    [Senate Hearing 115-]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
                                FISCAL YEAR 2018

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met at 2:17 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Lindsey Graham (chairman)
    presiding.
        Present: Senators Graham, Blunt, Boozman, Moran, Lankford,
    Daines, Rubio, Leahy, Durbin, Shaheen, Coons, Merkley, and Van
    Hollen.

      RUSSIA'S POLICIES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD SPECIFIC EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

    STATEMENTS OF:
            HON. PAVLO KLIMKIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, UKRAINE
            HON. PIOTR WILCZEK, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
                POLAND
            HON. DAVID BAKRADZE, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF GEORGIA
            HON. ANDRIS TEIKMANIS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
                LATVIA
            HON. ROLANDAS KRISCIUNAS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC
                OF LITHUANIA
            HON. EERIK MARMEI, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF ESTONIA

                  opening statement of senator lindsey graham

        Senator Graham. The subcommittee will come to order.
        I want to thank Senator Leahy for being such a good partner
    in this endeavor.
        Our hearing today is on Russia's polices and intentions
    toward specific European nations. The one thing that we have in
    common with all of these countries: they are young, struggling
    democracies and they are friends of the United States.
        Out of respect for your families, I will not pronounce any
    of your names. I will try to get your country right and you
    have an opportunity when you speak to tell us who you are.
        We have the Foreign Minister from Ukraine, the Ambassador
    from Poland, the Ambassador from Georgia, the Ambassador from
    Latvia, the Ambassador from Lithuania, and the Ambassador from
    Estonia. I have met most of you on my travels, and I cannot
    thank you enough for coming to this hearing today, and to share
    with the subcommittee, and the American people, what is going
    on in your backyard because you live in a very difficult
    neighborhood.
        I would like to welcome to the subcommittee Senators Rubio
    and Van Hollen. Hopefully we can do things together that are
    good for the country.
        I will make a short opening statement followed by Senator
    Leahy, and we will have 5-minute rounds of questions and
    answers. Again, to each of you, thank you very much for coming.
        Very briefly, everybody talks about what happened in our
    election in 2016 and let me tell you my views.
        The Russians tried to interfere in our election. I do not
    believe they changed the outcome, but it was the Russians who
    hacked into the Democratic National Committee. It was the
    Russians who compromised John Podesta's e-mails. In my view, it
    was the Russians who provided that information to WikiLeaks in
    an effort to interfere with our election.
        It is my belief if we forgive and forget regarding our own
    election, we will invite future aggression by other countries.
    The Republican Party and Democratic Party should be one when it
    comes to foreign interference. An attack on one party should be
    considered an attack on all. I want this subcommittee to lead
    the way in terms of uniting our country to pushback against
    Russia's interference in democracy at home and abroad.
        The goal is to find out from these countries what it is
    like to live in the shadow of Russia. What kind of interference
    do they face in their daily lives? What are the efforts, the
    tools, and the toolbox of Russia to undermine their
    democracies? The subcommittee needs to create a counter-Russia
    account, a soft power account.
        This subcommittee has jurisdiction over foreign operations
    and I would like to try to convince Americans it is in our
    interest to put some money aside to help these emerging
    democracies because at the end of the day, democracy should be
    a goal of all of us simply because democracies tend not to go
    to war.
        I want to make sure we can do whatever we can within
    reason. Money is tight, but it would be a good investment to
    have a counter-Russia account to put some money aside--and
    maybe cyber security assistance, maybe it is trade assistance,
    whatever it is--that we can help you withstand this assault on
    your democracies by Russia.
        That is the goal: to understand what is going on and do
    something about it. To each of you, thank you for coming to the
    subcommittee. I think if we can come together and produce a
    product, history will judge us well.
        Senator Leahy.

                     statement of senator patrick j. leahy

        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad you are
    having this hearing.
        I want to mention that Tim Rieser has always helped by
    giving me a phonetic pronunciation, but I will still mix it up.
    I think the fact that we have representatives of Estonia and
    Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Poland and Ukraine, places that
    many of us have visited; I know you have and I know Senator
    Durbin has.
        We know the stakes involved. This is the second
    congressional hearing on Russia since the beginning of the new
    administration. I suspect we are going to have many more.
        It is also the benefit of hearing directly from the
    representatives of countries that have experienced Russia's
    military aggression, and economic and political interference
    for many years.
        We now count ourselves among those who are facing some of
    the same kinds of interference. We learned the Russian
    Government interfered in our elections to further its own
    interests and our new President has said virtually nothing
    about it.
        He has made no secret of his admiration for President
    Putin. He has called the American news media the enemy of the
    people. That is something you might expect of President Putin,
    but not of the President of the United States.
        We need an independent investigation into Russia's
    interference in our election. By knowing exactly what happened,
    we can take appropriate action. But at the same time, I think
    we need hearings, like Chairman Graham has called here, so the
    American public will know what Russia is doing in other parts
    of the world.
        It is one thing when we see our leaders attacking the
    American media. I disagree with that. I disagree when nothing
    is said about Vladimir Putin's ruthless campaign to silence his
    critics, especially to silence the Russian press.
        We have not heard any criticism from our President about
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, Russia's
    occupation of Georgian territory, the atrocities committed by
    Russian forces in Syria, their support for the Assad regime, or
    Russia's efforts to undermine stability and democracy across
    Europe.
        I think I want you to know that not everybody in this
    country is praising Vladimir Putin. I do not. The chairman does
    not. I think that supporting the independence of our friends
    and allies when they are under a threat of attack is in the
    United States' national interest.
        I will continue to work with Senator Graham. I want to
    ensure that U.S. assistance is made available for our partners
    in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
        It is not because we are seeking a confrontation with
    Russia. It is because we recognize the importance of ensuring
    that our partners can maintain their sovereignty and provide
    for their people.
        Do I agree with the President in saying we should have a
    constructive relationship with Russia rather than an
    adversarial one? Yes, if that is possible. But we cannot ignore
    the significance of the Russian Government's malignant
    activities toward us and our partners if we want to protect our
    own national interests.
        So I thank you for having this hearing. I thank all of you
    for being here.
        Senator Graham. Thanks, Senator Leahy.
        And we will start with the Foreign Minister of the Ukraine.
    STATEMENT OF HON. PAVLO KLIMKIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN
                AFFAIRS, UKRAINE
        Minister Klimkin. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy,
    Members of the subcommittee.
        Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify before
    you today. And of course, it is great to sit in the line here
    with friends in front of the subcommittee.
        Back in 1994, still as a young diplomat, I was involved in
    the process of strategic nuclear disarmament. While working on
    the Budapest Memorandum, I had already questioned its
    effectiveness and feasibility to ensure security of Ukraine.
        Still, and I have to say it, it was beyond my imagination
    that in 20 years, one guarantor of our suzerainty and
    territorial integrity, a permanent U.N. Security Council member
    will invade Ukraine and occupy parts of its territory.
        Why did it happen? Here is the key to understanding what is
    the root cause of Russian policies and intentions to all its
    European countries, particularly the Ukraine--for Putin, the
    collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe of
    the 20th century.
        From the very beginning, he was and is still obsessed with
    restoring the former Russian greatness. Of course, it could be
    done in two ways. One way was to invest in building a strong
    democratic state with the rule of law and competitive market
    economy, honoring the international principle and order. But it
    was not the Russian choice.
        Instead, the Kremlin resorted to aggressive expansionism in
    gross violations with the international law in different
    dimensions: breaking the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Final Act,
    undermining arms control and possibly violating the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and New START
    treaties, aggressive with trade and energy pressure in
    contradiction to the W20 principles and, of course, blatantly
    violating human rights.
        The Kremlin has developed the concept of hybrid warfare and
    launched it with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the
    invasion in Donbas. It is a highly sophisticated strategy which
    mixes conventional aggression with economy, and economic
    pressure with propaganda and misinformation, as well as direct
    interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It is
    waged daily against peaceful countries to undermine, disrupt,
    and sow dissent.
        It is spearheaded and lying in ruins across the globe by
    the insidious television channel RT, which seeks not to promote
    any particular narrative, but to undermine that of the host.
        In real terms, this hybrid war against Ukraine translates
    into a shocking number of Russian weaponry pumped into the
    occupied Donbas and Crimea. It is now about 4,200 regular
    troops and up to 40,000 militants. It is about more than 400
    tanks and 800 armored vehicles. It is up to 1,000 artillery
    systems and over 200 multiple rocket launchers, and around
    23,000 troops in the occupied Crimea.
        Just a few hours ago, the Russian agent at the
    International Court of Justice made a completely ridiculous
    statement that the Russian-backed militants actually discovered
    all that weaponry had been hidden in the old Soviet coal mines.
    It is in this case just today. Can anyone believe it?
        Kremlin's war against my country over the last 3 years has
    led to over 7 percent of the Ukraine being occupied, almost
    10,000 of my fellow Ukrainians, both military and civilians,
    losing their lives with a further 23,000 being injured.
        Just in the last 6 weeks, the Russians and their proxies
    launched a fierce attack against our troops and civilian
    population in Avdiivka. Russia has recognized the passports and
    documents issued by illegal entities in Donbas, and have also
    completed the introduction of the Russian ruble as the currency
    in the occupied territory.
        Furthermore, Russia has also ordered the illegal
    expropriation of the key enterprises in the occupied territory.
    All this is nothing but the clear breach of each and every
    point of the Minsk Peace Agreement.
        The only viable way to negotiate with Russia is from a
    position of strength and international solidarity. And no new
    agreements should be made with Russia until such time as they
    have delivered on their provisions and commitments.
        So let me thank all of you for the enormous support which
    the United States has given to Ukraine, in particular over the
    last 3 years in our fight against the resurgent Russia. And all
    the signals from the new U.S. administration give us great hope
    that the United States' support for the Ukraine will continue
    and increase. And this continued support is not just in the
    interest of the Ukraine. It is in the interest of the United
    States, and the freedom and stability of the wider
    transatlantic alliance.
        So I am asking the subcommittee for its explicit support in
    a number of areas. Defensively, we have been supplied by the
    United States, and continued military and technical support
    would make a powerful statement to the Kremlin and improve
    significantly Ukraine's ability to defend its territory against
    the Russian army. This support has already shown its
    effectiveness.
        The battalion of the 73rd Brigade, trained by U.S.
    instruction, was one of the most effective in repelling the
    Russian attacks in Avdiivka. The units prepared by the U.S.
    instructors appeared to be very effective on the frontline.
    That is why we believe this kind of support and training is
    very important and should be continued.
        So I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of
    funds authorized for security assistance to Ukraine in the
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017. And please
    support the appropriation of funds for enhanced assistance to
    Ukraine in the U.S. fiscal year 2017 budget and, of course,
    forthcoming 2018 budget.
        Ukraine also needs a long term security arrangement for
    closer partnership and cooperation on defense and security. The
    involvement of the United States will be key for any such
    arrangement to work. Of course, we need U.S. support in re-
    launching the negotiations of the signatory of the Budapest
    Memorandum. The United States should play a key role in the
    negotiation, both on Donbas and Crimea.
        And finally, until Russia gets off Ukrainian land, there
    must be no easing up of sanctions. If anything, they should be
    increased.
        Dear Senators, the Ukraine is on the frontline and
    currently the only country fighting and dying to hold off
    Russia. And Ukraine does not simply ask for support. We
    currently spend 6.6 percent of our GDP on defense. At the same
    time, it is obvious that we need the U.S. and transatlantic
    solidarity with Ukraine and Ukrainian people.
        A strong, stable, and democratic Ukraine able to defend its
    borders against Russian expansionism is a crucial ally for the
    United States in the region and globally.
        Thank you.
        [The statement follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Pavlo Klimkin
        Let me thank you for giving me this opportunity to share with you
    our assessments and related first-hand information on Russian policies
    towards a big European country--towards Ukraine.
        The current policies of Russia towards Ukraine can be expressed in
    one word--the war.
        It has been already 3 years since Russia launched a military
    aggression against Ukraine on 20 February 2014. The appalling number of
    victims highlights the immorality of Kremlin's war against the
    Ukrainian people: over 9,800 Ukrainian citizens have been killed, about
    23,000 wounded and almost 1.8 million have become internally displaced
    persons. 7.2 percent of Ukrainian territory has been seized by Russia
    and millions of Ukrainian citizens live there under occupation and
    endless terror.
        Two years after the Package of Measures for the Implementation of
    the Minsk Agreements was signed, none of its provisions has been
    fulfilled by the Kremlin and its proxies, including the very first
    step--comprehensible and sustainable ceasefire.

      --In 2016 there were about 16,000 ceasefire violations, including
            about 5,000 ceasefire violations with prohibited artillery and
            large-caliber mortars.
      --In 2017 the OSCE SMM has recorded a notable increase in the use of
            weapons proscribed by the Minsk agreements, including multiple
            launch rocket systems and artillery.

        The recent spike in violence in and around Avdiivka is an eloquent
    example of controlled escalation strategy and a clear indication of
    Russia's blatant disregard of its commitments under the Minsk
    Agreements.
        I would like to thank our partner the United States for training
    provided to the Ukrainian military, which have already shown its
    effectiveness. The battalion of the 72nd brigade trained in Yavoriv by
    the U.S. instructors was one of the most effective in repeling the
    Russian-control attacks on Avdiyivka.
        The units prepared by the U.S. instructors appear to be very
    effective on the frontline and they demonstrate the lowest level of
    losses in manpower, better joint maneuvers and tactics implementation.
        That is why we believe this kind of training and support in
    enhancing Ukraine's defense is very important and should be continued.
        Moscow's attempts to make security on the ground conditional on
    implementation of its political demands breach the Minsk Agreements and
    further exacerbate the dire situation of civilians in certain areas of
    the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
        The sustained attacks of the Russian hybrid forces would not be
    possible without continued logistic support.
        Russia keeps sending weapons, ammunition and manpower to Ukraine
    through the 409.7-km of uncontrolled segment of the Ukrainian-Russian
    state border. Heavy flamethrower TOS-1 ``Buratino'', radar jamming
    system ``Zhytel'', drone Orlan-10--all manufactured in Russia and used
    exclusively by the Russian Army--have been registered by the OSCE SMM
    in Donbas over the past year and in 2017.
        Russia continues to cover up the reinforcement of its proxies as
    ``humanitarian aid''.
        On February 28 the Kremlin dispatched its 61th so-called
    ``humanitarian convoy'' without consent and inspection by the Ukrainian
    authorities and ignoring the coordinating role of the ICRC as well as
    principles of international humanitarian law.
        Political settlement on the East of Ukraine is possible only if
    adequate security preconditions are provided by Russia.
        No political settlement on the East of Ukraine is possible while
    there is constant shelling, wide presence of Russian troops and
    mercenaries, weapon supply from Russia and no control by Ukraine over
    its border.
        Russia is imposing by brutal force a model of hybrid elections--
    without termination of aggression, without legal institutions and law
    enforcement agencies, without environment for return and expressing
    their position through vote of over 2 million displaced persons,
    without disarmament of illegal armed formations exercising terrorism.
        The Kremlin's Decree of February 18, 2017 on recognition of so-
    called documents issued on the territories of certain areas of the
    Donetsk and Luhansk regions, confiscation of Ukrainian assets (public
    and private enterprises) and introduction of the ``ruble zone'' are yet
    another evidence of Russian occupation of the part of Donbas as well as
    a clear violation of international law and the Minsk Agreements.
        Russia is also trying to water down the trilateral format of the
    Minsk talks by granting the illegal +representatives of Donetsk and
    Luhansk; full member status in the process of consultations.
        Moscow is willing to disclaim all liability for the developments in
    Donbas by insisting on its mediator status. Russia hopes that such an
    approach will help it to mitigate or even to get rid of sanctions.
        The developments in the humanitarian sphere require every strong
    consolidated effort to unblock this important track of the Minsk
    Agreements. The civilian population continues to suffer from
    restrictions, deprivation and hardships inflicted upon them by the
    Russian hybrid forces.
        Despite Kremlins' commitments to put additional pressure on the
    illegal armed formations to grant the international humanitarian
    organizations, including the ICRC, access into the region, the
    situation on the ground has not seen even the slightest change.
        During the previous month, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in
    Ukraine faced increased restrictions on freedom of movement for the
    monitors and other impediments to its activities in non-government-
    controlled areas.
        Such actions carried out by the Russian and Russia-backed militants
    in areas under their control are meant to disrupt the OSCE SMM mandated
    activities, particularly those aimed at monitoring and verifying
    withdrawal of heavy weapons, as envisaged by the Minsk Agreements.
        According to the latest OSCE SMM daily reports covering the period
    of 1-28 February 2017, the OSCE monitors registered over 130 incidents
    of impeding the SMM's activities by the illegal armed formations.
        The international solidarity and consistency of international
    policy of non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea is very
    important.
        The illegal annexation of Crimea and the city Sevastopol has
    imposed very serious challenges to the international security and to
    human rights of people remaining in Crimea. The occupied Crimea has
    become a ``grey zone'' where the militarization, repression and
    political persecution are in growing progress.
        The atmosphere of fear, intimidation, physical and psychological
    pressure forced about 35-40 thousand Ukrainian citizens (including over
    20 thousand Crimean Tatars) to leave occupied Crimea and settle in
    other areas of Ukraine. Today the Crimean Tatars, having survived a
    genocide of the Soviet deportation in 1944, once again face severe
    repressions.
        We witness murders, tortures, harassment, illegal detentions,
    enforced disappearances, intimidation, raids and searches, attacks on
    property and arrests under fabricated charges, and the persecution of
    journalists, human rights defenders and activists.
        The Russian authorities use such methods to eliminate any public
    opposition to the occupation of Crimea and to the current government.
    For the same reasons local independent media and journalists have
    nearly all been co-opted, forced to flee, or run out of business.
        Russia has designated the militarization of Crimea as a top
    priority. The aim is to make the peninsular a powerful military base to
    ensure full control over adjusting regions thus to counterbalance NATO
    forces in the Black Sea region.
        Comparing to the pre-occupation period, Russia has more than
    doubled personal strength of its military in Crimea (from 12,500 before
    the occupation to 29,300 as of October 2016). In the near future (2020-
    2025) it should further increase up to 43,000.
        Russia also has substantially reinforced and modernized its Crimean
    military land, air and naval components. Since January 2014 it has
    increased:

      --a number of tanks from 0 to 40
      --armed combat vehicles from 92 to 583
      --artillery systems of the caliber more than 100 mm from 24 to 162
      --combat aircraft from 22 to 101
      --combat helicopters from 37 to 56
      --anti aircraft systems from 0 to 16
      --combat ships from 26 to 30
      --submarines from 2 to 5

        Particularly dangerous are the Russian actions to prepare Crimean
    military infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons, including
    refurbishing of the infrastructure of Soviet-era nuclear warheads
    storage facilities. Potential carriers of nuclear weapon, such as
    warships, short-range missile systems and combat aircraft, have been
    already deployed in the Crimean Peninsula.
        In fact, Russia turns Crimea into a ``grey zone'', which is de-
    facto not covered by the existing multilateral arms control agreements.
        Crimea has been already used by Russia for its outreached
    activities (in Syria). Such role for military facilities in Crimea
    might be developed in the future.
        The militarization of Crimea complicates the process of its de-
    occupation and poses serious threats both to the national security of
    Ukraine and regional security.
        The only effective response to aggressive actions of Russia should
    be international solidarity with Ukraine and strengthening political,
    diplomatic and economic pressure on the aggressor. Russia must fully
    implement the Minsk Agreements and restore the territorial integrity of
    Ukraine, including de-occupation of Crimea. Unless so done, the imposed
    sanctions must be not only preserved but enhanced.
        I am also confident that Ukraine can effectively retaliate the
    Russian aggression only when its defense is strong and Kremlin
    understands that further hostilities will be even more costly.
    Appeasement and concessions made to the aggressor would only encourage
    it for further aggression.
        In this regard, we highly value the bicameral and bipartisan unity
    and support of the U.S. Congress on the issue of utilizing sanction
    policy against Russia.
        We are grateful for your advocacy of an increased U.S. security
    assistance to Ukraine, including through provision of defensive
    weapons.
        I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of funds
    authorized for security assistance to Ukraine in the NDAA, 2017.
        The NDAA, 2017 reaffirms once again the high level of continued
    bicameral and bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress for Ukraine
    fighting the ongoing Russian aggression.
        It is also important that the U.S. security assistance to Ukraine
    does not decrease in the forthcoming 2018 budget.
        We are grateful that the United States has already provided $3
    billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine.
        We also very much appreciate the fact that the State, Foreign
    Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 cleared by
    this subcommittee has authorized providing of U.S. loan guarantees to
    Ukraine in fiscal year 2017 budget.
        I would like to ask you to support the appropriation of the
    necessary funds for the above purposes in the fiscal year 2017, and,
    possibly, fiscal year 2018 budgets.
        I would like to draw special attention to the situation with
    humanitarian needs of Ukrainian people affected by the Russian
    aggression. The horrors of war and its terrible consequences are daily
    reality for millions of people, with no hope for a quick end to their
    suffering. Totally Ukraine has 3.8 million people in need of
    humanitarian assistance, including 1.7 million--in need of an immediate
    assistance.
        According to U.N. estimates, there is a need of at least $214
    million in additional humanitarian aid for 2017 with a critical
    requirement of $127 million. Ukraine's huge budget resources alongside
    assistance from our Western partners are being spend on humanitarian
    aid, but all these joint efforts are not able to meet existing
    challenges. The United Stated is a lead donor of humanitarian
    assistance to conflict-affected Ukrainians with more than $49 million
    provided last year. At the same time, given the scope of urgently
    needed help we would appreciate a decision of the U.S. Government to
    extend humanitarian aid programs in Ukraine.
        Given the large scope of challenges faced by Ukraine because of
    Russian aggression, we count on increased U.S. financial assistance for
    Ukraine that will help us implement the comprehensive reform agenda and
    ensure Ukraine's economic sustainability.
        Let me convey our strong belief that the Congress of the United
    States will remain united in supporting Ukraine defending its
    independence and choice for free and democratic future.
        I thank you.

        Senator Graham. Thank you very much. If you could, please
    try to keep your statements to 5 minutes. We have questions
    where you can tell us anything on your mind, but time is of the
    essence in the Senate. So thank you very much.
        Mr. Ambassador.
    STATEMENT OF HON. PIOTR WILCZEK, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF
                THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
        Ambassador Wilczek. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
    subcommittee.
        Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Senate
    subcommittee. It is an honor to be here and I am pleased to be
    able to provide the view of Poland's Government on Russia's
    policy in Europe and the challenges originating from it.
        The Kremlin has a chief strategic objective: restore the
    superpower status lost after the fall of communism. The way to
    achieve this goal seems straightforward, altering the security
    architecture in Europe, thus impeding post-Soviet countries
    from integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community.
        First, the current situation, while pursuing its foreign
    policy objectives, Moscow largely relies on force,
    intimidation, and economic extortions trying to impose on other
    countries an autocratic and oligarchic form of government.
        Russia invaded Georgia, harassed Moldova, meddled in the
    Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and violated international law by
    annexing Crimea.
        Finally, the Kremlin masterminded and keeps fueling the
    conflict in eastern Ukraine. Although Moscow signed the
    ceasefire agreements--Minsk I and Minsk II--it did not withdraw
    from the region which is the point of departure to achieve a
    political solution. Even worse, during the last weeks, we have
    seen increasing military clashes in the Donbas.
        Second, Russia is a growing military threat. President
    Putin embarked Russia on a large scale modernization of its
    armed forces. The introduction of new types of equipment was
    coupled with the reform of military doctrine. The threshold for
    the usage of nuclear weapons has been lowered.
        Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania, became the
    most militarized region in Europe. Russia equipped the exclave
    with Anti-Access Area-Denial capabilities. This A2/AD bubble
    aims at limiting NATO's freedom of maneuver and action on
    Allied territory. It covers an area spanning from northeastern
    Poland to the Baltic States.
        Moreover, Kaliningrad is equipped with Iskander systems
    nuclear capable missiles able of hitting targets in Estonia,
    Latvia, Poland, and even in eastern parts of Germany.
        Moscow conducts large scale snap exercises with openly
    aggressive scenarios. We also observe an unprecedented number
    of military incidents provoked by Russia, but the most alarming
    issue is Russia's ability to take prompt and deceptive actions.
    We saw that in Crimea.
        Third, the hybrid dimension, the challenges posed by
    Russia's actions go beyond the conventional military realm. We
    see them in the cyber, informational, and energy domains.
        Russia deliberately employs hybrid means to act below the
    threshold of a military conflict. Moscow often acts by
    exploiting national vulnerabilities and sensitivities. This
    might involve actions in the cyber domain, frequently backed by
    a fierce propaganda effort. Ukraine is a case in point.
        While countries in Central Europe try to diversify their
    import routes, Russia promotes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline,
    creating divisions among EU member states. Should this project
    go ahead, Russia could effectively hinder the diversification
    efforts of the whole region. Increased gas supplies from Russia
    would inevitably affect the economic viability of LNG projects
    in Central and Eastern Europe.
        Fourth, our response, two words--uncertainty and
    insecurity--best describe the current security situation we
    operate in. Such conditions and challenges call for an adequate
    answer. NATO is the best platform to provide it. It is a unique
    force multiplier.
        Deterring all those threats and challenges requires a swift
    and full implementation of the decisions taken at the Summit in
    Warsaw in 2016. Furthermore, my government believes that the
    Special Meeting of Heads of States and Governments should be an
    important milestone in the process of adapting the Alliance's
    defense and deterrence posture.
        As the challenges we face are here to stay, the Enhanced
    Forward Presence of Allied troops on the eastern flank of the
    Alliance should have a long term character. Poland is very
    grateful for those actions. It would be impossible to achieve
    the Warsaw's Summit decisions without American leadership.
        In this context, I would also like to thank you for the
    deployment of your troops to our region under the NATO flag. A
    long term American commitment to the Enhanced Forward Presence
    (EFP) is absolutely essential. I would like to add that the
    presence of American soldiers in Poland, as part of Operation
    Atlantic Resolve, is of equal and paramount importance. Further
    congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative
    would be greatly appreciated.
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, a
    fair burden-sharing among allies is a must. Poland meets the 2
    percent defense spending target along NATO guidelines. More
    than 20 percent of our 2017 military budget will be spent on
    military equipment. Our soldiers serve in missions in
    Afghanistan and Kosovo. Poland contributes to collective
    defense. A Polish tank company has been deployed to Latvia
    under the framework of the EFP. Our vessel commands the
    Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 operating on the Aegean Sea.
        Poland has always been ready to deal with the terrorist
    threat. Polish and American soldiers were brothers-in-arms
    during the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Altogether, more
    than 40,000 Polish troops took part in both operations.
    Nowadays, Poland is an active member of the Global Coalition
    Against Daesh.
        Moreover, our efforts go beyond the military domain. Last
    year saw the opening of an import LNG terminal in Poland. It
    could become a gateway for U.S. made LNG destined for clients
    in Central Europe. Delivering gas supplies to Ukraine via
    Poland would send a powerful political message, whilst
    providing business opportunities for American firms.
        Moscow orchestrated the conflict in the Ukraine and Moscow
    has all the means to end it. Moscow signed ceasefire
    agreements, Minsk I and Minsk II, but does not respect their
    provisions. Moreover, Russia decided to recognize the documents
    produced by the so-called Donbas Republics.
        To sum up, taking into account Russia's actions, we see no
    ground to ease the sanctions or to change our policy vis-a-vis
    Moscow. Congressional support for maintaining transatlantic
    unity and solidarity on this issue is indispensable.
        A couple of weeks ago, General James Mattis said at NATO
    headquarters, ``Europe and North America need to work together
    stronger than ever in times of turmoil and unpredictability.''
    I firmly believe that the political and military engagement of
    the United States is necessary for preserving peace and
    stability in Europe.
        Let me stress that we remain open to dialogue with Moscow.
    However, such dialogue needs to be conditional on Russia
    changing its current policies and its stance towards
    international law.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
    look forward to taking your questions.
        [The statement follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Piotr Wilczek
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee,

        Thank you for inviting me to testify before the United States
    Senate Committee on Appropriations, State, Foreign Operations, and
    Related Programs Subcommittee. It is an honor to be here and I am
    pleased to be able to provide the view of my government on Russia's
    policy in Europe and the challenges originating from it.
        Let me start by briefly outlining Russia's policy goals. Following
    that, I would like to highlight four points for you to consider.
        The Kremlin has a chief strategic objective: restore the superpower
    status lost after the fall of communism. The way to achieve this goal
    seems straightforward: altering the security architecture in Europe,
    thus impeding post-soviet countries from integrating with the Euro-
    Atlantic community.

    First. The current situation.

        While pursuing its foreign policy objectives, Moscow largely relies
    on force, intimidation and economic extortions, trying to impose on
    other countries an autocratic and oligarchic form of government. Russia
    invaded Georgia, harassed Moldova, meddled in the Nagorno Karabach
    conflict and violated international law by annexing Crimea. Finally,
    the Kremlin masterminded and keeps fueling the conflict in eastern
    Ukraine. Although Moscow signed the ceasefire agreements--Minsk I and
    Minsk II--it did not withdraw from the region what is the point of
    departure to achieve the political solution. Even worse, during the
    last weeks we have seen increasing military clashes in the Donbas.
        The Russian aggression against Ukraine ended the period of a post-
    Cold War stability. Moscow decided to undermine the European security
    architecture, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.
        All these actions have been heralding the course of President
    Putin's Russia. Having left the path of dialogue and democratic change
    sparked in the early 1990s, it evolved into a dark residue of the
    Soviet menace. Yet again, military power became the Kremlin's chief
    tool for pursuing its policy objectives.

