one final question this morning
because I want to let my other colleagues get in here. You said
that, you know, it's worked, basically; the Active Duty troops
have improved the situation. What is your metric for that?
Because as near as I can tell, you know, we have made
substantial improvement since 2005 on border security, but what
metric has changed since we sent the Active Duty troops there
that shows that there has been some sort of improvement on any
of these issues that you list in terms of, you know, drugs and
border crossings and all of that?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, in terms of metrics, the initial
deployment consistent with a heavy deployment of engineering
personnel, so along 22 of the ports of entry we laid some 70
miles of concertina wire to make it more difficult for somebody
to cross over illegally at those ports of entry. This made it
easier for--it allowed CBP, we believe, to be able to spread
their manpower more efficiently across a large number of ports
of entry that could have potentially been at risk.
Additionally, we sent medical personnel down to help with
initial screening. And we also sent down some facilities people
to provide facilities for CBP.
But in terms of the metrics, sir, I would say that the fact
that we hardened those ports of entry is probably probably the
best answer that I can give you.
Secretary Rood. The only thing I would add, Mr. Chairman,
as we look to the Customs and Border Patrol and the Department
of Homeland Security as the primary mission-holder. Our role,
of course, is to augment their efforts.
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Rood. Their statements to us and their assessment
of the efforts that DOD has provided is that it has allowed
them to focus their resources elsewhere and assisted in their
mission accomplishment.
The Chairman. None of that is an actual metric measurement.
That is just sort of the opinion. But one final question--
sorry, I do have one final question. When are we going to be at
the point where you can say we don't need Active Duty troops?
Because we haven't needed them for a long time before that, now
we apparently need them.
What are we looking for where we can get to the point where
we no longer are going to send Active Duty troops to the
border? What needs to be accomplished before we can stop using
this somewhat unprecedented step of actually sending Active
Duty troops to the border?
Secretary Rood. Mr. Chairman, of course, the Defense
Department acts in support of request from the Department of
Homeland Security/CBP, they are the primary mission-holder. As
we look to how we will choose to augment those resources and
respond to those requests for assistance, we look across the
total force, Active, Reserve, and National Guard, to determine
what is the right mix and the appropriateness of the force to
respond.
And that is where our decision was made in terms of the
timeliness----
The Chairman. Got it. So you don't really know basically
what we need to accomplish. At the end of the day, it's DHS
that makes that call. They decide that they need. They ask you
for help. They work through it. But surely as the one providing
the resources and trying to plan for the future, they have
given you some idea of what it is they are trying to accomplish
so that they won't need you anymore.
Secretary Rood. They do give us an idea and we work with
them to scope the requests and to understand what they are
trying to accomplish so that we provide the right capabilities.
The Chairman. And what would your take on that be?
Admiral Gilday. It depends on the specific request, sir.
You know, for example, some of the requests where they have
asked for surveillance capabilities, we delve into a little bit
of what are you trying to detect and why and what are the
circumstances?
With regard to the National Guard, of course, we work with
the National Guard Bureau and----
The Chairman. Sorry, but that is--I don't want to
interrupt, I am asking specifically about the Active Duty
troops who have been sent to the border. I understand all that
other stuff. All that other stuff, if that was all you are
doing, was all that stuff that you have talked about, we
wouldn't be having this hearing.
It is the Active Duty troops that sort of caught the
attention of the committee.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, if I can give an example, but before
that, back to the metric----
The Chairman. Microphone again, sorry.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, just for a moment on the metric. We
really are trying to prove a negative if we are trying to
prove, you know, how many people didn't cross the border. We
just don't know, except for the feedback that we receive from
CBP that, you know, at the time we deployed, you know, those
initial numbers were 10,000; now 10,000 never reached the
border. But, you know, we felt that we were better prepared--or
CBP was better prepared because of the work that we did.
In terms of the work that we have done and are doing, it's
not, it's not a steady-state demand signal. So although we
deployed 5,900 in early November, by Christmas those numbers
are down to 2,400----
The Chairman. Why?
Admiral Gilday. Because we had--we finished laying the
concertina wire. When that mission was complete, we redeployed
those people home. When we determined that the flow of migrants
that had to be screened by our medical personnel wasn't as high
as originally estimated, we downsized and we brought those
people home.
When the facilities that we built were no longer required
by CBP, they had initially surged their forces--their personnel
down there, we had provided temporary housing. When that wasn't
required, we sent our people and we sent the equipment home.
And so we have tried to adjust, keeping in mind readiness,
keeping in mind cost. And so it has been fairly evolving and
dynamic.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, I want to go back, because I am
not sure we got the rest of the story. You started your answer
a few moments ago on why Active Duty, with 10,000 folks coming
up through Mexico, didn't know for sure where they are going to
go. The decision was that the Border Patrol folks would focus
on the ports of entry, and that left the rest of the border to
be covered.
And so can you continue then? And back to the chairman's
question, why Active Duty in that circumstance versus Guard?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So broadly we are taking a look
at these requirements across the total force. And we are trying
to see which forces are best suited for the task and who is
readily available. And so in one's mind's eye, they may think
that the National Guard is just a gigantic organization that we
continue to draw from for years and years, for a decade, in
fact. And we just can't.
And so at the time when those forces were massing and we
weren't sure whether they were going to come by foot, by
vehicle, or by train, the decision was made within the
Department given the options that we laid out in terms of
timing, to send Active Duty, because we get those troops down
there within a week.
And so I hope that gives a little bit more context, sir, in
terms of what drove the Active Duty. But we did look at the
Guard, and we did look at Guard capacity for the missions--for
those particular missions or the requirements that DHS and CBP
had requested, and we just did not have those. We didn't have
that--those skill sets available in the Guard to draw upon at
the time.
Secretary Rood. Congressman Thornberry, if I may add just
briefly to that?
Mr. Thornberry. Yeah.
Secretary Rood. In evaluating the present request, in
working with the National Guard Bureau and the state adjutant
generals, part of the reason, or the reason that we have
selected from the Active Duty to fill part of those requests
going forward is that the Guard satisfies those requests from
19 Guard units, 19 States. And there's a limit to the number of
volunteers, which is the way they have sourced them, that they
can do.
And so the feedback from the National Guard Bureau and the
adjutant generals is that about the present state, a little
over 2,000, is what they can sustain. And therefore the delta
between that sustainable rate and the new request from the
Department of Homeland Security is what we are going to source,
therefore, from the Active Duty.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Yeah, that really gets to where I
wanted to go. So if I can just summarize my understanding of
this, Homeland Security says, we need help doing X, Y, Z, and
then you--can you, DOD, help us? And then you look at what
those specific requirements, or asks, are, and figure out what
forces can fulfill their requests?
And in this case, one of the key things was how quick can
you get them there, because you didn't know where the caravan
was going. And, secondly, what sort of specific capabilities
did you need, because a lot of the Guard folks, at least the
ones that you could deploy, didn't really have it. Does that
sum it up?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think so. I would like to add,
though, that these requirements from CBP just don't drop as a
surprise. And so we work with CBP on a daily basis to refine
these requirements so that we can be more predictable, so that
we can ask hard questions, so that we can look at legal aspects
and make sure that, you know, the force is going to be used in
a way that is consistent with the authorities that we have.
And so it is ongoing partnership to get to what we think is
the right answer. And the right answer isn't always
satisfactory for all parties.
Mr. Thornberry. But you have got to be flexible with
events, because, for example, there are stories that there's a
new caravan that is forming in Central America, headed this
way. So you have got to, in your conversations with them, be
ready to adjust to changes in the situation, don't you?
Secretary Rood. Yes, that is right. And you are correct,
current information shows a caravan of over 12,000 people.
There are three that we are tracking--the Department of
Homeland Security is tracking--en route, and one of which is
over 12,000 people, in the latest estimate.
And so, yes, we do have to be flexible on those events. As
Admiral Gilday mentioned, the number of troops and the mix of
them has varied over time and it will need to do so. And we do
work very closely with DHS and CBP to understand the ``what''
they are trying to accomplish more fully so that we can source
it and provide the type of assistance that will be meaningful.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to yield my time to Representative
Torres Small. Microphone.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Under Secretary Rood and
Admiral Gilday, for being here. I really appreciate the
dialogue about the choices that you are making when it comes to
National Guard versus deployment of Active military. And you
listed some of the components: timeliness, the scope of the
request, the cost, and available troops.
One thing I would like to dig into more is readiness.
Admiral Gilday mentioned it briefly. We ask a lot from our
troops, and it's critical that we provide that readiness,
specifically through rest and refit between missions and
deployment.
So what impact does an increase in deployment of troops
used along the border have on soldier readiness?
Admiral Gilday. So far, it has been manageable. So as I
explained a few minutes ago, we try to----
The Chairman. I am sorry, microphone.
Admiral Gilday. As I explained a few minutes ago, we try to
rotate the troops in about every 6 to 8 weeks. And so we are
trying to make sure that we maintain that deployed-to-dwell
ratio at a manageable level, because we may have to call on
those same forces to deploy to another mission.
The border security mission is obviously a high priority
for the administration, and so we are balancing that
requirement along with Syria, Afghanistan, ongoing commitments
in Africa, the Western Pacific, and so we are trying to balance
all of that.
But in this particular case, we have been using troops that
are based here in the continental United States and we have
been trying to rotate them in at a fairly--I don't want to say
it is a revolving door, but you know, that first group went in
at the beginning of November, they were out before Christmas,
the next group will come out at the end of the month here, and
so we try to manage it in that manner.
Ms. Torres Small. Shifting gears just a little bit, CBP
personnel, it's my understanding, are meant to be the primary
and principal members who interact with migrants on the border,
but we have already discussed somewhat the medical component of
the mission.
Can you give me a little more clarification on how the
medical part of the mission is limited based on interactions
with migrants and how that is controlled?
Secretary Rood. Congresswoman, you are correct, the Customs
and Border Patrol is the primary mission holder and the law
enforcement agency. They have the responsibility to interface
principally with the migrants. DOD personnel, medical
personnel, are there to assist after screening has been
conducted by CBP personnel.
If there's someone they believe presents an illness or an
issue that they would like to refer them after that screening
to DOD personnel, we can assist with medical treatment.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. Just shifting a little bit to
the National Guard. I represent New Mexico. We have had a long
history of National Guard working on the border as part of the
anti-drug task force. Can you explain a little bit the
differences between that longer history and the current
National Guard operation?
Secretary Rood. Well, as you mentioned, Congresswoman,
National Guard members and indeed other members of the force
have been deployed over the years to the border, in addition to
those deployments that the current President, President Trump,
has directed.
Of course, President Obama directed several deployments.
Those occurred during President Bush's tenure and during
President Clinton's tenure. Their mission is always--the
primary mission holder is the Department of Homeland Security,
Customs and Border Protection.
Ms. Torres Small. And I am sorry, just because we are
running short on time, the differences?
Secretary Rood. The differences--it is a very similar
mission and it depends on what the DHS requests of us
specifically to augment their forces. And that varies over
time, whether it is surveillance or it's monitoring of
different border areas, or in this particular case, emplacement
of barriers between ports of entry.
Ms. Torres Small. So National Guard is also placing
barriers at ports of entry?
Secretary Rood. That mission--my understanding is it will
be done by Active Duty.
Ms. Torres Small. Okay.
Secretary Rood. About 150 miles of concertina wire in
between ports of entry between now and the end of the fiscal
year.
Ms. Torres Small. So any specific differences between this
National Guard deployment and previous ones?
Admiral Gilday. I think it's relatively the same. I can't
speak to the previous mission that you referred to, but I can
give you some examples of what we are relying on the Guard for
now.
Heavily--with respect to aviation--and so they have a
number of rotary-wing aircraft with electro-optical and IR
[infrared] sensors that we don't have as many of in the Active
force to be honest, and so they have about 17 aircraft that we
rely upon heavily, particularly in New Mexico and Arizona.
The other place where we are providing a lot of support is
vehicle mechanics for CBP vehicles, intelligence analysts that
help at CBP headquarters, paralegals, administrative
assistance, and so the hope is that we are freeing up--or the
goal is that we are freeing up CBP agents to actually do law
enforcement.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary Rood and
Admiral Gilday, thank you so much for being here today. We are
so fortunate to have the military personnel, the personnel that
we have with the U.S. Custom and Border Protection agents on
our border to protect American families, to address the issues
that we have on the southern border, and I want to thank both
of you for your service.
In particular, I have a firsthand experience of the
benefits of being activated. I served 31 years in Army Guard, I
am very grateful to have three sons who have served in the
National Guard. We have found that being activated--for us, it
was hurricane recovery and relief--but being activated and
mobilized actually enhances training and the camaraderie of our
members has never been better.
And so I want to thank you for the opportunities that you
actually give, and as has been indicated, 19 different States
have had Guard members at the southern border. And I just know
how positive that is for our Guard members.
A precedent exists with the last five administrations for
the use of DOD personnel, and Secretary Rood, for surveillance,
logistics, aviation support, and other assistance. This support
on the southern border has been carried out with Operation Jump
Start under President George Bush and Operation Phalanx under
President Barack Obama.
Can you discuss the relationship between the DOD and
Customs and Border Protection personnel on the ground and do
you see this relationship changing on the extension of Active
Duty mission? And of course, we understand that it's backing up
the law enforcement and personnel.
Secretary Rood. Congressman, as you correctly point out,
the Defense Department has a long history of supporting Customs
and Border Protection as well as other Federal agencies in
support of their civil missions. And the relationship is really
a very close one, both here in Washington and in our deployed
units in the field, they live and work together.
And so as CBP performs their primary mission and their law
enforcement duties, we assist them, and that takes various
forms. As mentioned, construction at 22 ports of entry
recently, not only concertina wire but jersey barriers, vehicle
obstructions, emplacement of shipping containers and other
temporary barriers to control the flow of individuals, and then
medical support, aviation support, things of that nature.
But it is just a day-to-day working relationship, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Well the backup and support makes such a
positive difference and it is so meaningful. With the military
mission extended to September 30th, 2019, what if any does the
Department have for transitioning the mission from Active Duty
to National Guard? What conditions are going to be met? As
indicated, it's ever changing.
Secretary Rood. As mentioned, Congressman, when we receive
requests for assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security, we look at them for legality, whether we have the
capability and the appropriateness of the request, and then
work with CBP in this particular case. In other cases, we do
other support.
To refine that here, the National Guard Bureau and the
State adjutant generals have indicated there's a predicted
steady state, if you will, that they think they can source in
terms of their provision. And so where we are unable to meet
those requests from the National Guard, that is where we have
looked at Active Duty through the end of this fiscal year, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Gilday,
what opportunities exist for units mobilized to the border to
maintain a high level of readiness? This is a concern by all of
us. Can you address the training that DOD personnel receive on
the Standing Rules for the [Use] of Force?
Admiral Gilday. I will. So I will take each of those. On
the first point, sir, I think it ties back to a point that you
made earlier about readiness. And so when we deploy our forces,
most people just think that we are consuming readiness. But we
are also producing readiness during those deployments.
So as you know, sir, many times at the end of that
deployment, you are at a higher state of readiness than you
were going into it because you just accumulate that type of
hands-on deckplates, leadership, and experience that you
typically wouldn't get at home station.
One really good example is the military police that we
have, under DOD authorities, providing protection for CBP
should they be overwhelmed at the border; and so the way that
we have had to train with CBP personnel to make sure that we
are clear on each of our authorities, to make sure that our
communications are compatible, to make sure that we understand
each other's tactics, techniques, and procedures. We ran those
teams together with CBP through 10 different vignettes,
training scenarios, both day and night.
And so we try to expose them to a wide range of
possibilities. Some of the best training that we have had is
with the military police. In terms of----
Mr. Wilson. Enhances readiness. Thank you very much.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick yes-
or-no question. Given the threat description that surrounded
this order, are the service members at the borders receiving
imminent danger pay?
Secretary Rood. No.
Admiral Gilday. No, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I would just yield the balance of
my time to Congresswoman Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Under Secretary Rood and
Admiral Gilday. You stated that the military support is for
three main purposes. In providing forces to stop the tide of
illegal immigration, stop human trafficking, and stop the flow
of illegal drugs.
I would like to hear, Admiral, which of these three
missions do you think is the most pressing?
Admiral Gilday. Drugs----
Mrs. Luria. Human trafficking----
Admiral Gilday. Trafficking----
Mrs. Luria. Or personnel crossing the border.
