- STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

[Senate Hearing 115-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2018

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TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2017

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:17 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Lindsey Graham (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Graham, Blunt, Boozman, Moran, Lankford,
Daines, Rubio, Leahy, Durbin, Shaheen, Coons, Merkley, and Van
Hollen.

RUSSIA'S POLICIES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD SPECIFIC EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

STATEMENTS OF:
HON. PAVLO KLIMKIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, UKRAINE
HON. PIOTR WILCZEK, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
POLAND
HON. DAVID BAKRADZE, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF GEORGIA
HON. ANDRIS TEIKMANIS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
LATVIA
HON. ROLANDAS KRISCIUNAS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF LITHUANIA
HON. EERIK MARMEI, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF ESTONIA

opening statement of senator lindsey graham

Senator Graham. The subcommittee will come to order.
I want to thank Senator Leahy for being such a good partner
in this endeavor.
Our hearing today is on Russia's polices and intentions
toward specific European nations. The one thing that we have in
common with all of these countries: they are young, struggling
democracies and they are friends of the United States.
Out of respect for your families, I will not pronounce any
of your names. I will try to get your country right and you
have an opportunity when you speak to tell us who you are.
We have the Foreign Minister from Ukraine, the Ambassador
from Poland, the Ambassador from Georgia, the Ambassador from
Latvia, the Ambassador from Lithuania, and the Ambassador from
Estonia. I have met most of you on my travels, and I cannot
thank you enough for coming to this hearing today, and to share
with the subcommittee, and the American people, what is going
on in your backyard because you live in a very difficult
neighborhood.
I would like to welcome to the subcommittee Senators Rubio
and Van Hollen. Hopefully we can do things together that are
good for the country.
I will make a short opening statement followed by Senator
Leahy, and we will have 5-minute rounds of questions and
answers. Again, to each of you, thank you very much for coming.
Very briefly, everybody talks about what happened in our
election in 2016 and let me tell you my views.
The Russians tried to interfere in our election. I do not
believe they changed the outcome, but it was the Russians who
hacked into the Democratic National Committee. It was the
Russians who compromised John Podesta's e-mails. In my view, it
was the Russians who provided that information to WikiLeaks in
an effort to interfere with our election.
It is my belief if we forgive and forget regarding our own
election, we will invite future aggression by other countries.
The Republican Party and Democratic Party should be one when it
comes to foreign interference. An attack on one party should be
considered an attack on all. I want this subcommittee to lead
the way in terms of uniting our country to pushback against
Russia's interference in democracy at home and abroad.
The goal is to find out from these countries what it is
like to live in the shadow of Russia. What kind of interference
do they face in their daily lives? What are the efforts, the
tools, and the toolbox of Russia to undermine their
democracies? The subcommittee needs to create a counter-Russia
account, a soft power account.
This subcommittee has jurisdiction over foreign operations
and I would like to try to convince Americans it is in our
interest to put some money aside to help these emerging
democracies because at the end of the day, democracy should be
a goal of all of us simply because democracies tend not to go
to war.
I want to make sure we can do whatever we can within
reason. Money is tight, but it would be a good investment to
have a counter-Russia account to put some money aside--and
maybe cyber security assistance, maybe it is trade assistance,
whatever it is--that we can help you withstand this assault on
your democracies by Russia.
That is the goal: to understand what is going on and do
something about it. To each of you, thank you for coming to the
subcommittee. I think if we can come together and produce a
product, history will judge us well.
Senator Leahy.

statement of senator patrick j. leahy

Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you are
having this hearing.
I want to mention that Tim Rieser has always helped by
giving me a phonetic pronunciation, but I will still mix it up.
I think the fact that we have representatives of Estonia and
Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Poland and Ukraine, places that
many of us have visited; I know you have and I know Senator
Durbin has.
We know the stakes involved. This is the second
congressional hearing on Russia since the beginning of the new
administration. I suspect we are going to have many more.
It is also the benefit of hearing directly from the
representatives of countries that have experienced Russia's
military aggression, and economic and political interference
for many years.
We now count ourselves among those who are facing some of
the same kinds of interference. We learned the Russian
Government interfered in our elections to further its own
interests and our new President has said virtually nothing
about it.
He has made no secret of his admiration for President
Putin. He has called the American news media the enemy of the
people. That is something you might expect of President Putin,
but not of the President of the United States.
We need an independent investigation into Russia's
interference in our election. By knowing exactly what happened,
we can take appropriate action. But at the same time, I think
we need hearings, like Chairman Graham has called here, so the
American public will know what Russia is doing in other parts
of the world.
It is one thing when we see our leaders attacking the
American media. I disagree with that. I disagree when nothing
is said about Vladimir Putin's ruthless campaign to silence his
critics, especially to silence the Russian press.
We have not heard any criticism from our President about
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, Russia's
occupation of Georgian territory, the atrocities committed by
Russian forces in Syria, their support for the Assad regime, or
Russia's efforts to undermine stability and democracy across
Europe.
I think I want you to know that not everybody in this
country is praising Vladimir Putin. I do not. The chairman does
not. I think that supporting the independence of our friends
and allies when they are under a threat of attack is in the
United States' national interest.
I will continue to work with Senator Graham. I want to
ensure that U.S. assistance is made available for our partners
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
It is not because we are seeking a confrontation with
Russia. It is because we recognize the importance of ensuring
that our partners can maintain their sovereignty and provide
for their people.
Do I agree with the President in saying we should have a
constructive relationship with Russia rather than an
adversarial one? Yes, if that is possible. But we cannot ignore
the significance of the Russian Government's malignant
activities toward us and our partners if we want to protect our
own national interests.
So I thank you for having this hearing. I thank all of you
for being here.
Senator Graham. Thanks, Senator Leahy.
And we will start with the Foreign Minister of the Ukraine.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAVLO KLIMKIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, UKRAINE
Minister Klimkin. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy,
Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify before
you today. And of course, it is great to sit in the line here
with friends in front of the subcommittee.
Back in 1994, still as a young diplomat, I was involved in
the process of strategic nuclear disarmament. While working on
the Budapest Memorandum, I had already questioned its
effectiveness and feasibility to ensure security of Ukraine.
Still, and I have to say it, it was beyond my imagination
that in 20 years, one guarantor of our suzerainty and
territorial integrity, a permanent U.N. Security Council member
will invade Ukraine and occupy parts of its territory.
Why did it happen? Here is the key to understanding what is
the root cause of Russian policies and intentions to all its
European countries, particularly the Ukraine--for Putin, the
collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe of
the 20th century.
From the very beginning, he was and is still obsessed with
restoring the former Russian greatness. Of course, it could be
done in two ways. One way was to invest in building a strong
democratic state with the rule of law and competitive market
economy, honoring the international principle and order. But it
was not the Russian choice.
Instead, the Kremlin resorted to aggressive expansionism in
gross violations with the international law in different
dimensions: breaking the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Final Act,
undermining arms control and possibly violating the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and New START
treaties, aggressive with trade and energy pressure in
contradiction to the W20 principles and, of course, blatantly
violating human rights.
The Kremlin has developed the concept of hybrid warfare and
launched it with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the
invasion in Donbas. It is a highly sophisticated strategy which
mixes conventional aggression with economy, and economic
pressure with propaganda and misinformation, as well as direct
interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It is
waged daily against peaceful countries to undermine, disrupt,
and sow dissent.
It is spearheaded and lying in ruins across the globe by
the insidious television channel RT, which seeks not to promote
any particular narrative, but to undermine that of the host.
In real terms, this hybrid war against Ukraine translates
into a shocking number of Russian weaponry pumped into the
occupied Donbas and Crimea. It is now about 4,200 regular
troops and up to 40,000 militants. It is about more than 400
tanks and 800 armored vehicles. It is up to 1,000 artillery
systems and over 200 multiple rocket launchers, and around
23,000 troops in the occupied Crimea.
Just a few hours ago, the Russian agent at the
International Court of Justice made a completely ridiculous
statement that the Russian-backed militants actually discovered
all that weaponry had been hidden in the old Soviet coal mines.
It is in this case just today. Can anyone believe it?
Kremlin's war against my country over the last 3 years has
led to over 7 percent of the Ukraine being occupied, almost
10,000 of my fellow Ukrainians, both military and civilians,
losing their lives with a further 23,000 being injured.
Just in the last 6 weeks, the Russians and their proxies
launched a fierce attack against our troops and civilian
population in Avdiivka. Russia has recognized the passports and
documents issued by illegal entities in Donbas, and have also
completed the introduction of the Russian ruble as the currency
in the occupied territory.
Furthermore, Russia has also ordered the illegal
expropriation of the key enterprises in the occupied territory.
All this is nothing but the clear breach of each and every
point of the Minsk Peace Agreement.
The only viable way to negotiate with Russia is from a
position of strength and international solidarity. And no new
agreements should be made with Russia until such time as they
have delivered on their provisions and commitments.
So let me thank all of you for the enormous support which
the United States has given to Ukraine, in particular over the
last 3 years in our fight against the resurgent Russia. And all
the signals from the new U.S. administration give us great hope
that the United States' support for the Ukraine will continue
and increase. And this continued support is not just in the
interest of the Ukraine. It is in the interest of the United
States, and the freedom and stability of the wider
transatlantic alliance.
So I am asking the subcommittee for its explicit support in
a number of areas. Defensively, we have been supplied by the
United States, and continued military and technical support
would make a powerful statement to the Kremlin and improve
significantly Ukraine's ability to defend its territory against
the Russian army. This support has already shown its
effectiveness.
The battalion of the 73rd Brigade, trained by U.S.
instruction, was one of the most effective in repelling the
Russian attacks in Avdiivka. The units prepared by the U.S.
instructors appeared to be very effective on the frontline.
That is why we believe this kind of support and training is
very important and should be continued.
So I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of
funds authorized for security assistance to Ukraine in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017. And please
support the appropriation of funds for enhanced assistance to
Ukraine in the U.S. fiscal year 2017 budget and, of course,
forthcoming 2018 budget.
Ukraine also needs a long term security arrangement for
closer partnership and cooperation on defense and security. The
involvement of the United States will be key for any such
arrangement to work. Of course, we need U.S. support in re-
launching the negotiations of the signatory of the Budapest
Memorandum. The United States should play a key role in the
negotiation, both on Donbas and Crimea.
And finally, until Russia gets off Ukrainian land, there
must be no easing up of sanctions. If anything, they should be
increased.
Dear Senators, the Ukraine is on the frontline and
currently the only country fighting and dying to hold off
Russia. And Ukraine does not simply ask for support. We
currently spend 6.6 percent of our GDP on defense. At the same
time, it is obvious that we need the U.S. and transatlantic
solidarity with Ukraine and Ukrainian people.
A strong, stable, and democratic Ukraine able to defend its
borders against Russian expansionism is a crucial ally for the
United States in the region and globally.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Pavlo Klimkin
Let me thank you for giving me this opportunity to share with you
our assessments and related first-hand information on Russian policies
towards a big European country--towards Ukraine.
The current policies of Russia towards Ukraine can be expressed in
one word--the war.
It has been already 3 years since Russia launched a military
aggression against Ukraine on 20 February 2014. The appalling number of
victims highlights the immorality of Kremlin's war against the
Ukrainian people: over 9,800 Ukrainian citizens have been killed, about
23,000 wounded and almost 1.8 million have become internally displaced
persons. 7.2 percent of Ukrainian territory has been seized by Russia
and millions of Ukrainian citizens live there under occupation and
endless terror.
Two years after the Package of Measures for the Implementation of
the Minsk Agreements was signed, none of its provisions has been
fulfilled by the Kremlin and its proxies, including the very first
step--comprehensible and sustainable ceasefire.

--In 2016 there were about 16,000 ceasefire violations, including
about 5,000 ceasefire violations with prohibited artillery and
large-caliber mortars.
--In 2017 the OSCE SMM has recorded a notable increase in the use of
weapons proscribed by the Minsk agreements, including multiple
launch rocket systems and artillery.

The recent spike in violence in and around Avdiivka is an eloquent
example of controlled escalation strategy and a clear indication of
Russia's blatant disregard of its commitments under the Minsk
Agreements.
I would like to thank our partner the United States for training
provided to the Ukrainian military, which have already shown its
effectiveness. The battalion of the 72nd brigade trained in Yavoriv by
the U.S. instructors was one of the most effective in repeling the
Russian-control attacks on Avdiyivka.
The units prepared by the U.S. instructors appear to be very
effective on the frontline and they demonstrate the lowest level of
losses in manpower, better joint maneuvers and tactics implementation.
That is why we believe this kind of training and support in
enhancing Ukraine's defense is very important and should be continued.
Moscow's attempts to make security on the ground conditional on
implementation of its political demands breach the Minsk Agreements and
further exacerbate the dire situation of civilians in certain areas of
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The sustained attacks of the Russian hybrid forces would not be
possible without continued logistic support.
Russia keeps sending weapons, ammunition and manpower to Ukraine
through the 409.7-km of uncontrolled segment of the Ukrainian-Russian
state border. Heavy flamethrower TOS-1 ``Buratino'', radar jamming
system ``Zhytel'', drone Orlan-10--all manufactured in Russia and used
exclusively by the Russian Army--have been registered by the OSCE SMM
in Donbas over the past year and in 2017.
Russia continues to cover up the reinforcement of its proxies as
``humanitarian aid''.
On February 28 the Kremlin dispatched its 61th so-called
``humanitarian convoy'' without consent and inspection by the Ukrainian
authorities and ignoring the coordinating role of the ICRC as well as
principles of international humanitarian law.
Political settlement on the East of Ukraine is possible only if
adequate security preconditions are provided by Russia.
No political settlement on the East of Ukraine is possible while
there is constant shelling, wide presence of Russian troops and
mercenaries, weapon supply from Russia and no control by Ukraine over
its border.
Russia is imposing by brutal force a model of hybrid elections--
without termination of aggression, without legal institutions and law
enforcement agencies, without environment for return and expressing
their position through vote of over 2 million displaced persons,
without disarmament of illegal armed formations exercising terrorism.
The Kremlin's Decree of February 18, 2017 on recognition of so-
called documents issued on the territories of certain areas of the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, confiscation of Ukrainian assets (public
and private enterprises) and introduction of the ``ruble zone'' are yet
another evidence of Russian occupation of the part of Donbas as well as
a clear violation of international law and the Minsk Agreements.
Russia is also trying to water down the trilateral format of the
Minsk talks by granting the illegal +representatives of Donetsk and
Luhansk; full member status in the process of consultations.
Moscow is willing to disclaim all liability for the developments in
Donbas by insisting on its mediator status. Russia hopes that such an
approach will help it to mitigate or even to get rid of sanctions.
The developments in the humanitarian sphere require every strong
consolidated effort to unblock this important track of the Minsk
Agreements. The civilian population continues to suffer from
restrictions, deprivation and hardships inflicted upon them by the
Russian hybrid forces.
Despite Kremlins' commitments to put additional pressure on the
illegal armed formations to grant the international humanitarian
organizations, including the ICRC, access into the region, the
situation on the ground has not seen even the slightest change.
During the previous month, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in
Ukraine faced increased restrictions on freedom of movement for the
monitors and other impediments to its activities in non-government-
controlled areas.
Such actions carried out by the Russian and Russia-backed militants
in areas under their control are meant to disrupt the OSCE SMM mandated
activities, particularly those aimed at monitoring and verifying
withdrawal of heavy weapons, as envisaged by the Minsk Agreements.
According to the latest OSCE SMM daily reports covering the period
of 1-28 February 2017, the OSCE monitors registered over 130 incidents
of impeding the SMM's activities by the illegal armed formations.
The international solidarity and consistency of international
policy of non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea is very
important.
The illegal annexation of Crimea and the city Sevastopol has
imposed very serious challenges to the international security and to
human rights of people remaining in Crimea. The occupied Crimea has
become a ``grey zone'' where the militarization, repression and
political persecution are in growing progress.
The atmosphere of fear, intimidation, physical and psychological
pressure forced about 35-40 thousand Ukrainian citizens (including over
20 thousand Crimean Tatars) to leave occupied Crimea and settle in
other areas of Ukraine. Today the Crimean Tatars, having survived a
genocide of the Soviet deportation in 1944, once again face severe
repressions.
We witness murders, tortures, harassment, illegal detentions,
enforced disappearances, intimidation, raids and searches, attacks on
property and arrests under fabricated charges, and the persecution of
journalists, human rights defenders and activists.
The Russian authorities use such methods to eliminate any public
opposition to the occupation of Crimea and to the current government.
For the same reasons local independent media and journalists have
nearly all been co-opted, forced to flee, or run out of business.
Russia has designated the militarization of Crimea as a top
priority. The aim is to make the peninsular a powerful military base to
ensure full control over adjusting regions thus to counterbalance NATO
forces in the Black Sea region.
Comparing to the pre-occupation period, Russia has more than
doubled personal strength of its military in Crimea (from 12,500 before
the occupation to 29,300 as of October 2016). In the near future (2020-
2025) it should further increase up to 43,000.
Russia also has substantially reinforced and modernized its Crimean
military land, air and naval components. Since January 2014 it has
increased:

--a number of tanks from 0 to 40
--armed combat vehicles from 92 to 583
--artillery systems of the caliber more than 100 mm from 24 to 162
--combat aircraft from 22 to 101
--combat helicopters from 37 to 56
--anti aircraft systems from 0 to 16
--combat ships from 26 to 30
--submarines from 2 to 5

Particularly dangerous are the Russian actions to prepare Crimean
military infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons, including
refurbishing of the infrastructure of Soviet-era nuclear warheads
storage facilities. Potential carriers of nuclear weapon, such as
warships, short-range missile systems and combat aircraft, have been
already deployed in the Crimean Peninsula.
In fact, Russia turns Crimea into a ``grey zone'', which is de-
facto not covered by the existing multilateral arms control agreements.
Crimea has been already used by Russia for its outreached
activities (in Syria). Such role for military facilities in Crimea
might be developed in the future.
The militarization of Crimea complicates the process of its de-
occupation and poses serious threats both to the national security of
Ukraine and regional security.
The only effective response to aggressive actions of Russia should
be international solidarity with Ukraine and strengthening political,
diplomatic and economic pressure on the aggressor. Russia must fully
implement the Minsk Agreements and restore the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, including de-occupation of Crimea. Unless so done, the imposed
sanctions must be not only preserved but enhanced.
I am also confident that Ukraine can effectively retaliate the
Russian aggression only when its defense is strong and Kremlin
understands that further hostilities will be even more costly.
Appeasement and concessions made to the aggressor would only encourage
it for further aggression.
In this regard, we highly value the bicameral and bipartisan unity
and support of the U.S. Congress on the issue of utilizing sanction
policy against Russia.
We are grateful for your advocacy of an increased U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine, including through provision of defensive
weapons.
I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of funds
authorized for security assistance to Ukraine in the NDAA, 2017.
The NDAA, 2017 reaffirms once again the high level of continued
bicameral and bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress for Ukraine
fighting the ongoing Russian aggression.
It is also important that the U.S. security assistance to Ukraine
does not decrease in the forthcoming 2018 budget.
We are grateful that the United States has already provided $3
billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine.
We also very much appreciate the fact that the State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 cleared by
this subcommittee has authorized providing of U.S. loan guarantees to
Ukraine in fiscal year 2017 budget.
I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of the
necessary funds for the above purposes in the fiscal year 2017, and,
possibly, fiscal year 2018 budgets.
I would like to draw special attention to the situation with
humanitarian needs of Ukrainian people affected by the Russian
aggression. The horrors of war and its terrible consequences are daily
reality for millions of people, with no hope for a quick end to their
suffering. Totally Ukraine has 3.8 million people in need of
humanitarian assistance, including 1.7 million--in need of an immediate
assistance.
According to U.N. estimates, there is a need of at least $214
million in additional humanitarian aid for 2017 with a critical
requirement of $127 million. Ukraine's huge budget resources alongside
assistance from our Western partners are being spend on humanitarian
aid, but all these joint efforts are not able to meet existing
challenges. The United Stated is a lead donor of humanitarian
assistance to conflict-affected Ukrainians with more than $49 million
provided last year. At the same time, given the scope of urgently
needed help we would appreciate a decision of the U.S. Government to
extend humanitarian aid programs in Ukraine.
Given the large scope of challenges faced by Ukraine because of
Russian aggression, we count on increased U.S. financial assistance for
Ukraine that will help us implement the comprehensive reform agenda and
ensure Ukraine's economic sustainability.
Let me convey our strong belief that the Congress of the United
States will remain united in supporting Ukraine defending its
independence and choice for free and democratic future.
I thank you.

Senator Graham. Thank you very much. If you could, please
try to keep your statements to 5 minutes. We have questions
where you can tell us anything on your mind, but time is of the
essence in the Senate. So thank you very much.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. PIOTR WILCZEK, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
Ambassador Wilczek. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Senate
subcommittee. It is an honor to be here and I am pleased to be
able to provide the view of Poland's Government on Russia's
policy in Europe and the challenges originating from it.
The Kremlin has a chief strategic objective: restore the
superpower status lost after the fall of communism. The way to
achieve this goal seems straightforward, altering the security
architecture in Europe, thus impeding post-Soviet countries
from integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community.
First, the current situation, while pursuing its foreign
policy objectives, Moscow largely relies on force,
intimidation, and economic extortions trying to impose on other
countries an autocratic and oligarchic form of government.
Russia invaded Georgia, harassed Moldova, meddled in the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and violated international law by
annexing Crimea.
Finally, the Kremlin masterminded and keeps fueling the
conflict in eastern Ukraine. Although Moscow signed the
ceasefire agreements--Minsk I and Minsk II--it did not withdraw
from the region which is the point of departure to achieve a
political solution. Even worse, during the last weeks, we have
seen increasing military clashes in the Donbas.
Second, Russia is a growing military threat. President
Putin embarked Russia on a large scale modernization of its
armed forces. The introduction of new types of equipment was
coupled with the reform of military doctrine. The threshold for
the usage of nuclear weapons has been lowered.
Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania, became the
most militarized region in Europe. Russia equipped the exclave
with Anti-Access Area-Denial capabilities. This A2/AD bubble
aims at limiting NATO's freedom of maneuver and action on
Allied territory. It covers an area spanning from northeastern
Poland to the Baltic States.
Moreover, Kaliningrad is equipped with Iskander systems
nuclear capable missiles able of hitting targets in Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, and even in eastern parts of Germany.
Moscow conducts large scale snap exercises with openly
aggressive scenarios. We also observe an unprecedented number
of military incidents provoked by Russia, but the most alarming
issue is Russia's ability to take prompt and deceptive actions.
We saw that in Crimea.
Third, the hybrid dimension, the challenges posed by
Russia's actions go beyond the conventional military realm. We
see them in the cyber, informational, and energy domains.
Russia deliberately employs hybrid means to act below the
threshold of a military conflict. Moscow often acts by
exploiting national vulnerabilities and sensitivities. This
might involve actions in the cyber domain, frequently backed by
a fierce propaganda effort. Ukraine is a case in point.
While countries in Central Europe try to diversify their
import routes, Russia promotes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline,
creating divisions among EU member states. Should this project
go ahead, Russia could effectively hinder the diversification
efforts of the whole region. Increased gas supplies from Russia
would inevitably affect the economic viability of LNG projects
in Central and Eastern Europe.
Fourth, our response, two words--uncertainty and
insecurity--best describe the current security situation we
operate in. Such conditions and challenges call for an adequate
answer. NATO is the best platform to provide it. It is a unique
force multiplier.
Deterring all those threats and challenges requires a swift
and full implementation of the decisions taken at the Summit in
Warsaw in 2016. Furthermore, my government believes that the
Special Meeting of Heads of States and Governments should be an
important milestone in the process of adapting the Alliance's
defense and deterrence posture.
As the challenges we face are here to stay, the Enhanced
Forward Presence of Allied troops on the eastern flank of the
Alliance should have a long term character. Poland is very
grateful for those actions. It would be impossible to achieve
the Warsaw's Summit decisions without American leadership.
In this context, I would also like to thank you for the
deployment of your troops to our region under the NATO flag. A
long term American commitment to the Enhanced Forward Presence
(EFP) is absolutely essential. I would like to add that the
presence of American soldiers in Poland, as part of Operation
Atlantic Resolve, is of equal and paramount importance. Further
congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative
would be greatly appreciated.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, a
fair burden-sharing among allies is a must. Poland meets the 2
percent defense spending target along NATO guidelines. More
than 20 percent of our 2017 military budget will be spent on
military equipment. Our soldiers serve in missions in
Afghanistan and Kosovo. Poland contributes to collective
defense. A Polish tank company has been deployed to Latvia
under the framework of the EFP. Our vessel commands the
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 operating on the Aegean Sea.
Poland has always been ready to deal with the terrorist
threat. Polish and American soldiers were brothers-in-arms
during the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Altogether, more
than 40,000 Polish troops took part in both operations.
Nowadays, Poland is an active member of the Global Coalition
Against Daesh.
Moreover, our efforts go beyond the military domain. Last
year saw the opening of an import LNG terminal in Poland. It
could become a gateway for U.S. made LNG destined for clients
in Central Europe. Delivering gas supplies to Ukraine via
Poland would send a powerful political message, whilst
providing business opportunities for American firms.
Moscow orchestrated the conflict in the Ukraine and Moscow
has all the means to end it. Moscow signed ceasefire
agreements, Minsk I and Minsk II, but does not respect their
provisions. Moreover, Russia decided to recognize the documents
produced by the so-called Donbas Republics.
To sum up, taking into account Russia's actions, we see no
ground to ease the sanctions or to change our policy vis-a-vis
Moscow. Congressional support for maintaining transatlantic
unity and solidarity on this issue is indispensable.
A couple of weeks ago, General James Mattis said at NATO
headquarters, ``Europe and North America need to work together
stronger than ever in times of turmoil and unpredictability.''
I firmly believe that the political and military engagement of
the United States is necessary for preserving peace and
stability in Europe.
Let me stress that we remain open to dialogue with Moscow.
However, such dialogue needs to be conditional on Russia
changing its current policies and its stance towards
international law.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to taking your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Piotr Wilczek
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee,

Thank you for inviting me to testify before the United States
Senate Committee on Appropriations, State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Subcommittee. It is an honor to be here and I am
pleased to be able to provide the view of my government on Russia's
policy in Europe and the challenges originating from it.
Let me start by briefly outlining Russia's policy goals. Following
that, I would like to highlight four points for you to consider.
The Kremlin has a chief strategic objective: restore the superpower
status lost after the fall of communism. The way to achieve this goal
seems straightforward: altering the security architecture in Europe,
thus impeding post-soviet countries from integrating with the Euro-
Atlantic community.

First. The current situation.

While pursuing its foreign policy objectives, Moscow largely relies
on force, intimidation and economic extortions, trying to impose on
other countries an autocratic and oligarchic form of government. Russia
invaded Georgia, harassed Moldova, meddled in the Nagorno Karabach
conflict and violated international law by annexing Crimea. Finally,
the Kremlin masterminded and keeps fueling the conflict in eastern
Ukraine. Although Moscow signed the ceasefire agreements--Minsk I and
Minsk II--it did not withdraw from the region what is the point of
departure to achieve the political solution. Even worse, during the
last weeks we have seen increasing military clashes in the Donbas.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine ended the period of a post-
Cold War stability. Moscow decided to undermine the European security
architecture, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.
All these actions have been heralding the course of President
Putin's Russia. Having left the path of dialogue and democratic change
sparked in the early 1990s, it evolved into a dark residue of the
Soviet menace. Yet again, military power became the Kremlin's chief
tool for pursuing its policy objectives.

