[Senate Hearing 115-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2018
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TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:18 p.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Lindsey Graham (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Graham, Moran, Daines, Leahy, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, and Van Hollen.
UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT
STATEMENTS OF:
MICHELE DUNNE, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
HON. ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
HON. TOM MALINOWSKI, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM
Senator Graham. The hearing will come to order. We have a
lot of our Democratic colleagues in transit. We will get
started. Senator Leahy is going to be a little late, but as
soon as he arrives, we will let him speak.
The hearing today is on United States' assistance for
Egypt. I would like to welcome our witnesses: Elliott Abrams,
Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations, and he has served in Government in a variety of
roles back to the Reagan administration; Michele Dunne,
Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; and Tom Malinowski, Former
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, U.S. Department of State.
I will go ahead and make a brief opening statement and we
will hear from our witnesses.
The reason for this hearing is that Egypt is important. It
is important enough for us to care about the relationship, to
try to make sure the relationship is going in the right
direction, and it is imperative for me that Egypt become
successful because it is such an important player in the Middle
East region. We provide hundreds of millions of dollars of aid
to the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people. I want to
make sure it is a good investment and I want to understand what
we are investing in.
The one thing I would say about Egypt on the security
front, they are doing things in Egypt that we have not done in
a while. They are helping with Hamas in a historic fashion.
They are taking the fight to the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) in the Sinai, but at the same time, civil society
seems to be deteriorating, their economy is lacking, and I
really worry about a consolidation of power in a way that is
basically undemocratic. I am not asking Egypt to become
America. I am asking Egypt to become the best that Egypt can
be.
Millions of people went to the streets years ago to protest
the Mubarak era. Some people gave their lives. Mohamed Morsi
was the result of that protest. It is clear to me that he
overplayed his hand. I want current Egyptian President Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi to be successful. I appreciate his partnership
on the security front, but for the American taxpayer, we need
to highlight what we are investing in and try to use our money
to bring about outcomes that will stabilize not only Egypt, but
also the region.
It is a large country with a unique history and I want
nothing but success for the Egyptian people. The purpose of
this hearing today is to inform the Congress about the good,
the bad, and the ugly. Unfortunately, it is all three and we
need to try to use our money in the most productive fashion to
help Egypt, but it is now time for Egypt to help us when it
comes to helping them.
With that, we will start with Ms. Dunne.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE DUNNE, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Ms. Dunne. Chairman Graham, subcommittee members, thank you
very much for this opportunity to address you.
The problem for the United States in assisting Egypt is
precisely this: how can the United States best support an
important country and a long-time regional ally when its
Government adopts policies that promise chronic instability?
The United States has an interest in supporting a stable
Egypt, an Egypt that is at peace with its neighbors and also at
peace with itself. But while President Sisi is fond of
presenting Egypt as a bastion of stability in a troubled
region, actually the country is struggling and I am afraid it
could be headed for unrest within a few years.
Now, to be fair, many of the problems in Egypt have roots
that go back well before Sisi came to power. They have got a
rapidly growing population. They have a history of indigenous
extremist groups. They have an enormous and obstructionist
bureaucracy. But there are also newer problems that Sisi has
caused or exacerbated which have made the country more violent,
more polarized, and poorer than it was, either under former
President Hosni Mubarak or even under President Mohammed Morsi.
We are meeting today on what is a public holiday in Egypt,
Sinai Liberation Day. And unfortunately, in the last few days
some very deeply troubling information has been coming out
showing the likelihood of the Egyptian army carrying out
extrajudicial killings of terrorist suspects in the Sinai,
perhaps in fact using assistance, using vehicles provided by
the United States in this.
And this highlights exactly the problem I am talking about.
Egypt does face a serious threat from terrorism, but the
unprecedented human rights abuses and political repression
practiced by the Government since 2013 is fanning the flames
rather than putting them out. And the United States, at this
point, it does not really have a way to ensure that our
assistance is not making the problem worse instead of better.
I am actually going to use my time to focus on the economic
situation because I think that does not get enough attention
because in general in the United States, President el-Sisi is
getting good marks on his economic policies. And there is a
positive side to what he is doing on the economy, but there is
also a very serious problem.
In the first few months of 2017, the misery index, which is
the rate of annual inflation plus unemployment for Egyptians
has been about 45 percent. Core inflation has been between 30
and 33 percent. Unemployment, according to official statistics,
is about 12.5 percent, and most experts think that is really an
underrepresentation. For young people, unemployment averages
about 30 percent. For young women, it is about 50 percent. So
for young Egyptians--and those are the most likely ones to
cause unrest--the misery index ranges from 60 to more than 80
percent, so it is clearly an unlivable situation. And despite
Draconian anti-protest laws, there has been a significant
increase in spontaneous protests related to economic grievances
in the past year.
Now, I said Sisi has gotten good marks on his economic
policies. And that is because he has taken a couple of
important steps on the fiscal side. He floated the Egyptian
currency, which is the main reason for the very high inflation
right now. And that was something that needed to be done. And
he has cut back energy subsidies partially and instituted a
value-added tax. And he did these things in order to get an IMF
loan, which he has gotten, for $12 billion over 3 years.
But there is another side in which Sisi's economic policies
are really not helping Egypt with its economic problems at all.
And that is when it comes to generating jobs, creating the
conditions in the Egyptian economy for jobs.
There are 94 million Egyptians and right now there are at
least 600,000 new Egyptians coming onto the labor market every
year, but the economy does not generate anywhere near enough
jobs for them and that number is only going to go up. Right
now, there are one million new Egyptians every 6 months, so 2
million new a year, so you can see how the people coming into
the labor force are going to be going up.
And despite lip service from Sisi about creating jobs and
so forth, it is simply not the case that his economic policies
are aimed toward that. And they are also not aimed toward
developing the labor force, which is a major issue in Egypt,
that even the jobs that are being created sometimes go begging
because Egyptians do not have the skills, especially if they
come out of the public education system. They do not have the
skills that are needed for those jobs.
You know, unfortunately, look, a World Bank report in 2014
said it clearly. Economic policies in Egypt are not focused on
promoting the emergence of fast growing, high productivity
private sector companies that would generate jobs. Instead, and
I am quoting here, they have worked to preserve insider
privileges leading to growth in sectors that are not labor
intensive.
This is what is happening in Egypt. For a long time,
economic policies have been skewed toward protecting the
privileges of a few, the cronies of the regime. In the Sisi
era, it is even fewer than that. It is really--the economic
policies are for the benefit of Sisi's own constituency, the
military itself. We are seeing a real change in laws,
regulations, et cetera, that are allowing the military rather
than the private sector to take up more and more economic
activity. That is what is behind these mega construction
projects that Sisi has been carrying out: the Suez Canal
passage, the new administrative capital he is building in the
desert, because this is how the Egyptian military knows how to
make money, by building things.
Let me just end with a few recommendations. I think the
United States, with its assistance, should set an example of
wise investment in human development, in education, and not
give budget support in the form of cash transfers and other
things that will disappear quickly without any benefit.
I would like to submit, Mr. Chair, some written testimony
in which I have more recommendations for foreign military
financing, but let me just say briefly, before the United
States extends more, we really need to investigate these
reports of human rights abuses and how the United States can
take foreign military assistance to Egypt off autopilot and
look at what we can really do to help and not to contribute to
a worse situation in the country.
Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michele Dunne
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, subcommittee members, thank
you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee.
The problem for United States' assistance to Egypt is precisely
this: how can the United States best support an important country and
longtime regional ally when its government adopts policies that promise
chronic instability? The United States has an interest in supporting a
stable Egypt, at peace with its neighbors and itself. The Egyptian-
Israeli peace is well established on the military and intelligence
levels, although lamentably cold on the civilian and citizen level.
While the United States will always do what it can to encourage closer
and more multifaceted ties, at this point the relationship has its own
dynamic. At the same time, there is much to be concerned about
regarding what is happening inside Egypt, where security, economic, and
political conditions have deteriorated since President Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi took control in 2013. With $77 billion in American taxpayer
dollars invested since 1948 in security and economic assistance to
Egypt,\1\ it is time for the United States to reconsider its approach.
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\1\ Jeremy M. Sharp, ``Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,''
Congressional Research Service, March 24, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf .
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While President Sisi is fond of presenting Egypt as a bastion of
stability in a troubled region, in reality the country is at best
limping along and is likely headed for unrest within a few years. There
are chronic challenges that date back years or decades, well before
Sisi came to power: a rapidly growing population; an economy that
generates few jobs; an enormous, obstructionist bureaucracy; and a
history of indigenous terrorist groups. But there are also newer
problems that Sisi has caused or exacerbated, which have made the
overall picture much worse than it was under former presidents Hosni
Mubarak or Mohammed Morsi. When Sisi took control in 2013, Egypt did
not have a virulent insurgency, thousands dead in extrajudicial
killings, tens of thousands of political prisoners, hundreds of
enforced disappearances, hundreds killed in terrorists attacks annually
including the recent suicide bombings targeting Christians, and a
desperate economic situation. Egypt has all of those problems now,
along with the strong social polarization and susceptibility to
radicalization that result. While regional factors (conflict in Libya
and the creation of the self-proclaimed Islamic State) are not helping,
Egypt's problems are in the main homegrown.
economic drivers of instability
In the unhappy context of unprecedented political repression and
rights abuses, Egyptians are also beset by an extremely difficult
economic situation. In the first few months of 2017, the misery index--
the rate of annual inflation plus unemployment--for Egyptians has been
about 45 percent. Core inflation in recent months has been between 30
and 33 percent; food prices are rising at an annual rate of 39
percent,\2\ a serious problem in a country in which a significant
number of citizens are poor and spent a large percentage of their
income on food. Unemployment according to official statistics is about
12.6 percent; \3\ many experts believe this underestimates the true
unemployment rate, which for young people is estimated at an average 30
percent and for young women nearly 50 percent.\4\ So for Egyptians
under 30--those most likely to cause unrest--the misery rate ranges
from 60 to more than 80 percent. Despite harsh anti-protest laws put in
place after 2013, public unrest related to the economy (such as
protests against shortages of bread, sugar, baby formula) has been on
the rise.
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\2\ Core inflation for March 2017: 32.35 percent; for February
2017: 33.1 percent. Inflation for fruits and vegetables for March 2017:
39 percent; for February 2017 31.3 percent. Central Bank of Egypt
website, http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/EconomicResearch/Statistics/Pages/
Inflation.aspx .
\3\ The World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/
overview.
\4\ Adel Abdel Ghafar, ``Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge
Facing Egypt's Youth,'' Brookings Doha Center, July 2016, https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/en_youth_in_egypt-1.pdf.
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The current high inflation is due to a decision President Sisi took
in November 2016, for which he has received much praise: he floated the
Egyptian currency, after years in which he and his predecessors spent
billions supporting the currency at an artificially high rate. That was
a necessary step, one of several which Sisi took to secure an IMF
standby agreement; he has also instituted a value-added tax and reduced
energy subsidies, needed for fiscal stabilization after Gulf States
started cutting back their cash aid. But if the currency devaluation is
not accompanied by steps to increase investment and generate jobs, it
will be pain without gain.
the problem with egypt's economic policies
This brings us to the core problem of the Egyptian economy: it does
not generate nearly enough jobs for the number of new entrants into the
labor force. Egypt has a population of nearly 94 million, increasing by
one million every 6 months. There are more than 600,000 new entrants
into the labor market every year,\5\ a number that will rise sharply in
coming years. Yet despite lip service from the government about the
need to create new jobs, Sisi's economic policies are not oriented
toward attracting investment in labor-intensive industries or services.
They do not encourage the creation or growth of the small and medium
enterprises that have the potential to generate most jobs.\6\ Sisi's
government also has not undertaken serious efforts to develop the
Egyptian labor force through education and training; private sector
employers complain persistently that graduates of public secondary
schools and universities lack the basic skills needed to perform the
jobs that are available.
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\5\ Ghada Barsoum, Mohamed Ramadan, and Mona Mostafa, ``Labour
market transitions of young women and men in Egypt,'' International
Labour Organization, June 2014, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247596.pdf.
