

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2017

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:34 p.m. in room SD-124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Moran, Murkowski, Boozman, Schatz, Tester, and Murphy.

U.S. ARMY

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JERRY MORAN

Senator MORAN. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. We are joined today—in fact, it is an honor and privilege to have with us General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, who is the commander of the United States European Command and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Our Nation was founded based upon a set of complex relationships with European countries. The complexity of our relationship regarding military support was developed due in significant part to alliances with allied powers of World War II leading to the first U.S. military headquarters in Europe in 1942 and in 1944, designating an official command structure with then then Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, a title now held by our witness today. We wish you were a Kansan, General.

Looking at the last 25 years, Europe has been a continent in transition. From the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the expansion of NATO and now the resurgence of Russia with its aggressive global power interests, European Command has had to adapt to a new reality of instability and uncertainty, forcing us to examine our partnerships and relationships with the 51 countries within the Command's area of responsibility.

The new reality must also take into account that despite the recent rise in turmoil and tension, we have reduced our footprint in Europe over the last 30 years. In 1989, the Army had 213,000

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troops stationed at 858 sites in Europe. Today, the Army has 26,000 troops in about 80 sites.

Two years ago, DOD announced the results of its European infrastructure consolidation. Its study resulting in the closure and divestiture of more than 15 sites throughout the continent and a decrease of 2,000 U.S. personnel, both military and civilian. Ironically, the result of—as the results of this consolidation study were released about 11 months later after “little green men” who bore a close resemblance to Russian soldiers began appearing in Crimea. This prompted the European Reassurance Initiative, a plan to bring more U.S. troops back to Europe.

At first, ERI (European Reassurance Initiative) was supposed to be a one-time, \$1 billion response to Russian activities in Crimea and Ukraine. Last year, the ERI request more than quadrupled to more than a total of \$3.4 billion. This is clearly now an enduring mission focused upon reassuring our allies as well as deterring further Russian aggression.

For example, I learned recently that the Army Brigade Combat Team rotation is increasing and I learned that the Big Red One soldiers from Fort Riley, Kansas are deploying this fall in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Committing more U.S. troops will come at a price and military construction will play an important role in optimizing our presence and readiness in Central and Eastern Europe.

This committee anticipates the Fiscal Year 2018 budget will include increased funding for ERI, including a significant increase in military construction funding. As such, it is important for the committee to better understand the progress made thus far in ERI and the geopolitical climate in which we are operating. The risks and challenges that are prevalent throughout the European Command area of responsibility from Russia positioning in the High North to violent extremists and transnational vulnerabilities in the south. If we return to the historic posture in Europe, how do we make certain our armed forces are sufficiently protected, that they do not become targets for terrorists?

Though our attention has been drawn to the east, particularly with the North Korean missile launches as recently as a few days ago, we must be ready to face what many describe as our nation’s greatest threat—Russia.

General Scaparrotti, your testimony today is timely and we welcome you to our subcommittee. Today’s hearing is an opportunity to examine your planning, priorities, and investments with people and with infrastructure that you foresee today and in the years to come in Europe.

Senator MORAN. I recognize my friend and colleague from Hawaii, the Ranking Member, for his opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BRIAN SCHATZ

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing to discuss the U.S. European Command and the European Reassurance Initiative for which this subcommittee appropriates military construction funding. I want to thank General Scaparrotti and I look forward to your testimony.

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Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing at an important time in EUCOM's history. And I am glad to see that we will have the chance to discuss EUCOM's theater and the ERI military construction funding in an open and in a classified context.

The political and military environment in Europe has changed massively over the last several years. Prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, EUCOM had experienced an extended period of peace time, prompting the U.S. to draw down its permanently stationed forces from around 300,000 during the Cold War to the current level of about 62,000. In Warsaw in June 2014 in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Obama announced ERI to reassure NATO allies and partners of America's commitment to European security and territorial integrity. ERI funding supports Operation Atlantic Resolve, which ensures EUCOM has a persistent rotational presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

As the situation in Eastern Europe evolved over the past several years, the nature of the mission has changed as well. From an initial goal of stabilizing the crisis, reassuring allies and building capacity, ERI is now shifting to emphasize deterrents. To support ERI, the committee has appropriated \$288 million for major MILCON projects since 2015 and an additional \$224 million for minor MILCON funded through defense O&M. These numbers are substantial, and while EUCOM's mission is critical, so too is transparency in numbers and a planning process that ensures that taxpayer dollars are spent in a manner that best supports the strategy.

And so, it is with this in mind that the scale of our MILCON investments should send a clear signal to allies and adversaries alike that the U.S. has an enduring commitment to the stability and defense of Europe. We must likewise make a commitment to our military forces serving in Eastern Europe to support basic quality of life projects and force protection projects as we have done elsewhere in the world.

Thank you to General Scaparrotti and thank you, Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Senator Schatz.

I just want to take a moment to recognize the 17 individuals that are with us this afternoon at our hearing. We are joined by 17 multinational students from the Army War College. They are here as part of the Carlisle Scholars Program. And I want to take a moment to thank them for their service and to welcome them to our hearing. You all might stand. Thank you all very much.

General Scaparrotti, we now draw attention to you and we welcome your testimony.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, U.S. ARMY

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Schatz, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify today as the Commander of the United States European Command. I would like to thank the committee for passing the fiscal year 2017 MILCON bill last September, providing EUCOM with stable, predictable, and on-time funding. The projects go a

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long way to support posture in EUCOM to meet our operational requirements.

On behalf of over 60,000 permanently assigned service members, as well as civilians, contractors, and their families who serve and represent our nation in Europe, we appreciate your support.

The European theater remains critical to our national interests. The NATO alliance gives us a unique advantage over our adversaries, a united capable war fighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and with our European partners provides the United States with a network of willing nations who support global operations and secure the international rules based order.

Our security architecture protects almost one billion people and safeguards transatlantic trade which now constitutes almost half the world's GDP. However, this security architecture is being tested and today we face the most dynamic European strategic environment in recent history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system that are transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional.

In the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to antagonist as it seeks to undermine the western led international order and reassert itself as a global power. Countries along Russia's periphery including Ukraine and Georgia struggle against Moscow's moliant activities and military actions. In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia terrorist and refugee flows.

In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle East while refugees flee to Europe in search of security and opportunity. And in the High North, Russia is reasserting its military presence and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the Arctic.

In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our plans, our posture, our readiness so that we remain relevant to the threats we face. In short, we are returning to our historic role as a warfighting command.

EUCOM's transition would not be possible without Congressional appropriations and support of the European Reassurance Initiative. Over the past 12 months, EUCOM has made clear progress with an enhanced forward presence, complex exercises and training, increased prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and partner capacity building throughout Europe. EUCOM's military construction program continues to build on the ongoing posture initiatives, infrastructure recapitalization, and the expansion of operational infrastructure.

Thanks to Congressional support, EUCOM has proceeded with the recapitalization of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center replacement project and the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center which I continue to believe is operationally imperative that EUCOM, AFRICOM, and NFIC—that's the NATO facility—those intelligence

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organizations remain collocated and that this project move forward as planned.

With your continued support, I remain confident that our ability to affect this return to warfighting focus—I remain confident our ability to affect this return to a warfighting focus, but there is much work to do. Our force posture needs to increase to provide credible deterrence to Russian aggression and we must have infrastructure to support this increased posture. Significant investments are needed to provide capacity for operations, exercises, training, reception, staging, and prepositioned assets.

The funds provided through ERI have jumpstarted infrastructure construction, but we must continue to invest in projects required to provide a ready and capable force presence. Accordingly, EUCOM is working with the services in the Office of Secretary of Defense to prepare budget submissions for fiscal year 18.

Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's members and the staff for their continued appropriations in support of EUCOM. Your support, that of other senior leaders, and above all the support of our public at home and across Europe, are vital to ensuring that we have a ready and relevant force. This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. And I remain confident that through the strength of our alliances and partnerships and with the professionalism of our service members we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

Chairman, thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPAROTTI, U.S. ARMY

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee, I am honored to testify before you in my first year as the Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM). It is a privilege to lead the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians in this Command. They continue to demonstrate remarkable commitment, dedication, and selfless service both in Europe and across the globe. We all appreciate your continued support.