    Second. Russia is a growing military threat.

        President Putin embarked Russia on a large-scale modernization of
    its armed forces. The introduction of new types of equipment was
    coupled with the reform of the military doctrine. The threshold for the
    usage of nuclear weapons has been lowered. Newly created military units
    have been deployed to the western parts of the country.
        Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania, became the most
    militarized region in Europe. Russia equipped the exclave with anti-
    access/area-denial capabilities. This A2/AD ``bubble'' relies on a
    combination of sophisticated anti-aircraft, anti-shipping and
    electronic warfare systems. It aims at limiting NATO's freedom of
    maneuver and action on Allied territory. It covers an area spanning
    from North-Eastern Poland to the Baltic states.
        Moreover, Kaliningrad is equipped with ``Iskander'' systems. These
    short-range ballistic missiles are nuclear-capable and able of hitting
    targets in Estonia, Latvia, Poland and even in eastern parts of
    Germany.
        Moscow conducts large-scale snap exercises with openly aggressive
    scenarios. The last snap military drills took place in Kaliningrad this
    February. We also observe an unprecedented number of military incidents
    provoked by Russia with Russian airplanes and warships violating Allied
    airspace and waters.
        But the most alarming issue is Russia's ability to take prompt and
    deceptive actions. We saw that in Crimea.

    Third. The hybrid dimension.

        The challenges posed by Russia's actions go beyond the conventional
    military realm. We see them in the cyber, informational and energy
    domains.
        Russia deliberately employs hybrid means to act below the threshold
    of a military conflict. Moscow often acts by exploiting national
    vulnerabilities and sensitivities. This might involve actions in the
    cyber domain, frequently backed by a fierce propaganda effort. Ukraine
    is the case in point.
        Take energy. Russia largely relies on oil and gas sales for its
    exports revenues. This is a simplification. In 2013 oil and petroleum
    products were responsible for 54 percent of the Russian gross exports
    sales. Gas accounted for 14 percent. These are all EIA figures. From
    the Russian perspective, it was not only easy, but also not so costly
    to use gas as a political weapon.
        Nowadays countries in Central Europe largely rely on Russia for
    their energy imports. Moscow uses energy resources as a tool in foreign
    policy. Countries cooperating with Russia benefit from large discounts
    on their energy bills. Those seeking integration with the West end up
    paying high prices or are threatened with being cut off from supplies.
    Just look at Ukraine.
        Today, while countries in Central Europe try to diversify their
    import routes, Russia promotes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, creating
    divisions among EU member states. Should this project go ahead, Russia
    could effectively hinder the diversification efforts of the whole
    region. Increased gas supplies from Russia would inevitably affect the
    economic viability of LNG projects in Central and Eastern Europe.

    Fourth. Our response.

        We have been living in a changed security environment for more than
    3 years. Two words--uncertainty and insecurity--best describe the
    current security situation we operate in. Such conditions and
    challenges call for an adequate answer. NATO is the best platform to
    provide it. It is a unique force multiplier.
        Deterring all those threats and challenges requires a swift and
    full implementation of the decisions taken at the Summit in Warsaw.
    Furthermore, my government believes that the Special Meeting of Heads
    of States and Governments scheduled to take place in Brussels later
    this year should be an important milestone in the process of adapting
    the Alliance's defense and deterrence posture.
        As the challenges we face are here to stay, the enhanced Forward
    Presence (eFP) of Allied troops on the Eastern flank of the Alliance
    should have a long-term character. Poland is very grateful for those
    actions. It would be impossible to achieve the Warsaw's Summit
    decisions without American leadership.
        In this context I would also like to thank you for the deployment
    of your troops to our region under the NATO flag. A long-term American
    commitment to the eFP is absolutely essential. I would like to add that
    the presence of American soldiers in Poland as part of Operation
    Atlantic Resolve is of equal and paramount importance. Further
    congressional support for the European Reassurance Initiative would be
    greatly appreciated.

      Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

        Before concluding allow me to underline that we take our
    commitments seriously. A fair burden-sharing among Allies is a must.
    Poland meets the 2 percent defense spending target along NATO
    guidelines. More than 20 percent of our 2017 military budget will be
    spent on military equipment. Our soldiers serve in missions in
    Afghanistan and Kosovo. Poland contributes to collective defense. A
    Polish tank company has been deployed to Latvia under the framework of
    the eFP. Our vessel commands the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2
    operating on the Aegean Sea.
        Poland has always been ready to deal with the terrorist threat.
    Polish and American soldiers were brothers-in-arms during the missions
    in Iraq and Afghanistan. Altogether, more than 40 thousand Polish
    troops took part in both operations. Nowadays, Poland is an active
    member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. Our F-16 fighter-jets are
    flying over Iraq.
        Moreover, our efforts go beyond the military domain.
        Together with our Danish and Norwegian partners we are working on a
    big-scale diversification project: the Baltic Pipe. A natural gas
    pipeline linking the Norwegian fields with Poland via Denmark. It would
    allow direct imports of natural gas from Norway to Poland. It could
    also be used to ship re-gasified LNG from Poland to Denmark.
        Last year saw the opening of an import LNG terminal in Poland. It
    could become a gateway for U.S.-made LNG destined for clients in
    Central Europe. Delivering gas supplies to Ukraine via Poland would
    send a powerful political message, whilst providing business
    opportunities for American firms.

      Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

        Moscow orchestrated the conflict in Ukraine and Moscow has all the
    means to end it. It signed ceasefire agreements, Minsk I and Minsk II,
    but does not respect their provisions. Moreover, Russia decided to
    recognize the documents produced by the so-called Donbas republics.
        Is it a proof of good will?
        To sum up, taking into account Russia's actions, we see no ground
    to ease the sanctions or to change our policy vis-a-vis Moscow.
    Congressional support for maintaining transatlantic unity and
    solidarity on this issue is indispensable.

      Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,

        A couple of weeks ago General James Mattis said at the NATO HQ that
    ``Europe and North America need to work together stronger than ever in
    times of turmoil and unpredictability''--I couldn't agree more with his
    statement. I firmly believe that the political and military engagement
    of the United States is necessary for preserving peace and stability in
    Europe.
        Let me stress that we remain open to dialogue with Moscow. However,
    such dialogue needs to be conditional on Russia changing its current
    policies and its stance towards international law.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
    forward to taking your questions.

        Senator Graham. Thank you. And to those who stick to 5
    minutes, your chance of assistance goes up. [Laughter.]
        Thank you very, very much.
        The Ambassador from Georgia.
    STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID BAKRADZE, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY
                OF GEORGIA
        Ambassador Bakradze. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.
        I am here today to remind you that before Ukraine, Georgia
    was invaded in 2008, and 20 percent of our country remains
    under Russian occupation.
        Despite ongoing Russian aggression, with the support of the
    United States, Georgia has made tremendous strides in
    strengthening democratic institutions and fostering economic
    development to solidify an irreversible pact towards Europe and
    Euro-Atlantic integration. I am also here to tell you that we
    need a stronger America in Georgia and the region.
        The conflict, which started in the early 1990's, reached
    its peak in 2008 with the Russian invasion of Georgia and the
    occupation of our territories. As the international community
    failed to effectively respond to early warning signs, Russia
    continues its occupation with up to 10,000 Russian military,
    security, and the Federal Security Service of the Russian
    Federation (FSB) border guard personnel. The Russian occupation
    forces have no legal mandate, and are in stark violation of
    international law of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement.
        In 2009, Russia began installing razor wire fences and
    other artificial obstacles along the occupation line. The total
    length of the trenches across both occupation lines is more
    than 62 miles. We greatly appreciate the interest of Congress,
    both its bodies and its representatives, who are frequently
    visiting the occupation line.
        In further violation of the ceasefire agreement, Moscow has
    signed so-called treaties with the occupational regimes. These
    documents represent a step towards annexation of Georgia's
    occupied regions as they provide a foundation for full
    integration into social, economic, administrative, and most
    importantly, military and security institutions of the Russian
    Federation.
        Georgia is pursuing an engagement and reconciliation
    process with the people in the occupied territories. We make
    all benefits, which are available to Georgian citizens, also
    accessible to our compatriots residing on the other side of the
    occupation line--free healthcare, educational, cultural,
    scientific programs, and other benefits of Georgia's European
    path such as visa liberalization.
        Since regaining its independence, and to undermine Georgian
    sovereignty and territorial integrity, Georgia has been subject
    to different forms of unconventional hybrid warfare.
        Russian propaganda in Georgia--in addition to an economic
    embargo of 2006, energy cuts, and the cyber attacks in 2008--
    seeks to challenge and derail Georgia's European and Euro-
    Atlantic integration aspirations. It builds on fears that exist
    in different societies, creating myths, and communicating
    through different forms of media.
        A recent example is the spreading of false information that
    through a well-deserved visa-free travel decision for Georgian
    citizens to Europe came at the expense of building refugee
    camps in Georgia.
        The Georgian Government has been effective in its strategic
    communication efforts through a coordinated approach,
    dismantling myths, but also countering anti-Western narratives
    by bringing tangible results to Georgian citizens such as a
    free trade agreement, an association agreement with Europe, and
    visa liberalization. As a result, we have managed to maintain
    strong support toward Georgia's EU and NATO aspirations within
    70 to 75 percent.
        Overall, despite Russia's vicious efforts, for a small
    nation, Georgia makes an outsized contribution in international
    security efforts by allocating more than 2 percent of our GDP
    for defense spending. We are a committed partner in the fight
    against terrorists and we are one of the largest contributors
    to the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With one of the
    highest number of 870 servicemen, Georgian soldiers are proudly
    standing shoulder to shoulder with allies in the most dangerous
    parts of the world.
        In recent years, we have made progress in building strong
    and effective state institutions ensuring democracy, human
    rights, and rule of law because we believe that our political
    and economic progress will ultimately serve as a potent
    antidote to Russia's expansionist design.
        For the last decade, Georgia--as the most reliable and
    democratic ally of the United States in a very tough region--
    has been a great example of American taxpayers' money wisely
    spent. Therefore, I want to invite the Members, and the staff
    of this subcommittee, to visit and see firsthand the
    transformational power of U.S. assistance.
        Last year, we signed a memorandum on a deepening of
    security and defense partnership between our two nations, and
    we successfully launched the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.
    Further improvements of these programs, and elevation of our
    security partnership, is of vital importance as we believe
    Georgia remains an essential part of the Euro-Atlantic security
    architecture.
        When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved, the
    United States and its allies sought to build Europe whole,
    free, and at peace. Today, when one of the basic foundations of
    security and peace--respect for national borders--is violated,
    a new transatlantic leadership is needed to fortify and enlarge
    the alliance.
        We believe a comprehensive, long term engagement strategy
    by the new administration will include the strengthening of
    Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, improving
    bilateral trade, economic investment relationships, and
    supporting the democratic choice of the Georgian people to
    integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
        All these measures will make Georgia stronger and more
    resilient. That is important because a stronger Georgia is in
    the United States' interest, as much as a stronger America is
    in Georgia's interest.
        Thank you.
        [The statement follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Hon. David Bakradze
                 russia's meddling in georgia--a brief history
        Georgia was under Russian colonial occupation between 1801 and
    1991, with prior independent statehood of more than 3,000 years. For a
    brief period between 1918 and 1921 Georgia reclaimed independence, only
    to face massive Soviet invasion and another 70 years of occupation.
        In 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia regained its
    independence and began a state-building process. Georgia's stated
    aspirations to European and Euro-Atlantic integration and its
    commitment to democratic progress and economic growth have since then
    provided a counterpoint to the new-imperialist intentions of the
    Russian Federation to keep Georgia and other former-Soviet states under
    its direct political influence and domination.
        U.S. support has been critical to Georgia's ability to continue on
    its path toward progress, despite regional challenges. In return,
    Georgia has been America's closest ally in a tough neighborhood. For a
    small nation, we make an outsized contribution to international
    security efforts with an allocation of more than 2 percent of our GDP
    to defense spending. We are also a committed partner in the fight
    against terrorism. We remain the largest per capita contributor to
    NATO's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan with 870 Georgian
    servicemen. Georgian soldiers stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.
    and allies in the most dangerous parts of the world, 32 Georgian
    soldiers lost their lives in the fight against terrorism.
        The U.S.-Georgia alliance remains vital in the face of ongoing
    Russian provocations, which have been going on for decades. The first
    demonstration of Russia's imperialist intensions--in what it likes to
    refer to as its ``near abroad''--came shortly after Georgia's
    independence, when Russia sponsored separatist movements in Georgia in
    the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in 1991 and the Abkhazia region in
    1992. Situations in both regions escalated to armed hostilities, where
    Russian-backed separatist forces and so called `Russian mercenaries'
    defeated the newly-formed weak and fragmented Georgian military forces,
    resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic
    Georgians from those regions.
        Throughout the 1992-1993 conflict, the ethnic Georgian population
    was subject to atrocities including acts of murder, torture, rape and
    pillage. The U.N. Secretary-General-mandated fact-finding mission,
    which visited Abkhazia, Georgia in 1993, described various episodes of
    the conflict where such acts occurred on a large scale.\1\ To escape
    the atrocities, the entire ethnic Georgian population of approximately
    260,000 was forced to flee from the Abkhazia region by 1994.\2\
    However, an estimated 35,000 Georgians remained in the region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Secretary-General's Fact-
    Finding Mission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia,
    Republic of Georgia,  17, U.N. Doc. S/26795, (Nov. 17, 1993).
        \2\ See UNHCR data at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
    page?page=49e48d2e6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The population that remained in the Abkhazia region soon was
    subject to forced passportization. As described by the EU-mandated
    Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
    Georgia, ``after the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in these two regions
    in early 1990s, en masse distribution of Russian passports to the
    remaining civilian population represented a deliberate and well-
    constructed policy aimed at establishing a pretext of the military
    intervention of the Russian Federation on the territory of Georgia [in
    August 2008]''.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ IIFFMCG Report, Volume II, at 187.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    russia-georgia war in august 2008 and security situation on the ground
                                 after 8 years
        The Russian military aggression and invasion of Georgia in August
    2008 brought a new wave of massive ethnic cleansing of the Georgian
    population from the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. The widespread
    violence against Georgian civilians included acts of killing, torture,
    rape, looting and burning of people's houses.\4\ All Georgian villages
    in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia with a total ethnic
    Georgian population of approximately 35,000 were burned down and
    destroyed in order to preclude any return of the expelled population.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ See for example ``Human Rights Watch, Up in Flames:
    Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over
    South Ossetia'' (Human Rights Watch 2009), at 127-194; ``Amnesty
    International, Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia
    Conflict'' (Amnesty International Publications, 2008), at 34-45.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        August 12, 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between the Russian Federation
    and Georgia calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops to the places
    held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, Russia continues to
    occupy both Georgian regions through the presence of approximately
    10,000 Russian military and security personnel and the so-called FSB
    border guards. The Russian occupation forces have no legal mandate and
    are in stark violation of international law. There is neither host
    country consent from Georgia to have Russian troops on Georgian soil,
    nor any agreement that would permit Russian military presence.
    Moreover, the Russian state has direct control over both regions given
    that top decision-makers in both the Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions
    are Russian citizens.
        In addition to the personnel presence, Russia has illegally built
    and fortified military infrastructure in the occupied regions. In
    August 2010, the military base located in the Abkhazia region was
    fortified with the S-300 type surface-to-air (anti-aircraft) missile
    system. In December 2010, Russia installed a multiple-launch rocket
    system artillery battalion (so-called ``Smerch'' units) at the
    Tskhinvali base. In January 2011, this base was further reinforced with
    the tactical-operational missile launch system ``Scarab B,'' also known
    as ``Tochka U,'' with an operational range of 120 km, and capability of
    being equipped with conventional and nuclear warheads.
        Despite the explicit calls of the international community to end
    the occupation and withdraw its military forces \5\ as called for by
    the EU-mediated Ceasefire Agreement signed after the August 2008 war,
    Russia has intensified both military build-up and grave human rights
    violations in the occupied regions. For instance, in 2015, the illegal
    military base in the Tskhinvali region was further fortified with
    modernized missile systems, such as the ballistic missile system
    ``Iskander,'' multiple BM-21"Grad'' rocket launchers, and the surface-
    to-air missile system ``Strela 10,'' as well as tanks and UAVs.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ These include: NATO, EU, Council of Europe, Resolutions of the
    OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,
    Lithuanian Seimas, Czech Senate, Romanian Senate, etc.
        \6\ Available at: http://dyn.function.mil.ru/news_page/
    world.htm?objInBlock=25&blk=10323761.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     creeping annexation and efforts of gog
        First in summer 2009 and then in April/May 2011, the Russian
    occupation forces started the installation of razor wire fences and
    other artificial obstacles along the occupation line in the Abkhazia
    and Tskhinvali regions; the process has further expanded since January
    2013 and continues today. The total length of the trenches across the
    Abkhazia region's occupation line is around 48 km. The total length of
    artificial barriers along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region
    is around 52 km, affecting around 200 local families, by leaving their
    houses behind the new barriers. Some of them were compelled to flee
    their places of residence, thus creating a further wave of IDPs.
        In parallel, Russian occupation forces are installing so-called
    ``border'' sign posts along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali
    region. As a result of the so-called ``borderization'' process, local
    families have found themselves cut off from agricultural lands, potable
    and irrigation water systems, religious sites and cemeteries; they are
    deprived of their fundamental rights, including the rights to free
    movement, education, and social and health services. This situation
    creates an imminent threat of further waves of displacement. The arrest
    of Georgian citizens for so-called ``illegal border crossing,''
    kidnappings for ransom, robberies, partial murders, attacks on
    civilians, discrimination against ethnic Georgians and violations of
    the Georgian central government-controlled air space by Russian
    helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continue to pose
    challenges for the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG). Since
    2010, 915 civilians have been detained for so called ``illegal border
    crossing.''
        In a further grave violation of the August 2008 Ceasefire
    Agreement, Moscow signed the so-called ``treaty on alliance and
    strategic partnership'' with the Sokhumi occupation regime on 24
    November 2014 and the so-called ``treaty on alliance and integration''
    with the Tskhinvali occupation regime on 18 March 2015. Although
    similar Russian-led initiatives have been undertaken in the past, these
    documents represent a factual annexation of Georgia's occupied regions,
    as they provide for full integration into the social, economic,
    administrative and--importantly--military and security institutions of
    the Russian Federation. Among others, the documents envisage the de-
    facto abolishment of the segment of the Georgia-Russia border in the
    Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, whereas the occupation line with the
    rest of Georgia will be further fortified. The documents also envisage:
    (1) the creation of ``common security and defense space;'' (2) the
    establishment of a Joint Coordinating Centre for law enforcement
    agencies, imposing the FSB system on both the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
    regions; (3) the simplification of procedures necessary for obtaining
    Russian citizenship; (4) the equalling of pensions and salaries to the
    equivalent level of allowances for residents of the Russian
    Federation's Southern District. The document signed with the Tskhinvali
    region contains certain differences, which speak of full de facto
    annexation of the region into the Russian Federation. The title--
    ``alliance and integration''--points to the genuine intention and
    ultimate goal of the document. The occupation regime in the Tskhinvali
    region confirms this by making explicit the necessity of becoming a
    Federal subject of Russia. The so-called ``President'' Leonid Tibilov
    recently announced a decision to initiate a referendum on the
    integration of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation.\7\ Follow-up
    field ``agreements,'' which have been already signed or are in the
    pipeline, will factually turn Georgia's regions into Federal parts of
    Russia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Available at: http://cominf.org/node/1166506480.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is worth mentioning that, in November 2011, then President of
    Russia Dmitry Medvedev made a statement that Russia's military
    aggression against Georgia was intended to counter Georgia's NATO
    ambitions and thus Georgia's sovereign choice to integrate into the
    Euro-Atlantic community.\8\ Furthermore, on August 8, 2012, on the
    fourth anniversary of the Russia-Georgia War, the President of the
    Russian Federation Vladimir Putin confessed that since 2006, Russia had
    developed a plan to invade Georgia. He also revealed that Moscow had
    been training militias of the Tskhinvali regime to directly participate
    in the military operations.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Statement of D. Medvedev is available at: http://www.rg.ru/
    2011/11/21/prezident-site.html.
        \9\ Statement of the President of the Russian Federation is
    available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/16180#sel=30:1,32:21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The policy of creeping annexation exercised by Russia against
    Georgia, coupled with the alarming developments in the region,
    demonstrate that Russia does not accept the sovereign choice of
    independent states and is attempting to restore zones of influence in
    the region.
        While advancing its Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia remains
    firmly committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and the de-
    escalation of tensions with Russia based on respect for Georgia's
    territorial integrity. Georgia has taken concrete steps in this
    direction. In November 2010, Georgia undertook a non-use of force
    pledge against the Russian Federation, which was further reiterated by
    the Parliament of Georgia in March 2013. While the international
    community lauded Georgia's pledge on the non-use of force, Russia
    explicitly refuses to reciprocate it. In November 2011, Georgia agreed
    on Russia's accession to World Trade Organizations, thus completely
    removing the barriers for Russia's membership in the WTO. In February
    2012, the Government of Georgia unilaterally abolished the visa regime
    for Russian citizens. In November 2012, the Prime Minister of Georgia
    appointed a Special Representative for Relations with the Russian
    Federation and launched a direct channel with Moscow, thus once again
    reaffirming the political will to mend economic, cultural and
    humanitarian ties with Russia. In the meantime, the Geneva
    International Discussions, co-chaired by the UN, EU and the OSCE,
    remain the only format for discussing outstanding political and
    humanitarian issues with the Russian Federation. In February 2014, the
    Georgian national team participated in the 2014 Winter Olympics in
    Sochi, while the Government of Georgia expressed readiness to cooperate
    with relevant Russian structures on security-related issues.
        The above constructive initiatives have been met with further
    provocations, the installation of artificial barriers on the territory
    of Georgia, and steps towards the annexation of the Abkhazia and
    Tskhinvali regions. Despite Georgia's tireless efforts at constructive
    engagement, Russia continues to obstruct agreement on establishing an
    international security presence in the occupied regions, and for the
    safe and dignified return of IDPs and refugees.
        Russia's efforts to legitimize its occupation of territories of a
    sovereign state include the illegal ``recognition'' of the Georgian
    regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali as independent states, and
    furthermore, the coercion of other nations, including through political
    and financial pressure, to do the same. After failing to achieve
    progress in this regard at the political level,\10\ the Russian
    Federation has been resorting to other instruments in order to
    legitimize the so-called ``independence'' and thus its illegal actions
    on the ground.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Despite Russia's illegal policy, only three states have
    recognized the so called ``independence'' of Georgia's occupied
    regions--Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Tuvalu and Vanuatu have
    withdrawn the recognition and established diplomatic relations with
    Georgia based on the principle of the latter's sovereignty and
    territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions remain inaccessible for the
    international community. The EU Monitoring Mission, which is an
    extremely important instrument to ensure security and stability on the
    ground, is still prevented from fully implementing its mandate by not
    being allowed to access the occupied regions. Notwithstanding, the EUMM
    is the only international mechanism capable of monitoring the situation
    in close proximity to the occupied regions. The latest report by the
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Human Rights Situation in the
    Occupied Regions of Georgia is attached (http://mfa.gov.ge/
    getattachment/fe17def2-cd11-48b6-b9ad-d0535e49e6fa/MFA-4-report-2016-
    fin.docx.aspx).
        In a recent development: Russian occupation regime in Tskhinvali
    scheduled a referendum on 9 April on changing the name of one of the
    oldest Georgian regions into the one similar to the Federal subject of
    the Russian Federation. This referendum is a step intended to lay a
    ground for illegal annexation of the occupied region.
        The international society should urge the Russian Federation to
    respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors and
    comply with its international obligations. The firm stance and
    consolidated efforts of international society is crucial to prevent
    another act of annexation in Europe. We appreciate a firm stance of the
    U.S. State Department on this issues as expressed in the Statement of
    the Embassy of USA in Georgia. Meanwhile, we remain open for
    constructive negotiations in the format of Geneva International
    Discussions. Last year was marked by the restoration of the Gali
    Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
        As concerns the relations with our compatriots living in the
    occupied territories, the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians, are an integral
    part of our common history and future, despite the current artificial
    barriers. There is no alternative to the return of the IPDs and
    refugees to their homes and to the full re-integration of all
    ethnicities into a vibrant society where human rights and individual
    freedoms as well as cultural and linguistic diversity of different
    communities are the Georgian State's top priorities.
        We firmly pursue the engagement, confidence building and
    reconciliation process with the people living in the occupied
    territories. We are offering all benefits which are open to Georgian
    citizens. We stand ready to offer all the progress we will be having on
    our development path. The Universal free healthcare, free education,
    benefits of Georgia's European integration path--Visa liberalization,
    educational, cultural, scientific programs are available for our
    citizens residing on the other side of the occupation line. (Main
    directions of the reconciliation and engagement policy of the Office of
    the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality is attached)
                                 hybrid warfare
        It is worth noting not only the persistence of Russia's efforts to
    undermine Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also the
    nature of those efforts. Since regaining its independence, Georgia has
    been subject to different forms of unconventional, hybrid warfare. The
    blackmailing and intimidation has been in the Russia's toolkit. The
    economic embargo of 2006, energy cuts, cyber-attacks in 2008 and after
    were parts of Russia's policy to attain its desired political results,
    to derail Georgia from its sovereign choice of European and Euro-
    Atlantic integration.
        For the last several years, Russian propaganda has become visible
    and stronger not only in Georgia, but in the wider region. The approach
    differs not only from country to country, but from region to region,
    serving the goal it wants to achieve in each location. In Georgia's,
    case Russia is defying and confronting Georgia's European and Euro-
    Atlantic path. It builds on fears and challenges that exist in
    different societies, creating myths and communicating through different
    forms of social media, using newly established NGO's or media
    organizations, like radio ``Sputnik'', Internet trolls etc.
        The Georgian Government has been successful in its strategic
    communications, through a coordinated approach that dismantles myths.
    The policy is not fighting propaganda with propaganda, but with
    truthful information and the policies, that deliver. Last 4 years have
    been successful for Georgia's European integration, bringing tangible
    results for its population, through European instruments, like Deep and
    Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, the Association Agreement and Visa
    Liberalization, that will be available for the citizens of Georgia by
    the end of this month. These deliverables are important to counter
    Russian propaganda that aims to showing futility of the reforms
    approximating with European legislation.
        We have managed, despite increased propaganda and an open media
    environment, through effective strategic communications and coordinated
    information campaigns, to maintain high support for Georgia's European
    and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. According to the recent polls, the
    Georgian population expressed 73-78 percent support for Georgia's
    membership in the EU and NATO.
        We have strengthened traditionally emotional support for European
    integration with knowledge-based support, something that cannot be
    easily challenged through propaganda efforts. An informed society
    cannot be easily influenced by misinformation. Coordination of the
    Government's activities with civil society (23 NGOs) efforts not only
    in the capital Tbilisi, but in the most exposed regions as well, is
    implemented by communication with the most vulnerable parts of society,
    through information providers, like regional media, municipality
    workers, teachers, clergy.
        We highly appreciate good cooperation with NATO's Center of
    Excellence on Strategic Communication since the day of its
    establishment in Riga, as well as with the EU EastStratComm unit in
    Brussels. We look forward to more initiatives from the U.S. Congress.
                  stronger united states for stronger georgia
        To summarize, despite the Russia's vicious efforts, Georgia has
    persisted on its path toward democratic progress and economic growth.
    We have made great progress in building strong and effective state
    institutions, ensuring: a free civil society; free media; free markets;
    social cohesion; and the rule of law. This past fall, we held free and
    fair parliamentary elections, cementing our democratic progress.
    Meanwhile, the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom named Georgia the 13th
    freest economy in the world, ensuring openness and integration into the
    global market and equal opportunities for all people interested in
    doing business in Georgia.
        We are confident that our political and economic progress will
    ultimately serve as potent antidotes to Russia's expansionist designs.
    Moreover, Russia's aggression and occupation of Georgian territories,
    its attempts to derail us from our pro-western path, made Georgia even
    more determined to resist Russian domination and pursue further
    integration with EU and NATO.
        Our viability, persistent and resilience could not be achieved
    without the United States continued and vital support for the last 25
    years. This coming April we will be celebrating 25 years of
    establishing diplomatic relations. During these years the U.S. has been
    one of the most important economic and security partners of Georgia.
    The U.S. is the largest bilateral donor, having provided several
    billion dollars since 1991. This support has always enjoyed bipartisan
    backing. Since 2009, we have institutionalized our relations and
    friendship through a Strategic Partnership charter, pledging to further
    Georgia's democratization, economic development, sovereignty, and
    territorial integrity.
        For the last decade Georgia has become the best example of the
    American Taxpayers money wisely spent, being the most reliable,
    consistent, credible democratic ally for the U.S. in a tough
    neighborhood. We have shown valor and commitment to our American
    partner during its most difficult times. We have always supported the
    U.S. in the fight against terrorism contributing to the U.S. and NATO
    led missions like an ally.
        Last year we have signed with U.S. memorandum on the deepening
    security and defense partnership, committing ``to strengthen the self-
    defense capabilities of Georgia's Armed Forces . . . improving
    readiness and supporting a resilient force that is capable of providing
    its own defense and contributing to that of others'', we have
    successfully launched Georgia Defense Readiness Program. Sustainability
    and further improvement of these programs and elevation of our security
    partnership to the new level is of vital importance, as we believe
    Georgia remains an essential piece of the Euro-Atlantic security
    architecture, as NATO is seeking to protect its allies from Russia's
    expansion.
        When the cold war ended, and the Soviet empire dissolved, the
    United States and its allies sought to build Europe whole, free, and at
    peace. Nowadays, when the empire strikes back and one of the basic
    foundations of security and peace--respect for national borders--is
    violated, new transatlantic leadership is needed to fortify and enlarge
    the alliance. We believe the new administration shall soon develop a
    comprehensive long-term engagement strategy for the region and Georgia,
    which will include the strengthening of Georgia's territorial integrity
    and sovereignty, improving bilateral trade and investment relationship
    and supporting the democratic choice of the Georgian people to
    integrate further with Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO. All
    these measures will make Georgia more resilient a and stronger and, we
    believe that stronger Georgia is in the United States' interest as much
    as stronger United States is in Georgia's interest.

