[Senate Hearing 115-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2019
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:31 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran (Chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Moran, Murkowski, Collins, Boozman,
Capito, Lankford, Shaheen, Leahy, Feinstein, Coons, and Van
Hollen.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JERRY MORAN
Senator Moran. As soon as I can see you, Director, I will
call the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, and
Related Agencies to come to order.
We have logistical issues today, in which there are votes
called at 3 o'clock. I think there are two votes. Our hearing
was intended and will be a two-part set of hearings, this one
in public, and then we will convene to the Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in the Visitors
Center in the United States Capitol for a more classified
briefing. We intend to do that.
Senator Shaheen and I have generally agreed to forgo our
opening statements. I will hold Members, Senator Feinstein is
the only one here to hear this, but I will do everything I can,
including with Senator Leahy, to restrict everyone to their 5
minutes, and I will use the gavel to accomplish that.
I will also attempt to call the hearing to reconvene in the
SCIF following the second vote of a two-vote series, so we will
try to get started as early as we can there. In that setting,
we will work hard to give everybody an opportunity to pursue
things that maybe they did not get to pursue here.
Let me just say, as my opening statement, Director, it is
an honor to have you here in front of us. It has been a
pleasure to get to know you. I express my gratitude to you and
the people who work at the FBI and other agencies related to
our national security and combating crime and terrorism. I am
very grateful for their service to our Nation and the efforts
that are so often successful in protecting us from lots of harm
in the lives of American citizens, so I am grateful for the
service of you and the FBI that you serve.
Senator Shaheen is forgoing her opening statement.
Director Wray, we would call upon you for your testimony.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY
Director Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Moran, and Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here
representing the men and women of the FBI. Our employees, as
the subcommittee knows, are spread across more than 350
locations all around the country, in 90 offices around the
world, and in 34 headquarters divisions.
What strikes me the most in coming back to working with the
organization every day after a hiatus is the people--people
tackling their jobs with strength and honesty and
professionalism; people committed to doing the right thing in
the right way; people fiercely committed to protecting the
American people from terrorists and criminals and spies; and
people following the facts independently no matter where they
lead and no matter who likes it.
Our people, nearly 37,000 of them, are the heart of the
FBI. Through their sense of duty and commitment, our employees
embody our core values and our motto of fidelity, bravery, and
integrity.
So I want to thank you for the funding you have provided us
in 2018. Without it, we would not be able to do all that great
work.
In the interest of the subcommittee's time, I have
shortened what I was going say here at the beginning and
included a lot more details about our budget request in my
written statement for the record. I am also happy to address
questions about our budget here today, in addition to questions
about threats we face and the FBI's critical capabilities.
This subcommittee has always been tremendously supportive
of the Bureau and giving us the resources that we need. I look
forward to discussing how we can maintain our capabilities
through the resource investments provided by the fiscal year
2018 budget, as enacted, and how we can build on that momentum
going forward. In particular, I hope to be able to discuss the
threats we face on the FBI's critical capabilities. We have a
lot of things on our plate, and some of the key priorities,
obviously, are counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber
threats, transnational organized crime, violent crime, the
opioid epidemic, and child predators. That is just at the top
of the list.
The threats are of grave importance to our security. We
want the American people to be able to focus on just living
their lives while we focus on keeping them safe. I am
incredibly proud of the FBI's work, but we cannot afford to be
complacent. We have to keep pace with technology in all those
areas that I listed and seek out new, innovative solutions to
the problems we face. Because if we do not do that, our
adversaries are not going to wait around on us--and we must
keep pace with them.
We cannot do any of that without your support and without
the resources that you provide. As always, we are committed to
being good stewards of those funds.
Thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Wray
Good afternoon Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members
of the subcommittee.
Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) especially thanks this Committee for its
support of the men and women of the FBI in the fiscal year 2018
appropriation. As the Committee is aware, FBI personnel are the
lifeforce of the organization--they work tirelessly to combat some of
the most complex and serious national security threats and crime
problems challenging the Nation's intelligence and law enforcement
communities. The funding you provided is imperative in allowing the FBI
to retain these precious assets--our personnel--as well as address
these considerable threats.
Today, I appear before you on behalf of these men and women who
tackle these threats and challenges every day. I am extremely proud of
their service and commitment to the FBI's mission and to ensuring the
safety and security of communities throughout our Nation. On their
behalf, I would like to express my appreciation for the support you
have given them in the past, ask for your continued support in the
future, and pledge to be the best possible stewards of the resources
you provide.
I would like to begin by providing a brief overview of the FBI's
fiscal year 2019 budget request, and then follow with a short
discussion of key threats and challenges that we face, both as a Nation
and as an organization.
fiscal year 2019 budget request overview
The fiscal year 2019 budget request proposes a total of $8.92
billion in direct budget authority to carry out the FBI's national
security, criminal law enforcement, and criminal justice services
missions. The request includes a total of $8.87 billion for Salaries
and Expenses, which will support 34,694 positions (12,927 Special
Agents, 3,055 Intelligence Analysts, and 18,712 professional staff),
and $51.9 million for Construction.
As a result of this budget being formulated before the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2018, it was built utilizing the prior year enacted level
as a starting point. Accordingly, this request sustains prior year
personnel and operational funding, but provides no discrete program
enhancements. The request also includes a cancellation of $148 million
from Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) automation fund
available surcharge balances.
When compared against the fiscal year 2018 Omnibus enacted level,
the fiscal year 2019 request level represents a total decrease of $476
million, including a $318 million reduction in the FBI's Construction
account funding for one-time projects, and a $158 million reduction to
the Salaries and Expenses account.
key threats and challenges
This Committee has provided critical resources for the FBI to
become what it is today--a threat-focused, intelligence-driven
organization. Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and
evolving threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists to hostile
foreign intelligence services and operatives; from sophisticated cyber-
based attacks to Internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children;
from violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay
current with constantly changing and new technologies that make our
jobs both easier and harder. Our adversaries--terrorists, foreign
intelligence services, and criminals--take advantage of modern
technology, including the Internet and social media, to facilitate
illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage terrorist attacks and
other illicit actions, and to disperse information on building
improvised explosive devices and other means to attack the United
States. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as complex as
any time in our history. And the consequences of not responding to and
countering threats and challenges have never been greater.
The support of this Committee in helping the FBI to do its part in
facing and thwarting these threats and challenges is greatly
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong
capabilities and capacities for assessing threats, sharing
intelligence, leveraging key technologies, and--in some respects, most
importantly--hiring some of the best to serve as Special Agents,
Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff. We have built and are
continuously enhancing a workforce that possesses the skills and
knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face
today--and tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views
change and transformation as a positive tool for keeping the FBI
focused on the key threats facing our Nation.
Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each
FBI employee understands that to defeat the key threats facing our
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and
criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and our
communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and
breadth of the FBI's mission: to protect the American people and uphold
the Constitution of the United States.
national security
Counterterrorism
Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority. The
terrorist threat against the United States remains persistent and
acute.
From a threat perspective, we are concerned with three areas in
particular: (1) those who are inspired by terrorist propaganda and feel
empowered to act out in support; (2) those who are enabled to act after
gaining inspiration from extremist propaganda and communicating with
members of foreign terrorist organizations who provide guidance on
operational planning or targets; and (3) those who are directed by
members of foreign terrorist organizations to commit specific, directed
acts in support of the group's ideology or cause. Prospective
terrorists can fall into any of the above categories or span the
spectrum, but in the end the result is the same--innocent men, women,
and children killed and families, friends, and whole communities left
to struggle in the aftermath.
Currently, the FBI views the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
and homegrown violent extremists as the main terrorism threats to the
United States. ISIS is relentless and ruthless in its campaign of
violence and has aggressively promoted its hateful message, attracting
like-minded violent extremists. The threats posed by ISIS foreign
terrorist fighters, including those recruited from the U.S., are
extremely dynamic. These threats remain the highest priority and create
the most serious challenges for the FBI, the U.S. intelligence
community, and our foreign, Federal, State, and local partners. We
continue to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign
fighters traveling in support of ISIS, as well as homegrown violent
extremists who may aspire to attack the United States from within. In
addition, in a manner consistent with the First Amendment, we are
working to expose, refute, and combat terrorist propaganda and training
available via the Internet and social media networks. Due to online
recruitment and indoctrination, foreign terrorist organizations are no
longer solely dependent on finding ways to get terrorist operatives
into the United States to recruit and carry out acts. Terrorists in
ungoverned spaces--both physical and cyber--readily disseminate
propaganda and training materials to attract easily influenced
individuals around the world to their cause. They encourage these
individuals to travel, or they motivate them to act at home. This is a
significant transformation from the terrorist threat our Nation faced a
decade ago.
ISIS was able to construct a narrative that touched on many facets
of life, from career opportunities to family life to a sense of
community. Those messages were not tailored solely for those who are
expressing signs of radicalization to violence--many who click through
the Internet every day, receive social media push notifications, and
participate in social networks have viewed ISIS propaganda. Ultimately,
a lot of the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense of belonging.
Echoing other terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated for lone offender
attacks in Western countries. ISIS videos and propaganda have
specifically advocated for attacks against soldiers, law enforcement,
and intelligence community personnel, but have branched out to include
any civilian as a worthy target.
The Internet is only one tool of many that terrorists use to
recruit. Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may be
susceptible and sympathetic to violent extremist messages; however, no
group has been as successful at drawing people into its perverse
ideology as ISIS. ISIS has proven dangerously competent at employing
such tools for its nefarious strategy. ISIS uses high-quality,
traditional media platforms, as well as widespread social media
campaigns to propagate its violent extremist ideology. With the
widespread use of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit,
and radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in the United States
either to travel or to conduct a homeland attack. Through the Internet,
terrorists overseas now have access into our local communities to
target and recruit our citizens and spread the message of
radicalization to violence faster than we imagined just a few years
ago.
ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al Qaeda maintains
its desire for large-scale attacks; however, continued counterterrorist
pressure has degraded the group, and in the near term, al Qaeda is more
likely to focus on supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks
against U.S. and allied interests in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.
Simultaneously, however, and especially over the last year, propaganda
from al Qaeda leaders seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own
attacks in the United States and the West.
In addition to foreign terrorist organizations, domestic violent
extremist movements collectively pose a steady threat of violence and
economic harm to the United States. Some trends within individual
movements will shift as most drivers for domestic violent extremism,
such as perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, socio-
political conditions, and reactions to legislative actions, remain
constant. We are most concerned about lone offender attacks, primarily
shootings, as they have served as the dominant mode for lethal domestic
extremist violence. We anticipate that law enforcement, racial
minorities, and the U.S. Government will continue to be significant
targets for many domestic violent extremist movements.
As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves,
we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying heavily on the
strength of our Federal, State, local, and international partnerships.
The FBI uses all lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat
these terrorist threats to the United States. Along with our domestic
and foreign partners, we are collecting and analyzing intelligence
concerning the ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations
and homegrown violent extremists. We continue to encourage information
sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task
Forces around the country. Be assured, the FBI continues to strive to
work and share information more efficiently, and to pursue a variety of
lawful methods to help stay ahead of these threats.
Counterintelligence
The Nation faces a continuing threat, both traditional and
asymmetric, from hostile foreign intelligence agencies. Traditional
espionage, often characterized by career foreign intelligence officers
acting as diplomats or ordinary citizens, and asymmetric espionage,
typically carried out by students, researchers, or businesspeople
operating front companies, is prevalent. Foreign intelligence services
not only seek our Nation's state and military secrets, but they also
target commercial trade secrets, research and development, and
intellectual property, as well as insider information from the Federal
Government, U.S. corporations, and American universities. Foreign
intelligence services continue to employ more creative and more
sophisticated methods to steal innovative technology, critical research
and development data, and intellectual property, in an effort to erode
America's economic leading edge. These illicit activities pose a
significant threat to national security and continue to be a priority
and focus of the FBI.
A particular focus of our counterintelligence efforts is aimed at
the growing scope of the insider threat--that is, when trusted
employees and contractors use their legitimate access to steal secrets
for personal benefit or to benefit another company or country. This
threat has been exacerbated in recent years as businesses have become
more global and increasingly exposed to foreign intelligence
organizations.
To combat this threat, the FBI has undertaken several initiatives.
We developed and deployed the Hybrid Threat Center (HTC) to support
Department of Commerce Entity List investigations. The HTC is the first
of its kind in the FBI; it has been well-received in the U.S.
Intelligence Community and the private sector.
Over the past year, we have strengthened collaboration,
coordination, and interaction between our Counterintelligence and Cyber
Divisions in an effort to more effectively identify, pursue, and defeat
hostile intelligence services using cyber means to penetrate or disrupt
U.S. Government entities or economic interests.
Finally, we have initiated a media campaign to increase awareness
of the threat of economic espionage. As part of this initiative, we
have made a threat awareness video available on our public website,
which has been shown thousands of times to raise awareness and generate
referrals from the private sector.
Cyber Threats
Virtually every national security threat and crime problem the FBI
faces is cyber-based or facilitated. We face sophisticated cyber
threats from state-sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized cyber
syndicates, and terrorists. On a daily basis, cyber-based actors seek
our state secrets, our trade secrets, our technology, and our ideas--
things of incredible value to all of us and of great importance to the
conduct of our government business and our national security. They seek
to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy.
As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber-
attacks on our Nation's private sector and government networks have
increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to continue
to grow. We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of
reporting on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the
amount of corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable
information compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims.
Within the FBI, we are focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber
activity: high- level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global
organized crime syndicates, as well as other technically sophisticated
attacks. FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are using
technical capabilities and traditional investigative techniques--such
as sources, court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical
surveillance, and forensics--to fight the full range of cyber threats.
And we continue to actively coordinate with our private and public
partners to pierce the veil of anonymity surrounding cyber based
crimes.
Botnets used by cyber criminals are have been responsible for
billions of dollars in damages over the past several years. The
widespread availability of malicious software (malware) that can create
botnets allows individuals to leverage the combined bandwidth of
thousands, if not millions, of compromised computers, servers, or
network-ready devices to conduct attacks. Cyber threat actors have also
increasingly conducted ransomware attacks against U.S. systems,
encrypting data and rendering systems unusable--thereby victimizing
individuals, businesses, and even public health providers.
Cyber criminals often operate through online forums, selling
illicit goods and services, including tools that can be used to
facilitate cyber attacks. These criminals have also increased the
sophistication of their schemes, which are more difficult to detect and
more resilient. Cyber threats are also becoming increasingly difficult
to investigate. For instance, many cyber actors are based abroad or
obfuscate their identities by using foreign infrastructure, making
coordination with international law enforcement partners essential.
The FBI is engaged in myriad efforts to combat cyber threats, from
improving threat identification and information sharing inside and
outside of government to developing and retaining new talent, to
examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We
take all potential threats to public and private sector systems
seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those
who pose a threat in cyberspace.
Going Dark
The rapid pace of advances in mobile and other communication
technologies continue to present a significant challenge to conducting
court-ordered electronic surveillance of criminals and terrorists.