The European theater remains critical to our national interests. The transatlantic alliance gives us an unmatched advantage over our adversaries—a united, capable, warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our Area of Responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network of willing partners who support global operations and secure the international rules-based order that our nations have defended together since World War II. Our security architecture protects more than 1 billion people and has safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now constitutes almost half of the world's combined GDP.

Nevertheless, today we face the most dynamic European security environment in history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system that are trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In the East, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to antagonist. Countries along Russia's periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia, are under threat from Moscow's malign influence and military aggression. In the Southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows. In the South, violent extremists and transnational criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle East, while refugees and migrants fleeing persecution to Europe in search of security and opportunity. In the High North, Russia is reasserting its military prowess and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the Arctic.

EUCOM fully recognizes the dynamic nature of this security environment, and in response, we are regenerating our abilities for deterrence and defense while continuing our security cooperation and engagement mission. This requires that we re-

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turn to our historical role as a command that is capable of executing the full-spectrum of joint and combined operations in a contested environment. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, plans, and readiness to respond to possible future conflicts.

This shift would not be possible without congressional support of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Thanks in large measure to ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM has made demonstrable progress. U.S. tanks have returned to European soil. U.S. F-15s and F-22s have demonstrated air dominance throughout the theater. U.S. naval forces have sailed throughout European waters. EUCOM has operationalized its Joint Cyber Center. With the approval of former Secretary Carter, EUCOM delivered the first new operational plan for the defense of Europe in over 25 years.

ERI also supports high-end exercises and training, improved infrastructure, and enhanced prepositioning of equipment and supplies, while State Department and DoD funds build partner capacity throughout Europe.

EUCOM has also continued to strengthen our relationship with allies and partners. Our relationship with Turkey endured a coup attempt with minimal disruption to multiple ongoing operations. EUCOM has strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO Alliance, which remains, as Secretary Mattis has said, the “bedrock” of our transatlantic security. Overall EUCOM is growing stronger.

II. THEATER ASSESSMENT—RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Over the past year I have highlighted three signature issues facing us in this dynamic security environment: Russia, radicals or violent extremists, and regional unrest—leading to refugee and migrant flows. At the same time, managing the political, economic, and social challenges posed by refugees and migrants is a consuming concern of our allies and partners.

Russia

Russia’s malign actions are supported by its diplomatic, information, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow intends to reemerge as a global power, and views international norms such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as components of a system designed to suppress it. Therefore, Russia seeks to undermine this international system and discredit those in the West who have created it. For example, Russia is taking steps to influence the internal politics of European countries just as it tried to do in the United States in an attempt to create disunity and weakness within Europe and undermine the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, Russia has repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that underpin European peace and stability, including the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and it is undermining transparency and confidence building regimes such as the Vienna Document and Open Skies, which provides greater transparency of posture and exercises in the region.

Russia’s political leadership appears to seek a resurgence through modernization of its military. Russia is adjusting its doctrine, modernizing its weapons, reorganizing the disposition of its forces, professionalizing its armed services, and upgrading capabilities in all warfighting domains. Russia desires a military force capable of achieving its strategic objectives and increasing its power.

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, including occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, and actions in Syria underscore its willingness to use military force to exert its influence in Europe and the Middle East. In Ukraine, Russia’s willingness to foment a bloody conflict into its third year through the use of proxy forces in the Donbas, and elsewhere, is deeply troubling to our allies and partners, particularly Russia’s closest neighbors. In Syria, Russia’s military intervention has changed the dynamics of the conflict, bolstered the Bashar al-Assad regime, targeted moderate opposition elements, and compounded human suffering in Syria, and complicated U.S. and coalition operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia has used this chaos to establish a permanent presence in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean.

This past year saw other significant demonstrations of Russia’s renewed military capability, including the first ever combat deployment of the KUZNETSOV Task Force, nation-wide strategic exercises, joint air, ground, and maritime operations in Syria using new platforms and precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of nuclear-capable

missiles to Kaliningrad. Russia’s deployment in Ukraine and Syria also revealed increased proficiency in expeditionary combat and sustainment operations.

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Another key component of Russia's military advancement is its Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). For example, in connection with its deployment to support the Assad regime in Syria, Russia fielded advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems that combine command and control and electronic warfare capabilities, and long range coastal defense cruise missiles with advanced air defense platforms. EUCOM assesses that Russia plans to meld existing and future IADS systems into a central command structure to control all air defense forces and weapons.

In the High North, Russia continues to strengthen its military presence through equipment, infrastructure, training, and other activities. Russia is positioning itself to gain strategic advantage if the Northern Sea Route opens and becomes a viable shipping lane between Europe and Asia.

Most concerning, however, is Moscow's substantial inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR and its troubling doctrine that calls on the potential use of these weapons to escalate its way out of a failing conflict. Russia's fielding of a conventional/nuclear dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF Treaty creates a mismatch in escalatory options with the West. In the context of Putin's highly centralized decisionmaking structure, Moscow's provocative rhetoric and nuclear threats increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

In addition to recent conventional and nuclear developments, Russia has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce, destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign influence over other nations. In neighboring states, Russia continues to fuel "protracted conflicts." In Moldova, for example, Russia has yet to follow through on its 1999 Istanbul summit commitments to withdraw an estimated 1,500 troops—whose presence has no mandate—from the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria. Russia asserts that it will remove its force once a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has been reached. However, Russia continued to undermine the discussion of a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict at the 5+2 negotiations. Moscow continues to play a role in destabilizing the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by selling arms to both parties—Armenia and Azerbaijan—while maintaining troops in Armenia, despite an international pledge to co-chair Minsk Group charged with seeking resolution of the conflict.

Russia fiercely opposes one of our strongest EUCOM partners, Georgia, in its attempts to align with the European and transatlantic communities. Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since its 2008 invasion the Georgian regions of has created lasting instability.

In the Balkans, Russia exploits ethnic tensions to slow progress on European and transatlantic integration. In 2016, Russia overtly interfered in the political processes of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.

Additional Russian activities short of war, range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia's outright denial of involvement in the lead up to Russia's occupation and attempted annexation in Crimea; attempts to influence elections in the United States, France and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and cyber activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations and Ukraine. In all of these ways and more, Russia is attempting to exert its influence, expand its power, and discredit the capability and relevance of the West.

Radicals

Violent extremists, most notably ISIS, pose a serious, immediate threat to U.S. personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe and worldwide. In 2016, there were major terrorist attacks in Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere. ISIS has made its intentions clear: it seeks to overthrow Western civilization and establish a world-wide caliphate.

While its footprint in Iraq and Syria shrunk in 2016, since 2014, ISIS has significantly expanded its operations throughout Europe and now leverages its network to enable and inspire attacks by European-based extremists in their resident countries. Further, ISIS has exploited the migration crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe. Since Turkey expanded its counter-ISIS role and advocacy for coalition operations in Mosul, it has experienced an increased number of terrorist attacks, and ISIS's leaders have called for more. We do not expect the threat to diminish in the near future.

As a consequence of this threat, European nations have been forced to divert financial resources and military personnel to internal security. The impact of this reallocation is not yet fully appreciated and will likely persist for years. In short, violent extremism poses a dangerous threat to transatlantic nations and to the international order that we value.

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Regional Volatility

In EUCOM's AOR, Russia's indirect actions have sought to exploit political unrest and socioeconomic disparities. Russian aggression in Ukraine has led to the deaths of approximately 10,000 people since April 2014. Recently in eastern Ukraine, Russia controls the battle tempo, again ratcheting up the number of daily violations of the cease fire and—even more concerning—directing combined Russian-separatist forces to target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate OSCE monitors in order to turn up the pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow's support for so-called "separatists" in eastern Ukraine destabilizes Kyiv's political structures, particularly as Ukraine undertakes politically-difficult reforms to combat corruption and comply with IMF requirements.

Ukraine seeks a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and Russian forces, full and unfettered access for OSCE monitors, and control over its internationally-recognized border with Russia. Russian-led separatist forces continue to commit the majority of ceasefire violations despite attempts by the OSCE to broker a lasting ceasefire along the Line of Contact.

Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. It now occupies a critical location at the crossroads of multiple strategic challenges. To its west, it implements the Montreux Convention, which governs transit through the Turkish Straits, and is committed to local solutions for Black Sea issues. To its north and east, Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. Ankara seeks to resume the level of trade with Moscow that it enjoyed prior to Turkey's November 2015 shoot down of a Russian fighter. Turkey has absorbed the largest number of refugees from Syria—almost 3 million. Despite these challenges, EUCOM continues to work closely with Turkey to enable critical basing and logistical support to the counter ISIS fight and supports Turkey to counter its terror threat.

Although the flow of refugees to Europe has slowed, the refugee situation remains a significant challenge to our European Allies and partners. The strain on the social systems of European nations, especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts resources that could otherwise go toward military and defense spending, and finding solutions has tested political relationships. EU member states struggle to find a common, "shared" approach to admit and settle migrants. Both NATO and the EU, in conjunction with Turkish and Greek authorities, have committed law enforcement and military assets to this issue, including a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance.

The Syrian civil war and the risk of spillover into neighboring states, including Israel, continue to threaten stability in Europe and the Levant. Despite assistance from the USG and the international community, the refugee population in Jordan and Lebanon has placed significant burdens on the government and local residents.

Additionally, factional fighting in Syria has resulted in occasional cross-border fire into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has avoided being drawn into the conflict in Syria but has taken military action to deny the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.

The Balkans' stability since the late 90's masks political and socio-economic fragility. Russia promotes anti-European views in this region by exploiting corrupt political systems, poor economic performance, and increased ethnic polarization. Additionally, Islamic radicals seek to take advantage of high unemployment rates, political turmoil, and socioeconomic disparities to recruit violent extremists.

Iran's regional influence in the Levant continues to grow through its ongoing support to radical groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and paramilitary groups involved in the Syrian conflict and in counter-ISIS efforts across Iraq. Iran, which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and is clearly committed to maintaining Syria as the key link of the Iran-Hezbollah axis, which sustains a terrorist network in Syrian-regime controlled territory. Furthermore, Iran has taken advantage of the Syrian crisis to militarily coordinate with Russia in support of Assad.

III. THEATER ASSESSMENT—STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES

EUCOM will meet these challenges and adapt to the new security environment by capitalizing on our strengths and building new capabilities. We are developing a credible and relevant force structure built for deterrence and defense and leveraging a unified and adaptive NATO Alliance, and transitioning into a command able to address the strategic challenges before us.

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Deter Russia

EUCOM activities, facilitated by ERI funding, continue to be the primary demonstration of our deterrent capability.

Increased Rotational Forces. ERI has directly supported an increase in the rotational presence of U.S. forces in Europe, a critical augmentation to EUCOM's assigned forces. For example, ERI funded Fort Stewart's 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team's deployment to Europe from March to September 2016. Also, ERI funded the deployment of F-22 fighters, B-52 bombers, and additional combat and lift aircraft to Europe as part of the ERI Theater Security Package. Looking ahead, continued congressional support for ERI will sustain these rotations and enable additional anti-submarine warfare capabilities complementing maritime domain awareness assets in Iceland that are included in the fiscal year 2017 ERI request. Additionally, rotational Marine units will operate from Norway and the Black Sea region.

Trained and Equipped Component Commands. EUCOM has also used ERI to fund and field Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), providing a rapid mobilization capability for additional armored units in Europe. Separately, EUCOM advocated for and received full support for a \$220 million NATO Security Investment Program project (i.e., paid for by NATO common funding) that will build warehousing and maintenance capability for staging APS stocks in Poland. Additionally, ERI funds dozens of projects to upgrade flight-line and munitions-storage infrastructure across eight NATO nations to support not only rotational presence but also training events in Eastern Europe. The Navy is using ERI to fund capability enablers and force rotations to support EUCOM and NATO exercises, including Mine Countermeasure Teams and additional flying hours specifically to enhance EUCOM's deterrence posture.

Persistent Presence. ERI increased funding for U.S. forces in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mediterranean during 2016. In addition, ERI allowed EUCOM to continue our contribution to NATO's Air Policing mission by funding a continued fighter presence in theater with the 493rd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath in the UK.

Complex Exercises with Allies and Partners. ERI expanded the scope of EUCOM's involvement in over 28 joint and multi-national maritime, air, amphibious, and ground exercises across 40 countries. In June 2016, EUCOM participated in the Polish national exercise ANAKONDA, which involved approximately 31,000 Allied troops—including over 14,000 U.S. personnel—and provided a robust demonstration of Allied defensive capabilities, readiness, and interoperability. ERI also supported Navy-led BALTOPS 16, the premier maritime exercise in the Baltic region with over 6,100 troops from participating nations. And utilizing ERI resources, the Air Force took part in over 50 exercises and training deployments across Europe. An Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement concluded with the EU last December enables EUCOM to cooperate better with EU missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI): EUCOM leads the Department of Defense's Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI), which provides a framework for understanding the Russian threat and a forum for coordinating efforts and requirements. RSI allows us to maximize the deterrent value of our activities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. In just over a year, RSI has created a number of analytic products for combatant commanders that will enable a more efficient application of existing resources and planning efforts.

Deterring Russia requires a whole of government approach, and EUCOM supports the strategy of approaching Russia from a position of strength while seeking appropriate military-to-military communication necessary to fulfill our defense obligations in accordance with the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Going forward, we must bring the information aspects of our national power more fully to bear on Russia, both to amplify our narrative and to draw attention to Russia's manipulative, coercive, and malign activities. Finally, NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.

Enable the NATO Alliance

As the United States manages multiple strategic challenges, our enduring strength remains NATO, the most successful alliance in history. NATO's leadership understands that the security environment has radically changed over the past few years. The Alliance has placed renewed emphasis on deterring further Russian aggression, countering transnational threats, such as violent extremist organizations, and projecting stability in the Middle East and North Africa, while fulfilling its commitments in Afghanistan.

The Warsaw Summit last July was a significant demonstration of unity, cooperation, and strategic adaptation. As the member nations declared in NATO's Warsaw

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Summit Communiqué, “We are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond”. This unity is NATO’s center of gravity, and the United States must continue to support solidarity among the Alliance nations.

Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The signature outcome of the 2016 Warsaw Summit was the decision to establish an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and Poland to demonstrate NATO’s cohesion in defense of the Alliance. Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have begun deploying multinational battalion task forces to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively on a rotational basis. Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) signed in 2017 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facilitating the deployment of U.S. forces to the three Baltic states. The United States serves as the framework nation for eFP in Poland and is working closely with the other framework nations and their host nations to ensure NATO’s key deterrence and defense measures are capable and integrated.

European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA). EUCOM continues to implement the EPAA to defend European NATO populations, territory, and infrastructure against ballistic missile threats from threats outside the Euro-Atlantic region. In July 2016, the U.S.-funded Aegis Ashore facility in Romania became operational and transferred to NATO operational control. Work on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland (authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2016 legislation) is underway and on track for completion by the end of calendar year 2018 and operational under NATO operational control in mid-2019.

Projecting Stability. NATO is a key contributor to ensuring security and projecting stability abroad. It is worth remembering that the first and only time the Alliance invoked the mutual defense provisions of its founding treaty was in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Today, through NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, over 12,000 troops (including over 5,000 non-U.S. personnel) provide training and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. NATO is committed to ensuring a stable Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for terrorists.

Additionally, it is notable that all 28 NATO nations participate in the Counter-ISIS coalition. NATO committed AWACS surveillance aircraft and actively contributes to capacity building in Iraq. EUCOM actively supports NATO’s goal of expanding its operations against this terrorist threat.

Support to Washington Treaty. EUCOM provides support for key articles of the Washington Treaty, enabling NATO members to meet their collective security commitments. EUCOM conducts activities, such as security cooperation, to help allies meet their Article 3 commitment to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack.” We have been able to reduce allies’ dependencies on Russian-sourced, legacy military equipment thanks to ongoing congressional support for critical authorities and funding that provide shared resources. EUCOM also actively assists the Alliance when an ally declares, under Article 4, that its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. The last time an ally invoked Article 4 was 2015, when Turkey sought consultation following terrorist attacks. Most importantly, EUCOM is the force that backs the United States’ commitment to Article 5, which declares that an armed attack on one ally is an attack on all.

