[Senate Hearing 115-906]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-906
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT TO BE VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 18, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-954 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
________
july 18, 2017
Page
To Consider the Nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF, for 1
Reappointment to the Grade of General and Reappointment to be
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Members Statements
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 2
Witness Statements
Selva, General Paul J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of 3
General and Reappointment to be Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 37
Questions for the Record....................................... 58
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 66
Biographical Sketch............................................ 67
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 68
Signature Page................................................. 68
(iii)
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT TO BE VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Graham,
Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
I think, first of all, we all have on our minds and in our
prayers Senator McCain. He is going through some recovery right
now and will not be able to come back this week. So that will
change the way we are doing business a little bit. But,
nonetheless, he will be back with us very soon.
Our Committee meets this morning to consider the
nomination--I should say the renomination--of General Selva for
the appointment to be the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
I think since we have already been through this drill on
the eight required questions, we are going to forego that. I am
assuming you have not changed your mind since the last time we
asked the eight questions. Is that correct?
General Selva. I have not changed my mind.
Senator Inhofe. Do you have any family here you would like
to introduce?
General Selva. I do, sir. I will do that in my opening
statement.
Senator Inhofe. All right. That is good.
General Selva, your record of service to our Nation is well
known to this committee. Your first 2 years at the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have been marked by great challenges to our national
security: the advance of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
in the Middle East; the Russian aggression in Ukraine and
actions against others in that region; North Korea's pursuit of
both nuclear and long-range missiles capability. Meanwhile, our
young men and women continue to serve on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, ensuring that that country never again serves as a
safe haven for terrorists.
Moving forward, new leadership at the Department of Defense
(DOD) and military services presents renewed opportunities for
our armed forces. As we work to meet the threats of today and
prepare for the threats of the future, crises around the world
only continue to multiply. Our servicemembers face the most
complex and diverse array of global threats since the end of
World War II.
Leading our military during such challenging times requires
strong leadership, and this committee looks forward to your
testimony about how you plan to guide our men and women.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I, too,
want to join you in wishing Senator McCain a speedy recovery
and a rapid return to his responsibilities. In fact, this might
be one of the few times I can say sincerely ``Go Navy'' because
I certainly do. I want to see him back, as we all do.
Senator Inhofe. I might observe, though, it cannot go
unnoticed that the first three that were here on time were all
three Army.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in welcoming General Selva. Thank you,
sir, for your service. As we consider your reappointment to
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recognize and
thank you for your many years of service to the Nation and your
willingness to continue to serve. Also, I want to recognize
your wife, Ricki, for her many years of support.
The United States faces a wide range of multifaceted and
varied challenges around the world. If you are reconfirmed as
the Vice Chairman, you will be an integral player in addressing
these complex international issues facing our national
interest.
Russia's malign influence and active measures activities
have been aimed at undermining the American people's faith in
our election process, as well as other Western elections.
Furthermore, Russia continues to threaten its neighbors and our
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and has failed
to end its interference in Ukraine by complying with its
commitments under the Minsk cease-fire agreement. Finally,
Russia has refused to withdraw its support for the Assad
regime.
North Korea's nuclear missile program is an immediate and
grave national security threat, and the United States continues
to grapple with the fact that there is no set of quick and
certain options. China has not demonstrated its willingness to
enforce effective sanctions against North Korea and, in
addition, continues to threaten the rules-based order in the
Asia-Pacific region by economic coercion of its smaller, more
vulnerable neighbors, and by undermining the freedom of
navigation.
Iran continues their aggressive weapons development
activities, including ballistic missile development efforts, as
well as other destabilizing activities in the region.
Finally, while we continue to make steady military progress
against ISIS, the Administration has yet to publicly articulate
a broader whole-of-government strategy for addressing the
issues that gave rise to ISIS in the first place.
General Selva, the aforementioned challenges are urgent and
pressing, and the committee looks forward to hearing from you
on how the Department of Defense plans to address these issues.
In addition, the Vice Chairman is assigned a number of
specific responsibilities. For example, the fiscal year 2017
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) strengthened the Vice
Chairman's role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
JROC, by making the Vice Chairman the principal adviser to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on joint planning capabilities and
joint performance requirements. Given the important function of
the JROC in reviewing requirements for acquisition programs to
ensure they are reasonable and necessary, I look forward to
your thoughts on the effectiveness of these new authorities and
whether you believe additional changes are warranted.
The Vice Chairman is a key player in the interagency
process, a role that often requires working closely with senior
policymakers within the Department and at the National Security
Council on critical national security issues. In light of the
strategic challenges I referenced earlier, the committee looks
forward to hearing from you on the effectiveness of the current
interagency process.
Finally, General Selva, you have been a partner with Deputy
Secretary Work in developing and fostering the Department's
innovation strategy, including the so-called Third Offset, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental, or DIUx, and other special projects. If confirmed
to a second term as the Vice Chairman, you will provide vital
continuity between the last Administration and the present
Administration. It is imperative that the Department of Defense
under Secretary Mattis continue this effort to learn how to
leverage the most dynamic sectors of our economy to harness new
technology and ways of thinking to solve our difficult and
diverse global challenges.
Thank you again, General Selva, for your willingness to
serve our Nation, and I look forward to the hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
You are recognized, General Selva.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Selva. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Before I begin, I would like to also recognize Chairman
McCain's service to our Nation both in and out of uniform. On
behalf of the Joint Staff, I wish him a complete and speedy
recovery, and I look forward to him being back here at work
soon.
Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to be considered for a second term as the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am grateful to the
President and the Secretary of Defense for their continued
trust and faith in my ability to serve.
I would like to make three brief points before I continue
and look forward to your questions.
First, I want to commend those who wear the cloth of our
Nation. During my 2 years as the Vice Chairman, I have had the
opportunity to visit servicemembers and their families around
the globe, and I am continually impressed by their dedication,
their selfless service, and their exceptional talents. It has
been my distinct honor to serve the men and women of the United
States Armed Forces as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. If reconfirmed, I will strive to keep faith with them.
Second, as you have already mentioned, Senator Inhofe, it
is important to acknowledge the highly complex challenges that
face our joint force today. The combination of external
challenges presented by adversaries and competitors and
internal challenges such as readiness and modernization,
amplified by continual budget instability, are all issues with
which this committee is very familiar. Please know that I value
the dialogue that I and other senior military leaders have with
this committee, and I thank the committee for your work on
behalf of this Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coast guardsmen, particularly the swift passage of this year's
National Defense Authorization Act. I hope through my work and
our discussions that I have conveyed to you the seriousness
with which I take my responsibilities as the Vice Chairman.
Finally, I would like to recognize my wife Ricki, the love
of my life, who is with me today and who has shared my 37-year
career and our 37-year marriage. As many of you know, she was a
classmate when we attended the United States Air Force Academy.
She is not only a lifelong friend and partner, but she provides
me with the counsel that only someone in her position can. For
that I will forever be grateful.
Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, members of the
committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
this committee to be considered for a second term as the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Selva.
I would like to start off with one that has been foremost
on my mind and I think on the minds of most of the members
here, as well as the uniforms. I applaud the uniforms for being
straightforward and honest about the threats that we are facing
right now, and that would be North Korea.
You know, they successfully tested a ballistic missile on
the Fourth of July. The country also completed a successful
nuclear test earlier on May 14th. The experts consider North
Korea's missile test on July Fourth to be the most significant
advancement toward a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic
missile.
We have had a lot of witnesses talk about this prior to
July Fourth. They were talking about when this happens, what
that will mean in terms of a threat to the United States. If
you take the projected range of that, that would actually be
somewhere around 5,000 miles, which would put parts of the
United States into range. So it is a scary thing.
We had an Armed Services Committee hearing on the Asia-
Pacific strategy on April 25th. We had a panel of experts, and
they were good. They agreed with me that North Korea currently
represents the most imminent threat to our national security.
I would like to have you go ahead and start with three
questions concerning that.
One, do you agree with the experts who have come to that
conclusion concerning our national security?
Secondly, North Korea is known to export ballistic missile
technology to other adversaries like Iran. Do you believe that
they are in the process of doing that? They have done that. And
then what other countries might pose a threat as a result of
what they are receiving from North Korea?
Thirdly, what is your level of confidence in terms of our
intelligence community's ability to monitor what is really
going on there? Those three things to start off with.
General Selva. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do agree in principle with the assessment that the North
Koreans are moving quickly to develop an intercontinental
ballistic missile capability. I, however, am not saying the
test on the Fourth of July demonstrates that they have the
capacity to strike the United States with any degree of
accuracy or reasonable confidence of success. What the experts
tell me is that the North Koreans have yet to demonstrate the
capacity to do the guidance and control that would be
required----
Senator Inhofe. I was only referring to range.
General Selva. Yes, sir. On range, they clearly have the
capability.
Senator Inhofe. You know, if they have the capability in
range, the other improvements are perhaps not too far behind.
General Selva. Yes, sir. We will have to watch very
carefully with the IC [Intelligence Community] the developments
on those particular capabilities.
I do agree with the Intelligence Community and others that
the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is an arms
proliferators. There is no evidence that they have engaged in
proliferation of their long-range ballistic missile technology,
but they have proliferated every other weapons system that they
have ever invented. It is a pretty clear pathway to the
potential proliferation of these kinds of weapons systems.
Senator Inhofe. The third question was on the capability of
our intelligence.
General Selva. I am reasonably confident in the ability of
our Intelligence Community to monitor the testing but not the
deployment of these missile systems. Kim Jong-un and his forces
are very good at camouflage, concealment, and deception. We
have a series of programs that I would be happy to talk about
in a classified setting that talk to the ability of our
Intelligence Community both military and civilian to monitor
those activities.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I think it has been said outside of a
classified hearing that the things that he has been doing make
him--the nicest thing I can say about Kim Jong-un is he is
totally unpredictable and the most unpredictable of anyone I
have ever had any kind of experience with or even reading
about. And that is what has been scary to most of the people,
and I assume you agree with that.
General Selva. Yes, sir. I do agree with that assessment.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Now, getting down to our threats, this committee has
received the testimony from the uniforms and from the
experienced people outside of the uniforms that only a third of
our Army brigade combat teams, only a fourth of our combat
aviation brigades are ready. We hear about 62 percent of our F-
18s that the marines use do not work. We recognize when we are
going through what we have been going through in the last few
years that the first thing to go is maintenance and then, of
course, modernization.
I would like to have your assessment whether or not you do
agree with General Stephen Wilson, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, for example, when he testified before this
committee, that fewer than 50 percent of the Air Force combat
force are sufficiently ready for a highly contested fight
against peer adversaries. He is going beyond just equipment. We
are getting down to our individuals.
Then another Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force Heather
Wilson, and General David Goldfein, USAF have told us that they
will be short 1,500 pilots, most of them fighters, by the end
of this year.
Do you agree with this assessment? Would you want to
elaborate on anything that they have said?
General Selva. Senator, I agree with both assessments. Both
speak to the availability of funds and resources to do the
high-end training that is required to make our forces ready for
what we call high intensity combat against a peer competitor.
The budget in 2017 is helpful. The proposed budget for 2018
will move us down the pathway to being able to restore much of
that training. But it will be a 2-year process beyond the
initial insertion of those resources before you see the
readiness improve.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with that.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Selva, again for your service.
One of the issues in terms of the Third Offset is creating
some different agency. One is the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental, DIUx. They are working in the public knowledge on
sort of very cheap satellites--inexpensive I should say--and
also exploiting them with artificial intelligence (AI). It is
something that we really need for many places, particularly
Korea, for constant dwell.
We are told that they are about to run out of money, and we
have not received the reprogramming yet. I would think this
would be an urgent need. Can you explain why they are in this
distress and what we can do?
General Selva. Yes, sir, I can. We actually put tremendous
demands on the defense experimental unit. In the programs that
they are working for us, we were notified early last week by
Director Raj Shah that they had been cash flowing into two
programs. We have a reprogramming proposal that is in staff as
we speak that will address the balance of their requirements
for this fiscal year, and we will actually begin some of the
funding for programs that will extend into next fiscal year.
They will be able to do that with year-end money.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
One of the areas of concern--and there are many--is the
situation in Iraq. I was there about 4 weeks ago. They are
making progress on the ground. General Stephen Townsend, USA,
is doing a superb job as the commander on the ground, along
with, when I was up at Q-West, the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd
Brigade was leading the advisory effort.
But the issue now becomes, as we reduce their
effectiveness--ISIS--our long-term presence there. Do you have
views on that?
Also, I heard there were claims at least by Revolutionary
Guards of Iran that if they are designated a terror group, they
will retaliate against our forces. Can you give us any insights
there?
General Selva. Sir, on Iraq, the fighting is far from over.
ISIS has lost their sanctuary in Mosul but they still have a
handful of small towns that they control in and around the
province. President Abadi has a plan with the Iraqi Security
Forces to begin a campaign, with Steve Townsend's help and
consent, to clear those towns and move into Anbar Province to
secure their border with Syria, all important work as that will
deny ISIS sanctuary on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border.
I share your concern. I read in this morning's papers about
the Iranian Republican Guard's Quds Force making a statement
that if they are declared an international terrorist
organization, that they will retaliate against our forces in
Iraq. We will have to posture ourselves to be ready for that,
but I do not think we should take that threat and keep it from
taking action against the Quds Force.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
In another area in your advance policy questions, you
indicated, which is something that has been seconded by so
many, that our adversaries in anti-access and area denial
technologies have eroded what used to be a tremendous overmatch
by the United States. The question is, what are we doing to get
back way ahead not just a few inches ahead, metaphorically?
General Selva. Thank you, Senator. You alluded to the work
that we have been doing over the past couple years in the
advanced concepts development arena, as well as working what
Deputy Secretary Robert Work called the Third Offset strategy.
Those are concepts that would allow us to contest what we call
the anti-access/area denial strategies that many of our
adversaries have attempted to impose upon us by making our
basing and our forces more resilient and able to survive under
the kinds of attacks that are associated with the area denial
strategies, particularly that China and North Korea are
attempting to impose upon us. It allows us to project force
into areas that otherwise would be presumed denied.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Just finally and quickly, we have been working for several
different Congresses on acquisition reform. We have passed
legislation. We still have a long way to go. I think we both
recognize that, honestly. As Chairman of JROC, you have been
given additional responsibility both actual and also kind of
referential or symbolic. But can you tell us what you are doing
to kind of help the service chiefs jump start acquisition and
get it so we can deliver systems. The Army is commendable for
many things, their timeliness, et cetera. But they have had a
tough record in getting systems from the drawing board into the
field. So can you comment?
General Selva. Yes, sir. We are implementing the guidance
that we received in last year's NDAA. Two specific things that
give the Vice Chairman's office a little bit more flexibility.
One is the direct requirement to be the advisor to the Chairman
for readiness and the deployment of systems that support
readiness.
The second is a building relationship with the service
chiefs and the service secretaries in their acquisition
authority roles. So the JROC is now providing requirements
directly to the service acquisition authorities not only for
the basic design and integration capabilities that would go
into systems but actual performance along the line of buying
systems. One really striking example of that capability was a
piece of work that we did to move counter-unmanned systems
technologies into Iraq from idea to fruition, measured in
months, from delivery to deployment, measured in weeks, and
those are numbers that are actually quite useful.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you very much, General Selva. Mrs. Selva, thank you
for your support and service to our Nation as well.
General Selva, in your answers to advance policy questions
regarding Southeast Asia, you suggest that short-term stressors
can be managed within the alliance construct. A few weeks ago
referring to the Philippines specifically, Secretary of Defense
James Mattis testified that in 2014 we canceled our named
counterterror operation with a premature view of success,
causing us to lose funding lines that we would have otherwise
been able to offer.
Do you agree with me and Secretary Mattis that
reestablishing a named operation is something we should
consider as part of our alliance obligations in order to make
sure that those short-term stressors do not turn into a
prolonged or long-term catastrophe?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am. In every case where we see the
resurgence of terror networks, particularly in the fragile
areas of the southern Philippines, I think it is worth
considering whether or not we reinstate a named operation not
only to provide for the resources that are required but to give
the Pacific Command commander and the field commanders in the
Philippines the kinds of authorities they need to work with
indigenous Philippine forces to actually help them be
successful in that battle space.
Senator Ernst. Excellent. I hope that we can work with
Secretary Mattis on this issue.
Moving on to another topic, you have been openly critical
of Congress about the budget process. I agree that it is long
past time for us to break the cycle of these continuing
resolutions. We are not doing ourselves any favor. However,
budgets are also a two-way street. DOD has not been able to
conduct or pass a clean audit for a very, very long time. That
is not helping our cause either.
What specifically will you do in your next 2 years to
achieve a clean audit that you have not maybe been able to
accomplish in the last 2 years?
General Selva. I have found over the last several years
that achieving the clean audit goal is a really vexing journey.
In particular, the discussions over the valuation of real
property are an obstacle in the way of getting that work done,
the debates over what we own and what it is actually worth. I
will share with you that in advance of his confirmation, I
spent several hours with the new Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Patrick Shanahan, discussing how we might get at this issue of
valuing capital property so that we can, in fact, clear a clean
audit. We will commit to working that together through the
Defense Management Action Group to try and come to resolution.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. I hope that we can move
forward on that, especially when it comes to the real property.
We have to own this, and we absolutely must get his done to
know how the dollars are being spent so that we can reassure
our taxpayers that we as Congress and you as DOD are doing the
right thing. So thank you for that. I hope we are successful.
You also support providing lethal defensive assistance to
Ukraine, something I have been pushing for a number of years as
well. Other than being actively engaged with the interagency on
this issue, what specific steps are underway in DOD in order to
make this happen?
General Selva. We are working very closely between the
Joint Staff and United States European Command to actually put
requirements on the table for an inventory of what that lethal
defensive aid might look like. It will be more than just a
military recommendation. This will be a policy choice on
whether or not we are going to give the Ukrainian Government
the tools they need to defend themselves against what we
believe to be a Russian-supported insurgency movement in the
Donbas.
Senator Ernst. I think it is really important.
In light of Russia's recently thwarted attempt to deny
Montenegro's accession to NATO, what steps should we be taking
to reaffirm our commitment to nations like Ukraine and Kosovo
and other candidates just in reassuring them that we will
assist them should they wish to become NATO members?
General Selva. Ma'am, I think one of the tools that we can
bring to bear as the Joint Staff and as the military team is
our mil-to-mil contacts with the chiefs of defense and the
leaders of their militaries to make sure that all those
countries, in spite of what is going on internally with or
without the interference of the Russian Government, actually
are able to make the military reforms that are necessary so
that they can move towards a path to membership in NATO.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. We have a lot of State
partnership programs out there and those countries need our
reassurance. So thank you, General Selva, again.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Hello, General. Thank you for being
here. Thank you for your service. I welcome your family.
I want to talk to you a little bit about where we are on
trying to combat military sexual assault. In 2013, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
said a majority of the Senate of the United States expressed a
lack of confidence in our ability to solve this ourselves. We
are currently on the clock, if you will. The President of the
United States said to us in December, you know what? You have a
year to review this thing and show me you can make a
difference. We understand that just because Senator
Gillibrand's vote was defeated yesterday does not mean that a
year from now it may not be reintroduced, and if we have not
been able to demonstrate we are making a difference, you know,
then we deserve to be held to the scrutiny and standard.
This is now 4 years later. We do not see a change in the
overall numbers. We do not see a change in the rate of
prosecution. We do not see a change in the rate of conviction,
and we do not see a change in the rate of retaliation. I am
really worried that in these measurables where commanders are
entirely responsible for outcomes, they have not met the level
of scrutiny and oversight that is really necessary to really
tackle this problem effectively.
Do you agree that more needs to be done to create
environments where victims and bystanders can report and not be
retaliated against?
General Selva. Senator, I believe that survivors of sexual
assault and bystanders should be given an environment where
they can report the events that have happened, and we can
provide an unbiased investigation and potential prosecution of
the wrongdoers who perpetrated the crime.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you agree that despite the
Department's efforts, we have not achieved enough progress?
General Selva. I do not agree that we have not achieved
enough progress, but perfection is the only standard that can
be allowed in this space. Sexual assault is contrary to the
notion that we treat all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
with the dignity and respect they deserve because they wear the
uniform of this Nation.
Senator Gillibrand. I do not think we are going for
perfection. I think we are going for a climate where men and
women can serve without being sexually assaulted, a climate
where they can report their crimes and know that they will be
prosecuted, that they can report their crimes and know that
they will not be retaliated. We are not even close. I mean, the
estimate of last year was 15,000 sexual assaults, unwanted
sexual contact, and rape. That is nowhere where we need to be.
We still have almost a 60 percent retaliation rate, and our
rate of conviction has not moved in 5 years.
