[Senate Hearing 115-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
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TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:34 p.m. in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Moran, Murkowski, Boozman, Schatz,
Tester, and Murphy.
U.S. ARMY
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, U.S. ARMY,
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
opening statement of senator jerry moran
Senator Moran. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon. We are joined today--in fact, it is an honor and
privilege to have with us General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, who is
the commander of the United States European Command and the
NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Our Nation was founded based upon a set of complex
relationships with European countries. The complexity of our
relationship regarding military support was developed due in
significant part to alliances with allied powers of World War
II leading to the first U.S. military headquarters in Europe in
1942 and in 1944, designating an official command structure
with then then Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme
Allied Commander of Europe, a title now held by our witness
today. We wish you were a Kansan, General.
Looking at the last 25 years, Europe has been a continent
in transition. From the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
collapse of the Soviet Union to the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, the expansion of NATO and now the resurgence of
Russia with its aggressive global power interests, European
Command has had to adapt to a new reality of instability and
uncertainty, forcing us to examine our partnerships and
relationships with the 51 countries within the Command's area
of responsibility.
The new reality must also take into account that despite
the recent rise in turmoil and tension, we have reduced our
footprint in Europe over the last 30 years. In 1989, the Army
had 213,000 troops stationed at 858 sites in Europe. Today, the
Army has 26,000 troops in about 80 sites.
Two years ago, DOD announced the results of its European
infrastructure consolidation. Its study resulting in the
closure and divestiture of more than 15 sites throughout the
continent and a decrease of 2,000 U.S. personnel, both military
and civilian. Ironically, the result of--as the results of this
consolidation study were released about 11 months later after
``little green men'' who bore a close resemblance to Russian
soldiers began appearing in Crimea. This prompted the European
Reassurance Initiative, a plan to bring more U.S. troops back
to Europe.
At first, ERI (European Reassurance Initiative) was
supposed to be a one-time, $1 billion response to Russian
activities in Crimea and Ukraine. Last year, the ERI request
more than quadrupled to more than a total of $3.4 billion. This
is clearly now an enduring mission focused upon reassuring our
allies as well as deterring further Russian aggression.
For example, I learned recently that the Army Brigade
Combat Team rotation is increasing and I learned that the Big
Red One soldiers from Fort Riley, Kansas are deploying this
fall in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Committing more
U.S. troops will come at a price and military construction will
play an important role in optimizing our presence and readiness
in Central and Eastern Europe.
This committee anticipates the Fiscal Year 2018 budget will
include increased funding for ERI, including a significant
increase in military construction funding. As such, it is
important for the committee to better understand the progress
made thus far in ERI and the geopolitical climate in which we
are operating. The risks and challenges that are prevalent
throughout the European Command area of responsibility from
Russia positioning in the High North to violent extremists and
transnational vulnerabilities in the south. If we return to the
historic posture in Europe, how do we make certain our armed
forces are sufficiently protected, that they do not become
targets for terrorists?
Though our attention has been drawn to the east,
particularly with the North Korean missile launches as recently
as a few days ago, we must be ready to face what many describe
as our nation's greatest threat--Russia.
General Scaparrotti, your testimony today is timely and we
welcome you to our subcommittee. Today's hearing is an
opportunity to examine your planning, priorities, and
investments with people and with infrastructure that you
foresee today and in the years to come in Europe.
Senator Moran. I recognize my friend and colleague from
Hawaii, the Ranking Member, for his opening remarks.
opening statement of senator brian schatz
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
holding this hearing to discuss the U.S. European Command and
the European Reassurance Initiative for which this subcommittee
appropriates military construction funding. I want to thank
General Scaparrotti and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing at an
important time in EUCOM's history. And I am glad to see that we
will have the chance to discuss EUCOM's theater and the ERI
military construction funding in an open and in a classified
context.
The political and military environment in Europe has
changed massively over the last several years. Prior to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, EUCOM had experienced an
extended period of peace time, prompting the U.S. to draw down
its permanently stationed forces from around 300,000 during the
Cold War to the current level of about 62,000. In Warsaw in
June 2014 in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
President Obama announced ERI to reassure NATO allies and
partners of America's commitment to European security and
territorial integrity. ERI funding supports Operation Atlantic
Resolve, which ensures EUCOM has a persistent rotational
presence in Central and Eastern Europe.
As the situation in Eastern Europe evolved over the past
several years, the nature of the mission has changed as well.
From an initial goal of stabilizing the crisis, reassuring
allies and building capacity, ERI is now shifting to emphasize
deterrents. To support ERI, the committee has appropriated $288
million for major MILCON projects since 2015 and an additional
$224 million for minor MILCON funded through defense O&M. These
numbers are substantial, and while EUCOM's mission is critical,
so too is transparency in numbers and a planning process that
ensures that taxpayer dollars are spent in a manner that best
supports the strategy.
And so, it is with this in mind that the scale of our
MILCON investments should send a clear signal to allies and
adversaries alike that the U.S. has an enduring commitment to
the stability and defense of Europe. We must likewise make a
commitment to our military forces serving in Eastern Europe to
support basic quality of life projects and force protection
projects as we have done elsewhere in the world.
Thank you to General Scaparrotti and thank you, Chairman,
for holding this important hearing.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
I just want to take a moment to recognize the 17
individuals that are with us this afternoon at our hearing. We
are joined by 17 multinational students from the Army War
College. They are here as part of the Carlisle Scholars
Program. And I want to take a moment to thank them for their
service and to welcome them to our hearing. You all might
stand. Thank you all very much.
General Scaparrotti, we now draw attention to you and we
welcome your testimony.
summary statement of
general curtis m. scaparrotti, u.s. army
General Scaparrotti. Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Schatz,
and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to
testify today as the Commander of the United States European
Command. I would like to thank the committee for passing the
fiscal year 2017 MILCON bill last September, providing EUCOM
with stable, predictable, and on-time funding. The projects go
a long way to support posture in EUCOM to meet our operational
requirements.
On behalf of over 60,000 permanently assigned service
members, as well as civilians, contractors, and their families
who serve and represent our nation in Europe, we appreciate
your support.
The European theater remains critical to our national
interests. The NATO alliance gives us a unique advantage over
our adversaries, a united capable war fighting alliance
resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that
have been forged in battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and
with our European partners provides the United States with a
network of willing nations who support global operations and
secure the international rules based order.
Our security architecture protects almost one billion
people and safeguards transatlantic trade which now constitutes
almost half the world's GDP. However, this security
architecture is being tested and today we face the most dynamic
European strategic environment in recent history. Political
volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats
to our security system that are transregional, multidomain, and
multifunctional.
In the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to
antagonist as it seeks to undermine the western led
international order and reassert itself as a global power.
Countries along Russia's periphery including Ukraine and
Georgia struggle against Moscow's moliant activities and
military actions. In the southeast, strategic drivers of
instability converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which
has to simultaneously manage Russia terrorist and refugee
flows.
In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal
elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
Middle East while refugees flee to Europe in search of security
and opportunity. And in the High North, Russia is reasserting
its military presence and positioning itself for strategic
advantage in the Arctic.
In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its
focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence
and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our plans, our
posture, our readiness so that we remain relevant to the
threats we face. In short, we are returning to our historic
role as a warfighting command.
EUCOM's transition would not be possible without
Congressional appropriations and support of the European
Reassurance Initiative. Over the past 12 months, EUCOM has made
clear progress with an enhanced forward presence, complex
exercises and training, increased prepositioning of equipment
and supplies, and partner capacity building throughout Europe.
EUCOM's military construction program continues to build on the
ongoing posture initiatives, infrastructure recapitalization,
and the expansion of operational infrastructure.
Thanks to Congressional support, EUCOM has proceeded with
the recapitalization of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center
replacement project and the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center
which I continue to believe is operationally imperative that
EUCOM, AFRICOM, and NFIC--that's the NATO facility--those
intelligence organizations remain collocated and that this
project move forward as planned.
With your continued support, I remain confident that our
ability to affect this return to warfighting focus--I remain
confident our ability to affect this return to a warfighting
focus, but there is much work to do. Our force posture needs to
increase to provide credible deterrence to Russian aggression
and we must have infrastructure to support this increased
posture. Significant investments are needed to provide capacity
for operations, exercises, training, reception, staging, and
prepositioned assets.
The funds provided through ERI have jumpstarted
infrastructure construction, but we must continue to invest in
projects required to provide a ready and capable force
presence. Accordingly, EUCOM is working with the services in
the Office of Secretary of Defense to prepare budget
submissions for fiscal year 18.
Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's members
and the staff for their continued appropriations in support of
EUCOM. Your support, that of other senior leaders, and above
all the support of our public at home and across Europe, are
vital to ensuring that we have a ready and relevant force. This
remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to meet the
demands of a dynamic security environment. And I remain
confident that through the strength of our alliances and
partnerships and with the professionalism of our service
members we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole,
free, and at peace.
Chairman, thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, U.S. Army
i. introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee, I am
honored to testify before you in my first year as the Commander of
United States European Command (EUCOM). It is a privilege to lead the
great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and
civilians in this Command. They continue to demonstrate remarkable
commitment, dedication, and selfless service both in Europe and across
the globe. We all appreciate your continued support.
The European theater remains critical to our national interests.
The transatlantic alliance gives us an unmatched advantage over our
adversaries--a united, capable, warfighting alliance resolved in its
purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in
battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our
Area of Responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network
of willing partners who support global operations and secure the
international rules-based order that our nations have defended together
since World War II. Our security architecture protects more than 1
billion people and has safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now
constitutes almost half of the world's combined GDP.
Nevertheless, today we face the most dynamic European security
environment in history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty
are compounded by threats to our security system that are trans-
regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In the East, a resurgent
Russia has turned from partner to antagonist. Countries along Russia's
periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia, are under threat from
Moscow's malign influence and military aggression.In the Southeast,
strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies, especially
Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia, terrorists, and
refugee flows. In the South, violent extremists and transnational
criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the
Middle East, while refugees and migrants fleeing persecution to Europe
in search of security and opportunity. In the High North, Russia is
reasserting its military prowess and positioning itself for strategic
advantage in the Arctic.
EUCOM fully recognizes the dynamic nature of this security
environment, and in response, we are regenerating our abilities for
deterrence and defense while continuing our security cooperation and
engagement mission. This requires that we return to our historical role
as a command that is capable of executing the full-spectrum of joint
and combined operations in a contested environment. Accordingly, we are
adjusting our posture, plans, and readiness to respond to possible
future conflicts.
This shift would not be possible without congressional support of
the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Thanks in large measure to
ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM has made demonstrable progress. U.S.
tanks have returned to European soil. U.S. F-15s and F-22s have
demonstrated air dominance throughout the theater. U.S. naval forces
have sailed throughout European waters. EUCOM has operationalized its
Joint Cyber Center. With the approval of former Secretary Carter, EUCOM
delivered the first new operational plan for the defense of Europe in
over 25 years.
ERI also supports high-end exercises and training, improved
infrastructure, and enhanced prepositioning of equipment and supplies,
while State Department and DoD funds build partner capacity throughout
Europe.
EUCOM has also continued to strengthen our relationship with allies
and partners. Our relationship with Turkey endured a coup attempt with
minimal disruption to multiple ongoing operations. EUCOM has
strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. Above all,
EUCOM has supported the NATO Alliance, which remains, as Secretary
Mattis has said, the ``bedrock'' of our transatlantic security. Overall
EUCOM is growing stronger.
ii. theater assessment--risks and challenges
Over the past year I have highlighted three signature issues facing
us in this dynamic security environment: Russia, radicals or violent
extremists, and regional unrest--leading to refugee and migrant
flows.At the same time, managing the political, economic, and social
challenges posed by refugees and migrants is a consuming concern of our
allies and partners.
Russia
Russia's malign actions are supported by its diplomatic,
information, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow intends to
reemerge as a global power, and views international norms such as the
rule of law, democracy, and human rights as components of a system
designed to suppress it. Therefore, Russia seeks to undermine this
international system and discredit those in the West who have created
it. For example, Russia is taking steps to influence the internal
politics of European countries just as it tried to do in the United
States in an attempt to create disunity and weakness within Europe and
undermine the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, Russia has
repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that underpin
European peace and stability, including the Treaty on Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE), and it is undermining transparency and confidence
building regimes such as the Vienna Document and Open Skies, which
provides greater transparency of posture and exercises in the region
Russia's political leadership appears to seek a resurgence through
modernization of its military. Russia is adjusting its doctrine,
modernizing its weapons, reorganizing the disposition of its forces,
professionalizing its armed services, and upgrading capabilities in all
warfighting domains. Russia desires a military force capable of
achieving its strategic objectives and increasing its power.
Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including occupation and attempted
annexation of Crimea, and actions in Syria underscore its willingness
to use military force to exert its influence in Europe and the Middle
East. In Ukraine, Russia's willingness to foment a bloody conflict into
its third year through the use of proxy forces in the Donbas, and
elsewhere, is deeply troubling to our allies and partners, particularly
Russia's closest neighbors. In Syria, Russia's military intervention
has changed the dynamics of the conflict, bolstered the Bashar al-Assad
regime, targeted moderate opposition elements, and compounded human
suffering in Syria, and complicated U.S. and coalition operations
against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia has used
this chaos toestablish a permanent presence in the Middle East and
eastern Mediterranean.
This past year saw other significant demonstrations of Russia's
renewed military capability, including the first ever combat deployment
of the KUZNETSOV Task Force, nation-wide strategic exercises, joint
air, ground, and maritime operations in Syria using new platforms and
precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of nuclear-capable
missiles to Kaliningrad. Russia's deployment in Ukraine and Syria
also revealed increased proficiency in expeditionary combat and
sustainment operations.
Another key component of Russia's military advancement is its
Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). For example, in connection with
its deployment to support the Assad regime in Syria, Russia fielded
advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems that combine command
and control and electronic warfare capabilities, and long range coastal
defense cruise missiles with advanced air defense platforms. EUCOM
assesses that Russia plans to meld existing and future IADS systems
into a central command structure to control all air defense forces and
weapons.
In the High North, Russia continues to strengthen its military
presence through equipment, infrastructure, training, and other
activities. Russia is positioning itself to gain strategic advantage if
the Northern Sea Route opens and becomes a viable shipping lane between
Europe and Asia.
Most concerning, however, is Moscow's substantial inventory of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR and its troubling doctrine
that calls on the potential use of these weapons to escalate its way
out of a failing conflict. Russia's fielding of a conventional/nuclear
dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF Treaty creates a
mismatch in escalatory options with the West. In the context of Putin's
highly centralized decisionmaking structure, Moscow's provocative
rhetoric and nuclear threats increase the likelihood of
misunderstanding and miscalculation.
In addition to recent conventional and nuclear developments, Russia
has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce,
destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign influence over other
nations. In neighboring states, Russia continues to fuel ``protracted
conflicts.'' In Moldova, for example, Russia has yet to follow through
on its 1999 Istanbul summit commitments to withdraw an estimated 1,500
troops--whose presence has no mandate--from the Moldovan breakaway
region of Transnistria. Russia asserts that it will remove its force
once a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has been
reached.However, Russia continued to undermine the discussion of a
comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict at the 5+2
negotiations. Moscow continues to play a role in destabilizing the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by selling arms to both parties--Armenia and
Azerbaijan--while maintaining troops in Armenia, despite an
international pledge to co-chair Minsk Group charged with seeking
resolution of the conflict.
Russia fiercely opposes one of our strongest EUCOM partners,
Georgia, in its attempts to align with the European and transatlantic
communities. Russia's occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since
its 2008 invasion the Georgian regions of has created lasting
instability.
In the Balkans, Russia exploits ethnic tensions to slow progress on
European and transatlantic integration. In 2016, Russia overtly
interfered in the political processes of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Montenegro.
Additional Russian activities short of war, range from
disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia's outright
denial of involvement in the lead up to Russia's occupation and
attempted annexation in Crimea; attempts to influence elections in the
United States, France and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda
campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and
cyber activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations
and Ukraine. In all of these ways and more, Russia is attempting to
exert its influence, expand its power, and discredit the capability and
relevance of the West.
Radicals
Violent extremists, most notably ISIS, pose a serious, immediate
threat to U.S. personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe
and worldwide. In 2016, there were major terrorist attacks in Berlin,
Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere. ISIS has made its
intentions clear: it seeks to overthrow Western civilization and
establish a world-wide caliphate.
While it's footprint in Iraq and Syria shrunk in 2016, since 2014,
ISIS has significantly expanded its operations throughout Europe and
now leverages its network to enable and inspire attacks by European-
based extremists in their resident countries. Further, ISIS has
exploited the migration crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe.
Since Turkey expanded its counter-ISIS role and advocacy for coalition
operations in Mosul, it has experienced an increased number of
terrorist attacks, and ISIS's leaders have called for more. We do not
expect the threat to diminish in the near future.
As a consequence of this threat, European nations have been forced
to divert financial resources and military personnel to internal
security. The impact of this reallocation is not yet fully appreciated
and will likely persist for years. In short, violent extremism poses a
dangerous threat to transatlantic nations and to the international
order that we value.