    Attachments:

      --Attachment 1: Quarterly Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
            of Georgia on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied
            Regions of Georgia.

      --Attachment 2: Main directions of the reconciliation and engagement
            policy of the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation
            and Civic Equality.

                                  ATTACHMENT 1

                     Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

       Fourth Quarterly Report (October-December 2016) of the Ministry of
                           Foreign Affairs of Georgia

        on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia

                                I. Introduction

                   aims of the report and methodology applied
        1. In January 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
    started preparation of quarterly reports aiming at assessing the human
    rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia. The Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs of Georgia prepared four such reports in 2015. This is
    the fourth quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
    Georgia for the year 2016 covering the period of October-December 2016.
    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will further continue the
    preparation of such reports on a quarterly basis. This reporting
    exercise aims to contribute to the provision of regular and updated
    information to the international community, to states as well as to
    international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, on
    the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.
        2. As for the applied methodology, this reporting exercise
    consolidates and assesses existing information from various open
    sources, national and international, on violations of human rights in
    the occupied regions of Georgia. Due to limitations on its length, the
    report does not aim to collect/contain information on all cases of
    violations of human rights in the occupied regions of Georgia; it aims
    to consolidate and assess only some of the most known examples of
    violations. The methodology applied does not provide for the conduct of
    fact-finding visits to the occupied regions of Georgia, nor to the
    conduct of interviews. Therefore the methodology applied does not
    enable this reporting exercise to collect and produce new data on the
    human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia.
       responsibility of the occupying power for human rights violations
        3. The territories of two regions of Georgia--Abkhazia, Georgia and
    the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation
    and human rights situation in these regions of Georgia remains
    alarming. The Russian Federation as the occupying power, exercises
    effective control over Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region,
    Georgia. These two regions still remaining under unlawful foreign
    military occupation, constitute above all dangerous ``black holes'' in
    terms of holding the human rights violators accountable. The occupying
    power, exercising effective control, has been preventing numerous
    international organizations from entering Abkhazia, Georgia and the
    Tskhinvali Region, Georgia.
        4. During the reporting period, ``EU Statement on the Secretary
    General's 14th Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'' \1\ was
    made at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting.\2\
    According to the statement, ``the human rights situation on the ground
    remains worrying''. It should be emphasized that in the same statement,
    ``[t]he EU calls on the Russian Federation to . . . provide the EU
    Monitoring Mission (EUMM) with access to the Georgian regions.''
    According to the statement, ``[t]he EU regrets that the Secretariat
    delegation and the CoE Human Rights Commissioner have not been granted
    access to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South
    Ossetia. The EU calls on all the concerned parties to facilitate access
    to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia
    for the relevant bodies of the CoE. The CoE should be able to fully and
    effectively use its instruments to ensure monitoring of the human
    rights situation in all conflict affected areas and for the benefit of
    all persons in need of human rights protection. No obstacles should be
    created to the work of international partners in this field.'' \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of
    Europe (April 2016-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf (2016) 37.
        \2\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
    report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
    of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
        \3\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
    report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
    of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        5. During the reporting period ``Statement of the Group of Friends
    of Georgia on the Conflict in Georgia'' was adopted at the 2016 OSCE
    Ministerial Council Meeting in Hamburg, held on 8-9 December 2016. In
    the Statement, delegations of Canada, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
    Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America expressed
    ``deep concern over the continuous discrimination against ethnic
    Georgians residing in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia'' and ``condemn[ed] the gross violations of rights related to
    freedom of movement, residence, property, as well as right to education
    in one's native language and underline[d] that the placement of
    artificial obstacles, including barbed and razor wire fences along the
    occupation line, further aggravates the humanitarian situation on the
    ground.'' It should be emphasized that the Statement called upon ``the
    Russian Federation to enable access by international human rights
    monitoring mechanisms to the occupied territories of Georgia.'' \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia on the Conflict in
    Georgia, ``The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia'', 9 December
    2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        6. During the reporting period, namely on 13th October 2016, at the
    session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),
    Mr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, then Foreign Minister of the Federal
    Republic of Germany stated the following: ``I support all the Council
    of Europe's efforts to secure regular access to Crimea for its
    monitoring bodies to observe the human rights situation. This is about
    not only Crimea, but South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Nagorno-
    Karabakh. There should be no blank areas on our continent where human
    rights are not observed.'' \5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 13
    October 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        7. It should be recalled here that during the reporting period of
    the second quarterly report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
    Georgia covering the period of April-June 2016, namely on 19 May 2016
    Mr. Giga Otkhozoria, was murdered by so called ``border guards''
    deployed along the occupation line with Abkhazia. The murder was
    committed in the village of Khurcha, Zugdidi district, located in the
    territory controlled by the Government of Georgia. The murderer of Mr.
    Giga Otkhozoria has been identified--Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli. After
    committing the murder Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices
    immediately fled to the occupied territory of Abkhazia. In May 2016,
    the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia issued a statement
    ``concerning the fact of murder committed in the village of Khurcha,
    Zugdidi District, on May 19, 2016.'' According to the statement ``this
    criminal act once again demonstrates the highly alarming situation in
    the occupied region of Abkhazia, Georgia and the full responsibility
    for it lies with the Russian Federation as with the power in effective
    control of the region.'' \6\ In May 2016, the Prosecutor's Office of
    Georgia filed charges against Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli for the
    premeditated murder of Mr. Giga Otkhozoria and criminal prosecution was
    launched under the Criminal Code of Georgia.\7\ In July 2016, Mr.
    Khajimba publicly declared that Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli would not be
    handed over to the Georgian authorities.\8\ During the reporting
    period, namely in December 2016, Zugdidi District Court found, in
    absentia, fugitive Mr. Rashid Kanji-Ogli guilty of the charges filed
    against him and sentenced him to deprivation of liberty for a term of
    12 years.\9\ However under the existing circumstances, Mr. Rashid
    Kanji-Ogli and his accomplices still remain unpunished. The above
    situation with regard to the violation of the right to life of Mr. Giga
    Otkhozoria once again demonstrates that the occupied territories of
    Georgia remain ``black holes'' in terms of holding the violators of
    human rights accountable. The above situation further reaffirms the
    need of immediate, unhindered and continuous access of international
    human rights monitoring mechanisms in the occupied territories of
    Georgia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
    concerning the fact of murder committed in the village of Khurcha,
    Zugdidi District, on May 19, 2016, 19 May 2016, available at .
        \7\ The Prosecutor's Office Launches Criminal Proceedings on the
    Murder of Giga Otkhozoria, ``Prosecutor's Office of Georgia'', 21 May
    2016, available at .
        \8\ Abkhazia will not hand over to Georgia border guard suspected
    in murder, ``Ria Novosti'', 6 July 2016, available at .
        \9\ Court Finds Rashid Kanji-Ogli, Accused of Giga Otkhozoria's
    Murder, Guilty, Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, 28 December 2016,
    available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       occupation line and installation of barbed wire fences and other
                              artificial obstacles
        8. The occupation line along the administrative boundary line (ABL)
    with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region separates Georgia from its two
    occupied territories. The process of so called ``borderization'' was
    commenced in 2011. Currently, the total length of razor wire and barbed
    wire fences and other artificial obstacles along the occupation line in
    Tskhinvali Region is nearly 52 km (overall length of the occupation
    line is more than 350 km) and along the occupation line in Abkhazia is
    48 km (overall length of the occupation line is around 145 km).
        9. According to ``EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th
    Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'', made on 16th November
    2016 at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting, ``the
    EU is deeply concerned about the illegal activities of
    ``borderization'' that divide families and communities and impedes the
    people on the ground, depriving them from fundamental rights, including
    education in the native language, property rights and freedom of
    movement, including in the context of so called border crossing, which,
    inter alia, may lead to fatal incidents. The EU calls on the
    authorities exercising effective control to remove the fences and other
    obstacles to the freedom of movement and to investigate all allegations
    of all crimes and human rights violations on the ground.'' \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
    report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
    of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        10. During the reporting period, an article was published in The
    New York Times which describes problems created by the occupation line
    and installation of barbed wire fences along the Tskhinvali region.\11\
    According to the article, the village of Jariasheni is ``[m]arked in
    places with barbed wire laid at night, in others by the sudden
    appearance of green signs declaring the start of a ``state border'' and
    elsewhere by the arrival of bulldozers, the reach of Russia keeps
    inching forward into Georgia with ever more ingenious markings of a
    frontier that only Russia and three other states recognize as real.''
    The article states that ``[t]he green border signs that first appeared
    last year and now keep popping up along the zigzagging boundary warn
    that ``passage is forbidden'' across what is declared to be a ``state
    border.'' According to the article, ``Kestutis Jankauskas, the head of
    the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, said it was hard to
    know where this boundary line exactly runs. It was never recognized or
    agreed upon, and its location depends on which maps are used. Russia,
    he said, is using a map drawn by the Soviet military's general staff in
    the 1980s. It demarcates what in the Soviet era was an inconsequential
    administrative boundary within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia
    but what is now hardening into a hazardous frontier. The fitful
    movement of the boundary seems to be driven mostly by Russia's desire
    to align what it sees as a state border with this old Soviet map. So
    far, the movement has always been forward, often by just a few yards
    but at other times by bigger leaps.'' \12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
    Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
    .
        \12\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
    Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      new so called ``laws'' and new wave of so called ``passportisation''
        11. As a result of a reaction of the international community on the
    issue of adoption of so called new ``laws'' and so called
    ``passportisation'', decision was made in December 2016 to amend so
    called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' and to
    enable residents of Gali district, holding Georgian citizenship, to
    obtain ``residence permits''; according to the amendment, ``resident
    permits can be issued to individuals holding foreign citizenship if
    they were born in Gali district of the Soviet Socialist Republic of
    Abkhazia.'' \13\ However, it should be noted here that resident permits
    will not enable to obtain so called ``Abkhazian citizenship'' until
    holding foreign citizenship.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Resident Permits will be given foreign citizens in Gali,
    ``Apsny'', 29 December 2016, available at .
        \14\ Legal status of residents of Eastern districts of Abkhazia
    will be regulated, ``Nuzhnaya Gazeta'', 29 December 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        12. As part of the new wave of so called ``passportisation'' in the
    Abkhazian region, the issuance of so called ``passports'' started in
    May 2016 and it was continuing during the reporting period.\15\ By the
    middle of December 2016, more than 3 000 new so called ``Abkhaz
    passports'' were issued.\16\ It has been decided to extend expiry date
    of old so called ``Abkhaz passports'' until 31st December 2018.\17\ It
    should be emphasized that on 18th October 2016, so called ``head of
    administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
    declared that ``from 17 800 residents of Gali district, only 340 have
    Abkhazian citizenship, the rest are Georgian citizens''.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Tania: during 1 month 300 passports were distributed in
    Sokhumi, ``Apsnypress'', 19 December 2016, available at .
        \16\ Manargia: more than 3 000 new Abkhaz passports were issued,
    ``Sputnik-Abkhazia'', 19 December 2106, available at .
        \17\ Expiry date of Abkhaz passports of old sample was extended
    until 31 December 2018, ``Apsnypress'', 31 December 2016, available at
    .
        \18\ Nadaraia: project is ready on creation of special economic
    zone in Gali district, ``Apsnypress'', 18 October 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        13. It should be recalled that on 1st April 2016, so called ``law
    on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' \19\ and ``law on
    entry and exit of Abkhazia'' \20\ became operational. A similar
    document was adopted by the Tskhinvali occupation regime, namely so
    called ``law on legal status of foreigners in the Republic of South
    Ossetia''. Adoption of so called ``laws'' in many ways target the
    ethnic Georgian population living in the occupied territories. The
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia once again expresses its serious
    concern on the adoption of new discriminatory regulations for ethnic
    Georgians living in the occupied regions of Georgia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ So called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in
    Abkhazia'' was designed in order to qualify ethnic Georgians, living in
    the region of Abkhazia, into a category of ``foreign citizens'' and to
    discriminate against them in many ways. Many ethnic Georgians living in
    Abkhazia, predominantly in Gali district, hold Georgian citizenship
    that qualifies them into the category of ``foreigners'' under the so
    called ``law on legal status of foreign citizens in Abkhazia'' and
    therefore puts limitation on their human rights including the freedom
    of movement, the right to property and labour rights. Under this so
    called ``law'' ethnic Georgians holding Georgian citizenship were
    deprived possibility to obtain residence permits and respective
    restrictive clauses prepared ``legal'' ground for persecution of ethnic
    Georgian families.
        \20\ By the adoption of so called ``law on entry and exit of
    Abkhazia'', the decision has been made to introduce visas for states a)
    not recognizing so called ``independence of Abkhazia'' and b) not
    having a ``bilateral agreement'' of visa free travel. Under this so
    called ``law'' any person can exit Abkhazia, however only so called
    ``citizens of Abkhazia'' can enter the Abkhazian region without
    additional formalities. It should be noted that a foreign citizen or a
    person without citizenship can be expelled from the territory of
    occupied Abkhazia if that person poses a threat to defense and security
    or to public order. It should be emphasized that this so called
    ``law'', creates additional obstacles to representatives of
    international organizations leading to further isolation of the region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   II. Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment

        14. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
    occupied regions of Georgia, the Russian FSB officers and
    representatives of the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali occupation regimes
    regularly take actions which amount to torture and ill-treatment. For
    years, there has been a regular flow of information on inadequate
    detentions conditions in so called ``detention centers'' in the
    occupied regions of Georgia. The practice of torture and ill-treatment
    in the occupied regions of Georgia remained an issue of concern during
    the reporting period as well.
        15. During the reporting period, namely on 10th December 2016, the
    Public Defender of Georgia issued the Report on Human Rights and
    Freedom in 2016. According to the report, ``inappropriate and degrading
    treatment is regularly applied toward detainees at Russian military
    basis, including forced labor, verbal and physical abuse, restriction
    of food and water etc.'' \21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
    Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
    Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        16. On 27th November 2016, three members of so called ``special
    forces unit'' of the Tskhinvali occupation regime inflicted severe
    physical assault to a 21-year-old resident in Tskhinvali. As a result,
    numerous traumas were inflicted to the head of the victim which was
    later hospitalized. During the incident, one of the members of so
    called ``special forces unit'' even fired a shot in the direction of
    the victim.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ A resident of Tshinvali was beaten by members of special
    forces unit, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 2 December 2016, available at ; General
    Prosecutor's Office started investigation against members of special
    forces unit, which have beaten a resident of Tskhinvali, Sputnik-
    Ossetia'', 6 December 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        17. In December 2016, in Tskhinvali members of so called ``special
    forces unit'' of the Tskhinvali occupation regime physically assaulted
    two schoolchildren--one boy and one girl of grade 11 of school N 2 in
    the restaurant ``Oasis''. Traumas to heads were inflicted to both of
    them; as a result the boy lost conscience. Later the victims were
    transported to a hospital for medical treatment.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ Tibilov: members of special forces unit should be examples of
    behavior, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 29 December 2016, available at ; Prosecutor's
    office is investigating details of brawl between youngsters and special
    forces unit, Sputnik-Ossetia'', 27 December 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        18. In October 2016, Mr. Khajimba declared that ``there is a need
    to change detention conditions of detainees in the detention centre''
    and so called ``minister of interior'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
    declared that ``problems related to detention conditions of criminals
    remain unsolved for already 23 years''.\24\ It has been argued by
    representatives of the Sokhumi occupation regime that ``absence of
    motivation of employees of the ministry of interior to work in the
    detention centre due to the low salary there'', ``understaffing of the
    preliminary detention centre with employees, which equals to 60 per
    cent'' and non-provision of ``the detention centre with necessary
    technical equipments'' are behind the problems.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Raul Khajimba: it is necessary to regulate issue of increasing
    salaries to employees of the preliminary detention centre,
    ``Apsnypress'', 20 October 2016, available at .
        \25\ Raul Khajimba: it is necessary to regulate issue of increasing
    salaries to employees of the preliminary detention centre,
    ``Apsnypress'', 20 October 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            III. Arbitrary Detention

        19. The Russian FSB officers regularly carry out arbitrary
    detention for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the
    occupation lines with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. In most cases
    detention is followed by fines and later release. Detention period can
    last several days or several months, in some cases several years.
    According to data supplied by the State Security Service of Georgia in
    the middle of December 2016, between 2008 and 12th December 2016, in
    total 2 775 people were detained by the Russian FSB officers for so
    called ``illegal border crossing'': 1 788 people were detained along
    the occupation line with the Abkhazian region and 987 people were
    detained along the occupation line with the Tskhinvali region; from 1st
    January 2016 to 12th December 2016, 190 people were detained along the
    occupation line with the Abkhazian region and 132 people were detained
    along the occupation line with the Tskhinvali region.\26\ It should be
    noted that according to the information of so called ``State Security
    Committee of South Ossetia'', 549 people were detained for so called
    ``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation line with the
    Tskhinvali region throughout the year 2016.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Representatives of the Russian occupying forces detained 2 775
    Georgians between 2008 and 12 December 2016 for so called illegal
    border crossing of Georgian occupied territories, ``Pirweli Information
    Agency'', 12 December 2016, available at .
        \27\ Authorities of South Ossetia expelled violator of state border
    from Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 28 December 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        20. According to the report of the Public Defender of Georgia
    issued during the reporting period, ``armed forced of the Russian
    Federation continue to detain minors, pregnant women, patients and
    older people.'' \28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
    Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
    Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        21. It is particularly alarming that during the reporting period,
    Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil remained in illegal detention in so called
    Tskhinvali prison.\29\ As described in the Third Quarterly Report
    (July-September 2016) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on
    the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Regions of Georgia, on 8
    June 2016, Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil, citizen of Georgia was detained by
    the Russian FSB officers for so called ``illegal border crossing''
    along the occupation line with Tskhinvali region. Initially, the
    detainee was sentenced 2 months of imprisonment for so called ``illegal
    border crossing''. However, later so called ``prosecutor's office'' of
    the Tskhinvali occupation regime initiated ``criminal case'' against
    Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil accusing him of ``causing serious damage to the
    health'' of an unspecified resident of the Tskhinavli region in the
    year 2008. The Government of Georgia considers the above accusations
    against Mr. Giorgi Giunashvil to be groundless and fabricated and
    therefore calls for his unconditional release.\30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ IPRM Meeting held in Ergneti, State Security Service of
    Georgia, 30 November 2016, available at .
        \30\ IPRM Meeting held in Ergneti, State Security Service of
    Georgia, 30 November 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        22. During the reporting period numerous cases were reported on
    arbitrary detention in the occupied regions of Georgia. Below are only
    few examples.
        23. On 12th October 2016, a resident of the village of Plavi, Gori
    district, was detained for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along
    the occupation line with Tskhinvali region and ``criminal charges''
    were filed against him for the above reason.\31\ However, according to
    the family members of the detainee, he had not crossed the occupation
    line.\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ Criminal case was filed in relation to violator of border from
    Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 12 October 2016, available at .
        \32\ A resident of the village of Plavi was detained for so called
    ``illegal border crossing'', ``IPN'', 12 October 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        24. On 22nd October 2016, a resident of the village of
    Mejvriskhevi, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers
    for so called ``illegal border crossing'' nearby the occupation line
    with the Tskhinvali region. The resident of the village of Mejvriskhevi
    did not cross the occupation line; when detained he was nearby the
    occupation line for cattle grazing.\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ 43-year-old man was detained for so called illegal border
    crossing, ``GHN'', 22 October 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        25. On 24th October 2016, a resident of the village Kirbali, Gori
    district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers for so called
    ``illegal border crossing'' nearby the occupation line with the
    Tskhinvali region. When detained, the resident of the village of
    Kirbali was collecting timber in the forest nearby the occupation line.
    He did not cross the occupation line. The detainee spent three days in
    detention in the Tskhinvali region.\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ What is the story of a man who spent three days in illegal
    detention the Tskhinvali detention center? ``Palitra News'', 27 October
    2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        26. On 5th and 6th November 2016, six citizens of Georgia were
    detained for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation
    line with Tskhinvali region.\35\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ Tskhinvali regime released six Georgian citizens as a result
    of fine payment, ``IPN'', 8 November 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        27. On 27th November 2016, a 18-year-old resident of Gori district
    was detained by the Russian FSB officers in the village of Jariasheni,
    nearby the occupation line with Tskhinvali region and was abducted to
    the occupied Tskhinvali region.\36\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ Occupants abducted 18-year-old man from the village of
    Jariasheni, ``Ambebi.ge'', 27 November 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        28. On 6th December 2016, several schoolchildren residing in the
    occupied village of Otobaia, Gali district, were detained by the
    Russian FSB officers Abkhazia. The schoolchildren were held in
    detention in the Russian military base for around 5 hours.\37\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ So called border guards freed schoolchildren detained in
    occupied Abkhazia, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 6 December 2016,
    available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        29. On 27th December 2016, a resident of the village of
    Mejvriskhevi, Gori district, was detained by the Russian FSB officers
    for so called ``illegal border crossing'' along the occupation line
    with Tskhinvali region.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ Authorities of South Ossetia expelled violator of state border
    from Georgia, ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 28 December 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            IV. Freedom of Movement

        30. Along the occupation lines with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions
    people are regularly subject to restrictions on freedom of movement by
    the Russian FSB officers: the operating crossing points along the
    occupation lines allow crossings only to individuals having one of the
    types of ``documents'' recognized by the occupying power. Those unable
    to present the ``document'' or show up at the crossing point out of
    working hours, are denied the right to cross, often leading to various
    types of problems of locals, including children. Restrictions on
    freedom of movement remained an issue of concern during the reporting
    period that has been attested by the various sources.
        31. It should be recalled that in spring 2016, two crossing points
    from six crossing points along the occupation line with the Abkhazian
    region were closed down.\39\ In November 2016, Mr. Khajimba publicly
    spoke about the policy of closing down the crossing points along the
    occupation line with the Abkhazian region.\40\ On 5th December 2016, so
    called ``head of administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi
    occupation regime publicly declared that ``the Russian Border Guards
    are closing more and more segments of fords on the River Enguri, the
    places in the river which were used to cross the border illegally. . .
    . In this 2016 year everything is ready to close down two more crossing
    points''.\41\ Eventually, by so called ``decree N 241'' of so called
    ``Government of Abkhazia'', dated 28 December 2016, decision was made
    to close down two more crossing points--``Nabakevi crossing point'' and
    ``Otobaia crossing point'' along the occupation line with the Abkhazian
    region.\42\ It should be noted that according to paragraph 3 of so
    called ``decree N 241'', ``the decree will enter into force in 30 days
    after it is published''.\43\ When commenting the decision on the
    closure of two additional crossing points, the representative of so
    called ``Government of Abkhazia'' stated the following: ``in accordance
    with governmental decision adopted earlier, we are gradually decreasing
    the number of crossing points on the border with Georgia''.\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia, Council of
    Europe (April 2015-September 2016), 2016, SG/Inf (2016) 37, paragraph
    41.
        \40\ Raul Khajimba: we will not let anybody to destroy our state in
    the heat of revenge, ``Apsnypress'', 10 November 2016, available at
    .
        \41\ Temur Nadaraia: data supplied by Dimitri Dbar are nor
    authentic and mislead the public, ``Apsnypress'', 5 December 2016,
    available at .
        \42\ Two more crossing pints on the border on the River Enguri will
    be closed, ``Apsnypress'', 28 December 2016, available at ; Decree of Government of Republic of Abkhazia,
    28 December 2016, available at .
        \43\ Decree of Government of Republic of Abkhazia, 28 December
    2016, available at .
        \44\ Two more crossing pints on the border on the River Enguri will
    be closed, ``Apsnypress'', 28 December 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        32. According to information disseminated on 26th October 2016, Mr.
    Tibilov declared that ``Tskhinvali needs airplanes in order to
    eradicate the practice by Ossetians travelling to Georgia for medical
    treatment''. According to the source, Mr. Tibilov stated that ``local
    residents often request authorities to send them for medical treatment
    to Georgia, where it is much easier to travel rather than to North
    Ossetia [the Russian Federation]''. According to Mr. Tibilov, ``South
    Ossetia is discussing with the Russian Federation the issue of creation
    of its own aviation''.\45\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ Leonid Tibilov--Tskhinvali needs airplanes in order to
    eradicate the practice by Ossetians travelling to Georgia for medical
    treatment, ``Ambebi'', 26 October 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        33. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
    occupied regions of Georgia, both in the Abkhazian region and in the
    Tskhinvali region so called ``border zones'' are established in the
    vicinity of the occupation lines by the occupying power. Residents of
    each occupied region are subject to restrictions on freedom of movement
    in terms of entering these so called ``border zones'' and in terms of
    moving within these so called ``border zones''. It should be emphasized
    that during the reporting period, so called ``deputy minister of
    foreign affairs'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime declared that
    ``there is a decision of government, adopted very recently, in fact few
    days ago, which approved extension of border zone''.\46\ According to
    the same source, ``this is a regime zone and correspondingly, entrance
    to this zone will be always restricted. Those who dwell there
    (householders, guests etc.) fall under this regime''.\47\ According to
    information disseminated on 15th November 2016, local residents of Gali
    district of the occupied Abkhazian region are subject to restrictions
    on freedom of movement: the Russian military personnel deployed there,
    demands ``documents'' in order to allow local residents to move across
    internal routes of Gali district.\48\ According to information
    disseminated on 16th December 2016, in the villages of Saberio,
    Lekukhona and Cheghali, Gali district, freedom of movement of local
    residents is restricted: occupants demand ``documents'' from locals in
    order to allow them to move from one village to another and shoot
    photos of local residents, presumably in order to create a
    database.\49\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \46\ ``Talks about militarization of Gali district are untenable'',
    ``ekhokavkaza'', 24 November 2016, available at .
        \47\ ``Talks about militarization of Gali district are untenable'',
    ``ekhokavkaza'', 24 November 2016, available at .
        \48\ In occupied Abkhazia population is subject to restrictions of
    movement on so called border, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 15
    November 2016, available at .
        \49\ In the villages of Gali district occupants restrict freedom of
    movement of locals, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 16 December 2016,
    available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        34. It should be emphasized that according to information
    disseminated on 23rd November 2016, the Russian FSB officers restricted
    freedom of movement of residents of the villages of Akhalubani, Adzvi
    and Jariasheni, Gori district, namely residents of these villages, on
    the occasion of St. George's Day, could not visit and pray in St.
    George's Church, located nearby the occupation line with the Tskhinvali
    region.\50\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ In Gori district, nearby the occupation line, mobilization of
    so called Russian border guards was noticeable, ``Newposts'', 23
    November 2016, available at ; Population is not allowed to
    pray nearby administrative boundary line with so called South Ossetia,
    ``Kvira'', 23 November 2016, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              V. Right to Property

        35. During the reporting period, violations of the right to
    property caused by the occupation of the territories of Georgia,
    remained the issue of concern.
        36. During the reporting period, a representative of the Tskhinvali
    occupation regime stated that ``particularly on locations, where the
    border is not yet clearly formalized, residents of adjacent territories
    often cultivate land and harvest crop and therefore violate the law.''
    He further stated that ``In cases when the border crosses directly
    through premises and plots of land, a householder should keep a
    passport in order to enter his plot of land, which remained on the
    territory of another state. There are a lot of such situations,
    predominantly in the village of Zardiantkari.'' \51\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ David Sanakoev: Arrangement of Border depends on financing,
    ``Sputnik-Ossetia'', 13 October, available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        37. According to the article which was published during the
    reporting period in The New York Times, the occupation line along the
    Tskhinvali region creates problems for local residents in terms of
    enjoyment of the right to property. According to the article, ``the
    dirt track now running through this tiny Georgian village [of
    Jariasheni] nonetheless means that Vephivia Tatiashvili can no longer
    go to his three-story house because it sits on land now patrolled by
    Russian border guards.'' The article argues that ``[t]here is no fence
    or barbed wire, but Mr. Tatiashvili does not dare to cross the track to
    visit his house for fear of being arrested, as his elderly neighbor
    was, by Russian border guards. ``It is too dangerous for me to go
    home,'' he said, complaining that the boundary has become so mobile
    that nobody really knows its final destination. Mr. Tatiashvili now
    lives in his brother's house, away from the border in the village
    center. . . . Russia starts right here,'' said Mr. Tatiashvili,
    pointing to the freshly dug track that separates his house from
    Georgian-held land.'' The article further observes that ``Elizbar
    Mestumrishvili, 75, a farmer who lives next to Mr. Tatiashvili's now-
    marooned house, can still get to his home, as it lies on the Georgian
    side of the new dirt track. But he is wary of going to the bottom of
    his garden, which lies within a 60-yard frontier zone that Russian and
    South Ossetian security officers claim the right to patrol. Pointing to
    a row of vines drooping with plump grapes, he said it was unwise to
    walk any farther because ``they might come and set up a border
    post''.'' \52\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \52\ In Russia's `Frozen Zone,' a Creeping Border With Georgia,
    Andrew Higgins, The New York Times, 23 October 2016, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        38. According to local residents of Gali district, so called
    ``administration of Gali district'' of the Sokhumi occupation regime
    forces them to sell most of their harvested citrus crops in the Russian
    Federation: however it is economically much more profitable for them to
    sell their crops of citrus in Zugdidi, the territory controlled by the
    Government of Georgia.\53\ I should be noted here that the European
    Court of Human Rights has interpreted ``possessions'' under Article 1
    (Protection of Property), Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
    Human Rights (ECHR) very broadly and has held that it includes movable
    or immovable property and also the economic interests connected with
    ``possessions''.\54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \53\ Abkhazian de-facto authorities force population of Gali
    district to transport citrus to Russia, ``Business Press News'', 27
    October 2016, available at .
        \54\ ``Possessions'' include ``a range of economic interests. The
    following have been held to fall within the protection of Article 1:
    movable or immovable property, tangible or intangible interests, such
    as shares, patents, an arbitration award, the entitlement to a pension,
    a landlord's entitlement to rent, the economic interests connected with
    the running of a business, the right to exercise a profession, a
    legitimate expectation that a certain state of affairs will apply, a
    legal claim, and the clientele of a cinema.'' Carss-Frisk, M. The right
    to property: A guide to the implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
    1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human rights handbooks,
    No. 4 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), p. 6, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 VI. Right to Education in the Native Language