I do not think we are achieving enough progress. I think we
have done a lot of good things in terms of getting better
evidentiary records, getting better evidentiary standards,
making sure there is special counsel for the individuals who do
report. But our rate of unrestricted reports, the ones where
you are willing to put your name and make it public, is going
down. Our rate of restricted reports percentage is going up.
The confidence in the system just is not there.
I really hope that you will commit to me to do a full look
at this issue, look for new solutions, look for untried
solutions because what we are doing today is not working. We
have done every small ball recommended reform we could possibly
do by every committee that has offered them.
General Selva. Ma'am, I will commit to working with the
services and the service secretaries to take a deep dive into
all of the programs that they have implemented and to take a
look at whether or not they will be effective in supporting the
survivors of sexual assault and in making sure that we get to
unbiased investigations and prosecutions.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
I would now like to talk a bit about our transgender
servicemembers. I have been pleased by the advances the
Department of Defense policies had made to be more inclusive to
transgender servicemembers who are twice as likely to serve,
according to one study, than the general population. But I am
concerned that the recent 6-month delay the Department has
approved before letting transgender people enlist in the
services will have some unintended consequences.
What have you learned so far in your review of this issue,
and how is the implementation going so far?
General Selva. Thank you, Senator. I am an advocate of
every qualified person who can meet the physical standards to
serve in our uniformed services to be able to do so.
Our decision to delay the accessions of transgender
individuals into the services was largely based on a
disagreement on the science of how mental health care and
hormone therapy for transgender individuals would help solve
the medical issues that are associated with gender dysphoria.
There are a host of other issues that involve the potential
physical standards that the service chiefs asked for additional
time to assess so that they can make the necessary changes to
infrastructure, as well as training curricula, for our basic
trainees who come in transgender status, particularly those who
have not undergone gender reassignment surgery and, while they
present as their target gender, are physiologically still in
their birth gender. Those issues will have to be dealt with
before we can actually begin to assess those individuals into
Active service.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. General Selva, welcome back.
Congratulations on your reappointment.
I would like to discuss the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, a treaty between the United States and the
then Soviet Union, now Russia, that prohibits land-based cruise
missiles or ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500
kilometers. Russia, it has been widely known, is cheating on
this treaty. The State Department found that 3 years ago.
You testified at the House Armed Services Committee that to
your knowledge, Russia does not intend to return to compliance
with the INF Treaty. Do you remain of the same opinion today?
General Selva. I do, sir, and there is no new intelligence
that says that the Russians are either inclined to return or to
abrogate the treaty. They are still trying to walk the middle
line.
Senator Cotton. I have to say I agree that as long as
Vladimir Putin gets to eat his cake and have it too, why would
he change? I assume that he is somewhat ambivalent about the
treaty. On the one hand, he benefits much more from the
prohibition on intermediate-range missiles in Europe since the
one country that could rapidly produce those missiles and
deploy them, the United States, is restrained from making those
missiles and deploying them.
On the other hand, I assume that he does not like the fact
that countries on his periphery, in particular, China, can
produce and deploy them. The way to square that circle is
simply to cheat, and as long as we let him get away with it,
then there is no reason not to keep cheating.
Is there anything in your mind that we could do to put
pressure on Russia to bring them back into compliance to change
their current mindset?
General Selva. The diplomatic tools that exist inside of
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty allow us to put a
modicum of pressure on the Russians through the bilateral
consultative committee to try and get them to return to
compliance.
The other tools that exist in the treaty include beginning
research and development efforts to field but not test
intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles within the
boundaries of the treaty. It is our assessment that the
Russians have gone beyond that provision in the treaty and have
actually fielded an intermediate-range cruise missile that
could be either nuclear or conventional capable. We do have
some options inside the treaty to put pressure on the Russians
not only diplomatically but also inside the military realm.
Senator Cotton. I am glad that you raised that because my
legislation, the INF Treaty Preservation Act, would authorize
money for just that and, in fact, with the House and the Senate
passed versions of the NDAA, it would start a program of
record. The Administration put out a statement of
Administration policy last week that had some issue with that
provision and another, but I suspect we will work it out in the
end since we all want to see Russia come back into compliance
with this treaty.
Putting aside its impact on our relationship with Russia,
though, I want to bring your attention to Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris' testimony. He stated a
few months ago in this committee that over 90 percent of
China's land-based missile forces fall between the range of 500
and 5,000 kilometers. Of course, China is not in violation of
the treaty because China is not a signatory to the treaty. Only
the United States and Russia are.
We do not have any matching offensive capability due to our
treaty obligations. Do you interpret this as a possible
offensive imbalance in the Asia-Pacific?
General Selva. Senator, it would be easy to interpret that
as an offensive imbalance but for that fact that we are not
restricted from fielding ballistic missile or cruise missile
systems that could be launched from ships or airplanes under
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. It is specific to land-
based missiles. With respect to whether or not we use the INF
Treaty as a reason to say targets inside of China might not be
held at risk I think is a bridge too far. I believe we can
assert that the deployment of missile systems on aircraft and
ships would allow us to hold those targets at risk.
Senator Cotton. They do, although the obvious disadvantage
of ships and aircraft is that they are relatively small
compared to land, which is why China has 90 percent of their
missile forces in that range from land. We are limited to what
we can do based on our ships and our aircraft.
Do you think that we should consider extending offensive
capabilities to allies in the Asia-Pacific who are also not
bound by this treaty to help counterbalance China's offensive
capabilities?
General Selva. I think those are options we should look at
as people who provide sound military advice to political
leaders, but that would be a policy choice on whether or not to
use that leverage against the Chinese.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
One final question about this area. Both Chief of Staff of
the Army, General Mark Milley, USA, and General H. R. McMaster,
USA, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, in his previous job have testified the Army is
outranged and outgunned. When they say that, that the Army is
outranged and outgunned, they are speaking about missile
systems that have this prohibited range. Correct? The 500 to
5,500 kilometer range?
General Selva. Senator, that is part of their argument but
it is not all of their argument. Many of our multiple launch
rocket systems are outranged by the Russians within the ranges
that are stipulated----
Senator Cotton. Below the 500 kilometers.
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. So it is both below the 500 kilometer,
which is a bad thing and we should address, but also that we
cannot get beyond the 500 kilometer range.
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you very much, and thank you again
for your service.
General Selva. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
everyone today who has mentioned our hopes and prayers for
Senator McCain to get back so he can harass the witnesses, as
he is accustomed to do.
General Selva, I know that you are interested in
innovation, and that is an important part of acquisition and
how we get where we are. I am concerned. We have had testimony
before this committee that small companies in Silicon Valley,
for example, will not even bid, will not even interact with the
Pentagon because the process is so cumbersome and lengthy and
burdensome. Now we are at a point where some significant
majority of the Defense Department funds go to four or five
major contractors.
How do we deal with the system itself, the structure, the
infrastructure of acquisition so that we can open up to greater
innovation coming very frequently from smaller companies?
General Selva. Senator, for large programs, our small
companies in Silicon Valley are likely not going to be the
competitors we are looking for.
However, that said, two very innovative programs are
actually underway as we speak. The first is a venture capital
incubator at National Defense University that helps our
acquisition professionals learn the ins and outs of the venture
capital business. Venture capital is what runs Silicon Valley.
It is the willingness to take risks on new programs, on new
technologies, on rapid prototyping that might or might not
deliver at relatively small amounts of money. That is the
reason we established in part the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental in Silicon Valley not only to have a point of
presence to interact with these new technology companies but to
actually have a funding vehicle where we can essentially engage
in rapid prototyping and venture capital-like activities with
those companies.
Senator King. Is that far enough along to determine whether
it is working?
General Selva. Sir, I think it is far enough along to
determine that it is working. In fact, we have expanded the
concept to technology centers in Boston and Austin, Texas as
well because we are finding the kinds of companies that can
bring us the innovative ideas that can then be scaled into
major programs.
Senator King. Let me talk about the Third Offset. The first
two were focused largely on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
Union. Talk about the Third Offset as it would relate to the
multiplicity and diversity of threats that we face today.
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
The threats we face today are largely based on mimicking
our command and control philosophies but adding to them long-
range precision strike munitions that can deny us access to the
areas that we previously had free access to.
The projection of power is fundamental to our ability to
fight wars. As we look at the Third Offset, the principal
things we were examining and continue to examine are artificial
intelligence and the ability to team humans with machines to
speed our understanding of the complex battle space that is
represented by these new adversaries and competitors and then
react inside of that battle space faster than they can respond
to our actions.
It also involves building around our bases and our forces a
degree of resiliency through camouflage, concealment,
deception, as well as distributed operations that prevent our
opponents from being able to hold the whole force at risk using
their ballistic and cruise missile systems. That is a snapshot
of what the Third Offset would bring us.
Senator King. I assume part of this is resiliency as a
defense against cyber. One would assume that if a conflict was
to begin, the first phase would be cyber to take out
communications systems and those kind of things. Is that part
of the thinking?
General Selva. Yes, sir. In fact, implicit in the Third
Offset thinking is the partnership between humans and machines,
and in that space, machine-to-machine defense of cyber networks
is actually an absolute requirement. It is not an implied task.
It is an explicit task. If we cannot defend our networks at
machine speed, we are giving our opponents maneuvering space in
that domain to defeat us in detail.
Senator King. A final question. There really is not time
for an answer, and perhaps you could take it for the record. I
recently finished General McMaster's book about Vietnam,
``Dereliction of Duty''. It is very critical, as you know, both
the political decision-making structure and the Joint Chiefs. I
would like your thoughts not now but in writing on what the
role of the Joint Chiefs are in a situation where the political
leadership is either not listening or taking a position that
you feel is contrary to the country's interests in terms of its
military capabilities. General McMaster does a masterful job of
outlining the problem, but I am interested in some thinking
about what is the solution to the problem that he illuminates
so brilliantly in that book.
General Selva. In short, Senator, I would say our
obligation is to provide blunt, honest, best military advice.
In the absence of a rule that forces our policymakers to
actually follow that advice, we continue to give it loud and
long.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Selva. Senator, I believe the Chairman and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have an obligation to advise our elected
leaders with truth, candor and discretion. Like McMaster, I
believe we owe honest and expert military advice at every stage
of policy making, including when our civilian leaders may
disagree or signal they do not want to hear it. Goldwater-
Nichols gave us a clearer and more focused voice than the Joint
Chiefs had, during that time period, in McMaster's book. But it
is still our obligation to use that voice with clarity and
courage, while supporting our elected leaders' roles and
responsibility in setting policy.
Senator King. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like my
colleagues, I want to say for the record how much we miss
Senator McCain and wish him a speedy recovery.
I also note that Senator Reed and Senator King talked about
DIUx. So I will not go back through this. But I do want to
express my very strong support for the work you are doing there
and how much more we can do with DIUx.
What I wanted to focus on, General Selva, I have heard you
publicly describe the main global threats that we face as
challenges: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent
extremism. I want to ask you about another global threat, and
that is climate change.
A Defense Department report from 2 years ago observed--and
I am going to quote it here--``Global climate change will have
wide-ranging implications for U.S. national security interests
over the foreseeable future because it will aggravate existing
problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental
degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak political
institutions.'' In short, this DOD report described climate
change as a threat multiplier.
General Selva, what impact do you believe that the change
in climate will have on the military services? What do you
believe the Department of Defense should be doing now to
prepare for this impact?
General Selva. Thank you, ma'am.
The dynamics that are happening in our climate will drive
uncertainty and will drive conflict. I will just provide one
example of how that can happen, and this is a manmade problem.
The dams along the Nile River control the flow of water into
what was the Fertile Crescent of Egypt. Any change to that
water flow causes the Egyptians to become more hostile to their
neighbors who are putting dams upstream of the Egyptian stretch
of the Nile River. I could build that argument in a variety of
countries around the world, and those are manmade problems not
directly related to climate change but related to how we as
humans change our environment.
If you extend that argument to the kinds of things that
might happen if we see tidal rises, if we see increasing
weather patterns of drought and flood and forest fires and
other natural events that happen inside of our environment,
then we are going to have to be prepared for what that means in
terms of the potential for instability in regions of the
country where those impacts happen, particularly today places
where there is massive food instability.
The Sahel in Africa is a classic example where a small
drought over a limited period of time can decimate the crops
and cause instability and make that an area fertile for
recruitment of extremists because they see no other way.
Similarly, you could look at the decimation of the
fisheries off Somalia that contributed to piracy because the
fishermen could not make their livelihood by doing what they do
best, which is fishing on the fishing grounds off of Somalia.
I think we need to be prepared for those. It will cause us
to have to address questions like humanitarian disaster relief.
It will also cause us to have to focus on places where climate
instability might cause actual political instability in regions
of the world we had not previously had to pay attention to.
Senator Warren. As climate change is an ongoing phenomenon,
one that right now is worsening, the climate change is going to
have a profound impact directly on our military and on our
military infrastructure and on how the military is able to
carry out its mission. I really hope, in addition to all the
other global challenges that you have in front of you--and I
know they are many and I know they are serious--we need you to
lead today on this challenge, General. Tomorrow may be too
late.
I want to follow up in just the little bit of time I have
remaining on Senator King's question about the Third Offset. I
know you have made this a priority all during your first term,
and I assume you will do the same if you are there for a second
term.
But what I am concerned about is that we do not appear to
be moving very fast. Many of the technologies that we are
talking about here are still in the development phase.
Meanwhile, our near-peer competitors are continuing to improve
their capabilities. It can take years, sometimes decades from
the time we first sign a contract for a new technology to
actually make it out into the field.
Let me just ask you if you can say something very briefly
because we are really over time and you can take this for the
record. What can we do about this to speed up our response time
here?
General Selva. I would make two quick points.
Senator Warren. Okay, and let us make them quick.
General Selva. First is rapid prototyping. We have to be
willing to invest and fail in systems that might not work.
The second is we cannot be bashful about bringing new
software into our architectures. We have worked very closely
with some of the companies in Silicon Valley to do rapid
prototyping, testing, and deployment of software that helps
with things like automatic target recognition and change
detection.
I think those are two things that we could do right now and
be quite successful.
Senator Warren. Good. I know you share my concern about
being outpaced by technology and how much you make this a
priority. You will have, I think, everyone's support here as
you make that a priority. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Selva, first of all, let me begin by just thanking
you for your service to our country.
Your previous work before you took your current position--
you were the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM). I know that in your statement for the record, you
stated that our military strategy is predicated on our ability
to deploy and sustain forces. Based upon your previous
position, you understand the need to be able to get to where
the fight is at.
I understand that you appreciate the reliance that we have
on commercial air carriers in order to do that within our
current plans. As you already know, right now DOD has no means
to extend the cyber protection to these critical commercial
carriers. I have talked about this at a few hearings, including
just last week.
My question for you is that if you were an adversary
nation, how would you exploit this? How would that impede the
ability of the United States to deploy forces? I realize that
you may be limited in what you can say about this in an open
session, but I think it would be really good for this committee
and the American people to hear a few general comments on the
issue because unless we continue to focus and gain public
support for what I think we need to do with regard to cyber
protection, it is going to be very difficult to where we have
to be. We have to have the commercial air carriers available in
times of an airlift. Could you comment about what that means
and how our adversaries might exploit the current situation?
General Selva. Senator, I am cautious other than echoing
what you said about the potential vulnerabilities of commercial
networks in an open session. But I will add the following.
It is not just our air carriers that make us successful at
projecting force overseas. It is our air carriers, our over
ocean merchant marine, as well as the rail and trucking
industry in this country. All three together, land, sea, and
air, are the capability that we bring to be able to deploy
force around the world. All of those capabilities I just
described are dependent on the quality and veracity of the data
that they use to move our forces. So that data, those networks
are just as important as the trucks, trains, ships, and planes
that move our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
I think solving this public-private cybersecurity
vulnerability would give us insights and experience to really
build the framework to use on the countless other cyber seams
between organizations in and outside of government.
Can you give me an update at least in general terms on how
the security gap is being addressed today? Clearly, it is not a
case of where we are just planning for the future. We have
things in place today. Can you give us some reassurances?
General Selva. Again, this is based on my experience in my
prior job. The TRANSCOM J-6 Director of Communications is given
the authorities and responsibilities of protecting not only the
TRANSCOM network but extending through contract vehicles to our
civilian providers those data standards and network standards
that allow them to subscribe to many of the protections that
are afforded to the TRANSCOM network. That may be a model upon
which we could build a continuing public-private partnership
into critical infrastructure in other sectors of the economy.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Just in the minute or so I have remaining, in your
experience is 2 years enough time to maximize the Vice Chief's
potential to provide optimal strategic guidance, as well as
maintain continuity for your large portfolio?
General Selva. No, sir, it is not, and that is why I am so
encouraged to see the work that was done in the 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act that actually makes the Chairman and
the Vice Chairman positions 4-year tours with only one
potential renomination for a 2-year extension. That 4-year term
will allow the Chairman and the Vice Chairman to have the
strategic impact that you expect of uniformed members in those
positions.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Selva, it is great to have you here before us
again. I certainly appreciate the opportunities to have some
discussions with you both here, as well as in my office. I want
to thank you for your focus on advanced technologies and the
understanding of how we need to be at the forefront of that to
continue to keep our competitive edge.
I just want to say, before I ask you a question, we have
heard a lot about Silicon Valley and other places like Boston
when it comes to advanced technology, but we have all of that
in Michigan as well. In fact, when the U.S. Patent Office
opened their first field office outside of Washington, DC, they
did it in Detroit, Michigan because more patents are filed
there than anywhere in the country. Given the fact that we have
more engineers per capita than any other area, it leads to
that. So I certainly hope as you are looking at innovative
technology, you continue to focus on a wide geographic space
and understand that we have incredible capabilities throughout
our country.
I recently met with General Robert Dyess, USA, the acting
Director of the Army's Capabilities Integration Center, as well
as Dr. Thomas Russell from the Army's Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology, to discuss the Army's robotics and autonomous
systems strategy. During that meeting, we discussed the
challenges of fielding these capabilities within troop
formations and the efficacy of employing autonomous and semi-
autonomous systems in future conflicts.
I know the Army's strategy calls for the investment in
specific technology areas over the next 5 years in autonomy,
robotics, artificial intelligence, as well as common control.
I would just like to hear your assessment and analysis as
to the status of each of the services and the Department in
researching and utilizing particularly autonomy and robotics.
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
All of the services are actually quite engaged in a
campaign to understand where advanced artificial intelligence
and autonomy can be inserted into current concepts of
operations and how they might be used in new and imaginative
concepts of operations to help defeat adversaries across the
spectrum of potential conflicts that we might find ourselves
in.
I am very careful in public settings about the discussion
of the very specifics of some of those autonomy initiatives,
particularly as they relate to advanced air defense and the
projection of force into denied areas because they will
actually expose some of the vulnerabilities we believe our
opponents have and they will actually expose some of the tools
that we think we can bring to bear.
But if you allow me to use shorthand, it is very compelling
when one looks at the capabilities that artificial intelligence
can bring to the speed and accuracy of command and control and
the capabilities that advanced robotics might bring to a
complex battle space, particularly machine-to-machine
interaction in space and cyberspace where speed is of the
essence. I will stop there at the risk of exposing things that
we are actually doing.
Senator Peters. No. I fully understand, General.
The DOD Directive 3000.09 governs the Department's approach
to autonomous weapons systems and is due to be renewed this
year, as you know. This directive specifically assigns
responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and
semi-autonomous functions and weapons systems, including both
manned as well as unmanned platforms. In doing so, the
Department has stated that it will not allow any robot or
machine to take lethal action without a human operator in the
decision-making loop. I know you are well aware of the moral
and ethical issues associated with that.
However, our adversaries often do not consider the same
moral and ethical issues that we consider each and every day.
In fact, a recent article in ``Defense One'' highlights
Russia's ambition to employ AI-directed weapons equipped with a
neural network capable of identifying and engaging targets and
even suggesting that Russian weapon makers see robotics and AI
as a key for their future sales for adversaries of ours around
the world.
Given that DOD directive is due to expire later this year,
can you provide us some update on the process to update and
renew the process and your thoughts regarding what seems to be
Russian developments in AI targeting?
General Selva. Yes, sir, I will.
First of all, there will be a raucous debate in the
Department about whether or not we take humans out of the
decision to take lethal action. I will tell you in this forum
that I am an advocate for keeping that restriction. Because we
take our values to war and because many of the things that we
must do in war are governed by the laws of war, which say we
must take proportional and discriminate action against an enemy
to achieve our objectives, I do not think it is reasonable for
us to put robots in charge of whether or not we take a human
life. That does not mean that we do not have to address the
development of those kinds of technologies and potentially find
their vulnerabilities and exploit those vulnerabilities to our
own defense. But publicly I think we should all be advocates
for keeping the ethical rules of war in place, lest we unleash
on humanity a set of robots that we do not know how to control.