Second. Russia is a growing military threat.

President Putin embarked Russia on a large-scale modernization of
its armed forces. The introduction of new types of equipment was
coupled with the reform of the military doctrine. The threshold for the
usage of nuclear weapons has been lowered. Newly created military units
have been deployed to the western parts of the country.
Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania, became the most
militarized region in Europe. Russia equipped the exclave with anti-
access/area-denial capabilities. This A2/AD ``bubble'' relies on a
combination of sophisticated anti-aircraft, anti-shipping and
electronic warfare systems. It aims at limiting NATO's freedom of
maneuver and action on Allied territory. It covers an area spanning
from North-Eastern Poland to the Baltic states.
Moreover, Kaliningrad is equipped with ``Iskander'' systems. These
short-range ballistic missiles are nuclear-capable and able of hitting
targets in Estonia, Latvia, Poland and even in eastern parts of
Germany.
Moscow conducts large-scale snap exercises with openly aggressive
scenarios. The last snap military drills took place in Kaliningrad this
February. We also observe an unprecedented number of military incidents
provoked by Russia with Russian airplanes and warships violating Allied
airspace and waters.
But the most alarming issue is Russia's ability to take prompt and
deceptive actions. We saw that in Crimea.

Third. The hybrid dimension.

The challenges posed by Russia's actions go beyond the conventional
military realm. We see them in the cyber, informational and energy
domains.
Russia deliberately employs hybrid means to act below the threshold
of a military conflict. Moscow often acts by exploiting national
vulnerabilities and sensitivities. This might involve actions in the
cyber domain, frequently backed by a fierce propaganda effort. Ukraine
is the case in point.
Take energy. Russia largely relies on oil and gas sales for its
exports revenues. This is a simplification. In 2013 oil and petroleum
products were responsible for 54 percent of the Russian gross exports
sales. Gas accounted for 14 percent. These are all EIA figures. From
the Russian perspective, it was not only easy, but also not so costly
to use gas as a political weapon.
Nowadays countries in Central Europe largely rely on Russia for
their energy imports. Moscow uses energy resources as a tool in foreign
policy. Countries cooperating with Russia benefit from large discounts
on their energy bills. Those seeking integration with the West end up
paying high prices or are threatened with being cut off from supplies.
Just look at Ukraine.
Today, while countries in Central Europe try to diversify their
import routes, Russia promotes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, creating
divisions among EU member states. Should this project go ahead, Russia
could effectively hinder the diversification efforts of the whole
region. Increased gas supplies from Russia would inevitably affect the
economic viability of LNG projects in Central and Eastern Europe.

Fourth. Our response.

We have been living in a changed security environment for more than
3 years. Two words--uncertainty and insecurity--best describe the
current security situation we operate in. Such conditions and
challenges call for an adequate answer. NATO is the best platform to
provide it. It is a unique force multiplier.
Deterring all those threats and challenges requires a swift and
full implementation of the decisions taken at the Summit in Warsaw.
Furthermore, my government believes that the Special Meeting of Heads
of States and Governments scheduled to take place in Brussels later
this year should be an important milestone in the process of adapting
the Alliance's defense and deterrence posture.
As the challenges we face are here to stay, the enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) of Allied troops on the Eastern flank of the Alliance
should have a long-term character. Poland is very grateful for those
actions. It would be impossible to achieve the Warsaw's Summit
decisions without American leadership.
In this context I would also like to thank you for the deployment
of your troops to our region under the NATO flag. A long-term American
commitment to the eFP is absolutely essential. I would like to add that
the presence of American soldiers in Poland as part of Operation
Atlantic Resolve is of equal and paramount importance. Further
congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative would be
greatly appreciated.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

Before concluding allow me to underline that we take our
commitments seriously. A fair burden-sharing among Allies is a must.
Poland meets the 2 percent defense spending target along NATO
guidelines. More than 20 percent of our 2017 military budget will be
spent on military equipment. Our soldiers serve in missions in
Afghanistan and Kosovo. Poland contributes to collective defense. A
Polish tank company has been deployed to Latvia under the framework of
the eFP. Our vessel commands the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2
operating on the Aegean Sea.
Poland has always been ready to deal with the terrorist threat.
Polish and American soldiers were brothers-in-arms during the missions
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Altogether, more than 40 thousand Polish
troops took part in both operations. Nowadays, Poland is an active
member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. Our F-16 fighter-jets are
flying over Iraq.
Moreover, our efforts go beyond the military domain.
Together with our Danish and Norwegian partners we are working on a
big-scale diversification project: the Baltic Pipe. A natural gas
pipeline linking the Norwegian fields with Poland via Denmark. It would
allow direct imports of natural gas from Norway to Poland. It could
also be used to ship re-gasified LNG from Poland to Denmark.
Last year saw the opening of an import LNG terminal in Poland. It
could become a gateway for U.S.-made LNG destined for clients in
Central Europe. Delivering gas supplies to Ukraine via Poland would
send a powerful political message, whilst providing business
opportunities for American firms.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

Moscow orchestrated the conflict in Ukraine and Moscow has all the
means to end it. It signed ceasefire agreements, Minsk I and Minsk II,
but does not respect their provisions. Moreover, Russia decided to
recognize the documents produced by the so-called Donbas republics.
Is it a proof of good will?
To sum up, taking into account Russia's actions, we see no ground
to ease the sanctions or to change our policy vis-a-vis Moscow.
Congressional support for maintaining transatlantic unity and
solidarity on this issue is indispensable.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

A couple of weeks ago General James Mattis said at the NATO HQ that
``Europe and North America need to work together stronger than ever in
times of turmoil and unpredictability''--I couldn't agree more with his
statement. I firmly believe that the political and military engagement
of the United States is necessary for preserving peace and stability in
Europe.
Let me stress that we remain open to dialogue with Moscow. However,
such dialogue needs to be conditional on Russia changing its current
policies and its stance towards international law.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to taking your questions.

Senator Graham. Thank you. And to those who stick to 5
minutes, your chance of assistance goes up. [Laughter.]
Thank you very, very much.
The Ambassador from Georgia.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID BAKRADZE, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY
OF GEORGIA
Ambassador Bakradze. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.
I am here today to remind you that before Ukraine, Georgia
was invaded in 2008, and 20 percent of our country remains
under Russian occupation.
Despite ongoing Russian aggression, with the support of the
United States, Georgia has made tremendous strides in
strengthening democratic institutions and fostering economic
development to solidify an irreversible pact towards Europe and
Euro-Atlantic integration. I am also here to tell you that we
need a stronger America in Georgia and the region.
The conflict, which started in the early 1990's, reached
its peak in 2008 with the Russian invasion of Georgia and the
occupation of our territories. As the international community
failed to effectively respond to early warning signs, Russia
continues its occupation with up to 10,000 Russian military,
security, and the Federal Security Service of the Russian
Federation (FSB) border guard personnel. The Russian occupation
forces have no legal mandate, and are in stark violation of
international law of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement.
In 2009, Russia began installing razor wire fences and
other artificial obstacles along the occupation line. The total
length of the trenches across both occupation lines is more
than 62 miles. We greatly appreciate the interest of Congress,
both its bodies and its representatives, who are frequently
visiting the occupation line.
In further violation of the ceasefire agreement, Moscow has
signed so-called treaties with the occupational regimes. These
documents represent a step towards annexation of Georgia's
occupied regions as they provide a foundation for full
integration into social, economic, administrative, and most
importantly, military and security institutions of the Russian
Federation.
Georgia is pursuing an engagement and reconciliation
process with the people in the occupied territories. We make
all benefits, which are available to Georgian citizens, also
accessible to our compatriots residing on the other side of the
occupation line--free healthcare, educational, cultural,
scientific programs, and other benefits of Georgia's European
path such as visa liberalization.
Since regaining its independence, and to undermine Georgian
sovereignty and territorial integrity, Georgia has been subject
to different forms of unconventional hybrid warfare.
Russian propaganda in Georgia--in addition to an economic
embargo of 2006, energy cuts, and the cyber attacks in 2008--
seeks to challenge and derail Georgia's European and Euro-
Atlantic integration aspirations. It builds on fears that exist
in different societies, creating myths, and communicating
through different forms of media.
A recent example is the spreading of false information that
through a well-deserved visa-free travel decision for Georgian
citizens to Europe came at the expense of building refugee
camps in Georgia.
The Georgian Government has been effective in its strategic
communication efforts through a coordinated approach,
dismantling myths, but also countering anti-Western narratives
by bringing tangible results to Georgian citizens such as a
free trade agreement, an association agreement with Europe, and
visa liberalization. As a result, we have managed to maintain
strong support toward Georgia's EU and NATO aspirations within
70 to 75 percent.
Overall, despite Russia's vicious efforts, for a small
nation, Georgia makes an outsized contribution in international
security efforts by allocating more than 2 percent of our GDP
for defense spending. We are a committed partner in the fight
against terrorists and we are one of the largest contributors
to the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With one of the
highest number of 870 servicemen, Georgian soldiers are proudly
standing shoulder to shoulder with allies in the most dangerous
parts of the world.
In recent years, we have made progress in building strong
and effective state institutions ensuring democracy, human
rights, and rule of law because we believe that our political
and economic progress will ultimately serve as a potent
antidote to Russia's expansionist design.
For the last decade, Georgia--as the most reliable and
democratic ally of the United States in a very tough region--
has been a great example of American taxpayers' money wisely
spent. Therefore, I want to invite the Members, and the staff
of this subcommittee, to visit and see firsthand the
transformational power of U.S. assistance.
Last year, we signed a memorandum on a deepening of
security and defense partnership between our two nations, and
we successfully launched the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.
Further improvements of these programs, and elevation of our
security partnership, is of vital importance as we believe
Georgia remains an essential part of the Euro-Atlantic security
architecture.
When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved, the
United States and its allies sought to build Europe whole,
free, and at peace. Today, when one of the basic foundations of
security and peace--respect for national borders--is violated,
a new transatlantic leadership is needed to fortify and enlarge
the alliance.
We believe a comprehensive, long term engagement strategy
by the new administration will include the strengthening of
Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, improving
bilateral trade, economic investment relationships, and
supporting the democratic choice of the Georgian people to
integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
All these measures will make Georgia stronger and more
resilient. That is important because a stronger Georgia is in
the United States' interest, as much as a stronger America is
in Georgia's interest.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Bakradze
russia's meddling in georgia--a brief history
Georgia was under Russian colonial occupation between 1801 and
1991, with prior independent statehood of more than 3,000 years. For a
brief period between 1918 and 1921 Georgia reclaimed independence, only
to face massive Soviet invasion and another 70 years of occupation.
In 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia regained its
independence and began a state-building process. Georgia's stated
aspirations to European and Euro-Atlantic integration and its
commitment to democratic progress and economic growth have since then
provided a counterpoint to the new-imperialist intentions of the
Russian Federation to keep Georgia and other former-Soviet states under
its direct political influence and domination.
U.S. support has been critical to Georgia's ability to continue on
its path toward progress, despite regional challenges. In return,
Georgia has been America's closest ally in a tough neighborhood. For a
small nation, we make an outsized contribution to international
security efforts with an allocation of more than 2 percent of our GDP
to defense spending. We are also a committed partner in the fight
against terrorism. We remain the largest per capita contributor to
NATO's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan with 870 Georgian
servicemen. Georgian soldiers stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.
and allies in the most dangerous parts of the world, 32 Georgian
soldiers lost their lives in the fight against terrorism.
The U.S.-Georgia alliance remains vital in the face of ongoing
Russian provocations, which have been going on for decades. The first
demonstration of Russia's imperialist intensions--in what it likes to
refer to as its ``near abroad''--came shortly after Georgia's
independence, when Russia sponsored separatist movements in Georgia in
the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in 1991 and the Abkhazia region in
1992. Situations in both regions escalated to armed hostilities, where
Russian-backed separatist forces and so called `Russian mercenaries'
defeated the newly-formed weak and fragmented Georgian military forces,
resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Georgians from those regions.
Throughout the 1992-1993 conflict, the ethnic Georgian population
was subject to atrocities including acts of murder, torture, rape and
pillage. The U.N. Secretary-General-mandated fact-finding mission,
which visited Abkhazia, Georgia in 1993, described various episodes of
the conflict where such acts occurred on a large scale.\1\ To escape
the atrocities, the entire ethnic Georgian population of approximately
260,000 was forced to flee from the Abkhazia region by 1994.\2\
However, an estimated 35,000 Georgians remained in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Secretary-General's Fact-
Finding Mission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia,
Republic of Georgia, 17, U.N. Doc. S/26795, (Nov. 17, 1993).
\2\ See UNHCR data at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
page?page=49e48d2e6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The population that remained in the Abkhazia region soon was
subject to forced passportization. As described by the EU-mandated
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
Georgia, ``after the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in these two regions
in early 1990s, en masse distribution of Russian passports to the
remaining civilian population represented a deliberate and well-
constructed policy aimed at establishing a pretext of the military
intervention of the Russian Federation on the territory of Georgia [in
August 2008]''.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ IIFFMCG Report, Volume II, at 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
russia-georgia war in august 2008 and security situation on the ground
after 8 years
The Russian military aggression and invasion of Georgia in August
2008 brought a new wave of massive ethnic cleansing of the Georgian
population from the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. The widespread
violence against Georgian civilians included acts of killing, torture,
rape, looting and burning of people's houses.\4\ All Georgian villages
in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia with a total ethnic
Georgian population of approximately 35,000 were burned down and
destroyed in order to preclude any return of the expelled population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See for example ``Human Rights Watch, Up in Flames:
Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over
South Ossetia'' (Human Rights Watch 2009), at 127-194; ``Amnesty
International, Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia
Conflict'' (Amnesty International Publications, 2008), at 34-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 12, 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between the Russian Federation
and Georgia calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops to the places
held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, Russia continues to
occupy both Georgian regions through the presence of approximately
10,000 Russian military and security personnel and the so-called FSB
border guards. The Russian occupation forces have no legal mandate and
are in stark violation of international law. There is neither host
country consent from Georgia to have Russian troops on Georgian soil,
nor any agreement that would permit Russian military presence.
Moreover, the Russian state has direct control over both regions given
that top decision-makers in both the Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions
are Russian citizens.
In addition to the personnel presence, Russia has illegally built
and fortified military infrastructure in the occupied regions. In
August 2010, the military base located in the Abkhazia region was
fortified with the S-300 type surface-to-air (anti-aircraft) missile
system. In December 2010, Russia installed a multiple-launch rocket
system artillery battalion (so-called ``Smerch'' units) at the
Tskhinvali base. In January 2011, this base was further reinforced with
the tactical-operational missile launch system ``Scarab B,'' also known
as ``Tochka U,'' with an operational range of 120 km, and capability of
being equipped with conventional and nuclear warheads.
Despite the explicit calls of the international community to end
the occupation and withdraw its military forces \5\ as called for by
the EU-mediated Ceasefire Agreement signed after the August 2008 war,
Russia has intensified both military build-up and grave human rights
violations in the occupied regions. For instance, in 2015, the illegal
military base in the Tskhinvali region was further fortified with
modernized missile systems, such as the ballistic missile system
``Iskander,'' multiple BM-21"Grad'' rocket launchers, and the surface-
to-air missile system ``Strela 10,'' as well as tanks and UAVs.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ These include: NATO, EU, Council of Europe, Resolutions of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,
Lithuanian Seimas, Czech Senate, Romanian Senate, etc.
\6\ Available at: http://dyn.function.mil.ru/news_page/
world.htm?objInBlock=25&blk=10323761.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
creeping annexation and efforts of gog
First in summer 2009 and then in April/May 2011, the Russian
occupation forces started the installation of razor wire fences and
other artificial obstacles along the occupation line in the Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali regions; the process has further expanded since January
2013 and continues today. The total length of the trenches across the
Abkhazia region's occupation line is around 48 km. The total length of
artificial barriers along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region
is around 52 km, affecting around 200 local families, by leaving their
houses behind the new barriers. Some of them were compelled to flee
their places of residence, thus creating a further wave of IDPs.
In parallel, Russian occupation forces are installing so-called
``border'' sign posts along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali
region. As a result of the so-called ``borderization'' process, local
families have found themselves cut off from agricultural lands, potable
and irrigation water systems, religious sites and cemeteries; they are
deprived of their fundamental rights, including the rights to free
movement, education, and social and health services. This situation
creates an imminent threat of further waves of displacement. The arrest
of Georgian citizens for so-called ``illegal border crossing,''
kidnappings for ransom, robberies, partial murders, attacks on
civilians, discrimination against ethnic Georgians and violations of
the Georgian central government-controlled air space by Russian
helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continue to pose
challenges for the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG). Since
2010, 915 civilians have been detained for so called ``illegal border
crossing.''
In a further grave violation of the August 2008 Ceasefire
Agreement, Moscow signed the so-called ``treaty on alliance and
strategic partnership'' with the Sokhumi occupation regime on 24
November 2014 and the so-called ``treaty on alliance and integration''
with the Tskhinvali occupation regime on 18 March 2015. Although
similar Russian-led initiatives have been undertaken in the past, these
documents represent a factual annexation of Georgia's occupied regions,
as they provide for full integration into the social, economic,
administrative and--importantly--military and security institutions of
the Russian Federation. Among others, the documents envisage the de-
facto abolishment of the segment of the Georgia-Russia border in the
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, whereas the occupation line with the
rest of Georgia will be further fortified. The documents also envisage:
(1) the creation of ``common security and defense space;'' (2) the
establishment of a Joint Coordinating Centre for law enforcement
agencies, imposing the FSB system on both the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
regions; (3) the simplification of procedures necessary for obtaining
Russian citizenship; (4) the equalling of pensions and salaries to the
equivalent level of allowances for residents of the Russian
Federation's Southern District. The document signed with the Tskhinvali
region contains certain differences, which speak of full de facto
annexation of the region into the Russian Federation. The title--
``alliance and integration''--points to the genuine intention and
ultimate goal of the document. The occupation regime in the Tskhinvali
region confirms this by making explicit the necessity of becoming a
Federal subject of Russia. The so-called ``President'' Leonid Tibilov
recently announced a decision to initiate a referendum on the
integration of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation.\7\ Follow-up
field ``agreements,'' which have been already signed or are in the
pipeline, will factually turn Georgia's regions into Federal parts of
Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Available at: http://cominf.org/node/1166506480.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth mentioning that, in November 2011, then President of
Russia Dmitry Medvedev made a statement that Russia's military
aggression against Georgia was intended to counter Georgia's NATO
ambitions and thus Georgia's sovereign choice to integrate into the
Euro-Atlantic community.\8\ Furthermore, on August 8, 2012, on the
fourth anniversary of the Russia-Georgia War, the President of the
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin confessed that since 2006, Russia had
developed a plan to invade Georgia. He also revealed that Moscow had
been training militias of the Tskhinvali regime to directly participate
in the military operations.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Statement of D. Medvedev is available at: http://www.rg.ru/
2011/11/21/prezident-site.html.
\9\ Statement of the President of the Russian Federation is
available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/16180#sel=30:1,32:21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The policy of creeping annexation exercised by Russia against
Georgia, coupled with the alarming developments in the region,
demonstrate that Russia does not accept the sovereign choice of
independent states and is attempting to restore zones of influence in
the region.
While advancing its Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia remains
firmly committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and the de-
escalation of tensions with Russia based on respect for Georgia's
territorial integrity. Georgia has taken concrete steps in this
direction. In November 2010, Georgia undertook a non-use of force
pledge against the Russian Federation, which was further reiterated by
the Parliament of Georgia in March 2013. While the international
community lauded Georgia's pledge on the non-use of force, Russia
explicitly refuses to reciprocate it. In November 2011, Georgia agreed
on Russia's accession to World Trade Organizations, thus completely
removing the barriers for Russia's membership in the WTO. In February
2012, the Government of Georgia unilaterally abolished the visa regime
for Russian citizens. In November 2012, the Prime Minister of Georgia
appointed a Special Representative for Relations with the Russian
Federation and launched a direct channel with Moscow, thus once again
reaffirming the political will to mend economic, cultural and
humanitarian ties with Russia. In the meantime, the Geneva
International Discussions, co-chaired by the UN, EU and the OSCE,
remain the only format for discussing outstanding political and
humanitarian issues with the Russian Federation. In February 2014, the
Georgian national team participated in the 2014 Winter Olympics in
Sochi, while the Government of Georgia expressed readiness to cooperate
with relevant Russian structures on security-related issues.
The above constructive initiatives have been met with further
provocations, the installation of artificial barriers on the territory
of Georgia, and steps towards the annexation of the Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali regions. Despite Georgia's tireless efforts at constructive
engagement, Russia continues to obstruct agreement on establishing an
international security presence in the occupied regions, and for the
safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees.
Russia's efforts to legitimize its occupation of territories of a
sovereign state include the illegal ``recognition'' of the Georgian
regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali as independent states, and
furthermore, the coercion of other nations, including through political
and financial pressure, to do the same. After failing to achieve
progress in this regard at the political level,\10\ the Russian
Federation has been resorting to other instruments in order to
legitimize the so-called ``independence'' and thus its illegal actions
on the ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Despite Russia's illegal policy, only three states have
recognized the so called ``independence'' of Georgia's occupied
regions--Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Tuvalu and Vanuatu have
withdrawn the recognition and established diplomatic relations with
Georgia based on the principle of the latter's sovereignty and
territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions remain inaccessible for the
international community. The EU Monitoring Mission, which is an
extremely important instrument to ensure security and stability on the
ground, is still prevented from fully implementing its mandate by not
being allowed to access the occupied regions. Notwithstanding, the EUMM
is the only international mechanism capable of monitoring the situation
in close proximity to the occupied regions. The latest report by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Human Rights Situation in the
Occupied Regions of Georgia is attached (http://mfa.gov.ge/
getattachment/fe17def2-cd11-48b6-b9ad-d0535e49e6fa/MFA-4-report-2016-
fin.docx.aspx).
In a recent development: Russian occupation regime in Tskhinvali
scheduled a referendum on 9 April on changing the name of one of the
oldest Georgian regions into the one similar to the Federal subject of
the Russian Federation. This referendum is a step intended to lay a
ground for illegal annexation of the occupied region.
The international society should urge the Russian Federation to
respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors and
comply with its international obligations. The firm stance and
consolidated efforts of international society is crucial to prevent
another act of annexation in Europe. We appreciate a firm stance of the
U.S. State Department on this issues as expressed in the Statement of
the Embassy of USA in Georgia. Meanwhile, we remain open for
constructive negotiations in the format of Geneva International
Discussions. Last year was marked by the restoration of the Gali
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
As concerns the relations with our compatriots living in the
occupied territories, the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians, are an integral
part of our common history and future, despite the current artificial
barriers. There is no alternative to the return of the IPDs and
refugees to their homes and to the full re-integration of all
ethnicities into a vibrant society where human rights and individual
freedoms as well as cultural and linguistic diversity of different
communities are the Georgian State's top priorities.
We firmly pursue the engagement, confidence building and
reconciliation process with the people living in the occupied
territories. We are offering all benefits which are open to Georgian
citizens. We stand ready to offer all the progress we will be having on
our development path. The Universal free healthcare, free education,
benefits of Georgia's European integration path--Visa liberalization,
educational, cultural, scientific programs are available for our
citizens residing on the other side of the occupation line. (Main
directions of the reconciliation and engagement policy of the Office of
the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality is attached)
hybrid warfare
It is worth noting not only the persistence of Russia's efforts to
undermine Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also the
nature of those efforts. Since regaining its independence, Georgia has
been subject to different forms of unconventional, hybrid warfare. The
blackmailing and intimidation has been in the Russia's toolkit. The
economic embargo of 2006, energy cuts, cyber-attacks in 2008 and after
were parts of Russia's policy to attain its desired political results,
to derail Georgia from its sovereign choice of European and Euro-
Atlantic integration.
For the last several years, Russian propaganda has become visible
and stronger not only in Georgia, but in the wider region. The approach
differs not only from country to country, but from region to region,
serving the goal it wants to achieve in each location. In Georgia's,
case Russia is defying and confronting Georgia's European and Euro-
Atlantic path. It builds on fears and challenges that exist in
different societies, creating myths and communicating through different
forms of social media, using newly established NGO's or media
organizations, like radio ``Sputnik'', Internet trolls etc.
The Georgian Government has been successful in its strategic
communications, through a coordinated approach that dismantles myths.
The policy is not fighting propaganda with propaganda, but with
truthful information and the policies, that deliver. Last 4 years have
been successful for Georgia's European integration, bringing tangible
results for its population, through European instruments, like Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, the Association Agreement and Visa
Liberalization, that will be available for the citizens of Georgia by
the end of this month. These deliverables are important to counter
Russian propaganda that aims to showing futility of the reforms
approximating with European legislation.
We have managed, despite increased propaganda and an open media
environment, through effective strategic communications and coordinated
information campaigns, to maintain high support for Georgia's European
and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. According to the recent polls, the
Georgian population expressed 73-78 percent support for Georgia's
membership in the EU and NATO.
We have strengthened traditionally emotional support for European
integration with knowledge-based support, something that cannot be
easily challenged through propaganda efforts. An informed society
cannot be easily influenced by misinformation. Coordination of the
Government's activities with civil society (23 NGOs) efforts not only
in the capital Tbilisi, but in the most exposed regions as well, is
implemented by communication with the most vulnerable parts of society,
through information providers, like regional media, municipality
workers, teachers, clergy.
We highly appreciate good cooperation with NATO's Center of
Excellence on Strategic Communication since the day of its
establishment in Riga, as well as with the EU EastStratComm unit in
Brussels. We look forward to more initiatives from the U.S. Congress.
stronger united states for stronger georgia
To summarize, despite the Russia's vicious efforts, Georgia has
persisted on its path toward democratic progress and economic growth.
We have made great progress in building strong and effective state
institutions, ensuring: a free civil society; free media; free markets;
social cohesion; and the rule of law. This past fall, we held free and
fair parliamentary elections, cementing our democratic progress.
Meanwhile, the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom named Georgia the 13th
freest economy in the world, ensuring openness and integration into the
global market and equal opportunities for all people interested in
doing business in Georgia.
We are confident that our political and economic progress will
ultimately serve as potent antidotes to Russia's expansionist designs.
Moreover, Russia's aggression and occupation of Georgian territories,
its attempts to derail us from our pro-western path, made Georgia even
more determined to resist Russian domination and pursue further
integration with EU and NATO.
Our viability, persistent and resilience could not be achieved
without the United States continued and vital support for the last 25
years. This coming April we will be celebrating 25 years of
establishing diplomatic relations. During these years the U.S. has been
one of the most important economic and security partners of Georgia.
The U.S. is the largest bilateral donor, having provided several
billion dollars since 1991. This support has always enjoyed bipartisan
backing. Since 2009, we have institutionalized our relations and
friendship through a Strategic Partnership charter, pledging to further
Georgia's democratization, economic development, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity.
For the last decade Georgia has become the best example of the
American Taxpayers money wisely spent, being the most reliable,
consistent, credible democratic ally for the U.S. in a tough
neighborhood. We have shown valor and commitment to our American
partner during its most difficult times. We have always supported the
U.S. in the fight against terrorism contributing to the U.S. and NATO
led missions like an ally.
Last year we have signed with U.S. memorandum on the deepening
security and defense partnership, committing ``to strengthen the self-
defense capabilities of Georgia's Armed Forces . . . improving
readiness and supporting a resilient force that is capable of providing
its own defense and contributing to that of others'', we have
successfully launched Georgia Defense Readiness Program. Sustainability
and further improvement of these programs and elevation of our security
partnership to the new level is of vital importance, as we believe
Georgia remains an essential piece of the Euro-Atlantic security
architecture, as NATO is seeking to protect its allies from Russia's
expansion.
When the cold war ended, and the Soviet empire dissolved, the
United States and its allies sought to build Europe whole, free, and at
peace. Nowadays, when the empire strikes back and one of the basic
foundations of security and peace--respect for national borders--is
violated, new transatlantic leadership is needed to fortify and enlarge
the alliance. We believe the new administration shall soon develop a
comprehensive long-term engagement strategy for the region and Georgia,
which will include the strengthening of Georgia's territorial integrity
and sovereignty, improving bilateral trade and investment relationship
and supporting the democratic choice of the Georgian people to
integrate further with Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO. All
these measures will make Georgia more resilient a and stronger and, we
believe that stronger Georgia is in the United States' interest as much
as stronger United States is in Georgia's interest.