        39. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
    occupied regions of Georgia, in the Gali district there are 31 schools
    and from these 31 schools only 11 schools, all of which are in so
    called ``lower zone'' of Gali district, had the status of Georgian
    schools until the end of the academic year 2014-2015. However, from the
    beginning of September of the academic year 2015-2016, drastic changes
    have been made in the curriculum of these 11 schools, implying teaching
    of all subjects in the Russian language in grades from I to IV. The
    academic year 2016-2017 started in line with the above changes implying
    teaching of all subjects in the Russian language and therefore the
    Russian language had become the formal instruction language also in
    grade V. The above policy, if continued for several years, would result
    in gradual replacement of the Georgian curriculum with the Russian
    curriculum for all grades in these 11 schools of so called ``lower
    zone'' of Gali district.
        40. According to the report of the Public Defender of Georgia
    issued during the reporting period, ``problems remain with the access
    of people living on occupied territories to education.'' \55\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ The Public Defender of Georgia 10 December Report on the
    Situation of the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in 2016, ``The
    Public Defender of Georgia'', 10 December 2016, p. 20, available at
    .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        41. During the reporting period, the situation with regard to the
    right to education in the native language in the Gali district remained
    the same. According to ``EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th
    Consolidated Report on the Conflict in Georgia'', made on 16th November
    2016 at 1271st Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Meeting,
    ``[t]he EU expresses its concern at reports on a continuing
    deterioration of the access to education in the native language in the
    Georgian region of Abkhazia. We strongly believe that the right to
    education for everyone, including education in the native language
    should be guaranteed and applied in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia
    and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia as well. We join the efforts of the
    Co-Chairs of Geneva International Discussions to promote understanding
    and respect for the universal right to education of the child.'' \56\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \56\ EU Statement on the Secretary General's 14th Consolidated
    report on the Conflict in Georgia, 1271st Council of Europe Committee
    of Ministers Meeting--16 November 2016.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        42. As described in previous quarterly reports of the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the human rights situation in the
    occupied regions of Georgia, there is a tendency of making decisions by
    parents on termination of attendance by their schoolchildren of the
    schools with newly introduced Russian curriculum and transferring them
    to the schools located on the other side of the occupation line;
    however the right to education in the native language remains
    problematic also in relation to freedom of movement. For example, in
    the reporting period, namely on the morning of 6th December 2016,
    several schoolchildren residing in the occupied village of Otobaia,
    Gali district were detained by the Russian FSB officers and were
    prevented from crossing the occupation line along Abkhazia and
    therefore from attending school in the village of Darcheli, Zugdidi
    district, the territory controlled by the Government of Georgia. It
    should be noted that the schoolchildren were held in detention in the
    Russian military base for around 5 hours.\57\ Moreover, the decision to
    close down two more crossing points along the occupation line with the
    Abkhazian region will create further impediments to the schoolchildren
    going to schools on the territory controlled by the Government of
    Georgia to get the education in the native language, as they have to
    pass additional several kilometres every day.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ So called border guards freed schoolchildren detained in
    occupied Abkhazia, ``Pirweli Information Agency'', 6 December 2016,
    available at .
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                VII. Conclusions

        43. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia constitutes infringements on freedom from
    torture and ill-treatment and therefore are violations of Article 7 of
    the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
    Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article
    3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE
    commitments.\58\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ The Vienna Concluding Document (1989) prohibits torture and
    other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Paragraph
    23.4; The Paris Document (1990) also prohibits torture and other cruel,
    inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Istanbul Charter for
    European Security commits to ``eradicating torture and other cruel,
    inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE
    area.'' Paragraph 21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        44. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia with regard to arbitrary detention and
    examples provided for the reporting period constitute arbitrary
    detention and therefore violations of Article 9 of the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 3 of the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 5 of the European
    Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and relevant provisions of the OSCE
    commitments.
        45. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia with regard to freedom of movement and
    examples provided for the reporting period constitute violations of the
    right to freedom of movement, namely of Article 12 of the International
    Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 13 of the
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2, Protocol No. 4
    of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE freedom
    of movement commitments.
        46. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia with regard to the right to property and
    examples provided for the reporting period violate the right to
    property, namely Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human
    Rights (UDHR); Article 1, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on
    Human Rights (ECHR); and the OSCE commitments.
        47. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia with regard to education in the native
    language and examples provided for the reporting period constitute
    violations of the right to education in one's native language and
    therefore violations of Article 26 (read in conjunction with Article 2)
    of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 2,
    Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);
    Article 28 (read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article 2) of the
    UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and relevant provisions of
    the OSCE commitments.
        48. It can be concluded that the situation described in the
    occupied regions of Georgia, particularly adoption of so called
    ``laws'' and the process of ``passportisation'' violates prohibition of
    discrimination provisions of Article 14 and Protocol No. 12 of the
    European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Article 26 of the
    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and the
    International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
    Discrimination.

                  VIII. Appeal to the International Community

        49. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to the
    international community, states as well as international
    intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations:

            to call on the Russian Federation to reverse its recognition of
            independence of the Georgian regions Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
            and to end the occupation of the Georgian territories;

            to call on the Russian Federation to stop violations of human
            rights on the occupied territories while exercising effective
            control;

            to continue calling on the Russian Federation to ensure free
            movement of people and removal of barbed and razor wires and
            other artificial obstacles and banners along the occupation
            line;

            to take additional measures in order to monitor and report on
            the human rights situation in the occupied regions of Georgia,
            more specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
            appeals to:

                    (i) the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
                    for Human Rights (OHCHR) to take additional measures in
                    order to regularly address and assess the human rights
                    situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

                    (ii) the UN Human Rights Council's Special Procedure
                    Mandate holders to take additional measures in order to
                    address and report on the human rights situation in
                    Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

                    (iii) the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
                    of Europe to take additional measures in order to
                    address and report on the human rights situation in
                    Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region of Georgia;

                    (iv) the OSCE and its autonomous institutions, namely
                    the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
                    (ODIHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner on
                    National Minorities (HCNM) to find ways for monitoring
                    the human rights situation in Georgia's occupied
                    regions. Such steps could, inter alia, include
                    undertaking a follow-up mission to the occupied regions
                    of Georgia and preparing a report on the status of the
                    implementation of the recommendations contained in the
                    ODIHR/HCNM 2008 Report on ``Human Rights in the War
                    Affected Areas following the Conflict in Georgia''.

            to continue calling on the Russian Federation to allow a)
            access of the international human rights monitoring mechanisms
            to the occupied regions of Georgia; b) access of the relevant
            missions of international organizations (e.g. EUMM), including
            humanitarian organizations, to the occupied regions of Georgia
            through legal routes;

            to continue and intensify condemning violations of human rights
            such as the right to life; freedom of movement; freedom from
            torture and ill-treatment; the right to liberty; the right to
            property and the right to receive education in the native
            language in the occupied regions of Georgia.

                                  ATTACHMENT 2

     Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic
                                    Equality

                             Main Directions of the
               Reconciliation and Engagement Policy of the SMRCE

        The Government of Georgia (GoG) pursues and actively implements the
    peaceful, pragmatic and constructive policy of reconciliation,
    engagement and confidence building with the aim to achieve conflict
    transformation, facilitate people-to-people contacts, assist the
    population on the ground and contribute to the peaceful settlement of
    the conflict.
        In this regard, the GoG continues to implement the main dimensions
    of the State Strategy towards the Occupied Territories: Engagement
    through Cooperation and its respective Action Plan with special
    emphasis on such components as healthcare, education, confidence
    building, socio-economic assistance, civil society development and
    international engagement.
        SMRCE actively cooperates with the EU, USA and with other
    international partners to enhance its peace policy based on the
    principles of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also, it
    actively participates in different formats and plays a leading role in
    their proceedings.
        The GoG continues to seek the ways for sharing the benefits and
    opportunities stemming from the EU-Georgia Visa Liberalization
    Dialogue, EU-Georgia political association and economic integration
    process, with the populations residing in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
    region/South Ossetia. The EU-Georgia high level political consultations
    are periodically held to discuss the existing local and regional
    challenges and assess the efforts undertaken towards the peaceful
    settlement of conflict in Georgia. The same issues are also discussed
    at the meetings of the Association Council and of the Subcommittee on
    Justice, Freedom and Security (the latest ones held on December 2 and
    June 16, 2016). Along with the existing situation the participants
    overviewed the implementation of the Engagement Strategy and Action
    Plan.
        SMRCE holds intensive consultations with international
    organizations to ensure their presence in the occupied regions despite
    all the obstacles these organizations face in terms of accessing these
    territories and carrying out their activities on the ground.
        SMRCE is actively engaged in the implementation of the
    Communication and Information Strategy of the GoG in the sphere of the
    European Integration. Informative video commercials concerning the
    Association Agreement were prepared and transmitted on Public
    broadcasting TV channel in 4 different languages, including in
    Abkhazian and Ossetian. Special booklets were printed and distributed
    in all these languages. In addition, with the assistance of the EU,
    SMRCE prepared short videos on the issues of visa liberalization,
    Association Agreement, education opportunities and ``Life with barbed
    wires'', which was screened at the Batumi International Conference in
    July and highlighted the existing situation and challenges of local
    population.
                  implementation of the engagement action plan
    Healthcare
        Free healthcare represents one of the cornerstones of the
    engagement strategy. Residents of the occupied territories largely
    benefit from the state-sponsored Referral Program under which they
    receive full-scale, needs-based medical treatment in any medical
    institution of Georgia. In April 2015 Hepatitis C elimination program
    (initiated through the support of US company ``Gilead'') was launched
    and the participation was extended to the residents of the occupied
    regions.
        Through the Liaison Mechanism (LM) effectively operating under the
    Action Plan for Engagement, the GoG regularly delivers to Abkhazia
    region necessary vaccines, including immunization and veterinary
    vaccines, diabetes and HIV/AIDS treatment and medicine for
    tuberculosis, also ambulance and other types of vehicle, medical
    equipment, etc. Annually the cost of delivered medicine amounts
    approximately to 250,000 USD.
        In 2013-2015 Government of Georgia spent more than 5 million USD on
    the healthcare of the residents of occupied regions. In 2016 the amount
    on healthcare component already equaled to 3.5 million USD. It is
    important to underline that throughout the years the number of persons
    coming over for free healthcare treatment has more than doubled.
        GoG continues the construction of multi-functional center,
    including the 200-bed hospital in Rukhi that is the closest point to
    the occupation line in the direction of Abkhazia region. The
    functioning of this high profile medical institution will make the
    receipt of the free of charge medical treatment even more accessible
    and convenient.
    Education
        The GoG continues sponsoring the ``1+4'' program that offers
    simplified procedures for the representatives of ethnic minorities,
    inter alia, Abkhazians and Ossetians, to enroll in higher education
    institutions of Georgia by passing only one exam in their native
    language, with 1 year in Georgian language training followed by 4 years
    of undergraduate studies in a program of their own choice. At the same
    time, the GoG maintains the operation of the International Education
    Center (IEC) which offers the funding of the MA and Ph.D. education to
    the residents of the country, including the one in the occupied
    territories.
        For these purposes and with the aim to simplify the existing
    procedures for the recognition of education received inside the
    occupied territories, the SMRCE in close cooperation with the Ministry
    of Education and Science of Georgia elaborated the amendments to the
    Order of the Minister of Education and Science of December 1, 2009 on
    the Rules for the Recognition of Higher Education Received in the
    Occupied Territories that entered into force on January 11, 2017. The
    introduced amendments to the Order created possibilities for the
    persons residing inside the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
    region/South Ossetia to obtain the recognition for the high education
    received inside the occupied territories via status neutral solutions
    and simplified procedures--online or through the assistance of
    international organization, without the need to travel to the rest of
    Georgia, to take Georgian ID or to present witnesses that was necessary
    before. On its side, the issued act certifying the receipt of education
    inside occupied territories authorizes the person to continue study in
    higher education institution in the rest of Georgia or abroad and to
    participate in international student mobility and education programs.
    Trade
        Multi-functional trading center was constructed in closest vicinity
    of occupation line in Rukhi in 2015 and launched in April 2016 that
    will facilitate trade and business contacts across the divide. The
    center also includes bank, veterinary clinic, post office, drug store,
    small refrigerators for storing the goods and collection points for
    agriculture products.
        The GoG continues to actively work on further facilitating and
    encouraging trade, business ties and confidence building across the ABL
    and for creating favorable and conducive environment in this regard.
        The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is
    funding a program entitled The ZRDA Activity in Georgia. The goal of it
    is to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth in targeted
    regions. The activity purpose is to improve livelihoods and resilience
    in targeted communities in Georgia, through improving MSME development
    and growth, increasing productivity of rural households, facilitating
    market linkages between producers and buyers, promote local economic
    development by establishing networks. USAID intends to provide a total
    of approximately $15,000,000 funding over a 5-year period.
    Liaison Mechanism
        The LM continues to serve the important functions of conveying
    messages between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, effective and regular delivery of
    the medicine and medical equipment to Abkhazia region and assistance of
    international organizations in the implementation of bilateral
    confidence building projects. Apart from this, LM directly participated
    in the implementation of several confidence building projects. In
    particular, LM was involved in the arrangement of Abkhaz Corner in the
    National Parliamentary Library of Georgia with the aim to promote the
    Abkhaz literature, culture and history, in the publishing of ``Mokvi
    Gospel'' in Georgian, Abkhazian and English languages that was
    distributed in Abkhazia region and conducted joint trainings of
    Georgian and Abkhazian doctors in Istanbul on the treatment of
    Hepatitis C.
        In 2016, the LM has delivered to Abkhazia region a special vehicle
    with spray equipment necessary for preserving box-trees and respective
    pesticides channeled by the GoG. It has also provided Sokhumi Child
    Center with ultra sound device allocated by the Ministry of Health of
    Georgia.
    CBMs
        In close cooperation with the LM and the CoE, SMRCE continuously
    facilitates the implementation of bilateral Georgian-Abkhazian and
    Georgian-Ossetian confidence building projects that includes the
    meetings, seminars, trainings, study visits etc. of various groups of
    people--teachers, doctors, cultural heritage experts, civil society
    representatives, etc.--on neutral territories. The number of such
    projects is increasing.

        In particular in 2016:

      --Georgian-Abkhazian young women participated in training on women
            empowerment in Yerevan;
      --``Series of European lectures'' were held in Sokhumi for teachers
            and lecturers, also with the participation of several Ossetian
            representatives;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian doctors participated in study visit to Berlin on
            the issues of drug prevention and treatment. As a result CoE
            mission took place to Sukhumi and Tbilisi for Pompidou Group
            experts;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian psychology and psychiatry specialists working
            with traumatized children participated in training in Budapest;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian archive specialists participated in follow-up
            meeting concerning the Soviet time materials in Yerevan,
            Tallinn and Paris as a result of which a joint publication will
            soon be made;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian teachers participated in last workshop in Graz
            on the methodology of teaching of foreign languages;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian human rights defenders and civil society
            representatives met in Budapest and Venice on follow-up meeting
            to discuss human rights issues;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian interpreters two times participated in training
            on translation technique in Budapest;
      --Georgian-Abkhazian museum experts participated in training on
            museum management issues in Budapest;
      --Field visit was implemented to Gudauta with the participation of
            CoE experts as a continuation to Georgian-Abkhazian cultural
            heritage project;
      --Training of trainers for Georgian-Abkhazian teachers on Human
            Rights education to children of 8-13 years based on CoE
            materials ``Compasito'' was held in Budapest.

        SMRCE supports the operation of COBERM--EU funded financial
    mechanism--that enables the implementation of bilateral confidence-
    building projects by non-government and international organizations.
        The SMRCE maintains flexible and transparent operation of the
    Modalities for Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of
    Georgia and continues to issue Non-objection Orders with respect to the
    submitted projects which concern the activities of international and
    non-governmental organizations in the occupied territories, including
    the confidence-building initiatives. In 2016, additionally 58 new
    projects were granted with non-objection (overall 345 projects); none
    was ever refused.
    Communication between the divided societies
        SMRCE engages in any kind of platform and tries to use any given
    opportunity to help re-establish effective communication among the
    divided communities. In February and June of 2015 and April of 2016
    informal dialogues were held in London between the representatives of
    Georgian and Abkhazian communities, amongst them politicians, experts
    and international organizations. Meetings of similar format were also
    held in September 2015 in Bern, Switzerland and in Berlin, Germany.
    Recent political developments had been discussed and the existing
    situation had been analyzed. At the same time, the SMRCE continues to
    actively take part in Civic Point of View meetings that is a platform
    for the meeting of representatives of Georgian-Ossetian communities.
        In the frames of GoG's peaceful policy of reconciliation,
    confidence building and engagement and as a result of agreement
    directly reached with the de-facto authorities, Georgian and Ossetian
    prisoners were released at Enguri Bridge on March 10, 2016. In
    particular, 14 citizens of Georgia held in illegal custody on the
    territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and 4
    Ossetians convicted under Georgian legislation were released from
    detention. The exchange of prisoners had a positive impact on peace
    process and confidence building between the divided communities.
    Assistance of conflict affected population
        GoG actively continues the efforts to alleviate the consequences of
    the installation of barbed wire fences and other physical barriers by
    the Russian militaries in villages adjacent to the occupation line. In
    the frames of the Interagency Commission, the GoG together with
    international partners restored the provision of irrigation and potable
    water in communities affected by Russian-built barbed wire fences,
    completed gasification works, provided local population with financial
    assistance during winter time, built and renovated several schools and
    kindergartens, created and rehabilitated ambulatories, restored roads
    and developed infrastructure, supported local youth in covering their
    university tuition fees and helped farmers in their agricultural work.
    The rehabilitation works and delivery of assistance to the local
    population continues annually.
        In 2016, due to the efforts of the GoG and with the assistance of
    international organizations (UNDP, UNHCR) the surface of the Enguri
    bridge was renovated. Also, the bus became operational on the bridge,
    following 8 years of restrictions. Consequently, the residents of the
    occupied territory are able to benefit from free-of-charge
    transportation.
        On 5 March 2017, representatives of the occupation regime abolished
    two so-called crossing points along the occupation line in the villages
    of Nabakebi and Otobaia, the Abkhazia region. The announced closure of
    two crossing points along the occupation line which are used daily by
    hundreds of commuters, will be detrimental to the freedom of movement
    of the population, including school children, on both sides of the
    occupation line. It will likely increase the risk of incidents,
    especially detentions.
        Such a unilateral decision would go against commitments to work
    towards enhanced security and improved living conditions for the
    conflict-affected population. Furthermore, it would be contrary to
    efforts to normalise the situation by creating an atmosphere that is
    not conducive to longer-term conflict resolution and overall stability
    in the region.
    GID and IPRM
        First Deputy State Minister of SMRCE heads the Second Working Group
    of Geneva International Discussions (GID) on humanitarian issues.
    Georgian delegation regularly raises issues of utmost importance, such
    as return of IDPs and refugees and grave violations of human rights and
    basic freedoms of the population residing in the occupied territories
    (e.g. freedom of movement, right to education in native language, right
    to unimpeded access to healthcare, etc.). Other important issues--such
    as the provision of water and gas, protection of the cultural heritage
    sites, fate of the detained--are also being raised.
        In the spirit of its constructive approach in 2015 and 2016 the GoG
    handed important archive materials to Abkhaz participants and an
    international expert on cultural heritage issues was enabled to visit
    Bedia and Likhny temples in Abkhazia region and elaborate a subsequent
    document on their current condition; another expert on healthcare
    issues conducted training on diabetes in Sokhumi. The potential
    cooperation on environmental issues, in particular, addressing a shared
    problem endangering the endemic box tree population in Georgia,
    including in Abkhazia has been also discussed.
        SMRCE actively participates in Incident Prevention and Response
    Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, which are held along the ABLs with Abkhazia
    and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia on a regular basis. As a result of
    agreement reached during the 35th round of GID, IPRM was resumed in
    Gali after 4 year suspension.
        Within the IPRM framework the issues of human rights violations in
    the occupied territories, including but not limited to illegal
    detentions, prisoners, deprivation of property, issues related to
    provision of potable and irrigation water as well as vital security and
    livelihood issues are being discussed. The hot lines remain operational
    and thanks to them kidnappings have been diminished substantially.

        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
        The Ambassador from Latvia.
    STATEMENT OF HON. ANDRIS TEIKMANIS, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY
                OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member
    Leahy, Members of the subcommittee.
        Thank you very much for inviting me to speak before this
    very honorable subcommittee.
        Latvia and the United States have a century-long history of
    truly friendly relations and a very close partnership. Due to
    this partnership, Latvia has safeguarded its independence and
    this partnership has facilitated Latvia's integration back into
    the Euro-Atlantic community.
        We have to admit today that the world has become less
    secure and less stable over the past decade. Causes for
    instability are various and the geography of the threats is
    diverse. Continued U.S. global leadership is extremely
    important to safeguard an international rules-based order. A
    strong transatlantic link is the best answer to today's
    security risks.
        Since 2003, Latvian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder
    with the United States in the fight against terrorism in Iraq
    and Afghanistan. We both have made sacrifices and Latvia
    remains committed to fighting terrorism within the global
    coalition against ISIL.
        We can do more. We are ready to do more. In 2017, Latvia
    considers additional contribution to the fight against
    terrorism in the form of financial assistance.
        Threats around us, and threats in the region, become more
    complex and harder to identify, quantify, and pinpoint.
    Russia's actions, vis-a-vis its neighbors, show a disturbing
    and worrisome trend that we have to reckon with.
        What happened in the Ukraine, Russia's steady and
    systematic military buildup, as well as the intensive military
    maneuvers in the proximity of NATO borders--like the one
    symbolically named Zapad 2017--have caused a significant
    deterioration in the European strategic security environment,
    and are challenging the European and international security
    order. This has a direct impact on the national security of
    Latvia, Europe, and NATO.
        To respond, we need a strong NATO as a source of stability
    and reliability. We need a prosperous and resilient European
    Union. We need an effective Organization for Security and Co-
    Operation in Europe (OSCE) capable of solving, not freezing,
    conflicts.
        Thanks to historical decisions of the NATO Warsaw Summit on
    the deployment of four multinational battle groups to the
    Atlantic eastern flank--including a Canadian-led Enhanced
    Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia--we are more secure and
    reassured. This is a very practical expression of solidarity
    from our allies and a strong deterrent signal to Russia.
        Security in our region is greatly strengthened thanks to
    Congress' support for the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative,
    the Atlantic Resolve mission, and the Foreign Military
    Financing Program, for which we are grateful.
        By taking into account that the challenges to our region
    are of a long term nature, we are looking forward to the
    continuation of the European Reassurance Initiative at the
    funding level of $3.4 billion or higher. Likewise, we hope that
    the Foreign Military Financing funding will be maintained or
    enhanced.
        The continued U.S. commitment to NATO is essential to
    preserving the irreversibility of these decisions. Latvia
    highly appreciates the very clear and resolute statement by the
    U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis at the NATO Defense
    Ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, thus reconfirming
    the United States' strong support to the Alliance. The meeting
    of the Presidents of three Baltic States and the Vice President
    of the United States in Munich in mid-February reassured us
    even further in this respect.
        Latvia is also stepping up and pulling more weight. Latvia
    is among the best examples when it comes to raising a nation's
    own defense capabilities. In case of military aggression, our
    own forces will be the first responders. We are well aware of
    that challenge, therefore Latvia has spent the past 2 years
    boosting its military capacity and improving interagency
    coordination. Currently, we are spending 1.7 percent and next
    year, only a few months to go, we will spend 2 percent of GDP
    for our defense.
        Since joining NATO in 2004, Latvia has been not only a
    recipient, but also a provider, of security. In proportion to
    our population of 2 million, we count as among the top
    contributors in missions to Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans,
    Mali, the Central African Republic, and Somalia.
        Europe and the United States should join their efforts to
    help Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova counter threats of a hybrid
    nature that are a mix of various elements including information
    warfare. Latvia has been active in providing its support to the
    Eastern partners to counter propaganda and to strengthen
    independent media.
        I would like to mention two examples of very practical
    approaches and supports towards the Eastern Partnership
    countries.
        First, the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence recently
    completed a study on skills and training needs of independent
    media in the Eastern Partnership countries.
        Second, Latvia is interested in the success of the Creative
    Content Support Fund that is being established with support
    from the European Endowment for Democracy and the British
    Government. This fund will strengthen the capacity of
    independent media to offer Russian language audiences a strong
    alternative to the Kremlin controlled media. We encourage the
    United States to consider supporting this important initiative.
        During pivotal times in history, the Alliance has always
    proven to be effective, credible, and united. Solidarity is the
    keyword here. I believe the spirit of solidarity will bring us
    to wise future decisions.
        Thank you very much.
        [The statement follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Hon. Andris Teikmanis

     (See also ``Annual Report About the Activities of the Security Police
     in 2015'' and ``Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-
    Military Influence in the Baltic States'' in the additional information
                          at the end of the hearing.)