That is way off in the future, but it is something we need to
deal with right now.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Good morning, General.
General, when do you expect the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) to be
complete?
General Selva. My expectation is it will take several more
months to complete the Nuclear Posture Review, and the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review will follow it because the
second review is actually informed by many of the strategic
choices that will be made in the Nuclear Posture Review.
Senator Fischer. You testified earlier this year that the
NPR would be examining response options to Russia's violation
of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Is that
correct?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. By that, do you mean that the NPR will
describe potential response options, or will it contain a
decision that we pursue a particular course of action?
General Selva. The design of the NPR is to provide the
President with options. We will provide him with a set of
options that might be reasonable responses to the Russian
activity with respect to the INF.
Senator Fischer. With no decision on those, just options?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. I know that we have conferred with the
Russians about their violation, and what has their response
been?
General Selva. They have been mute on how they intend to
respond.
Senator Fischer. Have you seen any indication that they
intend to come back into compliance with this treaty?
General Selva. No, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. As you provide options to the President,
will you be including the Russian response or non-response in
those options that you give him?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am. The Russian activities are a
part of the strategic environment within which we will present
options to the President.
Senator Fischer. If they would, all of a sudden, step
forward and begin a dialogue with us, would that change then
the options that you present to the President?
General Selva. It would likely change those options, but if
the Russians step forward and said they were willing to return
to compliance with the INF, we would have to have a method of
actually verifying that compliance, which would require
inspections of the weapons systems they have deployed.
Senator Fischer. So you would anticipate the options still
would contain that they have not responded.
General Selva. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. There has been some suggestion that Russia
does not really get any kind of military advantage from the
deployment of their ground launched cruise missile. Do you
agree with that view?
General Selva. Given the location of the specific missile
and the deployment, they do not gain any advantage in Europe,
and that is as close as I will get to agreeing with that view,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Beyond the direct military implications,
do you believe there are broader strategic implications when it
comes to confronting violations of an arms control agreement
and that failing to respond could have a negative consequence
on those broader implications when it comes to
nonproliferation?
General Selva. I think, ma'am, with respect to any given
treaty on nonproliferation, the inability to enforce the
standards to which parties have agreed, whether bilaterally or
multilaterally, renders all other agreements less compelling.
Senator Fischer. Can you tell us your opinion on where we
go from here?
General Selva. I think we should use all of the tools that
exist within the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty to
negotiate with and try to compel the Russians to return to
compliance. I am not saying that they will. We should also take
a look inside of the treaty, as we present options to the
President, at those research and development programs that are
available to us to actually increase pressure on the Russians.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
As you know, Russia maintains far more tactical nuclear
weapons than the United States, and they are deploying more
nuclear-capable sea, air, and now ground launched cruise
missiles. Do you believe that the line between strategic
nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons is eroding, and
what implications does this have for any future arms control
talks?
General Selva. I think as we discuss nuclear deterrence
with the Russians and now the Chinese and likely in the future
other countries, we need to make very clear that there is no
firebreak between strategic nuclear weapons and, ``non-
strategic nuclear weapons'', that the use of nuclear weapons in
war crosses a threshold that will require a response.
Senator Fischer. Is this advice that the present
Administration has received?
General Selva. It is the standing advice we have given
every President that I know of in recent history.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that future agreements must
include limitations on those tactical nuclear weapons?
General Selva. I think it would be a useful diplomatic
exercise and useful initiative to attempt to negotiate with all
holders of tactical nuclear weapons, their reduction and
potential elimination to avoid the potential for miscalculation
in the future.
Senator Fischer. Should it be more than just an exercise?
Should it be part of the goals that we are trying to attain in
any treaty?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am. Let me be clear with my terms. I
did not mean that as an exercise as an intellectual exercise. I
meant it as an act of force of diplomacy to actually get that
work done.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Welcome back, General.
I want to follow up on the questions on the Third Offset
that Senator King and Senator Warren raised, and specifically I
want to talk a little bit about directed energy.
As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you have unique
insight into the Joint Requirements Oversight Council which
identifies capability gaps for the military and generates the
requirements to fill those gaps. For the purposes of things
like base protection, counter-rocket, counter-artillery,
counter-mortar, counter-UAS [unmanned aerial systems], directed
energy weapons systems have significant advantages but seem to
be unable to enter the requirements setting process largely
because alternative kinetic options already exist.
What do you think is preventing the transition of these
technologies to the warfighter? Is it simply the pursuit of
perfection over fielding something today or are directed energy
weapons being held to a different standard?
General Selva. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I do not believe they are being held to a different
standard. The introduction of directed energy weapons into
particularly defensive capabilities has proven a difficult task
in order to produce the power and the concentration of energy
on targets to destroy them, particularly artillery and
ballistic missiles. We have had significant progress in the
counter unmanned aircraft systems area in bringing directed
energy weapons into either defeating the sensors or defeating
the actual aircraft themselves.
I think the promise is there for directed energy. It is
going to be a matter of the concentration of that energy to
have lethal effect. Back to your original point, I do not
believe we are holding the directed energy technology to a
different standard, but we need to continue to investigate
whether or not it does give us the advantages that the
technology advocates promise specifically with respect to the
necessity to kill an incoming kinetic vehicle.
Senator Heinrich. You know, I have been following this for
a long time. As you know, I started out my career at Air Force
research labs, and I would just encourage you to take a close
look at where these are today both in terms of high-energy
lasers and high-powered microwaves. You know, once you see
artillery shells shot out of the sky, unmanned aerial vehicles,
I think we are at a point today where this is ready for prime
time as opposed to continuing to chase perfection. I think the
solutions that it offers avoid many of the collateral damage
issues that inherently plague kinetic munitions and missiles. I
would just urge you to sort of stay at the cutting edge of what
we can offer right now within this technology.
I want to shift a little bit to the issue of Russia. You
and I have talked before about that. But to me and to many of
my colleagues, I think the pattern of behavior from Russia is
painfully obvious, that they will do what it takes to achieve
their objectives with very little limitations. Whether it is
interfering in United States elections, interfering with
European elections, formulating an assassination plot like in
Montenegro, Russia is treating the West right now like it is
the wild, wild West with no norms, no laws, no consequences.
Should there be consequences for the kind of hostile
actions that we have seen from Russia both directed at the
United States and at our allies in Europe?
General Selva. Senator, I believe there should be
consequences. The Russians have adopted a philosophy of
operating below what they believe what is the West's threshold
to respond.
Senator Heinrich. Exactly.
General Selva. We need to understand what that strategy
means and how to counter it and impose the kinds of
consequences that are necessary to prevent them from being
successful or to deter them from the activity in the first
place. Part and parcel of that is understanding how they are
doing what they are doing.
Senator Heinrich. Absolutely.
Do you have thoughts on what those consequences should look
like if we want Russia to change their current pattern of
behavior?
General Selva. I think this is going to require that we
bring all of the tools of government to bear. The military tool
is not going to be enough particularly given the kinds of
circumstances where the Russians attempt to operate, as I
mentioned earlier, below our threshold to respond.
Senator Heinrich. A whole-of-government approach that
includes things like sanctions, that includes things like the
removal of properties that we have seen here in the United
States. We should consider all of those things working in
concert.
General Selva. All of those, among others, yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
General Selva. To your question on directed energy, I will
commit to having a meeting with the JROC and bring in the
technology experts who can bring us up to date to make sure we
are not missing something.
Senator Heinrich. I would deeply appreciate that. I think
there is a handful of projects that are sort of on the shelf
and ready to go right now, that there is a great deal of
interest in moving forward directly to the warfighter.
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, congratulations on your renomination.
I want to talk about readiness here for a minute. From 2010
to 2016, the Department of Defense budget was cut by 24
percent, a quarter of the budget gone. Did you support that
drastic cut?
General Selva. Sir, I was not in the position I am in
during that period of time. I was the executor of the cuts at
the receiving end as both a fielded commander and a combatant
commander.
My caution is those cuts hurt. They hurt not only our
ability to respond with respect to purchasing new weapons
systems and being ready for what we are facing today, but they
also caused us to balance readiness and procurement. Because
readiness is something you can defer to the future, we deferred
a lot of training during that time period in order to make
those numbers work.
Senator Sullivan. I agree with that, and I think that these
drastic cuts are coming home to roost in terms of readiness. Do
you believe that a lack of readiness can be deadly for our
military members?
General Selva. A lack of readiness in high-end combat can
be deadly. It is important to understand that what we did
during that time period was focus on the fight that was right
ahead of us. We made sure our forces were ready to deploy to
the places they were going, and we deferred most of the high-
end training, the complex maneuver exercises, the joint
exercises that make us ready to face peer competitors.
Senator Sullivan. Let me just go into more specifics. There
was an article in the ``Marine Corps Times'' a year and a half
ago. It talked about Marine Corps aviation and how the lack of
readiness is not only harmful to our national interests but it
is actually threatening the safety of our aviators. When they
are not able to fly, the article said, more Marine aviation-
related deaths are going up.
We had a horrible, horrible accident just 2 weeks ago with
the C-130 refueler. The 16 brave souls were killed in that.
What are we doing about those kind of training accidents
that in my view are undermining the ability of the force to
operate and risking the lives of the men and women who
volunteer to defend their country? It is outrageous.
General Selva. First of all, Senator, I mourn the loss of
the 16 marines last week as well. But it is way too premature
to make any conclusions about the cause of that accident. In
deference to the bravery of those 16 marines, I think we should
reserve judgment on whether or not training was an issue in
that accident.
It is common among aviators, of which I am one, that
training does have value in increasing the safety and efficacy
of our force. During those time periods where we compromise on
training, we do assume risk. That is a consequence of having to
balance within a budget that we are given to operate. I think
we should be careful about making conclusions about last week's
accident or using a single article to make conclusions about
the viability of training for aviators inside the Marine Corps.
Senator Sullivan. In 2015, marine aviation-related deaths
hit a 5-year high. Something needs to change. To me, it relates
to training. Are our aviators in the Marine Corps and Air Force
flying less hours right now?
General Selva. Sir, I am not disputing that we need to
focus on training and safety within all of our aviation
services. Please do not get me wrong. With reference to the
specific accident we are talking about----
Senator Sullivan. I am not talking about that. That is an
example of what is happening too often, and I think it relates
directly to a 25 percent decline in military spending. Nobody
talks about this Congress approved that the previous
Administration cut a quarter of the defense budget.
General Selva. It is reasonable to draw the conclusion that
reductions in training are potentially the cause of an increase
in the risk we take to do the work we do.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just a follow-up on Chairman
Inhofe's question about North Korea. The testimony in front of
this committee has been consistently in an open setting it is
no longer a matter of if but when Kim Jong-un is going to have
an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile that can threaten
not just Alaska, my State, and Hawaii, Senator Hirono's State,
but the entire Lower 48 continental United States.
Can you describe succinctly what our North Korea strategy
is, what the goal is, and how we are trying to achieve it, and
how we in the Congress can help you? Is the goal to prevent at
all costs Kim Jong-un having that capability? Because, as you
know, General, he is rapidly, rapidly getting it. What is the
goal. What is the end state? How can we support it?
General Selva. Senator, I think we have to have two
parallel lines of effort. The first is to attempt
diplomatically and militarily to prevent him from achieving his
goal of having a nuclear weapon on an intercontinental
ballistic missile.
Senator Sullivan. Would we preemptively launch military
operations?
General Selva. I think we have to entertain that potential
option. That would be a policy choice by the President of the
United States to execute or not execute that option.
Senator Sullivan. Which would need the authorization of
Congress. Do you believe that?
General Selva. We would. We need to think seriously about
what the consequences of that action might be.
A parallel line of effort is to make sure that as he
continues along a path to developing weapons that can strike
the continental United States, that we have a parallel effort
to provide for the defense of the United States with a suitable
ballistic missile defense system that can handle the low volume
at this point of missiles that he might be able to deploy that
could strike us here across all of U.S. territory, Alaska,
Hawaii, and the Lower 48.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, it is good to see you again. Thank you very much
for your continuing service.
As we sit here discussing the threats posed by both Russia
and North Korea, they are two very different countries that we
try to figure out what is it going to take for us to alter the
behavior of both of these countries.
In the case of Russia, it appears as though maintaining
sanctions and possibly imposing more sanctions has some kind of
salutary effect. Would you agree with that?
General Selva. Yes, ma'am. I think in concert with our NATO
allies and other partners, that targeted sanctions on Russia do
actually have effect and can affect their behavior.
Senator Hirono. It is a lot harder to figure out what will
incentivize North Korea to alter their push to become a nuclear
power. We seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on our hope that
China will play a pivotal role in reining in North Korea's
ambitions. Do you think that we are placing too much emphasis
on China? If so, you mentioned diplomatic solutions or
diplomatic approaches. I do not know that we even have a
confirmed ambassador to South Korea, for example.
What are your thoughts about what more we can do, i.e., to
incentivize China to do more with regard to North Korea or for
us to pursue some other avenues, long shots as they may be,
because Kim Jong-un does not appear to respond to the usual
approaches?
General Selva. Thank you, ma'am.
I think the work that is being done to pressurize the
situation with respect to North Korea in terms of economic
sanctions and broad trade sanctions is helpful. It is also
quite useful to get the Chinese to do whatever they can
diplomatically and use whatever leverage they have.
A point that is not lost on me and I do not think on any of
you is the fact that Kim Jong-un, who has possession of nuclear
weapons that can threaten the United States, clearly has
possession of weapons that could threaten his relationship with
China and fundamentally change the power structure in the
region. That makes a Kim Jong-un armed with nuclear weapons a
threat to China as well. I think we should leverage as much of
that as we can to try and get the Chinese not only to work on
what they believe is maintaining the stability of North Korea,
but to put pressure on him not to deploy nuclear weapons should
he continue their development. I think that accrues to our
benefit because it avoids open conflict with North Korea,
although we need to continue to be prepared in the event that
they are not successful.
Senator Hirono. Do you think that our best bet with regard
to North Korea is to come to a much better understanding with
China? Because you say that economic sanctions has an impact on
North Korea, although it is hard to see that as having much of
a deterrent effect at all. We all recognize that, yes, a
nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to China, but it is very
hard to tell when China will deem that there has been a tipping
point reach with regard to North Korea where some kind of a
much more concerted effort will come into play.
Do we have the kind of relationship with China right now
that will enable us very quickly to identify what I would deem
a tipping point and do something in a concerted way with the
United States and China?
General Selva. I can only give you an assessment as an
observer of the activities of the State Department and our
Secretary of State. They are giving a tremendous amount of
effort to building that relationship with China. The early
indications were that China was willing to put pressure on
North Korea, although we have not seen that pressure be
successful.
Senator Hirono. I am keeping my fingers crossed.
With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, there are some who
argue that or observe that we do not have a current overarching
strategy to address the challenges in this part of the region,
which has some of the largest militaries and four of the five
most significant threats to the United States are in the Asia-
Pacific area. Do you agree that we do not have an overarching
strategy to address the challenges in the Asia-Pacific arena?
General Selva. I do not agree that we do not have a
strategy. The question is whether the critics of that strategy
believe it is fulsome enough to deal with the threats of a
resurgent North Korea, an emerging China, and a resurgent
Russia, three of the principal threats in the region, in
addition to violent extremism.
Senator Hirono. I am running out of time, General. If we do
have a strategy, very succinctly what is that strategy with
regard to the Asia-Pacific threats?
General Selva. We manage some of our longest standing
alliances in the Pacific with Japan, Korea, the Philippines,
Thailand, and others. We have relationships with Australia, New
Zealand, and likeminded nations that are putting pressure on
China not to destabilize the region. Those are not specifically
aimed at North Korea, but they could be. We are a nation that
exists on trade and economic relationships in the region and
very strong diplomatic relationships and alliances across the
Pacific. Those are the sum pieces of the strategy without
actually trying to outline all of it.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Selva. I appreciate you being here.
There is a lot of bipartisanship on this committee, and I
think you know that based on the legislation that we are
putting forward. The senior Senator from Hawaii serves as
Ranking Member of the Seapower Subcommittee, a committee that I
have the honor of chairing.
We recommended to the full committee and this committee has
reported language which is contained in the SHIPS Act which
sets as a policy of the United States of America that we move
to a 355-ship fleet. The House of Representatives has also
taken this issue up and has put that in their bill, and that
bill is further along over there than here.
This 355-ship requirement, General--and I hope you will
take this back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 355-ship
requirement is not something the shipbuilding industry came up
with, although I am sure they are delighted about it. It is not
something that we invented as people in States that build
ships, although we would like to see the idea of defending our
Nation and military manufacturing. This is a requirement that
came from the people out in the field looking at the seas and
saying what do we need to make America safe at this particular
time. Basically they took the requirements, sent them in, and
it was way more than 355. It was about twice that much. Then
they said, resource-constrained, what should be the
requirement? The considered opinion of the best minds in the
military came up with the 355.
I just want to emphasize to you before I ask another
question that we take that requirement seriously. We have been
in a position this year, both in the House and Senate
committees, to give you what you need, and we want to
communicate to you that we take this seriously and we want to
be your partner there and actually give substance to what has
been stated as the requirement. So please know that.
Now, also in the area of bipartisanship, I want to applaud
what Senator Heinrich said about Russia. I think I am quoting
him correctly. Russia will do whatever they feel is necessary
and they look at the threshold of what we in the West are sort
of willing to tolerate and kind of stay under that threshold.
That has been a pretty good strategy for President Putin. I am
getting tired of it. I hope the American people and the
Pentagon and this Committee are getting tired of it because it
threatens international security.
Now, you answered a question to Senator Ernst about
providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. As I understand it, in
eastern Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine has troops there,
and they are engaged in kinetic activity against Russian-backed
forces. Is that correct, General Selva?
General Selva. Yes, sir, that is correct, along the line of
contact between the Donbas and the rest of the Ukraine.
Senator Wicker. Would it be helpful to those Ukrainian
troops if they had better lethal weapons in which to defend
their country and defend the Government of Ukraine?
General Selva. Sir, that is a policy choice. The kinds of
lethal defensive weapons that have been advocated for Ukraine
would allow them to defend themselves along the line of contact
against those forces supported by the Russians.
Senator Wicker. There is a discussion among the Joint Staff
about this I understand from your earlier answer. You are
working with the European Command to identify what types of
weapons are necessary. So when can we expect a decision about
that, and how can we be helpful in exhorting our government to
provide the kind of weapons that I think Senator Ernst and I
and others are advocating?
General Selva. Sir, those discussions are ongoing. I think
within the coming months you will have an answer to that
question. But we have advocated, for example, for lethal means
like anti-tank weapons, so not tanks and offensive capability,
but defensive capability----
Senator Wicker. We have advocated. Who is the ``we'' there?
General Selva. We being the European Command and the Joint
Staff.
Senator Wicker. Now, months. It could be 11 months. It
could be 2 months. Can you give us a little more specific idea
of when we might actually be able to make a decision and do
something that would help these people defend themselves and
stand up to the sort of activity that Senator Heinrich was
talking about in his question?
General Selva. Sir, if I can take that back and get you the
actual timeline for the discussions. I do not have it with me,
but I am happy to do that.
[The information follows:]
General Selva. The decision is a subject for interagency
discussion at the Principals Level. Additional work is being
done now to refine option packages. I anticipate a decision on
a specific option to be made soon, with the potential to begin
execution as early as the fall of this year. Congress will be
notified once the decision is made.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much. Please be
advised that this Senator for one thinks that it is time for us
to give these people what they need to defend their own
country. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Wicker, let me add that currently
the Oklahoma 45th Guard is over there training them, and they
are a little bit perplexed on what they are training them with.
Excellent question.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow those questions asked by my colleague from
Mississippi, and first to overwhelmingly endorse his view--and
I have championed it on this committee--that this Nation should
be providing the kind of lethal defensive weapons, including
anti-tank armaments, that are necessary for the Ukrainians to
defend their own nation. You would agree with me that they are
defending their nation against Russian aggression. Correct?
General Selva. Yes, sir. They are defending their
sovereignty.
Senator Blumenthal. You said I think a moment ago that the
question of whether to provide that type of weaponry is a
policy choice. But perhaps you can tell us in as graphic terms
as possible what the difference it would make if we provide
those kinds of weapons to the Ukrainians. They would be far
more effective on the battlefield in defending their country.
Correct?
General Selva. Yes, sir. Let me make sure that I am clear
on the discussion of the policy question. The policy question
is not whether or not to provide lethal defensive assistance
but the kinds and quantities of that lethal defensive
assistance to the Ukrainians so that they can defend their
sovereignty.
Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you can give us some examples of
that choice.
General Selva. How advanced would the anti-tank weapons be
and in what quantities would they be delivered as an example of
that conversation.