Admiral Gilday. Difficult to prioritize. All pretty
important. I would say that I think as we transition to our new
mission set from the ports of entry to the areas between the
ports of entry, we bring a skill set with respect to detection
and monitoring that I think is going to be very valuable for
CBP in trying to get their arms around all three of those
problems----
Mrs. Luria. Okay.
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. Which could be present at any
point in the border.
Mrs. Luria. Well, in that case, I would like to focus on
the flow of illegal drugs. And it has been reported that, you
know, a large portion of the drugs do not in fact come across
the border. They come by sea and our ports of entry.
And as you know, also myself, as a surface warfare officer
for 20 years, we know that the Navy used to supply forces
frequently in support of SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command],
JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] South, to stop that flow.
I met with Admiral Grady, who's the executive agent for
Global Force Management for Fleet Forces, and he confirmed that
the only forces that we're giving to SOUTHCOM currently are
those that happen to be transiting as an opportunity between
east and west coasts.
So I was wondering if you could compare the request for
forces that we are currently receiving from SOUTHCOM versus
those that we are meeting, towards the goal of stopping the
flow of drugs at sea. And what percentage of requests for
forces from SOUTHCOM would you say have gone unmet in the last
several years?
Admiral Gilday. So I think we really need to talk about the
last probably 18 months under a new President with a new
National Security Strategy and a new defense strategy.
And so that new defense strategy racks and stacks problem
sets for us with respect to China, Russia, North Korea, Iran,
and the counter-VEO [violent extremist organization] problem.
And so what we have done in the past year in particular, is we
have prioritized our resources in accordance with those
priorities. We just can't do it all.
As the chairman brought up in his statement at the
beginning, we have under-sourced readiness for some time. That
is the Secretary, and the acting Secretary now's, top priority,
is in order to make us more lethal, we have to be ready.
And so we have had to ruthlessly prioritize. And quite
honestly, although the drug problem is a big problem, we have
historically under-resourced Southern Command against that
problem set.
And I--I probably have an unsatisfactory answer for you,
ma'am, in terms of--in terms of our being able to improve in
that regard. But I do think--when we have problems like that, I
do think it requires more imagination to get after it in a
better way. And so it is looked at. I am just being honest with
you with respect to the racking and stacking of national
priorities. It hasn't reached the top.
Mrs. Luria. So with that racking and stacking of national
priorities, this is currently the only one in our discussion
that is being potentially envisioned as a national emergency.
So it doesn't seem consistent with where we have placed it in
our order of priority for allocating forces.
And when you say, use creativity, you just mentioned that
when we use forces, we are not just consuming readiness, but we
are producing readiness?
Admiral Gilday. Yes.
Mrs. Luria. So that is another element that I would ask you
to consider, possibly, when we have forces that are not
actually deployed but in their workup and training phases, to
be able to participate as well in this mission of combating the
flow of drugs at sea while they are also building their
readiness.
Admiral Gilday. Congresswoman, I think that is a fair
comment. To your point about priorities, so the National
Defense Strategy is a strategy. And it has laid out priorities
that we follow. But reality strikes, we end up reprioritizing.
And in this case, that is exactly what happened.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, Secretary Rood, thank you for being here. Thank
you for your service.
Secretary Rood, thank you for your expertise and the
dialogue that you are having here today. I am going to ask you
two questions and then I am going to concede my time to Mr.
Bergman.
The admiral indicated that it is hard to answer a negative.
How many people were deterred, how many people didn't cross the
border. So I have two simple questions for you. I think they
are yes or no but I am not going to restrict you to yes or no
if you feel you need to answer them more broadly.
So to your knowledge, is the United States border with
Mexico currently closed? And by closed, I mean is the level of
protection that is currently being provided by Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense stopping illegal
immigration? Has it stopped? Has illegal immigration stopped
between Mexico and the United States as a result of the current
level of protection from Homeland Security and DOD?
Secretary Rood. No. Just in the last 3 months alone, CBP
reports apprehending 154,000 illegal immigrants.
Mr. Turner. To your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, are there
portions of the U.S. border between Mexico and the United
States where individuals can enter the United States illegally,
unimpeded?
Secretary Rood. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield my time to
Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you and I appreciate you yielding time,
Mr. Turner. I am glad you both are here.
Just for clarification, I want to make sure that nothing
has changed since I took off the uniform about 10 years ago and
that you only pay a guardsman or reservist when they are
performing some type of duty. Correct? Okay.
Admiral Gilday. Yes.
Mr. Bergman. So the point is there are Active Duty
personnel that we have down there today. You are paying them
normal pay rate. No combat pay. Just our normal pay rate. Any
TAD [temporary additional duty]?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, it depends, but those numbers are
very, very small.
Mr. Bergman. So the point is----
Admiral Gilday. So they do receive, when they deploy for
more than 30 days away from home station, they do receive a
modest family separation allowance.
Mr. Bergman. Okay, so family separation allowance. But the
bottom line is minimal to no additional cost by utilizing
Active Component personnel. Any idea how many of the Active
Component personnel that you are using down there, it's their
first deployment since joining the military?
In other words, they are not in a dwell time because they
have been stressed over a period of time?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would like to take that for the
record.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Well, because we know the troops coming
off the line need to get R&R [rest and recuperation], need to
get refreshed, need to get retrained, in some cases re-
missioned if they change units. Any special skill sets that are
required on the border right now that we might call HDLD, high
demand/low density assets that would be getting stressed?
Admiral Gilday. Not skill set so much, sir, but I would say
if we are stressed anywhere it is rotary wing just because of
the demand we have for helicopters in Syria, in Iraq, and
Afghanistan. So we have been a bit pinched in terms of helos,
to be honest. But not at a point where we have significant
concerns about them----
Mr. Bergman. Okay. So stress on the flight hours on
airframe as opposed to time on the pilot seat, button seat?
Okay.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, just availability of the assets
with crews that are at a, let us say, a 1:2 dwell.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Is it fair to say that if we have a lot
of first-time folks deploying, this is why they joined, maybe
in a slightly different, you know, fight, if you will, or
mission, probably more appropriately said, than they originally
envisioned on their first deployment.
But are we making them more capable because of the training
and what they are doing on a daily basis here so that when we
do have to deploy them somewhere in the world that they are
more ready and ready to take on whatever mission?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would say in general, yes.
Specifically, down to every person I think it would be
difficult to make that argument that the medical personnel, for
example, who are doing medical screening may not be optimizing
their skill sets. But that said, it is a critically important
mission at the moment.
Mr. Bergman. We know that no matter what the situation is,
whether we are dealing with combat injuries on the battlefield
or dealing with humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, the
need for medical personnel, whether it be doctors or nurses, is
going to continue to be stressed no matter what we are using
them for.
So with that, for those of you who have been around a
while, the Three Block War--humanitarian assistance, keeping
the peace, and making the peace--bottom line is, let us stay in
that first one or two, especially in that middle block here.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. If I could just follow it up with
a quick question based on Mr. Turner's question there. So DHS
asks you basically for help at the end of the day with what
they are doing. And I guess the question that occurred to me
is, do you ever say no?
Because by Mr. Turner's definition there, I mean, to
actually close the border to stop anybody from ever being able
to cross in an unauthorized manner, anything across, I would
think you could plop 50,000 U.S. troops down there on the
border, you would still have a hard time doing that.
And also note for the committee, and I am sure Mr. Turner
is aware, every single combatant commander that we have has
requests that go unfilled. It is absolutely true, because there
is too much in the world that we need to do. We don't have the
resources for all of them. I guess that is the biggest concern
from this discussion here is, yes, we can talk about the border
all day long, and if that is the only thing that you had to
worry about at DOD, well, heck, 5,900, that is nothing.
I mean, why not 50,000, okay? But we have got other needs
in the world which we will hear about in great detail in this
committee. And the reason we are starting here is because this
is not primary to our mission. And if we start down this road
with what those previous questions were and say, you know, DOD,
it's all about the border, where does it stop?
So, under what circumstances would you say no; look, yes
there is a border problem. There will always be a border
problem. We are not going to completely shut that border off.
But we also have ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. We
also have Afghanistan and Syria. We are worried about Russia
and China. Do we have a sufficient presence to deal with
deterring that threat?
So, under what circumstances, when DHS comes over and says,
hey, we need your equipment, we need your troops, do you say,
look, we don't have the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] that we need in Africa, all right? We don't
have, you know, enough of a troop presence in Eastern Europe to
deter Russia, so that is going to take priority.
Under what circumstances do you say that?
Secretary Rood. Mr. Chairman, when----
The Chairman. I know that is not directly your call. That
is more the Secretary of Defense's call. But I am curious as to
your perspective.
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. When the Department of Homeland
Security or another civil agency makes a request for
assistance, we look at it from the legality of it, the
appropriateness--do we have a capability that can actually meet
that need? And then we do look at readiness and the impact on
our other mission areas.
And the same approach, basic approach applies whether it is
DHS requesting support at the border or----
The Chairman. What would be most helpful on this is if you
could give us an example of when you did say no to DHS. You
know, and I will drub it up, what if they asked you for $10
billion out of MILCON [military construction] to help build the
wall? Would you say no then?
Secretary Rood. Well, with respect to use of MILCON
authorities, of course, the President would need to declare a
national emergency and the Secretary of Defense make certain
determinations before we would ever reach that question. And so
the Department of Homeland Security couldn't make that request
directly to us. It would need to be initiated by the
President's declaration.
With respect to your question about where we say no, we
haven't always approved every request from the Department of
Homeland Security, but we generally work with them to find ways
that we can adjust what we are going to provide to meet the
mission need. Sometimes they don't have a full understanding of
what we can do.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In case nobody noticed, we are in the midst of a raging
debate about this whole issue of border security, and
apparently the President wanted to use the military like 10
days before the election. All well and good.
Specific question probably more for the record. What were
the precise talents, skill sets, and operation that the
individual units had when they were deployed to the border, the
5,900? What were their skill sets? And that is unit by unit. So
please deliver that to us.
Secondly, there's a major question of readiness. It has
been raised here over and over. And thirdly, apparently the
military is good at stacking containers to form some sort of a
wall and laying concertina wire. What else did they actually
do? And apparently they were deployed in the southeastern part
of Texas, and the threat moved to San Diego and Tijuana.
Did the military move also to address that threat? All for
the record, having asked for that specific information, I would
like to turn over my remaining time to the esteemed lady from
Oklahoma, Ms. Horn.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 72.]
Ms. Horn. Thank you very much, Mr. Garamendi, and thank
you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral for being here today. My
question focuses back on readiness for a moment, and I am
curious as to the Active Duty troops that were deployed, where
they were before their deployment and what they were doing
before their deployment and what it took to get them down
there.
And then the second part of my question is given that we
have discussed the historical nature of the National Guard
working with DHS and taking the lead on some of these, does the
National Guard have the capability to accomplish the same
mission--concertina wire and hardening of the border and that
sort of thing?
Admiral Gilday. Congresswoman, your first question was
about where these forces were before they actually went down to
the border. So they were based in the continental United States
and they were ready forces--ready to deploy within 30 days.
And so we always have a reserve of forces that we can draw
upon for--you name an emergency that we are going to respond
to, or we need to send additional forces to plus-up for a
particular mission somewhere in the globe.
And so those forces are trained, certified, manned,
trained, and equipped in order to do their specific tasks. And
we selected them specifically because we felt that they were
best suited based on the inventory of forces that we had, that
they were best suited with those skill sets in a timely manner
to deploy at the right readiness level and properly trained.
With respect to your second question, which had to do with
whether or not Guard has the skill sets for concertina wire,
they do and they have in the past, but not in this particular--
but not in this particular operation.
Ms. Horn. As a follow-up to that, you mentioned a 30-day
turnaround for deployment. What is the difference in turnaround
time for deployment between the Active Duty troops that
deployed and a National Guard unit being deployable in that
time?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I will have to get back to you with
specifics on those corresponding dwell times between both
Active and Guard to give you a precise answer.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Horn. I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I am
painfully familiar with this topic, I have been on the Homeland
Security Committee for 15 years. And while we have talked a lot
today about the last 12 to 13 years where we have been
repeatedly sending Reserve and Guard and Active Duty troops
down there, it has been going on since the Alamo and every
decade in between, we have used DOD assets for that mission.
But to get to the chairman's question in the initial part
of this hearing, what is it going to take for us to not have to
continue this pattern? We are going to have to adequately fund
the Department of Homeland Security instead of continually
reaching into DOD to subsidize that department.
It has been inadequately funded since its inception by
Republican and Democrat administrations. That has to be
addressed. So one of the things this President's trying to
address, been asking for money for fencing. And I am just
astounded by the fact that we continue to act stupid in
Congress and fuss over things like $5.7 billion in fencing and
it cost us $11 billion to shut the government down.
I would like to know, Admiral, do you know how much it has
cost for these last deployments that we have had down there,
how much it costs the DOD?
Admiral Gilday. So I can tell you, sir, Active Duty, our
projection through the end of this month is $132 million, and
for the National Guard in the last fiscal year was $103
million, and we project in fiscal year 2019 to be $448 million.
So it will be about $550 million overall for the Guard and
the--it is difficult to give you an accurate estimate right now
on Active Duty just based--as I have described, the requirement
is evolving and fluctuating.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah, and that is just the most recent. I mean,
we continue to do this and we have got to adequately fund the
Department of Homeland Security, specifically Customs and
Border Protection. With that, I yield the balance of my time to
General Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Rogers, for yielding time. Just
very quickly, you know, I spent my whole military career as an
engineer, and I was what they call a sapper on the Army side.
You know, what we do is build obstacles, okay?
And there are many purposes for obstacles and I am sure it
is the same way in the Navy. We have turn, fix, disrupt, and
block. And I use an analogy, locks don't keep burglars out of
your houses or cars. But I do know in my neighborhood last
year, there were burglars going through and breaking into all
of the cars that were unlocked.
So those locks didn't keep them from getting in a car, but
it did slow them down. And barriers or obstacles--I prefer not
even barriers--obstacles have different purposes and they move
people to where they are.
Do you agree that obstacles never, unless they are covered,
unless they were constantly watched, that you can always get by
or bypass them, however they do make it easier to where you
locate people coming across illegally?
Would you agree with that, Vice Admiral and Mr. Secretary?
Admiral Gilday. Yes sir, in the abstract, I agree with
that. There are a lot of variables that go into wall placement,
but I think you are right in the fact that a barrier is
ineffective unless you are surveilling it and you can react if
it's breached.
Mr. Kelly. And I want to touch just a little bit about
whether it's Guard or Active Component, you guys agree that the
new policy is that Guard and Reserves and Active Component is a
force of one, and they all have operational requirements?
And I want to use my small State of Mississippi, which has
about 10,000 members in our Mississippi Army National Guard and
about 1,500 in our Air Guard, but currently, we have one
company, Charlie Company, First Battalion, 114th Aviation that
is on the border supporting this mission and doing great work
down there.
That being said, we have a BCT [brigade combat team] doing
Operation Spartan Shield in Kuwait, Jordan, other places, so
that is about 4,500 of our 10,000 Army soldiers. We have the
184th ESC [Expeditionary Sustainment Command], which is also a
headquarters which is in Kuwait right now doing logistics.
We have State missions, we have these little things called
hurricanes that we have to respond to, we have all these forces
deployed as part of the Active force, as part of the rotational
forces we have to defend our missions. Is that a reason to use
maybe sometimes Active Duty forces when Guard forces can do the
same thing, Admiral?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. As you said initially, it is one
force; who's best suited for the task? And as I mentioned
earlier, the Guard has sustainability issues as well that we
can't just wish away just like the Active side does.
And so I think it is a balanced approach in terms of how we
use--how we put those people to best use.
Mr. Kelly. And thank you for that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
Planning. Nobody can guess what the President's going to
do, but we have some indications what he might do. Have you
taken into account, outside of the personnel, the cost for
construction of a barrier different than the wire and fence
that you are presently working on? If you were to do the 230
miles.
Admiral Gilday. Sir--maybe you should take this one.
Secretary Rood. Well, as you mentioned, Congressman, a
national emergency declaration has not been issued by the
President. And if it were, there are other legal requirements
that we have done prudent--pre-planning to understand the law
and our obligations under it.