There is a real and growing gap between law enforcement's legal
authority to access digital information and its technical ability to do
so. The FBI refers to this growing challenge as ``Going Dark,'' and it
affects the spectrum of our work.
The benefits of our increasingly digital lives have been
accompanied by new dangers, and we have seen how criminals and
terrorists use advances in technology to their advantage. In the
counterterrorism context, for instance, our agents and analysts are
increasingly finding that communications and contacts between groups
like ISIS and potential recruits occur in encrypted private messaging
platforms. The use of encrypted platforms also presents serious
challenges to law enforcement's ability to identify, investigate, and
disrupt threats that range from counterterrorism to child exploitation,
gangs, drug traffickers and white-collar crimes. In addition, we are
seeing more and more cases where we believe significant evidence
resides on a phone, a tablet, or a laptop--evidence that may be the
difference between an offender being convicted or acquitted. If we
cannot access this evidence, it will have ongoing, significant effects
on our ability to identify, stop, and prosecute these offenders.
Where they can, our agents develop investigative workarounds on a
case-by-case basis, including by using physical world techniques and
examining non-content sources of digital information (such as
metadata). As an organization, the FBI also invests in alternative
methods of lawful engineered access. Ultimately, these efforts, while
significant, have severe constraints. Non-content information is often
not sufficient to meet the rigorous constitutional burden to prove
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, developing alternative
technical methods is typically a time-consuming, expensive, and
uncertain process. Even when possible, such methods are difficult to
scale across investigations, and may be perishable due to a short
technical life cycle or as a consequence of disclosure through legal
proceedings.
We respect the right of Americans to engage in private
communications, regardless of the medium or technology. The more we as
a society rely on electronic devices to communicate and store
information, the more likely it is that information once found in
filing cabinets, letters, and photo albums will now be stored only in
electronic form. Whether it is instant messages, texts, or old-
fashioned letters, citizens have the right to communicate with one
another in private, because the free flow of information is vital to a
thriving democracy. Our aim is not to expand the government's legal
authority, but rather to ensure that we can obtain electronic
information and evidence pursuant to the statutory authority that
Congress already has provided to us to keep America safe. The benefits
of our increasingly digital lives have been accompanied by new dangers,
and we have seen how criminals and terrorists use advances in
technology to their advantage. When changes in technology hinder law
enforcement's ability to exercise investigative tools and follow
critical leads, those changes also hinder efforts to identify and stop
criminals or terrorists.
Some observers have conceived of this challenge as a trade-off
between privacy and security. In our view, the demanding requirements
to obtain legal authority to access data--such as by applying to a
neutral judge for a warrant or a wiretap--necessarily already account
for both privacy and security. The FBI is actively engaged with
relevant stakeholders, including companies providing technological
services, to educate them on the effects of the Going Dark challenge on
both public safety and the rule of law, and with the academic community
and technologists to encourage their voluntary cooperation to work with
us on developing technical solutions to this problem.
criminal threats
We face many criminal threats, from complex white-collar fraud in
the financial, healthcare, and housing sectors to transnational and
regional organized criminal enterprises to violent crime and public
corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and international--and
individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to our
security and safety in communities across the Nation. A key tenet of
protecting the Nation from those who wish to do us harm is the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS. The goal of NICS is
to ensure that guns don't fall into the wrong hands, and also ensures
the timely transfer of firearms to eligible gun buyers. Mandated by the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and launched by the FBI
on November 30, 1998, NICS is used by Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs)
to instantly determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible to buy
firearms. NICS receives information from tens of thousands of FFLs and
checks to ensure that applicants do not have a criminal record or
aren't otherwise prohibited and therefore ineligible to purchase a
firearm. In the first complete month of operation in 1998, a total of
892,840 firearm background checks were processed; in 2017,
approximately 2.1 million checks were processed per month.
While most checks are completed by electronic searches of the NICS
database within minutes, a small number of checks require examiners to
review records and resolve missing or incomplete information before an
application can be approved or rejected. Ensuring the timely processing
of these inquiries is important to ensure law abiding citizens can
exercise their right to purchase a firearm and to protect communities
from prohibited and therefore ineligible individuals attempting to
acquire a firearm. The FBI is currently processing a record number of
checks, averaging over 2.3 million a month during the first 3 months of
2018.
Violent Crime
Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well
organized and use violence to control neighborhoods, and boost their
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with
Federal, State, local, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task
forces and individual investigations.
FBI joint task forces--Violent Crime Safe Streets, Violent Gang
Safe Streets, and SafeTrails--focus on identifying and targeting major
groups operating as criminal enterprises. Much of the FBI criminal
intelligence is derived from our State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement partners, who know their communities inside and out. Joint
task forces benefit from FBI surveillance assets, and our sources track
these gangs to identify emerging trends. Through these multi- subject
and multi-jurisdictional investigations, the FBI concentrates its
efforts on high-level groups engaged in patterns of racketeering. This
investigative model enables us to target senior gang leadership and to
develop enterprise-based prosecutions.
By way of example, the FBI has dedicated tremendous resources to
combat the threat of violence posed by MS-13. The atypical nature of
this gang has required a multi-pronged approach--we work through our
task forces here in the U.S. while simultaneously gathering
intelligence and aiding our international law enforcement partners. We
do this through the FBI's Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces (TAGs).
Established in El Salvador in 2007 through the FBI's National Gang Task
Force, Legal Attache (Legat) San Salvador, and the United States
Department of State, each TAG is a fully operational unit responsible
for the investigation of MS-13 operating in the Northern Triangle of
Central America and threatening the United States. This program
combines the expertise, resources, and jurisdiction of participating
agencies involved in investigating and countering transnational
criminal gang activity in the United States and Central America. There
are now TAGs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Through these
combined efforts, the FBI has achieved substantial success in
countering the MS-13 threat across the United States and Central
America.
Despite these efforts, we still have work to do. The latest Uniform
Crime Reporting statistics gathered from the Crime in the United
States, 2016 show the number of violent crimes in the Nation increased
by 4.1 percent compared with the 2015 estimate, and although
preliminary data for 2017 shows that violent crime overall is leveling
off and murder may be on the decline, there are still jurisdictions
that are struggling. We also still have far to go before crime rates
are back to the levels in 2014 and 2015. We are committed to working
with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners toward that end.
Transnational Organized Crime
More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal
enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional''
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder,
modern criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud and
manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, identity
theft, human trafficking , and other illegal activities. Preventing and
combating transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort
by the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partners.
While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains
a significant and growing threat to national and international security
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic
institutions and economic stability across the globe.
Opioids
Large amounts of high-quality, low cost heroin and illicit fentanyl
are contributing to record numbers of overdose deaths and life-
threatening addictions nationwide. Transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) are also introducing synthetic opioids to the U.S. market,
including fentanyl and fentanyl analogs. To address this evolving
threat, we are taking a multi-faceted approach and establishing many
initiatives and units across our criminal program.
One response to this threat is our Prescription Drug Initiative
(PDI). The PDI was established in 2016 in response to the substantial
and increasing threat associated with prescription drug diversion, and
in particular, the staggering national increase in opioid-related
deaths. The objective of the PDI is to identify and target criminal
enterprises and other groups engaged in prescription drug schemes;
identify and prosecute, where appropriate, organizations with improper
corporate policies related to prescription drugs; and identify and
prosecute, where appropriate, organizations with improper prescribing
and dispensing practices. The PDI prioritizes investigations which
target ``gatekeeper'' positions, to include medical professionals and
pharmacies that divert opioids outside the scope of their medical
practice and/or distribute these medications with no legitimate medical
purpose. Since its inception, the PDI has resulted in the conviction of
numerous medical professionals and secured significant Federal prison
sentences, to include life terms for physicians who cause harm or death
to the patients entrusted to their care. In August of 2017, PDI
resources were enlisted to support the Attorney General's Opioid Fraud
and Abuse Detection Unit in 12 judicial districts significantly
affected by the opioid crisis.
The Hi-Tech Organized Crime Unit (HTOCU) is another response to the
growing opioid epidemic. This unit focuses on the trafficking of
opioids via the Internet, specifically the Dark Net. HTOCU is leading a
proactive effort to increase awareness, train personnel, and provide
guidance to FBI field offices on how to successfully address this
threat. As a result, numerous investigations and operations have been
initiated and several online vendors who are facilitating the
trafficking of opioids via the Internet, to include fentanyl, have been
disrupted. Beyond these two programs, the FBI has dedicated additional
resources to address this expansive threat. We have more than doubled
our number of Transnational Organized Crime Task Forces, expanded the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Airport Initiative
to focus on insider threats partnering with TCO actors, and created and
led the Fentanyl Safety Working Group at FBI Headquarters, which has
led to a new program to protect field agents and support employees with
personal protective equipment (PPE) and opioid antagonists (i.e.
naloxone) from the threat of fentanyl exposure. The FBI participated,
along with other Federal partners, in the creation of the Heroin
Availability Reduction Plan (HARP), takes part in monthly HARP meetings
hosted by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and
continues to provide training to our international law enforcement
partners on successful identification, seizure, and neutralization of
clandestine heroin/fentanyl laboratories.
Crimes Against Children
The FBI also has several programs in place to arrest child
predators and to recover missing and endangered children. To this end,
the FBI funds or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our
Innocence Lost National Initiative, Innocent Images National
Initiative, annual Operation Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid
Deployment Teams, Victim Services, 80 Child Exploitation Task Forces,
53 International Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force Officers,
as well as numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and
children about safety measures they can follow.
The FBI committed significant resources to Operation Pacifier,
which targeted the administrators and users of ``Playpen''--a members-
only website on the Tor anonymity network run by a highly-
sophisticated, global enterprise dedicated to the sexual exploitation
of children. To date, in the United States this operation has led to
the arrest of over 348 individuals, the prosecution of 25 child
pornography producers and 51 hands-on abusers, and the rescue or
identification of 55 children. This operation has also yielded the
arrest of 548 individuals abroad, and the identification or rescue of
296 children abroad. These successes only underscore how much work
remains to address child exploitation on the Dark Net.
Another such program is Operation Cross Country. This nationwide
law enforcement action focuses on underage victims of sex trafficking,
completed its 11th iteration during the second week of October and
recovered 84 minors. Over 400 agencies partnering with FBI field
offices were instrumental in recovering child victims of all
backgrounds and arresting sex traffickers, including sex customers.
More than 100 victim specialists, in coordination with local law
enforcement victim advocates and non-governmental organizations,
provided services to child and adult victims.
Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams are ready response teams
stationed across the country to quickly respond to abductions.
Investigators bring to this issue the full array of forensic tools such
as DNA analysis, trace evidence, impression evidence, and digital
forensics. Through improved communications, law enforcement also has
the ability to quickly share information with partners throughout the
world, and these outreach programs play an integral role in prevention.
key cross-cutting capabilities and capacities
I would like to briefly highlight some key cross-cutting
capabilities and capacities that are critical to our efforts in each of
the threat and crime problems described.
Operational and Information Technology
As criminal and terrorist threats become more diverse and
dangerous, the role of technology becomes increasingly important to our
efforts. We are using technology to improve the way we collect,
analyze, and share information. We have seen significant improvement in
capabilities and capacities over the past decade; but keeping pace with
technology remains a key concern for the future.
The FBI Laboratory is one of the largest and most comprehensive
forensic laboratories in the world. Operating out of a state-of-the-art
facility in Quantico, Virginia, laboratory personnel travel the world
on assignment, using science and technology to protect the Nation and
support law enforcement, intelligence, military, and forensic science
partners. The Lab's many services include providing expert testimony,
mapping crime scenes, and conducting forensic exams of physical and
hazardous evidence. Lab personnel possess expertise in many areas of
forensics supporting law enforcement and intelligence purposes,
including explosives, trace evidence, documents, chemistry,
cryptography, DNA, facial reconstruction, fingerprints, firearms,
digital forensics and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
One example of the Lab's key services and programs is the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS), software the FBI develops and administers,
which allows 200 law enforcement laboratories throughout the United
States to compare over 16 million DNA profiles. In the last 20 years,
CODIS has aided nearly 400,000 investigations, while maintaining its
sterling reputation and the confidence of the American public.
The Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) is
another example. Formally established in 2004, TEDAC serves as the
single interagency organization that receives, fully analyzes, and
exploits all priority terrorist improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
TEDAC coordinates the efforts of the entire government, including law
enforcement, intelligence, and military entities, to gather and share
intelligence about IEDs. These efforts help disarm and disrupt IEDs,
link them to their makers, and prevent future attacks. For example,
Laboratory Division personnel recently testified in New York in the
successful prosecution of Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh after linking him
to a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device prepared for an attack
on the U.S. military base in Afghanistan. Although originally focused
on devices from Iraq and Afghanistan, TEDAC now receives and analyzes
devices from all over the world.
Additionally, the Laboratory Division maintains a capability to
provide forensic support for significant shooting investigations. The
Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team provides support to FBI field
offices by bringing together expertise from various Laboratory
components to provide enhanced technical support to document complex
shooting crime scenes. Services are scene- and situation-dependent and
may include mapping of the shooting scene in two or three dimensions,
scene documentation through photography, including aerial and oblique
imagery, 360-degree photography and videography, trajectory
reconstruction, and the analysis of gunshot residue and shot patterns.
Significant investigations supported by this team include the shootings
at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California; the Pulse
Night Club in Orlando, Florida; the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival in
Las Vegas, Nevada; and the shooting of 12 police officers during a
protest against police shootings in Dallas, Texas.
FBI Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts need the best
technological tools available to be responsive to the advanced and
evolving threats that face our Nation. Enterprise information
technology must be designed so that it provides information to
operational employees rather than forcing employees to conform to the
tools available. IT equipment must be reliable and accessible, thus
decreasing the time between information collection and dissemination.
conclusion
In closing, the work being done by the FBI is immeasurable;
however, we cannot afford to be complacent. We must seek out new
technologies and solutions for the problems that exist today as well as
those that are on the horizon. We must build toward the future so that
we are prepared to deal with the threats we will face at home and
abroad and understand how those threats may be connected. Towards that
end, intelligence is gathered, consistent with our authorities, to help
us understand and prioritize identified threats and to determine where
there are gaps. We then try to fill those gaps and continue to learn as
much as we can about the threats we are addressing and those we may
need to address. We do this for national security and criminal threats,
on both a national and local field office level. We then compare the
national and local perspectives to develop a threat prioritization
ranking for each of the FBI's 56 field offices. By creating this
ranking, we strive to actively pursue our highest threats where they
are occurring. This gives us a better assessment of what the dangers
are, what's being done about them, and what we should spend time and
valuable resources on.
A key challenge inhibiting our ability to address current and
future threats is the lack of a headquarters facility that fully
fosters collaboration, intelligence sharing, and is dynamic, enabling
Special Agents, Intelligence Analyst, and other Professional Staff to
combat evolving threats as they arise. The current J. Edgar Hoover
building is incompatible with what the United States expects of the
FBI. Our goal is to build a consolidated, secure, resilient
intelligence community-worthy facility. But even more than that, what
we need is a facility capable of meeting the increased demands of the
Nation's premier Intelligence and Law Enforcement organization for the
future of the FBI. This building will address the way we will work for
the next 50 or more years.