Attachments:

--Attachment 1: Quarterly Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Georgia on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied
Regions of Georgia.

--Attachment 2: Main directions of the reconciliation and engagement
policy of the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation
and Civic Equality.

ATTACHMENT 1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

Fourth Quarterly Report (October-December 2016) of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia

on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia

I. Introduction

aims of the report and methodology applied
1. In January 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
started preparation of quarterly reports aiming at assessing the human
rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia prepared four such reports in 2015. This is
the fourth quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Georgia for the year 2016 covering the period of October-December 2016.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will further continue the
preparation of such reports on a quarterly basis. This reporting
exercise aims to contribute to the provision of regular and updated
information to the international community, to states as well as to
international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, on
the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.
2. As for the applied methodology, this reporting exercise
consolidates and assesses existing information from various open
sources, national and international, on violations of human rights in
the occupied regions of Georgia. Due to limitations on its length, the
report does not aim to collect/contain information on all cases of
violations of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia; it aims
to consolidate and assess only some of the most known examples of
violations. The methodology applied does not provide for the conduct of
fact-finding visits to the occupied regions of Georgia, nor to the
conduct of interviews. Therefore the methodology applied does not
enable this reporting exercise to collect and produce new data on the
human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.
responsibility of the occupying power for human rights violations
3. The territories of two regions of Georgia--Abkhazia, Georgia and
the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation
and human rights situation in these regions of Georgia remains
alarming. The Russian Federation as the occupying power, exercises
effective control over Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region,
Georgia. These two regions still remaining under unlawful foreign
military occupation, constitute above all dangerous ``black holes'' in
terms of holding the human rights violators accountable. The occupying
power, exercising effective control, has been preventing numerous
international organizations from entering Abkhazia, Georgia and the
Tskhinvali Region, Georgia.
4. During the reporting period, ``EU Statement on the Secretary
General's 14th Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'' \1\ was
made at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting.\2\
According to the statement, ``the human rights situation on the ground
remains worrying''. It should be emphasized that in the same statement,
``[t]he EU calls on the Russian Federation to . . . provide the EU
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) with access to the Georgian regions.''
According to the statement, ``[t]he EU regrets that the Secretariat
delegation and the CoE Human Rights Commissioner have not been granted
access to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South
Ossetia. The EU calls on all the concerned parties to facilitate access
to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia
for the relevant bodies of the CoE. The CoE should be able to fully and
effectively use its instruments to ensure monitoring of the human
rights situation in all conflict affected areas and for the benefit of
all persons in need of human rights protection. No obstacles should be
created to the work of international partners in this field.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of
Europe (April 2016-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf (2016) 37.
\2\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
\3\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. During the reporting period ``Statement of the Group of Friends
of Georgia on the Conflict in Georgia'' was adopted at the 2016 OSCE
Ministerial Council Meeting in Hamburg, held on 8-9 December 2016. In
the Statement, delegations of Canada, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America expressed
``deep concern over the continuous discrimination against ethnic
Georgians residing in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia'' and ``condemn[ed] the gross violations of rights related to
freedom of movement, residence, property, as well as right to education
in one's native language and underline[d] that the placement of
artificial obstacles, including barbed and razor wire fences along the
occupation line, further aggravates the humanitarian situation on the
ground.'' It should be emphasized that the Statement called upon ``the
Russian Federation to enable access by international human rights
monitoring mechanisms to the occupied territories of Georgia.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia on the Conflict in
Georgia, ``The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia'', 9 December
2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. During the reporting period, namely on 13th October 2016, at the
session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),
Mr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, then Foreign Minister of the Federal
Republic of Germany stated the following: ``I support all the Council
of Europe's efforts to secure regular access to Crimea for its
monitoring bodies to observe the human rights situation. This is about
not only Crimea, but South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-
Karabakh. There should be no blank areas on our continent where human
rights are not observed.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 13
October 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. It should be recalled here that during the reporting period of
the second quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Georgia covering the period of April-June 2016, namely on 19 May 2016
Mr. Giga Otkhozoria, was murdered by so called ``border guards''
deployed along the occupation line with Abkhazia. The murder was
committed in the village of Khurcha, Zugdidi district, located in the
territory controlled by the Government of Georgia. The murderer of Mr.
Giga Otkhozoria has been identified--Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli. After
committing the murder Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices
immediately fled to the occupied territory of Abkhazia. In May 2016,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia issued a statement
``concerning the fact of murder committed in the village of Khurcha,
Zugdidi District, on May 19, 2016.'' According to the statement ``this
criminal act once again demonstrates the highly alarming situation in
the occupied region of Abkhazia, Georgia and the full responsibility
for it lies with the Russian Federation as with the power in effective
control of the region.'' \6\ In May 2016, the Prosecutor's Office of
Georgia filed charges against Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli for the
premeditated murder of Mr. Giga Otkhozoria and criminal prosecution was
launched under the Criminal Code of Georgia.\7\ In July 2016, Mr.
Khajimba publicly declared that Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli would not be
handed over to the Georgian authorities.\8\ During the reporting
period, namely in December 2016, Zugdidi District Court found, in
absentia, fugitive Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli guilty of the charges filed
against him and sentenced him to deprivation of liberty for a term of
12 years.\9\ However under the existing circumstances, Mr. Rashid
Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices still remain unpunished. The above
situation with regard to the violation of the right to life of Mr. Giga
Otkhozoria once again demonstrates that the occupied territories of
Georgia remain ``black holes'' in terms of holding the violators of
human rights accountable. The above situation further reaffirms the
need of immediate, unhindered and continuous access of international
human rights monitoring mechanisms in the occupied territories of
Georgia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
concerning the fact of murder committed in the village of Khurcha,
Zugdidi District, on May 19, 2016, 19 May 2016, available at .
\7\ The Prosecutor's Office Launches Criminal Proceedings on the
Murder of Giga Otkhozoria, ``Prosecutor's Office of Georgia'', 21 May
2016, available at .
\8\ Abkhazia will not hand over to Georgia border guard suspected
in murder, ``Ria Novosti'', 6 July 2016, available at .
\9\ Court Finds Rashid Kanji-Ogli, Accused of Giga Otkhozoria's
Murder, Guilty, Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 28 December 2016,
available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
occupation line and installation of barbed wire fences and other
artificial obstacles
8. The occupation line along the administrative boundary line (ABL)
with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region separates Georgia from its two
occupied territories. The process of so called ``borderization'' was
commenced in 2011. Currently, the total length of razor wire and barbed
wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the occupation line in
Tskhinvali Region is nearly 52 km (overall length of the occupation
line is more than 350 km) and along the occupation line in Abkhazia is
48 km (overall length of the occupation line is around 145 km).
9. According to ``EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th
Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'', made on 16th November
2016 at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting, ``the
EU is deeply concerned about the illegal activities of
``borderization'' that divide families and communities and impedes the
people on the ground, depriving them from fundamental rights, including
education in the native language, property rights and freedom of
movement, including in the context of so called border crossing, which,
inter alia, may lead to fatal incidents. The EU calls on the
authorities exercising effective control to remove the fences and other
obstacles to the freedom of movement and to investigate all allegations
of all crimes and human rights violations on the ground.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. During the reporting period, an article was published in The
New York Times which describes problems created by the occupation line
and installation of barbed wire fences along the Tskhinvali region.\11\
According to the article, the village of Jariasheni is ``[m]arked in
places with barbed wire laid at night, in others by the sudden
appearance of green signs declaring the start of a ``state border'' and
elsewhere by the arrival of bulldozers, the reach of Russia keeps
inching forward into Georgia with ever more ingenious markings of a
frontier that only Russia and three other states recognize as real.''
The article states that ``[t]he green border signs that first appeared
last year and now keep popping up along the zigzagging boundary warn
that ``passage is forbidden'' across what is declared to be a ``state
border.'' According to the article, ``Kestutis Jankauskas, the head of
the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, said it was hard to
know where this boundary line exactly runs. It was never recognized or
agreed upon, and its location depends on which maps are used. Russia,
he said, is using a map drawn by the Soviet military's general staff in
the 1980s. It demarcates what in the Soviet era was an inconsequential
administrative boundary within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia
but what is now hardening into a hazardous frontier. The fitful
movement of the boundary seems to be driven mostly by Russia's desire
to align what it sees as a state border with this old Soviet map. So
far, the movement has always been forward, often by just a few yards
but at other times by bigger leaps.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
.
\12\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
new so called ``laws'' and new wave of so called ``passportisation''
11. As a result of a reaction of the international community on the
issue of adoption of so called new ``laws'' and so called
``passportisation'', decision was made in December 2016 to amend so
called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' and to
enable residents of Gali district, holding Georgian citizenship, to
obtain ``residence permits''; according to the amendment, ``resident
permits can be issued to individuals holding foreign citizenship if
they were born in Gali district of the Soviet Socialist Republic of
Abkhazia.'' \13\ However, it should be noted here that resident permits
will not enable to obtain so called ``Abkhazian citizenship'' until
holding foreign citizenship.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Resident Permits will be given foreign citizens in Gali,
``Apsny'', 29 December 2016, available at .
\14\ Legal status of residents of Eastern districts of Abkhazia
will be regulated, ``Nuzhnaya Gazeta'', 29 December 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. As part of the new wave of so called ``passportisation'' in the
Abkhazian region, the issuance of so called ``passports'' started in
May 2016 and it was continuing during the reporting period.\15\ By the
middle of December 2016, more than 3 000 new so called ``Abkhaz
passports'' were issued.\16\ It has been decided to extend expiry date
of old so called ``Abkhaz passports'' until 31st December 2018.\17\ It
should be emphasized that on 18th October 2016, so called ``head of
administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
declared that ``from 17 800 residents of Gali district, only 340 have
Abkhazian citizenship, the rest are Georgian citizens''.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Tania: during 1 month 300 passports were distributed in
Sokhumi, ``Apsnypress'', 19 December 2016, available at .
\16\ Manargia: more than 3 000 new Abkhaz passports were issued,
``Sputnik-Abkhazia'', 19 December 2106, available at .
\17\ Expiry date of Abkhaz passports of old sample was extended
until 31 December 2018, ``Apsnypress'', 31 December 2016, available at
.
\18\ Nadaraia: project is ready on creation of special economic
zone in Gali district, ``Apsnypress'', 18 October 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. It should be recalled that on 1st April 2016, so called ``law
on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' \19\ and ``law on
entry and exit of Abkhazia'' \20\ became operational. A similar
document was adopted by the Tskhinvali occupation regime, namely so
called ``law on legal status of foreigners in the Republic of South
Ossetia''. Adoption of so called ``laws'' in many ways target the
ethnic Georgian population living in the occupied territories. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia once again expresses its serious
concern on the adoption of new discriminatory regulations for ethnic
Georgians living in the occupied regions of Georgia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ So called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in
Abkhazia'' was designed in order to qualify ethnic Georgians, living in
the region of Abkhazia, into a category of ``foreign citizens'' and to
discriminate against them in many ways. Many ethnic Georgians living in
Abkhazia, predominantly in Gali district, hold Georgian citizenship
that qualifies them into the category of ``foreigners'' under the so
called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' and
therefore puts limitation on their human rights including the freedom
of movement, the right to property and labour rights. Under this so
called ``law'' ethnic Georgians holding Georgian citizenship were
deprived possibility to obtain residence permits and respective
restrictive clauses prepared ``legal'' ground for persecution of ethnic
Georgian families.
\20\ By the adoption of so called ``law on entry and exit of
Abkhazia'', the decision has been made to introduce visas for states a)
not recognizing so called ``independence of Abkhazia'' and b) not
having a ``bilateral agreement'' of visa free travel. Under this so
called ``law'' any person can exit Abkhazia, however only so called
``citizens of Abkhazia'' can enter the Abkhazian region without
additional formalities. It should be noted that a foreign citizen or a
person without citizenship can be expelled from the territory of
occupied Abkhazia if that person poses a threat to defense and security
or to public order. It should be emphasized that this so called
``law'', creates additional obstacles to representatives of
international organizations leading to further isolation of the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment

14. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
occupied regions of Georgia, the Russian FSB officers and
representatives of the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali occupation regimes
regularly take actions which amount to torture and ill-treatment. For
years, there has been a regular flow of information on inadequate
detentions conditions in so called ``detention centers'' in the
occupied regions of Georgia. The practice of torture and ill-treatment
in the occupied regions of Georgia remained an issue of concern during
the reporting period as well.
15. During the reporting period, namely on 10th December 2016, the
Public Defender of Georgia issued the Report on Human Rights and
Freedom in 2016. According to the report, ``inappropriate and degrading
treatment is regularly applied toward detainees at Russian military
basis, including forced labor, verbal and physical abuse, restriction
of food and water etc.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. On 27th November 2016, three members of so called ``special
forces unit'' of the Tskhinvali occupation regime inflicted severe
physical assault to a 21-year-old resident in Tskhinvali. As a result,
numerous traumas were inflicted to the head of the victim which was
later hospitalized. During the incident, one of the members of so
called ``special forces unit'' even fired a shot in the direction of
the victim.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ A resident of Tshinvali was beaten by members of special
forces unit, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 2 December 2016, available at ; General
Prosecutor's Office started investigation against members of special
forces unit, which have beaten a resident of Tskhinvali, Sputnik-
Ossetia'', 6 December 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. In December 2016, in Tskhinvali members of so called ``special
forces unit'' of the Tskhinvali occupation regime physically assaulted
two schoolchildren--one boy and one girl of grade 11 of school N 2 in
the restaurant ``Oasis''. Traumas to heads were inflicted to both of
them; as a result the boy lost conscience. Later the victims were
transported to a hospital for medical treatment.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Tibilov: members of special forces unit should be examples of
behavior, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 29 December 2016, available at ; Prosecutor's
office is investigating details of brawl between youngsters and special
forces unit, Sputnik-Ossetia'', 27 December 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. In October 2016, Mr. Khajimba declared that ``there is a need
to change detention conditions of detainees in the detention centre''
and so called ``minister of interior'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
declared that ``problems related to detention conditions of criminals
remain unsolved for already 23 years''.\24\ It has been argued by
representatives of the Sokhumi occupation regime that ``absence of
motivation of employees of the ministry of interior to work in the
detention centre due to the low salary there'', ``understaffing of the
preliminary detention centre with employees, which equals to 60 per
cent'' and non-provision of ``the detention centre with necessary
technical equipments'' are behind the problems.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Raul Khajimba: it is necessary to regulate issue of increasing
salaries to employees of the preliminary detention centre,
``Apsnypress'', 20 October 2016, available at .
\25\ Raul Khajimba: it is necessary to regulate issue of increasing
salaries to employees of the preliminary detention centre,
``Apsnypress'', 20 October 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Arbitrary Detention

19. The Russian FSB officers regularly carry out arbitrary
detention for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the
occupation lines with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. In most cases
detention is followed by fines and later release. Detention period can
last several days or several months, in some cases several years.
According to data supplied by the State Security Service of Georgia in
the middle of December 2016, between 2008 and 12th December 2016, in
total 2 775 people were detained by the Russian FSB officers for so
called ``illegal border crossing'': 1 788 people were detained along
the occupation line with the Abkhazian region and 987 people were
detained along the occupation line with the Tskhinvali region; from 1st
January 2016 to 12th December 2016, 190 people were detained along the
occupation line with the Abkhazian region and 132 people were detained
along the occupation line with the Tskhinvali region.\26\ It should be
noted that according to the information of so called ``State Security
Committee of South Ossetia'', 549 people were detained for so called
``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation line with the
Tskhinvali region throughout the year 2016.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Representatives of the Russian occupying forces detained 2 775
Georgians between 2008 and 12 December 2016 for so called illegal
border crossing of Georgian occupied territories, ``Pirweli Information
Agency'', 12 December 2016, available at .
\27\ Authorities of South Ossetia expelled violator of state border
from Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 28 December 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. According to the report of the Public Defender of Georgia
issued during the reporting period, ``armed forced of the Russian
Federation continue to detain minors, pregnant women, patients and
older people.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. It is particularly alarming that during the reporting period,
Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil remained in illegal detention in so called
Tskhinvali prison.\29\ As described in the Third Quarterly Report
(July-September 2016) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on
the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia, on 8
June 2016, Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil, citizen of Georgia was detained by
the Russian FSB officers for so called ``illegal border crossing''
along the occupation line with Tskhinvali region. Initially, the
detainee was sentenced 2 months of imprisonment for so called ``illegal
border crossing''. However, later so called ``prosecutor's office'' of
the Tskhinvali occupation regime initiated ``criminal case'' against
Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil accusing him of ``causing serious damage to the
health'' of an unspecified resident of the Tskhinavli region in the
year 2008. The Government of Georgia considers the above accusations
against Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil to be groundless and fabricated and
therefore calls for his unconditional release.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ IPRM Meeting held in Ergneti, State Security Service of
Georgia, 30 November 2016, available at .
\30\ IPRM Meeting held in Ergneti, State Security Service of
Georgia, 30 November 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
22. During the reporting period numerous cases were reported on
arbitrary detention in the occupied regions of Georgia. Below are only
few examples.
23. On 12th October 2016, a resident of the village of Plavi, Gori
district, was detained for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along
the occupation line with Tskhinvali region and ``criminal charges''
were filed against him for the above reason.\31\ However, according to
the family members of the detainee, he had not crossed the occupation
line.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Criminal case was filed in relation to violator of border from
Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 12 October 2016, available at .
\32\ A resident of the village of Plavi was detained for so called
``illegal border crossing'', ``IPN'', 12 October 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. On 22nd October 2016, a resident of the village of
Mejvriskhevi, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers
for so called ``illegal border crossing'' nearby the occupation line
with the Tskhinvali region. The resident of the village of Mejvriskhevi
did not cross the occupation line; when detained he was nearby the
occupation line for cattle grazing.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 43-year-old man was detained for so called illegal border
crossing, ``GHN'', 22 October 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. On 24th October 2016, a resident of the village Kirbali, Gori
district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called
``illegal border crossing'' nearby the occupation line with the
Tskhinvali region. When detained, the resident of the village of
Kirbali was collecting timber in the forest nearby the occupation line.
He did not cross the occupation line. The detainee spent three days in
detention in the Tskhinvali region.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ What is the story of a man who spent three days in illegal
detention the Tskhinvali detention center? ``Palitra News'', 27 October
2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. On 5th and 6th November 2016, six citizens of Georgia were
detained for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation
line with Tskhinvali region.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Tskhinvali regime released six Georgian citizens as a result
of fine payment, ``IPN'', 8 November 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. On 27th November 2016, a 18-year-old resident of Gori district
was detained by the Russian FSB officers in the village of Jariasheni,
nearby the occupation line with Tskhinvali region and was abducted to
the occupied Tskhinvali region.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Occupants abducted 18-year-old man from the village of
Jariasheni, ``Ambebi.ge'', 27 November 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. On 6th December 2016, several schoolchildren residing in the
occupied village of Otobaia, Gali district, were detained by the
Russian FSB officers Abkhazia. The schoolchildren were held in
detention in the Russian military base for around 5 hours.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ So called border guards freed schoolchildren detained in
occupied Abkhazia, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 6 December 2016,
available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. On 27th December 2016, a resident of the village of
Mejvriskhevi, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers
for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation line
with Tskhinvali region.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Authorities of South Ossetia expelled violator of state border
from Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 28 December 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Freedom of Movement

30. Along the occupation lines with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions
people are regularly subject to restrictions on freedom of movement by
the Russian FSB officers: the operating crossing points along the
occupation lines allow crossings only to individuals having one of the
types of ``documents'' recognized by the occupying power. Those unable
to present the ``document'' or show up at the crossing point out of
working hours, are denied the right to cross, often leading to various
types of problems of locals, including children. Restrictions on
freedom of movement remained an issue of concern during the reporting
period that has been attested by the various sources.
31. It should be recalled that in spring 2016, two crossing points
from six crossing points along the occupation line with the Abkhazian
region were closed down.\39\ In November 2016, Mr. Khajimba publicly
spoke about the policy of closing down the crossing points along the
occupation line with the Abkhazian region.\40\ On 5th December 2016, so
called ``head of administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi
occupation regime publicly declared that ``the Russian Border Guards
are closing more and more segments of fords on the River Enguri, the
places in the river which were used to cross the border illegally. . .
. In this 2016 year everything is ready to close down two more crossing
points''.\41\ Eventually, by so called ``decree N 241'' of so called
``Government of Abkhazia'', dated 28 December 2016, decision was made
to close down two more crossing points--``Nabakevi crossing point'' and
``Otobaia crossing point'' along the occupation line with the Abkhazian
region.\42\ It should be noted that according to paragraph 3 of so
called ``decree N 241'', ``the decree will enter into force in 30 days
after it is published''.\43\ When commenting the decision on the
closure of two additional crossing points, the representative of so
called ``Government of Abkhazia'' stated the following: ``in accordance
with governmental decision adopted earlier, we are gradually decreasing
the number of crossing points on the border with Georgia''.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of
Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf (2016) 37, paragraph
41.
\40\ Raul Khajimba: we will not let anybody to destroy our state in
the heat of revenge, ``Apsnypress'', 10 November 2016, available at
.
\41\ Temur Nadaraia: data supplied by Dimitri Dbar are nor
authentic and mislead the public, ``Apsnypress'', 5 December 2016,
available at .
\42\ Two more crossing pints on the border on the River Enguri will
be closed, ``Apsnypress'', 28 December 2016, available at ; Decree of Government of Republic of Abkhazia,
28 December 2016, available at .
\43\ Decree of Government of Republic of Abkhazia, 28 December
2016, available at .
\44\ Two more crossing pints on the border on the River Enguri will
be closed, ``Apsnypress'', 28 December 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. According to information disseminated on 26th October 2016, Mr.
Tibilov declared that ``Tskhinvali needs airplanes in order to
eradicate the practice by Ossetians travelling to Georgia for medical
treatment''. According to the source, Mr. Tibilov stated that ``local
residents often request authorities to send them for medical treatment
to Georgia, where it is much easier to travel rather than to North
Ossetia [the Russian Federation]''. According to Mr. Tibilov, ``South
Ossetia is discussing with the Russian Federation the issue of creation
of its own aviation''.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Leonid Tibilov--Tskhinvali needs airplanes in order to
eradicate the practice by Ossetians travelling to Georgia for medical
treatment, ``Ambebi'', 26 October 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
occupied regions of Georgia, both in the Abkhazian region and in the
Tskhinvali region so called ``border zones'' are established in the
vicinity of the occupation lines by the occupying power. Residents of
each occupied region are subject to restrictions on freedom of movement
in terms of entering these so called ``border zones'' and in terms of
moving within these so called ``border zones''. It should be emphasized
that during the reporting period, so called ``deputy minister of
foreign affairs'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime declared that
``there is a decision of government, adopted very recently, in fact few
days ago, which approved extension of border zone''.\46\ According to
the same source, ``this is a regime zone and correspondingly, entrance
to this zone will be always restricted. Those who dwell there
(householders, guests etc.) fall under this regime''.\47\ According to
information disseminated on 15th November 2016, local residents of Gali
district of the occupied Abkhazian region are subject to restrictions
on freedom of movement: the Russian military personnel deployed there,
demands ``documents'' in order to allow local residents to move across
internal routes of Gali district.\48\ According to information
disseminated on 16th December 2016, in the villages of Saberio,
Lekukhona and Cheghali, Gali district, freedom of movement of local
residents is restricted: occupants demand ``documents'' from locals in
order to allow them to move from one village to another and shoot
photos of local residents, presumably in order to create a
database.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ ``Talks about militarization of Gali district are untenable'',
``ekhokavkaza'', 24 November 2016, available at .
\47\ ``Talks about militarization of Gali district are untenable'',
``ekhokavkaza'', 24 November 2016, available at .
\48\ In occupied Abkhazia population is subject to restrictions of
movement on so called border, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 15
November 2016, available at .
\49\ In the villages of Gali district occupants restrict freedom of
movement of locals, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 16 December 2016,
available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. It should be emphasized that according to information
disseminated on 23rd November 2016, the Russian FSB officers restricted
freedom of movement of residents of the villages of Akhalubani, Adzvi
and Jariasheni, Gori district, namely residents of these villages, on
the occasion of St. George's Day, could not visit and pray in St.
George's Church, located nearby the occupation line with the Tskhinvali
region.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ In Gori district, nearby the occupation line, mobilization of
so called Russian border guards was noticeable, ``Newposts'', 23
November 2016, available at ; Population is not allowed to
pray nearby administrative boundary line with so called South Ossetia,
``Kvira'', 23 November 2016, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Right to Property

35. During the reporting period, violations of the right to
property caused by the occupation of the territories of Georgia,
remained the issue of concern.
36. During the reporting period, a representative of the Tskhinvali
occupation regime stated that ``particularly on locations, where the
border is not yet clearly formalized, residents of adjacent territories
often cultivate land and harvest crop and therefore violate the law.''
He further stated that ``In cases when the border crosses directly
through premises and plots of land, a householder should keep a
passport in order to enter his plot of land, which remained on the
territory of another state. There are a lot of such situations,
predominantly in the village of Zardiantkari.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ David Sanakoev: Arrangement of Border depends on financing,
``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 13 October, available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. According to the article which was published during the
reporting period in The New York Times, the occupation line along the
Tskhinvali region creates problems for local residents in terms of
enjoyment of the right to property. According to the article, ``the
dirt track now running through this tiny Georgian village [of
Jariasheni] nonetheless means that Vephivia Tatiashvili can no longer
go to his three-story house because it sits on land now patrolled by
Russian border guards.'' The article argues that ``[t]here is no fence
or barbed wire, but Mr. Tatiashvili does not dare to cross the track to
visit his house for fear of being arrested, as his elderly neighbor
was, by Russian border guards. ``It is too dangerous for me to go
home,'' he said, complaining that the boundary has become so mobile
that nobody really knows its final destination. Mr. Tatiashvili now
lives in his brother's house, away from the border in the village
center. . . . Russia starts right here,'' said Mr. Tatiashvili,
pointing to the freshly dug track that separates his house from
Georgian-held land.'' The article further observes that ``Elizbar
Mestumrishvili, 75, a farmer who lives next to Mr. Tatiashvili's now-
marooned house, can still get to his home, as it lies on the Georgian
side of the new dirt track. But he is wary of going to the bottom of
his garden, which lies within a 60-yard frontier zone that Russian and
South Ossetian security officers claim the right to patrol. Pointing to
a row of vines drooping with plump grapes, he said it was unwise to
walk any farther because ``they might come and set up a border
post''.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. According to local residents of Gali district, so called
``administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
forces them to sell most of their harvested citrus crops in the Russian
Federation: however it is economically much more profitable for them to
sell their crops of citrus in Zugdidi, the territory controlled by the
Government of Georgia.\53\ I should be noted here that the European
Court of Human Rights has interpreted ``possessions'' under Article 1
(Protection of Property), Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) very broadly and has held that it includes movable
or immovable property and also the economic interests connected with
``possessions''.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Abkhazian de-facto authorities force population of Gali
district to transport citrus to Russia, ``Business Press News'', 27
October 2016, available at .
\54\ ``Possessions'' include ``a range of economic interests. The
following have been held to fall within the protection of Article 1:
movable or immovable property, tangible or intangible interests, such
as shares, patents, an arbitration award, the entitlement to a pension,
a landlord's entitlement to rent, the economic interests connected with
the running of a business, the right to exercise a profession, a
legitimate expectation that a certain state of affairs will apply, a
legal claim, and the clientele of a cinema.'' Carss-Frisk, M. The right
to property: A guide to the implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human rights handbooks,
No. 4 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), p. 6, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Right to Education in the Native Language

39. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
occupied regions of Georgia, in the Gali district there are 31 schools
and from these 31 schools only 11 schools, all of which are in so
called ``lower zone'' of Gali district, had the status of Georgian
schools until the end of the academic year 2014-2015. However, from the
beginning of September of the academic year 2015-2016, drastic changes
have been made in the curriculum of these 11 schools, implying teaching
of all subjects in the Russian language in grades from I to IV. The
academic year 2016-2017 started in line with the above changes implying
teaching of all subjects in the Russian language and therefore the
Russian language had become the formal instruction language also in
grade V. The above policy, if continued for several years, would result
in gradual replacement of the Georgian curriculum with the Russian
curriculum for all grades in these 11 schools of so called ``lower
zone'' of Gali district.
40. According to the report of the Public Defender of Georgia
issued during the reporting period, ``problems remain with the access
of people living on occupied territories to education.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. During the reporting period, the situation with regard to the
right to education in the native language in the Gali district remained
the same. According to ``EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th
Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'', made on 16th November
2016 at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting,
``[t]he EU expresses its concern at reports on a continuing
deterioration of the access to education in the native language in the
Georgian region of Abkhazia. We strongly believe that the right to
education for everyone, including education in the native language
should be guaranteed and applied in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia as well. We join the efforts of the
Co-Chairs of Geneva International Discussions to promote understanding
and respect for the universal right to education of the child.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
42. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
occupied regions of Georgia, there is a tendency of making decisions by
parents on termination of attendance by their schoolchildren of the
schools with newly introduced Russian curriculum and transferring them
to the schools located on the other side of the occupation line;
however the right to education in the native language remains
problematic also in relation to freedom of movement. For example, in
the reporting period, namely on the morning of 6th December 2016,
several schoolchildren residing in the occupied village of Otobaia,
Gali district were detained by the Russian FSB officers and were
prevented from crossing the occupation line along Abkhazia and
therefore from attending school in the village of Darcheli, Zugdidi
district, the territory controlled by the Government of Georgia. It
should be noted that the schoolchildren were held in detention in the
Russian military base for around 5 hours.\57\ Moreover, the decision to
close down two more crossing points along the occupation line with the
Abkhazian region will create further impediments to the schoolchildren
going to schools on the territory controlled by the Government of
Georgia to get the education in the native language, as they have to
pass additional several kilometres every day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ So called border guards freed schoolchildren detained in
occupied Abkhazia, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 6 December 2016,
available at .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Conclusions

43. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia constitutes infringements on freedom from
torture and ill-treatment and therefore are violations of Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE
commitments.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ The Vienna Concluding Document (1989) prohibits torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Paragraph
23.4; The Paris Document (1990) also prohibits torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Istanbul Charter for
European Security commits to ``eradicating torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE
area.'' Paragraph 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia with regard to arbitrary detention and
examples provided for the reporting period constitute arbitrary
detention and therefore violations of Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 3 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and relevant provisions of the OSCE
commitments.
45. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia with regard to freedom of movement and
examples provided for the reporting period constitute violations of the
right to freedom of movement, namely of Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 13 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2, Protocol No. 4
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE freedom
of movement commitments.
46. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia with regard to the right to property and
examples provided for the reporting period violate the right to
property, namely Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR); Article 1, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.
47. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia with regard to education in the native
language and examples provided for the reporting period constitute
violations of the right to education in one's native language and
therefore violations of Article 26 (read in conjunction with Article 2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2,
Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);
Article 28 (read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article 2) of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and relevant provisions of
the OSCE commitments.
48. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
occupied regions of Georgia, particularly adoption of so called
``laws'' and the process of ``passportisation'' violates prohibition of
discrimination provisions of Article 14 and Protocol No. 12 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.

VIII. Appeal to the International Community

49. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to the
international community, states as well as international
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations:

to call on the Russian Federation to reverse its recognition of
independence of the Georgian regions Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
and to end the occupation of the Georgian territories;

to call on the Russian Federation to stop violations of human
rights on the occupied territories while exercising effective
control;

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to ensure free
movement of people and removal of barbed and razor wires and
other artificial obstacles and banners along the occupation
line;

to take additional measures in order to monitor and report on
the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia,
more specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
appeals to:

(i) the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) to take additional measures in
order to regularly address and assess the human rights
situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

(ii) the UN Human Rights Council's Special Procedure
Mandate holders to take additional measures in order to
address and report on the human rights situation in
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

(iii) the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
of Europe to take additional measures in order to
address and report on the human rights situation in
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

(iv) the OSCE and its autonomous institutions, namely
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM) to find ways for monitoring
the human rights situation in Georgia's occupied
regions. Such steps could, inter alia, include
undertaking a follow-up mission to the occupied regions
of Georgia and preparing a report on the status of the
implementation of the recommendations contained in the
ODIHR/HCNM 2008 Report on ``Human Rights in the War
Affected Areas following the Conflict in Georgia''.

to continue calling on the Russian Federation to allow a)
access of the international human rights monitoring mechanisms
to the occupied regions of Georgia; b) access of the relevant
missions of international organizations (e.g. EUMM), including
humanitarian organizations, to the occupied regions of Georgia
through legal routes;

to continue and intensify condemning violations of human rights
such as the right to life; freedom of movement; freedom from
torture and ill-treatment; the right to liberty; the right to
property and the right to receive education in the native
language in the occupied regions of Georgia.

ATTACHMENT 2

Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic
Equality

Main Directions of the
Reconciliation and Engagement Policy of the SMRCE

The Government of Georgia (GoG) pursues and actively implements the
peaceful, pragmatic and constructive policy of reconciliation,
engagement and confidence building with the aim to achieve conflict
transformation, facilitate people-to-people contacts, assist the
population on the ground and contribute to the peaceful settlement of
the conflict.
In this regard, the GoG continues to implement the main dimensions
of the State Strategy towards the Occupied Territories: Engagement
through Cooperation and its respective Action Plan with special
emphasis on such components as healthcare, education, confidence
building, socio-economic assistance, civil society development and
international engagement.
SMRCE actively cooperates with the EU, USA and with other
international partners to enhance its peace policy based on the
principles of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also, it
actively participates in different formats and plays a leading role in
their proceedings.
The GoG continues to seek the ways for sharing the benefits and
opportunities stemming from the EU-Georgia Visa Liberalization
Dialogue, EU-Georgia political association and economic integration
process, with the populations residing in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
region/South Ossetia. The EU-Georgia high level political consultations
are periodically held to discuss the existing local and regional
challenges and assess the efforts undertaken towards the peaceful
settlement of conflict in Georgia. The same issues are also discussed
at the meetings of the Association Council and of the Subcommittee on
Justice, Freedom and Security (the latest ones held on December 2 and
June 16, 2016). Along with the existing situation the participants
overviewed the implementation of the Engagement Strategy and Action
Plan.
SMRCE holds intensive consultations with international
organizations to ensure their presence in the occupied regions despite
all the obstacles these organizations face in terms of accessing these
territories and carrying out their activities on the ground.
SMRCE is actively engaged in the implementation of the
Communication and Information Strategy of the GoG in the sphere of the
European Integration. Informative video commercials concerning the
Association Agreement were prepared and transmitted on Public
broadcasting TV channel in 4 different languages, including in
Abkhazian and Ossetian. Special booklets were printed and distributed
in all these languages. In addition, with the assistance of the EU,
SMRCE prepared short videos on the issues of visa liberalization,
Association Agreement, education opportunities and ``Life with barbed
wires'', which was screened at the Batumi International Conference in
July and highlighted the existing situation and challenges of local
population.
implementation of the engagement action plan
Healthcare
Free healthcare represents one of the cornerstones of the
engagement strategy. Residents of the occupied territories largely
benefit from the state-sponsored Referral Program under which they
receive full-scale, needs-based medical treatment in any medical
institution of Georgia. In April 2015 Hepatitis C elimination program
(initiated through the support of US company ``Gilead'') was launched
and the participation was extended to the residents of the occupied
regions.
Through the Liaison Mechanism (LM) effectively operating under the
Action Plan for Engagement, the GoG regularly delivers to Abkhazia
region necessary vaccines, including immunization and veterinary
vaccines, diabetes and HIV/AIDS treatment and medicine for
tuberculosis, also ambulance and other types of vehicle, medical
equipment, etc. Annually the cost of delivered medicine amounts
approximately to 250,000 USD.
In 2013-2015 Government of Georgia spent more than 5 million USD on
the healthcare of the residents of occupied regions. In 2016 the amount
on healthcare component already equaled to 3.5 million USD. It is
important to underline that throughout the years the number of persons
coming over for free healthcare treatment has more than doubled.
GoG continues the construction of multi-functional center,
including the 200-bed hospital in Rukhi that is the closest point to
the occupation line in the direction of Abkhazia region. The
functioning of this high profile medical institution will make the
receipt of the free of charge medical treatment even more accessible
and convenient.
Education
The GoG continues sponsoring the ``1+4'' program that offers
simplified procedures for the representatives of ethnic minorities,
inter alia, Abkhazians and Ossetians, to enroll in higher education
institutions of Georgia by passing only one exam in their native
language, with 1 year in Georgian language training followed by 4 years
of undergraduate studies in a program of their own choice. At the same
time, the GoG maintains the operation of the International Education
Center (IEC) which offers the funding of the MA and Ph.D. education to
the residents of the country, including the one in the occupied
territories.
For these purposes and with the aim to simplify the existing
procedures for the recognition of education received inside the
occupied territories, the SMRCE in close cooperation with the Ministry
of Education and Science of Georgia elaborated the amendments to the
Order of the Minister of Education and Science of December 1, 2009 on
the Rules for the Recognition of Higher Education Received in the
Occupied Territories that entered into force on January 11, 2017. The
introduced amendments to the Order created possibilities for the
persons residing inside the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
region/South Ossetia to obtain the recognition for the high education
received inside the occupied territories via status neutral solutions
and simplified procedures--online or through the assistance of
international organization, without the need to travel to the rest of
Georgia, to take Georgian ID or to present witnesses that was necessary
before. On its side, the issued act certifying the receipt of education
inside occupied territories authorizes the person to continue study in
higher education institution in the rest of Georgia or abroad and to
participate in international student mobility and education programs.
Trade
Multi-functional trading center was constructed in closest vicinity
of occupation line in Rukhi in 2015 and launched in April 2016 that
will facilitate trade and business contacts across the divide. The
center also includes bank, veterinary clinic, post office, drug store,
small refrigerators for storing the goods and collection points for
agriculture products.
The GoG continues to actively work on further facilitating and
encouraging trade, business ties and confidence building across the ABL
and for creating favorable and conducive environment in this regard.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is
funding a program entitled The ZRDA Activity in Georgia. The goal of it
is to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth in targeted
regions. The activity purpose is to improve livelihoods and resilience
in targeted communities in Georgia, through improving MSME development
and growth, increasing productivity of rural households, facilitating
market linkages between producers and buyers, promote local economic
development by establishing networks. USAID intends to provide a total
of approximately $15,000,000 funding over a 5-year period.
Liaison Mechanism
The LM continues to serve the important functions of conveying
messages between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, effective and regular delivery of
the medicine and medical equipment to Abkhazia region and assistance of
international organizations in the implementation of bilateral
confidence building projects. Apart from this, LM directly participated
in the implementation of several confidence building projects. In
particular, LM was involved in the arrangement of Abkhaz Corner in the
National Parliamentary Library of Georgia with the aim to promote the
Abkhaz literature, culture and history, in the publishing of ``Mokvi
Gospel'' in Georgian, Abkhazian and English languages that was
distributed in Abkhazia region and conducted joint trainings of
Georgian and Abkhazian doctors in Istanbul on the treatment of
Hepatitis C.
In 2016, the LM has delivered to Abkhazia region a special vehicle
with spray equipment necessary for preserving box-trees and respective
pesticides channeled by the GoG. It has also provided Sokhumi Child
Center with ultra sound device allocated by the Ministry of Health of
Georgia.
CBMs
In close cooperation with the LM and the CoE, SMRCE continuously
facilitates the implementation of bilateral Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian confidence building projects that includes the
meetings, seminars, trainings, study visits etc. of various groups of
people--teachers, doctors, cultural heritage experts, civil society
representatives, etc.--on neutral territories. The number of such
projects is increasing.

In particular in 2016:

--Georgian-Abkhazian young women participated in training on women
empowerment in Yerevan;
--``Series of European lectures'' were held in Sokhumi for teachers
and lecturers, also with the participation of several Ossetian
representatives;
--Georgian-Abkhazian doctors participated in study visit to Berlin on
the issues of drug prevention and treatment. As a result CoE
mission took place to Sukhumi and Tbilisi for Pompidou Group
experts;
--Georgian-Abkhazian psychology and psychiatry specialists working
with traumatized children participated in training in Budapest;
--Georgian-Abkhazian archive specialists participated in follow-up
meeting concerning the Soviet time materials in Yerevan,
Tallinn and Paris as a result of which a joint publication will
soon be made;
--Georgian-Abkhazian teachers participated in last workshop in Graz
on the methodology of teaching of foreign languages;
--Georgian-Abkhazian human rights defenders and civil society
representatives met in Budapest and Venice on follow-up meeting
to discuss human rights issues;
--Georgian-Abkhazian interpreters two times participated in training
on translation technique in Budapest;
--Georgian-Abkhazian museum experts participated in training on
museum management issues in Budapest;
--Field visit was implemented to Gudauta with the participation of
CoE experts as a continuation to Georgian-Abkhazian cultural
heritage project;
--Training of trainers for Georgian-Abkhazian teachers on Human
Rights education to children of 8-13 years based on CoE
materials ``Compasito'' was held in Budapest.

SMRCE supports the operation of COBERM--EU funded financial
mechanism--that enables the implementation of bilateral confidence-
building projects by non-government and international organizations.
The SMRCE maintains flexible and transparent operation of the
Modalities for Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of
Georgia and continues to issue Non-objection Orders with respect to the
submitted projects which concern the activities of international and
non-governmental organizations in the occupied territories, including
the confidence-building initiatives. In 2016, additionally 58 new
projects were granted with non-objection (overall 345 projects); none
was ever refused.
Communication between the divided societies
SMRCE engages in any kind of platform and tries to use any given
opportunity to help re-establish effective communication among the
divided communities. In February and June of 2015 and April of 2016
informal dialogues were held in London between the representatives of
Georgian and Abkhazian communities, amongst them politicians, experts
and international organizations. Meetings of similar format were also
held in September 2015 in Bern, Switzerland and in Berlin, Germany.
Recent political developments had been discussed and the existing
situation had been analyzed. At the same time, the SMRCE continues to
actively take part in Civic Point of View meetings that is a platform
for the meeting of representatives of Georgian-Ossetian communities.
In the frames of GoG's peaceful policy of reconciliation,
confidence building and engagement and as a result of agreement
directly reached with the de-facto authorities, Georgian and Ossetian
prisoners were released at Enguri Bridge on March 10, 2016. In
particular, 14 citizens of Georgia held in illegal custody on the
territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and 4
Ossetians convicted under Georgian legislation were released from
detention. The exchange of prisoners had a positive impact on peace
process and confidence building between the divided communities.
Assistance of conflict affected population
GoG actively continues the efforts to alleviate the consequences of
the installation of barbed wire fences and other physical barriers by
the Russian militaries in villages adjacent to the occupation line. In
the frames of the Interagency Commission, the GoG together with
international partners restored the provision of irrigation and potable
water in communities affected by Russian-built barbed wire fences,
completed gasification works, provided local population with financial
assistance during winter time, built and renovated several schools and
kindergartens, created and rehabilitated ambulatories, restored roads
and developed infrastructure, supported local youth in covering their
university tuition fees and helped farmers in their agricultural work.
The rehabilitation works and delivery of assistance to the local
population continues annually.
In 2016, due to the efforts of the GoG and with the assistance of
international organizations (UNDP, UNHCR) the surface of the Enguri
bridge was renovated. Also, the bus became operational on the bridge,
following 8 years of restrictions. Consequently, the residents of the
occupied territory are able to benefit from free-of-charge
transportation.
On 5 March 2017, representatives of the occupation regime abolished
two so-called crossing points along the occupation line in the villages
of Nabakebi and Otobaia, the Abkhazia region. The announced closure of
two crossing points along the occupation line which are used daily by
hundreds of commuters, will be detrimental to the freedom of movement
of the population, including school children, on both sides of the
occupation line. It will likely increase the risk of incidents,
especially detentions.
Such a unilateral decision would go against commitments to work
towards enhanced security and improved living conditions for the
conflict-affected population. Furthermore, it would be contrary to
efforts to normalise the situation by creating an atmosphere that is
not conducive to longer-term conflict resolution and overall stability
in the region.
GID and IPRM
First Deputy State Minister of SMRCE heads the Second Working Group
of Geneva International Discussions (GID) on humanitarian issues.
Georgian delegation regularly raises issues of utmost importance, such
as return of IDPs and refugees and grave violations of human rights and
basic freedoms of the population residing in the occupied territories
(e.g. freedom of movement, right to education in native language, right
to unimpeded access to healthcare, etc.). Other important issues--such
as the provision of water and gas, protection of the cultural heritage
sites, fate of the detained--are also being raised.
In the spirit of its constructive approach in 2015 and 2016 the GoG
handed important archive materials to Abkhaz participants and an
international expert on cultural heritage issues was enabled to visit
Bedia and Likhny temples in Abkhazia region and elaborate a subsequent
document on their current condition; another expert on healthcare
issues conducted training on diabetes in Sokhumi. The potential
cooperation on environmental issues, in particular, addressing a shared
problem endangering the endemic box tree population in Georgia,
including in Abkhazia has been also discussed.
SMRCE actively participates in Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, which are held along the ABLs with Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia on a regular basis. As a result of
agreement reached during the 35th round of GID, IPRM was resumed in
Gali after 4 year suspension.
Within the IPRM framework the issues of human rights violations in
the occupied territories, including but not limited to illegal
detentions, prisoners, deprivation of property, issues related to
provision of potable and irrigation water as well as vital security and
livelihood issues are being discussed. The hot lines remain operational
and thanks to them kidnappings have been diminished substantially.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
The Ambassador from Latvia.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDRIS TEIKMANIS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
Ambassador Teikmanis. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member
Leahy, Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you very much for inviting me to speak before this
very honorable subcommittee.
Latvia and the United States have a century-long history of
truly friendly relations and a very close partnership. Due to
this partnership, Latvia has safeguarded its independence and
this partnership has facilitated Latvia's integration back into
the Euro-Atlantic community.
We have to admit today that the world has become less
secure and less stable over the past decade. Causes for
instability are various and the geography of the threats is
diverse. Continued U.S. global leadership is extremely
important to safeguard an international rules-based order. A
strong transatlantic link is the best answer to today's
security risks.
Since 2003, Latvian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder
with the United States in the fight against terrorism in Iraq
and Afghanistan. We both have made sacrifices and Latvia
remains committed to fighting terrorism within the global
coalition against ISIL.
We can do more. We are ready to do more. In 2017, Latvia
considers additional contribution to the fight against
terrorism in the form of financial assistance.
Threats around us, and threats in the region, become more
complex and harder to identify, quantify, and pinpoint.
Russia's actions, vis-a-vis its neighbors, show a disturbing
and worrisome trend that we have to reckon with.
What happened in the Ukraine, Russia's steady and
systematic military buildup, as well as the intensive military
maneuvers in the proximity of NATO borders--like the one
symbolically named Zapad 2017--have caused a significant
deterioration in the European strategic security environment,
and are challenging the European and international security
order. This has a direct impact on the national security of
Latvia, Europe, and NATO.
To respond, we need a strong NATO as a source of stability
and reliability. We need a prosperous and resilient European
Union. We need an effective Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE) capable of solving, not freezing,
conflicts.
Thanks to historical decisions of the NATO Warsaw Summit on
the deployment of four multinational battle groups to the
Atlantic eastern flank--including a Canadian-led Enhanced
Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia--we are more secure and
reassured. This is a very practical expression of solidarity
from our allies and a strong deterrent signal to Russia.
Security in our region is greatly strengthened thanks to
Congress' support for the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative,
the Atlantic Resolve mission, and the Foreign Military
Financing Program, for which we are grateful.
By taking into account that the challenges to our region
are of a long term nature, we are looking forward to the
continuation of the European Reassurance Initiative at the
funding level of $3.4 billion or higher. Likewise, we hope that
the Foreign Military Financing funding will be maintained or
enhanced.
The continued U.S. commitment to NATO is essential to
preserving the irreversibility of these decisions. Latvia
highly appreciates the very clear and resolute statement by the
U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis at the NATO Defense
Ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, thus reconfirming
the United States' strong support to the Alliance. The meeting
of the Presidents of three Baltic States and the Vice President
of the United States in Munich in mid-February reassured us
even further in this respect.
Latvia is also stepping up and pulling more weight. Latvia
is among the best examples when it comes to raising a nation's
own defense capabilities. In case of military aggression, our
own forces will be the first responders. We are well aware of
that challenge, therefore Latvia has spent the past 2 years
boosting its military capacity and improving interagency
coordination. Currently, we are spending 1.7 percent and next
year, only a few months to go, we will spend 2 percent of GDP
for our defense.
Since joining NATO in 2004, Latvia has been not only a
recipient, but also a provider, of security. In proportion to
our population of 2 million, we count as among the top
contributors in missions to Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans,
Mali, the Central African Republic, and Somalia.
Europe and the United States should join their efforts to
help Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova counter threats of a hybrid
nature that are a mix of various elements including information
warfare. Latvia has been active in providing its support to the
Eastern partners to counter propaganda and to strengthen
independent media.
I would like to mention two examples of very practical
approaches and supports towards the Eastern Partnership
countries.
First, the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence recently
completed a study on skills and training needs of independent
media in the Eastern Partnership countries.
Second, Latvia is interested in the success of the Creative
Content Support Fund that is being established with support
from the European Endowment for Democracy and the British
Government. This fund will strengthen the capacity of
independent media to offer Russian language audiences a strong
alternative to the Kremlin controlled media. We encourage the
United States to consider supporting this important initiative.
During pivotal times in history, the Alliance has always
proven to be effective, credible, and united. Solidarity is the
keyword here. I believe the spirit of solidarity will bring us
to wise future decisions.
Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Andris Teikmanis

(See also ``Annual Report About the Activities of the Security Police
in 2015'' and ``Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-
Military Influence in the Baltic States'' in the additional information
at the end of the hearing.)