\6\ Decision-making that favored insider privileges over broader
job creation policies has been a persistent problem. See ``More Jobs,
Better Jobs: A Priority for Egypt,'' The World Bank, June 2014, http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/926831468247461895/pdf/
884470EG0repla00
Box385343B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
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Instead of focusing on creating jobs and improving labor force
skills, Sisi's economic policies are oriented toward helping his most
important constituency--the military--to make money. That means
undertaking mega construction projects, such as the second Suez Canal
passage and new administrative capital in the desert (``Wedian''), with
no serious consideration as to whether such projects will generate
significant employment, growth, or even revenue for the government.
Sisi has also decreed many changes in laws, regulations, and government
contracting procedures to allow the military or military-affiliated
companies to take a larger-than-ever share of the economic pie.\7\
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\7\ See Emily Crane Linn, ``The Army and its President,'' Foreign
Policy, January 28, 2016 http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/28/the-army-
and-its-president-egypt-sisi/; Shana Marshall, ``The Egyptian Armed
Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire,'' Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/04/15/
egyptian-armed-forces-and-remaking-of-economic-empire-pub-59726.
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The fact that economic decisions in Egypt serve such a narrow range
of interests reflects the overall constriction of public institutions
as well as civil society. The parliament is open only to coup-
supporters, with not only most Islamists but also many secular parties
either legally barred or strongly harassed--even including several
larger secular parties that have supported Sisi but have tried to
preserve some modicum of independence.\8\ The judiciary, once the
branch of the government most respected by citizens, has become highly
politicized. Media and journalists have been strongly repressed, and
there are very few media outlets that are truly independent. Civil
society groups, both secular groups focusing on human rights or civil
liberties and social welfare groups suspected of ties to the Muslim
Brotherhood, have received harsh treatment unprecedented in Egypt--
closed down, assets confiscated, leaders either under prosecution or
driven out of the country by death threats.
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\8\ Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, ``Egypt's Secular Political
Parties: A Struggle for Identity and Independence,'' Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, March 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/
03/31/egypt-s-secular-political-parties-struggle-for-identity-and-
independence-pub-68482.
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All of this repression of society and institutions adds up to a
situation in which there is minimal input to Sisi on important
decisions, which are therefore made in the interests of the few and not
the many. This is a more exaggerated version of what has long been the
case; during the Mubarak era economic decisions were made to favor
crony capitalists as well as the military, whereas now it is just the
military.
the u.s. dilemma regarding assistance
For the United States, Egyptian Government decisionmaking that
works against stability rather than for it has become a bigger problem
over time. U.S. assistance increased sharply at the time of the
Egyptian-Israeli peace in the late 1970s, and for a while military and
economic assistance were each funded at about $1 billion per year. Over
time, military assistance stabilized at $1.3 billion annually, while
economic assistance began to drop off gradually, until in recent years
it has been $150 million per year. Egypt has used much of the military
assistance to arm itself with heavy weapons (such as fixed-wing
aircraft and tanks) for the sort of ground war it has not fought since
1973 and might not ever fight again, resisting persistent advice from
U.S. officials to devote more assistance to training, lighter weapons,
and higher technology.
The United States has gradually decreased economic assistance
partly due to difficulties in implementing programs with Egyptian
Government partners as well as persistent disagreements between U.S.
and Egyptian officials about needed reforms.\9\ While some Egyptian
officials have welcomed mutually-agreed reform programs, training, and
technical assistance, others have stonewalled or frustrated such
programs, pressing instead for cash assistance. The more pernicious
side of this has been the strong campaign of harassment and retribution
against American NGOs carrying out assistance programs, as well as
Egyptian organizations or individuals who work with American or
European organizations.\10\ This is hardly the behavior of a partner in
development.
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\9\ Amy Hawthorne, ``Rethinking U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt,''
Project on Middle East Democracy, October 2016, http://pomed.org/pomed-
publications/new-report-rethinking-u-s-economic-aid-to-egypt/.
\10\ ``Close Case 173,'' Amnesty International, https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/12/close-case-173/.
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opportunity for a new approach
With a new U.S. administration in office that is reexamining
foreign assistance priorities overall, there is an opportunity to take
assistance to Egypt off auto-pilot and design an approach that better
serves the interests of the United States and of Egypt--the nation
broadly, not only the military. Members of Congress and of this
subcommittee, with their long experience in dealing with assistance to
Egypt, have a special responsibility to shape an approach that makes
sense and draws on lessons learned.
The new approach should have a tighter focus on the most pressing
threats to Egypt's stability: terrorism, but also inadequate education,
unemployment, and the destruction of civil society. Ideally the U.S.
and Egyptian Governments would agree on assistance programs and the
Egyptian Government would cease harassment of implementing
organizations. If those goals are unrealistic with the current
government, the United States can still extend assistance to the
Egyptian people with a minimum of government cooperation. At a bare
minimum, the U.S. Government should ensure that its assistance is
neither wasted nor complicit in exacerbating the country's problems.
recommendations for fiscal year 2018 assistance to egypt
Foreign Military Financing
--Rather than starting with a fixed amount of FMF, assess the actual
threats to Egypt's security and to U.S. interests in Egypt,
which center primarily on security of the borders with Libya
and Gaza, the Sinai insurgency, and the proliferation of small
militant groups in mainland Egypt.
--Determine what sort of training, technical assistance, and weaponry
the United States could provide to help the Egyptian military
face these threats, and what it will cost.
--Make further security assistance contingent on a stop to
extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearance, and
other serious human rights abuses by the Egyptian Government
carried out in Sinai and elsewhere. There is no point in trying
to help the government to fight terrorism while it enflames the
problem at the same time, potentially with the use of U.S.-
provided equipment.
Economic Support Funds
--Set an example of wise investment in human development by devoting
most new economic assistance to merit-based scholarships for
higher or vocational education at quality institutions in Egypt
or abroad, including the American University in Cairo. Consider
converting the existing backlog of unobligated economic
assistance, amounting to several hundred million dollars, into
a fund for such scholarships.
--Model good practices for job creation and support small and medium
enterprises by continuing to fund the Egyptian-American
Enterprise Fund.
--Continue direct assistance to Egyptian civil society organizations,
but not through the bilateral aid program. Such assistance
should instead be administered either through the National
Endowment for Democracy,\11\ the Department of State's Bureau
of Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights, or private foundations.
Discontinue democracy and governance programs (judiciary,
parliament, decentralization) with the government.
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\11\ The author serves on the board of the National Endowment for
Democracy.
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--Do not give budget support to the government in the form of cash
transfers or loan guarantees under current circumstances, as
the funds will disappear quickly with no discernable benefit to
Egyptian citizens or to the United States. The United States
has already helped to address the government's fiscal
challenges by supporting a $12 billion loan from the
International Monetary Fund as well as encouraging Saudi Arabia
to provide oil worth several hundred million dollars per month.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Abrams.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
appear here today and I hope I can insert the full statement
for the record.
There is a remarkable similarity between the structure of
our aid to Egypt and the structure of the Egyptian military and
its activities. And that is that both were really established
decades ago and both need to be rethought. I want to talk about
the security sector today.
Our aid to Egypt had not been very high and then leapt up
after the Sadat visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accord,
and that is 1978. That is 40 years ago. The Middle East has
changed, and Egypt's role in the Middle East has changed in
that period.
The Egypt of that period was really the most influential
country, the most influential Arab country. And its position on
everything was of significance to us, but that is no longer
true. Egypt has no role of significance when it comes to the
conflict in Yemen or in Iraq or in Syria, nor really on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. Egypt's weight in the
region has really declined.
Now, what we obviously want to achieve was, you said, Mr.
Chairman, a stable Egypt, a democratic Egypt, an Egypt that can
deal with the terrorist threat that it clearly does face, that
can protect its borders. We want to help Egypt protect the
human rights of all Egyptians, but I am always reminded of a
conversation I had decades ago with the late Tom Lantos, who
was a great champion of human rights. And I was in the Bush
administration at this point--it was about 10 years ago--and
talking about aid to Egypt. And Tom Lantos said to me, ``Let me
ask you a question. Do you really think Egypt needs more tanks
or more schools?'' And I think it is a question we continue to
have to ask ourselves.
Let us look at the Egyptian military. Our goals--probably
the key goal in Egypt today on the security side is to fight
terrorism. But the Egyptian military remains a force designed
to conduct conventional warfare and indeed to conduct
conventional warfare against Israel. That is what they exercise
for, another war with Israel. As an Israeli analyst put it last
year, ``The Egyptian military is essentially still modeled to
refight the 1973 war.''
Stratfor put it this way. ``While the existential threat
from conventional foreign militaries has waned in recent years,
the new and unconventional dangers of insurgencies, terrorism,
and non-state actors have risen to take its place. Egypt's
large and inflexible conventional forces, which are better
suited to guard against foreign incursion, may not be as
capable of addressing the country's current security
problems.''
The Egyptian military is actually spending huge amounts of
money enhancing their conventional capability. CRS reported
that in February 2015, they purchased 24 Dassault Rafale
multirole fighters, a frigate, and missiles from France. That
was a deal worth nearly $6 billion. In 2014, they got four--
they bought four naval corvettes from France. That was $1.35
billion. Fall of 2015, two Mistral helicopter carriers from
France, large purchases from Russia.
How do purchases like an anti-ballistic missile system from
Russia and advanced combat jets really combat terrorist groups
like ISIS? How do submarines? Yet Egypt just last week received
the first of four German-made attack submarines, total cost 1.4
billion Euros.
There are other problems with the arms aid to Egypt. GAO
published a report last March entitled ``U.S. Government Should
Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for
Egypt.'' They are not doing all the vetting that they should be
doing.
Turn to the approach to terrorism. It is just not
succeeding. The tactics of the Egyptian Government appear to be
failing. Just as the terrorist attacks have become routine, so
to have heavy-handed Egyptian responses resulting in civilian
casualties. Michele Dunne mentioned this video that just
surfaced. An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment recently
concluded state-sanctioned violence against civilians has only
increased anger against the military. That is in Sinai.
Egyptian policy has ``shifted some sympathy from the military
to the militants, who are increasingly seen as a way to take
revenge.'' That is Sinai.
I think actually that the Egyptian handling of this is
creating jihadis. I mean, if you take 60,000 political
prisoners--and that is the number that there are in Egypt--
people who have not committed acts of violence, beat them up,
toss them into prison, keep them there for years, incarcerate
them with real jihadis. And what comes out at the end of that
process is more jihadis. That is what is happening in Egyptian
prisons.
A recent New York Times article about prisoners in Egypt
interviewed a man named Ayman who said many of the prisoners he
met were from the Muslim Brotherhood. The group formally
renounced violence in the early 1970s, but Ayman watched his
cellmates grow hardened in prison. The torture and unjust
imprisonment for long periods without clear charges or trial
dates created human bombs.
NPR recently had a story about a journalist who was jailed,
Hossam el-Deen, who said, ``In jail, they become ISIS.'' This
is a common story. It is the story that produced Ayman al-
Zawahiri of al-Qaida, who was radicalized in an Egyptian
prison.
So I think it is time, Mr. Chairman, to review the tactics
of the Egyptian military against terrorism and to review the
nature of our aid so that it is targeted toward fighting
terrorism and not toward sustaining this conventional military
that really has no significant use today.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Elliott Abrams
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss United States
assistance to Egypt. I will concentrate on the security side of the
U.S.-Egypt aid relationship in my testimony.
There is a remarkable similarity between the structure of U.S. aid
to Egypt, and the structure of the Egyptian military. Both were
established decades ago, and both badly need rethinking and upgrading.
As the Congressional Research Service summed it up, ``Between 1948
and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $77.4 billion in
bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars--not adjusted
for inflation), including $1.3 billion a year in military aid from 1987
to the present.'' \1\ As you know, our aid to Egypt leapt upward after
the Sadat visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords of 1978. The
assistance numbers are $370 million in 1975, for example, and $2.588
billion in 1979. Since then the average amount of aid, in total, has
been around $2 billion per year, of which 1.3 billion has been military
aid since the late 1980s.