Being expected to respond to a wide range of complex and ever-
changing threats and crime problems is not new to the FBI. Our success
in meeting these challenges is, however, directly tied to the resources
provided to the FBI. The resources the Committee provides each year are
critical for the FBI's ability to address existing and emerging
national security and criminal threats.
Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Shaheen, and Members of the
subcommittee, I would like to close by thanking you for this
opportunity to discuss the FBI's fiscal year 2019 budget request and
the key threats and challenges that we are facing, both as a nation and
as an organization. We are grateful for the leadership that you and
this subcommittee have provided to the FBI. We would not possess the
capabilities and capacities to deal with these threats and challenges
today without your support. Your willingness to invest in and support
our workforce and our physical and technical infrastructure allow the
men and women of the FBI to make a difference every day in communities
large and small throughout our Nation and around the world. We thank
you for that support.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Director. I will begin with my
round of questioning. I will try to do so very briefly as well.
USA GYMNASTICS
I had intended to ask much more budget-oriented questions
before I got to this one, but I do want to highlight the
importance to me in an effort that our subcommittee in
Commerce--I Chair a subcommittee in Commerce that is
responsible for Olympic and amateur sports through the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. Senator Feinstein from
California has been hugely engaged in this issue. But our
subcommittee is looking at the issue of the perspective of what
happened to gymnasts, in particular, but Olympian sports
figures as a result of sexual abuse.
In our investigation, we have collected thousands of
documents and have had two hearings. One of the things,
Director, that I wanted to ask you, let me read this so I get
it correct: There are current and former athletes who have come
forward with accusations of abuse by individuals associated
with their sport, and Michigan State's response to claims of
sexual abuse indicate that those indications were such that the
FBI had been notified. As you would know, Dr. Larry Nassar has
been convicted and is serving prison time. But the follow-up to
that has been that the various entities who received reports of
this abuse had an indication from the FBI not to say anything
and that the FBI had been notified.
I know that you have commenced an investigation, an
internal investigation, of what transpired, but the answers to
these questions are important to us as we pursue additional
hearings in the near future.
So, Director, I would appreciate anything that you can tell
me about whether or not reports of abuse of athletes were made
to the FBI, and if the FBI would have encouraged or insisted
that the people making those reports say nothing to anyone
else.
Director Wray. Mr. Chairman, as we have discussed,
obviously, I think what happened to those women is horrific,
and I am gratified that Dr. Nassar is being held accountable
and will be spending the rest of his life in prison.
I first learned that there were questions about the FBI's
response to allegations when during the 2015-2016 period when
those things were happening. I learned of the allegations in
February when the newspapers started raising the issue. I
immediately commissioned our Inspection Division to do a deep
dive after-action report to look at what was done, what was not
done, what lessons we can learn and how we can make sure that
we are doing things appropriately.
That review is ongoing, so I do not have anything to report
on right now. But I am very much looking forward to that and am
committed to taking appropriate steps once I hear what they
find.
Senator Moran. I look forward to following that report's
completion, having a full understanding of what transpired,
because it will have consequences for others involved that we
are investigating.
Let me just ask a general question. It is related to the
one that we just discussed.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
I am of the view that the appropriations process needs to
work. We need to march 12 appropriations bills across the
Senate floor, across the House floor, and be considered by a
President. Obviously, the appropriations process is about
spending money and priorities, which we look forward to hearing
more from you about, but it is also about oversight. I want
this subcommittee to be in a position in which we pursue
whether or not taxpayer dollars are wisely spent.
I would just ask you, at this point, tell me your view
about congressional oversight. What do you expect to be the
relationship between our subcommittee and other congressional
committees in regard to the FBI? And what is its responsibility
to Congress?
Director Wray. Mr. Chairman, this is an important topic to
me. We respect very much the importance of traditional
congressional oversight. We welcome the tough questions, given
our responsibilities, and we are committed to being as
responsive as we can to appropriate questions and requests. Of
course, we are also committed to being faithful to our oath to
protect the American people and uphold the Constitution.
All of us in the intelligence community understand that to
include, as it always has, protection of sources and methods. I
will tell you that, as anybody in the intelligence community
knows, human sources, in particular, who have put themselves at
great risk to work with us and with our foreign partners have
to be able to trust that we are going to protect their
identities and, in many cases, their lives and the lives of
their families. The day that we cannot protect human sources is
the day the American people start becoming less safe.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Director.
Let me now turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
USA GYMNASTICS
It is nice to have you here, Director Wray. I want to
follow up on Senator Moran's question about the investigation
into USA Gymnastics and Larry Nassar, and applaud his efforts
as head of the Commerce subcommittee that is looking into this
matter.
You may not know the answer. If you do not, I hope you will
see if you can find out and include that information in what is
provided to this subcommittee. When FBI agents interviewed
individuals who had alleged abuse by Nassar, do you know if
there were victim specialists or, in the case of minors, child
adolescent forensic interviewers, there for those interviews?
Director Wray. Senator, I do not know the answer to that
question. I do know that our Office of Victim Assistance, as we
call it, is an incredibly important function for us, in
particular to deal with victims exactly like these folks. They
are stretched very, very thin. But the reason we call them
Office of Victim Assistance is because they are designed to
help victims. It is not just to make them possible witnesses.
Senator Shaheen. I hope your investigation will examine
that matter and make sure if the appropriate people were not
present, that it will reflect that, so that we have that
information in the future.
Also, do you commit to sharing the summary results of that
internal review with this subcommittee?
Director Wray. I would be happy to make sure that we are
providing the subcommittee all appropriate information about
that review. At the moment, I do not know yet what they are
going to find, of course, but this is an important topic to me.
There is nothing more important, no category of victims more
important, then the most vulnerable populations, which includes
our kids.
Senator Shaheen. Absolutely. I think the question is not
just if Larry Nassar will be held accountable, but also any
other participants in USA Gymnastics or the U.S. Olympic
Committee who knew what was going on. We need to hold those
individuals accountable, too.
ELECTION SECURITY
When you and I spoke on the phone, and I appreciated your
call, we talked about the elections coming up. The intelligence
community has said there are reasons to believe the
interference we saw in the 2016 election by the Russians will
be occurring in 2018 or there will be an effort to interfere
again in 2018. Can you talk about what the FBI is doing to
secure our election systems?
Director Wray. I think in particular--we work very closely
with the Department of Homeland Security and others. Our role,
in particular, is focused on trying to identify the threat,
investigate the threat, pursue and disrupt the threat. One of
the first things I did after getting sworn in as Director was
create a Foreign Influence Task Force, which brings together
our Counterintelligence Division, our Cyber Division, our
Criminal Division, and even our Counterterrorism Division,
believe it or not, with the idea of having a single,
consolidated, coordinated effort that makes this issue a
priority. And we work with our colleagues at DHS. We work with
our foreign partners, because, of course, they have concerns
about efforts to interfere or influence, I should say, their
elections.
So we are actively working with a particular focus on 2018
and then, ultimately, 2020.
Senator Shaheen. I am really pleased to hear that, and I
look forward to hearing more details about that in our closed
session, because I think this is not a partisan issue. This is
an issue about a foreign government's efforts to undermine our
system of government and, ultimately, our way of life in
America. So, whatever the FBI can do to address that issue I
think is very important.
BLACK CUBE
On May 6, ``The New Yorker'' ran what I thought was a very
troubling story about an Israeli private-intelligence firm
called ``Black Cube''. The firm, apparently, is accused of
performing an undercover campaign to discredit Obama
administration officials who were proponents of the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal. The firm has also been accused of being used by
Harvey Weinstein to gather intelligence on his victims in order
to stop the publication of sexual misconduct allegations
against him.
What is the FBI's role in investigating this kind of
organization?
Director Wray. Senator, of course, I cannot comment on or
even confirm the existence of any specific investigation. But
what I can tell you is that we look at these things through two
lenses. There is both a criminal lens and a counterintelligence
lens.
On the counterintelligence lens, any time a firm that might
be working on behalf of a foreign power, for example, we would
want to be approaching whether or not there are
counterintelligence implications from that end of it. Likewise,
on the criminal side, we would be looking at any kind of firm
that might be engaged in any violation of Federal criminal law.
There are many of those, as you can imagine.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up. I apologize for
leaving to go to another hearing, but I look forward to seeing
you in the closed session.
Senator Moran. Senator Shaheen, thank you for your
questioning in regard to the athletes. I appreciate your
leadership in this regard. I know how seriously you take it.
Senator Lankford is next recognized. We are going to hold
you to the time limit as best I can.
Senator Lankford. I will take it from there. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
DOCUMENT REQUESTS
Director, good to see you again. Over the past 6 months,
there have been numerous document requests back and forth with
the FBI. The FBI has hired additional contractors to be able to
expedite some of that process.
Can you give me an update on requests from the House and
the Senate for any documents that we have requested either from
the House or Senate to be able to have access to, redacted or
unredacted? What is the status of those at this point?
Director Wray. Senator, as you alluded to; we actually have
been dealing with quite a number of requests, some of them
almost unprecedented in their volume from a number of different
committees. We have, in the case of one committee, for example,
doubled the number of people working on it basically around the
clock, full-time, to over 50 people.
So we are chugging away, making progress. A lot of the
redactions, depending on the particular committee requesting,
have to do with things like grand jury secrecy, where we
legally have an implication or, as I referenced with the
Chairman, protection of human sources and methods, or, in some
cases, ongoing investigations.
So we are trying our best to be responsive, but we are also
trying to be responsible.
Senator Lankford. Sure. So do you have any deadlines when
they will be--all documents that are currently in request--I am
sure there is always another request coming.
Director Wray. Well, it is rolling. I do not have numbers
for you here right now, with that level of specificity in this
hearing. But I can tell you that every week we are cranking out
documents and people are coming over to spaces that we have set
aside for the Hill to review documents. So it is an ongoing
process of thousands of documents being produced.
FBI AND ATF PROCESSES ALIGNMENT
Senator Lankford. Sure. Let me switch over. The Department
of Justice and I started a conversation about 6 years ago about
trying to align the processes of FBI and ATF, because they are
both doing investigations, but their processes are very
different. I know you do not oversee ATF, but I have continued
to be able to raise the Department of Justice to be able to
take a look at those two processes and make sure they are good
and consistent. Quite frankly, I think the FBI has a very good
process to be able to go through how you conduct
investigations, how you gather evidence, what you do. There may
be some things to be able to learn from ATF.
Do you know if there has been outreach from DOJ yet to FBI
to be able to look at processes at FBI, to try to lay that
comparison with ATF?
Director Wray. Senator, I do not know specifically about
that. I will tell you that we work daily with ATF. They are
great partners. As you say, while I am sure there are things
they can learn from us, there are definitely things we can
learn from them, too, so we are in constant contact at all
levels.
Senator Lankford. Great. We will continue to follow up on
that.
BACKGROUND CHECK
The background checks have been a constant issue about
trying to raise the number of background checks and the speed
of those. The FBI is obviously very involved in helping with
that process.
Can you help us understand better what can be done better
not only to up the speed but to give your agents more time to
be able to work on transnational criminal organizations, crimes
against children, and so many other things that you do rather
than so much time on the background checks? Is there a better
way to do it?
Director Wray. I think we are all frustrated at the pace.
We have to be thorough. We have to be careful.
I think one of the challenges that we deal with is that,
when we are running searches, we are fundamentally, at the FBI,
a field-deployed organization, so it is not just that there
could be one place centrally at headquarters that would have
all that information.
Nominees could probably be faster in getting us paperwork
because that is where we start. But there are a lot of
different ways in which lots of us have to do more. We have
looked at things, and we do do things like use retired agents
who sometimes come back as contractors, because they have that
some of that judgment and experience. All of that requires
resources, but that is another way we are trying----
Senator Lankford. If there are ways that we can help on
that, we are very interested in being able to get that from
you. Obviously, we do not want to take a lot of time from your
agents' time with other projects they have. This is very
important as well, to be able to do background checks with
great speed, but it also takes a tremendous amount of time.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
Let me switch over to transnational criminal organizations
to try to see the focus you have had and the cooperation with
U.S. attorneys at this point, because that requires a
tremendous amount of coordination with all areas DHS, all
areas, obviously, of the FBI, U.S. attorneys.
What are you seeing at this point in the transnational
criminal organizations?
Director Wray. I think transnational criminal organizations
are maybe one of the least talked about but yet most pervasive
threats we have to deal with. We see it not just in the obvious
in terms of drug trafficking and all kinds of violent crime,
but even the things that might not be as obvious to the
American people. Of course, they are involved in human
trafficking. We have seen reporting about them relying on
intellectual property theft of all kinds of things to raise
revenue.
So pretty much any violation that the subcommittee can
think about, transnational criminal organizations are in them.
So we are seeing that more and more.
I think one of the strengths that the FBI brings to the
table, over the course of its entire 110-year history, is a
focus on organized crime, dismantling enterprises, going after
not just the people but taking apart their infrastructure,
taking away their money, all of that. So it is something that I
think we are going to have to put even more focus on and kind
of capture also the global cross-border dynamics.
So at the end of the day, I think it comes down to
technology and the cross-border dimension to it. Those are the
trends that I would most cite to you on that.
Senator Lankford. We want you to keep your eye on the ball
on that and will be glad to be able to help. Let us know what
you need.
Director Wray. Thank you.
Senator Moran. The Vice Chairman of the full committee is
recognized, Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Wray, thank you for being here today. As you know,
I began my career in law enforcement. I watch the FBI and
others, and I hope you will take back to the bureau my thanks
to the men and women who are working every day to uphold the
integrity and independence of the FBI. That is important to all
of us.
I have a number of questions for you.
I will note for the record the President's budget request
reduces overall FBI funding by 5 percent. They request no
funding for the new FBI headquarters. They request a rescission
of another $148 million in salaries and expenses. I am going to
give you a question for the record of how that will impact the
ability of the FBI to do its job.
Frankly, I am concerned with this administration--I would
be concerned with any administration, but this one especially
with the relentless, politicized attacks on our Nation's law
enforcement institutions, because I think that could affect
their independence. There is a unifying theme to it. They
attack anybody who has investigated Russia's interference in
our democracy.
RUSSIA INVESTIGATION
The President has called your bureau ``a disgrace''. The
Chair of the House Intelligence Committee suggested you should
be impeached, which goes beyond balderdash. It is one of the
dumbest statements I have heard any Member of Congress of
either party ever say, and I have heard a few in both parties.
You have been the Director of the FBI since August. Do you
believe the men and women of the FBI working on the Russia
investigation are driven by anything other than a duty to the
rule of law and to ensuring that anyone who attacked our
democracy in 2016 is held accountable?
Director Wray. Senator, I can only speak to what I have
seen since I have been on the job, but the agents that I have
worked with since being on the job have inspired me every day
in terms of their professionalism, their integrity, their
courage, and their commitment to doing the right thing in the
right way, which I think is the key.
Senator Leahy. You said at your confirmation hearing that
the Russia investigation was not a ``witch hunt''. You have
been there as the FBI Director for 10 months. You are far more
immersed in the details of the FBI. Is that still your opinion?
Director Wray. Yes.