And depending on what the Department of Homeland Security,
CBP would identify and how those requests would be met, that
would determine the type of wall and the cost----
Mr. Norcross. So you are not looking at any scenarios right
now at all? There's no pre-planning----
Secretary Rood. We are merely----
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. Whether you are going to put a
concrete barrier or some steel up or some wire?
Secretary Rood. Yes. It would depend on the circumstances
that we would reach at that moment. And obviously, we have done
prudent pre-planning. I have seen, as you have, the statements
the President has made regarding the possibility of a national
emergency. So we have looked into how that would operate.
Mr. Norcross. So what are your ranges of cost estimates?
Secretary Rood. Again, it--there is no--after the President
were to declare a national emergency----
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. We understand the process. But--
--
Secretary Rood. But--but with----
Mr. Norcross [continuing]. You have to look down the road
and anticipate. We could put a full barrier up, a 35-foot wall.
We could put wire. You are not going to wait until that phone
call comes to start planning. That is one thing that you do
well.
Secretary Rood. Within such a declaration, a national
emergency would be the citation of the authorities under which
it is done. We have limited authorities. Depending on what
those authorities are, sir, it would define how much money was
available. And we would obviously work with the Department of
Homeland Security to get their latest prioritized listing.
And from all those factors--land availability, cost of
land, other things, would come into play if you were talking
about a barrier construction or even the placement of wire.
Those are considerations that would need to be reached at that
point.
Mr. Norcross. So no pre-planning in terms of cost and
personnel, or what it would take to do the job that is taking
place until you get that declaration?
Secretary Rood. We would have--in that circumstance, we
have not made any decisions nor formalized what those would be.
But obviously, depending on what the type of barrier the Army
Corps of Engineers in the barrier case would be asked to do,
they have been looking at different types of construction.
Mr. Norcross. Is this the most cost-effective way of
putting up a barrier?
Secretary Rood. Sir, we would respond to what the
Department of Homeland Security and the CBP identified in that
area. The Army Corps of Engineers has done construction, parts
of the 654 miles of barrier on the southern border, over our
history. And those things vary, given the circumstances at the
time.
Mr. Norcross. I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Conaway. Is that correct? I
don't think he is here. He is not here.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. And I was on the border a
week ago today, in the Brownsville, McAllen area. And talking
to the people there, they have a very good plan of what they
would like to do if they were given more assets, more money,
more resources.
So my first hope is that we as a Congress will give
Homeland Security more of what they need. And that they have a
well-defined plan of how they could put that to use.
But if that doesn't happen, the President will have the
choice he will have to make, of declaring a national emergency
and then using money from somewhere to build some kind of
barrier.
And my hope--Mr. Rood, I am going to direct this to you.
And maybe this is a little speculative and you can't give me a
definitive and final answer, but my hope would be that
emergency money for that purpose would come out of emergency
money from another purpose, and we would have to replenish that
later; like disaster relief.
I mean, I would hate to see that happen. But that would be
the best possible alternative I can think of, especially
compared to taking money from military construction. Because
those projects have been in the pipeline for years and years,
and that would be disruptive.
So my hope would be it would be emergency to emergency. Do
you have any thoughts on those lines, Mr. Rood?
Secretary Rood. Well, Congressman, of course at this stage
the President has not chosen to declare a national emergency.
And if he were to do so, then the Secretary of Defense, the
next step in the process would need to determine that
undertaking military construction projects.
Assuming that that was the authority authorized by the
President in his declaration, then the Secretary of Defense
would then need to make a determination that, by undertaking
these military construction projects, that that was necessary
to support the use of the Armed Forces. And then we would flow
from there.
There are only limited authorities available to the Defense
Department if directed by the President or if authorized, I
should say, to pursue them. And he would identify, in his
declaration, what those authorities were.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And I will just reiterate. My
hope is that Congress does the right thing, and we authorize
money and not--we don't have to go down that road at all.
General Gilday, I would like to ask you a question. And you
have already done a good job of explaining the benefits that
accrue when these missions are being performed, to the people
doing those missions.
And you talked about facilities, troops, engineering,
medical, and rotary wing. When it comes to readiness, we have
talked about construction but we also talked about training.
That is the other component.
We have used our troops in a variety of worldwide
humanitarian missions: Ebola outbreak in Africa, tsunamis,
earthquake relief, and others. And there is a humanitarian
component to the southern border crisis, as well as a national
security component.
When our medical troops, for instance, are helping Homeland
Security on the border, are they gaining experience that helps
them? Or if they were doing a humanitarian mission in Africa,
does that help them in their professional and military careers?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. As I mentioned earlier, I think
with each of the skill sets, it varies a bit. The example I
gave with medical, so they are doing follow-on screenings after
CBP does their initial medical screening.
So most of those referrals are routine elements and so I
could make the argument that if I deployed those same people
overseas to Afghanistan, that they might receive a higher level
of training.
But I think that we have placed a high degree of importance
on the work that they are doing on the border. They know it is
important work. They know it must be done.
I do think that--again, to answer your question, I do think
there's varying degrees, to be honest with you, on how much
training value that you receive from each particular mission,
some more than others.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During Operation Desert Storm and after 9/11, Presidents
invoked the National Emergencies Act, NEA, twice, citing the
emergency military construction authority. According to the
Department of Defense records, the Department funded 18
projects.
I am looking at these projects right now; airfield runways,
medical facilities, barracks, security measures for weapons of
mass destruction, et cetera, et cetera, to name a few. All of
those projects were determined as necessary to support the
Armed Forces in the declared emergency, which makes sense.
You need a runway for aircraft to land, places for service
members to live and receive health care. Admiral Gilday, how is
the border wall necessary to support the use of Armed Forces
and what authorities would be needed to make that
determination?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is a hypothetical. I----
Mr. Carbajal. You can give me a hypothetical answer.
Admiral Gilday. I will give you a hypothetical answer if
that is okay.
So the President has a range of different authorities that
he can invoke. And each of those authorities are tied to laws
that have specific requirements that would dictate how that
money--that would dictate the determination of the calculus
that the Department would go through to determine whether or
not you could justify using those funds to build a barrier.
Mr. Carbajal. Do you know what those authorities are?
Admiral Gilday. Broadly I know what they are, sir, I have
not looked at them in detail because I am not an engineer. But
I know that there are specific authorities that, as you have
stated, we would have to show that DOD benefits.
You know, whether the argument would be that we no longer
have to deploy 5,900 people to the wall, we would have to take
a look at that more deeply to see if that is a justifiable, you
know, cause-effect.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday. Yeah.
Mr. Carbajal. How is the Department determining which
military construction projects can be scrapped in order to fund
the wall? I am sure you are looking at that now in light of the
rhetoric and the discussion that is ensuing.
Which projects would be scrapped?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, of course, the President would
need to invoke a national emergency and cite the use of section
2808 of title 10, which is the military construction provision,
to authorize such an activity. The President's not, of course,
chosen to do so; therefore, we have only done preliminary,
prudent pre-planning, we have not developed a specific list of
military construction projects because the President hasn't
taken that step.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Last year, I received a call from
some of my constituents who had to endure living on base in
housing environments with their families, that they are
expected to live--at Fort Benning, Georgia, to be exact.
I specifically sent a letter to Secretary Mattis regarding
this constituent call and the serious concerns raised. This
family lived on base for about 5 years, and because of the
children being exposed to high levels of lead, they are now
dealing with health-related disabilities and other symptoms.
Funds are required to address these deteriorating living
conditions but now there is a chance that we will neglect
service members again. This time it will be for, again, a
needless wall. Could any of these obligated funds for MILCON
and family housing be used to improve the living conditions for
service members and their families?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, again, the--this would be a
hypothetical situation that the President has not chosen to
invoke a national emergency and authorize the use of section
2808 military construction funds. So we at the Defense
Department are not making trades with those funds at this time.
Mr. Carbajal. But will you agree, if you had to take
funding from existing DOD priorities, it would leave some of
those priorities without funding?
Secretary Rood. The--if----
Mr. Carbajal [continuing]. Or is there enough funding
surplus right now available for the wall?
Secretary Rood. Any use of military construction funds for
purpose B instead of purpose A it would obviously come from one
source to another, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I touch on this because I also
have Camp Roberts in my district, and I am informed there is an
important road for really important training and facilities
that exists on this base. And currently, that road cannot be
traversed. And again, these funds that would go towards a wall
would be taken away from being able to rehabilitate that road.
So----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, I yield my time back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rood, Vice Admiral Gilday, thanks so much for
joining us. Up here in the corner. There we go.
Secretary Rood, I just wanted to ask one simple question,
just yes or no. Are the troops that are currently deployed
along with our Customs and Border Patrol agents, are they a
help in helping the Customs and Border Patrol agents achieve
the counter-narcotics missions that they have been charged
with? And do the troops and their capabilities also help the
Customs and Border Patrol agents in stymieing the flow of
narcotics into the United States?
Secretary Rood. Yes.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am going to now yield the balance of my time to Mr.
Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Wittman, I appreciate that.
Secretary Rood or Vice Admiral, a question for you. First,
let's start with--let's not deal with hypotheticals, which some
of my colleagues want to talk about, if-then.
We are here at this moment of time talking about this
because we failed to provide adequate resources to DHS to deal
with their own mission, their own challenges. So we are now
having to assist those--supplement those resources.
Can either of you tell me, of the approximately $500
million we are talking about estimated for the year, what
percentage of those needs DHS could address themselves if
properly funded?
Secretary Rood. Well, certainly the Department of Homeland
Security, CBP looks, as we understand it, within their own
resources and authorities first before asking for augmentation
or supplemental----
Mr. Mitchell. Can you talk a little louder, sir? I am
sorry.
Secretary Rood. Certainly the DHS, CBP looks within their
own resources--as we understand it from them--before asking for
supplementation or augmentation from the DOD. And so the
specialized skills--there are some specialized skills we bring
to the table, but in other cases if they possess those
capabilities at DHS and CBP, they could do it themselves.
Mr. Mitchell. I appreciate the general response. Let us
try, Vice Admiral, what percentage of the overall is actually
military-specific versus a lack of resources at DHS, sir?
Admiral Gilday. So to answer your question, sir, none of
the capabilities that we are providing are combat capabilities,
it is not a war zone along the border. And so all the, you
know, I talked about aviation, I talked about paralegals,
mechanics, facilities, medical, concertina wire, none of that
is a unique military skill set.
Mr. Mitchell. So the reality is we are sitting here today
discussing this because we failed to adequately deal with a
comprehensive solution to our southern border. So now, we are
trying to basically put our finger in the holes until Congress
does its job.
Would you disagree with that, Vice Admiral?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, if I took that same argument and said
that we need to use DOD to respond to a hurricane. There are
certain situations where, you know, one of our primary missions
is defense support to civil authorities. And so I think that
one is a tricky one to answer.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I will yield back. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you. I do want to make a quick note on
the budget. The President made his budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security in February of 2018. Congress
fully met that request, both the Senate and the House. So what
whatever crisis occurred to him in the months that followed, it
was not at the top of his mind in February of 2018.
That was the budget request and we fully funded it. This is
not a question for you, gentlemen, this is just, you know, to
make the point. We are hearing now from the--I mean, gosh, if
we just gave more money to the Department of Homeland Security,
this wouldn't be a problem.
And, you know, it's odd for me to be making this point, you
know, with the fiscal conservatives on the other side of the
aisle, we are $22 trillion in debt. Our deficit is going to be
$1 trillion this year. We just cut taxes by somewhere in the
neighborhood of $2 trillion.
On this committee, we hear repeatedly about all the areas
of the Department of Defense that have gone underfunded. We
don't have--well, I was going to say, we can't print money. We
can, in fact, print money. But there's a downside to that, as I
think all of the Republicans would acknowledge.
So where are you going to find all this extra money, you
know, for the Department of Homeland Security sort of implied,
well, so just get more money. We also have a few other needs in
the country that have gone unmet. We have a $600 billion
infrastructure deficit by most estimates, to the point where
water is poisoned and bridges are collapsing in the United
States of America.
So we have to make budget choices. And I will also point
out that go back to 2005 and to now, we have quadrupled the
number of Border Patrol agents, we have built 700 miles of
wall, we have drones and sensors, we have massively increased
the amount of money that we have spent on border security.
So I am not sure the solution here is just spend more money
so that way we don't have to steal it from the Department of
Defense. We have got a make a budget that works for all of us.
And this is going to be something we are going to wrestle with
once we try to get our budget in place for this year, because
there are a lot of DOD needs.
The discretionary budget, a little over $1 trillion, okay?
And Department of Homeland Security is part of that. We, at
DOD, are like 55 percent of that. So before you get too excited
about giving more money to DHS, you have got to find it
somewhere. You know, if we can find it somewhere, I am wide
open to the discussion. But we have to make choices.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will avoid getting into the broader budget issues, which
obviously affect a whole variety of things. I would simply
point out that with DOD, Homeland Security, or any of the
agencies, they have to formulate their budget months in advance
of it even coming to us.
One of the things that changed is that now we have
thousands and tens of thousands of migrants who are coming in
caravans which we have not seen before. And I think members, if
they look at the statistics which are provided by the
Department of Homeland Security, the days when we had a greater
number of people, but most of them were from Mexico and you
could simply put them back across the border, are very
different from these large family groups, 10,000, 12,000 people
coming. So yes, it changed the requirements.
And as we have been talking, if anything, we have to be
more flexible to respond to changing circumstances. I think
that is what the President is trying to do. I would prefer he
not have to resort to DOD to make up for gaps in Department of
Homeland Security funding. But I do think it is important to
acknowledge that things change and our government has to
respond.
The Chairman. And that is very true. And we would be in a
better position to respond if we weren't $22 trillion in debt.
So the more resources you have the more flexibility you have.
And we face some very difficult choices no matter how the
circumstances come down to us.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad the
discussion has taken this turn.
Mr. Rood, my understanding is that you are familiar with
the 2018 National Defense Strategy because you helped write
that. Is that correct?
Secretary Rood. I didn't help write it, sir, I came in
afterwards. But I have been helping implement it.
Mr. Keating. You are familiar with the contents?
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keating. What, in your opinion--just in a sentence or
so--what is the use of that document? What is the importance of
that for utilization purposes?
Secretary Rood. Yes, to guide the activities of the Defense
Department and others and prioritize our efforts.
Mr. Keating. Yes, I would suggest too that it is also an
important document as well when we are looking at the overall
strategic priorities. It is an important budget document as
well for this committee and for Congress, because that is what
we look towards to do the, you know, fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2023 budget requests.
So although things do change quickly, when I heard the
admiral say that, you know, it is hard to get priorities, when
you were asked that question about our activities in the
southern border versus what is in that defense strategy
document, or we have to be creative.
That creates problems for us doing our job and using that.
For instance, Mr. Rood, in that, that whole document, was the
term southern border ever--those words ever in that document?
Secretary Rood. I don't recall that in the unclassified
version, sir.
Mr. Keating. Was the word caravan ever used?
Secretary Rood. Not that I can recall.
Mr. Keating. So here is our dilemma, as a committee and a
Congress, we have to have priorities. Money is finite. And we
have to make decisions on funding.
So I think this is an important hearing as a discussion
point to go from going forward because things aren't in sync in
terms of the way I view them. We have to make those decisions.
We have to assess priorities. This committee has a history--
this Congress has history of really relying on our defense and
our military to tell us what those priorities are so we can
fund them.
I think we are at a point where I am hearing terms, you
know, just hard to give priorities, everything is important,
things that aren't even mentioned in the strategic document we
are supposed to use to make those priorities are now coming to
the forefront and they are being said there is crisis
surrounding those things.
But the two things have to get in sync. And I think instead
of a question, you might want to comment, how can this
committee best function? Because we can't function giving those
resources going forward, when we have to take a turn and look
at different views, quote/unquote, or we have to be creative.
Those things really make our job next to impossible. Could
you comment on that?
Secretary Rood. Sure, I will--Congressman, I would say--
commend your knowledge and the way that you are following the
National Defense Strategy. That is our guidepost in the Defense
Department. We are trying to live that life to make that vision
of what we are saying.
And there are some hard choices that are described in that
document, in setting out that vision for the future. And some
of it is an uncomfortable reality that we as a Nation need to
confront.
With respect to support to civil authorities, I would say
those kinds of requests--and we do not lack the ability to
prioritize our resources and I think you will see in the coming
budget that we have made a major effort to try to track along
the lines of the National Defense Strategy.