                              latvia-united states
        Latvia and the United States have a century long history of truly
    friendly relations. The United States is our closest strategic partner.
    The Latvian-American strategic partnership has helped Latvia to
    safeguard its independence and build democratic society, has
    facilitated Latvia's integration into the Euro Atlantic community.
    Latvia highly values the extensive political dialogue and multifaceted
    co-operation developed over the years.
                           global security challenges
        We have to admit today that the world has become less secure and
    less stable over the past decade. Causes for instability are various
    and the geography of the threats is diverse. The continued U.S. global
    leadership is extremely important to safeguard an international rules
    based order. The strong transatlantic link is the answer to today's
    security risks--terrorism, radicalism, cyberwarfare, information
    confrontations. Latvia is ready to continue joining the U.S. in this
    important endeavor to make the world more secure and stable.
        Since 2003, Latvian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder with the
    United States in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    We both have made sacrifices. Latvia remains committed to fighting
    terrorism within the Global Coalition against ISIL and providing
    financial support and military expertise to those who fight ISIL in
    Iraq and Syria. Since 2014 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
    Excellence in Riga (NATO StratCom) provides in-depth analyses and
    recommendations on countering Russian and ISIL propaganda.
        We could do more. We are ready to do more. In 2017 Latvia is
    considering additional contribution to the fight against terrorism in
    the form of financial assistance.
                        security situation in the region
        Threats around us have become more complex and harder to identify,
    quantify and pinpoint. Russia's actions vis-a-vis its neighbors show a
    disturbing and worrisome trend that we have to reckon with.
        As it is evident from the new Russian National Security Strategy,
    Russia has defined NATO as its adversary and threat to its national
    interest. The Strategy also reflects the sentiment and desire for a
    world order with spheres of influence. This vision is outdated and
    unrealistic; the sovereign nations Russia wishes to subject to such
    division have their own vision and an active say in their development
    and choice with whom to ally themselves. This sovereign right may not
    be challenged.
        What happened in Ukraine, and Russia's steady and systematic
    military build-up as well as the intensive military maneuvers in the
    proximity of NATO's borders--like the ones symbolically named ``Zapad
    2017'' (which means ``West 2017'' in Russian)--have caused a
    significant deterioration in European strategic security environment
    and are challenging the European and international security order. This
    has direct impact on the national security of Latvia, Europe and NATO.
    We take it seriously. I do predict that we can expect continued
    pressure both in terms of military pressure and hybridized warfare
    employing both military assets and non-military means aimed at eroding
    and deconstructing the unity of Europe, the Transatlantic link and
    consequently--NATO. These actions include a range of instruments,
    including propaganda, economic pressure and financing of political
    campaigns to cyber-attacks and aggressive intelligence gathering.
        To respond, we need a strong NATO as a source of stability and
    reliability. We need a prosperous and resilient European Union. We need
    an effective Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
    (OSCE) capable of solving, not freezing conflicts. We need more co-
    operation at the regional level. To uphold our European values and
    principles, we have to back them with strong institutions and
    partnerships with its neighbors that are nurtured on a daily basis.
        Being aware that internal and external security is interlinked,
    Latvia is doing its outmost to build on our own resilience, strengthen
    our border security and invest in our self-defense. However, our
    strength is in our solidarity! We are grateful to NATO and individual
    Allies, in particular, the U.S., for a significant military
    reinforcement experienced already. An enhanced military presence
    combined with assurance measures such as air policing and military
    exercises has provided us with visible reassurance.
                             nato and u.s. presence
        Following swiftly on the heels of Russian aggression in Ukraine,
    NATO reacted by taking decisions to reassure Allies that were proper to
    deter Russia. And since then, it has proceeded with strengthening
    strategic partnerships to build security together with non-NATO
    countries like Sweden and Finland in our region.
        Thanks to historical decisions of the NATO Warsaw Summit on the
    deployment of four multinational battle groups to the Alliance's
    Eastern flank, including a Canadian-led Enhanced Forward Presence
    battle group in Latvia, we are more secure and reassured. This is a
    very practical expression of solidarity from our allies and a strong
    deterrent signal to Russia. Security in our region is greatly
    strengthened thanks to the Congress support for the U.S. European
    Reassurance Initiative/European Deterrence Initiative, the Atlantic
    Resolve mission and the Foreign Military Financing for which we are
    grateful. Taking into account that challenges to our region are of a
    long term nature, we are looking forward to the continuation of the
    European Deterrence Initiative at the funding level of $3.4 billion or
    higher. Likewise we hope that the Foreign Military Financing funding
    will be maintained or enhanced. These policies have strengthened our
    regional security and made a positive impact on addressing our
    immediate shortfalls in national capabilities.
        The continued U.S. commitment to NATO is essential to preserving
    the irreversibility of these decisions. Latvia highly appreciates the
    very clear and resolute statement by the U.S. Defense Secretary Jim
    Mattis at the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in Brussels last month,
    thus reconfirming the U.S. strong support to the Alliance. The meeting
    of the Presidents of three Baltic States and the Vice President of the
    United States in Munich in mid-February reassured us even further in
    this respect.
        Having said this, I would like to add that Latvia shares the notion
    that NATO must be capable of confronting the 21st century threats. We
    agree there is a need to modernize NATO, to streamline the Alliance's
    military command structures, to place greater focus on counter-
    terrorism and cyber security, on information warfare. NATO has to have
    appropriate investment in military capabilities that can be achieved by
    equally sharing the burden of our collective security.
                       latvia's contributions to defense
        Latvia is also stepping up and pulling more weight. Latvia is among
    the best examples when it comes to raising a nation's own defense
    capabilities. In case of military aggression, our own forces will be
    the first responders. We are well aware of that challenge, therefore
    Latvia has spent last 2 years boosting its military capacity and
    improving the interagency coordination. For the current fiscal year,
    our defense spending has increased by 22 percent, reaching 1.7 percent
    of GDP. Our commitment to NATO target of 2 percent will be reached next
    year--in 2018.
        Since joining NATO in 2004, Latvia has not only been a recipient,
    but also a provider of security. In proportion to our population of 2
    million, count us amongst the top contributors to international
    peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have also contributed
    to the missions in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Mali, the Central
    African Republic, and off the coast of Somalia.
                        supporting our eastern neighbors
        Transatlantic resolve is also needed to continue strengthening
    resilience of the EU's Eastern neighbors who constantly encounter
    threats to their territorial integrity and statehood as a result of
    Russia's aggressive actions. Europe and the United States should stand
    firmly on calling Russia to comply with international rules and its
    commitments, in particular--fully with the Minsk Agreement.
    Transatlantic unity is of utmost importance in this respect. The latest
    escalation in the Eastern Ukraine underlines this. We need to keep up
    pressure on Russia to de-escalate the situation and facilitate peaceful
    resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. We should continue supporting
    Ukraine both practically and politically, because the success of
    Ukraine to firmly stand on its own feet will be the best response to
    the concept of spheres of influence.
        Europe and the U.S. should join their efforts to also help Ukraine,
    Georgia, and Moldova counter threats of hybrid nature that are a mix of
    various elements including information warfare. Latvia has been active
    in providing its support to the Eastern partners to counter propaganda
    and to strengthen independent media through various frameworks--NATO
    (NATO StratCom), the European Union (East StratCom Task Force),
    regionally and nationally (Baltic Centre for Media Excellence).
        I would like to mention two examples of very practical approach and
    support towards the Eastern Partnership countries. Firstly, the Baltic
    Centre for Media Excellence recently completed a study on skills and
    training needs of independent media in the Eastern Partnership
    countries. We encourage all donors to use the findings of the study to
    improve the coordination and targeting of their media support programs.
        Secondly, Latvia is interested in the success of the Creative
    Content Support Fund that is now being established with support from
    the European Endowment for Democracy and the British Government. The
    Fund will strengthen the capacity of the independent media to offer
    Russian-language audiences a strong alternative to the Kremlin-
    controlled media. We encourage the United States to consider supporting
    this important initiative.
                                 in conclusion
        We are living in very turbulent times. The international rules
    based order has been challenged. The European security architecture has
    been shaken up as a result of the more aggressive, assertive and
    adventurous foreign policy pursued by Russia. The other fundamental
    change in Europe's security has come with the appearance of incidents
    of terrorism on European soil. The transatlantic community needs to
    address these threats jointly. To be successful and effective in this
    endeavor we need a strong NATO, the transatlantic link and solid unity
    among the Allies. We should also support our neighbors for them to
    strengthen their resilience--both in the East and the South.
        During the pivotal times in history, the Alliance has always proven
    to be effective, credible and united. Solidarity is the key word here.
    I believe this spirit of solidarity will bring us to wise future
    decisions.

        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
        The Ambassador from Lithuania.
    STATEMENT OF HON. ROLANDAS KRISCIUNAS, AMBASSADOR,
                EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Chairman Graham, Ranking Member
    Leahy, and Members of the subcommittee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    present our assessment of the threats Russia's policies pose to
    our democracy, to explain what Lithuania is doing to counter
    those threats, and to explore the possibilities for cooperation
    between Lithuania and the United States.
        First of all, let me name the threats we face. Russia has
    never stopped using its political, economic, propaganda, and
    other open and undercover tools to make democratic countries
    more vulnerable to present day challenges. The attack on
    Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the war in
    eastern Ukraine are being perceived by Lithuania as having
    considerable implications to its own national security.
        Russia is increasing its military capabilities on the
    Lithuanian border. Kaliningrad is the most militarized zone in
    Europe. Large scale military exercises of an offensive nature
    on our borders with Belarus are taking place regularly.
        Russia is extremely active in the information field, using
    pro-Russian media, propaganda, disinformation, fake news,
    trolls, and leaks in order to confuse public opinion and to
    influence decisionmaking.
        Russia's international media channels spread its views on
    disinformation on sensitive topics such as migration,
    terrorism, ethnic relations, and the deployment of NATO troops
    in Central and Eastern Europe.
        In my written testimony, you will find various examples of
    Russia's preparations against Lithuania.
        Another security threat is the Ostrovets Nuclear Power
    Plant, which is under construction in Belarus. Because of
    revisions in nuclear safety, it has the potential to become a
    second Chernobyl.
        How do we fight back against these threats? In 2018,
    Lithuania will be spending over 2 percent of GDP on defense and
    we plan to go beyond this benchmark in the future. We are
    modernizing our military by spending 31 percent of the budget
    for new weapon systems.
        The LNG terminal independence was one of the best
    investments into our security. As its name suggests, it ensures
    the independence of energy supplies and deprives Russia of one
    of its manipulation tools. It has opened the Baltic market for
    potential LNG deliveries from the United States.
        Dear Senators, using this opportunity, allow me to thank
    you for your personal support and for the United States'
    support to our security. We greatly appreciate the
    strengthening of the United States' military presence in Europe
    and the implementation of the European Deterrence Initiative.
        We do believe that the best deterrence, therefore, the only
    way to achieve regional stability is to place U.S. and NATO
    troops in the Baltic States on a permanent basis. In our view,
    it is necessary to have forces and military plans adequate for
    deterrence.
        When it comes to practical areas of defense cooperation,
    Lithuania and the United States have been engaged in close
    dialogue. On our part, we are ready to move forward with more
    precise bilateral projects, and timelines, with identified
    financial resources on both sides.
        The projects can include the establishment of Baltic
    regional air defense capability, prepositioning of military
    equipment, procurement of ammunition, and intelligence,
    surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR)
    capabilities among others.
        While bringing your attention to defense issues, close
    cooperation to counter hybrid threats are necessary. To counter
    threats posed by disinformation, Lithuania launched a National
    Information Influence Identification and Analysis Ecosystem
    Project to monitor and analyze the information environment, and
    preclude possible unfriendly actions. The possibility to access
    some of the services and tools of the United States would make
    this system more efficient.
        Currently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is broadcasting
    via Lithuania almost 10 hours a day in Russian and Belorussian
    languages. We see the need to increase the radio coverage and
    to improve the signal quality for the listeners of RFE/RL in
    Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and we should aim at raising
    transmission power and extending the programming into 24 hours.
        We should also work together in creating an attractive and
    positive narrative about Western societies for radio and
    television programs seen in the region. There is also a great
    need to tell the true facts of history to the societies
    influenced by Russian propaganda.
        Finally, we are aiming to strengthen border security. With
    the U.S. Army support, Lithuania will be launching a new RAID
    systems project. Lithuania also plans to build a Situation
    Awareness Center that would integrate border, air, and maritime
    situation pictures. United States experience and assistance in
    this area would be greatly appreciated.
        Once again, thank you for this opportunity to tell you our
    part of the story today. We much value our strategic
    partnership with the United States. We will continue to be your
    reliable ally willing and hoping to work with the U.S. Congress
    and the U.S. administration very closely.
        Thank you, and I am pleased to be on the mark first.
        [The statement follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rolandas Krisciunas
        Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, and members of the
    subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to present our assessment of the threats Russia's policies and
    intentions pose to our democracy, to explain what Lithuania is doing to
    counter these threats and to explore the possibilities for cooperation
    between Lithuania and United States.

                              I. Threat Assessment

    1. Russia's Aggressive Posture

        Russia continues to maintain its aggressive posture towards NATO
    and the EU. Russia has deliberately chosen confrontation with the Euro-
    Atlantic community aiming at weakening Europe, discrediting NATO and
    cutting the transatlantic link. These are the most alarming trends of
    the past years:

      --Russia updated basic strategic documents, indicating NATO, and
            particularly the U.S., as threats. It is written in official
            documents, it is publically said by Russian politicians, and it
            is constantly broadcasted on TV for the public.
      --Russia withdrew from international agreements aimed at building
            trust and stability and thus assuring existence of the
            international security system. Russia is violating basic
            international law norms, and is keen to change current
            international order.
      --At the time NATO was aiming to build a strategic partnership with
            Russia, cutting defense structures and focusing on
            expeditionary forces, Russia was increasing its investments
            into defense, modernizing its armaments and military
            structures, reviewing its strategy, doctrine and tactics.
      --Russia is extremely active in the information field, using pro-
            Russian media (e.g. Russia Today, Sputnik), propaganda,
            disinformation, fake news, trolls, leaks etc. in order to
            confuse public opinion and influence the decisionmaking.
      --Russia also employs lobbying, PR agencies to disseminate the
            conspiracy theories, to discredit other states in the
            international arena and harasses those who criticize the
            Kremlin.
      --Russia is active in promoting its narratives: ``the West is corrupt
            and morally bankrupt'', ``fascist regime in Kiev'', ``Ukraine
            is an artificial state'', ``widespread Russophobia''. There is
            a constant manipulation of the historical facts, e.g. common
            history of the post-Soviet countries, and the victory over
            fascism in the World War II (liberators vs occupiers).
      --Russia tends to support European extremist and anti-EU groups,
            strives to foment divisions and instability in the target
            countries, and to create divisions inside the EU and NATO.
            Other forms of action: cyber activity (attacks against critical
            infrastructure, hacked and leaked emails, and cyber espionage),
            initiation of population resettlement (in order to change the
            ethnic composition of a frozen conflict region), creation of
            the proxy groups (pseudo-NGOs, youth organizations, research
            institutes, think tanks, motorcycle clubs).
      --The compatriot policy (providing financial, healthcare or other
            kind of benefits to Russian-speakers abroad, issuing Russian
            passports, and justifying aggression against neighboring
            countries with protection of Russian speakers' rights) is being
            used as an additional tool for Russia's disruptive strategies
            abroad.
      --Rising militant nationalism and chauvinism inside Russian society
            is a result of government efforts to mobilize the population
            and increase its acceptance for sacrifices in the name of
            ``higher'' national objectives. Nationalism in Russia is
            tolerated and fostered but nationalism in other countries
            presented to Russian public almost as extreme as Nazism. An
            intense state propaganda campaign has stoked Russians'
            perception that Putin righted a historical wrong in
            orchestrating Russia's seizure of Crimea and reasserted
            Russia's great-power interests against hostile West.
      --For more examples of Russian hybrid activities see Annex 1.

        The Kremlin increasingly sees Europe whole, free, and at peace not
    as an opportunity for prosperous coexistence, but as a threat to its
    geopolitical agenda and regime survival. Moscow views the Western
    values--pluralism and openness--as weaknesses to be exploited. Its
    tactics are asymmetrical, subversive, and not easily confronted. U.S.
    is presented as an abuser of a global dominant position and Russia
    knows a solution--diminishing U.S. role in the world to achieve
    multipolar international order. Western governments have ignored this
    threat for too long, but finally, awareness is growing that the
    transatlantic community must do more to defend its values and
    institutions.

    2. Threat Perception in Lithuania

        The illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine are
    being perceived by Lithuania as having substantial implications to its
    own national security for the following reasons:

      --Russia has never stopped treating the Baltic States as part of its
            exclusive sphere of influence and used its political, economic,
            energy resources, propaganda, cyber, information and other
            coercive, open and undercover tools to make the democratic
            countries more vulnerable to the present-day challenges.
      --In Ukraine, Russia demonstrated that it would not shy away from
            invading sovereign country.
      --Russian military snap readiness exercises that take place regularly
            complicate tactical warning and increase military tensions
            along the Russian borders.
      --Russia is increasing its military capabilities on Lithuania's
            borders. It is broadening its range of military options in the
            region and limiting NATO's possibilities to reinforce and
            resupply.
      --Large-scale military exercises of the offensive nature on our
            borders with Belarus taking place regularly.
      --``Russia first'' military tactics to engage in a military conflict
            and destroy its adversary military installations is
            particularly dangerous. Russian determination to use nuclear
            component as an escalation in order to ``deescalate'' regional
            conflict is extremely dangerous.

        There are additional reasons that explain our concern:

      --Attack on Georgia in 2008, illegal annexation of Crimea and covert
            use of military and paramilitary forces by Russia in Ukraine
            redrew the political map of Europe and shook up the rules-based
            international peace order.
      --It is difficult to trust Russia to uphold its word and its
            international commitments, as it violated--among other--
            Budapest Memorandum, Helsinki Accords and the UN Charter.
    2.1 Kaliningrad Factor
        Kaliningrad is the most militarized zone in Europe with extensive
    A2/AD capabilities. These capabilities allow gaining control of the
    Baltic Sea and air space. Short-range nuclear-capable ballistic
    missiles Iskander are expected to be deployed to Kaliningrad this year.
    Last year, two frigates armed with nuclear capable cruise missiles
    ``Kalibr'' (range up to 2500 km) have been additionally deployed to
    Kaliningrad, as well as coastal defense missile system ``Bastion'',
    capable of blocking the entrance to the Baltic Sea.
        Around 25,000 troops are permanently deployed in the Kaliningrad
    region. It is assessed that up to 70 percent of the region's population
    is related to the military in one way or another.
        It became a new practice to command civilian ships to change their
    course in Lithuanian exclusive economic zone during exercises of
    Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet.
    2.2 Belarus Factor
        President Lukashenko has been balancing between the West and Russia
    for decades in order to receive possible benefits from the both sides.
    However, in military terms, Belarus is fully integrated with Russia and
    has limited means to disallow using its territory for military
    operations. Quick military operation to unite Kaliningrad region with
    Belarus (through the so-called Suwalki gap) was being exercised by
    Russian troops. In case of conflict, it is very unlikely that Belarus
    remains neutral.
        Situation in Belarus is worrisome. Weak economic situation allows
    Russia to dictate conditions for cooperation. Two countries have a
    joint air defense system, there are Russian facilities and capabilities
    in the territory of Belarus. Astravets nuclear plant, which is under
    construction, is one more risk as the project does not have economic
    grounds and technological reliability. Its nuclear safety credentials
    cannot be trusted. It is Russian political project created in order to
    prevent the integration of Baltic countries into the European Energy
    system.

                           II. Closing Security Gaps

                        ensuring defense and deterrence

        Due to geographic location of the Baltic States, the most credible
    way to deter Russia is by making it physically difficult to achieve its
    objective to capture and hold the Baltic States by strengthening their
    defense and resilience.
        Bearing in mind the time and geographical factors, credible
    deterrence in the Baltics could primarily be ensured through having
    adequate capabilities and the will to act. The Baltic States do have
    the will, but due to the size of their economies, they are not in a
    position to eliminate all the gaps in their defence capabilities by
    themselves.

    1. National Efforts

        The awareness of being a frontline state and the lessons learned
    from the war in Georgia, and especially in Ukraine, led to immediate
    steps that were necessary to take in order to strengthen Lithuania's
    security:

      --Increase of professional soldiers in the armed forces,
            reintroduction of conscription, higher number of citizens
            familiar with armaments and military tactics.
      --Increase of defense budget, which is set to hit the 2 percent of
            GDP mark next year and subsequently grow, as required, based on
            threat analysis and the need to further modernize our armed
            forces.
      --Modernization by substantial defense procurements (28 percent of
            the current budget goes to procurement of new weapons systems).
      --LNG terminal was built to ensure independence of energy supplies
            and to cut short one of the Russia's manipulation tools.
      --National legislation related to state of war, crisis management and
            information security has been amended in order to remove some
            legal obstacles for smooth and fast national response actions.
      --New law on cyber security was adopted. It overhauls national cyber
            governance system, defines general cyber security requirements
            as well as identifies additional cyber security measures,
            including close private-public cooperation. In 2015 National
            Cyber Security Center was established. It focuses on protection
            of critical information infrastructure, public sector,
            increasing resilience and response capability.
      --In response to Russia's information war, strategic communication
            capabilities have been improved within the government and in
            the armed forces. Public awareness of information warfare and
            propaganda was raised. Lithuania is part of information sharing
            and coordination platforms among the Baltic States, Poland and
            Finland, contributes to the EU and NATO StratCom capabilities.
      --Monitoring of TV and radio programs for initiating legal actions to
            suspend licenses for those disseminating disinformation and
            hatred was introduced.

    2. Strengthening Conventional Capabilities

        Conventional threats being the main cause for concern, current
    efforts to improve Lithuania's defense capabilities are focused
    primarily on modernization of armed forces, increasing the ability to
    inflict damage on adversary. There are some crucial areas where Allied
    support and specifically that of United States is very much needed:
      --The U.S. military presence in Europe (notably in Germany,
            Netherlands, and Poland) is being strengthened and ERI
            (European Reassurance Initiative)/EDI (European Deterrence
            Initiative) are being implemented, which we greatly appreciate.
      --The NATO`s enhanced Forward Presence with 4 (U.S., Germany, Canada
            and UK) battle groups being deployed in Poland, Lithuania,
            Latvia and Estonia is an important contribution. It is our
            strong belief, however, that restoring the U.S. military
            presence in Europe back to a pre-2009 level would be highly
            instrumental and play well into substantiating our joint
            credible deterrence and defense posture.
      --In our view, it is necessary to have forces and adopt military
            plans adequate for deterrence, especially considering Russia's
            A2/AD (anti-access and area denial) and growing naval
            capabilities in the Baltic Sea.
      --The best deterrence, therefore, and the only way to achieve
            regional stability, is to place U.S. and NATO troops in the
            Baltic States on a permanent basis.

        When it comes to practical areas of defense cooperation we would
    need U.S. assistance in:

      --The establishment of Baltic regional air-defense capability that is
            the most important element for ensuring regional security. This
            would allow the Baltic States armed forces to respond to a
            military aggression at the very first stage of a conflict and
            to sustain before the reinforcement arrives.
      --The prepositioning of military equipment that allows for rapid
            reinforcement. In terms of cost value, it is much better to
            invest in defense installations in the Eastern part of Europe.
            Lower-cost U.S. investments with a high rate of our
            contribution are mutually beneficial.
      --Procurement of ammunition to increase our antitank capabilities,
            namely Javelin, AMRAM for the NASAM system, and 155 mm
            artillery shells.
      --ISTAR capabilities to gather crucially important intelligence.
      --Need to upgrade our communication systems.
      --As time being a very important factor, it would be welcome to apply
            for the Baltic region a program similar to ``Train and Equip''
            thus strengthening the Eastern border of NATO, increasing
            abilities of forces in place to defend, and contributing to
            deterrence. It could be worth considering the revival of the
            Warsaw initiative that in previous years helped to acquire
            necessary capabilities while procuring products of U.S.
            manufacturers.

        In all these mentioned areas, Lithuania and United States have been
    engaged in discussions and dialogue, but we on our part are ready to
    move forward with more precise bilateral projects and targeted
    timelines with identified financial resources on both sides.

    3. Countering Hybrid Threats

        Recent study ``Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats and Potential
    Responses'' by RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/pubs/
    research_reports/RR1577.html) concludes that while improving the
    conventional deterrent in the Baltic region is important, the U.S. and
    NATO should also address the potential for all forms of Russian
    aggression across the conflict spectrum. An increased U.S.-Baltic
    engagement in the area of hybrid threats--in parallel with more
    substantial NATO/U.S. military presence in the region--would be very
    welcome.
        Currently, an intra-governmental discussion is ongoing in Lithuania
    on the coordination between various institutions of countering hybrid
    threats. The Government aims at upgrading an integrated system of
    crisis management and countering hybrid threats. Here, we are seeking
    to gain from the U.S. experience and are ready to share ours.
        Lithuania supports regional cooperation among NATO Allies exposed
    to similar types of hybrid threats, which would include closer
    interagency cooperation among border guard, police, and municipal
    authorities. This would lead to joint development of comprehensive
    cooperation mechanisms and procedures for reacting to and countering
    hybrid threats. Closer regional cooperation between Baltic and Nordic
    States, Poland and the U.S. would be very instrumental and desirable.
        The EU and NATO would gain from closer dialogue with the third
    states directly affected by the hybrid threats, particularly Georgia,
    Ukraine, and Moldova. Additionally, we should invest in supporting
    these countries in building up their capabilities. Continued U.S.
    engagement in this direction would be welcome.
    3.1 Disinformation
        In order to counter disinformation attacks, Lithuania launched a
    national information influence identification and analysis ecosystem
    project to monitor and analyze physical and electronic information
    environment, and preclude possible unfriendly and destructive actions.
    The recent example was the reaction to the fake news about the alleged
    rape of a teenage girl in Lithuania by the German soldiers. The
    reaction time was very short, it was managed smoothly and did not have
    a negative effect on the perception of the local population towards the
    NATO Allies and the Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania.
        It would make a great benefit if similar systems were launched in
    other two Baltic States and Poland, also possibly in a wider region. It
    would allow us to understand the pattern of Russian influence
    activities, monitor them and preclude some unintended actions. To make
    this system more effective, the access to some of the U.S. services
    would be appreciated to facilitate the analysis of electronic
    environment and technologies like cybercrime, and social communication
    analysis tools (about $300,000 per year for licenses).
        The legal cooperation on information warfare is another important
    area, as it is often the case when the U.S.-owned cyber space is used
    initiating information attacks against other states.
        More American popular culture in Lithuania could help to neutralize
    Russia's so-called ``active measures''. Cultural, student, journalist
    exchange projects, educational, history programs should be encouraged
    and funded. In January 2017, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
    and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) shipped to Lithuania an AM
    radio transmitter for broadcasting of the RFE/RL programs to Russia and
    Belarus. The Nautel NX-200 type solid-state transmitter currently is
    under installation in Viesintos (North-East of Lithuania).
        The AM band is available in all car radios. The AM radio can be
    very important in case Russian or Belarusian authorities block the
    websites of RFE/RL. Currently, RFE/RL is broadcasting via Lithuania
    almost 10 hours a day in Russian and Belarusian languages. The
    transmission power is 75,000 W. The annual broadcasting cost is
    $220,186.
        In order to increase the radio coverage, to improve the signal
    quality and to provide the most convenient schedule for the listeners
    of RFE/RL in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, we should aim at raising the
    transmission power from 75,000 W to 120,000 W and RFE/RL 24 hour
    broadcasting. The annual broadcasting cost would be $890,000 (increase
    by $670,000).
    3.2 Cyber Threats
        In the face of rapidly growing cyber threats, it is critically
    important for Lithuania to make a leap forward in critical information
    infrastructure protection. To give a spark in this direction, we
    suggest the idea of establishing a Cyber Laboratory within our National
    Cyber Security Center and propose a joint project that could be
    ambitiously pursued with the U.S. support. It would greatly contribute
    to our security by: (1) enhancing cyber defense capabilities of our
    armed forces; (2) strengthening resilience of state-level critical
    information infrastructure; (3) laying a better background to the
    development of national cyber defense competencies; (4) enabling better
    preparedness to counter conventional and hybrid scenarios against
    Lithuania.
    3.3 Border Security
        Security of the borders starts with the situation awareness and the
    ability to monitor. This year, with the U.S. Army support, Lithuania
    will be launching a new so-called RAID systems project that would
    significantly increase national abilities in beefing up our border
    security. We hope this to be enhanced to the Baltic regional operation
    with the overall aim to have an integral security situation picture of
    NATO's Eastern border. U.S. assistance in this area would be of
    tremendous importance.
        Lithuania plans to build a situation awareness center that would
    integrate border, air and maritime security situation picture. We see
    many reasons for turning it into a regional U.S.--Baltic center. U.S.
    experience and assistance in this area would be of great help.
    3.4 Energy Security
        Lithuania has been very active in fighting Russian dominance in the
    energy sphere. We constructed the first LNG terminal in the Baltic Sea
    region, which broke Russian monopoly of gas supply and reduced
    political influence. It has opened Baltic gas market for potential LNG
    deliveries from USA.
        Lithuania bridged the Baltic Sea by laying underwater electricity
    cable linking Lithuania and Sweden and got connected with Poland as
    well. Our next goal is to connect with continental European electricity
    networks. Baltic States aim to synchronize their electricity networks
    with the EU, breaking away from Russia. It is a matter of urgency and
    top priority, because of geopolitical aspects, security and economic/
    market issues.
        The Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant constructed in Belarus is a
    nuclear and environmental safety issue not only for Lithuania, but for
    the whole region (for more information about the Ostrovets NPP see
    Annex 2).
        Lithuania (the EU) deals with the issue engaging unilateral and
    multilateral instruments including but not limited to the Espoo, Aarhus
    and the Nuclear Safety Conventions aiming to promote nuclear and
    environmental safety in the Ostrovets NPP. Seriousness of nuclear
    safety issues should warrant it to become an item on bilateral U.S.-
    Belarus agenda. We also ask for U.S. support regarding this issue in
    the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

                                    ANNEX 1

                     Examples of Russian Hybrid Activities

    1. Aggressive Russian Intelligence Operations

        Russian intelligence services (RIS) support Russian foreign policy
    objectives by conducting active and aggressive influence operations or
    espionage against Lithuania.

      --In 2015 the FSB officer Nikolay FILIPCHENKO, one of the organizers
            and coordinators of the FSB long-term operation against
            Lithuania, was detained in Lithuania. His recruitment targets
            were VIP Protection Department, officers of other institutions,
            Lithuanian politicians, and state servants. With the help of
            the recruited law enforcement officers (VIP Protection
            Department), the FSB had intentions to penetrate other
            Lithuanian state institutions, among them--the President
            Palace. FILIPCHENKO was looking for a VIP protection officer
            who could arrange possibility for FSB to plant bug into
            Presidential Office and residence.
      --During the parliamentary elections in Lithuania in October 2016,
            when RIS extensively focused on the collection of the
            information about domestic political situation and the
            recruitment of Lithuanian citizens who could provide such
            information.

    2. Increasing Russian Cyber Intelligence Attacks

        RIS is more often using increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks
    for intelligence collection and against high value political and
    economic targets.

      --In autumn 2016 GRU related Internet hacker group SOFACY (APT28)
            conducted attack against several members of Lithuanian
            parliament. With the help of social engineering the GRU tried
            to penetrate Parliament computers, gain their control and
            overtake the information stored there. The cyber attack against
            members of the Lithuanian Parliament was a part of SOFACY
            attack series against NATO and Ukraine targets. We assess that
            in the near term Russian intelligence services will continue to
            organize cyber attacks against NATO countries.

    3. Wide Scope of Russian Technical Intelligence Capabilities

        Russia has a wide scope of technical capabilities to intercept,
    decrypt and process electronic communications. It uses stationary
    technical intelligence centers in Kaliningrad oblast, mainland Russia
    and Belarus, as well as mobile land, air and sea units.

      --In June 2013 a couple of phone conversations between Lithuanian MFA
            diplomats in Vilnius and diplomats posted to Hungary and
            Azerbaijan were released to YouTube. Diplomats informally
            discussed Lithuanian relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. It
            was Russian active measures operation aimed to discredit
            Lithuanian EU Presidency and instigate internal tensions in
            Lithuania. Conversations were intercepted by Russian electronic
            intelligence unit.