NATO Spending Trends. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies pledged to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and invest in the development of highly-capable and deployable forces. Today, in addition to the United States, four allies (Estonia, Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom) meet the NATO guidelines for 2 percent of GDP, up from three in 2014. Allies’ defense expenditures increased in 2015 for the first time since 2009 and grew at a real rate of 3.8 percent in 2016, with 22 member nations increasing defense spending. Allies are showing demonstrable progress toward their commitment to contribute 2 percent of their GDP within a decade (by 2024).

This is a positive trend, but allied nations must meet the 2 percent mark with 20 percent allocated to the modernization of equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner capability shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control; air to air refueling; and air and missile defense. Further, both EUCOM and NATO are hampered by inadequate infrastructure that affects the ability to maneuver across the continent. The expansion of the Alliance to include former Eastern Bloc countries has exacerbated the lack of common transportation networks between the newer NATO members in the east and the more established allies in the west. EUCOM is working closely with NATO to identify and address infrastructure requirements to improve U.S. and NATO freedom of movement throughout the theater.

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Build Partner Capacity

EUCOM has spent several decades working with the Department of State to help allied and partner nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. This partner capacity building has been accomplished with the support of this Committee, which has been generous in providing us the authorization we need to accomplish this critical task. I would highlight two activities in particular.

Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB helps partner nations build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions. For example, EUCOM fully endorses the work of the Defense Reform Advisory Board in Ukraine, which is helping to bring about both political and military reform as the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Armed Forces transition from centralized Soviet-style systems and concepts towards a Euro-Atlantic model. We also support defense institutions in Georgia, helping them improve their strategic logistics, human and material resource management, and institutional aspects of their training management system. Overall, our DIB efforts lay the groundwork for broader security cooperation activities.

Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine (JMTG-U). Together with forces from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, and Canada using State Department-provided Foreign Military Financing and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds, EUCOM trains, advises, and equips Ukraine security forces, helping them build the capacity to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our team, working through the Multinational Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine's institutional training capability so that Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable armed force. Our efforts include the training of both conventional and special operations units, as well as advising Ukraine on defense reform priorities.

Assist Israel

EUCOM's mission to assist in the defense of Israel, one of our closest allies, remains a top priority. Success will depend on the continued support of Congress and our strong relationship with the Israel Defense Forces. Many aspects of our bilateral relationship have been guided by the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP) framework, which dates to the Reagan Administration. SCIP enables robust cooperation and coordination on a vast range of security matters. Going forward, we are working to update the SCIP to incorporate an examination of all major exercises to ensure each meets the three major pillars of our security relationship: (1) missile defense, air operations, and counter-terrorism; (2) managing the Weapon Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Israel (WRSA-I); and (3) ensuring Israel's qualitative military edge.

Counter Transnational Threats

Adopting a whole-of-government approach, EUCOM, together with its interagency partners, conducts initiatives to counter transnational threats including countering terrorism and the flow of foreign fighters, countering illicit finance networks, combatting the trafficking of persons and illicit substances; and building allied and partner security, investigative, and judicial capacity. In conjunction with the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and other Federal law enforcement agencies, EUCOM works to monitor and thwart the flow of foreign fighters, support the dismantlement of facilitation networks, and build partner nation capacity to defeat violent extremism.

Through our counter terrorism cell, EUCOM strengthens the global Counter-ISIS efforts in coordination with and support of U.S. Central (CENTCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), and Special Operations (SOCOM) Commands. We have focused on those who facilitate the ISIS brand and network through radicalization, financing, and propaganda.

Also, EUCOM and NATO are working to increase ties with the EU to enhance the capabilities Europe can collectively bring to bear against transnational threats. These three organizational nodes foster a shared understanding of the threats, help match resources accordingly, and can address all elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. In order to realize this networked approach, EUCOM will support NATO efforts to expand the capability and capacity of Allied Joint Forces Command—Naples.

Enable Global Operations

EUCOM personnel actively support operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM AORs. EUCOM's well-developed and tested infrastructure provides critical capabilities in strategic locations such as Incirlik, Turkey; Sigonella, Italy; and Moron and Rota, Spain. Basing and access in Germany, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom enable more timely and coordinated trans-regional crisis response.

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IV. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Significant U.S. force reductions following the collapse of the Soviet Union were based on the assumption that Russia would be a strategic partner to the West. These reductions now limit U.S. options for addressing challenges in a changing European strategic environment. The strategic rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, combined with budget limitations in the Budget Control Act of 2011, have contributed to substantial posture reductions across our land and air domains. For example, between 2010 and 2013, two fighter squadrons and a two-star numbered air force headquarters were inactivated, along with associated critical enablers and staff personnel. In addition, the last two heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a two-star division headquarters, and a three-star corps headquarters were removed from Europe, leaving only one Stryker and one airborne brigade. As a result of the BCT losses, without fully-resourced heel-to-toe rotational forces the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from further aggression.

Deterrence Posture. Going forward, we will need to continue maintaining capable forces for effective deterrence. EUCOM is coordinating across the DoD to obtain the forces we need in every warfare domain. This may include additional maneuver forces, combat air squadrons, anti-submarine capabilities, a carrier strike group, and maritime amphibious capabilities. We will continue to enhance our plans for pre-positioning equipment across the theater as a flexible deterrent measure and to exercise the joint reception, staging, and onward integration of CONUS-based forces into Europe.

ERI Requirements. EUCOM's continues to require the ability to deter Russian aggression and counter malign influence while assuring allies and partners. We anticipate needing to continue deterrence measured initiated in previous ERI submissions to include: Army and Air Force prepositioning, retention of F-15 presence, improved airfield infrastructure improvements, and to address some new capabilities needed in the theater.

Indications and Warnings (I&W). EUCOM's ability to provide strategic warning is critical to credible deterrence. A robust intelligence capability enables accurate analysis and rapid response in a changing theater security environment. This capability also supports the design of realistic exercises, posture alignment, and future requirements. Furthermore, when completed, EUCOM's Joint Intelligence Analytic Center at Royal Air Force Croughton will provide a dedicated, purpose-built intelligence facility collocated with NATO and AFRICOM's analytic centers that will enhance capability and capacity in both combatant commands and NATO. Finally, additional intelligence collection platforms in theater, such as the U-2, the RQ-4, and the RC-135, are required for accurate and timely threat information to support strategic decisions.

Recapitalization Efforts. The European Infrastructure Consolidation effort announced in January 2015 enables EUCOM to divest excess capacity and consolidate missions and footprints at enduring locations. However, with aging infrastructure and little recent investment, recapitalization and consolidation projects are required to support warfighter readiness, command and control requirements, deployments, training, and quality of life. This Committee has been key to these critical efforts. We continue to modernize communications facilities and schools across Europe. Last year, Congress authorized the final increment for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center, which enables the closure of RAFs Molesworth and Alconbury.

V. CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by again thanking this Committee's Members and staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only through providing our requested funding, but also by helping us to articulate the challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior leaders and, above all, from the public at home and across Europe is vital to ensuring that we remain ready and relevant. This is a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. I remain confident that through the strength of our Alliance and partnerships, and with the professionalism of our service members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole, free and at peace.

Senator MORAN. General, thank you. General, thank you very much.

I am going to turn first to the Senator from Alaska who is on a schedule today that we want to be accommodating. So the Senator from Alaska is recognized.

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RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for allowing me to kind of skip the line. And I am sorry that I will not be able to be part of the second half of this briefing, but I do appreciate the opportunity to have you before the committee here, General Scaparrotti, and just thank you for your leadership.

You have mentioned the High North and that is an area that I pay close particular attention and concern to. You mentioned Russia positioning itself to gain strategic advantage, not only with the sea lanes as they are becoming open, but we are seeing stepped up activity. I think it is fair to say that all Alaskans are paying particularly close attention to Russia. It was just a few weeks ago that for four days in a row we were greeted with aircraft that were spotted off the coast of Alaska. And, well, that used to be a common sight. We have not really seen that since 2015. So people look up. They wonder what the scramble is all about and they really wonder what is going on.