Regional Volatility
In EUCOM's AOR, Russia's indirect actions have sought to exploit
political unrest and socioeconomic disparities. Russian aggression in
Ukraine has led to the deaths of approximately 10,000 people since
April 2014. Recently in eastern Ukraine, Russia controls the battle
tempo, again ratcheting up the number of daily violations of the cease
fire and--even more concerning--directing combined Russian-separatist
forces to target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate
OSCE monitors in order to turn up the pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore,
Moscow's support for so-called ``separatists'' in eastern Ukraine
destabilizes Kyiv's political structures, particularly as Ukraine
undertakes politically-difficult reforms to combat corruption and
comply with IMF requirements.
Ukraine seeks a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, the withdrawal
of heavy weapons and Russian forces, full and unfettered access for
OSCE monitors, and control over its internationally-recognized border
with Russia. Russian-led separatist forces continue to commit the
majority of ceasefire violations despite attempts by the OSCE to broker
a lasting ceasefire along the Line of Contact.
Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. It
now occupies a critical location at the crossroads of multiple
strategic challenges. To its west, it implements the Montreux
Convention, which governs transit through the Turkish Straits, and is
committed to local solutions for Black Sea issues. To its north and
east, Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. Ankara
seeks to resume the level of trade with Moscow that it enjoyed prior to
Turkey's November 2015 shoot down of a Russian fighter. Turkey has
absorbed the largest number of refugees from Syria--almost 3 million.
Despite these challenges, EUCOM continues to work closely withTurkey to
enable critical basing and logistical support to the counter ISIS fight
and supports Turkey to counter its terror threat.
Although the flow of refugees to Europe has slowed, the refugee
situation remains a significant challenge to our European Allies and
partners. The strain on the social systems of European nations,
especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts resources that could
otherwise go toward military and defense spending, and finding
solutions has tested political relationships. EU member states struggle
to find a common, ``shared'' approach to admit and settle migrants.
Both NATO and the EU, in conjunction with Turkish and Greek
authorities, have committed law enforcement and military assets to this
issue, including a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct
reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance.
The Syrian civil war and the risk of spillover into neighboring
states, including Israel, continue to threaten stability in Europe and
the Levant. Despite assistance from the USG and the international
community, the refugee population in Jordan and Lebanon has placed
significant burdens on the government and local residents.
Additionally, factional fighting in Syria has resulted in
occasional cross-border fire into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
Israel has avoided being drawn into the conflict in Syria but has taken
military action to deny the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.
The Balkans' stability since the late 90's masks political and
socio-economic fragility. Russia promotes anti-European views in this
region by exploiting corrupt political systems, poor economic
performance, and increased ethnic polarization. Additionally, Islamic
radicals seek to take advantage of high unemployment rates, political
turmoil, and socioeconomic disparities to recruit violent extremists.
Iran's regional influence in the Levant continues to grow through
its ongoing support to radical groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah,
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and paramilitary groups involved in
the Syrian conflict and in counter-ISIS efforts across Iraq. Iran,
which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to
transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and is clearly
committed to maintaining Syria as the key link of the Iran-Hezbollah
axis, which sustains a terrorist network in Syrian-regime controlled
territory. Furthermore, Iran has taken advantage of the Syrian crisis
to militarily coordinate with Russia in support of Assad.
iii. theater assessment--strengths and opportunities
EUCOM will meet these challenges and adapt to the new security
environment by capitalizing on our strengths and building new
capabilities. We are developing a credible and relevant force structure
built for deterrence and defense and leveraging a unified and adaptive
NATO Alliance, and transitioning into a command able to address the
strategic challenges before us.
Deter Russia
EUCOM activities, facilitated by ERI funding, continue to be the
primary demonstration of our deterrent capability.
Increased Rotational Forces. ERI has directly supported an increase
in the rotational presence of U.S. forces in Europe, a critical
augmentation to EUCOM's assigned forces. For example, ERI funded Fort
Stewart's 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team's deployment to Europe from
March to September 2016. Also, ERI funded the deployment of F-22
fighters, B-52 bombers, and additional combat and lift aircraft to
Europe as part of the ERI Theater Security Package. Looking ahead,
continued congressional support for ERI will sustain these rotations
and enable additional anti- submarine warfare capabilities
complementing maritime domain awareness assets in Iceland that are
included in the fiscal year 2017 ERI request. Additionally, rotational
Marine units will operate from Norway and the Black Sea region.
Trained and Equipped Component Commands. EUCOM has also used ERI to
fund and field Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), providing a rapid
mobilization capability for additional armored units in Europe.
Separately, EUCOM advocated for and received full support for a $220
million NATO Security Investment Program project (i.e., paid for by
NATO common funding) that will build warehousing and maintenance
capability for staging APS stocks in Poland. Additionally, ERI funds
dozens of projects to upgrade flight-line and munitions-storage
infrastructure across eight NATO nations to support not only rotational
presence but also training events in Eastern Europe. The Navy is using
ERI to fund capability enablers and force rotations to support EUCOM
and NATO exercises, including Mine Countermeasure Teams and additional
flying hours specifically to enhance EUCOM's deterrence posture.
Persistent Presence. ERI increased funding for U.S. forces in the
Baltics, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mediterranean during 2016.
In addition, ERI allowed EUCOM to continue our contribution to NATO's
Air Policing mission by funding a continued fighter presence in theater
with the 493rd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath in the UK.
Complex Exercises with Allies and Partners. ERI expanded the scope
of EUCOM's involvement in over 28 joint and multi-national maritime,
air, amphibious, and ground exercises across 40 countries. In June
2016, EUCOM participated in the Polish national exercise ANAKONDA,
which involved approximately 31,000 Allied troops-- including over
14,000 U.S. personnel--and provided a robust demonstration of Allied
defensive capabilities, readiness, and interoperability. ERI also
supported Navy-led BALTOPS 16, the premier maritime exercise in the
Baltic region with over 6,100 troops from participating nations. And
utilizing ERI resources, the Air Force took part in over 50 exercises
and training deployments across Europe. An Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement concluded with the EU last December enables EUCOM
to cooperate better with EU missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.
Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI): EUCOM leads the Department of
Defense's Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI), which provides a framework
for understanding the Russian threat and a forum for coordinating
efforts and requirements. RSI allows us to maximize the deterrent value
of our activities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. In just over a
year, RSI has created a number of analytic products for combatant
commanders that will enable a more efficient application of existing
resources and planning efforts.
Deterring Russia requires a whole of government approach, and EUCOM
supports the strategy of approaching Russia from a position of strength
while seeking appropriate military-to-military communication necessary
to fulfill our defense obligations in accordance with the fiscal year
2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Going forward, we must bring
the information aspects of our national power more fully to bear on
Russia, both to amplify our narrative and to draw attention to Russia's
manipulative, coercive, and malign activities. Finally, NATO and U.S.
nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our
modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible,
and safe nuclear capability.
Enable the NATO Alliance
As the United States manages multiple strategic challenges, our
enduring strength remains NATO, the most successful alliance in
history. NATO's leadership understands that the security environment
has radically changed over the past few years. The Alliance has placed
renewed emphasis on deterring further Russian aggression, countering
transnational threats, such as violent extremist organizations, and
projecting stability in the Middle East and North Africa, while
fulfilling its commitments in Afghanistan.
The Warsaw Summit last July was a significant demonstration of
unity, cooperation, and strategic adaptation. As the member nations
declared in NATO's Warsaw Summit Communique, ``We are united in our
commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond''.
This unity is NATO's center of gravity, and the United States must
continue to support solidarity among the Alliance nations.
Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The signature outcome of the 2016
Warsaw Summit was the decision to establish an enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and Poland to demonstrate NATO's cohesion
in defense of the Alliance. Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
the United States have begun deploying multinational battalion task
forces to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively on a
rotational basis.Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) signed in 2017
with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facilitating the deployment of
U.S forces to the three Baltic states. The United States serves as the
framework nation for eFP in Poland and is working closely with the
other framework nations and their host nations to ensure NATO's key
deterrence and defense measures are capable and integrated.
European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA). EUCOM continues to
implement the EPAA to defend European NATO populations, territory, and
infrastructure against ballistic missile threats from threats outside
the Euro-Atlantic region. In July 2016, the U.S.-funded Aegis Ashore
facility in Romania became operational and transferred to NATO
operational control. Work on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland
(authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2016 legislation) is
underway and on track for completion by the end of calendar year 2018
and operational under NATO operational control in mid-2019.
Projecting Stability. NATO is a key contributor to ensuring
security and projecting stability abroad. It is worth remembering that
the first and only time the Alliance invoked the mutual defense
provisions of its founding treaty was in response to the 9/11 attacks
on the United States. Today, through NATO's Resolute Support Mission,
over 12,000 troops (including over 5,000 non-U.S. personnel) provide
training and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions.