With respect to support to civil authorities, of course,
this is a longstanding activity the Department of Defense has
done. And it is not just limited to the southern border. I
mean, for example, this coming weekend at the Super Bowl, the
Defense Department will provide assets in support of civil
authorities. When the U.N. General Assembly meets in the
summertime in New York or in September, we will also provide
support to civil authorities for that type of activity. And
there is a range of others. Fires, floods, et cetera.
Mr. Keating. I would just say this. That although----
Secretary Rood. Yes.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. Parenthetically I have a great
deal of confidence in the defense of the New England Patriots,
I also want to say this, that has been traditionally done.
But I see a difference in scope that is occurring with the
discussions we are having now with the southern border and the
effect of that on our readiness, on those five central areas of
threat--China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. and terrorist
groups.
And that document that is our--I think our guidepost, going
forward, the things that all of a sudden are getting so much
more, you know, resources drawn to them aren't contained in
that.
And I will just say this because my time is out. That we
have to do a better job if we are going to act in a bipartisan
way, listening to our military and defense, to have a clearer,
more accountable and a more timely demonstration of what these
priorities are.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your role in keeping our
Nation safe from threats, both foreign and nearby.
And Admiral, you said that it is not a war zone down there.
I would just like to pause a little bit on that because I had
an opportunity to go in October to the border. And I came away
with the impression that we are at war. And it is with the drug
cartels.
As I spent time with the Border Patrol agents, and we could
actually see the scouts on the other side of the border, and
they talked about how we are outmanned and out-funded, in many
ways, and how they are taking advantage of so many people in
this process. And people are dying.
Last year, we lost 72,000 people to drug overdoses, 72,000.
That is more people than died during the entirety of the
Vietnam war. And so we have a mission to protect people's
lives, including to counter the drug crisis.
And the drugs are flowing across our border. Our agents are
doing a wonderful job. They are finding a lot of drugs, and
that is what people talk about, we are finding drugs at the
port of entry. And I champion that.
But I also know there are a lot of drugs that are making it
across that we are not catching, and they are ending up in
Missouri. And they are ending up in my families that I have
talked to, there are parents whose child has died of a heroin
overdose.
That is why we have got to counter this. The Missouri
National Guard was deployed there last summer. They did an
amazing job. They had two UH-72 crews. During the 6 months they
were there, they had 470 apprehensions and they got 1,986
pounds of marijuana that was seized. I thank God for what they
are doing, that that didn't end up in our country.
But they are doing an amazing job. And Congress has
actually given the DOD the ability to provide military support
to law enforcement agencies, specifically for countering the
counterdrug purposes; section 284 of title 10 of the United
States Code authorizes the DOD to provide support to
counterdrug activities to control the transnational organized
crime.
The law clearly identifies various activities that DOD is
authorized to conduct, including the construction of road and
construction of fences, light installation among smuggling
quarters, aerial and ground reconnaissance, transportation.
So I guess, two questions I would like to focus on. How
long has the Department of Defense been providing support to
counterdrug operations at the border? And can you please
provide specific examples of how DOD is carrying out the
authorities authorized by Congress?
Secretary Rood. Congresswoman, we have, at the Department,
provided support to counterdrug missions at the Department of
Homeland Security and, indeed, other civilian agencies, for a
very long time, for decades. That support continues.
As you correctly point out, section 284 of title 10 does
provide the Secretary of Defense the authority in performance
of that counterdrug mission, such as blocking drug-smuggling
corridors, to erect barriers, fencing, provide road
construction, things of that nature, to aid in that
counternarcotics mission.
Mrs. Hartzler. So you are saying that Congress has
authorized the Department of Defense to build a fence to
counter drugs?
Secretary Rood. If it meets the----
Mrs. Hartzler. That is already law?
Secretary Rood. Yes, that is right. If it meets that
criteria in section 284, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. How many miles of fence have been
built, to date, under this authority?
Secretary Rood. I will have to take, for the record, the
specific amount of fencing built under that authority. Now, of
course, there are 654 miles of barrier at the southern border
today.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Right. And I think that it is very clear, we
have already given, then, the authority to do this. And we do
have a very critical mission to keep people safe and to make
sure that people don't die as a result of these transnational
drug cartel activity. And currently, they are.
So it is imperative for us to find a solution. And I am
very hopeful that in the next 3 weeks, we will come together in
a bipartisan fashion to address this security issue as well as
the humanitarian issue that Ranking Member Thornberry
mentioned.
Because we have a 42 percent increase in number of family
units, and we have 60,000 unaccompanied children that were
caught last year, 60,000. I am a former teacher and a mom. This
is a humanitarian crisis. We had two children die.
As long as there is this incentive with an open border, the
drug cartels are going to continue to take advantage of women
and children, and people are going to die. So thank you for
what you are doing.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Kim.
Mr. Kim. Hi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much. Good morning, Secretary Rood, and good
morning, Admiral Gilday. I wanted to build off of a question
that the chairman asked earlier about the process of review for
the DHS request.
Now, when we are dealing with crises and emergencies, our
Nation has a process put in place with the National Security
Council, convening our national security agencies to be able to
discuss and evaluate those considerations in how we respond to
these types of emergencies.
I worked at the National Security Council through a number
of different crises and emergencies, and I saw how that
collective process was important. It was something that
strengthened our response, making sure that we are getting
interagency buy-in and equities to consider these different
efforts.
So I wanted to ask, with the decision last October with the
deployment of Active Duty in response to the crisis that you
were talking about, what interagency process, what national
security process at the NSC [National Security Council] was
conducted? Was there NSC meetings? Were there principal
meetings, deputy meetings that were pushing for that decision,
reviewing the DHS process and informing the DOD's response to
this?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, there were a series of
meetings that were convened by the White House to review and
coordinate the roles of different departments and agencies that
included the National Security Council, as you mentioned.
At times, those are done pursuant to the National Security
Council's activities. At other times, more on the domestic
policy council side of the ledger. And so there were quite a
few of those meetings and they continue to be an ongoing
process.
You are exactly right that it is critical to coordinate
those various activities, because in this particular case, the
Defense Department is not the lead agency, we are providing
support and augmentation to the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Kim. So prior to DOD's decision to move forward to
fulfill the request by DHS, there was a Principals Committee, a
National Security Council meeting convened that moved forward
with those conclusions that informed DOD's response?
Secretary Rood. There were meetings typically chaired by
other members in the White House staff to convene that included
members of the National Security Council staff in them. With
reviewing the exact deployment of Active Duty forces, obviously
that was a Defense Department decision about how to source the
request for assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Kim. Who were the White House officials that would
chair in the meetings that were reviewing this particular
request during that time period?
Secretary Rood. We would have to get you the specifics, but
certainly there were any number of those meetings that were
held, including with the White House Deputy Chief of Staff
convening some of those, as well as others such as, as I
mentioned, with the participation of the Homeland Security
Advisor and the National Security Council staff.
Mr. Kim. Great. Well I appreciate that. It is incredibly
important that we follow up, so I would like to hear some
greater detail on what meetings were happening and to whatever
extent you can share that, because these processes that are put
in place are there for our Nation's protection.
This process put through the National Security Act put in
place something to make sure we have that constant deliberation
and we have a certain amount of set standards by which we
approach every emergency and crisis, whether domestic or
foreign.
And these are the types of staffs that understand why it is
we have a Situation Room in the White House that allows us to
gather and check politics at the door and make sure that we
focus in on approaching these with the best security in mind
for the American people.
So that is why I asked those questions. Thank you, I yield
back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the Chair
mentioned that the 2018 DHS budget was funded and to be honest
with you, I remember very little discussion about the budget.
I think it was just accepted and it was done, and I would
just point out to the other members that in the fiscal year
2018 budget, there was $1.375 billion for border wall
construction, $251 million in San Diego, $445 million for the
Rio Grande Valley, $196 again for the Rio Grande Valley, $445
for San Diego, El Centro, Yuma and Tucson, 84 miles in all.
The President has now requested funding for an additional
215 miles, a significant portion of which is the completion of
the border wall in those very areas where it was started under
the 2018 appropriations, where there was little if any
discussion, certainly no discussion about it being immoral to
do such a thing.
I want to follow up on what my colleague Ms. Hartzler said
and the Congresslady from Virginia, Ms. Luria. I believe the
point she was getting at--and I want to encourage my
colleagues, I don't pretend to tell anybody on this committee
what to do, but I would suggest a CODEL [congressional
delegation] down to SOUTHCOM to discuss JIATF South and the
things that go on down there and what can be done to stop the
flow of drugs in the United States is well worthwhile and would
be worth the committee actually having a hearing on.
But if I may, reading from a report from Latin America,
from--forgive me, I don't have the name of who did this. As of
2016, 43 of the 50 most homicidal cities in the planet were
located in Latin America. Is that consistent with your beliefs,
gentlemen?
Secretary Rood. Sir, I confess I am not familiar with the
particular statistic you are citing, but obviously there are a
number of cities in Latin America that do experience a high
rate of homicide.
Mr. Scott. At least 17 of the top 20 countries in the world
with regard to homicide rates are located in Central America. I
think one thing that most of us would agree on--and that is
from a report from the Igarape Institute.
I think one of the things most of us in this committee
would agree on is that the vast majority of that violence is
the end result of the trafficking of drugs and the money that
comes from drugs through the cartels in those regions and
countries of the world. Do you believe that is a fair
statement?
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Admiral, with regard to SOUTHCOM and JIATF
South, if you talk to any of the leadership down there, they
will tell you that on a regular basis, that they know where the
drugs are--we knew exactly where they were at some point in the
event, but didn't have the assets to go after them.
Is that a fair statement from what you hear from your
colleagues, Admiral Tidd, or----
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. SOUTHCOM is never satisfied with
the amount of resources they have for the enormous
responsibility they have with respect to counter-narcotics.
Mr. Scott. So since September the 11th, my understanding
and certainly numbers vary a little bit, but somewhere around
10,000 Americans have lost their lives, civilian and military,
in what we call the global war on terror.
Is that pretty close to an accurate number?
Secretary Rood. I----
Mr. Scott. 3,000 on September 11th.
Secretary Rood. I think that is about right, sir.
Mr. Scott. We lose 5,000 Americans every month to drug
overdoses, more so today than just a few years ago. It is
growing, quite honestly, exponentially. It is baffling to me
that we give SOUTHCOM the leftovers when these acts of
terrorism in our backyard are coming from the western
hemisphere, they are in the western hemisphere.
And we spend virtually nothing on SOUTHCOM. JIATF South,
$435.5 million, less than 1.5 percent of the U.S. counter-
narcotics budget that resulted in greater than 76 percent of
the interdictions of drugs coming into the United States.
Mr. Chairman, my time is about to expire but I do hope that
the committee will pursue the funding of SOUTHCOM and JIATF
South and the role that they play in the war on the drugs
coming into this country and what our help through that means
can do with regard to bringing stability in Central and South
America.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Scott. I think it is a very
important point, we are going to have the SOUTHCOM Commander
testify at our normal hearing as we get ready for our budget. I
think that is enormously important as we look at those needs.
And I will point out we do spend a lot of money in this
country on combating drugs coming into this country,
prosecuting those that distribute them. I would suggest that
there are a couple other areas if we are dealing with the drug
problem. Number one, it is much more of a demand problem than
it is a supply problem. We have spent a lot of money trying to
cut it off, we have sent a lot of people to jail.
We have to figure out how to get Americans to stop
demanding so many drugs and a huge part of that is making
treatment available. I know in my own State there are people
who want treatment for various drug addictions who cannot get
it because they either don't have--there aren't simply any
beds, any people available to provide it or they don't have the
healthcare dollars to pay for it. And if you ask any expert who
has studied the drug problem which is more important to
stopping it, supply or demand, every single one of them will
say demand.
As long as there is the unbelievable demand for drugs they
will find some way to get in here, no matter how many people we
arrest, no matter how many walls we build. We got to do it. I
don't disagree with that. And we have. But let us understand
the totality of the problem and also the finite resources that
we have talked about earlier.
Mr. Cisneros, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Mr.
Secretary, thank you, Admiral, for being here today. I will
keep my questions short and brief, but we know DHS requested
DOD to improve 37 miles of the Barry Goldwater Range, 37 miles
of barrier fencing there at an estimated cost of $450 million.
We also know the Navy took $7.5 million of its operational
and maintenance budget in order to start that. We also know, as
previously was stated, that construction--the military backlog
of construction--there is a backlog of military construction.
So my question is what maintenance had to be deferred or
delayed or canceled because of that transfer of maintenance
money to this barrier wall?
And going forward, what construction is going to have to be
canceled or future maintenance is going to have to be delayed
or canceled because of the money going to improve this 37 miles
of barrier wall?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, as you point out, along the
Barry Goldwater Range, which is an active bombing range, there
was a request from the Department of Homeland Security to
examine a larger barrier there.
We have not performed military construction funds for that.
The Navy, as you point out, used $7.5 million to conduct
planning in the event that a decision is made to erect such a
barrier, but that decision to use a construction funds has not
yet occurred. Now, that came from the operations and
maintenance accounts and those are broad accounts in which we
draw from to support the operations of the Defense Department,
sir.
Mr. Cisneros. Yes, but being a former Navy supply officer,
I know how hard commands fight for that money and they want
that money. And I know how devastating it could be when that
money's taken away. And I am sure a commanding officer could
have used that money, that he is saying that now my readiness
has been delayed because it's been taken away. But I mean do we
have a list of any deferred or canceled maintenance that had to
be stopped because this money has been transferred?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, I will have to take that for
the record and see if there are any specific lists that we
could provide.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Cisneros. Okay. And secondly, I know we--again, we
talked about the military construction and if the President
enacts his powers in order to declare an emergency and where
that money would come from.
Now I know you can't answer a hypothetical question--or you
don't want to answer a hypothetical question, but will you
commit to providing a list to the committee in the event that
authority by the President is triggered, including the specific
impact on military readiness and the requirements of each
project that is identified for cancellation or deferral if the
President in fact does declare an emergency in order to build
his wall?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, again, the President has not
made such a declaration at this point. And then, depending on
which part of the law that he would authorize DOD to act
pursuant to, then that would guide us down another path that we
would have to meet the requirements of that law.
So it may not involve military construction, depending on
should the President invoke such authority and then what
authority he should cite in that declaration. And so it would
be premature, since we don't possess such a list at this point,
to provide that to you.
Mr. Cisneros. I understand but what I am asking simply in
this situation is if that situation does occur, will you
provide a list to this committee telling us what construction
is being canceled?
Secretary Rood. We would certainly operate in accordance
with the law. I think here we are not yet at the stage where we
would reach such a question, sir. And so we would obviously
keep the committee informed about our activities. But
consistent with the requirements in whichever applicable law
was conducted--and depending on which authority the President
cited, there are different requirements that apply, as you are
aware, I am sure.
Mr. Cisneros. I defer my time back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 9/11, as we all know,
resulted in the deaths of roughly 3,000 Americans in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia and the Washington, DC, area. And
the net effect of the loss of those 3,000 lives was to invade
Iraq and Afghanistan at cost of trillions of dollars and many
thousands of lost lives by military personnel and civilian
support personnel.
In contrast, illegal aliens cause roughly 2,000 homicides
on American soil per year. At least over 2,000 illegal aliens
were apprehended by Federal law enforcement officers in fiscal
year 2018, for homicides. And as was mentioned earlier by
Congresswoman Hartzler and Congressman Scott, drug overdoses
cost roughly 70,000 American lives per year and the evidence is
overwhelming that a substantial portion of the drugs, those
poisons that caused the loss of American lives, come across our
southern border illegally.
In terms of lost American lives, then, our poor southern
border combined with the homicides of illegal aliens far
exceeds the loss of life caused by 9/11. With that as a
backdrop, I want to direct your attention to 10 United States
Code 284, which authorizes President Trump to deploy the
military to the southern border to build fences and to do a lot
of other things. And for clarity, if you look it up in the
dictionary, the word fence includes the word barrier and the
word barrier includes walls made of a variety of different
materials.
So that having been said, it seems to me that 10 U.S. Code
284 can be used by the President of the United States to direct
the United States military to build a wall. Now as of today--
you have mentioned military forces along the southern border.
Have any of them been deployed pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284?
Secretary Rood. Congressman, I don't believe any of our
forces have been deployed pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284. You are
correct, however, that that use of authority would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to erect barriers, roads, fencing,
those type of materials to disrupt drug smuggling.