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\1\ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy Sharp, RL33003 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But that's 30 years ago, Mr. Chairman. The Middle East has changed,
and Egypt's role in the Middle East has changed. The Egypt of decades
ago was the single most influential Arab country, whose position on
every issue of significance in the region was of real importance to the
United States. If we wanted to achieve, or to block, something in the
Arab League, it often took little more than a conversation with Egypt's
president. Egypt was critical to the Israeli-Palestinian ``peace
process.'' Today, Egypt has no role of significance when it comes to
the conflict in Yemen, or in Iraq, or in Syria, nor frankly does it
have much of a role in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. As
an analysis by the Middle East Institute stated,
During the 1990s and afterwards, there were numerous
illustrations of Egypt's diminished status in the Arab world.
If Egypt played any role at all in the efforts to advance the
negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the
1990s, it was only a marginal one. Egypt took no part in the
preliminary work that was necessary in order to convene the
Madrid Conference and set in motion a new Arab-Israel peace
process under American sponsorship. The Oslo Agreement between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was
signed behind Egypt's back, as was the peace agreement between
Israel and Jordan, which angered the Egyptians, who thought
Jordan would reap the fruits of peace at Egypt's expense.\2\
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\2\ ``The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Legacy of Camp
David: 1979-2009,'' (Middle East Institute: Washington, DC, 2009), 31,
http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Legacy-Camp-
David.pdf.
Egypt's weight in the region has simply declined.
The aid we have been giving to Egypt since the late 1970s and
continue to give now should have a purpose. What actually do we want
for it? Why do we give it? With the passage of time, I think it is fair
to say we don't need to bribe or reward Egypt for its relations with
Israel. As we saw under President Morsi, even a Muslim Brotherhood
government did not end diplomatic relations and security cooperation
with Israel--because those relations are in Egypt's interest. So our
aid should be based on our desire to help achieve a stable, secure,
Egypt that can defeat the terrorist threat it faces and protect its
borders, helps to stabilize the region, and remains at peace with
Israel. We also want to help the Egyptian people achieve a system that
is more democratic and more respectful of their human rights. I will
never forget a conversation I had more than a decade ago with the late
Congressman Tom Lantos, a great champion of human rights. I was an
official of the George W. Bush administration and we were discussing
aid to Egypt, and Tom Lantos posed a question. He said, ``Tell me,
really, do you think Egypt needs more tanks, or more schools?''
We should judge the overall U.S. aid program against all those
goals.
Let us look first at the Egyptian military. While our goals are
above all to help it fight terrorism, the Egyptian military remains a
force designed to conduct conventional war--against Israel. Major
military exercises continue to presume Israel is the enemy. As an
Israeli analysis put it last year, ``The Egyptian military is
essentially still modeled to refight the 1973 war, with a war paradigm
very similar to that of 1973, yet with more advanced hardware and
somewhat improved tactics. Its core competence is to move large armored
and infantry formations into forward defense positions, under the cover
of a mobile integrated air-defense system. Egypt's focus is still on
main battle platforms (such as tanks, frigates, jets, etc).'' \3\ The
analysis from Stratfor put it this way:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ron Tira, ``The Future Middle East Strategic Balance:
Conventional and Unconventional Sources of Instability,'' Proliferation
Papers 56 (2016): 35, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/prolif56_tira_oksl_v2.pdf.
[W]hile the existential threat from conventional foreign
militaries has waned in recent years, the new and
unconventional dangers of insurgencies, terrorism and non-state
actors have risen to take its place. Egypt's large and
inflexible conventional forces, which are better suited to
guard against foreign incursion, may not be as capable of
addressing the country's current security issues. . . . While
Egypt has taken some steps toward better equipping its troops
for counterinsurgency campaigns, it remains overwhelmingly
focused on enhancing its military's conventional fighting
capabilities. This stance is especially visible in the Egyptian
military's force structure. Rather than restructuring its
forces into a more flexible organization geared toward
counterinsurgency operations, the military has maintained a
centralized hierarchy that is broken down into conventional
military region, army, corps and division units of command. It
has also continued to invest heavily in weaponry such as
surface-to-air missile batteries, anti-ship missiles, tanks and
frigates that, for the most part, are useless for addressing
Egypt's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism threats.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Egypt's Conventional Military Thinking,'' Stratfor, June 12,
2015, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypts-conventional-military-
thinking.
Recently, Egypt has begun exercises with Russia for the first time:
a news story dated October of last year was headlined ``First Russian-
Egyptian military exercise on Egyptian soil.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``First Russian-Egyptian military exercise on Egyptian soil,''
Heaven TV7 Jerusalem, October 26, 2016, http://www.tv7israelnews.com/
first-russian-egyptian-military-exercise-on-egyptian-soil/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Egyptian military is spending huge sums on enhancing that
conventional capability. The Congressional Research Service reports
that
In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Dassault Rafale
multirole fighters, a frigate, and missiles from France in a
deal worth an estimated $5.9 billion (half of which is financed
by French loans). France delivered the first three planes in
July 2015. In 2014, France sold Egypt four naval corvettes and
a frigate in a deal worth $1.35 billion. In the fall of 2015,
France announced that it would sell Egypt two Mistral-class
helicopter carriers (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters,
four landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 billion. In a separate
deal with Russia, Egypt will purchase 46 Ka-52 Alligator
helicopters which can operate on the Mistral-class helicopter
carrier.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy Sharp, RL33003 (2017),
18, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
Other Russian arms sales include Antey-2500 (S-300) anti-ballistic
missile system (a $1 billion contract) and 46 MiG-29 multirole fighters
(a $2 billion contract). How do an anti-ballistic missile system and
advanced combat jets really combat terrorist groups like Islamic State?
How do submarines? Yet Egypt just last week received a German-made
attack submarine--the first of four it has ordered, for a total
reported price of 1.4 billion Euros.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``First Egyptian Navy Type 209/1400 submarine arrives to
Egypt,'' Naval Today, April 19, 2017, https://navaltoday.com/2017/04/
19/first-egyptian-navy-type-2091400-arrives-to-egypt/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are other problems with our arms aid to Egypt. The Government
Accountability Office published a report in March last year entitled
``U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights
Vetting for Egypt.'' That report states that we cannot account for all
the aid we are giving Egypt and indeed that Egypt is hindering U.S.
efforts to track the billions of dollars in assistance. The GAO report
referred to ``the Egyptian Government's incomplete and slow responses
to some inquiries limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security
of certain equipment, including NVDs [night vision devices] and riot-
control items.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance:
U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights
Vetting for Egypt, GAO-16-435 (Washington, DC, 2016), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/680/676503.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also a problem with human rights vetting. GAO said that
The U.S. Government completed some, but not all, human rights
vetting required by State policy before providing training or
equipment to Egyptian security forces. State deemed GAO's
estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that
were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information,
which is excluded from this public report. Moreover, State has
not established specific policies and procedures for vetting
Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although State
concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment
vetting, it has not established a timeframe for such action.
State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with
the Leahy law. However, without vetting policies and
procedures, the U.S. Government risks providing U.S. equipment
to recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Ibid.
Egypt's approach to combating terrorism, which we are in fact
supporting to the tune of $1.3 billion per year, is not succeeding.
There is a real effort in Sinai, but very recently we saw terrorism
extending again from northern to southern Sinai. The Congressional
Research Service report from which I quoted previously, dated March 24,
2017, noted that ``Terrorists belonging to the Islamic State-affiliated
Sinai Province (SP) have attacked military bases and police
checkpoints, killing hundreds of Egyptian soldiers. Egypt has declared
a state of emergency in northern Sinai, where most of the attacks take
place.'' \10\ But the most recent Sinai attack was in southern Sinai,
one week ago, Tuesday, April 17, at St Catherine's monastery.\11\ One
policeman was killed and four wounded, demonstrating sadly that Islamic
State continues to be able to operate in southern Sinai. On March 24,
skirmishes with insurgents produced a dozen casualties, ten soldiers
and two policemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy Sharp, RL33003 (2017),
13, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
\11\ Declan Walsh, ``Gunmen Kill Police Officer Near St.
Catherine's Monastery in Egypt,'' New York Times, April 18, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/middleeast/egypt-
monastery-sinai-attack-
isis.html?_r=1&mc_cid=8aa4c1c91b&mc_eid=9a4f749274.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While no one can doubt the desire of the Egyptian Government to end
terrorism and defeat Islamic State in Sinai, its tactics appear to be
failing. Just as the terrorist attacks have become routine, so too have
heavy-handed Egyptian responses resulting in civilian casualties.
Egyptian security forces continue to accidentally kill considerable
numbers of civilians in counterterror operations. In one incident, a
group of tourists was mistakenly bombed in 2015. In January, a drone
strike caused 10 civilian deaths. On April 20, a video surfaced on
Twitter ``that appears to show members of the Egyptian military
shooting unarmed detainees to death at point-blank range in the Sinai
Peninsula and staging the killings to look as if they had happened in
combat.'' \12\ Details surrounding the incident remain unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Matthew Haag, ``Video Appears to Show Egyptian Soldiers
Killing Unarmed Men in Sinai,'' New York Times, April 20, 2017, https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/middleeast/egypt-soldiers-
extrajudicial-killings-sinai-peninsula.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment concluded that ``State-
sanctioned violence against civilians has only increased local anger
against the military. . . .'' and that Egyptian policy ``has shifted
some sympathy from the military to the militants, who are increasingly
seen as a way to take revenge. . . . The combination of heavy
repression, numerous civilian casualties, and the increased reliance on
the use of airpower and heavy weaponry has not only alienated the local
population, it has proven highly ineffective.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Maged Mandour, ``The Heavy Civilian Toll in Sinai,'' Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 16, 2017, http://
carnegieendowment.org/sada/68296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's not just the violence that is alienating Sinai residents, but
the neglect as well. An article in Foreign Affairs last month said
this:
Sinai residents are prohibited from joining any senior post
in the state. They cannot work in the army, police, judiciary,
or in diplomacy. Meanwhile, no development projects have been
undertaken in North Sinai the past 40 years. The villages of
Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed have no schools or hospitals and no
modern system to receive potable water. They depend on
rainwater and wells, as if it were the Middle Ages.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Maged Atef, ``Sinai's Suffering,'' Foreign Affairs, March 13,
2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2017-03-13/sinai-s-
suffering.
That is no way to win the residents away from the terrorists. The
Foreign Affairs article warns that ``the population trusts the army
less by the day as it cuts off communications and services, sieges the
city, bombs villages, and displaces residents.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Egyptian Government claims to be winning the battle against
terror in Sinai, but its claims are suspect. The Carnegie report
suggests that the numbers are not credible:
the number of casualties during counterterrorism operations far
exceeds the estimated number of Wilayat Sinai fighters. Since
the start of the large counterterrorism ``Operation Martyr's
Right'' in September 2015, the Egyptian military has reported
that 2,529 militants were killed and 2,481 others arrested as
of December 2016. However, foreign intelligence agencies,
including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Israel
Defense Forces, estimated in mid-2016 that the size of Wilayat
Sinai ranges from several hundred to a thousand militants, far
below the numbers of reported killings. This disconnect can be
explained by faulty intelligence or by inflating of the number
of militants killed to include civilian deaths among militant
deaths. The Egyptian Government has a history of attacking
civilians mistaken for militants. Local sources in Sinai back
up the existence of such incidents, including an invented
attack on a police station in Sheikh Zuweid that was used to
justify the deaths of civilians in September 2013.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Mandour, ``The Heavy Civilian Toll in Sinai.''
Sinai is a particularly dangerous area but the battle against
terrorism is a difficult one throughout Egypt. The Department of State
issued a travel warning in December that begins ``The U.S. Department
of State warns U.S. citizens of threats from terrorist groups in Egypt
and to consider the risks of travel to the country.'' \17\ Same for
Canada, which tells citizens ``Global Affairs Canada advises against
non-essential travel to Egypt due to the unpredictable security
situation. This advisory does not apply to the Red Sea coastal resorts
of Hurghada (and its surroundings) and Sharm el-Sheikh, nor to the area
from Luxor to Aswan along the upper Nile, where you should exercise a
high degree of caution . . . The security situation in Egypt is
unpredictable. There is a significant risk of terrorist attacks
throughout the country. Attacks can be indiscriminate and occur with no
warning, including in Cairo.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Egypt Travel Warning,'' U.S. Department of State, December
23, 2016, https://
travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/egypt-travel-
warning.html.