A senior Defense official was quoted as saying that this was “not a concern and attributed the uptick to a recent lack of available Russian aircraft and the need to boost training.” So I want to ask you about that, whether you agree with that assessment, but also want to have you speak to the specifics that we are seeing in Russia and this Arctic expansion.

It was highlighted in the news this weekend. I do not know if you saw the Sunday night—the NBC Nightly News report on the 80th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade. This is a Russian Arctic Brigade that is now stationed along the Finnish border. And, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, it might be—it is a two-minute clip, but it is pretty substantive in terms of showing what the Russians are doing in their Arctic training and recognizing that they are training in temperatures that are tough. It is 40 degrees below zero.

They are using everything from tanks to military hardware, snow machines, even reindeer and dog sleds. But it is not just the training that is going on. It is what is happening with the opening of some pretty impressive new bases, not just dusting off the Cold-War era Arctic bases. They recently unveiled a 14,000-square foot Arctic shamrock, which is a permanent Arctic base along the 80th parallel, as well as having four new bases planned.

So folks in Alaska are wondering what is going on. They hear senior defense officials say, you know, don’t be too worried here. How do you offer the assurance to Alaskans, I guess, or to all Americans, about what we are seeing in Russia right now? What does this year’s ERI do to basically keep Russia on its side of the border? So if you can speak to the activities in the High North, I would greatly appreciate it.

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, thank you. I think you accurately described what we see.

Russia as it has invested in its forces over the last 5 to 6 years, is doing so in a very broad manner, and so it affects their air, maritime, ground forces, their coastal defense forces, their radar systems for air defense, et cetera. So we see it across the board. And

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we have now seen them begin to make those improvements in the High North or in the Arctic as well.

As you noted, the northern sea route, one of the routes there, is—given the warming, is the most likely it is the one that is open first, et cetera, and it does travel closest to their border. As they put in bases, they are refurbishing old ones. They are putting in some new ones. They are placing forces, as you noted. They are placing some air defense and missile systems in as well.

Our concern is that rather than the Arctic being a place that is for commerce, stable, freedom of maneuvering in accordance with international laws is adhered to, that they could position themselves in a place to control the Arctic and that sea lane and so that is what we are watching very closely.

I would tell you that the flights are a function in a sense of their growing capabilities, their refurbishment of their air force, their long-range bombers that you referred to, but they are also starting to demonstrate those capabilities. That is what they are doing. They are demonstrating their capabilities. They do so on the other side on the Arctic into Europe as well.

ERI is the very basis of our response to Russian aggression, malign influence, and also their modernization. The ERI funds provide us the capability, for instance, in early warning systems it provides us capabilities in ISR, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, specifically with respect to antisubmarine warfare, which is a very important component of their High North. Their northern fleet is in that area in the Arctic.

And so all of those things go into that. When we go into the classified session I can go into a good deal more detail about what they are doing and how we can influence that, but as you said, I remain concerned and it is a point that I bring out because of our need to continue what we are doing in ERI, but broader than that, we also need to continue our modernization so that we remain dominant in the domains that provide all of our citizens and the Europeans reassurance that we can deter this threat and protect the United States.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I appreciate that and I will look forward to an opportunity to perhaps visit more directly with you about some of these specifics. I am going to be taking a group of members at the end of this month to Norway, where we will have an opportunity to visit the Marines at the Joint Arctic Training there at Vaernes. And I know that we have various partnerships in other places with other Arctic nations like Canada for things like search and rescue, but do we have any other military partnerships or opportunities like this and do you see us doing more of what we are seeing right now with the Marines in Norway and kind of building that capacity out?

General SCAPAROTTI. We have a good partnership obviously with Norway. We have begun to work in a more routine basis, particularly with our Marines now, but also with other services, air and naval, as well as Sweden and Finland in the north. And we will continue those operations with them, the training, the practice interoperability, et cetera.

They have a very good understanding of Russia's posture because of their position and their long relationship with them and that is

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very helpful to us as well in understanding deterrents, understanding a proper posture, and being able to get that right.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Sir, I appreciate it, and again I look forward to talking with you about these and other aspects. Thank you.

Senator MORAN. Senator Schatz.

BUDGET PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scaparrotti, I wanted to talk to you about the need for predictability in the context of ERI. You are here in an unusual week where we are passing a big bipartisan bill. And I know we did the MILCON piece last year, which was great, but obviously, there are implications in terms of rotational forces and other needs that you have at EUCOM that are going to be met through this omnibus.

So I wonder if you might not just briefly describe what this does for ERI and maybe recount the private conversation we had about the extent to which our friends and allies alike are actually watching twists and turns in the legislative process.

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, thank you.

I just reiterate as I said in my opening that, you know, a predictable stable budget and funding is very important to us because it allows us to plan and do it efficiently. That is particularly important when it comes to the posture of troops like we are trying to reposture in Europe a bit. Long-term planning helps that. It helps with our modernization because we can actually lay out a plan for that modernization to include to ensure that at an end of a period of time we have a force that is relevant to the threats that we see.

Finally, your note. I had noted that as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and working closely with our allies there, I can assure that our partners and our allies pay close attention to our budgeting because they understand what is year on year, what is done only at a year of time. And so their question then is are you sure that this that is funded on a yearly basis is in fact going to be funded over the next couple of years or through fruition with our plans. And so it is helpful in that respect to. It is an assurance to our allies that what we have begun, we are going to finish in terms of posture, exercises, facilities, et cetera.

Senator SCHATZ. Can you talk to me about long-term or even medium range planning when it comes to both major MILCON and minor MILCON and without getting into what is and isn't in a FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan). I understand sort of that technical and legal discussion. I just want to hear from you what is our planning timeframe and how should we be thinking about your planning timeframe when we think about funding.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, we actually, in EUCOM we have an infrastructure plan that we develop as a part of the staff in conjunction with OSD. It looks out beyond 5 years. I think it is one of the basic documents. In fact, I want it to be a living document to the extent that when a new staff member comes in or another commander into the command, they should read that as one of the base documents so they know what our vision is for the posture, the footprint, and the facilities that we need in Europe.

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Coupled with that is a plan for posture. We have that on a four-year plan as to where we think we need to go with the appropriate force in EUCOM. Those are all tied, obviously to MILCON and long-term. I think it is just important that we have a vision that is longer term so that we can plan and budget in that respect and do it efficiently.

Senator SCHATZ. And where does ERI sit in those various processes?

General SCAPARROTTI. ERI today, as you know, is funded yearly. It is OCO. It is not in the base. And as a result of that, you could look shorter term if you are not careful.

Now, what I want to assure the committee is that we looked at the criteria that Congress budgeted ERI for, its purpose. We have those categories. And then we also go through a process within the components in Europe against those categories over the FYDP. So we are not looking at just next year. We are looking at where we want to be at the end of the FYDP and we actually help cost that out. So that is helpful.

Senator SCHATZ. But just to be clear, it sounds like it is okay on your side, but to the extent that it is not in the FY DP formally, it becomes a problem on our side, right?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, it would be helpful for us all not to—

Senator SCHATZ. Right.

General SCAPARROTTI [continued]. Have to come back into that next year with uncertainty.

Senator SCHATZ. Right. And it seems to me that to the extent that this is about reassurance, that it would be reassuring for our allies to see that we are willing to do long-term investments that are going to get amortized over the period during which we are going to be engaged in ERI, which presumably is certainly longer than the 1 year that OCO allows us to do.

QUALITY OF LIFE IN EASTERN EUROPE

One final question and then maybe I will take a brief second round. You know, when ERI was rolled out in 2014, it was sort of in response to an emerging situation and so the funding needs and the priorities were, you know, mission, runways, building control towers, ammo storage. We are obviously not into basing in those parts of Eastern Europe, but there is at least a more semi-permanent presence that we have to think about.