Senator Blumenthal. Why not give them the most advanced
kind of anti-tank weapons or the most advanced kind that they
need to counter--why give them second rate anti-tank weapons?
General Selva. I do not want to be argumentative. Some of
the weapons that we have have technology controls on them that
we do not transfer them to other countries unless we can have
assurances that the technology will not be exploited. Even in
your question, you actually qualified by saying the lethal
capabilities they need versus the best possible available. That
is the policy choice we have to make with respect to the types
and amounts of aid that we provide.
Senator Blumenthal. I would agree with you that we should
not transfer technology that could be compromised or that could
be captured by our Russian adversaries. They are our
adversaries too. But I just want to join in the expression of
impatience, very strong impatience with the delays that we
seemed to have encountered.
I met just last Sunday with a group of Ukrainian Americans
who, in effect, said to me, you know, you have been coming to
us saying these weapons are going to be provided. Is there some
kind of barrier or obstacle? I am at a loss to give them the
kind of answer they deserve. I think we are at a loss to
understand what the barriers or obstacles are. I am not
directing this question or my impatience at you personally
because I recognize there are other factors at issue here.
With respect to Russian interference in our elections, you
have no reason to question the overwhelming unanimous views of
the Intelligence Community that they interfered in our
elections. Do you?
General Selva. I have no reason to question their views,
but I have no firsthand knowledge of the information that they
are examining.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me that having
some kind of cybersecurity pact with the Russians seems
foolhardy at best?
General Selva. Not having the details of the potential
agreement, it is hard for me to say that they would be any more
reasonable about a cyber pact than they are about INF or any of
the other treaties without some ironclad method of verification
and validation of their intentions. So it is worth a
conversation. The question is without any detail, we are having
a hypothetical discussion about whether or not they would
comply.
Senator Blumenthal. Their record in the cyber domain is one
of attacking this Nation. Would you agree?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. So sharing any information with them is
just going to give them additional, in effect, keys to our
cyber kingdom?
General Selva. If that is the foundation of such an
agreement, that would be true.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, any kind of information sharing
would be involved in a pact or agreement, and it seems highly
foolhardy and dangerous to our national security.
General Selva. Again, without the context of the actual
agreement, it is hard to know what information would or would
not be shared.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I want to end where I should have begun by thanking you for
your service and congratulations on your reappointment and your
new position. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General, I want to echo that too. You have served well and
I look forward to keeping you in the job.
I associate myself with Senator Wicker and Blumenthal and
Inhofe about helping the Ukraine.
Do you agree that given the threats we face--and we have
just been talking about a few of them--the Air Force needs to
be bigger and more capable in the out-years?
General Selva. Yes, sir. I believe that is the proposal
that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary
brought forward in the last budget.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Let us talk about three battlefields right quickly. Iraq.
Do you support a residual force once ISIL [Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant] is defeated in Iraq, if the Iraqis would
agree, of United States Forces?
General Selva. Yes, sir. If the Iraqis will agree, we will
likely need to do continued advising and assisting and training
of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Senator Graham. Is that true for the Air Force
particularly?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The Iranians are there in fairly large
numbers I hear. Is that correct? Or having influence in fairly
substantial ways.
General Selva. As a consequence of a long relationship
between Iraqi Shia and the Iranian Government, there are
Iranians present in Iraq. That does not mean that they
necessarily have to be a controlling influence in Iraq.
Continuing to build our relationship with the Iraqi Government
and the Iraqi Security Forces I believe is in our interests.
Senator Graham. Offering Iraq something they would want
from us, not from Iran, like helping train the Air Force would
probably give us leverage in Iraq.
General Selva. It quite possibly would, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Afghanistan. What is the state of the
Afghan Air Force in terms of the capability to support their
forces in the field?
General Selva. They are beginning to be able to support
their forces in the field with a modicum of lift and with light
attack aircraft, which are very useful in the theater. Their
helicopter force is subject to the maintenance woes of old
Russian aircraft. We have a proposal in place to actually
replace their aging Russian vintage helicopters with UH-60s.
Those are the helicopters that the Afghan Air Force trains on
here in the United States.
Senator Graham. Until that happens, do you agree that it
would be in our interest to provide some air power that is
missing to the Afghan Security Forces as they fight
international terrorists?
General Selva. Yes, sir, particularly as a bridge to their
capability to provide long-term support for their ground force.
Senator Graham. Do you support additional troops going into
Afghanistan?
General Selva. I think that would be a determination of
what specific tasks those forces would be doing, but as we look
at Afghanistan today----
Senator Graham. Counterterrorism would be----
General Selva. Counterterrorism would be one of those
missions. Supporting the Afghan National Security Forces with
train, advise, and assist would be another one of those
missions.
Senator Graham. Have some air power at their disposal they
do not have today?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Syria. The day we take Raqqa back, we
better have a plan post-Raqqa. Right?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. What role do you think the United States
should play in terms of stabilizing Syria when Raqqa falls?
General Selva. It is actually I think a bigger task than
that, Senator. Raqqa is the current center of external planning
for ISIS in Syria, but they have already begun a migration
towards the middle Euphrates Valley. Until we have worked
either by, with, and through partners on the ground or the
Syrian Government shows a willingness to actually deny
sanctuary to ISIS, they will continue to be a threat to
stability in Iraq and in the region. We will not be done when
we are done in Raqqa.
Senator Graham. A very good point.
Air power is being deployed in Syria against ISIL today.
Right? American air power?
General Selva. American and coalition air power from 69
nations are being used in Iraq and Syria today, as well as a
very small number of ground forces that are providing advice
and assistance to those elements that are willing to fight ISIS
in Syria.
Senator Graham. Would you be open to adding more air power
into Afghanistan? I was shocked to hear the number of F-16s we
have was pretty small.
General Selva. I would have to look at the numbers, to be
honest with you, Senator. The capacity of those airplanes to
range most of Afghanistan and to service the targets in
Afghanistan with the help of tankers and bombers from the Gulf
is actually a pretty compelling amount of air power in the
region, as we speak.
Senator Graham. When I left, I was shocked at the few that
we had given the task that we face in Afghanistan.
So from the American military point of view, a lot of hard
fighting yet to be done in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Can you see a scenario where American air
power is not absolutely essential to deciding the outcome of
these battles?
General Selva. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, and to all those who
serve in the Air Force, thank them.
General Selva. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will say at the
outset that our thoughts and prayers are with Chairman McCain
as he recovers from his surgery, and we look forward to his
being back at the committee very soon.
General, thank you for your service.
I want to talk to you about several different topics, but I
want to start with the Iran certification.
Yesterday, the Administration certified to Congress that
Iran is in compliance with the nuclear deal. I have very
significant concerns with that certification. I want to ask you
in your judgment do you believe Iran is in compliance with the
deal?
General Selva. Based on the evidence that has been
presented by the Intelligence Community, it appears that Iran
is in compliance with the rules that were laid out in the
JCPOA.
Senator Cruz. Are they testing ballistic missiles?
General Selva. They are testing ballistic missiles, but
those were not covered under the agreement.
Senator Cruz. How serious do you assess the threat of Iran
developing nuclear weapons?
General Selva. I think without the controls of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has the technical
expertise to be able to continue down the path to development
of nuclear weapons.
Senator Cruz. As you know, a similar deal was negotiated
with North Korea in the Clinton administration, and it resulted
in North Korea acquiring a substantial number of nuclear
weapons. What do you believe makes this deal likely to result
in any outcome different from what happened in North Korea?
General Selva. I think there are two substantial
differences at the outset. That does not mean that will not be
setbacks in the agreement. The first is the inspection regime
that went into the agreement that allows for international
inspectors to inspect all of the areas that the Iranians used
in their development and storage of enriched uranium and
potentially the development of nuclear weapons. The second is--
--
Senator Cruz. How much advance notice does Iran get before
those notifications?
General Selva. I do not have the details of how much
advance notice they get, but we are reasonably confident that
the inspectors are able to randomly inspect. They have
installed technical measures that allow for constant
surveillance of those same sites.
The second is the provisions that allow for sanctions
outside of the agreement to continue to be in place on those
areas of the Iranian economy, as well as leadership that engage
in activities that are not governed by the treaty--or by the
agreement. It is not a treaty.
Senator Cruz. Last week we also discovered that Iran had
sentenced an American citizen and a Princeton graduate student
to 10 years in prison. Does it concern you that we are
certifying they are in compliance with the deal in the wake of
their imprisoning yet another American?
General Selva. It concerns me whenever an American citizen
is imprisoned overseas, particularly in a regime that is not
transparent with their judiciary system. But again, the
specifics of the agreement are directed explicitly at the
development of and storage of nuclear weapons.
Senator Cruz. We will continue this conversation, but I
will say that I think the Iran deal is wholly inadequate. The
inspection regime is designed to facilitate cheating. It
requires effectively 3 weeks advance notice, and for the most
sensitive sites, the Iranians self-inspect. The American people
received numerous assurances that North Korea would abide by an
agreement very, very similar to this, and North Korea, Kim
Jong-il, happily took the billions of dollars the Clinton
administration sent to them and used it to develop nuclear
weapons. I believe the Ayatollah Khamenei intends to do the
exact same thing.
I think the certification yesterday was unfortunate and is
dangerous. There is another certification that is due in
October I believe, and there is also an upcoming deadline for
waiving sanctions. Let me say I would urge the Administration
there is no greater threat on the face of the earth to the
United States than the threat of a nuclear Iran. I think the
certification yesterday was very hard to justify with the facts
on the ground.
Let me shift to another topic. There is right now a
disagreement going on between the Department of Defense and the
House Armed Services Committee concerning whether a separate
military branch should be created for space. I would be
interested in your thoughts on that question.
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
I do not believe now is the right time to have a discussion
about developing a space force with all of the leadership and
infrastructure that would go with it. It would also complicate
the command and control of the space constellation which is
critical to our military operations. So I believe the time is
not right for a conversation about a separate space corps or
space force.
Senator Cruz. How do we do a better job defending ourselves
in space, given the vulnerabilities and our dependence on
satellite technology for virtually every aspect of our
military?
General Selva. Senator, I think there are three things that
we need to do. Actually two are in progress. One is in work.
The first was the consolidation of our national military
defense of space in a single command and control center in
Colorado Springs that allowed us to operate the entire
constellation as opposed to satellites in the aegis. The
National Defense Space Center I believe it is called is
functioning at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado as we
speak.
The second is to vest the Commander of Air Force Space
Command with the components and responsibilities to manage the
entire constellation vice trying to manage it through
subcomponents of his own headquarters. U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), under General John Hyten's leadership, has
implemented that change in the command and control arrangements
just in the last few months. It is time to let that play out
and see if we can get some efficiencies out of it.
The third is to continue to vest in the Secretary of the
Air Force the acquisition authority for satellite
constellations that are critical to military defense.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, General.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset, I want to say on behalf of so many of us
that have not had a chance to register our wishes that Chairman
McCain have a speedy recovery and return as quickly as
possible.
You know, you have had, General, an extraordinary career,
very distinguished. I suspect that there is not a problem in
the world with you continuing that service, and I thank you for
your willingness to be able to do it.
Because of that experience, do you want to comment on the
fact that Russia has a history of meddling in other people's
elections going way back, as far back as what we saw and what
they did in Georgia, what obviously we have seen that they have
done in Ukraine and using cyber? I am asking this for your
perspective because I think Putin understands he cannot beat us
on land. He cannot beat us in the air. He cannot beat us on the
sea or under the sea, and he cannot beat us in space. But he
thinks he can beat us in cyber. He has had a number of
successes going back to Georgia, Ukraine, now in the European
elections, several European countries.
Do you want to comment about how serious this cyber attack
problem from Russia is, including our own country and the
attacks that we have seen here?
General Selva. Thank you, Senator.
I indicated earlier that I do not have any firsthand
knowledge of the Russian activity that is alleged in our
elections from the Intelligence Community. However, as a person
who has spent a lot of time thinking about the security of the
data that represents our electoral system, I think we ought to
think very carefully about how we protect that data and how we
use that data to facilitate the democratic process in our
United States.
An example that I have used publicly and, if you will
forgive me, I will use now is it is much easier to tamper with
registration data than it is to tamper with voting data. If I
wanted to complicate an American election or I wanted to
complicate an election anywhere in the world, I would simply
make it more difficult for people to vote as opposed to trying
to get in after the fact and change the record of their votes.
As we look at our system, which is distributed across 50 States
and every precinct and municipality in those 50 States, we need
to be really careful that we do not make the assertion that
that inherently distributed system is protected because of its
diversity and distribution.
I think we as a Nation ought to think carefully about the
value of the data on all of us, our voting records in terms of
how we register and where we register, and how protecting that
matters for future elections. That way no one, not Russia, not
China, not anybody else who wants to intervene in an election
will have the capacity to change our willingness and ability
vote and our willingness and ability to vote our conscience for
those democratically elected leaders of our country.
Senator Nelson. For example, it could be something as
simple as going into the registration records and deleting
registrations. So a person shows up and they say, Mr. Jones, I
am sorry you are not registered. Show up on election day or
something as easy as going in and changing addresses so that it
fouls up the registration system of what precinct that you are
in. It could be something as simple as this, and it would
hugely complicate, especially in a place like Florida that has
had tremendous complications with its voting, which has
produced long lines that are sometimes as long as 7 hours. That
is recent history, by the way. You can imagine with people
trying to contest the fact that they show up on election day
and they say they are not registered and they know they are and
they are trying to prove that they are and how that would foul
up all of the other voters standing in line. It is an
extraordinary and scary thought.
Since I am the last one here seeking recognition, I just
want to ask you another question. What is your experience?
Would you share with the committee your experience where your
own privacy has been invaded on your personal accounts? Is that
something that you feel comfortable in sharing? I think it
would be very helpful for the committee to either know that
publicly or privately.
General Selva. Yes, sir. I would share this small amount of
information publicly.
Immediately following the OPM [Office of Personnel
Management] breach, where significant amounts of personal
identifying information were made available through a loss of
data, about 48 hours later I was locked out of one of my bank
and investment accounts as a consequence of a third party
attempting to enter that account using information that was
likely garnered from that personally identifying information
that was the consequence of the OPM breach. I subsequently
received a letter from OPM that notified me that my personal
data was, in fact, part of the breach. That is an example.
I can guarantee you for that hour and a half to 2 hours it
took for me to work with my bank and brokerage company to make
sure my data and my investments were secure that my attention
was not entirely devoted to the task at hand, which was being
the Commander of the United States Transportation Command.
Senator Nelson. Are you aware that that has happened to
other high-ranking United States military officers?
General Selva. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. I think that states it, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Reed, did you want to add anything?
Senator Reed. No.
Senator Inhofe. Let me say, General Selva, you have been an
excellent witness. We appreciate very much your straightforward
answers, and we thank you for your service.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to General Paul J. Selva by
Chairman McCain prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
department of defense reforms
Question. On previous occasions you have answered this Committee's
policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, the last time being in connection with your prior nomination to be
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You indicated that you did
not see a need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your
last confirmation hearing?
Answer. I have not changed my views on the importance,
implementation, and practice of reforms since I last appeared before
this committee.
Question. In light of your experience as Vice Chairman, do you see
any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what
modifications do you believe would be appropriate?
Answer. The most recent modifications to Goldwater-Nichols have
helped the Joint Force by increasing flexibility in force development
and acquisition. I look forward to working with the department and this
committee on policy reforms that continue to improve our Joint Force's
warfighting ability.
duties
Question. Based on your experience during your tenure as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what recommendations, if any, do
you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in sections
152 through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of
the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and
operation of the Joint Staff in general?
Answer. Implementation is ongoing for the foundational reforms you
directed in fiscal year 2017. It is too early to assess whether future
reforms are warranted. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretary, Joint Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders to identify
additional reforms as part of a continuing dialogue with the committee.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you expect to face if you are confirmed again?
Answer. The current security environment is extraordinarily dynamic
and complex. We face simultaneous challenges from Russia, China, Iran,
North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. We are directly
confronting ISIS in Iraq and Syria and are in the midst of a critical
transition in Afghanistan. While dealing with these pressing
challenges, we must also modernize the military. Over the last decade,
sustained operational commitments, budgetary instability, and advances
by our adversaries have threatened our ability to project power and
eroded our competitive advantage in key warfighting areas.
Question. If confirmed again, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for a framework
for deterrence that addresses the threats we face today. I will work
closely with the Services and combatant commanders to ensure we meet
operational requirements, retain strategic flexibility, and ensure our
competitive advantage now and in the future. Given the challenges we
confront, it remains critical that we enhance our integration with
other elements of the Interagency in partnership with Congress.
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed again,
what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major
challenges you identified above, would you set for your second term as
Vice Chairman?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities will remain focused on
developing and advancing the capabilities, posture, operating concepts,
and human capital necessary to assure our allies and partners, deter
adversaries, compete on a day-to-day basis, and respond across the
spectrum of conflict. This includes continuing efforts to modernize our
aging nuclear enterprise, advancing innovation across the Department,
developing the right mix of capabilities with sufficient capacity,
rebuilding readiness, balancing risk, and optimizing our ability to
respond to crises.
advice of the service chiefs, combatant commanders, and chief of the
national guard bureau
Question. Section 163 of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman
for the Combatant Commanders, especially on the operational
requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10 provides for
the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit their advice
or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice or
opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide that
advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the
President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.
Based upon your experience and observations in your first term as
Vice Chairman, what changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you
believe may be necessary to ensure that the views of the individual
Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau are presented and considered?
Answer. Reflecting on my recent experience, I do not believe
changes to Sections 151 or 163 of Title 10 (as they relate to the
provision of military advice) are necessary at this time. If confirmed,
I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might
indicate changes to the legislation are warranted.
united states military force sufficiency
Question. America will likely never have the resources to assign
all the forces each combatant commander believes they need, which leads
the Department of Defense to apportion forces in operations planning.
As U.S. military forces are already severely challenged in terms of
capacity, there are consequences when it comes time to allocate them
for a given contingency.
If we remain a global power, does our niche remain our global power
projection capabilities?
Answer. Promptly and decisively projecting military power to meet
multiple challenges is the sine qua non of a 21st Century global power.
Question. Do you believe the United States must retain the
capability to strike any global target (hold any target at risk), both
in the nuclear and conventional sense, and use it if our strategic
vital interests are threatened?
Answer. Yes, I believe the United States must maintain a set of
capabilities to hold any target at risk.
Question. In your opinion, does power projection include our
ability to deploy and sustain forces anywhere on the planet, across the
full range of military operations? Do you believe this is a unique
characteristic of the American way of war?
Answer. Yes. Our military strategy is unique in the world and is
predicated on our unparalleled ability to project power and act
decisively across the full range of military operations.
Question. Do you believe we must also have a sufficient strategic
and operational reserve, national mobilization capability, and robust
defense industrial base to provide a second echelon of follow-on forces
if a contingency arises in a particular region, especially against a
near peer, great power state?
Answer. Yes. Faced with multiple simultaneous global contingencies,
the Joint Force will deploy and sustain trained and ready active and
reserve component forces. The industrial base must be capable of
surging spare parts, end items, and critical munitions to support
wartime demands. Innovation during conflict is equally important; the
industrial base must be capable of developing and deploying new systems
in the midst of a fight.
Question. In light of current and future threats to the United
States' strategic vital interests, what do you believe should be the
U.S. military's posture and capacity to address these threats?
Answer. America today faces strategic challenges broadly in scope,
threat, and geography. As such, our posture must provide flexible
response options while also allowing us to quickly mass at the right
time and place. Power projection is critical because it allows us to
avoid excessively deployed combat power while maintaining enough
forward-deployed forces to assure our allies while deterring our
enemies.
Our ability to deter and assure depends on our production and
maintenance of a Joint Force right-sized for defense strategy across
capacity, capability and readiness. The Joint Force must continue
investing in capacity to ensure that the right forces with the right
capabilities are available when required.
united states military capability dominance
Question. The Committee has received sobering briefings on the
status of the United States' military technological lead over potential
adversaries that have ``gone to school'' on the way our military has
conducted warfare over the past quarter century, and are rapidly
closing the gap in various capability areas where we previously enjoyed
a large overmatch.
In your view, what are the top operational challenges our
warfighting commanders are facing currently, and will face in the
future?
Answer. Our adversaries have studied the American way of war and
pursued capabilities to specifically counter our historic advantages,
straining Joint Force capabilities at both the high and low technology
ends of the warfighting spectrum, as well as challenging our
warfighting commanders to operate below the threshold of traditional
armed conflict. Specific operational challenges arise from our
decreasing technological overmatch and playing an away game against
potential adversaries. This frequently gives potential adversaries
advantages in decision speed and capacities that they can bring to
bear. The Joint Force's ability to fight into these environments and
sustain efforts in them is threatened due in part to massed salvos of
ballistic/cruise missiles coupled with non-kinetic attacks against our
integrated air and missile defense networks. Subsequently, commanders
are forced into early repositioning of theater war reserves and moving
logistic operations further from desired operational locations
exacerbating potential vulnerabilities to our fighting force.