ZTE
Senator Leahy. Thank you. You also recently testified that
you are ``deeply concerned'' about allowing the Chinese cell
phone company ZTE to operate within the United States because
of the potential for espionage.
The company also violated sanctions and sold technology to
North Korea and Iran, and our Commerce Department has brought
charges against them. But the President announced on Twitter
this week that he has ``instructed'' his Commerce Department to
get ZTE ``back in business, fast'', so those Chinese jobs are
not lost.
If the President allows ZTE further access to our market
and to American technology, could this place both our
telecommunications networks and Americans' private data at-
risk?
Director Wray. Senator, the questions about the Commerce
Department's settlements, its remedies, and penalties, I would
defer to the Commerce Department.
Senator Leahy. I understand.
Director Wray. But what I can tell you is that we at the
FBI remain deeply concerned that any company beholden to
foreign governments that do not share our values are not
companies that we want to be gaining positions of power inside
our telecommunications network.
That gives them the capacity to maliciously modify or steal
information. That gives them the capacity to conduct undetected
espionage. That gives them the capacity to exert pressure or
control.
So all of those are things that we were concerned about
with any company that, as I say, is beholden to a foreign
government.
Senator Leahy. But this company, is there pretty well a
consensus among our intelligence people, the FBI included, that
they do pose a threat or a potential threat to us?
Director Wray. Again, I want to be careful in this setting
in commenting on a specific company, but I remain of the view
that I have articulated before about companies of this sort and
the capacity that giving them access to our telecommunications
network provides.
Senator Leahy. You had earlier testified specifically on
ZTE.
Director Wray. In response to a question about that
company, I provided an answer almost identical to what I just
did here. My view has not changed since that earlier testimony.
Senator Leahy. I share your concern about ZTE. I was
concerned that, 72 hours after the Chinese Government pumped a
half billion dollars into a theme park in Indonesia that had
Donald Trump's name on it, he said we should put those people
back to work.
But that is probably just coincidence, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Leahy, thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director, and thank you for your leadership.
HOMEGROWN EXTREMISTS
A major challenge for the FBI is homegrown extremists in
every State in the Nation who have been inspired by ISIS or Al
Qaeda or similar groups, and radicalized no longer by traveling
to training camps but via the Internet through videos or
private chat rooms or other means.
How is the FBI countering that threat? It seems to be very
difficult to identify these individuals.
Director Wray. Senator, you are exactly right. You put your
finger on what I would call sort of our highest
counterterrorism priority at the moment. We have about 1,000
investigations into exactly the kind of people you are
describing, covering all 50 States as I am sitting here right
now. That is not even counting the Al Qaeda investigations, the
traditional ISIS investigations, or the domestic terrorism
investigations, but just the group you are talking about.
What makes it so hard is that there are not many dots to
connect with some of these people. They pick soft targets. They
use easy-to-use weapons, IEDs, cars, knives, guns. And they can
make decisions on the spur of the moment.
We are trying to get better at looking for red flags as to
when people who are getting radicalized make that switch into
potentially mobilizing. A lot of that is outreach to the
community, and partnership with our State and local law
enforcement who know those communities better, but it is hard.
It is something that I compare notes with my foreign
counterparts on a lot, and they have the same challenge. All of
our closest allies have the same issue.
NO FLY, NO BUY
Senator Collins. I introduced a bill that we refer to as
the No Fly, No Buy legislation. What it says is that, if you
are listed on the Government's terrorist watch list--and I am
not talking about the very broad one; I am talking about the
no-fly list--where you are considered to be so dangerous that
we do not allow you to board an airplane--now, obviously, a lot
of the people on this list are not Americans, but there is a
small subset that is. Our bipartisan bill says that you should
not be able to purchase a firearm if you are on that list.
It has robust due-process provisions, so you can challenge
the denial of the firearm purchase in Federal court. If you
win, your attorney fees are reimbursed to you.
Do you think that is a good policy for us?
Director Wray. I certainly, like you, want to make sure
that we are keeping guns out of the wrong hands. I think I
would have to look hard at the legislation itself to have a
better sense of not just legally, which I would consult with
the Department on, but operationally what it would mean. So I
would be happy to take a closer look at the bill.
Senator Collins. Thank you. That would be helpful.
CYBERSECURITY
Finally, how is the FBI responding to the growing
cybersecurity threat from both state and nonstate actors,
particularly with regard to our critical infrastructure, such
as the electrical grid?
Director Wray. We are doing a number of things, both on the
enforcement and investigations side but also on the outreach
and communication side. We have cyber task forces in every
field office. We have a 24/7 Cyber Watch, kind of like our
Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) on that
terrorism side. We have a number of things like that that help
lead the investigation.
Then on the outreach side, we try to communicate with the
critical infrastructure private sector and give them threat
information so that they can better prepare. We are trying to
be more forward-leaning all the time. I talk about this when I
meet with the private sector--how we can better get them
timely, actionable, relevant information, so that they can take
steps to harden their infrastructure.
Of course, we work very closely with the Department of
Homeland Security on that as well. It is a mission that we try
to tackle together, each of us with our own respective
responsibilities.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I think that communication with
the private sector in both directions is absolutely critical,
so that you can share threat information, malicious software
signatures.
There was a DOD study with defense contractors that did
that, and people were amazed to find that they did not have the
same information. So I think that can be valuable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Collins.
The Senator from California, Senator Feinstein.
USA GYMNASTICS
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director, I wanted to ask you one question on the Larry
Nassar case. Last year, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on abuse within Olympic sports. Two survivors testified
about being abused by Dr. Nassar. He is taken care of.
What is troubling to me is, last week, a gold medal
Olympian came in and spoke to the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee and myself to say that she reported abuse to a
specific local office, which I will give you privately, that
she had suffered abuse, and nothing was done about it. She
tried for a year with the FBI in that office and then gave up.
So the question I have is, has the FBI been instructed to
take these complaints seriously and promptly respond to women
making them? Because I am really concerned about it. These are
all young women, and they deserve an investigation.
Director Wray. Senator, I share your concern. My heart goes
out to the victims of Dr. Nassar.
As I think I might have mentioned earlier in the hearing,
once I heard that there were questions about the stuff that had
happened in 2015 and 2016, I commissioned an internal deep-dive
by our Inspection Division to do a full after-action report to
figure out what we did in all the different offices that might
have been involved, what we did not do, and what lessons we can
learn.
I have not gotten the results of that yet. It is still
ongoing. But I intend to make sure that, if there were mistakes
made, we learn from those mistakes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. And will you share that study
with us?
Director Wray. I would be happy to share the appropriate
information with the subcommittee.
NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS)
Senator Feinstein. Another question, following the murders
of the nine churchgoers at Emmanuel AME in South Carolina in
2015, the FBI admitted it did not properly obtain information
regarding the gunman's drug arrest record, which should have
prohibited him from buying a handgun. The FBI apparently had
not completed its review within 3 days, so the dealer was
legally permitted to complete the sale to the gunman. As we
know, nine people died as a result.
Are there instances where State records or other records
cannot be physically obtained within a 3-day delay period by
the FBI?
Director Wray. I do not know if I can speak for all 50
States on that. I have actually gone out to the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) in West
Virginia and sat there and listened in on the earpieces, so I
can actually hear what our folks do and what it is like to
actually take one of these calls. We do try very hard to turn
them around as quickly as we can, but we need to be right.
I will tell you, you might be interested to know that, in
the first 3 months of this year, we have had a record number of
NICS checks.
Senator Feinstein. A record number of?
Director Wray. NICS checks per month each of those months.
So we are doing a ton of work. That can always get better.
I do know that some States, the way they keep the records in
terms of what they reflect as a disposition, for example, on a
prior arrest does not necessarily fit as well in our system, so
it takes more work to kind of drill down and understand. It
gets really obscure, but it depends on which subsection of the
code as to whether it is actually a prohibitor or not and
things like that. So we are always getting better.
Senator Feinstein. Do you think the 3-day provision should
be eliminated?
Director Wray. I would have to look at the implications of
that.
Senator Feinstein. Okay, would you look and just give us a
recommendation one way or another.
Director Wray. I would be happy to tell you what I think
the operational impact of that would be.
Senator Feinstein. Good.
You say in your written testimony that, ``Domestic violent
extremist movements collectively pose a steady threat of
violence and economic harm to the United States.'' That is a
quote.
HATE CRIMES/DOMESTIC TERRORISM
In 2015, the FBI reported that there were 5,850 incidents
of hate crimes, and specific offenses against Muslims grew 67
percent from 2014.
Given this tremendous increase, what is the FBI doing to
increase its investigative resources related to hate crimes?
Director Wray. Well, we have dedicated units that focus on
civil rights offenses, including hate crimes. Also, we find
with some frequency that hate crimes and domestic terrorism--
and I think the reference that I was making that you are
referring to was intended to speak about domestic terrorism,
which may or may not, depending on the instance, be the same
thing as a hate crime. So our Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) make that a principal area of focus.
And we have, ironically, about the same number of domestic
terrorism investigations, which is about a thousand, as we do
homegrown violent extremists. And that covers the waterfront,
though, all the way from white supremacist investigations all
the way to anarchist investigations and pretty much everything
in between.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
The Senator from Arkansas, Senator Boozman.
Senator, I would tell you, before you arrived, we are close
on time. I would encourage you, if you are going to ask
questions, to stay within the 5 minutes. We have Senator Coons,
Senator Van Hollen----
Senator Boozman. I will do whatever you tell me to do
today.
[Laughter.]
Senator Moran. The Senator is recognized.
Senator Boozman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Director, for being here. We really do
appreciate your hard work. I know Senator Collins has already
asked about it, so I am not going to ask again about
cybersecurity, and how important that is. I think all the
subcommittee shares that thought. Anything we can do to help
you in that regard, we will.
CHILD EXPLOITATION
One of the issues in your testimony that you touched on was
child exploitation. As you know, the Department of Homeland
Security also was very interested in that. Can you talk about
your abilities to work together? Are you working together?
Director Wray. We do work together on those issues. We have
Task Forces specifically focused on child exploitation, child
pornography, and different kinds of sexual crimes focused on
children. I think Homeland Security makes a great partner on
that. Both of us rely very heavily on State and local law
enforcement, because it requires that, too.
There is also a role, I think, for victim services because
these are unusually difficult cases, just given the nature of
the victim population. We have something called Innocence Lost,
which is an initiative of ours. It is intelligence-driven. It
is kind of focused on trying to make sure we have the maximum
impact. And, of course, the role of cyber, as you mentioned, in
your other topic becomes inextricably intertwined with that.
NICS
Senator Boozman. I also would like to ask a little bit
about NICS in the sense that we have Arkansans that, for one
reason or another, maybe they have similar names, have wound up
in a situation where they have been denied and then want to
appeal. The backlog on that is great right now.
Can you talk to us a little bit about how you are trying to
address that?
Director Wray. Certainly, the resource constraints that we
have at NICS are significant. As I mentioned, we had a record
number of checks the first 3 months of this year. We try very
hard to make sure that we do not have delays within the time
period allowed.
In my experience, the vast majority of calls can be dealt
with in the same phone call. As I mentioned, I wanted to kind
of see what it is like to be out there in person, so I actually
went out to West Virginia and sat in the call center, put
earpieces on, and actually listened to an operator doing a few
of these.
Some of them can be greenlighted right there on the call.
Some of them can be denied right there on the call. A lot of
them require a little more work, which I think usually can be
done within the time period allowed.
Senator Boozman. Very good. That would be a nice place to
go visit. Maybe we will get an opportunity to do that.
I yield back, in an effort to accommodate my colleagues.
Senator Collins [presiding]. Thank you. It is great being
Chairman, however briefly.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Director Wray, thanks for being here, and thank you to the
men and women of the FBI for helping protect our country.
FBI HEADQUARTERS
You say in your testimony that it is important that the FBI
have a new headquarters. You talked about the current condition
of the J. Edgar Hoover Building. I must say, for those of us
who have been following this process for many years, we have
gotten whiplash when it comes to the FBI building.
Let me read to you from a 2016 prospectus from the GSA that
was put together after years of congressional input, GSA input,
FBI input, congressional support. It said that the current
building cannot be redeveloped to provide the necessary space
and consolidate the FBI headquarter components or to meet the
agency's physical security requirements. They go on to say very
specifically that they looked at the idea of redeveloping the
FBI building at its current site and said that it was not
capable of meeting the security setback requirements.
As you know, other major security facilities--CIA, NSA,
Cyber Command--they are on campus settings with these large
setbacks. Don't those large setbacks provide extra, enhanced
security to the people who work in those places?
Director Wray. Senator, obviously, security is extremely
important not just to our folks but to me since I would have to
work in the building. The proposal that we have on the table
right now would allow us to get to a Level V security, much
like our partners, say Scotland Yard and various others around
the world who function like us.
So we are comfortable that putting in place a new
building--not renovating the old one but a brand-new building
in that space--allows us to be able to kind of do both things,
which is to take advantage of the location that we need but at
the same time provide the security----
Senator Van Hollen. Mr. Director, with all respect, you are
going to have to convince me anyway that the reasons why the
FBI and the GSA have rejected their earlier assessment that
developing at the current site regardless of the configuration
would provide adequate security. That is the same reason we
have the CIA on a campus, that we have NSA on a campus.
I have to go on, but it just does not compute that larger
setbacks do not provide more security. So the question would be
what kind of security you are willing to give up.
ZTE
Here is what I want to ask you. I want to go back to
Senator Leahy's questions about ZTE and your earlier testimony
before the Senate Intelligence Committee. My understanding is
you maintain the same assessment today as before. Is that
right?
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Just to put it bluntly, what was
President Trump thinking when he tweeted out what he did about
putting ZTE back in business?
Director Wray. Senator, I cannot speak to what anybody else
was thinking. I am not really a Twitter guy. What I will tell
you is that we take very seriously our obligation to protect
our national security, so we look at it through the lens of
what kind of capacity providing a company that is beholden to
another government that may not share our values----
Senator Van Hollen. So the fact that you do not know what
he was thinking tells me he did not consult with you or anyone
at the FBI before he sent that out, did he?
Director Wray. Well, I would not get into our discussions,
but I would just say that my assessment----
Senator Van Hollen. Well, no, that is not a discussion. No,
come on. I mean, did the President reach out to you and the FBI
before he sent out his tweet on ZTE? That is an important
question.
I mean, if he did, it suggests that he took into account or
rejected your advice. I am just asking if the President asked
you----
Director Wray. I am not aware of any discussion of that
sort.
Senator Van Hollen. Do you know if ZTE has accessed U.S.
trade secrets and provided them to the Chinese Government?
Director Wray. I am sorry, could you repeat that?
Senator Van Hollen. Do you know if there is any evidence
that ZTE has accessed stolen U.S. trade secrets and provided
them to the government?
Director Wray. Senator, I am not sure there is anything I
could say on that topic in this setting.
ELECTION SECURITY
Senator Van Hollen. All right. My last questions really
relate to what Senator Shaheen said. Your colleagues in the law
enforcement community have indicated they expect that the
Russians will interfere in the midterm 2018 elections, very
much like they did before. When you testified back in February,
you indicated that the President had not directed you or the
FBI to take any additional actions to confront Russian
interference.