And so I am wondering what is that next tier, especially as it relates to quality of life? Because I have heard now anecdotally from people who have served in ERI, from service members that there are quality of life constraints that make it one of the tougher places to serve. And obviously we have to do whatever is mission critical, but over time, as you know, the quality of life stuff is mission critical too. So I am wondering if you could speak to how you are working that into the plan.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, part of ERI is the facilities that we need to appropriately station particularly mechanized forces who are a combat aviation brigade, et cetera. So as you look at some of the MILCON here, it is actually improving those facilities.

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I would say also that particularly taking care of people, our allies have been quite good about their investment, not only in facilities to help those units, but facilities like barracks for our troops, the kinds of support that they might find in a normal base. So we are looking to them as well.

I would say that particularly in the east with the ERI and the rotational forces there, I do not see a need for the kind of support that we typically give in one of our bases in Western Europe, but we are working to improve it so that our forces there are well taken care of, but they also can focus on the mission that they have at hand. And we will continue to work with that in mind.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you.

GEOPOLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Senator.

General, in 2014 when this initiative regarding reassuring our allies in Europe came into existence, there was a certain climate that preexisted that caused us to think this was a necessary step for the United States to pursue. How would you describe the change in climate from that point in time to today?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, personally, I think that the recognition in Europe in particular, that Russia is intent on its stated goals of establishing itself as a global power, that it will press on the international norms, continue to press that after breaking international laws with respect to Ukraine, for instance, that it is intent that its modernization and the use of its military to set facts on the ground beforehand, I think that has become even more apparent since 2014 and we continue to see that drumbeat. And I think for the most part in Europe they understand that and they are committed to deterrence of Russia as well.

It is greater, obviously, in the east where they face them directly than perhaps in the south or west, but the alliance has been strong and I think our partners are as well in this recognition. Warsaw made that commitment, you know, or the alliance did at Warsaw, and I think it was quite clear.

Senator MORAN. And what has changed in regard to Russia's efforts? Has there been a consequence of our reassurance efforts in a response from Russia in how we would have expected them to behave or how they are changing their behavior?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, I think if you look at their stated response, they recognize what we are doing. I think they are concerned about the changes that we have made as the United States in terms of the rotational forces that we have now put in, what NATO has done with enhanced forward presence. It has their attention. I think their response is one to say that they are deterred by that. They have recognized it. They have said publicly that they are making adjustments on their western border and in the Baltic and Black Sea as a result of that.

So I think that is the response that I look for. I wish we had a crystal ball we could see clearly the cognitive impact on the regime in Russia, but I cannot say that clearly at this point.

Senator MORAN. What more needs to be done to reassure our allies and to deter Russian aggression? I do not know that there is a solid answer to this question, but I am interested in your thought

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process. How do we know we are in the position we need to be that our allies feel reassured and those that we oppose for their actions feel constrained?

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, that is really the tough question. I mean, we look at—we are in a deterrence posture now and determining how we assess the effectiveness of that deterrence is very difficult. Part of it is because it is a cognitive effect you are trying to have more so than a posture effect and so it is more difficult. And I can talk about it more in a classified, but I think that what we need to do is we need to stay strong with our allies. We need to ensure with our country and as much as we can with them that we approach this from a whole of government approach.

The Russians see this as a whole of society approach. They do not see a differentiation between what they do in the military with respect to their actions. They include diplomatic, economic leverage, et cetera. I think our response has to recognize that as well. And then we need to also improve our posture because we need to have a strong front. That is what Russia respects is strength.

RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

Senator MORAN. When we visited in Europe with you earlier this year, we had been to France and Germany, both concerned about intrusion by Russia into their elections. Any update? Any sense of what is going on in that regard?

General SCAPARROTTI. They both continue to be very concerned about it, France in particular. I think publicly you saw that France believes they did have some influence and direct influence by Russia in terms of who they preferred to see elected. You know, there was a relationship there as well in terms of, you know, what we had learned and our ability to help them posture themselves to protect against that. And Germany shares the same concerns. And there is a number of other elections between now and fall in Europe where, you know, Russia is known to have been directly involved with parties that they can influence or politicians as well.

BURDEN SHARING ON INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

Senator MORAN. What is the relationship between—let me do it this way. We are going to spend some money on infrastructure. This committee has been supportive of that effort and I assume will continue to do so. What do we pay for ourselves? What is NATO responsible for? What are our other allies responsible for?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think we work together on sorting out exactly what you do, but I think a quick way to look at this is we are willing to put infrastructure and some funding into some of their facilities, the airfields, their ports, their storage facilities and some of those things in order to help us early on with this step, but we expect them to put in funds to help us with that as well, as well as support of our troops.

The second thing is that we need to be able to move with some agility, both us and our European partners. And so within each of those countries, I would expect that they invest in their infrastructure, in their rail, in those fuel capacity, fuel stores, and those kinds of things that we need in order to be able to move at speed in Europe. In the Cold War, we had a very good laydown of that.

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The nations there had, you know, responsibilities in turn in their nations so that we could move through countries.

That has deteriorated, or let us say it has declined since the Cold War and we are now in a process with the other nations of looking at what we need to do to have the right structure in order to provide for our agility in theater and they are taking that on as well.

MILITARY MEDICAL CARE

Senator MORAN. Let me ask one more question. Then we will go to Senator Schatz and we will have another round.

Medical care and treatment for our service men and women. What is the status in Europe? What role does it play globally in our military efforts? What do you see as the future needs?

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, first of all, one of our lines of effort in Europe is enable global operations. Because of our location and particularly in the medical facilities, we service not only EUCOM and the servicemembers there, but we often bring our wounded and those ill from Central Command, from AFRICOM, into our theater too. So Landstuhl is a critical facility, but it was built in the 1950s.

And as you know, with the help of this committee, we have been appropriated most of the funding for the Rhine Ordnance Barracks Military Hospital that is being—it has already started construction. And we would ask you for the continued funding of that to complete that project in about '20, '21, or '22. It is critical not only to EUCOM and the health of our families and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines there, but it is critical I think for our movement and our posture medically in other theaters also.

Senator MORAN. General, thank you.

Senator Schatz.

CRITICAL VACANCIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to follow up on your view of the Russians taking a whole of government approach to exercising power and I specifically wanted to ask you about the extent to which we are using the whole of government as a country in the European context. We do not have an Assistant Secretary for Europe and European Affairs. I understand we have an acting in that position. Most ambassadorships are not even nominated, let alone confirmed.

And without forcing you into a political conversation, I would just like you to speak to the utility of working with our State Department and other counterparts in making sure that in terms of alliance management and the diplomacy and politics that goes with your job that you have the full complement that you need.

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, you know, I approach, as I said before, the importance of whole of government, I approach what we do in Europe from that viewpoint. I have a POLAD who is—it is an ambassador. She is very experienced—Ambassador Elliott. We treat her essentially as a deputy in order to harness the other agencies of government and particularly diplomacy, to have that coordination with our embassies and make sure it is very tight.

And so, when we approach whether it is deterring Russia or it is countering transnational threats, all of those things rely on, first, good diplomacy, economic information, instruments of power in

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order to work. And I think, frankly, while the military provides some muscle to our diplomacy, we always want diplomacy to take the lead. And the intent is, is that we prevent war and you do not have to use the military instrument of power. So I think it is very important we continue to approach, you know, our challenges in Europe in the same manner.

Senator SCHATZ. Is it fair to say you are looking forward to working with the newly confirmed diplomats as soon as they are nominated and confirmed?

General SCAPARROTTI. That is true.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. I wanted to ask you to sort of just make the best case you could for an additional BCT in Europe. I know that is being knocked around and I would just like you to make the case for it.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, you know, today I have two BCTs. One is an airborne infantry brigade combat team. One is a cavalry element 22. And the challenges that we have, Russia's posture is not a light force. It is a heavy force. And so in order to have the posture that is both credible and of the right composition, then we need more armored forces. I have one rotational brigade today. I think, frankly, I need to increase that over time to make sure that we do have a force of enough size that enables us to deter Russia and is a good posture for the follow-on forces should we have a crisis.

The second thing I would mention, Senator, is that what comes beyond that is the enablers, things like engineers, you know, a fires brigade, an aviation brigade, those enablers that help those armored units to fight in the way that we do effectively.

EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE CONSOLIDATION

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. Last question. On the European infrastructure consolidation, can you just give us a status report? I understand none of the facilities have been turned back, but I also am reading reports that indicate that there is a reconsideration at least of portions of EIC, so could you give us a status report, please?

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, yes. By my count, since '13 when this began, we have got about 57 sites. And as you know, a site can be a very small thing or it can be somewhat large, but 57 that we have returned to host stations. We have got 15 remaining today that have not been turned over. The decisions to turn those over remain constant. That is the work. That is what we are moving toward.

I understand the services are looking at a couple of those sites potentially to reconsider. That is a service issue. I would tell you personally that we in EUCOM always consider the environment, how it changes, and what we need to support our posture, so I too think there is probably a couple that might be worth reconsideration, but that has not been done and it is actually a service function for the most part.

Senator SCHATZ. And that decision is at the Office of the Secretary?

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General SCAPARROTTI. I do not know that for sure. I would have to go—the actual decision itself. It is certainly, you know, above my level as Secretary or beyond.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTER AT RAF CROUGHTON

Senator MORAN. General, this subcommittee has been supportive of the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center at RAF Croughton. I think that decision was made before you arrived in your current position. There has been some suggestion that it should be built at Lajes Field. Let me ask you to explain to us, if you believe it to be true, why Croughton is the right place to relocate the existing facility. I would be glad to hear what you have to say.

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, as you said, that decision was made beforehand, but when I took over, I assembled our staff. I have been there. I visited the NFIC and our JAC that is a part of the JIAC and I took a look at the other available bases. And I think that Croughton is the right place. I think it is correct to have those facilities, the different facilities. There are six different entities there collocated.

What we get here is we get real synergy out of EUCOM, AFRICOM, the NATO, the DIA support apparatus, as well as BICES, which is an intelligence exchange communication system. Those are the six kind of pieces that make a part of—that make this up. We get great synergy out of them being in one place.

Number two, the challenge today is to make sure that we can actually exchange information at a relevant speed. And today, information moves very quickly, as you know. When you collocate those, they have an opportunity then to share intel appropriately and very quickly as well as analysts and discuss issues. This is powerful and it is particularly important between NATO and the U.S.

The other thing I would mention, Senator, is that for the NATO Intelligence Center that supports me and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Power in Europe under NATO, the framework nation for that intelligence facility is the United States. So what we provide in one site as a U.S. intelligence facility, that support apparatus supports NATO. If it were to be someplace else, we will also have to have the people and the resources at that other place duplicated to support that facility because we have that commitment within NATO.

Secondly, it is all 28 members have to agree on the location, et cetera, which they have done. That, within NATO, is an important factor here, I think. So I think for several reasons it is actually in a very good facility. When we talk in the closed session I can be in a little more detail on this, but I do think we have it right.

Senator MORAN. Let me just ask a little bit further. In your analysis, are there any circumstances, either as a matter of being cost effective or of military value, that the facility should be located at Lajes Field in Portugal?

General SCAPARROTTI. No, I do not think so.

Senator MORAN. Okay.

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you.

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MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO COUNTRIES

Senator MORAN. The Enhanced Forward Presence units are all located currently in the Baltics and Poland. Do you think any additional units need to be stationed in the southern flank of NATO, in Romania or Bulgaria?

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, today I think given the posture that we have, we are in fairly good shape. I think I will look at that as time goes on here through the summer and end of the fall.

So in Romania and Bulgaria on the NATO side, we have something similar to enhanced forward presence in the Baltics and it is called tailored forward presence. Romania, Bulgaria, and other nations that have chosen to take part in that have formed a multinational brigade that operates in those two countries, exercises together, and provides deterrents in that area. It extends also to our maritime forces and NATO, et cetera.

Secondly, we rotate forces through there almost routinely. Marines, for instance, and then also we have one of the NEC Battalions out of our rotational armored brigade down there now, and we will probably be in that part. You know, we will probably have a unit down there out of that a good deal of the year. So I think with that capability, we are beginning to get the posture right in the southeast as well as up in the Baltics and Poland.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Senator MORAN. General, we have talked mostly about Russia. Tell me about terrorists and terrorism, what role and what stance is the United States and NATO required necessarily to combat terrorism?

General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, I think first of all the idea—and you have probably heard this before—that it takes a network to defeat a network.

The terrorists, ISIS and other organizations, as you know are reaching out globally. They have cells and operations in other countries with their headquarters, ISIS, centered in Syria and in Iraq at what they call their caliphate. And I believe our role in EUCOM is to help strengthen that network.

So we have done that. We have a counter transnational threat cell that has connected with both EU and NATO to help reinforce their network, in other words, connect with those countries and reinforce that, primarily to exchange information, exchange analysis, intelligence, and to help each other build our partner capacity in counterterrorism.

Those are the steps that we have taken. NATO is taking a part in that as well. And I think that is the most effective way for us to begin to counter this terrorist threat from a military perspective.

Senator MORAN. Well, let me ask about the European Reassurance Initiative, is there a component in addition to combating the aggressive nature of Russia, do those actions that we take in that regard also have a consequence in fighting terrorism?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think they do from demonstrating strength. They do in the sense that, you know, our operational and intelligence assets, the sharing of in other domains, for instance, in cyber or information. Those relationships that you build for one, de-

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terrifying Russia, play immediately into the other things that you do. So, you know, building relationships capacity works hand in glove in that respect.

Senator MORAN. How are we doing? This will be my final question and then we will turn to Senator Murphy and Senator Boozman and then we will move to our classified setting. What steps are we taking? Assure me that we are taking the necessary steps and describe those that you can to protect our servicemen and women and their families from terrorist activities in Europe.

General SCAPARROTTI. We, and I say we—it is not EUCOM. It is our entire intelligence community—pay very close attention to the intelligence that we get, to the intelligence that our partners can provide for us. We have a working group that is established that is not just EUCOM. It is in conjunction with our intelligence community that, on a very routine basis, looks at this. If we see any indicator that there may be an increased threat or certainly one that has, you know, timing, location, activity attached to it, then we bring that working group together and it comes to my attention. We have had to exercise that in Europe, you know, more often than I would care to talk about. And to this extent, I think we have done a good job.

Now, based on that, we also put out warnings or we take steps with raising security at our bases throughout Europe or in specific places. We give warnings to both our servicemembers and our families and sometimes we limit their travel in areas when we need to if at a given period of time we think there is a threat that would cause us to have that much concern. And that is the way we work it on a daily basis.

Senator MORAN. I wish you well in that regard.

Senator Murphy.

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you.

BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN EUROPE

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for being with us. Sorry I missed the beginning of the testimony.

I wanted to build upon I think the last question that Senator Schatz asked regarding the partnership between the work that you do and the work that the State Department does.

Now, I have worried from the beginning that a European Reassurance Initiative anchored almost wholly in military support misunderstands the nature of the Russian threat and maybe also misunderstands their intentions inside Ukraine. I do not think that Russia wants to militarily own Ukraine. I think they want to create confusion and clouded title around a significant enough portion of the country to ultimately set forth a chain of political events inside Kiev that reinstalls leadership that is friendly to Moscow again so it can be a client state in the way that it looked under the Yanukovych regime.

And so while the line may move a little to the left and a little to the right, ultimately they are trying to create enough chaos in Kiev and throughout the rest of the country that a decision is made to just give up and ultimately come to the conclusion that Ukraine

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is better off being friends with Russia and giving them whatever they need in order to get there.

And so, to me, you know, that speaks to the other elements of a real comprehensive European Reassurance Initiative which would partner together, I think, the very necessary military components with real anti-corruption resources. We have done great work in Kiev to give them a little bit of money to make the police force more responsible to the needs of the people. It has been successful, but it is a tiny amount of money. Real energy and dependence resources. I know you are talking with the State Department all the time about the need to bring real money to the table to help these countries become energy independent.

Right now, we can give them advice, but we really cannot put any money on the table. We can give them money to partner with us on military exercises, but we cannot put money on the table to help them build an interconnection to reverse flow gas. Real economic assistance, and then, as we have talked a lot about in Congress, real efforts to build up objective media to fight back against the Russia propaganda which is real and present throughout all of the eastern edge of the continent.