latvia-united states
Latvia and the United States have a century long history of truly
friendly relations. The United States is our closest strategic partner.
The Latvian-American strategic partnership has helped Latvia to
safeguard its independence and build democratic society, has
facilitated Latvia's integration into the Euro Atlantic community.
Latvia highly values the extensive political dialogue and multifaceted
co-operation developed over the years.
global security challenges
We have to admit today that the world has become less secure and
less stable over the past decade. Causes for instability are various
and the geography of the threats is diverse. The continued U.S. global
leadership is extremely important to safeguard an international rules
based order. The strong transatlantic link is the answer to today's
security risks--terrorism, radicalism, cyberwarfare, information
confrontations. Latvia is ready to continue joining the U.S. in this
important endeavor to make the world more secure and stable.
Since 2003, Latvian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder with the
United States in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We both have made sacrifices. Latvia remains committed to fighting
terrorism within the Global Coalition against ISIL and providing
financial support and military expertise to those who fight ISIL in
Iraq and Syria. Since 2014 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence in Riga (NATO StratCom) provides in-depth analyses and
recommendations on countering Russian and ISIL propaganda.
We could do more. We are ready to do more. In 2017 Latvia is
considering additional contribution to the fight against terrorism in
the form of financial assistance.
security situation in the region
Threats around us have become more complex and harder to identify,
quantify and pinpoint. Russia's actions vis-a-vis its neighbors show a
disturbing and worrisome trend that we have to reckon with.
As it is evident from the new Russian National Security Strategy,
Russia has defined NATO as its adversary and threat to its national
interest. The Strategy also reflects the sentiment and desire for a
world order with spheres of influence. This vision is outdated and
unrealistic; the sovereign nations Russia wishes to subject to such
division have their own vision and an active say in their development
and choice with whom to ally themselves. This sovereign right may not
be challenged.
What happened in Ukraine, and Russia's steady and systematic
military build-up as well as the intensive military maneuvers in the
proximity of NATO's borders--like the ones symbolically named ``Zapad
2017'' (which means ``West 2017'' in Russian)--have caused a
significant deterioration in European strategic security environment
and are challenging the European and international security order. This
has direct impact on the national security of Latvia, Europe and NATO.
We take it seriously. I do predict that we can expect continued
pressure both in terms of military pressure and hybridized warfare
employing both military assets and non-military means aimed at eroding
and deconstructing the unity of Europe, the Transatlantic link and
consequently--NATO. These actions include a range of instruments,
including propaganda, economic pressure and financing of political
campaigns to cyber-attacks and aggressive intelligence gathering.
To respond, we need a strong NATO as a source of stability and
reliability. We need a prosperous and resilient European Union. We need
an effective Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) capable of solving, not freezing conflicts. We need more co-
operation at the regional level. To uphold our European values and
principles, we have to back them with strong institutions and
partnerships with its neighbors that are nurtured on a daily basis.
Being aware that internal and external security is interlinked,
Latvia is doing its outmost to build on our own resilience, strengthen
our border security and invest in our self-defense. However, our
strength is in our solidarity! We are grateful to NATO and individual
Allies, in particular, the U.S., for a significant military
reinforcement experienced already. An enhanced military presence
combined with assurance measures such as air policing and military
exercises has provided us with visible reassurance.
nato and u.s. presence
Following swiftly on the heels of Russian aggression in Ukraine,
NATO reacted by taking decisions to reassure Allies that were proper to
deter Russia. And since then, it has proceeded with strengthening
strategic partnerships to build security together with non-NATO
countries like Sweden and Finland in our region.
Thanks to historical decisions of the NATO Warsaw Summit on the
deployment of four multinational battle groups to the Alliance's
Eastern flank, including a Canadian-led Enhanced Forward Presence
battle group in Latvia, we are more secure and reassured. This is a
very practical expression of solidarity from our allies and a strong
deterrent signal to Russia. Security in our region is greatly
strengthened thanks to the Congress support for the U.S. European
Reassurance Initiative/European Deterrence Initiative, the Atlantic
Resolve mission and the Foreign Military Financing for which we are
grateful. Taking into account that challenges to our region are of a
long term nature, we are looking forward to the continuation of the
European Deterrence Initiative at the funding level of $3.4 billion or
higher. Likewise we hope that the Foreign Military Financing funding
will be maintained or enhanced. These policies have strengthened our
regional security and made a positive impact on addressing our
immediate shortfalls in national capabilities.
The continued U.S. commitment to NATO is essential to preserving
the irreversibility of these decisions. Latvia highly appreciates the
very clear and resolute statement by the U.S. Defense Secretary Jim
Mattis at the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in Brussels last month,
thus reconfirming the U.S. strong support to the Alliance. The meeting
of the Presidents of three Baltic States and the Vice President of the
United States in Munich in mid-February reassured us even further in
this respect.
Having said this, I would like to add that Latvia shares the notion
that NATO must be capable of confronting the 21st century threats. We
agree there is a need to modernize NATO, to streamline the Alliance's
military command structures, to place greater focus on counter-
terrorism and cyber security, on information warfare. NATO has to have
appropriate investment in military capabilities that can be achieved by
equally sharing the burden of our collective security.
latvia's contributions to defense
Latvia is also stepping up and pulling more weight. Latvia is among
the best examples when it comes to raising a nation's own defense
capabilities. In case of military aggression, our own forces will be
the first responders. We are well aware of that challenge, therefore
Latvia has spent last 2 years boosting its military capacity and
improving the interagency coordination. For the current fiscal year,
our defense spending has increased by 22 percent, reaching 1.7 percent
of GDP. Our commitment to NATO target of 2 percent will be reached next
year--in 2018.
Since joining NATO in 2004, Latvia has not only been a recipient,
but also a provider of security. In proportion to our population of 2
million, count us amongst the top contributors to international
peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have also contributed
to the missions in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Mali, the Central
African Republic, and off the coast of Somalia.
supporting our eastern neighbors
Transatlantic resolve is also needed to continue strengthening
resilience of the EU's Eastern neighbors who constantly encounter
threats to their territorial integrity and statehood as a result of
Russia's aggressive actions. Europe and the United States should stand
firmly on calling Russia to comply with international rules and its
commitments, in particular--fully with the Minsk Agreement.
Transatlantic unity is of utmost importance in this respect. The latest
escalation in the Eastern Ukraine underlines this. We need to keep up
pressure on Russia to de-escalate the situation and facilitate peaceful
resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. We should continue supporting
Ukraine both practically and politically, because the success of
Ukraine to firmly stand on its own feet will be the best response to
the concept of spheres of influence.
Europe and the U.S. should join their efforts to also help Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova counter threats of hybrid nature that are a mix of
various elements including information warfare. Latvia has been active
in providing its support to the Eastern partners to counter propaganda
and to strengthen independent media through various frameworks--NATO
(NATO StratCom), the European Union (East StratCom Task Force),
regionally and nationally (Baltic Centre for Media Excellence).
I would like to mention two examples of very practical approach and
support towards the Eastern Partnership countries. Firstly, the Baltic
Centre for Media Excellence recently completed a study on skills and
training needs of independent media in the Eastern Partnership
countries. We encourage all donors to use the findings of the study to
improve the coordination and targeting of their media support programs.
Secondly, Latvia is interested in the success of the Creative
Content Support Fund that is now being established with support from
the European Endowment for Democracy and the British Government. The
Fund will strengthen the capacity of the independent media to offer
Russian-language audiences a strong alternative to the Kremlin-
controlled media. We encourage the United States to consider supporting
this important initiative.
in conclusion
We are living in very turbulent times. The international rules
based order has been challenged. The European security architecture has
been shaken up as a result of the more aggressive, assertive and
adventurous foreign policy pursued by Russia. The other fundamental
change in Europe's security has come with the appearance of incidents
of terrorism on European soil. The transatlantic community needs to
address these threats jointly. To be successful and effective in this
endeavor we need a strong NATO, the transatlantic link and solid unity
among the Allies. We should also support our neighbors for them to
strengthen their resilience--both in the East and the South.
During the pivotal times in history, the Alliance has always proven
to be effective, credible and united. Solidarity is the key word here.
I believe this spirit of solidarity will bring us to wise future
decisions.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
The Ambassador from Lithuania.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROLANDAS KRISCIUNAS, AMBASSADOR,
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
Ambassador Krisciunas. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member
Leahy, and Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
present our assessment of the threats Russia's policies pose to
our democracy, to explain what Lithuania is doing to counter
those threats, and to explore the possibilities for cooperation
between Lithuania and the United States.
First of all, let me name the threats we face. Russia has
never stopped using its political, economic, propaganda, and
other open and undercover tools to make democratic countries
more vulnerable to present day challenges. The attack on
Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the war in
eastern Ukraine are being perceived by Lithuania as having
considerable implications to its own national security.
Russia is increasing its military capabilities on the
Lithuanian border. Kaliningrad is the most militarized zone in
Europe. Large scale military exercises of an offensive nature
on our borders with Belarus are taking place regularly.
Russia is extremely active in the information field, using
pro-Russian media, propaganda, disinformation, fake news,
trolls, and leaks in order to confuse public opinion and to
influence decisionmaking.
Russia's international media channels spread its views on
disinformation on sensitive topics such as migration,
terrorism, ethnic relations, and the deployment of NATO troops
in Central and Eastern Europe.
In my written testimony, you will find various examples of
Russia's preparations against Lithuania.
Another security threat is the Ostrovets Nuclear Power
Plant, which is under construction in Belarus. Because of
revisions in nuclear safety, it has the potential to become a
second Chernobyl.
How do we fight back against these threats? In 2018,
Lithuania will be spending over 2 percent of GDP on defense and
we plan to go beyond this benchmark in the future. We are
modernizing our military by spending 31 percent of the budget
for new weapon systems.
The LNG terminal independence was one of the best
investments into our security. As its name suggests, it ensures
the independence of energy supplies and deprives Russia of one
of its manipulation tools. It has opened the Baltic market for
potential LNG deliveries from the United States.
Dear Senators, using this opportunity, allow me to thank
you for your personal support and for the United States'
support to our security. We greatly appreciate the
strengthening of the United States' military presence in Europe
and the implementation of the European Deterrence Initiative.
We do believe that the best deterrence, therefore, the only
way to achieve regional stability is to place U.S. and NATO
troops in the Baltic States on a permanent basis. In our view,
it is necessary to have forces and military plans adequate for
deterrence.
When it comes to practical areas of defense cooperation,
Lithuania and the United States have been engaged in close
dialogue. On our part, we are ready to move forward with more
precise bilateral projects, and timelines, with identified
financial resources on both sides.
The projects can include the establishment of Baltic
regional air defense capability, prepositioning of military
equipment, procurement of ammunition, and intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR)
capabilities among others.
While bringing your attention to defense issues, close
cooperation to counter hybrid threats are necessary. To counter
threats posed by disinformation, Lithuania launched a National
Information Influence Identification and Analysis Ecosystem
Project to monitor and analyze the information environment, and
preclude possible unfriendly actions. The possibility to access
some of the services and tools of the United States would make
this system more efficient.
Currently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is broadcasting
via Lithuania almost 10 hours a day in Russian and Belorussian
languages. We see the need to increase the radio coverage and
to improve the signal quality for the listeners of RFE/RL in
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and we should aim at raising
transmission power and extending the programming into 24 hours.
We should also work together in creating an attractive and
positive narrative about Western societies for radio and
television programs seen in the region. There is also a great
need to tell the true facts of history to the societies
influenced by Russian propaganda.
Finally, we are aiming to strengthen border security. With
the U.S. Army support, Lithuania will be launching a new RAID
systems project. Lithuania also plans to build a Situation
Awareness Center that would integrate border, air, and maritime
situation pictures. United States experience and assistance in
this area would be greatly appreciated.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to tell you our
part of the story today. We much value our strategic
partnership with the United States. We will continue to be your
reliable ally willing and hoping to work with the U.S. Congress
and the U.S. administration very closely.
Thank you, and I am pleased to be on the mark first.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rolandas Krisciunas
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members of the
subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to present our assessment of the threats Russia's policies and
intentions pose to our democracy, to explain what Lithuania is doing to
counter these threats and to explore the possibilities for cooperation
between Lithuania and United States.

I. Threat Assessment

1. Russia's Aggressive Posture

Russia continues to maintain its aggressive posture towards NATO
and the EU. Russia has deliberately chosen confrontation with the Euro-
Atlantic community aiming at weakening Europe, discrediting NATO and
cutting the transatlantic link. These are the most alarming trends of
the past years:

--Russia updated basic strategic documents, indicating NATO, and
particularly the U.S., as threats. It is written in official
documents, it is publically said by Russian politicians, and it
is constantly broadcasted on TV for the public.
--Russia withdrew from international agreements aimed at building
trust and stability and thus assuring existence of the
international security system. Russia is violating basic
international law norms, and is keen to change current
international order.
--At the time NATO was aiming to build a strategic partnership with
Russia, cutting defense structures and focusing on
expeditionary forces, Russia was increasing its investments
into defense, modernizing its armaments and military
structures, reviewing its strategy, doctrine and tactics.
--Russia is extremely active in the information field, using pro-
Russian media (e.g. Russia Today, Sputnik), propaganda,
disinformation, fake news, trolls, leaks etc. in order to
confuse public opinion and influence the decisionmaking.
--Russia also employs lobbying, PR agencies to disseminate the
conspiracy theories, to discredit other states in the
international arena and harasses those who criticize the
Kremlin.
--Russia is active in promoting its narratives: ``the West is corrupt
and morally bankrupt'', ``fascist regime in Kiev'', ``Ukraine
is an artificial state'', ``widespread Russophobia''. There is
a constant manipulation of the historical facts, e.g. common
history of the post-Soviet countries, and the victory over
fascism in the World War II (liberators vs occupiers).
--Russia tends to support European extremist and anti-EU groups,
strives to foment divisions and instability in the target
countries, and to create divisions inside the EU and NATO.
Other forms of action: cyber activity (attacks against critical
infrastructure, hacked and leaked emails, and cyber espionage),
initiation of population resettlement (in order to change the
ethnic composition of a frozen conflict region), creation of
the proxy groups (pseudo-NGOs, youth organizations, research
institutes, think tanks, motorcycle clubs).
--The compatriot policy (providing financial, healthcare or other
kind of benefits to Russian-speakers abroad, issuing Russian
passports, and justifying aggression against neighboring
countries with protection of Russian speakers' rights) is being
used as an additional tool for Russia's disruptive strategies
abroad.
--Rising militant nationalism and chauvinism inside Russian society
is a result of government efforts to mobilize the population
and increase its acceptance for sacrifices in the name of
``higher'' national objectives. Nationalism in Russia is
tolerated and fostered but nationalism in other countries
presented to Russian public almost as extreme as Nazism. An
intense state propaganda campaign has stoked Russians'
perception that Putin righted a historical wrong in
orchestrating Russia's seizure of Crimea and reasserted
Russia's great-power interests against hostile West.
--For more examples of Russian hybrid activities see Annex 1.

The Kremlin increasingly sees Europe whole, free, and at peace not
as an opportunity for prosperous coexistence, but as a threat to its
geopolitical agenda and regime survival. Moscow views the Western
values--pluralism and openness--as weaknesses to be exploited. Its
tactics are asymmetrical, subversive, and not easily confronted. U.S.
is presented as an abuser of a global dominant position and Russia
knows a solution--diminishing U.S. role in the world to achieve
multipolar international order. Western governments have ignored this
threat for too long, but finally, awareness is growing that the
transatlantic community must do more to defend its values and
institutions.

2. Threat Perception in Lithuania

The illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine are
being perceived by Lithuania as having substantial implications to its
own national security for the following reasons:

--Russia has never stopped treating the Baltic States as part of its
exclusive sphere of influence and used its political, economic,
energy resources, propaganda, cyber, information and other
coercive, open and undercover tools to make the democratic
countries more vulnerable to the present-day challenges.
--In Ukraine, Russia demonstrated that it would not shy away from
invading sovereign country.
--Russian military snap readiness exercises that take place regularly
complicate tactical warning and increase military tensions
along the Russian borders.
--Russia is increasing its military capabilities on Lithuania's
borders. It is broadening its range of military options in the
region and limiting NATO's possibilities to reinforce and
resupply.
--Large-scale military exercises of the offensive nature on our
borders with Belarus taking place regularly.
--``Russia first'' military tactics to engage in a military conflict
and destroy its adversary military installations is
particularly dangerous. Russian determination to use nuclear
component as an escalation in order to ``deescalate'' regional
conflict is extremely dangerous.

There are additional reasons that explain our concern:

--Attack on Georgia in 2008, illegal annexation of Crimea and covert
use of military and paramilitary forces by Russia in Ukraine
redrew the political map of Europe and shook up the rules-based
international peace order.
--It is difficult to trust Russia to uphold its word and its
international commitments, as it violated--among other--
Budapest Memorandum, Helsinki Accords and the UN Charter.
2.1 Kaliningrad Factor
Kaliningrad is the most militarized zone in Europe with extensive
A2/AD capabilities. These capabilities allow gaining control of the
Baltic Sea and air space. Short-range nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles Iskander are expected to be deployed to Kaliningrad this year.
Last year, two frigates armed with nuclear capable cruise missiles
``Kalibr'' (range up to 2500 km) have been additionally deployed to
Kaliningrad, as well as coastal defense missile system ``Bastion'',
capable of blocking the entrance to the Baltic Sea.
Around 25,000 troops are permanently deployed in the Kaliningrad
region. It is assessed that up to 70 percent of the region's population
is related to the military in one way or another.
It became a new practice to command civilian ships to change their
course in Lithuanian exclusive economic zone during exercises of
Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet.
2.2 Belarus Factor
President Lukashenko has been balancing between the West and Russia
for decades in order to receive possible benefits from the both sides.
However, in military terms, Belarus is fully integrated with Russia and
has limited means to disallow using its territory for military
operations. Quick military operation to unite Kaliningrad region with
Belarus (through the so-called Suwalki gap) was being exercised by
Russian troops. In case of conflict, it is very unlikely that Belarus
remains neutral.
Situation in Belarus is worrisome. Weak economic situation allows
Russia to dictate conditions for cooperation. Two countries have a
joint air defense system, there are Russian facilities and capabilities
in the territory of Belarus. Astravets nuclear plant, which is under
construction, is one more risk as the project does not have economic
grounds and technological reliability. Its nuclear safety credentials
cannot be trusted. It is Russian political project created in order to
prevent the integration of Baltic countries into the European Energy
system.

II. Closing Security Gaps

ensuring defense and deterrence

Due to geographic location of the Baltic States, the most credible
way to deter Russia is by making it physically difficult to achieve its
objective to capture and hold the Baltic States by strengthening their
defense and resilience.
Bearing in mind the time and geographical factors, credible
deterrence in the Baltics could primarily be ensured through having
adequate capabilities and the will to act. The Baltic States do have
the will, but due to the size of their economies, they are not in a
position to eliminate all the gaps in their defence capabilities by
themselves.

1. National Efforts

The awareness of being a frontline state and the lessons learned
from the war in Georgia, and especially in Ukraine, led to immediate
steps that were necessary to take in order to strengthen Lithuania's
security:

--Increase of professional soldiers in the armed forces,
reintroduction of conscription, higher number of citizens
familiar with armaments and military tactics.
--Increase of defense budget, which is set to hit the 2 percent of
GDP mark next year and subsequently grow, as required, based on
threat analysis and the need to further modernize our armed
forces.
--Modernization by substantial defense procurements (28 percent of
the current budget goes to procurement of new weapons systems).
--LNG terminal was built to ensure independence of energy supplies
and to cut short one of the Russia's manipulation tools.
--National legislation related to state of war, crisis management and
information security has been amended in order to remove some
legal obstacles for smooth and fast national response actions.
--New law on cyber security was adopted. It overhauls national cyber
governance system, defines general cyber security requirements
as well as identifies additional cyber security measures,
including close private-public cooperation. In 2015 National
Cyber Security Center was established. It focuses on protection
of critical information infrastructure, public sector,
increasing resilience and response capability.
--In response to Russia's information war, strategic communication
capabilities have been improved within the government and in
the armed forces. Public awareness of information warfare and
propaganda was raised. Lithuania is part of information sharing
and coordination platforms among the Baltic States, Poland and
Finland, contributes to the EU and NATO StratCom capabilities.
--Monitoring of TV and radio programs for initiating legal actions to
suspend licenses for those disseminating disinformation and
hatred was introduced.

2. Strengthening Conventional Capabilities

Conventional threats being the main cause for concern, current
efforts to improve Lithuania's defense capabilities are focused
primarily on modernization of armed forces, increasing the ability to
inflict damage on adversary. There are some crucial areas where Allied
support and specifically that of United States is very much needed:
--The U.S. military presence in Europe (notably in Germany,
Netherlands, and Poland) is being strengthened and ERI
(European Reassurance Initiative)/EDI (European Deterrence
Initiative) are being implemented, which we greatly appreciate.
--The NATO`s enhanced Forward Presence with 4 (U.S., Germany, Canada
and UK) battle groups being deployed in Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia is an important contribution. It is our
strong belief, however, that restoring the U.S. military
presence in Europe back to a pre-2009 level would be highly
instrumental and play well into substantiating our joint
credible deterrence and defense posture.
--In our view, it is necessary to have forces and adopt military
plans adequate for deterrence, especially considering Russia's
A2/AD (anti-access and area denial) and growing naval
capabilities in the Baltic Sea.
--The best deterrence, therefore, and the only way to achieve
regional stability, is to place U.S. and NATO troops in the
Baltic States on a permanent basis.

When it comes to practical areas of defense cooperation we would
need U.S. assistance in:

--The establishment of Baltic regional air-defense capability that is
the most important element for ensuring regional security. This
would allow the Baltic States armed forces to respond to a
military aggression at the very first stage of a conflict and
to sustain before the reinforcement arrives.
--The prepositioning of military equipment that allows for rapid
reinforcement. In terms of cost value, it is much better to
invest in defense installations in the Eastern part of Europe.
Lower-cost U.S. investments with a high rate of our
contribution are mutually beneficial.
--Procurement of ammunition to increase our antitank capabilities,
namely Javelin, AMRAM for the NASAM system, and 155 mm
artillery shells.
--ISTAR capabilities to gather crucially important intelligence.
--Need to upgrade our communication systems.
--As time being a very important factor, it would be welcome to apply
for the Baltic region a program similar to ``Train and Equip''
thus strengthening the Eastern border of NATO, increasing
abilities of forces in place to defend, and contributing to
deterrence. It could be worth considering the revival of the
Warsaw initiative that in previous years helped to acquire
necessary capabilities while procuring products of U.S.
manufacturers.

In all these mentioned areas, Lithuania and United States have been
engaged in discussions and dialogue, but we on our part are ready to
move forward with more precise bilateral projects and targeted
timelines with identified financial resources on both sides.

3. Countering Hybrid Threats

Recent study ``Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats and Potential
Responses'' by RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1577.html) concludes that while improving the
conventional deterrent in the Baltic region is important, the U.S. and
NATO should also address the potential for all forms of Russian
aggression across the conflict spectrum. An increased U.S.-Baltic
engagement in the area of hybrid threats--in parallel with more
substantial NATO/U.S. military presence in the region--would be very
welcome.
Currently, an intra-governmental discussion is ongoing in Lithuania
on the coordination between various institutions of countering hybrid
threats. The Government aims at upgrading an integrated system of
crisis management and countering hybrid threats. Here, we are seeking
to gain from the U.S. experience and are ready to share ours.
Lithuania supports regional cooperation among NATO Allies exposed
to similar types of hybrid threats, which would include closer
interagency cooperation among border guard, police, and municipal
authorities. This would lead to joint development of comprehensive
cooperation mechanisms and procedures for reacting to and countering
hybrid threats. Closer regional cooperation between Baltic and Nordic
States, Poland and the U.S. would be very instrumental and desirable.
The EU and NATO would gain from closer dialogue with the third
states directly affected by the hybrid threats, particularly Georgia,
Ukraine, and Moldova. Additionally, we should invest in supporting
these countries in building up their capabilities. Continued U.S.
engagement in this direction would be welcome.
3.1 Disinformation
In order to counter disinformation attacks, Lithuania launched a
national information influence identification and analysis ecosystem
project to monitor and analyze physical and electronic information
environment, and preclude possible unfriendly and destructive actions.
The recent example was the reaction to the fake news about the alleged
rape of a teenage girl in Lithuania by the German soldiers. The
reaction time was very short, it was managed smoothly and did not have
a negative effect on the perception of the local population towards the
NATO Allies and the Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania.
It would make a great benefit if similar systems were launched in
other two Baltic States and Poland, also possibly in a wider region. It
would allow us to understand the pattern of Russian influence
activities, monitor them and preclude some unintended actions. To make
this system more effective, the access to some of the U.S. services
would be appreciated to facilitate the analysis of electronic
environment and technologies like cybercrime, and social communication
analysis tools (about $300,000 per year for licenses).
The legal cooperation on information warfare is another important
area, as it is often the case when the U.S.-owned cyber space is used
initiating information attacks against other states.
More American popular culture in Lithuania could help to neutralize
Russia's so-called ``active measures''. Cultural, student, journalist
exchange projects, educational, history programs should be encouraged
and funded. In January 2017, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) shipped to Lithuania an AM
radio transmitter for broadcasting of the RFE/RL programs to Russia and
Belarus. The Nautel NX-200 type solid-state transmitter currently is
under installation in Viesintos (North-East of Lithuania).
The AM band is available in all car radios. The AM radio can be
very important in case Russian or Belarusian authorities block the
websites of RFE/RL. Currently, RFE/RL is broadcasting via Lithuania
almost 10 hours a day in Russian and Belarusian languages. The
transmission power is 75,000 W. The annual broadcasting cost is
$220,186.
In order to increase the radio coverage, to improve the signal
quality and to provide the most convenient schedule for the listeners
of RFE/RL in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, we should aim at raising the
transmission power from 75,000 W to 120,000 W and RFE/RL 24 hour
broadcasting. The annual broadcasting cost would be $890,000 (increase
by $670,000).
3.2 Cyber Threats
In the face of rapidly growing cyber threats, it is critically
important for Lithuania to make a leap forward in critical information
infrastructure protection. To give a spark in this direction, we
suggest the idea of establishing a Cyber Laboratory within our National
Cyber Security Center and propose a joint project that could be
ambitiously pursued with the U.S. support. It would greatly contribute
to our security by: (1) enhancing cyber defense capabilities of our
armed forces; (2) strengthening resilience of state-level critical
information infrastructure; (3) laying a better background to the
development of national cyber defense competencies; (4) enabling better
preparedness to counter conventional and hybrid scenarios against
Lithuania.
3.3 Border Security
Security of the borders starts with the situation awareness and the
ability to monitor. This year, with the U.S. Army support, Lithuania
will be launching a new so-called RAID systems project that would
significantly increase national abilities in beefing up our border
security. We hope this to be enhanced to the Baltic regional operation
with the overall aim to have an integral security situation picture of
NATO's Eastern border. U.S. assistance in this area would be of
tremendous importance.
Lithuania plans to build a situation awareness center that would
integrate border, air and maritime security situation picture. We see
many reasons for turning it into a regional U.S.--Baltic center. U.S.
experience and assistance in this area would be of great help.
3.4 Energy Security
Lithuania has been very active in fighting Russian dominance in the
energy sphere. We constructed the first LNG terminal in the Baltic Sea
region, which broke Russian monopoly of gas supply and reduced
political influence. It has opened Baltic gas market for potential LNG
deliveries from USA.
Lithuania bridged the Baltic Sea by laying underwater electricity
cable linking Lithuania and Sweden and got connected with Poland as
well. Our next goal is to connect with continental European electricity
networks. Baltic States aim to synchronize their electricity networks
with the EU, breaking away from Russia. It is a matter of urgency and
top priority, because of geopolitical aspects, security and economic/
market issues.
The Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant constructed in Belarus is a
nuclear and environmental safety issue not only for Lithuania, but for
the whole region (for more information about the Ostrovets NPP see
Annex 2).
Lithuania (the EU) deals with the issue engaging unilateral and
multilateral instruments including but not limited to the Espoo, Aarhus
and the Nuclear Safety Conventions aiming to promote nuclear and
environmental safety in the Ostrovets NPP. Seriousness of nuclear
safety issues should warrant it to become an item on bilateral U.S.-
Belarus agenda. We also ask for U.S. support regarding this issue in
the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

ANNEX 1

Examples of Russian Hybrid Activities

1. Aggressive Russian Intelligence Operations

Russian intelligence services (RIS) support Russian foreign policy
objectives by conducting active and aggressive influence operations or
espionage against Lithuania.

--In 2015 the FSB officer Nikolay FILIPCHENKO, one of the organizers
and coordinators of the FSB long-term operation against
Lithuania, was detained in Lithuania. His recruitment targets
were VIP Protection Department, officers of other institutions,
Lithuanian politicians, and state servants. With the help of
the recruited law enforcement officers (VIP Protection
Department), the FSB had intentions to penetrate other
Lithuanian state institutions, among them--the President
Palace. FILIPCHENKO was looking for a VIP protection officer
who could arrange possibility for FSB to plant bug into
Presidential Office and residence.
--During the parliamentary elections in Lithuania in October 2016,
when RIS extensively focused on the collection of the
information about domestic political situation and the
recruitment of Lithuanian citizens who could provide such
information.

2. Increasing Russian Cyber Intelligence Attacks

RIS is more often using increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks
for intelligence collection and against high value political and
economic targets.

--In autumn 2016 GRU related Internet hacker group SOFACY (APT28)
conducted attack against several members of Lithuanian
parliament. With the help of social engineering the GRU tried
to penetrate Parliament computers, gain their control and
overtake the information stored there. The cyber attack against
members of the Lithuanian Parliament was a part of SOFACY
attack series against NATO and Ukraine targets. We assess that
in the near term Russian intelligence services will continue to
organize cyber attacks against NATO countries.

3. Wide Scope of Russian Technical Intelligence Capabilities

Russia has a wide scope of technical capabilities to intercept,
decrypt and process electronic communications. It uses stationary
technical intelligence centers in Kaliningrad oblast, mainland Russia
and Belarus, as well as mobile land, air and sea units.

--In June 2013 a couple of phone conversations between Lithuanian MFA
diplomats in Vilnius and diplomats posted to Hungary and
Azerbaijan were released to YouTube. Diplomats informally
discussed Lithuanian relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. It
was Russian active measures operation aimed to discredit
Lithuanian EU Presidency and instigate internal tensions in
Lithuania. Conversations were intercepted by Russian electronic
intelligence unit.

4. Investment in IT Projects As Intelligence and Subversion Threat

Russia has traditionally used supply of energy resources,
investment in strategically important sectors of economy and trade
relations as a tool to influence domestic and foreign policy of
Lithuania as well as other countries. Lithuanian energy and economic
dependency on Russia is decreasing, however, Russia is inventing novel
ways to use its economic resources to increase its influence
capabilities.