My question is, have you heard from the President on that
issue since February? Has he directed you and the FBI to
enhance your operations in preparation for midterm elections?
Director Wray. Senator, we did in fact, as I think the
White House has reported, meet. A group of us--me, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Attorney General, and others did meet with
the President not that long ago where he emphasized the
importance of protecting our election from foreign
interference.
Senator Van Hollen. All right, I am going to send you a
written question regarding legislation Senator Rubio and I have
introduced called the DETER Act.
Thank you.
Director Wray. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Moran [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
The Senator from West Virginia, Senator Capito.
Senator Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS)
Thank you, Mr. Director, for being here. I caught, just as
I walked in, you talked about your visit to West Virginia. So
that was going to be my first question, to talk about the CJIS
Division in Clarksburg, the great work that they are doing
there not just on the NICS system but on a lot of the
background checks, et cetera.
I did not know if there was anything you wanted to add
about that facility. Obviously, we are very proud of it in West
Virginia and the good work that is done there.
Director Wray. I would be happy to. I really enjoyed my
visit out there. All I had really covered so far about what is
out there are questions about NICS.
Of course, as you know, there is a lot of very important
work being done out there, everything from the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) to the Uniform Crime Reporting
Program (UCR), and the National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS) that does the crime reporting statistics. There is just
a lot out there, our Public Access Line that takes calls from
the public.
It is a thriving facility with great people working really,
really hard. I was very impressed by what I saw out there.
Senator Capito. Thank you. We are certainly glad you are
there.
FBI HEADQUARTERS
I would say, my cohort from Maryland, in talking about the
headquarters, I understand that part of the plan on the
headquarters remaining toward the downtown area would be to
move some of the existing employees or maybe functions to other
places, one of which was Clarksburg, I believe.
Did you have any thoughts on that?
Director Wray. For about a decade now, the FBI has been
working on plans to move various functions and headcount out of
the National Capital region, including not just Clarksburg but
Huntsville; Pocatello, Idaho, on the IT side; and even
Quantico.
The new headquarters proposal that we have would
significantly expand the number of people who would be in the
headquarters building here. So it is a combination of things.
TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
Senator Capito. Okay. As you are aware, State and Federal
authorities successfully executed a widescale takedown
operation of the Peterson drug trafficking organization in
Huntington, West Virginia, and Detroit as part of Operation
Saigon Sunset. As a result, the officers apprehended 90
suspected drug suppliers and traffickers; 167 grams of cocaine;
760 grams of heroin; 450 grams of fentanyl, which is enough to
kill 250,000 individuals.
I just want to thank you and your department and the
coordinating aspects of what you have done with the U.S.
attorney's office. I understand every law enforcement officer
that was in any part of that area was a part of that.
I just want to know, is this typical of what the FBI is
doing around the country, in terms of being able to fortify
those local resources to be able to catch these guys? Because,
literally, they are killing our people.
Director Wray. This is a huge priority for us. One of the
things I have been trying very hard to do as Director is not
spend all my time inside the beltway. I have been trying to get
out. I am determined to try to get to all 56 of our Field
Offices by the end of this year. I am making good headway.
Every office I go to, there is incredible work being done
by the men and women of the FBI on some of the same kinds of
issues you are talking about. It never fails to give me an
extra spring in my step. We could not do it, though, without
our partners. That is the important piece. It is not just the
FBI. It is us with DEA, ATF, HSI, and State and local partners,
in particular.
Key is that we have a lot of task force officers. We have
about 500-and-something task forces, that is not even counting
the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and over 7,000 task force
officers, which means officers from State and local law
enforcement, for example.
Through the resources this committee provides us, we are
paying their overtime, their use of vehicles, et cetera.
Frankly, if you looked at the number of task force officers
that we work with every day in all of our field offices, there
are actually more task force officers than there are agents on
task forces. So they are a huge part of it. It is very much a
team effort. We are grateful for their support.
Senator Capito. I appreciate that. I think I stated
earlier, we really could not do it without that leadership,
without the expertise and technology and the intelligence and
everything that comes along with the good men and women of the
FBI. Thank you very much.
Director Wray. And we could not do it without the
subcommittee's support, frankly, because the threats,
everywhere I go, somebody has some idea of something the FBI
should do more of. I have not found very many people with good
ideas of what the FBI should do less of yet. So we are
stretched thin, but we are working hard with our partners.
Senator Capito. We will be there to support you. Thank you.
Director Wray. Thank you.
Senator Moran. The Senator from Delaware, Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Moran.
Director Wray, it is good to be with you. I think we have
known each other for about 25 years, and it is great to see you
in this role, and I am grateful for what you and the terrific
men and women of Federal law enforcement and, in particular,
the FBI do week in and week out, their service, their devotion
to the country, to the Constitution, and to the rule of law.
You are literally the Federal cops on the beat, as you were
just discussing with the Senator from West Virginia. You play a
key part in making sure that not just Federal law enforcement,
but Federal, State, and local law enforcement is highly
effective. And you keep all Americans safe regardless of their
political leanings, their backgrounds, their race, their
religion or creed.
When you took the oath last August, you took it to protect
our Constitution, not to protect any individual or any party.
FBI EFFECTIVENESS
I have to say, I am deeply troubled by recent baseless
attacks on the FBI. Would you agree that the effectiveness of
the FBI really depends on citizens, on witnesses, on juries, on
State and local law enforcement all being able to have trust in
the FBI?
Director Wray. Senator, the people you just listed off are
great examples of the opinions that matter to me most and that
matter to our people most. There are a lot of opinions out
there about the FBI, just like there are about everybody in
this room. But the opinions that matter the most are the
opinions of juries when our agents take the stand; the opinions
of magistrate judges when our agents bring them a search
warrant; the opinions of our State and local partners, if they
trust us to work with them; our private sector partners; our
community partners; judges; as I mentioned before, victims and
their families, do they trust us? Those are the opinions of
people who know us through our work, and those are the opinions
that matter to me and to our people.
Senator Coons. I hope that you do not find the opinions of
some discouraging or dispiriting.
This is National Police Week. We are all in our Nation's
Capital honoring the men and women of law enforcement across
the country. But we have seen, I think tragically, a series of
public statements by President Trump suggesting that the
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election is
``a witch hunt.''
He literally said last month, ``You look at the corruption
at the top of the FBI, it's a disgrace.''
Now, if this was just some stray comment, there is a wide
range of opinions in our country, as you mentioned, we could
dismiss it. But I am concerned it is beginning to have an
impact.
There was a poll of 1,500 Americans released last week by
the Economist that said 7 percent of Democrats, 25 percent of
independents, and 61 percent of Republicans said the FBI is
framing the President with the Department of Justice.
Let me repeat that: 61 percent of Republicans surveyed said
the FBI and the Justice Department are framing the President of
the United States.
That seems to me directly opposite the care, the diligence,
the professionalism, the dedication to rule of law that I have
known in the men and women who I know in the FBI, in our field
office in Delaware and here, in my service in the Senate.
Director, can I just ask you, are the FBI and the
Department of Justice in any way attempting to frame the
President of the United States?
Director Wray. Senator, the people that I work with every
day, the people that I see every day inside the FBI, are
committed to doing the right thing in the right way with
professionalism, integrity, objectivity, and courage. So while
I recognize that there are, as I said, a lot of opinions out
there, we do not focus on polls and surveys and studies. We
focus on, as I said, the opinions of people who know us through
our work.
What I find when I go out and talk to people in the field
out on the frontlines, our partners, the judges, the
prosecutors, the victims, the feedback I get uniformly is
positive and supportive.
Senator Coons. Should you come to visit the field office in
Wilmington, Delaware, I think you will get exactly that same
feedback. The FBI is a highly valued part of our local law
enforcement community and a great contributor.
There was a case just last month in Kansas where three men
were convicted of plotting to blow up an apartment complex and
mosque, and the FBI could disrupt this plot because an
informant trusted the FBI. Jurors trusted the FBI, all the
evidence it developed and brought forward, despite attacks on
the FBI from the defense in that specific case.
So I will just conclude on this point by saying that I
think trust in the FBI is absolutely essential to the rule of
law in our country. I did not mean to berate you on the point.
I just think we cannot go without commenting on the fact that
there is, in my mind, a steady erosion in confidence, and there
is a cause of it, and I truly hope that the men and women of
the FBI know that they have strong bipartisan support here in
Congress.
NICS
Let me ask you a last question. My home community of
Wilmington, as I know you know, has faced an epidemic of gun
violence in recent years. We have had a lot of assistance from
Federal law enforcement. One of the things we are trying to do
is to make sure that we keep guns out of the hands of persons
prohibited. That is why I joined with Senator Toomey to
introduce the NICS Denial Notification Act, which requires the
Federal Government to notify State and local law enforcement
when a person prohibited fails a background check.
Last year, the NICS section denied 104,000 firearm
transactions where people who are prohibited by law attempted
to buy.
Do you think it would be helpful for Federal law
enforcement to notify State law enforcement when someone
prohibited from owning a firearm attempts to purchase one?
Director Wray. Senator, obviously, we, like you, want to
make sure we are keeping guns out of the hands of the wrong
people--those who are prohibited by law from possessing them.
And NICS denials are a key tool in that.
I have not studied the bill that you are describing. We do
feel very strongly about our need to work closely with State
and local partners to share information. I would have to look
at the operational impact of that. Obviously, there is always a
balance. We all feel in today's world in law enforcement that
we want more information, but we also get deluged with
information. So we have to work through some of those issues.
I will say, on Wilmington, as you may know, the Task Force
that we have had working there, I think there has been a 71
percent drop in gun crime in the last year.
Senator Coons. We are very hopeful. Summer is just getting
started. We are hoping that trend will hold.
Director Wray. We had an arrest just yesterday, actually,
there on a kidnapping, murder charge related to one of the big
gangs in Wilmington.
Senator Coons. You did. I will forward you the bill. Thank
you for your indulgence.
Thank you very much for your service.
Senator Moran. The Senator from Alaska, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief, because I know we have a vote that has begun.
Director Wray, thank you for being here. Thank you for what
you do. I want to just reassure that I join with the Senator
from Delaware and the Senator from West Virginia, my support
for the good work that the men the women of the FBI deal with
every day.
I certainly have had my differences with the FBI over the
years, particularly as it related to the handling of former
Senator Stevens' investigation. I am still not satisfied that
the agency properly investigated the whistleblower who called
attention to the misconduct in the investigation and the
prosecution. But I want to make very clear, I have not lost
faith in the FBI as an institution.
I had an opportunity just a few months back to meet with
the special agent in charge in Anchorage and his senior team to
convey the point directly, to get an update from all of them,
to look them all in the eyeball and just let them know that we
have great faith in the work that they do. And it is hard, and
it is difficult.
And we worry, I worry, about the morale of the men and the
women for some of the same reasons that you have heard here
today. I hope that the message that you convey back to them is
that we need them to do the jobs that we have tasked them to
do. We respect the work that they have in front of them. I was
able to share my direct thanks.
I wanted to speak just very quickly to the issue that is
really front and foremost in the minds of many people in
Anchorage and around the State. Our State has been dubbed the
most dangerous in the country, Anchorage as one of the more
dangerous cities. You do not think about that when you think
about Alaska, but the homicides on a per capita basis have put
us in a category of notoriety that we do not seek, and we must
address, and we must change.
We are seeing so much of this because of the drug violence
that is coming with the trafficking that we are seeing. We are
looking forward to what this high-intensity drug trafficking
area program will bring to the area with some additional
Federal resourcing. So any increased attention that we are able
to receive when it comes to resourcing is pretty important,
because we feel like we are at the end of the road there.
But I would ask your senior team to look at whether Alaska
is being appropriately resourced to meet the Federal law
enforcement needs in the State, and brief my office on the
findings, specifically to coordinate with--we have a great U.S.
attorney up there. We have strong troopers. We need more of our
troopers. Our police chiefs are maxed.
But it is really when all the partners come together that
we are able to make some headway, and we capitalize on the
resources that are made available.
So I would just ask your folks to take a look at that
situation in Alaska, because, again, it has come on in
unprecedented levels and at a time and a pace that is alarming
to us.
Director Wray. I would be happy to take a closer look at
it. We have a great Special Agent in Charge up there, as you
mentioned.
I do think, in general, these issues are going to be solved
or mitigated through a combination of partnerships, as you
alluded to, and intelligence partnerships meaning: How can we
figure out how all the different players, the feds, FBI, the
different Federal agencies, State and local agencies, can
somehow get their 2-plus-2 to equal more than 4? In other
words, how do we get synergies between them to maximize the
impact? And the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
designation that you described is part of that.
And then intelligence, meaning let's figure out what is
really driving the problem and focus the resources on impact. I
think all too often historically in law enforcement people
focus just on stats of number of arrests, et cetera, without
necessarily taking that next step to figure out if you are
really addressing the core driver of the problem. Each city has
its own unique idiosyncrasies.
We have gotten, I think, a lot better and, hopefully, can
bring more to the table with our Intelligence Analysts to try
to understand better what is it that is causing that spike that
you are talking about in Anchorage.
Senator Murkowski. Good. We look forward to working with
you. Thank you for your leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Senator Murkowski, thank you very much.
Director, thank you very much for your testimony today, to
this point.
I want to take a moment to reassure you and the people that
you lead, but, more importantly, the American people, that we
will do everything that we can as members of this subcommittee,
as appropriators, and as United States Senators to see that the
bureau is equipped to prevent and combat an ever-changing
landscape both here and abroad of criminal activity that can be
and has been very devastating to the American people.
We will take our responsibilities very seriously, and I
look forward to developing a very close working relationship
with you in that regard. And I appreciate the partnership that
exists between the FBI and other Federal agencies, but
particularly those agencies back home, my local and State law
enforcement officials.
We have had significant success. I can name three off the
top of my head just in the last few months in Kansas as a
result of that partnership between the FBI and local law
enforcement. So we are very grateful to you and to the men and
women that you lead.
We are going to recess. My script says it is brief, but it
will probably be longer than ``brief.''
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
But with no further questions, this afternoon's open
hearing is concluded. Senators may submit additional questions
for the official record. We request the FBI's response within
30 days.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Christopher A. Wray
Questions Submitted by Senator Jerry Moran
national bioforensic analysis center (nbfac): dhs owned facility used
by fbi for bioforensic analysis--new cost sharing arrangement
Question 1. I understand that the FBI uses the National Bioforensic
Analysis Center (NBFAC) for research and investigatory purposes. While
the FBI is the main user of this facility, the lab itself is actually
owned by the Department of Homeland Security. In order to avoid closure
and maintain facility operations, the Bureau is considering sharing 40
percent of the NBFAC's expenses and operating costs with DHS.
1a. What is the nature of this agreement, including the work
the FBI performs in this facility, and the importance of
maintaining operations?