NATO is committed to ensuring a stable Afghanistan that is not a safe
haven for terrorists.
Additionally, it is notable that all 28 NATO nations participate in
the Counter-ISIS coalition. NATO committed AWACS surveillance aircraft
and actively contributes to capacity building in Iraq. EUCOM actively
supports NATO's goal of expanding its operations against this terrorist
threat.
Support to Washington Treaty. EUCOM provides support for key
articles of the Washington Treaty, enabling NATO members to meet their
collective security commitments. EUCOM conducts activities, such as
security cooperation, to help allies meet their Article 3 commitment to
``maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to
resist attack.'' We have been able to reduce allies' dependencies on
Russian-sourced, legacy military equipment thanks to ongoing
congressional support for critical authorities and funding that provide
shared resources. EUCOM also actively assists the Alliance when an ally
declares, under Article 4, that its territorial integrity, political
independence, or security is threatened. The last time an ally invoked
Article 4 was 2015, when Turkey sought consultation following terrorist
attacks. Most importantly, EUCOM is the force that backs the United
States' commitment to Article 5, which declares that an armed attack on
one ally is an attack on all.
NATO Spending Trends. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies
pledged to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and invest in
the development of highly- capable and deployable forces. Today, in
addition to the United States, four allies (Estonia, Greece, Poland,
and the United Kingdom) meet the NATO guidelines for 2 percent of GDP,
up from three in 2014. Allies' defense expenditures increased in 2015
for the first time since 2009 and grew at a real rate of 3.8 percent in
2016, with 22 member nations increasing defense spending. Allies are
showing demonstrable progress toward their commitment to contribute 2
percent of their GDP within a decade (by 2024).
This is a positive trend, but allied nations must meet the 2
percent mark with 20 percent allocated to the modernization of
equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner capability
shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control;
air to air refueling; and air and missile defense. Further, both EUCOM
and NATO are hampered by inadequate infrastructure that affects the
ability to maneuver across the continent. The expansion of the Alliance
to include former Eastern Bloc countries has exacerbated the lack of
common transportation networks between the newer NATO members in the
east and the more established allies in the west. EUCOM is working
closely with NATO to identify and address infrastructure requirements
to improve U.S. and NATO freedom of movement throughout the theater.
Build Partner Capacity
EUCOM has spent several decades working with the Department of
State to help allied and partner nations develop and improve their
military and other security forces. This partner capacity building has
been accomplished with the support of this Committee, which has been
generous in providing us the authorization we need to accomplish this
critical task. I would highlight two activities in particular.
Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB helps partner nations build
effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions. For
example, EUCOM fully endorses the work of the Defense Reform Advisory
Board in Ukraine, which is helping to bring about both political and
military reform as the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Armed
Forces transition from centralized Soviet-style systems and concepts
towards a Euro-Atlantic model. We also support defense institutions in
Georgia, helping them improve their strategic logistics, human and
material resource management, and institutional aspects of their
training management system. Overall, our DIB efforts lay the groundwork
for broader security cooperation activities.
Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine (JMTG-U). Together with
forces from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, and Canada using State
Department-provided Foreign Military Financing and Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative funds, EUCOM trains, advises, and equips Ukraine
security forces, helping them build the capacity to defend their
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our team, working through the
Multinational Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine's institutional
training capability so that Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable
armed force. Our efforts include the training of both conventional and
special operations units, as well as advising Ukraine on defense reform
priorities.
Assist Israel
EUCOM's mission to assist in the defense of Israel, one of our
closest allies, remains a top priority. Success will depend on the
continued support of Congress and our strong relationship with the
Israel Defense Forces. Many aspects of our bilateral relationship have
been guided by the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP)
framework, which dates to the Reagan Administration. SCIP enables
robust cooperation and coordination on a vast range of security
matters. Going forward, we are working to update the SCIP to
incorporate an examination of all major exercises to ensure each meets
the three major pillars of our security relationship: (1) missile
defense, air operations, and counter-terrorism; (2) managing the Weapon
Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Israel (WRSA-I); and (3) ensuring Israel's
qualitative military edge.
Counter Transnational Threats
Adopting a whole-of-government approach, EUCOM, together with its
interagency partners, conducts initiatives to counter transnational
threats including countering terrorism and the flow of foreign
fighters, countering illicit finance networks, combatting the
trafficking of persons and illicit substances; and building allied and
partner security, investigative, and judicial capacity. In conjunction
with the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and other
Federal law enforcement agencies, EUCOM works to monitor and thwart the
flow of foreign fighters, support the dismantlement of facilitation
networks, and build partner nation capacity to defeat violent
extremism.
Through our counter terrorism cell, EUCOM strengthens the global
Counter-ISIS efforts in coordination with and support of U.S. Central
(CENTCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), and Special Operations (SOCOM) Commands.
We have focused on those who facilitate the ISIS brand and network
through radicalization, financing, and propaganda.
Also, EUCOM and NATO are working to increase ties with the EU to
enhance the capabilities Europe can collectively bring to bear against
transnational threats. These three organizational nodes foster a shared
understanding of the threats, help match resources accordingly, and can
address all elements of national power including diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic. In order to realize this
networked approach, EUCOM will support NATO efforts to expand the
capability and capacity of Allied Joint Forces Command--Naples.
Enable Global Operations
EUCOM personnel actively support operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM
AORs. EUCOM's well-developed and tested infrastructure provides
critical capabilities in strategic locations such as Incirlik, Turkey;
Sigonella, Italy' and Moron and Rota, Spain. Basing and access in
Germany, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom
enable more timely and coordinated trans-regional crisis response.
iv. resource requirements
Significant U.S. force reductions following the collapse of the
Soviet Union were based on the assumption that Russia would be a
strategic partner to the West. These reductions now limit U.S. options
for addressing challenges in a changing European strategic environment.
The strategic rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, combined with budget
limitations in the Budget Control Act of 2011, have contributed to
substantial posture reductions across our land and air domains. For
example, between 2010 and 2013, two fighter squadrons and a two-star
numbered air force headquarters were inactivated, along with associated
critical enablers and staff personnel. In addition, the last two heavy
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a two-star division headquarters, and a
three-star corps headquarters were removed from Europe, leaving only
one Stryker and one airborne brigade. As a result of the BCT losses,
without fully-resourced heel-to-toe rotational forces the ground force
permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the combatant
command's directed mission to deter Russia from further aggression.
Deterrence Posture. Going forward, we will need to continue
maintaining capable forces for effective deterrence. EUCOM is
coordinating across the DoD to obtain the forces we need in every
warfare domain. This may include additional maneuver forces, combat air
squadrons, anti-submarine capabilities, a carrier strike group, and
maritime amphibious capabilities. We will continue to enhance our plans
for pre-positioning equipment across the theater as a flexible
deterrent measure and to exercise the joint reception, staging, and
onward integration of CONUS-based forces into Europe.
ERI Requirements. EUCOM's continues to require the ability to deter
Russian aggression and counter malign influence while assuring allies
and partners. We anticipate needing to continue deterrence measured
initiated in previous ERI submissions to include: Army and Air Force
prepositioning, retention of F-15 presence, improved airfield
infrastructure improvements, and to address some new capabilities
needed in the theater.
Indications and Warnings (I&W). EUCOM's ability to provide
strategic warning is critical to credible deterrence. . A robust
intelligence capability enables accurate analysis and rapid response in
a changing theater security environment. This capability also supports
the design of realistic exercises, posture alignment, and future
requirements. Furthermore, when completed, EUCOM's Joint Intelligence
Analytic Center at Royal Air Force Croughton will provide a dedicated,
purpose-built intelligence facility collocated with NATO and AFRICOM's
analytic centers that will enhance capability and capacity in both
combatant commands and NATO. Finally, additional intelligence
collection platforms in theater, such as the U-2, the RQ-4, and the RC-
135, are required for accurate and timely threat information to support
strategic decisions.
Recapitalization Efforts. The European Infrastructure Consolidation
effort announced in January 2015 enables EUCOM to divest excess
capacity and consolidate missions and footprints at enduring locations.
However, with aging infrastructure and little recent investment,
recapitalization and consolidation projects are required to support
warfighter readiness, command and control requirements, deployments,
training, and quality of life. This Committee has been key to these
critical efforts. We continue to modernize communications facilities
and schools across Europe. Last year, Congress authorized the final
increment for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center, which enables the
closure of RAFs Molesworth and Alconbury.
v. conclusion
Let me conclude by again thanking this Committee's Members and
staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only through providing
our requested funding, but also by helping us to articulate the
challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior leaders and,
above all, from the public at home and across Europe is vital to
ensuring that we remain ready and relevant. This is a pivotal time for
EUCOM as we transition to meet the demands of a dynamic security
environment. I remain confident that through the strength of our
Alliance and partnerships, and with the professionalism of our service
members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole, free and
at peace.