\18\ ``Egypt,'' Government of Canada, April 12, 2017, https://
travel.gc.ca/destinations/egypt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would suggest that in our general battle against terrorism, Mr.
Chairman, Egypt is acting in ways that will in fact make it not an
asset but a liability--indeed will make it a jihadi factory. It is
estimated that there are 60,000 political prisoners in Egypt today--
meaning individuals who did not commit crimes of violence. If you take
thousands of young men, toss them into prison, beat and torture them,
incarcerate them for lengthy periods with actual jihadis, what comes
out at the end of the process is in fact more jihadis.
There can be little debate about prison conditions and about the
maltreatment of prisoners. But there can also be little debate about
what this produces. Here is part of a New York Times article about
prisoners in Egypt:
Ayman said that many of the prisoners he met were from the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist political organization that
briefly held power after Mubarak. The group formally renounced
violence in the early 1970s, but Ayman watched his cellmates
grow hardened in prison. ``The torture and unjust imprisonment
for long periods without clear charges or trial dates created
human bombs,'' he said. ``Each one of them was just waiting to
get out. They are so thirsty for revenge.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Joshua Hammer, ``How Egypt's Activists Became `Generation
Jail,''' New York Times, March 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/14/magazine/how-egypts-activists-became-generation-jail.html?_r=0.
Last year an NPR story reminded us that ``Egypt has a history of
breeding militancy in its jails. Prominent jihadists including al-Qaida
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri were radicalized during their abuse and
humiliation in prison. Now it appears to be continuing, possibly on a
wider scale to match a broad crackdown on rights in Egypt.'' \20\ The
story quotes one journalist who was jailed, Hossam el-Deen:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Leila Fadel, ``As Egypt's Jails Fill, Growing Fears of a Rise
in Radicalization,'' NPR, August 24, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/
parallels/2016/08/24/491170122/as-egypts-jails-fill-growing-fears-of-a-
rise-in-radicalization.
In jail, they become ISIS. And this is very horrible. Many
people--not one or two or three, many. . . . And I saw even
members of Muslim [Brotherhood] become ISIS now. Some of them
spent 3 years now without any real accusation in this very hard
condition--so they become thinking that violence is the
solution.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ibid.
The story then recounts a communication with someone still in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
prison:
Today he sleeps on the floor, with no mattress, in a cell
with 10 other people. He told me that ISIS members imprisoned
with him try to recruit him frequently. He says there are more
than 100 ISIS members inside, and they openly sing Islamic
State chants together at night. They bring him food. They talk
to him about his father, who was killed in 2013 along with
nearly 1,000 others, when the government crushed two sit-ins in
Cairo. They tell him he should take revenge.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid.
Ahmed Maher, a leader of the movement that peacefully overthrew
Hosni Mubarak, and who is now under house arrest in Egypt after being
imprisoned for his opposition to the government, gave us all another
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
warning:
Prison has really become a breeding ground for extremists. It
has become a school for crime and terrorism, since there are
hundreds of young men piled on top of each other in narrow
confines, jihadists next to Muslim Brotherhood members next to
revolutionaries next to sympathizers. There are also a large
number of young people who were also arrested by mistake and
who don't belong to any school of thought.
Everyone is suffering oppression and punishment inside the
prisons. Everyone is accused of being either a terrorist or a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is turning the people
arrested by mistake who don't belong to any movement into
jihadists. Moreover, Muslim Brotherhood members are gradually
becoming radicalized, since they suffer from inhumane treatment
in the prisons. The authorities treat the prisoners like
slaves, and this inspires a thirst for revenge, not to mention
the undignified treatment that the families face when they
visit.
ISIS has exploited the situation.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ ``In Translation: April 6's Ahmed Maher on Egypt under Sisi,''
Arabist, August 17, 2015, https://arabist.net/blog/2015/8/17/in-
translation-april-6s-ahmed-maher-on-egypt-under-sisi?utm_
source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=
%252AMideast%20Brief.
So I believe that the current policies of the government of Egypt
almost guarantee that terrorism will continue and may indeed expand.
Our military assistance program is pretty much irrelevant to the
effort to combat terror in Egypt. The Egyptian military has, as I've
noted, wanted to spend vast sums on submarines and frigates and high-
performance combat jets, all of which are useless in fighting terror
and waste scarce resources. I believe we should all be reviewing our
own aid to see how it can be made far more useful to the achievement of
our own goals: to repeat what I said earlier, to help achieve a stable,
secure Egypt that can defeat the terrorist threat it faces and protect
its borders, help to stabilize the region, remain at peace with Israel,
and protect the freedom and human rights of Egyptians.
Stratfor suggests some changes that would be useful: ``Such an
effort would require heavy investment into rapid reaction forces
equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication
gear. These forces would need to be backed by enhanced intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. In order to transport them,
Egypt would also need numerous modern aviation assets.'' \24\ By the
latter I assume they mean things like transport capabilities that would
permit getting well-trained counter-terror forces to where they are
needed very quickly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``Egypt's Conventional Military Thinking,'' Stratfor, June 12,
2015, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypts-conventional-military-
thinking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We need to discuss the mix of weaponry now being given to Egypt to
see how it matches with our objectives. As you know this has been an
American goal at least since 2015--to align FMF with shared security
interests. This is a matter of equipment, but also of training and
doctrine. And all of the aid, and the advice and training we give, of
course exists in a context--in this case, the context of growing
terrorist activity in Egypt combined with a repressive government
policy that seems most likely to increase rather than diminish the
ability of terrorists to recruit.
We remain too much on automatic pilot, continuing an aid program
that reflects a Middle East and an Egypt of 30 or 40 years ago. That's
why this hearing and the subcommittee's work to review that program and
rethink the aid relationship with Egypt is of such great value.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee.
Senator Graham. Mr. Malinowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM MALINOWSKI, FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Senator Graham, members of the
subcommittee.
Let me--I want to start by echoing a point that Elliott
Abrams made because I think the overarching question here is
what are our interests? What are our expectations with respect
to our relationship with Egypt? And what do we actually get for
this investment?
The aid program, the relationship, it has been based on a
longstanding assumption that Egypt is an important player in
the region. And with that assumption comes another that our
long-term interest and better governance, respect for human
rights sometimes comes into conflict with our immediate
national security interests.
We certainly, in the Obama administration, operated under
the assumption that there was a lot that Egypt could do for
regional security and for us. And we tried again and again and
again to engage them on a variety of common interests. And I
would say the reality is we were frustrated in the vast
majority of cases. More and more, it looked to us that Egypt is
becoming a country that sucks up aid, a lot more from the Gulf
states than from us, as you know, while contributing very, very
little to regional security and treating the aid as an
entitlement that simply must continue and continue and
continue.
About the only country--well, there is the longstanding
Egyptian commitment not to tear up the treaty with Israel. I
guess that is one thing that we get. At this point, in the
history of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, I would say that
that is something that sustains itself because it is very much
in Egypt's interests. It is not something that they do for us.
In Libya, their influence has been largely negative. After
receiving $70 billion of American assistance over the years, I
am sure you have noticed that there is not a single Egyptian F-
16s in the skies over Raqqa or Mosul helping us in the counter-
ISIL fight. Yes, they are engaged with ISIL in the Sinai, but
as we have heard, in ways that probably make the problem
steadily worse rather than better. And there is video that has
already been mentioned a couple of times, I think in addition
to showing something gruesome, also shows just how
counterproductive the tactics are. This is basically a window
into a strategy in which young men who may or even may not be
members of ISIS are rounded up, executed in cold blood, and
then passed off as casualties in a battlefield fight so that
the army can look good. We know from history that is the way to
lose a fight like this, not to win.
I think that almost any observer of the Sisi Government I
think would agree that over the last 2 or 3 years the primary
priority of the Egyptian military and General Sisi has not been
to fight terrorism or to improve governance. It has been to
make sure that what happened in 2011, the Tahrir Square rising,
that something like that can never, ever, ever, ever happen
again in Egypt and that the power of the military over the
country's politics and economics is not challenged again. And
as a result, they have concentrated as much on persecuting
their political opponents, peaceful protesters, independent
NGOs--the very people in the country who are most likely to
despise jihadism--as it has on hunting down terrorists.
So we know some of the leading dissidents in the country
from the 2011 period are still in jail. Tens of thousands of
others behind bars for nothing more than having attended a
demonstration or being members of a political party. A lot of
these folks languish for years in pre-trial detention, like the
American citizen Aya Hijazi did. Many are subjected to the most
brutal forms of torture.
Read, if you have the stomach for it, the coroner's report
on the death of that young Italian student, Guilio Regeni, who
was disappeared in Cairo last year, and you will have a sense
of the sadistic treatment that Egyptians experience at the
hands of their security agencies. The top officials of those
agencies know perfectly well, what goes on, and they do nothing
to stop it. In fact, one of the most notorious places of
torture in Egypt is the headquarters of the national security
agency, the successor to the old secret police, right in
downtown Cairo near Tahrir Square.
Meanwhile, crackdown on NGOs has intensified. The NGO law
basically makes it illegal for civil society organizations to
function unless they get permission for every single thing they
do from the Government. We have had a steady presence of
preposterous, ridiculous, and pernicious anti-American
propaganda in the state media. So the same Government that
comes up here and lobbies for less restrictions on assistance
in the name of better relations with Egypt, back home in Egypt
treats anybody who seeks to get support and partnership from
the United States as a criminal.
What should we do in light of all of these problems? Well,
I think we have to have realistic expectations. Egypt has been
experiencing this turmoil for a long time. Only Egyptians can
resolve this. It is probably going to take a lot longer for
that to happen. I do not think more positive engagement is
going to work very well, nor do I think more quid pro quo slap
on the wrist conditionality is going to work all that well in
terms of changing things fundamentally.
But thought it may be hard to change the way the Egyptian
Government treats its own people, one recommendation I would
have is that we should demand that it change the way it treats
ours. We should have zero tolerance for the mistreatment of
American citizens, for continued anti-American propaganda and
state media, and for the persecution of individuals or NGOs for
association with Americans.
I will say this half tongue in cheek. You can call this an
America First human rights policy for Egypt. These are things
we can demand and they will respect it if we demand them.
Number two, avoid complicity in these abuses. So, enforce
the Leahy Law when there are serious violations. Be very, very
wary--I would encourage you all--of any proposals to try to
strengthen, intensify, deepen, counterterrorism and
intelligence sharing partnerships with the security agencies
that are engaged in these abuses. They will abuse the
partnerships in addition to the people.
Third, avoid reinforcing the Egyptian sense that aid is an
entitlement. So cash flow financing of military aid, we should
not go back to that.
And then the big question is what do we do about military
assistance? What do we do about the $1.3 billion NFMF? I think
it would be a dispiriting choice to simply go back to providing
that unconditionally. It would just be helping Egypt buy
weapons that are ill-suited to meet the threats that it faces
while reinforcing that entitlement mentality and kicking the
serious problems down the road again.
Another possibility would be to provide most of it,
continue withholding the 15 percent currently withheld because
of human rights abuses. That would send a modest signal of
disapproval. Not sure if it would do all that much good.
The third option would be to step back and ask whether our
investment in Egypt is appropriate given the value we get from
it and the crisis and opportunities we face elsewhere. My
strong view is that the investment is completely out of
balance. Does it really make sense for this Government which
does so little for regional security which consistently rejects
our advice, which describes us to its people as a hostile enemy
to receive such a disproportional share of U.S. military aid.
So I agree. We should tailor what we provide to actual
counterinsurgency operations in places like the Sinai if they
are willing to accept it, which I am not sure if they would
under those terms, and think about where else in the region and
the world our partnerships are appreciated and our money can do
actual good in the fight against terrorism and for a better
world.
Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Malinowski
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
There is a perception of Egypt that has guided our engagement with
the country for decades. Egypt is the largest country in the Arab
world; historically, it has exercised great political, cultural, and
religious influence in the region as a whole. With that in mind,
despite the internal turmoil Egypt has experienced in the last few
years, the Obama administration, like its predecessors, tried to engage
successive governments in Cairo to address regional challenges. We
tried to address the internal turmoil, too, especially after the Tahrir
Square revolution created what seemed like a real chance to help
Egyptians build democracy. But as those hopes faded, Egypt began to
look once again like a classic case of a country where our long term
interest in better governance and human rights came into conflict with
our immediate need to cooperate with an important country on security
interests.