Question. What is your assessment of the capability and capacity of
our current and planned military forces to achieve success with respect
to these operational challenges?
Answer. Today's Joint Force is the most capable, professional
military force in the world, and can successfully defend the homeland,
prosecute the fight against violent extremist organizations, and defeat
any adversary in the world. However, we assess the trend of the Joint
Force's ability to fulfill our requirements is increasingly
challenging, particularly in our ability to compete below the level of
armed conflict and respond to multiple, overlapping contingencies. In
specific areas we have limited capacity to compete against adversaries.
However, increasing capacity alone will not regain ground lost due to
our decreasing technological overmatch.
Question. Do you believe our military is shaped properly to achieve
success with respect to these challenges with respect to the optimal
size and mix of long-range versus short-range, stand-off versus stand-
in, and manned versus unmanned capabilities?
Answer. While our military is shaped properly to achieve success
with respect to these challenges, our adversaries Anti-Access and Area-
Denial investments have eroded U.S. overmatch in global power
projection and long-range, stand-off, manned capabilities, while aging
infrastructure limits our ability to sustain a protracted conflict.
budget control act
Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress fails
to repeal the budget caps in the 2011 Budget Control Act?
Answer. BCA funding levels are insufficient to meet our worldwide
commitments. The tradeoffs required to balance capability, capacity,
and readiness are no longer sustainable. Without relief, our
competitive advantage will continue to erode.
Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress does
not conform to the budget caps of the 2011 Budget Control Act and
sequestration is triggered?
Answer. BCA funding levels are insufficient to meet our worldwide
commitments. Sequestration further damages the Armed Forces due to the
arbitrary nature of implementation. Across the board cuts remove the
Department's ability to balance capability, capacity, and readiness.
Question. How would our Armed Forces be affected if Congress passes
a continuing resolution, instead of a fiscal year 2018 appropriation
bill?
Answer. A year-long continuing resolution would pose a greater risk
to the Armed Forces than the BCA spending cap in 2018, significantly
challenging our ability to maintain our competitive advantage and
accomplish our national military strategy in acceptable timelines at
acceptable cost. Fiscal year 17 base funding, which we would receive
under a continuing resolution, effectively matches BCA levels ($522B in
FY18). Unlike the BCA, a CR would misallocate resources and prohibit
new starts, damaging both the immediate and long term readiness of the
Joint Force. Repeated continuing resolutions have hampered long-term
investment and often resulted in increased costs. Nine of the last ten
fiscal years began under a continuing resolution, forcing the
Department to delay critical new starts for acquisition programs,
installation and infrastructure modernization, and to cancel major
training events. Continuing resolutions also come with significant
opportunity costs generated by their inherent lack of flexibility and
predictability. Finally, a continuing resolution will challenge our
ability to resource Congress' intended force structure growth.
middle east / strategy to defeat the islamic state of iraq and syria
(isis)
Question. President Trump ordered a 30-day review of the strategy
to combat ISIS at the end of January. He signed a formal executive
memorandum declaring, ``It is the policy of the United States that ISIS
be defeated,'' to ``convey to the world and to our allies the strength
of our resolve,'' according to a senior administration official. The
battlefield in Syria, however, has become increasingly complicated as
United States-backed forces liberate ISIS-held territory and come into
contact with pro-regime forces.
How do you define the ``defeat'' of ISIS?
Answer. The ``defeat'' of ISIS has three primary components: the
threat posed is localized and not exportable; it is degraded into
smaller disaggregated organizations that can be addressed by law
enforcement and partner nation security forces; and the group can no
longer hold territory or achieve safe haven.
Question. In what ways does the United States strategy to defeat
ISIS take into account the Syrian regime, Iranian-backed forces, and
Russia?
Answer. Our focus in Syria is to defeat ISIS. As ISIS loses
territory, the shrinking battlespace means our operations to defeat
ISIS occur in close proximity to pro-regime forces. To ensure the
safety of United States and coalition personnel, we are making efforts
to de-conflict with Russian military forces, who can influence Regime-
aligned forces. We are also working to prevent Iranian-backed forces
from gaining a permanent foothold and achieving their strategic goals.
Question. Apart from the counter-ISIS campaign, what are United
States objectives in Syria with respect to the civil war and regional
security?
Answer. United States objectives in Syria beyond the defeat of ISIS
include de-escalation of the ongoing civil war, addressing the
humanitarian crisis created by the conflict, helping our partners in
the region strengthen their borders, and supporting a political process
that allows the Syrian people to select new leadership.
Question. Do you believe the military should have a role in
increasing pressure on the Assad regime with the goal of bringing about
a political solution in Syria? If so, what are the benefits and risks
of such an approach?
Answer. The focus of our military campaign in Syria is the defeat
of ISIS, working with and in support of our local partner forces. We
support the current de-escalation agreement in southwest Syria and
ongoing United States diplomatic efforts to further U.S. interests.
Question. How does the military contribute to a strategy in Syria?
Answer. The military component of the current strategy in Syria is
focused on defeating ISIS and ending the humanitarian crisis.
Currently, the military is destroying ISIS physical presence and
developing partner forces.
iraq
Question. The Iraqi Security Forces, with significant enabling
support by United States and coalition forces, have made great progress
over the past year in liberating territory controlled by ISIS. However,
significant questions about the presence and role of United States
troops remain.
What do you envision the roles and missions of United States forces
in Iraq will need to be in the short, medium, and long term in order to
prevent the resurgence of ISIS and emergence of other destabilizing
groups?
Answer. I believe the roles and missions of United States forces in
the short- and medium-term will remain the same: training, advising,
and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to defeat ISIS forces,
regain territory, secure and hold territory, and develop as a
legitimate security provider to the Iraqi people. Over the long-term,
we will continue to train, advise, and assist the Government of Iraq to
ensure its sovereignty.
Question. What is the appropriate size and composition of an
enduring United States presence in Iraq given these roles and missions?
Answer. We will continue our by, with, and through strategy by
working with Iraqi political leaders to develop a force level that will
be sufficient to accomplish the necessary missions while respecting
Iraqi sovereignty and the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq.
Question. How does United States strategy seek to mitigate Iranian
malign influence in Iraq?
Answer. The best counterbalance to Iranian malign influence in Iraq
is a strong United States--Government of Iraq relationship and an Iraqi
Government that is stable and functioning. Our strategy in Iraq
cultivates this security partnership while developing Iraqi Security
Force capabilities and empowering the Government of Iraq. The United
States is encouraging neighboring countries like Jordan and those of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, who have shared interests with the United
States, to reduce Iran's ability to negatively affect outcomes in Iraq.
afghanistan
Question. At a February 2017 Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on Afghanistan, General Nicholson stated, ``we're in a
stalemate.'' He also said that what will break the stalemate in
Afghanistan are the further development of key offensive Afghan
capabilities such as special forces and the Afghan Air Force to allow
them to overmatch the Taliban or any other group on the battlefield. He
also said, `` . . . I have adequate resourcing in my counter-terrorism
mission. In my Train, Advise, and Assist mission, however, we have a
shortfall of a few thousand [troops].'' Although none of the district
centers are held by the enemy, it is reported that at the end of 2016,
the Taliban held about 15 percent more territory than it did in 2015.
Do you agree with General Nicholson that the security situation is
in a stalemate in Afghanistan after more than 15 years of fighting?
Answer. Yes.
Question. When do you expect we will have a strategy that supports
the Afghan efforts to break the stalemate?
Answer. We are developing a strategy and are in discussions within
the interagency in order to provide recommendations to the President.
Question. What are the key elements of this strategy?
Answer. The strategy is conditions based. We will remain partnered
with the Afghans to ensure terrorists in that region that wish to
attack the United States do not have the capability to do so. The
strategy will also feature close coordination of military, diplomatic,
economic, and informational actions.
Question. Will you commit to briefing the strategy to the
Committee?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree with General Nicholson's assessment that
there is a need for more troops?
Answer. Along with interagency partners, we are working on a
strategy for Afghanistan and the South Asia region, which will be
presented to the President and will include recommendations on force
levels.
Question. Much has been made of the potential increase in United
States troops. At the same time, however, numerous diplomatic
positions, to include the Ambassadorships in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, remain unfilled.
In your view, what are the ramifications to our mission in
Afghanistan of allowing State Department and United States Agency for
International Development efforts to be under-manned and under-
resourced?
Answer. Under-resourcing the State Department and USAID in
Afghanistan undermines our strategy as they will drive long term
success.
Question. Is this a conflict that can be resolved militarily?
Answer. There must ultimately be a political solution; the best
means to bring a resolution of the conflict is an Afghan-led peace
process.
Question. Do high profile terrorist attacks in Kabul by the Taliban
and similar attacks by ISIS elsewhere in the country, represent a
terrorist organization losing and trying to present a picture of
relevance, or does it signal an organization increasing in strength?
Answer. While the threat persists, the total number of high-profile
attacks in Kabul decreased by 20 percent compared to the same time
period last year, and by 11 percent in the rest of the country. The
Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks
to generate media attention, create the perception of insecurity, and
undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
States in any reconciliation negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and
other insurgent groups?
Answer. The United States' role is to help facilitate the peace
process, but in the end, it must be an Afghan-led process.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
take to advance the reconciliation process?
Answer. The United States continues to support an Afghan-led
political process to determine the future of their country, and
continues to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF) through train, advise, and assist missions in order to enable
stability and set conditions for a political solution to end the
conflict.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, in particular Pakistan, in facilitating stability in
Afghanistan and throughout the region?
Answer. It is critical that Pakistan and other neighboring
countries support the legitimate Afghan Government, the United States
and NATO missions, and take positive steps to fight terrorism and
achieve stability in the region.
iran
Question. In your view, what is the nature of the threat posed by
Iran?
Answer. Iran seeks to achieve regional power and influence in the
Middle East through a variety of means. To advance its strategic
interests, it is pursuing more advanced missile systems and a more
capable naval presence that could be used to threaten the Arabian Gulf
region and Strait of Hormuz in the event of conflict. It is also
developing proxy forces, supporting Shi' a movements, and promoting
other pro-regime elements throughout the region.
Question. What is the role of our Armed Forces in countering Iran's
proxy networks specifically, and Iran's malign influence more broadly,
throughout the Middle East?
Answer. The armed forces' primary role is to support United States
diplomatic efforts to apply pressure against Iran and its proxy
networks' destabilizing activities, and, through security assistance,
help build our partners' resiliency against Iran's malign influence.
Throughout the Middle East, the United States Armed Forces continue to
maintain the plans, posture, and preparations to assure our partners
and respond to Iran and its proxies' activities that directly threaten
United States interests.
Question. In your view, is Iran complying with its obligations
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?
Answer. I do not have any indications that Iran is currently
failing to meet its commitments under the JCPOA. The IC is well-
positioned to detect malign activity related to Iran's nuclear program
that may violate this nuclear agreement.
Question. Since the signing of the JCPOA, do you believe there has
been any change in Iran's malign activities?
Answer. No, Iran continues its malign activities regionally.
yemen
Question. The war in Yemen is a complex conflict involving
different Yemeni factions backed by the Gulf States and Iran, Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, and other actors.
What are United States interests in Yemen and what role do United
States forces play in safeguarding those interests?
Answer. The United States national interests in Yemen are to
protect the United States Homeland, United States persons, and our
allies from terrorist attacks, to ensure freedom of navigation, and to
disrupt Iranian malign activity. Our military forces complement broader
United States Government efforts to support our Gulf partners and the
international community in their drive to deny safe havens for
terrorists and restore security in Yemen.
Question. Do you believe a political resolution to the situation in
Yemen is necessary and, if so, what needs to occur for such a
resolution to be achieved?
Answer. Yes, a political solution in Yemen is required and we are
working with our regional partners to reduce ungoverned spaces and deny
safe haven to terrorists. For example, we continue to work with our
partners in the region to maintain pressure on Al-Aq'eda in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Islamic State in Yemen, to contain threats to freedom
of navigation in the Bab Al-Mandab, and to help partners pursue long-
term political resolution in the region.
Question. What is the nature of United States support to the Saudi-
led coalition and what is being done to help the coalition minimize
civilian casualties and suffering as a result of the conflict?
Answer. The United States provides support to the Saudi-led
coalition through sales of military hardware and institutional advice
and assistance, as well as limited direct support to operations through
aerial refueling, intelligence sharing, and operational advising to
promote compliance with the law of armed conflict. These actions enable
more effective Saudi operations with an aim to minimize civilian
casualties and suffering.
russia and europe
Question. At his nomination hearing, General Dunford was asked what
he considered the greatest threat to our national security. General
Dunford said, ``My assessment today, Senator, is that Russia presents
the greatest threat to our national security.''
Do you still agree with General Dunford's assessment that Russia is
the ``greatest threat to our national security''?
Answer. Yes, I agree that today Russia poses the greatest threat to
our national security.
Question. If so, why in your view is Russia the greatest threat
compared to China, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS?
Answer. While North Korea, Iran, and ISIS clearly have malign
intentions and pose regional as well as global threats, none of these
pose an existential threat to the Nation. Russia and China are in a
different category; they are capable of engaging the United States
across the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional conflict. They
continue to relentlessly invest in a full-range of modern capabilities.
What makes Russia a more immediate threat at this time is its nuclear
capability, demonstrated aggressive behavior, and willingness to employ
its military forces.
Question. How do we deter Russian aggression and defend NATO?
Answer. The United States is committed to article 5, which is the
bedrock principle of NATO. That United States commitment is backed by
the readiness of the U.S. Joint Force. U.S. Forces are postured forward
to provide an immediate response, either separately or collectively
with the other NATO Allies, to any acts of aggression against any NATO
member. The United States maintains a safe, reliable, and effective
nuclear capability to deter Russian nuclear attack.
russia deterrence concept
Question. During General Dunford's nomination hearing, he said,
``we need an effective deterrent model for the 21st Century to deal
with the kind of threats that we are now seeing in Russia because,
quite frankly, I think that kind of asymmetric threat is one we will
continue to see in the future and certainly we are going to continue to
see that in the European context.''
Do you agree with General Dunford's assessment on the need to
``update our deterrence and response model to deal with the kind of
threat that we have today, which has been described as a hybrid threat
from Russia''?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What has been done to update our deterrence and response
model to deal with the Russian hybrid warfare threat?
Answer. We are enhancing our capacity to compete below the level of
armed conflict, to include in the diplomatic, information, and economic
realms, in order to impose costs for disruptive Russian behavior while
denying them the benefits of malign activities. We are continuing to
enhance our military capabilities for protecting U.S. interests, are
encouraging our Allies to do the same, and are strengthening our
capacity to reinforce those Allies in the event of conflict.
Question. What more in your view needs to be done in this regard?
Answer. We continue to refine our strategy to countering Russian
malign influence operations and we resource these efforts
appropriately. Responding to hybrid warfare is an inherently whole-of-
government proposition. In conjunction with the interagency, we are
continuing to build partner capacity while ensuring our allies are
resourced and focused on the Russian hybrid threat.
russia's violation of the intermediate range nuclear force (inf) treaty
Question. Russia's deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM) in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty: 1) poses a risk to
our NATO allies and United States forces in Europe; and 2) is part of a
wider deployment by Russia of sea, air, and ground-launched nuclear
capable missiles. You told the House Armed Services Committee on March
8, 2017, that ``we believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based
cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the [INF] Treaty
. . . the system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities in
Europe . . . I don't have enough information on their intent to
conclude other than that they do not intend to return to compliance . .
. .''
How should the United States address the military implications of
this new nuclear ground-launched cruise missile?
Answer. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty is only
in our national security interest if all parties comply with their
Treaty obligations. We must continue to engage Russia, both directly
and together with our allies, to pressure Russia to return to full and
verifiable compliance. However, we must be prepared if Russia fails to
return to compliance.
Question. Should we initiate a program to determine the need for
strike systems comparable to the GLCM?
Answer. The Administration is in the final stages of reviewing the
United States response to Russia's INF violation, including potential
military measures to increase pressure on Russia to return to full and
verifiable compliance with its Treaty obligations. At this point, it is
premature to identify any particular systems we may develop.
Question. Should we increase NATO's defenses against these new
ground-based cruise missiles, as well as Russia's air and sea-launched
cruise missiles? If so, please specifically describe systems being
considered.
Answer. Russian investments and demonstrated cruise missile
capability in the Syrian conflict highlight the need for the United
States and NATO to increase defenses against the cruise missile threat.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) will examine all threats--
North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. The policy statements in the BMDR
will recommend the proper balance between Homeland and regional missile
defense, and specifically speak to our policy regarding Russia's threat
systems in Europe.
united states force posture in europe
Question. General Breedlove told the Committee in 2015 that, ``our
current force posture in Europe has been based on Russia as a strategic
partner . . . .'' In 2016, General Scaparrotti's written testimony
stated, ``the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate
to meet the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from
further aggression.''
What changes have we made and should we make to our current
military posture in Europe to adjust to the current threat reality?
Answer. The United States leads an enhanced forward presence
mission in Poland, which is one of four NATO multinational Battle
Groups in the Baltic States and Poland. In addition, outside the NATO
framework, the United States Army provides a rotational presence of an
Armored Brigade Combat Team in Eastern Europe. We're also placing
additional Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) in Europe. The United States
will maintain its commitment to a persistent rotational presence of
air, land, and sea forces in Europe.
Question. Will you revisit the European Infrastructure
Consolidation (EIC) initiative that was developed prior to the
resurgence of Russian adventurism to determine whether its
implementation remains consistent with our efforts with the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to bolster military capabilities and
reassure our allies?
Answer. We continue to evaluate the strategic situation and, in
close coordination with our allies and partners, adapt our posture and
capabilities to secure U.S. interests.
russian activities outside europe
Question. What is your assessment of Putin's objectives and
operations in Libya? How do Putin's actions in Libya compare to
Russia's intervention in Syria?
Answer. Russia's activities in Libya are generally aimed at gaining
influence, and it is pursuing various strategies to bolster its
regional influence in the Middle East. In direct contrast to Russia's
actions in Syria, it is using regional engagement rather than direct
military intervention to strengthen its position.
Question. From your interactions with Russian General Gerasimov,
how sincere do you believe the Russians are about cooperating against
ISIS in Syria and how does that square with their actions to date?
Answer. I would caution against us trying to determine Russian
sincerity or motives in Syria. We operate consistent with our national
security objectives, and Russia has its own calculus. Our experience
has been that we have mutual objectives in ensuring the safety of our
respective forces operating in close proximity. These operational
deconfliction requirements remain a critical interest that we will
continue to pursue through established channels.
ukraine lethal assistance
Question. Do you believe we should provide lethal assistance to
Ukraine?
Answer. I support the provision of lethal defensive security
assistance to Ukraine, and the Department of
Defense is actively engaged with the interagency on this issue.
Despite readiness improvements enabled through United States training,
Ukraine still has significant capability shortfalls as it faces a
technologically superior adversary.
nato
Question. Ahead of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in February,
NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg said, ``After many years with steep
cuts in defense spending, we have turned a corner,'' announcing that
defense spending in real terms increased by 3.8 percent or about $10
billion in 2016 among our NATO Allies, but qualifying it with, ``This
makes a difference but it is absolutely vital that we keep up the
momentum.''
From your perspective, what are the other dimensions of burden
sharing, besides the 2 percent of GDP defense spending, that are
important to keep in mind when discussing defense contributions of our
allies and partners?
Answer. NATO Allies and partners have served shoulder-to-shoulder
with the United States, and over the past 20 years they have
contributed significantly to both NATO and non-NATO operations in and
outside of Europe. These include combat operations where partners
fought alongside United States forces in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Libya, and other locations. Their contributions across the spectrum--
military, economic, and humanitarian--have been essential to our
successes. Further, our allies and partners are a critical component of
our ability to project power globally.
Question. If Turkey purchases a Russian or Chinese air and missile
defense system, how would that affect its ability to be integrated into
NATO's air and missile defense architecture?
Answer. If Turkey purchased a Russian or Chinese air and missile
defense system, there would be significant integration issues because
the systems likely are built on different infrastructure platforms.
This would also place significant restraints on interoperability and
system integration due to the counter-intelligence risk.
asia and the pacific
Question. The Defense Department's January 2012 strategic guidance,
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century,''
states ``while the United States military will continue to contribute
to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region.'' Likewise, the 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense
Review states that the United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen
our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security
interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,''
and that, to accomplish this, the Department ``will augment and adapt
our forward presence'' in the Asia-Pacific region.