Senator Moran. General, thank you. General, thank you very
much.
I am going to turn first to the Senator from Alaska who is
on a schedule today that we want to be accommodating. So the
Senator from Alaska is recognized.
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for allowing me to kind of skip the line. And I am sorry that I
will not be able to be part of the second half of this
briefing, but I do appreciate the opportunity to have you
before the committee here, General Scaparrotti, and just thank
you for your leadership.
You have mentioned the High North and that is an area that
I pay close particular attention and concern to. You mentioned
Russia positioning itself to gain strategic advantage, not only
with the sea lanes as they are becoming open, but we are seeing
stepped up activity. I think it is fair to say that all
Alaskans are paying particularly close attention to Russia. It
was just a few weeks ago that for four days in a row we were
greeted with aircraft that were spotted off the coast of
Alaska. And, well, that used to be a common sight. We have not
really seen that since 2015. So people look up. They wonder
what the scramble is all about and they really wonder what is
going on.
A senior Defense official was quoted as saying that this
was ``not a concern and attributed the uptick to a recent lack
of available Russian aircraft and the need to boost training.''
So I want to ask you about that, whether you agree with that
assessment, but also want to have you speak to the specifics
that we are seeing in Russia and this Arctic expansion.
It was highlighted in the news this weekend. I do not know
if you saw the Sunday night--the NBC Nightly News report on the
80th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade. This is a Russian Arctic
Brigade that is now stationed along the Finnish border. And,
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, it might be--it is a two-
minute clip, but it is pretty substantive in terms of showing
what the Russians are doing in their Arctic training and
recognizing that they are training in temperatures that are
tough. It is 40 degrees below zero.
They are using everything from tanks to military hardware,
snow machines, even reindeer and dog sleds. But it is not just
the training that is going on. It is what is happening with the
opening of some pretty impressive new bases, not just dusting
off the Cold-War era Arctic bases. They recently unveiled a
14,000-square foot Arctic shamrock, which is a permanent Arctic
base along the 80th parallel, as well as having four new bases
planned.
So folks in Alaska are wondering what is going on. They
hear senior defense officials say, you know, don't be too
worried here. How do you offer the assurance to Alaskans, I
guess, or to all Americans, about what we are seeing in Russia
right now? What does this year's ERI do to basically keep
Russia on its side of the border? So if you can speak to the
activities in the High North, I would greatly appreciate it.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. I think you
accurately described what we see.
Russia as it has invested in its forces over the last 5 to
6 years, is doing so in a very broad manner, and so it affects
their air, maritime, ground forces, their coastal defense
forces, their radar systems for air defense, et cetera. So we
see it across the board. And we have now seen them begin to
make those improvements in the High North or in the Arctic as
well.
As you noted, the northern sea route, one of the routes
there, is--given the warming, is the most likely it is the one
that is open first, et cetera, and it does travel closest to
their border. As they put in bases, they are refurbishing old
ones. They are putting in some new ones. They are placing
forces, as you noted. They are placing some air defense and
missile systems in as well.
Our concern is that rather than the Arctic being a place
that is for commerce, stable, freedom of maneuvering in
accordance with international laws is adhered to, that they
could position themselves in a place to control the Arctic and
that sea lane and so that is what we are watching very closely.
I would tell you that the flights are a function in a sense
of their growing capabilities, their refurbishment of their air
force, their long-range bombers that you referred to, but they
are also starting to demonstrate those capabilities. That is
what they are doing. They are demonstrating their capabilities.
They do so on the other side on the Arctic into Europe as well.
ERI is the very basis of our response to Russian
aggression, malign influence, and also their modernization. The
ERI funds provide us the capability, for instance, in early
warning systems it provides us capabilities in ISR,
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, specifically with
respect to antisubmarine warfare, which is a very important
component of their High North. Their northern fleet is in that
area in the Arctic.
And so all of those things go into that. When we go into
the classified session I can go into a good deal more detail
about what they are doing and how we can influence that, but as
you said, I remain concerned and it is a point that I bring out
because of our need to continue what we are doing in ERI, but
broader than that, we also need to continue our modernization
so that we remain dominant in the domains that provide all of
our citizens and the Europeans reassurance that we can deter
this threat and protect the United States.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I appreciate that and I will look
forward to an opportunity to perhaps visit more directly with
you about some of these specifics. I am going to be taking a
group of members at the end of this month to Norway, where we
will have an opportunity to visit the Marines at the Joint
Arctic Training there at Vaernes. And I know that we have
various partnerships in other places with other Arctic nations
like Canada for things like search and rescue, but do we have
any other military partnerships or opportunities like this and
do you see us doing more of what we are seeing right now with
the Marines in Norway and kind of building that capacity out?
General Scaparrotti. We have a good partnership obviously
with Norway. We have begun to work in a more routine basis,
particularly with our Marines now, but also with other
services, air and naval, as well as Sweden and Finland in the
north. And we will continue those operations with them, the
training, the practice interoperability, et cetera.
They have a very good understanding of Russia's posture
because of their position and their long relationship with them
and that is very helpful to us as well in understanding
deterrents, understanding a proper posture, and being able to
get that right.
Senator Murkowski. Sir, I appreciate it, and again I look
forward to talking with you about these and other aspects.
Thank you.
Senator Moran. Senator Schatz.
BUDGET PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, I wanted to talk to you about the need
for predictability in the context of ERI. You are here in an
unusual week where we are passing a big bipartisan bill. And I
know we did the MILCON piece last year, which was great, but
obviously, there are implications in terms of rotational forces
and other needs that you have at EUCOM that are going to be met
through this omnibus.
So I wonder if you might not just briefly describe what
this does for ERI and maybe recount the private conversation we
had about the extent to which our friends and allies alike are
actually watching twists and turns in the legislative process.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you.
I just reiterate as I said in my opening that, you know, a
predictable stable budget and funding is very important to us
because it allows us to plan and do it efficiently. That is
particularly important when it comes to the posture of troops
like we are trying to reposture in Europe a bit. Long-term
planning helps that. It helps with our modernization because we
can actually lay out a plan for that modernization to include
to ensure that at an end of a period of time we have a force
that is relevant to the threats that we see.
Finally, your note. I had noted that as the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe and working closely with our allies there,
I can assure that our partners and our allies pay close
attention to our budgeting because they understand what is year
on year, what is done only at a year of time. And so their
question then is are you sure that this that is funded on a
yearly basis is in fact going to be funded over the next couple
of years or through fruition with our plans. And so it is
helpful in that respect to. It is an assurance to our allies
that what we have begun, we are going to finish in terms of
posture, exercises, facilities, et cetera.
Senator Schatz. Can you talk to me about long-term or even
medium range planning when it comes to both major MILCON and
minor MILCON and without getting into what is and isn't in a
FYDP (Future Years Defense Plan). I understand sort of that
technical and legal discussion. I just want to hear from you
what is our planning timeframe and how should we be thinking
about your planning timeframe when we think about funding.
General Scaparrotti. Well, we actually, in EUCOM we have an
infrastructure plan that we develop as a part of the staff in
conjunction with OSD. It looks out beyond 5 years. I think it
is one of the basic documents. In fact, I want it to be a
living document to the extent that when a new staff member
comes in or another commander into the command, they should
read that as one of the base documents so they know what our
vision is for the posture, the footprint, and the facilities
that we need in Europe.
Coupled with that is a plan for posture. We have that on a
four-year plan as to where we think we need to go with the
appropriate force in EUCOM. Those are all tied, obviously to
MILCON and long-term. I think it is just important that we have
a vision that is longer term so that we can plan and budget in
that respect and do it efficiently.
Senator Schatz. And where does ERI sit in those various
processes?
General Scaparrotti. ERI today, as you know, is funded
yearly. It is OCO. It is not in the base. And as a result of
that, you could look shorter term if you are not careful.
Now, what I want to assure the committee is that we looked
at the criteria that Congress budgeted ERI for, its purpose. We
have those categories. And then we also go through a process
within the components in Europe against those categories over
the FYDP. So we are not looking at just next year. We are
looking at where we want to be at the end of the FYDP and we
actually help cost that out. So that is helpful.
Senator Schatz. But just to be clear, it sounds like it is
okay on your side, but to the extent that it is not in the FY
DP formally, it becomes a problem on our side, right?
General Scaparrotti. Well, it would be helpful for us all
not to----
Senator Schatz. Right.
General Scaparrotti [continued]. Have to come back into
that next year with uncertainty.