    4. Investment in IT Projects As Intelligence and Subversion Threat

        Russia has traditionally used supply of energy resources,
    investment in strategically important sectors of economy and trade
    relations as a tool to influence domestic and foreign policy of
    Lithuania as well as other countries. Lithuanian energy and economic
    dependency on Russia is decreasing, however, Russia is inventing novel
    ways to use its economic resources to increase its influence
    capabilities.

      --The company based in Lithuania and owned by Russian citizens, who
            have ties to Russian Federal Security Service, is planning to
            launch data center project Amber Core that would be a biggest
            data center in the Baltic region. Data center project poses a
            threat to Lithuania's national security. It is probable that
            after the construction of the data center the FSB would acquire
            the possibility to overtake the data of Lithuanian and foreign
            state institutions stored there and by such means to collect
            intelligence information. If state institutions, banks,
            telecommunication enterprises become the clients of the data
            center, Russia would acquire the possibility to undermine
            Lithuanian state management and functioning of the economy in
            order to implement its political, economic and military
            interests.

    5. Russian Propaganda and Disinformation Activities

        Russia pursues to influence Lithuanian and Western audiences by
    setting up and promoting international media channels that spread its
    views and disinformation on the sensitive topics--such as migration
    crisis, terrorism, ethnic relations, deployment of NATO troops in
    Central and Eastern Europe etc.

      --The most active propaganda project of Russia's international media
            outlet ``Rossyia Segodnia'' in Lithuania is website
            Baltnews.lt. It realizes Russia's informational and ideological
            policy, disseminates articles which cover main narratives of
            Russian propaganda. Baltnews.lt gets funding from ``Rossyia
            Segodnia'' in a complex and non-transparent financial scheme
            through intermediary companies in foreign states.
      --A new ``Rossyia Segodnia'' propaganda project ``Sputniknews.lt''
            was launched in Lithuania in December 2016. ``Sputniknews.lt''
            is oriented in Lithuanian-speaking audience, but for the moment
            failed to gain any popularity.
      --The most recent example of information attack was attempt by
            Russian media outlets and pro-Russian activists in February
            2017 to the spread the fake news that German soldiers stationed
            in Lithuania were culpable for the rape of the teenage girl.
            This particular piece of disinformation failed to attract
            attention of mainstream media, but the like information attacks
            against NATO military personnel deployed in the region are
            highly likely to be repeated in the future.

    6. Russian Political and Social Influence Activities

        Moscow's attempts to regain the influence in the post-Soviet region
    materialize in Russia's efforts to weaken Lithuania's social integrity
    and to escalate intra-ethnic tensions. Russia employs so call
    compatriot policy to achieve that. Kremlin's aim is to discredit and
    hinder any efforts made by the authorities' to carry out a successful
    integration of national minorities.

      --The main goal of Russia's compatriot policy in the Baltics is to
            incite ethnic tensions. The Fund to Support and Protect the
            Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, which was established by
            the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal agency
            ``Rossotrudnichestvo'', finances two Lithuanian-based
            organizations, which try to fuel ethnic tensions within
            Lithuania. Centre for the Protection and Research of
            Fundamental Rights uses various international human-rights
            events to blame Lithuania for violating the rights of ethnic
            communities. Independent Human Rights Centre, takes part in
            pro-Russian propaganda campaigns against the US and NATO. Both
            organizations receive nearly 100 thousand euro from the fund
            every year. Vladimir POZDOROVKIN, current coordinator of the
            Baltics in the fund, had been the chief of SVR under a
            diplomatic cover at the Russian Embassy in Vilnius from 1994
            till 1996.
      --Russian Embassy in Lithuania directly controls, coordinates and
            finances activities variety of pro-Russian organizations, clubs
            and groups ranging from political protests to cultural events.
            Despite the fact that pro-Kremlin political parties or NGOs
            currently fail to gain wider support, their representatives are
            constantly used as information sources for Russian propaganda,
            because mostly their political actions and ideas coincide with
            Russia's viewpoint. One of the most popular ideas suggested by
            these political organizations is the idea of Lithuania's
            neutrality and withdrawal from NATO.

    7. Belarus As a Base of Russian Influence and Agression

        Close military and intelligence cooperation between Russia and
    Belarus and significant Russian influence in Belarusian society poses a
    significant threat to Lithuanian national security.

      --In 2014 Belarusian intelligence operation against Lithuanian
            military communications system was terminated. Belarusian
            military intelligence (GRU) undercover officer Sergey KURULENKO
            carried out the operation. He tried to collect information
            about fiber optic cable network of national Lithuanian air
            navigation system. The cable was also used by the military,
            among other for NATO communications. Due to close military
            cooperation between Belarus and Russia, it is highly likely
            that the Belarusian GRU shared the collected information with
            the Russian military intelligence GRU.
      --Approximately 100 pro-Russian groups are active in Belarus. Many of
            them are paramilitary patriotic groups, some of them related to
            Belarusian Cossacks movement. These groups are most active in
            Belarus regions bordering Lithuania and Poland. Cossacks played
            significant role in the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine,
            including the Crimea takeover operation. Belarusian Cossacks
            and other pro-Russian paramilitary groups operate in the same
            fashion as in Ukraine, using representatives of Russian
            Orthodox Church as liaison officers for the Russian
            intelligence services. Pro-Russian groups in Belarus can be
            used by Russia to pressure Belarusian president Alexander
            Lukashenko as well as various operations (provocations) against
            the NATO member countries, e.g. Lithuania and Poland. Such
            provocations are highly likely during the ``Zapad 2017''
            military exercise.

                                    ANNEX 2

      Main Facts About the Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Project in
                                    Belarus

      --Belarus is implementing the NPP project \1\ in violation to the
            international nuclear and environmental safety requirements and
            without respect to the principles of openness, transparency and
            good neighbourliness. That was recognized internationally:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Ostrovets NPP in Belarus is situated in the North-Western
    part of Belarus, Grodno oblast, near Ostrovets (coordinates
    544519.6"N 260528.9"E). The distance from the construction site to
    the Lithuanian capital Vilnius 40 km, to the Lithuanian (and external
    EU) border 20 km. The NPP will have two units with VVER-1200 reactors
    (output capacity up to 2x1200 MW, operating lifetime--60 years). The
    first unit of the NPP is scheduled for launch in 2019, the second--in
    2020. The contractor general--Rosatom's subsidiary company--
    Atomstroyexport (Russia). Project financed by Russia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        --The Meeting of Parties (MOP) of the Espoo Convention \2\ and the
                MOP of the Aarhus Convention \3\ acknowledged that Belarus
                was developing the NPP project in violation to the
                mentioned Conventions (decision VI/2 of the Espoo
                Convention MOP--ECE/MP.EIA/20.Add.1, decision V/9c of the
                Aarhus Convention ECE/MP.PP/2014/2/Add.1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Espoo Convention--UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact
    Assessment in a Transboundary Context.
        \3\ Aarhus Convention--UNECE Convention on Access to Information,
    Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
    Environmental Matters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      --The Ostrovets construction site was selected prior to the start of
            the transboundary environmental impact assessment (EIA),
            without seismic, geological and hydrological research and
            without consultations with the immediate neighbours, i.e.
            Lithuania. This constitutes serious violations of the Espoo,
            Aarhus and the Nuclear Safety Conventions.
      --Belarus sidesteps from its international obligations: the
            accomplishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (the
            IAEA) specialised mission for site and design evaluation (Site
            and External Events Design (SEED) mission) and the risk and
            safety assessments (the stress tests) in line with the
            declaration signed with the European Commission on 23 June
            2011. Despite Lithuanian requests and the recommendations of
            the Espoo Convention to look into the site selection process
            and scientific researches of the sites, the IAEA SEED mission
            invited by Belarus was incomplete and was not tasked to assess
            site related issues.
      --In 2016, at least six incidents occurred at the Ostrovets NPP. Two
            of the incidents included the reactor vessel--one of the most
            important safety components of a NPP. In all the cases Belarus
            tried to conceal the information about the incidents and after
            it appeared in the independent media, Belarus either denied it
            or attempted to downgrade the consequences. The recurrent
            incidents at the Ostrovets NPP reveal serious problems with the
            work and safety culture and raise reasonable doubts regarding
            the competence and independence of the Belarus nuclear safety
            regulator ``Gosatomnadzor'' that is currently the department
            within the Ministry of Emergency situations of Belarus. It also
            indicates the lack of transparency and openness in the
            implementation of the project.

                    Ostrovets NPP: A Multidimensional Threat

        Environmental threat. The implementation phase of the Ostrovets NPP
    project was commenced before the start of the transboundary
    environmental impact assessment (EIA), without the obligatory seismic,
    geological and hydrological research. Lithuania holds that the
    transboundary EIA is still pending, as Lithuanian questions regarding
    the potential impact on its environment and population have not been
    answered, public hearings for the Lithuanian public have not been
    arranged, consultations with Lithuania in line with Art. 5 of the Espoo
    Convention have not been organised.
        Radiological threat. Belarus selected the Ostrovets site that is
    20 km from the Lithuanian border and 40 km from the Lithuanian
    capital Vilnius without obligatory assessment of population density in
    the territory of Lithuania and without assessment of feasibility to
    implement emergency preparedness and response arrangements in case of a
    nuclear accident, although it is required by the IAEA. In case of an
    accident at the Ostrovets NPP, \1/3\ of Lithuanian population (within
    the radius of 100 km from the Ostrovets NPP) could be affected. Need
    for evacuation of the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, where all the
    Governmental institutions are based, cannot be excluded.
        Unfair competition. Belarus is constructing its NPP with a prospect
    of electricity export to the European market; however, Belarus has no
    necessary infrastructure neither for the operation of the NPP, nor for
    the electricity export, but expects to make use of the Lithuanian
    infrastructure, including the newly build power interconnections with
    Poland and Sweden. Belarus does not invest into nuclear and
    environmental safety in order to reach the level set by the
    international safety standards, thus creating the potential for
    distortions in the European electricity market. Furthermore, attempts
    to evade from needed investments into adequate safety of this project
    distorts the competition in the nuclear industry globally. It is of
    utmost importance to ensure that electricity trade with third countries
    follows the rules of fair competition (level playing field) and that
    electricity produced in violation to the international nuclear and
    environmental safety standards would not be accepted in the European
    electricity market.
        Military threat. For the physical protection of the Ostrovets NPP
    Belarus created a new military unit No. 7434 under the command of
    Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Zhadobin. It will consist of 300 military
    personnel that is trained not only in Belarus, but also in Russia.\4\
    In February 2017, the military unit was located in the place of
    permanent deployment. Moreover, in 2016, Belarus started the
    construction of the military base for the Air Force and Air Defence
    units for the security needs of Belarus NPP.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ ``The military unit for the protection of BelAES will be
    located at the site of a permanent deployment in early January'' http:/
    /www.atom.belta.by/ru/belaes_ru/view/voennaja-chast-po-oxrane-belaes-
    razmestitsja-na-meste-postojannoj-dislokatsii-v-nachale-janvarja-8954/.
        \5\ ``First stage of military base to guard Belarusian nuclear
    power plant ready in 2016'' http://atom.belta.by/en/belaes_en/view/
    belaes_en/view/first-stage-of-military-base-to-guard-belarusian-
    nuclear-power-plant-ready-in-2016-8091/t_id/1.

         Population within the range of 100 km from the Belarus NPP &
                                Kaliningrad NPP

        International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on emergency preparedness
    and response: territories within the radius of 100 km can require
    evacuation within a day and relocation within a week to a month.
        Belarusian authorities agree that there is a possibility for the
    radiological impact to the environment and people: \6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Based on A.N. Rykov, Director of Belinipenergoprom,
    presentation, 16-06-2010.

      --1000 km--possible short-term restriction for consumption of locally
            produced food;
      --300 km--possible long-term restriction for consumption of certain
            types of food;
      --100 km--possible need for iodine therapy.

        Senator Graham. Well, thank you. That is the model for the
    rest of us right there. You nailed it. Lithuania is doing well.
        Senator Leahy. Get out the checkbook.
    STATEMENT OF HON. EERIK MARMEI, AMBASSADOR, EMBASSY OF
                ESTONIA
        Ambassador Marmei. Thank you. My name is Eerik Marmei. I am
    the Ambassador of Estonia.
        Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, Members of the
    subcommittee.
        Thank you for the invitation to testify before the United
    States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign
    Operations, and Related Programs. It is an honor to be here.
        First, let me emphasize how important the United States'
    steadfast support for the freedom and independence of Estonia
    has been. Our membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is the
    cornerstone of our prosperity and security, and we are mindful
    of the role the United States has played in supporting and
    assisting us.
        As Russia's immediate neighbor, Estonia would like nothing
    more than to have good relations with a democratic Russia,
    including prosperous trade and active everyday relations at all
    levels of society. But shared commitment to the core values of
    democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are indispensable
    pillars for good, neighborly relations.
        We should not be guided by wishful thinking, but by real
    facts. Examples of Russian malign activities in Europe, to name
    but a few, include the Russia-Georgia war, the annexation of
    Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine, provocative activities by
    the Russian military, and interference in Western democratic
    processes including elections. We have learned that inadequate
    responses to such behavior can only feed future transgressions.
        I would like to stress that Russia's ambitions and
    activities are not only of concern to NATO's eastern flank or
    the countries represented at this hearing, but are influencing
    all our allies in the West. Therefore, it is essential not to
    regionalize the Russian threat to Eastern European countries,
    but to clearly recognize that the threat of Russia's subversive
    methods has expanded far beyond the eastern flank of Europe,
    including to the United States. We, as neighbors to Russia, are
    just a bit more used to witnessing such behavior.
        Upcoming elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany
    are a perfect theater for the Russian disinformation warriors.
        The goal of Russia's influence and activities in Europe is
    to create tension and sow confusion between European Union
    member states and within individual states. By doing so, the
    Kremlin hopes to influence the decisionmaking process and steer
    the narrative and outcomes towards its own interests.
        The illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 succeeded
    largely because of a successful information war that allowed
    Russia to avoid a direct military confrontation. It can be
    expected that Russia will use this tactic--extensive
    manipulation of information--to support its military goals in
    order to achieve strategic advantage in the future as well.
    This forces the adversary to doubt and verify the facts, thus
    delaying its response.
        The unity of the West, joint action, and the decision to
    stay the course towards Russia has been the strongest message
    in response to Russian actions so far. To be credible, we need
    to stand by our values and be consistent in our policies. We
    need to take into account that Russia sees itself being in a
    confrontational era with the West for a long time.
        We, the West, need to address the subversive actions in a
    systematic and coordinated way within the European Union and
    NATO, but also in cooperation between these two organizations.
    This should be done in very practical terms. We need to share
    more intelligence on Russia's subversive methods and to decode
    the Russian hybrid method playbook.
        We need to raise the awareness of decision makers and the
    public at large in order to limit the ability to abuse the open
    nature of our societies. We can do it by exposing or countering
    Russia's malign tactics such as covert support to political
    parties and politicians, seemingly innocent NGO's or economic
    leverage gained through murky business connections. Also,
    transparency, regulation, and anti-corruption measures can, and
    should be, strengthened.
        The Kremlin makes extensive use of Russian and foreign
    language media outlets, as well as countless fake social media
    accounts. Merely constant reaction to propaganda is not enough
    and can sometimes even be counter-effective.
        The quality of strategic communication capabilities, and
    the formation of our own messages, needs to be improved. The
    effect of disinformation can be diminished by enhancing
    critical reading skills within intended audiences. The best
    medicine against disinformation is an open and free, high
    quality, and pluralistic media environment offering a variety
    of voices and opinions.
        I firmly believe this subcommittee plays an important role
    in effecting positive change in the areas I have described
    above.
        Funding for initiatives that fall under the State
    Department, USAID, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the
    National Endowment for Democracy, to mention but a few, can all
    contribute to building capability and resilience in Europe in
    order to counter changes Russia is trying to achieve.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to provide you with my
    thoughts and I look forward to answering your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The statement follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Eerik Marmei
        Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy, members of the subcommittee,

        Thank you for the invitation to testify before the United States
    Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
    Related Programs. It is an honor to be here. We are here to discuss an
    important topic: Russia and Europe.
        First, let me emphasize how important the United States' steadfast
    support for the freedom and independence of Estonia has been. Your non-
    recognition policy helped carry us through the darkest days of Soviet
    occupation and we thank you for your unwavering support to join the
    family of nations since we regained our independence. Our membership in
    Euroatlantic institutions is the cornerstone of our prosperity and
    security and we are mindful of the role the U.S. has played in
    assisting us.
        As Russia's immediate neighbor, Estonia would like nothing more
    than to have good relations with a democratic Russia, including
    prosperous trade and active everyday relations at all levels of
    society. But shared commitment to the core values of democracy, human
    rights and the rule of law are indispensable pillars for good-
    neighborly relations. Those values have underpinned the post-war
    international order and we should not abandon them. It is now up to
    Russia to honor those fundamental principles.
        We shouldn't be guided by wishful thinking but by real facts.
    Russia has demonstrated time and time again that it cannot be trusted.
    There is a disturbing pattern of aggressive behavior that dates back at
    least to 2008. We have learned that inadequate responses to such
    behavior can only feed future transgressions.
        Examples of Russia's malign activities in Europe, to name but a
    few, include the Russia-Georgia war, the annexation of Crimea, the war
    in Eastern Ukraine, provocative activities by the Russian military, and
    interference in Western democratic processes, including elections.
        I would like to stress that Russia's ambitions and activities are
    not only of concern to NATO's eastern flank or the countries
    represented at this hearing, but are influencing all our allies in the
    West. We, as neighbors to Russia, are just a bit more used to
    witnessing such behavior. Upcoming elections in the Netherlands,
    France, and Germany are a perfect theatre for the Russian
    disinformation warriors. Therefore, it is essential not to regionalize
    the Russian threat to Eastern European countries, but to clearly
    recognize that the threat of Russia's subversive methods has expanded
    far beyond the ``Eastern flank'' of Europe, including to the United
    States.
        The goal of Russia's influence and activities in the European Union
    is to create tensions and sow confusion both between member states and
    within individual states. By doing so, the Kremlin hopes to influence
    the decisionmaking process and steer the narrative and outcomes towards
    its own interests.\1\ Russia sees the problems ailing the European
    Union--including Brexit, the migrant crisis and the debt crisis--as
    signs of the weakening of the Western-led world order and it seeks to
    reconfigure power relationships in international politics.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Estonian Information Board, 2017. International Security and
    Estonia. http://teabeamet.ee/pdf/EIB_public_report_Feb_2017.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Kremlin makes extensive use of Russian- and foreign-language
    media outlets, as well as countless fake social media accounts. The
    fabricated information often falls on fertile soil in certain circles
    in the EU, who further disseminate the Kremlin's talking points.
        The illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 succeeded largely
    because of a successful information war that allowed Russia to avoid a
    direct military confrontation. It can be expected that Russia will use
    this tactic--extensive manipulation of information to support its
    military goals in order to achieve strategic advantage--in the future
    as well. This forces the adversary to doubt and verify the facts, thus
    delaying its response.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To carry out its foreign policy goals, the Kremlin is increasingly
    reliant on right- and left-wing populist parties arrayed against or
    frustrated by the European Union and NATO. Open or covert sponsoring of
    the numerous populist anti-establishment far-right and far-left
    political movements across Europe lends the Russian message credibility
    and allows it to distance itself officially. We have also seen how the
    Russian diaspora can be instrumentalized and how the Russian Orthodox
    Church and state monopolies can be mobilized to achieve their foreign
    policy goals. President Putin has even managed to use history as a tool
    of warfare.
        The best way to build resilience against Russia's malign influence
    is to make sure our own house is, and remains, in order. Cohesiveness
    of our societies, trust in government and sticking to our fundamental
    values make us less susceptible to such attempts.
        The unity of the West, joint action and the decision to stay the
    course towards Russia, has been the strongest message in response to
    Russian actions so far. To be credible we need to stand by our values
    and be consistent in our policies. We need to take into account that
    Russia sees itself being in a confrontational era with the West for a
    long time. Only a strong, united and efficient Europe can contribute to
    the fight against terrorism and also counter Russian malign influence.
    U.S. backing and cooperation, both with individual countries and
    through Euro-Atlantic institutions is vital to this effort.
        We, the West, need to address the subversive actions in a
    systematic and coordinated way within the EU and NATO, but also in
    cooperation between these two organizations. This should be in very
    practical terms: we need to share more intelligence on Russia's
    subversive methods--to decode ``the Russian hybrid method playbook''.
    We need to raise the awareness of decision makers and the public at
    large in order to limit the ability to abuse the open nature of our
    societies. We can do it by exposing or countering Russia's malign
    tactics such as covert support to political parties and politicians,
    seemingly innocent NGOs or economic leverage gained through murky
    business connections. Also, transparency regulation and anti-corruption
    measures can and should be strengthened.
        Merely constant reactions to propaganda is not enough and can
    sometimes even be countereffective. The quality of strategic
    communication capabilities and the formation of our own messages needs
    to be improved. The effect of disinformation can be diminished by
    enhancing critical reading skills within intended audiences. The best
    medicine against disinformation is an open and free, high-quality and
    pluralistic media environment offering a variety of voices and
    opinions.
        I firmly believe the subcommittee plays an important role in
    effecting positive change in areas I've described above. Funding for
    initiatives that fall under the State Department, USAID, the
    Broadcasting Board of Governors, the National Endowment for Democracy,
    to mention but a few, wisely chosen and strategically deployed, can all
    contribute to building capability and resilience in Europe in order to
    counter changes Russia is trying to achieve.
        In conclusion, I'm sure all the countries represented here would
    like to have good-neighborly and predictable relations with a
    democratic Russia that respects the core values of democracy and
    international law. Unfortunately for the time being, Russia remains a
    common concern for the West as it is an unpredictable and aggressive
    actor in Europe and beyond. Transatlantic unity and a clear, unwavering
    posture in our policy towards Russia will remain crucial in near
    future.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to provide you with my thoughts
    and I look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Graham. Thank you all for coming and informing the
    subcommittee of what you face, a Parade of Horribles when it
    comes to Russia.

                             RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

        Lithuania. There was a recent deployment of German soldiers
    to Lithuania to help train Lithuanian military. I have been
    informed that as soon as the soldiers from Germany arrived,
    there was an allegation that one of the German soldiers had
    raped a Lithuanian woman. Are you familiar with that?
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes, it did not take long, Senator,
    because right after German troops had arrived, because of the
    decisions taken in Warsaw for deployment, German troops are
    leading the battalion in Lithuania.
        It was almost like the second day or the next day of their
    arrival, after their arrival, there was news spread that a
    teenage girl was raped, allegedly, by German troops and it was
    absolutely nonsense. It was fake news. It was cooked and it was
    denied right away.
        But, of course, as you know with fake news, not all people
    are aware listening to the denouncement of this that it is not
    true.
        Senator Graham. Did it come from a Russian outlet, the
    news?
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes, that is what we suspect. It is
    always difficult to get a grip of where it comes from first.
    But yes, that is what we suspect because the very idea is very
    clear: that NATO troops in Lithuania are bad.
        Senator Graham. Have you experienced an uptick of Russian
    involvement since President Obama drew the red line in Syria
    against Assad and nothing happened, or has it been the same the
    whole time? Did that affect Russia's involvement at all or is
    it all about the same?
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, I would not say that there have
    not been some significant changes. While we have been
    experiencing Russian hybrid warfare already for 35 years, well,
    maybe we have become a bit more resilient to it. But certainly,
    it has never stopped.
        Certain narratives are not changing and certain methods are
    still being used. And in that sense, very much has been
    disclosed by journalists as to what are the methods, how
    trolling is being done, and where the fake facts are emerging.
        I would not say that the intensity has changed in the
    course of the last years, but it has not diminished.
        Senator Graham. Is it, then, constant Russian interference
    in your countries? Has it been constant? Is it on the rise?
        Ambassador Marmei. Yes, Chairman, it has been constant as
    my Latvian colleague said. We have experienced this for the
    past 25 years.
        I think what really opened our eyes was the 2007 cyber
    attacks against Estonia; that was politically motivated. And
    even today, the cyber domain remains one of the most important
    areas, and we really need to put more emphasis on this issue as
    well; bilaterally but also in NATO.

                                 U.S. RESPONSE

        Senator Graham. What do you think the consequences would be
    if our country forgave and forgot the interference in our
    election by Russia? What kind of effect do you think that would
    have on Russia?
        The Foreign Minister from the Ukraine.
        Minister Klimkin. Actually, Russia has developed a very
    systemic way on how to use all kinds of unconventional warfare.
        Senator Graham. My question is what would the effect be if
    the United States did not act regarding the interference in our
    election? Would it embolden Russia?
        Minister Klimkin. Well, there should be a clear way of how
    to react to the Russian interference. Otherwise, the Russians
    are always good in exploiting weaknesses.
        Senator Graham. The Ambassador from Poland, do you agree
    with that?
        Ambassador Wilczek. I mean, it is difficult for me to make
    comments on what Americans should do, or should not do, or what
    would happen if Americans did not do something.
        But I think that investigations in such cases are essential
    in all countries and it cannot be covered up. It just should be
    investigated in every case.
        Ambassador Bakradze. To continue what my colleague from
    Poland just said, as I have mentioned in my remarks, as we
    think that international response on the invasion and
    occupation of Georgia was insufficient; that that might have
    led to the further operation of the Russian Federation towards
    the Ukraine, et cetera. I think that international response is
    generally necessary in the violation of international laws.
        Senator Graham. Thank you all. You will have a chance to
    tell the subcommittee specifically what we could do to help you
    regarding Russia on the power side.
        Senator Leahy.
        Senator Leahy. Thank you. This has been very instructive.
    Mr. Klimkin, am I pronouncing that correctly? Thank you.

                          RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

        In 2014, since Russia's annexation of Crimea, the United
    States has supported the Ukrainian Government against pro-
    Russian separatists.
        During our past election campaign, Mr. Trump said we might
    withdraw U.S. support, possibly as a deal with Vladimir Putin,
    and said that he would also look into recognizing and approving
    of Russia's annexation of Crimea.
        Have you or any other senior Ukrainian officials met with
    President Trump or Secretary Tillerson to discuss their policy
    toward the Ukraine?
        Minister Klimkin. I have just met with Secretary Tillerson
    a couple of hours ago, and it was a very strong message of
    support for Ukraine, and that any kind of tradeoffs is not
    possible. And our President had a phone conversation with
    President Trump, and it was the same, a very clear message.
        Senator Leahy. Did he say anything about Crimea?
        Minister Klimkin. No compromise about Crimea, and Crimea is
    the issue about rules and international law.
        Senator Leahy. How important is our aid to Ukraine?
        Minister Klimkin. The U.S. support and U.S. assistance,
    more security-related assistance, and reform-related assistance
    was and is fundamental for the Ukraine in the sense of our
    ability to counter Russian aggression and in the sense of us
    creating a democratic and European Ukraine.
        Senator Leahy. Thank you.
        Ambassador Wilczek, your country, Poland, is uniquely
    positioned geographically between the conflict between Russia
    and Ukraine.
        I assume Russia's deployment of nuclear capable missiles to
    Kaliningrad creates significant challenges for you, am I
    correct?
        Ambassador Wilczek. As I have just said, the deployment of
    these missiles to Kaliningrad is very essential for our
    security. It is a kind of, I think, it was a kind of
    breakthrough moment because it strengthens this feeling of
    insecurity and uncertainty.
        And it is not only about Poland. It is about the
    flexibility of NATO in this region, and it is also about the
    Baltic countries and other countries.
        So this area of the Kaliningrad region is an especially
    sensitive area. And as I said, it is the most militarized area
    in the whole of Europe, I think.
        Senator Leahy. Do you get support from NATO? Do you feel
    that NATO's support is strong?
        Ambassador Wilczek. Yes, we feel enormous support both from
    NATO and bilaterally from the United States. So I think that
    the whole project of deployment and deterrence is implemented
    right now. That we are still being supported fully by the
    United States is essential for our security and is very
    important.

                             RUSSIA AND THE BALTICS

        Senator Leahy. Do you, in the Baltic states, Latvia,
    Lithuania, and Estonia feel any greater or less concern about a
    Russian invasion since the elections here in the United States?
        Ambassador Teikmanis. I think we are concerned since 2014
    or even before that, since 2008, since Georgia or Ukraine.
        We are all concerned because we see the international
    rules-based order is being challenged. And that is a concern
    for all of Europe. It is a concern for all of NATO. And here we
    are considering that the most important principle is the
    indivisibility of NATO territory.
        And it does not matter which part of NATO can be
    challenged. It is a challenge for the whole of NATO in this
    sense: the assurances from NATO, the presence of NATO
    battalions, international battalions on Baltic soil, and
    reassurance given by the United States in particular, that
    gives a strong sense of a strong response to anybody who wants
    to challenge NATO as the strongest military organization. That
    is the only response we can expect from NATO and that is a
    response that is understandable by everybody.
        That gives us, as small nations, a good sense of assurance
    about our security, safety, and stability for the future.
        Senator Leahy. Does anybody disagree with that?
        Ambassador Marmei. If I just may add, Senator, I think what
    we have seen in the past 2\1/2\ years, with the two NATO
    summits, Wales in 2014 and Warsaw last year, have made very
    important decisions. It is important to implement those
    decisions, and we do not see any change in direction in that
    sense.
        This is my answer to the question: Is there a change of
    direction after the elections in the United States? No, we do
    not see that happening. Thank you.
        Senator Leahy. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Graham. Senator Moran.
        Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Mr. Minister and Ambassadors, thank you for joining us.