Mr. Brooks. Does 10 U.S.--excuse me, 10 U.S.C. 284, as you
understand it, require the declaration of a national emergency
before it is implemented?
Secretary Rood. No.
Mr. Brooks. It does not?
Secretary Rood. No.
Mr. Brooks. Has President Trump, to your knowledge, ever
used 10 U.S.C. 284 to direct the military to build the wall
that is necessary for border security?
Secretary Rood. No, not to my knowledge, Congressman.
Mr. Brooks. If President Trump were to direct the Pentagon,
United States military pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284, to build such
barriers as are necessary to secure our southern border from
drug trafficking and international crime cartels, would the
United States military obey that order?
Secretary Rood. If we judge it to be a lawful order, yes,
sir. And I assume it would be.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, I appreciate your responses and, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time.
Mr. Rood and Admiral Gilday, I am a new Member of Congress and
newly put on the Readiness Subcommittee, and so most of my
questions will have to do with the readiness aspect of this.
And I understand for years that the Department has been
briefing Congress on the concerns of readiness on our Armed
Forces, and so to that end I would love it if you could--if you
are able to talk us through a couple of the major units that
are deployed at the border, what their mission is. And if you
could tell us what they would be doing if they weren't on the
border right now, normally?
Admiral Gilday. That is a good question. So we have
engineering battalions who, right now, are--and that is
actually a joint project with both Army engineers and Air Force
welders, we are actually welding concertina wire above the wall
in sections of Arizona and California.
Those particular units would not probably be doing that if
they weren't deployed to the southern border. I am not sure
where they were in the readiness cycle when they were deployed,
but I can look up that information and try to give you a sense.
With respect to readiness, I will honestly say that some
units either have or will miss company level training
opportunities based on the deployment. But because we are
limiting the deployments to fairly short periods of time, we
believe that in every one of those cases we can recover from
that.
Ms. Houlahan. So if it would be all right to ask for the
record if we could have a list of all of the units that are
deployed and also their DRRS [Defense Readiness Reporting
System] reports from before and after the deployment so that we
could understand from a quantitative perspective how the
readiness has been effected if it has been positively or
negatively.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 74.]
My second question is for either of you all. And I
understand in reading your preparation material that in some
cases small portions and in some cases individuals are being
deployed from their units separate from their units.
And we know the units have a finite period at home to train
for their next deployment. Are we hurting their home unit
training or readiness, are we impeding or impairing
individuals' career abilities by deploying in this way?
Admiral Gilday. I don't think it is a significant impact.
Based on the short duration in time that we are deploying them,
we have tried to, whenever possible, deploy our personnel as
units instead of deploying them individually, because that is
how they were trained and certified.
And so we are trying to maintain that construct so we get
the most out of that deployment forward down to the border.
There is a cost with respect to dwell time and we do deploy
them, we have to recover that.
And so there is no way around that, but again, we have
tried to minimize the time away to minimize that recovery.
Ms. Houlahan. So it is definitely clear in the preparation
materials that I read that there were some individuals and very
small groups of people that have been deployed. And so I would
like to know if there's any way of capturing the impact of that
that you could report back to us from a quantitative
perspective.
The next question that I have is for Mr. Rood, which has to
do with title 10 and section 276, which states that the
Secretary of Defense should prescribe regulations to ensure
that the provision of any support to law enforcement does not
adversely affect the military preparedness of the United
States.
Are you aware of any directives or policy statements put
forth by the Department to ensure that any readiness impacts of
this border deployment has been mitigated?
Secretary Rood. The deployments that are done to the border
area of course are all consistent with our domestic authorities
and DOD personnel deployed there are not engaged in law
enforcement activities.
The Secretary does gauge their impact on readiness, and as
mentioned, we track that through a regular reporting system.
And depending on the units, in some cases readiness has
increased, in other cases it's declined. And that varies over
the course of a deployment.
Ms. Houlahan. So I am not certain if I heard a yes or no
answer to the question. I guess I was asking if there were any
directives or policy statements put forth by the Department,
and I didn't know if I actually heard a yes or no on that.
Secretary Rood. Could I ask you to clarify, you are asking
for a directive that changes the present policy on usage----
Ms. Houlahan. I am looking for how the directives are being
implemented specifically.
Secretary Rood. Perhaps I could take that for the record. I
am not aware of any change from our past practice with respect
to----
Ms. Houlahan. So it sounds like that is no I guess is the
answer.
Secretary Rood. I will confess, I am not sure I properly
understand your question, and I am sure it is my issue,
Congresswoman.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Houlahan. Not a problem, not a problem. I yield the
rest of my time and thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this hearing
today we have heard comments that have already established that
the current U.S. military presence on the southern border is
indeed similar in size and scope to the DOD support to border
protection and security over the previous two administrations.
And I understand the DOD pays the bill to support DHS
through use of operation and maintenance and personnel funds,
usually to the tune of about $100 million per year. My
question, and this will build upon some of the previous
questions, is what if any readiness functions go unfunded or
unexecuted because of the additional cost to support missions
like Operation Guardian Support and Operation Faithful Patriot?
I know in the previous response you touched upon the cost
because of dwell time. Can you go further in depth on the dwell
time issue, but any other readiness impacts?
Admiral Gilday. So in terms of monetary costs, in terms of
what we had to reprogram in order to, you know, conduct an out-
of-cycle deployment, I will have to get back to you on what the
trades were in order to make that happen.
So we didn't do something, we are not going to do something
based on that deployment, but I will have to go back and take a
look at that in order to give you a more concise answer.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Stefanik. Okay, I think that is really important that
we get that information. Building upon that, and this was also
touched upon previously, but I would like more specifics, can
you describe what the training value is to Active Duty Army and
Marine Corps units deployed to the southern border, and are we
ensuring that the right types of units perform the right types
of duties to enhance their training and readiness.
Admiral Gilday. I think that we have done an excellent job
at matching specific skill sets and units that have been
trained in those mission areas that we are matching them to
along the border.
Ms. Stefanik. And can you give me an example of that?
Admiral Gilday. I think a really good example are military
police. And so we are using them in a mission to protect CBP
should those ports of entry get overrun. They are the absolute
perfect unit to perform that function.
I mentioned earlier, they have received great training
value from the training vignettes that they have done with CBP
in preparation for that mission.
Ms. Stefanik. And my last question is, since the October
2018 request, how specifically have border points been hardened
during the initial deployment of Active Duty personnel? And
what specifically does that hardening involve? And which
specific points were indeed hardened?
Secretary Rood. Congresswoman, there were 22 points of
entry along the four southern States that were in the nine
sectors that CBP breaks that mission into. And at those
barriers--at those areas around the points of entry, 70 miles
of concertina wire was emplaced atop existing barrier. In other
cases, depending on the location, to control vehicle traffic,
there was a request for Jersey barriers or other vehicle-
shaping barriers.
And then in other cases, to harden the specific location,
construction was performed to create barriers and place
shipping containers, things of that nature. It varied depending
on which point of entry and how that the hardening was done.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Crow.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Secretary Rood, Admiral Gilday. We
appreciate you being here today.
I have been struggling to try to piece together a
chronology of the decision to send the Active Duty troops to
the border. As me and my colleagues have pointed out, there is
a long history of National Guard and Reserve cooperation,
support. But what distinguishes this is the use of Active Duty
and the number of Active Duty troops.
And I am also very concerned always with operational need
driving the use of Active Duty forces as opposed to politics.
So could you help me answer a simple question, who originated
the idea to send Active Duty soldiers to the border? Did that
idea come out of the White House or did it come out of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Secretary Rood. Neither, sir. When the request is received
for assistance by the Department of--the Department of Homeland
Security is the mission-holder and they provide a request for
assistance where they are unable to meet their needs to the
Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense then looks at those needs,
whatever the request is, and tries to identify from the total
force the best way to source the mission need. And that is
where the decision ended up being made in that particular case,
as Admiral Gilday testified, to use Active Duty troops last
fall in addition to the National Guardsmen that were already
deployed.
Mr. Crow. So there was a determination that there were no
sufficient National Guard and Reserve forces available to meet
that request?
Admiral Gilday. So it was primarily driven by timing. I
described at the time the direction came from the White House
and those migrants were massing down in southern Mexico, the
direction was to move forces fairly expeditiously to the
border. And so based on the fact that with----
Mr. Crow. You said that directive came from the White
House.
Admiral Gilday. That directive ultimately came from the
White House, yes, as I recall. So that direction for us to
deploy, not necessarily to use Active Duty forces. That was a
decision made inside the Department.
Mr. Crow. Okay. The second question relates to just the
living conditions for our troops on the border. There were
reports late last year of our soldiers in tents, without
running water. Can you please explain for me what the living
conditions for those soldiers look like right now?
Admiral Gilday. My understanding of the living conditions
are pretty good for deployed units that are living in tents. I
haven't heard any reports, sir, of a lack of running water or
of any facilities that they require.
Mr. Crow. How many soldiers are living in tents right now?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would have to get back to you with
an exact count. Based on the mission and the location, we
probably have some people in hotels, particularly as we move to
this, as we transition to the missions between the POEs [points
of entry] out in the middle of the desert in some cases.
So I will have to get back to you with specifics.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Crow. Admiral, you said earlier that barriers are
ineffective unless you are also surveilling them. One of the
requests from DHS is to build an additional 150 miles of
concertina wire by March of this year. Is it your understanding
that that 150 miles will also be surveilled mileage?
Admiral Gilday. It is not. I don't know what CBP's plan is
along that section of concertina-wired wall that we are helping
out with. I don't know what their long-term plan is.
Mr. Crow. So by your definition that a barrier has to be
surveilled to be effective, then would some of that mileage
potentially be ineffective?
Admiral Gilday. I am unsure if I--I am unsure if there is--
--
Secretary Rood. Sir, we received the request for assistance
again from the Customs and Border Patrol but it is our
understanding they do have a surveillance plan along these
barriers. In some cases it is to go in addition to existing
infrastructure that is there, sir.
Mr. Crow. I understand that, but I would like some
clarification on whether or not the resources that are being
used by the Department of Defense are effectively being used.
And if there is not coordination between DHS and DOD to make
sure that is happening, we definitely need make sure that it
is.
Secretary Rood. There is close coordination and part of the
recent request for assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security is about mobile surveillance assets to provide
additional capability to detect and monitor movements and
activities at the border.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. We are going to try to wrap this
up at 12:30 just because I don't want to abuse the Pentagon
witnesses the first time they send them over to me so that they
don't send any more. It may slip a little bit past that, but if
we could move as quickly as possible through the rest that
would be great.
Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And note taken.
Admiral Gilday, as you are aware, one of the cost drivers
for military construction is the changing classification of the
mission, where the mission itself is not changing, but perhaps
it goes from TS [Top Secret] to TS/SCI [Sensitive Compartmented
Information] or to some different security classification.
In a world--and I know this hasn't happened yet, but in a
world in which MILCON dollars were used for a barrier at the
southern border, would we expect those missions perhaps to be
reevaluated in terms of their classification or would we expect
those construction projects to sort of goose to the top of the
list in a reprioritization?
Admiral Gilday. I am not sure I understand your question
specifically, sir, with respect to the security
classifications.
Mr. Gaetz. Right. So in a world in which one of the cost
drivers to MILCON is the fact that some facilities have to go
from TS to SCI or----
Admiral Gilday. Now I understand----
Mr. Gaetz. To TS, like, walk us through what happens to
those types of projects in a world in which resources were not
available for that type of construction.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would be speculating. I have not
been involved with any of the, you know, initial work that has
gone on to take a look at what those metrics might be. But I
will get back to you with a better answer.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Gaetz. Yes, my request would be like in a world in
which that were to happen that we look at those specific types
of MILCON projects and really determine the impact on them.
And Mr. Chairman, heeding your advice, I would like to
yield my remaining to my colleague from Florida, Mr. Waltz.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Enormously helpful, I
appreciate it. Well, actually, go ahead.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a Pentagon alum, been on the other side of there--thank
you for coming. So broadly speaking, I think we all agree that
the Pentagon has been providing the support for many decades.
Is there an effort to get to the point where the Pentagon's not
providing the support?
So, if we looked at the DHS appropriation and looked at
what you are being requested, is that roughly--does that
roughly match or is there some reason that the National Guard
Bureau in particular wants to, or needs to, or provides
training and readiness value of continuing to provide this
support, or have we all just become very comfortable with this
kind of steady state?
Secretary Rood. Sir, I would say the Department of Homeland
Security Customs and Border Patrol, they obviously deploy a
larger number of agents, a larger number of resources to the
border. DOD's role is to augment them. Now, as situations
arise--and they have varied over the years--but there has been
a steady stream for decades, where the Defense Department has
provided that support. Sometimes the nature is adjusted over
time, but it has been there.
Mr. Waltz. Contingencies aside or spikes, but just a trend
line.
Secretary Rood. And it's really a resourcing issue outside
the Defense Department.
Mr. Waltz. Because DHS's resources have increased.
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waltz. Right. And the chairman noted that apprehensions
have decreased, are you seeing--bottom line, are you seeing an
increase or decrease in requests over time, over, say, the last
several years, aside from the recent caravan, coming from DHS?
Secretary Rood. In the last year we have seen an uptick, if
you will, in the requests due to the increased activities and
the flow. And again, I mean, the volume is instructive. Last
year over 500,000 apprehensions by our law enforcement
authorities; a larger number of people entered the country and
were not apprehended. Last 2 years alone, a larger number than
the population of Washington, DC, have been apprehended, or a
city the size of San Francisco----
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Secretary Rood. Apprehensions in 2 years.
Mr. Waltz. On the Active Duty side, I would like to echo
Ms. Stefanik, my colleague, and I would be very interested in
what are the Active Duty troops not doing? I mean, what was the
opportunity cost? Were they--did they miss training rotations?
Are they in the lineup for deployment, the effect on dwell
time? Just understanding better that cost.
And then finally, I would like to echo Mr. Scott and the
importance of JIATF South. Secretary of Navy Spencer has
indicated that ships are critical to the deterrent of drugs
coming across our waterways.
Admiral Tidd indicated we are only stemming about a quarter
of what we are detecting, one-fourth. Is there any
consideration, reconsideration for the Navy providing more
assets to SOUTHCOM, particularly LCS [littoral combat ship],
which would be uniquely suited for that mission?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, it is not a Navy call. And so, I go
back to the National Defense Strategy and as unpopular as it
is, it is a ruthless prioritization. And I don't think that
anybody in uniform disagrees at the severity of the drug
problem, but the----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Okay, fair enough.
The Chairman. Good there.
Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Hey, gentlemen, thank you for doing this. I
have been in your seat and I know it's getting on in time here.
So thank you for sticking with us.
As someone who was at the Pentagon, who was married to a
30-year Army veteran and who has a stepdaughter on Active Duty
right now, I am extremely concerned that we preserve the
perception and reality that the U.S. military is apolitical.
So, the three concerns I have or the three questions I have
are, one, about the timing of the decision to deploy, which is
hard to feel wasn't political given how close it was to the
midterms.
Number two, the choice to put Active Duty folks down there
instead of Guard, which I absolutely agree has been done for a
long time by many administrations.
And then, three, the missions that those Active Duty folks
are pursuing and any bleed over into law enforcement
activities, which, of course, goes back to the very founding of
our state.
So, on the choice to deploy, on the timing, in answer to
Mr. Crow's question, you said it was a directive from the White
House, is that correct? In the form of a memo?
Admiral Gilday. As best as I can recall. Not specific that
Active Duty be deployed, but that the U.S. military respond.
Secretary Rood. And accompanying that is, of course, a
formal request for assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security.
Ms. Slotkin. Of course. Was there anyone, civilian or
military at the three-star rank or above, who disagreed or
pushed back on the request and the timing of the request? To
your knowledge--just obviously that you would be aware of?
Admiral Gilday. There were certainly discussions about, you
know, making best military advice on how we should respond.
Ms. Slotkin. Was there any formal dissent, any
transmissions back to the White House with the dissent of any
one civilian or military above--three-star or above that you
were tracking?
Admiral Gilday. Not that I know of, no.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. On the choice of Active Duty, so I heard
your reply, I think to Representative Luria, that there--it was
really available forces at that time and having to get to the
border very quickly.
Is there any other factors that went into the decision to
use Active Duty over Guard besides speed, for the record?