Senator Schatz. Right. And it seems to me that to the
extent that this is about reassurance, that it would be
reassuring for our allies to see that we are willing to do
long-term investments that are going to get amortized over the
period during which we are going to be engaged in ERI, which
presumably is certainly longer than the 1 year that OCO allows
us to do.
QUALITY OF LIFE IN EASTERN EUROPE
One final question and then maybe I will take a brief
second round. You know, when ERI was rolled out in 2014, it was
sort of in response to an emerging situation and so the funding
needs and the priorities were, you know, mission, runways,
building control towers, ammo storage. We are obviously not
into basing in those parts of Eastern Europe, but there is at
least a more semi-permanent presence that we have to think
about.
And so I am wondering what is that next tier, especially as
it relates to quality of life? Because I have heard now
anecdotally from people who have served in ERI, from service
members that there are quality of life constraints that make it
one of the tougher places to serve. And obviously we have to do
whatever is mission critical, but over time, as you know, the
quality of life stuff is mission critical too. So I am
wondering if you could speak to how you are working that into
the plan.
General Scaparrotti. Well, part of ERI is the facilities
that we need to appropriately station particularly mechanized
forces who are a combat aviation brigade, et cetera. So as you
look at some of the MILCON here, it is actually improving those
facilities.
I would say also that particularly taking care of people,
our allies have been quite good about their investment, not
only in facilities to help those units, but facilities like
barracks for our troops, the kinds of support that they might
find in a normal base. So we are looking to them as well.
I would say that particularly in the east with the ERI and
the rotational forces there, I do not see a need for the kind
of support that we typically give in one of our bases in
Western Europe, but we are working to improve it so that our
forces there are well taken care of, but they also can focus on
the mission that they have at hand. And we will continue to
work with that in mind.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
GEOPOLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator.
General, in 2014 when this initiative regarding reassuring
our allies in Europe came into existence, there was a certain
climate that preexisted that caused us to think this was a
necessary step for the United States to pursue. How would you
describe the change in climate from that point in time to
today?
General Scaparrotti. Well, personally, I think that the
recognition in Europe in particular, that Russia is intent on
its stated goals of establishing itself as a global power, that
it will press on the international norms, continue to press
that after breaking international laws with respect to Ukraine,
for instance, that it is intent that its modernization and the
use of its military to set facts on the ground beforehand, I
think that has become even more apparent since 2014 and we
continue to see that drumbeat. And I think for the most part in
Europe they understand that and they are committed to
deterrence of Russia as well.
It is greater, obviously, in the east where they face them
directly than perhaps in the south or west, but the alliance
has been strong and I think our partners are as well in this
recognition. Warsaw made that commitment, you know, or the
alliance did at Warsaw, and I think it was quite clear.
Senator Moran. And what has changed in regard to Russia's
efforts? Has there been a consequence of our reassurance
efforts in a response from Russia in how we would have expected
them to behave or how they are changing their behavior?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think if you look at their
stated response, they recognize what we are doing. I think they
are concerned about the changes that we have made as the United
States in terms of the rotational forces that we have now put
in, what NATO has done with enhanced forward presence. It has
their attention. I think their response is one to say that they
are deterred by that. They have recognized it. They have said
publicly that they are making adjustments on their western
border and in the Baltic and Black Sea as a result of that.
So I think that is the response that I look for. I wish we
had a crystal ball we could see clearly the cognitive impact on
the regime in Russia, but I cannot say that clearly at this
point.
Senator Moran. What more needs to be done to reassure our
allies and to deter Russian aggression? I do not know that
there is a solid answer to this question, but I am interested
in your thought process. How do we know we are in the position
we need to be that our allies feel reassured and those that we
oppose for their actions feel constrained?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, that is really the tough
question. I mean, we look at--we are in a deterrence posture
now and determining how we assess the effectiveness of that
deterrence is very difficult. Part of it is because it is a
cognitive effect you are trying to have more so than a posture
effect and so it is more difficult. And I can talk about it
more in a classified, but I think that what we need to do is we
need to stay strong with our allies. We need to ensure with our
country and as much as we can with them that we approach this
from a whole of government approach.
The Russians see this as a whole of society approach. They
do not see a differentiation between what they do in the
military with respect to their actions. They include
diplomatic, economic leverage, et cetera. I think our response
has to recognize that as well. And then we need to also improve
our posture because we need to have a strong front. That is
what Russia respects is strength.
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
Senator Moran. When we visited in Europe with you earlier
this year, we had been to France and Germany, both concerned
about intrusion by Russia into their elections. Any update? Any
sense of what is going on in that regard?
General Scaparrotti. They both continue to be very
concerned about it, France in particular. I think publicly you
saw that France believes they did have some influence and
direct influence by Russia in terms of who they preferred to
see elected. You know, there was a relationship there as well
in terms of, you know, what we had learned and our ability to
help them posture themselves to protect against that. And
Germany shares the same concerns. And there is a number of
other elections between now and fall in Europe where, you know,
Russia is known to have been directly involved with parties
that they can influence or politicians as well.
BURDEN SHARING ON INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
Senator Moran. What is the relationship between--let me do
it this way. We are going to spend some money on
infrastructure. This committee has been supportive of that
effort and I assume will continue to do so. What do we pay for
ourselves? What is NATO responsible for? What are our other
allies responsible for?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think we work together on
sorting out exactly what you do, but I think a quick way to
look at this is we are willing to put infrastructure and some
funding into some of their facilities, the airfields, their
ports, their storage facilities and some of those things in
order to help us early on with this step, but we expect them to
put in funds to help us with that as well, as well as support
of our troops.
The second things is that we need to be able to move with
some agility, both us and our European partners. And so within
each of those countries, I would expect that they invest in
their infrastructure, in their rail, in those fuel capacity,
fuel stores, and those kinds of things that we need in order to
be able to move at speed in Europe. In the Cold War, we had a
very good laydown of that. The nations there had, you know,
responsibilities in turn in their nations so that we could move
through countries.
That has deteriorated, or let us say it has declined since
the Cold War and we are now in a process with the other nations
of looking at what we need to do to have the right structure in
order to provide for our agility in theater and they are taking
that on as well.
MILITARY MEDICAL CARE
Senator Moran. Let me ask one more question. Then we will
go to Senator Schatz and we will have another round.
Medical care and treatment for our service men and women.
What is the status in Europe? What role does it play globally
in our military efforts? What do you see as the future needs?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, one of our lines
of effort in Europe is enable global operations. Because of our
location and particularly in the medical facilities, we service
not only EUCOM and the servicemembers there, but we often bring
our wounded and those ill from Central Command, from AFRICOM,
into our theater too. So Landstuhl is a critical facility, but
it was built in the 1950s.
And as you know, with the help of this committee, we have
been appropriated most of the funding for the Rhine Ordinance
Barracks Military Hospital that is being--it has already
started construction. And we would ask you for the continued
funding of that to complete that project in about '20, '21, or
'22. It is critical not only to EUCOM and the health of our
families and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines there,
but it is critical I think for our movement and our posture
medically in other theaters also.
Senator Moran. General, thank you.
Senator Schatz.
CRITICAL VACANCIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to follow up on your view of the Russians taking a
whole of government approach to exercising power and I
specifically wanted to ask you about the extent to which we are
using the whole of government as a country in the European
context. We do not have an Assistant Secretary for Europe and
European Affairs. I understand we have an acting in that
position. Most ambassadorships are not even nominated, let
alone confirmed.
And without forcing you into a political conversation, I
would just like you to speak to the utility of working with our
State Department and other counterparts in making sure that in
terms of alliance management and the diplomacy and politics
that goes with your job that you have the full complement that
you need.
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, I approach, as I said
before, the importance of whole of government, I approach what
we do in Europe from that viewpoint. I have a POLAD who is--it
is an ambassador. She is very experienced--Ambassador Elliott.
We treat her essentially as a deputy in order to harness the
other agencies of government and particularly diplomacy, to
have that coordination with our embassies and make sure it is
very tight.
And so, when we approach whether it is deterring Russia or
it is countering transnational threats, all of those things
rely on, first, good diplomacy, economic information,
instruments of power in order to work. And I think, frankly,
while the military provides some muscle to our diplomacy, we
always want diplomacy to take the lead. And the intent is, is
that we prevent war and you do not have to use the military
instrument of power. So I think it is very important we
continue to approach, you know, our challenges in Europe in the
same manner.
Senator Schatz. Is it fair to say you are looking forward
to working with the newly confirmed diplomats as soon as they
are nominated and confirmed?
General Scaparrotti. That is true.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. I wanted to ask you to sort of
just make the best case you could for an additional BCT in
Europe. I know that is being knocked around and I would just
like you to make the case for it.
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, today I have two BCTs.