--The company based in Lithuania and owned by Russian citizens, who
have ties to Russian Federal Security Service, is planning to
launch data center project Amber Core that would be a biggest
data center in the Baltic region. Data center project poses a
threat to Lithuania's national security. It is probable that
after the construction of the data center the FSB would acquire
the possibility to overtake the data of Lithuanian and foreign
state institutions stored there and by such means to collect
intelligence information. If state institutions, banks,
telecommunication enterprises become the clients of the data
center, Russia would acquire the possibility to undermine
Lithuanian state management and functioning of the economy in
order to implement its political, economic and military
interests.

5. Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Activities

Russia pursues to influence Lithuanian and Western audiences by
setting up and promoting international media channels that spread its
views and disinformation on the sensitive topics--such as migration
crisis, terrorism, ethnic relations, deployment of NATO troops in
Central and Eastern Europe etc.

--The most active propaganda project of Russia's international media
outlet ``Rossyia Segodnia'' in Lithuania is website
Baltnews.lt. It realizes Russia's informational and ideological
policy, disseminates articles which cover main narratives of
Russian propaganda. Baltnews.lt gets funding from ``Rossyia
Segodnia'' in a complex and non-transparent financial scheme
through intermediary companies in foreign states.
--A new ``Rossyia Segodnia'' propaganda project ``Sputniknews.lt''
was launched in Lithuania in December 2016. ``Sputniknews.lt''
is oriented in Lithuanian-speaking audience, but for the moment
failed to gain any popularity.
--The most recent example of information attack was attempt by
Russian media outlets and pro-Russian activists in February
2017 to the spread the fake news that German soldiers stationed
in Lithuania were culpable for the rape of the teenage girl.
This particular piece of disinformation failed to attract
attention of mainstream media, but the like information attacks
against NATO military personnel deployed in the region are
highly likely to be repeated in the future.

6. Russian Political and Social Influence Activities

Moscow's attempts to regain the influence in the post-Soviet region
materialize in Russia's efforts to weaken Lithuania's social integrity
and to escalate intra-ethnic tensions. Russia employs so call
compatriot policy to achieve that. Kremlin's aim is to discredit and
hinder any efforts made by the authorities' to carry out a successful
integration of national minorities.

--The main goal of Russia's compatriot policy in the Baltics is to
incite ethnic tensions. The Fund to Support and Protect the
Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, which was established by
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal agency
``Rossotrudnichestvo'', finances two Lithuanian-based
organizations, which try to fuel ethnic tensions within
Lithuania. Centre for the Protection and Research of
Fundamental Rights uses various international human-rights
events to blame Lithuania for violating the rights of ethnic
communities. Independent Human Rights Centre, takes part in
pro-Russian propaganda campaigns against the US and NATO. Both
organizations receive nearly 100 thousand euro from the fund
every year. Vladimir POZDOROVKIN, current coordinator of the
Baltics in the fund, had been the chief of SVR under a
diplomatic cover at the Russian Embassy in Vilnius from 1994
till 1996.
--Russian Embassy in Lithuania directly controls, coordinates and
finances activities variety of pro-Russian organizations, clubs
and groups ranging from political protests to cultural events.
Despite the fact that pro-Kremlin political parties or NGOs
currently fail to gain wider support, their representatives are
constantly used as information sources for Russian propaganda,
because mostly their political actions and ideas coincide with
Russia's viewpoint. One of the most popular ideas suggested by
these political organizations is the idea of Lithuania's
neutrality and withdrawal from NATO.

7. Belarus As a Base of Russian Influence and Agression

Close military and intelligence cooperation between Russia and
Belarus and significant Russian influence in Belarusian society poses a
significant threat to Lithuanian national security.

--In 2014 Belarusian intelligence operation against Lithuanian
military communications system was terminated. Belarusian
military intelligence (GRU) undercover officer Sergey KURULENKO
carried out the operation. He tried to collect information
about fiber optic cable network of national Lithuanian air
navigation system. The cable was also used by the military,
among other for NATO communications. Due to close military
cooperation between Belarus and Russia, it is highly likely
that the Belarusian GRU shared the collected information with
the Russian military intelligence GRU.
--Approximately 100 pro-Russian groups are active in Belarus. Many of
them are paramilitary patriotic groups, some of them related to
Belarusian Cossacks movement. These groups are most active in
Belarus regions bordering Lithuania and Poland. Cossacks played
significant role in the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine,
including the Crimea takeover operation. Belarusian Cossacks
and other pro-Russian paramilitary groups operate in the same
fashion as in Ukraine, using representatives of Russian
Orthodox Church as liaison officers for the Russian
intelligence services. Pro-Russian groups in Belarus can be
used by Russia to pressure Belarusian president Alexander
Lukashenko as well as various operations (provocations) against
the NATO member countries, e.g. Lithuania and Poland. Such
provocations are highly likely during the ``Zapad 2017''
military exercise.

ANNEX 2

Main Facts About the Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Project in
Belarus

--Belarus is implementing the NPP project \1\ in violation to the
international nuclear and environmental safety requirements and
without respect to the principles of openness, transparency and
good neighbourliness. That was recognized internationally:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Ostrovets NPP in Belarus is situated in the North-Western
part of Belarus, Grodno oblast, near Ostrovets (coordinates
544519.6"N 260528.9"E). The distance from the construction site to
the Lithuanian capital Vilnius 40 km, to the Lithuanian (and external
EU) border 20 km. The NPP will have two units with VVER-1200 reactors
(output capacity up to 2x1200 MW, operating lifetime--60 years). The
first unit of the NPP is scheduled for launch in 2019, the second--in
2020. The contractor general--Rosatom's subsidiary company--
Atomstroyexport (Russia). Project financed by Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--The Meeting of Parties (MOP) of the Espoo Convention \2\ and the
MOP of the Aarhus Convention \3\ acknowledged that Belarus
was developing the NPP project in violation to the
mentioned Conventions (decision VI/2 of the Espoo
Convention MOP--ECE/MP.EIA/20.Add.1, decision V/9c of the
Aarhus Convention ECE/MP.PP/2014/2/Add.1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Espoo Convention--UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context.
\3\ Aarhus Convention--UNECE Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--The Ostrovets construction site was selected prior to the start of
the transboundary environmental impact assessment (EIA),
without seismic, geological and hydrological research and
without consultations with the immediate neighbours, i.e.
Lithuania. This constitutes serious violations of the Espoo,
Aarhus and the Nuclear Safety Conventions.
--Belarus sidesteps from its international obligations: the
accomplishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (the
IAEA) specialised mission for site and design evaluation (Site
and External Events Design (SEED) mission) and the risk and
safety assessments (the stress tests) in line with the
declaration signed with the European Commission on 23 June
2011. Despite Lithuanian requests and the recommendations of
the Espoo Convention to look into the site selection process
and scientific researches of the sites, the IAEA SEED mission
invited by Belarus was incomplete and was not tasked to assess
site related issues.
--In 2016, at least six incidents occurred at the Ostrovets NPP. Two
of the incidents included the reactor vessel--one of the most
important safety components of a NPP. In all the cases Belarus
tried to conceal the information about the incidents and after
it appeared in the independent media, Belarus either denied it
or attempted to downgrade the consequences. The recurrent
incidents at the Ostrovets NPP reveal serious problems with the
work and safety culture and raise reasonable doubts regarding
the competence and independence of the Belarus nuclear safety
regulator ``Gosatomnadzor'' that is currently the department
within the Ministry of Emergency situations of Belarus. It also
indicates the lack of transparency and openness in the
implementation of the project.

Ostrovets NPP: A Multidimensional Threat

Environmental threat. The implementation phase of the Ostrovets NPP
project was commenced before the start of the transboundary
environmental impact assessment (EIA), without the obligatory seismic,
geological and hydrological research. Lithuania holds that the
transboundary EIA is still pending, as Lithuanian questions regarding
the potential impact on its environment and population have not been
answered, public hearings for the Lithuanian public have not been
arranged, consultations with Lithuania in line with Art. 5 of the Espoo
Convention have not been organised.
Radiological threat. Belarus selected the Ostrovets site that is
20 km from the Lithuanian border and 40 km from the Lithuanian
capital Vilnius without obligatory assessment of population density in
the territory of Lithuania and without assessment of feasibility to
implement emergency preparedness and response arrangements in case of a
nuclear accident, although it is required by the IAEA. In case of an
accident at the Ostrovets NPP, \1/3\ of Lithuanian population (within
the radius of 100 km from the Ostrovets NPP) could be affected. Need
for evacuation of the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, where all the
Governmental institutions are based, cannot be excluded.
Unfair competition. Belarus is constructing its NPP with a prospect
of electricity export to the European market; however, Belarus has no
necessary infrastructure neither for the operation of the NPP, nor for
the electricity export, but expects to make use of the Lithuanian
infrastructure, including the newly build power interconnections with
Poland and Sweden. Belarus does not invest into nuclear and
environmental safety in order to reach the level set by the
international safety standards, thus creating the potential for
distortions in the European electricity market. Furthermore, attempts
to evade from needed investments into adequate safety of this project
distorts the competition in the nuclear industry globally. It is of
utmost importance to ensure that electricity trade with third countries
follows the rules of fair competition (level playing field) and that
electricity produced in violation to the international nuclear and
environmental safety standards would not be accepted in the European
electricity market.
Military threat. For the physical protection of the Ostrovets NPP
Belarus created a new military unit No. 7434 under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Zhadobin. It will consist of 300 military
personnel that is trained not only in Belarus, but also in Russia.\4\
In February 2017, the military unit was located in the place of
permanent deployment. Moreover, in 2016, Belarus started the
construction of the military base for the Air Force and Air Defence
units for the security needs of Belarus NPP.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``The military unit for the protection of BelAES will be
located at the site of a permanent deployment in early January'' http:/
/www.atom.belta.by/ru/belaes_ru/view/voennaja-chast-po-oxrane-belaes-
razmestitsja-na-meste-postojannoj-dislokatsii-v-nachale-janvarja-8954/.
\5\ ``First stage of military base to guard Belarusian nuclear
power plant ready in 2016'' http://atom.belta.by/en/belaes_en/view/
belaes_en/view/first-stage-of-military-base-to-guard-belarusian-
nuclear-power-plant-ready-in-2016-8091/t_id/1.

Population within the range of 100 km from the Belarus NPP &
Kaliningrad NPP

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on emergency preparedness
and response: territories within the radius of 100 km can require
evacuation within a day and relocation within a week to a month.
Belarusian authorities agree that there is a possibility for the
radiological impact to the environment and people: \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Based on A.N. Rykov, Director of Belinipenergoprom,
presentation, 16-06-2010.

--1000 km--possible short-term restriction for consumption of locally
produced food;
--300 km--possible long-term restriction for consumption of certain
types of food;
--100 km--possible need for iodine therapy.

Senator Graham. Well, thank you. That is the model for the
rest of us right there. You nailed it. Lithuania is doing well.
Senator Leahy. Get out the checkbook.
STATEMENT OF HON. EERIK MARMEI, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF
ESTONIA
Ambassador Marmei. Thank you. My name is Eerik Marmei. I am
the Ambassador of Estonia.
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, Members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for the invitation to testify before the United
States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs. It is an honor to be here.
First, let me emphasize how important the United States'
steadfast support for the freedom and independence of Estonia
has been. Our membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is the
cornerstone of our prosperity and security, and we are mindful
of the role the United States has played in supporting and
assisting us.
As Russia's immediate neighbor, Estonia would like nothing
more than to have good relations with a democratic Russia,
including prosperous trade and active everyday relations at all
levels of society. But shared commitment to the core values of
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are indispensable
pillars for good, neighborly relations.
We should not be guided by wishful thinking, but by real
facts. Examples of Russian malign activities in Europe, to name
but a few, include the Russia-Georgia war, the annexation of
Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine, provocative activities by
the Russian military, and interference in Western democratic
processes including elections. We have learned that inadequate
responses to such behavior can only feed future transgressions.
I would like to stress that Russia's ambitions and
activities are not only of concern to NATO's eastern flank or
the countries represented at this hearing, but are influencing
all our allies in the West. Therefore, it is essential not to
regionalize the Russian threat to Eastern European countries,
but to clearly recognize that the threat of Russia's subversive
methods has expanded far beyond the eastern flank of Europe,
including to the United States. We, as neighbors to Russia, are
just a bit more used to witnessing such behavior.
Upcoming elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany
are a perfect theater for the Russian disinformation warriors.
The goal of Russia's influence and activities in Europe is
to create tension and sow confusion between European Union
member states and within individual states. By doing so, the
Kremlin hopes to influence the decisionmaking process and steer
the narrative and outcomes towards its own interests.
The illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 succeeded
largely because of a successful information war that allowed
Russia to avoid a direct military confrontation. It can be
expected that Russia will use this tactic--extensive
manipulation of information--to support its military goals in
order to achieve strategic advantage in the future as well.
This forces the adversary to doubt and verify the facts, thus
delaying its response.
The unity of the West, joint action, and the decision to
stay the course towards Russia has been the strongest message
in response to Russian actions so far. To be credible, we need
to stand by our values and be consistent in our policies. We
need to take into account that Russia sees itself being in a
confrontational era with the West for a long time.
We, the West, need to address the subversive actions in a
systematic and coordinated way within the European Union and
NATO, but also in cooperation between these two organizations.
This should be done in very practical terms. We need to share
more intelligence on Russia's subversive methods and to decode
the Russian hybrid method playbook.
We need to raise the awareness of decision makers and the
public at large in order to limit the ability to abuse the open
nature of our societies. We can do it by exposing or countering
Russia's malign tactics such as covert support to political
parties and politicians, seemingly innocent NGO's or economic
leverage gained through murky business connections. Also,
transparency, regulation, and anti-corruption measures can, and
should be, strengthened.
The Kremlin makes extensive use of Russian and foreign
language media outlets, as well as countless fake social media
accounts. Merely constant reaction to propaganda is not enough
and can sometimes even be counter-effective.
The quality of strategic communication capabilities, and
the formation of our own messages, needs to be improved. The
effect of disinformation can be diminished by enhancing
critical reading skills within intended audiences. The best
medicine against disinformation is an open and free, high
quality, and pluralistic media environment offering a variety
of voices and opinions.
I firmly believe this subcommittee plays an important role
in effecting positive change in the areas I have described
above.
Funding for initiatives that fall under the State
Department, USAID, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the
National Endowment for Democracy, to mention but a few, can all
contribute to building capability and resilience in Europe in
order to counter changes Russia is trying to achieve.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide you with my
thoughts and I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eerik Marmei
Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, members of the subcommittee,

Thank you for the invitation to testify before the United States
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs. It is an honor to be here. We are here to discuss an
important topic: Russia and Europe.
First, let me emphasize how important the United States' steadfast
support for the freedom and independence of Estonia has been. Your non-
recognition policy helped carry us through the darkest days of Soviet
occupation and we thank you for your unwavering support to join the
family of nations since we regained our independence. Our membership in
Euroatlantic institutions is the cornerstone of our prosperity and
security and we are mindful of the role the U.S. has played in
assisting us.
As Russia's immediate neighbor, Estonia would like nothing more
than to have good relations with a democratic Russia, including
prosperous trade and active everyday relations at all levels of
society. But shared commitment to the core values of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law are indispensable pillars for good-
neighborly relations. Those values have underpinned the post-war
international order and we should not abandon them. It is now up to
Russia to honor those fundamental principles.
We shouldn't be guided by wishful thinking but by real facts.
Russia has demonstrated time and time again that it cannot be trusted.
There is a disturbing pattern of aggressive behavior that dates back at
least to 2008. We have learned that inadequate responses to such
behavior can only feed future transgressions.
Examples of Russia's malign activities in Europe, to name but a
few, include the Russia-Georgia war, the annexation of Crimea, the war
in Eastern Ukraine, provocative activities by the Russian military, and
interference in Western democratic processes, including elections.
I would like to stress that Russia's ambitions and activities are
not only of concern to NATO's eastern flank or the countries
represented at this hearing, but are influencing all our allies in the
West. We, as neighbors to Russia, are just a bit more used to
witnessing such behavior. Upcoming elections in the Netherlands,
France, and Germany are a perfect theatre for the Russian
disinformation warriors. Therefore, it is essential not to regionalize
the Russian threat to Eastern European countries, but to clearly
recognize that the threat of Russia's subversive methods has expanded
far beyond the ``Eastern flank'' of Europe, including to the United
States.
The goal of Russia's influence and activities in the European Union
is to create tensions and sow confusion both between member states and
within individual states. By doing so, the Kremlin hopes to influence
the decisionmaking process and steer the narrative and outcomes towards
its own interests.\1\ Russia sees the problems ailing the European
Union--including Brexit, the migrant crisis and the debt crisis--as
signs of the weakening of the Western-led world order and it seeks to
reconfigure power relationships in international politics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estonian Information Board, 2017. International Security and
Estonia. http://teabeamet.ee/pdf/EIB_public_report_Feb_2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Kremlin makes extensive use of Russian- and foreign-language
media outlets, as well as countless fake social media accounts. The
fabricated information often falls on fertile soil in certain circles
in the EU, who further disseminate the Kremlin's talking points.
The illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 succeeded largely
because of a successful information war that allowed Russia to avoid a
direct military confrontation. It can be expected that Russia will use
this tactic--extensive manipulation of information to support its
military goals in order to achieve strategic advantage--in the future
as well. This forces the adversary to doubt and verify the facts, thus
delaying its response.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To carry out its foreign policy goals, the Kremlin is increasingly
reliant on right- and left-wing populist parties arrayed against or
frustrated by the European Union and NATO. Open or covert sponsoring of
the numerous populist anti-establishment far-right and far-left
political movements across Europe lends the Russian message credibility
and allows it to distance itself officially. We have also seen how the
Russian diaspora can be instrumentalized and how the Russian Orthodox
Church and state monopolies can be mobilized to achieve their foreign
policy goals. President Putin has even managed to use history as a tool
of warfare.
The best way to build resilience against Russia's malign influence
is to make sure our own house is, and remains, in order. Cohesiveness
of our societies, trust in government and sticking to our fundamental
values make us less susceptible to such attempts.
The unity of the West, joint action and the decision to stay the
course towards Russia, has been the strongest message in response to
Russian actions so far. To be credible we need to stand by our values
and be consistent in our policies. We need to take into account that
Russia sees itself being in a confrontational era with the West for a
long time. Only a strong, united and efficient Europe can contribute to
the fight against terrorism and also counter Russian malign influence.
U.S. backing and cooperation, both with individual countries and
through Euro-Atlantic institutions is vital to this effort.
We, the West, need to address the subversive actions in a
systematic and coordinated way within the EU and NATO, but also in
cooperation between these two organizations. This should be in very
practical terms: we need to share more intelligence on Russia's
subversive methods--to decode ``the Russian hybrid method playbook''.
We need to raise the awareness of decision makers and the public at
large in order to limit the ability to abuse the open nature of our
societies. We can do it by exposing or countering Russia's malign
tactics such as covert support to political parties and politicians,
seemingly innocent NGOs or economic leverage gained through murky
business connections. Also, transparency regulation and anti-corruption
measures can and should be strengthened.
Merely constant reactions to propaganda is not enough and can
sometimes even be countereffective. The quality of strategic
communication capabilities and the formation of our own messages needs
to be improved. The effect of disinformation can be diminished by
enhancing critical reading skills within intended audiences. The best
medicine against disinformation is an open and free, high-quality and
pluralistic media environment offering a variety of voices and
opinions.
I firmly believe the subcommittee plays an important role in
effecting positive change in areas I've described above. Funding for
initiatives that fall under the State Department, USAID, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors, the National Endowment for Democracy,
to mention but a few, wisely chosen and strategically deployed, can all
contribute to building capability and resilience in Europe in order to
counter changes Russia is trying to achieve.
In conclusion, I'm sure all the countries represented here would
like to have good-neighborly and predictable relations with a
democratic Russia that respects the core values of democracy and
international law. Unfortunately for the time being, Russia remains a
common concern for the West as it is an unpredictable and aggressive
actor in Europe and beyond. Transatlantic unity and a clear, unwavering
posture in our policy towards Russia will remain crucial in near
future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide you with my thoughts
and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator Graham. Thank you all for coming and informing the
subcommittee of what you face, a Parade of Horribles when it
comes to Russia.

RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

Lithuania. There was a recent deployment of German soldiers
to Lithuania to help train Lithuanian military. I have been
informed that as soon as the soldiers from Germany arrived,
there was an allegation that one of the German soldiers had
raped a Lithuanian woman. Are you familiar with that?
Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes, it did not take long, Senator,
because right after German troops had arrived, because of the
decisions taken in Warsaw for deployment, German troops are
leading the battalion in Lithuania.
It was almost like the second day or the next day of their
arrival, after their arrival, there was news spread that a
teenage girl was raped, allegedly, by German troops and it was
absolutely nonsense. It was fake news. It was cooked and it was
denied right away.
But, of course, as you know with fake news, not all people
are aware listening to the denouncement of this that it is not
true.
Senator Graham. Did it come from a Russian outlet, the
news?
Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes, that is what we suspect. It is
always difficult to get a grip of where it comes from first.
But yes, that is what we suspect because the very idea is very
clear: that NATO troops in Lithuania are bad.
Senator Graham. Have you experienced an uptick of Russian
involvement since President Obama drew the red line in Syria
against Assad and nothing happened, or has it been the same the
whole time? Did that affect Russia's involvement at all or is
it all about the same?
Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, I would not say that there have
not been some significant changes. While we have been
experiencing Russian hybrid warfare already for 35 years, well,
maybe we have become a bit more resilient to it. But certainly,
it has never stopped.
Certain narratives are not changing and certain methods are
still being used. And in that sense, very much has been
disclosed by journalists as to what are the methods, how
trolling is being done, and where the fake facts are emerging.
I would not say that the intensity has changed in the
course of the last years, but it has not diminished.
Senator Graham. Is it, then, constant Russian interference
in your countries? Has it been constant? Is it on the rise?
Ambassador Marmei. Yes, Chairman, it has been constant as
my Latvian colleague said. We have experienced this for the
past 25 years.
I think what really opened our eyes was the 2007 cyber
attacks against Estonia; that was politically motivated. And
even today, the cyber domain remains one of the most important
areas, and we really need to put more emphasis on this issue as
well; bilaterally but also in NATO.

U.S. RESPONSE

Senator Graham. What do you think the consequences would be
if our country forgave and forgot the interference in our
election by Russia? What kind of effect do you think that would
have on Russia?
The Foreign Minister from the Ukraine.
Minister Klimkin. Actually, Russia has developed a very
systemic way on how to use all kinds of unconventional warfare.
Senator Graham. My question is what would the effect be if
the United States did not act regarding the interference in our
election? Would it embolden Russia?
Minister Klimkin. Well, there should be a clear way of how
to react to the Russian interference. Otherwise, the Russians
are always good in exploiting weaknesses.
Senator Graham. The Ambassador from Poland, do you agree
with that?
Ambassador Wilczek. I mean, it is difficult for me to make
comments on what Americans should do, or should not do, or what
would happen if Americans did not do something.
But I think that investigations in such cases are essential
in all countries and it cannot be covered up. It just should be
investigated in every case.
Ambassador Bakradze. To continue what my colleague from
Poland just said, as I have mentioned in my remarks, as we
think that international response on the invasion and
occupation of Georgia was insufficient; that that might have
led to the further operation of the Russian Federation towards
the Ukraine, et cetera. I think that international response is
generally necessary in the violation of international laws.
Senator Graham. Thank you all. You will have a chance to
tell the subcommittee specifically what we could do to help you
regarding Russia on the power side.
Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. This has been very instructive.
Mr. Klimkin, am I pronouncing that correctly? Thank you.

RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

In 2014, since Russia's annexation of Crimea, the United
States has supported the Ukrainian Government against pro-
Russian separatists.
During our past election campaign, Mr. Trump said we might
withdraw U.S. support, possibly as a deal with Vladimir Putin,
and said that he would also look into recognizing and approving
of Russia's annexation of Crimea.
Have you or any other senior Ukrainian officials met with
President Trump or Secretary Tillerson to discuss their policy
toward the Ukraine?
Minister Klimkin. I have just met with Secretary Tillerson
a couple of hours ago, and it was a very strong message of
support for Ukraine, and that any kind of tradeoffs is not
possible. And our President had a phone conversation with
President Trump, and it was the same, a very clear message.
Senator Leahy. Did he say anything about Crimea?
Minister Klimkin. No compromise about Crimea, and Crimea is
the issue about rules and international law.
Senator Leahy. How important is our aid to Ukraine?
Minister Klimkin. The U.S. support and U.S. assistance,
more security-related assistance, and reform-related assistance
was and is fundamental for the Ukraine in the sense of our
ability to counter Russian aggression and in the sense of us
creating a democratic and European Ukraine.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Ambassador Wilczek, your country, Poland, is uniquely
positioned geographically between the conflict between Russia
and Ukraine.
I assume Russia's deployment of nuclear capable missiles to
Kaliningrad creates significant challenges for you, am I
correct?
Ambassador Wilczek. As I have just said, the deployment of
these missiles to Kaliningrad is very essential for our
security. It is a kind of, I think, it was a kind of
breakthrough moment because it strengthens this feeling of
insecurity and uncertainty.
And it is not only about Poland. It is about the
flexibility of NATO in this region, and it is also about the
Baltic countries and other countries.
So this area of the Kaliningrad region is an especially
sensitive area. And as I said, it is the most militarized area
in the whole of Europe, I think.
Senator Leahy. Do you get support from NATO? Do you feel
that NATO's support is strong?
Ambassador Wilczek. Yes, we feel enormous support both from
NATO and bilaterally from the United States. So I think that
the whole project of deployment and deterrence is implemented
right now. That we are still being supported fully by the
United States is essential for our security and is very
important.

RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS

Senator Leahy. Do you, in the Baltic states, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia feel any greater or less concern about a
Russian invasion since the elections here in the United States?
Ambassador Teikmanis. I think we are concerned since 2014
or even before that, since 2008, since Georgia or Ukraine.
We are all concerned because we see the international
rules-based order is being challenged. And that is a concern
for all of Europe. It is a concern for all of NATO. And here we
are considering that the most important principle is the
indivisibility of NATO territory.
And it does not matter which part of NATO can be
challenged. It is a challenge for the whole of NATO in this
sense: the assurances from NATO, the presence of NATO
battalions, international battalions on Baltic soil, and
reassurance given by the United States in particular, that
gives a strong sense of a strong response to anybody who wants
to challenge NATO as the strongest military organization. That
is the only response we can expect from NATO and that is a
response that is understandable by everybody.
That gives us, as small nations, a good sense of assurance
about our security, safety, and stability for the future.
Senator Leahy. Does anybody disagree with that?
Ambassador Marmei. If I just may add, Senator, I think what
we have seen in the past 2\1/2\ years, with the two NATO
summits, Wales in 2014 and Warsaw last year, have made very
important decisions. It is important to implement those
decisions, and we do not see any change in direction in that
sense.
This is my answer to the question: Is there a change of
direction after the elections in the United States? No, we do
not see that happening. Thank you.
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Minister and Ambassadors, thank you for joining us.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

As we make decisions about spending money, taxpayer dollars
of American taxpayers, what would you highlight for me as the
priorities that we should have in the financial aid that we
provide your countries? Is there a consensus?
I mean, I am happy to have one or a few of you respond to
that if there is consensus in what is the highest priority.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, if I may.
Probably the programs that have been already mentioned
today, this is the European Reassurance Initiative or the
Deterrence Initiative that has already started and financing is
assured partly. We hope very much that this program will be
financed fully and maybe even higher.
As well, foreign military financing received by the Baltic
States is a very crucial point of improving our resilience, our
capabilities.
And third, I would mention are the programs devoted to
counter hybrid warfare. And these programs can be in different
shapes, whether it is the strengthening of free media,
independent media, or countering the propaganda, or countering
hybrid attacks. All of these programs are doing very relevant
work to increase resilience.
Senator Moran. Does anyone wish to add or detract or
subtract? Minister.
Minister Klimkin. In the case of Ukraine, it is probably a
bit different one, but in our case it is definitely about
upgrading the Ukraine defense and security sector to the NATO
standards.
It is about permanent control. It is about training. And it
is a two-way road because we understand now the sense of hybrid
warfare and unconventional warfare.
So it is about exchange, but it is also about weapon
supplies, especially defensive weapon supplies.
Senator Moran. Let me ask if any of you have other
thoughts, if you would get that to the subcommittee, I want to
ask a couple more questions. So if you can provide that answer
in writing, I would appreciate it.

SANCTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Senator Moran. There are some EU members that are chafing
at the continued imposition of sanctions against Russia.
In your estimation, what do we need to do to keep EU
unified in its support for those sanctions? And how significant
is it that the United States continue its sanctions in that
effort? Ambassador.
Ambassador Marmei. Senator, as long as we keep to the
principle of the Minsk Agreements, there will be unity on both
sides of the Atlantic in the European Union and the United
States.
So this is a very clear message that we should send to
Russia that Minsk is the basic fundamental agreement that has
to be fulfilled by all parties. And as long as this is not
done, the sanctions should continue.
Ambassador Krisciunas. If I may, Senator, I would add that
as long as the United States is strong on sanctions and we
understand that that is the strongest tool we have in our
toolbox. So that will unite Europe also.
Senator Moran. U.S. leadership, if I can paraphrase, U.S.
leadership matters in this regard.
Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes.

ENERGY

Senator Moran. Let me ask a question about energy. There is
a Rand Corporation study that indicates Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, and Poland are among the EU members most vulnerable
to a problem with energy if Russia would take certain actions.
And yet, there is a 2014 European Commission study that says
that there are cooperative measures among the EU that could
significantly reduce the impact of any short-term cutoff of
supplies of energy.
Are those measures in place, the things that are thought
that could reduce the implications of an energy cutoff? Has the
EU taken the steps necessary to mitigate the damage?
Ambassador Krisciunas. I would say that building a LNG
terminal in Klaipeda, Lithuania and building an LNG terminal in
Poland has changed the situation quite substantially,
especially for Lithuania and the Baltic States.
We do believe we are strengthening our inter-linkages
between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. So we are able to get
gas from anywhere including LNG from the United States, which I
do expect to see in the future. So it is no longer possible for
Russia to blackmail us on the gas.
On electricity, we still have one big project to come
synchronization with the Western European grid, which is
important. It is quite an intricate project. It will take time
to develop, but that will be the last straw in our
independence. So that will make the Baltic States purely
independent and self-sufficient in this regard.
And I do believe that for the other countries it could be
different.
Senator Moran. Georgia and Poland.
Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much. And let me
combine it with your first question with regards to Georgia as
a provider of an alternative diversified route for energy
supplies for Europe, which is not dependent on Russia.
We now have two pipelines. The third one is under
construction, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline. The importance of
strengthening Georgia and stability in Georgia as one of the
alternative routes and pathways to supplying the alternative
energy sources for Europe is critical. And therefore one of the
main attentions from the United States, we expect, is in the
energy sector.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Ambassador Wilczek. As far as energy cooperation is
concerned, I believe and we believe in Poland that it should be
based on mutual benefit. So it should be beneficial for those
countries that cooperate, like the United States and the
countries of Central Europe.
So this LNG terminal in Poland mentioned by my Lithuanian
colleague is a very important part of this project of
diversification.
There is also a project, which is in progress, of the
Baltic Pipeline with Denmark and Norway. And, of course, there
is the very important issue of Nord Stream 2 forced by Russia.
This is a project which divides the European Union partners
because, of course, it has been suspended for some time.
But this is actually interesting that, as far as energy is
concerned, the European Union should be also the energy union.
This is an idea very much advertised by Poland that the
European Union, if it is not an energy union, there is no
union.
So we really think about diversification and cooperation
with the United States especially, as far as LNG is concerned,
as very important for Central Europe.
Senator Graham. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I want to
specifically thank you, Chairman Graham as well as Ranking
Member Leahy for convening this hearing, and for assembling
these important ambassadors and a foreign minister from vital
European allies of ours. This has focused us in a bipartisan
way on how we can confront Russian aggression together.
I am encouraged by your call that we create a counter-
Russia account specifically to strengthen our allied and
partner democracies.
This week is the 150th Anniversary of the creation of the
Appropriations Committee in the United States Senate, something
that showed, I think, the wisdom of the founders in recognizing
that having a strong hand for the Senate in the shaping of our
investments, including those overseas, was something that has
enduring relevance.
I joined my colleague on this subcommittee, Senator Marco
Rubio of Florida, last week in a bipartisan speech on the floor
of Congress about the importance of countering Russian
aggression. We reviewed many of the issues that were raised by
the witnesses today based on trips that each of us have taken
to your various countries. We heard from you directly about
hybrid warfare; about the illegal and inappropriate invasion
and annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern
Ukraine; about the importance of our standing in solidarity
with our allies in Poland and the Baltic States; and the real
challenges that Georgia has faced, since it was the first of
you to be illegally invaded, and to have some of its territory
occupied in an ongoing, disruptive way.
I just want to mention two bills here in the Senate that
have already garnered bipartisan support for those who have any
concern about the absences of bipartisanship here.
The Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act has 10 Republican
and 10 Democrat cosponsoring it. It would make Russia pay the
price for its illegal annexation of Crimea, for the ongoing
violence in eastern Ukraine, for their support of Assad's
murderous regime in Syria, and their meddling in our own
American elections last November.
The other bill, led by Senator Graham, the Russian Review
Act, would make certain that congress has to weigh in before
sanctions against Russia could be waived. I am proud to be a
cosponsor, as are many on this subcommittee, of these bills.
We continue to believe that the transatlantic alliance is
absolutely essential. It is a force for stability in the world,
to maintain the world order that we worked together to build
over the last seven decades.
So let me ask a few questions, if I might.

U.S. LEADERSHIP

There has been a rumored proposal by the administration to
cut by as much as 37 percent our State Department and USAID,
which are essential for the funding of many of the programs
that we have been talking about.
What would the absence of American leadership in this area
mean for your countries? Would you feel safer in the face of an
aggressive Russia if we were to cut back on programs that we
have just discussed like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and
other programs that support your resilience both in terms of
your governance, democracy institutions, and in terms of our
sustainment of some of the development initiatives?
Would any of you care to speak to that question?
Please, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Wilczek. Senator Coons, I think this is just a
rhetorical question.
Senator Coons. Yes.
Ambassador Wilczek. We will not feel safer when the budget
for such projects will be essentially cut. So we hope that it
is just kind of deliberation tweaking, not really a decision
because this sounds very dangerous.
But we hope that it still can be changed, and people who
think this way will change their minds because American
leadership in this region is essential and you know this very
well. That there is great support for American leadership in
this part of Europe, perhaps more than in other parts of
Europe.
So we really rely, as countries of the region, on firm
American leadership and support.

BROADCASTING PROGRAMS

Senator Coons. On a visit I took last August, in addition
to several visits by my colleagues, I heard about the
importance of strengthening our investment in countering Russia
Today, Sputnik, and other propaganda outlets.
You referenced, Mr. Ambassador, the broadcasting from
Latvia both for Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio
Liberty.
Tell me how Russian propaganda operations are affecting
your country and how we might strengthen and expand our
investment in counter Russian propaganda operations that would
be more effective?
Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, to give a short answer,
probably we are less concerned in Latvia about Russia Today,
because the programs of Russia Today are being broadcast in
English.
Russia has all the opportunities to broadcast in Russian.
There are major television channels and that is what Russia is
doing. And Latvia, as a democratic country, is not putting any
barriers to free speech, to free broadcasting. While at the
same time we are aware about the content of these programs,
what is essential is to give an alternative to different
sources, to reliable sources. To give an alternative of
broadcasting in Russian, to be understandable, but to be
objective, reliable, and different from those major television
channels broadcasting from Russia.

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

Senator Coons. One last question, Mr. Chairman, to the
Ambassador from Georgia.
I understand that the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) has helped make possible significant
programs in Georgia over the last 20 years in modernizing
industries and in agriculture.
Can you comment at all on the value of OPIC in helping make
possible mutually beneficial programs in Georgia?
Ambassador Bakradze. There are several programs that OPIC
has implemented in Georgia which is really productive, not only
for developing Georgia, modernizing its economic potential, but
is also beneficial for both sides.
And therefore in that regard, I can provide in a more
detailed way by submitting in a written way more detailed
information.
Senator Coons. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GEORGIA

Ambassador Bakradze, in your testimony you talked about
Russia creating borders on the edge of territory that is
occupied in Georgia.
Can you talk a bit about the recent closing of two of these
controlled crossing points and the impact that it has had for
Georgia's territorial integrity?
Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much, Senator, for that
question. Very recently, just 2 days ago, Russian controlled
forces in the Abkhazia and occupied region have closed two
checkpoints. That is affecting free movement of people. That is
affecting free movement of school children over the occupation
line.
And we are really appreciative of a very strong statement
that the State Department has made with regards to these
developments.
Also one more very recent development was the initiation 2
weeks ago by the de facto Tskhinvali region authorities to hold
a referendum about renaming this region into the one associated
with one of Russia's autonomous republics. And we also
appreciate the very strong statement that was made by the U.S.
Department of State in this regard.
These kinds of developments continue, but we believe in a
peaceful resolution of this problem. We believe in the Geneva
discussion where U.S. authorities are actively contributing.
Thank you.
Senator Boozman. Thank you. So you were pleased with the
American response, then, in that regard?
Ambassador Bakradze. There was a very strong statement just
yesterday made by the State Department about the closure of
these two checkpoints with explaining what kind of humanitarian
difficulties it will create for those people residing adjacent
to the occupation line.

U.S. PROGRAMS

Senator Boozman. Let me ask all of you or just whoever
wants to jump in.
Which U.S. administered programs in your country seem to
have the most impact? And are there ways that we can improve
them? So, what is working? What programs do you like the most
and how can we make them better?
Yes, sir.
Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much. We are really
appreciative.
We are celebrating 25 years of our diplomatic relations
this year, and we believe that the U.S. assistance during these
25 years were essential for the survival, for the
transformation that Georgia has been through, for creating
democratic institutions, solidifying civil society, and making
new opportunities for our people.
These are the assistance that comes through USAID that
comes through FMA for supporting Georgia's resilience when it
comes to the defense and security cooperation, and supporting
Georgian democracy and the rule of law when it comes to the
support of the United States.
We believe there is space for more cooperation on trade,
economic, and investment direction as we believe that security
is also coming through economic means.
Senator Boozman. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Krisciunas. I would say that any support that
you could give to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in
developing their content and strengthening their capacity to
reach longer distances would matter a lot. So that is the most
important.
I, myself, I am still old enough to remember the Soviet
times when my father was listening. I was a child at that time.
My father was listening on the radio to Radio Free Europe and I
know what kind of impact it was. It was eagerly sought every
evening. There were always plenty of people in Lithuania
sitting by the radio and listening to it. It was a word of
freedom.
So the more words of freedom you could express through the
region, the more secure the region will be because that will be
destroying the monopoly on news.
Senator Boozman. So you like the contact, but strong
broadcast.
Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes.
Senator Boozman. Very good. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator.
I would emphasize that in the Estonian case, the most
efficient funding has come through for military funds and also
ERI, or the European Reassurance Initiative; so most of the
American taxpayers' money has gone to these capabilities, but
also to infrastructure build up.
We have received about $75 million from the ERI funding in
the recent 2 years. And we have spent that money on
infrastructure, but also on the capability development on the
antitank weapons.
Also IMF money, which is very important and hopefully it
will be increased in the coming years, goes to the very
important capability development.
Thank you.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Very quickly.
Ambassador Wilczek. Yes, if I can add just to what my
Estonian colleague said.
The European Reassurance Initiative is most important for
us and we would like to thank you for just this great increase
in this program from $1 billion to $3 billion. It is very, very
essential.
But also what my colleague mentioned as well, in all kinds
of exchange of people, all kinds of programs, we do need Radio
Free Europe and such projects, but not to such an extent as it
was under communism. Now people can move and can visit each
other's countries.
So I think that support for programs like Fulbright and all
kinds of exchange programs is also very, very important; just
people going both ways and learning about each other. And I
think that for strengthening American support, support of the
American citizens and taxpayers, it is very important that
American taxpayers also see our countries and see them thanks
to exchange programs, which I think are now underestimated;
their role is underestimated.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Teikmanis. Just to add my support to what has
been said of ERI and for the military financing. That is really
a kind of value added above our own national contribution,
national investment, and procurement programs that really gives
a very focused strengthening of all the capabilities. Thank
you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for being here.
Each of you is welcome to come back to or to visit Chicago,
which I am honored to represent, where you will find many
people from your homeland, and you will find many great
restaurants. Estonia? Not too sure. [Laughter.]
But for the rest, I guarantee it. It will be well worth the
journey and we would be honored to have you visit.
So 3 weeks ago, we had our first break and I decided to
visit Warsaw, Vilnius, and Kiev for the very reason that we are
meeting today. Because I knew there was anxiety and concern
about the future of NATO and the future relationship between
the United States and your countries.
And it was a good visit. There were many things I came home
with from having met with President Poroshenko, having met with
President Grybauskait?, and with the leaders in Poland, as well
as so many other countries.
But I remember one comment particularly from 4 days in
travel. The man's name was Zbigniew Pisarski, he works for the
Casimir Pulaski Foundation. We had dinner in Warsaw and he
asked me a question which goes to the point of the opening made
by the chairman.
He said, ``We are wondering if the United States does not
take the Russian invasion into your election seriously, will
you take the Russian invasion into Poland seriously?''
I thought about that question. I have thought about it ever
since. And I want to salute the chairman here, who has been one
of the few who has been willing to step up and speak out about
how this outrage of the cyber attack by the Russians into the
American election should not go unnoticed and certainly should
be responded to.
It is a starting point to our credibility when it comes to
our relationship with Russia. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for what you said earlier.
I could go through a litany, I will not, of my concerns on
the security side, and most of them have been touched on here
whether it is Kaliningrad or whether it is the Zapad which the
Russians are planning to put 100,000 Russian soldiers into
Belarus in September on the borders of Lithuania, and Poland,
and the Ukraine.
And there is a serious concern about what they might do
next after we have seen what they have done in the Ukraine and
what they could do with these troops on the border there for
this so-called military exercise.
We are concerned about the hybrid war. I had not heard that
term before, but I heard it throughout my visit. The hybrid
war, and not just the military side of it, but the cyber side
of it and the propaganda side of it.

U.S. AND NATO FORCES

I guess my question, in addition to my suggestion. Number
one, Mr. Chairman, that when we commit NATO forces and our
allies--Germany in Lithuania, I believe it is UK in Latvia, am
I correct on that, and Canada into Estonia--I would hope the
United States would always have a complement of our uniforms
and forces as part of it.
It is not a negative thing in terms of their capability,
but it is a demonstration, a symbol, that the United States is
committed to this NATO alliance in every one of these
deployments.
The other thing I would hope is that in the Ukraine, your
president, I said to him, ``What do you need?'' And he said,
``In the Budapest Agreement, we gave up 1,000 nuclear missiles.
Can you give us 1,000 antitank missiles?'' And I understood
what he was saying. They need that for the protection of the
Ukraine and to stop any incursion of Russians into the rest of
your country.
But the point I want to get to is this, Mr. Chairman, and
that is we have to learn what they have already experienced. We
have to learn what the Russians have done to you, which led to
decisions in Lithuania to suspend RT for a number of months
which led, at some point, to a cyber attack on Estonia, which
crippled your economy. You have been through these experiences.
Now we are being threatened with the same thing.
We can teach you many things about the military. You can
teach us about these other aspects of the hybrid war and
prepare us so that the next election is not another victim of
Russian aggression.
I know you have talked about this, and I will not dwell on
it any further because I know Senator Van Hollen would like to
ask questions too.
But I thank you all for coming. We value your friendship.
We value this alliance. It is strong, bipartisan strong in
Congress.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Very quickly.
Ambassador Marmei. If I can just respond to Senator Durbin.
What he raised is a very important issue is the American troop
presence in the Baltic States.
You correctly mentioned that there will be an enforced
forward presence of NATO. As we speak, the British, actually
are moving into Estonia with 1,200 men. There will be full
operational capability of these forces by June this year.
But what I want to emphasize here, and you pointed out, is
that the American presence in the Baltic States should remain.
We have company-sized units in each country right now, and we
would like to see them being embedded to that battalion.
Ambassador Krisciunas. Chairman, if I may. Supporting 100
percent what was told by my colleague from Estonia.
But I just wanted to thank Senator Durbin for his visits to
those important capitals he mentioned. Those are also very
important. So it is a part of showing our partnership to the
world that we are strong together. And so it is very important.
And I am very encouraged and thankful to all the Senators
who are visiting our countries to send this very strong
partnership message. And there are plenty of Lithuanian
restaurants in Chicago.
Senator Graham. On that note, Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Well, thank you, Chairman.
And I have been in five or six of your countries. I was in
Estonia a year ago in September, when we had a Reserve A-10
Unit there from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and they
were back again for an even more extended period of time this
year.
But following up on what Senator Durbin said, and it was
really the question I wanted to pursue anyway.
We clearly understand Russian improper involvement in our
elections. It is a wide belief that they are currently involved
in both the upcoming German and the upcoming French elections.
But you all have experience with this as well.

RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

And I wondered if you want to share, maybe one at a time,
some sense of what you saw through RT or through manipulation
of your infrastructure in ways where you feel like the Russians
were improperly involved. Or everybody, maybe in a couple of
cases, understands improper involvement in your election
situation, if you could share some of that with us that would
be helpful.
And I am wondering if we could just start maybe, Ambassador
Marmei, with you?
Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator.
I think one of the very clear operations of influence that
I mentioned earlier also was the cyber attack in 2007. We see
those cyber hackings on a daily basis. It is continuous.
I think it is also important to point out that the Kremlin-
backed Russian language television and media channels are
trying to influence the Russian speaking population in Estonia
and in other countries. It is not specifically an Estonian
issue. It is everywhere else. We have to really deal with this.
We have, 2 years ago, opened an Estonian broadcasting
company Russian language channel to counter that propaganda.
I think what we see is also a lot of intimidation when it
comes to the security of our borders and airspace; the
violation of air and maritime borders. We had to deal with this
as well.
We have to deal with the support of, or the influence of,
the NGO's in our countries as well and also academia.
Senator Blunt. That would be Russian influence.
Ambassador Marmei. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. I am going to run out of time here.
I will say that the visit that I made there a year ago, I
think 1 of the 2 days that I was there with our A-10 pilots,
the Russians were practicing invading Estonia 20 miles away
from the Estonian border, and it was very publicly clear that
that was the purpose of that exercise.
Mr. Krisciunas, anything in Lithuania you would want to
talk about?
Ambassador Krisciunas. Well, I would say, Senator that of
course it is difficult to influence the election in Lithuania
probably for Russian propaganda, even though I would say they
are clearly probably trying in there.
But because in Lithuania, there is almost like 80 percent
support of EU membership and NATO, so it is very difficult. It
is not popular to go against those topics which Russia would
like to destroy.
So what we see is the efforts by some media outlets to put
doubt on NATO relevance or to be cooked with fake news which
would show to the Lithuanian public that, ``The Americans are
not with you. They are looking the other way,'' and things like
that.
So the fake news of a similar nature would be the ones
which are being cooked in Lithuania, trying to cast a doubt, of
course, in general of the people believing in the government,
believing in the NATO and trying to push, for example, NATO.
Let us be neutral. ``Why should Lithuania be a NATO member? Let
us be neutral.''
So it seems like it is a very vague message. It is not like
against NATO but, ``Why are we not neutral? We are not a
militaristic Nation,'' and so on. So that is the kind of news
which is being probably most exploited in Lithuania.
Senator Blunt. Ambassador Teikmanis.
Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, I can join the assessment of my
colleagues in three directions we are facing when we see hybrid
warfare.
One is Russian television channels that are broadcasting in
Russian. And the major narrative is probably linked eternally
to the Baltic States, but also to the European Union.
And its narrative tells us that, ``The European Union is
economically collapsing, and that was a great strategic mistake
by the Baltic States to have joined to the European Union. And
the only way to get back to prosperity and welfare is to come
back to Russia and through the Russian economy, get to high
welfare.''
Another way is financing of NGO's. While the people in the
NGO's are not so numerous--and each of them are working at
several NGO's--they are financed by different kinds of Russian
Foundations, and have very nice names linked to the
``protection of human rights,'' or ``European research,'' or
whatever. And they are pretending to be fighting for the rights
of Russian speakers while allegedly developing another
narrative that Russian speakers in, for instance, Latvia are
abused and facing massive abuse of their human rights.
And probably the third I would mention is rather strong
work in social media spreading out different fake news and
trolling.
Or as we saw quite recently--well, that is another
indication probably whether the news is important--for warfare
just when preparation for Atlantic Resolve started and U.S.
troops started to move to Poland from Germany. Well, the news
headline appeared on different websites that over 3,000 NATO
tanks were rolling towards the Russian border. Well, that was
spread out in news lines and social media.
Senator Blunt. Well, thank you.
I think the point, Chairman, here is well taken that there
is a lot we can learn by sharing what we learned from what
happened here, but also looking at what our friends have
consistently dealt with for two decades now. And thank you for
letting me use a little extra time.
Senator Graham. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, I think
that is one of the central questions of this whole hearing.
If the ones who did not comment could put into writing
examples of interference in your election system, that is very
important.
Senator Graham. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Mr. Minister, and Ambassadors for your testimony today.
Mr. Chairman, it is great to be on this subcommittee. And I
want to join our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to thank you
for your leadership in general and for putting together this
hearing because Russian interference in our elections is not a
democratic party issue. It is not a republican issue. It is an
American issue. In fact, it is an issue obviously important to
democratic countries around the world, as all of you are
testifying to today.
You have had this experience over many, many years with
both the military challenges and threats, but also the
intimidation through various means of propaganda. The
propaganda invasion is a little bit new to the United States in
terms of our elections. We are seeing it, as Senator Blunt
said, in the upcoming elections in France and Germany.
And Mr. Chairman, I would agree with your opening
statement, which is that if we do not respond, then we will
allow those actions to be encouraged. If they can do this kind
of interference with impunity, they will do it again and again
and again.
So I support the legislation that would, first of all,
require congressional consent before we roll back any
sanctions. And I also support the legislation that would go
further. I think we need to now impose sanctions on a
bipartisan basis to send the signal you are talking about
because if we do not do it, we are simply going to be
encouraging this kind of interference in elections going
forward.
And I appreciate the testimony from all of you as to the
lessons learned, and look forward to getting some of the
written observations from others.

CYBER WARFARE

I would say that, obviously, we need to strengthen our
cyber capabilities across the board. I mean, this is the new
dimension of security, of warfare and I am pleased that my
State of Maryland is the home of the U.S. Cyber Command.
And Ambassador Marmei, I know Estonia takes the lead in
NATO with respect to cyber security. We also have a good
relationship between the Maryland National Guard and your
efforts on behalf of NATO, and look forward to strengthening
those ties.
With respect to cyber security, what I would ask is very
quickly for each of you to try and grade what you think are our
current capabilities, and whether you think this is an area
where we need to put more resources, and how vulnerable are we
today? We know the Russians are very involved every day in
trying to penetrate our systems.
And I would, starting with you Ambassador Marmei, because
of Estonia's lead within NATO, if you could give us some
assessment of where you think we are.
Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator. We have good news
and bad news, I think, or bad news and good news.
First of all, I would too, also thank you for the really
good cooperation that Estonia and Maryland have enjoyed in the
past 25 years especially the cooperation between Estonia, and
the Armed Forces, and your National Guard. Your 175th Air Wing
has been to Estonia. You have 21 planes there, 18 of those have
been to Estonia. So this is excellent. And also the cooperation
with your cyber defense unit there is developing very fast.
Now it is clear, as you pointed out, that cyber is the new
domain of warfare. What is good is that NATO really recognized
that last year during the Warsaw Summit, and clearly pointed
out that cyber warfare is the fourth domain of warfare. But a
lot remains to be done in this area.
We have to be, all our countries individually have to put
more resources into that, but we should also collectively deal
with these issues also on a bilateral basis between the
relevant countries. But also with NATO which, as you know,
Estonia hosts the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence. I would
encourage you when you talk about the further funding of the
countering of hybrid warfare to find more resources to put to
that Center as well, and to have more people in NATO
Headquarters also to deal with this issue.
It will not fade away. It will, this issue will be with us
for the good part of this century, I think. So we have to
really put more emphasis in this.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. And everyone else can, in writing, respond
as we are running out of time.
There is a vote being called any minute now and there are a
couple of Members of the subcommittee on the way. So I want to
make sure everybody can ask questions.
Very briefly, what have I learned? There has been a
systematic effort to undermine democracies in your countries by
Russia for years.
Does everybody agree with that statement?
Let the record reflect an affirmative answer.
Prior efforts to deter Russia have failed. They are getting
more aggressive not less.
Affirmative answer.
Without American leadership, nothing will work.
Affirmative answer.
All right. Who do we have? We have two Members on the way.
Senator Van Hollen, do you want to continue until they come?
Senator Van Hollen. Well, Chairman, I think--and this is a
discussion for Members of Congress--I do believe that as you
have indicated that we need to come together across party lines
to respond. And we need to learn from your own experiences the
kind of measures that we need to be on the, one, lookout for.
But we also need to be very focused on what we are doing.
Let me ask you this. If the United States does not take any
affirmative action beyond what President Obama already did with
respect to the Russian interference in our elections, do you
believe that would embolden Russia to take these actions on an
even larger scale in your countries and other democracies
around the world?
Senator Graham. And for the record, you can answer that
because we have Senator Daines, if that is okay. That is a very
good question, but I want to make sure that everybody can ask
questions.
Senator Daines.
Ambassador Marmei. I think this is real important to show
unity and resolve. To do it individually on a bilateral basis
between our countries, but also through NATO and in our case in
the European Union, which is a very important organization for
us.
So a lot remains to be done, but we have to show resolve
and unity otherwise what you describe will become true.
Senator Graham. Senator Daines. I have been told the vote
is on, so we have about 7 or 8 minutes, probably.
Senator Daines. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. Thank you for being here, and in representing your
respective countries, and your interest in the United States.
The United States values our strong relationships and our
alliances, and strengthening these ties can help improve the
security, and certainly the stability, across Eastern Europe.
Many of you also represent NATO allies. This alliance has
proven to be an effective and steadfast bulwark against
aggression and terrorism in Eastern Europe and around the
world. It is critical that NATO remains strong and continues to
receive robust support from the United States, particularly in
light of ongoing Russian aggression that undermines regional
stability and threatens our national security.
Russian interference is not limited to the security fear
either. Disinformation campaigns seeking to discredit alliances
such as NATO, cyber attacks, or substantially raising energy
costs as a means to influence other countries have occurred far
too frequently.