Intelligence reporting, obviously we are in an unclassified
setting, any other factors on record that led to the decision
to use Active Duty?
Admiral Gilday. I think other factors were capacity, the
right skill sets, readiness impacts were considered, and timing
was key.
Ms. Slotkin. Was there ever a consideration of--we have now
seen stories come out of some, I think, misstated talking
points about the terrorist threat emanating out of the
caravans, out of the number of terrorists that were coming
across the border in that area, was there a threat assessment
in any way that led to the choice to use Active Duty over
Guard?
Admiral Gilday. No, there was no connection.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. And then the missions, obviously, we all
know that the U.S. military cannot perform law enforcement
activities inside the United States. I am sure we all believe
that that is important.
I understand that there was a memo that was sent over by
then Chief of Staff Kelly, indicating that in agreement with
the law as it stands, no law enforcement activities were to
take place unless otherwise directed by the President of the
United States.
Has the President of the United States directed the
Department of Defense in any way to use those forces in law
enforcement roles?
Admiral Gilday. No.
Secretary Rood. No.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Thanks, gentlemen.
I yield the rest of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, chairman. And want to thank both of
you for coming in, I thank for you leadership and your service
in securing our country.
We have serious vulnerabilities in our southern border and
American citizens are suffering a devastating impact. We have
talked about drugs today, human trafficking, some of the
criminals that get through that victimize innocent Americans,
Sunni extremism, we could go on and on--and I think Ms.
Hartzler raised--just a huge impact, 72,000 Americans this year
will suffer or die of an overdose. And much of those drugs are
coming over from our southern border.
So I just want to make the statement that Republicans and
Democrats must sit together, negotiate and solve this problem
in good faith. Americans demand it and we can do better.
Under Secretary Rood, I just want to clarify a couple of
your key points for our constituents back in the Nebraska
Second District. And I want to just clarify some key points,
just make sure I have it right. Is the current deployment
consistent with past precedent of Republican and Democratic
administrations?
Secretary Rood. Yes.
Mr. Bacon. Is the current deployment consistent with law?
Secretary Rood. Absolutely.
Mr. Bacon. And is the current deployment support of an
inherent Federal function?
Secretary Rood. Yes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I think those are key points that we
need to stress. Admiral Gilday, about a year ago, Admiral Tidd
said that some of the pathways and vulnerabilities used by
criminal organizations in South and Central America are being
exploited by terrorists.
The Guatemala Ambassador personally told me that he has
detained dozens of Sunni extremists within their country, there
were--that were trying to get to our country using--and they
had false identifications. Rear Admiral Hendrickson said a year
ago that individuals have been detained south of the border who
have ties with terrorists and some with the intentions to
conduct attacks against our homeland. Can you give us an update
on what you know--what this threat of terrorism is via our
southern border?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I will say this, the threat is
real. I would also say that we have a significant presence of
special forces in South America as we speak. They are
conducting training missions, and so as we talk about
priorities within the Department of Defense and the fact that
we are resource constrained, it is in our best interest to form
those partnerships to help those countries take care of those
problems whenever they can. And so that is an example of our
focus in South America, getting after that particular threat
stream.
Mr. Bacon. If you have any other updates that you can
share, obviously in an unclassified setting, on the terrorist
activity that we are seeing through South America and Central
America. Also the information I have is about 8 months old.
Admiral Gilday. Yes sir, we can arrange a briefing for you
to get an update on that.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you gentlemen for being here today,
thank you for your preparation, you have taken quite a bit of
time to come here, and thank you to your staff for all of the
preparation as well. I was happy to hear from my colleague that
the National Guards troops were excited and enjoyed being
deployed on these extra missions.
I have heard that from some of our National Guardsmen and
women as well, that they enjoy the extra training. I can tell
you that our Active Duty service men and women do not always
enjoy the extra deployments especially as they come right
before the holidays, over Thanksgiving and Christmas as this
one did.
I bring that up because I am really concerned about the
OPTEMPO [operations tempo]. As you know better than I,
Secretary Rood, over the last several years we have seen
significant strain on our Armed Forces from the 5 accidents in
the 7th Fleet, the tragic loss of 17 sailors aboard the USS
Fitzgerald and the USS McCain, to our special forces leadership
expressing concern at the high rate of deployment and how it is
affecting recruitment, to Secretary Mattis himself highlighting
the need to restore readiness to our National Guard by
resetting their equipment, we have seen strains in our
military. I know that is something, Admiral Gilday, that the
military's been working very hard to get troops back home with
their families at a better rate.
You, I am sure, during your service saw the difference
after 9/11 in troop deployments and what a hardship that could
be on our military service member and families.
Given that, Secretary Rood, it is my understanding that our
troops at the border are providing the following capabilities:
stringing concertina wire as we have heard, planning
assistance, engineering and aviation support, medical teams,
command and control facilities, mobile surveillance camera
operations, and temporary housing and personal protective
equipment for CBP personnel. Are any of these missions,
missions that the DHS or contractors for the DHS could not
provide?
Secretary Rood. Well the starting point of course,
Congresswoman, is the DHS making an assessment that their
organic capabilities--they need augmentation, and therefore
they are making a request to the Defense Department for support
to civil authorities so that is the triggering event.
Obviously the Department of Homeland Security, CBP and
others possess things such as helicopters and medical personnel
in addition to the Defense Department. But depending on the
circumstances they have made a determination that their
assets--and we work with them to try to develop an
understanding of the mission need--that their assets were
insufficient by themselves to meet that need, hence they have
made a request for assistance.
Ms. Sherrill. So they have made the determination that
their assets are insufficient. Were they given sufficient
assets, could they undertake those missions?
Secretary Rood. In a general sense, yes. I mean, for
example some of the helicopter support that DOD has provided,
if the DHS--I assume if they had sufficient rotary-wing support
they could have met that mission need themselves.
Ms. Sherrill. The reason I am asking is because as you
yourself said, the rotor-wing support, and as a former
helicopter pilot I am certainly interested in all things rotary
wing.
The needs overseas are very great and now that we are
providing this on the border, the balance between what DHS
should be doing and what I think Active Duty military troops
should be doing is something that I am very interested in.
And so, what I am looking for is should the DHS really be
advocating for better supplies and then we, as the House Armed
Services Committee, can really help our troops to perform their
missions, and their traditional missions, especially overseas
with our wars in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as now where
our special forces are deployed across the world--including, as
we hear, in South America.
And so I guess that is something that I think we need to
continue to look into. I will talk to you a bit, Admiral
Gilday, as you know some of the Nation's greatest threats are
the security vulnerabilities in our land, air, and sea ports.
This is particularly something I care about, being from New
Jersey because we have some of the largest ports of entry in
the United States.
And there are new and emerging threats and I am concerned
that all this talk about border security when we don't include
our other ports of entry, is really missing some of the
emerging threats that we have seen.
And I bring this up because just last Tuesday night, at
Newark Airport, one of the 15 busiest airports in the country,
it was shut down for an hour after reports of an unauthorized
drone, when it entered their airspace. This delay cost our
economy $65 million, and disrupted many people's lives. So
given that, I wonder Admiral----
The Chairman. I am sorry, your time has expired so whatever
you want to know is going to have to be for the record.
Ms. Sherrill. I will come back to that, thank you very much
and thank you for your time today.
The Chairman. Okay. And at the end of this hearing there
will be an opportunity--everyone here will have an opportunity
to submit questions and statements for the record.
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rood, in a
New York Times article dated November 10, 2018, anonymous
Pentagon officials were quoted deriding the deployment as an
expensive waste of time and resources and a morale killer to
boot.
Do you know who those anonymous sources at the Pentagon
were that would call this is a waste of time?
Secretary Rood. No, sir. Obviously, this is a mission that
we take seriously at the Defense Department that we have
executed before in various permutations. And we are executing
in support of our colleagues at the Customs and Border
Protection.
Mr. Banks. Clearly, you would agree everything that we have
heard over the past couple of hours would contradict those
anonymous sources who called this deployment a waste of time.
Would you agree simply?
Secretary Rood. Yes, border security is an element in
national security. And that is part of the Defense Department's
mission.
Mr. Banks. In a Time magazine article dated November 15,
2018, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said quote,
``It's a waste of time. It's clear to me that he is using the
military as political pawns which is completely
irresponsible.''
Everything that we have heard over the past couple of hours
would clearly contradict former Secretary Hagel's account of
what is occurring at the border that our troops have
contributed to, correct?
Secretary Rood. Sir, I have not read former Secretary
Hagel's comments. But I can say our mission is devoted to
supporting the Customs and Border Patrol. There is a very
legitimate long-standing mission that we have performed over
the years at the Defense Department. And we are doing so again.
Mr. Banks. Later in that article, it is quoted saying
quote, ``Troops often find themselves with little to do. They
fill their time throwing a football around, texting their
girlfriends, exercising or waiting for the outdoor mess hall to
open.''
Secretary wouldn't you agree that quote and these
descriptions are not just disrespectful but downright demeaning
to our men and women in uniform?
Secretary Rood. Our men and women in uniform are very
devoted to the missions that they have been sent upon. And the
type of behavior you are talking about, waiting for the mess
hall to open or throwing a football, by the way, in my travels
around the world, it's not unusual behavior----
Mr. Banks. Do you find that in Afghanistan as well?
Secretary Rood. For our troops.
Mr. Banks. That is right. Admiral, I wonder if you can--in
your opening statement, you talked some about those
surveillance missions. I wonder if you can--we haven't talked a
whole lot about that today. Can you describe or give us
anecdotes of what is involved with that mission and how our
troops have contributed to that?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we are just transitioning now from our
missions at the ports of entry to this surveillance mission
between the ports of entry. We have an ongoing pilot program
right now with the Marine Corps with the special MAGTF [Marine
Air-Ground Task Force]-7 out of Camp Pendleton is actually
working with CBP.
One of the things we are trying to do is get our arms
around the exact requirement with respect to manpower. And so,
the systems are a little bit different than the systems that we
have in the Marine Corps or in the Navy or in the Army. And so,
there will be a training period.
But essentially, there are trucks and vans that have a
surveillance camera suite. And the mission is to conduct
surveillance, detection, and monitoring between the POEs so
that we can then cue CBP to come in and detain the people.
Fairly simple mission, but again you go back to the
effectiveness of a barrier or any type of wall is ineffective
without surveillance, so. So we owe you a report out on whether
or not we--on the effectiveness of this operation. We have
direction from the Secretary of Defense to conduct an
assessment no less than 90 days.
Sir, if I could just add. A moment ago, you talked about
throwing around footballs. And we have tried really hard not to
waste people's time down at the border. So, there have been
occasions when we haven't gotten it right with respect to
numbers.
And maybe we had excess capacity. But we have brought those
people back when we realized that we have made a mistake. And
we are not trying just to have a photo op down there with
people on the border.
Mr. Banks. I appreciate that. After hearing your testimony
and your answers over the past couple of hours, it is clear to
me more than ever that our troops have played a valuable role
at the border. And we appreciate your testimony today. With
that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. We have three people left who want
to ask questions. It is after 12:30 so if we could--and two of
them represent districts on the border, so I want to try to get
to them. But the quicker we can do it, the more the witnesses
will appreciate it, but Miss Escobar from Texas.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
so much for being here. I am very grateful for your leadership
and for your responses to the questions. I come from the U.S.-
Mexico border. I represent El Paso, Texas, which has been one
of the safest communities in the United States for close to two
decades.
The vast majority of the individuals that we are seeing
coming to the southern border are people seeking asylum. They
are not individuals here who are setting out to do us harm. I
want to recall that in 1997 and would like for you all to help
me out with this, a young man, Esequiel Hernandez, was shot and
killed by a U.S. Marine who was patrolling the border. Can you
help me and remind me and remind Americans what are the rules
of engagement when you are in communities like my own, like
Redford, Texas, and West Texas?
Admiral Gilday. So, they are not rules of engagement when
we have forces deployed in domestic situations like this. They
are actually standing rules for the use of force. And they are
guidance that authorizes the use of non-deadly force in order
to control an escalating situation.
And the emphasis in our training is towards deescalation.
So, how can you use a minimal amount of force to get the
problem under control so that it doesn't become a larger
problem.
We always have the inherent right of self-defense to use
deadly force. But we train to only use deadly force when all
lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed.
So the emphasis is on nonlethal. I would tell you that the
preponderance of the troops we have down at the border have not
been in a position to have contact with migrants; the medical
personnel, yes.
But even the protection personnel that we put to protect
CBP, they are the fourth or fifth echelon back in terms of a
defense in depth kind of construct. I hope that answers your
question, ma'am, with respect to the use of force.
Ms. Escobar. Yes, thank you so much. Another follow-up
question on a separate topic, last summer during the height of
the family separation crisis, the Department of Homeland
Security asked the Department of Defense to prepare to receive
unaccompanied minors at some of the military installations.
In my district, Fort Bliss was identified as one of those
potential sites. Can you provide us with an update? Have any
other sites been identified? What is the status of this? And
would you commit to notifying this committee of any updates on
this topic?
Secretary Rood. Congresswoman, I would say as you correctly
pointed out, last year the Department of Homeland--HHS, Health
and Human Services had made requests of the Defense Department
for supplementary housing for unaccompanied alien children.
There was a separate request from the Department of Homeland
Security for housing of families of migrants.
In both cases, the Defense Department reviewed our
available facilities, and they were both for facilities or land
for temporary facilities to be erected. And we provided a
favorable response to both the Department of HHS and DHS.
Those departments chose not to take advantage of those
availabilities, and they still haven't to this period of time.
And so at present, we don't have something ongoing or a search
for other locations that we would notify the committee of.
Ms. Escobar. In the future, if that does come up again, are
you committed to notifying this committee?
Secretary Rood. We would certainly keep in contact with you
on that, yes.
Ms. Escobar. Okay. Thank you.
I yield.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for staying and being here with us.
Appreciate it.
I wanted to go back, just very, very quickly. When do you
think we might have some information regarding the opportunity
costs in terms of our troops and their families? Any sense of
how soon that can get out?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, we will take a look at that as soon
as we get back this afternoon, and get back to you. Again, I
don't think it has been significant in terms of time. But we do
owe you an answer on that.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
I want to go to the national emergency that we are talking
about. And I understand, Secretary Rood, a hypothetical, if you
will. But at the same time, it is not so hypothetical if we are
looking, perhaps, into 3 weeks from now. What does that look
like from the viewpoint of the military?
Secretary Rood. Well, as you know, Congresswoman, the
President has the authority to declare a national emergency----
Mrs. Davis. Of course.
Secretary Rood [continuing]. Or the Congress. And so
obviously, we would await such a determination by either the
Congress or the President. And depending on what authority--in
this case, the President, I think you were referring to--were
to cite, it then triggers certain requirements depending on
which statute is utilized.
And so we have done some prudent planning to try to
determine what our legal obligations would be, to make sure we
understand the correct operation of those different
authorities.
But at this stage, it hasn't progressed to the point that I
am aware of, that the President has issued----
Mrs. Davis. But--what I am wondering about is that the
number of illegal crossings. Clearly, they are down. I mean,
they are down even from George W. Bush, I believe, even half,
from a millions, somewhere in the neighborhood of about 400,000
at this time.
So it's not the number of crossings. We didn't declare a
national emergency at that time. The President--Bush did not do
that. What is it now?
Secretary Rood. Well, the numbers of crossings have
fluctuated over the years. Last year, the--and we rely on the
Department of Homeland Security for this data. Their number of
apprehensions, there's a larger number of people that come
across than--than are apprehended, of course.
Mrs. Davis. Of course.
Secretary Rood. And they gave us a 521,000 in fiscal year
2018, which is up from 415,000 the previous fiscal year. The
difference is, really, the caravans and some of the nature of
the asylum-seekers.
Mrs. Davis. Is the nature of the asylum-seekers, though, is
what they need something different? So if we had more judges
and more processing capability, perhaps, that is really what is
needed, not necessarily declaring a national emergency.
So, you know, what I am wondering is, how I translate that
for my constituents. My constituents all live on the border, as
does my colleague, Ms. Escobar. So how do we see that? And I
think that they count on our military, I think, to define, also
clearly, why is this a national emergency? What do they have to
do? How do they protect their children? How do they protect
their families?
I mean, I don't know that anybody has--we have a national
emergency for natural disasters that I don't think in the State
of California, or in the country, we have declared that. Other
Presidents have not stepped in to do that even though the
situations were different for them.