Would you recommend the current Administration continue the
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region? If so, what does the term
``rebalance'' mean to you in terms of force structure, posture, basing,
capabilities, and funding?
Answer. The Joint Force will continue to sustain and strengthen our
approach toward Asia-Pacific in a way that complements all other
aspects of United States engagement (including diplomatic, information,
and economic) and supports key multilateral institutions in the region.
The Department has made and will continue to make adjustments to the
regional posture of the military component including the locations and
type of forces in regions as the operational needs pertain to the five
key challenges. The Department must continue to enhance U.S. Force
posture and capabilities in the Pacific while preserving the ability to
protect U.S. National interest globally.
Question. How do you assess the strength and health of our military
alliances in the region? Are they on solid footing or do we have reason
to be concerned?
Answer. The five formal treaty alliances in Asia (Japan, Republic
of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand) are all on solid
footing. Short-term stressors develop, but are managed within the
alliance constructs.
Question. There are increasing calls from members of Congress for
an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, similar to the European
Deterrence Initiative. Would you recommend such an Asia-Pacific
Stability Initiative?
Answer. The Joint Staff supports efforts to improve and reinforce
U.S. military capabilities across the region and strengthen our
alliances.
Question. If so, what would be the objectives and priorities and
how would you recommend the Department use the funding, if
appropriated?
Answer. If appropriated, the Joint Force will use funding in
accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act to invest in
operationally relevant infrastructure, increase air and sea assets
available in theater, improve resiliency, expand and diversify
munitions, and enhance capabilities to improve and reinforce U.S.
military capabilities across the region.
north korea
Question. The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system to South Korea is a highly visible and concrete
action to counter the North Korean missile threat.
If deterrence fails with North Korea, can we respond decisively and
win?
Answer. Yes, in partnership with our South Korean ally, we can
respond decisively to defeat North Korea. We continually re-evaluate
required follow-on force flow, risk to operations in other theaters,
and the significant loss of life, both military and civilian, that will
likely result in the event of a military campaign on the Korean
Peninsula.
What other steps would you recommend we prepare to take to deter
Kim Jong-Un and ensure the safety and security of South Korea and
United States forces stationed in the region?
Answer. We continue to support our Japanese and South Korean
counterparts in strengthening their respective defense capabilities
against the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. We have also made
significant progress in promoting trilateral cooperation with Japan and
South Korea.
china
Question. What military actions do you recommend to deter war with
China, maintain free passage through the global commons, and assure our
Pacific allies and friends?
Answer. Deterring war is an exercise in influencing China's
decision calculus, making diplomacy preferable to conflict and managing
crises in such a manner that they do not unintentionally escalate. To
do this, the Joint Force will engage with the Chinese military within
congressionally mandated limits, build alliance capacity through close
cooperation, and uphold international law through appropriate
operations.
Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding
economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does
that growth influence the United States security posture in the Asia-
Pacific region?
Answer. The Chinese have shown their willingness to exploit their
economic leverage as a way to advance their regional political
objectives. As China's military modernization continues, the United
States and its allies and partners will continue to be challenged to
balance China's influence.
Question. What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in
coordination with allies and partners, to militarily counter the
increasing challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas?
Answer. Long-term, sustained presence is critical to demonstrating
that the United States is committed to the region. The United States
will continue to develop a security network through multilateral
partnerships. Unilaterally, we will continue to develop capabilities to
counter China's improving military capabilities.
Question. China's defense budget seems to be increasing at an
alarming rate year after year. However, China's plans and strategies do
not seem aimed at military domination outside of its immediate
neighborhood.
How do you explain this discrepancy and why China is engaged in
such a massive military build-up?
Answer. China's leaders remain focused on developing the
capabilities to increase its regional influence and to counter any
third-party intervention--including by the United States--during a
crisis or conflict. China is also seeking resources and economic
opportunities outside of the region to support continued domestic
economic growth and prosperity. China's growing military is being
designed and postured to be able to protect its interests both in the
Asia-Pacific region and abroad. China's military modernization
emphasizes development of capabilities with the potential to degrade
core United States military-technological advantages.
freedom of navigation operations
Question. While we have continued conducting freedom of navigation
operations, the Committee has heard from several high-ranking officials
from within the Pentagon and combatant commands that they are
constrained from carrying out critical tier three freedom of navigation
operations because of the lack of a timely decision-making and approval
process in Washington. While the Committee understands the need to have
broad interagency agreement on such operations to ensure they are
effective and not counterproductive, extended delays for approval of
these requests seems excessive.
Can increased authority be delegated to Combatant Commanders to
carry out freedom of navigation operations? If not, what can be done to
streamline the process to prevent unnecessary delay in considering such
requests?
Answer. The existing authorities for freedom of navigation
operations (FONOPs) are sufficient to enable the Joint Force to
effectively achieve its objectives globally and regionally.
india
Question. Congress and this Committee strongly support an enhanced
defense relationship between the United States and India. Over the
coming years, India could be one of our strongest and most dependable
military partners in the region. Bolstering and strengthening the
relationship, and encouraging enhanced engagement by India in the Asia-
Pacific region should be a top priority of the Defense Department.
What is your view of the current state of the United States-India
military cooperation relationship?
Answer. The United States-India military relationship is strong and
getting stronger. Our two countries cooperate through complex exercises
as well as robust engagement through defense trade and technology
cooperation.
Question. What are your recommendations for bolstering the overall
defense relationship between our two countries?
Answer. The United States and India should continue to expand
cooperation in areas of mutual interest like maritime security in the
Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region that increase our ability to
work together to maintain stability. We should also continue to
strengthen our defense relationship with India by pursuing
opportunities to co-develop and co-produce defense technology that is
in the interests of both countries under the United States-India
Defense Technology and Trade Initiative.
pakistan
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend for our
military-to-military relations with Pakistan?
Answer. We need to continue mil-to-mil cooperation with Pakistan in
order to improve Pakistan's capacity to combat terrorist organizations,
while working with Pakistan on ways to enhance security along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and help bring stability in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
increased role of ground forces in the pacific
Question. Admiral Harris, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command,
and Deputy Secretary Work, have repeatedly articulated a need for the
Army to develop myriad capabilities to ``project power'' beyond the
ground domain into the air and maritime domains to anchor defenses in
the Pacific, and provide mutually supporting relationships among
ground, naval, and air forces in the theater. The ability of ground
forces to hold at risk adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles
aimed at our ships, and at airfields, ports and other fixed facilities;
and to provide electronic warfare and communications support for our
air and naval forces could enable the United States to present
adversaries with our own ``anti-access/area denial'' challenge.
Do you believe United States defense policy would be better served
if the Army were to develop the capabilities and operational concepts
for such a role, both for the European and the Pacific theaters?
Answer. Yes. We are exploring operational concepts for ground
forces outside of traditional roles to expand our anti-access/area
denial globally. More broadly, we are examining the role of every
Service in addressing multi-domain threats.
Question. Do you believe our current ground forces posture in the
Asia-Pacific region is adequate? If not, what actions would you
recommend to improve it?
Answer. Our ground forces in the Asia-Pacific are postured
appropriately to meet today's challenges, yet we continuously assess
the evolving threat environment and our respective force posture.
western hemisphere
Question. What roles do United States forces play in addressing
transregional threats in the Western Hemisphere, including the threats
posed by transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups?
Answer. The Joint Force protects the United States from any nation
state attack against our Homeland. DOD provides aerial, maritime, and
cyber detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking into the United
States, which facilitates interdiction by law enforcement entities.
Upon request, the Joint Force is poised and ready to support U.S law
enforcement and federal agencies responsible for addressing threats to
our Homeland by criminal networks and terrorist groups.
Working with our allies and partners, the United States disrupts
external attack operations and denies terrorist groups from exploiting
criminal and other threat networks. U.S forces provide equipment,
training, infrastructure and intelligence to build the capacity,
capability, and professionalism of partner nation security forces to
assist in countering shared transnational threats.
readiness of the armed forces
Question. How would you assess the current state of readiness?
Answer. Today, each service faces significant readiness challenges
from manpower shortfalls to delays in infrastructure investment and
ground systems required to build, train, and launch combat ready
forces. While we maintain a competitive advantage over any potential
adversary in the world, that advantage is eroding and the Joint Force
is challenged to meet operational requirements while sustaining
investment in capabilities.
Question. How would you plan to restore full spectrum readiness and
under what timeline? Additionally, how would you enforce those
timelines to ensure that goals are met?
Answer. Predictable and sufficient funding is key to restore full
spectrum readiness. The FY17 appropriation addresses the Department's
most pressing near-term readiness requirements and places us in a
better position to begin restoring readiness to the joint force in
FY18. The FY18 budget supports ongoing operations and continues the
rebuilding of warfighting readiness by increasing funding for critical
training, depot maintenance, and munitions with the purpose of
restoring capacity and lethality. In FY19, we will begin to realize
full spectrum readiness recovery in capability, capacity, and
infrastructure.
countering cyber-enabled information operations
Question. Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-
enabled information operations against the United States and our
European allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining
democracy and collective security. Since the attack on America's 2016
election, the U.S. election systems and networks have been designated
as critical infrastructure. General Rogers, Commander of U.S. Cyber
Command, has testified to this Committee that he has not been tasked to
counter such operations.
Do you believe that U.S. Cyber Command should be prepared to take
action against foreign actors attempting to influence the 2018 U.S.
election cycle through cyberspace?
Answer. DOD must be prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland and its
interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence as outlined
in the 2015 Cyber Strategy. Any U.S. response should involve a whole-
of-government approach employing all the tools at our disposal.
Question. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence
testified to the Committee that the best way to deter cyber-attacks and
foreign information warfare operations is to demonstrably ``hold at
risk'' those things that the elites in adversary nations value most
highly. The Task Force specifically recommends that each Combatant
Commander be tasked with developing a strategy for accomplishing this
that is tailored to specific potential adversaries.
Do you agree with these conclusions and recommendations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you think that the Department of Defense needs to
better integrate its capabilities and planning for cyber operations and
information warfare?
Answer. Yes. The Department must continue to improve its ability to
exploit cyberspace as a pathway for Information Operations to affect
adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions in support of strategic
ends. We must also enhance our ability to support allies and partner
efforts to defend against and defeat adversary propaganda,
misinformation, and disinformation delivered in cyberspace.
Question. If so, how would you recommend that this goal be
achieved?
Answer. Effective information and cyber operations require
integration across all warfighting domains to ensure efforts are
working collectively to achieve effects. As our fluency continues to
mature, we are refining new operational and organizational constructs
and advanced tools to outpace competitors. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with Congress to continue to advance our capability.
officer management issues
Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you
wield significant influence over joint officer management policies.
Despite numerous changes in the law, the requirements and the process
for attaining joint officer qualifications are still beset by systemic
challenges. Some of these challenges require the Services to make
officer assignments to ``check the box'' for joint qualifications at
the cost of assignments to other career enhancing and professional
development opportunities. Also, officers assigned to a designated
joint billet on an operational staff receive joint credit while other
officers performing substantially the same duties supporting the same
joint commander do not receive joint credit unless they submit a
package to have their assignments qualify for joint service.
If confirmed again, what steps will you take to review the joint
qualification requirements to ensure that the qualification process is
matched to the increasingly joint service environment in which many
officers serve throughout their careers?
Answer. I appreciate the committee's recent work in improving the
joint qualification process. As we implement the recent statutory
changes, I firmly believe that the joint officer qualification process
provides a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
strategic levels. If reconfirmed, I will work with the relevant Joint
and Service components and the Congress to ensure that the joint
qualification process continues to hone joint officer qualification
requirements through programs like Joint Force Development.
Question. How would you assess the Department of Defense's progress
in providing the military services the force management tools necessary
to meet the needs of the 21st Century joint, all-volunteer force?
Answer. The Department, the Joint Staff, and the Services have
positively worked together over the past 10 years to develop a set of
flexible force management tools needed to shape the joint force to meet
the challenges of the 21st Century. If reconfirmed, I will continue to
examine the strategic environment to ensure that the tools remain
relevant.
Question. Do you believe the current Department and service
procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
nomination by the President are sufficient to ensure the Secretaries of
the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the President
can make informed decisions?
Answer. Yes, it is my understanding that the Services evaluate
officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any
available adverse or reportable information, and have a rigorous
process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair and
reasonable for the officers involved?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What modifications, if any, to the requirements for joint
officer qualifications are necessary to ensure that military officers
are able to attain meaningful joint and service-specific leadership
experience and professional development?
Answer. I believe that the current combination of Joint
Professional Military Education and requisite experience gained through
joint assignments, training, and exercises prepares officers to operate
effectively at both the strategic and operational levels. I do not
currently recommend any modifications to the requirements for joint
officer qualification.
Question. In your view, what is the impact of joint qualification
requirements on the ability of the Services to select the best
qualified officers for promotion and to enable officer assignments that
will satisfy service-specific officer professional development
requirements?
Answer. In the conflicts of both today and tomorrow, it is critical
that officers are prepared to operate effectively as senior leaders in
both Service and joint environments. Although satisfying joint
qualification requirements may affect the time available for officers
to develop Service-specific skill sets, doing so produces a cadre of
well-rounded and competitive leaders who are capable of integrating
Service functions with other Services in support of national directives
in both strategic and operational environments. In my opinion, officers
with these capabilities possess the greatest potential for success in
positions of senior leadership across the force and therefore are the
most qualified for promotion.
headquarters streamlining
Question. Congress has previously directed reforms to consolidate
the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the
military departments.
How would you describe your progress in identifying and
implementing streamlining and reductions in the Joint Staff?
Answer. The Joint Staff took the lead for both the Joint Staff and
the Combatant Commander in applying Major DOD Headquarters Activities
(MHA) reductions. Our re-baselining actions were conducted in
accordance with the OSD MHA framework and will achieve compliance by
FY20.
Question. What Joint Staff areas, specifically and if any, do you
consider to be the priorities for further consolidation or reductions?
Answer. The Joint Staff is currently reorganizing, with the intent
of meeting current legislative guidance on MHA reductions and
authorized personnel, while simultaneously supporting the Chairman's
responsibility for global integration. While I do not believe there are
any additional areas for further consolidation or reduction within the
Joint Staff at this time, we are constantly reviewing our structure and
process to find efficiencies and improve integration
Question. What are the negative impacts, if any, of headquarters
streamlining on Department missions and capabilities?
Answer. We are still assessing what negative impacts headquarters
reduction may have created. DCMO is leading a DOD-wide reform
initiative review which should conclude later this year.
defense acquisition reform
Question. Over the past two years, Congress has implemented a
number of acquisition reform measures designed to reduce the costs and
development timelines of major systems to improve the process of moving
programs from Department research efforts into operational
capabilities, and to streamline access to innovative commercial
technologies and systems. The Department has been slow to implement
most of these reforms.
What are your views regarding acquisition reform and the need for
improvements in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. I am fully supportive of the reforms put in place by
Congress in the 2016 & 2017 NDAAs, and would only caution that further
reform should be considered only after we successfully implement and
then benchmark these most recent changes, to ensure DOD acquisition
outcomes are actually improving in response to these reforms.
Question. If confirmed again, what actions would you take from your
position to accelerate the implementation of these reforms?
Answer. Once the Department completes the assessment of the impact
of the 2016 and 2017 reforms, whatever actions are taken to accelerate
reform should be based upon the following key principals: 1) The
responsibility and authority for acquisition system outcomes should be
clearly identified within the DOD; 2) The requirements' sponsor should
be an integral part of delivering needed capability and remains
accountable throughout the acquisition process, and; 3) There is a
continued effort to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies across
defense acquisition.
Question. If confirmed again, what actions would you propose, if
any, to ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable,
and prioritized?
Answer. I believe that recent legislation better aligns
responsibility for performance requirements with Service and Joint
priorities. If reconfirmed, I will work to ensure the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System achieves the goals of
the legislation and remains a solid foundation for validating
realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized requirements.
Question. What should be the role of the Combatant Commanders,
Service Chiefs, and Joint Staff in the acquisition process?
Answer. Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff
play a vital role in achieving success throughout the acquisition
process by proactively engaging with Service and Defense Acquisition
Executives during the acquisition life-cycle.
Question. Are there specific new roles or responsibilities that
should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or Combatant Commanders in the
acquisition process?
Answer. While I do not believe there are new roles or
responsibilities that should be assigned to the Service Chiefs or
Combatant Commands, I am supportive of changes that promote Service
accountability in acquisitions and further streamline the bureaucratic
processes.
Question. In what ways do you believe the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System needs to be reformed in order to
better respond to rapid changes by our competitors and the pace of
technological change more generally?
Answer. I agree with the changes addressed in the 2017 NDAA. We are
currently in the process of drafting a new requirements policy and
associated Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Instruction and Manual to reflect Congressional reforms and improve the
process. These will ensure the system is more responsive to the speed
of technology in order to keep pace with our competitors. The JCIDS
process is also being adapted to accommodate rapidly changing threat
environments, allowing for more robust intelligence and requirements
integration and to introduce Joint Performance Requirements. These
enhancements will allow the Services the authority and autonomy to
quickly develop capabilities and deliver those to the warfighter.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 made a number of changes in the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council and the role of the Vice Chairman, including elevating the role
of the Vice Chairman to be the principal adviser to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on joint military capabilities and joint
performance requirements.
To what extent have these changes been implemented?
Answer. The Joint Staff is updating the JROC and JCIDS guidance
documents to implement the congressionally-directed modifications to
the requirements process. The Services are currently implementing their
requirements pilot programs which accommodate all aspects of the
Acquisition Agility Act--promoting interoperability of technology with
emphasis on Modular Open Systems Architecture.
Question. What is your assessment of the positive and negative
impact of these changes?
Answer. As implementation is in its early stages, it is too early
to assess the impact. If re-confirmed, I look forward to sharing my
assessment of future impacts with the committee.
Question. Do you recommend making additional changes to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and Defense Acquisition Board in terms
of composition and staffing, authority, scope of responsibility, and
associated processes?
Answer. I do not recommend making any additional changes to the
requirements or acquisition processes until already mandated changes
are further implemented and the Department has time to evaluate the
results of those changes.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 made a number of changes in acquisition policy, allowing the
Department to take greater advantage of rapid prototyping
opportunities.
To what extent have these changes been implemented?
Answer. The Services and the Department have moved deliberately in
both practice and policy to take advantage of greater rapid prototyping
authorities granted in the 2017 NDAA. Current initiatives along with
future opportunities are being considered for rapid prototyping
applicability and I expect the number of rapid prototyping actions to
increase over time.
Question. What is the appropriate role that prototyping should play
in helping to establish better requirements, more rapidly, for the
acquisition process? Are there additional reforms you believe are
required to capitalize on the opportunities associated with prototyping
for improved requirements definition?
Answer. Prototyping is a key part of the requirements/acquisition
process and should continue to be leveraged to ensure that requirements
are realistic and technically achievable. This is especially important
early in the lifecycle of capability development. There were
significant legislative changes made to the acquisitions process in
FY17, including prototyping. If reconfirmed, I look forward to
assessing the impact of those changes and providing feedback to the
committee on opportunities.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that systems are not
prematurely deployed before they have had their technical risk removed
and before they have been tested and found to be operationally
effective and suitable for operational use?
Answer. Capabilities, whether or not developed as a result of rapid
prototyping, will continue to meet the practices and standards in
existence today that assure they are suitable, effective, and reliable.
research, technology, innovation, and testing capabilities
Question. The Department of Defense has a number of organizations
and thousands of technical personnel working on internal and contracted
research programs to develop next generation warfighting capabilities.
These include the $13 billion science and technology programs, the $1
billion Small Business Innovation Research program, and the network of
over 50 Department labs and test ranges that develop and test all
systems before they are deployed. It also includes newer efforts at
prototyping in the Strategic Capabilities Office and outreach to
commercial companies through DARPA and the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (DIUx).
Are you satisfied with the quality of the facilities and workforce
at the Department's labs and test ranges?
Answer. Yes, but new, emerging capabilities will require adaptation
and expansion of facility capabilities.
Question. What steps will you take to improve the effectiveness of
the Department's technology development and testing community to
support near term and future operational needs?
Answer. I will continue to work with our Combatant Commanders to
ensure that Department level S&T is prioritized to meet both near- and
far-term operational needs. I am also highly supportive of efforts
within the operational test community to streamline and leverage
development testing in order to expedite system fielding.
space
Question. The House Armed Services Committee-version of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contains a
provision directing the establishment of a separate Space Corps within
the Department of the Air Force.
What are your views on the establishment of such a corps?
Answer. Establishing a space corps at this time will not
effectively address concerns with the management and organization of
the national security space enterprise. This proposal currently is
without adequate study of the root causes of the identified problems,
and assumes that a space corps will resolve space challenges without
acknowledging the ongoing effort between the Air Force and USSTRATCOM
to optimize management and integration to compete more effectively in a
contested space environment. Establishing a space corps at this time
could disrupt these current lines of effort and exacerbate existing
issues rather than improving our effectiveness in space operations.