Answer. Since its inception in 2004, NBFAC was funded and operated
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and co-located with the
Biological Threat Characterization Center (BTCC) in the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at Fort Detrick,
Maryland. The NBFAC is a unique United States Government asset that
permits the analysis of biological threat agents, including dangerous
infectious agents and toxins, and examines traditional forensic
evidence contaminated with biohazardous materials (e.g., fingerprints,
trace evidence, documents, photographs, etc.). It is the only facility
within the United States that can conduct these types of forensic
analyses and examinations of biohazardous evidence. The NBFAC's
capability ensures that the government is provided with high-quality,
defensible, actionable results within hours or days instead of months
or years, which was commonplace prior to the establishment of the
NBFAC. Discontinuing operations would eliminate over 10 years of
investment and progress in building a forensic analytical capability
established to serve both law enforcement and the Intelligence
Community in the examination of hazardous biological agents.
At the direction of the OMB, the FBI entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) to establish a cost-sharing agreement whereby the FBI
provides 40 percent of the funds necessary for the operation of the
NBACC. This MOA establishes the FBI as the responsible party for the
operational activities of the NBFAC portion of the NBACC, while DHS
retains its operation of the Biological Threat Characterization Center
and the operation and maintenance of the NBACC building.
1b. Would it be more efficient for the FBI to own this
facility itself and, if so, what would you expect the upfront
and annual costs to be?
Answer. The FBI has not been asked to assume sole responsibility of
the facility, and therefore, cannot provide a breakout of assumed
costs.
1c. Finally, is this cost sharing arrangement included in the
Bureau's budget request? Do you have sufficient resources to
shoulder this agreement? Will the cost of NBFAC impact other
aspects of FBI operations?
Answer. The fiscal year 2019 request was formulated before the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 was passed. As a result, the fiscal year
2019 request does not include any program increases for NBFAC. The FBI
will attempt to minimize significant impacts to operations and will
also work with other members of the biodefense community to develop a
more expansive customer base and thus, offset overall costs.
counterterrorism: fbi's growing mission--response v. position
reductions
Question 2. Threats facing our Nation, both foreign and domestic,
are evolving rapidly.
2a. What are the type of threats we are facing and how do
they affect the growing mission of the FBI?
Answer. Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top
priority. The terrorism threat to the United States remains persistent
and acute. From a threat perspective, we are concerned with three areas
in particular: (1) those who are inspired by terrorist propaganda and
act out in support; (2) those who are enabled to act after gaining
inspiration from violent extremist propaganda and communicating with
members of foreign terrorist organizations who provide guidance on
operational planning or targets; and (3) those who are directed by
members of foreign terrorist organizations to commit specific acts in
support of the group's ideology or cause. Prospective terrorists can
fall into any one of these three categories or span across them, but in
the end the result is the same--innocent men, women, and children
killed and families, friends, and whole communities left to struggle in
the aftermath.
Currently, the FBI views the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and
homegrown violent extremists as the main terrorism threats to the
United States. Additionally, domestic violent extremist movements
collectively pose a steady threat of violence and economic harm to the
United States. As the threat to harm the United States and United
States interests evolves, the FBI must adapt and confront these
challenges, relying heavily on the strength of our Federal, State,
local, and international partnerships. The FBI uses all necessary
lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these terrorist
threats to the United States.
2b. I am concerned by the Bureau's proposal to cut 500
positions in the fiscal year 2019 request, especially given
that they are from the Intelligence; Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence; Criminal Enterprise and Federal Crimes;
and Criminal Justice Services Divisions. The FBI must be good
stewards of taxpayer dollars while having adequate resources to
support its growing mission and responsibilities. Can you
explain the proposed cuts included in the fiscal year 2019
request, addressing both the necessity and rationale?
Answer. As previously referenced, the fiscal year 2019 request was
formulated before the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 was passed. As a
result, the fiscal year 2019 request reflects a decrease of $158
million. However, the FBI received significant increases in the fiscal
year 2018 Appropriations to combat counterterrorism and
counterintelligence, opioids, human trafficking, cyber intrusions,
child exploitation, and surveillance, which must be sustained.
fix nics
Question 3.
3a. The Fix NICS Act was included in the 2018 Omnibus. What
are the actions the FBI is taking to implement the Fix NICS
Act?
Answer. The FBI has implemented the requirement to process appeals
within 60 days of receiving the appeal. The FBI has provided guidance
to the Point-of-Contact (POC) States regarding the adherence to the
requirement under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 for
processing appeals within the mandated timeframe.
Additionally, the FBI customized individual teleconferences with
the States to raise awareness for reporting arrests to State
repositories, relay the importance of submitting mental health records,
provide support to the States in this endeavor, and to gain vital
information from the States regarding their arrest and disposition
reporting practices. Invitations were sent to the State CJIS Systems
Officers (CSO), State Compact Officer (SCO), State Identification
Bureau (SIB) Head, and NICS POC in each State to participate in their
individual teleconference. Ten teleconferences a week were completed
from April 9, 2018, through June 1, 2018. Only four United States
Territories have not responded to their invitation, and the NICS
Section is awaiting their response to schedule their teleconference.
Additionally, the FBI is performing research to identify dispositions
missing from criminal history records. Discussions are ongoing with the
U.S. Courts and U.S. Attorney's Offices to develop a process for the
electronic submission of dispositions.
The FBI also continues to coordinate with Federal agencies; since
November 2017, eight new Federal agencies began submitting information
to into NICS indices.
3b. The Fix NICS Act was included in the 2018 Omnibus, which
passed after the FBI submitted its fiscal year 2019 budget
request. Do you anticipate that the implementation of this Act
will create new resource needs? If so, what are they?
Answer. The FBI has and continues to identify solutions to automate
and streamline appeal-related processes. The NICS Section is cross-
training staff and taking advantage of other personnel resources to
support the NICS mission. The Fix NICS Act includes a provision for the
correction of erroneous system information within a 60-day timeframe
from the date of receipt of information from an appellant for
correction of erroneous information on a denied transaction.
Prior to the passage of the Fix NICS Act, there was no timeframe to
complete an appeal after receiving information to correct an erroneous
record on a denied transaction; therefore, implementation of the Fix
NICS Act requirement to adjudicate appeals within 60 days of receipt
could create resource challenges. The FBI has realigned resources to
ensure it is processing appeals within the 60 day mandate.
In addition, the FBI will be conducting analysis to determine if
every Federal agency has achieved benchmarks established in their
implementation plans. This would require additional personnel and/or
resources than what is currently dedicated. FBI resources would also
need to be made available to Federal Departments or agencies that need
technical assistance with compliance.
Further, the FBI will be required to provide training and technical
assistance to all States.
3c. Finally, I understand that complete case records are
often not included in the NICS system. Is there a way, either
through implementing Fix NICS or otherwise to further
incentivize State and local partners to update records in the
NICS system, and include the final disposition of cases,
following the initial report of an arrest?
Answer. The FBI relies upon the collaboration and cooperation of
agencies nationwide to submit information on prohibited individuals.
With the passage of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA),
incentives were put in place to encourage local, State, and Tribal
agencies to make eligible records available for NICS purposes through
NICS Act Record Improvement (NARIP) grants. Likewise, the NIAA required
Federal agencies to make relevant records available to the NICS. The
National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) grant incentive
also provides support to States for efforts to update records. The
passage of the Fix NICS Act in March will further enhance these
efforts. It requires States to provide an implementation plan by March
2019 with benchmarks for improvements as a needs assessment. This will
further enhance the Department's efforts to identify obstacles in
making complete records available to the NICS and what others steps can
be taken to support State partners.
3d. What other actions is the Bureau taking to resolve this
problem?
Answer. The list below describes steps the FBI is taking and has
taken to encourage States to make available potentially prohibiting
information for NICS determinations:
--Provide electronic interfaces for the ease and automation of record
sharing;
--Provide detailed information, education, and liaison support to
help agencies detect which records their agencies possess that
would be of specific interest to the NICS;
--Provide regular and detailed reporting of records housed within the
various databases of the FBI that each agency has submitted.
These reports provide agencies a self-auditing tool that
support the detection of missing records and/or incomplete
data;
--The FBI staff are asked to speak at and support meetings and
conferences nationwide. Subject matter experts support the
efforts of State partners in making relevant records available
at the national level;
--The FBI provides annual criminal history dashboards to agency
contacts. Each dashboard provides information about the number
of arrests on file in the FBI's Next Generation Identification
(NGI) System, as well as the number of arrests with and without
final disposition data;
--The FBI requests that agencies perform self-audits to identify gaps
in providing arrests and subsequent disposition information to
the NGI;
--The FBI provides reports to requesting agencies containing arrests
with missing dispositions that are older than a year. This
supports a continuous self-auditing tool;
--The FBI has dedicated staff performing research to assist in the
location of missing dispositions, which the FBI then uses to
update criminal history records in the NGI;
--The FBI has dedicated liaison teams who specialize with the
applicable databases searched by the NICS. They provide regular
and ongoing support to record-owning agencies and contributors
with the identification, submission, and maintenance of data
and records;
The FBI created a Disposition Task Force in 2009 and continues
through today to collectively pursue methods to enhance disposition
reporting.
cyber security--threats and current assessment
Question 4. In the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI)
Worldwide Threat Assessment, Cyber Security is again listed as the Top
National Intelligence Priority. The FBI is the lead Federal agency for
investigating cyber-attacks by criminals, adversaries, and terrorists.
4a. What are the threats we are currently facing and the
actions the Bureau is taking to combat them, including the
Bureau's ``Going Dark'' efforts?
Answer. The country faces cyber threats from sophisticated
cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, and state-sponsored actors. The FBI
has seen a rise in ``blended threats,'' which are hybrid threats of
nation states working in tandem with criminal actors to target the
United States, its businesses, and its people. The Yahoo! Investigation
is a recent example of this blended threat. FSB officers had protected,
directed, and paid criminal hackers to collect information through
computer intrusions in the United States and elsewhere. Similarly, in
the Mabna Investigation, nine Iranians were charged with conducting a
massive cyber theft campaign against educational, private, and
government institutions on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. These individuals were each leaders, contractors, associates,
hackers-for-hire, or affiliates of the Mabna Institute, an Iran-based
company.
The United States also faces the significant issue of threats to
Critical Infrastructure. Cyber attacks against the energy sector can
cause significant disruptions or damage to the industrial control
systems/supervisory control and data acquisition (ICS/SCADA) systems.
Advanced persistent threat (APT) actors can harvest credentials and
establish persistence on victim energy sector networks with the intent
to develop cyber-attack capabilities or cause energy service
disruptions during conflict. Similar APTs exist targeting the
telecommunications and financial services sectors.
One of the most significant challenges to the FBI's ability to
access investigative data is the ``Going Dark'' problem. ``Going Dark''
describes circumstances where the government is unable to obtain
critical information in an intelligible and usable form (or at all),
despite having a court order authorizing the government's access to
that information. The problem impacts a range of issues, including:
data retention; anonymization; provider compliance (or absence
thereof); real-time communications; foreign-stored data; data
localization laws; tool development and perishability; and other
similar issues -Impacting the FBI's investigative and intelligence
programs. Electronic communication service providers are increasingly
implementing encryption in a manner to thwart court ordered government
access to the content of communications. Counterterrorism and
counterintelligence subjects are extensively using encryption
technologies to conceal their communications and nefarious activities.
Drug trafficking organizations are using anonymization and encryption
technologies to obfuscate and expand their criminal interests; further
contributing to the opioid crisis. Gangs, organized crime, human
trafficking rings, and child exploitation offenders use anonymization
and encryption technologies to inhibit investigative efforts to
identify and prevent these horrific crimes. In an effort to address
these Going Dark challenges, the FBI created a new Section (Cyber
Operations Section) which will be responsible for computer network
exploitation capabilities and enabling innovation.
The FBI is open to all constructive solutions that seriously
address the public safety issues. We need a thoughtful and sensible
approach, one that may vary across business models and technologies. We
have a team devoted to explaining this challenge and are currently
working with stakeholders to find a way forward.
4b. The fiscal year 2019 request does not include any program
enhancements for cyber and other mission activities. Is the
Bureau adequately equipped to combat the growing number of
cyber-attacks?
Answer. The FBI is committed to its mission of protecting the
American people and will align resources to the highest priority
threats, including cyber attacks, dangerous gangs and the opioid
crisis.
Virtually every national security threat and crime problem the FBI
faces is cyber-based or facilitated. The FBI faces sophisticated cyber
threats from state-sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized cyber
syndicates, and terrorists. On a daily basis, cyber-based actors seek
state secrets, trade secrets, technology, and the ideas of the American
people--things of incredible value and of great importance to the
conduct of government business and national security. They also seek to
strike critical infrastructure and to harm the United States economy.
The FBI is focused on the most dangerous malicious cyber activity:
high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global organized
crime syndicates, as well as other technically sophisticated attacks.
FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are using technical
capabilities and traditional investigative techniques--such as sources,
court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, and
forensics--to fight the full range of cyber threats. The FBI also
continues to actively coordinate with private and public partners to
pierce the veil of anonymity surrounding cyber based crimes.
The FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat these cyber
threats, from improving threat identification and information sharing
inside and outside of government to developing and retaining new
talent, to examining the way the FBI operates to disrupt and defeat
these threats. The FBI takes all potential threats to public and
private sector systems seriously and will continue to investigate and
hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.
fbi investigation of usa gymnastics
Question 5. I chair the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection, Product Safety, Insurance, and Data Security, which has
oversight jurisdiction over Olympic and amateur sports through the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. Because hundreds of current and
former athletes have come forward with accusations of abuse by
individuals associated with their sports, my Commerce Subcommittee
launched an investigation into the United States Olympic Committee
(USOC), USA Gymnastics (USAG), and Michigan State's responses to the
claims of sexual abuse of young athletes, which include the abuse
inflicted by former sports doctor Larry Nassar. Documents obtained by
my Commerce Subcommittee and outside reports indicate that the FBI was
made aware of accusations against Nassar as early as July, 2015.
5a. What is the FBI's role in investigating these crimes, and
did the Bureau share the reported accusations it received or
its own investigatory findings with State or local law
enforcement?
5b. Did the FBI share the details of the accusations or its
investigatory findings with Michigan State prior to September,
2016? If not, why?
5c. It has been reported that the FBI asked USA Gymnastics to
keep these accusations of abuse private, is that true? If so,
why?
5d. Finally, what role do you see the FBI playing to protect
future athletes from abuse that may cross State jurisdictions
and what resources does the FBI need to fill this role?
Answer to all portions of Question 5. Until an on-going review
being conducted by FBI Inspection Division is completed, the FBI will
not provide comment.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
Question 1.
1a. As Chairman of the Senate Aging Committee, I have held
numerous hearings focused on scams and fraudulent schemes that
target our Nation's seniors. I'm pleased to see that the FBI is
directing people to the Aging Committee's website for
additional resources, including our Fraud Hotline. Seniors lose
an estimated $3 billion annually to financial exploitation, and
the perpetrators of these scams are sophisticated and ruthless.
The FBI initiated more than 200 cases involving financial
crimes against seniors in the last year, and it played an
important role in the elder fraud sweep recently announced by
the Attorney General that involved over 250 defendants and
losses of more than half a billion dollars. The Aging
Committee's own data show that recent arrests have had a real
impact on deterring scammers. How is the FBI directing
resources toward combatting these crimes, including by working
towards gaining more cooperation from countries where these
criminals are operating?