So I think we owe it to people to try and explain that a
little bit better than--and I think that is done. And the other
thing very quickly, and thank you again for your indulgence,
the concern of border agents, just this weekend I happened to
be talking to one of our Border Patrol agents who was sharing
with me what we know is that they need more agents.
And we have put more money into that. We actually had--we
had one contractor who did a miserable job at it, but we were
doing better. But we also had a tremendous number of people who
have left this service. How are we going to keep up? And what
role do these discussions have?
I know that my constituent really felt that we made it very
difficult for people who want to be a border agent today. Not
your problem but I just think it's one that we need to
recognize. If we are putting more money in, that is great, but
we are not hiring the people because we are losing as many
people as we are hiring. And so the attrition rate is really
what is causing this problem.
Thank you very much for being here. I appreciate your----
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for indulging us. I am going to be as
brief as possible. Let me first say that I wish my colleague on
the other side of the aisle was still here. He referenced a
service member as being disrespectful for commenting that it
was a waste of time. I would suggest that that is the actions
of a whistleblower, not someone who is being disrespectful.
I spent Christmas Eve at the border serving our troops. In
addition to doing that, I had three 1-hour meetings with
different groups at the border. And the colonel there said to
me at the end of my time there, our mission is complete here.
That was on December 24th.
The service members told me about placing C-wire
[concertina wire] at the border, but they also said to me,
people who are climbing over those fences and walls aren't
running away, they are sitting on the wire or at the wire
waiting for a CBP officer to come so they can be apprehended as
asylum-seekers.
So I am concerned that the readiness that we should be
working on with our service members is not being done. Many of
these service members now have lost time with their families at
Thanksgiving, at Christmas, at New Year's, are still there.
They don't have an end of the mission date that they can rely
on.
I don't think this is the way to treat our service members.
So with all of that, I am going to ask you to just comment on
that. If the mission is complete, why are they still there?
Admiral Gilday. So ma'am, at its peak, we had 5,900 troops,
Active Duty, deployed to the border. This was in early
November. That number was cut down to about 2,400 by Christmas.
And so what we have tried to do is systematically reduce those
numbers as, for example, if DHS said that they needed 50--70
miles of concertina wire laid, and we lay that wire, we then
redeploy those people home.
Initially we deployed our troops to Texas, Arizona, and
California. When the migrant groups did not go to Texas or
Arizona, and they went towards San Diego, towards your home
district, we reduced those numbers in those two States
significantly, almost down to zero. And so we have tried to
match the troops to the requirement on an evolving basis as
best we can.
I am sorry to hear about the colonel's comment, and am I am
just guessing it was perhaps the military police group that was
in San Diego. What he may have been talking about, ma'am, was
the fact that that mission perhaps they saw it as complete when
the surge of migrants, you know, dissipated. And that is a fair
comment to make.
We have tried to be responsive in reducing those numbers as
quickly as we can.
Ms. Speier. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Before we leave, I ask unanimous consent to include into
the record all member statements and extraneous material;
without objection, so ordered. I want to very much thank our
witnesses for staying with us for the entire time, and the
committee for their questions.
Mr. Thornberry, anything? We are good. We are adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
January 29, 2019
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 29, 2019
=======================================================================
[[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 29, 2019
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Please provide a list of all support provided by the
Department of Defense (to include Military Departments, Defense
Agencies, and Field Activities) to other Federal Agencies for missions
on, or related to, the southern border from April 1, 2018 to January
30, 2019. Support includes any provision of personnel, materiel, or
administrative services provided on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable
basis, including, but not limited to, acquisition, contracting,
financial (appropriated, working capital, and non-appropriated funds),
materiel, equipment, goods, services, military personnel, civilian
personnel, and other support. This list must include the granting DOD
entity, the receiving Agency or Agencies, as well as type, time period,
cost of support, and whether DOD has or will be reimbursed.
Secretary Rood. Department of Defense (DOD) support to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the southern border is being
executed pursuant to the President's direction, including in his April
4, 2018, Presidential memorandum, ``Securing the Southern Border of the
United States.''
DOD assistance to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Operation
Guardian Support
On April 5, 2018, CBP requested DOD assistance in support of the
CBP border security mission in four specific border sectors: Rio Grande
Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio, Texas; and the Tucson sector in Arizona.
On April 6, 2018, the Secretary of Defense authorized and approved up
to 4,000 National Guard personnel in a duty status pursuant to section
502(f) of title 32, U.S. Code (i.e., support of operations or missions
undertaken by the member's unit at the request of the President or
Secretary of Defense), to conduct operations in support of validated
DHS border security missions through September 30, 2018. Duty under
Section 502 requires the concurrence of the Governors concerned.
National Guard personnel were to support mission requirements
identified by appropriate DHS and DOD officials. In accordance with
this direction, the Secretary of Defense approved CBP requests for the
following National Guard support:
Aviation support (e.g., medium- and heavy-lift support;
9,084 flight hours for light aviation support; and 1,422 flight hours
for unmanned aircraft system (UAS) support);
Infrastructure support (e.g., infrastructure maintenance,
road maintenance, infrastructure deployment, vegetation clearing, and
facility maintenance);
Fleet maintenance and repair and movement of vehicles;
Communications support;
90 intelligence analysts;
20 planners; and
Surveillance support (e.g., surveillance camera
operators, aerostat surveillance systems with crew, mobile surveillance
platform operators)
On April 11, 2018, DHS requested 12,000 flight hours of light
helicopter support and 1,343 ground support personnel. On April 13,
2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the request through September
30, 2018.
On May 9, 2018, DHS requested 736 National Guard personnel to
assist CBP Office of Field Operations, Air and Maritime Operations, and
Office of Intelligence. On May 11, 2018, the Secretary of Defense
approved the request through September 30, 2018.
On August 21, 2018, DHS requested an extension of the National
Guard support to September 30, 2019, and up to 15,950 flight hours of
air support and 2,182 ground support personnel (7,800 hours of light
rotary-wing air support in 7 U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) sectors; 1,700
hours of medium rotary-wing air support in 3 USBP sectors; 3,450 hours
of fixed-wing air support in 4 USBP sectors; and 3,000 hours of UAS
support in 4 USBP sectors), as well as 327 indirect support personnel
for command and control. On August 30, 2018, the Secretary of Defense
approved the request.
The current estimated cost of this support totals $411 million,
including $103 million in fiscal year (FY) 2018 and $308 million in FY
2019. Consistent with the President's direction, including in his April
4, 2018, Presidential memorandum, ``Securing the Southern Border of the
United States,'' DOD support is provided on a non-reimbursable basis to
the greatest extent legally permissible.
Attorney Support for the Department of Justice
On May 16, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that DOD
detail 21 attorneys with criminal trial experience to DOJ to serve as
Special Assistant United States Attorneys (SAUSAs) for a period not to
exceed 179 days. On May 27, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the
request.
DOD provided a combination of Active Component (5), Reserve
Component (14) (including 2 Air National Guard), and civilian (2)
attorneys. All Reserve officers served in a voluntary duty status
pursuant to section 12301(d) of title 10, U.S. Code. These attorneys
were sourced from the Air Force (5), Army (9), Marines (2), Navy (3),
and Defense Legal Services Agency (2).
DOD attorneys were assigned to U.S. Attorney Offices in: Corpus
Christi, Texas (1); Del Rio, Texas (3); El Centro, California (1); El
Paso, Texas (2); Laredo, Texas (2); Las Cruces, New Mexico (5);
McAllen, Texas (2); San Diego, California (4); and Yuma, Arizona (1).
These DOD attorneys were appointed as SAUSAs and worked full time
under the direction and supervision of Assistant U.S. Attorneys,
assisting in prosecuting reactive border immigration cases, with a
focus on misdemeanor improper entry and felony illegal reentry cases.
Their duties included: drafting pleadings; assisting with plea
negotiations; and making court appearances, all under the supervision
of Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
This detail of DOD personnel, which cost $1.5 million, was executed
pursuant to the Economy Act and was executed on a fully reimbursable
basis.
DOD assistance to CBP Operation Secure Line
On August 8, 2018, DHS requested two military planners to assist
the CBP Migrant Crisis Action Team (MCAT) through November 20, 2018. On
August 17, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the request. On
November 17, 2018, DHS requested a 90-day extension for the two
military planners. On November 19, 2018, the Secretary of Defense
approved the request.
On October 25, 2018, DHS requested additional support to address
the risk posed by an approaching Central American migrant caravan.
Specifically, DHS requested:
Military planning team to coordinate operation,
engineering, medical, and logistic support.
Engineering capability to provide temporary vehicle
barriers and pedestrian style fencing at and around a port of entry
(POE), including but not limited to: 2 one-half-mile segments of
continuous anti-personnel intrusion fencing (for a total of 1 mile),
approximately 4 one-way retractable vehicle anti-intrusion barricades,
up to approximately 100,000 square feet of configurable pedestrian
fencing, and approximately 5,000 total (non-continuous) feet of fixed
vehicle barricades.
Deployable medical units to triage and treat up to 1,000
personnel every 24 hours and to be prepared to stabilize and prepare
injured personnel for commercial transport to civilian medical
facilities as necessary.
Medium-lift rotary-wing aviation support, on-call 24-
hours a day, to supplement the movement of CBP quick reaction force
tactical personnel in and around locations determined by CBP day or
night.
Strategic lift aviation, available with 12-hour
notification, to move up to 400 CBP personnel and equipment to a
location determined by CBP.
Command center facility for up to 100 personnel.
Temporary housing for up to 2,345 CBP personnel.
Meals-ready-to-eat for 2,345 CBP personnel for 2 meals
per day for approximately 10 days and field kitchen capable of feeding
2,345 CBP personnel for 1 meal per day for 10 days.
Riot gear equipment (helmet with face shield, hand-held
shields, shin guards) for 500 CBP personnel.
Military personnel to provide Federal, State, and local
police with assistance necessary to protect CBP personnel as they
perform their Federal functions.
On October 26, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the
request--with the exception of the request for military personnel to
protect CBP personnel, which required a Presidential determination--and
authorized active-duty military personnel to provide support through
December 15, 2018. DOD selected the military personnel best-suited and
available from the total force to provide the assistance to CBP
requested by DHS, pursuant to the President's direction and as approved
by DOD. Active-duty military personnel were more readily available
than, and their use did not incur the additional pay and allowance
costs associated with using, National Guard personnel. Although
military personnel are highly trained and, for the most part, required
no additional training, U.S. Northern Command conducted mandatory two-
day training with all military personnel deployed to the southern
border before those personnel began providing support to CBP. This
deployment of military personnel did not, and is not expected to,
compromise the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to respond to other
national security threats around the world.
On November 14, 2018, DHS requested that DOD emplace an additional
26 miles of concertina wire at designated locations outside the POE
buffer zones. DHS remained responsible to address environmental
compliance for all areas of installation and the necessary access to
land. On November 16, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the
request and authorized the support through December 15, 2018.
On November 15, 2018, DHS requested DOD assistance with medical
evaluations, and, if needed, urgent medical care of migrants referred
by CBP to DOD deployed medical units at up to three POEs, or port
extensions, along the U.S. Southwest border. DOD medical personnel also
were to evaluate, treat, or refer migrants identified by CBP with
potential or suspected conditions or infectious diseases that pose a
public health risk. Once evaluated and treated for urgent medical
conditions, or suspected conditions or infectious diseases, migrants
either were to be returned to CBP for processing or to be transferred
by CBP to local civilian health facilities for further medical care.
DOD medical personnel were not to be present at locations where CBP
conducts migrant medical screening. CBP law enforcement officials were
to maintain custody for each migrant referred to DOD medical personnel
at all times. CBP remained responsible for escorting migrants to and
from the DOD medical units, and during transportation to and from local
civilian health facilities. CBP also remained responsible for providing
interpreters for migrants who were to be evaluated or treated by DOD
medical personnel. On November 16, 2018, the Secretary of Defense
approved the request and authorized DOD medical assistance through
December 15, 2018.
On November 18, 2018, DHS requested that DOD protect CBP personnel
performing their Federal functions within property controlled by CBP at
or adjacent to one or more designated POEs, as necessary. This DOD
military protection would be employed if CBP, other Federal law
enforcement personnel, National Guard personnel operating under State
command and control, and State and local law enforcement personnel were
unable to apprehend or otherwise control migrants or other individuals
attempting to enter the United States who threaten to harm CBP
personnel or disrupt the ability of such personnel to perform their
Federal functions within property controlled by CBP at or adjacent to a
POE. On November 18, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the
request contingent upon authorization by the President, which was
provided on November 20, 2018. DOD military personnel protecting CBP
personnel were authorized to perform missions that required direct
contact with migrants and, at DOD's discretion, might require them to
be armed. Decisions regarding arming of DOD personnel and related rules
for the use of force were informed by the circumstances of this
protection mission and made by DOD, or, in the case of National Guard
personnel performing this mission under State control, by the
applicable State Governors, and in consultation with CBP. DOD military
personnel performing this mission were not to perform civilian law
enforcement-type activities, such as arrest, search, and seizure;
however, DOD military personnel were authorized to take actions to
mitigate hostile actions by migrants against CBP personnel performing
their Federal functions within property controlled by CBP at or
adjacent to a designated POE, including but not limited to a show of
force, crowd control, temporary detention, and cursory search necessary
for the protection of CBP personnel. In these circumstances,
``temporary detention'' meant holding individuals for a brief period of
time to resolve an imminent threat to the safety and security of CBP or
DOD personnel within property controlled by CBP at or adjacent to the
designated POE and to effectuate the orderly transfer of such
individuals to CBP or other law enforcement personnel as soon as
possible (CBP's expectation was that such detention would last seconds
to minutes, depending on the situation).
On November 30, 2018, DHS requested an extension of the active-duty
military support in CBP Region IX (California and Arizona), with the
proviso that, as operationally required, the extended capabilities
could be shifted or expanded back into CBP Region VI (New Mexico and
Texas) following consultation between DHS and DOD. DHS requested that
DOD:
Maintain medium-lift rotary-wing aircraft capability with
accompanying pilots and aviation support personnel to supplement the
movement of CBP tactical personnel in and around locations determined
by CBP. These aircraft were to perform standard aviation mission
profiles, including but not be limited to Quick Reaction Force support,
helicopter rope suspension technique/fast rope insertion of QRF
personnel, command and control (C2), transport of CBP personnel and
mission essential supplies, and casualty evacuation.
Maintain aviation terminal control and asset de-
confliction at CBP designated locations.
Maintain the fixed-wing capability with accompanying
pilots and aviation support personnel to move approximately 50 CBP
personnel and equipment to a location determined by CBP within 12 hours
following a 48-hour notification.
Maintain capability at CBP-designated locations to
evaluate and treat up to 200 migrants, CBP personnel, and other
authorized personnel per day, and to provide emergency casualty care
and public health support.
Maintain Military Police support at CBP-designated
locations to protect CBP personnel performing their Federal functions.
Maintain engineering capabilities at CBP-designated
locations to emplace POE barriers, emplace additional hardening
measures as required, and maintain POE-hardening structures (including
but not limited to fencing, concertina wire, and barriers). In CBP
Region IX, maintain engineering capabilities at CBP-designated
locations to complete currently agreed-to engineering priorities (if
not completed by December 15, 2018). Maintain capability to surge
engineering barrier maintenance and repair support to needs that emerge
along the border outside of CBP Region IX.
Maintain temporary housing and/or structures to house up
to 500 CBP personnel with associated latrine and shower facilities. CBP
was to establish/maintain interagency agreements with appropriate DOD
organization.
Maintain temporary hand receipt of riot gear.
On December 4, 2018, the Secretary of Defense approved the request,
extending the support through January 31, 2019, or such time that CBP,
in consultation with DHS and DOD, determined that the risk posed by the
caravan to CBP personnel performing their Federal functions at POEs
affected by the arrival of the caravan was mitigated or reduced to an
acceptable level, whichever was earlier.
On December 27, 2018, DHS requested new DOD support. Specifically,
in addition to aviation support, which was previously approved by the
Secretary of Defense through September 31, 2019, DHS requested: (1)
mobile surveillance camera operators to support CBP agents through
September 30, 2019; and (2) 150 miles of concertina wire emplacement
between the POEs by March 31, 2019. On January 11, 2019, the Secretary
of Defense approved the request.