Question. Do you support making the Air Force Space Command a
subordinate Unified Command of the U.S. Strategic Command with joint
staffing?
Answer. I support USSTRATCOM's recent decision to elevate his
component commander for space operations from a three-star to a four-
star general officer who will be dual-hatted as the commander of Air
Force Space Command. It will require time to evaluate the impact of
this increased level of oversight, affecting both the provision of
joint space forces and the conduct of joint space operations. Further,
DOD is currently conducting an NDAA-directed review more broadly of the
overall space enterprise, which will provide greater insights on this
particular matter. I support allowing time to implement this
reorganization and to evaluate its efficacy.
Question. If you oppose such a move, what actions would you
recommend to improve perceived issues with the management and
operations of the national security space enterprise from a military
perspective?
Answer. I am awaiting the results of the review of the DOD space
enterprise, which is examining the root causes of the shrinking of our
operational advantage in space, and I will be glad to provide my views
to the committee once we finish evaluating those results.
commercial space capabilities
Question. In support of the Department's technology innovation
agenda, and to address reconnaissance needs in Northeast Asia, the
Middle East, and elsewhere, you and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
have sponsored through DIUx a two-part effort with small, innovative
commercial space companies to try to (1) build very inexpensive radar
imaging satellites that could be deployed in large numbers to provide
nearly constant coverage of specific areas of interest, and (2) make
effective use of such collection capabilities, and exploit advances in
artificial intelligence and machine learning software to determine
``patterns of life'' and automated detection and identification of
mobile targets.
What do you intend to accomplish with this initiative and when do
you expect to have results?
Answer. This initiative will allow the Department to leverage less
expensive radar imaging satellites to fill gaps in space-based
reconnaissance by encouraging commercial development in space-based
radar imaging. This will allow the Joint Force to deploy the right
capability for a given situation, allow us to flex and adapt to the
threat, respond to the situation, and be unpredictable across an
increasingly contested space environment. However, commercial radar
imaging by no means replaces the need for exquisite government
satellites capable of focusing on specific targets of interest; rather,
it provides capacity and broader focus for countrywide patterns of life
that in turn can provide indications and warning to tip exquisite
assets or posture forces.
Against certain targets, radar also lends itself well to machine
processing, which accelerates our ability to close the kill chain from
detection to engagement. The first of three pathfinder satellites is
scheduled to launch in late 2017, with immediate access to a portion of
its data. As constellations quickly build out over the next few years,
much more imagery will be available for government purchase similar to
how we purchase electro-optical imagery today. Artificial intelligence
and machine learning increases the amount of imagery that can be
distilled into patterns of life at machine speed and does not require
more imagery analysts to exploit the data. The first of the machine
vision algorithms will be demonstrated in early 2018, and algorithms
that can be run on multiple radar imagery sources for a host of
government organizations will be available by the end of 2018.
nuclear deterrence
Question. The Vice Chairman has traditionally served as the Joint
Staff's senior subject matter expert on nuclear deterrence.
Do you support the current triad of delivery systems?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the timely replacement for the AGM-86
cruise missile? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. A nuclear air-launched cruise missile contributes
significantly to every element of U.S. nuclear strategy and is
therefore an essential component of our future nuclear capability. The
AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), initially fielded in 1982,
is well beyond its intended service life. The Department has undertaken
several Service Life Extension Programs to sustain ALCM, but they are
not sufficient to meet long term operational requirements.
Do you support the timely replacement of the LGM-30 Minuteman III
system? If so, why?
Question. Yes. The current Minuteman III weapon system was
initially fielded in 1970. Some of the supporting command and control
system and infrastructure date back to the 1960s. Our intercontinental
ballistic missile force requires recapitalization and modernization as
a result of critical sub-systems age-out and booster asset depletion
from surveillance and flight testing. The Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent will replace the Minuteman III and provide a fully integrated
weapon system to include new flight systems, command and control sub-
systems, and launch systems.
Do you support the timely replacement of the E-4B National Airborne
Operations Center? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. The National Airborne Operations Center, the NAOC, is
the most survivable command center within the National Military Command
System supporting command and control for the Secretary of Defense and
the President. The E-4B fleet, which supports the NAOC missions, will
continue to face availability issues due to aircraft age and resulting
maintenance and modification requirements. Efforts are underway to
replace the aging fleet.
Question. Do you support the Council on Oversight of the National
Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. I support the Council's responsibilities to provide
the highest level of oversight, integration, and advocacy across the
DOD and with other agencies.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. The Services continue to take steps to provide increased
training and resources to respond to and investigate allegations of
sexual assault, such as a newly established 24/7 response capability
available everywhere the military operates.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
of proposals to remove the disposition authority from military
commanders over violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
including sexual assaults?
Answer. I firmly believe that the commander's role is indispensable
in the military justice process. We trust commanders with the lives of
their subordinates, and we must trust them to address misconduct in the
ranks. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) establishes a
criminal justice system that is a critical part of commanders'
authority and responsibility to maintain good order and discipline in
each unit. Misconduct in the military, including sexual assault, is
best addressed when commanders are accountable for addressing it, not
when their responsibility and authority are diminished. The FY17 NDAA's
revision of the UCMJ preserved the critical role of military commanders
in the military justice process. The military services and DOD are now
focused on implementing the many UCMJ changes and properly training
convening authorities, judge advocates, and other servicemembers on the
new law and associated rules and policies.
Question. What is your assessment of the military's protections
against retaliation for reporting sexual assault?
Answer. DOD and the military services are committed to ensuring
that servicemembers who report sexual assault have appropriate
protection from retaliation. The Department has enhanced its sexual
assault prevention and response training to emphasize the prohibitions
against retaliation and the protections available to those who
experience retaliation. DOD released a Retaliation Prevention and
Response Strategy in 2016 to further define policies and procedures to
protect from retaliation those who report, witnesses, or respond to
sexual assault. Additionally, the military Services are implementing
the additional notification, training, and reporting requirements
relating to retaliation that were established in recent NDAAs.
Question. In response to advance policy questions regarding the
Department of Defense's sexual assault prevention and response program
when you were first nominated to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, you responded that, ``We have taken strong action to address
the climate within the military and to bring perpetrators to justice.
We hold commanders accountable for both.''
What is your view of the role of the chain of command in
maintaining a command climate where sexual harassment and sexual
assaults are not tolerated?
Answer. The chain of command is fundamental to maintaining a
command climate where sexual harassment and sexual assault are not
tolerated. Commanders are accountable for what happens in their units
and must foster a climate of dignity, respect, and trust for all
servicemembers, where sexual harassment and sexual assault are never
condoned or ignored.
Question. How are commanders held accountable for failing to
adequately address the command climate with respect to sexual
harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. Commanders are responsible for promoting equal opportunity
and the elimination of unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and
sexual assault within their commands. DOD and the services focus on
supporting all commanders' efforts to establish positive command
climates, and DOD policy requires the military departments to hold
commanders accountable when they fall short. Commanders who fail to
adequately address their command climate could face a range of
consequences, to include complaints from members of their commands and
follow-up inquiries under Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and subsequent investigations, Inspector General complaints and
subsequent investigations, administrative counseling and corrective
measures, adverse performance evaluations, and punitive action.
Question. Can commanders be held accountable for failing to bring
perpetrators to justice without exercising unlawful command influence?
Answer. Yes, commanders are held accountable in that they are
responsible for implementing and fully supporting sexual assault
prevention and response efforts in their commands, for ensuring each
report of sexual assault is investigated, for making an appropriate
disposition decision on each unrestricted report of sexual assault, and
for taking any necessary disposition actions. They are also required to
report the disposition of each unrestricted report of sexual assault to
Congress. A commander's disposition decision is a discretionary
judgement that must be free of any unlawful command influence from
superior authorities. Senior officers in the chain of command who have
concerns about the handling of sexual assault cases by their
subordinates may lawfully withhold disposition authority at their level
for certain types of cases.
Question. In your view, do military and civilian leaders in the
Department of Defense have the tools and resources needed to hold
commanders accountable for these issues? If not, what additional
authority do they need?
Answer. Yes. Our leaders have the tools and resources needed to
hold commanders accountable for sustaining positive command climates
and maintaining good order and discipline in their commands.
suicide prevention and mental health resources
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue
to concern the Committee.
In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
families, including members of the reserve components?
Answer. Preventing suicide among members of the Armed Services and
their families is one of the most important challenges within the Joint
Force. We are working with OSD, Defense Agencies, the private sector,
and civil society to better understand the factors leading to suicidal
thoughts and the most effective prevention techniques. We are shaping
policy to foster a culture of Total Force Fitness that enhances
wellness, promotes resilience, and sustains a military force fit in
mind, body, and spirit. In addition to educating the force on suicide
prevention, we are providing additional training and support to our
first responders (chaplains, senior enlisted leaders, legal counsel,
and mental health providers) to ensure they are as equipped as possible
to prevent suicides. Working together with the Services, we will
continue to improve effectiveness and enhance the accessibility of
support.
Question. What actions have been taken since your last confirmation
to reduce the stigma associated with servicemembers seeking mental
health care? In your view, are these actions sufficient, or must more
be done to encourage servicemembers to seek mental health care when
needed?
Answer. If reconfirmed, I will do everything in my power to
continue the Department's progress in encouraging servicemembers to
seek mental health care when they are in crisis. The Department has
taken a number of actions to reduce the stigma associated with mental
health care. The Services have been most successful by embedding
behavioral health specialists within operational units. These embedded
specialists become trusted agents that are both readily visible and
accessible to servicemembers well before they reach the point of
despair. We have seen increased provider-patient contacts since
embedding these specialists, as well as decreased behavioral health
hospitalizations.
Question. If confirmed again, what additional actions will you take
to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to
servicemembers in theater, and to the servicemembers and their
families, including Guard and Reserve members, upon return to their
home stations?
Answer. We will continue to address areas that build resilience
among our servicemembers and their families, improve early
identification of unduly stressed individuals, and enhance ready access
to embedded licensed professional behavioral health specialists.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee is always concerned about the sustainment
of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and
morale, welfare and recreation services.
After the experience of your first tour as Vice Chairman, what
further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs
would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on
budgets?
Answer. We recognize quality-of-life programs that support child
care, spousal employment, and special-needs families are often top
concerns for our military families and enable our servicemembers to
continue and succeed in their missions. It is important that we
continue to focus on program evaluation and outcomes to ensure we
prioritize core programs that address the greatest needs and produce
the greatest impact on joint force readiness.
Question. In a constrained budget environment, should the Services
downsize or eliminate certain legacy quality of life programs that are
less important to servicemembers and their families in the 21st
Century?
Answer. Quality of life programs are important to the servicemember
and their family and directly contribute to readiness and retention. I
will continue to review existing programs and, with proper analysis,
seek efficiencies in existing legacy programs where possible, to
include examining our current service delivery models.
audit, financial management, and oversight
Question. The Department of Defense has been incapable of obtaining
a clean audit opinion for over 25 years, despite billions of dollars
being spent on the effort. The Department is also on a number of GAO
High Risk lists for management failures, including in financial
management, weapons systems acquisition, and supply chain management.
The Department is also in the midst of a number of investigations
regarding waste, fraud, and abuse, as well as continuing to be unable
to assert control over millions of dollars in improper and unauthorized
payments.
Should it be a priority for the Department to address these
management issues, especially in times of perceived budget constraints?
Answer. Yes, auditability is a DOD priority and in 2018, all major
elements of the Department will be under audit. This will include
standalone audits for many organizations and an overarching audit of
the entire Department. Clearly understanding where and how money is
spent will help address our fiscal management challenges and allow us
to implement a process of remediation and accountability.
Question. How should Congress view these financial management
weaknesses when contemplating increased budgets for the Department?
Answer. The Department has made--and will continue to prioritize--
financial management and business transformation improvements. These
improvements increase the Department's ability to make sound decisions
through improved data accuracy and accountability. Despite
improvements, financial management challenges will continue. If
confirmed, I will remained focused on addressing these challenges.
Question. What steps will you take to improve financial management
within the Department?
Answer. I will continue to support financial management
improvements and the transformation of business processes through my
role as the Chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),
Co-Chair of the Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG), and other
management and oversight bodies. Specifically, I will continue to
address a DOD-wide audit, human capital issues related to financial
management certification, and implementation of initiatives that ensure
effective use of resources.
operational energy
Question. In his responses to the advance policy questions from
this Committee, Secretary Mattis talked about his time in Iraq, and how
he called upon the Department of Defense to ``unleash us from the
tether of fuel.'' He stated that ``units would be faced with
unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel'' and
resupply efforts ``made us vulnerable in ways that were exploited by
the enemy.''
Do you believe this issue remains a challenge for the Department?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed again, what specific steps will you take to
unleash the Department from the tether of fuel?
Answer. If confirmed, as Chairman of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) I will ensure that new capabilities are
assessed for energy supportability and will review energy key
performance parameters as needed, before approving programs for
production. In the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment, I will assess and
manage energy-related risks to operations, training, and testing as
they relate to supporting infrastructure, equipment, platforms, and
personnel. I will also ensure that joint exercises and wargames
incorporate and assess the Joint Force's energy demand and logistics
supportability, as well as continue to use the acquisition process to
explore not only ways to reduce energy consumption for our weapons
systems, but to find alternate and renewable energy sources as well.
Question. If confirmed again, what priorities would you establish
for defense investments in and deployment of operational energy
technologies to increase the combat capabilities of warfighters, reduce
logistical burdens, and enhance mission assurance on our installations?
Answer. We have a comprehensive operational energy program and I
fully support its goals and objectives. We will continue to use the
same standards for ranking energy technologies as for any other
Departmental decision for basic research funding. We continue to assess
alternative energy sources and evaluate improvements in the use of
petroleum-based fuels, which ultimately will improve operational reach
and lower vulnerabilities to the warfighter.
Question. If confirmed again, how will you consider operational
forces' energy needs and vulnerabilities during training exercises,
operational plans, and war games?
Answer. I share the concerns expressed by Secretary Mattis about
this operational vulnerability. Through our global integration
exercises, war gaming, and training programs we are taking
opportunities to test mitigation solutions. This includes involvement
with our multinational partners and allies around the globe and builds
on Service and our combatant commanders insights on operational
impacts. As they occur, we leverage public and private industry
innovations into our future joint force planning. We are examining
access, capacity, and risks across all horizons to address this
challenge.
energy and acquisition
Question. How can our acquisition systems better incorporate the
use of energy in military platforms, and how, if at all, are
assessments of future requirements taking into account energy needs as
a key performance parameter?
Answer. The acquisition system considers the use of energy in
military platforms as an important consideration in design,
development, production and sustainment. In the requirements process,
energy will remain a key performance parameter that must be considered
in the review and validation of future capability requirements.
energy resiliency in the fight against the islamic state of iraq and
syria (isis)
Question. Back in July 2016 after a coup attempt, the Turkish
Government cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, which is the primary
platform for launching coalition airstrikes in the fight against ISIS.
For roughly a week, deployed units had to operate relying on backup
generators, which is expensive and is certainly not the preferred
method of operation given the demanding tempo of sorties against ISIS.
Recently, the Air Force described an incident in the past (via open
source) in which a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) mission based in the
United States was flying a targeting mission overseas. Because of a
power outage stateside, the RPA feed temporarily lost visual and the
target was able to get ``away and is able to continue plotting against
the United States and our allies.''
If confirmed again, how will you specifically address and make
energy resiliency and mission assurance a priority for the Department
of Defense, to include acquiring and deploying sustainable and
renewable energy assets to improve combat capability for deployed units
on our military installations and forward operating bases?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
efforts to increase the combat capability of deployed forces through
improved energy resilience and mission assurance, in particular by
emphasizing these attributes through the joint requirements process and
encouraging innovation in both areas. We will continue to participate
in DOD initiatives to improve energy resiliency and mission assurance
on critical installations, and advocate for development and fielding of
alternative energy sources.
Question. Do you support the J-4's enforcement of the energy
supportability key performance parameter in the requirements process?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed again for this position, to appear
before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed again, to appear before this
Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this Committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for
information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed again, do you agree to provide to this
Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of
the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of
the formality of a letter from the Chairman?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
russian information warfare and cyber threats
1. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what is needed within the
Department of Defense (DOD) to address disinformation campaigns?
General Selva. The Department needs to improve its ability to
identify and attribute disinformation efforts. Effective response
requires us to operate within a whole-of-government approach, and in
concert with our allies and partners.
2. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, are we seeing an increase in
Russian attempts to influence United States servicemembers?
General Selva. Yes, we have. Russia targets both the general United
States populace, as well as specific segments of society, to include
military servicemembers, as part of their information operations and
influence and disinformation campaigns. The cyberspace domain, to
include electronic communication and social media, are relatively
permissive environments for Russian state and state-affiliated actors.
3. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what is DOD doing to help
protect our servicemembers from this type of insidious undermining by
the Russian Government and their proxies?
General Selva. Our forces are generally resilient in the face of
this kind of activity once it is exposed and discredited; the key is to
inoculate our forces to disinformation before it occurs, and expose and
attribute the activity once discovered. The Department conducts annual
information assurance (IA) training for all personnel to enhance their
awareness of tactics employed by threat actors. This training is
continuously updated to incorporate the newest and most relevant
threats.
4. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, do you feel we have the
capabilities within DOD to defend against this kind of attack?
General Selva. Yes, we have the appropriate individual capabilities
to defend against this kind of activity, and we are working to apply
those capabilities to better understand and analyze the information
environment, and to develop narratives, conduct planning, and
coordinate Defense strategic messaging in concert with the whole-of-
government.
The Department of Defense conducts planning, capability
development, and exercises to counter adversary influence and
disinformation campaign threats to U.S. interests. Responses to any
incident must be determined on a case-by-case basis to ensure the
response is appropriate to the threat.
5. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, are we capable of doing to
them what they're doing to us?
General Selva. From a capabilities standpoint we could. However, we
do not believe that adopting these tactics is in our interests. Rather,
we need an integrated strategy for response and, more importantly, a
strategy for proactive engagement. We don't want to respond to
disinformation, we want to set the information environment so that our
adversaries are responding to us. Second, we need to build a cross-
government organization that not only harnesses and coordinates
strategic messaging for DOD, but for the USG as well, complete with
requisite authorities to task and execute. We--the USG--must organize
so that we are capable of coordinating consistent messaging from all
levels of the government, and persistent messaging which overshadows
the adversarial message.
6. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what is the proper ``whole-of-
government'' response to disinformation campaigns?
General Selva. Interagency coordination is necessary to assessing
the impact of adversary propaganda, providing attribution, and
coordinating a consistent message across all levels of government.
7. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what is DOD doing in
conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other
agencies to ensure there are no cyber seams or gaps that are
exploitable by the Russians or any other bad actors for that matter?
General Selva. The Department of Homeland Security has the overall
responsibility for protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure,
and works with DOD and other interagency partners to identify civilian
critical infrastructure, provide education to its partners through the
sector specific agencies (SSAs), share information, and collaborate on
measures to address cyber seams or gaps. If requested by the Secretary
of Homeland Security and approved by the Secretary of Defense, DOD will
support national prevention, mitigation, and recovery efforts from
cyber incidents.
8. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what ideas do you have for a
whole-of-government approach to protect our national critical
infrastructure from attack given 90 percent of it is owned and operated
by the private sector?
General Selva. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to direct
military operations, including certain cyber operations, to respond to
an imminent or ongoing cyber attack or to authorize, at the request of
a civil authority, support to state and local governments and to the
private sector in responding to and recovering from such an attack. As
cyber threats evolve, a more expansive DOD role may be required and
should be explored. Any broadening of DOD's role would need to consider
the breadth, depth, and speed of action required, and the resources
necessary to meet those requirements. In all cases, any role for the
Joint Force must be fully integrated into a whole-of-government
approach.
9. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what ideas do you have as far
as a whole-of-government approach at countering information operations
and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns?
General Selva. We must leverage diplomatic and military-to-military
engagements to increase transparency and to communicate the US
narrative more actively and broadly. This would inoculate at-risk
audiences to disinformation and therefore undermine adversary
disinformation campaigns. We can also rapidly share counterpropaganda
techniques and best practices across the USG, and with allies and
partners.
10. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, during your hearing you
mentioned how United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was
leveraging contractors to help close the gap between DOD's needs and
the cybersecurity of the privately owned and operated critical
infrastructure TRANSCOM relies on. Please provide additional
information on the initiatives that TRANSCOM is utilizing here, and
your thoughts on how that might be leveraged in a wider way across the
whole-of-government?