Answer. Combatting elder fraud is a Department of Justice priority.
As a part of the Department of Justice's elder fraud initiative, the
largest coordinated sweep of elder fraud cases in history took place in
February 2018. The cases involve more than 250 defendants from around
the globe who victimized more than a million Americans, most of whom
were elderly. The cases include criminal, civil, and forfeiture actions
across more than 50 Federal districts. Of the defendants, 200 were
charged criminally. In each case, offenders engaged in financial
schemes that targeted or largely affected seniors. In total, the
charged elder fraud schemes caused losses of more than half a billion
dollars.
Exceptional assistance from foreign law enforcement partners has
amplified the effectiveness of the Department's initiative. The sweep
in February 2018 benefited greatly from the work of the International
Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group (IMMFWG), a network of civil and
criminal law enforcement agencies from Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Europol, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The IMMFWG is co-chaired by the United States
Department of Justice and FTC, and law enforcement in the United
Kingdom, and serves as a model for international cooperation against
specific threats that endanger the financial well-being of each member
country's residents.
As the lead Federal criminal agency for the investigation of
financial crimes, the FBI will continue to prioritize our efforts to
protect all citizens, including our seniors, not only through law
enforcement efforts, which are a large deterrent, but also through
partnerships with other criminal and civil agencies. One of our main
goals is to ensure we inform and educate the public on these criminal
actors who seek to take advantage and swindle innocent victims of their
hard earned savings.
The FBI also works closely with our international partners to
support investigations with an international nexus through our 63 Legal
Attache offices around the world and through specific initiatives such
as the recent Operation Wire Wire which addressed financial crimes in
partnership with Nigeria.
In a focused effort to combat elder fraud, the FBI will continue to
work closely with the Department of Justice to ensure agents are
trained to identify and investigate elder fraud schemes. The FBI has
over 700 agents dedicated to addressing a variety of financial crimes,
including many which affect the elderly. Currently there are over 6,000
active financial crime investigations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
ongoing russian electoral interference in 2018
Question 1. The FBI was among the 17 intelligence organizations
concluding that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a multi-
pronged influence campaign aimed at sowing discord among the American
electorate and helping to elect Donald Trump. Now we are just months
away from the 2018 midterm elections.
1a. What is the FBI's assessment about the threat of Russia
again trying to interfere in our elections? What is the FBI
doing to combat this interference, and what more needs to be
done?
Answer. To ensure the FBI is positioned to protect our democratic
processes in advance of the upcoming 2018 and future elections, we have
undertaken numerous efforts in collaboration with partners in the
United States and abroad. Notably, the FBI established the Foreign
Influence Task Force in the fall of 2017 to identify and combat foreign
influence operations targeting the United States.
The FBI will continue to work with our United States Government and
international partners to identify and disrupt, as appropriate and
lawfully authorized, foreign activities aimed at interfering with our
democratic process and will raise public awareness about the objectives
and tactics of foreign adversaries seeking to influence the information
environment.
The FBI does not have any information suggesting Russia will cease
its attempts to interfere with United States elections or to otherwise
attempt to undermine public confidence in United States democratic
institutions.
zte
Question 2. At the May 22, 2018, hearing, I asked you about the
threat posed to our national security by the Chinese telecommunications
company ZTE. You testified that you are ``deeply concerned'' about the
threat posed by companies beholden to adversarial foreign powers, such
as ZTE.
2a. Given President Trump's order to the Commerce Department
to get ZTE ``back into [sic] business fast,'' \1\ will you
commit to conveying your concerns about ZTE to the National
Security Advisor or other White House officials as appropriate?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
995680316458262533?lang=en.
Answer. As we've previously stated, Chinese firms such as ZTE and
Huawei seek to gain access to critical United States telecommunications
infrastructure through the sale of equipment, service agreements,
acquisitions, and joint ventures. While these firms may be motivated in
part by commercial interests, some of these transactions could give the
government of China the capacity to exert pressure or control over
United States telecommunications infrastructure, maliciously modify or
steal information from government and corporate entities, and conduct
undetected espionage against the United States Government and private
sector interests.
The FBI remains committed to informing the private sector and
United States Government officials about these potential risks to
national security and working with these stakeholders to assess the
risk created by particular commercial relationships and ensure that
these risks are factored into related decisions. We have also informed
appropriate government agencies of specific risks.
citizenship alone and threat of terrorism
Question 3. I have asked several Trump administration officials
whether they agree with a 2017 Homeland Security Office of Intelligence
and Analysis report that found that citizenship alone is not a reliable
indicator of terrorist threat. These officials, including your
predecessor Director Comey and then-Secretary of Homeland Security John
Kelly, told me they agree with the report's conclusion.
3a. Do you agree that citizenship alone is not a reliable
indicator of terrorist threat?
Answer. Yes, citizenship alone is not a reliable indicator of
terrorist threat.
torture
Question 4. I asked you at your confirmation hearing if
waterboarding was torture and you said that it was. This question is
more timely than ever because our President has talked about bringing
back waterboarding and ``a hell of a lot worse.''
4a. In your view, does a human being have a moral right not
to be tortured?
Answer. As I have stated during previous congressional testimony,
torture is illegal under Federal law. The FBI will not engage in
torture.
budget request
Question 5. The President's budget request reduces overall FBI
funding by 5 percent, requests no funding for the new FBI headquarters,
and requests a rescission of another $148 million in salaries and
expenses.
5a. How will these proposed cuts impact the FBI's ability to
meet its law enforcement, investigatory, and national security
mission?
Answer. The fiscal year 2019 request was formulated before the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 was passed. As a result, the fiscal year
2019 request reflects a decrease of $158 million from the 2018 enacted
level for Salaries and Expenses. This Committee provided significant
increases in the fiscal year 2018 Appropriation, including resources to
combat terrorism, counterintelligence, opioids, human trafficking,
cyber intrusions, child exploitation, and surveillance, which must be
sustained.
stingrays/cell site simulators
Question 6. In 2015, the Department of Justice issued guidance on
the use of cell site simulators, also known as ``Stingrays,'' requiring
a warrant to use this invasive technology.\2\ Federal law requires
simulators to be operated with minimum interference to cellular
service.\3\ But there have been reports that Stingrays may interrupt
cellular service--including disrupting 911 calls. It is important that
when the FBI seeks a court order for use of a Stingray, it fully
informs the court about any interference this technology may cause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-
enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators.
\3\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3124.
6a. What data or information does the FBI rely upon to ensure
that its use of Stingrays generates ``a minimum of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interference''--as required by law?
Answer. The FBI has developed law enforcement sensitive operational
protocols and device configurations designed to permit the operation of
cell site simulators (CSS) with a minimum of interference in accordance
with our legal obligations under Title 18, United States Code, section
3124. In developing the protocols and settings, the FBI has leveraged
the expertise of engineers who have extensive experience in cellular
networks. Decades of successful CSS use by the FBI and other agencies
have validated the FBI's position with respect to minimizing the
potential for interference.
encryption
Question 7. The FBI is reportedly renewing a push for legal
authority to force U.S. technology companies to build decryption tools
into smartphones and other devices.\4\ I am concerned this sort of
``exceptional access'' system would introduce inherent vulnerabilities
and weaken security for everyone, but I am also concerned about what
effects this will have on U.S. technology and those that use it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/politics/unlock-phones-
encryption.html.
7a. If we require U.S. device manufacturers to build
encryption ``backdoors'' into their products, won't that simply
harm our world-leading technology companies by encouraging
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
innovation elsewhere, like Germany or Finland?
Answer. The FBI is not seeking to force companies to include
specific technology mandates, sometimes wrongly referred to as
``backdoors,'' into products and services, and we recognize and support
the use of encryption to make Americans safer. However, the FBI does
not view the encryption debate as a ``zero sum'' issue, where there is
either total encryption that prevents anyone from accessing data for
any reason or no encryption.
7b. If we require U.S. technology companies to build
``backdoors'' into their products, then what do you expect
Apple to do when the Chinese government demands that Apple help
it unlock the iPhone of a peaceful political or religious
dissident in China?
Answer. As stated above, the United States does not seek
``backdoors.'' While we cannot presume to know the details of the
specific proprietary agreements between Apple and China in which China
approved the sale of Apple products, it is important to note that the
Chinese government's domestic law only permits the sale or use of
products in China that use government-approved encryption technology.
Any companies or individuals selling encryption products in China must
first obtain the approval of the government, and to obtain that
approval, legal requirements require companies to provide source code
to computing and network equipment. Finally, China's anti-terrorism
laws require all data related to Chinese users to be maintained on
servers in China and companies to provide encryption keys to public
security authorities, so China would not need Apple's assistance in
unlocking their products.
border search of electronic devices
Question 8. Senator Daines and I recently introduced legislation
that would require the Department of Homeland Security to have at least
reasonable suspicion when they search the electronic devices of
Americans at an international border crossing. Current DHS policy
allows DHS officers to conduct such searches for no reason at all,
under the so-called ``border search exception'' to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.
8a. If the FBI were to conduct a search of an American's
electronic device at the border, what level of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion would Bureau policy first require?
Answer. The FBI is required to follow the controlling legal
authority in each Federal jurisdiction where the authorized
investigative activity occurs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
mccabe memos
Question 1. The Washington Post has reported that former FBI Deputy
Director Andrew McCabe kept notes and wrote memos detailing his
interactions with the President.
1a. Is this accurate--did Mr. McCabe take contemporaneous
notes or write memos about his interactions with the President?
1b. Will the FBI also provide Mr. McCabe's notes and memos?
Answer. The FBI cannot confirm or deny the accuracy of the
Washington Post's reporting because doing so may implicate an ongoing
investigation.
torture report and the fbi
Question 2. In 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of
the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program was completed and a copy of
the full 6,700-page classified report was sent to parts of the
executive branch, including the FBI.
The Study is intended to be used broadly by those with appropriate
clearances to ensure that the abuses documented in the Study would
never be repeated.
2a. Have you personally read the Study? If not, will you
commit to reading it?
2b. Have other top-ranking FBI officials read the Study? If
not, will you ensure that the full, final Study is reviewed by
top FBI officials?
Answer. I am familiar with the critical portions of the study,
including the findings and conclusions. As I have stated during
previous congressional testimony, torture is illegal under Federal law.
The FBI will not engage in torture.
domestic violence crimes and guns
Question 3. Individuals convicted of domestic violence abuse or who
are subject to a protection order are supposed to be prohibited from
possessing firearms or ammunition under Federal law.
However, I understand that many domestic violence abusers are,
nevertheless, able to buy guns. In 2013 and 2014, 30 percent of denials
for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence were issued after the
prohibited abuser took possession of the firearm, because the
background check was not completed in time.
It is important for the FBI to partner with local law enforcement
and domestic violence programs to reduce the number of firearms in the
hands of domestic violence offenders.
3a. What is the FBI doing to reduce firearm possession by
domestic abusers?
Answer. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) makes every effort to make Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic
Violence (MCDV) determinations within three business days, before a
firearm transfer is allowed under Federal law. Because the MCDV force
element and relationship to victim may not be readily apparent in an
automated record found during the NICS background check process, the
NICS Legal Instruments Examiner (NICS Examiner) must reach out to
external agencies to obtain this needed information. As a result,
transactions involving a potential MCDV conviction are frequently
delayed for further research. In order to be prohibiting, the NICS
Examiner must determine the existence of a requisite qualifying
relationship, as well as establish if the individual was convicted of
an offense or subsection of an offense, which has an element of use or
attempted use of physical force, or threatened use of a deadly weapon.
The FBI continues to pursue initiatives that allow for accurate and
complete information to be available to the NICS. With the passage of
the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Congress instituted
incentives and requirements to assist local, State, Tribal, and Federal
agencies in making eligible records available for NICS purposes. The
FBI has long-standing relationships with record-owning agencies, and
has collaborated with and advocated for record sharing. The FBI has
numerous proactive measures in place to support agencies in the
identification of lacking or missing information in the applicable
databases searched by the NICS. The bulleted list below highlights a
few specific measures the FBI has in place to address missing or
incomplete records in the applicable databases searched by the NICS.
Particular attention has been given to the criteria needed to identify
disqualifying MCDVs, not only by the FBI, but by Federal agencies
awarding grant money in support of record improvement.
--Educational outreach to increase database records and final
dispositions, as well as the identification of other needed
pieces of information to support the immediate identification
of prohibiting information, such as relationship to victim,
statute, and subsection of the conviction;
--The FBI provides annual criminal history dashboards to agency
contacts. Each dashboard provides information about the number
of arrests on file in the FBI's Next Generation Identification
(NGI) System, as well as the number of arrests with and without
final disposition data;
--The FBI requests that agencies perform self-audits to identify gaps
in providing arrests and subsequent disposition information to
the NGI System;
--The FBI provides reports to requesting agencies containing arrests
with missing dispositions that are older than a year. This
supports a continuous self-auditing tool;
--The FBI has dedicated staff performing research to assist in the
location of missing dispositions, which the FBI then uses to
update criminal history records in the NGI;
--The FBI has dedicated liaison teams who specialize with the
applicable databases searched by the NICS. They provide regular
and ongoing support to record-owning agencies and contributors
with the identification, submission, and maintenance of data
and records;
--If an MCDV is established by the FBI and all the needed criteria
cannot be added to the appropriate criminal history record, a
record is added to the NICS Indices to support future
transactions. State users of the NICS have been likewise
encouraged to do the same.
In addition, there are various tools available to contributors to
indicate a person's ineligibility. For example, in the NCIC, a
contributor could set a Brady Indicator within the protection order
record, or a condition set by the judge that would immediately indicate
a person's disqualification. Within the criminal history record, a
contributor could be sure to post the specific section/subsection of
the subject's conviction, post the relationship to victim information
on the face of the record, or set the firearm's disqualification flag.
All of these practices serve the immediate nature with which the NICS
Section is intended to serve. The FBI has and continues to educate and
promote these tools to all criminal justice partners.
handguns that fire rifle rounds
Question 4. Over the past two decades, the gun industry has
developed handguns that can fire rifle rounds, which can penetrate the
standard body armor worn by law enforcement officers. This is
extraordinarily concerning to our law enforcement officers and to
everyday citizens.
4a. Do you believe such handguns that can fire rifle rounds
represent a threat to law enforcement?
Answer. Any handgun used in a crime of violence against law
enforcement officers is a threat. These specific handguns--which fire
traditional rifle caliber cartridges--are especially dangerous due to
the high likelihood of the projectile penetrating traditional soft body
armor. However, the FBI does not have the pertinent data to quantify
the specific increased threat.
4b. What is the FBI's plan to address this new type of
weapon?
Answer. The concern is not the weapon but rather cartridge and
subsequent projectile which a weapon fires. The FBI has long been
focused on identifying cartridges which create the highest threats to
FBI personnel. In identifying these threat cartridges, the FBI has
invested heavily in ``rifle rated plates'' for issuance to our
personnel. These plates greatly reduce the risk of armor penetration by
rifle caliber rounds to the most vital areas.
The FBI shares information on this threat with State and local
authorities through established partnerships between the Training
Division's Ballistic Research Facility (BRF) and the Academy's
executive leadership programs.
hate crimes
Question 5. While the FBI typically reports 7,000 to 10,000 hate
crimes, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that the true number
may approach 300,000, approximately 30 times more.