RUSSIAN THREATS

Ambassador Wilczek, what threats from the Kremlin do you
view as the most imminent, whether it is to Poland, NATO, or
the region as a whole?
Ambassador Wilczek. Threats from Kremlin, which threats?
Senator Daines. Yes. Which threats do you view from Kremlin
as most imminent, most urgent, whether it is to Poland, to
NATO, or the region as a whole?
Ambassador Wilczek. I think it is to the whole Western
world or the transatlantic alliance, I would say, both Europe
and the United States.
Now, the cyber war is going on every day all the time and
it is a threat for everyone because it does not depend on how
far you are from the Kremlin. You can be 500 miles, you can be
5,000 miles, and you can be a dictatorship or a democracy.
There are various ways of using this hybrid war and the cyber
war. So I think that everyone is vulnerable.
And what is essential to our countries to be in our message
to NATO and the United States and our countries to be
unambiguous. What is the most dangerous thing, I think,
especially as far as the war against the Ukraine is concerned
is that many messages from the various countries are not
unanimous. It is not univocal. It is not clear cut that this is
the war.
I think this should be stated openly that there is Crimea,
there is Donbas. There is a war against the Ukraine. And I
think that there is also a war, a cyber war, against so many
other countries.
Senator Daines. So in light of that, what in your view
would be the very best and most effective response to Putin's
hybrid efforts to advance his goals whether it is energy,
informational, or cyber?
Ambassador Wilczek. Well, it is energy, and information,
and cyber.
I think that first of all the cooperation on energy should
be strengthened. And the position, for example, of the European
Union, again, should be unambiguous because it is dividing the
Union when various countries have various opinions about energy
cooperation.
So I think the cooperation of this region with the United
States should be strengthened as far as energy is concerned.
And I think that today, I have just returned from a
conference on cyber security organized by the Visegrad
countries--Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary--and I
think that we are still not aware how important this new kind
of war is conducted today.
So I think cyber should be the most important, the most
essential way of cooperation.

ENERGY

Senator Daines. You brought up the issue of energy as well
as cyber. I want to switch gears here.
Ambassador Marmei, as you know, or may not know, my home
State of Montana is one of the leading energy producing states
in the United States. In fact, we have more recoverable coal
than any State in the United States.
Montanans understand the importance of and access to
reliable and an affordable source of energy, and undoubtedly,
so do Estonians.
The question is how dependent is your country on Russia for
its energy needs and what concerns does that raise?
Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator, for this question.
I think Estonia enjoys a rather different situation in the
region in the sense that we are not reliant on Russian energy.
The only energy that we use or import from Russia is gas, but
it only forms about 7 percent of the total energy consumption.
Estonians are reliant on oil shale, which we generate to
produce electricity. So in that sense, we are not really
dependent on Russia.
But there is a bigger issue here, which is that as long the
region, the Baltic region is still considered as an energy
island inside the European Union, then it is not a matter of
how dependent Estonia is. But the question really is how safe
the whole region can be from the Russian energy influence and
tools?
Senator Daines. So would the region be more secure if that
dependence was on the United States versus Russia?
Ambassador Marmei. Well, the United States plays a very
important role here, especially when it comes to LNG and the
export to Europe, which is, I understand, the issue of
licensing. And this is clearly what Lithuania is looking
forward to getting more American LNG to Europe, to Lithuania.
Also it is important to mention that Estonia actually
exports 30 percent of our gas from Lithuania today. So it is
only 8 percent from Russia. And this shows how important the
connections between these countries are when it comes to
pipelines and then power grids.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you all.
We have just a few minutes left on the vote. Senator Rubio
is in another committee hearing and he cannot make it by 4:15,
which is the time we have to all leave. So I will make sure he
can ask you questions in writing. I know he has been very, very
good on this issue.
To all of you, thank you for coming. This has been eye
opening, at least to me and I am sure to every member of the
subcommittee. My goal is to inform the American people of the
risks that you have being in the backyard of Russia as a
democracy. That they are coming after us, France, and Germany
until somebody stops them. And we are going to try to give you
more tools in your toolbox to fight back because the safer you
are, the safer we will be.
To all of you, thank you very much. You have been very
brave to come here today and to our friends in the Ukraine,
keep your chin up. I think the Ambassador from Poland got it
right. We need to get the Ukraine right before anything else
will happen.
Every effort to stop Russia in the past, whether it be
Georgia, the Ukraine, you name it, is clearly not working. My
goal is to come up with something that will work. I want a
better relationship with Russia, but that never will be
achieved until Russia changes its practice of trying to grind
democracy into the ground.
I can understand why Putin is afraid of democracy. I cannot
understand why America and others will not defend it.
I just met with President Trump. I think you are going to
have a good ally in President Trump in terms of having a
rotational troop presence in a permanent fashion. That the
Ukraine will be helped more and not less, and that we will push
back against all Russian aggression.
I look forward to working with him and my Democratic and
Republican colleagues to give you some hope in the region that
America is back. This subcommittee hearing is just the
beginning of what I think will be a long journey.
Our next hearing will be March 29, and we will look at
civil society's perspective on Russia and Russia's regional
influence.
To all of you, thank you very much. Your country is in our
thoughts and prayers, and I want you to see in America a more
reliable ally in the future. Thank you.
The record will be open until Friday.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the witnesses for response subsequent to the
hearing:]

Questions Submitted to Hon. Pavlo Klimkin
Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. Ukrainian security services have clear evidence of Russia's
constant attempts to interfere in elections in Ukraine by using a
variety of cyber tools, as well as other methods. This submission will
focus on events that took place in 2014. Subsequent and more recent
attacks are the subject of ongoing investigations. Once these
investigations are concluded, we will be happy to provide that
additional information as it becomes available and when its release
into public domain would not compromise the national security interests
of Ukraine.
On May 22, 2014, ahead of the Presidential elections in Ukraine
scheduled for May 25, 2014, the ``Elections'' Unified Information
Analysis System (designed to announce preliminary results on the
process of voting and counting of votes) was blocked. The computer
system of the Central Election Commission (CEC) was rendered inoperable
and most of the data files were deleted or made inaccessible. Malware
was detected in the CEC's LAN, part which could not be neutralized by
the licensed Russian-made ``Kaspersky"antivirus software installed in
the system. Ukrainian specialists managed to promptly address the
threat and to minimize negative consequences of the external
interference.
On May 23, 2014, hacker group ``CyberBerkut'' (which, according to
available data, is controlled by the Russian secret service FSB
(Federal Security Service) and is responsible for cyber attacks on
information infrastructure of Ukrainian state institutions) released
files and official correspondence from the Ukrainian CEC computers,
including network and cyber security technical documentation, as well
as passwords to all network devices, on its site cyber-berkut.org.
Ukrainian security experts revealed that over 20 CEC's LAN
computers, including the server, were infected with the malware, later
detected as ``Sofacy'' virus (created by ART28 hacker group). This
group reportedly acts in the interests of the Russian Federation's
secret services and was involved in targeted cyber attacks on
electronic information resources in Ukraine, European countries and the
USA. The virus is intended to steal restricted information and make
destructive impact on electronic information resources, including
software. It is characterized by high immunity toward detection and
neutralization by antivirus software.
As the hacking activities against the ``Elections'' system were
carried out on the eve of the extraordinary Presidential elections in
Ukraine, they are evidence of an attempt by the Russian secret services
to discredit the Ukrainian authorities as unable to organize elections
at the regional and national levels and, in its turn, to disrupt the
election as the whole.
As another evidence of Russia's attempt to influence the electoral
process, there was publication (starting from 8 pm on May 25, 2014) by
the Russian media (TV and online outlets) of a fake report on an
alleged victory of Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the ``Right Sector'' (party
labeled by Russia as an instigator of the Revolution of Dignity and
portrayed as an ``anti-Russian ultranationalist and fascist group'').
The CEC server was externally infected by malicious software
designed to display fake statistical voting results at a set time
(Dmytro Yarosh--37.13 percent, Poroshenko--29.63 percent, Tymoshenko--
11.42 percent etc.).
The mentioned malware was neutralized in a timely fashion by the
Ukrainian specialists. Nevertheless, as the Russian special services
were not aware that it was detected, the Russian media started to share
(at a specific time) the fake news of Dmytro Yarosh's victory at the
Presidential elections in Ukraine.
Moreover, aside from interfering in Ukraine's elections, Russia has
used its special forces to conduct, at the barrel of a gun, its own
elections in the territory of Ukraine. As the U.S. is well aware, in
2014, in the course of a Special Forces operation on the Ukrainian
Crimean peninsula, Russia staged an illegal referendum. The results of
this referendum have been used by the Kremlin to illegally occupy
Crimea. Furthermore, the results of that referendum and the attempted
illegal annexation have never been recognized by Ukraine, the United
States or the rest of the international community. There have also been
attempts to hold similar sham referendums in the specific areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, currently controlled by Russia and Russia-
backed terrorists. Such attempts, as well as Russia's ongoing
interference in Ukraine's electoral system, are part of Russia's hybrid
warfare against Ukraine.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Has the Minsk II process failed? Is there an alternative
to Minsk II?
Answer. Ukraine remains committed to the unconditional
implementation of the Minsk Agreements in their entirety and takes
consistent action to this end.
Nevertheless, the Minsk peace process falters, but not because of
Minsk documents' defect in content and form, while some elements really
seem to be rather uneasy compromises. It falters because Moscow does
not want to do anything at all, for Kremlin needs neither Donbas, nor
its population.
Russia still considers Ukraine as a part of its core geopolitical
interests, which, if realized, would mean the end to Ukraine's European
and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
As a result, almost 2 years and a half have passed since signing of
the first Minsk document, but peace still has not come to Donbas.
Despite Ukraine's and its allies' joint efforts to resolve the conflict
peacefully, Russia continuously denies all its obligations claiming its
non-involvement in what Russia calls ``Ukrainian internal conflict''.
Under such circumstances, it seems almost impossible to ensure proper
implementation of the Minsk documents as Ukraine and its partners, on
one hand, and Russia--on another, have such polar perceptions of the
nature of the conflict.
Recently, Russia has made a number of very controversial steps,
which have nothing to do with its commitments under the Minsk
agreements, but clearly testify Kremlin's willingness to raise stakes
and test the reaction of the West. In particular, Kremlin made a formal
decision to recognize ``documents'' issued by illegal entities of
certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, which
means Moscow's recognition of its de facto occupation of the certain
areas of Donbas.
Moscow also backed `grabbing' of local state and private economic
entities operating in the Ukrainian legal environment by the members of
illegal armed formations (IAFs) and mastered their ``formal decision''
to recognize Russian rouble as ``the only currency''.
Moreover, Russia is destroying the industrial potential of Donbas
by looting local plants and factories, dismantling the most profitable
and valuable industrial assets and moving them to the Russian
territory. It was Russia which issued formal permissions to 243 Russian
enterprises to ``conduct foreign trade operations'' with ``business
entities'' from the certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
Ukraine through the Government-uncontrolled section of Ukraine-Russia
border.
By taking the above measures, Russia derails the Minsk peace
process, simultaneously shifting the responsibility for the possible
collapse of the Minsk Agreements on Ukraine. Kremlin's clear goal is to
get rid of the international sanctions or at least to ease the
sanctions' pressure.
In order to unblock the Minsk as the single peace option we should
jointly create such tough conditions under which Russia will think at
least twice before taking any unfriendly actions towards Ukraine in
breach of Kremlin's commitments under the Minsk Agreements. In this
regard, we ask the United States to consider the following options:

--To strengthen sanctions;
--To strengthen the U.S. involvement in the multinational support of
Ukraine in its negotiations with Russia, aimed at
implementation of the Minsk agreements, de-occupation of Donbas
and Crimea;
--To provide Ukraine with defensive military aid and to enhance the
exchange of intelligence information;
--To assist Ukraine in training its military personnel;
--To support OSCE/SMM activities in Ukraine and enhancement of its
technical capacities;
--To provide expertise and financial support of the bold reform
agenda;
--To invest in Ukraine's economy; and
--To provide continuous political and diplomatic support regarding
Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
______

Questions Submitted to Hon. Piotr Wilczek
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Poland
Question Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. Poland has played a leading role in sanctions against
Russia, following Russia's intervention in Ukraine. How would you amend
or bolster sanctions on Russia, moving forward?
Answer. Poland remains a strong proponent of the sanctions policy
toward Russia. There are no grounds for softening or lifting the
sanctions. The reasons behind their deployment are still valid: Russia
occupies Crimea and is actively fueling the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine.
Moscow shows no sign of good will. What's worse, its rolling out a
set of measures that could lead to a creeping annexation of Eastern
Ukraine, i.e.:

--The recognition of ID cards issued by separatists in Donetsk and
Lugansk;
--The introduction of the Russian ruble as the official currency in
areas controlled by separatists; and
--Calling the contact line between the two sides a ``state border''.

The sanctions, and more importantly, the countersanctions
introduced by Russia had a severe impact on the Polish economy.
According to the econometric analysis, our GDP shrank by 0.3 percent.
Yet, we are ready to pay this price in order to protect the basic
values underpinning international law, such as the peaceful coexistence
of the nations and the inviolability of sovereign states.
We hope that the United States will continue to support Poland and
the EU in the goal of improving the situation in the region. To this
end, the international community must speak with a strong and coherent
voice.
We saw an added value in the process of coordinating the sanctions
regime between the UE, the United States, Canada, Japan and other
important players. We believe that this process, which was suspended
last year, should be restored.
Should the situation in Ukraine deteriorate due to Moscow's
actions, we should be ready to implement even stronger restrictive
measures. Different ideas and proposal with this regard have already
been discussed among the EU Member States and its partners upon placing
current sanctions (e.g. enlarging the list of sanctioned persons and
entities, imposing stricter conditions with regard to present economic
sanctions or widening their scope to new sectors).
______

Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. We haven't noticed direct Russian interferences in the
electoral process in Poland. However, 2015 saw the creation of a pro-
Russian party in our country (``Zmiana'', i.e. ``The Change''). Openly
pro-Russian, its members support Moscow's aggressive policy towards
Poland and other members of the international community.
______

Questions Submitted to Hon. David Bakradze
Ambassador, Embassy of Georgia
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. Russia has always demonstrated interest toward Georgia's
election processes and has, through various means, attempted to affect
them. However, Russia could not have produced such an effect on the
domestic election outcome via cyber-attacks owing to the fact that
Georgia simply does not employ the electronic system and ballots for
vote counting.
In view of this, Russia utilized propaganda as a tool to influence
the elections by creating an overall atmosphere, where anti-Western
sentiments are reinforced and pro-Russian positions/attitudes are
shaped and supported.
In fact, the Russian propaganda enlists Russian as well as some
Georgian language media outlets, Russian non-governmental
organizations, and their Georgian partners along with the domestic pro-
Russian political parties and movements to actively promote the Russian
narrative and anti-Western attitudes in the Georgian population.
In Georgia, Russian propaganda makes use of television as one of
its key instruments. According to the latest survey, 90 percent of
Georgia's population stated that television was their main source of
information. It is noteworthy, however, that the number of pro-Russian
Internet publications is increasing in line with the growing figure of
Internet users in the country.
The instruments of aggressive Russian propaganda represented in
Georgia include the Kremlin-run Russian television channels that
operate freely thanks to the pluralistic media environment in the
country. The Russian information agency ``Sputnik'' must be set apart
in that context, as it runs not only an online portal, but also a 24-
hour radio broadcast.
Russian propaganda is actively engaged in social media and online
publications. The printed media that has quite a substantial
circulation in Georgia, is rife with Russian propaganda, anti-Western,
and, specifically, anti-American narrative and mantras.
In recent years, Russia has actively utilized non-governmental
organizations as a means of exerting influence via the so-called ``soft
power'' tools. Recent Russian strategic documents set out a specific
budget for funds that have been created for the purpose of mobilizing
public opinion in favor of, and reinforcing support for Russia's
political agenda--altogether carrying an ulterior motive of
discrediting the West.
Generally, the Georgian population is not easily receptive of
public proclamation of pro-Russian ideas. Therefore, the pro-Russian
political parties rarely declare their pro-Russian sentiments publicly;
however, there have been some exceptions. For instance, during the run
up to the 2016 parliamentary elections, a pro-Russian party
``Tsentristebi'' (The Centrists) ran a television campaign ad
(including via the state sponsored ``Public Broadcaster'') in which the
party issued a promise to its electorate that, in case of victory, they
would legitimize the Russian military bases existent in Georgia's
occupied territories, and ensure the payment of Russian pensions in the
country. Following this development, the leadership of the ``Public
Broadcaster'' reached a decision to suspend the airing of this campaign
ad on the grounds that it contained messaging that was directed against
the state sovereignty, and was violating the supreme law of the land--
the constitution of the Georgian state. In light of such resistance,
the political parties loyal to Russia directed their efforts toward
propagating anti-Western narratives instead of concentrating on the
dissemination of pro-Russian ideas.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Since 1995, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) has committed over $500 million across 48 projects in Georgia to
stimulate private sector investment, rebuild war-torn buildings,
modernize industries, and position Georgia for a more stable and
prosperous future. How have OPIC investments in the agriculture sector,
among others, helped to build a more resilient Georgia that is less
vulnerable to Russia?
Answer. There is much to be said for OPIC's share in helping to
build a more resilient Georgia that is less vulnerable to Russia. OPIC,
together with the USAID and other donor agencies, provide western
capital investments to Georgia, which foster economic and political
stability in the country. Such agencies have introduced the western
model of doing business and corporate governance into the country and
this has helped improve the exportability of Georgian goods and
increased the diversity of the country's export markets. The OPIC's
mandate is to promote private investments and while doing so OPIC is
greatly contributing to the expansion of US-Georgian business ties. The
OPIC investment policy is based on measuring the developmental score of
projects and this is one of the key criteria that the Corporation
considers when approving loans. Thus, all projects financed by OPIC are
geared towards aiding Georgia's further development as well as ensuring
return on U.S. investments by requiring at least 25 percent involvement
from American companies.
OPIC has been investing in Georgia since 1993. The Corporation has
played an important role in the development of different sectors of the
Georgia's economy, including: the financial sector, tourism,
healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, education, mining, renewable
energy, real estate and hotel industries. OPIC also contributes to the
development of small and medium size businesses and is very effective
in providing affordable loans directly to the qualified businesses.
Issues like local jobs, sustainable employment, worker rights, host
country benefits, transfer of knowledge, transfer of know-how and
environmentally friendly solutions are all very important elements of
OPIC projects in Georgia. Thereby, practically every OPIC project in
the country can be considered as a part of the Impact Investment
Strategy.
The 2008 war with Russia displaced thousands of people from their
homes and delayed the economic growth of the country. Today, 20 percent
of Georgia's territory is under Russian occupation. Traditionally, the
Kartly region, the one most affected by the Russian invasion was known
for fruit and vegetable production. The population of this region
supported their families through agriculture.The OPIC financed projects
in the agriculture sector create employment opportunities for low
income families that are most susceptible to Russian propaganda. More
than half of the country's population is employed/self-employed in the
agricultural sector (although, it constitutes only 9 percent of
Georgia's GDP), therefore, agricultural projects are essential, as they
help generate income for IDPs as well as much of Georgia's general
population.
The OPIC projects in the agriculture sector also contribute to food
security in the country. Thanks to the year-round production of
vegetables and new technologies in the agricultural sector that OPIC
provides, Georgian consumers became less dependent on imported food
products, especially from Russia.
Some of the hallmark investments carried out by OPIC in Georgia's
agriculture sector include as follows:

1. Teliani Valley Winery: OPIC helped the company increase its
production capacity and produce greater quantities of quality Georgian
wines. This was one of the earliest private investments into the
Georgian wine industry, which has traditionally been Georgia's number
one export commodity. Teliani Valley annually exports around 5-7
million bottles of wines to European, American and Chinese markets. The
ability to comply with the highest quality standards, which in
themselves require heavy capital expenditure into the production
facilities and equipment, made it possible for the company to diversify
its export markets, thereby making it virtually independent of the
Russian market.
2. Sante Walsh Products: This is a dairy product plant that
produces around 100 sorts of various products with 50 million liters of
milk and milk powder utilization capacity. The company collects around
10 million liters of natural milk from 2,000 local farmers. This was
the first local, Georgian, producer of dairy products that introduced
quality standards. Prior to this, the market was dominated by Russian
dairy products.
3. Cold Storage & Refrigerator in Poti: This OPIC project allows
for the storage of fruits and vegetables produced in western Georgia
according to EU standards. This storage acts as a collection center for
local farmers, who are keen to export to European markets since supply
is relatively low, and, therefore, there is a waiting period that
ensures that the required capacity of goods is reached prior to export.
The modern shock freezing technology provides farmers and traders with
the ability to store their produce in the cold storage and export it to
the EU market within a week, thereby, substituting the Russian export
market.
4. Wendy's Georgia: The roll-out of Wendy's restaurants in the
country boosted the local production of raw meat and meat products.
Moreover, some of the vegetables used by the restaurants will soon be
of Georgian production.

It is noteworthy that in other sectors OPIC has supported two
educational projects in Georgia, which ensure that the younger
population has broader access to western standard curricula and quality
of education. Additionally, OPIC is financing the first hospital
project in Tbilisi that will be in compliance with JCI standards and
provide citizens with high quality healthcare.
Successes in the OPIC funded projects creates certain confidence
for U.S. and other companies to closer evaluate the investment climate
of Georgia and ultimately make sound and profitable investments.
Increased engagement from U.S. companies not only contributes to the
economic development of the country but serves as a strong
reinforcement to the security of Georgia and the region as a whole.
OPIC's involvement in, and effect on Georgia, including the
country's agricultural sector, is hard to overestimate. Along with the
funds allocated by other U.S. donors, the OPIC's engagement in Georgia
exemplifies the effective spending of U.S. taxpayers dollars,
especially considering the positive outcomes of the allotted investment
in Georgia. The country stands ready to further continue its
cooperation with OPIC to help ensure positioning Georgia for a more
stable and prosperous future.
______

Question Submitted to Hon. Andris Teikmanis
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Latvia
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. Considering the situation in Latvia, namely, its proximity
to the Russian Federation, it has and is continuing to use various
measures in order to distort elections in Latvia. However, methods and
influence channels used by Russia are slightly different from those in
the Western Europe or U.S. since Latvia is home for a significant
Russian-speaking minority which, in Russia's opinion, is an asset to be
used for meddling in Latvia's internal affairs.
First, Russian diplomatic missions are working closely with
compatriots from various organizations. Very often leaders and members
of compatriot associations happen to be involved in political parties.
Therefore, Russian diplomatic missions keep in touch with them, offer
help and assistance in compatriot issues while using these resources to
groom loyal present or future politicians. The relationship is mutually
beneficial because that way Russian compatriot politicians can add
unintentional extra resources to their campaigns. The more resources
they add to their associations the more favorable is their position
within the Russian compatriot environment. As a result, Russian
compatriots often are leaning to vote Kremlin-backed personalities and
are helping to create negative mass PR on other political parties.
Second, Russia is growing its influence within information
environment by spreading propaganda and misinformation. There have been
cases in Latvia where misleading information has been disseminated
before election in order to create a negative image about certain
political parties or candidates whom are not in Russia's interest. As
mentioned before, for such purposes compatriots have also been used.
Lately Russian propaganda is more concentrated on creation of a myth
that Latvia is a ``failed state''. It may result in voter's inactivity
which is beneficial for Russia. Other aspect of this is the presence of
Russian media in Latvia. Latvian Russian-speakers get a vast amount of
their information from Russian television which overwhelmingly gives a
platform to pro-Kremlin politicians and activists from Latvia. This
situation distorts perception of reality since on the Russian state
controlled TV they disseminate far more radical views than at home.
Another thing, it is almost impossible to qualify it as spending on
electoral campaign, as there is no information available for Latvian
state institutions on conditions upon which the broadcasting time is
granted.
Last, there have been cases where various political parties have
been offered an assistance by or tried to establish relationship with
professional Russian political campaigners and communication experts.
There are indications, that certain pro-Kremlin political parties have
received free-of-charge services of such specialists from Russia thus
potentially giving them advantage in comparison with other political
competitors.
Overall, Russia's presence in Latvia's electoral process is
evident. Since Russia has had limited success distorting elections in
Latvia through channels mentioned above, it may build up a new
strategy. Most likely, in upcoming Latvian municipal and parliamentary
elections it will try to strengthen its messages about Latvia as a
``failed state'' in order to decrease the overall participation rate
which in turn would be beneficial for pro-Kremlin political parties
with strong pool of loyal voters. Also possible establishment and
running of multiple pro-Russian parties affiliated so called
``Latvian'' parties may be considered as a tool for fragmenting
``Latvian vote'' (decreasing proportion of voters per other larger
Western-orientated parties) in their favor and in this way increasing
possibility for increase of Russian influence in Latvian politics.
______

Questions Submitted to Hon. Rolandas Krisciunas
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. One of the main parts of Russia's compatriot policy is to
support political parties with the Russian compatriot presence. Russia
controls and directs activities of compatriot organizations through the
Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots which works under auspices
of the Russian Embassy in Lithuania. In Lithuania Russian compatriots
take part in the elections in the list of Electoral Actions of Poles in
Lithuania-Unions of Christian Families and party ``Russian Alliance''.
From 2008 these political parties participate in elections together and
have support from the Russian Embassy in Lithuania. Leaders of
aforementioned political parties seek to stop the integration of ethnic
minorities into Lithuanian society and this activity is beneficial for
Russia. In 2016 6 MPs were elected from this coalition.
______

Questions Submitted to Hon. Eerik Marmei
Ambassador, Embassy of Estonia
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
outcome.
Answer. There have been attempts to interfere in Estonia's
electoral process. Our Internal Security Service has successfully
prevented attempts to finance political parties from Russia and
explained to Estonian political parties the security risks connected
with the acceptance of illegal foreign funding.
However, during the 2009 European Parliament elections in Estonia,
Russia's ``non-interference ``do not intervene'' in other states'
internal affairs via their compatriots policy was on full display. The
activity of the Head of Department of Foreign Relations for the Moscow
City Government Georgi Muradov is also specifically worth mentioning.
On February 28, 2009, when Russia's Compatriots organizations had a
meeting in Tallinn, Muradov's two-day visit to Estonia began. At the
beginning of the visit Muradov claimed in his interview to the Estonian
media that he came to to rest and visit his friend. In reality the
visit began in the Embassy of Russian Federation in Tallinn holding
conversations with selected compatriots who had been called out to
attend. The purpose was to agree on how to form a joint list of Russian
candidates for the elections, with Aleksey Semyonov, an active member
of the Coordination Council and the Head of the non-profit association
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, being the number one
candidate. Highlighting him was understandable, as he is a person
presenting a view on human rights favourable for Russia and his
activity is being financed from Moscow. According to the annual report
of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, financial support
from the Embassy of Russian Federation formed nearly half of the total
support to their projects in 2008.
At the meeting the candidates of the planned joint list were
offered a motivation package of over 10 million EEK, if they would
fulfil established conditions. How such a large sum would have arrived
in Estonia in practice remains unknown, as they did not manage to form
the joint candidates list and thus the purpose of motivation vanished.

Source: 2009 Estonian Interal Security Service Annual Review page
12: (https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/
Annual%20Review%202009.pdf).

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[The following materials were submitted by Hon. Andris
Teikmanis, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Latvia for
the record:]

Annual Report About the Activities of the Security Police in 2015

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------

Tools of Destabilization

Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator Graham. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., Tuesday, March 7, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]