Looking back on our experience, I would say that the perception of
Egypt as an important player in the region, and thus our weighing of
the trade offs, needs revision. We should see Egypt more clearly for
what it has become: a country that sucks up aid from the United States
and the Gulf countries, treating our largesse as an entitlement, while
contributing virtually nothing positive to regional security or
prosperity. Yes, it is true that Egypt has maintained its peace treaty
with Israel, but that is not a concession to us; it is something it
does in its own interest. The one place in the region where Egypt has
exercised independent influence is Libya, where it has made matters
worse. It has played no significant role in the counter-ISIS coalition.
We've given Egypt more than $70 billion over the years, yet the last
time I checked, there were no Egyptian F-16s helping us fight ISIS over
Raqqa or Mosul. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military has taken our aid
while consistently rejecting the advice we've offered alongside it--for
example, that it fight the insurgency in the Sinai by securing rather
than punishing the population. As a result, that insurgency has grown,
and terrorism has increased in Egypt since President Sisi took power.
Despite all this, it is often said that President Sisi is the
counter-terrorism partner we need. He is a religious man committed to
secular politics. He says he wants to reform Islam. He promises to
protect Christians. He tells us a lot of what we want to hear. And I'm
willing to believe that he believes it. But we need to ask ourselves:
why would young people in the Muslim world who might be open to
persuasion by extremists look instead to an army general known for
imprisoning and torturing thousands of young Egyptians for moral and
spiritual guidance? General Sisi is not a man who can exercise
influence in such matters, whatever his intentions. What he should do
is to focus on governing Egypt well, delivering services and security
and giving his people the sense that they are being treated fairly and
with dignity. That would be the best thing he could do to counter the
extremists.
Unfortunately, neither good governance nor counter-terrorism has
been the Egyptian military's top priority in recent years. Its focus,
and General Sisi's, has been preserving its dominant position in
Egypt's government and economy. To that end, it has concentrated as
much on persecuting political opponents, peaceful protestors and
independent NGOs--the very people in the country most likely to despise
jihadism--as it has on hunting down terrorists.
Prominent dissidents like Alaa Abdel Fatah and Ahmed Maher, both
leaders of the 2011 Tahrir Square movement, remain in prison after
being convicted in unfair trials. Tens of thousands of others who are
not as well known are also behind bars for nothing more than having
attended a demonstration or membership in a political party or for
reasons that security agencies do not explain, since current counter-
terrorism laws basically give them carte blanche to do what they want.
Many prisoners languish for years in pre-trial detention, like the
recently released American citizen Aya Hijazi. Some disappear for weeks
or months, their fates hidden from family and lawyers. Many are
subjected to the most brutal forms of torture. Read, if you have the
stomach for it, the autopsy reports on the death of the Italian
student, Guilio Regeni, who was disappeared in Cairo last year, and you
will have a sense of the sadistic treatment Egyptians experience at the
hands their security agencies, especially when suspected of political
crimes. The top officials of those agencies know perfectly well what
goes on and do nothing to stop it.
One consequence of the Egyptian Government's conflation of
political dissent with terrorism is that in the country's overcrowded
prisons, peaceful protestors are held right alongside violent
jihadists. I've heard from people released from those prisons that
inside, the men from ISIS taunt those who had placed their faith in
political activism: ``You thought you could change Egypt through
elections and look at what happened to you; next time, don't be a fool
and fight with us.''
The Sisi government has also intensified its crackdown on NGOs. A
new NGO law the parliament adopted last November essentially places
civil society groups under government supervision, prohibiting work
that doesn't conform with the government's priorities. Here is an
example of what that means in practice: this February, the government
shut down the main organization in Egypt working to rehabilitate
victims of torture.
Meanwhile, the government reserves its worst persecution and
vitriol for those in Egyptian society who have received support from
the United States. Think about what this means: Even as the Egyptian
military takes billions of dollars from us, even as the Egyptian state
and its lobbyists make the rounds in Washington urging us to improve
the relationship, prominent Egyptians who commit the so called crime of
partnering with us are prosecuted or have their bank accounts frozen.
Mr. Chairman, two of your counterparts in the Egyptian parliament who
were among the most vocal supporters of good relations with the West
and peace with Israel were thrown out of the parliament last year,
including Mohammed Anwar Sadat, the nephew of the late President Sadat,
who was expelled for speaking to Westerners about the NGO law.
This doesn't just happen to those associated with democracy and
human rights issues. Last year, the Egyptians launched a smear campaign
against the U.S. non- profit organization RTI, through which we were
providing aid to Egypt's education system. The Egyptian Government
prevented us from spending a significant share of our economic
assistance because of restrictions it imposed or outrageous accusations
it made against the implementing NGOs. Eventually, we moved some of
that funding elsewhere.
All this has been part of a broader campaign in Egypt's state and
pro-government media against the United States. General Sisi himself
often has spoken about what he sees as the threat of ``fourth
generation warfare''--which other Egyptian military officials have
explicitly defined as an effort by the U.S. and other Western countries
to weaken Egypt through promotion of democratic values and funding of
NGOs. In the last couple of years, state media have constantly pushed
the message that the United States aims to destroy Egypt from within.
Some of it is obviously preposterous--my favorite was a full page
spread in one newspaper alleging that the Hunger Games movies contained
hidden signals to Egyptians to rise up against their state. But it's
not a laughing matter. This propaganda reaches a lot more people than
anything ISIS puts out, and it encourages deep cynicism and hostility
towards the United States. We raised this with General Sisi during the
Obama administration, and he has tempered his own comments since. But
the larger problem in state media continues, and we should be much less
tolerant of it.
What should we do in light of all these problems?
We should start with realistic expectations. U.S. officials have
spent countless hours with their Egyptian counterparts in recent years,
urging economic reforms, better military strategies, and greater
respect for human rights, offering help on all counts, to almost no
avail. More of that kind of positive engagement is not likely to help.
Any efforts to improve the relationship will likely be subverted anyway
by Egyptian actions to which we will have to respond. The video that
surfaced over the weekend showing Egyptian security forces in the Sinai
executing prisoners who apparently had been transported in U.S.
provided Humvees is a case in point--that kind of incident could
require, under the Leahy Law, suspending assistance to forces in the
Sinai unless those responsible are punished.
At the same time, I don't think that quid pro quo conditions on
assistance are likely to do much good, either, at this point. The
Egyptians don't believe we're capable of sticking to our guns for long
when we use that weapon.
If there is any chance for fundamental change in Egypt, it's going
to come from within. And it's probably going to take a long time. But
there are some sensible steps we can take in the meantime.
First, though it may be hard to change the way the Egyptian
Government treats its own people, we can certainly demand that it
change how it treats us. We should have zero tolerance for the
mistreatment of American citizens (several more of whom remain unfairly
imprisoned), for continued anti-American propaganda in state media, and
for the persecution of individuals or NGOs for association with
Americans. Call it an America First human rights policy. Swift
consequences for such actions would deter them and lead over time to a
healthier U.S.-Egyptian relationship.
Second, we should avoid policies and statements that make us
complicit in or legitimize the Egyptian Government's abuses. This means
having a correct relationship with General Sisi, without giving him
undue praise or suggesting that his rhetorical commitment to fighting
extremism excuses crimes that fuel extremism. It means enforcing the
Leahy Law. It means keeping our distance from the Egyptian security
agencies responsible for political persecution. I would encourage you,
Mr. Chairman, to be especially wary of any proposals to enter into
additional intelligence sharing or counter-terrorism partnerships with
these agencies; this is an area were congressional oversight is needed.
Third, we should continue to speak out publicly against human
rights abuses in Egypt, ideally in concert with European and other
allies. I am confident that the Egyptians care about their
international image, and that it matters to them greatly, for example,
when we and our allies speak with one voice, for example, at the UN
Human Rights Council. Multilateral diplomacy can be effective with
Egypt at least on the margins. We should it pursue it with greater
vigor.
Fourth, we should avoid reinforcing the Egyptian sense that U.S.
assistance is an entitlement. The Obama administration ended cash flow
financing of military aid to Egypt, and that decision should stand. It
makes no sense for U.S. taxpayers to be on the hook for subsidizing
Egypt's defense budget years in advance no matter what the Egyptian
Government does in the interim.
That leaves one final, critical question--what to do with our
military aid to Egypt? There are three basic choices here. We could
simply return to providing $1.2 billion a year unconditionally. That
would be a dispiriting choice, in my view--we'd just be helping Egypt
buy weapons that are ill suited to meet the security threats it faces,
while reinforcing its entitlement mentality, and kicking the tough
issues down the road once more. Or, we could provide most of the aid
package, while continuing to withhold the 15 percent currently withheld
because of human rights abuses. That would send a modest signal of
disapproval, but do little good besides.
The third option would be to step back and ask whether our
investment in Egypt is appropriate given the value we get from it and
the crises and opportunities we face elsewhere. My strong view is that
the investment is completely out of balance. Does it really make sense
for this government, which does so little for regional security, which
consistently rejects our advice, which describes us to its people as a
hostile enemy, to receive such a disproportionate share of U.S.
military aid?
Again, I'm not arguing here that we use aid as leverage to get
something out of Egypt. I'm simply arguing for spending money sensibly.
Let's provide assistance tailored to support the Egyptian military's
efforts to protect its borders and its people from terrorists--
assistance that might enable a true counterinsurgency campaign in the
Sinai, for example--if it is willing to use it wisely. But we should no
longer subsidize the purchase of planes and tanks that Egypt wants for
showing off at military parades, or for a hypothetical war with one of
its neighbors.
And then we should reprogram the bulk of the $1.2 billion subsidy
where we can actually achieve something and where our help is
appreciated. Think of what we could do with such a sum. We could make
sure every Syrian refugee child can go to school. We could provide
democratic Tunisia more of the support it needs to protect itself
against returning foreign fighters and to get its economy going again.
We could more quickly restore governance to liberated areas of Iraq and
Syria. We could do more to help the victims of famine in Yemen. With
just the teensiest fraction of that sum, my former bureau at the State
Department could do more to help victims of torture and persecution in
Egypt and elsewhere; it could make a huge contribution to our North
Korea strategy by getting more uncensored information to the North
Korean people; it could ensure that everyone in Iran has access to an
uncensored Internet in time for their presidential elections this year.
That's just my list; I'm sure, Mr. Chairman, you could come up with
your own.
I think our foreign policy would benefit from a more rational
allocation of foreign aid spending. I also think that our relationship
with Egypt, over time, would benefit if we could break out of the
straightjacket of an outdated policy and stop providing it with support
for which virtually no one in the U.S. Government can provide a
positive justification. Let's try to imagine a policy tailored to our
interests and values, and then work over time to put it into place.
Senator Graham. Well, thank you.
COOPERATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
We will do 7-minute rounds of questions and answers and I
will start off.
Mr. Abrams, I talked to Israel recently. They are fairly
pleased with the security cooperation between Egypt and Israel
regarding Hamas. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Abrams. Yes. The Government of Egypt, of course, views
Hamas as part of the Brotherhood, very much opposed to it, and
there is probably better cooperation against Hamas than there
has ever been. I think it is fair to say the Israelis are more
active now in helping in Sinai than they have ever been before.
Senator Graham. I hear reports where Egyptian helicopters
are flying from Israeli airbases to confront ISIL.
Mr. Abrams. I have heard those reports.
Senator Graham. So, on the good side, it seems like we have
a relationship between Egypt and Israel on the security front
that is productive.
REPRESSIVE NGO LAW
Tom, tell us about the NGO law very briefly if you could.
What are the new requirements of this new law they have passed?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, they have gotten tighter and tighter,
but basically a whole range of day-to-day activities that an
organization needs to conduct.
Senator Graham. Well, I have heard that you have to get
approval from the Government for a poll survey.
Mr. Malinowski. Sure, or any number of other activities.