Unfortunately, the number of State and local law enforcement
agencies reporting their hate crimes statistics to the FBI seems to be
decreasing, with 500 fewer agencies reporting their data to the FBI
between 2014 and 2015.
5a. What do you intend to do to make it easier for local
agencies to report this crucial data to the FBI?
Answer. The FBI is in the process of transitioning all law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) to the National Incident-Based Reporting
System (NIBRS) by January 1, 2021. Reporting via NIBRS will improve the
quality, reliability, and accuracy of the data received from
participating LEAs. NIBRS will also ease the ability for LEAs to report
hate crime data as it is collected within the NIBRS record layout
versus a separate record layout which is required for Summary Reporting
System agencies.
The FBI is actively participating in the Department of Justice's
(DOJ) Hate Crime Enforcement and Prevention Initiative. This group is
focusing on developing strategies for improving the hate crime data
collection. One strategy developed is a plan to offer joint law
enforcement officer (LEO) hate crime training throughout the country
with the assistance of the FBI Civil Rights Unit (CRU). The FBI will
assist the LEO participants in understanding the Federal hate crime
laws and identifying bias-motivated incidents. Ensuring the officers at
a crime scene, and/or officers interviewing the victim(s) have a full
understanding of the events which occurred within a bias-motivated
incident is essential to identify these crimes.
There is also an additional focus on how LEAs report hate crime
data to the FBI. To emphasize the importance and value of reporting
hate crime data, the FBI is currently contacting State UCR Program
managers, requesting that State-sponsored training conducted by the FBI
is carried out within that managers' region. In addition, the FBI posts
information about hate crimes on the publically available web site at
5b. What do you think would foster more accurate and complete
reporting from local police to the FBI?
Answer. The FBI believes obtaining the commitment of local agency
administrators to provide hate crime investigative training to their
LEOs would foster more accurate and complete reporting. Many officers
may not be aware of the signs to look for when investigating a bias-
motivated crime. Often times, a hate crime incident requires additional
investigation to ascertain if the offense was motivated by the
offender's bias against the victim. Instituting a hate crime point of
contact or unit within the LEAs could also improve the reporting of
hate crime incidents.
white nationalism and online cyber-hate
Question 6. During last year's Presidential election, the Anti-
Defamation League identified 2.6 million tweets that had anti-Semitic
language, with nearly 20,000 tweets directed at 50,000 U. S.
journalists.
One Jewish reporter received threats over twitter, including a
picture of her face superimposed on a corpse in a concentration camp.
The photo included a message saying, ``Don't mess with our boy Trump,
or you will be first in line for the camp.'' This type of cyber-hate
has targeted other minority communities as well, including Muslim and
immigrant communities.
6a. What steps is the FBI taking to address the rise of these
threatening messages and prevent them from leading to actual
hate crimes?
Answer. Hate crimes are the highest priority of the FBI's Civil
Rights program, not only because of the devastating impact they have on
families and communities, but also because groups that preach hatred
and intolerance can plant the seed of domestic terrorism here in our
country. As part of its responsibility to uphold and protect the civil
rights of the American people, the FBI takes a number of steps to
combat hate crimes. The Bureau investigates hundreds of these cases
every year and works to detect and deter further incidents through law
enforcement training, public outreach, and partnerships with a myriad
of community groups.
The FBI is the lead investigative agency for criminal violations of
Federal civil rights statutes. The FBI works closely with State/local/
Tribal authorities on investigations, even when Federal charges are not
brought. FBI resources, forensic expertise, and experience in
identification and proof of hate-based motivations often provide an
invaluable complement to local law enforcement.
The FBI has forged partnerships nationally and locally with many
civil rights organizations to establish rapport, share information,
address concerns, and cooperate in solving problems. Additionally, the
majority of the FBI's field offices participate in local Hate Crime
Working Groups. These Working Groups combine community and law
enforcement resources to develop strategies to address local hate crime
problems.
The FBI conducts hundreds of operational seminars, workshops, and
training sessions annually for local law enforcement, minority and
religious organizations, and community groups to promote cooperation
and reduce civil rights abuses. Each year, the FBI also provides hate
crimes training for new agents, hundreds of current agents, and
thousands of police officers worldwide.
6b. Is the FBI working with social media companies to take
down these types of messages and posts?
Answer. The mission of the FBI's Civil Rights program is to enforce
Federal civil rights statutes and to ensure the protected rights of all
persons are not violated. This requires a delicate balance between the
enforcement of hate crimes statutes and a rigorous obedience to the
Constitution of the United States.
A hate crime is defined as a criminal offense against a person or
property motivated by the individual's bias against race, religion,
disability, ethnic/national origin, sexual orientation, gender, or
gender identity. The FBI must pursue its legitimate investigative goals
without infringing upon the protected exercise of free speech. In the
absence of an allegation of a violation of Federal law, the FBI cannot
pursue investigative activities. When a message or post sent via social
media rises to the level of a true threat as defined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that is, when a message communicates a
serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against an
individual or group, based on the aforementioned protected classes, the
FBI can initiate a hate crime investigation. In the course of that
investigation, the FBI may request a social media company preserve the
threatening post as evidence. A post containing a threatening message
sufficient for the FBI to open a hate crime investigation would likely
also violate the terms of service of any established social media
company.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
foreign meddling in american elections
Question 1. Since the Citizens United decision, our campaign
finance system has been inundated with dark money, or funds donated to
entities that may conceal the identities of donors, which are in turn
spent to influence our elections. Now, it has been reported that the
FBI is investigating allegations that malign Russian interests have
used our broken campaign finance system to conceal allegedly illegal
campaign finance activity with the aim of influencing American
elections.
1a. What legal or institutional obstacles exist that could
frustrate law enforcement officials' ability to identify all
beneficial owners or other participants in a scheme to funnel
foreign money into the American campaign finance system?
Answer. Companies founded under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code are not required to disclose their donors to the Internal
Revenue Service and can accept unlimited contributions without
disclosing the source of funds. 501(c)(4) and limited liability
companies (LLC) can then be used to make political expenditures
themselves or donate to Super PACs, potentially influencing elections
while avoiding the required transparency of campaign finance laws,
which increases the risk that they can be used illegally to funnel
foreign money into U.S. Federal elections.
1b. In the course of investigating criminal foreign election
meddling, would law enforcement benefit from greater
transparency as to the identities of all persons behind
transfers of otherwise dark money in the American campaign
finance system?
Answer. Adding transparency laws to common non-profit schemes
utilized by dark money brokers would allow law enforcement to more
easily identify potential foreign influence schemes by forcing the
identities of sources of funds to be disclosed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question 1. What specific actions has President Trump directed you
to take to investigate and confront Russian interference in future U.S.
elections, including to prevent Russian cyber-attacks on voting
infrastructure and State-sponsored disinformation efforts through
media?
1a. Has the President taken actions sufficient to deter
Russian interference in future U.S. elections?
Answer. The FBI has undertaken numerous efforts in collaboration
with our counterparts in the United States Government and international
partners to protect our democratic processes.
The threat of foreign interference in our democratic process
through the weaponization of the information space requires a whole-of-
society response. The FBI's efforts are focused on identifying, and
when possible and appropriate, exposing covert foreign sponsorship of
disinformation, propaganda, and broader influence operations.
1b. Has the President committed additional resources to the
FBI's efforts to investigate and prevent Russian interference
in U.S. elections? If yes, please describe how the FBI is
utilizing those resources to confront future interference in
U.S. elections.
Answer. In fiscal year 2018, the FBI created a Foreign Influence
Task Force to investigate efforts by foreign actors to influence
threats to the electoral process. Intelligence gleaned from Task Force
efforts are shared with Intelligence Community partners.
Question 2. The fiscal year 2018 omnibus funds the Criminal Justice
Services at $540 million. The Criminal Justice Services unit houses the
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division whose mission is
to ``equip law enforcement, national security, and intelligence
community partners with the criminal justice information they need to
protect the U.S. while preserving civil liberties.'' CJIS operates the
Next Generation Identification (NGI) which has processed approximately
76 million fingerprints each year in the past 2 years; the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) which allows Federal
Firearm Licensees (FFLs) to conduct instant criminal background
searches on firearm sales and the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program
which provides statistical compilations of crimes such as murder,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft,
motor vehicle theft, and arson; officers killed and assaulted in the
line of duty; and hate crime statistics.
The FBI's fiscal year 2019 budget proposes $503.364 million dollars
for CJIS which represents a $36.636 million cut.
The FBI has stated in its fiscal year 2019 budget justification
that it plans to reform the UCR to ensure a national standard for
reporting crime.
2a. The FBI created a New UCR Project with the goal to
``improve the accuracy and timeliness of the crime data
collection and delivery process'' and to have NIBRS become the
national standard for crime reporting by January 1, 2021. How
will the FBI accomplish this goal with these budget cuts?
Answer. In January 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
surged subject matter experts with established skill sets to define a
way forward to transition agencies reporting crime via the Summary
Reporting System to the NIBRS. For agency planning purposes, 2018 is
considered a pivotal year for the NIBRS transition. The FBI is
executing critical engagement activities in the areas of (1) NIBRS
transition data, (2) stakeholder engagement, and (3) marketing. The
submission of crime data to the FBI is voluntary and agencies'
transitions to NIBRS are affected by many variables outside of the
FBI's direct control. The FBI is encouraging agencies to take these
steps, which should result in the progression toward a national NIBRS
transition. Specific strategies currently being executed by the FBI
include:
--Monitoring the overall progress of the transition on an agency
level.
--Engagement with State and Federal Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
Program administrators.
--Engagement with law enforcement associations and other
representative groups, to include, but not limited to:
--Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy
Board (APB),
--International Association of Chiefs of Police,
--Major Cities Chiefs Association,
--National Sheriffs' Association, and
--Major County Sheriffs of America.
--Leveraging FBI Field Offices to promote the importance of the
transition to NIBRS with partner agencies in their areas of
responsibility.
--Partnering with the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics to increase NIBRS participation by offering funding
assistance through the National Crime Statistics Exchange
initiative.
--Development of preeminent UCR and NIBRS Web sites with
comprehensive NIBRS transition resources.
In the fall of 2017, the FBI assembled a task force, comprised of
FBI personnel and local, State, Tribal, and academia representatives,
to address crime-reporting timeliness and provide recommendations on
how to obtain and release data in a timelier manner. The recommended
changes allow for the most frequent updates of crime data to be
released.
On June 30, 2017, the FBI deployed the Crime Data Explorer (CDE),
an additional part of the FBI's effort to modernize the publication of
national crime data. CDE allows the public to view and interact with
FBI data, providing users with the ability to query, view, and download
crime- reporting data submitted to the FBI.
In June 2018, the FBI deployed the Uniform Crime Reporting-
Technical Refresh (UCR-TR), allowing for enhancements in the processing
of crime data. UCR-TR is a centralized, searchable data repository of
the FBI. One major enhancement the UCR-TR provides is the automation of
data processing, which until the system's deployment was manually
conducted by the FBI. The following are some of the functions UCR-TR
provides:
--Supports new and legacy data submitted through NIBRS, Summary
Reporting, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted
(LEOKA), and Hate Crime, automating manual data quality
processes.
--Establishes interoperability by providing the capability to receive
data submission in a modern data specification (i.e. extensible
markup language [XML]).
--Provides an internal web-based interface for FBI users to access
data to improve service to UCR data contributors.
--Supports an external web-based portal, the CDE, to provide data
dissemination to law enforcement agencies and the public to
allow for electronic publishing on a more frequent schedule.
The deployment of the CDE combined with the NIBRS transition, UCR-
TR, and the cessation of the data embargo policy will improve the
accuracy and timeliness of the collection and release of crime data.
2b. In 2015, then Director Comey said that it was
`unacceptable' that the Guardian newspaper had better data on
police violence than the FBI did. Do you also agree that this
is unacceptable?
Answer. High profile events involving the law enforcement community
and public highlighted the need for better crime data. In order to
address this need, the FBI established the National Use-of-Force (UoF)
Data Collection at the behest of local, State, Tribal, and Federal
partners and major law enforcement agencies. The National UoF Data
Collection is a voluntary collection in which local, State, Tribal, and
Federal agencies provide the FBI with information on incidents of use-
of-force. The goal of the data collection is not to offer insight into
single use-of-force incidents, but to provide an aggregate view of the
incidents reported and the circumstances, subjects, and officers
involved.
2c. Do I have your commitment that the new NIBRS metric will
include data on the use of excessive force by police officers?
Answer. The FBI is committed to implementing the National UoF Data
Collection. While this collection is a separate collection from the
NIBRS, both collections reside within the FBI's UCR Program. The
National UoF Data Collection will include any use-of-force which
results in the death or serious bodily injury of a person, as well as
when a law enforcement officer discharges a firearm at or in the
direction of a person. The definition of serious bodily injury will be
based, in part, upon Title 18, United States Code, Section 2246 (4).
The term ``serious bodily injury'' means ``bodily injury that involves
a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, protracted and obvious
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.''
The FBI is working with the Office of Management and Budget on the
release of this national collection.
Question 3. An analysis by FiveThirtyEight, revealed that ``the
2016 Crime in the United States report--the first released under
President Trump's administration--contains close to 70 percent fewer
data tables than the 2015 version did.'' Four of my colleagues and I
sent a letter to you and AG Sessions asking you to restore this data
and I am pleased that the missing data sets have been restored.
However, I remain concerned. The FBI's response indicates that you
performed an analysis of web traffic data and eliminated the data sets
that were not frequently trafficked and thus reduced publicly available
data from 81 to 29 tables. Policymakers, criminologists, researchers
and the public rely on this objective data to analyze crime trends.
3a. What prompted the FBI to conduct this web traffic review?
Is this the first time such a review has been conducted
regarding crime data sets?
Answer. In an effort to move to a digital presentation of data, FBI
staff performed web traffic analysis on tables viewed in previous Crime
in the United States (CIUS) reports. This was the first time the FBI
had conducted such an analysis. Many of the eliminated tables were
different views of the same data set. Based on user feedback, the FBI
published all 74 tables as downloadable Excel files on FBI.gov. These
files were made available to the public on April 19, 2018.
3b. Do I have your commitment that you will retain all data
sets going forward to ensure transparency?
Answer. The Crime Data Explorer (CDE) is part of the FBI's broader
effort to modernize the reporting of national crime data. CDE is a web-
based solution enabling the public to view and interact with the FBI
data in an intuitive and user-friendly way. The FBI plans to leverage
the CDE to transition from a table driven publication to a more
accessible view of the data. CDE users can view trends, download bulk
datasets, and access an open application-programming interface, which
allows users to create custom views and conduct their own analysis of
the data reported to the FBI.
A marketing strategy will be implemented to ensure the public is
aware of how to access the data.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Moran. The subcommittee now stands in recess. We
will reconvene in a closed and classified session to hear
Director Wray in SVC-217.
I intend to call that meeting to order shortly after the
beginning of the second vote now occurring in the United States
Senate. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., Wednesday, May 16, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]