                                U.S. ASSISTANCE

        As we make decisions about spending money, taxpayer dollars
    of American taxpayers, what would you highlight for me as the
    priorities that we should have in the financial aid that we
    provide your countries? Is there a consensus?
        I mean, I am happy to have one or a few of you respond to
    that if there is consensus in what is the highest priority.
    Ambassador.
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, if I may.
        Probably the programs that have been already mentioned
    today, this is the European Reassurance Initiative or the
    Deterrence Initiative that has already started and financing is
    assured partly. We hope very much that this program will be
    financed fully and maybe even higher.
        As well, foreign military financing received by the Baltic
    States is a very crucial point of improving our resilience, our
    capabilities.
        And third, I would mention are the programs devoted to
    counter hybrid warfare. And these programs can be in different
    shapes, whether it is the strengthening of free media,
    independent media, or countering the propaganda, or countering
    hybrid attacks. All of these programs are doing very relevant
    work to increase resilience.
        Senator Moran. Does anyone wish to add or detract or
    subtract? Minister.
        Minister Klimkin. In the case of Ukraine, it is probably a
    bit different one, but in our case it is definitely about
    upgrading the Ukraine defense and security sector to the NATO
    standards.
        It is about permanent control. It is about training. And it
    is a two-way road because we understand now the sense of hybrid
    warfare and unconventional warfare.
        So it is about exchange, but it is also about weapon
    supplies, especially defensive weapon supplies.
        Senator Moran. Let me ask if any of you have other
    thoughts, if you would get that to the subcommittee, I want to
    ask a couple more questions. So if you can provide that answer
    in writing, I would appreciate it.

                        SANCTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

        Senator Moran. There are some EU members that are chafing
    at the continued imposition of sanctions against Russia.
        In your estimation, what do we need to do to keep EU
    unified in its support for those sanctions? And how significant
    is it that the United States continue its sanctions in that
    effort? Ambassador.
        Ambassador Marmei. Senator, as long as we keep to the
    principle of the Minsk Agreements, there will be unity on both
    sides of the Atlantic in the European Union and the United
    States.
        So this is a very clear message that we should send to
    Russia that Minsk is the basic fundamental agreement that has
    to be fulfilled by all parties. And as long as this is not
    done, the sanctions should continue.
        Ambassador Krisciunas. If I may, Senator, I would add that
    as long as the United States is strong on sanctions and we
    understand that that is the strongest tool we have in our
    toolbox. So that will unite Europe also.
        Senator Moran. U.S. leadership, if I can paraphrase, U.S.
    leadership matters in this regard.
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes.

                                     ENERGY

        Senator Moran. Let me ask a question about energy. There is
    a Rand Corporation study that indicates Estonia, Latvia, and
    Lithuania, and Poland are among the EU members most vulnerable
    to a problem with energy if Russia would take certain actions.
    And yet, there is a 2014 European Commission study that says
    that there are cooperative measures among the EU that could
    significantly reduce the impact of any short-term cutoff of
    supplies of energy.
        Are those measures in place, the things that are thought
    that could reduce the implications of an energy cutoff? Has the
    EU taken the steps necessary to mitigate the damage?
        Ambassador Krisciunas. I would say that building a LNG
    terminal in Klaipeda, Lithuania and building an LNG terminal in
    Poland has changed the situation quite substantially,
    especially for Lithuania and the Baltic States.
        We do believe we are strengthening our inter-linkages
    between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. So we are able to get
    gas from anywhere including LNG from the United States, which I
    do expect to see in the future. So it is no longer possible for
    Russia to blackmail us on the gas.
        On electricity, we still have one big project to come
    synchronization with the Western European grid, which is
    important. It is quite an intricate project. It will take time
    to develop, but that will be the last straw in our
    independence. So that will make the Baltic States purely
    independent and self-sufficient in this regard.
        And I do believe that for the other countries it could be
    different.
        Senator Moran. Georgia and Poland.
        Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much. And let me
    combine it with your first question with regards to Georgia as
    a provider of an alternative diversified route for energy
    supplies for Europe, which is not dependent on Russia.
        We now have two pipelines. The third one is under
    construction, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline. The importance of
    strengthening Georgia and stability in Georgia as one of the
    alternative routes and pathways to supplying the alternative
    energy sources for Europe is critical. And therefore one of the
    main attentions from the United States, we expect, is in the
    energy sector.
        Senator Moran. Thank you.
        Ambassador Wilczek. As far as energy cooperation is
    concerned, I believe and we believe in Poland that it should be
    based on mutual benefit. So it should be beneficial for those
    countries that cooperate, like the United States and the
    countries of Central Europe.
        So this LNG terminal in Poland mentioned by my Lithuanian
    colleague is a very important part of this project of
    diversification.
        There is also a project, which is in progress, of the
    Baltic Pipeline with Denmark and Norway. And, of course, there
    is the very important issue of Nord Stream 2 forced by Russia.
    This is a project which divides the European Union partners
    because, of course, it has been suspended for some time.
        But this is actually interesting that, as far as energy is
    concerned, the European Union should be also the energy union.
    This is an idea very much advertised by Poland that the
    European Union, if it is not an energy union, there is no
    union.
        So we really think about diversification and cooperation
    with the United States especially, as far as LNG is concerned,
    as very important for Central Europe.
        Senator Graham. Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I want to
    specifically thank you, Chairman Graham as well as Ranking
    Member Leahy for convening this hearing, and for assembling
    these important ambassadors and a foreign minister from vital
    European allies of ours. This has focused us in a bipartisan
    way on how we can confront Russian aggression together.
        I am encouraged by your call that we create a counter-
    Russia account specifically to strengthen our allied and
    partner democracies.
        This week is the 150th Anniversary of the creation of the
    Appropriations Committee in the United States Senate, something
    that showed, I think, the wisdom of the founders in recognizing
    that having a strong hand for the Senate in the shaping of our
    investments, including those overseas, was something that has
    enduring relevance.
        I joined my colleague on this subcommittee, Senator Marco
    Rubio of Florida, last week in a bipartisan speech on the floor
    of Congress about the importance of countering Russian
    aggression. We reviewed many of the issues that were raised by
    the witnesses today based on trips that each of us have taken
    to your various countries. We heard from you directly about
    hybrid warfare; about the illegal and inappropriate invasion
    and annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern
    Ukraine; about the importance of our standing in solidarity
    with our allies in Poland and the Baltic States; and the real
    challenges that Georgia has faced, since it was the first of
    you to be illegally invaded, and to have some of its territory
    occupied in an ongoing, disruptive way.
        I just want to mention two bills here in the Senate that
    have already garnered bipartisan support for those who have any
    concern about the absences of bipartisanship here.
        The Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act has 10 Republican
    and 10 Democrat cosponsoring it. It would make Russia pay the
    price for its illegal annexation of Crimea, for the ongoing
    violence in eastern Ukraine, for their support of Assad's
    murderous regime in Syria, and their meddling in our own
    American elections last November.
        The other bill, led by Senator Graham, the Russian Review
    Act, would make certain that congress has to weigh in before
    sanctions against Russia could be waived. I am proud to be a
    cosponsor, as are many on this subcommittee, of these bills.
        We continue to believe that the transatlantic alliance is
    absolutely essential. It is a force for stability in the world,
    to maintain the world order that we worked together to build
    over the last seven decades.
        So let me ask a few questions, if I might.

                                U.S. LEADERSHIP

        There has been a rumored proposal by the administration to
    cut by as much as 37 percent our State Department and USAID,
    which are essential for the funding of many of the programs
    that we have been talking about.
        What would the absence of American leadership in this area
    mean for your countries? Would you feel safer in the face of an
    aggressive Russia if we were to cut back on programs that we
    have just discussed like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and
    other programs that support your resilience both in terms of
    your governance, democracy institutions, and in terms of our
    sustainment of some of the development initiatives?
        Would any of you care to speak to that question?
        Please, Mr. Ambassador.
        Ambassador Wilczek. Senator Coons, I think this is just a
    rhetorical question.
        Senator Coons. Yes.
        Ambassador Wilczek. We will not feel safer when the budget
    for such projects will be essentially cut. So we hope that it
    is just kind of deliberation tweaking, not really a decision
    because this sounds very dangerous.
        But we hope that it still can be changed, and people who
    think this way will change their minds because American
    leadership in this region is essential and you know this very
    well. That there is great support for American leadership in
    this part of Europe, perhaps more than in other parts of
    Europe.
        So we really rely, as countries of the region, on firm
    American leadership and support.

                             BROADCASTING PROGRAMS

        Senator Coons. On a visit I took last August, in addition
    to several visits by my colleagues, I heard about the
    importance of strengthening our investment in countering Russia
    Today, Sputnik, and other propaganda outlets.
        You referenced, Mr. Ambassador, the broadcasting from
    Latvia both for Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio
    Liberty.
        Tell me how Russian propaganda operations are affecting
    your country and how we might strengthen and expand our
    investment in counter Russian propaganda operations that would
    be more effective?
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, to give a short answer,
    probably we are less concerned in Latvia about Russia Today,
    because the programs of Russia Today are being broadcast in
    English.
        Russia has all the opportunities to broadcast in Russian.
    There are major television channels and that is what Russia is
    doing. And Latvia, as a democratic country, is not putting any
    barriers to free speech, to free broadcasting. While at the
    same time we are aware about the content of these programs,
    what is essential is to give an alternative to different
    sources, to reliable sources. To give an alternative of
    broadcasting in Russian, to be understandable, but to be
    objective, reliable, and different from those major television
    channels broadcasting from Russia.

                    OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

        Senator Coons. One last question, Mr. Chairman, to the
    Ambassador from Georgia.
        I understand that the Overseas Private Investment
    Corporation (OPIC) has helped make possible significant
    programs in Georgia over the last 20 years in modernizing
    industries and in agriculture.
        Can you comment at all on the value of OPIC in helping make
    possible mutually beneficial programs in Georgia?
        Ambassador Bakradze. There are several programs that OPIC
    has implemented in Georgia which is really productive, not only
    for developing Georgia, modernizing its economic potential, but
    is also beneficial for both sides.
        And therefore in that regard, I can provide in a more
    detailed way by submitting in a written way more detailed
    information.
        Senator Coons. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Senator Boozman.
        Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                                    GEORGIA

        Ambassador Bakradze, in your testimony you talked about
    Russia creating borders on the edge of territory that is
    occupied in Georgia.
        Can you talk a bit about the recent closing of two of these
    controlled crossing points and the impact that it has had for
    Georgia's territorial integrity?
        Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much, Senator, for that
    question. Very recently, just 2 days ago, Russian controlled
    forces in the Abkhazia and occupied region have closed two
    checkpoints. That is affecting free movement of people. That is
    affecting free movement of school children over the occupation
    line.
        And we are really appreciative of a very strong statement
    that the State Department has made with regards to these
    developments.
        Also one more very recent development was the initiation 2
    weeks ago by the de facto Tskhinvali region authorities to hold
    a referendum about renaming this region into the one associated
    with one of Russia's autonomous republics. And we also
    appreciate the very strong statement that was made by the U.S.
    Department of State in this regard.
        These kinds of developments continue, but we believe in a
    peaceful resolution of this problem. We believe in the Geneva
    discussion where U.S. authorities are actively contributing.
        Thank you.
        Senator Boozman. Thank you. So you were pleased with the
    American response, then, in that regard?
        Ambassador Bakradze. There was a very strong statement just
    yesterday made by the State Department about the closure of
    these two checkpoints with explaining what kind of humanitarian
    difficulties it will create for those people residing adjacent
    to the occupation line.

                                 U.S. PROGRAMS

        Senator Boozman. Let me ask all of you or just whoever
    wants to jump in.
        Which U.S. administered programs in your country seem to
    have the most impact? And are there ways that we can improve
    them? So, what is working? What programs do you like the most
    and how can we make them better?
        Yes, sir.
        Ambassador Bakradze. Thank you very much. We are really
    appreciative.
        We are celebrating 25 years of our diplomatic relations
    this year, and we believe that the U.S. assistance during these
    25 years were essential for the survival, for the
    transformation that Georgia has been through, for creating
    democratic institutions, solidifying civil society, and making
    new opportunities for our people.
        These are the assistance that comes through USAID that
    comes through FMA for supporting Georgia's resilience when it
    comes to the defense and security cooperation, and supporting
    Georgian democracy and the rule of law when it comes to the
    support of the United States.
        We believe there is space for more cooperation on trade,
    economic, and investment direction as we believe that security
    is also coming through economic means.
        Senator Boozman. Yes, sir.
        Ambassador Krisciunas. I would say that any support that
    you could give to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in
    developing their content and strengthening their capacity to
    reach longer distances would matter a lot. So that is the most
    important.
        I, myself, I am still old enough to remember the Soviet
    times when my father was listening. I was a child at that time.
    My father was listening on the radio to Radio Free Europe and I
    know what kind of impact it was. It was eagerly sought every
    evening. There were always plenty of people in Lithuania
    sitting by the radio and listening to it. It was a word of
    freedom.
        So the more words of freedom you could express through the
    region, the more secure the region will be because that will be
    destroying the monopoly on news.
        Senator Boozman. So you like the contact, but strong
    broadcast.
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Yes.
        Senator Boozman. Very good. Yes, sir.
        Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator.
        I would emphasize that in the Estonian case, the most
    efficient funding has come through for military funds and also
    ERI, or the European Reassurance Initiative; so most of the
    American taxpayers' money has gone to these capabilities, but
    also to infrastructure build up.
        We have received about $75 million from the ERI funding in
    the recent 2 years. And we have spent that money on
    infrastructure, but also on the capability development on the
    antitank weapons.
        Also IMF money, which is very important and hopefully it
    will be increased in the coming years, goes to the very
    important capability development.
        Thank you.
        Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Graham. Very quickly.
        Ambassador Wilczek. Yes, if I can add just to what my
    Estonian colleague said.
        The European Reassurance Initiative is most important for
    us and we would like to thank you for just this great increase
    in this program from $1 billion to $3 billion. It is very, very
    essential.
        But also what my colleague mentioned as well, in all kinds
    of exchange of people, all kinds of programs, we do need Radio
    Free Europe and such projects, but not to such an extent as it
    was under communism. Now people can move and can visit each
    other's countries.
        So I think that support for programs like Fulbright and all
    kinds of exchange programs is also very, very important; just
    people going both ways and learning about each other. And I
    think that for strengthening American support, support of the
    American citizens and taxpayers, it is very important that
    American taxpayers also see our countries and see them thanks
    to exchange programs, which I think are now underestimated;
    their role is underestimated.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Senator Durbin.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Just to add my support to what has
    been said of ERI and for the military financing. That is really
    a kind of value added above our own national contribution,
    national investment, and procurement programs that really gives
    a very focused strengthening of all the capabilities. Thank
    you.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you for being here.
        Each of you is welcome to come back to or to visit Chicago,
    which I am honored to represent, where you will find many
    people from your homeland, and you will find many great
    restaurants. Estonia? Not too sure. [Laughter.]
        But for the rest, I guarantee it. It will be well worth the
    journey and we would be honored to have you visit.
        So 3 weeks ago, we had our first break and I decided to
    visit Warsaw, Vilnius, and Kiev for the very reason that we are
    meeting today. Because I knew there was anxiety and concern
    about the future of NATO and the future relationship between
    the United States and your countries.
        And it was a good visit. There were many things I came home
    with from having met with President Poroshenko, having met with
    President Grybauskait?, and with the leaders in Poland, as well
    as so many other countries.
        But I remember one comment particularly from 4 days in
    travel. The man's name was Zbigniew Pisarski, he works for the
    Casimir Pulaski Foundation. We had dinner in Warsaw and he
    asked me a question which goes to the point of the opening made
    by the chairman.
        He said, ``We are wondering if the United States does not
    take the Russian invasion into your election seriously, will
    you take the Russian invasion into Poland seriously?''
        I thought about that question. I have thought about it ever
    since. And I want to salute the chairman here, who has been one
    of the few who has been willing to step up and speak out about
    how this outrage of the cyber attack by the Russians into the
    American election should not go unnoticed and certainly should
    be responded to.
        It is a starting point to our credibility when it comes to
    our relationship with Russia. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman,
    for what you said earlier.
        I could go through a litany, I will not, of my concerns on
    the security side, and most of them have been touched on here
    whether it is Kaliningrad or whether it is the Zapad which the
    Russians are planning to put 100,000 Russian soldiers into
    Belarus in September on the borders of Lithuania, and Poland,
    and the Ukraine.
        And there is a serious concern about what they might do
    next after we have seen what they have done in the Ukraine and
    what they could do with these troops on the border there for
    this so-called military exercise.
        We are concerned about the hybrid war. I had not heard that
    term before, but I heard it throughout my visit. The hybrid
    war, and not just the military side of it, but the cyber side
    of it and the propaganda side of it.

                              U.S. AND NATO FORCES

        I guess my question, in addition to my suggestion. Number
    one, Mr. Chairman, that when we commit NATO forces and our
    allies--Germany in Lithuania, I believe it is UK in Latvia, am
    I correct on that, and Canada into Estonia--I would hope the
    United States would always have a complement of our uniforms
    and forces as part of it.
        It is not a negative thing in terms of their capability,
    but it is a demonstration, a symbol, that the United States is
    committed to this NATO alliance in every one of these
    deployments.
        The other thing I would hope is that in the Ukraine, your
    president, I said to him, ``What do you need?'' And he said,
    ``In the Budapest Agreement, we gave up 1,000 nuclear missiles.
    Can you give us 1,000 antitank missiles?'' And I understood
    what he was saying. They need that for the protection of the
    Ukraine and to stop any incursion of Russians into the rest of
    your country.
        But the point I want to get to is this, Mr. Chairman, and
    that is we have to learn what they have already experienced. We
    have to learn what the Russians have done to you, which led to
    decisions in Lithuania to suspend RT for a number of months
    which led, at some point, to a cyber attack on Estonia, which
    crippled your economy. You have been through these experiences.
    Now we are being threatened with the same thing.
        We can teach you many things about the military. You can
    teach us about these other aspects of the hybrid war and
    prepare us so that the next election is not another victim of
    Russian aggression.
        I know you have talked about this, and I will not dwell on
    it any further because I know Senator Van Hollen would like to
    ask questions too.
        But I thank you all for coming. We value your friendship.
    We value this alliance. It is strong, bipartisan strong in
    Congress.
        Thank you.
        Senator Graham. Very quickly.
        Ambassador Marmei. If I can just respond to Senator Durbin.
    What he raised is a very important issue is the American troop
    presence in the Baltic States.
        You correctly mentioned that there will be an enforced
    forward presence of NATO. As we speak, the British, actually
    are moving into Estonia with 1,200 men. There will be full
    operational capability of these forces by June this year.
        But what I want to emphasize here, and you pointed out, is
    that the American presence in the Baltic States should remain.
    We have company-sized units in each country right now, and we
    would like to see them being embedded to that battalion.
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Chairman, if I may. Supporting 100
    percent what was told by my colleague from Estonia.
        But I just wanted to thank Senator Durbin for his visits to
    those important capitals he mentioned. Those are also very
    important. So it is a part of showing our partnership to the
    world that we are strong together. And so it is very important.
        And I am very encouraged and thankful to all the Senators
    who are visiting our countries to send this very strong
    partnership message. And there are plenty of Lithuanian
    restaurants in Chicago.
        Senator Graham. On that note, Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Well, thank you, Chairman.
        And I have been in five or six of your countries. I was in
    Estonia a year ago in September, when we had a Reserve A-10
    Unit there from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and they
    were back again for an even more extended period of time this
    year.
        But following up on what Senator Durbin said, and it was
    really the question I wanted to pursue anyway.
        We clearly understand Russian improper involvement in our
    elections. It is a wide belief that they are currently involved
    in both the upcoming German and the upcoming French elections.
    But you all have experience with this as well.

                             RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

        And I wondered if you want to share, maybe one at a time,
    some sense of what you saw through RT or through manipulation
    of your infrastructure in ways where you feel like the Russians
    were improperly involved. Or everybody, maybe in a couple of
    cases, understands improper involvement in your election
    situation, if you could share some of that with us that would
    be helpful.
        And I am wondering if we could just start maybe, Ambassador
    Marmei, with you?
        Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator.
        I think one of the very clear operations of influence that
    I mentioned earlier also was the cyber attack in 2007. We see
    those cyber hackings on a daily basis. It is continuous.
        I think it is also important to point out that the Kremlin-
    backed Russian language television and media channels are
    trying to influence the Russian speaking population in Estonia
    and in other countries. It is not specifically an Estonian
    issue. It is everywhere else. We have to really deal with this.
        We have, 2 years ago, opened an Estonian broadcasting
    company Russian language channel to counter that propaganda.
        I think what we see is also a lot of intimidation when it
    comes to the security of our borders and airspace; the
    violation of air and maritime borders. We had to deal with this
    as well.
        We have to deal with the support of, or the influence of,
    the NGO's in our countries as well and also academia.
        Senator Blunt. That would be Russian influence.
        Ambassador Marmei. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blunt. I am going to run out of time here.
        I will say that the visit that I made there a year ago, I
    think 1 of the 2 days that I was there with our A-10 pilots,
    the Russians were practicing invading Estonia 20 miles away
    from the Estonian border, and it was very publicly clear that
    that was the purpose of that exercise.
        Mr. Krisciunas, anything in Lithuania you would want to
    talk about?
        Ambassador Krisciunas. Well, I would say, Senator that of
    course it is difficult to influence the election in Lithuania
    probably for Russian propaganda, even though I would say they
    are clearly probably trying in there.
        But because in Lithuania, there is almost like 80 percent
    support of EU membership and NATO, so it is very difficult. It
    is not popular to go against those topics which Russia would
    like to destroy.
        So what we see is the efforts by some media outlets to put
    doubt on NATO relevance or to be cooked with fake news which
    would show to the Lithuanian public that, ``The Americans are
    not with you. They are looking the other way,'' and things like
    that.
        So the fake news of a similar nature would be the ones
    which are being cooked in Lithuania, trying to cast a doubt, of
    course, in general of the people believing in the government,
    believing in the NATO and trying to push, for example, NATO.
    Let us be neutral. ``Why should Lithuania be a NATO member? Let
    us be neutral.''
        So it seems like it is a very vague message. It is not like
    against NATO but, ``Why are we not neutral? We are not a
    militaristic Nation,'' and so on. So that is the kind of news
    which is being probably most exploited in Lithuania.
        Senator Blunt. Ambassador Teikmanis.
        Ambassador Teikmanis. Well, I can join the assessment of my
    colleagues in three directions we are facing when we see hybrid
    warfare.
        One is Russian television channels that are broadcasting in
    Russian. And the major narrative is probably linked eternally
    to the Baltic States, but also to the European Union.
        And its narrative tells us that, ``The European Union is
    economically collapsing, and that was a great strategic mistake
    by the Baltic States to have joined to the European Union. And
    the only way to get back to prosperity and welfare is to come
    back to Russia and through the Russian economy, get to high
    welfare.''
        Another way is financing of NGO's. While the people in the
    NGO's are not so numerous--and each of them are working at
    several NGO's--they are financed by different kinds of Russian
    Foundations, and have very nice names linked to the
    ``protection of human rights,'' or ``European research,'' or
    whatever. And they are pretending to be fighting for the rights
    of Russian speakers while allegedly developing another
    narrative that Russian speakers in, for instance, Latvia are
    abused and facing massive abuse of their human rights.
        And probably the third I would mention is rather strong
    work in social media spreading out different fake news and
    trolling.
        Or as we saw quite recently--well, that is another
    indication probably whether the news is important--for warfare
    just when preparation for Atlantic Resolve started and U.S.
    troops started to move to Poland from Germany. Well, the news
    headline appeared on different websites that over 3,000 NATO
    tanks were rolling towards the Russian border. Well, that was
    spread out in news lines and social media.
        Senator Blunt. Well, thank you.
        I think the point, Chairman, here is well taken that there
    is a lot we can learn by sharing what we learned from what
    happened here, but also looking at what our friends have
    consistently dealt with for two decades now. And thank you for
    letting me use a little extra time.
        Senator Graham. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, I think
    that is one of the central questions of this whole hearing.
        If the ones who did not comment could put into writing
    examples of interference in your election system, that is very
    important.
        Senator Graham. Senator Van Hollen.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Mr. Minister, and Ambassadors for your testimony today.
        Mr. Chairman, it is great to be on this subcommittee. And I
    want to join our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to thank you
    for your leadership in general and for putting together this
    hearing because Russian interference in our elections is not a
    democratic party issue. It is not a republican issue. It is an
    American issue. In fact, it is an issue obviously important to
    democratic countries around the world, as all of you are
    testifying to today.
        You have had this experience over many, many years with
    both the military challenges and threats, but also the
    intimidation through various means of propaganda. The
    propaganda invasion is a little bit new to the United States in
    terms of our elections. We are seeing it, as Senator Blunt
    said, in the upcoming elections in France and Germany.
        And Mr. Chairman, I would agree with your opening
    statement, which is that if we do not respond, then we will
    allow those actions to be encouraged. If they can do this kind
    of interference with impunity, they will do it again and again
    and again.
        So I support the legislation that would, first of all,
    require congressional consent before we roll back any
    sanctions. And I also support the legislation that would go
    further. I think we need to now impose sanctions on a
    bipartisan basis to send the signal you are talking about
    because if we do not do it, we are simply going to be
    encouraging this kind of interference in elections going
    forward.
        And I appreciate the testimony from all of you as to the
    lessons learned, and look forward to getting some of the
    written observations from others.

                                 CYBER WARFARE

        I would say that, obviously, we need to strengthen our
    cyber capabilities across the board. I mean, this is the new
    dimension of security, of warfare and I am pleased that my
    State of Maryland is the home of the U.S. Cyber Command.
        And Ambassador Marmei, I know Estonia takes the lead in
    NATO with respect to cyber security. We also have a good
    relationship between the Maryland National Guard and your
    efforts on behalf of NATO, and look forward to strengthening
    those ties.
        With respect to cyber security, what I would ask is very
    quickly for each of you to try and grade what you think are our
    current capabilities, and whether you think this is an area
    where we need to put more resources, and how vulnerable are we
    today? We know the Russians are very involved every day in
    trying to penetrate our systems.
        And I would, starting with you Ambassador Marmei, because
    of Estonia's lead within NATO, if you could give us some
    assessment of where you think we are.
        Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator. We have good news
    and bad news, I think, or bad news and good news.
        First of all, I would too, also thank you for the really
    good cooperation that Estonia and Maryland have enjoyed in the
    past 25 years especially the cooperation between Estonia, and
    the Armed Forces, and your National Guard. Your 175th Air Wing
    has been to Estonia. You have 21 planes there, 18 of those have
    been to Estonia. So this is excellent. And also the cooperation
    with your cyber defense unit there is developing very fast.
        Now it is clear, as you pointed out, that cyber is the new
    domain of warfare. What is good is that NATO really recognized
    that last year during the Warsaw Summit, and clearly pointed
    out that cyber warfare is the fourth domain of warfare. But a
    lot remains to be done in this area.
        We have to be, all our countries individually have to put
    more resources into that, but we should also collectively deal
    with these issues also on a bilateral basis between the
    relevant countries. But also with NATO which, as you know,
    Estonia hosts the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence. I would
    encourage you when you talk about the further funding of the
    countering of hybrid warfare to find more resources to put to
    that Center as well, and to have more people in NATO
    Headquarters also to deal with this issue.
        It will not fade away. It will, this issue will be with us
    for the good part of this century, I think. So we have to
    really put more emphasis in this.
        Thank you.
        Senator Graham. And everyone else can, in writing, respond
    as we are running out of time.
        There is a vote being called any minute now and there are a
    couple of Members of the subcommittee on the way. So I want to
    make sure everybody can ask questions.
        Very briefly, what have I learned? There has been a
    systematic effort to undermine democracies in your countries by
    Russia for years.
        Does everybody agree with that statement?
        Let the record reflect an affirmative answer.
        Prior efforts to deter Russia have failed. They are getting
    more aggressive not less.
        Affirmative answer.
        Without American leadership, nothing will work.
        Affirmative answer.
        All right. Who do we have? We have two Members on the way.
    Senator Van Hollen, do you want to continue until they come?
        Senator Van Hollen. Well, Chairman, I think--and this is a
    discussion for Members of Congress--I do believe that as you
    have indicated that we need to come together across party lines
    to respond. And we need to learn from your own experiences the
    kind of measures that we need to be on the, one, lookout for.
    But we also need to be very focused on what we are doing.
        Let me ask you this. If the United States does not take any
    affirmative action beyond what President Obama already did with
    respect to the Russian interference in our elections, do you
    believe that would embolden Russia to take these actions on an
    even larger scale in your countries and other democracies
    around the world?
        Senator Graham. And for the record, you can answer that
    because we have Senator Daines, if that is okay. That is a very
    good question, but I want to make sure that everybody can ask
    questions.
        Senator Daines.
        Ambassador Marmei. I think this is real important to show
    unity and resolve. To do it individually on a bilateral basis
    between our countries, but also through NATO and in our case in
    the European Union, which is a very important organization for
    us.
        So a lot remains to be done, but we have to show resolve
    and unity otherwise what you describe will become true.
        Senator Graham. Senator Daines. I have been told the vote
    is on, so we have about 7 or 8 minutes, probably.
        Senator Daines. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome. Thank you for being here, and in representing your
    respective countries, and your interest in the United States.
        The United States values our strong relationships and our
    alliances, and strengthening these ties can help improve the
    security, and certainly the stability, across Eastern Europe.
        Many of you also represent NATO allies. This alliance has
    proven to be an effective and steadfast bulwark against
    aggression and terrorism in Eastern Europe and around the
    world. It is critical that NATO remains strong and continues to
    receive robust support from the United States, particularly in
    light of ongoing Russian aggression that undermines regional
    stability and threatens our national security.
        Russian interference is not limited to the security fear
    either. Disinformation campaigns seeking to discredit alliances
    such as NATO, cyber attacks, or substantially raising energy
    costs as a means to influence other countries have occurred far
    too frequently.