So, first of all, those requirements give the Government the
opportunity to say no and to shut down particular activities,
but even if the Government is not so inclined, the mere fact
that you have to constantly ask for permission to do things is
just--it makes it virtually impossible to function. And it is
almost impossible not to--the rules are so complicated, it is
impossible not to be in violation of something at any given
moment, which means that at any given moment if the Government
wants to shut you down, it can.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Malinowski. An example of this, the leading
organization in Egypt for the rehabilitation of torture victims
was recently shut down, so.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Malinowski. Yeah.
Senator Graham. It is also true that American NGOs and
employees, the International Republican Institute and the
National Democratic Institute, have been convicted in Egyptian
court of being spies. Is that true, Mr. Abrams?
Mr. Abrams. It is true and it is an extraordinary thing.
Senator Graham. Ray LaHood's son.
Mr. Abrams. Ray LaHood's son is one of them. It is an
extraordinary thing. We are talking about Freedom House, IRI,
NDI. These are not subversive organizations.
Senator Graham. Right. I have talked extensively with
President el-Sisi about this. I appreciate what the Egyptian
Government did with Aya Hijazi. Clearly, I think they were
trumped up charges. She was acquitted within a few days of a
visit, so so much for we cannot control what happens in the
judiciary.
IMPACT OF EGYPT AS A FAILED STATE
Ms. Dunne, in terms of the future of Egypt, without some
economic reforms and without economic growth, what is going to
happen in Egypt? And to all of you very quickly--what does it
matter to us if Egypt becomes a failed state? Because that is
what I fear the most, quite frankly, is that we are headed that
way.
Ms. Dunne. Yes, Senator. That is true. That danger is
there. The employment problem in Egypt is enormous. The human
development problem in Egypt is enormous. They have failing
educational institutions, people coming out of secondary school
and even public universities without the basic skills needed to
be in the global workforce.
So those are major problems and, as I have said, the
Egyptian Government persistently makes economic decisions that
do not really empower the private sector, small and medium
enterprises, et cetera, to create jobs. That is what is really
needed to create, you know, labor intensive industries,
services, et cetera, to put Egyptians to work. Without that,
you have got a growing unemployment rate and you have a growing
population. The growing population, I think, is also related to
the fact that young women cannot get jobs and so sometimes they
marry very early and start families, have big families.
So they are--you know, this is--it is hard to see where
this is going. And what the Government keeps doing, and I think
Tom Malinowski referred to this, is just trying to attract more
and more external financing to keep them afloat, but that is
not a long-term plan. They need a productive economy.
Senator Graham. Elliott.
Mr. Abrams. But it is by far the most populous Arab state
with over 90 million people and growing fast. So if it were to
become a failed state, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the impact on
the whole Arab world would be destabilizing. It would be
destabilizing in North Africa and if you ever got refugee
flows, it would make the refugee situation in the region and
toward Europe that much worse.
Senator Graham. How realistic is that? Is that a
possibility?
Mr. Abrams. Well, I think it is a possibility that you
would see more disorder because, for one thing, as Dr. Dunne
says, the economic conditions are deteriorating. You have more
strikes. You could see more bread riots. So you could see a
deterioration which could--you know, it is a vicious cycle.
That produces more repression, which then produces more of an
uprising. So I think it is we should not assume stability in
Egypt.
Senator Graham. That is my question. We assume it just
because it has been there, but I do not think that is a good
assumption to make, given what I know.
Tom, do you agree with that?
Mr. Malinowski. Sure. You know, I do not think Egypt has
been stable for the last 6 years, since 2011. I think it would
be foolish for me to make predictions about when the next
political rising will be. We have no idea, but we do know that
this is a country that will demonstrate surface stability until
it does not. And because of its size, because of its
volatility, the consequences could be quite great.
Senator Graham. Thank you all. I will recognize Senator
Leahy now. Then we will go to Senator Moran.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize for being late. I am glad to see this panel. I know
all three of them and the subcommittee is fortunate to have
their views.
Egypt is an important country, at least in their mind. The
question is where is it going. We--yes.
Let me try a different microphone. Can you hear me all
right?
Senator Graham. Yes.
U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT AND EGYPTIAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Senator Leahy. Okay. In my lifetime, we have provided more
than $79 billion in economic and military aid to Egypt. That
does not include the excess defense equipment that runs into
billions more. Yet the Egyptian people seem generally unaware
of this, since the U.S. comes across so negatively in most of
the polls. Or maybe they do know it and they resent how the aid
has been used to prop up repressive actions in their own
Government. And the younger generation sees no prospects for
jobs.
Now, Egypt's position geographically does give it
importance. I don't know if it justifies the billions of
dollars we spend there. Thousands of members of political
oppositions parties have been imprisoned after sham trials.
Members of civil society organizations are falsely accused of
salacious crimes, and are detained for years. Critics of the
Government are tortured and killed, when U.S. officials and
independent press are denied access to areas where U.S. weapons
are being used amid reports of war crimes. I think we have to
ask some basic questions.
Secretary Malinowski, you have heard me ask these questions
before, but what are the Egyptian Government's intentions with
civil society groups? If they use anti-terrorism laws to arrest
these people, how should we react? What purpose does our $1.3
billion in annual military aid serve and what security threats
do they face to justify it?
I want Egypt to succeed, but certainly not in a way where
critics of the government are being repressed, where the
response to our concerns is ``give us the money, give us the
aid, give us the equipment. But we are not going to tell you
how we are going to use it.'' That's not acceptable.
Mr. Malinowski, you were Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights. I want you to know an awful lot of members of the
Senate, both Republicans and Democrats, applaud what you did.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
EGYPT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Senator Leahy. I am sure you had a lot of meetings with the
Egyptian authorities on human rights concerns. How did they
respond? Was it useful?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, my job was talking to authoritarian
Governments around the world. And I have to say the meetings
with the Government of Egypt were amongst the least productive
and most unpleasant in my time at the State Department. That
there are a lot of Governments around the world that do things
we don't like, but you can have a thoughtful and intelligent
conversation, intellectually challenging where you are talking
to somebody who you feel like they have got the best interest
of their country in mind, but they have a different vision for
how to achieve them. And in the case of Egypt, it is just
angry, rude denial of all problems and how dare you, U.S.
Government official, raise these things with us and where is
our money? Thank you very much. Goodbye.
Senator Leahy. That is giving them the benefit of the
doubt.
Mr. Malinowski. Yeah. I don't have to be as diplomatic
anymore as I used to be. And, you know, this is why I have come
to the conclusion that probably more endless hours of attempted
persuasion are not going to get us very far, that what we need
with the Government of Egypt is a stepping back, a bit of a
time out where we get out of this entitlement mentality where
they think that every part of the relationship is something
that we owe them. And we step back and try to design a
relationship and an aid program that actually is there to do
something positive rather than just an aid program that we
provide because of what we fear they will do if we somehow cut
them off. And----
Senator Leahy. When I express concern about human rights,
they say, ``Look how much we are doing against ISIL in Iraq,
Syria, Yemen.'' Are they?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, certainly not in Syria, certainly not
in Yemen. They are fighting ISIL in the Sinai, but as we were
discussing, in a manner that is probably making the problem
worse, not better. They face a very, very real genuine serious
security threat. Their soldiers, their police are getting blown
up. There are attacks in Cairo and other Egyptian cities. I
would like to be able to help them with that threat. I would
help any country facing that threat.
But what they have been absolutely resistant to doing is
taking the advice that our military and our national security
professionals have tried to offer with the equipment, with the
training that our aid pays for. And so you see these very ham-
handed tactics that, again, make the problem worse.
Senator Leahy. Chairman, my time is up, but Dr. Dunne and
Mr. Abrams, my staff gave me a summary of everything you have
already said and I was not only impressed, but I am very
appreciative of it from both of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
Senator Moran.
U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you
all for joining us this afternoon. I will try to do two or
three quick questions. What is the consequence to an alteration
of the aid we provide Egypt and the relationship between Egypt
and Israel? The historic connection there exists. Would you
expect any consequences today if we alter the aid that we
provide Egypt?
Mr. Abrams. Well, I would not, Senator. We saw even during
the Morsi period when there was some fear that he would
completely change the relations with Israel, he did not really
touch that. Good relations with Israel are in the interests of
Egypt. The army understands that. They are getting help. As
Senator Graham was mentioning, they are getting help in the
Sinai, so I think the answer is no impact.
Senator Moran. Okay. Anyone disagree? Yes, Ms. Dunne.
Ms. Dunne. Well, I don't disagree, but I would like to add
something, Senator. Look, I think that there is a good and bad
side to the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. The good side is the
military to military and security to security cooperation. The
not so good side is the civilian side of it and the people to
people side, which is very weak and very cold. And but I agree
with Mr. Abrams that the aid that the U.S. provides no longer
drives this.
And I would point out that there was a period during the
Obama administration shortly after the military coup of 2013 in
which much of the military assistance was suspended for more
than a year. I mean, that was the heyday of Egyptian-Israeli
relations, so I think that really proved the point that the
relationship now has its own logic, its own dynamic.
Senator Moran. Thank you. I was looking for that kind of
reassurance.
EGYPT AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Mr. Malinowski, you indicated about what is occurring in
regard to NGOs and Senator Graham followed up a bit on that.
What is the rationale? What benefits the Egyptian Government in
restricting NGO activity? Why is that a benefit to them?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, parts of it are more logical in a
nasty way than others. Certainly, if there is an NGO that is
working on anti-torture and your police and security forces are
engaged in torture, then you may not want that NGO running
around and making its reports. NGOs that work on press freedom,
on human rights issues, on any matter or anti-corruption, very
important. Any matter on which the Government is likely to be
exposed for doing bad things. It is natural that in an
authoritarian state like this would want to bring those kinds
of NGOs under control.
What is interesting and perhaps a bit less obviously
rational is that this crackdown has encompassed not just
organizations working on what you might think are politically
sensitive issues like the ones I mentioned, but virtually all
NGOs that operate independently from the state.
One of the problems we had last year in our ESD Program is
we had an NGO called RTI, which is one of the big sort of U.S.
AID implementers that was working on education programs in
Egypt--totally innocuous, non-political. And that organization
became subject to a massive campaign of public vilification in
the Egyptian state media. They are corrupting our youth. They
are spreading homosexuality. They are doing this and that. All
part of this larger campaign against foreign and particularly
American funding of NGOs.
So the Government uses this kind of nationalism, this anti-
Americanism, to vilify NGOs of all stripes. And in that case,
it resulted in Welfare Secretary Kerry pleading with General
el-Sisi, ``Please, take our aid. Do us the favor of taking our
money?'' And in the end, they would not do it, or they were
willing to take it if we just wrote them a check, but they did
not want us to do it through an independent NGO. And one of the
best decisions we made was to say, ``All right. To heck with
it. We are going to spend that money in Tunisia, in Iraq, in
Syria, and places where we have equally pressing interests, but
partners who want to work with us.''
Senator Moran. Thank you very much.
EGYPT AND RUSSIA
Mr. Abrams, you mentioned that Egypt is purchasing Russian
military equipment. Russian special forces have been dispatched
to the western desert in Egypt. Since intervening in Syria,
there has been a lot of concern about Russia asserting itself
in the Middle East. In changing how we provide aid, are we
giving Russians opportunity for more influence in Egypt and in
the region as a whole? What is the consequences to Russia and
its influence based upon decisions we might make?
Mr. Abrams. I think one would have to say that there would
be something of an opening for the Russians. Unlike the Gulf
states which are giving tens of billions of dollars or the
United States, we give about a billion and a half a year. The
Russians are not going to give them that kind of money, but
they would be willing to make loans and sell arms and equipment
and they would throw their weight around in Cairo if they see a
weakening of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship.
The thing is, you know, they cannot really replace us in
terms of economic aid, in terms of military aid, in terms of
technical assistance, but I think we would have to acknowledge
that you might see a kind of resentful Government of Egypt
talking to the Russians more. They are doing--for the first
time in history, they are doing now a military exercise with
the Russians in the western desert and they are doing that
already when the aid has not been cut back a cent. You might
see more of that.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing, both you and Senator Leahy, and to all of
our witnesses for your testimony.