So I wanted to maybe put a little flesh on the bone and ask you. I know you said you always want to lead with diplomacy first, but some of these things are not real—not diplomacy in the sense that it is just two sides talking to each other, right? They are real hard tools that State and USAID have to deploy side by side with you that change the battle space. And so I maybe wanted to ask you to drill down a little bit more specifically on some of the hard tools that you work with State that ultimately can be dispositive in a place like Ukraine.

General SCAPAROTTI. Well, first of all, I would agree with you and say that we, in every country that we are active in in EUCOM, we are nested under the Embassy and the ambassador and their approach with the other agencies and our government. And so whether it is information, it is not just a military support information apparatus that we can help with. It is actually, first and foremost, supporting the ambassador and the State Department's information campaigns there, supporting their support for USAID or Treasury or others that are working.

I think it is just very important that we are integrated. And so with our defense attaché, our offices in each one of the embassies, that is what we work to do is make sure we understand their program first and then make sure we are not doing anything that is not fully integrated with that or seems to work counter in it.

One of the areas that you have got to be careful in is information because we have some capacity and we have got to make sure we are nested with their information campaign so what we do as a Government and what we say has integrity.

Senator MURPHY. Back to my original premise on Russia's intentions in Ukraine, if you believe their intention is ultimately to march that separatist army into the capital, then it makes sense to approach this from a military first standpoint. If you believe that their intention is to essentially sit where they are long enough so that they politically and economically unwind the country, then you would certainly provide enough military support to make sure you

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are not wrong, but your approach would not be military. Your approach would start with economic and political support to keep them alive long enough so that the Russians say, "I guess we are not going to win this one inside Kiev."

Is my assessment wrong in terms of what Russia's intentions are there?

General SCAPAROTTI. No, I think that if you look at particularly their doctrine as it has changed, I think Russia looks at this, what we call competition blue, the level of conflict. I think they see that as a part of their entire range of conflict. And their objective is if they can achieve what they want, the objectives in Ukraine, without ever using anything more in the military, but doing it through economic intimidation, political provocation, and those other means like you described, then that is what they would much prefer to do. And that is essentially what we see them working on in their disinformation campaigns, et cetera.

I would just point out as well that both the embassy and us have advisors there with—in the Ukrainian Government working on reform, helping them with planning and the things that they have to do to shift to a democratic government established in our values that has control of the military, that works under the values of rule of law, et cetera. And so that is part of that effort and, of course, we are a part of that group that does that and supports those advisors.

Senator MURPHY. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, this partnership which worked, I think, very well over the course of the last 5 years between EUCOM and Victoria Nuland and her staff at the Assistant Secretary level. It is hard to do without an Assistant Secretary for Europe, so and I know we are united in our desire to ultimately get leadership at State that will help partner with the Regional Command, but every day that goes by without an Assistant Secretary, that partnership is made harder.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MORAN. The Senator from Arkansas, Senator Boozman. Senator Boozman, we recognized a moment ago some students of yours. I understand you were a guest lecturer today for scholars in our audience.

MITIGATING RISKS WITH RUSSIA

Senator BOOZMAN. Now we are looking forward to them coming very much, so it is great to have you all here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Senator from Hawaii for holding this very, very important hearing. And, General, thank you for taking the time. I know you are a busy guy, but this is so very important, such an important topic. We really are living in an unprecedented dynamic time right now when it comes to the global security environment, and this is particularly true in your area of responsibility.

Tell me a little bit. In your testimony, you discussed the likelihood of miscalculation and misunderstanding with Moscow. Can you talk a little bit about that further highlighting some of the steps you and your team are taking to mitigating the threat and how we—are we mitigating this threat among our NATO allies?

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General SCAPARROTTI. Senator, first of all, where I am concerned about that is in places where we have forces in close proximity to the Russians. So in the Black Sea, the Baltic, our maritime forces, in the area along the borders, in the Eastern Med where we know they had presence. And it is basically, you know, we operate in international waters. As we should, we expect them to follow international norms as well. So we continue to do that.

At times, particularly in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, you have seen where they have had some maneuvers with aircraft or their ships that we deem to be dangerous. So, you know, we rely on our leaders at a lower level, to take the steps that they need to take at a tactical level to ensure that we are, one, not provocative and that we protect our forces as well, but we are strong. We are going to fly and sail where we should and where we need to in international waters and with international norms.

And so that is the way I approach it. And I think our commanders have done a very good job. Their judgment has been excellent and sometimes they have been in, you know, some tight spots with Russian forces in close proximity.

The last part is we make sure that if we do exercises and training, we are transparent. We tell the Russians if we are doing exercises in the east or in the waters that they are nearby. We let them know that so there is no misunderstanding of what we are doing. We would ask them to do to the same.

Senator BOOZMAN. And our NATO allies that perhaps sometimes do not have the experience in dealing with these kind of things, how do we mitigate that?

General SCAPARROTTI. You know, we work very closely with them. And within NATO, in particular, our interoperability is improving. We are very used to working with most of those forces. And so even on eastern front, our work with Baltics and Poland, in particular, is very close. We obviously do normal planning with them. We discuss these issues. It is not that I am not concerned about it, but I think we have got a good relationship where we can actually ensure that our allies as well as our forces are paying close attention to that.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. General, can you talk a little bit, share your thoughts on the relationship between Russia and China, particularly with Putin's possible visit to Beijing later this month for the so-called One Belt One Road Summit? Obviously, the implications of this partnership are significant and many. How do you see this relationship playing out and what implications do you see for EUCOM and NATO?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think it is a bit worrisome in terms of the relationship if it were to become very close, but I think there is natural tensions there between Russia and China as well. And so because of that, I think we just need to keep a close watch on it.

In some respects, they both are pushing against these international norms that I talked about, you know, pushing against the international security structure that is rules based that has really

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kept the peace globally since the end of World War II. And so, from that respect, they have a similar approach.

Senator BOOZMAN. Very good. One other thing. When you combine your area of responsibility with AFRICOM's, that really is a massive and pretty dynamic geographic area. I think probably 100 countries are involved between the two theaters. Can you talk about the impact of the resurgence of Russia these past few years on your service components and does the consolidation of service components between EUCOM and AFRICOM help or hinder the coordination and can you speak to the strain or challenges on your service components in meeting the current demands?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all, the resurgent Russia has caused us, as I said earlier, to change our posture. It changes the operations that they do, the components do. It changes their readiness that they have to have on a daily basis. Five or 6 years ago, we were not concerned about being ready today.

Senator BOOZMAN. Right.

General SCAPARROTTI. We are now. And so that has picked up their op temp. They are also, as you know, my components are also components of AFRICOM and General Waldhauser. The cooperation is very tight. It is very good between the staffs, but it is, as you can imagine, that one component commander has two different bosses.

Most of the time, we work this out pretty well. There has been several times in the past year where a component's requirement to assist AFRICOM, for instance, has, I thought, raised the level of risk that we take in EUCOM with our responsibilities. And when that happens, then we have a discussion with the chairman or the secretary if necessary so that—and I think that is the important thing—so that we all understand the risk that is involved if there is a demand that is beyond the for structure that I have in EUCOM or AFRICOM has to service both theaters simultaneously.

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, General. We do appreciate you, appreciate all you represent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MORAN. Thank you, Senator Boozman.

General, anything you would like to add or clarify to your remarks or responses to our questions before I close out the hearing?

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I just want to thank the committee for your support. I would underscore the importance of ERI in terms of getting our posture changed and in the right place and that it will take predictable continued funding in order to complete what we have begun. And when we go into the classified hearing, I can be more specific about what I see that being—

Senator MORAN. Thank you.

General SCAPARROTTI [continued]. In the future.

Senator MORAN. General, again, thanks for being with us today in this setting and the one that will follow. We thank you for everything that you do and we would ask on behalf of me and my colleagues that you express our gratitude to those that serve under your command throughout Europe.

For members of the subcommittee, any questions for the record should be turned into subcommittee staff no later than Tuesday, May 9th.

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SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

We will now recess and reconvene in SVC-217 for a classified session. [Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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