The estimated cost of DOD support to CBP Operation Secure Line
through January 31, 2019, is $132 million. Consistent with the
President's direction, including in his April 4, 2018, Presidential
memorandum, ``Securing the Southern Border of the United States,'' DOD
support is provided on a non-reimbursable basis to the greatest extent
legally permissible.
Mr. Smith. Please provide an accounting of all expenses incurred by
the Department of Defense--specified by appropriation, budget activity,
and sub-activity group--for all operations and support for DOD and
other Federal activities along the southern border. This should include
appropriated, working capital, and non-appropriated funds. This list
include the granting DOD entity, the receiving Agency or Agencies, as
well as type of activity, time period, cost, and whether DOD has or
will be reimbursed.
Secretary Rood. DOD support to CBP Operation Guardian Support
commenced on April 7, 2018. As of February 21, 2019, DOD has incurred
$216 million in reported obligations for expenses such as National
Guard pay and allowances, applicable per diem costs, Operation and
Maintenance support costs, and Operation and Maintenance flying hour
costs ($103M FY 2018; $113M FY 2019).
Costs are primarily being reported in the following Budget Sub-
Activity Groups (SAGs):
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DOD support to CBP Operation Secure Line commenced on October
16, 2018, and, as of February 20, 2019, DOD has incurred $49 million in
reported obligations such as personnel subsistence/per diem/lodging/
family separation allowance, travel, supplies, and transportation.
Costs are primarily being reported in the following Budget Sub-Activity
Groups (SAGs):
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DOD provides support to CBP under available legal authorities,
consistent with the April 4, 2018, Presidential memorandum, ``Securing
the Southern Border of the United States.'' All DOD costs incurred are
on a non-reimbursable basis, to the greatest extent legally
permissible.
Presently, the DOD Components providing the personnel and
capabilities are responsible for the resulting bills. The DOD
Components are leveraging base budget appropriations to pay for the
border support mission. To date, the DOD Components have reported costs
mainly in Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts.
The DOD Comptroller is reviewing DOD accounts to fund this support with
minimal disruption to readiness and other DOD missions. The DOD
Comptroller will analyze the reported costs to develop sourcing
strategies for potential reprogramming actions, as required, in the
context of all DOD requirements.
Mr. Smith. During your testimony you stated that ``most people just
think we are consuming readiness, but we're also producing readiness
during those of deployments.'' Please provide specific examples. How is
there an overall net gain in readiness for units that support the
border mission as it relates to missed home station training, reset, or
pre-deployment training? Your testimony referred to the training
specific to Military Police (MPs) and the potential for command and
control leadership principles that may get exercised. Please exclude
these from your examples.
Admiral Gilday. In aggregate, the Joint Force's support to the
Southwest Border (SWB) mission has not significantly impacted the
strategic readiness of the Joint Force, largely because the current
Global Force Management (GFM) process enables the Force Providers to
source the SWB mission and internally rotate forces in such a way as to
mitigate the overall impacts to strategic readiness.
Although the strategic readiness impact to the Joint Force is
mitigated, individual unit impacts can be more pronounced. Analysis of
unit reporting in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
indicates that there have been both increases and decreases to unit-
level readiness reporting for those units supporting the SWB mission
since October, 2018. It is important to note that short-term unit
readiness increases are tempered by decreases caused by both split/
partial deployments and missed unit-level training activities.
The instances of unit readiness increases involve units and
individuals who are employed in such a way that the assigned mission in
support of the SWB aligns with the unit's designed or ``Core'' wartime
mission. Examples of small-unit and individual readiness increases
represent instances when the unit, and/or individuals, are able to
exercise aspects of their Core Mission Essential Tasks (METs) while
conducting the SWB mission. Additional examples of units/individuals
who are able to exercise components of their Core-METs include
engineering units that are emplacing obstacles and constructing
barriers, as well as Quartermaster, Field Feeding Companies (FFCs), who
are able to execute tasks that directly link to the unit's Core-METs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Please provide specific details on which units have
been deployed, including those expected to be deployed in the coming
weeks, the locations of their deployments, and how this mission is
impacting troops' readiness.
Secretary Rood. As of March 13, 2019, there were approximately
3,999 active-duty military personnel supporting CBP Operation Secure
Line. The attached document identifies active-duty military units
supporting CBP Operation Secure Line. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
As of March 11, 2019, there were approximately 2,227 National Guard
personnel supporting CBP Operation Guardian Support at the southern
border of the United States. National Guard personnel from Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and West Virginia are currently supporting CBP Operation
Guardian Support. The attached document identifies National Guard units
supporting CBP Operation Guardian Support. [The information referred to
is classified and retained in the committee files.]
DOD, including the Military Services, proactively manages any
effects on readiness regardless of mission set by means of diligent and
conscientious unit selection, through appropriate mission-assignment
processes, and by leveraging training and readiness opportunities when
available.
Mr. Garamendi. Please provide specific details on which units have
been deployed, including those expected to be deployed in the coming
weeks, the locations of their deployments, and how this mission is
impacting troops' readiness.
Admiral Gilday. For the complete listing of units, locations,
please see classified enclosure (ENCL-A) ENCL-A is the placemat. [The
enclosure referred to is classified and retained in the committee
files.]
To date, the Joint Force's support to the Southwest Border (SWB)
mission has not significantly impacted the strategic readiness of the
Joint Force, largely because the current Global Force Management (GFM)
process enables the Force Providers to source the SWB mission and
internally rotate forces in such a way as to mitigate the overall
impacts to strategic readiness.
This assessment is based largely from the overall impacts to the
Force Providers. The Army units providing support to the SWB mission
are sourced primarily from units outside of Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs), which enables the Army to preserve BCT readiness in support of
National Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities. For the Marine Corps, the
initial sourcing of Request for Assistance 3 (RFA-3) included a
Regimental Headquarters in addition to an Engineer Battalion
Headquarters and a Military Police (MP) Company. As of mid-February,
the Marine Regimental Headquarters is being replaced by an Army Brigade
Headquarters, which will help mitigate some of the impacts to training
and readiness I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).
Depending on the SWB's continued mission, scope, and duration, an
overall readiness decline is possible in training proficiency,
equipment readiness and personnel availability, as well as a
degradation of available forces to support global commitments. The
Joint Staff, in conjunction with OSD and the Force Providers will
continue to closely assess these potential impacts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. Mr. Rood, the administration is considering the
declaration of a national emergency on the southern border. Yet, the
deployment strategy indicates the administration believes the situation
is improving. Active duty troop deployment peaked at 5,900 in November
2018 and has since fallen to 2,300 troops currently at the southern
border. How does this justify the potential declaration of a national
emergency?
Secretary Rood. On February 15, 2019, the President declared a
national emergency because ``[t]he current situation at the southern
border presents a border security and humanitarian crisis that
threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national
emergency.'' In his proclamation, the President also determined that
``[b]ecause of the gravity of the current emergency situation, it is
necessary for the Armed Forces to provide additional support to address
the crisis.''
Mr. Brown. Mr. Rood, when the deployment was extended to September
2019, DOD stated that troops would be providing ``mobile surveillance
camera operations''. I have deep concerns regarding our military
conducting surveillance operations on U.S. soil. What authorities are
you using to authorize this surveillance and how are you ensuring that
the rights of U.S. citizens are protected?
Secretary Rood. Congress has provided DOD with several authorities
to detect and monitor cross-border traffic. For example, section 274 of
title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes DOD, in support of civilian law
enforcement agencies, to detect, monitor, and communicate the movement
of surface traffic outside of the geographic boundary of the United
States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of the
boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the boundary.
DOD's exercise of such authorities are consistent with the law,
including laws protecting the rights of U.S. citizens.
Mr. Brown. Vice Admiral Gilday, there has been reporting that
several overseas deployments--including at least one to Europe--have
been impacted by using our military in our own backyards in California,
Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico instead of where they are trained to
operate--abroad and in foreign lands. How many overseas deployments
have been impacted by this decision and how has the diversion affected
our commitments to our allies?
Admiral Gilday. No overseas deployment impact reported (confirmed
with each of the Force Providers); all impacts reported have been
CONUS-based training events and exercises. Accordingly, the Joint Staff
assesses that the current Joint Force support to the SWB mission has
not affected commitments with allies or partners.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Ms. Houlahan. Please provide an updated list deployed personnel and
a map of their location. For any units larger than 10, please describe
what their mission is and what they would be doing if they weren't on
the border right now.
Secretary Rood. As of March 13, 2019, there were approximately
3,999 active-duty military personnel supporting CBP Operation Secure
Line. The attached document identifies active-duty military units
supporting CBP Operation Secure Line. [The information referred to is
classified and retained in the committee files.]
As of March 11, 2019, there were approximately 2,227 National Guard
personnel supporting CBP Operation Guardian Support at the southern
border of the United States. National Guard personnel from Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and West Virginia are currently supporting CBP Operation
Guardian Support. The attached document identifies National Guard units
supporting CBP Operation Guardian Support. [The information referred to
is classified and retained in the committee files.]
Military personnel are performing aviation; engineering (e.g.,
temporary barriers, and emplace concertina wire); communications; fleet
maintenance; law enforcement information analysis; planning; and
detection and monitoring. Additionally, a small number of personnel
remain available for emergency response at POEs in California through
September 30, 2019. This includes 1 military police platoon and a small
number of medics on 48-hour notice and 1 military police company on 7-
day Prepared-to-Deploy Order with medics.
Ms. Houlahan. Please provide a list of all the units that have been
and are currently deployed and also their Defense Readiness Reporting
System (DRRS) reports from before and after deployment so that we could
understand from a quantitative perspective how their readiness has been
affected if it has been positively or negatively.
Secretary Rood. [Please see the classified enclosure (ENCL-B) for
the list of all units and a snapshot of their DRRS reports from October
2018 through the present. ENCL-B is the J35 SWB Product.] [The
enclosure referred to is classified and retained in the committee
files.]
Ms. Houlahan. In some cases, individuals are being deployed from
their units separate from their units and we know the units have a
finite period at home to train for their next deployment. Are we
hurting their home unit training or readiness, are we impeding or
impairing individuals' career abilities by deploying in this way? How
is the Department capturing the impact of this from a quantitative
perspective?
Secretary Rood. In aggregate, the Joint Force's support to the CBP
security mission at the southern border has not affected the strategic
readiness of the Joint Force significantly, largely because the current
Global Force Management (GFM) process enables the Force Providers to
source Joint Force support to CBP at the southern border and internally
rotate forces in such a way as to mitigate the overall effects on
strategic readiness.
In those cases where readiness may have been affected for units
supporting the CBP, many of the reported negative effects are due to
partial or split deployments (not the full unit). The issue is that
partially deployed, or split-based, units are unable to train
effectively to collective standards against their designed mission,
which degrades their overall unit readiness. Historical review of
reporting for units that experience readiness degradations due to
partial deployments for a limited period of time indicates that these
units can return to pre-deployed readiness levels fairly quickly.
Accordingly, the GFM process enables the Force Providers both to source
and rotate units in such a way as to mitigate the overall effects on
readiness. The GFM process includes detailed impact statements that
clearly articulate risks to both mission and force. These impact
statements include effects on readiness, thereby quantitatively
capturing the impact of DOD's support of CBP at the southern border.
Ms. Houlahan. Title 10, section 276 states that the Secretary of
Defense should prescribe regulations to ensure that the provision that
any support to law enforcement does not adversely affect the military
preparedness of the United States. Are you aware of any directives or
policy statements put forth by the department to ensure that any
readiness impacts of this border deployment has been mitigated? If so,
please provide copies of those policies or directives. If not, why not?
How does the Department plan to comply with Section 276?
Secretary Rood. DOD policy in DOD Directive 3025.18, ``Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),'' requires that all requests from
civil authorities for assistance be evaluated for effects on readiness.
DOD, including the Military Services, proactively manages any effects
on readiness regardless of mission set by means of diligent and
conscientious unit selection, through appropriate mission-assignment
processes, and by leveraging training and readiness opportunities when
available. As such, DOD does not anticipate that DOD support to DHS at
the southern border will adversely affect the military preparedness of
the United States.
DOD Instruction 3025.21, ``Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies,'' establishes that it is DOD policy that ``DOD
shall be prepared to support civilian law enforcement agencies
consistent with the needs of military preparedness of the United
States, while recognizing and conforming to the legal limitations on
direct DOD involvement in civilian law enforcement activities.'' DOD
Instruction 3025.21 also provides guidance and assigns responsibilities
with regards to ``evaluating requests for assistance in terms of effect
on military preparedness of the United States.''
The President's January 27, 2017, memorandum, ``Rebuilding the U.S.
Armed Forces,'' established that it is ``the policy of the United
States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces.'' Consistent with this policy,
military readiness remains a key DOD priority.
Ms. Houlahan. Will the Department seek reimbursement for the
deployment of forces to the Southern Border as outlined by 10 USC 277?
If so, will the funds from the reimbursement used to remediate any
readiness challenges with the deployed units?
Secretary Rood. Consistent with the President's direction,
including his April 4, 2018, Presidential memorandum, ``Securing the
Southern Border of the United States,'' DOD support is provided on a
non-reimbursable basis to the greatest extent legally permissible.
Section 277(c) of title 10, U.S. Code, for instance, authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement for support if such
support: (1) is provided in the normal course of military training or
operations; or (2) results in a benefit to the element of DOD or
personnel of the National Guard providing the support that is
substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from
military operations or training. In addition, section 1059 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
114-92) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, without reimbursement, for purposes
of increasing ongoing efforts to secure the southern land border of the
United States.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. Vice Admiral Gilday, in testimony last year Admiral
Tidd, Commander of USSOUTHCOM, stated ``threat networks including . . .
terrorist supporters and sympathizers . . . use common pathways and
conduct operations that span the [southern] region and reach deep into
our homeland.'' In your testimony you affirmed this statement adding
that you consider the terror threat in the Southern Region to be ``very
real''. Please provide an updated assessment of the terror threat in
the Southern Region including number of individuals with known or
suspected connections to terrorism detained each year over the previous
5 years by the U.S. or partner governments in Central or South America
that pose a threat to the United States.
Admiral Gilday. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
Ms. Escobar. Mr. Rood, does the military believe Central American
families, who have a right to seek asylum under international and
immigration laws, constitute a national emergency? Subsequently, does
the military believe that asylum seekers are a threat to national
security?
Secretary Rood. DOD defers to the White House and the Department of
Justice to comment on the President's lawful authority to declare a
national emergency. DOD support to DHS is being executed pursuant to
the President's direction, including in his April 4, 2018, Presidential
memorandum, ``Securing the Southern Border of the United States.'' The
Secretary of Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the nature of
the crisis at the southern border.
Ms. Escobar. Mr. Rood, the President, in reference to using the
military to build a wall, recently said ``the military wants this to
happen''. Can you please respond to the President's comment?
Secretary Rood. DOD defers to the White House to elaborate on the
President's statement.
DOD uses barriers to protect and control access to military
installations in the United States and overseas, including areas of
active conflict.
According to the Secretary of Homeland Security, border barriers
enable the U.S. Border Patrol to cover more border area with fewer
agents and to manage more effectively the flow of people entering and
exiting the United States.
Ms. Escobar. The President is reportedly considering pulling $3.6
billion in military construction funds and $3 billion in Pentagon civil
works funds to build a wall. This sets a terrible precedent for
critical dollars for the military to be diverted toward a campaign
promise. Mr. Rood, if the President declares a national emergency, how
will the military ensure the American people are safe from actual
threats to our country?
Secretary Rood. On February 15, 2019, the President declared a
national emergency and invoked section 2808 of title 10, U.S. Code. If
the Acting Secretary of Defense determines that barrier construction is
necessary to support the use of the armed forces, his selection of
military construction (MILCON) projects to be used as funding sources
for the emergency MILCON projects would minimize effects on readiness.
Ms. Escobar. Mr. Rood, the Trump administration has repeatedly
claimed that terrorists are coming in through the southern border. What
data can you share about how many national security threats cross at
the southern border? The northern border?
Secretary Rood. DOD defers to DHS to describe potential terrorist
entry into the United States through the southern border. In accordance
with section 402 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-
296; section 202 of title 6, U.S. Code), DHS is responsible for
preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism
into the United States and for securing the borders, territorial
waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea
transportation systems of the United States. The Secretary of Homeland
Security has repeatedly emphasized the nature of the crisis at the
southern border.
[all]