EGYPT AND RUSSIA
Just to follow up a little bit on Senator Moran's question,
might we expect that Sisi would go back to the days of Nasser
where Egypt played off Russia against the United States in
terms of future assistance, Mr. Abrams?
Mr. Abrams. I think you would see him threatening to do
that. I think you would see that in the state press. It is hard
for them. I mean, you know, the whole military now after all
these decades is really equipped with American stuff. Now, they
are starting to diversify with these more recent purchases, but
I think you would certainly hear, if you will, threats of doing
that. And the Russians would love to take advantage of this. As
we have seen in Syria, they would like to reinsert themselves.
For Putin, this would be a dream come true. So I don't--I think
we have to acknowledge that there is a danger of the Egyptians
moving in that direction.
Senator Shaheen. Did either--did you want to comment on
that, Mr. Malinowski?
Mr. Malinowski. Yeah. I mean, I agree with Mr. Abrams. And
they will if we let them, in a way. I mean, it is an old game,
right? And we remember that game in the Cold War where all
kinds of authoritarian countries in the developing world would
play us off against the Soviet Union. If you are not nice to
us, we will go to Moscow or we will go to Beijing.
And I hope we don't allow ourselves--this is a much bigger
question than just Egypt. In this era of unfortunate great
power, resume great power competition, I hope we don't allow
our decisions to be influenced too often by that kind of
calculus because all we would be doing is empowering people
like Sisi to get what they want by making that trip to Moscow
and being pictured with Putin and then scaring us into giving
him more. I don't think that is in our interest.
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Dunne, did you want to add something?
Ms. Dunne. Yes. Thank you, Senator. I just wanted to add
that I think this is already happening, in effect, and I think
it will happen even if we continue providing the military aid
at the full level, that clearly President Sisi admires Putin a
great deal, approves. He said openly from the beginning that he
approved of the Russian intervention in Syria and perhaps would
feel the same way about Libya, that he is ramping up the
relationship with Russia in a number of ways. So I think he is
going to move forward with that relationship even if we provide
all the aid.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON PROGRESS
To follow up, Dr. Dunne, I was struck by your testimony
where you point out that what under Sisi Egypt is moving to a
state where even more so than under Mubarak the interests of
the few are what overrides decisionmaking as opposed to the
interests of the many. Remembering the press reports about the
brief time in which the Muslim Brotherhood controlled Egypt,
and there were a number of reports about mainstream Egyptian
society. I am probably using the wrong term there in terms of
identifying who was concerned about that, but there were
definitely reports that there were many Egyptians who were not
happy with that situation and who were feeling relieved when
Sisi actually took back control in Egypt.
So to what extent do we think the Egyptian people are happy
with what Sisi is doing and the direction that he is heading
and how do we speak to the people of Egypt in terms of the
support that we want to provide?
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Senator. Look, I think that it is
certainly true that while Mohammed Morsi of The Muslim
Brotherhood was president of Egypt, it was a very brief time.
It was a year. You know, there were concerns among more secular
Egyptians who don't consider themselves Islamists that the
Brotherhood would sort of try to bring about different
expressions of Islamic law or things like that. There
definitely were concerns.
Now, the Brotherhood through Morsi was in power a very
brief time and, frankly, they did not have time to do any of
that. And we can only kind of imagine what they would have
done. What they did do, which Senator Graham indicated earlier,
was to, you know, overplay their hand and they did a number of
undemocratic things. They sort of manhandled the Egyptian
judiciary and forced through a constitution that a lot of
Egyptians did not agree with, right?
So it is true. There was a lot of public resentment and
opposition to Morsi, but I think unfortunately what the
military did was use that to not only remove Morsi, but to end
the democratic transition. And that is--I do not think that is
what most Egyptians wanted. You know, people went out in the
millions in June 2013 calling for a new presidential election.
They wanted a chance to vote again on whether Morsi should
continue his term or not. That is not what they got. They got
an end to the whole thing and a restoration of military rule in
a much more direct and brutal way than they had under Mubarak.
Sisi is growing increasingly unpopular. There is not much
polling in Egypt nowadays, but the little there is shows that
because of his failure to deliver what he promised, either in
terms of security or in terms of improving the economy,
Egyptians are becoming disenchanted. But at this point because
he has thrown so many people in prison and eliminated so many
opposition political forces, they really do not have many
alternatives from which to choose.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
EGYPT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Mr. Malinowski, the recent visit by President Sisi saw the
White House saying that they did not want to make human rights
an issue, a public issue. They preferred to work behind the
scenes. President Trump suggested that. Is that a good approach
for us to be taking when it comes to the human rights issues in
Egypt?
Mr. Malinowski. You will not be shocked to hear me say no
and it is not just the impact on Egypt that I am concerned
about. I am somewhat pessimistic about our ability to influence
Egypt in any fundamental way right now. But when I was
Assistant Secretary, I would often find in traveling around the
world in Africa and Asia people would throw certain emblematic
examples of American relationships with other countries in my
face, and Egypt was one of them. Oh, you know, you are here.
You are criticizing us. You are urging us to do this and that,
but look, in Egypt you are propping up.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Malinowski. And I would explain, look, we are not. You
know, it is much more complicated and we are criticizing them
and withholding some aid. But the point is that when the whole
world sees the spectacle of the Egyptian general coming to the
White House and being praised in such a way by the President of
the United States and then the statement that we will not talk
about human rights publicly. And I am afraid it affects
perceptions of what we stand for in the hearts and minds of
people in every part of the world in a negative way.
I am glad they got Aya Hijazi out of prison and I applaud
President Trump for bringing her to the White House when she
returned. That was a good symbolic action. But the way that
visit itself was handled, I was very sad.
Senator Shaheen. Me too. Thank you all.
Senator Graham. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Graham, and Ranking
Member Leahy for convening the hearing and for our assembled
witnesses for testifying today. I must say that this is a very
disheartening hearing. It is a reminder just how challenging it
is for us to pursue our three goals of promoting regional
security, supporting American values, and defending human
rights in a country that has received more than $70 billion in
U.S. bilateral aid over many, many years.
And many of the topics I had thought I would address have
already been discussed by others, so let me focus on a few
specific questions. Given the broad and intense crackdown on
human rights that has been going on under the current
Government in Egypt, I am concerned about it undermining long-
term efforts to build any enduring political institutions or to
successfully combat and defeat violent extremists.
U.S. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS FOR EGYPT
So, first, there is a significant amount, if I understand
right, of unobligated Economic Support Funds--I think something
like $600 million. There were reports last year that these are
funds that multiple organizations had not received as
implementing partners of ours and never got final approval from
the Egyptian Government to continue their work. Why is Egypt
delaying these funds and why should we continue to provide
funds when there is such a dramatic backlog? $600 million is
not chicken feed. That is real money and could make a
significant difference in a country that has so many basic
challenges addressing the real human needs of its people. I am
looking for any volunteer from the panel who wants to address
that one.
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. And, you know, unfortunately, there is a long history
of real problems between the United States Government and the
Egyptian Government in getting the economic support funds spent
in a productive way.
One thing that there have been disagreements sometimes
about economic reforms that were needed. There has been
Egyptian Government resistance, but then, you know, puzzlingly,
even when sometimes there was agreement on steps to be taken,
there was even, you know, specific programs agreed upon and
signed and so forth with Egyptian ministries, there are times
when the Egyptian Government then has obstructed the
implementation of programs. I believe Tom Malinowski was
referring to just such a program of educational assistance that
was to have been implemented by RTI.
And so I think what this gets down to is a couple of
things. One thing is that there is a deep xenophobia inside the
Egyptian Government, particularly certain parts of the Egyptian
Government, the security establishment, and they fight very
hard against engagement between--people to people engagement
between Egyptians and foreign organizations, nongovernmental
organizations and so forth. And they will try to block it
because of their deep suspicion.
The other thing is that basically there are parts of the
Egyptian Government, they really want the aid in cash. And
sometimes they will just try to stonewall programs in the hopes
that it will eventually just be delivered in cash as cash
budgets support with few or no conditions.
So there is a long history of this. And if you would permit
me, Senator, my own feeling about this is this could usefully
be converted into something like, for example, a fund for
scholarships, for university and vocational educational
scholarships for Egyptians, for the kind of training that they
need that perhaps could be implemented with a minimum of
Egyptian Government involvement.
Senator Coons. Interesting.
Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Yeah. So a while back President Sisi made a
speech which he mentioned a concept notice, well, that he
referred to as fourth generation warfare. And what he meant by
that, as other Egyptian officials explained in more detail, was
an effort by the United States and other western countries to
destroy Egypt from within--I am using their terms--by through
these kinds of assistance programs, subverting Egyptian youth,
spreading western ideals, democratic ideals, human rights
ideals, et cetera.
We had a talk with him about that during the former
administration and about the broader problem of this anti-
American propaganda. And we did not hear as much of that
personally from him subsequently, but certainly in the Egyptian
state media, pro-Government media, these kinds of attacks on
our aid providers, including RTI, continued to the point where
it became very, very difficult for them to continue to do their
work. They worried about the safety of their Egyptian
employees, amongst other things.
I totally agree that, you know, something like a
scholarship program would be a great way to spend economic
assistance money in Egypt. It would be the thing probably above
all that ordinary Egyptians would appreciate. I am not sure if
we could implement it because you cannot just do it remotely.
You have got to have people there to do the selection and
figure out, you know, who gets what. And I do not know if we
can do that without risk.
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
Senator Coons. I have just a minute and a half left, so let
me--two other questions, and, Mr. Abrams, I will invite you to
answer all of these in one move, if you could. Some have called
upon the Trump administration to designate the Muslim
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and I would be
interested, Ms. Dunne, if there is sufficient evidence to do so
and what would the consequences be.
And then last, Mr. Abrams, you might combine a comment on
ESF with whether long-term stability in Egypt is possible
without strengthening civil society. And I would be interested
in hearing what concerns you have about the attack on civil
society. Thank you.
Mr. Abrams. Well, I just wanted to start by saying on the
international cooperation question, part of the problem is the
so-called Ministry of International Cooperation in Cairo, which
is about the least cooperative agency on the face of the Earth
when it comes to implementing American aid programs. I will
leave the MB answer to others, but, no, you should not
designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
That would be, I think, a very foolish move.
Egypt is not going to be stable if there is nothing in it
but the army and the opposition to the army.
Senator Coons. Right.
Mr. Abrams. And if all of the civil society organizations
that represent actually not just Egyptians, but represent
American values as it turns out in Egypt like freedom of press
and freedom of speech, freedom of association, free trade
unions are crushed by the state that is going to weaken
stability in Egypt not only in the long run, but I would say in
the medium run.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Ms. Dunne.
Ms. Dunne. Briefly on the Muslim Brotherhood question,
Senator. First of all, no, I do not believe the evidence
exists. First of all, there is not anything really globally
called the Muslim Brotherhood, but even let's just look at the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood itself. I do not think the evidence
exists that they are carrying out actions that meet the U.S.
legal standard of terrorist activity.
Second of all, I would say that I think if the United
States decided to designate regardless even without the
evidence, it would be handing a major victory to ISIS because
they are the ones who have argued that, you know, only violence
works and therefore that those Islamists who tried to pursue
change through political or other means were fools.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much. I appreciate the whole
panel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Senator Graham. Senator Daines.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the panel for coming today. Foreign assistance can serve as an
effective tool of American foreign policy and advance U.S.
interests abroad, whether it be humanitarian aid or economic
and military support. That being said, it is essential the
programs are administered in open, transparent, and accountable
fashion that minimizes the potential of running into any
consequences or use by inappropriate recipients.
The significance of accountability was further highlighted
by the recent horrific terrorist attacks on Coptic Christians
and others in Egypt. Ensuring the U.S. taxpayer dollars and
equipment does not end up in the wrong hands is certainly of
utmost importance.
SCENARIOS FOR EGYPT'S DEVELOPMENT
Dr. Dunne, in terms of Egyptian political stability, what
do you see as potential best and worst case scenarios for the
next 2 to 3 years?
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Senator.