General Selva. USTRANSCOM is leading, on behalf of the Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), implementation and
enhancement of existing policy in order to provide sufficient clarity
to industry, via contract language, to raise the bar on our collective
cybersecurity posture. Further, the Commander, USTRANSCOM, established
a recurring series of Cyber Roundtables to advance the community of
interest beyond cybersecurity situational awareness to pursue actions
that will mitigate cyber-related risk. These sessions are composed of
whole-of-government participants, academia, industry partners and
technical experts. USTRANSCOM's collaboration with partners, contract
language and Cyber Roundtables are exemplary efforts which could be a
model for whole-of-government approaches albeit with adjustment for
other organization's unique requirements.
ukraine and lethal defensive weapons
11. Senator McCaskill. General Selva,what is the timeline for the
decision of what lethal defensive weapons will be provided to Ukraine?
General Selva. The decision has been the subject for interagency
discussion at the Principals Level. Additional work is being done now
to refine option packages. We would anticipate a decision on a specific
option to be made soon, with the potential to begin execution as early
as the fall 2017. Congress will be notified once the decision is made.
12. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what defensive weapons are
being considered and in what quantities, and which are not?
General Selva. Several option packages are currently being
considered by the interagency. The discussion includes the types and
quantities of potential weapons.
13. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what are the short and long
term expected effects of providing Ukraine with lethal defensive weapon
systems?
General Selva. Ukrainian forces are facing a technologically
superior force. If an option for defensive weapon systems is approved,
I anticipate this action would help offset Ukraine's tactical
disadvantages in defense of its territory, and build resiliency and
survivability in its forces. It could also open the door for other
allies, following our example, to increase their assistance in filling
critical Ukrainian defensive shortfalls. In the long-term, we believe
these systems will aid Ukraine in defending its sovereignty.
north korea and ballistic missile defense
14. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) has spent $40 billion since 2002 on the Ground-Based Interceptor
system. Although it has had two successful tests in a row, the overall
success rate is 40 percent since 2010. Are you satisfied with our
current Ballistic Missile Defense framework?
General Selva. I feel very confident the Ground Based Mid-Course
Defense System is capable of defending the United States from the
current North Korean threat. However, we must continue to develop,
test, and employ improvements to the missile defense system to keep
pace with the aggressive developmental cycles of our adversaries, to
include North Korea.
15. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what needs to be done to
better the system?
General Selva. The Department of Defense is currently undergoing a
comprehensive review of the entire Ballistic Missile Defense
enterprise. This effort will inform and guide future improvements to
all elements of the Missile Defense systems.
india partnership
16. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what is your view of the
current state of the United States-India security relationship?
General Selva. The United States-India security relationship
continues on an upward trajectory. In 2012, Secretary Carter launched
the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), which continues to
be one of the primary areas of focus in United States-India bilateral
defense discussions. The Trump administration and Secretary Mattis are
committed to building a long-term security relationship with India to
promote stability in the region.
17. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, can India be counted on to be
a reliable partner in Asia-Pacific?
General Selva. Yes, India is a reliable regional partner. As the
world's largest democracy, India and the United States share many core
interests such as commitment to the rule of law and promoting global
security, stability, and economic prosperity. India's commitment to the
Asia-Pacific region can be seen through its humanitarian support and
outreach in the aftermath of natural disasters.
18. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, what would be your strategy
for bolstering the overall defense relationship between our two
countries?
General Selva. The strategy for bolstering the overall India-United
States defense relationship is three-fold. The first would be to
continue to increase mil-mil exercises in number and complexity,
particularly with the Indian Navy. The second would be to increase
defense trade and defense technology cooperation under DTTI and its
Joint Working Groups. The third would be to continue to increase the
mil-mil interpersonal interactions by leveraging training and formal
military education programs.
19. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, which areas would you focus
on and what specific priorities would you establish?
General Selva. The top priorities are expanding cooperation in
maritime security in the Indian Ocean region and continuing to build
India's defense capabilities. Increasing mil-mil exercises and
expanding on the lessons we have learned in previous exercises such as
MALABAR and RIMPAC will improve our ability to operate together.
20. Senator McCaskill. General Selva, does further cooperation with
India threaten our relationship with Pakistan? If so, how do we balance
the need for Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan with the threat posed
by China?
General Selva. No. The United States relationships with India and
Pakistan are not zero sum. We continue to maintain productive
interaction with both nations to promote access and influence that can
be used to facilitate our interests, to include stability in
Afghanistan, and that can be leveraged to ease India-Pakistan tensions
on a variety of issues.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
syria
21. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, earlier this month, President
Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump brokered a ceasefire in
southwest Syria at the G-20 summit in Germany. It has been reported
that Israel does not support the agreement because it ``perpetuates the
Iranian presence.'' Could you provide an update on the status of that
ceasefire?
General Selva. The de-escalation zone in southwest Syria, which
includes a ceasefire component along with plans to facilitate delivery
of humanitarian aid, went into effect on July 9, 2017. Since then the
ceasefire has held, with minor reports of skirmishes between the
conflicting parties.
The United States, Russia, and Jordan are conducting ongoing
meetings to determine the way forward for the de-escalation zone. Those
meetings include discussion of the presence of non-Syrian forces within
specified areas of the de-escalation zone, including Iranian forces,
Iranian proxies, and other foreign armed entities. The United States
recognizes Israel's legitimate apprehension about hostile forces along
their border and is working to ensure any agreements made regarding
southwest Syria address those concerns.
22. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, did the Administration consult
with the military before announcing the ceasefire?
General Selva. The Department of Defense has been a part of the
interagency team conducting planning and negotiations for the de-
escalation zone in southwest Syria since the beginning. We have worked
closely with the State Department to ensure the de-escalation zone, and
the associated ceasefire, can be executed concurrently with our
operations to defeat ISIS and counter violent extremism across Syria.
23. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, can you discuss any guidance
that was received from the Administration as to how the U.S. military
was to enforce the ceasefire?
General Selva. The details for the monitoring and enforcement of
the ceasefire are still being discussed. At this time the plan does not
call for the U.S. military to enforce the ceasefire, and I will defer
on the specific roles of security forces on the ground until the
agreement is complete.
The de-escalation zone in southwest Syria relies on the willingness
of the conflicting parties, including Syrian government forces, pro-
government forces, and armed opposition groups, to cease hostilities
along pre-determined lines of contact in Dara'a, al-Qunaytirah, and al-
Suwayda provinces. The United States, Russian Federation, and Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan intend to monitor and influence the conflicting
parties into compliance with the ceasefire.
24. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, I am concerned that the
Administration is touting a ceasefire that is nowhere near at-Tanf
where United States troops have a presence, and it is also away from
the Euphrates River Valley where coalition troops are focused on the
Counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] mission. Can you explain
how this ceasefire is helping with protecting our troops in Syria who
have come into contact with Syrian regime forces and Iranian Hezbollah
on the other side of Syria, closer to the Iraqi border?
General Selva. The recently enacted ceasefire agreement for
southwest Syria was not intended to protect United States troops
operating in other parts of the country. For our U.S. troops, and those
of our Coalition and local partners, we have other arrangements with
the Russians to de-conflict operations in order to enhance safety and
retain freedom of maneuver. In addition to geographic de-confliction
measures, the United States and Russia maintain an open communications
channel to allow commanders in the region to de-conflict operations on
the ground and in the air to avoid mishaps.
25. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, it seems that the Syrian regime
is moving up the Euphrates River Valley, toward Deir-ez-Zor. How will
their movements affect our counter-ISIS mission in the same region?
General Selva. The Syrian regime is present in Deir-ez-Zor, and has
been fighting ISIS for control of the city for the past several years.
The regime has always intended, and clearly stated, that they will
conduct military operations to liberate the city. The United States
also intends to conduct operations in the Euphrates River Valley (ERV)
beyond the liberation of Tabqa and Raqqa in order to complete the
destruction of ISIS. As in other parts of the country where our forces
have come into close proximity, we must be aware of regime operations
and ensure they are aware of our operations in order to de-conflict and
avoid mishaps. Continuing operations in other parts of the ERV will
require additional de-confliction measures.
iraq
26. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, recent news reports indicate
that Iran is exerting tremendous influence in Iraq from flooding the
market with consumer goods to television programming that is
sympathetic to Iran. How concerned are you about Iran's influence in
Iraq and what is the United States doing to counter this influence?
General Selva. Iran seeks to influence Iraq to counter United
States and allied influence, expand its operational reach, and gain
influence throughout the Middle East. Iran provides support to Iraqi
Shia militant groups and Shia political parties, primarily through the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Quods Force. Operations against ISIS
have led many Shia Iraqis to view Iran and Iran-aligned militias
positively. United States and Coalition advisors are working to bolster
Iraqi security services to strengthen Iraq against Iranian influence.
27. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, we were all pleased to hear
that the Iraqi Security Forces liberated Mosul after a brutal 9 month
campaign. However, more work remains. What is the Iraqi Government
doing to rebuild Mosul and restore stability?
General Selva. The Iraqi government understands the importance of
rebuilding Mosul to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that their
government is capable and responsive. Restoring stability starts with
establishing security in order to set conditions for the return of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and restoration of essential
services. This has largely occurred in parts of Eastern Mosul with
markets and schools reopening and returning to some semblance of
normalcy. The Government of Iraq will need to address even greater
stability challenges in Western Mosul due to extensive damage to
infrastructure and wide use of IEDs and booby traps. To date, only 42
percent of Iraq's humanitarian response plan has been funded for what
has been estimated at over $1 billion dollar stabilization project.
28. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, how is the Iraqi Government
incorporating other ethnicities in the effort to rebuild and what is
the United States military doing to support those efforts?
General Selva. The Iraqi Government understands that national
stability directly correlates to inclusivity and that rebuilding
efforts provide opportunities for inclusivity. One example is the GOI's
``pay-for-work'' stabilization programs in Mosul that enable citizens
the opportunity to assist in rebuilding their community while earning
wages to provide for their families. There are opportunities across the
country for initiatives like this.
From the United States military perspective, we have seen positive
trends of Iraqi nationalism and acceptance of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF), specifically the Counter-Terrorism Service and, to some extent,
the Iraqi Army. The U.S. military is committed to investing in the
training and advising of the ISF, with a focus on professionalizing the
force while promoting nationalism and inclusivity.
russian influence
29. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, we have seen an emboldened
Russia willing to use hybrid tactics to discredit western democracy and
values in Europe. How is our military combining its tools with tools of
other agencies to address hybrid threats?
General Selva. As hybrid tactics often combine military, economic,
cultural, and political aspects, so too does our approach to countering
these tactics. We leverage routine coordination in training and
operations between DOD and our military allies and partners, Department
of State, the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to
reduce the vulnerability of friendly forces and populations to these
tactics, advance shared values and themes, and expose and attribute
malign activity.
30. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, how closely is DOD working with
the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Intelligence
Community to look at the broad spectrum of hybrid threats emanating
from Russia?
General Selva. We are working closely with our interagency partners
to strengthen our ability to detect, deter, and defeat hybrid threats
emanating from Russia. For example, defense intelligence organizations
coordinate routinely with the Intelligence Community on assessments
that address a broad spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats
emanating from Russia. This includes supporting efforts, such as the
Russia Strategic Initiative, a Department of Defense decision-aid
framework that supports the integration of multiple Combatant Command
Russia-related efforts and requirements. National intelligence
organizations also routinely support this initiative.
31. Senator Shaheen. General Selva, given the abundance of hybrid
tools to include disinformation, cyber-attacks, and illicit financing,
how best can the United States Government approach these issues in the
future?
General Selva. By enhancing resilience of our systems and building
capacity in our allied and partner nations in order to identify and
mitigate threats/attacks as early as possible. Domestic resilience and
better partner capacity will increase the amount of time that our
government will have to identify, isolate, and defeat these emerging
hybrid threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
russia-china relationship
32. Senator Hirono. General Selva, Russia-China relations appear to
have reached a new high, including multiple joint statements vowing to
deepen their partnership and a signed roadmap on military cooperation
for 2017-2020. How does a closer relationship between Russia and China
impact our interests and strategy in the region?
General Selva. The Russia-China relationship is complex and we
continue to monitor their cooperative activities with great attention.
Our primary focus remains supporting our Allies and strengthening our
well-established, transparent security partnerships both in Europe and
in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia-China cooperation does not change
the imperative of supporting enduring United States interests in the
European and Asia-Pacific regions. In particular, our commitment to act
by, with, and through our allies and partners in these regions remains
crucial for Joint Force support toward addressing security challenges
and achieving U.S. strategic objectives.
missile defense
33. Senator Hirono. General Selva, some experts claim that North
Korea has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could have
the ability to reach Alaska. How well are Alaska, Hawaii and the
continental United States protected from North Korean missile launches?
General Selva. The nation's Ground Based Mid-Course Defense system
is very capable of defeating North Korean missile threats to the
homeland.
34. Senator Hirono. General Selva, as their capabilities continue
to improve, how are we expanding our missile defense capabilities to
defend against this threat?
General Selva. In the near term we are focused on improvements to
both the capability and the capacity of our sensor networks and
interceptors. For the longer term, the Department of Defense is
undergoing a comprehensive review of the entire Ballistic Missile
Defense enterprise. This effort will inform and guide future
improvements to all elements of the Missile Defense systems.
south china sea freedom of navigation operations
35. Senator Hirono. General Selva, at the Shangri-la Dialogue
Summit, a number of defense ministers from allied countries called for
the continuation of U.S Navy freedom of navigation patrols in the South
China Sea. These types of patrols demonstrate the U.S.' resolve to
defend our allies and to maintain the sanctity of the international
rule of law and the Law of the Sea. What are your thoughts on
conducting freedom of navigation exercises?
General Selva. Since its inception in 1979 the Freedom of
Navigation Program has helped preserve the vital national interest of
global mobility. Continuing to challenge coastal states' excessive
maritime claims is important as we will continue to fly, sail, and
operate wherever international law allows in order to protect U.S.
national security interests, and demonstrate our commitment to uphold a
rules-based security order.
36. Senator Hirono. General Selva, currently, who has the authority
to make the decision to conduct the exercise?
General Selva. Subject to interagency review, and synchronization
with other U.S. Government activities in their areas of responsibility,
Combatant Commanders can conduct regular FONOPs in a routine manner
throughout the globe to protect freedom of navigation and overflight.
advancements of our adversaries
37. Senator Hirono. General Selva, a common theme that we hear from
the Services and experts in national defense is that one of the biggest
challenges in the future will be staying ahead of the rate of
modernization we see in our adversaries, particularly our near peer
adversaries. How does the advancements of our adversaries impact the
advice you provide the President and future operational plans for the
most critical threats?
General Selva. The advancements of adversaries informs the Joint
Force's future operational plans for the most critical threats,
particularly as they relate to our competitive advantage and as such
forms the basis of my best military advice to the President.
maritime security program
38. Senator Hirono. General Selva, you and I have discussed the
importance of the Maritime Security Program (MSP) to our national
security efforts. While it might be allowed due to a loophole in the
current law, do you think it is inherently fair for an MSP designated
ship which receives payments from the Maritime Administration (MARAD)
to compete against a non-MSP U.S. flagged ship in a domestic trade
route? Please explain.
General Selva. Yes. Commercial carriers participating in the
Maritime Security Program adhere to the law. According to 46 United
States Code, Chapter 531, as a condition of receiving full payment for
a fiscal year by the Secretary of Transportation, the vessel must be
operated exclusively in the foreign commerce or in mixed foreign
commerce and domestic trade allowed under a registry endorsement for a
period of at least 320 days in the fiscal year.
The MSP financial payments are paid to a limited number of U.S.
flagged oceangoing ship operators in return for making their ships,
crews, and intermodal transportation and communication networks
available to the DOD for sealift operations during times of contingency
or national emergency. The Department of Defense relies on the ships
MSP participants provide, and leverages their vast intermodal
capabilities and global reach to move the Nation's combat power from
the Continental United States to all points across the globe. During
times of contingency, the Department must preserve all transportation
options, be it the number of commercial participants, operating
locations and maritime lanes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
fighter aircraft inventory and hi-low mix
39. Senator Warren. General Selva, the caps established by the
Budget Control Act have forced the Department to consider a number of
unwanted tradeoffs, delaying some modernization programs to the out
years and divesting older weapon systems earlier than planned. For
example, the Air Force has had to slow its F-35A buy and, according to
previous testimony, is considering divesting the F-15C fleet without
replacements. What would be the impact of divesting the F-15C fleet
without an adequate number of fifth generation fighters to replace it?
General Selva. There are no plans to divest any F-15C aircraft in
the FYDP, as this would significantly degrade our air-to-air capability
against potential adversaries. As F-35 aircraft come online, a subset
of aircraft and pilots will be equipped and trained to focus on the
air-to-air mission set covered by the F-15C to ensure there are no gaps
in capability. With the current force size, we must carefully replace
aging F-15Cs with F-35As to ensure success across the range of missions
we support.
40. Senator Warren. General Selva, are there benefits to having a
high-low mix in the U.S. military's fighter inventory?
General Selva. Yes. Having a high-low mix in the U.S. military's
fighter inventory allows us to equip the combatant commands with the
appropriate capability for a given threat.
defense innovation unit, experimental (diux)
41. Senator Warren. General Selva, the House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee marked up a bill that would cut funding for DIUx by
approximately 50 percent. What impact would that reduction have on DIUx
operations if enacted?
General Selva. A reduction of DIUx budget by 50 percent would halt
the Department's momentum gained over the last two years with
nontraditional defense firms. DIUx credibility with emerging technology
sector companies would be adversely impacted, and access to
nontraditional defense firms and innovative, emerging capability would
decrease.
42. Senator Warren. General Selva, you testified that the
Department puts ``tremendous demands on the defense experimental unit''
and that it was currently working on a reprogramming request. In your
view, has DIUx been worth the investment?
General Selva. Yes. DIUx provides the department access to
innovative commercial solutions that may solve DOD problems at a pace
and agility level that uniquely leverages the rapid rate of progress in
industry. The DIUx process can result in capability solutions in a
competitive environment measured in weeks and months rather than years.
Their continued work with nontraditional defense firms also gives them
a visibility into innovative technology and emerging companies that
inform multiple efforts across the Department, areas the Department has
been challenged to access previous to the work of DIUx.
intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
43. Senator Warren. General Selva, the Department submitted a
report to Congress in July 2016 entitled ``The Department of Defense
Plan for Military Response Options to Russian Federation Violations of
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty''. The unclassified report
laid out a number of options for responses to Russia's violation, but
notably it did not recommend the research and development of a new
land-based cruise missile. What are the range of military options, from
least aggressive to most aggressive, at our disposal?
General Selva. The INF Treaty prohibits the possession, production,
and testing of ground launched intermediate-range cruise and ballistic
missiles. Research and development (R&D) of these systems is, however,
not prohibited by the treaty. R&D of these systems could pressure
Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty, and
if Russia continues to violate the treaty, R&D on these capabilities
would help posture us for a post-INF Treaty world. There are three
categories of systems we could consider as part of this R&D process:
modification of current air- and sea-based strike systems into a ground
launched mode; development of new systems; and the purchase of
intermediate-range ground launched systems from countries not
constrained by the INF Treaty.
44. Senator Warren. General Selva, what other military options
exist aside from developing a new land-based cruise missile?
General Selva. In addition to possible compliant research and
development of non-compliant systems, we will continue development of
compliant offensive systems as well as defensive systems that negate
Russia's advantage.
45. Senator Warren. General Selva, to your knowledge, are there any
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies that would allow the
United States to base a new dual-capable ground-launched cruise missile
on their territory?
General Selva. No, not to my knowledge.
funding inter-agency partners
46. Senator Warren. General Selva, the Trump administration's
Fiscal Year 2018 budget proposal would make significant cuts to the
State Department and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). If enacted, would these cuts to our diplomacy and
development resources be helpful or harmful to our military's ability
to meet what you refer to as the five challenges: Russia, China, Iran,
North Korea, and violent extremism?
General Selva. The State Department and USAID are extremely
important to a whole-of-government approach to national security and
cuts in these organizations will have an impact on the military
dimension.
The Chairman has spoken a great deal about competition short of
traditional armed conflict. In fact, it is a central tenet of the
National Military Strategy. To effectively compete against our
potential adversaries, State and USAID are essential partners.
Investment in preventive diplomacy and development complement military
action in a manner that is greater than the sum of their parts.
______
[The nomination reference of General Paul Selva, USAF
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The biographical sketch of General Paul J. Selva, USAF,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Paul
J. Selva, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:]
The nominee responded and the information is contained in
the Committee's executive files.
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
------
[The nomination of General Paul J. Selva, USAF was reported
to the Senate by Chairman McCain on July 20, 2017, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2017.]
[all]