One is an airborne infantry brigade combat team. One is a
cavalry element 22. And the challenges that we have, Russia's
posture is not a light force. It is a heavy force. And so in
order to have the posture that is both credible and of the
right composition, then we need more armored forces. I have one
rotational brigade today. I think, frankly, I need to increase
that over time to make sure that we do have a force of enough
size that enables us to deter Russia and is a good posture for
the follow-on forces should we have a crisis.
The second thing I would mention, Senator, is that what
comes beyond that is the enablers, things like engineers, you
know, a fires brigade, an aviation brigade, those enablers that
help those armored units to fight in the way that we do
effectively.
EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE CONSOLIDATION
Senator Schatz. Thank you. Last question. On the European
infrastructure consolidation, can you just give us a status
report? I understand none of the facilities have been turned
back, but I also am reading reports that indicate that there is
a reconsideration at least of portions of EIC, so could you
give us a status report, please?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, yes. By my count, since '13
when this began, we have got about 57 sites. And as you know, a
site can be a very small thing or it can be somewhat large, but
57 that we have returned to host stations. We have got 15
remaining today that have not been turned over. The decisions
to turn those over remain constant. That is the work. That is
what we are moving toward.
I understand the services are looking at a couple of those
sites potentially to reconsider. That is a service issue. I
would tell you personally that we in EUCOM always consider the
environment, how it changes, and what we need to support our
posture, so I too think there is probably a couple that might
be worth reconsideration, but that has not been done and it is
actually a service function for the most part.
Senator Schatz. And that decision is at the Office of the
Secretary?
General Scaparrotti. I do not know that for sure. I would
have to go--the actual decision itself. It is certainly, you
know, above my level as Secretary or beyond.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTER AT RAF CROUGHTON
Senator Moran. General, this subcommittee has been
supportive of the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center at RAF
Croughton. I think that decision was made before you arrived in
your current position. There has been some suggestion that it
should be built at Lajes Field. Let me ask you to explain to
us, if you believe it to be true, why Croughton is the right
place to relocate the existing facility. I would be glad to
hear what you have to say.
General Scaparrotti. Well, as you said, that decision was
made beforehand, but when I took over, I assembled our staff. I
have been there. I visited the NFIC and our JAC that is a part
of the JIAC and I took a look at the other available bases. And
I think that Croughton is the right place. I think it is
correct to have those facilities, the different facilities.
There are six different entities there collocated.
What we get here is we get real synergy out of EUCOM,
AFRICOM, the NATO, the DIA support apparatus, as well as BICES,
which is an intelligence exchange communication system. Those
are the six kind of pieces that make a part of--that make this
up. We get great synergy out of them being in one place.
Number two, the challenge today is to make sure that we can
actually exchange information at a relevant speed. And today,
information moves very quickly, as you know. When you collocate
those, they have an opportunity then to share intel
appropriately and very quickly as well as analysts and discuss
issues. This is powerful and it is particularly important
between NATO and the U.S.
The other thing I would mention, Senator, is that for the
NATO Intelligence Center that supports me and Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Power in Europe under NATO, the framework
nation for that intelligence facility is the United States. So
what we provide in one site as a U.S. intelligence facility,
that support apparatus supports NATO. If it were to be
someplace else, we will also have to have the people and the
resources at that other place duplicated to support that
facility because we have that commitment within NATO.
Secondly, it is all 28 members have to agree on the
location, et cetera, which they have done. That, within NATO,
is an important factor here, I think. So I think for several
reasons it is actually in a very good facility. When we talk in
the closed session I can be in a little more detail on this,
but I do think we have it right.
Senator Moran. Let me just ask a little bit further. In
your analysis, are there any circumstances, either as a matter
of being cost effective or of military value, that the facility
should be located at Lajes Field in Portugal?
General Scaparrotti. No, I do not think so.
Senator Moran. Okay.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO COUNTRIES
Senator Moran. The Enhanced Forward Presence units are all
located currently in the Baltics and Poland. Do you think any
additional units need to be stationed in the southern flank of
NATO, in Romania or Bulgaria?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, today I think given the
posture that we have, we are in fairly good shape. I think I
will look at that as time goes on here through the summer and
end of the fall.
So in Romania and Bulgaria on the NATO side, we have
something similar to enhanced forward presence in the Baltics
and it is called tailored forward presence. Romania, Bulgaria,
and other nations that have chosen to take part in that have
formed a multinational brigade that operates in those two
countries, exercises together, and provides deterrents in that
area. It extends also to our maritime forces and NATO, et
cetera.
Secondly, we rotate forces through there almost routinely.
Marines, for instance, and then also we have one of the NEC
Battalions out of our rotational armored brigade down there
now, and we will probably be in that part. You know, we will
probably have a unit down there out of that a good deal of the
year. So I think with that capability, we are beginning to get
the posture right in the southeast as well as up in the Baltics
and Poland.
COMBATING TERRORISM
Senator Moran. General, we have talked mostly about Russia.
Tell me about terrorists and terrorism, what role and what
stance is the United States and NATO required necessarily to
combat terrorism?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think first of all the
idea--and you have probably heard this before--that it takes a
network to defeat a network.
The terrorists, ISIS and other organizations, as you know
are reaching out globally. They have cells and operations in
other countries with their headquarters, ISIS, centered in
Syria and in Iraq at what they call their caliphate. And I
believe our role in EUCOM is to help strengthen that network.
So we have done that. We have a counter transnational
threat cell that has connected with both EU and NATO to help
reinforce their network, in other words, connect with those
countries and reinforce that, primarily to exchange
information, exchange analysis, intelligence, and to help each
other build our partner capacity in counterterrorism.
Those are the steps that we have taken. NATO is taking a
part in that as well. And I think that is the most effective
way for us to begin to counter this terrorist threat from a
military perspective.
Senator Moran. Well, let me ask about the European
Reassurance Initiative, is there a component in addition to
combating the aggressive nature of Russia, do those actions
that we take in that regard also have a consequence in fighting
terrorism?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think they do from
demonstrating strength. They do in the sense that, you know,
our operational and intelligence assets, the sharing of in
other domains, for instance, in cyber or information. Those
relationships that you build for one, deterring Russia, play
immediately into the other things that you do. So, you know,
building relationships capacity works hand in glove in that
respect.
Senator Moran. How are we doing? This will be my final
question and then we will turn to Senator Murphy and Senator
Boozman and then we will move to our classified setting. What
steps are we taking? Assure me that we are taking the necessary
steps and describe those that you can to protect our servicemen
and women and their families from terrorist activities in
Europe.
General Scaparrotti. We, and I say we--it is not EUCOM. It
is our entire intelligence community--pay very close attention
to the intelligence that we get, to the intelligence that our
partners can provide for us. We have a working group that is
established that is not just EUCOM. It is in conjunction with
our intelligence community that, on a very routine basis, looks
at this. If we see any indicator that there may be an increased
threat or certainly one that has, you know, timing, location,
activity attached to it, then we bring that working group
together and it comes to my attention. We have had to exercise
that in Europe, you know, more often than I would care to talk
about. And to this extent, I think we have done a good job.
Now, based on that, we also put out warnings or we take
steps with raising security at our bases throughout Europe or
in specific places. We give warnings to both our servicemembers
and our families and sometimes we limit their travel in areas
when we need to if at a given period of time we think there is
a threat that would cause us to have that much concern. And
that is the way we work it on a daily basis.
Senator Moran. I wish you well in that regard.
Senator Murphy.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN EUROPE
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, General, for being with us. Sorry I missed the beginning
of the testimony.
I wanted to build upon I think the last question that
Senator Schatz asked regarding the partnership between the work
that you do and the work that the State Department does.
Now, I have worried from the beginning that a European
Reassurance Initiative anchored almost wholly in military
support misunderstands the nature of the Russian threat and
maybe also misunderstands their intentions inside Ukraine. I do
not think that Russia wants to militarily own Ukraine. I think
they want to create confusion and clouded title around a
significant enough portion of the country to ultimately set
forth a chain of political events inside Kiev that reinstalls
leadership that is friendly to Moscow again so it can be a
client state in the way that it looked under the Yanukovych
regime.
And so while the line may move a little to the left and a
little to the right, ultimately they are trying to create
enough chaos in Kiev and throughout the rest of the country
that a decision is made to just give up and ultimately come to
the conclusion that Ukraine is better off being friends with
Russia and giving them whatever they need in order to get
there.
And so, to me, you know, that speaks to the other elements
of a real comprehensive European Reassurance Initiative which
would partner together, I think, the very necessary military
components with real anti-corruption resources. We have done
great work in Kiev to give them a little bit of money to make
the police force more responsible to the needs of the people.
It has been successful, but it is a tiny amount of money. Real
energy and dependence resources. I know you are talking with
the State Department all the time about the need to bring real
money to the table to help these countries become energy
independent.