Look, the best-case scenario would be that, you know, some
sort of a return to a more open political process in which more
people can participate, a turn away from repression and human
rights abuses, a change in the economic policies towards
something that is a little more private sector oriented and
oriented toward generating jobs for ordinary Egyptians. I wish
I thought that was a likely scenario, but I have not seen any
indications that things are going that way.
The worst-case scenario, you know, there is a possibility
of sort of political unrest similar to what happened in 2011.
What is even worse than that though, would be if the insurgency
that is based in Sinai and the individual cells related to ISIS
that we see starting to pop up in the Egyptian mainland were to
really take off, you know, into a kind of--a larger insurgency.
And that is my fear about the Egyptian Government's approach
right now, that they are actually driving towards this
insurgency becoming a much larger thing and really
destabilizing the country.
UPCOMING EGYPTIAN ELECTIONS
Senator Daines. Thank you. So when you think about the U.S.
relationship with Egypt and particularly the continued U.S.
support for President Sisi, what are the potential benefits as
well as the risks ahead of the next Egyptian presidential
election?
Ms. Dunne. Yes, Senator. As you point out, so President
Sisi's term ends about a year from now in May of 2018. And I do
think the United States has to be careful about the signal that
we send, that we should be supporting Egypt as a nation, the
Egyptians as a people, and making a vote for a positive future
for Egypt without endorsing necessarily President Sisi himself
or the specific policies that he is pursuing because many of
them are quite troubling.
U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAMS FOR EGYPT
Senator Daines. Mr. Abrams, on your testimony, you state
that the Egyptian military remains a force designated--or
excuse me--designed to conduct conventional war, not to fight
terrorism. With that in mind, the previous administration
proposed to require military assistance to Egypt to be directed
to be used for, and I will quote, ``counterterrorism, border
security, Sinai security, and maritime security.'' Are these
appropriate and effective conditions?
Mr. Abrams. I think it is the right idea. I think the
problem in part is that that may be what we direct our aid to,
but if the Egyptian military is meanwhile buying submarines
which they do not need to combat terrorism, buying high
performance combat jets which they do not need to combat
terrorism, they are wasting an awful lot of the resources. So
we are pouring it in, but they are pouring it out on the wrong
end.
But I think what the Obama administration did in trying to
push them in that direction is the right thing to do and I
would hope that the Congress would continue it.
IMPROVING U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT
Senator Daines. So along that line then, what other
conditions might you recommend to ensure that U.S. assistance
is used effectively and does advance our interests?
Mr. Abrams. First, that we continue to insist that it be
used on a certain kind of program, a certain kind of weapons
system. I also think they need more training to do this in a
way that suggests that they are killing terrorists rather than
civilians.
The Egyptian military has said--it is in the testimony--
they have killed about 2,500 ISIS people in Sinai and captured
2,500. That is 5,000. But the CIA estimates there are only
between 500 and 1,000 anyway, so these numbers are not
reliable. And I think we ought to have some conversations with
the Egyptian military in which they are more honest with us
about what they are doing and in which they are not creating
jihadis by attacking civilians in Sinai, creating sympathy for
the Sinai province of ISIS.
IMPORTANCE OF EGYPT TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Senator Daines. So many of us were back home the last
couple of weeks and if you talk to the men and women on the
street and if they were here in this and were asked the
question, ``Are U.S. interests, are they served by sending U.S.
taxpayer dollars to Egypt and why should America care?'' I will
let Mr. Abrams answer that. How would you respond then talking
to the person on the street as oftentimes we are having to
justify when we go back home----
Mr. Abrams. Yeah.
Senator Daines [continuing]. The significant amount of
dollars that are sent overseas.
Mr. Abrams. The latter part, I think we can say, is in a
sense easier. We have learned the hard way that terrorism that
emerges in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. So
we are talking here about terrorist groups, the strength or
weakness of terrorist groups that seek ultimately to attack the
United States.
Now, whether $1.3 billion for Egypt, looking at the global
question of combatting terrorism, whether $1.3 billion for
Egypt can really be defended today I think is a lot harder to
explain to your constituents.
Senator Daines. Dr. Dunne, Egypt's economy has grown in
recent decades. You pointed that out. It still faces challenges
in private sector growth, unemployment, especially for young
people, Egyptians under the age of 30. How would you recommend
the United States help boost Egypt's economy and do you see
opportunities in the ag and potentially natural resource
sectors?
Ms. Dunne. Thank you, Senator.
So I have already mentioned that I do think the United
States should support human development, the development of the
Egyptian labor force, so young Egyptians coming into the market
have good skills through our education, you know, which is
highly valued.
On the job creation side, you know, we really have this
problem with Egyptian Government policies not supporting--not
changing their policies in such a way as to support the private
sector small and medium enterprises. It could be the
agricultural sector is one of the promising sectors in Egypt.
So what we can do, I think we have been trying to do some
things through the Egyptian American Enterprise Fund. The
United States, you know, has established this fund and I think
it is starting to do some things that set a good example of how
one would encourage small and medium enterprises and so forth,
but admittedly, this is a very, very tough one. And several
administrations have tried and not been successful in getting
the Egyptian Government to change its policies in such a way as
to really generate jobs. It is a very tough one.
What we can do is try to set a good example and do the best
thing we can do, a little bit of good with the amount of aid
that we are comfortable providing.
Senator Daines. Thanks, Dr. Dunne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for your testimony today.
And, Dr. Dunne, I think you are right on the mark when you
said there is absolutely no way the Egyptian people bargained
for the kind of repressive regime that they have today, 60,000
political prisoners, journalists being locked up. That is not
what the Egyptian people asked for.
I can also sense all of us are obviously frustrated because
we are struggling with how we can better use our leverage and
influence with Egypt, which over a period of time has been a
close ally of the United States. And I think you all made the
case very well that the United States is less reliant on
Egypt's sort of standing in the region. I think it is also fair
to say from Egypt's perspective, they are a little less reliant
on the United States given the amount of money they are getting
from the Gulf states and some other potential limits.
That is not to say we do not have leverage. So this
subcommittee is going to have to make specific decisions on
where we go on military assistance and economic assistance.
Thank you, Dr. Dunne, for your suggestions with respect to the
economic assistance.
CASH FLOW FINANCING
I would like to get from all of you where you stand on the
following things. Should Congress put in a restriction that
continues the Obama's administration's prohibition on the cash
flow financing? Should we put that in the legislation? Yes? All
three yes. Okay.
Now, Senator Daines raised the question about limiting the
military assistance to the four pillars that the Obama
administration had laid out, the counterterrorism, border
security, Sinai security, maritime security.
Mr. Abrams, you pointed out that there is a lot of
flexibility in those categories. Based on your testimony, it
sounds to me like you all might support actually a tightening
of those categories and making it even more focused on
counterterrorism in the Sinai, maybe some strict border
security type actions. Is that the case?
Mr. Abrams. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. All right.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes. And I would add access to the Sinai
for our people. I would add for journalists. NGOs would be an
important piece of this. I mean, if we are going to be serious
about counterinsurgency, there has got to be accountability
that goes with that. And one of the outrageous demands that we
made, ``outrageous demands'' we made on the Egyptians was if we
are going to be giving you all of this help in the Sinai, maybe
you should allow our people to go there and see what is going
on. And that was not received with great enthusiasm.
Senator Van Hollen. I hear you.
Dr. Dunne.
Ms. Dunne. Yes. I mean, and look, you know, the GAO report
from a year ago spoke about the very serious problems the
United States has had with end use monitoring and human rights
vetting that are required by our laws based on obstruction by
the Egyptian Government. So I think we need to take another
look at that and be serious about that, especially in view of
these very troubling recent reports about extrajudicial
killings.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it. And would you all support a
continuation of the 15 percent withholding unless there is a
certification that the Egyptian Government is making progress
toward more democracy and human rights?
Mr. Abrams. Actually, I would raise because the last year
has been really horrendous for human rights. So I would at
least ask you to consider going to 20 or 25.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
Ms. Dunne. I would agree with that. And I think also that
at a more basic level as long as we continue to keep the $1.3
billion in FMF on sort of autopilot and they know that is going
to be approved every year and then it is just a question of how
do we do it, then that is another thing that sort of removes
some U.S. leverage. I think it is time for a sort of ground up
assessment of what is really needed to help Egypt effectively
and in a way that we think we can monitor and respect our own
laws and so forth in doing.
Mr. Malinowski. I strongly agree with Dr. Dunne. Keeping
the 15 percent is better than nothing, but I think a much more
fundamental assessment is needed. The basic problem is that
Egypt does not view this assistance as having a policy purpose.
This is not money that America is giving us to help us achieve
something. It is owed. It is part of a deal that was struck
decades ago. And that mentality, I think, is what I could not
explain to your constituents and that needs to be broken.
Senator Van Hollen. Fair enough. So a provision extending
the ban on the cash flow financing, conditions that limit the
aid that we do provide, the military assistance that we do
provide, to an even narrower category, and then expanding the
withhold amount withheld or reducing the overall amount based
on the current conditions. Would you look--in terms of the
current conditions for withholding, do you have any suggestions
there? Do you think that the criteria are the right ones?
Mr. Malinowski. I think I would need to look at them again
in light of what is happening on the ground right now. I mean,
I think they are the right categories, but we always want to
try to hone them to the daily realities.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. And so my last question is
assuming the Senate accepts these recommendations and we move
forward with these conditions, obviously the Egyptian
Government will not like it, but what do you believe their
reaction will be? Do you think that they will move forward with
us?
Using this leverage in the way that we are talking about, I
assume your judgment is that this would be a sort of a moment
where we say to the Egyptians, ``This is not on automatic
pilot. We are serious about this.'' And that you believe that
will have a--in the long-term, a beneficial result.
Mr. Abrams. I don't think the Egyptians are going to walk
away. The aid is still very significant and it is very
significant for the military, which is President Sisi's base of
support. And, you know, what will happen if you cut the aid,
you, meaning the Congress, is that the administration will play
good cop bad cop in what is potentially a very useful way.
Ms. Dunne. And I would add to that, Senator, that clearly
President Sisi is eager to have a good relationship with
President Trump. He has sort of sought that avidly from the
time of the campaign until now. And so--you know, and the
administration has indicated that they are going to have a
fresh look at aid. I was struck by the fact that during
President Sisi's visit he did not get a promise, it seems, from
the administration to keep aid on autopilot, so there is a
moment here I think that can be used to redefine the
relationship in a way that is more in our interests.
Senator Van Hollen. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Senator Graham. Thank you all for a very helpful hearing as
we try to go forward. We are about to do, hopefully this week,
fiscal year 2017, but we will take all of this in terms of
fiscal year 2018. It is going to be a real budget struggle. We
have got to find a way to replace the sequestration caps. A 29
percent cut to the State Department is just unacceptable.
The reason we had this hearing is that we all care. I care
about Egypt. I want to have a good relationship with Egypt.
What I see is disheartening. I am not asking Egypt to do what I
am telling them. I am asking Egypt to listen to their people
who went out in the streets in 2011, and to me, this is not
what they bargained for. I don't think they got what they
bargained for from Mr. Morsi and I don't think they are getting
what they bargained for or hoped for from the current regime.
As to the taxpayer dollars we have, we are obligated to
spend them wisely consistent with our values. As to what Egypt
might do, I don't know what they might do. I just know what we
need to do. We need to reshape the relationship in a way that
is sustainable. A good outcome for Egypt is a good outcome for
us.
What is a good outcome? That everybody is sharing the
benefits or the economy, that the military is a strong
institution, but it is not the most dominant player in the
economy, and that political parties can form and people can
have their voices heard without fear. These are simple things
that we take for granted but have stood the test of time. And
that is not the direction we are headed.
As to what they might do with Russia or any other country,
I just hope they understand that we want to be friendly, but I
don't think it is wise to hook your wagon to Russian President
Vladimir Putin. What he offers Russia over time will be
rejected. It is just a matter of time before the Russian people
realize that Putin has played them for a fool, ripped them off,
put their country and their economy at risk. I hope Egypt will
take a new direction, not march toward Putin, but march away
from him. March back to the square where it all started.
With that, the hearing is adjourned. We will have the next
hearing on May 9 on democracy programs and sometimes later
about the fiscal year 2018 budget.
Thank you all for coming. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., Tuesday, April 25, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]