                                RUSSIAN THREATS

        Ambassador Wilczek, what threats from the Kremlin do you
    view as the most imminent, whether it is to Poland, NATO, or
    the region as a whole?
        Ambassador Wilczek. Threats from Kremlin, which threats?
        Senator Daines. Yes. Which threats do you view from Kremlin
    as most imminent, most urgent, whether it is to Poland, to
    NATO, or the region as a whole?
        Ambassador Wilczek. I think it is to the whole Western
    world or the transatlantic alliance, I would say, both Europe
    and the United States.
        Now, the cyber war is going on every day all the time and
    it is a threat for everyone because it does not depend on how
    far you are from the Kremlin. You can be 500 miles, you can be
    5,000 miles, and you can be a dictatorship or a democracy.
    There are various ways of using this hybrid war and the cyber
    war. So I think that everyone is vulnerable.
        And what is essential to our countries to be in our message
    to NATO and the United States and our countries to be
    unambiguous. What is the most dangerous thing, I think,
    especially as far as the war against the Ukraine is concerned
    is that many messages from the various countries are not
    unanimous. It is not univocal. It is not clear cut that this is
    the war.
        I think this should be stated openly that there is Crimea,
    there is Donbas. There is a war against the Ukraine. And I
    think that there is also a war, a cyber war, against so many
    other countries.
        Senator Daines. So in light of that, what in your view
    would be the very best and most effective response to Putin's
    hybrid efforts to advance his goals whether it is energy,
    informational, or cyber?
        Ambassador Wilczek. Well, it is energy, and information,
    and cyber.
        I think that first of all the cooperation on energy should
    be strengthened. And the position, for example, of the European
    Union, again, should be unambiguous because it is dividing the
    Union when various countries have various opinions about energy
    cooperation.
        So I think the cooperation of this region with the United
    States should be strengthened as far as energy is concerned.
        And I think that today, I have just returned from a
    conference on cyber security organized by the Visegrad
    countries--Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary--and I
    think that we are still not aware how important this new kind
    of war is conducted today.
        So I think cyber should be the most important, the most
    essential way of cooperation.

                                     ENERGY

        Senator Daines. You brought up the issue of energy as well
    as cyber. I want to switch gears here.
        Ambassador Marmei, as you know, or may not know, my home
    State of Montana is one of the leading energy producing states
    in the United States. In fact, we have more recoverable coal
    than any State in the United States.
        Montanans understand the importance of and access to
    reliable and an affordable source of energy, and undoubtedly,
    so do Estonians.
        The question is how dependent is your country on Russia for
    its energy needs and what concerns does that raise?
        Ambassador Marmei. Thank you, Senator, for this question.
        I think Estonia enjoys a rather different situation in the
    region in the sense that we are not reliant on Russian energy.
    The only energy that we use or import from Russia is gas, but
    it only forms about 7 percent of the total energy consumption.
    Estonians are reliant on oil shale, which we generate to
    produce electricity. So in that sense, we are not really
    dependent on Russia.
        But there is a bigger issue here, which is that as long the
    region, the Baltic region is still considered as an energy
    island inside the European Union, then it is not a matter of
    how dependent Estonia is. But the question really is how safe
    the whole region can be from the Russian energy influence and
    tools?
        Senator Daines. So would the region be more secure if that
    dependence was on the United States versus Russia?
        Ambassador Marmei. Well, the United States plays a very
    important role here, especially when it comes to LNG and the
    export to Europe, which is, I understand, the issue of
    licensing. And this is clearly what Lithuania is looking
    forward to getting more American LNG to Europe, to Lithuania.
        Also it is important to mention that Estonia actually
    exports 30 percent of our gas from Lithuania today. So it is
    only 8 percent from Russia. And this shows how important the
    connections between these countries are when it comes to
    pipelines and then power grids.
        Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Graham. Thank you all.
        We have just a few minutes left on the vote. Senator Rubio
    is in another committee hearing and he cannot make it by 4:15,
    which is the time we have to all leave. So I will make sure he
    can ask you questions in writing. I know he has been very, very
    good on this issue.
        To all of you, thank you for coming. This has been eye
    opening, at least to me and I am sure to every member of the
    subcommittee. My goal is to inform the American people of the
    risks that you have being in the backyard of Russia as a
    democracy. That they are coming after us, France, and Germany
    until somebody stops them. And we are going to try to give you
    more tools in your toolbox to fight back because the safer you
    are, the safer we will be.
        To all of you, thank you very much. You have been very
    brave to come here today and to our friends in the Ukraine,
    keep your chin up. I think the Ambassador from Poland got it
    right. We need to get the Ukraine right before anything else
    will happen.
        Every effort to stop Russia in the past, whether it be
    Georgia, the Ukraine, you name it, is clearly not working. My
    goal is to come up with something that will work. I want a
    better relationship with Russia, but that never will be
    achieved until Russia changes its practice of trying to grind
    democracy into the ground.
        I can understand why Putin is afraid of democracy. I cannot
    understand why America and others will not defend it.
        I just met with President Trump. I think you are going to
    have a good ally in President Trump in terms of having a
    rotational troop presence in a permanent fashion. That the
    Ukraine will be helped more and not less, and that we will push
    back against all Russian aggression.
        I look forward to working with him and my Democratic and
    Republican colleagues to give you some hope in the region that
    America is back. This subcommittee hearing is just the
    beginning of what I think will be a long journey.
        Our next hearing will be March 29, and we will look at
    civil society's perspective on Russia and Russia's regional
    influence.
        To all of you, thank you very much. Your country is in our
    thoughts and prayers, and I want you to see in America a more
    reliable ally in the future. Thank you.
        The record will be open until Friday.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the witnesses for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                   Questions Submitted to Hon. Pavlo Klimkin
                     Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs
                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. Ukrainian security services have clear evidence of Russia's
    constant attempts to interfere in elections in Ukraine by using a
    variety of cyber tools, as well as other methods. This submission will
    focus on events that took place in 2014. Subsequent and more recent
    attacks are the subject of ongoing investigations. Once these
    investigations are concluded, we will be happy to provide that
    additional information as it becomes available and when its release
    into public domain would not compromise the national security interests
    of Ukraine.
        On May 22, 2014, ahead of the Presidential elections in Ukraine
    scheduled for May 25, 2014, the ``Elections'' Unified Information
    Analysis System (designed to announce preliminary results on the
    process of voting and counting of votes) was blocked. The computer
    system of the Central Election Commission (CEC) was rendered inoperable
    and most of the data files were deleted or made inaccessible. Malware
    was detected in the CEC's LAN, part which could not be neutralized by
    the licensed Russian-made ``Kaspersky"antivirus software installed in
    the system. Ukrainian specialists managed to promptly address the
    threat and to minimize negative consequences of the external
    interference.
        On May 23, 2014, hacker group ``CyberBerkut'' (which, according to
    available data, is controlled by the Russian secret service FSB
    (Federal Security Service) and is responsible for cyber attacks on
    information infrastructure of Ukrainian state institutions) released
    files and official correspondence from the Ukrainian CEC computers,
    including network and cyber security technical documentation, as well
    as passwords to all network devices, on its site cyber-berkut.org.
        Ukrainian security experts revealed that over 20 CEC's LAN
    computers, including the server, were infected with the malware, later
    detected as ``Sofacy'' virus (created by ART28 hacker group). This
    group reportedly acts in the interests of the Russian Federation's
    secret services and was involved in targeted cyber attacks on
    electronic information resources in Ukraine, European countries and the
    USA. The virus is intended to steal restricted information and make
    destructive impact on electronic information resources, including
    software. It is characterized by high immunity toward detection and
    neutralization by antivirus software.
        As the hacking activities against the ``Elections'' system were
    carried out on the eve of the extraordinary Presidential elections in
    Ukraine, they are evidence of an attempt by the Russian secret services
    to discredit the Ukrainian authorities as unable to organize elections
    at the regional and national levels and, in its turn, to disrupt the
    election as the whole.
        As another evidence of Russia's attempt to influence the electoral
    process, there was publication (starting from 8 pm on May 25, 2014) by
    the Russian media (TV and online outlets) of a fake report on an
    alleged victory of Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the ``Right Sector'' (party
    labeled by Russia as an instigator of the Revolution of Dignity and
    portrayed as an ``anti-Russian ultranationalist and fascist group'').
        The CEC server was externally infected by malicious software
    designed to display fake statistical voting results at a set time
    (Dmytro Yarosh--37.13 percent, Poroshenko--29.63 percent, Tymoshenko--
    11.42 percent etc.).
        The mentioned malware was neutralized in a timely fashion by the
    Ukrainian specialists. Nevertheless, as the Russian special services
    were not aware that it was detected, the Russian media started to share
    (at a specific time) the fake news of Dmytro Yarosh's victory at the
    Presidential elections in Ukraine.
        Moreover, aside from interfering in Ukraine's elections, Russia has
    used its special forces to conduct, at the barrel of a gun, its own
    elections in the territory of Ukraine. As the U.S. is well aware, in
    2014, in the course of a Special Forces operation on the Ukrainian
    Crimean peninsula, Russia staged an illegal referendum. The results of
    this referendum have been used by the Kremlin to illegally occupy
    Crimea. Furthermore, the results of that referendum and the attempted
    illegal annexation have never been recognized by Ukraine, the United
    States or the rest of the international community. There have also been
    attempts to hold similar sham referendums in the specific areas of
    Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, currently controlled by Russia and Russia-
    backed terrorists. Such attempts, as well as Russia's ongoing
    interference in Ukraine's electoral system, are part of Russia's hybrid
    warfare against Ukraine.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
        Question. Has the Minsk II process failed? Is there an alternative
    to Minsk II?
        Answer. Ukraine remains committed to the unconditional
    implementation of the Minsk Agreements in their entirety and takes
    consistent action to this end.
        Nevertheless, the Minsk peace process falters, but not because of
    Minsk documents' defect in content and form, while some elements really
    seem to be rather uneasy compromises. It falters because Moscow does
    not want to do anything at all, for Kremlin needs neither Donbas, nor
    its population.
        Russia still considers Ukraine as a part of its core geopolitical
    interests, which, if realized, would mean the end to Ukraine's European
    and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
        As a result, almost 2 years and a half have passed since signing of
    the first Minsk document, but peace still has not come to Donbas.
    Despite Ukraine's and its allies' joint efforts to resolve the conflict
    peacefully, Russia continuously denies all its obligations claiming its
    non-involvement in what Russia calls ``Ukrainian internal conflict''.
    Under such circumstances, it seems almost impossible to ensure proper
    implementation of the Minsk documents as Ukraine and its partners, on
    one hand, and Russia--on another, have such polar perceptions of the
    nature of the conflict.
        Recently, Russia has made a number of very controversial steps,
    which have nothing to do with its commitments under the Minsk
    agreements, but clearly testify Kremlin's willingness to raise stakes
    and test the reaction of the West. In particular, Kremlin made a formal
    decision to recognize ``documents'' issued by illegal entities of
    certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, which
    means Moscow's recognition of its de facto occupation of the certain
    areas of Donbas.
        Moscow also backed `grabbing' of local state and private economic
    entities operating in the Ukrainian legal environment by the members of
    illegal armed formations (IAFs) and mastered their ``formal decision''
    to recognize Russian rouble as ``the only currency''.
        Moreover, Russia is destroying the industrial potential of Donbas
    by looting local plants and factories, dismantling the most profitable
    and valuable industrial assets and moving them to the Russian
    territory. It was Russia which issued formal permissions to 243 Russian
    enterprises to ``conduct foreign trade operations'' with ``business
    entities'' from the certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of
    Ukraine through the Government-uncontrolled section of Ukraine-Russia
    border.
        By taking the above measures, Russia derails the Minsk peace
    process, simultaneously shifting the responsibility for the possible
    collapse of the Minsk Agreements on Ukraine. Kremlin's clear goal is to
    get rid of the international sanctions or at least to ease the
    sanctions' pressure.
        In order to unblock the Minsk as the single peace option we should
    jointly create such tough conditions under which Russia will think at
    least twice before taking any unfriendly actions towards Ukraine in
    breach of Kremlin's commitments under the Minsk Agreements. In this
    regard, we ask the United States to consider the following options:

      --To strengthen sanctions;
      --To strengthen the U.S. involvement in the multinational support of
            Ukraine in its negotiations with Russia, aimed at
            implementation of the Minsk agreements, de-occupation of Donbas
            and Crimea;
      --To provide Ukraine with defensive military aid and to enhance the
            exchange of intelligence information;
      --To assist Ukraine in training its military personnel;
      --To support OSCE/SMM activities in Ukraine and enhancement of its
            technical capacities;
      --To provide expertise and financial support of the bold reform
            agenda;
      --To invest in Ukraine's economy; and
      --To provide continuous political and diplomatic support regarding
            Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted to Hon. Piotr Wilczek
                 Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Poland
                 Question Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
        Question. Poland has played a leading role in sanctions against
    Russia, following Russia's intervention in Ukraine. How would you amend
    or bolster sanctions on Russia, moving forward?
        Answer. Poland remains a strong proponent of the sanctions policy
    toward Russia. There are no grounds for softening or lifting the
    sanctions. The reasons behind their deployment are still valid: Russia
    occupies Crimea and is actively fueling the conflict in Eastern
    Ukraine.
        Moscow shows no sign of good will. What's worse, its rolling out a
    set of measures that could lead to a creeping annexation of Eastern
    Ukraine, i.e.:

      --The recognition of ID cards issued by separatists in Donetsk and
            Lugansk;
      --The introduction of the Russian ruble as the official currency in
            areas controlled by separatists; and
      --Calling the contact line between the two sides a ``state border''.

        The sanctions, and more importantly, the countersanctions
    introduced by Russia had a severe impact on the Polish economy.
    According to the econometric analysis, our GDP shrank by 0.3 percent.
    Yet, we are ready to pay this price in order to protect the basic
    values underpinning international law, such as the peaceful coexistence
    of the nations and the inviolability of sovereign states.
        We hope that the United States will continue to support Poland and
    the EU in the goal of improving the situation in the region. To this
    end, the international community must speak with a strong and coherent
    voice.
        We saw an added value in the process of coordinating the sanctions
    regime between the UE, the United States, Canada, Japan and other
    important players. We believe that this process, which was suspended
    last year, should be restored.
        Should the situation in Ukraine deteriorate due to Moscow's
    actions, we should be ready to implement even stronger restrictive
    measures. Different ideas and proposal with this regard have already
    been discussed among the EU Member States and its partners upon placing
    current sanctions (e.g. enlarging the list of sanctioned persons and
    entities, imposing stricter conditions with regard to present economic
    sanctions or widening their scope to new sectors).
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. We haven't noticed direct Russian interferences in the
    electoral process in Poland. However, 2015 saw the creation of a pro-
    Russian party in our country (``Zmiana'', i.e. ``The Change''). Openly
    pro-Russian, its members support Moscow's aggressive policy towards
    Poland and other members of the international community.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted to Hon. David Bakradze
                         Ambassador, Embassy of Georgia
                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. Russia has always demonstrated interest toward Georgia's
    election processes and has, through various means, attempted to affect
    them. However, Russia could not have produced such an effect on the
    domestic election outcome via cyber-attacks owing to the fact that
    Georgia simply does not employ the electronic system and ballots for
    vote counting.
        In view of this, Russia utilized propaganda as a tool to influence
    the elections by creating an overall atmosphere, where anti-Western
    sentiments are reinforced and pro-Russian positions/attitudes are
    shaped and supported.
        In fact, the Russian propaganda enlists Russian as well as some
    Georgian language media outlets, Russian non-governmental
    organizations, and their Georgian partners along with the domestic pro-
    Russian political parties and movements to actively promote the Russian
    narrative and anti-Western attitudes in the Georgian population.
        In Georgia, Russian propaganda makes use of television as one of
    its key instruments. According to the latest survey, 90 percent of
    Georgia's population stated that television was their main source of
    information. It is noteworthy, however, that the number of pro-Russian
    Internet publications is increasing in line with the growing figure of
    Internet users in the country.
        The instruments of aggressive Russian propaganda represented in
    Georgia include the Kremlin-run Russian television channels that
    operate freely thanks to the pluralistic media environment in the
    country. The Russian information agency ``Sputnik'' must be set apart
    in that context, as it runs not only an online portal, but also a 24-
    hour radio broadcast.
        Russian propaganda is actively engaged in social media and online
    publications. The printed media that has quite a substantial
    circulation in Georgia, is rife with Russian propaganda, anti-Western,
    and, specifically, anti-American narrative and mantras.
        In recent years, Russia has actively utilized non-governmental
    organizations as a means of exerting influence via the so-called ``soft
    power'' tools. Recent Russian strategic documents set out a specific
    budget for funds that have been created for the purpose of mobilizing
    public opinion in favor of, and reinforcing support for Russia's
    political agenda--altogether carrying an ulterior motive of
    discrediting the West.
        Generally, the Georgian population is not easily receptive of
    public proclamation of pro-Russian ideas. Therefore, the pro-Russian
    political parties rarely declare their pro-Russian sentiments publicly;
    however, there have been some exceptions. For instance, during the run
    up to the 2016 parliamentary elections, a pro-Russian party
    ``Tsentristebi'' (The Centrists) ran a television campaign ad
    (including via the state sponsored ``Public Broadcaster'') in which the
    party issued a promise to its electorate that, in case of victory, they
    would legitimize the Russian military bases existent in Georgia's
    occupied territories, and ensure the payment of Russian pensions in the
    country. Following this development, the leadership of the ``Public
    Broadcaster'' reached a decision to suspend the airing of this campaign
    ad on the grounds that it contained messaging that was directed against
    the state sovereignty, and was violating the supreme law of the land--
    the constitution of the Georgian state. In light of such resistance,
    the political parties loyal to Russia directed their efforts toward
    propagating anti-Western narratives instead of concentrating on the
    dissemination of pro-Russian ideas.
                                     ______

               Question Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
        Question. Since 1995, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
    (OPIC) has committed over $500 million across 48 projects in Georgia to
    stimulate private sector investment, rebuild war-torn buildings,
    modernize industries, and position Georgia for a more stable and
    prosperous future. How have OPIC investments in the agriculture sector,
    among others, helped to build a more resilient Georgia that is less
    vulnerable to Russia?
        Answer. There is much to be said for OPIC's share in helping to
    build a more resilient Georgia that is less vulnerable to Russia. OPIC,
    together with the USAID and other donor agencies, provide western
    capital investments to Georgia, which foster economic and political
    stability in the country. Such agencies have introduced the western
    model of doing business and corporate governance into the country and
    this has helped improve the exportability of Georgian goods and
    increased the diversity of the country's export markets. The OPIC's
    mandate is to promote private investments and while doing so OPIC is
    greatly contributing to the expansion of US-Georgian business ties. The
    OPIC investment policy is based on measuring the developmental score of
    projects and this is one of the key criteria that the Corporation
    considers when approving loans. Thus, all projects financed by OPIC are
    geared towards aiding Georgia's further development as well as ensuring
    return on U.S. investments by requiring at least 25 percent involvement
    from American companies.
        OPIC has been investing in Georgia since 1993. The Corporation has
    played an important role in the development of different sectors of the
    Georgia's economy, including: the financial sector, tourism,
    healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, education, mining, renewable
    energy, real estate and hotel industries. OPIC also contributes to the
    development of small and medium size businesses and is very effective
    in providing affordable loans directly to the qualified businesses.
        Issues like local jobs, sustainable employment, worker rights, host
    country benefits, transfer of knowledge, transfer of know-how and
    environmentally friendly solutions are all very important elements of
    OPIC projects in Georgia. Thereby, practically every OPIC project in
    the country can be considered as a part of the Impact Investment
    Strategy.
        The 2008 war with Russia displaced thousands of people from their
    homes and delayed the economic growth of the country. Today, 20 percent
    of Georgia's territory is under Russian occupation. Traditionally, the
    Kartly region, the one most affected by the Russian invasion was known
    for fruit and vegetable production. The population of this region
    supported their families through agriculture.The OPIC financed projects
    in the agriculture sector create employment opportunities for low
    income families that are most susceptible to Russian propaganda. More
    than half of the country's population is employed/self-employed in the
    agricultural sector (although, it constitutes only 9 percent of
    Georgia's GDP), therefore, agricultural projects are essential, as they
    help generate income for IDPs as well as much of Georgia's general
    population.
        The OPIC projects in the agriculture sector also contribute to food
    security in the country. Thanks to the year-round production of
    vegetables and new technologies in the agricultural sector that OPIC
    provides, Georgian consumers became less dependent on imported food
    products, especially from Russia.
        Some of the hallmark investments carried out by OPIC in Georgia's
    agriculture sector include as follows:

        1.  Teliani Valley Winery: OPIC helped the company increase its
    production capacity and produce greater quantities of quality Georgian
    wines. This was one of the earliest private investments into the
    Georgian wine industry, which has traditionally been Georgia's number
    one export commodity. Teliani Valley annually exports around 5-7
    million bottles of wines to European, American and Chinese markets. The
    ability to comply with the highest quality standards, which in
    themselves require heavy capital expenditure into the production
    facilities and equipment, made it possible for the company to diversify
    its export markets, thereby making it virtually independent of the
    Russian market.
        2.  Sante Walsh Products: This is a dairy product plant that
    produces around 100 sorts of various products with 50 million liters of
    milk and milk powder utilization capacity. The company collects around
    10 million liters of natural milk from 2,000 local farmers. This was
    the first local, Georgian, producer of dairy products that introduced
    quality standards. Prior to this, the market was dominated by Russian
    dairy products.
        3.  Cold Storage & Refrigerator in Poti: This OPIC project allows
    for the storage of fruits and vegetables produced in western Georgia
    according to EU standards. This storage acts as a collection center for
    local farmers, who are keen to export to European markets since supply
    is relatively low, and, therefore, there is a waiting period that
    ensures that the required capacity of goods is reached prior to export.
    The modern shock freezing technology provides farmers and traders with
    the ability to store their produce in the cold storage and export it to
    the EU market within a week, thereby, substituting the Russian export
    market.
        4.  Wendy's Georgia: The roll-out of Wendy's restaurants in the
    country boosted the local production of raw meat and meat products.
    Moreover, some of the vegetables used by the restaurants will soon be
    of Georgian production.

        It is noteworthy that in other sectors OPIC has supported two
    educational projects in Georgia, which ensure that the younger
    population has broader access to western standard curricula and quality
    of education. Additionally, OPIC is financing the first hospital
    project in Tbilisi that will be in compliance with JCI standards and
    provide citizens with high quality healthcare.
        Successes in the OPIC funded projects creates certain confidence
    for U.S. and other companies to closer evaluate the investment climate
    of Georgia and ultimately make sound and profitable investments.
    Increased engagement from U.S. companies not only contributes to the
    economic development of the country but serves as a strong
    reinforcement to the security of Georgia and the region as a whole.
        OPIC's involvement in, and effect on Georgia, including the
    country's agricultural sector, is hard to overestimate. Along with the
    funds allocated by other U.S. donors, the OPIC's engagement in Georgia
    exemplifies the effective spending of U.S. taxpayers dollars,
    especially considering the positive outcomes of the allotted investment
    in Georgia. The country stands ready to further continue its
    cooperation with OPIC to help ensure positioning Georgia for a more
    stable and prosperous future.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted to Hon. Andris Teikmanis
                 Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Latvia
                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. Considering the situation in Latvia, namely, its proximity
    to the Russian Federation, it has and is continuing to use various
    measures in order to distort elections in Latvia. However, methods and
    influence channels used by Russia are slightly different from those in
    the Western Europe or U.S. since Latvia is home for a significant
    Russian-speaking minority which, in Russia's opinion, is an asset to be
    used for meddling in Latvia's internal affairs.
        First, Russian diplomatic missions are working closely with
    compatriots from various organizations. Very often leaders and members
    of compatriot associations happen to be involved in political parties.
    Therefore, Russian diplomatic missions keep in touch with them, offer
    help and assistance in compatriot issues while using these resources to
    groom loyal present or future politicians. The relationship is mutually
    beneficial because that way Russian compatriot politicians can add
    unintentional extra resources to their campaigns. The more resources
    they add to their associations the more favorable is their position
    within the Russian compatriot environment. As a result, Russian
    compatriots often are leaning to vote Kremlin-backed personalities and
    are helping to create negative mass PR on other political parties.
        Second, Russia is growing its influence within information
    environment by spreading propaganda and misinformation. There have been
    cases in Latvia where misleading information has been disseminated
    before election in order to create a negative image about certain
    political parties or candidates whom are not in Russia's interest. As
    mentioned before, for such purposes compatriots have also been used.
    Lately Russian propaganda is more concentrated on creation of a myth
    that Latvia is a ``failed state''. It may result in voter's inactivity
    which is beneficial for Russia. Other aspect of this is the presence of
    Russian media in Latvia. Latvian Russian-speakers get a vast amount of
    their information from Russian television which overwhelmingly gives a
    platform to pro-Kremlin politicians and activists from Latvia. This
    situation distorts perception of reality since on the Russian state
    controlled TV they disseminate far more radical views than at home.
    Another thing, it is almost impossible to qualify it as spending on
    electoral campaign, as there is no information available for Latvian
    state institutions on conditions upon which the broadcasting time is
    granted.
        Last, there have been cases where various political parties have
    been offered an assistance by or tried to establish relationship with
    professional Russian political campaigners and communication experts.
    There are indications, that certain pro-Kremlin political parties have
    received free-of-charge services of such specialists from Russia thus
    potentially giving them advantage in comparison with other political
    competitors.
        Overall, Russia's presence in Latvia's electoral process is
    evident. Since Russia has had limited success distorting elections in
    Latvia through channels mentioned above, it may build up a new
    strategy. Most likely, in upcoming Latvian municipal and parliamentary
    elections it will try to strengthen its messages about Latvia as a
    ``failed state'' in order to decrease the overall participation rate
    which in turn would be beneficial for pro-Kremlin political parties
    with strong pool of loyal voters. Also possible establishment and
    running of multiple pro-Russian parties affiliated so called
    ``Latvian'' parties may be considered as a tool for fragmenting
    ``Latvian vote'' (decreasing proportion of voters per other larger
    Western-orientated parties) in their favor and in this way increasing
    possibility for increase of Russian influence in Latvian politics.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted to Hon. Rolandas Krisciunas
                Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania
                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. One of the main parts of Russia's compatriot policy is to
    support political parties with the Russian compatriot presence. Russia
    controls and directs activities of compatriot organizations through the
    Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots which works under auspices
    of the Russian Embassy in Lithuania. In Lithuania Russian compatriots
    take part in the elections in the list of Electoral Actions of Poles in
    Lithuania-Unions of Christian Families and party ``Russian Alliance''.
    From 2008 these political parties participate in elections together and
    have support from the Russian Embassy in Lithuania. Leaders of
    aforementioned political parties seek to stop the integration of ethnic
    minorities into Lithuanian society and this activity is beneficial for
    Russia. In 2016 6 MPs were elected from this coalition.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted to Hon. Eerik Marmei
                         Ambassador, Embassy of Estonia
                  Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
        Question. Please describe in detail Russian interference in
    elections in your respective countries, including specific actions
    taken to undermine the credibility of the polls or to influence the
    outcome.
        Answer. There have been attempts to interfere in Estonia's
    electoral process. Our Internal Security Service has successfully
    prevented attempts to finance political parties from Russia and
    explained to Estonian political parties the security risks connected
    with the acceptance of illegal foreign funding.
        However, during the 2009 European Parliament elections in Estonia,
    Russia's ``non-interference ``do not intervene'' in other states'
    internal affairs via their compatriots policy was on full display. The
    activity of the Head of Department of Foreign Relations for the Moscow
    City Government Georgi Muradov is also specifically worth mentioning.
        On February 28, 2009, when Russia's Compatriots organizations had a
    meeting in Tallinn, Muradov's two-day visit to Estonia began. At the
    beginning of the visit Muradov claimed in his interview to the Estonian
    media that he came to to rest and visit his friend. In reality the
    visit began in the Embassy of Russian Federation in Tallinn holding
    conversations with selected compatriots who had been called out to
    attend. The purpose was to agree on how to form a joint list of Russian
    candidates for the elections, with Aleksey Semyonov, an active member
    of the Coordination Council and the Head of the non-profit association
    Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, being the number one
    candidate. Highlighting him was understandable, as he is a person
    presenting a view on human rights favourable for Russia and his
    activity is being financed from Moscow. According to the annual report
    of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, financial support
    from the Embassy of Russian Federation formed nearly half of the total
    support to their projects in 2008.
        At the meeting the candidates of the planned joint list were
    offered a motivation package of over 10 million EEK, if they would
    fulfil established conditions. How such a large sum would have arrived
    in Estonia in practice remains unknown, as they did not manage to form
    the joint candidates list and thus the purpose of motivation vanished.

        Source: 2009 Estonian Interal Security Service Annual Review page
    12: (https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/
    Annual%20Review%202009.pdf).

                             ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

        [The following materials were submitted by Hon. Andris
    Teikmanis, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Latvia for
    the record:]

       Annual Report About the Activities of the Security Police in 2015

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                    ------

                            Tools of Destabilization

       Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Graham. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., Tuesday, March 7, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
    the Chair.]