Right now, we can give them advice, but we really cannot
put any money on the table. We can give them money to partner
with us on military exercises, but we cannot put money on the
table to help them build an interconnection to reverse flow
gas. Real economic assistance, and then, as we have talked a
lot about in Congress, real efforts to build up objective media
to fight back against the Russia propaganda which is real and
present throughout all of the eastern edge of the continent.
So I wanted to maybe put a little flesh on the bone and ask
you. I know you said you always want to lead with diplomacy
first, but some of these things are not real--not diplomacy in
the sense that it is just two sides talking to each other,
right? They are real hard tools that State and USAID have to
deploy side by side with you that change the battle space. And
so I maybe wanted to ask you to drill down a little bit more
specifically on some of the hard tools that you work with State
that ultimately can be dispositive in a place like Ukraine.
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I would agree with
you and say that we, in every country that we are active in in
EUCOM, we are nested under the Embassy and the ambassador and
their approach with the other agencies and our government. And
so whether it is information, it is not just a military support
information apparatus that we can help with. It is actually,
first and foremost, supporting the ambassador and the State
Department's information campaigns there, supporting their
support for USAID or Treasury or others that are working.
I think it is just very important that we are integrated.
And so with our defense attache, our offices in each one of the
embassies, that is what we work to do is make sure we
understand their program first and then make sure we are not
doing anything that is not fully integrated with that or seems
to work counter in it.
One of the areas that you have got to be careful in is
information because we have some capacity and we have got to
make sure we are nested with their information campaign so what
we do as a Government and what we say has integrity.
Senator Murphy. Back to my original premise on Russia's
intentions in Ukraine, if you believe their intention is
ultimately to march that separatist army into the capital, then
it makes sense to approach this from a military first
standpoint. If you believe that their intention is to
essentially sit where they are long enough so that they
politically and economically unwind the country, then you would
certainly provide enough military support to make sure you are
not wrong, but your approach would not be military. Your
approach would start with economic and political support to
keep them alive long enough so that the Russians say, ``I guess
we are not going to win this one inside Kiev.''
Is my assessment wrong in terms of what Russia's intentions
are there?
General Scaparrotti. No, I think that if you look at
particularly their doctrine as it has changed, I think Russia
looks at this, what we call competition blue, the level of
conflict. I think they see that as a part of their entire range
of conflict. And their objective is if they can achieve what
they want, the objectives in Ukraine, without ever using
anything more in the military, but doing it through economic
intimidation, political provocation, and those other means like
you described, then that is what they would much prefer to do.
And that is essentially what we see them working on in their
disinformation campaigns, et cetera.
I would just point out as well that both the embassy and us
have advisors there with--in the Ukrainian Government working
on reform, helping them with planning and the things that they
have to do to shift to a democratic government established in
our values that has control of the military, that works under
the values of rule of law, et cetera. And so that is part of
that effort and, of course, we are a part of that group that
does that and supports those advisors.
Senator Murphy. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, this
partnership which worked, I think, very well over the course of
the last 5 years between EUCOM and Victoria Nuland and her
staff at the Assistant Secretary level. It is hard to do
without an Assistant Secretary for Europe, so and I know we are
united in our desire to ultimately get leadership at State that
will help partner with the Regional Command, but every day that
goes by without an Assistant Secretary, that partnership is
made harder.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. The Senator from Arkansas, Senator Boozman.
Senator Boozman, we recognized a moment ago some students of
yours. I understand you were a guest lecturer today for
scholars in our audience.
MITIGATING RISKS WITH RUSSIA
Senator Boozman. Now we are looking forward to them coming
very much, so it is great to have you all here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Senator from Hawaii for
holding this very, very important hearing. And, General, thank
you for taking the time. I know you are a busy guy, but this is
so very important, such an important topic. We really are
living in an unprecedented dynamic time right now when it comes
to the global security environment, and this is particularly
true in your area of responsibility.
Tell me a little bit. In your testimony, you discussed the
likelihood of miscalculation and misunderstanding with Moscow.
Can you talk a little bit about that further highlighting some
of the steps you and your team are taking to mitigating the
threat and how we--are we mitigating this threat among our NATO
allies?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, where I am
concerned about that is in places where we have forces in close
proximity to the Russians. So in the Black Sea, the Baltic, our
maritime forces, in the area along the borders, in the Eastern
Med where we know they had presence. And it is basically, you
know, we operate in international waters. As we should, we
expect them to follow international norms as well. So we
continue to do that.
At times, particularly in the Baltic or in the Black Sea,
you have seen where they have had some maneuvers with aircraft
or their ships that we deem to be dangerous. So, you know, we
rely on our leaders at a lower level, to take the steps that
they need to take at a tactical level to ensure that we are,
one, not provocative and that we protect our forces as well,
but we are strong. We are going to fly and sail where we should
and where we need to in international waters and with
international norms.
And so that is the way I approach it. And I think our
commanders have done a very good job. Their judgment has been
excellent and sometimes they have been in, you know, some tight
spots with Russian forces in close proximity.
The last part is we make sure that if we do exercises and
training, we are transparent. We tell the Russians if we are
doing exercises in the east or in the waters that they are
nearby. We let them know that so there is no misunderstanding
of what we are doing. We would ask them to do to the same.
Senator Boozman. And our NATO allies that perhaps sometimes
do not have the experience in dealing with these kind of
things, how do we mitigate that?
General Scaparrotti. You know, we work very closely with
them. And within NATO, in particular, our interoperability is
improving. We are very used to working with most of those
forces. And so even on eastern front, our work with Baltics and
Poland, in particular, is very close. We obviously do normal
planning with them. We discuss these issues. It is not that I
am not concerned about it, but I think we have got a good
relationship where we can actually ensure that our allies as
well as our forces are paying close attention to that.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA
Senator Boozman. Very good. General, can you talk a little
bit, share your thoughts on the relationship between Russia and
China, particularly with Putin's possible visit to Beijing
later this month for the so-called One Belt One Road Summit?
Obviously, the implications of this partnership are significant
and many. How do you see this relationship playing out and what
implications do you see for EUCOM and NATO?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think it is a bit worrisome in
terms of the relationship if it were to become very close, but
I think there is natural tensions there between Russia and
China as well. And so because of that, I think we just need to
keep a close watch on it.
In some respects, they both are pushing against these
international norms that I talked about, you know, pushing
against the international security structure that is rules
based that has really kept the peace globally since the end of
World War II. And so, from that respect, they have a similar
approach.
Senator Boozman. Very good. One other thing. When you
combine your area of responsibility with AFRICOM's, that really
is a massive and pretty dynamic geographic area. I think
probably 100 countries are involved between the two theaters.
Can you talk about the impact of the resurgence of Russia these
past few years on your service components and does the
consolidation of service components between EUCOM and AFRICOM
help or hinder the coordination and can you speak to the strain
or challenges on your service components in meeting the current
demands?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, the resurgent
Russia has caused us, as I said earlier, to change our posture.
It changes the operations that they do, the components do. It
changes their readiness that they have to have on a daily
basis. Five or 6 years ago, we were not concerned about being
ready today.
Senator Boozman. Right.
General Scaparrotti. We are now. And so that has picked up
their op temp. They are also, as you know, my components are
also components of AFRICOM and General Waldhauser. The
cooperation is very tight. It is very good between the staffs,
but it is, as you can imagine, that one component commander has
two different bosses.
Most of the time, we work this out pretty well. There has
been several times in the past year where a component's
requirement to assist AFRICOM, for instance, has, I thought,
raised the level of risk that we take in EUCOM with our
responsibilities. And when that happens, then we have a
discussion with the chairman or the secretary if necessary so
that--and I think that is the important thing--so that we all
understand the risk that is involved if there is a demand that
is beyond the for structure that I have in EUCOM or AFRICOM has
to service both theaters simultaneously.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, General. We do appreciate you,
appreciate all you represent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Senator Boozman.
General, anything you would like to add or clarify to your
remarks or responses to our questions before I close out the
hearing?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I just want to thank the
committee for your support. I would underscore the importance
of ERI in terms of getting our posture changed and in the right
place and that it will take predictable continued funding in
order to complete what we have begun. And when we go into the
classified hearing, I can be more specific about what I see
that being----
Senator Moran. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti [continued]. In the future.
Senator Moran. General, again, thanks for being with us
today in this setting and the one that will follow. We thank
you for everything that you do and we would ask on behalf of me
and my colleagues that you express our gratitude to those that
serve under your command throughout Europe.
For members of the subcommittee, any questions for the
record should be turned into subcommittee staff no later than
Tuesday, May 9th.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
We will now recess and reconvene in SVC-217 for a
classified session. [Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., Tuesday, May 2,
the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the
Chair.]